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The National Interest: Normative Foundations
Author(s): W. David Clinton

Source: The Review of Politics , Autumn, 1986, Vol. 48, No. 4 (Autumn, 1986), pp. 495-
519
Published by: Cambridge University Press for the University of Notre Dame du lac on
behalf of Review of Politics
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/1407381
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The National Interest:
Normnative Foundations
W. David Clinton
"The national interest" is frequently criticized in the contempo
ternational relations as an ambiguous term that lends itself t
unethical state policies by justifying single-minded nationa
article argues that much of the criticism of the national inter
grounds in fact derives from confusion over the meaning of the
arates two meanings - national interest as the common good o
ciety, set off from the international environment, and nation
concrete objects of value over which states bargain, within th
setting. It surveys six views of the link among the national inte
tional society that legitimates various state interests, and the
cal action, and concludes that statesmanship which relies on b
national interest can provide the best guide to ethical state co
"anarchical society" of international politics.
The analyst who addresses the normative strength

nesses of the national interest quickly discovers he
untroubled waters. Doubts press themselves imme
reader of the literature on the term. It is said to be
and wrongheadedly dogmatic"' and is dismissed as
the nation is interested in."2It has been denounce
that saps democratic processes"3 and derided as "a so
Stone."4 The author of the entry on national interest
tional Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences recommende
cept be discarded by scholars because it was not a us
further study.5
Whatever else they prove, the multifarious critici
strate that it is rare for the national interest to be
value-free tool of social science. Observers may pr
qualities of the concept: "The choice is not between
ples and the national interest, devoid of moral di
tween one set of moral principles divorced from po
and another set of moral principles derived from pol
Or they may strongly condemn it: "During perio
scarcity . . . the temptation will be to secure resour
for one national or regional segment of the species,
other segments of the species suffer or die. (This is
tent, the operational definition given to the nationa
the superpowers.)"7 Few, if any, profess themselves
495

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496 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS
moral worth.8 The national interest d

tions.
To demonstrate that national interest is not only ethically sig-

nificant, but also at least provisionally ethically valuable, it is nec-
essary also to assert that for the foreseeable future states will con-
tinue to play the major role in international politics. Recognizing
the effects of contemporary interdependence has shown us the in-
adequacy of any simple "billiard ball" conception of unitary states
monopolizing influence in the world arena. Reality should coun-
teract the tendency to reify the state and to forget the crosscutting
purposes pursued by other actors-individual and corporate, gov-
ernment and nongovernmental- who ignore and sometimes frus-
trate the wishes of putative leaders. There is more to be under-
stood in international politics than the intentions of the foreign
ministry.
Yet if states are not billiard balls, neither are they mothballs-
objects that appear to be solid, but then dissolve into the thin air
of interdependence without leaving a trace. The old agenda of
"high politics," which was deemed to be the special province of
states, has not been pushed aside, if one sees the attention steadily
focused on the breakoff and resumption of discussions on SALT-
START, the introduction of new NATO missiles in Western Eu-
rope, or the dispute over the former Spanish Sahara. Does the
heart of the modern era lie in the obsolescence of military force as
a means of gaining what decision-makers and populations want
most? Such does not seem to have been the case in the Falklands
war or the ongoing conflicts within Cambodia and between Iran
and Iraq. Have states become so entangled in a web of interna-
tional and transnational ties that they have lost the capacity for in-
dependent action in support of national objectives? The hypothe-
sis must be squared with reports that OPEC is torn by dissension
among members cheating on their assigned production quotas, or
that the European Community is becalmed by the unwillingnes
of its members to accept majority voting as a complete substitute
for unanimity.
What interdependence seems to have wrought is a world that
is, to be sure, more complex-with more participants, not all of
them states, seeking to press their claims, and new problems,
many of which require cooperative solutions - but not one in
which any other form of social organization has displaced the state
from its central position or made it unable to act if it finds action

