Proceedings IFKAD 2018

Delft, Netherlands, 4-6 July 2018

ISBN 978-88-96687-11-6
ISSN 2280787X

What is an Idea? Between Synchronicity and Opacity

Rico Sneller
Department of Philosophy
University of Leiden
P.O. Box 9515 2300 RA Leiden
Netherlands

Structured Abstract

Purpose – It is my aim in this paper to elucidate the nature of ideas. I will argue that an
idea, far from being a useful asset or tool, comes down to a disposition to overcome,
whether in thinking or in acting, an impasse. Generating ideas cannot fail to affect the
generator’s structure of subjectivity itself, enabling them to look ‘beyond’ a given
impasse.

Design/methodology/approach – I propose an approach that is philosophical in nature,

with an emphasis on phenomenology. In my presentation I will briefly discuss some
phenomenological features of ideas. Ideas, I will argue, are (1) beyond a subject/object
split: a fundamental ‘passivity’ in the subject will necessarily be part and parcel of their
‘generation’. Next (2), ideas will be occasioned by synchronistic developments that typify
the idea-generator’s wider environment. Finally (3), ideas are bound to possess an
irreducibly opacity, that can never be made fully transparent.

Originality/value – This methodology puts in evidence that the prevailing empirical-

scientific worldviews tend to over-emphasise objects. However, not only can we imagine
ways of being that do not comply with an object-structure (emotions, values, beliefs), but
also do those things that we approach as objects lose essential features in the very act of
our objectification. This is very relevant when it comes to ideas. Approached as objects,
ideas seem to be susceptible to manipulation and instrumentalization. It is my hypothesis
that the nature of ideas undoes the prevailing subject/object structure that characterises
our technological age.

Practical implications – The outcomes of the application will be a non-exhaustive list of

eight preconditions for idea generation.

Keywords – idea, subject/object split, synchronicity, disposition, opacity

Paper type – Academic Research Paper

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ISBN 978-88-96687-11-6
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1 Introduction
It is my aim in this paper to elucidate the nature of ideas. To enhance new ideas
presupposes some notion of their nature. For, having an erroneous or distorted picture of
ideas (e.g., as objects) while claiming to promote their development (in society, science,
philosophy etc.) may all too easily lead to blocking their arrival. Partly inspired by the
Romantic period (e.g., Friedrich Schlegel) I would argue that an idea, far from being a
useful asset or tool, comes down to a disposition to overcome, whether in thinking or in
acting, a human impasse or predicament. Ideas, I would claim, are configurations that
comprise both subject and object; generating ideas affect the generator’s structure of
subjectivity itself, enabling them to look ‘beyond’ a given impasse. This explains the fact
that oftentimes those confronted with new ideas (e.g., Plato, Einstein, Heidegger, M.L.
King) remain isolated; their audience, while not necessarily unintelligent, lacks the
concomitant disposition that enables to see, think, or act in conformity to the idea.
My approach will be from a philosophical backdrop, with an emphasis on
phenomenology. I will briefly discuss some phenomenological features of ideas. Ideas, I
will argue, are (1) beyond a subject/object split: a fundamental ‘passivity’ in the subject
will necessarily be part and parcel of their ‘generation’. Next (2), ideas are occasioned by
synchronistic occurrences that typify the idea-generator’s wider environment. Finally (3),
ideas are bound to possess an irreducibly opacity, that can never be made fully
transparent. A prospective comparative study of idea generation could elucidate these
features.
The prevailing empirical-scientific worldviews tend to over-emphasise objects. This
suggests that being-an-object is a condition of possibility for existence. However, not only
can we imagine modes of being that hardly comply with an object-structure (emotions,
values, beliefs); moreover, things that we do approach as objects lose essential features
when objectified or reified. This is very relevant when it comes to ideas. Reified, ideas
seem to become susceptible to manipulation and instrumentalization. It is my hypothesis
that the nature of ideas undoes the prevailing subject/object structure that characterises
our technological age’s over-all mind-set.
Why deny the predicate of ‘idea’ to designs, for example, to commit mass murder, to
maximise profit by destroying others, or to bureaucratically streamline societal control
processes? Obviously, such designs can be very creative and intelligent, as history
continuously shows. If my argument to associate ideas exclusively with overcoming a
human predicament seems circular, this will only be so as long as the subject of idea-
generation is left unproblematised. True ideas, so will be my claim in this article,
represent configurations that renew human acting, thinking, or believing, in such a way
that original configurations are multiplied. New scientific theories, philosophical
endeavours, or religious practices are just as many examples of such idea-configurations;

