Province of Camarines Sur v. Bodega Glassware, G.R. No.

194199, March 22, 2017

FACTS:
On September 28, 1966, through then Provincial Governor Apolonio G. Maleniza,
petitioner donated around 600 square meters of this parcel of land to the Camarines
Sur Teachers' Association, Inc. (CASTEA) through a Deed of Donation Inter Vivos (Deed of
Donation).7 The Deed of Donation included an automatic revocation clause which
states:
That the condition of this donation is that the DONEE shall use the
above-described portion of land subject of the present donation for no other
purpose except the construction of its building to be owned and to be
constructed by the above-named DONEE to house its offices to be used by the
said Camarines Sur Teachers' Association, Inc.,in connection with its functions
under its charter and by-laws and the Naga City Teachers' Association as well as
the Camarines Sur High School Alumni Association, PROVIDED FURTHERMORE,
that the DONEE shall not sell, mortgage or incumber the property herein
donated including any and all improvements thereon in favor of any party and
provided, lastly, that the construction of the building or buildings referred to
above shall be commenced within a period of one (1) year from and after the
execution of this donation, otherwise, this donation shall be deemed
automatically revoked and voided and of no further force and effect. 

CASTEA accepted the donation .However, on August 15, 1995, CASTEA entered
into a Contract of Lease with Bodega over the donated property. 9 Under the Contract
of Lease, CASTEA leased the property to Bodega for a period of 20 years . Petitioner left
Bodega undisturbed and merely tolerated its possession of the property. 
Petitioner demanded that Bodega vacate the property and surrender its
peaceful possession. Bodega refused to comply with the demand.  Petioner executed a
Deed of Revocation of Donation. CASTEA never challenged this revocation.
FILED BEFORE MTC- unlawful detainer and payment of rent.
MTC- ordered Bodega TO VACATE the property and to pay P15,000 a month as
reasonable compensation. 
RTC Naga City – DISMISSED for failure of the plaintiff to present evidence to sustain its cause
of action
CA- AFFIRMED RTC’S DECISION
-PETITIONER CANNOT DEMAND THAT BODEGA VACATE
-Bodega's possession of the property is based on its Contract of Lease with CASTEA
-Petioner it should have first filed an action for reconveyance of the property against
CASTEA.
- petitioner's action has already prescribed. According to it, Article 1144 (1) of
the Civil Code applies in this case. Thus, petitioner had 10 years to file an action for
reconveyance from the time the Deed of Donation was violated. As the Contract of
 Lease was entered into on September 1, 1995, petitioner, thus, had 10 years from this
date to file the action. Unfortunately, the action for unlawful detainer was filed more
than 12 years later. Further, the CA added that even the revocation of the donation
was done beyond the 10-year prescriptive period.
CONTENTION OF PARTIES:

PETITIONER filed this verified petition for review on certiorari challenging the

assailed Decision. It argues that the CA wrongly applied the doctrine in Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila.It asserts that the assailed Decision in fact categorically stated that
in donations containing an automatic revocation clause, judicial intervention is
not necessary for the purpose of effectively revoking the donation. Such a
revocation is valid subject to judicial intervention only when its propriety is challenged
in court. 26 
DETACa

BODEGA anchors its right of possession on its Contract of Lease with CASTEA. It
insists that the Contract of Lease is valid because CASTEA is the owner of the property.
The automatic revocation clause did not immediately revoke the donation in the
absence of a judicial declaration. It also agrees with the CA that the petitioner's
action has already prescribed. 
provisional and done solely to settle the question of possession.
The Ruling of the Court
1. ISSUE OF UNLAWFUL DETAINER
An action for unlawful detainer, as in this case, pertains to specific circumstances
of dispossession. It refers to a situation where the current occupant of the property
initially obtained possession lawfully. 33 This possession only became unlawful due to
the expiration of the right to possess which may be a contract, express or implied, or by
mere tolerance. 34  HEITAD

An action for unlawful detainer must allege and establish the following key
jurisdictional facts:
(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by
tolerance of the plaintiff;
(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant
of the termination of the latter's right of possession;
(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived
the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and
(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the
plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment. 

When in an unlawful detainer action, the party seeking recovery of possession

alleges that the opposing party occupied the subject property by mere tolerance, this
must be alleged clearly and the acts of tolerance established.  Further, the party seeking
possession must identify the source of his or her claim as well as satisfactorily present
evidence establishing it.
In this case, petitioner alleged that as early as 2005, it had asked Bodega to
present proof of its legal basis for occupying the property. Bodega, however, failed to
heed this demand. For several years, petitioner merely tolerated Bodega's possession
by allowing it to continue using its building and conducting business on the property.
Petitioner demanded that Bodega vacate the property in November 2007. This presents
a clear case of unlawful detainer based on mere tolerance.
Petitioner proceeds to argue that its right of possession is based on its
ownership. This, in turn, is hinged on its position that the property reverted back to the
petitioner when the donation was revoked as provided in the automatic revocation
clause in the Deed of Donation.
2. DONATION RULING

We shall rule on the effect of the automatic revocation clause for the purpose of
ascertaining who between petitioner and Bodega has the right to possess the property.
This Court has affirmed the validity of an automatic revocation clause in
donations in the case of De Luna v. Abrigo  promulgated in 1990. We explained the
nature of automatic revocation clauses by first identifying the three categories of
donation. In De Luna,we said that a donation may be simple, remuneratory or onerous.
A donation is simple when the cause is the donor's pure liberality. It is remuneratory
when the donor "gives something to reward past or future services or because of future
charges or burdens, when the value of said services, burdens or charges is less than the
value of the donation." 38 A donation is onerous when it is "subject to burdens, charges,
or future services equal (or more) in value than that of the thing donated x x x."  39 This
Court found that the donation in De Luna was onerous as it required the donee to build
a chapel, a nursery, and a kindergarten. We then went on to explain that an ONEROUS
DONATION is governed by the law on contracts and not by the law on donations. It
is within this context that this Court found an automatic revocation clause as valid. 
aDSIHc

We explained in De Luna that Article 1306 of the Civil Code allows the parties "to
establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem
convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order
or public policy." 40 In contracts law, parties may agree to give one or both of them the
right to rescind a contract unilaterally. This is akin to an automatic revocation clause in
an onerous donation. The jurisprudence on automatic rescission in the field of
contracts law therefore applies in an automatic revocation clause.
Hence, in De Luna,we applied our rulings in University of the Philippines v. De los
Angeles  and Angeles v. Calasanz  where we held that an automatic rescission clause
effectively rescinds the contract upon breach without need of any judicial declaration.
In University of the Philippines,this Court held that a party to a contract with an
automatic rescission clause, who believes that there has been a breach warranting
rescission, may consider the contract rescinded without previous court action. Speaking
through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, we said:
x x x [T]he law definitely does not require that the contracting party who
believes itself injured must first file suit and wait for a judgment before taking
extrajudicial steps to protect its interest. Otherwise, the party injured by the
other's breach will have to passively sit and watch its damages accumulate
during the pendency of the suit until the final judgment of rescission is rendered
when the law itself requires that he should exercise due diligence to minimize its
own damages x x x. 43

We, however, clarified that the other party may contest the extrajudicial
rescission in court in case of abuse or error by the rescinder. It is only in this case where
a judicial resolution of the issue becomes necessary.
Applying this to the automatic revocation clause, we ruled in De Luna  that:
It is clear, however, that judicial intervention is necessary not for
purposes of obtaining a judicial declaration rescinding a contract already
deemed rescinded by virtue of an agreement providing for rescission even
without judicial intervention, but in order to determine whether or not the
rescission was proper. 

While the ruling in De Luna applied specifically to onerous donations with an

automatic revocation clause, we extended this doctrine to apply to donations inter
vivos in general in Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila. We explained in this case that
Article 732 of the Civil Code states that the general provisions on obligations and
contracts shall govern donations inter vivos in all matters not determined in Title III,
Book III on donations. Title III has no explicit provisions for instances where a
donation has an automatic revocation clause. Thus, the rules in contracts law
regarding automatic rescission of contracts as well as the jurisprudence explaining it
find suppletory application. We then reiterated in Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Manila that where a donation has an automatic revocation clause, the occurrence of
the condition agreed to by the parties as to cause the revocation , is sufficient for a
party to consider the donation revoked without need of any judicial action. A judicial
finding that the revocation is proper is only necessary when the other party actually
goes to court for the specific purpose of challenging the propriety of the revocation.
Nevertheless, even in such a case, "x x x the decision of the court will be merely
declaratory of the revocation, but it is not in itself the revocatory act." 45 We also
explained in this case that in ascertaining the PRESCRIPTION OF ACTIONS ARISING
FROM AN AUTOMATIC REVOCATION clause in donations, the general provisions on
prescription under the Civil Code apply. Article 764 — which provides for a four-year
prescriptive period to file an action to revoke the donation in case of breach of a
condition — governs an instance where the deed of donation does not contain an
automatic revocation clause. 46
 We repeated this ruling in Dolar v. Barangay Lublub (Now P.D. Monfort North)
Municipality of Dumangas.47 We once again held that if a contract of donation provides
for automatic rescission or reversion in case of a breach of a condition and the donee
violates it or fails to comply with it, the property donated automatically reverts back to
the donor without need of any judicial declaration. It is only when the donee denies the
rescission or challenges its propriety that the court can intervene to conclusively settle
whether the resolution was proper. This was also the import of our ruling
in Zamboanga Barter Traders Kilusang Bayan, Inc. v. Plagata.48
In this case, the Deed of Donation contains a clear automatic revocation clause.
The clause states:
That the condition of this donation is that the DONEE shall use the
above-described portion of land subject of the present donation for no other
purpose except the construction of its building to be owned and to be
constructed by the above-named DONEE to house its offices to be used by the
said Camarines Sur Teachers' Association, Inc.,in connection with its functions
under its charter and by-laws and the Naga City Teachers' Association as well as
the Camarines Sur High School Alumni Association, PROVIDED FURTHERMORE,
that the DONEE shall not sell, mortgage or incumber the property herein
donated including any and all improvements thereon in favor of any party and
provided, lastly, that the construction of the building or buildings referred to
above shall be commenced within a period of one (1) year from and after the
execution of this donation, otherwise, this donation shall be deemed
automatically revoked and voided and of no further force and effect. 49 
ETHIDa

The provision identifies THREE CONDITIONS FOR THE DONATION: (1) that the
property shall be used for "no other purpose except the construction of its building to
be owned and to be constructed by the above-named DONEE to house its offices to be
used by the said Camarines Sur Teachers' Association, Inc.,in connection with its
functions under its charter and by-laws and the Naga City Teachers' Association as well
as the Camarines Sur High School Alumni Association," (2) CASTEA shall "not sell,
mortgage or incumber the property herein donated including any and all
improvements thereon in favor of any party," and (3) "the construction of the building
or buildings referred to above shall be commenced within a period of one (1) year from
and after the execution." The last clause of this paragraph states that "otherwise, this
donation shall be deemed automatically revoked x x x." 50 We read the final clause of
this provision as an automatic revocation clause which pertains to all three conditions
of the donation. When CASTEA leased the property to Bodega, it breached the first and
second conditions.
Accordingly, petitioner takes the position that when CASTEA leased the property
to Bodega, it violated the conditions in the Deed of Donation and as such, the
property automatically reverted to it. It even executed a Deed of Revocation. The
records show that CASTEA never contested this revocation. Hence, applying the ruling
in De Luna,  Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, Dolar  n and  Zamboanga Barter Traders
Kilusang Bayan, Inc., PETITIONER VALIDLY CONSIDERED THE DONATION REVOKED
AND BY VIRTUE OF THE AUTOMATIC REVOCATION CLAUSE, THIS REVOCATION WAS
AUTOMATIC AND IMMEDIATE, WITHOUT NEED OF JUDICIAL INTERVENTION. Thus,
the CA clearly erred in its finding that petitioner should have first filed an action for
reconveyance. This contradicts the doctrine stated in the aforementioned cases and
renders nugatory the very essence of an automatic revocation clause.
Thus, as petitioner validly considered the donation revoked and CASTEA never
contested it, the property donated effectively reverted back to it as owner. In
demanding the return of the property, petitioner sources its right of possession on its
ownership. Under Article 428 of the Civil Code, the owner has a right of action against
the holder and possessor of the thing in order to recover it.
This right of possession prevails over Bodega's claim which is anchored on its
Contract of Lease with CASTEA. CASTEA's act of leasing the property to Bodega, in
breach of the conditions stated in the Deed of Donation, is the very same act which
caused the automatic revocation of the donation. Thus, it had no right, either as an
owner or as an authorized administrator of the property to lease it to Bodega. While a
lessor need not be the owner of the property leased, he or she must, at the very least,
have the authority to lease it out. 51 None exists in this case. Bodega finds no basis for
its continued possession of the property. TIADCc

As to the QUESTION OF PRESCRIPTION, we rule that the petitioner's right to file

this ejectment suit against Bodega HAS NOT PRESCRIBED.
First, we reiterate that jurisprudence has definitively declared that Article 764 on
the prescription of actions for the revocation of a donation does not apply in cases
where the donation has an automatic revocation clause. 52 This is necessarily so
because Article 764 speaks of a judicial action for the revocation of a donation-
INAPPICABLE. It cannot govern cases where a breach of a condition automatically,
and without need of judicial intervention, revokes the donation.
Second, we cannot agree with the ruling of the CA that the petitioner should
have first filed an action for reconveyance of the property, and that petitioner's action
has prescribed since it did not file the action within 10 years. This reveals a FAILURE TO
UNDERSTAND THE NATURE OF A DONATION WITH AN AUTOMATIC REVOCATION
CLAUSE. There can be no 10-year prescriptive period to file an action to speak of. When
the donee does not contest the revocation, no court action is necessary.
Third, as owner of the property in this case, the petitioner is entitled to its
possession. The petitioner's action for ejectment is anchored on this right to possess.
Under the Civil Code and the Rules of Court, a party seeking to eject another from a
property for unlawful detainer must file the action for ejectment within one year from
the last demand to vacate. 53 This is the prescriptive period that the petitioner is bound
to comply with in this case. The records show that the petitioner served its last demand
letter on November 11, 2007. It filed the action for ejectment on March 13, 2008 or
 around four months from the last demand. The action is clearly within the prescriptive
period.  cSEDTC

We also affirm the grant of damages in favor of the petitioner.

Section 17 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 17. Judgment.— If after trial the court finds that the allegations of the
complaint are true, it shall render judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the
restitution of the premises, the sum justly due as arrears of rent or
as reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises,
attorney's fees and costs. x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
RENT ISSUE:

Thus, the rightful possessor in an unlawful detainer case is entitled to

recover damages, which REFER TO "RENTS" OR "THE REASONABLE COMPENSATION
for the use and occupation of the premises," or "fair rental value of the
property" 54 and attorney's fees and costs. The amount of rent in the Contract of Lease
is evidence of the fair rental value of the property. That the petitioner asked for half
of this amount as damages is REASONABLE GIVEN the circumstances.

The Decision of the MTC Naga City is REINSTATED.

De Luna v. Abrigo 181 SCRA 150
 Since onerous donations are governed by the rules of contracts, the prescription period is 10 years (based on a written contract),
and not the 4-year period based on Article 764 (revocation must be brought within 4 years from the non-compliance of the
conditions of the donation). (De Luna v Abrigo)
 Remuneratory donation is one where the donee gives something to reward past or future services or because of future charges
or burdens, when the value of said services, burdens or charges is less than the value of the donation. (De Luna -> this definition
seems wrong as it includes future charges, which are necessarily modal)
--
 Article 764 does not apply to onerous donations because onerous donations are governed by the rules of Contracts. Hence, the
prescription period is 10 years, not 4 years. (De Luna v Abrigo)
--
 Nothing in law prohibits parties from entering into an agreement that violation of the terms of the contract would cause
cancellation thereof even without court intervention.
o In cases like these, judicial intervention is necessary not for purposes of obtaining a judicial declaration rescinding a contract
already deemed rescinded but in order to determine whether or not the rescission was proper. (De Luna)
[G.R. No. 57455. January 18, 1990.]

EVELYN DE LUNA, ROSALINA DE LUNA, PRUDENCIO DE LUNA,

JR., WILLARD DE LUNA, ANTONIO DE LUNA, and
JOSELITO DE LUNA,  petitioners, vs. HON. SOFRONIO F. ABRIGO,
Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch
IX, and LUZONIAN UNIVERSITY FOUNDATION, INC.,  respondents.

Milberto B. Zurbano for petitioners.

 Jovito E. Talabong for private respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; DONATION; CLASSIFICATION AS TO MOTIVE, PURPOSE OR

CAUSE. — From the viewpoint of motive, purpose or cause, donations may
be 1) simple, 2) remuneratory or 3) onerous. A simple donation is one the
cause of which is pure liberality (no strings attached). A remuneratory
donation is one where the donee gives something to reward past or future
services or because of future charges or burdens, when the value of said
services, burdens or charges is less than the value of the donation. An
onerous donation is one which is subject to burdens, charges or future
services equal (or more) in value than that of the thing donated (Edgardo L.
Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated, 11 ed., 726).
2. ID.; ONEROUS DONATION GOVERNED BY RULES ON CONTRACT AND
GENERAL RULES ON PRESCRIPTION OF ACTION. — Under the old Civil Code,
it is settled rule that donations with an onerous cause are governed not by
the law on donations but by the rules on contracts, as held in the cases of
Carlos v. Ramil, L-6736, September 5, 1911, 20 Phil. 183, Manalo vs. de Mesa,
L-9449, February 12, 1915, 29 Phil. 495. On the matter of prescription of
actions for the revocation of onerous donation, it was held that the general
rules on prescription applies. (Parks v. Province of Tarlac, supra.) The same
rules apply under the New Civil Code as provided in Article 733 thereof which
provides: "Article 733. Donations with an onerous cause shall be governed by
the rules on contracts, and remuneratory donations by the provisions of the
present Title as regards that portion which exceeds the value of the burden
imposed."
3. ID.; CONTRACTS; PARTIES THERETO HAVE THE RIGHT TO ESTABLISH
STIPULATIONS NOT CONTRARY TO LAW. — Under Article 1306 of the New
Civil Code, the parties to a contract have the right "to establish such
stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deemed convenient,
provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public orders
or public policy." Paragraph 11 of the "Revival of Donation Intervivos, has
provided that" violation of any of the conditions (herein) shall cause
the automatic reversion of the donated area to the donor, his heirs, . . . ,
without the need of executing any other document for that purpose and
without obligation on the part of the DONOR". Said stipulation not being
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy, is valid
and binding upon the foundation who voluntarily consented thereto.
4. ID.; ID.; JUDICIAL ACTION FOR RESCISSION OF CONTRACT NOT NECESSARY
WHEN SO STIPULATED. — The validity of the stipulation in the contract
providing for the automatic reversion of the donated property to the donor
upon non-compliance cannot be doubted. It is in the nature of an agreement
granting a party the right to rescind a contract unilaterally in case of breach,
without need of going to court. Upon the happening of the resolutory
condition of non-compliance with the conditions of the contract, the
donation is automatically revoked without need of a judicial declaration to
that effect. In the case of University of the Philippines v. de los Angeles, L-
28602, September 29, 1970, 35 SCRA 102-107, it was held: ". . . There is
nothing in the law that prohibits the parties from entering into agreement
that violation of the terms of the contract would cause cancellation thereof,
even without court intervention. In other words, it is not always necessary for
the injured party to resort to court for rescission of the contract (Froilan v.
Pan Oriental Shipping Co., et al., L-11897, 31 October 1964,12 SCRA 276)."
This was reiterated in the case of Angeles v. Calasanz, L-42283, March 18,
1985: "Well settled is, however, the rule that a judicial action for the
rescission of a contract is not necessary where the contract provides that it
may be revoked and cancelled for violation of any of its terms and conditions
(Lopez v. Commissioner of Customs, 37 SCRA 327, 334, and cases cited
therein). Resort to judicial action for rescission is obviously not
contemplated. The validity of the stipulation can not be seriously disputed. It
is in the nature of a facultative resolutory condition which in many cases has
been upheld, by this court. (Ponce Enrile v. Court of Appeals, 29 SCRA 504)"
5. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADING;
MOTION OF PARTY NECESSARY. — On the matter of the donee's non-
compliance with the conditions of the donation have been contested by
private respondents who claimed that improvements more valuable than the
donated property had been introduced, a judgment on the pleadings is not
proper. Moreover, in the absence of a motion for judgment on the pleadings,
the court cannot motu proprio render such judgment. Section 1 of Rule 19
provides: "Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the
material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion
of that party, direct judgment on such pleading."

