Jhon Anthony M.

Briones
Juris Doctor 2B

XV. ELECTION CONTESTS

11. Peña v. HRET, 270 SCRA 340 (1997)

FACTS:

Petitioner and the private respondent (Alfredo E. Abueg) were contenders as a Member
of the House of Representatives representing the SecondDistrict of the province of
Palawaninthe May 8, 1995 elections.On May 12, 195, upon canvassing the votes cast, the
ProvincialBoard of Canvassers of Palawan proclaimed the private respondent as the winner.

On May 22, 1995, the instant petition was filed with the HRET, wherein the petitioner,
averred the elections in the precincts of the Second District of Palawan were tainted with
massive fraud, widespread vote-buying, intimidation and terrorism and other serious
irregularities committed before, during and after the voting, and during the counting of votes and
the preparation of election returns and certificates of canvass which affected the results of the
election.

Private respondent moved to dismiss the case since the petitioner did not specifically
allege the precincts where said irregularities were present. HRET stated that the Protestant
failed to specify which are the 700 precincts, out of the said 743 precincts, that are included in
his protest; he even failed to allege the municipalities where the protested precincts are located.
Worse, the body of the Petition does not even mention the 700 precincts.Reference to them is
made only in the Prayer. These omissions prevent Protestee from being apprised of the issues
which he has to meet and make it virtually impossible for the Tribunal to determine which ballot
boxes have to be collected. HRET also held that this scattershot allegation is not allowedin
election contests and that “it is necessary to make a precise indication of the precincts protested
and a specification of the claimed offenses to have been committed by the parties.

ISSUE:

Whether the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to having acted without or inexcess of jurisdiction in dismissing the
election protest of petitioner.

HELD:

No. Petitioner makes no specific mention of the precincts where widespread election, fraud and
irregularities occurred. This is a fatal omission, as it goes into the very substance of the
protest.Under Section 21 of the Revised Rules of Procedure of HRET, insufficiency in form and
substance of the petition constitutes aground for the immediate dismissal of the Petition.

The prescription that the petition must be sufficient in form and substance means that
thepetition must be more than merely rhetorical. If the allegations contained therein are
unsupported by even the faintest whisper of authority in fact and law, then there is no other
course than to dismiss the petition, otherwise, the assumptions of an elected public official
may,and will always be held up by petitions of this sort by the losing candidate.
Admittedly, the rule is well-established that the power to annul an election should beexercised
with the greatest care as it involves the free and fair expression of the popular will.Itis only in
extreme cases of fraud and under circumstances which demonstrate to the fullestdegree a
fundamental and wantondisregard of the law that elections are annulled, and then only when it
becomes impossible to take any other step.

This Court’s jurisdiction to review decisions and orders of electoral tribunalsoperates only upon
a showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the tribunal.Onlywhere such a grave abuse
of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with theelectoral tribunal’s judgment.There
is such showing in the present petition.
12. Saquilyan v. COMELEC, 416 SCRA 658 (2003)

FACTS:

Petitioner Saquilayan and respondent Jaro were candidates for the Office of
Municipal Mayor of Imus, Cavite in the May 14, 2001 local elections. After the votes
were canvassed, Saquilayan was proclaimed the winner for having received 27,494
votes against Jaro’s 26,746 votes.
On May 28, 2001, Jaro instituted an Election Protest Case (EPC No. 01-02)
before the RTC of Imus, Cavite contesting the results in all 453 election precincts in the
Municipality of Imus. Saquilayan filed his Answer with Motion to Dismiss contending,
among other things, that the election protest failed to state a cause of action. The
Motion to Dismiss was denied by the RTC in an Order dated July 31, 2001. Saquilayan
questioned the denial before the Comelec’s Second Division through a petition for
certiorari and prohibition, which was docketed as SPR No. 19-2001. On January 22,
2002, the Second Division ruled in favor of Saquilayan and ordered the dismissal of the
election protest. Jaro sought a reconsideration of the order of dismissal and the case
was elevated to the Comelec en banc. On February 26, 2003, the Comelec en banc
issued the questioned resolution granting Jaro’s Motion for Reconsideration.
Saquilayan’s petition was thereunder dismissed and EPC No. 01-02 was ordered to
proceed. Aggrieved, Saquilayan filed the present petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC is correct in deciding that the instant petition
failed to state a cause of action citing as a basis the Court’s ruling in Peña v. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal?

HELD:
Yes. In said case, petitioner Teodoro Peña, the losing party in the congressional
elections, contested 700 out of 742 election precincts without specifying the precincts
where the anomalies allegedly occurred. Furthermore, Peña made only general
allegations, to wit:3
7. The elections in the precincts of the Second District of Palawan were tainted
with massive fraud, widespread vote-buying, intimidation and terrorism and other
serious irregularities committed before, during and after the voting, and during the
counting of votes and the preparation of election returns and certificates of canvass
which affected the results of the election. Among the fraudulent acts committed were
the massive vote-buying and intimidation of voters, disenfranchisement of petitioner’s
known supporters through systematic deletion of names from the list of voters, allowing
persons to vote in excess of the number of registered voters, misappreciation,
misreading and non-reading of protestant’s ballots and other irregularities.

The Court in that case dismissed the election protest, holding that the failure to
make specific mention of the precincts where wide-spread election fraud and
irregularities occurred, and the bare allegations of massive fraud, widespread
intimidation and terrorism, without specification and substantiation of where and how
these occurrences took place, render the protest fatally defective. As explained by the
Court:
The prescription that the petition must be sufficient in form and substance means
that the petition must be more than merely rhetorical. If the allegations contained therein
are unsupported by even the faintest whisper of authority in fact and law, then there is
no other course than to dismiss the petition, otherwise, the assumption of an elected
official may, and always [will,] be held up by petitions of this sort by a losing candidate.
Therein petitioner Miguel argued that the general allegations of fraud and irregularities
were not sufficient to order the opening of ballot boxes and counting of ballots. The
Court, however, found the allegations embodied in the election protest to be serious
enough to necessitate the opening of the ballot boxes to resolve the issue of fraud and
irregularities in the election.
The facts of the present petition are similar to those in Miguel rather than to those
in Peña. In Miguel, there was a controversy between two candidates for municipal
mayor, while Peña dealt with candidates for a congressional district office. Also, one
reason that led to the dismissal of the election protest in Peña was the protestant’s
failure to specify the 700 out of the 743 precincts where the alleged anomalies occurred.
In both Miguel and the present petition, the protestants questioned all the precincts in
their respective municipalities.
Furthermore, the Miguel case, being the more recent decision, should prevail in
case of a conflict, under the well-established doctrine that a later judgment supersedes
a prior one in case of an inconsistency.
13. Soller v. COMELEC, 339 SCRA 685 (2000)