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NORMATIVE FOUNDATIONS 497
necessary, by its lights and for its ends. It

then, that improving the ethical standards
tem means improving the conduct of state
ereignty, states may do unjust, harmful th
with normative concerns wishes to stop t
things, through persuasion or deterrence.
ethical, beneficial things, and they shou
them more often. What seems unlikely to
justice is an effort to assume states away or
as the cause of the problem of injustice rath
mechanism for its amelioration as well.
If world politics remains, in the last analysis, the politics of

society of independent (or even interdependent) states, then it
mains important to know what the ends of states are. Understan
ing their goals is a necessary first step toward guiding their defi
tion of their goals in morally satisfying ways. Rescuing nationa
interest is not simply a gain for knowledge; it can also help
make the world of states more ethically tolerable than it otherw
might be. Promoting justice in world politics may not mean ov
coming national interest, but rather working through it.
DEFINING NATIONAL INTEREST
To approach the normative issue, it is necessary first to sep

two meanings of the term national interest that are frequentl
fused. The failure to distinguish between these two definitio
the tendency, indeed, to switch from one to the other withou
knowledging the fact - accounts for some of the suspicion
national interest is an ambiguous and even dangerous term in
cussing international relations.
First, "the national interest" may be taken to mean the ov
common good of an entire society. The definition of nationa
terest proposed here rejects the view that society is sim
framework for the interaction - sometimes cooperative, mor
ten competitive-of smaller interest groups, which form the
data of politics. Instead, it sees the national society as a comm
nity, with common standards of political ethics, with ties of
tual respect and appreciation (not only coinciding interests) b
ing its members together-and with a real common good t
the long run benefits all those within the community, in the
as members of the whole, if not always in their capacity of

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bers of a subgroup. Individuals in socie

poses broader than convenience and th
unshared aims. The society, in the w
more than a "partnership";9 it is a "com
common norms and common life . .. w
man existence."o In such a setting, hum
dividual dignity as collaborators in the
well as protectors of their more particu
A view of politics that denies commu
zens to the role of interest-group mem
lesson of unrestrained self-interest, to
leaders to act on behalf of the whol
tendencies that former President Carter decried in his Farewell
Address:
Today, as people have become ever more doubtful of the ability

the Government to deal with our problems, we are increasing
drawn to single-issue groups and special interest organizations to en
sure that whatever else happens, our own personal views and
own private interests are protected. This is a disturbing factor in
American political life. It tends to distort our purposes, because t
national interest is not always the sum of all our single or special i
terests. We are all Americans together, and we must not forget t
the common good is our common interest and our individual
sponsibility.12
As Carter's plea makes clear, countries do not automatical

compose themselves into such communities. The union betw
East and West Pakistan, for example, was always a somewhat ar
ficial creation, and mistrust between the two populations show
it. Links of common citizenship can decay, leaving political
thorities with the choice of a breakup of the state or repressio
and even civil war. There may be a "community continuum
along which countries can be ranged according to the degre
unity they possess. Yet "the common good" often remains a pow
ful political symbol, even in the nations where apparent differ
ences are most pronounced.'3 And it is precisely the (often
spoken) idea of a national interest that gives us a standard
which we can condemn regimes that repress their populations o
discriminate against some under their rule.
If the society as a whole is granted a reality other than that
the sum of its contending parts, then it becomes difficult to de
that the group defined by the society has its "interest" just as

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smaller, more particular groups have t

goals, so it has its own, more inclusive e
improvement as the expression of the c
and the means for promoting their com
the common good.
The common good or common interest
defined by rational consideration of wh
the society, and by a normative choice o
whole lies. It rests on a rejection of the
choices are merely subjective "values," an
for preferring one set of values over an
ences are equally legitimate. The comm
society need not maintain the sort of va
cludes an autonomous public good and th
icy the resultant of an interplay among
Many different agencies within the soc
pressing the public good and of attem
closer to reality. Recognition of the com
out diversity or make scattered centers
subject to state control. However, the po
most important location for efforts to co
common good. The public interest or th
part, in that which makes the state bett
tion of protecting and promoting the goo
ternational realm, this includes the abilit
ety from outside threats and to enga
cooperation with other societies. The nat
to foreign policy, is the end of maint
state-that entity delegated to speak a
matters of diplomacy - to protect the so
search for its shared good.
This end of the community should not
pursued by policymakers. Nor can it be
in public opinion. The common good i
the standard by which to judge official
ion. In the goals they set, statesmen can
the common good, and they may do so
the complex set of aims they define by
is only an estimation of the common int
an objective reality that does not depend
policymakers. If these officials are skill