DECISION

FACTS:
On January 24, 1965, Prudencio de Luna donated a portion of 7,500 square
meters of his lot to the Luzonian Colleges, Inc., (now Luzonian University
Foundation, Inc., herein referred to as the foundation). The donation,
embodied in a Deed of Donation Intervivos was subject to certain terms and
conditions and provided for the automatic reversion to the donor of the
donated property in case of violation or non-compliance. The foundation
failed to comply with the conditions of the donation.
On April 9, 1971, Prudencio de Luna "revived" the said donation in favor of
the foundation, in a document entitled "Revival of Donation Intervivos" . It
was made subject to the burden requiring the donee to construct a chapel, a
nursery and a kindergarten school in the donated property within five years
from execution of the deed of donation.It also provided for the AUTOMATIC
REVERSION to the donor of the donated area in case of violation of the
conditions thereof. Later a Deed of Segregation was executed with resulted
to the name of the foundation.
Later herein petitioners or the HEIRS OF THE LATE PRUDENCIO DE LUNA
filed a complaint before RTC QUEZON CITY alleging that the terms and
conditions of the donation were not complied with by the foundation. Among
others, it prayed for the cancellation of the donation and the reversion of the
donated land to the heirs. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No.
8624.
FOUNDATION CONTENTION:
1. it had partially and substantially complied with the conditions of the
donation
 2. donor has granted the foundation an indefinite extension of time to
complete the construction of the chapel
3. Invoke the defense of prescription of action and prayed for the
dismissal of the complaint.  prcd

RTC’s
Under Article 764 of the New Civil Code, actions to revoke a donation on the
ground of non-compliance with any of the conditions of the donation shall
prescribe in four years counted from such non-compliance. Thus, already
barred by prescription.  LLjur

PETITIONER’s
It is then petitioners' claim that the action filed before the Court of First
Instance of Quezon is not one for revocation of the donation under
Article 764 of the New Civil Code which prescribes in four (4) years, but one
to enforce a written contract which prescribes in ten (10) years.
The petition is impressed with merit.
From the viewpoint of motive, purpose or cause, donations may be 1) simple, 2) remuneratory or 3) onerous. A simple
donation is one the cause of which is pure liberality (no strings attached). A remuneratory donation is one where the
donee gives something to reward past or future services or because of future charges or burdens, when the value of
said services, burdens or charges is less than the value of the donation. An onerous donation is one which is subject to
burdens, charges or future services equal (or more) in value than that of the thing donated (Edgardo L. Paras, Civil
Code of the Philippines Annotated, 11 ed., 726).

AS TO WHAT LAW GOVERNS ONEROUS DONATION

( 1)rules on contracts2) general rules on prescription)

It is the finding of the trial court, which is not disputed by the parties, that the
donation subject of this case is ONE WITH AN ONEROUS CAUSE. It was
made subject to the burden requiring the donee to construct a chapel, a
nursery and a kindergarten school in the donated property within five years
from execution of the deed of donation.
Under the old Civil Code, it is settled rule that donations with an ONEROUS
CAUSE are governed not by the law on donations but by the rules on
contracts. On the matter of prescription of actions for the revocation of
onerous donation, it was held that the general rules on prescription applies.
As provided in Article 733 thereof which provides:
 "Article 733. Donations with an onerous cause shall be governed by
the rules on contracts, and remuneratory donations by the
provisions of the present Title as regards that portion which exceeds
the value of the burden imposed."

It is true that Article 764 of the New Civil Code, actions for the revocation of
a donation must be brought within for (4) years from the non-compliance of
the conditions of the donation. However, it is Our opinion that the said article
does not apply to onerous donations in view of the specific provision of
Article 733 providing that onerous donations are governed by the rules on
contracts.
VALIDY OF AUTIMATIC RECISION CLAUSE
The validity of the stipulation in the contract providing for the automatic
reversion of the donated property to the donor upon non-compliance cannot
be doubted. It is in the nature of an agreement granting a party the right to
rescind a contract unilaterally in case of breach, without need of going to
court. Upon the happening of the resolutory condition of non-compliance
with the conditions of the contract, the donation is automatically revoked
without need of a judicial declaration to that effect.
This was reiterated in the case of Angeles v. Calasanz, L-42283, March 18,
1985:
"Well settled is, however, the rule that a judicial action for the
rescission of a contract is not necessary where the contract provides
that it may be revoked and cancelled for violation of any of its terms
and conditions (Lopez v. Commissioner of Customs, 37 SCRA 327,
334, and cases cited therein).
"Resort to judicial action for rescission is obviously not
contemplated. The validity of the stipulation can not be seriously
disputed. It is in the nature of a facultative resolutory condition
which in many cases has been upheld, by this court. (Ponce Enrile v.
Court of Appeals, 29 SCRA 504)".

It is clear, however, that judicial intervention is necessary not for purposes of

obtaining a judicial declaration rescinding a contract already deemed
rescinded by virtue of an agreement providing for rescission even without
judicial intervention, but IN ORDER TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT THE
RESCISSION WAS PROPER.  prcd

The case of Parks v. Province of Tarlac, supra, relied upon by the trial court, is
not applicable in the case at bar. While the donation involved therein was
also onerous, there was no agreement in the donation providing for
automatic rescission, thus, the need for a judicial declaration revoking said
donation.
The trial court was therefore not correct in holding that the complaint in the
case at bar is barred by prescription under Article 764 of the New Civil Code
because Article 764 does not apply to onerous donations.
As provided in the donation executed on April 9, 1971, compliance with the
terms and conditions of the contract of donation, shall be made within five
(5) years from its execution. The complaint which was filed on September 23,
1980 was then well within the ten (10) year prescriptive period to enforce a
written contract (Article 1144[1], New Civil Code), counted from April 9, 1976.
Finally, considering that the allegations in the complaint on the MATTER OF
THE DONEE'S NON-COMPLIANCE with the conditions of the donation have
been contested by private respondents who claimed that improvements
more valuable than the donated property had been introduced, a judgment
on the pleadings is not proper. Moreover, in the absence of a motion for
judgment on the pleadings, the court cannot motu proprio render such
judgment. Section 1 of Rule 19 provides: "Where an answer fails to tender an
issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's
pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such
pleading."
Respondent judge is ordered to conduct a trial on the merits to
determine the propriety of the revocation of the subject donation.
SO ORDERED.
Reyes v. Mosqueda 187 SCRA 661

FACTS:
Dr. Emilio Pascual died intestate and without issue on November 18, 1972.
On December 3, 1973, the heirs of Dr. Pascual filed Special Proceedings No.
73-30-M in the then Court of First Instance of Pampanga for the
administration of his estate. On February 12, 1976, Ursula Pascual filed a
motion to exclude some properties from the inventory of Pascual's estate
and to deliver the titles thereto to her. Ursula alleged that Dr. Pascual during
his lifetime or on November 2, 1966 executed a "DONATION MORTIS
CAUSA" in her favor covering properties which are included in the estate of
Dr. Pascual (subject of Special Proceedings No. 73-30-M) and therefore
should be excluded from the inventory.  cdphil

On August 1, 1976; the trial court issued an order excluding from the
inventory of the estate the properties donated to Ursula.
The petitioners, however, claim that the donation mortis causa, being of later effect, must yield to a
deed of donation of real property inter vivos over the same subject properties made in favor of Ofelia D.
Parungao, a minor with her mother, Rosario Duncil, accepting the gift and donation for and in her behalf
in 1969. The petitioners argue that the “Donation Mortis Causa” was void as it did not comply with the
formalities of wills.

In the meantime, on September 23, 1976, Ursula Pascual executed a deed of

absolute sale over the Tondo property in favor of Benjamin, Oscar, Jose and
Emmanuel, all surnamed Reyes.
On May 2, 1978, Benjamin Reyes, private respondent in G. R. Nos. 73241-42
filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of Transfer Certificate of Title No.
129092, Register of Deeds of Manila and/or reconveyance of deed of title
against Ofelia Parungao and Rosario Duncil with the then Court of First
Instance of Manila. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 115164.
In their answer with compulsory counterclaim Parungao and Duncil
denied Reyes' assertion of ownership over the Tondo property. On
November 6, 1978, Ofelia Parungao filed a complaint for recovery of
possession over the Tondo property against Benjamin Reyes and his nephew
Oscar Reyes with the Court of First Instance of Manila.
The two cases were consolidated.
LOWER COURTS’ DECISION: TCT No. 129092 in the name of Ofelia PARUNGAO.
That the "Donation Mortis Causa" executed by Emilio Pascual in favor of his
sister Ursula Pascual was actually a Donation Inter Vivos.
ISSUES:
The issues raised in these petitions are two-fold:
(1) In G.R. No. L-45394, petitioner Pedro Dalusong questions the jurisdiction
of the probate court to exclude the properties donated to Ursula Pascual in
its Order dated August 1, 1976, and
(2) In G.R. No. L-45262 and G.R. Nos. 73241-42 Ruperto Reyes, Reynaldo C.
San Juan, in his capacity as special administrator of the estate of Emilio
Pascual (petitioner in G.R. No. L-45262), Ofelia Parungao and Rosario Duncil
(petitioners in G.R. Nos. 73241-42) question the appellate court's finding that
the "Donation Mortis Causa" executed by Emilio Pascual in favor of his sister
Ursula Pascual was actually a Donation Inter Vivos.
SC’s DECISION…

ISSUE ON JURISDICTION. The provisional character of the exclusion of the

contested properties in the inventory as stressed in the order is within the
jurisdiction of the probate court. This was stressed in the case of Cuizon  v.
Ramolete (129 SCRA 495 [1984]) which we cited in the case of Morales  v. Court
of First Instance of Cavite, Branch  V  (146 SCRA 373 [1986]):
"It is well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of
proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or
determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate
and which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. All
that the said court could do as regards said properties is to
determine whether they should or should not be included in the
inventory or list of properties to be administered by the
administrator.
2. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING THAT THE DEED ENTITLED “DONATION MORTIS
CAUSA” IS IN FACT A DONATION INTER VIVOS 

The subject deed of donation titled "DONATION MORTIS CAUSA" duly

notarized by a certain Cornelio M. Sigua states:
That the said DONOR, Dr. Emilio D. Pascual, for and in CONSIDERATION
OF THE LOVE AND AFFECTION which he has and bears unto the said
DONEE, as also for the PERSONAL SERVICES RENDERED by the said
DONEE to the said DONOR, does hereby by these presents voluntarily GIVE,
GRANT, and DONATE MORTIS CAUSA, unto the said DONEE URSULA D.
PASCUAL, her heirs and assigns
Considering the provisions of the DONATION MORTIS CAUSA the appellate
court ruled that the deed of donation was actually a donation inter vivos
although denominated as DONATION MORTIS CAUSA.
It is, now a settled rule that the title given to a deed of donation is not the
determinative factor which makes the donation "inter vivos" or "mortis
causa." This Court explained in Concepcion  v. Concepcion (91 Phil. 823 [1952])
—
". . . But, it is a rule consistently followed by the courts that it is the body of the
document of donation and the statements contained therein , and not the title
that should be considered in ascertaining the intention of the donor. Here, the
donation is entitled and called donacio onerosa mortis causa. From the body,
however, we find that the donation was of a nature remunerative rather than
onerous. It was for past services rendered, services which may not be considered as a
debt to be paid by the donee but services rendered to her freely and in goodwill. The
donation instead of being onerous or for a valuable consideration, as in payment of a
legal obligation, was more of remuneratory or compensatory nature, besides being
partly motivated by affection.
If a donation by its terms is inter vivos, this character is not altered by the fact that the
donor styles it mortis causa.

Applying the above principles to the instant petitions, there is no doubt that
the so-called DONATION MORTIS CAUSA is really a donation inter vivos. The
donation was executed by Dr. Pascual in favor of his sister Ursula Pascual
out of love and affection as well as a recognition of the personal
services rendered by the donee to the donor. The transfer of ownership
over the properties donated to the donee was immediate and independent
of the death of the donor. The provision as regards the reservation of
properties for the donor's subsistence in relation to the other provisions of
the deed of donation CONFIRMS THE INTENTION OF THE DONOR TO GIVE
NAKED OWNERSHIP OF THE PROPERTIES TO THE DONEE IMMEDIATELY
AFTER THE EXECUTION OF THE DEED OF DONATION.  LLpr

Cruz v. Court of Appeals 140 SCRA 245

 Donor has the burden to allege and establish the requirements prescribed by law for which the annulment or reduction of the
donation can be based. (Cruz v CA)
[G.R. No. L-58671. November 22, 1985.]

EDUVIGIS J. CRUZ,  petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET

AL.,  respondents.
FACTS:
In 1973, Eduvigis J. Cruz, a CHILDLESS WIDOW, donated a 235.5 sq.m.
residential lot in San Isidro, Taytay, Rizal together with the two-door
apartment created thereon to her grandnieces, private respondents herein
by virtue of a "Kasulatan Sa Kaloobpala". The property was accordingly
transferred to the names of private respondents.
In 1974, Eduvigis Cruz judicially adopted Cresencia Ocreto, a minor, after
which she extrajudicially tried to revoke the donation, but the donees
resisted, alleging that —
(a) the property in question was co-owned by Eduvigis Cruz and
her brother, the late Maximo Cruz, grandfather of the donees,
hence the latter own 1/2 of the property by inheritance; and
(b) Eduvigis Cruz owns another property, an agricultural land of
more than two hectares situated in Barrio Dolores, Taytay, Rizal,
hence the donation did not impair the presumptive legitime of the
adopted child.

In 1975, petitioner filed a complaint against the donees for revocation of

donation in the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Civil Case No. 21049), invoking
Article 760, paragraph 3 of the New Civil Code.
CFI revoked the donation.
CA reversed the decision, finding that ..
-Eduvigis Cruz owns another lot.
-The donated lot did not belong entirely to Eduvigis as 1/2 thereof
belonged to her brother Maximo Cruz
-donation would not impair the legitime of the adopted child.
- In an action for revocation of donation, the donor has the burden
to show that the donation has impaired the legitime of the
subsequent child; but in this case, EDUVIGIS DID NOT EVEN ALLEGE
IT IN HER COMPLAINT.

ISSUE: WON the decision correctly dismissed the complaint to annul the
subject donation.
RULING:
YES. Unfortunately, in the case at bar, the COMPLAINT for annulment does
not allege that the subject donation impairs the legitime of the adopted
child. Nor is there proof of impairment of legitime. On the contrary, there is
unrebutted evidence that the donor has another piece of land although
then subject to litigation.  LibLex

In the case of the subsequent adoption of a minor by one who had previously donated some or all of his
properties to another, the donor may sue for the annulment or reduction of the donation within four years
from the date of adoption, if the donation impairs the legitime of the adopted, taking into account the whole
estate of the donor at the time of the adoption of the child. (Civil Code, Articles 760, 761 and 763). Of course,
the burden of proof is on the plaintiff-donor, who must allege and establish the requirements prescribed by
law, on the basis of which annulment or reduction of the donation can be adjudged.

The legal situation of petitioner-donor, as plaintiff, is made worse by the factual finding of the Court of Appeals
that the grandfather of the donees was the owner  pro indiviso of one-half of the donated land, the effect of
which is to reduce the value of the donation which can then more easily be taken from the portion of the estate
within the free disposal of petitioner.

Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Court of Appeals 198 SCRA 300

 When the deed of donation expressly provides for automatic rescission and reversion of the property donated, the rules on
contract and the general rules on prescription should apply, not 764. (Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v CA)

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 77425. June 19, 1991.]

THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA, THE

ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF IMUS, and the SPOUSES
FLORENCIO IGNAO and SOLEDAD C.
IGNAO,  petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE ESTATE
OF DECEASED SPOUSES EUSEBIO DE CASTRO and MARTINA
RIETA, represented by MARINA RIETA GRANADOS and
THERESA RIETA TOLENTINO,  respondents.

[G.R. No. 77450. June 19, 1991.]

THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA, THE

ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF IMUS, and the SPOUSES
FLORENCIO IGNAO and SOLEDAD C.
IGNAO,  petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE ESTATE
OF DECEASED SPOUSES EUSEBIO DE CASTRO and MARTINA
 RIETA, represented by MARINA RIETA GRANADOS and
THERESA RIETA TOLENTINO,  respondents.

Severino C. Dominguez for petitioner Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus, Cavite.