Facts:
Petitioner and private respondent were both candidates for mayor of the
municipality of Bansud, Oriental Mindoro in the May 11, 1998 elections. On May 14,
1998, the municipal board of canvassers proclaimed petitioner Ferdinand Thomas
Soller duly elected mayor.
On May 19, 1998, private respondent Angel Saulong filed with the COMELEC a
"petition for annulment of the proclamation/exclusion of election return". [1] On May 25,
1998, private respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pinamalayan, Oriental
Mindoro, an election protest against petitioner docketed as EC-31-98.
On June 15, 1998, petitioner filed his answer with counter-protest. Petitioner also
moved to dismiss private respondent's protest on the ground of lack of jurisdiction,
forum-shopping, and failure to state cause of action. [2]
On July 3, 1998, COMELEC dismissed the pre-proclamation case filed by private
respondent.
On October 1, 1998, the trial court denied petitioner's motion to dismiss. Petitioner
moved for reconsideration but said motion was denied. Petitioner then filed with the
COMELEC a petition for certiorari contending that respondent RTC acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in not dismissing private
respondent's election protest.
On August 31, 1999, the COMELEC en banc dismissed petitioner's suit. The
election tribunal held that private respondent paid the required filing fee. It also declared
that the defect in the verification is a mere technical defect which should not bar the
determination of the merits of the case. The election tribunal stated that there was no
forum shopping to speak of.
Under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, a motion for reconsideration of its en
banc ruling is prohibited except in a case involving an election offense. [3] Since the
present controversy involves no election offense, reconsideration is not possible and
petitioner has no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. Accordingly, petitioner properly filed the instant petition for certiorari with
this Court.
On September 21, 1999, we required the parties to maintain the status quo
ante prevailing as of September 17, 1999, the date of filing of this petition.
Before us, petitioner asserts that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction:
Issue:

Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to

lack or excess of jurisdiction in affirming respondent rtc's refusal to dismiss private
respondent's election protest despite his (sic) lack of jurisdiction over the same by
reason of the failure of the private respondent to pay all the requisite filing fees.

Held:
In Miranda v. Castillo, private respondents each paid per assessment the amount
of P465.00 as filing fees. Of this amount, P414.00 was allocated for the JDF, P10.00 for
legal research fund, P5.00 for victim compensation fee, and only the amount of P32.00
was regarded as filing fee. The Court considered the amount as partial payment of the
P300.00 filing fee under the COMELEC rules and required payment of the deficiency in
the amount of P268.00. But then again, the Court reiterated the caveat that in view of
Pahilan, Gatchalian, and Loyola cases we would no longer tolerate any mistake in the
payment of the full amount of filing fees for election cases filed after the promulgation of
the Loyola decision on March 27, 1997. Clearly then, errors in the payment of filing fees
in election cases is no longer excusable. And the dismissal of the present case for that
reason is, in our view, called for.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw library Besides, there is
another reason to dismiss private respondent’s election protest. We note that the
verification of aforesaid protest is defective. In the verification, private respondent
merely stated that he caused the preparation of his petition and he has read and
understood all the allegations therein. 14 Certainly, this is insufficient as private
respondent failed to state that the contents of his election protest are true and correct of
his personal knowledge. 15 Since the petition lacks proper verification, it should be
treated as an unsigned pleading and must be dismissed. 16 Further, we find that private
respondent did not comply with the required certification against forum shopping.
Private respondent successively filed a "petition for annulment of the
proclamation/exclusion of election return" and an election protest. Yet, he did not
disclose in his election protest that he earlier filed a petition for annulment of
proclamation/exclusion of election returns.

It could be argued that private respondent’s petition for annulment of

proclamation/exclusion of election returns was a pre-proclamation case. The issues
raised in that petition pertain to the preparation and appreciation of election returns and
the proceedings of the municipal board of canvassers. But note that such petition was
filed after the proclamation of petitioner as the winning candidate, thus, the petition was
no longer viable, for pre-proclamation controversies may no longer be entertained by
the COMELEC after the winning candidates have been proclaimed. It might even be
claimed with some reason that private respondent, by resorting to the wrong remedy,
abandoned his pre-proclamation case earlier filed.

Nonetheless, private respondent’s belief that he no longer had a pending case

before the COMELEC because he deemed it abandoned upon filing of his protest is not
a valid reason for non-disclosure of the pendency of said pre-proclamation case. Note
that the COMELEC dismissed private respondent’s preproclamation case only on July
3, 1998. Before the dismissal, said case was legally still pending resolution. Similarly,
the fact that private respondent’s protest was not based on the same cause of action as
his pre-proclamation case is not a valid excuse for not complying with the required
disclosure in the certification against forum shopping. The requirement to file a
certificate of non-forum shopping is mandatory. Failure to comply with this requirement
cannot be excused by the fact that a party is not guilty of forum shopping. The rule
applies to any complaint, petition, application or other initiatory pleading, regardless of
whether the party filing it has actually committed forum shopping. Every party filing any
initiatory pleading is required to swear under oath that he has not and will not commit
forum shopping. Otherwise we would have an absurd situation, as in this case, where
the parties themselves would be the judge of whether their actions constitute a violation
of the rule, and compliance therewith would depend on their belief that they might or
might not have violated the requirement. Such interpretation of the requirement would
defeat the very purpose of the rule.
14. Arroyo v. HRET, 246 SCRA 384 (1995)

Facts:

After the May 11, 1992 elections, Arroyo was declared as the duly elected Congressman
of the lone district of Makati. Arroyo won by 13,559 votes over his opponent. His opponent
Syjuco protested the declaration before the HRET. Syjuco alleged that Arroyo won due to
massive fraud hence he moved for revision and recounting. HRET gave way but during the
process some HRET employees and personnel conducted some irregularities to ensure
Syjuco’s win. After some paper battles between the two, Syjuco, realizing that mere revision
and recounting would not suffice to overthrow the more than 12,000 votes lead of Arroyo over
him, revised his complaint by including and introducing in his memorandum cum addendum that
his complaint is actually based on a broader and more equitable non-traditional determination of
the existence of the precinct-level document-based anomalies and that the revision he initially
sought is just incidental to such determination. The 3 justices members of the HRET ruled that
such amendment is already beyond the tribunal’s jurisdiction and the 6 representative members
ruled otherwise. Consequently, by a vote of 6-3, the HRET did not dismiss the protest filed by
Syjuco and the HRET later declared Syjuco as the winner.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction.

HELD: However guised or justified by Syjuco, this innovative theory he introduced for the first
time in his memorandum cum addendum indeed broadened the scope of the election protest
beyond what he originally sought-the mere revision of ballots. From his initial prayer for revision
which lays primary, if not exclusive emphasis on the physical recount and appreciation of ballots
alone, private respondent’s belated attempt to inject this theory at the memorandum stage calls
for presentation of evidence (consisting of thousands of documents) aside from, or other than,
the ballots themselves. By having done so, Syjuco in fact intended to completely abandon the
process and results of the revision and thereafter sought to rely on his brainchild process he
fondly coined as “precinct-level document-based evidence.” This is clearly substantial
amendment of the election protest expressly proscribed by Rule 28 of the HRET internal rules.
15. Legarda v. De Castro, 454 SCRA 242 (2005)

Facts:

         In a Resolution dated January 18, 2005, the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET)
confirmed the jurisdiction over the protest of Loren B. Legarda and denied the motion of
protestee, Noli L. de Castro for its outright dismissal.  The Tribunal further ordered
concerned officials to undertake measures for the protection and preservation of the
ballot boxes and election documents subject of the protest.

    On February 4, 2005, De Castro filed a motion for reconsideration assailing the said
resolution.   