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interest they define will be quite clo

good. But the two are not the same.
"The national interest," then, refers t
ciple of diplomacy, which posits the co
in its relations with other national uni
action. The term national interests, by
narrower goals, which serve the broade
est" by maintaining or increasing the
interests may include access to warm-w
tary bases on foreign soil, friendly re
state, or any other goal that protects
which may take any of a large number
them from the overall common good,
terests might be referred to as "state in
Each state has one overall national i
particular state interests, and it mu
them. Any one state interest is only p
Of these particular interests, not all ar
all can be pursued by any nation lack
some may be mutually exclusive. So
and attention, at the cost of postponin
even of letting them drop by the ways
be made according to the guidance p
tional interest.'4 Moreover, the national interest cannot be
equated with a list of state interests, any more than it can be re-
duced to the sum of demands by domestic groups. It may be nec-
essary to the psychic health of a society that it choose to stand for
principles as well as-and at times instead of-material interests
in its foreign policy. It is one of the prime duties of statesmanship
to know when and how to make such choices.
The goals that may increase the power of the state in its ext
nal relationships may vary widely among states and, within on
state, across time. Circumstances may make any of a large num
ber of aims a state interest of some state at some point. Yet, wh
these state interests display tremendous variety, they form a co
mon thread that allows one to interpret much of international p
itics. Every state possesses interests and most states act on them
On the basis of trade-offs among these interests, compromises
be struck and diplomacy carried on. Despite their differences o
regime, states can find in these interests a common languag
which they may carry on diplomatic discourse.

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On the other hand, because the overall

care of each state depends so heavily on
principles, it is likely to be unique to
Gaulle's "certain idea of France," it is un
would ever have described the presidenc
"le juge supirieur de l'intbret national,"'5
of France's mission gave meaning to
France's citizens shared. The national int
that community apart from the outside
to those bonds that are shared by the m
among themselves but not with other
states who dealt with de Gaulle might tes
of one society may be incomprehensib
type (although different societies may h
or less similar, giving the national int
lesser resemblance to the national interes
Individual state interests, despite their
ularity, can nevertheless form the comm
may meet to compose or at least confine
self-interested bargains. The much more
interest, going to the heart of a society's
on what makes it distinctive as a natio
states of their differences on question
tance. It can be the subject of ideologica
prolong international conflict. An intern
terest, by contrast, focuses on the deals
pushes into the background basic ques
probably never be able to agree; it pi
laundry list of particular interests and l
mental issue of the national purpose tha
tended to serve. Insofar as the United States and the Soviet Union
have reached agreement in their uneasy common history, the
have done so by concentrating on particular state interests-weap-
ons systems, geographically defined spheres of influence, trading
compacts - and not by debating their two overarching national in
terests, which are grounded in opposing conceptions of the be
regime and the place of the individual. Yet forgetting the nation
interest means losing hold of the very reason that state interests
are important.
It is true that one can say only that "most" states act on their in
terests. But while to say that most states act on their interests is t

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acknowledge that states do not always d

they are guided by their interests mo
motive. Forced to cope with challenges
cause they cannot call on a world go
members of the Western states system
past three centuries have by and large
that protected their ability for self
action; that is, they have promoted th
tern has not been altered by the great
diversity of states in the twentieth cen
ferent cultural heritages, one Western
dent Third World states have apparent
coupled with an insistence on prese
eignty.16 The combination of the ASEA
Vietnamese occupation of Laos and
the balance of power and the protectio
Metternich or a Bolingbroke would hav
ately. Most states seek to protect their
terests because the exigencies of an un
tem force them to it. No one person o
interests will be generally valued; th
condition in which all states find them
choose to resist it and act on other gr
ways directed by their states' interest
of the time to make the examination o
part of the understanding of the natio
There is thus a reciprocal influence b
environment and national interest. Th
but thin world community encompassi
rower but more potent national com
community has its common good bec
has an identifiable meaning for its mem
one another. When one moves to the in
of a common interest becomes vast
community becomes less solid. Enou
however, to prevent the rulers in each
judges in their own cause when they a
to support their common or national i
world community - frail and divided t
last word in defining the state's de
claim, supportable by justifying argu