Dolorfino and Dominguez Law Offices for Sps. Ignao.
Joselito R. Enriquez for private respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; DEED OF DONATION; WHEN CONTENTS THEREOF PROVIDE FOR

AUTOMATIC REVERSION OF PROPERTY DONATED IN CASE OF VIOLATION OF
CONDITIONS SET FORTH THEREIN, JUDICIAL ACTION FOR RESCISSION, NOT
NECESSARY. — The deed of donation involved herein expressly provides for
automatic reversion of the property donated in case of violation of the
condition therein, hence a judicial declaration revoking the same is not
necessary. As aptly stated by the Court of Appeals: "By the very express
provision in the deed of donation itself that the violation of the condition
thereof would render ipso facto null and void the deed of donation, WE are of
the opinion that there would be no legal necessity anymore to have the
donation judicially declared null and void for the reason that the very deed of
donation itself declares it so. For where (sic) it otherwise and that the donors
and the donee contemplated a court action during the execution of the deed
of donation to have the donation judicially rescinded or declared null and
void should the condition be violated, then the phrase reading 'would render
ipso facto null and void' would not appear in the deed of donation." In support
of its aforesaid position, respondent court relied on the rule that a judicial
action for rescission of a contract is not necessary where the contract
provides that it may be revoked and cancelled for violation of any of its terms
and conditions. It called attention to the holding that there is nothing in the
law that prohibits the parties from entering into an agreement that a
violation of the terms of the contract would cause its cancellation even
without court intervention, and that it is not always necessary for the injured
party to resort to court for rescission of the contract. It reiterated the
doctrine that a judicial action is proper only when there is absence of a
special provision granting the power of cancellation.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; DE LUNA, ET AL., v. ABRIGO, ET AL. [181 SCRA 150], APPLICABLE
IN CASE AT BAR; RATIONALE FOR THE RULE. — The validity of such a
stipulation in the deed of donation providing for the automatic reversion of
the donated property to the donor upon non-compliance of the condition
was upheld in the recent case of De Luna, et al. vs. Abrigo, et al., 181 SCRA 150
(1990). It was held therein that said stipulation is in the nature of an
agreement granting a party the right to rescind a contract unilaterally in case
of breach, without need of going to court, and that, upon the happening of
the resolutory condition or non-compliance with the conditions of the
contract, the donation is automatically revoked without need of a judicial
declaration to that effect. While what was the subject of that case was an
onerous donation which, under Article 733 of the Civil Code is governed by
the rules on contracts, since the donation in the case at bar is also subject to
the same rules because of its provision on automatic revocation upon the
violation of a resolutory condition, from parity of reasons said
pronouncements in De Luna pertinently apply. The rationale for the foregoing
is that in contracts providing for automatic revocation, judicial intervention is
necessary not for purposes of obtaining a judicial declaration rescinding a
contract already deemed rescinded by virtue of an agreement providing for
rescission even without judicial intervention, but in order to determine
whether or not the rescission was proper.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; GENERAL RULES ON CONTRACT AND PRESCRIPTION SHOULD
APPLY, NOT ART. 764 OF THE CODE. — When a deed of donation, as in this
case, expressly provides for automatic revocation and reversion of the
property donated, the rules on contract and the general rules on prescription
should apply, and not Article 764 of the Civil Code. Since Article 1306 of said
Code authorizes the parties to a contract to establish such stipulations,
clauses, terms and conditions not contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order or public policy, we are of the opinion that, at the very least, that
stipulation of the parties providing for automatic revocation of the deed of
donation, without prior judicial action for that purpose, is valid subject to the
determination of the propriety of the rescission sought. Where such
propriety is sustained, the decision of the court will be merely declaratory of
the revocation, but it is not in itself the revocatory act.
4. ID.; ID.; PROHIBITION AGAINST ALIENATION FOR AN UNREASONABLE
LENGTH OF TIME; CONTRARY TO PUBLIC POLICY. — The cause of action of
private respondents is based on the alleged breach by petitioners of the
resolutory condition in the deed of donation that the property donated
should not be sold within a period of one hundred (100) years from the date
of execution of the deed of donation. Said condition, in our opinion,
constitutes an undue restriction on the rights arising from ownership of
petitioners and is, therefore, contrary to public policy. Donation, as a mode
of acquiring ownership, results in an effective transfer of title over the
property from the donor to the donee. Once a donation is accepted, the
donee becomes the absolute owner of the property donated. Although the
donor may impose certain conditions in the deed of donation, the same
must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order and public
policy. The condition imposed in the deed of donation in the case before us
constitutes a patently unreasonable and undue restriction on the right of the
donee to dispose of the property donated, which right is an indispensable
attribute of ownership. Such a prohibition against alienation, in order to be
valid, must not be perpetual or for an unreasonable period of time.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; SHOULD BE DECLARED NULL AND VOID AS AN IMPOSSIBLE
CONDITION. — It is significant that the provisions therein regarding a
testator also necessarily involve, in the main, the devolution of property by
gratuitous title hence, as is generally the case of donations, being an act of
liberality, the imposition of an unreasonable period of prohibition to alienate
the property should be deemed anathema to the basic and actual intent of
either the donor or testator. For that reason, the regulatory arm of the law is
or must be interposed to prevent an unreasonable departure from the
normative policy expressed in the aforesaid Articles 494 and 870 of the Code.
In the case at bar, we hold that the prohibition in the deed of donation
against the alienation of the property for an entire century, being an
unreasonable emasculation and denial of an integral attribute of ownership,
should be declared as an illegal or impossible condition within the
contemplation of Article 727 of the Civil Code. Consequently, as specifically
stated in said statutory provision, such condition shall be considered as not
imposed. No reliance may accordingly be placed on said prohibitory
paragraph in the deed of donation. The net result is that, absent said
proscription, the deed of sale supposedly constitutive of the cause of action
for the nullification of the deed of donation is not in truth violative of the
latter hence, for lack of cause of action, the case for private respondents
must fail.
6. SUPREME COURT; HAS AUTHORITY TO REVIEW MATTERS EVEN IF THEY ARE
NOT ASSIGNED AS ERRORS ON APPEAL; CASE AT BAR. — It will readily be
noted that the provision in the deed of donation against alienation of the
land for one hundred (100) years was the very basis for the action to nullify
the deed of donation. At the same time, it was likewise the controverted
fundament of the motion to dismiss the case a quo, which motion was
sustained by the trial court and set aside by respondent court, both on the
issue of prescription. That ruling of respondent court interpreting said
provision was assigned as an error in the present petition. While the issue of
the validity of the same provision was not squarely raised, it is ineluctably
related to petitioner's aforesaid assignment of error since both issues are
grounded on and refer to the very same provision. This Court is clothed with
ample authority to review matters, even if they are not assigned as errors on
appeal, if it finds that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just
decision of the case. Thus, we have held that an unassigned error closely
related to an error properly assigned, or upon which the determination of
the question properly assigned is dependent, will be considered by the
appellate court notwithstanding the failure to assign it as error.
7. ID.; ID.; FOR THE EXPEDITIOUS ADMINISTRATION OF SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE,
REMAND OF THE CASE TO THE LOWER COURT FOR FURTHER RECEPTION OF
EVIDENCE, NOT NECESSARY. — We have laid down the rule that the remand
of the case to the lower court for further reception of evidence is not
necessary where the Court is in a position to resolve the dispute based on
the records before it. On many occasions, the Court, in the public interest
and for the expeditious administration of justice has resolved actions on the
merits instead of remanding them to the trial court for further proceedings,
such as where the ends of justice, would not be subserved by the remand of
the case. The aforestated considerations obtain in and apply to the present
case with respect to the matter of the validity of the resolutory condition in
question.
 
 DECISION

REGALADO, J  :p

These two petitions for review on certiorari 1 seek to overturn the decision of

the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 05456 2 which reversed and set aside
the order of the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite dismissing Civil Case No.
095-84, as well as the order of said respondent court denying petitioner's
motions for the reconsideration of its aforesaid decision.
On November 29, 1984, private respondents as plaintiffs, filed a complaint
for nullification of deed of donation, rescission of contract and reconveyance
of real property with damages against petitioners Florencio and Soledad C.
Ignao and the Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus, Cavite, together with the
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch XX, Imus, Cavite and which was docketed as Civil Case No. 095-84
therein. 3
In their complaint, private respondents alleged that on August 23, 1930, the
spouses Eusebio de Castro and Martina Rieta, now both deceased, executed
a deed of donation in favor of therein defendant Roman Catholic Archbishop
of Manila covering a parcel of land (Lot No. 626, Cadastral Survey of Kawit),
located at Kawit, Cavite, containing an area of 964 square meters, more or
less. The deed of donation allegedly provides that the donee shall not
dispose or sell the property within a period of one hundred (100) years from
the execution of the deed of donation, otherwise a violation of such
condition would render ipso facto null and void the deed of donation and the
property would revert to the estate of the donors.
It is further alleged that on or about June 30, 1980, and while still within the
prohibitive period to dispose of the property, petitioner Roman Catholic
Bishop of Imus, in whose administration all properties within the province of
Cavite owned by the Archdiocese of Manila was allegedly transferred on April
26, 1962, executed a deed of absolute sale of the property subject of the
donation in favor of petitioners Florencio and Soledad C. Ignao in
consideration of the sum of P114,000.00. As a consequence of the sale,
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 115990 was issued by the Register of Deeds
of Cavite on November 15, 1980 in the name of said petitioner spouses.
What transpired thereafter is narrated by respondent court in its assailed
decision. 4 On December 17, 1984, petitioners Florencio Ignao and Soledad C.
Ignao filed a motion to dismiss based on the grounds that (1) herein private
respondents, as plaintiffs therein, have no legal capacity to sue; and (2) the
complaint states no cause of action.
On December 19, 1984, petitioner Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus also filed a
motion to dismiss on three (3) grounds, the first two (2) grounds of which
were identical to that of the motion to dismiss filed by the Ignao spouses,
and the third ground being that the cause of action has prescribed.
On January 9, 1985, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila likewise filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground that he is not a real party in interest and,
therefore, the complaint does not state a cause of action against him.
After private respondents had filed their oppositions to the said motions to
dismiss and the petitioners had countered with their respective replies, with
rejoinders thereto by private respondents, the trial court issued an order
dated January 31, 1985, dismissing the complaint on the ground that the
cause of action has prescribed. 5
Private respondents thereafter appealed to the Court of Appeals raising the
issues on (a) whether or not the action for rescission of contracts (deed of
donation and deed of sale) has prescribed; and (b) whether or not the
dismissal of the action for rescission of contracts (deed of donation and deed
of sale) on the ground of prescription carries with it the dismissal of the main
action for reconveyance of real property. 6
On December 23, 1986, respondent Court of Appeals, holding that the action
has not yet prescribed, rendered a decision in favor of private respondents,
with the following dispositive portion: Cdpr

"WHEREFORE, the Order of January 31, 1985 dismissing appellants'

complaint is SET ASIDE and Civil Case No. 095-84 is hereby ordered
REINSTATED and REMANDED to the lower court for further
proceedings. No costs." 7
Petitioners Ignao and the Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus then filed their
separate motions for reconsideration which were denied by respondent
Court of Appeals in its resolution dated February 6, 1987, 8 a hence, the filing
of these appeals by certiorari.
It is the contention of petitioners that the cause of action of herein private
respondents has already prescribed, invoking Article 764 of the Civil Code
which provides that "(t)he donation shall be revoked at the instance of the
donor, when the donee fails to comply with any of the conditions which the
former imposed upon the latter," and that "(t)his action shall prescribe after
four years from the non-compliance with the condition, may be transmitted
to the heirs of the donor, and may be exercised against the donee's heirs."
We do not agree.
Although it is true that under Article 764 of the Civil Code an action for the
revocation of a donation must be brought within four (4) years from the non-
compliance of the conditions of the donation, the same is not applicable in
the case at bar. The deed of donation involved herein expressly provides for
automatic reversion of the property donated in case of violation of the
condition therein, hence a judicial declaration revoking the same is not
necessary. As aptly stated by the Court of Appeals:
"By the very express provision in the deed of donation itself that the
violation of the condition thereof would render ipso facto null and
void the deed of donation, WE are of the opinion that there would be
no legal necessity anymore to have the donation judicially declared
null and void for the reason that the very deed of donation itself
declares it so. For where (sic) it otherwise and that the donors and
the donee contemplated a court action during the execution of the
deed of donation to have the donation judicially rescinded or
declared null and void should the condition be violated, then the
phrase reading 'would render ipso facto null and void' would not
appear in the deed of donation." 9

In support of its aforesaid position, respondent court relied on the rule that a
judicial action for rescission of a contract is not necessary where the contract
provides that it may be revoked and cancelled for violation of any of its terms
and conditions. 10 It called attention to the holding that there is nothing in
the law that prohibits the parties from entering into an agreement that a
violation of the terms of the contract would cause its cancellation even
without court intervention, and that it is not always necessary for the injured
party to resort to court for rescission of the contract. 11 It reiterated the
doctrine that a judicial action is proper only when there is absence of a
special provision granting the power of cancellation. 12
It is true that the aforesaid rules were applied to the contracts involved
therein, but we see no reason why the same should not apply to the
donation in the present case. Article 732 of the Civil Code provides that
donations inter vivos shall be governed by the general provisions on contracts
and obligations in all that is not determined in Title III, Book III on donations.
Now, said Title III does not have an explicit provision on the matter of a
donation with a resolutory condition and which is subject to an express
provision that the same shall be considered ipso facto revoked upon the
breach of said resolutory condition imposed in the deed therefor, as is the
case of the deed presently in question. The suppletory application of the
foregoing doctrinal rulings to the present controversy is consequently
justified.
The validity of such a stipulation in the deed of donation providing for the
automatic reversion of the donated property to the donor upon non-
compliance of the condition was upheld in the recent case of De Luna, et al.
vs. Abrigo, et al.  13 It was held therein that said stipulation is in the nature of
an agreement granting a party the right to rescind a contract unilaterally m
case of breach, without need of going to court, and that, upon the happening
of the resolutory condition or non-compliance with the conditions of the
contract, the donation is automatically revoked without need of a judicial
declaration to that effect. While what was the subject of that case was an
onerous donation which, under Article 733 of the Civil Code is governed by
the rules on contracts, since the donation in the case at bar is also subject to
the same rules because of its provision on automatic revocation upon the
violation of a resolutory condition, from parity of reasons said
pronouncements in De Luna pertinently apply.  prcd

The rationale for the foregoing is that in contracts providing for automatic
revocation, judical intervention is necessary not for purposes of obtaining a
judicial declaration rescinding a contract already deemed rescinded by virtue
of an agreement providing for rescission even without judicial intervention,
but in order to determine whether or not the rescission was proper. 14
When a deed of donation, as in this case, expressly provides for automatic
revocation and reversion of the property donated, the rules on contract and
the general rules on prescription should apply, and not Article 764 of the Civil
Code. Since Article 1306 of said Code authorizes the parties to a contract to
establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions not contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order or public policy, we are of the opinion
that, at the very least, that stipulation of the parties providing for automatic
revocation of the deed of donation, without prior judicial action for that
purpose, is valid subject to the determination of the propriety of the
rescission sought. Where such propriety is sustained, the decision of the
court will be merely declaratory of the revocation, but it is not in itself the
revocatory act.
 
On the foregoing ratiocinations, the Court of Appeals committed no error in
holding that the cause of action of herein private respondents has not yet
prescribed since an action to enforce a written contract prescribes in ten (10)
years. 15 It is our view that Article 764 was intended to provide a judicial
remedy in case of non-fulfillment or contravention of conditions specified in
the deed of donation if and when the parties have not agreed on the
automatic revocation of such donation upon the occurrence of the
contingency contemplated therein. That is not the situation in the case at
bar.
Nonetheless, we find that although the action filed by private respondents
may not be dismissed by reason of prescription, the same should be
dismissed on the ground that private respondents have no cause of action
against petitioners.
The cause of action of private respondents is based on the alleged breach by
petitioners of the resolutory condition in the deed of donation that the
property donated should not be sold within a period of one hundred (100)
years from the date of execution of the deed of donation. Said condition, in
our opinion, constitutes an undue restriction on the rights arising from
ownership of petitioners and is, therefore, contrary to public policy.
Donation, as a mode of acquiring ownership, results in an effective transfer
of title over the property from the donor to the donee. Once a donation is
accepted, the donee becomes the absolute owner of the property donated.
Although the donor may impose certain conditions in the deed of donation,
the same must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order
and public policy. The condition imposed in the deed of donation in the case
before us constitutes a patently unreasonable and undue restriction on the
right of the donee to dispose of the property donated, which right is an
indispensable attribute of ownership. Such a prohibition against alienation,
in order to be valid, must not be perpetual or for an unreasonable period of
time.
Certain provisions of the Civil Code illustrative of the aforesaid policy may be
considered applicable by analogy. Under the third paragraph of Article 494, a
donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which shall not exceed
twenty (20) years. Article 870, on its part, declares that the dispositions of the
testator declaring all or part of the estate inalienable for more than twenty
(20) years are void. LLphil

It is significant that the provisions therein regarding a testator also

necessarily involve, in the main, the devolution of property by gratuitous title
hence, as is generally the case of donations, being an act of liberality, the
imposition of an unreasonable period of prohibition to alienate the property
should be deemed anathema to the basic and actual intent of either the
donor or testator. For that reason, the regulatory arm of the law is or must
be interposed to prevent an unreasonable departure from the normative
policy expressed in the aforesaid Articles 494 and 870 of the Code.
In the case at bar, we hold that the prohibition in the deed of donation
against the alienation of the property for an entire century, being an
unreasonable emasculation and denial of an integral attribute of ownership,
should be declared as an illegal or impossible condition within the
contemplation of Article 727 of the Civil Code. Consequently, as specifically
stated in said statutory provision, such condition shall be considered as not
imposed. No reliance may accordingly be placed on said prohibitory
paragraph in the deed of donation. The net result is that, absent said
proscription, the deed of sale supposedly constitutive of the cause of action
for the nullification of the deed of donation is not in truth violative of the
latter hence, for lack of cause of action, the case for private respondents
must fail.
It may be argued that the validity of such prohibitory provision in the deed of
donation was not specifically put in issue in the pleadings of the parties. That
may be true, but such oversight or inaction does not prevent this Court from
passing upon and resolving the same.
It will readily be noted that the provision in the deed of donation against
alienation of the land for one hundred (100) years was the very basis for the
action to nullify the deed of donation. At the same time, it was likewise the
controverted fundament of the motion to dismiss the case a quo, which
motion was sustained by the trial court and set aside by respondent court,
both on the issue of prescription. That ruling of respondent court
interpreting said provision was assigned as an error in the present petition.
While the issue of the validity of the same provision was not squarely raised,
it is ineluctably related to petitioner's aforesaid assignment of error since
both issues are grounded on and refer to the very same provision.  cdphil

This Court is clothed with ample authority to review matters, even if they are
not assigned as errors on appeal, if it finds that their consideration is
necessary in arriving at a just decision of the case. 16 Thus, we have held that
an unassigned error closely related to an error properly assigned, 17 or upon
which the determination of the question properly assigned is dependent, will
be considered by the appellate court notwithstanding the failure to assign it
as error. 18
Additionally, we have laid down the rule that the remand of the case to the
lower court for further reception of evidence is not necessary where the
Court is in a position to resolve the dispute based on the records before it.
On many occasions, the Court, in the public interest and for the expeditious
administration of justice, has resolved actions on the merits instead of
remanding them to the trial court for further proceedings, such as where the
ends of justice, would not be subserved by the remand of the case. 19 The
aforestated considerations obtain in and apply to the present case with
respect to the matter of the validity of the resolutory condition in question.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of respondent court is SET ASIDE and another
judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING Civil Case No. 095-84 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch XX, Imus, Cavite.
SO ORDERED.
Eduarte v. Court of Appeals 253 SCRA 391

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 105944. February 9, 1996.]

SPOUSES ROMULO AND SALLY EDUARTE,  petitioners, vs. THE

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEDRO CALAPINE
(substituted by ALEXANDER CALAPINE and ARTEMIS
CALAPINE),  respondents.

Makalintal Barot Torres & Ibarra  for petitioners.