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ISBN 978-88-96687-11-6
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to the extent, that is, that they give rise to endless renewal. 1 Instead, ‘ideas’ facilitating
human trafficking, or global inequality, multiply predicaments in proportion to achieved
goals; producing them remotely resembles filling a Danaids tub.

2 Beyond subject/object split

The question of morality already shows that it is hazardous to take the common notion
of ‘idea’ for granted. As if ‘idea’ were an unequivocal, a-moral notion, universally
applicable, even beyond the constraints of the particular type of our modern,
technological-scientific society and its underlying structure of subjectivity. For one thing,
ideas are no universal entities reaching from Western intellectuals, philosophers or
scientists, to ancient Chinese soothsayers and Jewish prophets alike. For another, even
within the range of ‘Western civilisation’ (provided this can be identified and defined as a
unity at all), there is no uniform notion of ‘idea’. It is highly probable that the notion of
‘idea’ in use today already draws on a particular set of presuppositions characteristic of
Modernity. This intricacy is not in itself a problem, for, if one is complacent with
Modernity, why bother about the limitations of its conception of ‘ideas’? It will become a
problem, though, if it turns out that Modernity itself, i.e., its underlying set of values and
presuppositions, is cumbersome. In this article it will be my claim that, since Modernity is
a problem, so will be the concomitant Modern notion of ‘ideas’. Should we remain blind
to this we might, rather than promote e.g. human wellbeing or flourishing, aggravate the
predicament of the Modern human condition. For a critique of Modernity, it should
suffice to refer here to some major 20th Century philosophers of culture (Heidegger,
Derrida, Adorno, Foucault, Deleuze, Klages, etc.); in multifarious ways, and most
emphatically, these thinkers address the destructiveness unintentionally brought about by
Enlightenment thinking. Aiming at liberating man from the bonds of nature, it ended up
in producing genocides, weapons of mass destruction, environmental pollution, flat
consumerism, and global inequality.
A brief glance at the history of Western thinking teaches that Plato coined the notion
‘idea’, thereby irretrievably introducing it into our vocabulary. Yet, Plato’s idéa was the
opposite of how we conceive of the notion today, as Plato’s reality concept radically
differs from ours. Idéa derives from the Greek verb horân, ‘to see’. I will quote here a
key passage from Plato’s Republic. In translation, the passage sounds unnecessarily
technical, as opposed to the Greek original. This is already telling, as it reminds us of the
modifications that Greek philosophical language underwent in the course of European
history. In the immediately preceding Socrates had just set out his famous cave allegory,
according to which we are all prisoners of sensory illusions. Liberation from these

1
I am greatly inspired at this point by Henri Bergson, 1932.

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illusions entails being led out of the cave into the light of true being. True being, Socrates
contends, is ultimately identical to Goodness itself, and can be compared to the sun
allowing us to see (= think). I have put those words that derive from the root
horân/‘seeing’ in bold characters.
“And if you assume that the ascent and the contemplation (theân) of the things
above is the soul’s ascension to the intelligible region (ton noèton topon), you
will not miss my surmise, since that is what you desire to hear. But God knows
whether it is true. But, at any rate, my dream as it appears to me is that in the
region of the known (en tooi gnoostooi) the last thing to be seen and hardly seen
(mogis horâsthai) is the idea of good (hè tou agathou idea), and that when seen
(ophtheisa) it must needs point us to the conclusion (sullogistea) that this is
indeed the cause for all things of all that is right and beautiful, giving birth in the
visible world (en …horatooi) to light, and the author of light and itself in the
intelligible world (en noètooi) being the authentic source of truth and reason
(noun), and that anyone who is to act wisely in private or public must have
caught sight (idein) of this.” (Republic, 517c)