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prevailing ideas on the rights and duties of

fiable grab for power. That many cases of
gression succeed merely means that the in
standards are loose, not that they are n
supply some check on the excesses that
tional interest of a particular state is inves
highest good, from which there is no fur
standards may be strengthened when s
conservative way dictated by their state i
tempting an ideological conversion of the
limited objectives that are said to serve
and nothing else.
Unadulterated self-assertion requires no
ers; it depends only on one's strength an
mands on them. Historically, however, th
rate description of interest-based state po
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries
doctrine of interests was at its height, see
interests meant advancing them as claims w
a larger interstate society-largely inform
cien regime, given a name in devices lik
later, but always in the background as a ju
of national desires with the order of the
daring states could flout the general expe
cost of arousing the community and st
against themselves.
The characteristic of the Napoleonic inte
olutionary was precisely that the Emperor
his aims, that he did not bargain over int
lenged European society in the name of li
takes two to bargain; it takes more to for
constitutes an acceptable bargain; but N
ested in the views of other parties, and
himself with the limited objectives dictat
The corresponding qualities of our own ag
ism, ideology - have fostered the tendenc
of national interest by breaking it out of i
setting it up as a principle of ungoverned
rand acted on his understanding of inte
Hitler, only on desire and malevolence in
that seemed to have returned to the state

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For the relationship between interest a

worked both ways. The "diplomatic re
withheld its approval of assertions of int
and thereby moderated their demands o
also the willingness of statesmen to think
est that permitted the slow accumulat
tions and norms which underlay the con
ued to fight for the illimitable objective
common cultural heritage would never h
society that Christendom formed. Kis
hopes for both a more prudent Ameri
stable international order when he descr
ing office: "Moral exuberance had inspir
and isolationism. It was my conviction t
damental national interests would pro
and an assurance of continuity."'8
Like the individual state's perception o
international society's definition of a
terms of state interests may alter. Und
stance, argument, or force, what had be
come expected, and vice versa, a process
codified in international law. "Interest
ideas, dominate directly the actions o
went on to add, however, "Yet the 'imag
these ideas have very often served as
tracks on which the dynamism of intere
F. H. Hinsley has applied this insight to
In the existence of separate states we hav

which each state pursues its interests at al
ternational relations is not concerned to sh
less to wish that they did not. His task is
different ways at different times-how an
change.20
The very fact that the standards of international society change

is evidence that they are not equivalent to ethical principles. Inter-
est, for all its mitigating benefits, remains a provisional, pruden-
tial guide. The commands that prudence is to apply in concrete
circumstances are to be found in prior standards of virtue, justice,
and mercy. These guides are timeless, universal, and binding-
but they are not unequivocal. Statesmanship brings them down to

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earth; yet, just as a leader may mistake wh

est lies, the norms of the international co
moment in history may diverge widely fr
any step among the three levels- the state
national interest and its important state i
among states on what constitutes a legitim
any one of them, and the unchanging
agreements can appear. One can only hope
of the world society, to the extent that it is f
tiality, will approximate in some degree t
tween ethical aspirations and political prac
this hope when he said in Federalist, No. 63
An attention to the judgment of other na

every government for two reasons: the one
the merit of any particular plan or measure
ous accounts, that it should appear to other
of a wise and honorable policy; the second i
particularly where the national councils m
strong passion or momentary interest, the p
ion of the impartial world may be the best
lowed. What has not America lost by her wa
eign nations; and how many errors and foll
avoided, if the justice and propriety of her
instance, been previously tried by the lig
probably appear to the unbiased part of man
CONNECTING THE THREE LEVELS
There remains the question of the manner in which these two

kinds of national interest interact and the normative implications
of such interaction. At least six views may be identified on th
link among the national interest, the international society that le-
gitimates various state interests, and the demands of ethical con-
duct. One directs the attention of national leaders solely to their
own national interest. A second advises these same leaders, in
their capacity as international actors, to be concerned with th
state interests of all actors and the international setting that sup
ports them, but not with the common good within other societies.
A third says attainment of any country's national interest requires
the prior establishment of a solid international society governed
on ethical principles; a fourth reverses that order. A fifth ask