Roberto E.  Gomez  for private respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS; DONATION;

REVOCATION; ALL CRIMES WHICH OFFEND THE DONOR SHOW INGRATITUDE
AND CAUSES REVOCATION. — As noted in Tolentino's Commentaries and
Jurisprudence on the Civil Code on paragraph (1) of Article 765 "all crimes
which offend the donor show ingratitude and are causes for revocation."
Petitioners' attempt to categorize the offenses according to their
classification under the Revised Penal Code is therefore unwarranted
considering that illegal detention, threats and coercion are considered as
crimes against the person of the donor despite the fact that they are
classified as crimes against personal liberty and security under the Revised
Penal Code.
2. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY; TESTIMONY
OF NBI HANDWRITING EXPERT GIVEN MORE WEIGHT AND CREDENCE THAN
THE TESTIMONY OF EXPERT FROM THE PC CRIME LABORATORY WHERE THE
FORMER WAS COMPLETE, THOROUGH AND SCIENTIFIC. — Respondent Court
of Appeals and the trial court cannot be faulted for giving more weight and
credence to the testimony of the NBI handwriting expert considering that the
examination of the said witness proved to be complete, thorough and
scientific. Confronted with contradicting testimonies from two handwriting
experts, the trial court and respondent Court of Appeals were convinced by
the opinion of the NBI handwriting expert as it was more exhaustive, in
contrast with the testimony of petitioners' witness from the PCCL which was
discarded on account of the several flaws. At the same time, petitioners'
witness failed to rebut the convincing testimony of the NBI handwriting
expert presented by private respondents. We therefore find no reason to
deviate from the assailed conclusions as the same are amply supported by
the evidence on record.
3. CIVIL LAW; LAND TITLES AND DEED; TORRENS SYSTEM OF LAND
REGISTRATION; POSSESSION CANNOT DEFEAT TITLE. — The rule is well-
settled that mere possession cannot defeat the title of a holder of a
registered torrens title to real property. Moreover, reliance on the doctrine
that a forged deed can legally be the root of a valid title is squarely in point in
this case.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.;  CASE AT BAR. — When herein petitioner purchased the
subject property from Helen Doria, the same was already covered by TCT No.
T-23205 under the latter's name. And although Helen Doria's title was
fraudulently secured, such fact cannot prejudice the rights of herein
petitioners absent any showing that they had any knowledge or participation
in such irregularity. Thus, they cannot be obliged to look beyond the
certificate of title which appeared to be valid on its face and sans any
annotation or notice of private respondents' adverse claim.
5. ID.; OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS; SALE; PURCHASER DEEMED IN
GOOD FAITH WHERE DISPUTED PROPERTY WAS BOUGHT WITHOUT NOTICE
THAT SOME OTHER PERSON HAS A RIGHT OR INTEREST IN SUCH PROPERTY.
— Contrary therefore to the conclusion of respondent Court, petitioners are
purchasers in good faith and for value as they bought the disputed property
without notice that some other person has a right or interest in such
property, and paid a full price for the same at the time of the purchase or
before they had notice of the claim or interest of some other person in the
property.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; INNOCENT PURCHASER FOR VALUE MUST BE RESPECTED
AND PROTECTED DESPITE FRAUD EMPLOYED BY THE SELLER IN SECURING
HIS TITLE. — Respondent Court therefore committed a reversible error when
it affirmed the ruling of the trial court annulling and setting aside the deed of
absolute sale dated March 25, 1988 between petitioners and Helen Doria, as
well as the Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-27434 issued under petitioners'
name, the established rule being that the rights of an innocent purchaser for
value must be respected and protected notwithstanding the fraud employed
by the seller in securing his title. 
RHLY

7. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; ACTION FOR DAMAGES AGAINST THE

TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES, PROPER REMEDY OF TRUE OWNER OF
PROPERTY FRAUDULENTLY DISPOSSESSED OF THE SAME. — In this regard, it
has been held that the proper recourse of the true owner of the property
who was prejudiced and fraudulently dispossessed of the same is to bring an
action for damages against those who caused or employed the fraud, and if
the latter are insolvent, an action against the Treasurer of the Philippines
may be filed for recovery of damages against the Assurance Fund.
8. ID.; ID.;  APPEALS; PERSON WHO FRAUDULENTLY ACQUIRED TITLE
OVER DISPUTED PROPERTY ADJUDGED LIABLE FOR DAMAGES TO TRUE
OWNERS. — Conformably with the foregoing, having established beyond
doubt that Helen Doria fraudulently secured her title over the disputed
property which she subsequently sold to petitioners, Helen Doria should
instead be adjudged liable to private respondents, and not to petitioners as
declared by the trial court and respondent Court of Appeals, for the resulting
damages to the true owner and original plaintiff, Pedro Calapine.

DECISION

FRANCISCO,  J  :
p

A donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes

gratuitously of a thing or right in favor of another, who accepts it. 1 On the
part of the donor, it is an exercise of one's generosity. However, on several
occasions, instead of being accorded recognition and appreciation for this
act of beneficence, the donor ends up as a victim of greed and ingratitude.
This was the fate that befell Pedro Calapine (herein original plaintiff)
constraining him to cause the revocation of the donation that he made to his
niece in 1984. The instant petition for  certiorari is interposed by the spouses
Romulo and Sally Eduarte, assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 29175 which affirmed the revocation of the donation made by
Pedro Calapine to his niece, Helen Doria, and at the same time declared
petitioners as purchasers in bad faith of the property donated.
As set out in the appealed decision, the undisputed facts are as follows:
"Pedro Calapine was the registered owner of a parcel of land
located in San Cristobal, San Pablo City, with an area of 12,199
square meters, as evidenced by Original Certificate of Title No. P-
2129 (Exhibits A and 1). On April 26, 1984, he executed a deed
entitled 'Pagbibigay-Pala (Donacion Inter-Vivos)' ceding one-half
portion thereof to his niece Helen S. Doria (Exhibit B).
"On July 26, 1984, another deed identically entitled was
purportedly executed by Pedro Calapine ceding unto Helen S. Doria
the whole of the parcel of land covered by OCT No. P-2129 (Exhibits C
and D), on the basis of which said original certificate was cancelled
and in lieu thereof Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-23205 was
issued in her name (Exhibits G and 2).
"On February 26, 1986, Helen S. Doria donated a portion of
157 square meters of the parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-23205
to the Calauan Christian Reformed Church, Inc. (Exhibit H), on the
basis of which said transfer certificate of title was cancelled and
TCT No. T-24444 was issued in its name covering 157 square meters
(Exhibit 2-A) and TCT No. T-24445, in the name of Helen S. Doria
covering the remaining portion of 12,042 square meters (Exhibit 3).
"On March 25, 1988, Helen S. Doria sold, transferred and
conveyed unto the spouses Romulo and Sally Eduarte the parcel of
land covered by TCT No. T-24445, save the portion of 700 square
meters on which the vendor's house had been erected (Exhibits 1
and 3-F), on the basis of which TCT No. 24445 was cancelled and in
lieu thereof TCT No. T-27434, issued in the name of the vendees
(Exhibit 4).
"Claiming that his signature to the deed of donation (Exhibits C
and D) was a forgery and that she was unworthy of his liberality,
Pedro Calapine brought suit against Helen S. Doria, the Calauan
Christian Reformed Church, Inc. and the spouses Romulo and Sally
Eduarte to revoke the donation made in favor of Helen S. Doria
(Exhibit B), to declare null and void the deeds of donation and sale
that she had executed in favor of the Calauan Christian Reformed
Church, Inc. and the spouses Romulo and Sally Eduarte (Exhibits H, l
and 3-F) and to cancel TCT Nos. T-24444, 24445 and T-27434.
"Answering the complaint, the defendants spouses denied
knowledge of the first deed of donation and alleged that after a part
of the property was donated to the defendant Calauan Christian
Reformed Church, Inc., the remaining portion thereof was sold to
them by the defendant Helen S. Doria; and that the plaintiff's
purported signature in the second deed of donation was his own,
hence genuine. They prayed that the complaint against them be
dismissed; that upon their counterclaim, the plaintiff be ordered to
pay them moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees; and
that upon their cross-claim the defendant Helen S. Doria be ordered
to reimburse them the purchase price of P110,000 and to pay them
moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees (pp. 23-31, rec.).
"The defendant Calauan Christian Reformed Church, Inc.
manifested in its answer the willingness to reconvey to the plaintiff
that part of the property donated to it by Helen S. Doria (pp. 36-38,
rec.). And having executed the corresponding deed of reconveyance,
the case as against it was dismissed (pp. 81-83; 84, rec.).
"The defendants Helen S. Doria and the City Assessor and the
Registrar of Deeds of San Pablo City did not file answers to the
plaintiff's complaint.
"After the plaintiff's death on August 27, 1989, on motion, he
was substituted by his nephews Alexander and Artemis Calapine
upon order of the Court (pp. 147-152; 250, rec.).
 "After trial, the Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region,
Branch 30, San Pablo City rendered judgment, the dispositive part of
which provides:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered by the Court in the instant case in favor of plaintiff
and against defendant Eduartes to wit:
1. DECLARING as it is hereby declared, the revocation of
the Deed of Donation dated April 26, 1984;
2. ANNULLING, voiding, setting aside and declaring
of no force and effect the Deed of Donation dated July 26,
1984, the deed of absolute sale executed on March 25, 1988
by and between spouses Eduartes and Helen Doria, and the
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-27434 issued under the
name of spouses Romulo and Sally Eduarte;
3. ORDERING the office of the Register of Deeds, San
Pablo City, to cancel TCT No. T-27434 or any other adverse title
emanating from OCT No. P-2129 and in lieu thereof, to issue a
new transfer certificate of title covering the subject property
under the names of the substitute-plaintiffs Alexander and
Artemis both surnamed Calapine, after payment of the
corresponding fees and taxes therefor; and
4. ORDERING defendant Helen Doria to pay substitute-
plaintiffs the sum of P20,000.00 as and for attorney's fees.
Judgment on the cross-claim of defendant Eduartes
against Helen Doria is further rendered by ordering the latter
to pay the former the sum of P110,000.00 with legal interest
thereon starting from March 25, 1988 until full payment, and
the further sum of P20,000.00 as and for attorney's fees.
The counterclaim of defendant Eduartes against plaintiff
is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
Costs against defendant Helen Doria in both the
complaint and the cross-claim (pp. 11-12, decision, pp. 264-
265, rec.).
"Only the defendants Eduarte spouses took an appeal (p. 266,
rec.), claiming that the trial court erred —
 1. In annulling, voiding, setting aside, and declaring of no force
and effect —
(a) the deed of donation (Exhibit C and 1-A), dated July
26, 1984;
(b) the deed of absolute sale (Exhibit 1 and 3-E)
executed on March 25, 1988 by and between
Spouses Eduartes and Helen Doria;
(c) TCT No. T-27434 (Exhibit 4) issued in the name of
spouses Romulo Eduarte and Sally Eduarte; and
in revoking the deed of donation (Exhibit B) dated April 26,
1984;
2. In declaring the appellants Eduartes buyers in bad faith;
3. In not finding the plaintiffs guilty of estoppel by silence
and/or guilty of suppression of evidence instead of
finding the appellants Eduartes guilty of suppression of
evidence; and
4. In finding that the signature of Pedro Calapine in the deed
of donation (Exhibits C and 1-A) dated July 26, 1984 a
forgery based on the opposite findings of the
handwriting experts presented by each party and in the
absence of the testimony of Pedro Calapine who was
then still alive (pp. 1-2, appellants' brief.)" 2

In its decision dated April 22, 1992, 3 respondent Court of Appeals

dismissed petitioners' appeal and affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Respondent court was in complete accord with the trial court in giving more
credence to the testimony of private respondents' expert witness, NBI
document examiner Bienvenido Albacea, who found Pedro Calapine's
signature in the second deed of donation to be a forgery. It also ruled that by
falsifying Pedro Calapine's signature, Helen Doria committed an act of
ingratitude which is a valid ground for revocation of the donation made in
her favor in accordance with Article 765 of the Civil Code. Furthermore,
respondent court upheld the trial court's finding that petitioners are not
buyers in good faith of the donated property as they failed to exercise due
diligence in verifying the true ownership of the property despite the
existence of circumstances that should have aroused their suspicions.  cdll

Petitioners are now before us taking exception to the foregoing

findings of respondent Court of Appeals and contending that the same are
not in accord with the law and evidence on record.
Anent the revocation of the first deed of donation, petitioners submit
that paragraph (1) of Article 765 of the Civil Code does not apply in this case
because the acts of ingratitude referred to therein pertain to offenses
committed by the donee against the person or property of the donor.
Petitioners argue that as the offense imputed to herein donee Helen Doria —
falsification of a public document — is neither a crime against the person nor
property of the donor but is a crime against public interest under the Revised
Penal Code, the same is not a ground for revocation.
In support of this contention, petitioners cite the following portions
found in Tolentino's Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code:
"Offense against Donor — . . . . The crimes against the person
of the donor would include not only homicide and physical injuries,
but also illegal detention, threats and coercion; and those against
honor include offenses against chastity and those against the
property, include robbery, theft, usurpation, swindling, arson,
damages, etc. (5 Manresa 175-176)." 4

This assertion, however, deserves scant consideration. The full text of

the very same commentary cited by petitioners belies their claim that
falsification of the deed of donation is not an act of ingratitude, to wit:
"Offense Against Donor. —  All crimes which offend the donor
show ingratitude and are causes for revocation.  There is no doubt,
therefore, that the donee who commits adultery with the wife of the
donor, gives cause for revocation by reason of ingratitude. The
crimes against the person of the donor would include not only
homicide and physical injuries, but also illegal detention, threats, and
coercion; those against honor include offenses against chastity; and
those against the property, include robbery, theft, usurpation,
swindling, arson, damages, etc. [Manresa 175-176]." 5 (Emphasis
supplied).
 Obviously, the first sentence was deleted by petitioners because it
totally controverts their contention. As noted in the aforecited opinion "all
crimes which offend the donor show ingratitude and are causes for
revocation." Petitioners' attempt to categorize the offenses according to their
classification under the Revised Penal Code is therefore unwarranted
considering that illegal detention, threats and coercion are considered as
crimes against the person of the donor despite the fact that they are
classified as crimes against personal liberty and security under the Revised
Penal Code. 6
Petitioners also impute grave error to respondent Court of Appeals in
finding that the second deed of donation dated July 26, 1984 was falsified.
Petitioners deplore the fact that more credence was given to the testimony
of the NBI handwriting expert who found Pedro Calapine's signature in the
second deed of donation to be a forgery despite the existence of
controverting testimony by PC-INP Crime Laboratory (PCCL) Chief Document
Examiner which petitioners adduced as evidence on their part.
We are not persuaded. Respondent Court of Appeals and the trial court
cannot be faulted for giving more weight and credence to the testimony of
the NBI handwriting expert considering that the examination of the said
witness proved to be complete, thorough and scientific.
In gauging the relative weight to be given to the opinion of handwriting
experts, we adhere to the following standards:
"We have held that the value of the opinion of a handwriting
expert depends not upon his mere statements of whether a writing
is genuine or false, but upon the assistance he may afford in pointing
out distinguishing marks, characteristics and discrepancies in and
between genuine and false specimens of writing which would
ordinarily escape notice or detection from an unpracticed observer.
The test of genuineness ought to be the resemblance, not the
formation of letters in some other specimens but to the general
character of writing, which is impressed on it as the involuntary and
unconscious result of constitution, habit or other permanent course,
and is, therefore itself permanent." 7

Confronted with contradicting testimonies from two handwriting

experts, the trial court and respondent Court of Appeals were convinced by
the opinion of the NBI handwriting expert as it was more exhaustive, in
contrast with the testimony of petitioners' witness from the PCCL which was
discarded on account of the following flaws:
"The Court is not convinced with Cruz's explanations. Apart
from the visual inconsistencies, i.e., the strokes with which some
letters were made, the variety in the sizes of the letters, the depth,
the difference in the slant which the Court itself observed in its own
examination of both the questioned signatures and those standard
specimen signatures, there is evidence showing that Cruz did not
make a thorough examination of all the signatures involved in this
particular issue. Thus even in the report submitted by the PCCL it
was admitted that they omitted or overlooked the examination of at
least three (3) standard specimen signatures of Pedro Calapine which
were previously subject of the NBI examination marked as Exhibits S-
9, S-10 and S-11. When questioned regarding this oversight, Cruz
testified that in his opinion, the inclusion or non-inclusion of said
exhibits in their examination will not affect the same and they would
have arrived at the same conclusion anyway. Again, when asked why
they did not bother to have the original copies of the documents
being questioned (Exhs. Q-1 through Q-3) for their examination, Cruz
replied that they are using a special film so it will not matter whether
the documents being examined are the original or a mere photocopy
(TSN 8, 10, 12 and 26, Hearing of Nov. 23, 1989).
"The Court will not attempt to make its own conclusion or
resolution on such a technical issue as the matter at hand in the light
of the cavalier attitude of Cruz. In fine, between the examinations
made by the two witnesses, that of Albacea's proved to be complete,
thorough and scientific and is worthy of credence and belief." 8

The afore-quoted findings confirm beyond doubt the failure of

petitioners' expert witness to satisfy the above-mentioned criteria for
evaluating the opinion of handwriting experts. At the same time, petitioners'
witness failed to rebut the convincing testimony of the NBI handwriting
expert presented by private respondents. We therefore find no reason to
deviate from the assailed conclusions as the same are amply supported by
the evidence on record.
 Finally, proceeding to the crucial issue that directly affects herein
petitioners, it is reiterated that petitioners are buyers in good faith of the
donated property, and therefore, it was grave error to annul and set aside
the deed of sale executed between petitioners and donee Helen Doria.
In adjudging petitioners as buyers in bad faith, respondent Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court's finding that the attendant circumstances,
that is, the presence of other occupants as well as houses built of strong
materials and fruit bearing trees in the subject land, should have aroused the
suspicion of petitioners and impelled them to exercise due diligence in
verifying the true ownership of the property being sold. Petitioners dispute
the lower court's conclusion and argue that although there were other
occupants in the subject property, no adverse claim was made by the latter
as they were mere tenants therein, thus, petitioners were not obliged to
make any further inquiry because the property being sold was covered by a
certificate of title under Helen Doria's name.
We agree with petitioners. The rule is well-settled that mere possession
cannot defeat the title of a holder of a registered torrens title to real
property. 9 Moreover, reliance on the doctrine that a forged deed can legally
be the root of a valid title is squarely in point in this case:
"Although generally a forged or fraudulent deed is a nullity
and conveys no title, however there are instances when such a
fraudulent document may become the root of a valid title. One such
instance is where the certificate of title was already transferred from
the name of the true owner to the forger, and while it remained that
way, the land was subsequently sold to an innocent purchaser. For
then, the vendee had the right to rely upon what appeared in the
certificate.
"Where there was nothing in the certificate of title to indicate
any cloud or vice in the ownership of the property, or any
encumbrance thereon, the purchaser is not required to explore
further than what the Torrens Title upon its face indicates in quest
for any hidden defect or inchoate right that may subsequently defeat
his right thereto. If the rule were otherwise, the efficacy and
conclusiveness of the certificate of title which the Torrens System
seeks to insure would entirely be futile and nugatory." 10
 When herein petitioners purchased the subject property from Helen
Doria, the same was already covered by TCT No. T-23205 under the latter's
name. And although Helen Doria's title was fraudulently secured, such fact
cannot prejudice the rights of herein petitioners absent any showing that
they had any knowledge or participation in such irregularity. Thus, they
cannot be obliged to look beyond the certificate of title which appeared to be
valid on its face and sans any annotation or notice of private respondents'
adverse claim. Contrary therefore to the conclusion of respondent Court,
petitioners are purchasers in good faith and for value as they bought the
disputed property without notice that some other person has a right or
interest in such property, and paid a full price for the same at the time of the
purchase or before they had notice of the claim or interest of some other
person in the property. 11
Respondent Court therefore committed a reversible error when it
affirmed the ruling of the trial court annulling and setting aside the deed of
absolute sale dated March 25, 1988 between petitioners and Helen Doria, as
well as the Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-27434 issued under petitioners'
name, the established rule being that the rights of an innocent purchaser for
value must be respected and protected notwithstanding the fraud employed
by the seller in securing his title. 12
In this regard, it has been held that the proper recourse of the true
owner of the property who was prejudiced and fraudulently dispossessed of
the same is to bring an action for damages against those who caused or
employed the fraud, and if the latter are insolvent, an action against the
Treasurer of the Philippines may be filed for recovery of damages against the
Assurance Fund. 13
Conformably with the foregoing, having established beyond doubt that
Helen Doria fraudulently secured her title over the disputed property which
she subsequently sold to petitioners, Helen Doria should instead be
adjudged liable to private respondents, and not to petitioners as declared by
the trial court and respondent Court of Appeals, for the resulting damages to
the true owner and original plaintiff, Pedro Calapine.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED and the appealed decision is
hereby MODIFIED. The portions of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
San Pablo City, Branch 30, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 29175 which ordered the following:
"xxx xxx xxx
"2. ANNULLING, voiding, setting aside and declaring
of no force and effect . . . , the deed of absolute sale executed on
March 25, 1988 by and between spouses Eduartes and Helen Doria,
and the Transfer Certificate of Title No T-27434 issued under the
name of spouses Romulo and Sally Eduarte;
"3. ORDERING the office of the Register of Deeds, San Pablo
City, to cancel TCT No. T-27434 or any other adverse title emanating
from OCT No. P-2129 and in lieu thereof, to issue a new transfer
certificate of title covering the subject property under the names of
the substitute-plaintiffs Alexander and Artemis both surnamed
Calapine, after payment of the corresponding fees and taxes
therefor; and
"4  . . .
"Judgment on the cross-claim of defendant Eduartes against
Helen Doria is further rendered by ordering the latter to pay the
former the sum of P110,000.00 with legal interest thereon starting
from March 25, 1988 until full payment, . . ."

are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Instead, Helen Doria is hereby ordered to pay herein private
respondents the sum of P110,000.00 with legal interest counted from March
25, 1988 until full payment, as damages for the resulting loss to original
plaintiff Pedro Calapine.
In all other respects, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed.  LLpr

SO ORDERED.
Quilala v. Alacntara 371 SCRA 311
[G.R. No. 132681. December 3, 2001.]