As appears from this passage, an idéa cannot be randomly invented, its eternal essence
can only be discovered. Discovering equals seeing, and seeing equals understanding, i.e.,
seeing clearly. The idea of the good, the prime idea, connects the visible and the
intelligible world. This connection is the root of ‘morality’. There is no place for creative
subjectivity here, since the role of the contemplating subject diminishes as contemplation
deepens. I think it will not be overstated that today we have become fully unacquainted
with both Plato’s notion of idéa (as a perennial ontological principle) and of
contemplation (as a subject-erasing act). Still, it could be surmised that, without these
notions, we would not have had the type of techno-scientific society we now have and in
which we are concerned with developing ‘ideas’.
It is not my aim in this article to dwell on this highly complex development, which
regards the origins of Modernity. Instead, I will give an example of a Modern approach of
the word ‘idea’. In Descartes, often presented as the father of Modern thinking, we see
that the notion of ‘idea’ is identified with content – or even ‘objects’ – of the mind. The
clarity and distinctiveness of ideas, Descartes holds, corroborates their truth value, and an
adequate methodology should pave the way towards reliable ‘ideas’. Discussing the
notion of God, as the ultimate perfection, Descartes states that,
“pour connaître la nature de Dieu, autant que la mienne en était capable, je
n’avais qu’à considérer de toutes les choses dont je trouvais en moi quelque
idée, si c’était perfection, ou non, de les posséder, et j’étais assuré qu’aucune de

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celles qui marquaient quelque imperfection, n’était en lui, mais que toutes les
autres y étaient.” (Descartes, 1989, 4ème partie, 94; my italics )

From Descartes onwards, ideas are linked to a scrutinising subject. This even applies
to the empiricist tradition (Locke, Hume), albeit that here judgmental or rational scrutiny
is gradually transformed into a scrutiny of perception. 2 In his ground-breaking study
Sources of the Self. The Making of Modern Identity, Charles Taylor analyses the rise of
the Modern subject in terms of a “disengaged self”, i.e., a self that has methodologically
withdrawn from reality in order to either conceive or perceive it ‘objectively’. (Taylor,
1989) This disengagement first creates the subject/object distinction characteristic of
Modernity and affects the latter’s notion of ‘ideas’. From Descartes to Kant and beyond,
‘ideas’ are equated to mental content exposed to the subject’s conceptual or perceptive
scrutiny.
Whether or not favoured by this development, the Romantic tradition inaugurates a
decisive renewal of the notion of ‘idea’. ‘Ideas’ are equated with the tidal waves of
nature; the latter inexhaustibly renews itself, owing to which ideas are always novelties.
Artists, painters, or philosophers, provided they expose themselves to the inner depths of
the mind, can generate ideas. Over-emphasising the subject of idea generation could well
miss the point; generating ‘ideas’ inevitably affects the structure of subjectivity
underlying this process. How would it not, since suddenly the subject (whether of
sensation or of reflection) finds itself in the midst of infinity, or as Schlegel puts it,
unintelligibility.
„Ja das Köstlichste was der Mensch hat, die innere Zufriedenheit selbst hängt,
wie jeder leicht wissen kann, irgendwo zuletzt an einem solchen Punkte, der im
Dunkeln gelassen werden muß, dafür aber auch das Ganze trägt und hält, und
diese Kraft in demselben Augenblicke verlieren würde, wo man ihn in Verstand
auflösen wollte. Wahrlich, es würde euch bange werden, wenn die ganze Welt,
wie ihr es fordert, einmal im Ernst durchaus verständlich würde. Und ist sie
selbst diese unendliche Welt nicht durch den Verstand aus der
Unverständlichkeit oder dem Chaos gebildet?“ 3

The obscure, the unintelligible, or chaos are intrinsically connected to what many
Romantics called ‘productive imagination’ (productive Einbildungskraft). 4 Obviously,

2
Cf Locke: “Idea is the object of thinking” and “since there appear not to be any ideas in the mind, before the
senses have conveyed any in, I conceive that ideas in the understanding are coeval with sensation.” An Essay
Concerning Human Understanding, II, Ch.I 1.23. Or Hume: “By ideas I mean the faint images of [impressions]
in thinking and reasoning”. A Treatise of Human Nature, I Pt. 1 sect. 1.
3
Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Über die Unverständlichkeit’.
4
Whether or not Romantic thinkers themselves were heir to Modernity is moot. I believe they both are and are
not, to the extent that they are both looking into and beyond the subject.