      De Castro argues that where the correctness of the number of votes is the issue,
the best evidence are the ballots; that the process of correcting the manifest errors in
the certificates of canvass or election returns is a function of the canvassing bodies; that
once the canvassing bodies had done their functions, no alteration or correction of
manifest errors can be made; that since the authority of the Tribunal involves an
exercise of judicial power to determine the facts based on the evidence presented and
to apply the law based on the established facts, it cannot perform the ministerial
function of canvassing election returns. He also contends that the Tribunal cannot
correct the manifest errors on the statements of votes (SOV) and certificates of canvass
(COC).  But it is not suggested by any of the parties that questions on the validity,
authenticity and correctness of the SOVs and COCs are outside the Tribunal’s
jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

       Whether or not the Tribunal can re-canvass the ballots and can correct the manifest
errors in the SOVs and COCs.

HELD:

      Yes.  The SC finds no reason why the Tribunal cannot perform this function.   SC
agrees that the ballots are the best and most conclusive evidence in an election contest
where the correctness of the number of votes of each candidate is involved. Legarda
merely seeks the correction of manifest errors, that is, errors in the process of different
levels of transposition and addition of votes.
           
The constitutional function as well as the power and the duty to be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualification of the President and Vice-
President is expressly vested in the PET, in Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution. 
Included therein is the duty to correct manifest errors in the SOVs and COCs. There is
no necessity, in the SC’s view, to amend the PET Rules to perform this function within
the ambit of its constitutional function.
 In the instant protest, Legarda enumerated all the provinces, municipalities and cities
where she questions all the results in all the precincts therein.  The protest here is
sufficient in form and substantively, serious enough on its face to pose a challenge to
De Castro’s title to his office.

Considering that the protest is sufficient in form and substance, the SC again stress
that nothing as yet has been proved as to the veracity of the allegations.  The protest is
only sufficient for the Tribunal to proceed and give the Legarda the opportunity to prove
her case pursuant to Rule 61 of the PET Rules. Although said rule only pertains to
revision of ballots, nothing herein prevents the Tribunal from allowing or including the
correction of manifest errors, pursuant to the Tribunal’s rule-making power under
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution.
16. Idulza v. COMELEC, 454 SCRA 242 (2004)

FACTS:
An election protest was filed by three unsuccessful candidates for seats in the
Sangguniang Panglungsod of Gingoog City, directed at three proclaimed candidates.
The COMELEC found merit in the protest and ordered the protestees to vacate their
posts. In reviewing the COMELECs actions, the Court is guided by two principles
particular to election cases: the recognition of the COMELECs specialized role in the
supervision of elections, and the liberal construction of election laws to the end that the
will of the people may not be defeated by mere technical objections.
On 17 May 2001, petitioners Isidro Idulza (Idulza) and Godofredo Cabana
(Cabana) were proclaimed as the seventh (7th) and eighth (8th) winning candidates for
the office of members of the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Gingoog City. Private
respondents Miguel Paderanga (Paderanga), Jojac Asuncion (Asuncion), and Ciferino
L. Garcia, Jr. (Garcia), all losing candidates for the same office, filed an election protest
with the COMELEC on 25 May 2001, against the two petitioners therein and Besben
Maquiso (Maquiso), who had placed ninth (9th) in the canvass results. The election
protest was docketed as COMELEC Case No. EPC 2001-3. After conducting the
revision of ballots, the COMELEC Second Division (Second Division) on 16 January
2003 promulgated a Resolution that settled the election protest at that point.

At the same time, the Second Division determined that one Rey Y. Mortiz
(Mortiz), who was not a party to the election protest, had garnered more votes than the
three protestants. Apparently, per the Certificate of Canvass, Mortiz had placed tenth
(10th) in the city council election, though he had not been impleaded in the protest as
he was a party-mate of the protestants.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in

proclaiming Mortiz and Bollozos, the former having no participation in the election
protest, while the latter having filed her motion for intervention beyond the period
provided by law?

Held:

The appreciation of contested ballots and election documents involves a

question of fact best left to the determination of the COMELEC, a specialized agency
tasked with the supervision of elections all over the country. 9 The findings of fact of the
COMELEC when supported by substantial evidence are final and non-reviewable. 10
Petitioners want this Court to review the specific appreciation by the Second Division of
ballots cast in forty-eight (48) precincts in Gingoog City. The bar for this manner of
review is quite high, considering that the Court is not a trier of facts. Yet before this
Court, petitioners merely direct us to examine the contrary conclusions made by
Commissioner Florentino Tuason in his dissenting opinion, without particularly
explaining why we should substitute the findings of one commissioner in lieu of those of
the COMELEC speaking as a collegial body. An examination of the Tuason dissent
reveals that it is predicated not on any broad question of law, but on the specific
application of principles of election law vis--vis particular ballots. His disagreement with
the majority is purely factual in basis, too detailed to the point of being pernickety. On
the other hand, the thirty (30) -page majority opinion is just as detailed in providing for
the general principles applicable in appreciating the ballots, and in explaining why each
particular contested ballot was interpreted in the particular way that it was. Petitioners
are unable to point out why the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in the
appreciation of the contested ballots. Notwithstanding the dissenting opinion, the
Second Divisions factual findings, as affirmed by the COMELEC En Banc, are
supported by substantial evidence and thus beyond the ken of review by the Court.

Thus, the Court is bound by the findings of the COMELEC as to how many votes
the parties had obtained in the city council election. The COMELEC had also noted that
Mortiz, who had originally placed tenth (10th), has become the seventh (7th) placer,
considering that his original vote total still surpassed that of the protestants. We are
unable to see how such declaration by the COMELEC could constitute grave abuse of
discretion, even if Mortiz had not been a party to the election protest. He was not a
losing candidate elevated into victory, as he apparently was already proclaimed a duly
elected city councilor in May of 2001. 11 The petitioners were dislodged from their
respective seats because the private respondents garnered more votes than them.
Mortizs vote total remained unchanged despite the protest. His elevation to seventh
(7th) place is but a necessary consequence of the finding of the COMELEC that the
petitioners had actually obtained less number of votes than as reflected in the first
canvass results. It would be patently ridiculous for the Court or the COMELEC to hold
that he should still be deemed as the tenth (10th) placer when the amended vote totals
reveal that he had garnered more votes than the new eighth (8th) placer. Presumptively,
the vote totals as amended after the revision more accurately reflect the true will of the
voters of Gingoog City, and the elevation of councilor Mortiz from tenth (10th) to
seventh (7th) place is in consonance with the electoral mandate.
17. Jalosjos v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 193237 and 193336 (2012)

FACTS:

In May 2007 Romeo M. Jalosjos, Jr., petitioner in G.R. 192474, ran for Mayor of
Tampilisan, Zamboanga del Norte, and won.While serving as Tampilisan Mayor, he
bought a residential house and lot inBarangayVeteransVillage, Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay
and renovated and furnished the same.In September 2008 he began occupying the
house.

After eight months or on May 6, 2009 Jalosjos applied with the Election
Registration Board (ERB) of Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay, for the transfer of his voters
registration record to Precinct 0051F ofBarangayVeteransVillage.Dan Erasmo, Sr.,
respondent in G.R. 192474, opposed the application.After due proceedings, the ERB
approved Jalosjos application and Undeterred, Erasmo filed a petition to exclude
Jalosjos from the list of registered voter. After hearing, the MCTC rendered judgment
excluding Jalosjos from the list of registered voters in question.The MCTC found that
Jalosjos did not abandon his domicile in Tampilisan since he continued even then to
serve as its Mayor.Jalosjos appealed his case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pagadian City which affirmed the MCTC Decision on September 11, 2009.

Jalosjos elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA) through a petition for
certiorari with an application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction which
was granted. On November 26, 2009 the CA granted his application and enjoined the
courts below from enforcing their decisions, with the result that his name was reinstated
in the Barangay Veterans Village voters list pending the resolution of the petition.