RICKY Q. QUILALA,  petitioner, vs. GLICERIA ALCANTARA,

LEONORA ALCANTARA, INES REYES and JOSE
REYES,  respondent.
 Feria Feria Lugtu D'Noche  for petitioner.
Teddy C. Macapagal  for respondents.

SYNOPSIS

Catalina Quilala executed a Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos in

favor of Violeta Quilala over a parcel of land. Here in issue is the validity of
the said Deed of Donation.
As the Deed of Donation complied with the requirements provided
under Art. 749 of the Civil Code, the Deed is valid. The fact that the second
page of the Deed of Donation on which only the Acknowledgment appeared
was signed by the donor and one witness on the left-hand margin, and by
the donee and the other witness on the right-hand margin, the same does
not affect the validity of the instrument. The requirement that the
contracting parties and their witnesses should sign on the left-hand margin
of the instrument is merely to ensure that each and every page of the
instrument is authenticated by the parties. Further, although the donee was
not mentioned by the notary public in the Acknowledgment, the same does
not render the page a private instrument as the donee nevertheless signed
on that second page. The acceptance, which was explicitly set forth on the
first page of the notarized Deed of Donation, was, therefore, made in a public
instrument.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; MODES OF ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP; DONATION OF AN

IMMOVABLE; REQUIREMENTS. — Under Article 749 of the Civil Code, the
donation of an immovable must be made in a public instrument in order to
be valid, specifying therein the property donated and the value of the
charges which the donee must satisfy. As a mode of acquiring ownership,
donation results in an effective transfer of title over the property from the
donor to the donee, and is perfected from the moment the donor knows of
the acceptance by the donee, provided the donee is not disqualified or
prohibited by law from accepting the donation. Once the donation is
accepted, it is generally considered irrevocable, and the donee becomes the
absolute owner of the property. The acceptance, to be valid, must be made
during the lifetime of both the donor and the donee. It may be made in the
same deed or in a separate public document, and the donor must know the
acceptance by the donee.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONSIDERATION OF AFFECTION AND GENEROSITY
VALID. — The Deed of Donation stipulated that the donation was made for
and in consideration of the "love and affection which the DONEE inspires in
the DONOR, and as an act of liberality and generosity." This was sufficient
cause for a donation. Indeed, donation is legally defined as "an act of
liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously of a thing or right in favor
of another, who accepts it."
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; REGISTRATION THEREOF UNDER PD 1529; REQUIREMENT
THAT CONTRACTING PARTIES AND WITNESSES SIGN ON THE LEFT-HAND
MARGIN, NOT ABSOLUTE. — The second page of the deed of donation, on
which the Acknowledgment appears, was signed by the donor and one
witness on the left-hand margin, and by the donee and the other witness on
the right-hand margin. Surely, the requirement under Section 112, par. 2
of PD No. 1529 that the contracting parties and their witnesses should sign
on the left-hand margin of the instrument is not absolute. The intendment of
the law merely is to ensure that each and every page of the instrument is
authenticated by the parties. The requirement is designed to avoid the
falsification of the contract after the same has already been duly executed by
the parties. Hence, a contracting party affixes his signature on each page of
the instrument to certify that he is agreeing to everything that is written
thereon at the time of signing. Simply put, the specification of the location of
the signature is merely directory: The fact that one of the parties signs on the
wrong side of the page does not invalidate the document. The purpose of
authenticating the page is served, and the requirement in the above-quoted
provision is deemed substantially complied with.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; NATURE OF THE INSTRUMENT AND ITS VALIDITY, NOT
AFFECTED BY DONEE'S LACK OF ACKNOWLEDGMENT BEFORE THE NOTARY
PUBLIC. — The lack of an acknowledgment by the donee before the notary
public does not also render the donation null and void. The instrument
should be treated in its entirety. It cannot be considered a private document
in part and a public document in another part. The fact that it was
acknowledged before a notary public converts the deed of donation in its
entirety a public instrument. The fact that the donee was not mentioned by
the notary public in the acknowledgment is of no moment. To be sure, it is
the conveyance that should be acknowledged as a free and voluntary act. In
any event, the donee signed on the second page, which contains the
Acknowledgment only. Her acceptance, which is explicitly set forth on the
first page of the notarized deed of donation, was made in a public
instrument.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; RELATED MATTERS IN CONSIDERATION. — The donation,
which we declare herein to be valid, will still be subjected to a test on its
inofficiousness under Article 771, in relation to Articles 752, 911 and 912 of
the Civil Code.Moreover, property donated inter vivos  is subject to collation
after the donor's death, whether the donation was made to a compulsory
heir or a stranger, unless there is an express prohibition if that had been the
donor's intention. EaICAD

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO,  J  : p

On February 20, 1981, Catalina Quilala executed a "Donation of Real

Property Inter Vivos" in favor of Violeta Quilala over a parcel of land located in
Sta. Cruz, Manila, containing an area of 94 square meters, and registered in
her name under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 17214 of the Register of
Deeds for Manila.  EITcaD

The "Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos" consists of two pages. The

first page contains the deed of donation itself, and is signed on the bottom
portion by Catalina Quilala as donor, Violeta Quilala as donee, and two
instrumental witnesses. 1 The second page contains the Acknowledgment,
which states merely that Catalina Quilala personally appeared before the
notary public and acknowledged that the donation was her free and
voluntary act and deed. There appear on the left-hand margin of the second
page the signatures of Catalina Quilala and one of the witnesses, and on the
right-hand margin the signatures of Violeta Quilala and the other
witness. 2 The Acknowledgment reads:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES )
QUEZON CITY  ) S.S.
Before Me, a Notary Public, for and in the City of Quezon,
Philippines, this 20th day of Feb. 1981, personally appeared
CATALINA QUILALA, with Residence Certificate No. 19055265 issued
at Quezon City on February 4, 1981, known to me and to me known
to be the same person who executed the foregoing instruments and
acknowledged to me that the same is her own free and voluntary act
and deed.
I hereby certify that this instrument consisting of two (2)
pages, including the page on which this acknowledgment is written,
has been signed by CATALINA QUILALA and her instrumental
witnesses at the end thereof and on the left-hand margin of page 2
and both pages have been sealed with my notarial seal.
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, in the City of
Quezon, Philippines, this 20th day of Feb., 1981.
(SGD.) NOTARY PUBLIC
Until December 31, 1981
(illegible)
DOC NO. 22;
PAGE NO. 6;
BOOK NO. XV;
SERIES OF 1981.

The deed of donation was registered with the Register of Deeds and, in
due course, TCT No. 17214 was cancelled and TCT No. 143015 was issued in
the name of Violeta Quilala.
On November 7, 1983, Catalina Quilala died. Violeta Quilala likewise
died on May 22, 1984. Petitioner Ricky Quilala alleges that he is the surviving
son of Violeta Quilala.
Meanwhile, respondents Gliceria Alcantara, Leonora Alcantara, Ines
Reyes and Juan Reyes, claiming to be Catalina's only surviving relatives within
the fourth civil degree of consanguinity, executed a deed of extrajudicial
settlement of estate, dividing and adjudicating unto themselves the above-
described property.
On September 13, 1984, respondents instituted against petitioner and
Guillermo T. San Pedro, the Registrar of Deeds of Manila, an action for the
declaration of nullity of the donation inter vivos, and for the cancellation of
TCT No. 143015 in the name of Violeta Quilala. The case was docketed as Civil
Case No. 84-26603 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 17.
Subsequently, respondents withdrew their complaint as against Guillermo T.
San Pedro and he was dropped as a party-defendant.
The trial court found that the deed of donation, although signed by
both Catalina and Violeta, was acknowledged before a notary public only by
the donor, Catalina. Consequently, there was no acceptance by Violeta of the
donation in a public instrument, thus rendering the donation null and void.
Furthermore, the trial court held that nowhere in Catalina's SSS records does
it appear that Violeta was Catalina's daughter. Rather, Violeta was referred to
therein as an adopted child, but there was no positive evidence that the
adoption was legal. On the other hand, the trial court found that
respondents were first cousins of Catalina Quilala. However, since it
appeared that Catalina died leaving a will, the trial court ruled that
respondents' deed of extrajudicial settlement can not be registered. The trial
court rendered judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
plaintiffs Gliceria Alcantara, Leonarda Alcantara, Ines Reyes and Juan
Reyes and against defendant Ricky A. Quilala, as follows:
1. Declaring null and void the deed of donation of real
property inter vivos executed on February 20, 1981 by Catalina
Quilala in favor of Violeta Quilala (Exhs. A as well as 11 and 11-A.);
2. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to cancel Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 143015 in the name of Violeta Quilala and to
issue a transfer certificate of title in the name of the Estate of
Catalina Quilala;.
3. Dismissing the complaint insofar as it seeks the registration
of the deed of extrajudicial settlement (Exhs. B and B-1.) and the
issuance by the Register of Deeds of Manila of a transfer certificate
of title in the names of the plaintiffs; and
 4. Dismissing the counterclaim of defendant Ricky A. Quilala.
No costs.
SO ORDERED. 3

Petitioner appealed the aforesaid decision. On July 30, 1997, the Court
of Appeals rendered a decision affirming with modification the decision of
the trial court by dismissing the complaint for lack of cause of action without
prejudice to the filing of probate proceedings of Catalina's alleged last will
and testament. 4
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED with
the following MODIFICATION:
(3) DISMISSING the complaint for lack of cause of action
without prejudice to the filing of the necessary probate proceedings
by the interested parties so as not to render nugatory the right of the
lawful heirs.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Court of

Appeals denied on February 11, 1998. 5 Hence, this petition for review, raising
the following assignment of errors:
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE DEED
OF DONATION OF REAL PROPERTY INTER-VIVOS IS NOT
REGISTRABLE.
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON UPHOLDING THE LOWER
COURT'S RULING THAT VIOLETA QUILALA IS NOT THE
DAUGHTER OF CATALINA QUILALA. 6
The principal issue raised is the validity of the donation executed by
Catalina in favor of Violeta. Under Article 749 of the Civil Code, the donation
of an immovable must be made in a public instrument in order to be
valid, 7 specifying therein the property donated and the value of the charges
which the donee must satisfy. As a mode of acquiring ownership, donation
results in an effective transfer of title over the property from the donor to the
donee, 8 and is perfected from the moment the donor knows of the
acceptance by the donee, 9 provided the donee is not disqualified or
prohibited by law from accepting the donation. Once the donation is
accepted, it is generally considered irrevocable, 10 and the donee becomes
the absolute owner of the property. 11 The acceptance, to be valid, must be
made during the lifetime of both the donor and the donee. 12 It may be made
in the same deed or in a separate public document, 13 and the donor must
know the acceptance by the donee. 14
In the case at bar, the deed of donation contained the number of the
certificate of title as well as the technical description of the real property
donated. It stipulated that the donation was made for and in consideration of
the "love and affection which the DONEE inspires in the DONOR, and as an
act of liberality and generosity." 15 This was sufficient cause for a
donation. Indeed, donation is legally defined as "an act of liberality whereby
a person disposes gratuitously of a thing or right in favor of another, who
accepts it." 16
The donee's acceptance of the donation was explicitly manifested in
the penultimate paragraph of the deed, which reads:  DHcSIT

That the DONEE hereby receives and accepts the gift and
donation made in her favor by the DONOR and she hereby expresses
her appreciation and gratefulness for the kindness and generosity of
the DONOR. 17

Below the terms and stipulations of the donation, the donor, donee
and their witnesses affixed their signature. However, the Acknowledgment
appearing on the second page mentioned only the donor, Catalina Quilala.
Thus, the trial court ruled that for Violeta's failure to acknowledge her
acceptance before the notary public, the same was set forth merely on a
private instrument, i.e., the first page of the instrument. We disagree.
The pertinent provision is Section 112, paragraph 2 of Presidential
Decree No. 1529, which states:
Deeds, conveyances, encumbrances, discharges, powers of
attorney and other voluntary instruments, whether affecting
registered or unregistered land, executed in accordance with law in
the form of public instruments shall be registrable:  Provided,
that, every such instrument shall be signed by person or persons
executing the same in the presence of at least two witnesses who shall
likewise sign thereon, and shall be acknowledged to be the free act and
deed of the person or persons executing the same  before a notary
public or other public officer authorized by law to take
 acknowledgment. Where the instrument so acknowledged consists of
two or more pages including the page whereon acknowledgment is
written, each page of the copy which is to be registered in the office of
the Register of Deeds, or if registration is not contemplated, each
page of the copy to be kept by the notary public, except the page where
the signatures already appear at the foot of the instrument, shall be
signed on the left margin thereof by the person or persons executing the
instrument and their witnesses, and all the pages sealed with the
notarial seal, and this fact as well as the  number  of pages shall be
stated in the acknowledgment. Where the instrument acknowledged
relates to a sale, transfer, mortgage or encumbrance of two or more
parcels of land, the number thereof shall likewise be set forth in said
acknowledgment." (italics ours).

As stated above, the second page of the deed of donation, on which

the Acknowledgment appears, was signed by the donor and one witness on
the left-hand margin, and by the donee and the other witness on the right
hand margin. Surely, the requirement that the contracting parties and their
witnesses should sign on the left-hand margin of the instrument is not
absolute. The intendment of the law merely is to ensure that each and every
page of the instrument is authenticated by the parties. The requirement is
designed to avoid the falsification of the contract after the same has already
been duly executed by the parties. Hence, a contracting party affixes his
signature on each page of the instrument to certify that he is agreeing to
everything that is written thereon at the time of signing.
Simply put, the specification of the location of the signature is merely
directory. The fact that one of the parties signs on the wrong side of the
page, does not invalidate the document. The purpose of authenticating the
page is served, and the requirement in the above-quoted provision is
deemed substantially complied with.
In the same vein, the lack of an acknowledgment by the donee before
the notary public does not also render the donation null and void. The
instrument should be treated in its entirety. It cannot be considered a private
document in part and a public document in another part. The fact that it was
acknowledged before a notary public converts the deed of donation in its
entirety a public instrument. The fact that the donee was not mentioned by
the notary public in the acknowledgment is of no moment. To be sure, it is
the conveyance that should be acknowledged as a free and voluntary act. In
any event, the donee signed on the second page, which contains the
Acknowledgment only. Her acceptance, which is explicitly set forth on the
first page of the notarized deed of donation, was made in a public
instrument.
It should be stressed that this Court, not being a trier of facts, can not
make a determination of whether Violeta was the daughter of Catalina, or
whether petitioner is the son of Violeta. These issues should be ventilated in
the appropriate probate or settlement proceedings affecting the respective
estates of Catalina and Violeta. Suffice it to state that the donation, which we
declare herein to be valid, will still be subjected to a test on its inofficiousness
under Article 771, 18 in relation to Articles 752, 911 and 912 of the Civil
Code.Moreover, property donated inter vivos is subject to collation after the
donor's death, 19 whether the donation was made to a compulsory heir or a
stranger, 20 unless there is an express prohibition if that had been the
donor's intention. 21  DaTICc

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The

appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a
new judgment is rendered dismissing Civil Case No. 84-26603.
SO ORDERED.
Noceda v. Court of Appeals 316 SCRA 504

On June 1, 1981, Aurora Directo, Rodolfo Noceda and Maria Arbizo extrajudicially settled a parcel of
land. On the same date, Directo donated 625 square meters of her share to Noceda, who is her nephew
being the son of her deceased sister, Carolina. On August 17, 1981, the same parties executed another
extrajudicial ettlement partition of the same lot.

Sometime in 1981, Noceda constructed a house on the land donated to him by Directo. Directo fenced
the portion allotted to her in the extrajudicial settlement, excluding the donated lot and constructed
thereon 3 huts. However, in 1985, Noceda removed the fence earlier constructed by Directo and
occupied the 3 huts and fenced the entire lot of Directo without her consent. Directo demanded from
Noceda to vacate her land, but the latter refused. Directo filed a complaint for recovery of possession
and rescission/annulment of donation, against Noceda before the trial court.

ISSUE:

W/N petitioner Noceda’s acts of usurpation constitute an act of ingratitude sufficient to grant the
revocation of the donation. – YES

RULING:
The Court ruled that petitioner's act of occupying the portion pertaining to private respondent Directo
without the latter's knowledge is an act of usurpation which is an offense against property of the donor
and considered as an act of ingratitude of a donee against the donor. The law does not require
conviction of the donee, it is enough that the offense be proved in the action for revocation.

With regard to the contention of petitioner Noceda that the right to enforce the revocation of the
donation had already prescribed, the Court was not persuaded. The Court ruled that while the complaint
for revocation was filed more than one (1) year from the alleged usurpation by petitioner of private
respondent's share in the subject lot, no competent proof was adduced by petitioner to prove his
allegation. The action to revoke by reason of ingratitude prescribes within one (1) year to be counted
from the time (a) the donor had knowledge of the fact; (b) provided that it was possible for him to bring
the action. It is incumbent upon petitioner to show proof of the concurrence of these two condition in
order that the one (1) year period for bringing the action be considered to have already prescribed.
According to the Court, no competent proof was adduced by petitioner to prove his allegation The Court
stressed that in civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by
preponderance of evidence and he who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation
is not evidence

Gonzales v. Court of Appeals 358 SCRA 393

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-37453. May 25, 1979]

RIZALINA GABRIEL GONZALES,  petitioner, vs. HONORABLE

COURT OF APPEALS and LUTGARDA SANTIAGO,  respondents.

