ALABA, MICHELLE M.
WEEK 11 policy that a public office is a public trust, the
1. ESTRADA V. DESIERTO, G.R. NOS.
146710-15,APRIL RESOLUTION
3, 2001
FACTS: There was an impeachment complaint filed
against President Estrada. The Philippine National
Police and the Armed Forces of the Philippines
withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the
crowd at EDSA Shrine.
Estrada appeared on television for the first time
since the beginning of the protests and maintains
that he will not resign. He said that he wanted the
impeachment trial to continue, stressing that only a
guilty verdict will remove him from office.
At 6:15pm, Estrada again appeared on television,
calling for a snap presidential election to be held
concurrently with congressional and local elections
on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in
this election.
On January 20, 2001, the Supreme Court declared
that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that
Estrada “constructively resigned his post”. Noon of
the same day, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her
oath of office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA,
becoming the 14th president of the Philippines.
At 2:00 pm, Estrada released a letter saying he had
“strong and serious doubts about the legality and
constitutionality of her proclamation as president”,
but saying he would give up his office to avoid being
an obstacle to healing the nation. Estrada and his
family later left Malacañang Palace.
He sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman
from “conducting any further proceedings in cases
filed against him not until his term as president
ends. He also prayed for judgment “confirming
petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President
of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable
to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring
respondent to have taken her oath as and to be
holding the Office of the President, only in an acting
capacity pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution.”
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner may invoke
immunity from suits.
HELD: No. As to the issue of the petitioner’s
contention that he is immune from suits, the Court
held that petitioner is no longer entitled to absolute
immunity from suit. The Court added that, given the
intent of the 1987 Constitution to breathe life to the
petitioner, as a non-sitting President, cannot claim
executive immunity for his alleged criminal acts
committed while a sitting President. From the
deliberations, the intent of the framers is clear that
the immunity of the president from suit is concurrent
only with his tenure and not his term.
2. REPUBLIC V. KENDRICK
DEVELOPMENTCORP.,G.R.NO. 149576, AUGU
FACTS: Respondent constructed a concrete
perimeter fence around some parcels of land
located behind the Civil Aviation Training Center of
the Air Transportation Office (ATO) in 1996. As a
result, the ATO was dispossessed of some 30,228
square meters of prime land. Respondent justified
its action with a claim of ownership over the
property. It presented Transfer Certificate of Titles
which was fake. The Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), filed a complaint for revocation, annulment
and cancellation of certificates of title in behalf of the
Republic of the Philippines in the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City. Respondent filed its answer
which was purportedly signed by Atty. Onofre
Garlitos, Jr. as counsel for respondent.
During the pendency of the case, the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee and Committee on Justice and
Human Rights conducted a hearing in aid of
legislation on the matter of land registration and
titling. In particular, the legislative investigation
looked into the issuance of fake titles and focused
on how respondent was able to acquire it.
During the congressional hearing Atty. Garlitos,
respondent’s former counsel. He testified that he
prepared respondent’s answer and transmitted an
unsigned draft to respondent’s president, Mr. Victor
Ong. The signature appearing above his name was
not his. He authorized no one to sign in his behalf
either. And he did not know who finally signed it.
With Atty. Garlitos’ revelation, the Republic promptly
filed an urgent motion to declare respondent in
default, predicated on its failure to file a valid
answer. The Republic argued that, since the person
who signed the answer was neither authorized by
Atty. Garlitos nor even known to him, the answer
was effectively an unsigned pleading.
The trial court issued a resolution granting the
Republic’s motion. Meanwhile, respondent sought
reconsideration but the trial court denied it.
Aggrieved, respondent elevated the matter to the
Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari seeking

to set aside the RTC resolution. Respondent
contended that the trial court erred in declaring it in
default for failure to file a valid and timely answer
which the CA yield to. The Republic moved for
reconsideration but it was denied. Thus, this
petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Kenrick failed to file a valid
answer on the ground that its pleading was
unsigned by its counsel Atty. Garlitos.
HELD: Yes. Pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 7, a pleading
must be “signed by the party or counsel
representing him.” The law is clear, and the
counsel’s duty and authority to sign a pleading is
personal to him and may not be delegated to just
any person.
The signature of counsel constitutes an assurance
by him that he has read the pleading; that, to the
best of his knowledge, information and belief, there
is a good ground to support it; and that it is not
interposed for delay. Under the Rules of Court, it is
counsel alone, by affixing his signature, who can
certify to these matters.
The preparation and signing of a pleading constitute
legal work involving practice of law which is
reserved exclusively for the members of the legal
profession. Counsel may delegate the signing of a
pleading to another lawyer but cannot do so in favor
of one who is not.
3. PEOPLE V. GAUDIA, G.R. NO. 146111, FEBRUARY hearing 23,
FACTS: On the afternoon of March 24, 1997,
accused appellant, Rolendo Gaudia, raped Remelyn
Loyola (3 1/2 years old), at the grove of ipil- ipil trees not guilty in arraignment While trial was in progress
near the victim’s house. The parents of appellant
offered to pay the amount of P15,000.00, for the
crime that their son committed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the offers of compromise
made by the parents of the accused to witness’
husband may be taken against the accused
HELD: No. Following the Principle of Res Inter Alios
Acta Alteri Nocere Non Debet, the actions of the
acussed parents in offering to compromise cannot
prejudice the accused, since he was not a party to
the said conversation, nor was it shown that he was
privy to the offer of compromise made by them to
the mother of the victim.
Similarly, appellant’s charge that the offers of
compromise allegedly made by the parents of the
appellant to Amalia, and by the appellant himself to
Amalia’s husband should not have been taken
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
against him by the trial court, even if sustained, will
not exculpate him. To be sure, the offer of
compromise allegedly made by appellant to Amalia
Loyola’s husband is hearsay evidence, and of no
probative value. It was only Amalia who testified as
to the alleged offer, and she was not a party to the
conversation which allegedly transpired at the
Hagonoy Municipal Jail. A witness can only testify
on facts which are based on his personal knowledge
or perception.
The offer of compromise allegedly made by the
appellant’s parents to Amalia may have been the
subject of testimony of Amalia. However, following
the principle of res inter alios acta alteri nocere non
debet , the actions of his parents cannot prejudice
the appellant, since he was not a party to the said
conversation, nor was it shown that he was privy to
the offer of compromise made by them to the
mother of the victim. They cannot be considered as
evidence against appellant but we reiterate that
these errors are not enough to reverse the
conviction of the appellant.
4. PEOPLE V. RAQUEL, G.R. NO. 119005, DECEM
FACTS: At midnight, accused knocked on door of
the house of the Spouses Gambalan. Agapita
Gambalan opened the door and heavily armed men
emerged, declared hold-up, and fired their guns at
him. Juliet Gambalan went out of their room after
gunshots
2004 and saw her husbands’ lifeless
body while a man took her husbands gun and left.
Juliet also saw a man fall beside their water pump
while two other men raw away. Accused Sabas
Raquel, Valeriano Raquel and Amado Ponce were
indicted for robbery w/ homicide in RTC. All pleaded
and before he could give a testimony, accused
Amado Ponce escaped from jail. The trial court
found all accused guilty
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in
convicting accused Sabas Raquel and Valeriano
Raquel of crime charged despite absence of
evidence positively implicating them as perpetrators
of crime
HELD: Yes. The prosecution failed to establish
beyond reasonable doubt the real identities of the
perpetrators of, much less participation of herein
appellants, in crime charged.
Identification of the appellants as culprits was based
chiefly on the extrajudicial statement of accused
Amado Ponce pointing to them as his co-
perpetrators

of the crime. Ponce escaped from jail before her
could testify and has been at large since then.
The extrajudicial statements of an accused
implicating a co-accused may not be utilized against
the latter, unless these are repeated in open court.
If the accused never had the opportunity to cross-
examine his co-accused on the latters extrajudicial
statements, it is elementary that the same are
hearsay as against said accused.
A distinction, obviously, should be made between
extrajudicial and judicial confessions. The former
deprives the other accused of the opportunity to
cross-examine the confessant, while in the latter his
confession is thrown wide open for cross-
examination and rebuttal
Res inter alios rule ordains that the rights of a party
cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or
omission of another. An extrajudicial confession is
binding only upon the confessant and is not
admissible against his co-accused. Since it would
not only be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly
unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of
mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought
not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither
ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence
against him.
Although rule has exceptions, such do not apply to
present case.
a. There exists no evidence linking appellants
to the crime.
b. Extrajudicial statement was made in
violation of the constitutional rights of
accused (admitted in testimony of officer)
Without the positive identification of appellants, the
evidence of the prosecution is not sufficient to
overcome the presumption of innocence guaranteed
by the Bill of Rights to them.
5. PEOPLE V. LISING, G.R. NO. 106210- 11, JANUARY 30, 1998, 285 SCRA 595
FACTS: Rodolfo Manalili, a businessman, asked
Felimon Garcia, his townmate, if he knew somebody
who could allegedly affect the arrest of Robert
Herrera, the suspect in the killing of his brother.
Garcia introduced Roberto Lising, Enrico Dizon and
another man to Manalili. During the meeting,
Manalili offered to pay them P50,000 for the job. On
April 23- 24, Lising's group met with Vic Lisboa and
conducted a surveillance on the Castaños
residence.
On April 25, the group saw a man and a woman
who happened to be Cochise Bernabe, 26 years old
and
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
a new graduate of the UP College of Law, and
Beebom Castaños, 22 -years old and a graduating
student of the UP College of Mass Communication,
leave the Castaños residence in a green box type
Lancer car. The group followed the Lancer car with
Lising, Dizon and Manga riding in a black car and
Lisboa and Garcia in a motorcycle. The Lancer car
stopped at Dayrit's Ham and Burger House on
Timog Circle. Alighting from the car, they were
accosted by Dizon and Manga.
On June 21, two security guards told the CAPCOM
that their friends Raul Morales and Jun Medrano,
both employees of Roberto Lising, informed them
that Lising killed a man and a woman in their
warehouse. On June 23, Raul Morales was picked
up and told his story. On June 25, the body of
Cochise was exhumed. The cause of his death was
multiple stab wounds. The next day, Beebom's body
was exhumed from a shallow grave, 2 kilometers
from where Cochise's body was found..
On July 1, 1992, the Court held Manalili, Lising,
Garcia, Manga and Dizon guilty of the crime of
double murder qualified with treachery and
aggravated by premeditation and abuse of public
position by Lising, Manga and Dizon. The Court also
held Lising, Dizon and Manga guilty of the crime of
slight illegal detention aggravated by use of a motor
vehicle. The accused were acquitted of the crime of
kidnapping, since the use of the car was done only
to facilitate the commission of the crime of slight
illegal detention
ISSUE: Whether or not Garcia’s liability is mitigated
by (1) his lack of intent or motive, (2) his acts were
made under the compulsion of an irresistible force,
&
(3) his voluntary surrender, which would make him
merely an accomplice to the crime
HELD: No. To be exempt from criminal liability, a
person invoking irresistible force or uncontrollable
fear must show that the force exerted was such that
it reduced him to a mere instrument who acted not
only without will but against his will. Such
compulsion must be of some character as to leave
the accused no opportunity for self-defense in equal
combat or for escape. Garcia's participation and
presence from the time the abduction was hatched,
up to the killing of the victims is undisputed.
6. REPUBLIC V. BAUTISTA, G.R. NO. 169801, S
FACTS: As pointed out by petitioner Department of
Health (DOH), Rescue Security’s own personnel
officer, Oliver Liangco, testified that in the morning
of 8 April 1996, he went to the DOH premises after
he received at work a phone call from a certain
Lourdes

Macabulos, Planning Officer of DOH-Region 3.
According to Liangco, Macabulos informed him
about the incident, prompting him to proceed to the
DOH premises and make an ocular inspection of the
storeroom. Furthermore, Liangco testified that
Macabulos accompanied him when he inspected
the storeroom and even verbally conveyed to him
that the drugs inside the storeroom were missing.
ISSUE: Does the notice to Liangco sufficiently
comply with the requirement under the Contract of
Security Services?
HELD: Yes. This fact alone is sufficient proof that
Rescue Security had been informed of the loss
through its personnel, Oliver Liangco. Under Rule
130, Section 26 of the Rules on Evidence, the act,
declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant
fact may be given in evidence against him. This rule
is based upon the notion that no man would make
any declaration against himself, unless it is true.
7. PEOPLE V. SABAGALA, G.R. NO. 131040, mereOCTOBER
FACTS: Michael Framio Sabagala raped the private
complainant Annie P. Cosip. The OSG focused on
the offer of marriage made by appellant to the victim issues pending, in connection with proof of other
which it claims is an admission of guilt. Appellant
offered to marry private complainant in his
desperate attempt to free himself from any liability. the above principles, this Court can infer that an
ISSUE: Was the offer of marriage in this case
deemed an admission of guilt?
HELD: Yes. In a number of cases, we have held
that an offer of marriage is considered an admission November 15, 1995, which respondent Judge
of guilt by the accused. If it were true that he did not
commit the crime, there is no reason why appellant
would go to the extent of offering to marry the
woman who supposedly fabricated false charges
against him. This is not in accord with ordinary
human experience. He would have stood his ground
and defended his innocence. In sum, we find no
error in the finding of guilt made by the trial court.
8. GUTIERREZ V. PALATTAO, A.M. NO. RTJ-95-1326,
FACTS: Annabelle R. Gutierrez was convicted by
respondent Judge Rodolfo G. Pallatao of Branch 33,
Regional Trial Court of Manila, for Violation of the
Bouncing Checks Law (Batas Pambansa Blg. 22)
and for Estafa under Article 315 (2)(d) of the
Revised Penal Code. Aggrieved by what she
perceived as a wrongful conviction, she filed this
administrative case against respondent for Serious
Misconduct, Graft and Corruption, Knowingly
Rendering an Unjust Decision, Falsification of
Public Document, and
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
Gross Ignorance of the Law. She averred that, since
the checks that were the bases of the informations
against her were not presented in evidence by the
prosecution, her conviction was erroneous and the
respondent should be held administratively liable
therefor.
Undoubtedly, respondent Judge based the
judgment of conviction, not on the checks
themselves, as these were not proffered in
evidence, but on petitioner's written statement,
dated November 15, 1995, which respondent judge
considered as admission on the part of the
petitioner that, she had indeed, issued the bouncing
checks subject of the informations but that she had
replaced them with new checks.
ISSUE: Whether or not the complainant's letter
which respondent Judge construed as an admission
proves beyond reasonable doubt her culpability
HELD: No. By its very nature, an "admission is the
5, 2001
acknowledgement of a fact or of
circumstances from which guilt may be inferred,
tending to incriminate the speaker, but not sufficient
of itself to establish his guilt." In other words, it is a
"statement by defendant of fact or facts pertinent to
facts or circumstances, to prove guilt, but which is,
of itself, insufficient to authorize conviction." From
admission in criminal cases is insufficient to prove
beyond reasonable doubt the commission of the
crime charged.
By itself, herein complainant's letter dated
construed as an admission that she indeed issued
the checks subject of the Informations filed against
her and that she was replacing them with new ones,
does not prove beyond reasonable doubt her
culpability under B.P. 22 and Article 315 (2)(d) of the
Revised Penal Code. To establish her guilt, it is
indispensable that the checks she issued for which
she was subsequently charged, be offered in
evidence because the gravamen of the offense
chargedJULY
is the8,act
1998
of knowingly issuing a check
with insufficient funds. Clearly, it was error to
convict complainant on the basis of her letter alone.
9. ALONTE V. SAVELLANO JR., G.R. NO.
131652, MARCH 9, 1998
FACTS: Petitioners were charged for rape before
the RTC of Binan, Laguna. A petition for a change
of venue to RTC of Manila was filed by the offended
party. During the pendency of such petition, the
offended party executed an affidavit of desistance.
The court granted the change of venue. Public
respondent Judge Savellano issued warrant of arrest

for both petitioners. Alonte surrendered and
Concepcion posted bail.
They pleaded “not guilty” to the charge. Thereafter,
the prosecution presented Juvie and had attested
the voluntariness of her desistance the same being
due to media pressure and that they would rather
establish new life elsewhere. Case was then
submitted for decision and Savellano sentenced
both accused to reclusion Perpetua. Savellano
commented that Alonte waived his right to due
process when he did not cross examine Juvie when
clarificatory questions were raised about the details
of the rape and on the voluntariness of her
desistance.
ISSUE: Whether petitioners-accused were denied of
due process.
HELD: Yes. There is no showing that Alonte waived
his right. The standard of waiver requires that it “not
only must be voluntary, but must be knowing,
intelligent, and done with sufficient awareness of the
relevant circumstances and likely consequences.”
Mere silence of the holder of the right should not be
so construed as a waiver of right, and the courts
must indulge every reasonable presumption against
waiver. The case is remanded to the lower court for
retrial and the decision earlier promulgated is
nullified.
Jurisprudence acknowledges that due process in
criminal proceedings, in particular, require:
(a) that the court or tribunal trying the case is
properly clothed with judicial power to hear and
determine the matter before it;
(b) that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the
person of the accused;
(c) that the accused is given an opportunity to be
heard; and
(d) that judgment is rendered only upon lawful
hearing.
The above constitutional and jurisprudential
postulates, by now elementary and deeply
imbedded in our own criminal justice system, are
mandatory and indispensable. The principles find
universal acceptance and are tersely expressed in
the oft- quoted statement that procedural due
process cannot possibly be met without a “law
which hears before it condemns, which proceeds
upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial.”
10. GARDINER V. MAGSALIN, G.R. NO. L-
48185, AUGUST 18, 1941
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
FACTS: On October 30,1940, the herein petitioner,
as Acting Provincial Fiscal of Pampanga, filed an
information against the said Catalino Fernandez and
the herein respondents Pedro Yalung, Eugenio
Villegas, Maximo Manlapid, Magno Icban, and
Rufino Maun, charging them with having conspired
together to kill, and that they did kill, one Gaudencio
Vivar, with evident premeditation.
Upon arraignment Catalino Fernandez pleaded
guilty and his five coaccused, not guilty. At the trial
of the latter, the former was called by the fiscal as
his first witness, to testify to the alleged conspiracy.
Upon objection of counsel for the defense, the
respondent judge did not permit the witness
Catalino Fernandez to testify against his coaccused,
on the ground that he being a conspirator, his act or
declaration is not admissible against his
coconspirators until the conspiracy is shown by
evidence other than such act or declaration, under
section 12, rule 123 of the Rules of Court. A written
motion for reconsideration, supported with lengthy
argument, was filed by the fiscal to no avail. Hence
the present petition for mandamus.
The only question raised here is the interpretation of
section 12 of rule 123, which reads as follows:
"Sec. 12. Admission by conspirator. The act or
declaration of a conspirator relating to the
conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in
evidence against the coconspirator after the
conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such
act or declaration."
ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of the friend of
Fernandez is admissible against Fernandez's co-
accused
HELD: No. The said provision is a re-enactment of
paragraph 6, section 298 of the old Code of Civil
Procedure, which provided that after proof of a
conspiracy, the act or declaration of a conspirator
relating to the conspiracy may be given in evidence.
This rule has a well-settled meaning in
jurisprudence, but apparently the respondents
completely missed it. It is one of the exceptions to
the "res inter alios" rule. It refers to an extrajudicial
declaration of a conspirator not to his testimony by
way of direct evidence.
For illustration, let us suppose that after the
formation but before the consummation of the
alleged conspiracy between Catalino Fernandez
and his five coaccused, the former borrowed a bolo
from a friend, stating that he and his coaccused
were going to kill Gaudencio Vivar. Such act and
declaration of Fernandez could not be given in
evidence against his coaccused unless the
conspiracy be proven first. The

testimony of Fernandez's friend to the effect that
Fernandez borrowed his bolo and told him that he
(Fernandez) and his coaccused were going to kill
Gaudencio Vivar would be admissible against
Fernandez, but not against his coaccused unless
the conspiracy between them be proven first. It is
admissible against Fernandez because the act,
declaration, or omission of a party as to a relevant
fact may be given in evidence against him (section
7, rule 123). But, without proof of conspiracy, it is
not admissible against Fernandez's co-accused
because the act and declaration of Fernandez are
res inter olios as to his coaccused and, therefore,
cannot affect them. But if there is conspiracy, each
conspirator is privy to the acts of the others; the act
of one conspirator is the act of all the
coconspirators.
11. PEOPLEV.CUI,G.R.NO.121982,
SEPTEMBER 10, 1999
FACTS: Merlita A. Jasa charged Manuel Cui, Jr. of
the crime of rape, under Art. 335, Par. 1 of the
Revised Penal Code. The testimony of the
complainant is said to be corroborated by Patrolman
Manampan, the Desk Officer who investigated the
case. He told the court that the accused admitted to
him that he used force in having sexual intercourse
with the complainant. But the prosecution cannot
avail of such entry in the police record. The alleged
statement of the accused given during police
investigation does not help the prosecution any in
view of the rule that a statement taken from the
accused without first informing him of his rights
under the Constitution, and without the assistance
of counsel, is inadmissible. According to Patrolman
Manampan himself, the only persons present when
the accused was investigated were Patrolman
Manampan, the complainant, Patrolman de Guzman
and Atty. Jasa, the brother of the complainant. So
the accused was without any assistance from
counsel at the time he made in writing the alleged
extrajudicial confession; neither was there any
evidence adduced to prove that the accused waived
his right to be assisted by counsel.
ISSUE: Whether or not the extrajudicial confession
of the accused is admissible
HELD: No. As repeatedly enunciated by the Court,
the weakness of the defense will not be allowed to
strengthen the evidence for the prosecution, and
that the prosecution must rely on the strength of its
own evidence and not on the weakness of that of
the defense.
The accused is presumed innocent until proved
otherwise, and it is only by proof beyond reasonable
doubt, which requires moral certainty, that this
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
presumption of innocence can be overcome.
Therefore, it is the duty of the prosecution to prove
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
In the case at bar, the prosecution fell short of this
duty. Hence, the constitutional presumption of
innocence calls for a reversal of the judgment of the
trial court.
12. PEOPLE V. FLORES, G.R. NO. 71980,
MARCH 18, 1991
FACTS: The victim, a registered nurse, did not have
the slightest idea that she would fall into the abyss
of death on that fateful night of September 21, 1984.
She was mercilessly raped and killed by four men.
The morning after, her naked body with a branch of
ipil-ipil inserted into her private part, was found lying
prostrate with several hack and stab wounds. She
was identified as Mercedes M. Dulay.
Appellants' principal objection to the judgment of
conviction is that it is based primarily on the
confession of their co-defendant, Flores, who was
the prosecution's sole eyewitness to the crimes.
ISSUE: Whether or not the extrajudicial confession
of Flores is admissible
HELD: No. The general rule that the confession of
an accused may be given in evidence against him
but that it is not competent evidence against his co-
accused, admits of exceptions. Thus, this Court has
held that where several accused are tried together
for the same complaint, the testimony lawfully given
by one during the trial implicating the others is
competent evidence against the latter. The
extrajudicial admission or confession of a co-
conspirator out of court is different from the
testimony given by a co-accused during trial. The
first is admissible against the declarant alone, but
the second is perfectly admissible against his co-
accused' who had the right and opportunity to cross-
examine the declarant.
In this case, the extrajudicial confession of Flores is
inadmissible because he was not assisted by
counsel. Moreover, his extrajudicial confession may
not even be accorded probative value in view of his
admission of the crime in open court. That being the
case, only his judicial confession should be weighed
and considered.
13. VILLANUEVA V. BALAGUER, G.R. NO.
180197, JUNE 23, 2009
FACTS: Petitioner Villanueva argues that by not
responding to the above letter which expressly
urged them to reply if the statements therein
contained are untrue, respondents in effect admitted
the matters stated therein, pursuant to the rule on
admission by

silence in Sec. 32, Rule 130,30 and the disputable
presumption that acquiescence resulted from a
belief that the thing acquiesced in was conformable
to the law or fact.
ISSUE: Does the failure of the addressee to
respond to a letter containing statements attributing
to him commission of acts constituting actionable
wrong, hence, adverse to his interest, and of such
nature as would call for his reaction, reply, or
comment if untrue, constitute his admission of said
statements, consequently, may be used in evidence
against him?
HELD: No. Petitioner’s argument lacks merit. One
cannot prove his claim by placing the burden of
proof on the other party. Indeed, "(a) man cannot
make evidence for himself by writing a letter
containing the statements that he wishes to prove.
He does not make the letter evidence by sending it
to the party against whom he wishes to prove the
facts [stated therein]. He no more can impose a duty
to answer a charge than he can impose a duty to
pay by sending goods. Therefore a failure to answer
such adverse assertions in the absence of further
circumstances making an answer requisite or
natural has no effect as an admission."
Moreover, the rule on admission by silence applies
to adverse statements in writing if the party was
carrying on a mutual correspondence with the
declarant. However, if there was no such mutual
correspondence, the rule is relaxed on the theory
that while the party would have immediately reacted
by a denial if the statements were orally made in his
presence, such prompt response can generally not
be expected if the party still has to resort to a written
reply.
In the same manner, we also cannot assume an
admission by silence on the part of Balaguer by
virtue of his failure to protest or disclaim the
attribution to him by the newspapers that he is the
source of the articles. As explained above, the rule
on admission by silence is relaxed when the
statement is not made orally in one’s presence or
when one still has to resort to a written reply, or
when there is no mutual correspondence between
the parties.
As for the publications themselves, newspaper
articles purporting to state what the defendant said
are inadmissible against him, since he cannot be
held responsible for the writings of third persons. As
correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, "while
the subject news items indicated that Balaguer was
the source of the columnists, proving that he truly
made such statements is another matter." Petitioner
failed to prove that Balaguer did make such
statements.
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
Notably, petitioner did not implead the editorial staff
and the publisher of the alleged defamatory
articles. Contrary to petitioner’s assertion, he should
have at least presented the authors of the news
articles as witnesses to prove his case against
respondents in the absence of an express
admission by the latter that the subject news articles
have been caused by them.
Petitioner also claims that respondents have
admitted that they held a press conference and
caused the publication of the news articles, based
on the testimony of Balaguer.
Admissions, however, should be clear and
unambiguous which can hardly be said of
Balaguer’s above testimony. If Balaguer intended to
admit the allegation that he conducted a press
conference and caused the publication of the news
articles, he could have done so. Instead, Balaguer
specifically denied these allegations in paragraphs 4
and 5 of his Answer.
14. PEOPLEV.ABO,G.R.NO.107235,
MARCH 2, 1994
FACTS: Adelia Velasco de Chavez accuses
Ladislao Abo (prisoner) of the crime of rape. Abo
would like to discredit her testimony.
ISSUE: May the testimony of Adelia be discredited?
HELD: No. There is nothing in the second assigned
error which would discredit the testimony of the
victim. We find no substantial inaccuracy in her
testimony describing the accused as having a scar
on his face and agree with the trial court that the
inaccuracy is on a minor point. It must be stressed
that the victim did not personally know the accused.
Nevertheless, as stated above, there was
spontaneity in her recognition of the accused as her
rapist. She did not, as well, hesitate to point to him
as the rapist at the police station. The accused
admitted this fact when he testified in court. But he
did not testify that he protested the accusation or
that he immediately told the policeman present that
the accusation was false. That accusation, if untrue,
naturally called for a denial. Then too, he further
testified on direct examination that he was
confronted by the victim's husband, Raymundo de
Chavez, at the police station:
15. PEOPLE V. ALEGRE, G.R. NO. L-30423,
NOVEMBER 7, 1979
FACTS: Ramiro Alegre and Jesus Medalla contend
that the lower court erred in utilizing the extrajudicial
confessions of Melecio Cudillan (now deceased) as
evidence against herein appellants; in concluding

from the alleged "Silence" of appellants when
allegedly pointed to by Melecio Cudillan as "his
companions" in the commission of the crime, an
admission of guilt; and in giving undue weight and
credence to the testimony of an inmate of the Pasay
City Jail that appellants admitted to him their
participation in the crime.
ISSUE: Whether or not the extrajudicial confession
of Cudillan may be used as evidence against the
two accused
HELD: No. The extrajudicial confessions of Melecio
Cudillan (Exhibits "A", "A- I " to "A-6" and "F", "F-1"
and "F-2"), on the basis of which the trial court was
able to reconstruct how Melecio Cudillan committed
the crime in question, cannot be used as evidence
and are not competent proof against appellants
Ramiro Alegre and Jesus Medalla, under the
principle of "res inter alios acta alteri nocere non
debet" there being no independent evidence of
conspiracy. As a general rule, the extrajudicial
declaration of an accused, although deliberately
made, is not admissible and does not have
probative value against his co- accused. It is merely
hearsay evidence as far as the other accused are
concerned. While there are recognized exceptions
to this rule, the facts and circumstances attendant in
the case at bar do not bring it within the purview of
such exceptions. The only evidence, therefore,
linking the appellants to the crime would be their
purported tacit admissions and/or failure to deny
their implications of the crime made by Melecio
Cudillan, and/or their purported verbal confessions
to Hernando Carillo, an inmate of the Pasay City jail.
16. PEOPLE V. PARAGSA, G.R. NO. L-44060,
JULY 20, 1978
FACTS: Paragsa admits having sexual intercourse
with Mirasol, the complaining witness, but he stoutly
denied that he did so by employing force or
intimidation against Mirasol. He claims he and
Mirasol were sweethearts; that on the day of the
incident, it was Mirasol who invited him to the latter's
house where they had sexual intercourse after
kissing each other; and that the intercourse they
had that afternoon was, as a matter of fact, their
third sexual intercourse.
Mirasol did not bother at all to rebut the testimony of
Paragsa and his witnesses to the effect that the
accused and Mirasol were actually sweethearts; and
that they had had two previous sexual
communications before July 13, 1971, one of which
happened on June 29, 1971 in the house of the
accused, where Mirasol and the accused slept
together in the evening of the same day after the
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
mother of the accused and Mirasol had returned
from the town fiesta of Bantayan, Cebu.
ISSUE: Whether or not the silence of Mirasol may
be construed as an admission of the truth of such
assertion
HELD: Yes. The rule allowing silence of a person to
be taken as an implied admission of the truth of the
statements uttered in his presence is applicable in
criminal cases. But before the silence of a party can
be taken as an admission of what is said, it must
appear: (1) that he heard and understood the
statement; (2) that he was at liberty to interpose a
denial; (3) that the statement was in respect to some
matter affecting his rights or in which he was then
interested, and calling, naturally, for an answer; (4)
that the facts were within his knowledge; and (5)
that the fact admitted or the inference to be drawn
from his silence would be material to the. These
requisites of admission by silence all obtain in the
present case. Hence, the silence of Mirasol on the
facts asserted by the accused and his witnesses
may be safely construed as an admission of the
truth of such assertion.
17. PEOPLE V. LORENZO, G.R. NO. 110107,
JANUARY 26, 1995
FACTS: For having allegedly killed her husband on
30 July 1990, accused-appellant Dolores Lorenzo, a
policewoman, was charged with the crime of
parricide in an information filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Tuguegarao, Cagayan, on 30
March 1992. The information was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 2060-92-TUG and raffled to
Branch 5. The accusatory portion thereof reads as
follows:
That on or about July 30, 1990, in the Municipality of
Tuguegarao, Province of Cagayan, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, PO1 Dolores C. Lorenzo, armed with a
bolo and a fan knife, with intent to kill, with evident
premeditation and with treachery did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault,
stab, hack and chop one, Agapito Lorenzo, her own
husband, inflicting upon him several injuries on the
different parts of his body which caused his death.
ISSUE: Whether or not the statement by the
accused was an admission or a confession
HELD: It was an admission. We do not, however,
agree with the trial court's characterization of the
appellant's declaration that she killed her husband
as an extrajudicial confession. It is only an
admission. It is clear from Sections 26 and 33, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court that there is a
distinction between