On November 28, 2009 Jalosjos filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the
position of Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay for the May 10,
2010 National Elections.This prompted Erasmo to file a petition to deny due course to or
cancel his COC before the COMELEC,claiming that Jalosjos made material
misrepresentations in that COC when he indicated in it that he resided in Ipil,
Zamboanga Sibugay.But the Second Division of the COMELEC issued a joint
resolution, dismissing Erasmos petitions for insufficiency in form and substance.

While Erasmos motion for reconsideration was pending before the COMELEC En
Banc, the May 10, 2010 elections took place, resulting in Jalosjos winning the elections
for Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay.He was proclaimed
winner on May 13, 2010.

Meantime, the CA rendered judgment in the voters exclusion case before

it,holding that the lower courts erred in excluding Jalosjos from the voters list of
Barangay Veterans Village in Ipil since he was qualified under the Constitution and
Republic Act 8189 to vote in that place.Erasmo filed a petition for review of the CA
decision before this Court in G.R. 193566.
Back to the COMELEC, on June 3, 2010 the En Banc granted Erasmos motion for
reconsideration and declared Jalosjos ineligible to seek election as Representative of
the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay.It held that Jalosjos did not satisfy the
residency requirement since, by continuing to hold the position of Mayor of Tampilisan,
Zamboanga Del Norte, he should be deemed not to have transferred his residence from
that place toBarangayVeteransVillagein Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.

Both Jalosjos and Erasmo came up to this Court on certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction at this time to pass upon the
question of Jalosjos residency qualification for running for the position of Representative
of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay considering that he has been proclaimed
winner in the election and has assumed the discharge of that office.

Held:

While the Constitution vests in the COMELEC the power todecide all questions
affecting elections, such power is not without limitation.It does not extend to contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the House of
Representatives and the Senate.The Constitution vests the resolution of these contests
solely upon the appropriate Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House of
Representatives.

The Court has already settled the question of when the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC ends and when that of the HRET begins.The Proclamation of a
congressional candidate following the election divests COMELEC of jurisdiction over
disputes relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the proclaimed
Representative in favor of the HRET.

Here, when the COMELEC En Banc issued its order dated June 3, 2010,
Jalosjos had already been proclaimed on May 13, 2010 as winner in the election. Thus,
the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction when it still passed upon the issue of his
qualification and declared him ineligible for the office of Representative of the Second
District of Zamboanga Sibugay.

It is of course argued, as the COMELEC law department insisted, that the

proclamation of Jalosjos was an exception to the above-stated rule. Since the
COMELEC declared him ineligible to run for that office, necessarily, his proclamation
was void following the ruling in Codilla, Sr. v. De Venecia. For Erasmo, the COMELEC
still has jurisdiction to issue its June 3, 2010 order based on Section 6 of Republic Act
6646.Section 6 provides:

Section 6.Effects of Disqualification Case.Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes
in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the
action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may
during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

Here, however, the fact is that on election day of 2010 the COMELEC En Banc
had as yet to resolve Erasmos appeal from the Second Divisions dismissal of the
disqualification case against Jalosjos.Thus, there then existed no final judgment
deleting Jalosjos name from the list of candidates for the congressional seat he
sought.The last standing official action in his case before election day was the ruling of
the COMELEC's Second Division that allowed his name to stay on that list.Meantime,
the COMELEC En Banc did not issue any order suspending his proclamation pending
its final resolution of his case.With the fact of his proclamation and assumption of office,
any issue regarding his qualification for the same, like his alleged lack of the required
residence, was solely for the HRET to consider and decide.

Consequently, the Court holds in G.R. 192474 that the COMELEC En Banc
exceeded its jurisdiction in declaring Jalosjos ineligible for the position of representative
for the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay, which he won in the elections, since it
had ceased to have jurisdiction over his case.Necessarily, Erasmos petitions (G.R.
192704 and G.R. 193566) questioning the validity of the registration of Jalosjos as a
voter and the COMELEC's failure to annul his proclamation also fail.The Court cannot
usurp the power vested by the Constitution solely on the HRET.
18. Reyes v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 204264, October 22, 2013

FACTS:

This is a Motion for Reconsideration of the En Banc Resolution of June 25, 2013 which
found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Commission on Elections and affirmed the
March 27, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division.

Petitioner raised the issue in the petition which is: Whether or not Respondent COMELEC is
without jurisdiction over Petitioner who is duly proclaimed winner and who has already taken her
oath of office for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the lone
congressional district of Marinduque. Petitioner is a duly proclaimed winner and having taken
her oath of office as member of the House of Representatives, all questions regarding her
qualifications are outside the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and are within the HRET exclusive
jurisdiction.

The averred proclamation is the critical pointer to the correctness of petitioner submission.The
crucial question is whether or not petitioner could be proclaimed on May 18, 2013. Differently
stated, was there basis for the proclamation of petitioner on May 18 , 2013.

The June 25, 2013 resolution held that before May 18, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc had
already finally disposed of the issue of petitioner lack of Filipino citizenship and residency via its
resolution dated May 14, 2013, cancelling petitioner certificate of candidacy. The proclamation
which petitioner secured on May 18, 2013 was without any basis. On June 10, 2013, petitioner
went to the Supreme Court questioning the COMELEC First Division ruling and the May 14,
2013 COMELEC En Banc decision, baseless proclamation on 18 May 2013 did not by that fact
of promulgation alone become valid and legal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it took cognizance of
"newly-discovered evidence" without the same having been testified on and offered and
admitted in evidence?

HELD: 
Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it took
cognizance of "newly-discovered evidence" without the same having been testified on and
offered and admitted in evidence. She assails the admission of the blog article of Eli Obligacion
as hearsay and the photocopy of the Certification from the Bureau of Immigration. She likewise
contends that there was a violation of her right to due process of law because she was not given
the opportunity to question and present controverting evidence.

It must be emphasized that the COMELEC is not bound to strictly adhere to the technical
rules of procedure in the presentation of evidence. Under Section 2 of Rule I, the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure "shall be liberally construed in order to achieve just, expeditious and
inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and proceeding brought before the
Commission." In view of the fact that the proceedings in a petition to deny due course or to
cancel certificate of candidacy are summary in nature, then the "newly discovered evidence"
was properly admitted by respondent COMELEC.
Furthermore, there was no denial of due process in the case at bar as petitioner was given
every opportunity to argue her case before the COMELEC. From 10 October 2012 when Tan's
petition was filed up to 27 March 2013 when the First Division rendered its resolution, petitioner
had a period of five (5) months to adduce evidence. Unfortunately, she did not avail herself of
the opportunity given her.

In administrative proceedings, procedural due process only requires that the party be
given the opportunity or right to be heard. As held in the case of Sahali v. COMELEC: The
petitioners should be reminded that due process does not necessarily mean or require a
hearing, but simply an opportunity or right to be heard. One may be heard, not solely by verbal
presentation but also, and perhaps many times more creditably and predictable than oral
argument, through pleadings. In administrative proceedings moreover, technical rules of
procedure and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative process cannot be fully equated
with due process in its strict judicial sense. Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot be
successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to be heard on his motion for
reconsideration.