Francisco D. Rilloraza, Jr.  for petitioners.

Angel A. Sison  for private respondent.

SYNOPSIS

Isabel Gabriel executed a 5-page will two months prior to her death.
The signatures of the deceased appear at the end of the will and at the
left margin of all the pages. The signatures of the three attesting
witnesses appear at the bottom of the attestation clause and on the left
margin of all the other pages. The will named private respondent as
universal heir and executor, and gave legacies in specified amounts to
certain persons including the petitioner herein. The petition for the
probate of the will filed by private respondent was opposed by petitioner.
The trial court disallowed the will on the grounds that the will of the
deceased was not executed and attested as required by law and that the
document presented for probate is not the purported will allegedly
dictated by the deceased, executed and signed by her, and attested by the
three attesting witnesses. Respondent appealed. The Court of Appeals,
upon consideration of the evidence, reversed the trial court's decision and
allowed the probate of the will.
In this petition for review, petitioner assigned ten errors which are
substantially factual in character and content. Affirming the decision of
the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held that the factual finding of
the Court of Appeals are not reviewable and are binding upon the
Supreme Court.

SYLLABUS

1. APPEAL; FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS ARE NOT

REVIEWABLE. — The factual findings of the Court of Appeals are not
reviewable the same being binding and conclusive on the Supreme Court,
particularly where the premises are borne by the record or based upon
substantial evidence. Assignments of errors involving factual issues
cannot be ventilated in a review of the decision of the Court of Appeals
because only legal question may be raised.
2. WILLS; ATTESTING WITNESSES; QUALIFICATIONS. — Under the
law, there is no mandatory requirement that the witnesses testify initially
at any time during the trial as to his good standing in the community, his
reputation for trustworthiness and reliability, his honesty and uprightness
in order that his testimony may be believed and accepted by the trial
court. It is enough that the qualifications enumerated in Article 820 of the
Civil Code are complied with, such that the soundness of his mind can be
shown by or deduced from his answers to the questions propounded to
him, that his age (18 years or more) is shown from his appearance,
testimony, or competently proved otherwise, as well as the fact that he is
not blind, deaf or dumb and that he is able to read and write to the
satisfaction of the court, and that he has none of the disqualifications
under Article 821 of the Civil Code.
3. ID.; ATTESTING WITNESSES ARE NOT CHARACTER WITNESSES. —
The instrumental witnesses are not character witnesses for they merely
attest the execution of a will or testament and affirm the formalities
attendant to said execution. The rulings concerning character witnesses in
naturalization proceedings are not applicable to instrumental witnesses to
wills executed under the Civil Code.
4. ID.; ID.; CREDIBLE WITNESSES MEAN COMPETENT WITNESSES. —
"Credible witnesses" mean competent witnesses and not those who
testify to facts from or upon hearsay. In the strict sense, the competency
of a person to be an instrumental witness to a will is determined by the
statute, that is Art. 820 and 821, Civil Code, whereas his credibility
depends on the appreciation of his testimony and arises from the belief
and conclusion of the court that said witness is telling the truth. It is not
necessary to introduce prior and independent proof of the fact that the
witnesses are "credible witnesses", that is, that they have a good standing
in the community and reputed to be trustworthy and reliable.
5. ID.; NOTARIAL WILLS, NATURE OF. — A notarial will duly
acknowledged by the testatrix and the witnesses before a notary public is
a public document executed and attested through the intervention of the
notary public and as such public document is evidence of the facts in
clear, unequivocal manner therein expressed. It has in its favor the
presumption of regularity. To contradict all these, there must be evidence
that is clear, convincing the more than merely preponderant.
6. ID.; ATTESTATION CLAUSE. — The attestation clause which the
attesting witness signed is the best evidence as to date of signing because
it preserves in permanent form a recital of all the material facts attending
the execution of the will. This is the very purpose of the attestation clause
which is made for the purpose of preserving in permanent form, a record
of the facts attending the execution of the will, so that in case of failure in
the memory of the subscribing witnesses, or other casualty they may still
be proved.
 7. ID.; EVIDENCE; WITNESSES; PHOTOGRAPHER NOT REQUIRED FOR
EXECUTION OF WILL. — The law does not require a photographer for the
execution and attestation of the will. The fact that an attesting witness
mistakenly identified the photographer scarcely detracts from her
testimony that she was present when the will was signed because what
matters here is not the photographer but the photograph taken which
clearly portrays the attesting witnesses and her co-witnesses.
8. ID.; ID.; MINOR INCONSISTENCIES. — The discrepancy in the
description of the typewriter used by the notary which he described as
"elate" which to him meant big letters which are of the type in which the
will was typewritten but which was identified by an experts as "pica", and
the mistake by the instrumental witness in mentioning the name of the
photographer-these are unimportant details which could have been
affected by the lapse of time and the treachery of human memory such as
by themselves would not alter the probative value of the testimonies of
the witnesses on the true execution of the will, for it cannot be expected
that the testimony of every person will be identical and coinciding with
each other with regard to details in an incident and that witnesses are not
expected to remember all details.
9. APPEAL; FINDING OF FACT OF TRIAL COURT. — The right of the
Court of Appeals to review, alter and reverse the findings of the trial court
where the appellate court, in reviewing the evidence has found that facts
and circumstances of weight and influence have been ignored and
overlooked and the significance of which have been misinterpreted by the
trial court, cannot be disputed. Find of facts made by the trial court,
particularly when they are based on conflicting evidence whose evaluation
hinges on questions of credibility of contending witnesses lies particularly
within the province of trial courts and generally, the appellate court
should not interfere with the same, unless the trial court has overlooked
and misinterpreted the facts and circumstances established in the record.
10. ID.; ID.; EXCEPTION TO THE RULE THAT JUDGMENT OF COURT OF
APPEALS IS CONCLUSIVE AS TO FACTS. — Among the exceptions to the
rule that the judgment of the Court of Appeals is conclusive as to the facts
and cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court are: (1) when the
conclusion as a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or
 conjectures; (2) when the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of
facts are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings,
went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee.
11. WILLS; DUE EXECUTION. — Where the tree instrumental
witnesses, who constitute the best evidence of the will-making, as well as
the lawyer who prepared it and who thereafter notarized it have testified
in favor of the will, and where all of them are disinterested witnesses who
stand to received no benefit from the testament, and the signatures of the
witnesses and the testatrix have been identified on the will and there
is no claim whatsoever and by any one, much less the petitioner that they
are not genuine, the decision holding that the will was executed in
accordance with the formalities required by law should be affirmed.

DECISION

GUERRERO, J  :p

This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals,

First Division, 1 promulgated on May 4, 1973 in CA-G. R. No. 36523-R which
reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal dated
December 15, 1964 and allowed the probate of the last will and testament
of the deceased Isabel Gabriel.
It appears that on June 24, 1961, herein private respondent
Lutgarda Santiago filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Rizal
docketed as Special Proceedings No. 3617, for the probate of a will alleged
to have been executed by the deceased Isabel Gabriel and designating
therein petitioner as the principal beneficiary and executrix.
There is no dispute in the records that the late Isabel Andres Gabriel
died as a widow and without issue in the municipality of Navotas, province
of Rizal her place of residence, on June 7, 1961 at the age of eighty-five
(85), having been born in 1876. It is likewise not controverted that herein
private respondent Lutgarda Santiago and petitioner Rizalina Gabriel
Gonzales are nieces of the deceased, and that private respondent, with
her husband and children, lived with the deceased at the latter's
residence prior and up to the time of her death.
The will submitted for probate, Exhibit "F", which is typewritten and
in Tagalog, appears to have been executed in Manila on the 15th day of
April, 1961, or barely two (2) months prior to the death of Isabel Gabriel. It
consists of five (5) pages, including the pages whereon the attestation
clause and the acknowledgment of the notary public were written. The
signatures of the deceased Isabel Gabriel appear at the end of the will on
page four and at the left margin of all the pages. The attestation clause,
which is found on page four, reads as follows:
 
"PATUNAY NG MGA SAKSI
"Kaming mga nakalagdang mga saksi o testigo na ang aming
mga tinitirahan ay nakasulat sa gawing kanan at kahilira ng aming
mga pangalan sa ibaba nito, ay pagpapatutuo na ipinakilala,
ipinaalam at ipinahayag sa amin ni Isabel Gabriel na ang kasulatang
ito na binubuo ng Limang Dahon (Five Pages) pati na ang dahong ito,
na siya niyang TESTAMENTO AT HULING HABILIN, ngayong ika 15 ng
Abril, 1961, ay nilagdaan ng nasabing testadora na si Isabel Gabriel
ang nasabing testamento sa ibaba o ilalim ng kasulatan na nasa ika
apat na dahon (page four) at nasa itaas ng patunay naming ito, at sa
kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawat dahon (and on the left hand margin
of each and every page), sa harap ng lahat at bawat isa sa amin, at
kami namang mga saksi ay lumagda sa harap ng nasabing testadora,
at sa harap ng lahat at bawat isa sa amin, sa ilalim ng patunay ng
mga saksi at sa kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawa't dahon ng
testamentong ito."

At the bottom thereof, under the heading "Pangalan", are written the
signatures of Matilde D. Orobia, Celso D. Gimpaya and Maria R. Gimpaya,
and opposite the same, under the heading "Tirahan", are their respective
places of residence, 961 Highway 54, Philamlife, for Miss Orobia, and 12
Dagala St., Navotas, Rizal, for the two Gimpayas. Their signatures also
appear on the left margin of all the other pages. The will is paged by
typewritten words as follows: "Unang Dahon" and underneath "(Page
One)", "Ikalawang Dahon" and underneath "(Page Two)", etc., appearing at
the top of each page.  prLL

The will itself provides that the testatrix desired to be buried in the
Catholic Cemetery of Navotas, Rizal in accordance with the rites of the
Roman Catholic Church, all expenses to be paid from her estate; that all
her obligations, if any, be paid; that legacies in specified amounts be given
to her sister, Praxides Gabriel Vda. de Santiago, her brother Santiago
Gabriel, and her nephews and nieces, Benjamin, Salud, Rizalina (herein
petitioner), Victoria, Ester, Andres, all surnamed Gabriel, and Evangelina,
Rudyardo, Rosa, Andrea, Marcial, Numancia, Verena, all surnamed
Santiago. The herein private respondent Lutgarda Santiago, who was
described in the will by the testatrix as "aking mahal na pamangkin na
aking pinalaki, inalagaan at minahal na katulad ng isang tunay na anak"
and named as universal heir and executor, were bequeathed all
properties and estate, real or personal, already acquired, or to be
acquired, in her (testatrix's) name, after satisfying the expenses, debts and
legacies as aforementioned.
The petition was opposed by Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales, herein
petitioner, assailing the document purporting to be the will of the
deceased on the following grounds:
1. that the same is not genuine; and in the alternative
2. that the same was not executed and attested as required by
law;
3. that, at the time of the alleged execution of the purported
will, the decedent lacked testamentary capacity due to old age and
sickness; and in the second alternative
4. that the purported will was procured through undue and
improper pressure and influence on the part of the principal
beneficiary, and/or of some other person for her benefit.

Lutgarda Santiago filed her Answer to the Opposition on February 1,

1962. After trial the court a quo rendered judgment, the summary and
dispositive portions of which read:
"Passing in summary upon the grounds advanced by the
oppositor, this Court finds:
 "1. That there is no iota of evidence to support the contention
that the purported will of the deceased was procured through undue
and improper pressure and influence on the part of the petitioner, or
of some other person for her benefit;
"2. That there is insufficient evidence to sustain the contention
that at the time of the alleged execution of the purported will, the
deceased lacked testamentary capacity due to old age and sickness;
"3. That sufficient and abundant evidence warrants
conclusively the fact that the purported will of the deceased was not
executed and attested as required by law;
"4. That the evidence is likewise conclusive that the document
presented for probate, Exhibit 'F' is not the purported will allegedly
dictated by the deceased, executed and signed by her, and attested
by her three attesting witnesses on April 15, 1961.
"WHEREFORE, Exhibit 'F', the document presented for probate
as the last will and testament of the deceased Isabel Gabriel, is
hereby DISALLOWED."

From this judgment of disallowance, Lutgarda Santiago appealed to

respondent Court, hence, the only issue decided on appeal was whether
or not the will in question was executed and attested as required by law.
The Court of Appeals, upon consideration of the evidence adduced by
both parties, rendered the decision now under review, holing that the will
in question was signed and executed by the deceased Isabel Gabriel on
April 15, 1961 in the presence of the three attesting witnesses, Matilde
Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya, signing and witnessing the
document in the presence of the deceased and of each other as required
by law, 2 hence allowed probate.
Oppositor Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales moved for reconsideration 3 of
the aforesaid decision and such motion was opposed 4 by petitioner-
appellant Lutgarda Santiago. Thereafter, parties submitted their
respective Memoranda, 5 and on August 28, 1973, respondent Court,
Former Special First Division, by Resolution 6 denied the motion for
reconsideration stating that:
"The oppositor-appellee contends that the preponderance of
evidence shows that the supposed last will and testament of Isabel
 Gabriel was not executed in accordance with law because the same
was signed on several occasions, that the testatrix did not sign the
will in the presence of all the instrumental witnesses did not sign the
will in the presence of each other.
"The resolution of the factual issue raised in the motion for
reconsideration hinges on the appreciation of the evidence. We have
carefully re-examined the oral and documentary evidence of record.
There is no reason to alter the findings of fact in the decision of this
Court sought to be set aside. 7

In her petition before this Court, oppositor Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales

contends that respondent Court abused its discretion and/or acted
without or in excess of its jurisdiction in reversing the findings of fact and
conclusions of the trial court. The Court, after deliberating on the petition
but without giving due course resolved, in the Resolution dated Oct. 11,
1973 to require the respondents to comment thereon, which comment
was filed on Nov. 14, 1973. Upon consideration of the allegations, the
issues raised and the arguments adduced in the petition, as well as the
Comment 8 of private respondent thereon, We denied the petition by
Resolution on November 26, 1973, 9 the question raised being factual and
for insufficient showing that the findings of fact by respondent Court were
unsupported by substantial evidence.
Subsequently, or on December 17, 1973, petitioner Rizalina Gabriel
Gonzales filed a Motion for Reconsideration 10 which private respondent
answered by way of her Comment or Opposition 11 filed on January 15,
1974. A Reply and Rejoinder to Reply followed. Finally, on March 27, 1974,
We resolved to give due course to the petition.
The petitioner in her brief makes the following assignment of errors:
I. The respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that the
document, Exhibit "F" was executed and attested as required by law when
there was absolutely no proof that the three instrumental witnesses were
credible witnesses.
II. The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the finding of the lower
court that the preparation and execution of the will Exhibit "F", was
unexpected and coincidental.
 III. The Court of Appeals erred in finding that Atty. Paraiso was not
previously furnished with the names and residence certificates of the
witnesses as to enable him to type such data into the document Exhibit
"F".
IV. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the fact that the three
typewritten lines under the typewritten words "Pangalan" and
"Tinitirahan" were left blank shows beyond cavil that the three attesting
witnesses were all present in the same occasion.
V. The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court's finding
that it was incredible that Isabel Gabriel could have dictated the will,
Exhibit "F", without any note or document, to Atty. Paraiso.
VI. The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the finding of the trial
court that Matilde Orubia was not physically present when the will, Exhibit
"F" was allegedly signed on April 15, 1961 by the deceased Isabel Gabriel
and the other witnesses Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya.
VII. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the trial court gave
undue importance to the picture takings as proof that the will was
improperly executed.
VIII. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the grave
contradictions, evasions, and misrepresentations of witnesses
(subscribing and notary) presented by the petitioner had been explained
away, and that the trial court erred in rejecting said testimonies.
IX. The Court of Appeals acted in excess of its appellate jurisdiction
or has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial
proceedings, as to call for an exercise of the power of supervision.
X. The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the decision of the trial
court and admitting to probate Exhibit "F", the alleged last will and
testament of the deceased Isabel Gabriel.
It will be noted from the above assignments of errors that the same
are substantially factual in character and content. Hence, at the very
outset, We must again state the oft-repeated and well-established rule
that in this jurisdiction, the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are not
reviewable, the same being binding and conclusive on this Court. This rule
has been stated and reiterated in a long line of cases enumerated in Chan
vs. CA (L-27488, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 737, 743) 12 and Tapas vs. CA (L-
22202, February 27; 1976, 69 SCRA 393), 13 and in the more recent cases
of Baptista vs. Carillo and CA (L-32192, July 30, 1976, 72 SCRA 214, 217)
and Vda. de Catindig vs. Heirs of Catalina Roque (L-25777, November 26,
1976, 74 SCRA 83, 88). In the case of Chan vs. CA, this Court said:  LibLex

". . . from Guico v. Mayuga, a 1936 decision, the opinion being

penned by the then Justice Recto, it has been well-settled that the
jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought to us from the Court of
Appeals is limited to reviewing and revising the errors of law imputed
to it, its findings of fact being conclusive. More specifically, in a
decision exactly a month later, this Court, speaking through the then
Justice Laurel it was held that the same principle is applicable, even if
the Court of Appeals was in disagreement with the lower court as to
the weight of the evidence with a consequent reversal of its findings
of fact. . . .

Stated otherwise, findings of facts by the Court of Appeals, when

supported by substantive evidence are not reviewable on appeal by
certiorari. Said findings of the appellate court are final and cannot be
disturbed by Us particularly because its premises are borne out by the
record or based upon substantial evidence and what is more, when such
findings are correct. Assignments of errors involving factual issues cannot
be ventilated in a review of the decision of the Court of Appeals because
only legal questions may be raised. The Supreme Court is not at liberty to
alter or modify the facts as set forth in the decision of the Court of
Appeals sought to be reversed. Where the findings of the Court of Appeals
are contrary to that of the trial court, a minute scrutiny by the Supreme
Court is in order, and resort to duly-proven evidence becomes necessary.
The general rule We have thus stated above is not without some
recognized exceptions.
Having laid down the above legal precepts as Our foundation, We
now proceed to consider petitioner's assignments of errors.
Petitioner, in her first assignment, contends that the respondent
Court of Appeals erred in holding that the document, Exhibit "F", was
executed and attested as required by law when there was
absolutely no proof that the three instrumental witnesses were credible
witnesses. She argues that the requirement in Article 806, Civil Code, that
the witnesses must be credible is an absolute requirement which must be
complied with before an alleged last will and testament may be admitted
to probate and that to be a credible witness, there must be evidence on
record that the witness has a good standing in his community, or that he
is honest and upright, or reputed to be trustworthy and reliable.
According to petitioner, unless the qualifications of the witness are first
established, his testimony may not be favorably considered. Petitioner
contends that the term "credible" is not synonymous with "competent" for
a witness may be competent under Article 820 and 821 of the Civil Code
and still not be credible as required by Article 805 of the same Code. It is
further urged that the term "credible" as used in the Civil Code should
receive the same settled and well-known meaning it has under
the Naturalization Law, the latter being a kindred legislation with the Civil
Code provisions on wills with respect to the qualifications of witnesses.
We find no merit to petitioner's first assignment of error. Article 820
of the Civil Code provides the qualifications of a witness to the execution
of wills while Article 821 sets forth the disqualification from being a
witness to a will. These Articles state:
"Art. 820. Any person of sound mind and of the age of
eighteen years or more, and not blind, deaf or dumb, and able to
read and write, may be a witness to the execution of a will
mentioned in article 805 of this Code.
"Art. 821. The following are disqualified from being witnesses
to a will:
(1) Any person not domiciled in the Philippines,
(2) Those who have been convicted of falsification of a
document, perjury or false testimony.