an admission and a confession. These sections
reads as follows:
Sec. 26. Admission of a party. — The act,
declaration or admission of a party as to a relevant
fact may be given in evidence against him.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 33. Confession. — The declaration of an
accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense
charged, or of any offense necessarily included
therein, may be given in evidence against him.
In a confession. there is an acknowledgment of
guilt. Admission is usually applied in criminal cases
to statements of fact by the accused which do not
directly involve an acknowledgment of guilt of the
accused or of the criminal intent to commit the
offense with which he is charged.
18. PEOPLE V. RAPEZA, G.R. NO. 169431,
APRIL 4, 2007
FACTS: Appellant Jerry Rapeza was charged of
murder for killing the spouses Cesar Ganzon and
Priscilla Libas. Appellee contends that upon the
supplied information that the appellant wanted to
confess, SPO2 Ciriaco Gapas invited the former for
questioning and thus was brought to the police
station without informing his rights. The Solicitor
General further contends that the appellant was not
informed of his constitutional right at the time of his
alleged detention for the custodial investigation
began only when the investigators started to elicit
information from him which took place at the time he
was brought to the house of Atty. Reyes. Moreover,
appellant did not interpose any objection to having
Atty. Reyes as his counsel.
However, the appellant testified that he claims that
he affixed his thumb mark through violence and
intimidation. He stresses that he was not informed
of his rights during the time of his detention when he
was already considered a suspect as the police had
already received information of his alleged
involvement in the crimes. Neither did a competent
and independent counsel assist him from the time
he was detained until trial began. Appellant likewise
maintains that although the Sinumpaang Salaysay
states that his rights were read to him, there was no
showing that his rights were explained to him in a
way that an uneducated person like him could
understand.
The RTC found him guilty of both crimes. The Court
of Appeals upheld the trial court.
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
ISSUE: Whether appellant’s extrajudicial confession
is admissible in evidence to warrant the verdict of
guilt.
HELD: No. The constitutional requirement obviously
had not been observed. Settled is the rule that the
moment a police officer tries to elicit admissions or
confessions or even plain information from a
suspect, the latter should, at that juncture, be
assisted by counsel, unless he waives this right in
writing and in the presence of counsel. Appellant did
not make any such waiver.
x x x The competent or independent lawyer so
engaged should be present from the beginning to
end, i.e., at all stages of the interview, counseling or
advising caution reasonably at every turn of the
investigation, and stopping the interrogation once in
a while either to give advice to the accused that he
may either continue, choose to remain silent or
terminate the interview.
The standards of "competent counsel" were not met
in this case given the deficiencies of the evidence
for the prosecution. Although Atty. Reyes signed the
confession as appellant’s counsel and he himself
notarized the statement, there is no evidence on
how he assisted appellant. The confession itself and
the testimonies of SPO2 Gapas and SPO2 Cuizon
bear no indication that Atty. Reyes had explained to
appellant his constitutional rights.
Furthermore, Atty. Reyes was not appellant’s
counsel of choice but was picked out by the police
officers allegedly through the barangay officials.
Appellant’s failure to interpose any objection to
having Atty. Reyes as his counsel cannot be taken
as consent under the prevailing circumstances. As
discussed earlier, appellant was not properly
informed of his rights, including the right to a
counsel preferably of his own choice.
It was made to appear in the alleged confession that
appellant was informed of his right to a counsel of
his own choice and that if he cannot afford the
services of one, the police shall provide him with
one, it was overlooked that it was not similarly made
to appear in the same statement that appellant was
advised that he had the option to reject the counsel
provided for him by the police authorities.
19. LADIANA V. PEOPLE, G.R. NO. 144293,
DECEMBER 4, 2002
FACTS: Prior to the conduct of the examination-in-
chief on Cortez, the defense counsel made an
admission as to the authorship, authenticity, and
voluntariness of the execution of the counter-
affidavit of accused Ladiana, which was
subscribed and

sworn to before Cortez. In said counter-affidavit,
accused Ladiana allegedly admitted to making the
fatal shots on Francisco. However, accused Ladiana
allegedly did so in self-defense as Francisco was
then purportedly attacking accused Ladiana and
had, in fact, already inflicted a stab wound on the
arm of accused Ladiana.
ISSUE: Whether or not the statement by the
accused was an admission or a confession
HELD: It was an admission. We do not, however,
agree with the Sandiganbayan’s characterization of
petitioner’s Counter-Affidavit as an extrajudicial
confession. It is only an admission. Sections 26 and
33 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence
distinguish one from the other as follows:
"SEC. 26. Admissions of a party. – The act,
declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant
fact may be given in evidence against him.
"SEC. 33. Confession. – The declaration of an
accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense
charged, or of any offense necessarily included
therein, may be given in evidence against him."
In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of
guilt; in an admission, there is merely a statement of
fact not directly involving an acknowledgment of
guilt or of the criminal intent to commit the offense
with which one is charged. 26 Thus, in the case at
bar, a statement by the accused admitting the
commission of the act charged against him but
denying that it was done with criminal intent is an
admission, not a confession. The Counter-Affidavit
in question contains an admission that petitioner
actually shot the victim when the latter was
attacking him.
20. BOSTONBANKOFTHEPHILS.V.
MANALO, G.R. NO. 158149, FEBRUARY 9, 2006
FACTS: Xavierville Estate, Inc. (XEI) sold to The
Overseas Bank of Manila (OBM) some residential
lots in Xavierville subdivision. Nevertheless, XEI
continued selling the residential lots in the
subdivision as agent of OBM.
Carlos Manalo, Jr. proposed to XEI, through its
President Emerito Ramos, to purchase two lots in
the Xavierville subdivision and offered as part of the
downpayment the P34,887.66 Ramos owed him.
XEI, through Ramos, agreed. Ramos confirmed the
reservation of the lots. The spouses constructed a
house on the property.The spouses were notified of
XEI’s resumption of selling operations. However,
they did not pay the balance of the downpayment
because XEI failed to prepare a contract of
conditional sale and transmit the same to them. XEI
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
also billed them for unpaid interests which they also
refused to pay.
XEI turned over its selling operations to OBM.
Subsequently, Commercial Bank of Manila (CBM)
acquired the Xavierville Estate from OBM. CBM
requested Perla Manalo to stop any on-going
construction on the property since it (CBM) was the
owner of the lot and she had no permission for such
construction. Perla informed them that her husband
had a contract with OBM, through XEI, to purchase
the property. She promised to send CBM the
documents. However, she failed to do so. Thus,
CBM filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against
the spouses. But later on, CBM moved to withdraw
its complaint because of the issues raised. In the
meantime, CBM was renamed the Boston Bank of
the Philippines.
Then, the spouses filed a complaint for specific
performance and damages against the bank before
the RTC. The spouses alleged that they had always
been ready and willing to pay the installments on the
lots sold to them but no contract was forthcoming.
The spouses further alleged that upon their partial
payment of the downpayment, they were entitled to
the execution and delivery of a Deed of Absolute
Sale covering the subject lots. During the trial, the
spouses adduced in evidence the separate
Contracts of Conditional Sale executed between
XEI and 3 other buyers to prove that XEI continued
selling residential lots in the subdivision as agent of
OBM after the latter had acquired the said lots.
The trial court ordered the petitioner to execute a
Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the spouses upon
the payment of the spouses of the balance of the
purchase price. It ruled that under the August 22,
1972 letter agreement of XEI and the spouses, the
parties had a "complete contract to sell" over the
lots, and that they had already partially
consummated the same. The Court of Appeals
sustained the ruling of the RTC, but declared that
the balance of the purchase price of the property
was payable in fixed amounts on a monthly basis for
120 months, based on the deeds of conditional sale
executed by XEI in favor of other lot buyers. Boston
Bank filed a Motion for the Reconsideration of the
decision. CA denied the MR.
ISSUE: Whether or not the terms of the 3 deeds of
conditional sale executed by XEI in favor of the
other lot buyers in the subdivision, which contained
uniform terms of 120 equal monthly installments,
constitute evidence that XEI also agreed to give the
Manalo spouses the same mode and timeline of
payment
HELD: No. The bare fact that other lot buyers were
allowed to pay the balance of the purchase price of

lots purchased by them in 120 or 180 monthly
installments does not constitute evidence that XEI
also agreed to give the respondents the same mode
and timeline of payment.
Under Section 34, Rule 130 of the Rvised Rules of
Court, evidence that one did a certain thing at one
time is not admissible to prove that he did the same
or similar thing at another time, although such
evidence may be received to prove habit, usage,
pattern of conduct or the intent of the parties.
Habit, custom, usage or pattern of conduct must be
proved like any other facts. The offering party must
establish the degree of specificity and frequency of
uniform response that ensures more than a mere
tendency to act in a given manner but rather,
conduct that is semi-automatic in nature. The
offering party must allege and prove specific,
repetitive conduct that might constitute evidence of
habit. The examples offered in evidence to prove
habit, or pattern of evidence must be numerous
enough to base on inference of systematic conduct.
Mere similarity of contracts does not present the
kind of sufficiently similar circumstances to outweigh
the danger of prejudice and confusion. In
determining whether the examples are numerous
enough, and sufficiently regular, the key criteria are
adequacy of sampling and uniformity of response. It
is only when examples offered to establish pattern
of conduct or habit are numerous enough to lose an
inference of systematic conduct that examples are
admissible.
Respondents failed to allege and prove that, as a
matter of business usage, habit or pattern of
conduct, XEI granted all lot buyers the right to pay
the balance of the purchase price in installments of
120 months of fixed amounts with pre-computed
interests, and that XEI and the respondents had
intended to adopt such terms of payment relative to
the sale of the two lots in question. Indeed,
respondents adduced in evidence the three
contracts of conditional sale executed by XEI and
other lot buyers merely to prove that XEI continued
to sell lots in the subdivision as sales agent of OBM
after it acquired said lots, not to prove usage, habit
or pattern of conduct on the part of XEI to require all
lot buyers in the subdivision to pay the balance of
the purchase price of said lots in 120 months.
21. PEOPLE V. SANTOS, G.R. NO. 100225-26,
MAY 11, 1993
FACTS: Santos in effect questions the trial court for
admitting a sworn statement by one Ronaldo
Guerrero (Exhibit "EE"), a witnesses in another
criminal case (Criminal Case No. 8117) where
appellant Santos was also charged with the murder
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
of one Daniel Nuguera which had taken place in the
very same site where Bautista and Cupcupin were
ambushed, i.e., at the corner of Yangco Street and
Estrella Street, Malabon, Metro Manila. When the
prosecution first presented the sworn statement of
Guerrero in order to show criminal propensity on the
part of appellant Santos, the defense objected to
admission of such sworn statement; the trial court
sustained the objection and rejected the evidence
for the purpose it was initially offered. However, the
trial court admitted the same as falling within one or
more of the exceptions set out in Section 34, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
Sec. 34. Similar Acts as Evidence. —
Evidence that one did or did not do a certain
thing at one time is not admissible to prove
that he did or did not do the same or a
similar thing at another time; but it may be
received to prove a specific intent or
knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme,
habit, custom or usage and the like.
Santos now complains that the affidavit of Ronaldo
Guerrero was hearsay evidence, considering that
the prosecution did not present Ronaldo Guerrero
as a witness during the trial.
ISSUE: Did the trial court err in admitting the
affidavit of Guerrero?
HELD: No. We consider that the trial court did not
commit reversible error in admitting the Guerrero
affidavit for the limited purpose for proving
knowledge or plan or scheme, and more specifically,
that appellant knew that the particular corner of two
(2) particular streets in Manila was a good place to
ambush a vehicle and its passengers. Appellant
also had waived the hearsay character of this
evidence by failure seasonably to object to the
admission of the affidavit; it is too late in that day to
raise the hearsay rule in the appellant's
memorandum after prosecution and defense had
presented their respective cases and had made
their respective offers of evidence. Finally, and in
any case, as pointed out by the Solicitor General,
the exclusion of the Guerrero affidavit would not
result in any change in the result reached by the trial
court. For that result is essentially and adequately
based upon the positive identification of appellant
Santos as one of the gunmen by Bautista and
Bohol.
22. PEOPLE V. DADLES, G.R. NOS. 118620-
21, SEPTEMBER 1, 1997
FACTS: As regards the victims Salvador and
Antonio Alipan, the appellant points out that the
testimony of Luzviminda who witnessed the alleged
kidnapping demonstrate that the victims were not
 ALABA, MICHELLE M.
deprived of
 ALABA, MICHELLE M.

their liberty because they went with the appellant

and his companions peacefully without being
subjected to threats and coercion.

ISSUE: Whether or nor the contention of Dadles is

correct
HELD: No. The court is not convinced. That the
victims' hands were not tied nor guns poked at their
sides when they were taken by the appellant's do
not conclusively preclude the deprivation of their
liberty. The circumstances surrounding the taking of
Salvador and Antonio, particularly the appellant and
his companions' previous conduct in kidnapping
victims Alipio and Dionisio, plainly demonstrate their
intent to likewise deprive Salvador and Antonio of
their liberty.

True it is that "evidence that one did or did not do a

certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove
that he did or did not do the same or similar thing at
another time." However, "it may be received to
prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan,
system, scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the
like."

WEEK 12
1. REPUBLIC vs. HEIRS OF FELIPE ALEJAGA
SR.G. R. No. 146030 - December 3, 2002
FACTS: Felipe Alejaga, Sr filed a Free Patent
Application covering a parcel of land at Dumolog,
Roxas City. Before such application, it appears that
on December 27, 1978, Efren L. Recio, Land
Inspector, submitted a report of his investigation and
verification of the land to the District Land Office,
Bureau of Lands, City of Roxas. The District Land
Officer of Roxas City approved the application and
the issuance of Free Patent to the applicant. On
March 16, 1979, the patent was also ordered to be
issued and the patent was forwarded to defendant
Register of Deeds, City of Roxas, for registration
and issuance of the corresponding Certificate of
Title. Thereafter, Original Certificate of Title was
issued to Alejaga Sr by the Register of Deeds.
The heirs of Ignacio Arrobang requested the
Director of Lands for an investigation for
irregularities in the issuance of the title of a
foreshore land in favor of Respondent. Isagani
Cartagena, Supervising Special Investigator, Legal
Division, Land Management Bureau (formerly
Bureau of Lands) submitted his Report dated April
17, 1989. The Chief, Legal Division, Land
Management Bureau, Manila, recommended to the
Director of Lands appropriate civil proceeding for
the cancellation of Free Patent and the
corresponding Original Certificate in the name of
respondent.
The government through the Solicitor General
instituted an action for Annulment/Cancellation of
Patent and Title and Reversion against
respondents. RTC rendered decision declaring Free
Patent Application and issuance of Original
Certificate of Title in the name of Felipe Alejaga is
by means of fraud hence, null and void ab initio.
Court of Appeals, reversed RTC ruling stating that,
petitioner failed to prove its allegation that
respondents had obtained the free patent and the
Certificate of Title through fraud and
misrepresentation. The CA brushed aside as
hearsay Isagani Cartagenas testimony that Land
Inspector Efren L. Recio had not conducted an
investigation on the free patent application of Felipe
Alejaga Sr. The CA added that petitioner had failed
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
to support its claim that the lot covered by
respondents free patent and title was foreshore
land.
ISSUE: Is the report made by Cartagena be
considered as only hearsay and thus cannot be
admitted?
HELD: No. The report had not been successfully
rebutted. In that report, Recio supposedly admitted
that he had not actually conducted an investigation
and ocular inspection of the parcel of land.
Cartagenas statement on Recios alleged admission
may be considered as "independently relevant." A
witness may testify as to the state of mind of
another person -- the latters knowledge, belief, or
good or bad faith -- and the formers statements may
then be regarded as independently relevant without
violating the hearsay rule.
Thus, because Cartagena took the witness stand
and opened himself to cross-examination, the
Investigation Report he had submitted to the director
of the Bureau of Lands constitutes part of his
testimony. Those portions of the report that
consisted of his personal knowledge, perceptions
and conclusions are not hearsay. On the other
hand, the part referring to the statement made by
Recio may be considered as independently relevant.
The doctrine on independently relevant statements
holds that conversations communicated to a witness
by a third person may be admitted as proof that,
regardless of their truth or falsity, they were actually
made. Evidence as to the making of such
statements is not secondary but primary, for in itself
it (a) constitutes a fact in issue or (b) is
circumstantially relevant to the existence of such
fact.
Since Cartagenas testimony was based on the
report of the investigation he had conducted, his
testimony was not hearsay and was, hence,
properly admitted by the trial court. Based on the
foregoing badges of fraud, it is sustained that
petitioners contention that the free patent granted to
Felipe Alejaga Sr. is void. Such fraud is a ground for
impugning the validity of the Certificate of Title. The
invalidity of the patent is sufficient basis for nullifying
the Certificate of Title issued in consequence
thereof, since the latter is merely evidence of the
former.Verily, the court upheld petitioners claim that
the issuance of the Alejagas patent and title was
tainted with fraud

2. SPOUSES QUIRINO DELA CRUZ and
GLORIA DELA CRUZ vs. PLANTERS
PRODUCTS, INC (PPI) G.R. No. 158649
FACTS: Spouses Dela Cruz operated the Barangay
Agricultural Supplyin Aliaga, Nueva Ecija engaged
in the distribution and sale of fertilizers and
agricultural chemical products, among others. At the
time material to the case, Quirino, a lawyer, was the
Municipal Mayor of Aliaga, Nueva Ecija.
Gloria applied for and was granted by respondent
PPI a regular credit line of ₱200,000.00 for a 60-
day term, with trust receipts as collaterals. Gloria
executed three more documents on September 14,
1978. The 60-day credit term lapsed without Gloria
paying her obligation under the Trust Receipt/SCS.
Hence, PPI wrote collection letters to her. As of July
9, 1985, the statement of account (Exhibit V)
showed a grand total liability of ₱240,355.10.
The trial court ordered petitioners "to pay the plaintiff
the amount of ₱240,335.10 plus 16% interest until
fully paid, attorney’s fees and cost of litigation. CA
affirmed.
ISSUE Whether the decision of the RTC
notwithstanding that the award to PPI of the amount
of ₱240,335.10 plus 16% interest per annum was
based on hearsay evidence
HELD: No. With Exhibit V (statement of account)
being a private document, authentication pursuant
to the rules on evidence was a condition for its
admissibility. Llanera, admittedly the person who
had prepared the document, was competent to
testify on the due execution and authenticity of
Exhibit V. Such authentication was done in
accordance with Rule 132 of the Rules of Court,
whose Section 20 states:
Section 20. Proof of private document. – Before
any private document offered as authentic is
received in evidence, its due execution and
authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed
or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the
signature or handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be
identified as that which it is claimed to be.
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
Nor have the petitioners proved that the entries
contained in Exhibit V were incorrect and
untruthful. They cannot be permitted to do so
now at this stage of final appeal, especially after
the lower courts found and accepted the
statement of account contained therein to be
properly authenticated and trustworthy. Indeed,
the Court is in no position to review and overturn
the lower courts’ unanimous finding and
acceptance without strong and valid reasons
because they involved an issue of fact.
3. PHILIPPINE FREE PRESS, INC. v. COURT OF
FACTS: Petitioner is a domestic corporation
APPEALS and LIWAYWAY PUBLISHING, INC.,
engaged in the publication of Philippine Free Press
[G.R. NO. 132864. October 24, 2005]
Magazine, one of the . . . widely circulated political
magazines in the Philippines sought the annulment
of the sale to private respondent because they
alleged that there was a vitiated consent by force
and intimidation by Gen. Menzi who was negotiating
the sale for and on behalf of the then President
Marcos.
Sometime during the middle of 1973, Locsin, Sr.
was contacted by Brig. Gen. Hans Menzi, the former
aide- de-camp of then President Marcos concerning
the sale of the [petitioner]. Locsin, Sr. requested that
the meeting be held inside the [petitioner] Building
and this was arranged by Menzi (TSN, 27 May
1993, pp. 69-70). During the said meeting, Menzi
once more reiterated Marcos's offer to purchase
both the name and the assets of [petitioner] adding
that "Marcos cannot be denied" (TSN, 27 May 1993,
p. 71). Locsin, Sr. refused but Menzi insisted that he
had no choice but to sell. Locsin, Sr. then made a
counteroffer that he will sell the land, the building
and all the machineries and equipment therein but
he will be allowed to keep the name of the
[petitioner].On February 26, 1987, [petitioner] filed a
complaint for Annulment of Sale against
[respondent] Liwayway and the PCGG before the
Regional Trail Court of Makati, Branch 146 on the
grounds of vitiated consent and gross inadequacy of
purchase price. On motion of defendant PCGG, the
complaint against it was dismissed on October 22,
1987. (Words in bracket and underscoring added)
ISSUE: is the CA correct in considering the
testimonial evidence as hearsay which clearly
established threats made upon petitioner ?

HELD: Yes. The evidence referred to as hearsay
pertains mainly to the testimonies of Messrs. Locsin,
Sr. and Teodoro Locsin, Jr. (the Locsins,
collectively), which, in gist, established the following
facts: 1) the widely circulated Free Press magazine,
which, prior to the declaration of Martial Law, took
the strongest critical stand against the Marcos
administration, was closed down on the eve of such
declaration, which closure eventually drove
petitioner to financial ruin; 2) upon Marcos' orders,
Mr. Locsin, Sr. was arrested and detained for over 2
months without charges and, together with his
family, was threatened with execution; 3) Mr.
Locsin, Sr. was provisionally released on the
condition that he refrains from reopening Free Press
and writing anything critical of the Marcos
administration; and 4) Mr. Locsin, Sr. and his family
remained fearful of reprisals from Marcos until the
1986 EDSA Revolution.
Jurisprudence instructs that evidence of statement
made or a testimony is hearsay if offered against a
party who has no opportunity to cross-examine the
witness. Hearsay evidence is excluded precisely
because the party against whom it is presented is
deprived of or is bereft of opportunity to cross-
examine the persons to whom the statements or
writings are attributed.15 And there can be no
quibbling that because death has supervened, the
late Gen Menzi, like the other purported Marcos
subalterns, Messrs. Baizas and De Vega, cannot
cross-examine the Locsins for the threatening
statements allegedly made by them for the late
President.
Like the Court of Appeals, we are not unmindful of
the exception to the hearsay rule provided in
Section 38, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which
reads:
SEC. 38. Declaration against interest. - The
declaration made by a person deceased or unable
to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the
fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it
was made so far contrary to the declarant's own
interest, that a reasonable man in his position would
not have made the declaration unless he believed it
to be true, may be received in evidence against
himself or his successors-in-interest and against
third persons.
Even if petitioner succeeds in halving its testimonial
evidence, one-half purporting to quote the words of
a live witness and the other half purporting to quote
what the live witness heard from one already dead,
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
the other pertaining to the dead shall nevertheless
remain hearsay in character.
The all too familiar rule is that "a witness can testify
only to those facts which he knows of his own
knowledge".20 There can be no quibbling that
petitioner's witnesses cannot testify respecting what
President Marcos said to Gen. Menzi about the
acquisition of petitioner's newspaper, if any there
be, precisely because none of said witnesses ever
had an opportunity to hear what the two talked
about.
Neither may petitioner circumvent
the hearsay rule by invoking the exception under the
declaration-against-interest rule. In context, the only
declaration supposedly made by Gen. Menzi which
can conceivably be labeled as adverse to his
interest could be that he was acting in behalf of
Marcos in offering to acquire the physical assets of
petitioner. Far from making a statement contrary to
his own interest, a declaration conveying the notion
that the declarant possessed the authority to speak
and to act for the President of the Republic can
hardly be considered as a declaration against
interest.
4. SALVADOR COMILANG vs. FRANCISCO
FACTS: Francisco and Mariano Burcena together
BURCENA and MARIANO BURCENA G.R. No.
with their mother, Dominga Reclusado Vda. de
146853 February 13, 2006
Burcena, filed a complaint for annulment of
document with damages against Salvador
Comilang.
They alleged that they are the owners of the subject
property in question, that they acquired it through
their earnings while working abroad and that it was
declared for taxation purposes in Dominga’s name
only as administrator thereof and Comilang caused
the execution of a Deed of Donation over said
property by taking advantage of Dominga’s
blindness, old age and physical infirmity, hence, the
said Deed of Donation is null and void.
In his Answer, Comilang contends that the Deed of
Donation was freely and voluntarily executed by
Dominga in consideration of her love and affection
for him and that the subject property was acquired
by Dominga together with her two sisters long
before respondents went to Hawaii.
During the pendency of the case and before she
could take the witness stand, Dominga died.
Witnesses for the plaintiffs were respondents and

their aunt, Margarita Burcena; while Comilang
testified on his own behalf.
The RTC held that the donation is void because
Dominga could not have validly disposed of the
subject property since it was bought with the money
sent by respondents while working abroad, although
declared for taxation purposes in Dominga’s name.
CA affirmed.
A petition for review on certiorari was filed by
Comilang arguing that Margarita’s statement on the
witness stand that Dominga told her that Francisco
and Mariano Burcena sent her money to buy the
subject property, should not have been given weight
or credence by the RTC and the CA because it is
hearsay and has no probative value.
Francisco and Mariano Burcena maintain that
Margarita’s testimony was not hearsay since
Margarita merely stated what Dominga said.
ISSUE: Should Margarita’s testimony be
categorized as hearsay evidence?
HELD: No. Anent Margarita’s testimony that
Dominga told her that Francisco and Mariano sent
her money to buy the subject property, it cannot be
categorized as hearsay evidence.
Margarita’s testimony was not presented to prove
the truth thereof, but only to establish the fact that
Dominga narrated to Margarita the source of the
funds used in the purchase of the subject property.
What was sought to be admitted in evidence, and
what was actually admitted in evidence, was the fact
that the statement was made by Dominga to
Margarita, not necessarily that the matters stated by
her were true. The said utterance is in the nature of
an independently relevant statement which may be
admitted in evidence as such, but not necessarily to
prove the truth thereof.
Thus, while it is true that the testimony of a witness
regarding a statement made by another person, if
intended to establish the truth of the fact asserted in
the statement, is clearly hearsay evidence, it is
otherwise if the purpose of placing the statement in
the record is merely to establish the fact that the
statement was made or the tenor of such statement.
Regardless of the truth or falsity of a statement,
when the fact that it has been made is relevant, the
hearsay rule does not apply and the statement may
be shown.
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
As a matter of fact, evidence as to the making of the
statement is not secondary but primary, for the
statement itself may constitute a fact in issue, or be
circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such
a fact. For this reason, the statement attributed to
Dominga regarding the source of the funds used to
purchase the subject property related to the court by
Margarita is admissible if only to establish the fact
that such statement was made and the tenor
thereof.
Besides, the testimony of Margarita is not the main
basis for the RTC’s decision. In fact, her testimony
is not indispensable. It merely serves to corroborate
the testimonies of the respondents on the source of
the funds used in purchasing the subject property.
The testimonies of all three witnesses for the
plaintiffs were found to be convincing and credible
by the RTC. This Court will not alter the findings of
the RTC on the credibility of witnesses, principally
because trial courts have vastly superior
advantages in ascertaining the truth and in detecting
falsehood as they have the opportunity to observe
the manner and demeanor of witnesses while
testifying.
5. ANNA LERIMA PATULA, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
FACTS: Petitioner, a sales representative at
PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 164457, April 11, 2012
Footlucker’s Chain of Stores, was charged with
estafa for failure to account for the proceeds of the
sales and deliver the collection to the said company.
During the trial, prosecution, in order to prove that
collectibles lawfully belonging to the company where
misappropriated by the accused, submitted the
following documentary evidence: (a) the receipts
allegedly issued by petitioner to each of her
customers upon their payment, (b) the ledgers
listing the accounts pertaining to each customer with
the corresponding notations of the receipt numbers
for each of the payments, and (c) the confirmation
sheets accomplished by Guivencan herself. The
ledgers and receipts were marked and formally
offered as Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives,
inclusive. Prosecution also presented Guivencan to
testify on the entries in the documentary evidence.
Petitioner’s counsel interposed a continuing
objection on the ground that the figures entered in
Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives, inclusive,
were hearsay because the persons who had made
the entries were not themselves presented in court.
 ALABA, MICHELLE M.

ISSUE: Whether or not testimony of a witness

6. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. REY
pertaining to entries in a document made by another GADO
person constitutes hearsay and may not be
admitted as evidence.

HELD: Section 36 of Rule 130, Rules of Court, a same is inadmissible for being a hearsay evidence.
rule that states that a witness can testify only to
those facts that she knows of her personal
knowledge; that is, which are derived from her own
perception, except as otherwise provided in the
Rules of Court. The personal knowledge of a
witness is a substantive prerequisite for accepting
testimonial evidence that establishes the truth of a
disputed fact. A witness bereft of personal
knowledge of the disputed fact cannot be called
upon for that purpose because her testimony
derives its value not from the credit accorded to her
as a witness presently testifying but from the
veracity and competency of the extrajudicial source
of her information.