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their ontology differs dramatically from both the Platonic and (though perhaps less) the
Cartesian-Lockean-Humean reality concept. In Romanticism, novelty, difference and
singularity are attributed a role hitherto unheard of.
I would argue that our present-day discourse on ‘ideas’ is highly ambiguous. On the
one hand, it is drawing on the Romantic tradition, while on the other hand it is still
framing its vocabulary against a Modern, rationalist-empiricist backdrop. (Derrida, 1987,
56ff) As a result, the contemporary notion of ideas is paralysed by self-contradiction.
Submitted to a scrutinising, disengaged subject, ideas tend to immediately conceal the
ontological abyss opened up by them. Assessed by the subject’s scrutiny, they slowly
assume object character and lose their radical potential. What is more, since the subject’s
scrutiny is not itself scrutinised, ideas easily fall prey to forms of ‘engagement’ the
apparently disengaged subject is still involved in. Criticists of Modernity (Nietzsche,
Marx, Freud) have pointed out that the acclaimed neutrality (disengagement) of the
rational subject is an illusion. A power will, economic interests, or affects – if not anxiety
– determine rational subjectivity’s inner structure, thereby submitting the subject’s ‘ideas’
to their own pernicious influence. Supervised by the Modern subject, ideas are not exempt
from (economic, libidinous, etc.) manipulation. Max Weber’s renowned notion of
Zweckrationalität (goal rationality) has made clear that, once the rational subject becomes
absolute, subject-based ideas can be put at the service of any goal. Disengagement
(‘objectivity’) makes the subject and its ideas prone to power, interests, or instincts.

3 Synchronicity
Should the above analysis make sense, a more promising way to further explore
‘ideas’ could be to follow the trajectory set out by the Romantic tradition. As already
noticed, it is not sure that this tradition is altogether aloof from an over-emphasis on the
discretionary subject. Nevertheless, it made attempts to rid this subject of its fixed
boundaries and usurping proclivities, thereby allowing for a more veridical
‘phenomenology’ of ideas.
In this article I do not intend to further analyse the Romantic tradition’s dealing with
ideas for its own sake. Instead, I will consider some viable elements of Romanticism’s
subject critique that in my view are still relevant for a contemporary appreciation of ideas.
Whether or not Romantic thinkers were successful in unravelling the rational, disengaged
subject, at least they endeavoured into reconnecting the subject to its (de-objectified)
environment. In this respect I believe that the notion of ‘synchronicity’ is convenient, as
synchronicity experiences often surround idea-generation developments. The term was
introduced by Carl Gustav Jung in order to make sense of ‘biographical coincidences’
linking someone’s inner mental processes to outer experiences. (Bishop, 2000; Main,
1997 and 2007; Von Franz, 2014) Examples of such coincidences abound, not only in

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people’s private lives but also on a wider, world historical scale. Since synchronicity
experiences seem to overcome the radical subject/object divide Modernity has
manoeuvred itself into, I think considering the notion of synchronicity and its
presuppositions could be helpful for a more adequate approach of ‘ideas’.
Jung defined ‘synchronicity’ as meaningful coincidence: a concurrence of events
without any common, clearly identifiable cause, without any linear (‘efficient’) causality. 5
Well-known is the example Jung gave of the scarab-like insect that flew into his study at
the exact moment his client was telling him about a scarab she had been dreaming about
that same night. The Modern, disengaged subject is likely to treat similar, murky events
as ‘mere’ coincidences. However, such events can well become meaningful once the
prevailing disengagement itself collapses and is all of a sudden experienced by the subject
in its sheer arbitrariness.
Since private synchronicity experiences tend to produce endless, unverifiable
casuistry, let us take a quick look at synchronicities on a global level. Besides being
‘verifiable’, their essence or effect seems to be a promotion of ‘ideas’.
Several ground-breaking world historical discoveries (the wheel, fire, agriculture,
infinitesimal calculus, electricity) have been made simultaneously without verifiable
evidence of any contact between those involved, that is, without a common cause.
Likewise, new sciences were founded at different places around the same time, such as
the science and name of ‘biology’ around 1800 (simultaneously introduced by Treviranus,
Beddoes, Lamarck and Burdach, cf Coleman, 1977; Junker, 2004 6), or ‘psychology’
(William James, Wilhelm Wundt). Thirdly, it is of note that the basis of the prospective
world religions (‘philosophy’ included) was laid in roughly the same period, and which
Karl Jaspers called axial age (Achsenzeit); the Buddha, Confucius, Lao-ze, the Jewish
prophets, and Socrates all lived between 800 and 200 BCE. Similar analyses of coevally
related yet causally unconnected occurrences were made by Michel Foucault; see for
example his comparative research on the altering treatment of madness in the Modern era
and the simultaneous delimitation of reason and unreason (cf Descartes).
An in-depth study of each of these idea-generating or -revealing synchronicities would
probably deliver interesting confluences and convergences without unequivocally leading
to a final common cause. Such an in-depth study could also be extended towards the
biographical conditions under which individuals managed to develop their ideas. 7 Linear,
‘efficient’ causality lacking comprehensive explanatory power, the sole ‘rationally
justifiable’ alternative seems to be to assume that mere coincidence has been at work.