Under the law, there is no mandatory requirement that the witness

testify initially or at any time during the trial as to his good standing in the
community, his reputation for trustworthiness and reliableness, his
honesty and uprightness in order that his testimony may be believed and
accepted by the trial court. It is enough that the qualifications enumerated
in Article 820 of the Civil Code are complied with, such that the soundness
of his mind can be shown by or deduced from his answers to the
questions propounded to him, that his age (18 years or more) is shown
from his appearance, testimony, or competently proved otherwise, as well
as the fact that he is not blind, deaf or dumb and that he is able to read
and write to the satisfaction of the Court, and that he has none of the
disqualifications under Article 821 of the Civil Code. We reject petitioner's
contention that it must first be established in the record the good
standing of the witness in the community, his reputation for
trustworthiness and reliableness, his honesty and uprightness, because
such attributes are presumed of the witness unless the contrary is proved
otherwise by the opposing party.
We also reject as without merit petitioner's contention that the term
"credible" as used in the Civil Code should be given the same meaning it
has under the Naturalization Law where the law is mandatory that the
petition for naturalization must be supported by two character witnesses
who must prove their good standing in the community, reputation for
trustworthiness and reliableness, their honesty and uprightness. The two
witnesses in a petition for naturalization are character witnesses in that
being citizens of the Philippines, they personally know the petitioner to be
a resident of the Philippines for the period of time required by the Act and
a person of good repute and morally irreproachable and that said
petitioner has in their opinion all the qualifications necessary to become a
citizen of the Philippines and is not in any way disqualified under the
provisions of the Naturalization Law (Section 7, Commonwealth Act No.
473 as amended).
In probate proceedings, the instrumental witnesses are not
character witnesses for they merely attest the execution of a will or
testament and affirm the formalities attendant to said execution. And We
agree with the respondent that the rulings laid down in the cases cited by
petitioner concerning character witnesses in naturalization proceedings
are not applicable to instrumental witnesses to wills executed under the
Civil Code of the Philippines.
In the case at bar, the finding that each and everyone of the three
instrumental witnesses, namely, Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria
Gimpaya, are competent and credible is satisfactorily supported by the
evidence as found by the respondent Court of Appeals, which findings of
fact this Tribunal is bound to accept and rely upon. Moreover, petitioner
has not pointed to any disqualification of any of the said witnesses, much
less has it been shown that anyone of them is below 18 years of age, of
unsound mind, deaf or dumb, or cannot read or write.
It is true that under Article 805 of the New Civil Code, every will,
other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by
the testator himself or by the testator's name written by some other
person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and
subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the
testator and of one another. While the petitioner submits that Article 820
and 821 of the New Civil Code speak of the competency of a witness due to
his qualifications under the first Article and none of the disqualifications
under the second Article, whereas Article 805 requires the attestation of
three or more credible witnesses, petitioner concludes that the
term credible requires something more than just being competent and,
therefore, a witness in addition to being competent under Articles 820
and 821 must also be a credible witness under Article 805.
Petitioner cites American authorities that competency and
credibility of a witness are not synonymous terms and one may be a
competent witness and yet not a credible one. She exacerbates that there
is no evidence on record to show that the instrumental witnesses are
credible in themselves, that is, that they are of good standing in the
community since one was a family driver by profession and the second
the wife of the driver, a housekeeper. It is true that Celso Gimpaya was
the driver of the testatrix and his wife Maria Gimpaya, merely a
housekeeper, and that Matilde Orobia was a piano teacher to a grandchild
of the testatrix. But the relation of employer and employee much less the
humble social or financial position of a person do not disqualify him to be
a competent testamentary witness. (Molo-Pekson and Perez-Nable vs.
Tanchuco, et al., 100 Phil. 344; Testate Estate of Raymundo, Off. Gaz.,
March 18, 1941, p. 788). llcd

Private respondent maintains that the qualifications of the three or

more credible witnesses mentioned in Article 805 of the Civil Code are
those mentioned in Article 820 of the same Code, this being obvious from
that portion of Article 820 which says "may be a witness to the execution
of a will mentioned in Article 805 of this Code," and cites authorities that
the word "credible" insofar as witnesses to a will are concerned simply
means "competent." Thus, in the case of Suntay vs. Suntay, 95 Phil. 500, the
Supreme Court held that "Granting that a will was duly executed and that
it was in existence at the time of, and not revoked before, the death of the
testator, still the provisions of the lost will must be clearly and distinctly
proved by at least two credible witnesses. 'Credible witnesses' mean
competent witnesses and not those who testify to facts from or upon hearsay."
(emphasis supplied).
In Molo Pekson and Perez-Nable vs. Tanchuco, et al., 100 Phil. 344, the
Supreme Court held that "Section 620 of the same Code of Civil Procedure
provides that any person of sound mind, and of the age of eighteen years
or more, and not blind, deaf, or dumb and able to read and write, may be
a witness to the execution of a will. This same provision is reproduced in
our New Civil Code of 1950, under Art. 820. The relation of employer and
employee, or being a relative to the beneficiary in a will, does not
disqualify one to be a witness to a will. The main qualification of a witness
in the attestation of wills, if other qualifications as to age, mental capacity
and literacy are present, is that said witness must be credible, that is to
say, his testimony may be entitled to credence. There is a long line of
authorities on this point, a few of which we may cite:
"A 'credible witness' is one who is not disqualified to testify by
mental incapacity, crime, or other cause. Historical Soc. of Dauphin
County vs. Kelker, 74 A. 619, 226 Pa. 16, 134 Am. St. Rep. 1010."
(Words and Phrases, Vol. 10, p. 340).
"As construed by the common law, a 'credible witness' to a will
means a 'competent witness.' Appeal of Clark, 95 A. 517, 114 Me.
105, Ann. Cas. 1917A, 837." (Ibid, p. 341).
"Expression 'credible witness' in relation to attestation of wills
means 'competent witness'; that is, one competent under the law to
testify to fact of execution of will. Vernon's Ann. Civ. St. art. 8283.
Moos vs. First State Bank of Uvalde, Tex. Civ. App. 60 S. W. 2nd 888,
889." (Ibid, p. 342)
 "The term 'credible', used in the statute of wills requiring that a
will shall be attested by two credible witnesses means competent;
witnesses who, at the time of attesting the will, are legally competent
to testify, in a court of justice, to the facts attested by subscribing the
will, the competency being determined as of the date of the
execution of the will and not of the time it is offered for probate.
Smith vs. Goodell, 101 N.E. 255, 266, 258 Ill. 145." (Ibid.)
"'Credible witnesses', as used in the statute relating to wills,
means competent witnesses — that is, such persons as are not
legally disqualified from testifying in courts of justice, by reason of
mental incapacity, interest, or the commission of crimes, or other
cause excluding them from testifying generally, or rendering them
incompetent in respect of the particular subject matter or in the
particular suit. Hill vs. Chicago Title & Trust co., 152 N.E. 545, 546, 322
Ill. 42." (Ibid. p. 343)

In the strict sense, the competency of a person to be an

instrumental witness to a will is determined by the statute, that is Art. 820
and 821, Civil Code, whereas his credibility depends on the appreciation of
his testimony and arises from the belief and conclusion of the Court that
said witness is telling the truth. Thus, in the case of Vda. de Aroyo v. El
Beaterio del Santissimo Rosario de Molo, No. L-22005, May 3, 1968, the
Supreme Court held and ruled that: "Competency as a witness is one
thing, and it is another to be a credible witness, so credible that the Court
must accept what he says. Trial courts may allow a person to testify as a
witness upon a given matter because he is competent, but may thereafter
decide whether to believe or not to believe his testimony."
In fine, We state the rule that the instrumental witnesses in order to
be competent must be shown to have the qualifications under Article 820
of the Civil Code and none of the disqualifications under Article 821 and
for their testimony to be credible, that is worthy of belief and entitled to
credence, it is not mandatory that evidence be first established on record
that the witnesses have a good standing in the community or that they
are honest and upright or reputed to be trustworthy and reliable, for a
person is presumed to be such unless the contrary is established
otherwise. In other words, the instrumental witnesses must be competent
and their testimonies must be credible before the court allows the
probate of the will they have attested. We, therefore, reject petitioner's
position that it was fatal for respondent not to have introduced prior and
independent proof of the fact that the witnesses were "credible
witnesses", that is, that they have a good standing in the community and
reputed to be trustworthy and reliable.
Under the second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth
assignments of errors, petitioner disputes the findings of fact of the
respondent court in finding that the preparation and execution of the will
was expected and not coincidental, in finding that Atty. Paraiso was not
previously furnished with the names and residence certificates of the
witnesses as to enable him to type such data into the document Exhibit
"F", in holding that the fact that the three typewritten lines under the
typewritten words "pangalan" and "tinitirahan" were left blank shows
beyond cavil that the three attesting witnesses were all present in the
same occasion, in holding credible that Isabel Gabriel could have dictated
the will without note or document to Atty. Paraiso, in holding that Matilde
Orobia was physically present when the will was signed on April 15, 1961
by the deceased Isabel Gabriel and the other witnesses Celso Gimpaya
and Maria Gimpaya, in holding that the trial court gave undue importance
to the picture takings as proof that the will was improperly executed, and
in holding that the grave contradictions, evasions and misrepresentations
of the witnesses (subscribing and notary) presented by the petitioner had
been explained away.
Since the above errors are factual, We must repeat what We have
previously laid down that the findings of fact of the appellate court are
binding and controlling which We cannot review, subject to certain
exceptions which We will consider and discuss hereinafter. We are
convinced that the appellate court's findings are sufficiently justified and
supported by the evidence on record. Thus, the alleged unnaturalness
characterizing the trip of the testatrix to the office of Atty. Paraiso and
bringing all the witnesses without previous appointment for the
preparation and execution of the will and that it was coincidental that
Atty. Paraiso was available at the moment impugns the finding of the
Court of Appeals that although Atty. Paraiso admitted the visit of Isabel
Gabriel and of her companions to his office on April 15, 1961 was
unexpected as there was no prior appointment with him, but he explained
that he was available for any business transaction on that day and that
Isabel Gabriel had earlier requested him to help her prepare her will. The
finding of the appellate court is amply based on the testimony of Celso
Gimpaya that he was not only informed on the morning of the day that he
witnessed the will but that it was the third time when Isabel Gabriel told
him that he was going to witness the making of her will, as well as the
testimony of Maria Gimpaya that she was called by her husband Celso
Gimpaya to proceed to Isabel Gabriel's house which was nearby and from
said house, they left in a car to the lawyer's office, which testimonies are
recited in the respondent Court's decision.
The respondent Court further found the following facts: that Celso
Gimpaya and his wife Maria Gimpaya obtained residence certificates a few
days before Exhibit "F" was executed. Celso Gimpaya's residence
certificate No. A-5114942 was issued at Navotas, Rizal on April 13, 1961
while Maria Gimpaya's residence certificate No. A-5114974 was issued
also at Navotas, Rizal on April 14, 1961. The respondent Court correctly
observed that there was nothing surprising in these facts and that the
securing of these residence certificates two days and one day,
respectively, before the execution of the will on April 15, 1961, far from
showing an amazing coincidence, reveals that the spouses were earlier
notified that they would be witnesses to the execution of Isabel Gabriel's
will.
 LLphil

We also agree with the respondent Court's conclusion that the

excursion to the office of Atty. Paraiso was planned by the deceased,
which conclusion was correctly drawn from the testimony of the Gimpaya
spouses that they started from the Navotas residence of the deceased
with a photographer and Isabel Gabriel herself, then they proceeded by
car to Matilde Orobia's house in Philamlife, Quezon City to fetch her and
from there, all the three witnesses (the Gimpayas and Orobia) passed by a
place where Isabel Gabriel stayed for about ten to fifteen minutes at the
clinic of Dr. Chikiamco before they proceeded to Atty. Cipriano Paraiso's
office.
It is also evident from the records, as testified to by Atty. Paraiso,
that previous to the day that the will was executed on April 15, 1961,
Isabel Gabriel had requested him to help her in the execution of her will
and that he told her that if she really wanted to execute her will, she
should bring with her at least the Mayor of Navotas, Rizal and a Councilor
to be her witnesses and that he (Atty. Paraiso) wanted a medical
certificate from a physician notwithstanding the fact that he believed her
to be of sound and disposition mind. From this evidence, the appellate
court rightly concluded, thus: "It is, therefore, clear that the presence of
Isabel Gabriel and her witnesses Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and
Maria Gimpaya including the photographer in the law office of Atty.
Paraiso was not coincidental as their gathering was pre-arranged by Isabel
Gabriel herself."
As to the appellate court's finding that Atty. Paraiso was not
previously furnished with the names and residence certificates of the
witnesses as to enable him to type such data into the document Exhibit
"F", which the petitioner assails as contradictory and irreconcilable with
the statement of the Court that Atty. Paraiso was handed a list (containing
the names of the witnesses and their respective residence certificates)
immediately upon their arrival in the law office by Isabel Gabriel and this
was corroborated by Atty. Paraiso himself who testified that it was only on
said occasion that he received such list from Isabel Gabriel, We cannot
agree with petitioner's contention. We find no contradiction for the
respondent Court held that on the occasion of the will-making on April 15,
1961, the list was given immediately to Atty. Paraiso and that no such list
was given the lawyer in any previous occasion or date prior to April 15,
1961.
But whether Atty. Paraiso was previously furnished with the names
and residence certificates of the witnesses on a prior occasion or on the
very occasion and date in April 15, 1961 when the will was executed, is
of no moment for such data appear in the notarial acknowledgment of
Notary Public Cipriano Paraiso, subscribed and sworn to by the witnesses
on April 15, 1961 following the attestation clause duly executed and
signed on the same occasion, April 15, 1961. And since Exhibit "F" is a
notarial will duly acknowledged by the testatrix and the witnesses before
a notary public, the same is a public document executed and attested
through the intervention of the notary public and as such public
document is evidence of the facts in clear, unequivocal manner therein
expressed. It has in its favor the presumption of regularity. To contradict
all these, there must be evidence that is clear, convincing and more than
merely preponderant. (Yturalde vs. Azurin, 28 SCRA 407). We find no such
evidence pointed by petitioner in the case at bar.
Likewise, the conclusion of the Court of Appeals in holding that the
fact that the three typewritten lines under the typewritten words
"pangalan" and "tinitirahan" were left blank shows beyond cavil that the
three attesting witnesses were all present in the same occasion merits
Our approval because this conclusion is supported and borne out by the
evidence found by the appellate court, thus: "On page 5 of Exhibit "F",
beneath the typewritten words "names", "Res. Tax Cert.", "date issued"
and "place issued" the only name of Isabel Gabriel with Residence Tax
Certificate No. A-5113274 issued on February 24, 1961 at Navotas, Rizal
appears to be in typewritten form while the names, residence tax
certificate numbers, dates and places of issuance of said certificates
pertaining to the three (3) witnesses were personally handwritten by Atty.
Paraiso. Again, this coincides with Atty. Paraiso's even the sale must be
made to close relatives; and the seventh was the appointment of the
appellant Santiago as executrix of the will without bond. The technical
description of the properties in paragraph 5 of Exhibit F was not given and
the numbers of the certificates of title were only supplied by Atty.
Paraiso."
It is true that in one disposition, the numbers of the Torrens titles of
the properties disposed and the docket number of a special proceeding
are indicated which Atty. Paraiso candidly admitted were supplied by him,
whereupon petitioner contends that it was incredible that Isabel Gabriel
could have dictated the will Exhibit "F" without any note or document to
Atty. Paraiso, considering that Isabel Gabriel was an old and sickly woman
more than eighty-one years old and had been suffering from a brain
injury caused by two severe blows at her head and died of terminal cancer
a few weeks after the execution of Exhibit "F". While we can rule that this
is a finding of fact which is within the competency of the respondent
appellate court in determining the testamentary capacity of the testatrix
and is, therefore, beyond Our power to revise and review, We
nevertheless hold that the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals
that the testatrix dictated her will without any note or memorandum
appears to be fully supported by the following facts or evidence appearing
on record. Thus, Isabel Gabriel, despite her age, was particularly active in
her business affairs as she actively managed the affairs of the movie
business Isabelita Theater, paying the aparatistas herself until June 4,
1961, 3 days before her death. She was the widow of the late Eligio Naval,
former Governor of Rizal Province and acted as co-administratrix in the
Intestate Estate of her deceased husband Eligio Naval. The text of the will
was in Tagalog, a dialect known and understood by her and in the light of
all the circumstances, We agree with the respondent Court that the
testatrix dictated her will without any note or memorandum, a fact
unanimously testified to by the three attesting witnesses and the notary
public himself.
Petitioner's sixth assignment of error is also benefit of merit. The
evidence, both testimonial and documentary is, according to the
respondent court, overwhelming that Matilde Orobia was physically
present when the will was signed on April 15, 1961 by the testatrix and the
other two witnesses, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya. Such factual
finding of the appellate court is very clear, thus: "On the contrary, the
record is replete with proof that Matilde Orobia was physically present
when the will was signed by Isabel Gabriel on April 15, 1961 along with her
co-witnesses Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya. The trial court's
conclusion that Orobia's admission that she gave piano lessons to the
child of the appellant on Wednesdays and Saturdays and that April 15,
1961 happened to be a Saturday for which reason Orobia could not have
been present to witness the will on that day — is purely conjectural.
Witness Orobia did not admit having given piano lessons to the
appellant's child every Wednesday and Saturday without fail. It is highly
probable that even if April 15, 1961 were a Saturday, she gave no piano
lessons on that day for which reason she could have witnessed the
execution of the will. Orobia spoke of occasions when she missed giving
piano lessons and had to make up for the same. Anyway, her presence at
the law office of Atty. Paraiso was in the morning of April 15, 1961 and
there was nothing to preclude her from giving piano lessons on the
afternoon of the same day in Navotas, Rizal."
 In addition to the testimony of Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and
Maria Gimpaya that Matilde was present on April 15, 1961 and that she
signed the attestation clause to the will and on the left-hand margin of
each of the pages of the will, the documentary evidence which is the will
itself, the attestation clause and the notarial acknowledgment
overwhelmingly and convincingly prove such fact that Matilde Orobia was
present on that day of April 15, 1961 and that she witnessed the will by
signing her name thereon and acknowledged the same before the notary
public, Atty. Cipriano P. Paraiso. The attestation clause which Matilde
Orobia signed is the best evidence as to the date of signing because it
preserves in permanent form a recital of all the material facts attending
the execution of the will. This is the very purpose of the attestation clause
which is made for the purpose of preserving in permanent form, a record
of the facts attending the execution of the will, so that in case of failure in
the memory of the subscribing witnesses, or other casualty they may still
be proved.(Thompson on Wills, 2nd ed., Sec. 132; Leynez vs. Leynez, 68
Phil. 745).
 LLpr