The reason for the exclusion of hearsay evidence is

that the person from whom the witness derived the
information on the facts in dispute is not in court and
under oath to be examined and cross-examined.

Moreover, the theory of the hearsay rule is that

when a human utterance is offered as evidence of
the truth of the fact asserted, the credit of the assert
or becomes the basis of inference, and, therefore,
the assertion can be received as evidence only
when made on the witness stand, subject to the test
of cross- examination. However, if an extrajudicial
utterance is offered, not as an assertion to prove the
matter asserted but without reference to the truth of
the matter asserted, the hearsay rule does not
apply.

For example, in a slander case, if a prosecution

witness testifies that he heard the accused say that
the complainant was a thief, this testimony is
admissible not to prove that the complainant was
really a thief, but merely to show that the accused
uttered those words. This kind of utterance is
hearsay in character but is not legal hearsay. The
distinction is, therefore, between (a) the fact that the
statement was made, to which the hearsay rule
does not apply, and (b) the truth of the facts
asserted in the statement, to which the hearsay rule
applies.

Hence, as Guivencan’s testimony intends to prove

an asserted fact, i.e., misappropriation on the part of
the accused through documentary evidence of
which the witness has no personal knowledge, the
 ALABA, MICHELLE M.
FACTS: Rey Gado seeks reversal of the judgment
of conviction rendered by Branch 276 of the
Regional Trial Court of the National Capital
Judicial Region stationed in Muntinlupa City.

The Information dated July 14, 1992 charging

accused-appellant and his co-accused Emma
Gallos with Murder.

On November 21, 1994, both accused-appellant

Rey Gado, and his co-accused Emma Gallos, who
voluntarily appeared in court upon notice, were
arraigned and both entered a plea of not guilty.
Emma Gallos was then also ordered to be
detained.

The two accused, on their part, sought refuge in

their defense of alibi. Rey Gado claimed to have
been tending the store of his brother at Sucat,
Cupang, Muntinlupa, about five kilometers away
from the place where the incident happened, while
Emma Gallos averred that she was at home
tending to her sick daughter.

The trial court rendered judgment acquitting

Emma Gallos. Rey Gado was, however, convicted
of the crime of murder

Accused-appellant vigorously takes exception to

the trial court's admission of the testimony of
Melencio Manalang, Sr., who testified in regard to
the statements and declarations of his son
concerning his assailants, claiming that the said
declarations are not in the nature of a dying
declaration for the simple reason that they were
not made under a clear consciousness of an
impending death.

ISSUE: Whether the statements, uttered by the

victim before he died partake of the nature of a
dying declaration or not.

HELD: Yes. As a rule, a dying declaration is

hearsay and is inadmissible as evidence. In order
that a dying declaration may be admissible as
evidence, four requisites must concur, namely:
that the declaration must concern the cause and
surrounding circumstances of the declarant's
death; that at the time the declaration was made,
the declarant was under a consciousness of an
impending death; that the declarant is competent
as a witness; and that the
 ALABA, MICHELLE M.

declaration is offered in a criminal case for admitted as a dying declaration and at the same time
homicide, murder or parricide, in which the declarant as part of the res gestae.
is a victim.

Capitalizing on the fact that the victim was still able

to stand and walk even after the first declaration
was made, accused-appellant contends that there
could not have possibly been a belief of a looming
and impending death on the part of the victim.

We cannot quite agree. From the established facts

in the case at bar, the trial court correctly
considered the declaration of the victim a dying
declaration and, therefore, admissible. The
declarant was conscious of his impending death.
This may be gleaned not only from the victim's
insistence right after he reached their house that he
should immediately be brought to the hospital and
that he was becoming weaker by the moment, but
also from the serious nature of his wounds (People
vs. Sarabia, 127 SCRA 100 [1984] and the fact that
the said victim died shortly afterwards (People v.
Araja, 105 SCRA 133 [1981]).

Even assuming that the victim's utterances were not

made under a firm belief of an impending death, the
victim's statements may, at the very least, form part
of the res gestae. For the admission of evidence as
part of the res gestae, it is required that (a) the
principal act, the res gestae, be a startling
occurrence, (b) the statements forming part thereof
were made before the declarant had the opportunity
to contrive, and (c) the statements refer to the
occurrence in question and its attending
circumstances (People vs. Siscar, 140 SCRA 316
[1985]). We have ruled that while the statement of
the victim may not qualify as a dying declaration
because it was not made under the consciousness
of impending death (People vs. Palamos, 49 Phil.
601 [1926]), it may still be admissible as part of the
res gestae if it was made immediately after the
incident (People vs. Reyes, 52 Phil. 538 [1928]), or
a few hours thereafter (People vs. Tumalip, 60
SCRA 303 [1974]). Definitely, the victim's statement
in the case at hand was made immediately after the
incident, before he could even have the opportunity
to contrive or concoct a story. Of relevance, too, is
the fact that on two occasions, first at their house,
and later while he was being brought to the hospital,
he identified one and the same person as his
assailant.

Where the elements of both a dying declaration and

a statement as part of the res gestae are present,
as in the case at bar, the statement may be
 ALABA, MICHELLE M.

7. PEOPLEOFTHEPHILIPPINES vs.
FACTS: At about seven o'clock in the evening of FLORENCIO ODENCIO and GUIAMELON MAMA
June 29, 1968, Prowa Talib (Palua Talib), a forty- G.R. No. L-31961 January 9, 1979
year old farmer, felled down by a volley of shots.
Setie rushed to the aid of her husband.

While Setie was comforting her husband, he

allegedly told her that he was going to die. He
directed her to remember what had happened to
him and that they had seen Guiamelon Mama and
Poren armed with guns. Prior to that shooting
incident, Prowa Talib had reported to the barrio
captain that Florencio Odencio had stolen his
lumber.

Ngelam Towa (Nilan Tuwa), another neighbor and

the uncle of Setie heard, the gunshots on the
occasion in question. He hastened to Talib's
house. Setie told him that Guiamelon Mama had
shot Talib. She advised her uncle not to use his
flashlight because Guiamelon was still in the
vicinity. Setie also told Towa that Florencio
Odencio had shot Oranen. Towa left Talib's house
in order to get assistance from his father-in-law.
While crossing the trail his flashlight focussed on
Florencio Odencio with two companions leaving
the scene of the crime.

Policemen arrived at Talib's house. Setie informed

them that Guiamelon was the gunwielder. They
brought Talib to a medical clinic where he was
interrogated by Patrolman Joaquin Sañada Talib
told Sañada that his assailants were Guiamelon,
Florencio Odencio and Florencio's father, Joseph
Odencio. Due to the critical condition of Talib
(nagaagonto), he was not able to sign his dying
declaration as taken down by Patrolman Sañada
Talib was brought to the hospital. He died on the
following day.

In his defense, Florencio, a thirty-two year-old

farmer, denied that he shot Talib and that he had
a misunderstanding with Oranen and Talib with
both of whom he was acquainted. Florencio
testified that he was in his house when the
shooting occurred.

ISSUE: WON the dying declaration of the

deceased is sufficient to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt.

HELD: Yes.

In disbelieving the alibis of Florencio and
Guiamelon, the trial court observed that the accused
were indubitably Identified as the assailants in
Talib's dying declarations to his wife and Patrolman
Sañada. Setie Mamalintao in her statement to the
police declared that she was able to recognize
Florencio and Guiamelon because there was a "big
torch" in front of her house and Karaing's house.
Talib's antemortem statement fortifies the testimony
of his widow, an eyewitness. Also, two other
witnesses saw the appellants leaving the scene of
the crime.
Moreover, Talib's dying declaration was sufficiently
proven. The rule is that a dying declaration may be
oral or written If oral, the witness, who heard it, may
testify thereto without the necessity, of course, of
reproducing exactly the words of the decedent, if he
is able to give the substance thereof. An unsigned
dying declaration may be used as a memorandum
by the witness who took it down. Thus, the guilt of
the appellants was proven beyond reasonable
doubt.
8. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
FRANCISCO SANTOS y BAINGAN @ PRAN
and VILLAMOR ASUNCION G.R. No. 94545
FACTS: Francisco Santos was charged with murder
of David Ambre. The prosecution presented as
witness Corazon and Pedro Dayao, as well as the
victim’s wife, Lolita Ambre. The witnesses saw
David fall after being shot and heard that his wife
asked him who shot him and answered “Pare Pran”.
Lolita knew that her husband was referring to
Francisco, the godfather of their youngest child.
ISSUE: Does the ante mortem statement of the
victim identifying Francisco constitute as a dying
declaration sufficient to sustain the latter’s
conviction?
HELD: Yes. A dying declaration is entitled to the
highest credence because no person who knows of
his impending death would make a careless and
false accusation. “As an exception to the hearsay
rule, the requisites for its admissibility are as
follows: (1) the declaration is made by the deceased
under the consciousness of his impending death; (2)
the deceased was at the time competent as a
witness;
(3) the declaration concerns the cause and
surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death;
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
and (4) the declaration is offered in a criminal care
wherein the declarant's death is the subject of
inquiry.
In the case at bar, the victim's declaration consisted
of the words "Pare Pran." Under the circumstances,
however, he could not have been expected to
articulate his awareness of something so obvious —
the inevitability of his demise — or to have the
energy to do so. The nature and extent of said
injuries underscored the seriousness of his condition
and they later proved by themselves that the
utterances of the deceased were made under a
consciousness of an impending death. That his
demise thereafter came swiftly, although not
instantaneously, further emphasized the victim's
realization of the hopelessness of his recovery.
9. People v. Serenas, G.R. No. 188124, June 29,
FACTS: Jonel Falabrica Serenas alias "Joe-An"
2010, 622 SCRA 485
(Joe-An) and Joel Lorica Labad (Joel) are convicted
of the crime of murder. Niño Noel Ramos (Niño) had
just brought his girlfriend, Dianne Charisse Gavino
(Dianne), home in Sto. Niño, Parañaque City. On his
way back to La Huerta, he passed by a bridge
connecting the barangays of Sto. Niño and La
Huerta. Thereat, Niño was stabbed and mauled. 4
Cesar Ramos (Cesar), Niño’s brother, was in the
vicinity of N. Domingo Street in La Huerta when he
heard a commotion on the bridge. As he was about
to proceed to the bridge, he met Niño and noticed
that his brother was soaked in his own blood. Niño
relayed to Cesar that he was stabbed by Joe-An.
Cesar immediately brought Niño to the hospital
where the latter expired thirty (30) minutes later.
ISSUE: Are the accused guilty based on the
declaration of the victim?
HELD: We respect the findings that Jonel Falabrica
Serenas is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
murder not by virtue of identification by Dianne but
as established by the dying declaration of the victim.
Upon the other hand, we reverse the conviction of
Joel Lorica Labad.
We cannot simply brush aside the fact that while
Dianne pointed to the persons who threatened to do
harm on the victim, she failed to identify who the
perpetrators of the crime are. To the mind of the
Court, this omission in Dianne’s affidavit is so
glaring

on a material point, i.e., the failure to attribute
authorship to the crime. Therefore, the testimony of
Dianne altogether becomes suspect.
Nevertheless, the prosecution’s case did not
necessarily crumble. The victim’s dying declaration
is a most telling evidence identifying Joe-an.
As an exception to the rule against hearsay
evidence, a dying declaration or ante mortem
statement is evidence of the highest order and is
entitled to utmost credence since no person aware
of his impending death would make a careless and
false accusation.28
In order for a dying declaration to be held
admissible, four requisites must concur: first, the
declaration must concern the cause and
surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death;
second, at the time the declaration was made, the
declarant must be under the consciousness of an
impending death; third, the declarant is competent
as a witness; and fourth, the declaration must be
offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or
parricide, in which the declarant is the victim.29
Niño’s ante mortem statement was relayed to his
brother Cesar.
All requisites for a dying declaration were sufficiently
met by the statement of the victim communicated to
Cesar. First, the statement pertained to Niño being
stabbed, particularly pin-pointing Joe-An as the
perpetrator. Second, Niño must have been fully
aware that he was on the brink of death considering
his bloodied condition when Cesar met him near the
bridge. Third, the competence of Niño is
unquestionable had he survived the stabbing
incident. Fourth, Niño’s statement was being offered
in a criminal prosecution for his murder.
Note however that based on the testimonies of
witnesses, there was no direct evidence linking
appellant Joel to the crime.
While the police officers caught Joel hiding under
the bridge, this incident appears to be circumstantial
and cannot stand to prove Joel’s complicity without
any corroborating evidence. Admittedly, Joel’s
defense of denial and alibi are inherently weak,
however, it is doctrinal that the weakness of the
defense cannot be the basis for conviction. The
primary burden still lies with the prosecution whose
evidence must stand or fall on its own weight and
who must establish by proof beyond reasonable
doubt the guilt of the accused
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
before there can be conviction.32 At this juncture, we
acquit appellant Joel.
With respect to Joe-An, the lower courts properly
appreciated the presence of treachery in qualifying
the crime to murder.
10. DANILO L. PAREL vs. SIMEON
FACTS: Simeon Prudencio filed a complaint for
B. PRUDENCIO G.R. No. 146556 April 19,
recovery of possession and damages against Danilo
Parel with the RTC Baguio. Prudencio is claiming
that he is the owner of a two-storey residential
house located at No. 61 Forbes Park National
Reservation near Department of Public Service
(DPS) compound, Baguio City.
In 1973, when the 2nd floor of the house was already
habitable, he allowed Parel’s parents to live there
and supervise the construction below. When the
house was finished, the Parel family was allowed to
live there since they have no house of their own..
In November 1985, Prudencio wrote Florentino a
notice for them to vacate the said house as the
former was due for retirement and he needed the
place. Danilo’s parents heeded this when they
migrated to US in 1986, however, Danilo and his
family unlawfully entered and took possession of the
ground floor of the house; and refused to leave
despite many demands.
Prudencio filed an action for recovery of possession,
and also asked from Parel for a monthly rentalof
P3.000 until he leaves the premises, plus moral and
exemplary damages and costs.
Parel alleged that his parents are co-owners of the
house and that his parents spent their own
resources in improving the house; that the
construction workers were hired by Florentino, and
that Florentino was an awardee of the land on which
the house stands.
The RTC declared that the house is co-owned by
Parel and Prudencio. It rejected the affidavit
executed by Florentino declaring the house as
owned by respondent saying that it was executed
because of an advisement addressed to the late
Florentino by the City Treasurer concerning the
property’s tax assessment and Florentino since it
should be the respondent who should pay the taxes;
and that the affidavit cannot be accepted for being
hearsay.

However, this was reversed by the CA which ruled
that the affidavit of Florentino, stating that he is not
the owner of the subject house but respondent, as
conclusive proof of respondent’s sole ownership of
the subject house. It ruled that Prudencio had
shown sufficient evidence to support his complaint
for recovery of possession when he presented the
affidavit dated September 24, 1973 executed by
Florentino and sworn to before the Assistant City
Assessor of Baguio City, G.F. Lagasca, which
reads:
”I, FLORENTINO PAREL, 42 years of age,
employee, and residing at Forbes Park,
Reservation No. 1, after having been sworn
to according to law depose and say:
That I am an occupant of a residential
building located at Forbes Park, Reservation
No. 1, Baguio City which is the subject of an
advice emanating from the Office of the City
Assessor, Baguio City, for assessment and
declaration for taxation purposes;
That I am not the owner of the building in
question;
That the building in question is owned by Mr.
Simeon B. Prudencio who is presently
residing at 55 Hyacinth, Roxas District,
Quezon City.”
ISSUE: Whether or not Florentino’s affidavit should
be given weight as conclusive proof of Prudencio’s
sole ownership
HELD: Yes. The affidavit should be given weight as
conclusive proof of Prudencio’s sole ownership of
the property.
Section 37. Dying declaration. — The declaration of
a dying person, made under the consciousness of
an impending death, may be received in any case
wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as
evidence of the cause and surrounding
circumstances of such death.
Section 38. Declaration against interest. — The
declaration made by a person deceased, or unable
to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the
fact is asserted in the declaration was at the time it
was made so far contrary to declarant's own
interest, that a reasonable man in his position would
not have made the declaration unless he believed it
to be true, may be received in evidence against
himself or his
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
successors in interest and against third persons.
(32a)
The theory under which such declarations are
received in evidence notwithstanding they are
hearsay is that the necessity of the occasion
renders the reception of such evidence advisable
and, further that the reliability of such declaration
asserts facts which are against his own pecuniary or
moral interest.
In this case, on the basis of the said affidavit, it is
safe to presume that he would not have made such
declaration unless he believed it to be true, as it is
prejudicial to himself as well as to his children’s
interests as his heirs. A declaration against interest
is the best evidence which affords the greatest
certainty of the facts in dispute.
There is also no evidence that Florentino revoked
such affidavit, even when the criminal complaint for
trespass to dwelling was filed by Prudencio and
even when a complaint for unlawful detainer was
filed against petitioner and his wife also in 1988
which was subsequently dismissed on the ground
that respondent’s action should be an accion
publiciana which is beyond the jurisdiction of the
MTC,
The building plan of the house was in the name of
Prudencio and his wife and the house was built in
accordance to said plan. Prudencio was the one
paying the real estate property taxes on the house
under his name since 1974. While tax receipts and
declarations are not incontrovertible evidence of
ownership, they constitute at least proof that the
holder has a claim of title over the property.
However as applicable in this case, the taxes, taken
with the other circumstances, it was concluded that
Prudencio is the sole owner of the house.
11. People v. Bernal GR 113685, June 19, 1997
FACTS: It appears that on August 5, 1991, around
11:30 in the morning, while Roberto Racasa and
Openda, Jr. were engaged in a drinking spree, they
invited Bernal, who was passing by, to join them.
After a few minutes, Bernal decided to leave both
men, apparently because he was going to fetch his
child. Thereafter, two men arrived, approached
Openda, Jr., and asked the latter if he was "Payat."
When he said yes, one of them suddenly pulled out
a handgun while the other handcuffed him and told
him "not to run because they were policemen" and
 ALABA, MICHELLE M.

because he had an "atraso" or a score to settle with storey residential house located at No. 61 Forbes
them. They then hastily took him away. Racasa
immediately went to the house of Openda, Jr. and
informed the latter's mother of the abduction.

Likewise, a certain Salito Enriquez, a tailor and a

friend of Openda, Jr., testified that sometime in
January 1991, Openda, Jr. confided to him that he
and Bernal's wife Naty were having an affair. One
time, Naty even gave Openda, Jr. money which they
used to pay for a motel room. He advised Naty "not
to do it again because she (was) a married woman.
Undoubtedly, his wife's infidelity was ample reason
for Bernal to contemplate revenge.

ISSUE: Whether or not the statement made by

Openda, Jr. (victim) is a declaration against
interest?

HELD: Yes, Motive is generally irrelevant, unless it

is utilized in establishing the identity of the
perpetrator. Coupled with enough circumstantial
evidence of facts from which it may be reasonably
inferred that the accused was the malefactor, motive
may be sufficient to support a conviction. Openda,
Jr.'s revelation to Enriquez regarding his illicit
relationship with Bernal's wife is admissible in
evidence, pursuant to Section 38, Rule 130 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence,

Sec. 38. Declaration against interest. The

declaration made by a person deceased, or unable
to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the
fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it
was made so far contrary to declarant's own
interest, that a reasonable man in his position would
not have made the declaration unless he believed it
to be true, may be received in evidence against
himself or his successors-in-interest and against
third persons.

Openda, Jr., having been missing since his

abduction, cannot be called upon to testify. His
confession to Enriquez, definitely a declaration
against his own interest, since his affair with Naty
Bernal was a crime, is admissible in evidence 13
because no sane person will be presumed to tell a
falsehood to his own detriment.

12. Parel v. Prudencio, G.R. No. 146556

FACTS: On February 27, 1992, Simeon Prudencio

(respondent) filed a complaint for recovery of
possession and damages against petitioner with the
RTC Baguio alleging that: he is the owner of a two-
 ALABA, MICHELLE M.
Park National Reservation near Department of September 24, 1973 executed by Florentino and
Public Service (DPS) compound, Baguio City;
such property was constructed solely from his own
funds and declared in his name under Tax
Declaration No. 47048; he commenced the
construction of said house in 1972 until its
completion three years later; when the second
floor of said house became habitable in 1973, he
allowed petitioner’s parents, Florentino (now
deceased) and Susan Parel, to move therein and
occupy the second floor while the construction of
the ground floor was on-going to supervise the
construction and to safeguard the materials; when
the construction of the second floor was finished
in 1975, respondent allowed petitioner’s parents
and children to transfer and temporarily reside
thereat; it was done out of sheer magnanimity as
petitioner’s parents have no house of their own
and since respondent’s wife is the older sister of
Florentino, petitioner’s father; in November 1985,
respondent wrote Florentino a notice for them to
vacate the said house as the former was due for
retirement and he needed the place to which
petitioner’s parents heeded when they migrated
to
U.S. in 1986; however, without respondent’s
knowledge, petitioner and his family unlawfully
entered and took possession of the ground floor of
respondent’s house; petitioner’s refusal to vacate
the house despite repeated demands prompted
respondent to file the instant action for recovery of
possession.

The RTC did not give credence to the tax

declaration as well as the several documents
showing the City Assessor’s assessment of the
property all in respondent’s name since tax
declarations are not conclusive proof of
ownership. It rejected the affidavit executed by
Florentino declaring the house as owned by
respondent saying that the affidavit should be
read in its entirety to determine the purpose of its
execution; that it was executed because of an
advisement addressed to the late Florentino by
the City Treasurer concerning the property’s tax
assessment and Florentino, thought then that it
should be the respondent who should pay the
taxes; and that the affidavit cannot be accepted
for being hearsay.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner was able to prove by

preponderance of evidence that his father was a
co- owner of the subject two-storey residential
house.

HELD: Respondent presented the affidavit dated

 ALABA, MICHELLE M.

sworn to before the Assistant City Assessor of prejudicial to himself as well as to his children’s
Baguio City, G.F. Lagasca, which reads: interests as his heirs.

I, FLORENTINO PAREL, 42 years of age,

employee, and residing at Forbes Park, Reservation
No. 1, after having been sworn to according to law
depose and say:

That he is the occupant of a residential building

located at Forbes Park, Reservation No. 1, Baguio
City which is the subject of an advicement
addressed to him emanating from the Office of the
City Assessor, Baguio City, for assessment and
declaration for taxation purposes;

That I am not the owner of the building in question;

That the building in question is owned by Mr.

Simeon
B. Prudencio who is presently residing at 55
Hyacinth, Roxas District, Quezon City.

Further, affiant say not.

Section 38 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court

provides:

SEC. 38. Declaration against interest. – The

declaration made by a person deceased, or unable
to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the
fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it
was made so far contrary to the declarant's own
interest, that a reasonable man in his position would
not have made the declaration unless he believed it
to be true, may be received in evidence against
himself or his successors-in-interest and against
third persons.

The theory under which declarations against interest

are received in evidence notwithstanding they are
hearsay is that the necessity of the occasion
renders the reception of such evidence advisable
and, further that the reliability of such declaration
asserts facts which are against his own pecuniary or
moral interest.

The affiant, Florentino, who died in 1989 was

petitioner’s father and had adequate knowledge with
respect to the subject covered by his statement. In
said affidavit, Florentino categorically declared that
while he is the occupant of the residential building,
he is not the owner of the same as it is owned by
respondent who is residing in Quezon City. It is safe
to presume that he would not have made such
declaration unless he believed it to be true, as it is
 ALABA, MICHELLE M.
A declaration against interest is the best evidence
which affords the greatest certainty of the facts in
dispute.

Notably, during Florentino’s lifetime, from 1973,

the year he executed said affidavit until 1989, the
year of his death, there is no showing that he had
revoked such affidavit even when a criminal
complaint for trespass to dwelling had been filed
by respondent against him (Florentino) and
petitioner in 1988 regarding the subject house
which the trial court dismissed due to the absence
of evidence showing that petitioner entered the
house against the latter’s will and held that the
remedy of respondent was to file an action for
ejectment;12 and even when a complaint for
unlawful detainer was filed against petitioner and
his wife also in 1988 which was subsequently
dismissed on the ground that respondent’s action
should be an accion publiciana which is beyond
the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court.

13. People v. Pruna, G.R. No. 138471

FACTS: On January 27, 1995, an information for
rape was filed against accused-appellant Manuel
Pruna y Ramirez or Erman Pruna y Ramirez
(hereafter PRUNA), the accusatory portion of
which reads:
That on or about January 3, 1995 at Sitio
Tabing-ilog, Brgy. Panilao, Pilar, Bataan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused
thru force and intimidation, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie
and succeed to have sexual intercourse
with the offended party, Lizette Arabelle
Gonzales, a 3-year-old minor girl, against
the will and consent of the latter, to her
damage and prejudice.

Dr. Emelita Quiroz, an obstetrician and

gynecologist at the Bataan Provincial Hospital,
testified that on 3 January 1995, she conducted a
complete physical examination on Lizette and took
wet smear specimen from her vaginal wall through
scraping. The urinalysis report includes a positive
finding for "sperm cells." Dr. Quiroz explained that
the presence of sperm cells in the vaginal canal
signified that sexual intercourse and ejaculation
had occurred on the person of the patient. There
was no laceration; but there was hyperemia,
which means reddening of the tissue around the
vaginal opening.

On the other hand, Pruna denied having raped
Lizette. He claimed that in the morning of 3 January
1995, he was in his house preparing coffee for
Carlito. After Carlito left, several men arrived and
boxed him for reasons not known to him. Carlito and
the latter’s friend then brought him to the barangay
hall. There, Lizette’s father boxed him. He was
thereafter brought to the Pilar Municipal Jail.
ISSUE: Whether or not Lizette was a competent
and credible witness considering that she was
allegedly only 3 years old when the alleged rape
occurred and 5 years old when she testified.
HELD: Yes. As a general rule, when a witness
takes the witness stand, the law, on ground of public
policy, presumes that he is competent. The court
cannot reject the witness in the absence of proof of
his incompetency. The burden is, therefore, upon
the party objecting to the competency of a witness
to establish the ground of incompetency.
Section 21 of Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence
enumerates the persons who are disqualified to be
witnesses. Among those disqualified are "[c]hildren
whose mental maturity is such as to render them
incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which
they are examined and relating them truthfully."
No precise minimum age can be fixed at which
children shall be excluded from testifying. The
intelligence, not the age, of a young child is the test
of the competency as a witness. It is settled that a
child, regardless of age, can be a competent
witness if he can perceive and, in perceiving, can
make known his perception to others and that he is
capable of relating truthfully the facts for which he is
examined.
In determining the competency of a child witness,
the court must consider his capacity (a) at the time
the fact to be testified to occurred such that he could
receive correct impressions thereof; (b) to
comprehend the obligation of an oath; and (c) to
relate those facts truly to the court at the time he is
offered as a witness. The examination should show
that the child has some understanding of the
punishment which may result from false swearing.
The requisite appreciation of consequences is
disclosed where the child states that he knows that
it is wrong to tell a lie, and that he would be
punished if he does so, or that he uses
language which is
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
equivalent to saying that he would be sent to hell for
false swearing. A child can be disqualified only if it
can be shown that his mental maturity renders him
incapable of perceiving facts respecting which he is
being examined and of relating them truthfully.
In this case, appellant questions the competency of
Lizette as a witness solely on the ground of her age.
He failed to discharge the burden of showing her
mental immaturity. From the above-quoted
testimony, it can be gleaned that Lizette had the
capacity of observation, recollection, and
34
communication and that she could discern the
consequence of telling a lie. We, therefore, sustain
the trial court in admitting her testimony and
according it great weight.
We are not persuaded by appellant’s assertion that
LIZETTE should not be allowed to testify two years
after the alleged rape "when the interplay of frail
memory combines with the imagination of earlier
years." It must be noted that it is a most natural
reaction for victims of criminal violence to have a
lasting impression of the manner in which the crime
was committed and the identity of the person
responsible therefor.
In a string of cases, we have said that the testimony
of a rape victim who is of young or tender age is
credible and deserves full credit, especially where
no motive is attributed to the victim that would make
her testify falsely against the accused. Indeed, a girl
of such age as Lizette would not concoct a story of
defloration; allow the examination of her private
parts; and undergo the expense, trouble,
inconvenience, and the trauma of a public trial
unless she was in fact raped.
14. CORAZON DEZOLLER TISON AND RENE
FACTS: This is a case of an action for
R. TISON vs COURT OF APPEALS G.R. no.
reconveyance of a parcel of land and an apartment.
121027 July 31, 1997
Teodora Guerrero died and left a parcel of land and
an apartment. Her husband Martin Guerrero
adjudicates the said land to him and consequently
sold to Teodora Domingo. The nephews and nieces
Tison et al seek to inherit by right of representation
from the property disputed property presenting
documentary evidence to prove filial relation. The
respondent contended that the documents/evidence
presented is