5
Linear or efficient causality entails that the cause both conditions and precedes the effect.
6
Cf Gottfried Reinhold Treviranus, Biologie; oder die Philosophie der lebenden Natur (1802); Jean-Baptiste
Lamarck, Hydrogéologie (1802); Thomas Beddoes, Contributions to Physical and Medical Knowledge,
principally from the West of England (1799); Karl Friedrich Burdach.
7
Among many other possibilities, let me just refer to the work of Jacques Derrida. Though the term
‘synchronicity’ is not used, his entire work abounds with reported synchronicity experiences.

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Yet, such an ‘explanation’ would be tantamount to a non-explanation. Moreover, it

overlooks the possibility that what is called ‘causality’ does not positively characterise
reality but rather reflects the rational-empirical subject’s mere default mode. Hume and
Kant already accounted for this, whereas Schopenhauer offered the most radical
philosophical underpinning. Schopenhauer claimed that causality, rather than being real,
concerns our mind’s mode of representing the world. Causal realism should be replaced
by representationalism.
Though many contemporary scientists agree with this (insisting on the explanatory
models science introduces) (Dürr, 1987, 49, 80f., 111, 156, 271, etc.), the linear (efficient)
causality principle’s limited impact has hardly come across the practice of science. As
long as a principle of linear causality still dominates the practice of science, though, it
will not only be unlikely that idea-generation can ever be more than fortuitous
coincidence; it will also be unlikely that the nature of ideas will be done justice to. It
could even be hypothesised that the predominance of causal realism prevents idea-
generation; not necessarily because it is flawed in itself but mainly because it draws upon
an uncritically favoured subject/object distinction. True, accounting for the challenge that
e.g. quantum mechanics, or hermeneutics (based on ‘understanding’ rather than on
‘explanation’ 8) poses to causal realism, is a necessary, not a sufficient condition for
prompting ideas. In addition, the subject of scientific observation or reflection should be
put into question. Only thus could a more adequate approach of idea-generation be
realised. 9

4 Opacity
At the beginning of this article I have defined ideas in terms of a disposition or a
configuration to overcome, whether in thinking or in acting, a human impasse or
predicament. I intended to connect ideas to ‘morality’, in the widest sense of the word, to
prevent application of the term to fertile and harmful configurations indifferently. I have
suggested that the circularity of my argument could only be avoided by denying the
subject an unquestioned discretionary role. The Modern subject/object distinction that
implicitly prevails over our common conception of ‘ideas’ today runs the risk of reducing
ideas to the mere mental content of a disengaged self, while blinding itself to the said

8
Cf W. Dilthey: “Die Natur erklären wir, das Seelenleben verstehen wir.“ Also cf Max Planck: “Wir wollen
hier nur feststellen, daß die theoretisch-physikalische Forschung in ihrer historischen Entwicklung
auffallenderweise zu einer Formulierung der physikalischen Ursächlichkeit geführt hat, welche einen
ausgesprochen teleologischen Charakter besitzt, daß aber dadurch nicht etwa etwas inhaltlich Neues oder gar
Gegensätzliches in die Art der Naturgesetzlichkeit hineingetragen wird. Es handelt sich vielmehr lediglich um
eine der Form nach verschiedene, sachlich jedoch vollkommen gleichberechtigte Betrachtungsweise.” Dürr,
1987, 36.
9
For an account of how quantum mechanics might affect the subject, see Radin, 2006. For an example of how
hermeneutics affects the subject, see Gadamer, 1960f.