As to the seventh error assigned by petitioner faulting the Court of

Appeals in holding that the trial court gave undue importance to the
picture-takings as proof that the will was improperly executed, We agree
with the reasoning of the respondent court that: "Matilde Orobia's
identification of the photographer as "Cesar Mendoza", contrary to what
the other two witnesses (Celso and Maria Gimpaya) and Atty. Paraiso said
that the photographer was Benjamin Cifra, Jr., is at worst a minor mistake
attributable to lapse of time. The law does not require a photographer for
the execution and attestation of the will. The fact that Miss Orobia
mistakenly identified the photographer as Cesar Mendoza scarcely
detracts from her testimony that she was present when the will was
signed because what matters here is not the photographer but the
photograph taken which clearly portrays Matilde Orobia herself, her co-
witnesses Celso Gimpaya." Further, the respondent Court correctly held:
"The trial court gave undue importance to the picture-takings, jumping
therefrom to the conclusion that the will was improperly executed. The
evidence however, heavily points to only one occasion of the execution of
the will on April 15, 1961 which was witnessed by Matilde Orobia, Celso
Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya. These witnesses were quite emphatic and
positive when they spoke of this occasion. Hence, their identification of
some photographs wherein they all appeared along with Isabel Gabriel
and Atty. Paraiso was superfluous."
Continuing, the respondent Court declared: "It is true that the
second picture-taking was disclosed at the cross examination of Celso
Gimpaya. But this was explained by Atty. Paraiso as a reenactment of the
first incident upon the insistence of Isabel Gabriel. Such reenactment
where Matilde Orobia was admittedly no longer present was wholly
unnecessary if not pointless. What was important was that the will was
duly executed and witnessed on the first occasion on April 15, 1961," and
We agree with the Court's rationalization in conformity with logic, law and
jurisprudence which do not require picture-taking as one of the legal
requisites for the execution or probate of a will.
Petitioner points to alleged grave contradictions, evasions and
misrepresentations of witnesses in their respective testimonies before the
trial court. On the other hand, the respondent Court of Appeals held that
said contradictions, evasions and misrepresentations had been explained
away. Such discrepancies as in the description of the typewriter used by
Atty. Paraiso which he described as "elite" which to him meant big letters
which are of the type in which the will was typewritten but which was
identified by witness Jolly Bugarin of the N.B.I as "pica", the mistake in
mentioning the name of the photographer by Matilde Orobia to be Cesar
Mendoza when actually it was Benjamin Cifra, Jr. — these are indeed
unimportant details which could have been affected by the lapse of time
and the treachery of human memory such that by themselves would not
alter the probative value of their testimonies on the true execution of the
will, (Pascual vs. dela Cruz, 28 SCRA 421, 424) for it cannot be expected
that the testimony of every person will be identical and coinciding with
each other with regard to details of an incident and that witnesses are not
expected to remember all details. Human experience teach us "that
contradictions of witnesses generally occur in the details of certain
incidents, after a long series of questionings, and far from being an
evidence of falsehood constitute a demonstration of good faith. Inasmuch
as not all those who witness an incident are impressed in like manner, it is
but natural that in relating their impressions, they should not agree in the
minor details; hence the contradiction in their testimony." (Lopez vs.
Liboro, 81 Phil. 429).
It is urged of Us by the petitioner that the findings of the trial court
should not have been disturbed by the respondent appellate court
because the trial court was in a better position to weigh and evaluate the
evidence presented in the course of the trial. As a general rule, petitioner
is correct but it is subject to well-established exceptions. The right of the
Court of Appeals to review, alter and reverse the findings of the trial court
where the appellate court, in reviewing the evidence has found that facts
and circumstances of weight and influence have been ignored and
overlooked and the significance of which have been misinterpreted by the
trial court, cannot be disputed. Findings of facts made by trial courts
particularly when they are based on conflicting evidence whose evaluation
hinges on questions of credibility of contending witnesses lies peculiarly
within the province of trial courts and generally, the appellate court
should not interfere with the same. In the instant case, however, the Court
of Appeals found that the trial court had overlooked and misinterpreted
the facts and circumstances established in the record. Whereas the
appellate court said that "Nothing in the record supports the trial court's
unbelief that Isabel Gabriel dictated her will without any note or
document to Atty. Paraiso;" that the trial court's conclusion that Matilde
Orobia could not have witnessed anybody signing the alleged will or that
she could not have witnessed Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya sign the
same or that she witnessed only the deceased signing it, is a conclusion
based not on facts but on inferences; that the trial court gave undue
importance to the picture-takings, jumping therefrom to the conclusion
that the will was improperly executed and that there is nothing in the
entire record to support the conclusion of the court a quo that the will-
signing occasion was a mere coincidence and that Isabel Gabriel made an
appointment only with Matilde Orobia to witness the signing of her will,
then it becomes the duty of the appellate court to reverse findings of fact
of the trial court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over the lower
courts. LLpr

Still the petitioner insists that the case at bar is an exception to the
rule that the judgment of the Court of Appeals is conclusive as to the facts
and cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court. Again We agree with the
petitioner that among the exceptions are: (1) when the conclusion is a
finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2)
when the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when
there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the presence of each other
as required by law. " Specifically, We affirm that on April 15, 1961 the
testatrix Isabel Gabriel, together with Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and
his wife Maria Gimpaya, and a photographer proceeded in a car to the
office of Atty. Cipriano Paraiso at the Bank of P.I. Building, Manila in the
morning of that day; that on the way, Isabel Gabriel obtained a medical
certificate from one Dr. Chikiamko which she gave to Atty. Paraiso upon
arriving at the latter's office and told the lawyer that she wanted her will
to be made; that Atty. Paraiso asked Isabel Gabriel to dictate what she
wanted to be written in the will and the attorney wrote down the dictation
of Isabel Gabriel in Tagalog, a language known to and spoken by her; that
Atty. Paraiso read back to her what he wrote as dictated and she affirmed
their correctness; the lawyer then typed the will and after finishing the
document, he read it to her and she told him that it was alright; that
thereafter, Isabel Gabriel signed her name at the end of the will in the
presence of the three witnesses Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria
Gimpaya and also at the left-hand margin of each and every page of the
document in the presence also of the said three witnesses; that thereafter
Matilde Orobia attested the will by signing her name at the end of the
attestation clause and at the left-hand margin of pages 1, 2, 3 and 5 of the
document in the presence of Isabel Gabriel and the other two witnesses,
Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya; then, Celso Gimpaya signed also the
will at the bottom of the attestation clause and at the left-hand margin of
the other pages of the document in the presence of Isabel Gabriel,
Matilde Orobia and Maria Gimpaya; that Maria Gimpaya followed suit,
signing her name at the foot of the attestation clause and at the left-hand
margin of every page in the presence of Isabel Gabriel, Matilde Orobia
and Celso Gimpaya; that thereafter, Atty. Paraiso notarized the will as
Page No. 94, Book No. IV, Series of 1961, in his Notarial Register. On the
occasion of the execution and attestation of the will, a photographer took
pictures, one Exhibit "G", depicting Matilde Orobia, the testatrix Isabel
Gabriel, Celso Gimpaya, Maria Gimpaya and Atty. Paraiso, taken on said
occasion of the signing of the will, and another, Exhibit "H", showing
Matilde Orobia signing testimony that he had earlier advised Isabel
Gabriel to bring with her at least the Mayor and a Councilor of Navotas,
Rizal to be her witnesses for he did not know beforehand the identities of
the three attesting witnesses until the latter showed up at his law office
with Isabel Gabriel on April 15, 1961. Atty. Paraiso's claim-which was not
controverted that he wrote down in his own hand the date appearing on
page 5 of Exhibit "F" dissipates any lingering doubt that he prepared and
ratified the will on the date in question."
It is also a factual finding of the Court of Appeals in holding that it
was credible that Isabel Gabriel could have dictated the will, Exhibit "F",
without any note or document to Atty. Paraiso as against the contention
of petitioner that it was incredible. This ruling of the respondent court is
fully supported by the evidence on record as stated in the decision under
review, thus: "Nothing in the record supports the trial court's unbelief that
Isabel Gabriel dictated her will without any note or document to Atty.
Paraiso. On the contrary, all the three attesting witnesses uniformly
testified that Isabel Gabriel dictated her will to Atty. Paraiso and that other
than the piece of paper that she handed to said lawyer she had no note or
document. This fact jibes with the evidence — which the trial court itself
believed was unshaken — that Isabel Gabriel was of sound disposing
memory when she executed her will.
Exhibit "F" reveals only seven (7) dispositions which are not
complicated but quite simple. The first was Isabel Gabriel's wish to be
interred according to Catholic rites; the second was a general directive to
pay her debts if any; the third provided for P1,000.00 for her sister
Praxides Gabriel Vda. de Santiago and P2,000.00 for her brother Santiago
Gabriel; the fourth was a listing of her 13 nephews and nieces including
oppositor-appellee Rizalina Gabriel and the amount for each legatee; the
fifth was the institution of the petitioner-appellant, Lutgarda Santiago as
the principal heir mentioning in general terms seven (7) types of
properties; the sixth disposed of the remainder of her estate which she
willed in favor of appellant Lutgarda Santiago but prohibiting the sale of
such properties to anyone except in extreme situations in which judgment
is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went
beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions
of both appellant and appellee. (Roque vs. Buan, et al., G.R. No. L-22459,
Oct. 31, 1967; Ramos vs. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co., G.R. No. L-22533, Feb. 9,
1967; Hilario, Jr. vs. City of Manila, G.R. No. L-19570; Sept. 14, 1967).
Petitioner's insistence is without merit. We hold that the case at bar
does not fall within any of the exceptions enumerated above. We likewise
hold that the findings of fact of the respondent appellate court are fully
supported by the evidence on record. The conclusions are fully sustained
by substantial evidence. We find no abuse of discretion and We
discern no misapprehension of facts. The respondent Court's findings of
fact are not conflicting. Hence, the well-established rule that the decision
of the Court of Appeals and its findings of fact are binding and conclusive
and should not be disturbed by this Tribunal and it must be applied in the
case at bar in its full force and effect, without qualification or reservation.
The above holding simply synthesizes the resolutions we have heretofore
made in respect to petitioner's previous assignments of error and to
which We have disagreed and, therefore, rejected.
The last assignments of error of petitioner must necessarily be
rejected by Us as We find the respondent Court acted properly and
correctly and has not departed from the accepted and usual course of
judicial proceedings as to call for the exercise of the power of supervision
by the Supreme Court, and as We find that the Court of Appeals did not
err in reversing the decision of the trial court and admitting to probate
Exhibit "F", the last will and testament of the deceased Isabel Gabriel.
We rule that the respondent Court's factual findings upon its
summation and evaluation of the evidence on record is unassailable that:
"From the welter of evidence presented, we are convinced that the will in
question was executed on April 15, 1961 in the presence of Matilde
Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya signing and witnessing the
same in the will on a table with Isabel Gabriel, Celso Gimpaya and Maria
Gimpaya sitting around the table. Atty. Paraiso, after finishing the notarial
act, then delivered the original to Isabel Gabriel and retained the other
copies for his file and notarial register. A few days following the signing of
the will, Isabel Gabriel, Celso Gimpaya and another photographer arrived
 at the office of Atty. Paraiso and told the lawyer that she wanted another
picture taken because the first picture did not turn out good. The lawyer
told her that this cannot be done because the will was already signed but
Isabel Gabriel insisted that a picture be taken, so a simulated signing was
performed during which incident Matilde Orobia was not present."  Cdpr

Petitioner's exacerbation centers on the supposed incredibility of

the testimonies of the witnesses for the proponent of the will, their
alleged evasions, inconsistencies and contradictions. But in the case at
bar, the three instrumental witnesses who constitute the best evidence of
the will-making have testified in favor of the probate of the will. So has the
lawyer who prepared it, one learned in the law and long in the practice
thereof, who thereafter notarized it. All of them are disinterested
witnesses who stand to receive no benefit from the testament. The
signatures of the witnesses and the testatrix have been identified on the
will and there is no claim whatsoever and by anyone, much less the
petitioner, that they were not genuine. In the last and final analysis, the
herein conflict is factual and we go back to the rule that the Supreme
Court cannot review and revise the findings of facts of the respondent
Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed
from is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Republic v. Silim (2001)

- The purpose of the formal requirement for acceptance of a donation is to ensure that such acceptance
is duly communicated to the donor. The actual knowledge by the donor of the construction and
existence of the school building pursuant to the condition of the donation fulfills the legal requirement
that the acceptance of the donation by the donee be communicated to the donor. (Republic v Silim)
-case wherein the notification was not noted in the instrument, but still, the SC ruled that the donation was valid.

 The purpose of the formal requirement for acceptance of a donation is to ensure that such acceptance is duly communicated to
the donor. The actual knowledge by the donor of the construction and existence of the school building pursuant to the condition of
the donation fulfills the legal requirement that the acceptance of the donation by the donee be communicated to the donor.
(Republic v Silim)

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,  petitioner, vs. LEON SILIM and

ILDEFONSA MANGUBAT,  respondents.
DECISION
FACTS:
 On 17 December 1971, respondents donated a 5,600 square meter parcel of
land in favor of the Bureau of Public Schools, Municipality of Malangas, Zamboanga
del Sur (BPS). In the Deed of Donation, respondents imposed the condition that the
said property should "be used exclusively and forever for school purposes
only."  This donation was accepted by Gregorio Buendia, the District Supervisor of
BPS, through an Affidavit of Acceptance and/or Confirmation of Donation.
Through a fund raising campaign spearheaded by the Parent-Teachers
Association of Barangay Kauswagan, a school building was constructed on the
donated land. However, the Bagong Lipunan school building that was supposed to
be allocated for the donated parcel of land in Barangay Kauswagan could not be
released since the government required that it be built upon a one (1) hectare
parcel of land. To remedy this predicament, Assistant School Division
Superintendent of the Province of Zamboanga del Sur, Sabdani Hadjirol, authorized
District Supervisor Buendia to officially transact for the exchange of the one-half
(1/2) hectare old school site of Kauswagan Elementary School TO A NEW AND
SUITABLE LOCATION which would fit the specifications of the government.
Pursuant to this, District Supervisor Buendia and Teresita Palma entered into a
Deed of Exchange whereby the donated lot was exchanged with the bigger lot
owned by the latter. Consequently, the Bagong Lipunan school buildings were
constructed on the new school site and the school building previously erected on
the donated lot was dismantled and transferred to the new location.
When respondent Leon Silim saw, to his surprise, that Vice-Mayor Wilfredo
Palma was constructing a house on the donated land, he asked the latter why
he was building a house on the property he donated to BPS. Vice Mayor Wilfredo
Palma replied that he is already the owner of the said property. Respondent Leon
Silim endeavored to stop the construction of the house on the donated property
but Vice-Mayor Wilfredo Palma advised him to just file a case in court.
Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and declared the
donation null and void on the grounds that the donation was not properly
accepted and the condition imposed on the donation was violated. 
Hence, the present case where petitioner raises the following issues:
I. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THE DONATION
NULL AND VOID DUE TO AN INVALID ACCEPTANCE BY THE DONEE.

II. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THE

DONATION NULL AND VOID DUE TO AN ALLEGED VIOLATION OF A
CONDITION IN THE DONATION. 
RULING
1. Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the donation
null and void for the reason that the acceptance was not allegedly done in
accordance with Articles 745 and 749 of the New Civil Code.We agree.
Donations, according to its purpose or cause, may be categorized as: (1) pure or simple; (2)
remuneratory or compensatory; (3) conditional or modal; and (4) onerous. A pure or simple donation is one
where the underlying cause is plain gratuity.  This is donation in its truest form. On the other hand, a
remuneratory or compensatory donation is one made for the purpose of rewarding the donee for past
services, which services do not amount to a demandable debt. 9 A conditional or modal donation is one where
the donation is made in consideration of future services or where the donor imposes certain conditions,
limitations or charges upon the donee, the value of which is inferior than that of the donation given.  10 Finally,
an onerous donation is that which imposes upon the donee a reciprocal obligation or, to be more precise, this
is the kind of donation made for a valuable consideration, the cost of which is equal to or more than the thing
donated. 11

Of all the foregoing classifications, donations of the ONEROUS TYPE are the most distinct. This is
because, unlike the other forms of donation, the validity of and the rights and obligations of the parties
involved in an onerous donation is completely governed not by the law on donations but by the law on
contracts.

The donation involved in the present controversy is one which is onerous

since there is a burden imposed upon the donee to build a school on the donated
property. 
We hold that there was a valid acceptance of the donation.
Sections 745 and 749 of the New Civil Code provide:
ARTICLE 745. The donee must accept the donation personally, or
through an authorized person with a special power for the purpose, or with
a general and sufficient power; otherwise the donation shall be void.

ARTICLE 749. In order that the donation of an immovable may be

laid, it must be made in a public document, specifying therein the property
donated and the value of the charge which the donee must satisfy.

The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a

separate public document, but it shall not take effect unless it is done
during the lifetime of the donor.

If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall

be notified thereof in an authentic form, and this step shall be noted in
both instruments.

The written acceptance of the donation having been considered by the

trial court in arriving at its decision, there is the presumption that this exhibit
was properly offered and admitted by the court.  AcICHD
 Moreover, this issue was never raised in the Court of Appeals. Nowhere in
their brief did respondents question the validity of the donation on the basis of the
alleged defect in the acceptance thereof. If there was such a defect, why did it take
respondents more than ten (10) years from the date of the donation to question its
validity? In the very least, they are guilty of estoppel. 
ISSUE OF THE THE ACCEPTANCE WAS NOT NOTED IN THE DEED OF DONATION
AS REQUIRED IN ARTICLE 749 OF THE CIVIL CODE.
The purpose of the formal requirement for acceptance of a donation is to
ensure that such acceptance is duly communicated to the donor.
In the case at bar, a school building was immediately constructed after the
donation was executed. Respondents had knowledge of the existence of the school
building put up on the donated lot through the efforts of the Parents-Teachers
Association of Barangay Kauswagan. It was when the school building was being
dismantled and transferred to the new site and when Vice-Mayor Wilfredo Palma
was constructing a house on the donated property that respondents came to know
of the Deed of Exchange. The actual knowledge by respondents of the
construction and existence of the school building fulfilled the legal requirement
that the acceptance of the donation by the donee be communicated to the donor.
ISSUE OF ACCEPTANCE:
On respondents' claim, which was upheld by the Court of Appeals, that the
acceptance by BPS District Supervisor Gregorio Buendia of the donation was
ineffective because of the absence of a special power of attorney from the
Republic of the Philippines, it is undisputed that the donation was made in favor
of the Bureau of Public Schools. Such being the case, his acceptance was authorized
under Section 47 of the 1987 Administrative Code which states:
SECTION 47. Contracts and Conveyances. — Contracts or conveyances
may be executed for and in behalf of the Government or of any of its
branches, subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, whenever
demanded by the exigency or exigencies of the service and as long as the
same are not prohibited by law.

VIOLATION OF CONDITION:
Without the slightest doubt, the condition for the donation was not in any
way violated when the lot donated was exchanged with another one. The purpose
for the donation remains the same, which is for the establishment of a school. The
exclusivity of the purpose was not altered or affected. In fact, the exchange of the
lot for a much bigger one was in furtherance and enhancement of the purpose of
the donation. The acquisition of the bigger lot paved the way for the release of
funds for the construction of Bagong Lipunan school building which could not be
accommodated by the limited area of the donated lot. 
CDaSAE