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leaders and citizens alike to devote themselves to moral stands and

the undifferentiated good of the world society, forsaking any o
gation to the national interest or state interests. And a sixth b
lieves a simultaneous attention to the national interest and state
interests obtains the advantages of each and is perhaps the s
path to strengthening the world society and the observance o
rality in international politics.
Exclusive concern with the national interest. First, one may say
the national interest is all that a statesman can really be exp
to know and hope to serve. The traditions, the accumulated w
dom, even, in Burke's term, the prejudices, that guide leader
ward the common good are the product of the shared experi
of a community conscious of its basic unity, which rememb
common past and looks forward to a shared future. What se
the national interest must take precedence over any dutie
gauzy interstate society, at least in the responsibilities of st
men, because the national interest has a depth and solidity
cannot be matched by any broader community that prete
pass judgment on state actions. With their grounding in hist
memories as well as expectations, national communities have
ality that an insubstantial "world opinion" cannot match.
States governed by leaders who keep this primary responsib
in mind are islands of peace, stability, and justice in a disord
and conflict-ridden world. Within them, concrete meaning m
be given to the general dictates of morality, but if statesme
glect their duty to the national interest, even these bulwark
disappear. So, too, will any protection from random internat
violence, for states preserve the order within which the searc
justice goes on. A state whose leaders and people forget o
mantle the ties that bind them into a community with a rec
nized national interest does more than run the risk of an internal
"war of every man against every man." As the recent example of
Lebanon and the American hostages makes clear, it also becomes
a danger to any international ties, since its inability to maintain
civil order allows internal violence to spill over into the outside
world and threaten innocent third parties. What international so-
ciety there is relies on states to undergird it by safeguarding their
own national interest as functioning communities. Therefore, they
must remain the final judges of the individual state interests that
are necessary to maintain the national society.
The noninterventionist diplomatic republic. A second view would be

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that adopted by the Concert of Europe, at

attempts to engraft it with the Holy Alli
tervention against revolution. The Concer
sion of the idea that there existed an inte
tained by the great powers. This society g
members sovereignty and certain other
not to be jeopardized by excessive dema
state. Through formal and informal con
an implicit understanding of what was
powers decided the legitimacy of claims o
by any among their number. Each was res
ing "Europe" both by the combined power
against it should it reach for preponder
again unleashing revolution (and perhaps
the stress of a general European war.
It was the very necessity of upholding t
straint and respect for others' sovereign i
cluded a concern with the overall national interest of other states.
Whether each state was serving its people's common good and
whether it had the form of government best suited to its society
were questions for which its fellow states bore no responsibility. So
long as a power did not define its national interest so as to require
the conquest or conversion of the rest of Europe, its government
was free to advance or ignore the good of its people without inter-
ference from outside. Each power's regime was a matter for its do-
mestic decision. In 1852, the other powers even accepted what
they had most anxiously sought to prevent ever since they had
pledged to oppose it in the Quadruple Alliance of 1815: the acces-
sion of another Emperor Napoleon in France. Conforming to
practice, international law was never more influenced by positiv-
ism: states were the only recognized actors in international poli-
tics, there were no standards drawn from natural law that they
were bound to obey, and their domestic practices were not subject
to foreign scrutiny. Interventions in the Ottoman Empire and in
the rapidly expanding colonial world which were justified by
pointing to real or alleged cruelties and incapacities on the part of
the reigning governments there only demonstrated that these ar-
eas were not part of the European system and thus did not share
in the rights of its members. Within Europe's international soci-
ety, the concern of foreign ministries was with the maintenance of
an external equilibrium of power through the manipulation of

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state interests, not the advancing of th

any individual society.
These two formulations differ beca
stands on the influence exercised by an
the actions of any one state. The first d
cause it doubts the reality of any such
national system; if a stable distributio
peace, it arises as the work of an invisib
the uncoordinated policies of independe
by the good of its own separate commu
an international consensus, so profou
stated publicly, so powerful it determ
state interests advanced by others, ye
power entirely free in its domestic searc
A balance of power is a work of artific
mutual obligations like that given exp
Protocol of the Belgian Conference in
droits particuliers; mais l'Europe aussi a
cial qui le lui a donn6."'22
First an international society, then the nat
tions suggest a more direct link betwee
an international order within which par
terests are put forward. Kant believed t
justice in the world community, war, a
for any people, but served as a convenie
and illiberalism. It thereby allowed a go
betray the national interest and to serv
despotic regime. The triumph of free g
secure in a world from which aggressiv
nated. Perfection of the state- establish
voted to seeking the true national inter
ognition by states of their minimal o
society not to settle their differences by
No proponent of world government,
state free to pursue its national interest;
reformed, they were also to remain i
that these sovereign entities would conti
clashing, state interests; he proposed on
their means of settling conflicts, by sig
of war. That the national interest of ea
or, indeed, would for the first time