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subject’s defencelessness against hidden power claims or economic interests. At this point
it could be helpful to remind ourselves of synchronicities frequently surrounding the
introduction of ground-breaking historical ideas. Obviously, there is no adequate
substantiation that such synchronicities always produce themselves when new ideas are
born; at least, confirmatory evidence can be provided that it often happens, while the
possibility that it was even more frequent than hitherto assumed should be left open for
further research.
A final feature that I believe brands ideas is an irreducible opacity: part of them
remains obscure. This is already implied by the absence of a subject in full control of the
idea-generation process. Ideas, I have suggested, are better conceived when seen as
configurations that help overcome a human predicament, and enable one to act or think
differently. The birth of an idea cannot but remain unclear, at least to outsiders, but
perhaps even to those advancing them, albeit to a lesser extent. A fertile idea illumines
(e.g., a field of expertise, a tradition) without being perspicuous or fathomable itself.
An explanatory theory about the unfathomable nature of ideas is given by the 19th
Century philosopher of technology, Ernst Kapp (1808-1896). Kapp introduced the notion
of ‘organ projection’. He put forward the claim that the invention of technological tools
presupposes an unconscious awareness of inner bodily functions. The piano, for example,
is conditioned by the human auditory system, the camera obscura by the ocular retina, and
the organ by our vocal cords. (Kapp, 1877; Du Prel, 1888, 74ff; Mitcham, 1994) Kapp’s
theory laid the basis for a number of philosophies of technology (Bergson, Cassirer,
Gehlen, MacLuhan). In line with Kapp, Ernst Cassirer (1874-1945) claimed that man can
only get to know himself by following the detour of his cultural artefacts. (Cassirer, 1944)
The inner origin of the latter remains necessarily clouded.
Another possible theory accounting for the opacity of ideas is offered by the 19th
Century thinker Adolf Zeising (1810-1876). Zeising proved that both nature and human
artefacts are governed by the same formative principle, i.e., of the golden section. This
principle of proportionality, already familiar to ancient architects (Vitruvius),
unconsciously determines architecture, music, painting and poetry. 10 The famous 20th
Century architect Le Corbusier largely drew on Zeising’s analyses.
Though a plethora of other explanations for the essential opacity of ideas could be
adduced, at least their virtue of overcoming a subject/object split would be an
indispensable element. The alleged disengagement of the rational-empirical subject can

10
Cf. e.g. Neue Lehre von den Proportionen des menschlichen Körpers (1854) and Der goldene Schnitt (1884).
For a discussion of Zeising see Du Prel, 1888, 76f.: “Wenn nun aber das Gesetz des goldenen Schnittes den
organischen Bau des Menschen ebenso beherrscht, wie es unbewussterweise angewendet wurde von den
Erbauern dorischer Tempel und gotischer Dome, so geht eben daraus hervor, dass Natur und Bewusstsein in der
gleichen Weise schaffen, dass unsere Geistesprodukte nicht vom Bewusstsein hervorgerufen, sondern nur
beleuchtet und zwar mangelhaft beleuchtet sind, wie das von einem entwicklungsfähigen Bewusstsein vorweg
zu erwarten ist.” Also see Frings, 2002.