inadmissible for being hearsay since the affiants
were never presented for cross-examination.
ISSUE: Is evidence presented hearsay evidence
and inadmissible?
HELD: The evidence submitted does not conform to
the rules on their admissibility; however the same
may be admitted by reason of private respondent's
failure to interpose any timely objection thereto at
the time they were being offered in evidence. It is
elementary that an objection shall be made at the
time when an alleged inadmissible document is
offered in evidence; otherwise, the objection shall
be treated as waived, since the right to object is
merely a privilege which the party may waive.
The primary proof that was considered in
ascertaining the relationship between the parties
concerned is the testimony of Corazon Dezoller
Tison to the effect that Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in
her lifetime, or sometime in 1946, categorically
declared that the former is Teodora's niece. Such a
statement is considered a declaration about
pedigree which is admissible, as an exception to the
hearsay rule, under Section 39, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court, subject to the following conditions:
(1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2)
that the declarant be related to the person whose
pedigree is the subject of inquiry; (3) that such
relationship be shown by evidence other than the
declaration; and
(4) that the declaration was made ante litem motam,
that is, not only before the commencement of the
suit involving the subject matter of the declaration,
but before any controversy has arisen thereon.
15. BEN-HUR NEPOMUCENO vs. ARHBENCEL
ANN LOPEZ, represented by her mother
ARACELI LOPEZ, Respondent.
G.R. No. 181258 March 18, 2010
FACTS: Respondent Arhbencel Ann Lopez
(Arhbencel), represented by her mother Araceli
Lopez (Araceli), filed a Complaint1with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City for recognition
and support against Ben-Hur Nepomuceno
(petitioner).
Arhbencel claimed to have been begotten out of an
extramarital affair of petitioner with Araceli; that
petitioner refused to affix his signature on her
Certificate of Birth; and that, by a handwritten note
dated August 7, 1999, petitioner nevertheless
obligated himself to give her financial support in the
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
amount of ₱1,500 on the 15th and 30th days of
each month beginning August 15, 1999.
Petitioner countered that Araceli had not proven that
he was the father of Arhbencel; and that he was
only forced to execute the handwritten note on
account of threats coming from the National
People’s Army.
The trial court held that Arhbencel’s Certificate of
Birth was not prima facie evidence of her filiation to
petitioner as it did not bear petitioner’s signature;
that petitioner’s handwritten undertaking to provide
support did not contain a categorical
acknowledgment that Arhbencel is his child; and
that there was no showing that petitioner performed
any overt act of acknowledgment of Arhbencel as
his illegitimate child after the execution of the note.
On appeal, petitioner contends that nowhere in the
documentary evidence presented by Araceli is an
explicit statement made by him that he is the father
of Arhbencel; that absent recognition or
acknowledgment, illegitimate children are not
entitled to support from the putative parent; that the
supposed payment made by him of Araceli’s
hospital bills was neither alleged in the complaint
nor proven during the trial; and that Arhbencel’s
claim of paternity and filiation was not established
by clear and convincing evidence.
ISSUE: Has Arhbencel’s claim of paternity and
filiation established by clear and convincing
evidence?
HELD: No. The Rules on Evidence include
provisions on pedigree. The relevant sections of
Rule 130 provide:
SEC. 39. Act or declaration about pedigree. — The
act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable
to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another
person related to him by birth or marriage, may be
received in evidence where it occurred before the
controversy, and the relationship between the two
persons is shown by evidence other than such act
or declaration. The word "pedigree" includes
relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage,
death, the dates when and the places where these
facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It
embraces also facts of family history intimately
connected with pedigree.
SEC. 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding
pedigree. — The reputation or tradition existing in a

family previous to the controversy, in respect to the
pedigree of any one of its members, may be
received in evidence if the witness testifying thereon
be also a member of the family, either by
consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family bibles or
other family books or charts, engraving on rings,
family portraits and the like, may be received as
evidence of pedigree.
This Court's rulings further specify what
incriminating acts are acceptable as evidence to
establish filiation. In Pe Lim v. CA, a case petitioner
often cites, we stated that the issue of paternity still
has to be resolved by such conventional evidence
as the relevant incriminating verbal and written acts
by the putative father. Under Article 278 of the New
Civil Code, voluntary recognition by a parent shall
be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement
before a court of record, or in any authentic writing.
To be effective, the claim of filiation must be made
by the putative father himself and the writing must
be the writing of the putative father. A notarial
agreement to support a child whose filiation is
admitted by the putative father was considered
acceptable evidence. Letters to the mother vowing
to be a good father to the child and pictures of the
putative father cuddling the child on various
occasions, together with the certificate of live birth,
proved filiation. However, a student permanent
record, a written consent to a father's operation, or a
marriage contract where the putative father gave
consent, cannot be taken as authentic writing.
Standing alone, neither a certificate of baptism nor
family pictures are sufficient to establish filiation.
In the present case, Arhbencel relies, in the main,
on the handwritten note executed by petitioner
which reads:
Manila, Aug. 7, 1999
I, Ben-Hur C. Nepomuceno, hereby undertake to
give and provide financial support in the
amount of
₱1,500.00 every fifteen and thirtieth day of each
month for a total of ₱3,000.00 a month starting Aug.
15, 1999, to Ahrbencel Ann Lopez, presently in the
custody of her mother Araceli Lopez without the
necessity of demand, subject to adjustment later
depending on the needs of the child and my income.
The abovequoted note does not contain any
statement whatsoever about Arhbencel’s filiation to
petitioner. It is, therefore, not within the ambit of
Article 172(2) vis-à-vis Article 175 of the Family Code
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
which admits as competent evidence of illegitimate
filiation an admission of filiation in a private
handwritten instrument signed by the parent
concerned.
The note cannot also be accorded the same weight
as the notarial agreement to support the child
referred to in Herrera. For it is not even notarized.
And Herrera instructs that the notarial agreement
must be accompanied by the putative father’s
admission of filiation to be an acceptable evidence
of filiation. Here, however, not only has petitioner
not admitted filiation through contemporaneous
actions. He has consistently denied it.
The only other documentary evidence submitted by
Arhbencel, a copy of her Certificate of Birth, has no
probative value to establish filiation to petitioner, the
latter not having signed the same.
At bottom, all that Arhbencel really has is petitioner’s
handwritten undertaking to provide financial support
to her which, without more, fails to establish her
claim of filiation. The Court is mindful that the best
interests of the child in cases involving paternity and
filiation should be advanced. It is, however, just as
mindful of the disturbance that unfounded paternity
suits cause to the privacy and peace of the putative
father’s legitimate family.
16. FRANCISCO L. JISON vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and MONINA JISON G.R. No. 124853
FACTS: Monina Jison alleged that Francisco had
February 24, 1998
been married to a certain Lilia Lopez Jison since
1940. At the end of 1945 or the start of 1946,
however, Francisco impregnated Esperanza F.
Amolar (who was then employed as the nanny of
Francisco's daughter, Lourdes). As a result, Monina
was born on 6 August 1946, in Dingle, Iloilo, and
since childhood, had enjoyed the continuous,
implied recognition as an illegitimate child of
Francisco by his acts and that of his family. Monina
prayed for a judicial declaration of her illegitimate
status and that FRANCISCO support and treat her
as such. Francisco alleged that he could not have
had sexual relations with Esperanza Amolar during
the period specified in the complaint as she had
ceased to be in his employ as early as 1944, and
did not know of her whereabouts since then.

The trial court categorized Monina’s many
evidences as hearsay evidence, incredulous
evidence, or self- serving evidence. Monina
appealed to the Court of Appeals and sought the
reversal of the trial court's decision. She alleged,
among others, that the trial court erred in rejecting
the admissibility of the duly identified notes and
letter of the relatives of the appellee as hearsay.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the testimonies of
Monina’s witnesses were sufficient to establish
Monina's filiation and it declared her to be the
illegitimate daughter of Francisco. Francisco assails
the various notes and letters written by his relatives
(Exhs. S to V) as they were not identified by the
authors.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Exhibits S to V may be
admissible in evidence
HELD: No. As to Exhibits "S," "T," "U" and "V," the
various notes and letters written by Francisco's
relatives, namely Mike Alano, Emilio Jison, Mariquit
Lopez and Fernando Lopez, respectively, allegedly
attesting to Monina's filiation, while their due
execution and authenticity are not in issue, as
MONINA witnessed the authors signing the
documents, nevertheless, under Rule 130, Section
39, the contents of these documents may not be
admitted, there being no showing that the
declarants- authors were dead or unable to testify,
neither was the relationship between the declarants
and Monina shown by evidence other than the
documents in question. 41 As to the admissibility of
these documents under Rule 130, Section 40,
however, this requires further elaboration.
Rule 130, Section 40, provides:
Sec. 40. Family reputation or
tradition regarding pedigree. — The
reputation or tradition existing in a family
previous to the controversy, in respect to the
pedigree of any one of its members, may be
received in evidence if the witness testifying
thereon be also a member of the family,
either by consanguinity or affinity. Entries in
family bibles or other family books or charts,
engravings on rings, family portraits and the
like may be received as evidence of
pedigree. (emphasis supplied)
It is evident that this provision may be
divided into two (2) parts: the portion containing
the first
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
underscored clause which pertains to testimonial
evidence, under which the documents in question
may not be admitted as the authors thereof did not
take the witness stand; and the section containing
the second underscored phrase. What must then be
ascertained is whether Exhibits S to V, as private
documents, fall within the scope of the clause "and
the like" as qualified by the preceding phrase
"entries in family bibles or other family books or
charts, engravings on rights [and] family portraits,"
We hold that the scope of the enumeration
contained in the second portion of this provision, in
light of the rule of ejusdem generis, is limited to
objects which are commonly known as "family
possessions," or those articles which represent, in
effect, a family's joint statement of its belief as to the
pedigree of a person. These have been described
as objects "openly exhibited and well known to the
family," or those "which, if preserved in a family,
may be regarded as giving a family tradition." Other
examples of these objects which are regarded as
reflective of a family's reputation or tradition
regarding pedigree are inscriptions on tombstones,
monuments or coffin plates.
Plainly then, Exhibits S to V, as private
documents not constituting "family possessions" as
discussed above, may not be admitted on the basis
of Rule 130, Section 40. Neither may these exhibits
be admitted on the basis of Rule 130, Section 41
regarding common reputation, 47 it having been
observed that:
The weight of authority appears to
be in favor of the theory that it is the general
repute, the common reputation in the family,
and not the common reputation in
community, that is a material element of
evidence going to establish pedigree. . . .
[Thus] matters of pedigree may be proved
by reputation in the family, and not by
reputation in the neighborhood or vicinity,
except where the pedigree in question is
marriage which may be proved by common
reputation in the community.
Their inadmissibility notwithstanding,
Exhibits "S" to "V," inclusive, may, in like manner as
MONINA's school records, properly be admitted as
part of her testimony to strengthen her claim that,
indeed, relatives of FRANCISCO recognized her as
his daughter.

17. Mendoza v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 86302
FACTS: The complaint was filed on August 21,
1981, in the Regional Trial Court in Cebu City.
Teopista Toring Tufiacao, the herein private
respondent, alleged that she was born on August
20, 1930, to Brigida Toring, who was then single,
and defendant Casimiro Mendoza, married at that
time to Emiliana Barrientos. She averred that
Mendoza recognized her as an illegitimate child by
treating her as such and according her the rights
and privileges of a recognized illegitimate child.
Casimiro Mendoza, then already 91 years old,
specifically denied the plaintiffs allegations and set
up a counterclaim for damages and attorney's fees.
Amplifying on her complaint, Teopista testified that it
was her mother who told her that her father was
Casimiro.
Lolito Tufiacao corroborated his mother and
said he considered Casimiro his grandfather
because Teopista said so. He would kiss his hand
whenever they saw each other and Casimiro would
give him money. Casimiro used to invite him to his
house and give him jackfruits. when his grandfather
learned that he was living on a rented lot, the old
man allowed him to build a house on the former's
land.
Isaac testified that his uncle Casimiro was
the father of Teopista because his father Hipolito,
Casimiro's brother, and his grandmother, Brigida
Mendoza, so informed him. He worked on
Casimiro's boat and whenever Casimiro paid him
his salary, he would also give him various amounts
from P2.00 to P10.00 to be delivered to Teopista.
Isaac also declared that Casimiro intended to give
certain properties to Teopista.
ISSUE: Whether or not Teopista was in continuous
possession of her claimed status of an illegitimate
child of Casimiro Mendoza.
HELD: Yes. But although Teopista has failed to
show that she was in open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate child of
Casimiro, we find that she has nevertheless
established that status by another method.
What both the trial court and the respondent court
did not take into account is that an illegitimate child
is allowed to establish his claimed filiation by "any
other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
laws," according to the Civil Code, or "by evidence
or proof in his favor that the defendant is her father,"
according to the Family Code. Such evidence may
consist of his baptismal certificate, a judicial
admission, a family Bible in which his name has
been entered, common reputation respecting his
pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of
witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible
under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
The trial court conceded that "the defendant's
parents, as well as the plaintiff himself, told
Gaudencio Mendoza and Isaac Mendoza, that
Teopista was the daughter of the defendant." It
should have probed this matter further in light of
Rule 130, Section 39, of the Rules of Court,
providing as follows:
Sec. 39. — Act or declarations about pedigree. —
The act or declaration of a person deceased, or
unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of
another person related to him by birth or marriage,
may be received in evidence where it occurred
before the controversy, and the relationship
between the two persons is shown by evidence
other than such act or declaration. The word
"pedigree" includes relationship, family genealogy,
birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the
places where these facts occurred, and the names
of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family
history intimately connected with pedigree.
The statement of the trial court regarding Teopista's
parentage is not entirely accurate. To set the record
straight, we will stress that it was only Isaac
Mendoza who testified on this question of pedigree,
and he did not cite Casimiro's father. His testimony
was that he was informed by his father Hipolito, who
was Casimiro's brother, and Brigida Mendoza,
Casimiro's own mother, that Teopista was
Casimiro's illegitimate daughter.
Such acts or declarations may be received in
evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule
because "it is the best the nature of the case admits
and because greater evils are apprehended from
the rejection of such proof than from its
admission.16 Nevertheless, precisely because of its
nature as hearsay evidence, there are certain
safeguards against its abuse. Commenting on this
provision, Francisco enumerates the following
requisites that have to be complied with before the
act or declaration regarding pedigree may be
admitted in evidence:

1. The declarant is dead or unable to testify.
2. The pedigree must be in issue.
3. The declarant must be a relative of the
person whose pedigree is in issue.
4. The declaration must be made before the
controversy arose.
5. The relationship between the declarant and
the person whose pedigree is in question must be
shown by evidence other than such declaration.
All the above requisites are present in the case at
bar. The persons who made the declarations about
the pedigree of Teopista, namely, the mother of
Casimiro, Brigida Mendoza, and his brother,
Hipolito, were both dead at the time of Isaac's
testimony. The declarations referred to the filiation
of Teopista and the paternity of Casimiro, which
were the very issues involved in the complaint for
compulsory recognition. The declarations were
made before the complaint was filed by Teopista or
before the controversy arose between her and
Casimiro. Finally, the relationship between the
declarants and Casimiro has been established by
evidence other than such declaration, consisting of
the extrajudicial partition of the estate of Florencio
Mendoza, in which Casimiro was mentioned as one
of his heirs.
The said declarations have not been refuted.
If we consider the other circumstances narrated
under oath by the private respondent and her
witnesses, such as the financial doles made by
Casimiro to Brigida Toring, the hiring of Teopista's
husband to drive the passenger truck of Casimiro,
who later sold the vehicle and gave the proceeds of
the sale to Teopista and her husband, the
permission he gave Lolito Tufiacao to build a house
on his land after he found that the latter was living
on a rented lot, and, no less remarkably, the joint
savings account Casimiro opened with Teopista, we
can reasonably conclude that Teopista was the
illegitimate daughter of Casimiro Mendoza.
18. THE ILOCOS NORTE ELECTRIC COMPANY
vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, (First
Division) LILIAN JUAN LUIS, JANE JUAN
YABES, VIRGINIA JUAN CID, GLORIA JUAN
CARAG, and PURISIMA JUAN G.R. No. L-53401
November 6, 1989
FACTS: Luis, et. al.’s Version
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
Strong typhoon "Gening" buffeted the province of
Ilocos Norte, bringing heavy rains and consequent
flooding. Between 5:30 and 6:00 A.M., after the
typhoon had abated and when the floodwaters were
beginning to recede, Isabel Lao Juan (a.k.a. Nana
Belen), proceeded to the Five Sisters Emporium, of
which she was the owner and proprietress, to look
after the merchandise therein that might have been
damaged. She was followed by Aida Bulong, a
Salesgirl at the Five Sisters Grocery, also owned by
Nana Belen, and by Linda Alonzo Estavillo, a ticket
seller at the YJ Cinema, which was partly owned by
Nana Belen. Aida and Linda walked side by side at
a distance of between 5 and 6 meters behind Nana
Belen. Suddenly, Nana Belen screamed "Ay" and
quickly sank into the water. The two girls attempted
to help, but fear dissuaded them from doing so
because on the spot where Nana Belen sank they
saw an electric wire dangling from a post and
moving in snake-like fashion in the water. Upon their
shouts for help, Ernesto dela Cruz tried to go to
Nana Belen, but at four meters away from her, he
turned back shouting that the water was grounded.
When Antonio Yabes was informed by
Ernesto that his mother-in law had been
electrocuted, he acted immediately. With his wife
Jane, together with Ernesto and one Joe Ros,
Yabes passed by the City Hall to request the police
to ask the people of INELCO to cut off the electric
current. Then Yabes instructed his boys to fish for
the body of Nana Belen, which was recovered about
two meters from an electric post.
In another place, at about 4:00 A.M. on
same date, Engineer Antonio Juan, Power Plant
Engineer of the NPC, noticed certain fluctuations in
their electric meter which indicated such
abnormalities as grounded or short-circuited lines.
On his way to the Laoag NPC Compound on an
inspection, he saw grounded and disconnected
lines. Electric lines were hanging from the posts to
the ground. Since he could not see any INELCO
lineman, he decided to go to the INELCO Office.
Engr. Juan saw an electric wire about 30 meters
long strung across the street "and the other end was
seeming to play with the current of the water." Engr.
Juan passed by the house of Nana Belen. Using the
resuscitator, he tried to revive Nana Belen. His
efforts proved futile. Rigor mortis was setting in. On
the left palm of Nana Belen, Engr. Juan noticed a
hollow wound.
 ALABA, MICHELLE M.

Dr. Jovencio Castro, Municipal Health Officer, shape and with

examined the body at about 8:00 A.M. The skin was
grayish or, in medical parlance, cyanotic, which
indicated death by electrocution. On the left palm,
the doctor found an "electrically charged wound" or
a first degree burn. About the base of the thumb on
the left hand was a burned wound. The certificate of
death prepared by Dr. Castro stated the cause of'
death as
,'circulatory shock electrocution".

INELCO’s version

It presented the testimonies of its officers and

employees, namely, Conrado Asis, electric
engineer; Loreto Abijero, collector-inspector; Fabico
Abijero, lineman; and Julio Agcaoili, president-
manager of INELCO seeking to prove that on and
even before the date of the incident, the electric
service system of the INELCO in the whole
franchise area, did not suffer from any defect that
might constitute a hazard to life and property. The
service lines, devices and other INELCO equipment
in the area had been newly-installed prior to the
date in question. As a public service operator and in
line with its business of supplying electric current to
the public, INELCO had installed safety devices to
prevent and avoid injuries to persons and damage
to property in case of natural calamities such as
floods, typhoons, fire and others. It had 12 linesmen
charged with the duty of making a round-the-clock
check-up of the areas respectively assigned to
them.

It asserts that although a strong typhoon

struck the province of Ilocos Norte, putting streets
under water, only a few known places were reported
to have suffered damaged electric lines. Abijero
testified that he did not see any cut or broken wires
in or near the vicinity. What he saw were many
people fishing out the body of Nana Belen. Dr.
Antonio Briones was presented to show that Nana
Belen could not have died of electrocution. Dr.
Briones testified to the following: Without an autopsy
on the cadaver of the victim, no doctor, not even a
medicolegal expert, can speculate as to the real
cause of death. Cyanosis could not have been
found in the body of the deceased three hours after
her death, because cyanosis which means lack of
oxygen circulating in the blood and rendering the
color of the skin purplish, appears only in a live
person. The presence of the elongated burn in the
left palm of the deceased is not sufficient to
establish her death by electrocution; since burns
caused by electricity are more or less round in
 ALABA, MICHELLE M.
points of entry and exit. Had the deceased held
the lethal wire for a long time, the laceration in her
palm would have been bigger and the injury more
massive.

INELCO claims that Nana Belen could have died

simply either by drowning or by electrocution due
to negligence attributable only to herself and not
to petitioner. It pointed out that Nana Belen,
without INELCO's knowledge, caused the
installation of a burglar deterrent by connecting a
wire from the main house to the iron gate and
fence of steel matting, thus, charging the latter
with electric current whenever the switch is on.
INELCO then conjectures that the switch to said
burglar deterrent must have been left on, hence,
causing Nana Belen’s electrocution when she
tried to open her gate.

CFI Decision
Ruled in favor of INELCO

CA Decision
Reversed the CFI Ruling

ISSUE: Did the CA commit grave abuse of

discretion in considering the purely hearsay
alleged declarations of Ernesto de la Cruz as part
of the res gestae?

RULING: No

By a preponderance of evidence, it was

shown that Nanay Belen died of electrocution, a
conclusion which can be primarily derived from
the photographed burnt wounds on the left palm of
Nanay Belen. Such wounds undoubtedly point to
the fact that she had clutched a live wire of
INELCO. This was corroborated by the testimony
of Dr. Castro who actually examined the body of
the deceased a few hours after the death and
described the said burnt wounds as a "first degree
burn and that they were "electrically charged".
Furthermore, witnesses Linda and Aida added
that after Nanay Belen screamed "Ay" and sank
into the water, they tried to render some help but
were overcome with fear by the sight of an electric
wire dangling from an electric post, moving in the
water in a snake-like fashion. It justifies CA in
concluding that "(t)he nature of the wounds as
described by the witnesses who saw them can
lead to no other conclusion than that they were
"burns," and there was nothing else in the street
where the victim was wading thru which could
cause a burn except the dangling live wire of
defendant company"

CA properly applied the principle of res gestae.
There is no sufficient reason to discredit the
testimonies of Linda and Aida who were with Nana
Belen during that morning. They were one in the
affirmation that Nana Belen, while wading in the
waist-deep flood five or six meters ahead of them,
suddenly screamed "Ay" and quickly sank into the
water. When they approached Nana Belen to help,
they were stopped by the sight of an electric wire
dangling from a post and moving in snake-like
fashion in the water. Ernesto also tried to approach
the deceased, but he turned back shouting that the
water was grounded. These bits of evidence carry
much weight. For the subject of the testimonies was
a startling occurrence, and the declarations may be
considered part of the res gestae.
For the admission of the res gestae in evidence, the
following requisites must be present:
(1) that the principal act, the res gestae, be a
startling occurrence;
(2) that the statements were made before the
declarant had time to contrive or devise;
(3) that the statements made must concern the
occurrence in question and its immediately
attending circumstances.
We do not find any abuse of discretion on the CA'
part in view of the satisfaction of said requisites in
the case at bar.
The statements made relative to the startling
occurrence are admitted in evidence precisely as an
exception to the hearsay rule on the grounds of
trustworthiness and necessity. "Trustworthiness"
because the statements are made instinctively
(Wesley vs. State, 53 Ala. 182), and "necessity"
because such natural and spontaneous utterances
are more convincing than the testimony of the same
person on the stand (Mobile vs. Ascraft 48 Ala. 31).
Therefore, the fact that the declarant, Ernesto, was
not presented to testify does not make the testimony
of Linda and Aida hearsay since the said declaration
is part of the res gestae. Similarly, we considered
part of the res gestae a conversation between two
accused immediately after commission of the crime
as overheard by a prosecution witness (People vs.
Reyes, 82 Phil. 563).
19. MARK BAYQUEN, vs. THE COURT OF
APPEALS AND THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES. G.R. No. 93851 March 6, 1992
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
FACTS: Bernadette Estepa’s testifies the following:
Before 4:00 a.m. of July 25, 1984, Bernadette
Estepa was awakened by a commotion outside her
room as if a door was being closed. Thinking that it
was only her brother, she returned to her bed and
went back to sleep. After about 5 minutes, she was
awakened by the alarm clock which she previously
set at 4:00. She called out Bong several times but
nobody answered so she got up to wake him up per
his request.
As she was calling his name she heard two
gunshots coming from downstairs. Immediately she
went down and there she saw at the stair landing
her brother, Bong, lying face down. She lifted him up
and noticed that he was bleeding. She asked him
"why". Bong answered in Ilocos, "Pinaltogandak ken
sinasakdak" (They shot and stabbed me.)
Bernadette asked him who did it and he answered
clearly, "Mark Bayquen and Boco".
Wilfredo Boco and Mark Bayquen were charged
before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City,
Branch VI for the crime of Homicide defined and
penalized under Art. 249 of the Revised Penal
Code.
Petitioner faults the appellate court for upholding the
trial court's reliance on the sole testimony of
Bernadette Estepa, the deceased's sister, who had
pointed to Wilfredo Boco and Mark Bayquen ads the
persons who "shot and stabbed" her brother Bong
Estepa, based on Bong's dying declaration. The
petitioner believes that the ante-mortem statements
should have been disregarded considering that they
were revealed 14 days after Bong Estepa's death on
July 24, 1984 or on August 8, 1984.
Bernadette's excuse in the present case for not
divulging the dying declaration of her brother, Bong
Estepa, was that she was afraid because she was
all alone since her parents, brothers and sisters
were all abroad. Strangely, however, this was not
her attitude, when, in the morning of the incident,
she ventured out into the dark alone at 4:00 in the
morning, walked down the stairs despite the sound
of two gunshots.
Nonetheless, granting her fears, We cannot
understand why she still failed to go to the police
authorities upon arrival from Germany of her father
and her mother, brothers and sister, from the States.
The physical presence of these persons would have
provided her the necessary moral support and
 ALABA, MICHELLE M.
would have shielded her from feared reprisals.

Petitioner asks instead that the statements of
Bernadette Estepa, uttered immediately after the
incident be given credence, since these were made
spontaneously without any opportunity to fabricate
or concoct any statement. Petitioner stated in his
appeal brief:
Interviewed right after the death of the brother by
investigating policeman MELENCIO SANTOS of the
Baguio City Police Department and asked who killed
her brother, she replied that her brother could hardly
talk.
Interviewed that same morning by Dr. Florita Ferrer-
Garcia, Officer-in-Charge of the Baguio Health
Department, for purposes of giving her consent to
the autopsy of her brother, she was asked who
killed her brother and her answer was that a robber
killed her brother without naming any names.
Again, interviewed by her own barangay captain,
Alberto Della, who even offered her the protection of
his office and even provided her with a rifle, when
asked if she knew the assailants of her brother, she
said "NO".
The herein accused-appellant respectfully submits
that these statements must be given great weight in
analyzing the whole body of evidence against the
accused. Aside from Bernadette Estepa, no one
was presented to corroborate her testimony. Upon
her sole testimony therefore rest the entire case.
ISSUE: Should the accused be considered
criminally liable based on the dying declarations of
Bong Estepa as part of res gestae given by her
sister Bernadette Estepa?
HELD: No. The utterances of the witness
Bernadette Estepa to the policeman, to the doctor,
and to her barangay captain were spontaneous
declarations, without premeditation on her part. She
was still suffering under the strain of a startling
occurence, the stimuli of which did not allow her any
opportunity to fabricate or dissimulate. It is the
respectful submission of herein accused-appellant
that such statements and utterances under the
obtaining conditions fall under the res gestae rule,
that is, they are part of the res gestae.
As between the spontaneous statements of
Bernadette Estepa, therefore, and those which she
gave before the NBI two weeks after her brother's
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
death, it is clear that the former statements should
be given weight and credence.
20. DBP POOL OF ACCREDITED INSURANCE
FACTS: Radio Mindanao Network, Inc. (RMN)
COMPANIES vs. RADIO MINDANAO
obtained a fire insurance for its office in Bacolod
NETWORK, INC. G.R. No. 147039 January 27,
City with DBP Pool of Accredited Insurance
Companies (DBP) and with Provident Insurance
Corp. Under the insurance insurance policy,
specifically condition no. 6 ( c ) and (d), it does not
cover any loss or damage occasioned by or through
or in consequence, directly or indirectly, of any of
the following consequences, namely: (c) War,
invasion, act of foreign enemy, hostilities, or warlike
operations (whether war be declared or not), civil
war. (d) Mutiny, riot, military or popular rising,
insurrection, rebellion, revolution, military or usurped
power.
On July 27, 1988, RMN’s office in Bacolod was
razed by armed men. RMN was denied recovery of
damages from the insurance companies on the
ground that the burning was caused by members of
the Communist Party of the Philippines/New
People’s Army (CPP/NPA) thus was covered under
the exception under the insurance policy. DBP and
Provident made such assertions based on the fire
investigation report of SFO III Leonardo Rochar and
LTC Nicolas Torres, that the bystanders heard the
armed men shouting “Mabuhay ang NPA” after they
set fire to the building.
RMN filed action for recovery of sum of
money against tge insurance companies. The trial
court ruled in favor of RMN stating that there was no
sufficient evidence to prove that the burning was
perpetrated by the NPA as the statements made by
the bystanders were hearsay. DBP and Provident
appealed to the CA, which affirmed the ruling of the
RTC.
ISSUE: WON the testimony of the bystanders is
considered as res gestae
HELD: No, it is not res gestae. In order for res
gestae to apply as an exception to the hearsay rule,
the following must be present: : (1) that the principal
act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence; (2) the
statements were made before the declarant had the
time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and (3) that

the statements must concern the occurrence in
question and its immediate attending circumstances.
Res gestae refers to those exclamations and
statements made by either the participants, victims,
or spectators to a crime immediately before, during,
or after the commission of the crime, when the
circumstances are such that the statements were
made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance
inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there
was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate
and to fabricate a false statement.
In the instance case, it cannot be said that these
utterances were made spontaneously by the
bystanders and before they had the time to contrive
or devise a falsehood. Both SFO III Rochar and Lt.
Col. Torres received the bystanders’ statements
while they were making their investigations during
and after the fire. It is reasonable to assume that
when these statements were noted down, the
bystanders already had enough time and
opportunity to mill around, talk to one another and
exchange information, not to mention theories and
speculations, as is the usual experience in
disquieting situations where hysteria is likely to take
place. It cannot therefore be ascertained whether
these utterances were the products of truth. That
the utterances may be mere idle talk is not remote.
Evidence that persons who burned the radio
facilities shouted “Mabuhay ang NPA” does not
furnish logical conclusion that they are member [sic]
of the NPA or that their act was an act of rebellion or
insurrection. Additional convincing proof need be
submitted. Defendants failed to discharge their
responsibility to present adequate proof that the loss
was due to a risk excluded.”
21. PEOPLE VS. PALMONES [G.R. No. 136303.
July 18, 2000]
FACTS: The case evolved from a shooting incident
that happened in Kidapawan, Sultan Kudaratthat
involved a police officer AsimMamansal as the
victim who was killed later and the brothers
AnthonyMelchor and Anthony Baltazar Palmones as
the accused-assailants.
That one night in April 27, 1997, the victim was shot
in a dark place, together with his paramour, while
riding home by an unidentified person who later
were
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
known through the prosecution’s witness testimony
as the Palmones brothers.
The identity of the two accused was raised based on
the testimony of Sony Boy Redovan, the witness of
the prosecution who was also a nephew of the
victim, who testified that before the death of his
uncle, the later was able to declare that the
accused-assailant were the Palmones brothers.
That the witness Redovan was able to talk with his
uncle nearly an hour before it dies, and that the
same declared who shot him.
The same testimony was also testified by Inspector
Tagum who said that he was able to ask the victim
while in the emergency room, about the identity of
his perpetrator, and that were Juany and Tony
Palmones.
The two accused were convicted for a crime of
murder in the RTC based largely on the alleged
dying declaration of the victim through the
testimonies of the witnesses Sonny Boy Redovan
and Inspector Tagum and the apparent weakness of
their defense. Hence, this appeal by the accused-
appellants to the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the court a quo erred in considering the
alleged dying declaration of AsimMamansal as an
exception to the hearsay rule.
2. Whether the court a quo erred in considering the
alleged dying declaration of AsimMamansal as part
of the Res Gestae Rule.
HELD:
1. Yes. There was an error in considering the
alleged dying declaration of AsimMamansal for it
lacks some of the requirements to be an exceptions
to the rule of inadmissibility of hearsay evidence for
it to be admissible as evidence to the court.
Section 31, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Sec. 31. Dying declaration. – The declaration of a
dying person, made under a consciousness of an
impending death, may be received in a criminal
case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as
evidence of the cause and surrounding
circumstances of such death
 ALABA, MICHELLE M.