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could be seen in the fact that war in self-defense would continue to

be licit. But as war became more destructive, states in increasing
numbers would recognize their shared interest in its abolition an
would instead devote themselves to the deepening of the interna-
tional order through commercial exchange. The result, attainable
only in the distant future, but nonetheless a realistic prospect an
not a pipe dream, was an international society composed of re
publican states. Neither element of this vision - the abolition
war nor the establishment of constitutional governments- would
survive without the other.24
First the national interest, then an international society. Kant was not
always completely consistent on the order in which he expected
these two advances to be achieved; in Perpetual Peace he seems to
say that domestic reform would come first. Other observers have
wholeheartedly followed this path, declaring that if states would
change in ways that allowed them to see their true national inter-
est-by adopting the principles of free trade, for example, or lib-
eral democracy, or Marxism-Leninism- comprehensive and last-
ing peace would be materially advanced, and the way would be
opened for fruitful international collaboration. Adherents of this
school, whom Waltz has termed his "second-image" analysts, hold
that disorder and injustice in the international realm can be
traced directly to the folly and abuses of existing governments and
national economic systems.25 Reform (or overturn) the national
regimes so that they or their successors can see where their com-
mon good really lies, and the strengthening of an international
community within which interests may be peacefully and harmo-
niously pursued will follow of its own accord.
Junking the national interest. A fifth school of thought would aban-
don the concept of the national interest altogether. One prong of
this attack holds that the idea of a comprehensive national interest
is unrealistic because it takes no account of the existence of indi-
viduals and subnational groups, each with its own independen
desires and vision of what its good requires: "The plurality of co
crete objectives and of ultimate objectives forbids a rational defin
tion of 'national interest'... ."26 The assumption that an organ
union binds the elements of society together and gives them
shared overall interest apart from and professedly superior to the
unique, unshared interests is open in particular to the criticis
that it is incompatible with American political culture. A concep
tion of politics that has never been comfortable with talk of "th

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state," that distrusts concentrated power,

for the protection of liberty on opposed
rather than professions of wisdom and
statesmen finds the implications of natio
ing, too statist, for comfort."27
The danger of national interest as a c
common good is that it will run to extre
legedly objective 'general will' or public i
pretext for conformism and repression:
pretentious explanations of how a com
worse, they can even be justifications for
some elements in the community in favo
right to obstruct the general will, it is sa
that the free interplay of subnational int
expression of liberal values in politics, on
foreign policy determined by the wishes
is composed entirely of particular goals t
state interests, without any attempt to fo
of any overall national interest - is also
respecting democratic freedoms, is likely
morality best as well.
At the same time, a second line of attac
interest, far from being unrealistically c
exclusivist. Because they posit the unsh
state as the proper end of foreign policy,
interest propound policies inimical to wo
versive of moral systems that are univer
enjoy basic human rights as persons, not
state, positivist standards of law notwith
sessing equal rights are entitled to equal
terest thinking, by dividing the human
making the prime responsibility of decis
ment of the interests of a particular subs
invidious distinction among persons. (Wo
their proclaimed responsibility even to t
use the nation as a cover for policies d
narrower, more exclusive subnational gr
Unthinking devotion to the interest of
into a crusade for a uniquely virtuous
claims of others-a possibility that esc
when he told a German audience in 19