In moving for the cancellation of petitioner's COC, respondent submitted records of the
Bureau of Immigration showing that petitioner is a holder of a US passport, and that her status
is that of a "balikbayan." At this point, the burden of proof shifted to petitioner, imposing upon
her the duty to prove that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and has not lost the same, or that
she has re-acquired such status in accordance with the provisions of R.A. No. 9225. Aside from
the bare allegation that she is a natural-born citizen, however, petitioner submitted no proof to
support such contention. Neither did she submit any proof as to the inapplicability of R.A. No.
9225 to her. DENIED.
19. Marcos v. Robredo, P.E.T. Case No. 5, February 16, 2021

FACTS:

After the 16 May 2016 national and local elections, Maria Leonor G. Robredo
emerged as the winner in the vice presidential race having garnered the highest votes,
with 14,418,817, followed by Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr. with 14,155,344 votes.28 With a
margin of 263,473 votes, Robredo’s claim to the position was questioned via an election
protest by Marcos on the grounds of fraud, anomalies, and irregularities.29 The protest
(and counter-protest) proceeded with the revision of the pilot provinces of Camarines
Sur, Iloilo, and Negros Occidental chosen by Marcos “due to the unusually high number
of undervotes in [these] provinces.”30 During the revision of the ballots from Camarines
Sur, in an ex parte motion dated 05 April 2018, Robredo sought for the PET to direct the
head revisors to apply the 25% shading threshold purportedly set by the COMELEC in
the revision, recount, and re-appreciation of ballots.31 In the aforementioned 10 April
2018 PET Resolution, the Tribunal denied the motion and ordered the re-application of
the 50% shading threshold, to wit — The Court is not aware of any COMELEC
Resolution that states the applicability of a 25% threshold; and the Tribunal cannot treat
the Random Manual Audit Guidelines and Report as proof of the threshold used by the
COMELEC. In fact, COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, as amended by COMELEC
Resolution No. 9164, which is COMELEC’s procedure for the recount of ballots in
election protests within its jurisdiction, does not mention a 25% threshold. Prior to the
amendment in Resolution No. 9164, Rule 15, Section 6 of Resolution No. 8804 states
that any shading less than 50% shall not be considered a valid vote. The wording is[,] in
fact[,] the same as Section 43 (l) of the 2010 PET Rules. COMELEC Resolution No.
9164, however, removed the 50% threshold[,] but did not impose a new threshold.32
The 10 April 2018 PET Resolution is presently the subject of Robredo’s Urgent Motion
for Reconsideration wherein she alleged that, as early as 6 September 2016, the PET
was informed by COMELEC, by way of a Letter to the then clerk of the tribunal, Atty.
Felipa B. Anama, of the 25% threshold used in the 9 May 2016 National and Local
Elections.33 The said adoption of the 25% shading threshold was adopted by
COMELEC in Minute Resolution No. 16-0600. 34 Robredo argues that both factual
circumstances give PET a legal basis to “impose a 25% threshold percentage in
determining whether a vote is valid.”35

ISSUE:

An analysis of the 10 April 2018 PET Resolution shows that the PET does not
question the authority of the COMELEC to set the shading threshold percentage.
Instead, the said Resolution is anchored on (a) the purported absence of any action of
COMELEC in setting a new threshold percentage in lieu of the 50% threshold
percentage, and (b) the insufficiency as evidence of the Random Manual Audit
Guidelines and Report to prove that the 25% threshold was in fact used by the
COMELEC.36
HELD:
Arguing that the 10 April 2018 PET Resolution will be setting an unstable and
potentially disenfranchising precedent, the Author will explain that the said PET
Resolution constitutes an ultra vires act that encroaches on the authority of the
COMELEC, which violates the equal protection clause under the Constitution and is
poised to massively disenfranchise voters.

1. The 10 April 2018 PET Resolution is an Ultra Vires Act If affirmed, the 10 April
2018 PET resolution, by refusing to acknowledge that the COMELEC has set 25% as
the new shading threshold percentage, will constitute an ultra vires act because it
encroaches on the authority of the COMELEC not only to promulgate rules, but also on
the manner to promulgate such rules. a. Setting Shading Threshold is a Quasi-
Legislative Function The COMELEC is a constitutional body charged with the duty to
enforce all laws “relative to the conduct of elections;” it is duty-bound to see to it that the
board of canvassers perform its proper functions.37 The primary grant of power to the
COMELEC is found in Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, thus — Sec[tion]

2. The [COMELEC] shall exercise the following powers and functions: (1)
Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the
elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials,
and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided
by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by
trial courts of limited jurisdiction. Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the [COMELEC] on
election contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final,
executory, and not appealable.
(3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting
elections, including determination of the number and location of polling places,
appointment of election officials and inspectors, and registration of voters.
(4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement agencies
and instrumentalities of the Government, including the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
for the exclusive purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible
elections.
(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or
coalitions which, in addition to other requirements, must present their platform or
program of government; and accredit citizens’ arms of the [COMELEC]. Religious
denominations and sects shall not be registered. Those which seek to achieve their
goals through violence or unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and adhere to this
Constitution, or which are supported by any foreign government shall likewise be
refused registration. Financial contributions from foreign governments and their
agencies to political parties, organizations, coalitions, or candidates related to elections,
constitute interference in national affairs, and, when accepted, shall be an additional
ground for the cancellation of their registration with the [COMELEC], in addition to other
penalties that may be prescribed by law.
 (6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for
inclusion or exclusion of voters; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of
violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds,
offenses, and malpractices.
(7) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize election
spending, including limitation of places where propaganda materials shall be posted,
and to prevent and penalize all forms of election frauds, offenses, malpractices, and
nuisance candidacies.
(8) Recommend to the President the removal of any officer or employee it has
deputized, or the imposition of any other disciplinary action, for violation or disregard of,
or disobedience to, its directive, order, or decision.
(9) Submit to the President and the Congress, a comprehensive report on the
conduct of each election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, or recall.38 It is well-
established in jurisprudence that there are three classifications of the powers of the
COMELEC: administrative, quasi-legislative, and quasijudicial.

The quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC embraces the power to “resolve

controversies arising from the enforcement of election laws, and to be the sole judge of
all preproclamation controversies[ ] and all contests relating to the elections, returns,
and qualifications. The Commission’s quasi-legislative power “refers to the issuance of
rules and regulations to implement the election laws and to exercise such legislative
functions as may expressly be delegated to it by Congress.”

Meanwhile, the administrative function points “to the enforcement and

administration of election laws. In the exercise of such power, the Constitution (Section
6, Article IX-A) and the Omnibus Election Code (Section 52 [(c)]) authorize the
COMELEC to issue rules and regulations to implement the provisions of the 1987
Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code.”42 Of relevance in the discussion is the
quasi-legislative or the rule-making powers of the COMELEC originally emanating from
Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 881, and later on, in relation to the AES, Republic Act No.
8436, 44 as amended by Republic Act No. 9369.

On the other hand, the jurisdiction of the PET and of other electoral tribunals, for
that matter, is confined only to contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of candidates. The PET was created under Article VII, Section 4 (7) of the
1987 Constitution and was considered as an innovation. Prior to such express
constitutional decree, there was Republic Act No. 1793 and BP Blg. 884. The
precursors of the present Constitution, on the one hand, did not contain similar
provisions and, instead, vested upon the legislature all phases of presidential and
vicepresidential elections — from the canvassing of election returns, to the proclamation
of the president-elect and the vice-president elect, and even the determination, by
ordinary legislation, of whether such proclamations may be contested.

The Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) and HRET, on the other hand, were
created under Article VI, Section 17, of the 1987 Constitution.51 The MTCs and RTCs,
acting as electoral tribunals, also receive their authority from Sections 251 and 252 of
the BP Blg. 881. The Supreme Court, in its 2010 decision for Macalintal v. Presidential
Electoral Tribunal, recognized that the PET, the SET, and HRET are electoral tribunals
and are each specifically and exclusively clothed with jurisdiction by the Constitution to
act respectively as the “‘sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications’ of the President and Vice-President, Senators, and Representatives.
XVI. ELECTION OFFENSES

Cases:

1. PADPAO v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 223505, October 3, 2017

FACTS:
On November 13, 2015, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 10015
which provided for the rules and regulations on the ban on bearing, carrying or
transporting of firearms and other deadly weapons and the employment, availment or
engagement of the services of security personnel or bodyguards during the election
period, more commonly referred to as the "Gun Ban." Despite the nomenclature used, it
must be noted that the regulation covers not only the subject of firearms, but also the
engagement of security services.
Section 2(e), Rule III of Resolution No. 10015 provides for the documentary
requirements for the application
Petitioner assails the validity of Section 2(e), Rule III of Resolution No. 10015
insofar as its application to PSAs is concerned. Petitioner asserts that the COMELEC
does not have any authority to promulgate rules regarding the bearing, carrying, or
transporting of firearms by PSAs. Petitioner alleges that PSAs should not be required to
secure authority from the COMELEC as RA 5487 already grants to PSAs and their
security guards, watchmen, detectives, and security personnel the authority to possess,
bear, carry, and transport firearms, being necessary equipment for the conduct of its
business and practice of its personnel's profession.
Petitioner maintains that the power to promulgate rules and regulations with regard to
said law is granted to the Philippine National Police (PNP), in consultation with the
PADPAO, under Section 17 of the said law:
SEC. 17. Rules and Regulations by Chief, Philippine Constabulary. - The Chief of
the Philippine Constabulary, in consultation with the Philippine Association of Detective
and Protective Agency Operators, Incorporated and subject to the provisions of existing
laws, is hereby authorized to issue the rules and regulations necessary to carry out the
purpose of this Act.
Petitioner also asserts that the COMELEC's powers are defined and limited to election
related matters under the 1987 Philippine Constitution. According to petitioner, nothing
in the Constitution gives to the COMELEC, even during election period, the power and
authority to promulgate rules and regulations relating to the bearing, carrying, and
transporting of firearms by PSAs. According to petitioner, in issuing Resolution No.
10015, the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction.

ISSUES:

Whether or Not Section 2(e), Rule III of Resolution No. 10015 is valid.

HELD: YES.
 Petitioner contends that the COMELEC does not have the authority, during an
election period, to impose upon PSAs the requirement of written authority from the
COMELEC to bear, carry, and transport firearms and other deadly weapons, as the
power to do so belongs exclusively to the PNP under RA 5487. Petitioner is mistaken.
The power of the COMELEC to promulgate rules and regulations to enforce and
implement elections laws is enshrined in the Constitution, which provides:
Section 6, Article IX-A:
Section 6. Each Commission en bane may promulgate its own rules
concerning pleadings and practice before it or before any of its offices. Such
rules, however, shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.
Section 2, Article IX-C:
Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and
functions:
(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct
of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.
The COMELEC's power to issue rules and regulations was reiterated in BP 881:
Article VII. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
SEC. 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. - In addition to the
powers and functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, the Commission shall
have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative
to the conduct of elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest
elections, and shall:
x xxx
(c) Promulgate rules and regulations implementing the provisions of this Code or
other laws which the Commission is required to enforce and administer x xx.
(Emphasis supplied)
Contrary to PADPAO's position, the Constitution and the cited laws specifically
empower the COMELEC to issue rules and regulations implementing the so-called Gun
Ban during election period.
Under BP 881 and RA 7166, it is unlawful for any person to bear, carry, or transport
firearms or other deadly weapons in public places during the election period, even if
otherwise licensed to do so, unless authorized in writing by the COMELEC. Section 35
of RA 7166 also uses the mandatory word "shall" to impose upon the COMELEC its
duty to issue rules and regulations to implement the law.
P ADPAO's insistence that the power to issue rules and regulations in relation to the
operation of PSAs belongs exclusively to the PNP is specious. In RA 5487, it is the PNP
that exercises general supervision over the operation of all private detective and
watchman security guard agencies. It has the exclusive authority to regulate and to
issue the required licenses to operate security and protective agencies. The COMELEC
does not encroach upon this authority of the PNP to regulate PSAs - as it merely
regulates the bearing, carrying, and transporting of firearms and other deadly weapons
by PSAs and all other persons, during election period.
Notably, the language of RA 5487 and its implementing rules is not so restrictive as to
prohibit other government agencies from imposing additional restrictions relating to the
conduct of business by PSAs and PSSPs under special circumstances. In this case, the
special circumstance is the election period. The Court takes judicial notice of the fact
that historically, Philippine elections have been marred by violence and unnecessary
bloodshed and additional guidelines must be put in place to eliminate, or at least, lessen
the threat. Whether or not the Gun Ban has been an effective deterrent is a different
matter, which is beyond the Court's domain.
Resolution No. 10015 provides for the requirements to obtain written authority from the
COMELEC to bear, carry, and transport firearms or dangerous weapons outside one's
residence or place of work, or in any public place only during the election period.
All told, the Court holds that the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion or
exceed its jurisdiction in including PSSPs and PSAs within the ambit of those persons
required to secure written authority from the COMELEC to bear, carry, and transport
firearms and other dangerous weapons outside their place of residence, work, or within
public places during the election period.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari with prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a

writ of preliminary injunction/temporary restraining order are DENIED for lack of merit.
The Court upholds Section 2(e), Rule III of COMELEC Resolution No. 10015 as valid
and constitutional.
2. Pimentel v. COMELEC, supra

Facts:
The Commission on Elections or COMELEC, acting as a National Canvassing
Board for the May 8, 1995 elections, while canvassing the returns in the senatorial race,
found a discrepancy between the Provincial Certificate of Canvas for Ilocos Norte and
its supporting Statement of
Votes per precinct or municipality for the province, such that the votes for candidates
Juan Ponce Enrile, Franklin M. Drilon, Ramon V. Mitra, as appearing in the Provincial
Certificate of Canvass[1] were more than the votes... tallied as appearing in the
Statement of Votes,... the COMELEC motu proprio ordered an investigation and
referred the matter to its Law Department.
Petitioner charged respondents with violation of Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6646,
otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987
Any member of the board of election inspectors or board of canvassers who tampers,
increases or decreases the votes received by a candidate in any election or any
member of the board who refuses, after proper verification and hearing,... to credit the
correct votes or deduct such tampered votes.
The respondents filed their respective counter-affidavits.[7] Subsequently, the parties
filed their respective Memoranda.[8]
In Minute Resolution No. 96-1497 dated May 14, 1996, the COMELEC en banc
resolved to file criminal as well as administrative charges against respondent for
violation of Section 27 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646
On August 13, 1996, the COMELEC en banc issued the assailed Minute Resolution No.
96-2333 where it was resolved to dismiss the complaint "for lack of sufficient evidence
to establish probable cause" and, in the administrative case, "to reprimand respondents
with stern... warning that a repetition of the same act in the future shall be dealt with
accordingly."[
It is from the COMELEC's dismissal of his complaint that petitioner files the instant
petition for certiorari asserting that
[t]he COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when they flip-flopped from their
earlier issued Minute Resolution... without giving any substantial justification for the
same,... ordered the dismissal of the charges against all of the private respondents for
insufficiency of evidence... arbitrary and capricious exercise of discretion by the
COMELEC amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

Issue:

WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION IN REVERSING ITS EARLIER RESOLUTION BY DISMISSING THE
COMPLAINT AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION
27(B) OF RA NO. 6646, ON THE GROUND OF 'LACK OF SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE
TO ESTABLISH PROBABLE CAUSE."... whether the COMELEC, in including that
probable cause did not exist to warrant prosecution of the respondents, committed
grave abuse of discretion.