As such, the requirements for the admissibility of an statement.

ante mortem statement are: (a) it must concern the
crime and the surrounding circumstances of the
declarant’s death; (b) at the time it was made, the
declarant was under a consciousness of impending
death; (c) the declarant was competent as a
witness; and (d) the declaration was offered in a
criminal case for murder, homicide or parricide
wherein which the decedent was the victim.

In cases where an alleged dying declaration is

sought to be admitted, it must be proven that that
the declaration was made “under a consciousness
of impending death” which means simply that the
declarant is fully aware that he is dying or going to
die from his wounds or injuries soon or imminently,
or shall have a complete conviction that death is at
hand, or there must be “a settled hopeless
expectation.”

In this case, it was not established by the

prosecution that the statements of the declarant
concerning the cause and surrounding
circumstances of his death were made under the
consciousness of impending death. No proof to this
effect was ever presented by the prosecution. It
was not shown whether Sonny Boy Redovan or
Inspector Alexander Tagum ever asked the victim
whether he believed that he was going to die out of
his injuries or any other similar question. Sonny Boy
Redovan claimed that he was able to talk with the
victim for around an hour but the only thing he
revealed of their conversation was the alleged
identification of the victim of his two assailants. For
his part, Inspector Tagum admitted that the only
question he asked of the victim was if the victim
knew who had shot him.From these points, there
was no proved that the victim was ever aware of the
seriousness of his condition.

2. Yes. The alleged statements attributed to the

victim cannot be admitted as part of the res gestae
because it lacks the requisites of spontaneity in
order for it to be admitted as part of the res gestae
and be admissible as evidence to the court.

Res gestae refers to those exclamations

and statements made by either the participants,
victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before,
during, or immediately after the commission of a
crime, when the circumstances are such that the
statements were made as a spontaneous reaction
or utterance inspired by the excitement of the
occasion and there was no opportunity for the
declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false
 ALABA, MICHELLE M.
In order to admit statements as evidence part of
the res gestae, the element of spontaneity is
critical. The following factors have generally been
considered in determining whether statements
offered in evidence as part of the res gestae have
been made spontaneously: (1) the time that
lapsed between the occurrence of the act or
transaction and the making of the statement; (2)
the place where the statement was made; (3) the
condition of the declarant when he made the
statement; (4) the presence or absence of
intervening events between the occurrence and
the statement relative thereto; and (5) the nature
and circumstances of the statement itself.

Tested against these factors to test the

spontaneity of the statements attributed to the
victim, we rule that these statements fail to qualify
as part of the res gestae. When Mamansal
allegedly uttered the statements attributed to him,
an appreciable amount of time had already
elapsed from the time that he was shot as the
victim was shot at around 10:00 p.m. but he only
uttered the statements attributed to him about 30
minutes to an hour later. Moreover, he allegedly
made these statements not at the scene of the
crime but at the hospital where he was brought for
treatment. Likewise, the trip from the scene of the
crime to the hospital constituted an intervening
event that could have afforded the victim
opportunity for deliberation. These circumstances,
taken together, indubitably show that the
statements allegedly uttered by Mamansal lack
the requisite spontaneity in order for these to be
admitted as part of the res gestae.

22. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.

FACTS: On November 2, 1996, the spouses
Rosendo and Merlita Tumulak went to the GORGONIO VILLARAMA alias Baby G.R. No.
cemetery to light candles for the dead, leaving 139211. February 12, 2003
behind their three young children, Arthel,
Bernadeth and Elizabeth (all minors), playing
inside their house without adult supervision.

Appellant, 35-year-old Gorgonio Villarama, elder

brother of the victim’s mother Merlita, arrived at
the Tumulaks house and found the three children
by themselves.

Thereupon, appellant ordered the two older

children, Arthel and Bernadeth, to pasture the
goats, leaving the youngest, Elizabeth, with him.
Once alone, appellant raped his niece Elizabeth.
 ALABA, MICHELLE M.

This was the scene which greeted the prosecutions still crying when her parents arrived reinforces
eyewitness, Ricardo Tumulak, younger brother of the
Elizabeth’s father Rosendo, when he arrived at his
brother’s house to return the bolo he borrowed from
the latter.

Rosendo and Merlita Tumulak got home at about six

oclock in the evening. They were met by Rosendos
parents who told them what happened.

Appellant asserts that the testimonies of the victim’s

parents were hearsay since they did not witness the
actual rape and were only relating the rape as
allegedly told to them by Elizabeth.

ISSUE: Whether or not the testimonies of the

victim’s parents are mere hearsay?

HELD: Yes.

There are several well-entrenched exceptions to the

hearsay rule under Sections 37 to 47 of Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court. Pertinent to the case at bar is
Section 42 which provides:

SEC. 42. Part of the res gestae. - Statements made

by a person while a startling occurrence is taking
place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto
with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be
given in evidence as part of the res gestae. So,
also, statements accompanying an equivocal act
material to the issue, and giving it a legal
significance, may be received as part of the res
gestae.

To be admissible as part of res gestae, a statement

must be spontaneous, made during a startling
occurrence or immediately prior or subsequent
thereto, and must relate to the circumstance of such
occurrence.29cräläwvirtualibräry

In the case at bar, there is no doubt that the victim

was subjected to a startling occurrence when she
pointed to appellant as her assailant. It is evident
from the records that the statement was
spontaneous because the time gap from the sexual
assault to the time the victim recounted her
harrowing experience in the hands of appellant was
very short. Obviously, there was neither capability
nor opportunity for the 4- year-old victim to fabricate
her statement.

The critical factor is the ability or chance to invent a

story of rape. At her age, the victim could not have
had the sophistication, let alone the malice, to tell
her mother that her uncle made her lie down, took
off her panties and inserted his penis inside her
vagina.

The shock of an unwelcome genital penetration on a

woman is unimaginable, more so to a four-year-old
child. Such a brutal experience constituted
unspeakable trauma. The fact that Elizabeth was
 ALABA, MICHELLE M.
conclusion that she was still in a traumatic state
when she made the statements pointing to
appellant.

23. RODOLFO BELBIS, JR. vs PEOPLE G.R. No.

FACTS: On December 9, 1997, Veronica Dacir
181052NOVEMBER 14, 2012
heard his live-in partner, Jose Bahillo, shouting
and calling her name. She saw blood at the back
of Jose’s shorts. It was there that he told her that
he was held by petitioner Alberto while Rodolfo
stabbed him four times. He was taken to the
hospital and was given immediate treatment and
antibiotics. Although his wounds were not
completely healed, Jose failed to return to the
hospital due to financial constraints.

Veronica brought Jose back to the hospital on

January 1, 1998, because he was complaining of
urinary retention and pains in his left and lumbar
regions. He was diagnosed with having advanced
Pyelonephritis, wherein his kidney was inflamed
and with pus formation and scarring.
Subsequently, Joes died.

The RTC convicted both accused of the crime of

homicide, but appreciated the mitigating
circumstance of incomplete self-defense. The CA
affirmed the decision.

On appeal, the petitioner argue that the CA erred

in ruling that the statements issued by the victim in
the presence of witnesses Veronica Dacir and
SPO1 Bataller before he died are dying
declarations within the contemplation of the law as
the victim still lived for one month after the said
dying declaration was made.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a dying

declaration in the case at bar.

HELD: No. A dying declaration is a statement

made by the victim of homicide, referring to the
material facts which concern the cause and
circumstances of the killing and which is uttered
under a fixed belief that death is impending and is
certain to follow immediately, or in a very short
time, without an opportunity of retraction and in
the absence of all hopes of recovery. In other
words, it is a statement made by a person after a
mortal wound has been inflicted, under a belief
that death is certain, stating the facts concerning
the cause and circumstances surrounding his/her
death.

As an exception to the hearsay rule, the requisites
for its admissibility are as follows: (1) the declaration
is made by the deceased under the consciousness
of his impending death; (2) the deceased was at the
time competent as a witness; (3) the declaration
concerns the cause and surrounding circumstances
of the declarant’s death; and (4) the declaration is
offered in a criminal case wherein the declarant’s
death is the subject of inquiry.
The fact that the victim was stabbed on December
9, 1997 and died only on January 8, 1998 does not
prove that the victim made the statement or
declaration under the consciousness of an
impending death. The rule is that, in order to make a
dying declaration admissible, a fixed belief in
inevitable and imminent death must be entered by
the declarant. It is the belief in impending death and
not the rapid succession of death in point of fact that
renders the dying declaration admissible. It is not
necessary that the approaching death be presaged
by the personal feelings of the deceased. The test is
whether the declarant has abandoned all hopes of
survival and looked on death as certainly
impending. As such, the CA incorrectly ruled that
there were dying declarations.
The CA should have admitted the statement made
by the victim to Veronica Dacir right after he was
stabbed as part of the res gestae and not a dying
declaration.
All that is required for the admissibility of a given
statement as part of the res gestae, is that it be
made under the influence of a startling event
witnessed by the person who made the declaration
before he had time to think and make up a story, or
to concoct or contrive a falsehood, or to fabricate an
account, and without any undue influence in
obtaining it, aside from referring to the event in
question or its immediate attending circumstances.
In sum, there are three requisites to admit evidence
as part of the res gestae: (1) that the principal act,
the res gestae, be a startling occurrence; (2) the
statements were made before the declarant had the
time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and (3) that
the statements must concern the occurrence in
question and its immediate attending circumstances.
It goes without saying that the element of
spontaneity is critical.
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
24.G.R. No. 150464 June 27,
2006SECURITY BANK AND TRUST COMPANY,
Petitioner, vs. ERIC GAN, Respondent.
FACTS: In 1981, respondent Eric Gan opened a
current account with petitioner at its Soler Branch in
Santa Cruz, Manila. Petitioner alleged that it had an
agreement with respondent wherein the latter would
deposit an initial amount in his current account and
he could draw checks on said account provided
there were sufficient funds to cover them.
Furthermore, under a special arrangement with
petitioner’s branch manager then, Mr. Qui,
respondent was allowed to transfer funds from his
account to another person’s account also within the
same branch. Respondent availed of such
arrangement several times by depositing checks in
his account and even before they cleared, he
withdrew the proceeds thereof and transferred them
to the other account. These transactions were
covered by what were known as "debit memos"
since respondent had no sufficient funds to cover
the amounts he transferred.
Later on, respondent purportedly incurred an
overdraft or negative balance in his account. As of
December 14, 1982, the overdraft balance came up
to P153,757.78.
In 1991, petitioner filed a complaint for sum of
money against respondent to recover the
P297,060.01 with 12% interest per annum from
September 16, 1990 until fully paid, attorney’s fees,
litigation expenses and costs of suit.
To prove its claim, petitioner presented Patricio
Mercado who was the bookkeeper who handled the
account of respondent and recorded his
transactions in a ledger. Based on the ledger, the
overdraft resulted from transfers of funds from
respondent’s current account to another person’s
account. These transfers were made under the
authority of Qui. Respondent categorically denied
that he ever authorized these “funds transfers.”
Both the trial court and the CA found that petitioner
failed to substantiate its claim that respondent
knowingly incurred an overdraft against his account.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ledger cards and the
testimony of Patricio Mercado constituted the best
evidence of the transactions made by the
respondent relative to his account

HELD: No. We see no reason to disturb the findings
of the lower courts.
The entries in the ledger, as testified to by Mercado
were not competent evidence to prove that
respondent consented to the transfers of funds.
These entries merely showed that the transfers
were indeed made and that Qui approved them.
Neither can we accept petitioner’s argument that the
entries made by Mercado in the ledger were
competent evidence to prove how and when the
negative balance incurred. Petitioner invokes
Section 43 of Rule 130 (Entries in the course of
business).
Under these exceptions to the hearsay rule, the
admission in evidence of entries in corporate books
required the satisfaction of the following conditions:
1. The person who made the entry must be
dead, or unable to testify;
2. The entries were made at or near the time of
the transactions to which they refer;
3. The entrant was in a position to know the
facts stated in the entries;
4. The entries were made in his professional
capacity or in the performance of a duty,
whether legal, contractual, moral or
religious; and
5. The entries were made in the ordinary or
regular course of business or duty.
The ledger entries did not meet the first and third
requisites.
Mercado, petitioner’s bookkeeper who prepared the
entries, was presented to testify on the transactions
pertaining to the account of respondent. It was in
the course of his testimony that the ledger entries
were presented. There was, therefore, neither
justification nor necessity for the presentation of the
entries as the person who made them was available
to testify in court.
Moreover, Mercado had no personal knowledge of
the facts constituting the entries, particularly those
entries which resulted in the negative balance. He
had no knowledge of the truth or falsity of these
entries.
As the Court of Appeals held, there is good reason
why evidence of this nature is incorrigibly hearsay.
Entries in business records which sprung from the
duty of other employees to communicate facts
occurring in the ordinary course of business are
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
prima facie admissible, the duty to communicate
being itself a badge of trustworthiness of the entries,
but not when they purport to record what were
independent agreements arrived at by some bank
officials and a client. In this case, the entries
become mere casual or voluntary reports of the
official concerned. To permit the ledgers, prepared
by the bank at its own instance, to substitute the
contract as proof of the agreements with third
parties, is to set a dangerous precedent. Business
entries are allowed as an exception to the hearsay
rule only under certain conditions specified in
Section 43, which must be scrupulously observed to
prevent them from being used as a source of undue
advantage for the party preparing them.
Thus, petitioner did not prove that respondent had
incurred a negative balance in his account.
Consequently, there was nothing to show that
respondent was indebted to it in the amount
claimed.
25. HEIRS OF IGNACIO CONTI V. COURT OF
FACTS: Lourdes Sampayo and Ignacio Conti,
APPEALS, G.R. NO. 118464
married to Rosario Cuario, were the co-owners of
the property. On 17 March 1986 Lourdes Sampayo
died intestate without issue. Subsequently, on 1
April 1987 private respondents Josefina S. Reyes
and the others were all represented by their
Attorney-in-Fact Lydia S. Reyes, with Lolita A.
Sampayo acting also in her own behalf and as
Attorney-in-Fact of Norma A. Sampayo, all claiming
to be collateral relatives of the deceased Lourdes
Sampayo, filed an action for partition and damages.
The spouses Ignacio Conti and Rosario Cuario
refused the partition on the ground that private
respondents failed to produce any document to
prove that they were the rightful heirs of Lourdes
Sampayo. On 30 August 1987 Ignacio Conti died
and was substituted as party-defendant by his
children Asuncion, Francisco, Milagros, Joselito,
Luisito, Diego and Teresita, all surnamed Conti.
At the trial, private respondents presented Lydia
Sampayo Reyes and Adelaida Sampayo to prove
that they were the collateral heirs of the deceased
Lourdes Sampayo and therefore entitled to her
rights as co-owner of the subject lot. Bringing with
her the original copy of her certificate of live birth
showing that her father was Inocentes Reyes and
her mother was Josefina Sampayo, Lydia Sampayo
Reyes testified that she was one of the nieces of
Lourdes Sampayo, being the daughter of Josefina
Sampayo,

the only living sibling of Lourdes. Lydia also testified
that Lourdes had another sister named Remedios J.
Sampayo who died in 1948, and two brothers,
Manuel J. Sampayo and Luis J. Sampayo who died
in 1983 and 1960, respectively. To prove that
Josefina, Remedios, Luis and Manuel were siblings
of Lourdes, their baptismal certificates together with
a photocopy of the birth certificate of Manuel
Sampayo were offered in evidence. These
documents showed that their father and mother, like
Lourdes Sampayo, were Antonio Sampayo and
Brigida Jaraza.
The certificates of baptism presented as part of the
testimony of Lydia Sampayo Reyes were prepared
by Rev. Franklin C. Rivero who duly certified that all
data therein written were in accordance with the
church records, hence, the lower left portion of the
documents bearing the seal of the church with the
notation as to where the documents were logged in
particular. The baptismal certificates were presented
in lieu of the birth certificates because the repository
of those documents, the Office of the Civil Registrar
of Lucena City, had been razed by fire on two
separate occasions, 27 November 1974 and 30
August 1983, thus all civil registration records were
totally burned. On the other hand, a photocopy of
Manuel’s birth certificate dated 25 October 1919
showed that it was issued by the Local Civil
Registrar of Lucena, Tayabas (now Lucena City).
Adelaida Sampayo, widow of Manuel Sampayo,
testified that her husband Manuel was the brother of
the deceased Lourdes, and with the death of
Manuel, Luis and Remedios, the only living sibling
of Lourdes was Josefina.
To rebut whatever rights the alleged heirs of
Lourdes had over the subject lot, petitioners
presented Rosario Cuario Conti, Rosa Ladines
Malundas and Rodolfo Espineli. Rosario testified
that the subject property was co-owned in equal
shares by her husband Ignacio Conti and Lourdes
Sampayo and that her family (Rosario) had been
staying in the subject property since 1937. 11 In
fact, she said that her late husband Ignacio Conti
paid for the real estate taxes 12 and spent for the
necessary repairs and improvements thereon 13
because by agreement Lourdes would leave her
share of the property to them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the documentary and
testimonial evidence submitted are competent and
adequate proofs that private respondents are
collateral heirs of Lourdes Sampayo
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
HELD: The entries made in the Registry Book may
be considered as entries made in the course of the
business under Section 43 of Rule 130, which is an
exception to the hearsay rule. The baptisms
administered by the church are one of its
transactions in the exercise of ecclesiastical duties
and recorded in the book of the church during the
course of its business.
It may be argued that baptismal certificates are
evidence only of the administration of the
sacrament, but in this case, there were four (4)
baptismal certificates which, when taken together,
uniformly show that Lourdes, Josefina, Remedios
and Luis had the same set of parents, as indicated
therein. Corroborated by the undisputed testimony
of Adelaida Sampayo that with the demise of
Lourdes and her brothers Manuel, Luis and sister
Remedios, the only sibling left was Josefina
Sampayo Reyes, such baptismal certificates have
acquired evidentiary weight to prove filiation.
Petitioners’ objection to the photocopy of the
certificate of birth of Manuel Sampayo was properly
discarded by the court a quo and respondent Court
of Appeals. According to Sec. 3, par. (1), Rule 130,
of the Rules of Court, when the subject of inquiry is
the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document itself
except when the original has been lost or destroyed
or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on
the part of the offeror. The loss or destruction of the
original certificate of birth of Manuel J. Sampayo
was duly established by the certification issued by
the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Lucena City
to the effect that its office was completely destroyed
by fire on 27 November 1974 and 30 August 1983,
respectively, and as consequence thereof, all civil
registration records were totally burned.
26. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner, vs.
JAIME M. RAMOS, NILDA RAMOS, ERLINDA
FACTS: Respondents are officers of the Negros
ILANO, MILAGROS ILANO, DANIEL ILANO
Telephone Company who held confirmed tickets for
AND FELIPA JAVALERA, respondents. G.R.
PAL. The tickets were brought sometime in August
No. 92740 March 23, 1992
1985. Among the conditions included in plaintiffs
tickets is the following:

1. CHECK-IN TIME- at least one hour before
PUBLISHED departure time of your flight. We will
consider your accommodation forfeited in favor of
waitlisted passenger if you fail to check-in at least
30 minutes before PUBLISHED departure time.
Respondents claim in their Complaint that they went
tot he check-in counter of the PAL's Naga branch at
least one (1) hour before the published departure
time but no one was at the counter until 30 minutes
before departure, but upon checking -in and
presentation of their tickets to the employee/clerk
who showed up, their tickets were cancelled and the
seats awarded to chance passengers; plaintiffs had
to go to Manila by bus, and seek actual, moral and
exemplary damages, and attorney's fees for breach
of contract of carriage.
PAL disclaim any liability, claiming that the non-
accommodation of plaintiff on the said flight was due
to their having check-in (sic) late for their flight. It is
averred even if PAL is found liable to the plaintiffs
such liability is confined to, and limited by, the CAB
Economic Regulations No. 7 in conjunction with
P.D. 589.
RTC found PAL guilty of breach of contract of
carriage. PAL appealed to the Court of Appeals who
affirmed the RTC’s decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the private respondents
were late in checking-in for their flight from Naga
City to Manila.
HELD: Yes. As a rule, the determination of a
question of fact depends largely on the credibility of
witnesses unless some documentary evidence is
available which clearly substantiates the issue and
whose genuineness and probative value is not
disputed.
The private respondents claim that they were on
time in checking-in for their flight; that no PAL
personnel attended to them until much later which
accounted for their late check-in; that PAL advanced
the check- in time and the departure of their flight
resulting in their non-accommodation; and that
they suffered physical difficulties, anxieties and
business losses. The evidence on record does not
support the above contentions. We note that there
were two other confirmed passengers who came
ahead of the private respondents names Capati
and Go but were refused accommodation because
they were late. The
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
private respondents submitted no controverting
evidence. As clearly manifested above, the
intervening time between Capati and Go and the
private respondents took only a mere second. If
indeed, the private respondents were at the check-in
counter at 3:30 p.m., they could have been the first
ones to be attended to by Araquel than Capati and
Go.
In the absence of any controverting evidence, the
documentary evidence presented to corroborate the
testimonies of PAL's witnesses are prima facie
evidence of the truth of their allegations. The plane
tickets of the private respondents (with emphasis on
the printed condition of the contract of carriage
regarding check-in time as well as on the notation
"late 4:02" stamped on the flight coupon by the
check-in clerk immediately upon the check-in of
private respondents) and the passenger Manifest of
Flight PR 264 (which showed the non-
accommodation of Capati and Go an the private
respondents)are entries made in the regular course
of business which the private respondents failed to
overcome with substantial and convincing evidence
other than their testimonies. Consequently, they
carry more weight and credence.
A writing or document made contemporaneously
with a transaction in which are evidenced facts
pertinent to an issue, when admitted as proof of
those facts, is ordinarily regarded as more reliable
proof and of greater probative force than the oral
testimony of a witness as to such facts based upon
memory and recollection. Spoken words could be
notoriously unreliable as against a written document
that speaks a uniform language.
27 NESTLE vs. FY SONS
FACTS: NESTLE and FY SONS entered into a
G.R. No. 150780 May 5, 2006
distributorship agreement whereby NESTLE would
supply its products for FY SONS to distribute to its
food service outlets. A deed of assignment was also
executed by respondent in favor of NESTLE
assigning the time deposit of a certain Calixto
Laureano in the amount of P500,000 to secure FY
SONS credit purchases from NESTLE. A special
power of attorney was likewise executed by
Laureano authorizing the FY SONS to use the time
deposit as collateral.
 ALABA, MICHELLE M.

NESTLE fined FY for allegedly selling 50 cases of HELD: No. The provision does not apply in this case
Krem-Top liquid coffee creamer to Lu Hing Market, because it does not involve entries made in the
a retail outlet in Tarlac. This was purportedly course of business. Rayos testified on a statement
proscribed by the agreement. Respondent paid the of account she prepared on the basis of invoices
fine. In September 1990, Krem-Top liquid coffee and delivery orders which she, however, knew
creamer was sold to Augustus Bakery and Grocery, nothing about. She had no personal knowledge of
an act again allegedly in violation of the agreement. the facts on which the accounts were based since,
NESTLE imposed a P40,000 fine which FY refused admittedly, she was not involved in the delivery of
to pay. goods and was merely in charge of the records and
documents of all accounts receivable as part of her
FY wrote petitioner to complain about the latter’s
duties as credit and collection manager. She thus
breaches of their agreement and the various acts of
knew nothing of the truth or falsity of the facts stated
bad faith committed by NESTLE against it. In turn,
in the invoices and delivery orders, i.e., whether
on NESTLE sent FY a demand letter and notice of
such deliveries were in fact made in the amounts
termination, alleging that the latter had outstanding
and on the dates stated, or whether they were
accounts of P995,319.81. When the alleged
actually received by respondent. She was not even
accounts were not settled, NESTLE applied the
the credit and collection manager during the period
P500,000 time deposit as partial payment.
the agreement was in effect.16 This can only mean
that she merely obtained these documents from
Respondent filed a complaint for damages against
another without any personal knowledge of their
petitiner, alleging bad faith.
contents.
Both the CA and the RTC found, among others, that
The foregoing shows that Rayos was incompetent to
NESTLE indeed failed to provide support to FY, its
testify on whether or not the invoices and delivery
distributor; that NESTLE unjustifiably refused to
orders turned over to her correctly reflected the
deliver stocks to FY; that the imposition of the
details of the deliveries made. Thus, the CA
P20,000 fine was void for having no basis; that
correctly disregarded her testimony.
NESTLE failed to prove FY’s alleged outstanding
obligation; that NESTLE terminated the agreement
Furthermore, the invoices and delivery orders
without sufficient basis in law or equity and in bad
presented by NESTLE were self-serving. Having
faith; and that petitioner should be held liable for
generated these documents, NESTLE could have
damages. Hence, NESTLE appealed.
easily fabricated them. NESTLE’s failure to present
any competent witness to identify the signatures and
NESTLE argues that the CA should not have
other information in those invoices and delivery
disregarded the testimony of its witness, Cristina
orders cast doubt on their veracity.
Rayos, who prepared the statement of account on
the basis of the invoices and delivery orders
corresponding to the alleged overdue accounts of 28. BARCELON, ROXAS SECURITIES, INC.
FACTS: Petitioner is a corporation engaged in
respondent. NESTLE further contends that the (now known as UBP Securities, Inc.) vs. CIR G.
the trading of securities. On 14 April 1988,
testimony of Rayos was an exception to the hearsay R. No. 157064 (August 7, 2006)
petitioner filed its Annual Income Tax Return for
rule under Section 43, Rule 130 of the Rules of taxable year 1987. After an audit investigation
Court: conducted by the BIR, respondent CIR issued an
assessment for deficiency income tax in the
Entries in the course of business. — Entries
amount of P826,698.31 arising from the
made at, or near the time of the transactions to
disallowance of the item on salaries, bonuses
which they refer, by a person deceased, or unable
and allowances in the amount of P1,219,093,93
to testify, who was in a position to know the facts
as part of the deductible business expense since
therein stated, may be received as prima facie
petitioner failed to subject the salaries, bonuses
evidence, if such person made the entries in his
and allowances to withholding taxes.
professional capacity or in the performance of duty
and in the ordinary or regular course of business or
This assessment was covered by Formal
duty.
Assessment Notice dated 1 February 1991,
ISSUE:Is the testimony of Rayos an exception to
the hearsay rule and thus be validly admitted?

which, respondent alleges, was sent to petitioner
through registered mail on 6 February 1991.
However, petitioner denies receiving the formal
assessment notice.
Petitioner filed a formal protest but subsequently,
the latter received a letter from the respondent
denying the protest with finality.
On 31 July 1998, petitioner filed a petition for
review with the CTA. The CTA found the BIR
records submitted by the respondent immaterial,
self-serving, and therefore insufficient to prove
that the assessment notice was mailed and duly
received by the petitioner.
CA - reversed the CTA decision, the CA found
the evidence presented by the respondent to be
sufficient proof that the tax assessment notice
was mailed to the petitioner, therefore the legal
presumption that it was received should apply
ISSUE Whether or not Rule 130 Section 44 is
applicable in this case
HELD: No. In the present case, petitioner denies
receiving the assessment notice, and the
respondent was unable to present substantial
evidence that such notice was, indeed, mailed or
sent by the respondent before the BIR’s right to
assess had prescribed and that said notice was
received by the petitioner. The respondent
presented the BIR record book where the name
of the taxpayer, the kind of tax assessed, the
registry receipt number and the date of mailing
were noted. The BIR records custodian, Ingrid
Versola, also testified that she made the entries
therein. Respondent offered the entry in the BIR
record book and the testimony of its record
custodian as entries in official records in
accordance with Section 44, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court, 24 which states that:
Section 44. Entries in official
records. - Entries in official records made in
the performance of his duty by a public
officer of the Philippines, or by a person in
the performance of a duty specially
enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence
of the facts therein stated.
The foregoing rule on evidence, however, must
be read in accordance with this
Court’s
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
pronouncement in Africa v. Caltex (Phil.), Inc.,
where it has been held that an entrant must have
personal knowledge of the facts stated by him or
such facts were acquired by him from reports
made by persons under a legal duty to submit the
same.
There are three requisites for admissibility under
the rule just mentioned:
(a) that the entry was made by a
public officer, or by another person
specially enjoined by law to do so;
(b) that it was made by the public
officer in the performance of his duties, or
by such other person in the performance
of a duty specially enjoined by law; and
(c) that the public officer or other
person had sufficient knowledge of the
facts by him stated, which must have
been acquired by him personally or
through official information x x x.
In this case, the entries made by Ingrid Versola
were not based on her personal knowledge as she
did not attest to the fact that she personally
prepared and mailed the assessment notice. Nor
was it stated in the transcript of stenographic notes
26 how and from whom she obtained the pertinent
information. Moreover, she did not attest to the fact
that she acquired the reports from persons under a
legal duty to submit the same. Hence, Rule 130,
Section 44 finds no application in the present case.
Thus, the evidence offered by respondent does not
qualify as an exception to the rule against hearsay
evidence.
29 G.R. No. 107735 February 1, 1996
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. RICARDO
SAN GABRIEL
FACTS: The accused is now before us on appeal.
The evidence shows that at around seven o'clock in
the evening of 26 November 1989, within the vicinity
of Pier 14 at North Harbor along Marcos Road,
Manila, a fistfight ensued between Jaime Tonog on
one hand and the accused Ricardo San Gabriel
together with "Ramon Doe" on the other. The fight
was eventually broken up when onlookers pacified
the protagonists. Ricardo and Ramon then hastened
towards Marcos Road but in no time were back with
bladed weapons. They approached Tonog
surreptitiously, surrounded him and simultaneously

stabbed him in the stomach and at the back, after
which the assailants ran towards the highway
leaving Tonog behind on the ground. He was then
brought to Mary Johnston Hospital where he was
pronounced dead on arrival.
Dr. Marcial G. Cenido, Medico-Legal Officer of the
Western Police District, autopsied the cadaver of
the victim and reported that it sustained two (2)
penetrating stab wounds each caused by a single-
bladed instrument. He opined that both wounds
were fatal.
The accused further claimed that he even stayed
with the victim and called out the latter's
companions to bring him to the hospital; that
prosecution witness Brenda Gonzales only arrived
at the crime scene after Tonog was already taken to
the hospital; that Brenda even inquired from him
what happened and then prodded him to testify; that
his refusal coupled with the fact that he owed
Gonzales some money earned him the ire of the
latter and that was why he was charged for the
death of Tonog.
RTC convicted the accused for murder. Hence this
appeal.
ISSUE: did the trial court erred in giving credence to
the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Brenda
Gonzales and Pio Ochobillo?
HELD: No. The accused leans heavily on the
Advance Information Sheet prepared by Pat. Steve
Casimiro which did not mention him at all and
named only "Ramon Doe" as the principal suspect.
This cannot defeat the positive and candid
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. Entries in
official records, as in the case of a police blotter, are
only prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
They are not conclusive. The entry in the police
blotter is not necessarily entitled to full credit for it
could be incomplete and inaccurate, sometimes
from either partial suggestions or for want of
suggestions or inquiries, without the aid of which the
witness may be unable to recall the connected
collateral circumstances necessary for the correction
of the first suggestion of his memory and for his
accurate recollection of all that pertain to the
subject. It is understandable that the testimony
during the trial would be more lengthy and detailed
than the matters stated in the police blotter.
Significantly, the Advance Information Sheet was
never formally offered by the defense during the
proceedings in the court below.
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
Hence any reliance by the accused on the
document must fail since the court cannot consider
any evidence which has not been formally offered
Parenthetically, the Advance Information Sheet was
prepared by the police officer only after interviewing
Camba, an alleged eyewitness. The accused then
could have compelled the attendance of Camba as
a witness. The failure to exert the slightest effort to
present Camba on the part of the accused should
militate against his cause.
Entries in official records made in the performance
of his duty by a public officer or by a person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law are
prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.But
to be admissible in evidence three (3) requisites
must concur: (a) The entry was made by a police
officer or by another person specially enjoined by
law to do so;
(b) It was made by the public officer in the
performance of his duties or by such other person in
the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law;
and, (c) The public officer or other person had
sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated,
which must have been acquired by him personally
or through official information.
30. PETER TARAPEN vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
FACTS: G.R.
Tarapen No.charged
was 173824.before
Augustthe
28,RTC
2008of
Baguio City with Frustrated Homicide for attacking
and assaulting James Lacbao Pangoden. The day
after, the victim died from the injuries he sustained.
Dr. Lindo Mensalvas and Dr. Rizal Leo Cala,
physicians at the SLU Hospital and BGHMC,
respectively, attended to the victim. They
respectively issued a medico-legal certificate
containing the injuries sustained by the victim.
In the findings of Dr. Mensalvas, James suffered
injuries on the "left frontoparietal and left
frontotemporo parietal" areas of his head.
However, from the medico-legal certificate issued by
Dr. Cala and with his testimony in court, it is clear
that the victim suffered injuries on the right side of
his head. Also, Molly and Silmana Linglingen,
vendors in the vicinity, claimed that James was hit
on the right side of the head.
ISSUE: Which medical findings should the Court
believe?