190.80.24.3 on Sun, 15 May 2022 23:18:31 UTC
the new [Nazi] Germany which we [in

well to study, adapt, adopt. I have seen G
in work and play an energy and burn
which, because it is wholly unselfish, is
patriotic devotion to one's own national c
a corresponding disregard for the rights
munity. Impartial justice is subverted w
differently simply because they happen
ferent points of the Earth's surface, und
dictions. "Thus," in the words of one cri
erable to dispense with the idea of the n
and instead appeal directly to the rights
sons affected by the choice'.""3
These two arguments against the na
combined. The unity of the traditiona
ways overestimated, is today dissolving a
itics lengthens and the complexity of th
ment grows. Subnational actors are n
subordination in a hierarchical set of go
interest by central decision-makers. Ins
demands, bypassing any attempted coor
est groups and individual bureaucratic
ments make their own side bargains w
parts abroad. As objectives multiply and the usefulness of
conventional forms of power seems more restricted, it becomes in-
creasingly difficult to rank ends in any coherent order, or to en-
force a choice once made.31
In addition, many of the new items on the agenda cannot be
satisfactorily resolved by any one state, or by a bargain between
two or more self-interested states. These broader global problems
of food production, environmental protection, and the like require
a global outlook; self-interested approaches will prompt only a
scramble for dwindling resources. This is a matter not only of an
increased number of participants, but also of a change in out-
look-toward a sense of responsibility for the world as a whole.
The state, looking to its "interest," can satisfy the requirements of
successful and just action at neither the subnational level nor the
supranational level, both of which are taking a greater part in de-
fining the global politics of our era. In either case, decisions based
on the national interest are dangerous and ethically deficient.
The best of both worlds? A final interpretation would say the two

190.80.24.3 on Sun, 15 May 2022 23:18:31 UTC
meanings of national interest fulfill two

portant needs. The overall national in
point within states; it is the reason why
ask their fellow citizens to subsume their narrower interests in the
common good. Particular state interests serve as the common cur
rency for dealings among states; more than that, by setting a
states on a level, with all standing on the same ground and none
holding a monopoly on virtue, they may encourage a certain
modesty of outlook that may lead to tolerance and cooperation
Policy based on the national interest stands as testimony that the
nation forms a true community. Policy directed toward attaining
various state interests is a result of the fact that there exists no
comparable world community possessed of a solidarity that could
demand comparable sacrifices in the world's interest. Neverthe
less, when states bargain with one another over interests instead o
attempting to destroy one another in ideological struggles, they
are acting within the confines of a tentative community, whose au
thority in determining the legitimacy of claims pressed by state
grows or diminishes along with the sense of unity felt by its mem
bers.32
Two meanings, two functions - it is not surprising that the bi
furcated term national interest should straddle the line between an-
cient and modern political thought. Domestically, it serves as the
modern term given to the ancients' injunction to serve the com-
mon good as the path to creating a more just society and inculcat-
ing virtue in its citizens (by reminding them of their ties to their
compatriots, their responsibilities to them, and the consequent ne-
cessity of sacrifice for the good of all). This meaning of the con-
cept does run counter to much in the American political tradi-
tion;33 it is more austere, more demanding, more concerned with
responsibilities and duties than rights.
Yet, in relations among states, the second meaning of national
interest often predominates. Here, it was advocated by moderns
as a "safe" guide to foreign actions. Writers of the seventeenth cen-
tury believed that to try to construct a foreign policy from ethical
principles alone could be impractical; but to rely on pure egoism
or to accept the aristocratic guideline of honor or glory would be
self-defeating, for both were based on the passions, which could
lead rulers into overreaching themselves or losing their heads (per-
haps literally). Interest - the desire for material gain - was, by
contrast, universal, predictable, calculating, and mundane. It was

190.80.24.3 on Sun, 15 May 2022 23:18:31 UTC
founded on reason, which would direct the statesman to the

course that would bring him the greatest gain, and it assumed this
desire for gain was present in every person and every state. By
submitting to the "lower" passion for material advancement and
directing it with rationality, statesmen would downplay higher
ideals and values, the better to preserve their states (and the com-
mon good of the societies that lay behind them).34 They would
also, said writers like Montesquieu, foster community and peace.
Both senses of the term undoubtedly carry their own risks. Pa-
triotism, the concern for the good of the whole, has been abused,
to justify discrimination against identifiable minorities within or
aggression against "lesser peoples" without. The persecution of a
segment of the society is the very negation of the view that the na-
tion is a community with a common interest. The community ap-
plies universal principles in a specific way precisely because of its
unique circumstances, which give it no right to dictate morality to
others. Nevertheless, the possibility remains that the term national
interest will be misappropriated for these illegitimate ends.
A foreign policy determined by particular state interests carries
its own dangers. While it may be, on the whole, restrained and
moderate, it may also leave no room for even the limited sympa-
thy or altruism that the tentative society of international relations
allows. It may be shortsighted, concentrating on immediate profit,
while betraying the larger principles of its own national society
and failing to be true to what is best in its own tradition. It may
display the same failings that modern political thought, it has
been charged, reveals in the domestic polity: the concentration on
the satisfaction of the lowest appetites, the constraining of any
wider imagination, the loss of the ability to distinguish between
the vital and the peripheral.
These are difficult and significant objections, but the two
meanings of the central term work to balance each other. The na-
tional interest is the statesman's prime responsibility, but conceiv-
ing his role as one of advancing narrower state interests reminds
him that there are other players on the field with their own inter-
ests to protect, punctures undue tendencies toward national self-
importance, may serve to restrain enthusiastic adventures, and
calls attention to the shared framework of an international society
within which the measured contest over interests can be carried
out. Conversely, one's views of the interests grounding foreign pol-
icy is enlightened by keeping in mind that they serve the larger