Held:

When filed, the petition was denominated as a "petition for review on certiorari."
Petitioner, however, filed a Motion to Treat Petition as a Special Civil Action Under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court where he pointed out that "[t]he petition was filed within the 30-
day period to file a petition for certiorari from the Resolution of the COMELEC" and that
[t]he arguments raised therein make out the same grounds for the issuance of the
extraordinary writ of certiorari. We recognize that the COMELEC must be accorded
full discretion whether or not to initiate a criminal case, pursuant to its power to
investigate and prosecute election offenses. We note that when investigating and
prosecuting election offenses, the COMELEC is acting analogous to the Ombudsman
with its investigatory and prosecutory powers. We agree with the Solicitor General that
the merit of respondents' defenses are best ventilated in the trial proper than at the
preliminary investigation.[40] For a preliminary investigation is essentially inquisitorial
and is only the means to discover who may be charged with a crime, its function being
merely to determine probable cause. COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the complaint on the ground "lack of sufficient evidence to establish probable
cause," curiously after it had previously found probable cause on the basis of the same
evidence.
Under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, a complaint initiated motu proprio by
the Commission is presumed to be based on sufficient probable cause for purposes of
issuing subpoenas to the respondents. The finding of the existence or non-existence of
probable cause in the prosecution of criminal cases brought before it, rests in the
discretion of the COMELEC in the exercise of its Constitutional authority to investigate
and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violation of election laws, including acts or
omissions constituting election frauds, offenses and malpractices.[46] The Court would
normally not interfere with such finding of the COMELEC. However, in extreme
situations, as in the case at bar, this Court will not hesitate to correct acts committed by
said body in grave abuse of discretion.
XVII. COMPUTERIZATION OF ELECTIONS

Cases:

1. Archbishop Capalla v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 201112, June 13, 2012

FACTS:

Comelec and Smartmatic-TIM entered into a Contract for the Provision of an Automated
Election System for the May 10, 2010 Synchronized National and Local Elections (AES
Contract) which is a Contract of Lease with Option to Purchase (OTP) the goods listed therein
consisting of the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS), both software and hardware. The parties
agreed that the AES Contract shall remain effective until the release of the performance security
posted by the Comelec. The Comelec was given until December 31, 2010 within which to
exercise the option to purchase. The option was, however, not exercised within said period. The
parties later entered into an extension agreement giving the Comelec until March 31, 2012
within which to exercise it.

Herein petitioners, however, assailed the validity of such agreement on the ground that
the same requires another public bidding since it substantially amended the terms of the
contract. They also averred that such extension to exercise the option will prejudice the
governments interest.

In the assailed June 13, 2012 decision of the Supreme Court, the Court upheld the
validity of the transaction. Hence, the petitioners moved for reconsideration.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the extension of the OTP in favor of Comelec is valid?

HELD:

In this case, the contract is still effective because the performance security has not been
released. Thus, not only the option and warranty provisions survive but the entire contract as
well. In light of the contractual provisions, we, therefore, sustain the amendment of the option
period. The amendment of a previously bidded contract is not per se invalid. For it to be
nullified, the amendment must be substantial such that the other bidders were deprived of the
terms and opportunities granted to the winning bidder after it won the same and that it is
prejudicial to public interest.

Here, the extension of the option period means that the Comelec had more time to
determine the propriety of exercising the option.With the extension, the Comelec could acquire
the subject PCOS machines under the same terms and conditions as earlier agreed upon. The
end result is that the Comelec acquired the subject PCOS machines with its meager budget and
was able to utilize the rentals paid for the 2010 elections as part of the purchase price.

The motions for reconsideration are DENIED for lack of merit.

2. Bagumabayan v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206719, April 10, 2019

FACTS:

On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted R.A. No. 8436, otherwise known as
the Election Modernization Act of 1997, which authorized the COMELEC to adopt an
automated election system (AES) for the process of voting, counting of votes and
canvassing/consolidation of results of the national and local elections.

On January 23, 2007, R.A. No. 9369 was signed into law, amending among
others certain provisions of R.A. No. 8436, pertinently Section 10 of the latter, to read:

SEC. 12. Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8436 is hereby amended to read as follows:

SEC. 14. Examination and Testing of Equipment or Device of the AES and Opening of
the Source Code for Review. - The Commission shall allow the political parties and
candidates or their representatives, citizens' arm or their representatives to examine
and test the equipment or device to be used in the voting and counting on the day of the
electoral exercise, before voting start. Test ballots and test forms shall be provided by
the Commission.

Immediately after the examination and testing of the equipment or device, parties
and candidates or their representatives, citizen's arms or their representatives, may
submit a written comment to the election officer who shall immediately transmit it to the
Commission for appropriate action.

The election officer shall keep minutes of the testing, a copy of which shall be
submitted to the Commission together with the minute of voting.

Once an AES technology is selected for implementation, the Commission shall promptly
make the source code of that technology available and open to any interested political
parry or groups which may conduct their own review thereof. (Underscoring and
emphasis Ours)

To facilitate the review process as mandated by the law, the COMELEC promulgated
Minute Resolution No. 10-01388 on February 10, 2010, adopting the guidelines
recommended by the COMELEC Advisory Council and the Technical Evaluation
Council (TEC). This resolution set the guidelines for the conduct of the source code
review, and was done a month before the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections.

Years later, this time for the 2013 National and Local elections, the TEC
submitted to the COMELEC on February 12, 20139 the former's resolution on the
certification of the validity of AES for the 2013 elections. As required by Section 9 of
R.A. No. 9369, SLI Global Solutions (SLI), certified and categorically stated that "the
AES, including its hardware and software components, are operating properly, securely,
and accurately, in accordance with the provisions of the Act,"10 and that the same could
be used by the voters, board of election inspectors (BEI), local and national boards of
canvassers, as well as the COMELEC in the aforementioned elections.
On March 1, 2013,11 the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9651, the
guidelines promulgated by COMELEC in order to fulfill its mandate to make the source
code available. According to Resolution No. 9651, several requirements12 must be
submitted by interested parties before they may be allowed to partake in the source
code review. Subsequently, on March 14, 2013, COMELEC likewise promulgated
Resolution No. 9657, which stated that to afford the COMELEC enough time to evaluate
the request for source code review, and the credentials of the reviewer, there is a need
to set a deadline within which the request, together with the credentials of its reviewer,
should be filed, and where to file the same. Resolution No. 9657 resolved that the
request for the conduct of the source code review by the political parties and interested
groups, together with the credentials of the reviewer, shall be filed no later than April 1,
2013.13

As a result of the aforementioned issuances, several parties, Parti do

Demokratiko Pilipino-Lakas Bayan, Pwersa ng Masang Pilipino, the Parish Pastoral
Council for Responsible Voting and the Liberal Party, in separate letters to the
COMELEC, requested for participation in the source code review.14 From April 10 to
24, 2013, these parties conducted the source code review for the Consolidated
Canvassing System and Elections Management System, but not for the Precinct Count
Optical Scan (PCOS) source code, as the same had not yet been released due to
negotiations between the COMELEC, Dominion Voting Systems (Dominion), and
Smartmatic TIM (Smartmatic) over an issue involving a disagreement with the latter two
institutions.