HELD: The Court believes in the findings made by
Dr. Cala as contained in the medico-legal certificate
he issued showing that the victim suffered injuries
on the right side of his head, consistent with the
declarations of prosecution witnesses that the victim
was, from behind, struck with a shovel twice on the
right side of the head. We give more weight to this
medical certificate, because the same was issued
by a government doctor. By actual practice, only
government physicians, by virtue of their oaths as
civil service officials, are competent to examine
persons and issue medical certificates which will be
used by the government. As such, the medical
certificate carries the presumption of regularity in
the performance of his functions and duties.
Moreover, under Section 44, Rule 130, Revised
Rules of Court, entries in official records made in
the performance of official duty are prima facie
evidence of the facts therein stated. Dr. Cala’s
findings that the victim sustained injuries on the right
side of his head are, therefore, conclusive in the
absence of evidence proving the contrary, as in this
case. We cannot consider the contents of the
medical certificate issued by Dr. Mensalvas
sufficient to controvert the findings of Dr. Cala. As
held by this Court, an unverified medical certificate
not issued by a government physician is unreliable.
Even assuming arguendo that we give more weight
to the medical certificate issued by Dr. Mensalvas,
this does not mean that the testimonies of Molly and
Silmana Linglingen shall be disbelieved. It is noted
that Dr. Mensalvas testified that the victim sustained
a wound on the right side of his head, possibly
caused by a steel shovel. Such a finding is
consistent with the claim of Molly and Silmana
Linglingen that the victim was hit on the right side of
the head. Though there can be inconsistencies of
the testimonies of the witnesses with Dr.
Mensalvas’s other findings (i.e., injuries on the left
portion of the head) this does not mean that we
should totally doubt and discard the other portions
of their testimonies.
Well-settled is the rule that the testimony of a
witness may be believed in part and disbelieved in
another, depending on the corroborative evidence
or the probabilities and improbabilities of the case.
Where a part of the testimony of a witness runs
counter to the medical evidence submitted, it is
within the sound discretion of the court to determine
which portions of the testimony to reject as false
and which to consider worthy of belief.
31. PNOC Shipping and Transport Corp. v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 107518
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
FACTS: This is a civil case for damages arising
from a sea collision incident when plaintiff's tanker
hit respondent's fishing boat, causing the boat to
sink.
The lower court and CA ruled in favor of respondent
on the basis of documentary exhibits presented,
mainly the price quotations. These price quotations
were issued personally to Del Rosario who
requested for them from dealers of equipment
similar to the ones lost at the collision of the two
vessels. However, these are not published in any
list, register, periodical or other compilation nor
containing data of everyday professional need and
relied upon in the work of the occupation.
ISSUE: Whether or not price quotations considered
commercial list, thus can be admissible in evidence?
HELD: No. Price quotations are not within the
purview of commercial lists as these are not
standard handbooks or periodicals, containing data
of everyday professional need and relied upon in
the work of the occupation. These are simply letters
responding to the queries of Del Rosario.
The price quotations are ordinary private writings
which under the Revised Rules of Court should
have been proffered along with the testimony of the
authors thereof. Del Rosario could not have testified
on the veracity of the contents of the writings even
though he was the seasoned owner of a fishing fleet
because he was not the one who issued the price
quotations.
A document is a commercial list if:
(1) it is a statement of matters of interest to persons
engaged in an occupation;
(2) such statement is contained in a list, register,
periodical or other published compilation; (3) said
compilation is published for the use of persons
engaged in that occupation, and
(4) it is generally used and relied upon by persons in
the same occupation.
32. MAURICIO MANLICLIC and PHILIPPINE
RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., vs. MODESTO
CALAUNAN G.R. NO. 150157 : January 25,
FACTS: The vehicles involved in this case are: (1)
Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 353 with plate number

CVD-478, owned by petitioner PRBLI and driven by
petitioner Mauricio Manliclic; and (2) owner-type
jeep with plate number PER-290, owned by
respondent Modesto Calaunan and driven by
Marcelo Mendoza.
At approximately Kilometer 40 of the North Luzon
Expressway in Barangay Lalangan, Plaridel,
Bulacan, the two vehicles collided. The front right
side of the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear left side
of the jeep causing the latter to move to the
shoulder on the right and then fall on a ditch with
water resulting to further extensive damage. The
bus veered to the left and stopped 7 to 8 meters
from point of collision.
By reason of such collision, a criminal case was
filed before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, charging
petitioner Manliclic with Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical
Injuries. Subsequently on 2 December 1991,
respondent filed a complaint for damages against
petitioners Manliclic and PRBLI before the RTC of
Dagupan City, docketed as Civil Case No. D-10086.
The criminal case was tried ahead of the civil case.
Among those who testified in the criminal case were
respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and
Fernando Ramos.
When the civil case was heard, counsel for
respondent prayed that the transcripts of
stenographic notes (TSNs)4 of the testimonies of
respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and
Fernando Ramos in the criminal case be received in
evidence in the civil case in as much as these
witnesses are not
The trial court subpoenaed the Clerk of Court of
Branch 8, RTC, Malolos, Bulacan, the court where
Criminal Case No. 684-M-89 was tried, to bring the
TSNs of the testimonies of respondent Calaunan, 5
Marcelo Mendoza6 and Fernando Ramos7 in said
case, together with other documentary evidence
marked therein.
Instead of the Branch Clerk of Court, it was Enrique
Santos Guevara, Court Interpreter, who appeared
before the court and identified the TSNs of the three
afore-named witnesses and other pertinent
documents he had brought.8 Counsel for respondent
wanted to mark other TSNs and documents from
the said criminal case to be adopted in the instant
case, but since the same were not brought to the
trial court, counsel for petitioners compromised that
said TSNs
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
and documents could be offered by counsel for
respondent as rebuttal evidence.
ISSUE: Are the TSNs presented admissible?
The TSNs containing the testimonies of respondent
Calaunan,18 Marcelo Mendoza19 and Fernando
Ramos20 should not be admitted in evidence for
failure of respondent to comply with the requisites of
Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
For Section 47, Rule 130 21 to apply, the following
requisites must be satisfied: (a) the witness is dead
or unable to testify; (b) his testimony or deposition
was given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or
administrative, between the same parties or those
representing the same interests; (c) the former case
involved the same subject as that in the present
case, although on different causes of action; (d) the
issue testified to by the witness in the former trial is
the same issue involved in the present case; and (e)
the adverse party had an opportunity to cross-
examine the witness in the former case.22
Admittedly, respondent failed to show the
concurrence of all the requisites set forth by the
Rules for a testimony given in a former case or
proceeding to be admissible as an exception to the
hearsay rule. Petitioner PRBLI, not being a party in
Criminal Case No. 684-M-89, had no opportunity to
cross-examine the three witnesses in said case. The
criminal case was filed exclusively against petitioner
Manliclic, petitioner PRBLI’s employee. The cases
dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers
uniformly declare that, strictly speaking, they are not
parties to the criminal cases instituted against their
employees.23
Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner PRBLI was
not a party in said criminal case, the testimonies of
the three witnesses are still admissible on the
ground that petitioner PRBLI failed to object on their
admissibility.
It is elementary that an objection shall be
made at the time when an alleged inadmissible
document is offered in evidence; otherwise, the
objection shall be treated as waived, since the right
to object is merely a privilege which the party may
waive. Thus, a failure to except to the evidence
because it does not conform to the statute is a
waiver of the provisions of the law. Even assuming
ex gratia argumenti that these documents are
inadmissible for being hearsay, but on account of
failure to object

thereto, the same may be admitted and considered
as sufficient to prove the facts therein asserted. 24
Hearsay evidence alone may be insufficient to
establish a fact in a suit but, when no objection is
made thereto, it is, like any other evidence, to be
considered and given the importance it deserves.25
33. JOSEPH E. ESTRADA vs. ANIANO
DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman,
RAMON GONZALES, VOLUNTEERS AGAINST
CRIME AND CORRUPTION, GRAFT FREE
PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, INC., LEONARD
DE VERA, DENNIS FUNA, ROMEO CAPULONG
and ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR. G.R. No.
146710- 15 March 2, 2001
FACTS: On October 4, 2000, petitioner then
President of the Republic of the Philippines Joseph
Ejercito Estrada was accused by Ilocos Sur
Governor, Luis "Chavit" Singson of receiving
millions of pesos from jueteng lords.
The exposẻ immediately ignited reactions of rage.
The next day, October 5, 2000, Senator Teofisto
Guingona, Jr., then the Senate Minority Leader,
took the floor and delivered a fiery privilege speech
entitled "I Accuse." He accused the petitioner of
receiving some P220 million in jueteng money from
Governor Singson from November 1998 to August
2000. He also charged that the petitioner took from
Governor Singson P70 million on excise tax on
cigarettes intended for Ilocos Sur. The privilege
speech was referred by then Senate President
Franklin Drilon, to the Blue Ribbon Committee (then
headed by Senator Aquilino Pimentel) and the
Committee on Justice (then headed by Senator
Renato Cayetano) for joint investigation.
Petitioner now contends that the respondent
Ombudsman should be stopped from conducting
the investigation of the cases filed against him due
to the barrage of prejudicial publicity on his guilt. He
submits that the respondent Ombudsman has
developed bias and is all set to file the criminal
cases in violation of his right to due process.
ISSUE: WON newspaper publications can deprive
an accused of his due process right to fair trial.
HELD: No. In Martelino, et al. vs. Alejandro, et al.,
the Court held that to warrant a finding of prejudicial
publicity there must be allegation and proof that the
judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that
they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the
case at bar, we find nothing in the records that will
prove that the tone and content of the publicity that
attended the investigation of petitioners fatally
infected the fairness and impartiality of the DOJ
Panel.
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
Petitioners cannot just rely on the subliminal effects
of publicity on the sense of fairness of the DOJ
Panel, for these are basically unbeknown and
beyond knowing. To be sure, the DOJ Panel is
composed of an Assistant Chief State Prosecutor
and Senior State Prosecutors. Their long experience
in criminal investigation is a factor to consider in
determining whether they can easily be blinded by
the klieg lights of publicity. Indeed, their 26-page
Resolution carries no indubitable indicia of bias for it
does not appear that they considered any extra-
record evidence except evidence properly adduced
by the parties. The length of time the investigation
was conducted despite its summary nature and the
generosity with which they accommodated the
discovery motions of petitioners speak well of their
fairness. At no instance, we note, did petitioners
seek the disqualification of any member of the DOJ
Panel on the ground of bias resulting from their
bombardment of prejudicial publicity.
Applying the above ruling, there is not
enough evidence to warrant this Court to enjoin the
preliminary investigation of the petitioner by the
respondent Ombudsman. Petitioner needs to offer
more than hostile headlines to discharge his burden
of proof. He needs to show more weighty social
science evidence to successfully prove the impaired
capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision.
Well to note, the cases against the petitioner are still
undergoing preliminary investigation by a special
panel of prosecutors in the office of the respondent
Ombudsman. No allegation whatsoever has been
made by the petitioner that the minds of the
members of this special panel have already been
infected by bias because of the pervasive prejudicial
publicity against him. Indeed, the special panel has
yet to come out with its findings and the Court
cannot second guess whether its recommendation
will be unfavorable to the petitioner.
The records show that petitioner has instead
charged respondent Ombudsman himself with bias.
To quote petitioner's submission, the respondent
Ombudsman "has been influenced by the barrage of
slanted news reports, and he has buckled to the
threats and pressures directed at him by the mobs."
News reports have also been quoted to establish
that the respondent Ombudsman has already
prejudged the cases of the petitioner and it is
postulated that the prosecutors investigating the
petitioner will be influenced by this bias of their
superior.
Again, the evidence proffered by the petitioner is
insubstantial. The accuracy of the news reports
referred to by the petitioner cannot be the subject of
judicial notice by this Court especially in light of the
denials of the respondent Ombudsman as to his
alleged prejudice and the presumption of good faith
and regularity in the performance of official duty to
which he is entitled.

34. LINTANG BEDOL vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS G.R. No. 179830
FACTS: Bedol was the chair of Provincial Board of
Canvassers for the province of Maguindano. He
failed to attend the scheduled canvassing of the
Provincial Certificates of Canvass. Bedol explained
that, while in his custody and possession, the
election paraphernalia were stolen. Due to
absences in the next scheduled investigative
proceedings and due to failure and refusal to submit
a written explanation of his absences, respondent
[petitioner] was issued a contempt charge by
COMELEC. Among the allegations of the complaint
against him was that he publicly displayed
disrespect for the authority of the COMELEC
through the media (interviews on national television
channels, and in newspapers and radios) by
flaunting an armory of long firearms and side arms
in public, and posing for the front page of a national
broadsheet, with a shiny pistol tucked in a holster
ISSUE: are the newspaper clippings admissible as
evidence?
HELD: Yes. The Court held that not all hearsay
evidence is inadmissible and how over time,
exceptions to the hearsay rule have emerged.
Hearsay evidence may be admitted by the courts on
grounds of "relevance, trustworthiness and
necessity." Another exception to the hearsay rule is
the doctrine of independently relevant statements,
where only the fact that such statements were made
ALABA, MICHELLE M.
is relevant, and the truth or falsity thereof is
immaterial.
Here, the newspaper clippings were introduced to
prove that petitioner deliberately defied or
challenged the authority of the COMELEC. As
ratiocinated by the COMELEC in the challenged
Resolution, it was not the mere content of the
articles that was in issue, but petitioner’s conduct
when he allowed himself to be interviewed in the
manner and circumstances, adverted to in the
COMELEC Resolution, on a pending controversy
which was still brewing in the COMELEC. While
petitioner claimed that he was misquoted, he denied
neither the said interview nor his picture splashed
on the newspaper with a firearm holstered at his
side but simply relied on his objection to the hearsay
nature of the newspaper clippings. It should be
stressed that petitioner was no ordinary witness or
respondent. He was under the administrative
supervision of the COMELEC and it was incumbent
upon him to demonstrate to the COMELEC that he
had faithfully discharged his duties as dictated by
law. His evasiveness and refusal to present his
evidence as well as his reliance on technicalities to
justify such refusal in the face of the allegations of
fraud or anomalies and newspaper publication
mentioned to the Contempt Charge and Show
Cause Order amounted to an implied admission of
the charges leveled against him.

WEEK 13
1. Jimenez v. Commission on Ecumenical
FACTS: The [petitioners] are sisters and the
Mission and Relations of the United
children of . . . Nicanor Teodoro and Francisca
Presbyterian Church in the USA, G.R. No.
Ciriaco. They filed their complaint in 1982 alleging
140472, June 10, 2002, 383 SCRA 326
that their mother was the owner of the subject
property which was titled in her name under OCT
No. 11757. Said property is now covered by TCT
No. 90689 in the name of [respondent] United
Church of Christ in the Philippines (or UCCP) for
this was donated to it by the Commission on
Ecumenical Mission in that Deed of Donation dated
July 1, 1977. [Petitioners] claim that their parents
never sold the lot to the Board of Foreign Missions
nor any one else, and that their purported
signatures on the impugned Deed of Sale have
been found to be forgeries by government
handwriting experts. Relying on this [respondents]
filed this suit [imputing] the fraudulent act upon
[respondents] and thus asked for the declaration of
nullity of the subject deed and of TCT No. 90689
issued in the name of UCCP, the reconveyance of
the subject property in their favor, and for the award
of damages.
The RTC favored the petitioners and held that there
was forgery. The CA reversed the RTC which had
"placed unquestioning faith and reliance on the
findings of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) and the Philippine Constabulary (PC) Crime
Laboratory Service." The appellate court doubted
the findings of the NBI and the PC handwriting
experts
ISSUE: Was there forgery?
HELD: No. It is also hornbook doctrine that the
opinions of handwriting experts, even those from the
NBI and the PC, are not binding upon courts. This
principle holds true especially when the question
involved is mere handwriting similarity or
dissimilarity, which can be determined by a visual
comparison of specimens of the questioned
signatures with those of the currently existing ones.
Handwriting experts are usually helpful in the
examination of forged documents because of the
technical procedure involved in analyzing them. But
resort to these experts is not mandatory or
indispensable to the examination or the comparison
of handwriting. 15 A finding of forgery does not
depend entirely on the testimonies of handwriting
ALABA, MICHELLE
experts, because the judge must conduct an
independent examination of the questioned
signature in order to arrive at a reasonable
conclusion as to its authenticity.
Moreover, Section 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court explicitly authorizes the court, by itself, to
make a comparison of the disputed handwriting
"with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the
party against whom the evidence is offered, or
proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the
judge."
After comparing the questioned signatures, the CA
concluded that they were not forged. We affirm its
finding.
"The findings of the handwriting experts are not
conclusive upon the court. On the contrary, courts
can totally disregard them and make their own
separate independent finding for themselves on the
matter. As this Court has once observed, the
authenticity of signatures is not a highly technical
issue in the same sense that questions concerning,
e.g., quantum physics or topology or molecular
biology, would constitute matters of a highly
technical nature. The opinion of a handwriting expert
is certainly much less compelling upon a judge than
an opinion rendered by a specialist of a highly
technical issue. The signatures on a questioned
document can be sighted by a judge who can and
should exercise independent judgment on the issue
of authenticity of such signatures (Gamido v. CA
251 SCRA 101). And this exactly what we have
done here. We have examined and analyzed the
subject signatures, and have found no substantial
indicia or reason to suspect their authenticity.
Contrary to the findings of the NBI and PC, upon
comparison of the questioned signature of Francisca
with her sample signatures on Exh. "F’, ‘G’ and ‘H’
we find resemblances but no stark and
distinguishing difference. The slight dissimilarities do
not indicate forgery for these are natural, expected
and inevitable variations in genuine signatures
made by one and the same person. Even the
sample signatures of Nicanor submitted by the
appellees show clear variations in structure, flourish,
and style. Those found in Exhibits ‘F’, ‘G’, ‘H’, ‘V’
and ‘W’ are markedly different from that in Exhibit
‘X’. It must be pointed out that the crux of the matter
here is forgery and any positive assertion of it can
not just be accepted blandly. Forgery cannot be
presumed, it must be proved by clear and
convincing evidence. Those who make the
allegation of forgery have the burden of proving it
since a mere allegation is not evidence. The
evidence of the appellees’ failed to prove the forgery
 ALABA, MICHELLE
they claim.

2. HEIRS OF SEVERA P. GREGORIO,
represented by its Administratrix
BUENCONSEJO PINEDA VDA. DE VIVAR,
Petitioners, v. COURT OF APPEALS, RICARDO
SANTOS, ROSALINA PALOMO, SPOUSES
WILSON TAN and BENITA LUI TAN,
FACTS: On October 30, 1986, the heirs of Severa
Gregorio filed with the trial court the instant
complaint against spouses Tan for cancellation of
title and/or reconveyance with damages alleging
that the deeds of conveyance were forged and are
therefore void.
Petitioners fault the Court of Appeals for not giving
credence to the testimony of NBI handwriting expert
Bienvenido Albacea, who examined the deed of
sale in question and concluded that the signature
thereon purporting to be that of the late Severa
Gregorio is forged. They contend that, as borne out
by the records, Albacea conducted an examination
of the original copy of subject deed of sale at the
Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City and
on the basis of such examination, he arrived at the
conclusion that the signature appearing thereon was
forged. Unfortunately, as a result of the fire of which
destroyed the Quezon City Hall, the records of the
case were all burned including the original copy of
the aforesaid deed of sale; and the said original
copy of the deed of sale could not be produced in
court thereby necessitating the presentation of a
certified true xerox copy thereof.
Petitioners claim that what was actually examined
by the NBI expert on September 10, 1987 at the
Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City was
the original copy of the deed of sale dated July 14,
1971 but a fire accident supervened preventing its
introduction during trial.
ISSUE: Whether or not the opinion of the
handwriting expert should be considered as
conclusive evidence to support an allegation of
forgery
HELD: No. Due to the technicality of the procedure
involved in the examination of forged documents,
the expertise of questioned document examiners is
usually helpful. However, resort to questioned
document examiners is not mandatory and while
probably useful, they are not indispensable in
examining or comparing handwriting. A finding of
forgery does not depend entirely on the testimony of
handwriting experts. Although such testimony may
be useful, the judge still exercises independent
judgement on the issue of authenticity of the
ALABA, MICHELLE
signatures under scrutiny. The judge cannot rely on
the mere testimony of the handwriting expert.
A judge must therefore conduct an
independent examination of the signature itself in
order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its
authenticity and this cannot be done without the
original copy being produced in court.
3.CECILIO C. HERNANDEZ, MA. VICTORIA C.
FACTS: Maria Lourdes San Juan Hernandez (or
HERNANDEZ-SAGUN, TERESA C.
Lulu) was born on February 14, 1947 to the spouses
HERNANDEZ- VILLA ABRILLE and
Felix Hernandez and Maria San Juan Hernandez.
NATIVIDADCRUZ- HERNANDEZ vs. JOVITA
Unfortunately, the latter died due to complications
SAN JUAN-SANTOS
during childbirth. After Maria's death, Felix left Lulu
G.R. No. 166470 and G.R. No. 169217 August 7,
in the care of her maternal uncle, Sotero C. San
Juan. On December 16, 1951, Felix married
Natividad Cruz. The union produced three children,
herein petitioners. Meanwhile, as the only child of
Maria and the sole testate heir of Sotero, Lulu
inherited valuable real properties from the San Juan
family. In 1968, upon reaching the age of majority,
Lulu was given full control of her estate.
Nevertheless, because Lulu did not even finish her
elementary education, Felix continued to exercise
actual administration of Lulu’s properties. Upon
Felix's death in 1993, petitioners took over the task
of administering Lulu's properties.
During the period of their informal administration
(from 1968 until 1993), Felix and petitioners
undertook various “projects” involving Lulu’s real
properties. In 1974, Felix allegedly purchased one
of Lulu’s properties for an undisclosed amount to
develop the Marilou Subdivision. Thus, Lulu signed
a special power of attorney (SPA) believing that she
was authorizing Ma. Victoria to appear in court on
her behalf when she was in fact unknowingly
authorizing her half-sister to sell the said property to
the Manila Electric Company for P18,206,400. In
September 1998, Lulu sought the assistance of her
maternal first cousin, respondent Jovita San Juan-
Santos, after learning that petitioners had been
dissipating her estate. She confided to Jovita that
she was made to live in the basement of petitioners’
home and was receiving a measly daily allowance
of P400 for her food and medication.
Respondent was appalled as Lulu was severely
overweight, unkempt and smelled of urine. She later
 ALABA, MICHELLE

found out that Lulu was occupying a cramped room suffice. Here, the trial judge was given ample
lit by a single fluorescent lamp without running
water. Due to Lulu's poor hygiene, respondent
brought her to several physicians for medical
examination. Lulu was found to be afflicted with
tuberculosis, rheumatism and diabetes from which
she was suffering several complications.

On October 2, 1998, respondent filed a petition for

guardianship in the RTC of San Mateo, Rizal,
Branch
76. She alleged that Lulu was incapable of taking
care of herself and managing her estate because
she was of weak mind. Subsequently, petitioners
moved to intervene in the proceedings to oppose
the same. Cecilio, Teresa and Ma. Victoria, for their
part, claimed that the issue of Lulu’s competency
had been settled in 1968 (upon her emancipation)
when the court ordered her legal guardian and
maternal uncle, Ciriaco San Juan, to deliver the
properties for her to manage. They likewise
asserted that Lulu was literate and, for that reason,
aware of the consequences of executing an SPA.

During the hearing, Lulu was presented and asked

to testify on her genealogy and experiences with the
San Juan and Hernandez families. Lulu identified
and described her parents, stepmother, half-siblings
and maternal relatives. Medical specialists testified
to explain the results of Lulu’s examinations which
revealed the alarming state of her health.
Furthermore, they unanimously opined that in view
of Lulu’s intelligence level (which was below
average) and fragile mental state, she would not be
able to care for herself and self-administer her
medications.

ISSUE: Whether or not the opinion of Lulu’s

attending physician regarding her mental illness
where inadmissible in evidence as they were not
experts in psychiatry

HELD: They are admissible. Under Section 50,

Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, an ordinary witness
may give his opinion on the mental sanity of a
person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted.
Lulu's attending physicians spoke and interacted
with her. Such occasions allowed them to
thoroughly observe her behavior and conclude that
her intelligence level was below average and her
mental stage below normal. Their opinions were
admissible in evidence.
Furthermore, where the sanity of a person is
at issue, expert opinion is not necessary. The
observations of the trial judge coupled with evidence
establishing the person's state of mental sanity will
 ALABA, MICHELLE
opportunity to observe Lulu personally when she
testified before the RTC.
Under Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of
Court, persons who, though of sound mind but by
reason of age, disease, weak mind or other similar
causes are incapable of taking care of themselves
and their property without outside aid, are
considered as incompetents who may properly be
placed under guardianship. The RTC and the CA
both found that Lulu was incapable of taking care
of herself and her properties without outside aid
due to her ailments and weak mind. Thus, since
determining whether or not Lulu is in fact an
incompetent would require a reexamination of the
evidence presented in the courts a quo, it
undoubtedly involves questions of fact. Petitioners
are furthermore ordered to render to respondent,
Lulu’s legal guardian, an accurate and faithful
accounting of all the properties and funds they
unlawfully appropriated for themselves from the
estate of Maria Lourdes San Juan Hernandez,
within thirty (30) days from receipt of this decision.
If warranted, the proper complaints should also be
filed against them for any criminal liability in
connection with the dissipation of Maria Lourdes
San Juan Hernandez’s estate and her unlawful
abduction from the custody of her legal guardian.

4. ERNESTO M. FULLERO v. PEOPLE [G.R. NO.

FACTS: In 1977, petitioner was employed as a
170583 : September 12, 2007]
telegraph operator at the Bureau of
Telecommunications Office in Iriga City (BTO,
Iriga City). In 1982, he became the Acting Chief
Operator of the same office until 1994.

A Personal Data Sheet (PDS) dated 8 January

1988, purportedly accomplished and signed by
petitioner, states that he passed the Civil
Engineering Board Examination given on 30-31
May 1985 in Manila with a rating of 75.8%. It
appears that he submitted the PDS to the Bureau
of Telecommunications Regional Office, Legazpi
City (BTO, Legazpi City).