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only claim self-transparency by neglecting the latter’s embeddedness. Ideas are never
fully translucent to subjects, neither in their generation nor in their pursuit. As
configurations that enable subjects to renew thinking, acting, or believing, so that a
predicament can be overcome, the locus of idea generation is not exclusively the mind.
Should ever a ‘science of ideas’ be initiated, as it was first promoted by Destutt de
Tracy (1754-1836) and continued by 20th Century thinkers Genrich Altshuller (1926-
1998) and Patrick Gunkel (1947-2017), then it would make sense to further explore the
ways creative thinkers themselves relate to their insights. This would make more sense
than for example resorting to the philosophy of Heidegger (which mysteriously attributes
a dialectic of concealment and disclosure to Being itself); one would have to comply with
Heidegger’s philosophy as such to start with, which is an impossible demand. Instead of
pretending to give an exhaustive survey, let me give a few examples of what I am
thinking of here. The examples do not prove anything, they are solely meant to illustrate.
When Descartes first came to his ‘idea’ of method as the proper mode to promote
sound knowledge, his description closely resembles Plato’s just liberated cave-man who
first sees the sun: “mon esprit s’accoutumait peu à peu à concevoir plus nettement et plus
distinctement ses objets”. (Descartes, 2ème partie, 75) James Hutton, the father of modern
geology, ends his famous speech for the Royal Society of Edinburgh (published in 1788)
stating that “if the succession of worlds is established in the system of nature, it is in vain
to look for any thing higher in the origin of the earth. The result, therefore, of our present
enquiry is, that we find no vestige of a beginning, – no prospect of an end.” (Hutton,
1785) In a letter to William James, Henri Bergson writes that his discovery of duration
“bouleversa toutes mes idées […]. Ceci fut le point de départ d’une série de réflexions qui
m’amenèrent, de degré en degré, à rejeter presque tout ce que j’avais accepté jusqu’alors,
et à changer complètement de point de vue.” (Bergson, 2011, 745) Jacques Derrida,
replying to his stupefied thesis supervisor Hippolyte who had no clue as to where his
brilliant PhD student was going, answered: “Si je voyais clairement, et d’avance, où je
vais, je crois bien que je ne ferais pas un pas de plus pour m’y rendre.” (Derrida, 1990,
442) Freud’s generalisation of the Oedipus complex rooted in the dark soil of self-
diagnosis. In his earliest reference, a letter to Wilhelm Fliess, he writes: “Ich habe die
Verliebtheit in die Mutter und die Eifersucht gegen den Vater auch bei mir gefunden und
halte sie jetzt für ein allgemeines Ereignis der frühen Kindheit.” (Freud, 1986, 293)

5 Practical implications
Should the nature of ideas be reconceived in terms of disposition or enabling
configuration, this will inevitably affect (social, scientific, intellectual) initiatives staged
to enhance them. An exclusively output- or profit-based focus will shift towards first
envisioning the all too narrow structure of ‘rational subjectivity’ and its suffocating,

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ISBN 978-88-96687-11-6
ISSN 2280787X

bureaucratised habitat. Only in light of a démasqué of this habitat can ideas arise that do
what they should do: overcome a human predicament, whether on the field of science,
philosophy, religion, or society.
The upshot of my argument cannot consist of giving a blueprint that can immediately
be used for profit maximisation of business companies, growth of academic output,
increase of voters turnout in elections, development and enhancement of weaponry, or
even the global spread of democracy. It is most likely that such goals reflect subjective
interests that are beyond possible criticism.
To avoid keeping my argument purely theoretical, I will mention what I believe are
some concrete preconditions for idea-generation. I infer them from the aforementioned
(1) need to overcome a subject/object split, (2) notable synchronicities surrounding the
birth of ideas, and (3) a certain extent of opacity in ideas. Obviously, these are no
sufficient conditions, as there will always be a degree of unpredictability involved in the
rise of ideas.
1. Room for spirituality and self-reflection.
2. Room for experiencing personal crises.
3. Cross-disciplinary contacts.
4. Multilingualism.
5. Availability of societal spaces where group pressure is less.
6. Infrastructures enabling unconventional individuals to interact.
7. Historical and cultural awareness.
8. Exposure to uncertainties.
The first six preconditions concern an explicit awareness of subject boundaries,
number 5-7 regard enhanced synchronicity awareness, whereas 7-8 are related to opacity
experience.
This list can doubtlessly be extended. The preconditions at least seem to have one thing in
common: space. Any system blind to its own arbitrariness tends to occupy space. A
society keen on ideas will necessarily protect spaces where anything solid melts.

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id., (1990), “Ponctuations: le temps de la thèse”, Du droit à la philosophie, Galilée, Paris.

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