This disagreement started on September 6, 2012,15 when Smartmatic filed an

action with the Court of Chancery in the State of Delaware in the United States against
Dominion, to which the latter filed a counterclaim. According to COMELEC, this
termination birthed two (2) consequences: first, Smartmatic lost its access to the
program systems of Dominion, which signified that any counting error committed in the
following elections could not be corrected; and second, Smartmatic failed to deliver to
the COMELEC the source code, pursuant to Section 14 of R.A. No. 8436, a failure that
meant the said source code would not be reviewable by any party or candidate
participating in the 2013 elections.

The foregoing caused a delay in the availability of the source code, and thus, it
was only on May 5, 2013 when a representative from SLI arrived in the Philippines with
a copy of the PCOS source code that was subjected to the trusted build.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to the Writ of Mandamus (a) to compel
COMELEC to use digital signatures in the electronic transmission of electronic election
returns; (b) to provide for vote verification in the casting of votes, and provide for
randomness in the selection of precincts for the manual audit; and (c) to postpone the
elections until such time that provisions for the use of digital signatures, review of the
source code, vote verification and randomness of manual audit are set in place.

HELD:

As for those subjects not related to the source code review, the Court finds that
Mandamus does not lie as regards the other claims of the petitioners, specifically to
compel the COMELEC to use digital signatures in the electronic transmission of
electronic election returns, to provide for vote verification in the casting of votes, and
provide for randomness in the selection of precincts for the manual audit, and to
postpone the elections until such time that provisions for the use of digital signatures,
review of the source code, vote verification and randomness of manual audit are set in
place.

Petitioners Tan Dem, et al., maintain in their submitted petition that the
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in approving and proceeding with the
conduct of automated elections for the year 2013, without the digital signatures
allegedly required by R.A. No. 9369 in order to authenticate and consider the electronic
election returns as "official election results" to be "used as the basis for the canvassing
of votes and the proclamation of a candidate,"49 and proceeding without the security
safeguards, particularly the lack of the source code review by interested groups, the
lack of vote verification, and the lack of randomness in the manual audit.50

As to the issue on the digital signatures, Tan Dem, et al. state that the
COMELEC removed the requirement of digital signatures, in supposed violation of the
automated election laws. The petitioners disagree that the "machine signature" of a
PCOS machine may be the functional equivalent of the aforementioned "digital
signature."51 First, property such as a PCOS machine cannot be a valid substitute
because, as property, it cannot assume the identity of a person, only the latter able to
acquire rights and to be the object of legal relations.5

Likewise, the COMELEC was alleged to have disabled the vote verification of the
PCOS machines that would have shown the actual votes as aptly scanned and read.
Instead, the PCOS machines merely displayed the statement "Congratulations. Your
vote has been registered." According to Tan Dem, et al., these statements only confirm
that the voting process was finished, but not necessarily that the votes were actually
read and recorded, as the votes were never displayed for confirmation.

Finally, Tan Dem, et al. accuse the COMELEC of failing to comply with the Random
Manual Audit (RMA) as laid down in COMELEC Resolution No. 8837 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 9595, for the May 2010 and May 2013 elections, respectively. The
COMELEC purportedly ordered that the precincts of audits be selected and disclosed at
least six hours before the close of polls during the May 2010 elections, while ordering
the selection and disclosure of the subject precincts, at least four days and two days
before the close of polls during the May 2013 elections. This allegedly rendered the
RMA highly questionable as it diluted the intended probability of the audit, as well as
made the selection of the subject precincts predictable.

On the other hand, the COMELEC advocates that it duly complied with the
requirements for the use of digital signatures, the verification system, the conduct of the
source code, and the RMA, and thus, Mandamus will not lie in this case.

As to the contention of Tan Dem, et al. that digital signatures were not used in
the transmission of electronic returns, the COMEL.EC advocates the view that it had
already been held and decided by the Court that the machines used in the elections are
capable of producing digitally-signed transmissions, as clarified in Archbishop Capalla,
et al. v. COMELEC. 55

As for the allegations of Tan Dem, et al. that the COMELEC disabled the vote
verification function of the PCOS machines to only show "Congratulations. Your vote
has been registered," instead of showing the actual votes scanned and read.
COMELEC counters that there is nothing in the law that requires the actual votes
scanned and read to be shown after the voter has registered his or her vote, and to
compel COMELEC to adopt a procedure not mandated by the law is beyond the realm
of Mandamus.

Finally, as for the allegation that there was a complete lack of randomness in the
manual audit, COMELEC states that Tan Dem, et al. misconstrue the law, and that the
term "random" pertains to the randomness of the selection of the precincts subject of
the audit, not that the audit was to be done secretly or by surprise.

As was the case in the discussion of the source code, the Court likewise notes
the recent promulgation of Resolution No. 10458, or the General Instructions for the
conduct of Random Manual Audit relative to the 13 May 2019 Automated National and
Local Elections and subsequent elections thereafter, on December 5, 2018, Resolution
No. 10460, or the General Instructions on the constitution, composition and appointment
of the Electoral Board; use of the Vote Counting Machines; the process of testing and
sealing of the Vote Counting Machines; and the voting, counting and transmission of
election results, on December 6, 2018, and Resolution No. 10487, or the VCM
Operation procedures for (A) Final Testing and Sealing (FTS) (B) Election Day and (C)
Transmission of Election Results in connection with the 13 May 2019 National and
Local Elections, on January 23, 2019. The latter Resolution No. 10487, in particular,
supplanted Resolution No. 10460.

The promulgation of these means that the previous cause of action, as regards
the conduct of the COMELEC, removes the justiciable controversy existing in the
consolidated petition, especially as it is these resolutions that now govern the conduct of
the specific items being assailed. Regardless, even if the petitioners' contentions that
the COMELEC erred are taken into consideration, the same is without merit. The Court
rules that the electronic transmission through the method promulgated by the
COMELEC, as well as the authentication of the results, are valid under the law.
According to A.M. No. 01-7-01 -SC,58 or the Rules on Electronic Evidence,
promulgated by the Court59 and alluded to with regard to the above mentioned
authentication process, a "digital signature" refers to an electronic signature consisting
of a transformation of an electronic document or an electronic data message using an
asymmetric or public cryptosystem such that a person having the initial untransformed
electronic document and the signer's public key can accurately determine: (i) whether
the transformation was created using the private key that corresponds to the signer's
public key; and (ii) whether the initial electronic document had been altered after the
transformation was made, and that for purposes of the Rules, a digital signature is
considered an electronic signature.

An electronic signature is likewise defined as "any distinctive mark, characteristic

and/or sound in electronic form representing the identity of a person and attached to or
logically associated with the electronic data message or electronic document or any
methodology or procedure employed or adopted by a person and executed or adopted
by such person with the intention of authenticating, signing or approving an electronic
data message or electronic document.