Petitioner denied executing and submitting the

subject PDS containing the statement that he
passed the 30-31 May 1985 board examination for
civil engineering. He likewise disowned the
signature and thumbmark appearing therein. He
claimed that the stroke of the signature appearing
in the PDS differs from the stroke of his genuine
signature. He added that the letters contained in
the PDS he accomplished and submitted were
typewritten in capital letters since his typewriter
does not have

small letters. As such, the subject PDS could not be
his because it had both small and capital typewritten
letters. Petitioner was charged with falsification of
public document under paragraph 4, Article 171 of
the Revised Penal Code. He questions the
admissibility of the PDS and the failure to call for a
handwriting expert to examine the signatures.
ISSUE: Whether or not resort to handwriting experts
is mandatory. NO
HELD: No. Exhibits J to R, which are the daily time
records of Magistrado signed by petitioner and
which were offered to compare petitioner's alleged
signature in the PDS with the said exhibits, are
admissible in evidence since they are relevant and
material to the charge of falsification against
petitioner. The signatures of petitioner in the said
exhibits, the authenticity of which were not denied
by petitioner, were presented to prove that these
signatures were similar to petitioner's signature in
the PDS where he made the alleged falsification.
Well-entrenched is the rule that resort to handwriting
experts is not mandatory. Handwriting experts, while
probably useful, are not indispensable in examining
or comparing handwritings or signatures. This is so
since under Section 22, Rule 132 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence, the handwriting of a person may
be proved by any witness who believes it to be the
handwriting of such person, because he has seen
the person write; or has seen writing purporting to
be his upon which the witness has acted or has
been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of
the handwriting of such person. Moreover, the
opinion of a non-expert witness, for which proper
basis is given, may be received in evidence
regarding the handwriting or signature of a person
with which he has sufficient familiarity.
The Legazpi City RTC was, therefore, not obliged to
put a handwriting expert on the witness stand and
direct the latter to examine petitioner's signatures in
the foregoing exhibits before ruling on their
admissibility. It can, as it did, rely on the testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses who are familiar with
petitioner's handwriting/signature in determining the
admissibility of the aforesaid exhibits. It can, by
itself, also compare petitioner's signature in the PDS
with the petitioner's signatures in the subject
exhibits with or without the aid of an expert witness
and thereafter rule on the admissibility of such
exhibits based on its own observation. In short, it
can exercise independent judgment as regards the
admissibility of said exhibits.
ALABA, MICHELLE
5. People v. Martinez, G.R. No. 116918 June 19,
1997
FACTS: Bonfilo Martinez and two other unidentified
persons were charged with the special complex
crime of robbery with rape. To prove the value of the
burglarized properties, the prosecution presented an
affidavit executed by Ernesto Buenvinida on March
7, 1994, containing a list of the stolen movables and
with their corresponding values, as now found in the
information. This affidavit was identified and marked
as Exhibit H for the prosecution during the
testimony of SPO4 Abner Castro, the police officer
who conducted an investigation of the incident on
December 28, 1991. In addition to testifying on the
arrest and investigation of appellant, Castro
repeated in open court the respective values of the
personal properties as explained to him by Ernesto
Buenvinida and how he helped Ernesto in the
preparation thereof. The same was formally
offered in evidence to prove, among others, the
facts and amounts contained therein and as testified
to by witness Castro. Although objected to by
appellant as self-serving, the lower court admitted
said document for the purpose for which it was
offered and as part of the testimony of said witness.
ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of Buenvinida
may be admissible
HELD: Yes. Even under the rule on opinions of
ordinary witnesses, the value of the stolen items
was established. It is a standing doctrine that the
opinion of a witness is admissible in evidence on
ordinary matters known to all men of common
perception, such as the value of ordinary household
articles. 31 Here, the witness is not just an ordinary
witness, but virtually an expert, since his work as an
investigator of crimes against property has given
him both the exposure to and experience in fixing
the current value of such ordinary articles subject of
the crime at bar. Incidentally, it is significant that
appellant never dared to cross-examine on the
points involved, which opportunity to cross-examine
takes the testimony of Castro out of the hearsay
rule, while the lack of objection to the value placed
by Castro bolsters his testimony under the cited
exception to the opinion rule
6. PASTOR DE JESUS vs COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: Herein respondents de Jesus, in their
G.R. No. 127857 June 20, 2006
capacity as legal heirs and successors-in-interest to
the property inherited by their late father Fermin de

Jesus (Fermin) filed a petition before the trial court
on 3 June 1991, seeking the partition of a parcel of
land left by their deceased grandparents.
From the pleadings and evidence presented by the
parties, the following facts were established: that
respondents de Jesus, are the legitimate children of
Fermin; that Pastor de Jesus is their uncle, being
the brother of Fermin; that the parties are all
residents of Bulanao, Tabuk, Kalinga-Apayao; that
the spouses Juan and Eustaquia de Jesus were the
parents of Fermin, Consolacion and Pastor de
Jesus from whom they inherited through intestate
succession the parcel of land in dispute consisting
of more or less five (5) hectares located in Ipil,
Bulanao, Tabuk, Kalinga-Apayao; that Juan de
Jesus died on 7 December 1964 while Fermin died
on 24 September 1979; that as of the filing of the
petition, the title to the property remained in the
name of Juan de Jesus.
Mainly in dispute is the claim of respondents de
Jesus that ownership of the said property had never
been transferred to anyone and/or partitioned
among the legal heirs thereto, and that as legitimate
children of Fermin and by right of representation
under the law of intestate succession, they are
entitled to their rightful share of the estate left by
their grandfather Juan de Jesus.
Pastor de Jesus contended that respondents de
Jesus are no longer entitled to their father’s share in
the subject property as the latter has already sold to
Pastor de Jesus his property right along with only
sister Consolacion for a consideration of
P10,000.00. This is evidenced by the notarized
Deed of Sale dated 13 September 1979, which
respondent admits has not yet been registered with
the Registry of Deeds. Pastor de Jesus prayed,
among others, for the dismissal of the petition for
lack of factual and legal basis.
The trial court ordered the Deed of Sale to be
submitted to the NBI for examination in order to
determine its genuineness and due execution.
Respondents de Jesus presented as witnesses
Alicia de Jesus Oakes, Ronaldo de Jesus and the
NBI Handwriting Expert Zenaida Torres. Their
rebuttal witnesses were Ronaldo and Maura
Maramag de Jesus (Maura).
On the other hand, Pastor de Jesus’s witnesses
were his sister Consolacion, Atty. Marcos C.
Diasen, Jr., Zenaida Tuazon and himself.
ALABA, MICHELLE
The Trial Court ruled that the extra-judicial
settlement is null and void.
The Court of Appeals stated that the rule that "a
notarized document is admissible in evidence
without proof of its due execution and is conclusive
as to the truthfulness of its contents" is not absolute
and may be rebutted by evidence to the contrary,
which respondents de Jesus were able to present
convincingly in the case at bar. The appellate court
thus declared that the notarized Deed of Sale is null
and void. Inconsistently, however, it declared the
same valid and binding with regard to Pastor de
Jesus and his sibling Consolacion.
ISSUE: Should the testimony of the parties
witnesses should be given more weight than the
opinion of an expert witness?
HELD: Yes. It is true that the opinion of handwriting
experts are not necessarily binding upon the court,
the expert’s function being to place before the court
data upon which the court can form its own opinion.
Handwriting experts are usually helpful in the
examination of forged documents because of the
technical procedure involved in analyzing them. But
resort to these experts is not mandatory or
indispensable to the examination or the comparison
of handwriting. A finding of forgery does not depend
entirely on the testimonies of handwriting experts,
because the judge must conduct an independent
examination of the questioned signature in order to
arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its
authenticity.
It bears stressing that the trial court may validly
determine forgery from its own independent
examination of the documentary evidence at hand.
This the trial court judge can do without resorting to
experts, especially when the question involved is
mere handwriting similarity or dissimilarity, which
can be determined by a visual comparison of
specimen of the questioned signatures with those of
currently existing ones. Section 22 of Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court explicitly authorizes the court, by
itself, to make a comparison of the disputed
handwriting with writings admitted or treated as
genuine by the party against whom the evidence is
offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction
of the judge.
The courts below did exactly this. They conducted
their independent examination of the signatures and
concluded that the disparity of the signatures on
page one (1) and page two (2) of the Deed of Sale
is readily noticeable upon inspection. Moreover, the
appellate court observed that a scrutiny of the
 ALABA, MICHELLE
documents

where Fermin’s specimen signatures appear show
that most of them do not bear his printed name but
Fermin consistently signed his name in full and
never in the abbreviated style as the one on page
one (1) of the Deed of Sale.
In support of Pastor de Jesus’s contention, on the
other hand, Pastor de Jesus, Consolacion, Atty.
Marcos C. Diasen, Jr., and Zenaida Tuazon all
testified that Fermin signed the Deed of Sale in their
presence.
However, the trial court held that their inconsistent
and incredible testimonies together with the
circumstances at the time of its alleged execution
rendered doubtful the genuineness of the Deed of
Sale. Moreover, the trial court found it irregular that
two (2) typewriters were used in preparing the Deed
of Sale when only one secretary typed the
document. The reason for this was not explained to
the full satisfaction of the trial court.
Thus, considering the testimonies of the witnesses
and a plain comparison of the questioned signatures
with admittedly genuine ones, the Court finds no
reason to reverse the findings of the two lower
courts. Although the Deed of Sale was a public
document having in its favor the presumption of
regularity, such presumption of regularity was
adequately refuted by competent witnesses and the
visual analysis of the signatures made by the courts
below.
Since the signatures of Fermin were forged, the
Deed of Sale is effectively nullified. The document
should not be annulled only with respect to Fermin’s
share. The document bearing the forged signatures
is in fact an extrajudicial settlement which requires
the assent of all the heirs to the extrajudicial
partition. It is not binding upon any person who has
not participated therein or had notice thereof.
7. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NOEL
LEE G.R. No. 139070 May 29, 2002
FACTS: This case sentenced Noel Lee to death for
the murder of Joseph Marquez. Lee pleaded not
guilty to the charge. At the trial, the prosecution
presented the following witnesses: (a) Herminia
Marquez, the mother of the victim; (b) Dr. Darwin
Corpuz, a resident doctor at the Manila Caloocan
University (MCU) Hospital; (c) PO2 Rodelio Ortiz, a
police officer who examined the crime scene; and
(d) Dr. Rosaline Cosidon, a medico-legal officer of
the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime
Laboratory.
ALABA, MICHELLE
The prosecution established that Herminia and her
son, Joseph were in the living room of their house
watching a basketball game on television. To
Herminia’s complete surprise, she saw a hand
holding a gun coming out of the open window
behind Joseph. She looked up and saw Noel Lee
peering through the window and holding the gun
aimed at Joseph. Before she could warn him, Lee
fired his gun hitting Joseph’s head. Herminia ran to
the window and saw Lee in a blue sando, flee
towards the direction of his house. Herminia brought
Joseph to the MCU Hospital where he later
died.1âwphi1.nêt
Police investigators inquired about the shooting
incident and Herminia subsequently proceeded to
the Caloocan City Police Headquarters where she
gave her sworn statement about the shooting. Upon
request of the Caloocan City police, a post-mortem
examination was made on Joseph’s body. Dr.
Rosaline O. Cosidon, a medico-legal officer of the
PNP Crime Laboratory Service found that the cause
of death is intracranial hemorrhage as a result of
gunshot wounds.
Herminia filed a complaint for murder against Lee,
who is a well-known figure in their neighbourhood
and has several criminal cases pending against him
in Caloocan City. He was charged with frustrated
homicide in 1984 and attempted murder in 1989.
For his defense, Lee presented two witnesses: (a)
Orlando Bermudez, a neighbor; and (b) himself. He
denies the killing of Joseph Marquez and made an
alibi. He also said that Joseph, the victim, had a bad
reputation in their neighborhood as a thief and drug
addict. He presented a letter handwritten by
Herminia, addressed to the Mayor where Herminia
was surrendering her son to the Mayor for
rehabilitation because he was hooked on shabu,
and was a thief. Herminia was scared that
eventually Joseph might not just steal but kill her
and everyone in their household because of his
drug habit.
ISSUE: Whether or not Herminia Marquez, the lone
prosecution eyewitness is a credible witness
HELD: Yes. Herminia’s testimony on direct
examination is positive, clear and straightforward.
She did not waver in her narration of the shooting
incident, neither did she waffle in recounting her
son’s death. She was subjected by defense counsel
to rigorous cross and re-cross examinations and yet
she stuck to her testimony given in the direct
examination. She readily gave specific details of the
crime scene, e.g., the physical arrangement of the
 ALABA, MICHELLE
sofa and the television set, the height of the sofa,
the
 ALABA, MICHELLE

wall and the window, because the crime happened
right in her own living room. She explained that she
was unable to warn Joseph because she was
shocked by the sight of Lee aiming a gun at her son.
The tragic events unfolded so fast and by the time
she took hold of herself, her son had been shot
dead.
Nonetheless, Lee points out inconsistencies in the
eyewitness’ testimony. In her affidavit of September
30, 1996 given before PO2 Rodelio Ortiz, Herminia
declared that while she and Joseph were watching
television, she saw a hand holding a gun pointed at
her son. The hand and the gun came out of a hole
in the window, i.e., "butas ng bintana." On cross-
examination, Herminia stated that she saw a hand
holding a gun in the open window, i.e., "bukas na
bintana." According to Lee, this inconsistency is a
serious flaw which cannot be repaired by her
statement on the witness stand.
The inconsistency between her affidavit and her
testimony was satisfactorily explained by Herminia
on cross-examination. She corrected her affidavit by
saying in open court that she saw the hand and the
gun coming out of the open window, not from a hole
in the window. In her direct testimony, Herminia
presented a photograph of her living room just the
way it looked from her side on the night of the
shooting. The sofa on which Joseph was seated is
against the wall, with the window a few inches
above the wall. The window is made of transparent
glass with six (6) vertical glass panes pushing
outwards. The entire window is enclosed by iron
grills with big spaces in between the grills. The living
room is well- lit and the area outside the house is
also lit by a fluorescent lamp.
The lone eyewitness’ account of the killing finds
support in the medico-legal report. Dr. Rosalie
Cosidon found that the deceased sustained two
gunshot wounds—one to the right of the forehead,
and the other, to the left side of the back of the
victim’s head. Two slugs were recovered from the
victim’s head. Judging from the location and number
of wounds sustained, Dr. Cosidon theorized that the
assailant could have been more than two feet away
from the victim.
As to character evidence, both sub-paragraphs (1)
and (2) of Section 51 of Rule 130 refer to character
evidence of the accused. And this evidence must
be "pertinent to the moral trait involved in the
offense charged," meaning, that the character
evidence must be relevant and germane to the kind
of the act charged, e.g., on a charge of rape,
character for chastity; on a charge of assault,
character for peacefulness or violence; on a charge
for embezzlement, character for honesty and
integrity. Sub-paragraph (3) of Section 51 of the said
Rule refers to the character of the offended party.
Character evidence, whether good or bad, of the
offended party may be proved "if it tends to establish
in any reasonable degree the probability or
improbability of the offense charged." Such
evidence is most commonly offered to support a
claim of self- defense in an assault or homicide case
or a claim of consent in a rape case.

Between Herminia’s testimony in open court and her

sworn statement, any inconsistency therein does
not necessarily discredit the witness. Affidavits are
generally considered inferior to open court
declarations because affidavits are taken ex-parte
and are almost always incomplete and inaccurate.
Oftentimes, they are executed when the affiant’s
mental faculties are not in such a state as to afford
him a fair opportunity of narrating in full the incident
that transpired. They are usually not prepared by
the affiant himself but by another who suggests
words to the affiant, or worse, uses his own
language in taking the affiant’s statements.

Herminia’s declarations are based on her actual

account of the commission of the crime. She had no
ill motive to accuse Lee of killing her son, or at least,
testify falsely against him.

8. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. ALLYSON
BELAGAN [G.R. NO. 132164 : October 19, 2004]
FACTS: The instant case stemmed from two (2)
separate complaints filed respectively by Magdalena
Gapuz, founder/directress of the "Mother and Child
Learning Center," and Ligaya Annawi, a public
school teacher at Fort Del Pilar Elementary School,
against respondent Dr. Allyson Belagan,
Superintendent of the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports (DECS), all from Baguio City.
Magdalena charged respondent with sexual
indignities and harassment, while Ligaya accused
him of sexual harassment and various malfeasances.
Magdalena's sworn complaint alleges that in the
course of their school inspection, while both were
descending the stairs of the second floor,
respondent suddenly placed his arms around her
shoulders and kissed her cheek. She was also
invited to go out on a date. Fearful that her
application might be jeopardized and that her
husband might harm respondent, Magdalena just
kept quiet.do Gloria.
On the part of Ligaya Annawi, she alleged in her
complaint that on four separate occasions,
respondent touched her breasts, kissed her cheek,
touched her groins, embraced her from behind and
pulled her close to him, his organ pressing the lower
part of her back.
The DECS conducted a joint investigation of the
complaints of Magdalena and Ligaya. In his
defense, respondent denied their charge of sexual
harassment. However, he presented evidence to
disprove the imputations against him. He also
presented the record of cases of Magdalena which
he used to attack the latter’s character.
ISSUE: Whether complaining witness, Magdalena
Gapuz, is credible.
HELD: Yes. Generally, the character of a party is
regarded as legally irrelevant in determining a
controversy. One statutory exception is that relied
upon by respondent, i.e., Section 51 (a) 3, Rule 130
of the Revised Rules on Evidence, which we quote
here:
"SEC. 51. Character evidence not generally
admissible; exceptions. '
(a) In Criminal Cases:
xxx xxx
ALABA, MICHELLE
(3) The good or bad moral character of the
offended party may be proved if it tends to establish
in any reasonable degree the probability or
improbability of the offense charged."
It will be readily observed that the above provision
pertains only to criminal cases, not to administrative
offenses. And even assuming that this technical rule
of evidence can be applied here, still, we cannot
sustain respondent's posture.
Not every good or bad moral character of the
offended party may be proved under this provision.
Only those which would establish the probability or
improbability of the offense charged. This means
that the character evidence must be limited to the
traits and characteristics involved in the type of
offense charged.Thus, on a charge of rape -
character for chastity, on a charge of assault -
character for peaceableness or violence, and on a
charge of embezzlement - character for honesty.In
one rape case, where it was established that the
alleged victim was morally loose and apparently
uncaring about her chastity, we found the conviction
of the accused doubtful.
In the present administrative case for sexual
harassment, respondent did not offer evidence that
has a bearing on Magdalena's chastity. What he
presented are charges for grave oral defamation,
grave threats, unjust vexation, physical injuries,
malicious mischief, etc. filed against her. Certainly,
these pieces of evidence are inadmissible under the
above provision because they do not establish the
probability or improbability of the offense charged.
Obviously, in invoking the above provision, what
respondent was trying to establish is Magdalena's
lack of credibility and not the probability or the
improbability of the charge. In this regard, a different
provision applies.
Credibility means the disposition and intention to tell
the truth in the testimony given. It refers to a
person's integrity, and to the fact that he is worthy of
belief. A witness may be discredited by evidence
attacking his general reputation for truth, honesty or
integrity. Section 11, Rule 132 of the same Revised
Rules on Evidence reads:
"SEC. 11. Impeachment of adverse party's witness.
'A witness may be impeached by the party against
whom he was called, by contradictory evidence, by
evidence that his general reputation for truth,
honesty, or integrity is bad, or by evidence that he
 ALABA, MICHELLE

has made at other times statements inconsistent a witness may not be impeached by evidence of
with his present testimony, but not by evidence of
particular wrongful acts, except that it may be
shown by the examination of the witness, or the
record of the judgment, that he has been convicted
of an offense."

Although she is the offended party, Magdalena, by

testifying in her own behalf, opened herself to
character or reputation attack pursuant to the
principle that a party who becomes a witness in his
own behalf places himself in the same position as
any other witness, and may be impeached by an
attack on his character or reputation.

With the foregoing disquisition, the Court of Appeals

is correct in holding that the character or reputation
of a complaining witness in a sexual charge is a
proper subject of inquiry. This leads us to the
ultimate question - is Magdalena's derogatory
record sufficient to discredit her credibility? No.

Settled is the principle that evidence of one's

character or reputation must be confined to a time
not too remote from the time in question.In other
words, what is to be determined is the character or
reputation of the person at the time of the trial and
prior thereto, but not at a period remote from the
commencement of the suit. Hence, to say that
Magdalena's credibility is diminished by proofs of
tarnished reputation existing almost a decade ago is
unreasonable. It is unfair to presume that a person
who has wandered from the path of moral
righteousness can never retrace his steps again.
Certainly, every person is capable to change or
reform.

Second, respondent failed to prove that Magdalena

was convicted in any of the criminal cases specified
by respondent. The general rule prevailing in a great
majority of jurisdictions is that it is not permissible to
show that a witness has been arrested or that he
has been charged with or prosecuted for a criminal
offense, or confined in jail for the purpose of
impairing his credibility. This view has usually been
based upon one or more of the following grounds or
theories: (a) that a mere unproven charge against
the witness does not logically tend to affect his
credibility, (b) that innocent persons are often
arrested or accused of a crime, (c) that one accused
of a crime is presumed to be innocent until his guilt
is legally established, and
(d) that a witness may not be impeached or
discredited by evidence of particular acts of
misconduct.Significantly, the same Section 11, Rule
132 of our Revised Rules on Evidence provides that
 ALABA, MICHELLE
particular wrongful acts. Such evidence is rejected
because of the confusion of issues and the waste
of time that would be involved, and because the
witness may not be prepared to expose the falsity
of such wrongful acts. As it happened in this case,
Magdalena was not able to explain or rebut each
of the charges against her listed by respondent.

But more than anything else, Magdalena testified

in a straightforward, candid and spontaneous
manner. Her testimony is replete with details, such
as the number of times she and respondent
inspected the pre-school, the specific part of the
stairs where respondent kissed her, and the
matter about her transient boarders during
summer. Magdalena would not have normally
thought about these details if she were not telling
the truth.

9. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JESUS

FACTS: Jesus Edualino was charged with the
EDUALINO [G.R. No. 119072 April 11, 1997]
crime of rape of Rowena Nantiza, a pregnant
woman. Edualino, while admitting that he was at
the dance, denied that he raped Rowena.

ISSUE: Is the moral character of a rape victim

material in the prosecution and conviction of the
accused?

HELD: No. Edualino raises the issue of the

character of Rowena. It is argued that a
responsible and decent married woman, who was
then three (3) months pregnant, would not be out
at two (2) o'clock in the morning getting drunk
much less would a decent Filipina ask a man to
accompany her to drink beer. It is contended that
Rowena merely concocted the charge of rape to
save her marriage since her husband had found
out that she was using drugs and drinking alcohol
and even made a spectacle of herself when she
tried to seduce Edualino while she was under the
influence of drug and alcohol. The Court has ruled
that prostitutes can be the victims of rape.

Even if Edualino's allegations that Rowena was

drunk and under the influence of drugs and that
she cannot be considered a decent and
responsible married woman, were true, said
circumstances will not per se preclude a finding
that she was raped. Edualino cannot successfully
argue that no rape occurred because no medical
examination was conducted to confirm the
presence of spermatozoa in

her private parts. A medical examination of the
victim is not a prerequisite in prosecutions for rape.
A person accused of rape can be convicted solely
on the testimony of the victim provided the
testimony is credible, natural, convincing and
otherwise consistent with human nature and the
course of things. After a careful and thorough study
of the records of the case, the Court is convinced
that the constitutional presumption of Edualino's
innocence has been overcome by proof of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
The Court likewise cannot believe that a married
woman would invent a story that she was raped in
an attempt to conceal addiction to drugs or alcohol,
in order to save her marriage. We fail to understand
how a false rape story can save a marriage.
10. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAFAEL
DIOPITA [G.R. No. 130601, 04 December 2000]
FACTS: Dominga Pikit-pikit was raped by Rafael
Diopita. Exhausted, Dominga slowly stood up, put
on her clothes and walked away in the direction of
her house. Finding it locked, she asked help from
her neighbors who called the police. Thereafter,
Dominga was brought to police station, where SPO1
Stephen Batacan entered her complaint in the
police blotter. Later, she was examined by Dr.
Floranne Lam-Vergara who found her "positive for
spermatocytes."
PO3 Steve dela Cruz, who was on duty at the
Intelligence and Investigation Section, went to the
scene of the crime to investigate and there he
recovered a colored white/yellow, size ten (10)
slipper. Since the victim earlier disclosed that the
suspect headed north after committing the crime, he
proceeded to that direction where he came upon
four
(4) houses about fifteen (15) to fifty (50) meters
away from the scene of the crime. A back-up team
was called and they rounded up all the residents
therein. Afterwards, four (4) men who fitted the
description of the suspect were invited to the police
station for questioning. They were Placido Laput,
William Silvano, Vicente Silvano and Diopita.
Dominga saw the four (4) men in a police line-up
and readily pointed at Diopita. The police then had
him try on the recovered slipper; it easily fitted him.
Thus, Diopita was detained while the others were
released.
Diopita argued that he was with his wife Flora, son
Ryan and fellow Jehovah’s Witnesses Roger
Custorio and Ruben Suarez at the house of Eulalio
Nisnisan for an informal Bible session upon the
invitation of Juan Nisnisan. He also claimed that
during those hours, he never left the place. Flora,
Roger, Ruben, Eulalio and Juan corroborated his
ALABA, MICHELLE
alibi and testified on his good moral character as a
ministerial servant of their faith.
ISSUE: Is the good moral character of the accused
material in ascertaining his guilt of the crime
charged?
HELD: No. The fact that Diopita is endowed with
such "sterling" qualities hardly justifies the
conclusion that he is innocent of the crime charged.
Similarly, his having attained the position of
"Ministerial Servant" in his faith is no guarantee
against any sexual perversion and plunderous
proclivity on his part. Indeed, religiosity is not always
an emblem of good conduct, and it is not the
unreligious alone who succumbs to the impulse to
rob and rape. An accused is not entitled to an
acquittal simply because of his previous good moral
character and exemplary conduct. The affirmance or
reversal of his conviction must be resolved on the
basic issue of whether the prosecution had
discharged its duty of proving his guilt beyond any
peradventure of doubt. Since the evidence of the
crime in the instant case is more than sufficient to
convict, the evidence of good moral character of
Diopita is unavailing.
11. OBEDENCIO V. JUDGE MURILLO, A.M. NO.
FACTS: The complainant
RTJ-03-1753, FEBRUARYaverred
5, 2004 that on May 3,
2000, he and his wife assisted their 14-year-old
daughter, Licel Acenas Obedencio, in filing with the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, Hall of Justice in
Cagayan de Oro City, a criminal complaint for rape
allegedly committed upon her when she was 11
years old by her uncle, Dexter Z. Acenas. hen, Licel
took the witness stand and was asked on matters
contained in her affidavit. She recanted the
allegations in her affidavit-complaint and denied
having been molested by her uncle, Dexter. She
explained that her mother forced her to file the rape
charge because of family inheritance problems.
Respondent judge asserts that, with the filing of the
affidavit of desistance, the court had no other
recourse but to dismiss the case.
ISSUE: Was the judge correct in dismissing the
case?
HELD: No. Licel was only 14 years old, definitely a
minor, on May 22, 2001, when she was presented
before respondent’s sala to affirm the execution of
her affidavit of desistance.
This being the case, said affidavit should have been
executed with the concurrence of her parents. Licel
could not validly give consent to an affidavit of
desistance, for a minor is incompetent to execute

such an instrument. Yet, notwithstanding the
absence of her parents’ conformity to the affidavit of
desistance and lack of notice to them or their lawyer
of the scheduled hearing, respondent judge
dismissed the criminal case. Truly, he should have
exercised more prudence and caution instead of
perfunctorily dismissing the case, considering the
nature and gravity of the offense charged.
At the very least, herein respondent should have
appointed a guardian ad litem for Licel, to protect
her welfare and interest, instead of hastily
dismissing the rape case. The Rule on Examination
of a Child Witness,14 which took effect on
December 15, 2000, governs the examination of
child witnesses who are victims of, accused of, or
witnesses to a crime. In the absence or incapacity of
the parents to be the guardian, Section 5 (a)15 of
said rule provides that the court may appoint a
guardian ad litem to promote the best interests of
the child. This rule was already in effect when
respondent judge dismissed the rape case on May
22, 2001.
12. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. VALENTIN
BARING, JR. G.R. No. 137933 : January 28, 2002
FACTS: Valentin Baring, Jr., herein accused-
appellant, was indicted for statutory rape
committed against a seven-year-old girl in an
information that reads-
That prior to August 2, 1997 and on several
occasions thereto, in the Municipality of Dasmarias,
Province of Cavite, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
lewd designs, by means of force, violence and
intimidation taking advantage of his superior
strength over the person of the victim who is only
seven (7) years old, did, then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, have carnal knowledge
of one Jennifer Donayre, against her will and
consent, to her damage and prejudice.
ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of the child
victim is credible ?
HELD: Yes. We are not at all uninformed in this
regard for we, in a plethora of cases, have
consistently upheld the full weight of a young victims
unwavering testimony. Also, there is Section 22 of
the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness, which
categorically states:
ALABA, MICHELLE
Section 22. Corroboration.-
Corroboration shall not be required of a
testimony of a child. His testimony, if credible
by itself, shall be sufficient to support a finding
of fact, conclusion, or judgment subject to the
standard proof required in criminal and non-
criminal cases.
What is important at this point, and we do not
hesitate to reiterate, is that forensic examination
inclusive of physical examination and forensic
interview of sexually assaulted children [adolescents
included] must be conducted with maximum
sensitivity to the young victims feelings of
vulnerability and embarrassment. Great care must
be observed in order to make the examination less
stressful lest they be more traumatic to the victim
than the very assault itself. The value of collecting
evidence should always be weighed against the
emotional cost of the procedure and examination of
the child.
13. PEOPLE V. RAMA, G.R. NO. 136304
FACTS: The birth of the New Year in 1998 saw the
loss of Roger and Eufemia Cabiguin's infant child,
Joyce Ann Cabiguin. Joyce Ann Cabiguin, a minor,
one (1) year and six (6) months old was kidnapped
by the abovenamed accused.
The prosecution's story was gathered mainly from
the testimony of five-year old Roxanne Cabiguin, a
cousin of Joyce Ann. Roxanne testified that Rama
called her and told her that if she would bring the
beautiful girl (referring to Joyce Ann) to him, he
would give Roxanne a biscuit. Rama gave her one
biscuit. She ate it. She then carried Joyce Ann to the
accused Rama who ran away with little Joyce Ann.
The defense contends, however, that Roxanne's
testimony, coming from the mouth of a five-year old,
does not deserve credit because she could not
answer many questions and appeared to have been
coached by her grandmother, Diana.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can give credence
to the testimony of the five-year old Roxanne.
HELD: Yes. In the case at bar, while the five-year
old witness, Roxanne, was not able to answer some
questions such as which was her left and her right,
she was straightforward in identifying the accused
Rama as the culprit
The determination of the competence and credibility
of a child as a witness rests primarily with the trial
judge as he had the opportunity to see the
 ALABA, MICHELLE
demeanor

of the witness, his apparent intelligence or lack of it,
and his understanding of the nature of the oath.
This conclusion is in accord with the spirit and letter
of the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness (the
"Rule") which became effective last December 15,
2000. The following provisions are apropos:
"Section 1. Applicability of the Rule. --Unless
otherwise provided, this Rule shall govern the
examination of child witnesses who are victims of
crime, accused of a crime, and witnesses to crime.
It shall apply in all criminal proceedings and non-
criminal proceedings involving child witnesses."
"Section 3. Construction of the Rule. --This Rule
shall be liberally construed to uphold the best
interests of the child and to promote the maximum
accommodation of child witnesses without prejudice
to the constitutional rights of the accused."
"Section 6. Competence. --Every child is presumed
qualified to be a witness. However, the court shall
conduct a competency examination of a child, motu
proprio or on motion of a party , when it finds that
substantial doubt exists regarding the ability of the
child to perceive, remember, communicate,
distinguish truth from falsehood, or appreciate the
duty to tell the truth in court.
(a) Proof of necessity. --A party seeking
competency examination must present proof
necessity of competence examination. The age
the child by itself is not a sufficient basis for
competency examination."
The Court has long held that the testimony of a sole
eyewitness is sufficient to support a conviction so
long as it is clear, straightforward and worthy of
credence by the trial court.
The Rule also provides in Section 22, viz:
"Section 22. Corroboration.-- Corroboration shall not
be required of a testimony of a child. His testimony,
if credible by itself, shall be sufficient to support a
finding of fact, conclusion, or judgment subject to
the standard of proof required in criminal and non-
criminal cases."
14. PEOPLE V. PLASENCIA, G.R. NO. 90198
November 7, 1995
ALABA, MICHELLE
FACTS: Antonio Plasencia, Roberto Descartin and
Joelito (Julito) Descartin were accused of robbery
with homicide. Francisca Espina, one of the
witnesses, look down to her palm while testifying
where she have notes.
ISSUE: Is the act of Francisca Espina in looking
down to her palm where she have notes written
loses her credibility and the trial court abusing its
discretion?
HELD: No. The use of memory aids during an
examination of a witness is not altogether
proscribed. Section 16, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court states:
Sec. 16. When witness may refer to memorandum.
— A witness may be allowed to refresh his memory
respecting a fact, by anything written or recorded by
himself or under his direction at the time when the
fact occurred, or immediately thereafter, or at any
other time when the fact was fresh in his memory
and he knew that the same was correctly written or
recorded; but in such case the writing or record
must be produced and may be inspected by the
adverse party, who may, if he chooses, cross-
examine the witness upon it and may read it in
evidence. So, also, a witness may testify from such
a writing or record, though he retain no recollection
of the particular facts, if he is able to swear that the
a
writing or record correctly stated the transaction
of
when made; but such evidence must be received
of
with caution.
a
Allowing a witness to refer to her notes rests on the
sound discretion of the trial court. In this case, the
exercise of that discretion has not been abused; the
witness herself has explained that she merely
wanted to be accurate on dates and details.
15. ROSELLA D. CANQUE vs. THE COURT OF
FACTS: Canque, a contractor doing business style
APPEALS and SOCOR CONSTRUCTION
under the name of RDC Construction, and Socor
CORPORATION G.R. No. 96202 April 13, 1999
Construction entered into a contract to supply RDC
with construction materials for the different road
repairs in Cebu City. After the completion of the
projects, Canque refused to pay Socor alleging that
she has already paid Socor 1.4M but did not issue
any receipt thereof and that the materials delivered
were not delivered. Socor presented its Book of
Collectibles evidencing the unpaid obligation of
Canque as well as Dolores Aday, its bookkeeper
who made the entries. Canque opposed the
admissibility of the Book of Collectibles on the
ground that it is
 ALABA, MICHELLE

hearsay as it will not prove that the materials were is doubly true when the witness stands to gain
delivered were or not. Further, it could not be materially or otherwise from the admission of such
admitted as evidence for other purpose other than evidence
the purpose which it was offered to prove.
Since there were other evidences presented by
ISSUE: Whether or not the Book of Collectibles is Socor to prove the existence of their contract with
admissible as evidence. Canque as well as the accomplishment of the
construction projects, the Court ruled in favor of
HELD: No, it is not admissible as evidence as it Socor.
merely corroborates the testimony of Aday. The
Court held that the bookkeeper has no personal
knowledge of the fact that the materials were
delivered or not. The only person could attest to
such fact was the project engineer alone, who,
however was not presented during trial. Though it is
inadmissible as evidence, it may however be
presented to refresh the memory of the witness.
Rule 132, Sec. 16 provides that:

Sec. 16. When witness may refer to

memorandum. — A witness may be allowed to
refresh his memory respecting a fact, by anything
written or recorded by himself or under his direction
at the time when the fact occurred, or immediately
thereafter, or at any other time when the fact was
fresh in his memory and knew that the same was
correctly written or recorded; but in such case the
writing or record must be produced and may be
inspected by the adverse party, who may, if he
chooses, cross examine the witness upon it, and
may read it in evidence. So, also, a witness may
testify from such writing or record, though he retain
no recollection of the particular facts, if he is able to
swear that the writing or record correctly stated the
transaction when made; but such evidence must be
received with caution.

The purpose of the Book was to prove that Canque

was indebted to RDC, thus, the nature of evidence
changed and not the purpose for which it was
offered. Since the Book only corroborated the
testimony of Aday, wherein she did indeed entered
the amount of indebtedness of Canque, it cannot be
admitted as evidence as a witness may not be
corroborated by any written statement prepared
wholly by him or her. She cannot be more credile
just because she supports her open-court
declaration with written statements of the same
facts even if she did prepare them during the
occasion in dispute, unless the proper predicate of
her failing memory is priorly laid down. What is
more, even where this requirement has been
satisfied, the express injunction of the rule itself is
that such evidence must be received with caution, if
only because it is not very difficult to conceive and
fabricate evidence of this nature. This

WEEK 14
1. [G.R. No. 107493. February 1, 1996]
NATIVIDAD CANDIDO, assisted by her husband
ALFREDO CANDIDO, and VICTORIA C.
RUMBAUA, assisted by her husband
AMORRUMBAUA, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and SOFRONIO DABU, respondents.
FACTS: Petitioners Natividad Candido and Victoria
Rumbaua are co-owners of a first-class irrigated
riceland in Orion, Bataan. Respondent Sofronio
Dabu served as their agricultural tenant. Petitioners
then lodged a complaint with the Regional Trial
Court of Bataan against respondent Dabu for
termination of tenancy relationship and recovery of
unpaid rentals from crop-year 1983 plus attorneys
fees and litigation expenses.
Petitioners averred in their complaint below that a
team from the Ministry of Agrarian Reform had fixed
a provisional rental of twenty-six (26) and twenty-
nine
(29) sacks of palay for the rainy and dry seasons,
respectively, which respondent failed to pay
beginning the crop-year 1983 dry season up to the
filing of the complaint.
Private respondent denied the material allegations
of the complaint and claimed that until 1983 their
sharing system was on a 50-50 basis; that his share
in the crop year 1983 dry season was still with
petitioner Natividad Candido who likewise retained
his water pump. He denied any provisional rental
allegedly fixed by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform
and at the same time maintained that only a
proposal for thirteen (13) cavans for the rainy
season crop and twenty-five percent (25%) of the
net harvest during the dry season was put forward.
He claimed that he paid his rentals by depositing
thirteen (13) cavans of palay for the 1984 rainy
season crop, thirteen (13) cavans for 1985 and eight
(8) cavans representing twenty-five percent (25%)
of the dry season harvest.
On motion of respondent upon issues being
joined, the case was referred to the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) for a preliminary
determination of the existing relationship between
the parties and for certification as to its propriety for
trial. Thereafter the DAR certified that the case was
proper for trial but only on the issue of non-payment
of rentals and not on the ejectment of respondent
Dabu. Accordingly trial proceeded on the issue of
non-payment of rentals.
ALABA, MICHELLE
After finding that no evidence was adduced by
petitioners to prove the provisional rental alleged to
have been fixed by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform,
the lower court dismissed the complaint. The Court
of Appeals confirmed the findings of the court a quo.
ISSUE: W/N the verified complaint and the affidavit
presented by petitioners to the DAR are proofs of
the provisional rentals fixed by it and that it was
error for the trial court not to have taken cognizance
of these documents.
HELD: The Court is not persuaded. It is settled that
courts will only consider as evidence that which has
been formally offered. The affidavit of petitioner
Natividad Candido mentioning the provisional rate of
rentals was never formally offered; neither the
alleged certification by the Ministry of Agrarian
Reform. Not having been formally offered, the
affidavit and certification cannot be considered as
evidence. Thus the trial court as well as the
appellate court correctly disregarded them. If they
neglected to offer those documents in evidence,
however vital they may be, petitioners only have
themselves to blame, not respondent who was not
even given a chance to object as the documents
were never offered in evidence.
A document, or any article for that matter, is not
evidence when it is simply marked for identification;
it must be formally offered, and the opposing
counsel given an opportunity to object to it or cross-
examine the witness called upon to prove or identify
it. A formal offer is necessary since judges are
required to base their findings of fact and judgment
only -and strictly - upon the evidence offered by the
parties at the trial. To allow a party to attach any
document to his pleading and then expect the court
to consider it as evidence may draw unwarranted
consequences. The opposing party will be deprived
of his chance to examine the document and object
to its admissibility. The appellate court will have
difficulty reviewing documents not previously
scrutinized by the court below. The pertinent
provisions of the Revised Rules of Court on the
inclusion on appeal of documentary evidence or
exhibits in the records cannot be stretched as to
include such pleadings or documents not offered at
the hearing of the case.
2. TERESITA E. VILLALUZ v. ROLANDO R.
LIGON [G.R. NO. 143721 : August 31, 2005]
FACTS: Teresita E. Villaluz (Villaluz) and
respondent Rolando R. Ligon (Ligon) were engaged
in several businesses. Sometime in 1987, Villaluz
borrowed sums of money from Ligon secured by
postdated checks which later bounced for the
reasons "Drawn

Against Insufficient Funds/Account Closed."
Demands were made on Villaluz but she failed to
pay her debt prompting Ligon to institute criminal
proceedings for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila.
During the hearing of said cases, Villaluz asked for
the settlement of their controversy and Ligon, as the
First Party, and Villaluz, as the Second Party,
executed a Memorandum of Agreement.
In accordance with said agreement, Villaluz issued
a check which again bounced upon presentment for
the reason that it was drawn against a closed
account. Ligon made several demands on Villaluz
but to no avail.
Since no payment was made, Ligon instituted a
complaint against Villaluz.
Upon failure of Villaluz and her counsel to appear at
the pre-trial conference, the RTC declared Villaluz
as in default and received Ligon's evidence ex-
parte. Villaluz through counsel, filed a Motion for
New Trial and a Motion to Admit Answer which were
both granted by the court.9
Villaluz filed a motion for reconsideration dated May
23, 1996, stating that given the opportunity to testify,
she will re-affirm the contents of her affidavit that
was submitted in support of her Motion for New
Trial, or in the alternative, she will formally offer the
same. This was denied by the RTC in its Order
dated July 22, 1996.
Villaluz went to the CA and claimed that the trial
court erred: in not dismissing the case on the
ground of forum shopping; in not granting the
defendant the opportunity to present evidence in her
behalf thereby depriving her of her fundamental right
to due process; and in not considering the evidence
already on record showing that the subject checks
had no valid consideration.
The CA denied the petition that the "Sinumpaang
Salaysay" which she submitted in support of her
motion for new trial cannot be taken into
consideration as the same was not formally offered
in evidence during trial.
ISSUE: Whether or not the affidavit of petitioner
earlier submitted in the motion for new trial should
be considered
HELD: No. Petitioner submitted a "Sinumpaang
Salaysay" stating that she is an illiterate and that
sometime in 1990, Ligon's lawyer deceived her into
signing a Memorandum of Agreement and in issuing
a check for P1.9 M. Petitioner argues that the
"Sinumpaang Salaysay" which she submitted as an
affidavit of merit in support of her motion for new
trial should be considered as part of the records of
the case even without formal offer of the same.
ALABA, MICHELLE
We do not agree. There is a need to formally offer
affidavits before the courts to afford the opposing
party the opportunity to ascertain or refute the
veracity of the contents of such statements. Courts
will only consider as evidence that which has not
been formally offered. If an affidavit was never
formally offered, it cannot be considered as
evidence. If petitioner neglected to offer her affidavit
in evidence, however vital it may be, she only has
herself to blame.
The rule is that a document, or any article for that
matter, is not evidence when it is simply marked for
identification; it must be formally offered and the
opposing counsel given an opportunity to object to it
or cross-examine the witness called upon to prove
or identify it. It is necessary that a formal offer is
made since judges are required to base their
findings of fact and judgment only, and strictly, upon
the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. To
allow a party to attach any document to his pleading
and expect the court to consider it as evidence may
draw unwarranted consequences. The opposing
party will be deprived of a chance to examine the
document and object to its admissibility. The
appellate court will also have difficulty reviewing the
documents not previously scrutinized by the court
below. Indeed, the pertinent provisions of the
Revised Rules of Court on the inclusion on appeal
of documentary evidence or exhibits in the records
cannot be stretched as to include such pleadings or
documents not offered at the hearing of the case.
In this case, while the motion for new trial was
granted, it cannot be said that the contents of the
affidavit attached thereto should be treated by the
trial court as evidence for the petitioner as it was not
formally offered during the trial on the merits.
3. JOSE TABUENA vs. CA and EMILIANO
FACTS: The subject of the case is a residential land
TABERNILLA, JR.
in Aklan where an action for recovery of ownership
G.R. No. 85423 MAY 6, 1991
was filed by the Estate of Alfredo Tabernilla against
petitioner Jose Tabuena.
It was found by the RTC that the mother of petitioner
was only allowed to stay on the property by mere
tolerance of Alfredo Tabernilla, on the condition that
she paid the realty tax thereon, which she did until
her death.
Tabuena appealed to the respondent court,
complaining that, in arriving at its factual findings,
the trial court motu proprio took cognizance of
Exhibits "A", "B" and "C", which had been marked
by the plaintiff but never formally submitted in
evidence. The CA, in sustaining the trial court, held
that contrary to

the allegations of the appellant, the said exhibits
were in fact formally submitted in evidence as
disclosed by the transcript of stenographic notes,
which it quoted at length.
ISSUE: Whether or not the exhibits were formally
submitted in evidence.
HELD: NO. Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides
in Section 35 thereof as follows:
Sec. 35. Offer of evidence.—The court shall
consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered. The purpose for which the
evidence is offered must be specified.
The mere fact that a particular document is marked
as an exhibit does not mean it has thereby already
been offered as part of the evidence of a party. It is
true that Exhibits "A," "B" and "C" were marked at
the pre-trial of the case below, but this was only for
the purpose of identifying them at that time. They
were not by such marking formally offered as
exhibits.
At the trial on the merits, the party may decide to
formally offer The exhibits if it believes they will
advance its cause, and then again it may decide not
to do so at all. In the latter event, such documents
cannot be considered evidence, nor can they be
given any evidentiary value.
Chief Justice Moran explained the rationale of this
rule by stating that “The offer is necessary because
it is the duty of a judge to rest his findings of facts
and his judgment only and strictly upon the
evidence offered by the patties at the trial.”
Even if there be no formal offer of an exhibit,
evidence may still be admitted against the adverse
party if, first, it has been duly identified by testimony
duly recorded and, second, it has itself been
incorporated in the records of the case. But we do
not find that these requirements have been satisfied
in the case before us.
4. PEOPLE vs. EDGARDO YAP and
SIMPLICIO OSMEÑA [G.R. No. 103517 February
FACTS: Edgardo Yap and Simplicio Osmeña were
charged with a violation of Section 4, Article II of
Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, for
having sold on October 1, 1989 in Ozamiz City six
sticks of marijuana for a consideration of ten pesos.
They pleaded not guilty.
ALABA, MICHELLE
From the evidence in this case. it appears that a
report of rampant pushing of prohibited drugs by
notorious pushers "Edgar" and "Simpoy," later
identified as Edgardo Yap and Simplicio Osmeña,
respectively, was submitted by a civilian informer to
the 10th Narcotics Regional Unit of the Philippine
Constabulary (PC).
A buy-bust operation was conducted and they were
arrested. They denied any participation in the
aforestated sale of prohibited drugs. Osmeña
claimed that in the morning of that day, he was in
their house doing some household chores when
Yap came and asked him to accompany him to buy
soap inside the public market.
The two accused claimed that the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses were never offered nor
admitted in evidence, nor were the specific
purposes for which they were offered duly stated,
contrary to Sections 34 and 35, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the claim of the two accused
is correct
HELD: No. In actual practice, there is a difference
between presentation or introduction of evidence
and offer of such evidence at the trial of a case. The
presentation of evidence consists of putting in as
evidence the testimony of the witnesses or the
documents relevant to the issue. An offer of
evidence, on the other hand, means the statement
made by counsel as to what he expects to prove
through the witness. This is what trial lawyers
understand by the "offer of evidence." Thus, "offer of
evidence," as used in Section 34 of Rule 132 must
be understood to include the presentation or
introduction of evidence. What is essential in order
that an offer of testimony may be valid, therefore, is
that the witness be called and asked appropriate
questions.
All the prosecution witnesses were presented and
examined before the court a quo, the questions and
answers being taken down in writing, and such
testimonies were offered thereafter to the trial court.
Had appellants wanted the trial court to reject the
evidence being introduced, they should have raised
an objection thereto. They cannot raise the question
for the first time on appeal. The right to object is a
privilege which the party may waive. It is not
consistent with the ends of justice for a party,
knowing of a supposed secret defect, to proceed
and take his chance for a favorable verdict, with the
power and intent to annul it as erroneous if it should
be against him.
 ALABA, MICHELLE
said section

5. PEOPLE VS. GODOY G.R. Nos. 115908-09

FACTS: Godoy was found guilty beyond reasonable

doubt of the crimes of rape and kidnapping with
serious illegal detention, and sentencing him to the
maximum penalty of death in both cases by the
Regional Trial Court.

The private complainant Mia Taha allegedly said

that her teacher Danny Codoy(Appellant) by means
of force, threat and intimidation, by using a knife and
by means of deceit, have carnal Knowledge with her
and kidnap or detained her, for a period of five.

The defense presented a different version of what

actually transpired.

His defense was that they were lovers, as

evidenced by the letters wrote by the complainant
(Mia Taha) to the accused and the same was
corroborated by the testimonies of the defense
witnesses.

ISSUE: Whether or not the testimonies of 2

witnesses prove the geniuses of the alleged
handwritings of Mia Taha and should their
testimonies be given probative value to the pieces
of evidence

HELD: Two other defense witnesses identified the

handwriting on the letters as belonging to Mia Taha.
They are Filomena Pielago and Erna Baradero who
were admittedly the former teachers of complainant
and highly familiar with her handwriting. The
greatest blunder committed by the trial court was in
ignoring the testimonies of these qualified witnesses
and refusing to give any probative value to these
two vital pieces of evidence, on the dubious and
lame pretext that no handwriting expert was
presented to analyze and evaluate the same.

Well-entrenched by now is the rule that resort to

questioned document examiners, more familiarly
called handwriting experts, is not mandatory.
Handwriting experts, while probably useful, are not
indispensable in examining or comparing
handwriting.72 This is so since under Section 22,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the handwriting of a
person may be proved by any witness who believes
it to be the handwriting of such person, because he
has seen the person write, or has seen writing
purporting to be his upon which the witness has
acted or been charged, and has thus acquired
knowledge of the handwriting of such person. The
 ALABA, MICHELLE
further provides that evidence respecting the
handwriting may also be given by a comparison,
made by the witness or the court, with writings
admitted or treated as genuine by the party
against whom the evidence is offered or proved to
be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge.

Under Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court,

the handwriting of a person may be proved by any
witness who believes it to be the handwriting of
such person, because he has seen the person
write, or has seen writing purporting to be his
upon which the witness has acted or been
charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the
handwriting of such person. The said section
further provides that evidence respecting the
handwriting may also be given by a comparison,
made by the witness or the court, with writings
admitted or treated as genuine by the party
against whom the evidence is offered or proved to
be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge.

6. G.R. No. 175991 August 31, 2011

JOSE R. CATACUTAN, Petitioner, vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.

FACTS: Private complainant Georgito Posesano

was an Instructor II with Salary Grade 13 while
private complainant Magdalena Divinagracia was
an Education Program Specialist II with Salary
Grade 16, both at the Surigao del Norte School of
Arts and Trades (SNSAT).

On June 2, 1997, the Commission on Higher

Education (CHED) Caraga Administrative Region,
appointed and promoted private complainants as
Vocational Instruction Supervisor III with Salary
Grade 18 at SNSAT.4 These promotional
appointments were duly approved and attested as
permanent by the Civil Service Commission
(CSC) on June 3, 1997. Being then the Officer-In-
Charge of SNSAT, the approved appointments
were formally transmitted to the petitioner on June
6, 1997, copy furnished the concerned
appointees. Despite receipt of the appointment
letter, the private complainants were not able to
assume their new position since petitioner made
known that he strongly opposed their
appointments and that he would not implement
them despite written orders from CHED and the
CSC, Caraga Regional Office.8 Thus, on August
2, 1997, private complainants lodged a formal
complaint against petitioner for grave abuse of
authority and disrespect of lawful orders before
the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao.

In an Information dated February 27, 1998,
petitioner was charged before the RTC of Surigao
City with violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 as
amended.
During arraignment on September 22, 1998,
petitioner pleaded "not guilty." For his defense,
petitioner admitted that he did not implement the
promotional appointments of the private
complainants because of some procedural lapses or
infirmities attending the preparation of the
appointment papers. According to him, the
appointment papers were prepared by SNSAT
Administrative Officer, Crispin Noguera, using blank
forms bearing the letterhead of SNSAT and not of
the CHED Regional Office who made the
appointments. He also averred that the appointment
papers cited the entire plantilla (1996 Plantilla-
OSEC-DECSB- VOCIS3-19, Pages 1-16) instead of
only the particular page on which the vacant item
occurs. He likewise claimed that he received only
the duplicate copies of the appointments contrary to
the usual procedure where the original appointment
papers and other supporting documents are
returned to his office. Finally, he asserted that the
transmittal letter from the CHED did not specify the
date of effectivity of the appointments. These
alleged infirmities, he contended, were formally
brought to the attention of the CHED Regional
Director on June 20, 1997 who, however, informed
him that the subject appointments were regular and
valid and directed him to implement the same. Still
not satisfied, petitioner sought the intercession of
CHED Chairman Angel C. Alcala in the settlement
of this administrative problem but the latter did not
respond. Petitioner alleged that his refusal to
implement the appointments of the private
complainants was not motivated by bad faith but he
just wanted to protect the interest of the government
by following strict compliance in the preparation of
appointment papers.
RTC: holding that the act of the petitioner in
defying the orders of the CHED and the CSC to
implement the subject promotional appointments
despite the rejection of his opposition, demonstrates
his palpable and patent fraudulent and dishonest
purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious
wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will. The
trial court ruled that petitioner’s refusal to implement
the appointments of the private complainants had
caused undue injury to them. Thus, it held petitioner
guilty of the crime charged and accordingly
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment
of six (6) years and one (1) month and perpetual
disqualification from public office.
ALABA, MICHELLE
On appeal, petitioner’s conviction was affirmed in
toto by the Sandiganbayan. The appellate court
ruled that the Decision of the trial court, being
supported by evidence and firmly anchored in law
and jurisprudence, is correct. It held that petitioner
failed to show that the trial court committed any
reversible error in judgment.
Hence, this petition. In the Court’s Resolution dated
February 26, 2007, the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) was required to file its Comment.
The OSG filed its Comment on June 5, 2007 while
the Office of the Special Prosecutor filed the
Comment for respondent People of the Philippines
on February 22, 2008.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioner’s constitutional
right[s] to due process and equal protection of the
law were violated when he was denied the
opportunity to present [in] evidence the Court of
Appeals.
HELD: No. Petitioner was not deprived of his right
to due process.
"Due process simply demands an opportunity to be
heard. "Due process is satisfied when the parties
are afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain their respective sides of the controversy.
"Where an opportunity to be heard either through
oral arguments or through pleadings is accorded,
there is no denial of procedural due process.
Guided by these established jurisprudential
pronouncements, petitioner can hardly claim denial
of his fundamental right to due process. Records
show that petitioner was able to confront and cross-
examine the witnesses against him, argue his case
vigorously, and explain the merits of his defense. To
reiterate, as long as a party was given the
opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he
cannot be said to have been denied due process of
law for the opportunity to be heard is the better
accepted norm of procedural due process.
There is also no denial of due process when the trial
court did not allow petitioner to introduce as
evidence the CA Decision in CA-G.R. SP No.
51795. It is well within the court’s discretion to reject
the presentation of evidence which it judiciously
believes irrelevant and impertinent to the
proceeding on hand. This is specially true when the
evidence sought to be presented in a criminal
proceeding as in this case, concerns an
administrative matter. As the Sandiganbayan aptly
remarked:
 ALABA, MICHELLE

The RTC committed no error in judgment when it exhibit sought to be

did not allow the Accused-appellant to present the
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
51795 (Jose R. Catacutan vs. Office of the
Ombudsman). The findings in administrative cases
are not binding upon the court trying a criminal
case, even if the criminal proceedings are based on
the same facts and incidents which gave rise to the
administrative matter. The dismissal of a criminal
case does not foreclose administrative action or
necessarily gives the accused a clean bill of health
in all respects. In the same way, the dismissal of an
administrative case does not operate to terminate a
criminal proceeding with the same subject matter.

Thus, considering the difference in the

quantum of evidence, as well as the procedure
followed and the sanctions imposed in criminal and
administrative proceedings, the findings and
conclusions in one should not necessarily be
binding on the other. Notably, the evidence
presented in the administrative case may not
necessarily be the same evidence to be presented
in the criminal cases.

On the basis of the afore-mentioned precedents, the

Court has no option but to declare that the courts
below correctly disallowed the introduction in
evidence of the CA Decision. "Due process of law is
not denied by the exclusion of irrelevant, immaterial,
or incompetent evidence, or testimony of an
incompetent witness. It is not an error to refuse
evidence which although admissible for certain
purposes, is not admissible for the purpose which
counsel states as the ground for offering it."

At any rate, even assuming that the trial court

erroneously rejected the introduction as evidence of
the CA Decision, petitioner is not left without legal
recourse. Petitioner could have availed of the
remedy provided in Section 40, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court which provides:

Section 40. Tender of excluded evidence. – If

documents or things offered in evidence are
excluded by the court, the offeror may have the
same attached to or made part of the record. If the
evidence excluded is oral, the offeror may state for
the record the name and other personal
circumstances of the witness and the substance of
the proposed testimony.

As observed by the appellate court, if the petitioner

is keen on having the RTC admit the CA’s Decision
for whatever it may be worth, he could have
included the same in his offer of exhibits. If an
 ALABA, MICHELLE
presented in evidence is rejected, the party anxiety warranting the award of moral damages
producing it should ask the court’s permission to under Article 2217 of the New Civil Code.
have the exhibit attached to the record.

As things stand, the CA Decision does not form

part of the records of the case, thus it has no
probative weight. Any evidence that a party
desires to submit for the consideration of the court
must be formally offered by him otherwise it is
excluded and rejected and cannot even be taken
cognizance of on appeal. The rules of procedure
and jurisprudence do not sanction the grant of
evidentiary value to evidence which was not
formally offered.

First, petitioner could not have committed the acts

imputed against him during the time material to
this case were it not for his being a public officer,
that is, as the Officer-In-Charge (Principal) of
SNSAT. As such public officer, he exercised
official duties and functions, which include the
exercise of administrative supervision over the
school such as taking charge of personnel
management and finances, as well as
implementing instruction as far as appointment of
teachers.

Second, petitioner acted with evident bad faith in

refusing to implement the appointments of private
complainants. While petitioner may have laudable
objectives in refusing the implementation of
private complainants’ valid appointments, the
Court fails to see how he can still claim good faith
when no less than the higher authorities have
already sustained the validity of the subject
appointments and have ordered him to proceed
with the implementation. "It is well to remember
that good intentions do not win cases, evidence
does."

Third, undue injury to the private complainants

was duly proven to the point of moral certainty.
Here, the private complainants suffered undue
injury when they were not able to assume their
official duties as Vocational Supervisors III despite
the issuance of their valid appointments. As borne
out by the records, they were able to assume their
new positions only on November 19, 1997. So in
the interregnum from June to November 1997,
private complainants failed to enjoy the benefits of
an increased salary corresponding to their newly
appointed positions. Likewise established is that
as a result of petitioner’s unjustified and inordinate
refusal to implement their valid appointments
notwithstanding clear and mandatory directives
from his superiors, the private complainants
suffered mental anguish, sleepless nights, serious
 ALABA, MICHELLE

At this point, the Court just needs to stress that the

foregoing are factual matters that were threshed out
and decided upon by the trial court which were
subsequently affirmed by the Sandiganbayan.
Where the factual findings of both the trial court and
the appellate court coincide, the same are binding
on this Court. In any event, apart from these factual
findings of the lower courts, this Court in its own
assessment and review of the records considers the
findings in order.