190.80.24.3 on Sun, 15 May 2022 23:18:31 UTC
goal, the national interest, which is in t

found political and ethical consideration
not be achieved all at once-and, indeed
achieved, so that it is an end always to b
approached through continuous effort di
ate goals.
CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS AND STANDING ASSUMPTIONS
The contribution of national-interest thinking to the ethical

lemmas of today would seem to be primarily a negative
Given a world of states accepting only a limited society am
themselves, national interest generally prevents them from d
too much to one another, rather than chastising them for do
too little for one another. In the foreseeable future, states ar
going to accord noncitizens all the rights and privileges of th
nationals; international relations will not proceed as if st
boundaries did not exist. The more immediate problem ma
one of restraint, supported by a strengthened international c
sensus on the give-and-take of interests, or in other words an
proach based on the sixth view, which makes use of both nati
interests and state interests.
To this endeavor, one might apply Tocqueville's description of
"interest rightly understood." Tocqueville saw individual Ameri-
cans pursuing their private interests within the framework of a
larger system that allowed all citizens to do the same. Like theo-
ries of national interest on the international level, the doctrine of
self-interest rightly understood did not attempt the avowedly futile
task of persuading citizens to set aside their personal interests and
devote themselves wholly to the common good. Instead, it sought
to convince them of two things: (1) that diverting some of their re-
sources to maintaining the system that gave them the freedom to
pursue their own interests was itself in the long run also in their
interests; and (2) that the preservation of the system depended to
some extent on their willingness to moderate the demands of their
private interests and to compromise their claims with those of oth-
ers. Liberty would not survive a fixation on private affairs by
"practical" people who had no time for politics: "Such folk think
they are following the doctrine of self-interest, but they have a
very crude idea thereof, and the better to guard their interests,
they neglect the chief of them, that is, to remain their own mas-

190.80.24.3 on Sun, 15 May 2022 23:18:31 UTC
ters."35 On the other hand, the spirit of

consistent with expectations that the citiz
plete attention to public and not private af
sovereign states discourages an attitude
part of any of them).
Tocqueville aimed for something less dem
tion that the assertion of private interests
need to protect the liberal regime that m
ble:
The principle of interest rightly under

acts of self-sacrifice, but it suggests daily sm
itself it cannot suffice to make a man virt
number of citizens in habits of regularity,
foresight, self-command; and, if it does not
tue by the will, it gradually draws them in
habits. If the principle of interest rightly
the whole moral world, extraordinary vi
more rare; but I think that gross depravity
common.
Tocqueville may have underestimated the

nity in even the individualistic American p
derstated its ability to call forth self-sacri
even "extraordinary virtues." But "interest
curately describes the comparative frailty o
munity and the limited extent of the dem
members. It entails a measure of self-restra
so that the realm in which they are made
willingness to devote some of one's time to
and its liberties on the national level corre
to act according to interest and not sheer
tional. A policy grounded in the protection
a "lofty" doctrine, but if it teaches statesm
tion, foresight, and self-command, it will
level of international behavior.
Interest rightly understood is applicable to international politics
because it deals with citizens in their relations with one another,
not with isolated individuals. Nor are states isolated from the out-
side world. Both internal and external circumstances determine a
state's "moral opportunity"- the leeway it enjoys to introduce ethi-
cal considerations into its actions.36 The scope of this opportunity
depends on the extent to which it believes its political, military,

190.80.24.3 onf:ffff:ffff on Thu, 01 Jan 1976 12:34:56 UTC
and economic position is safe - that is,

terests are secured. A stable internat
members as legitimate can be sustain
rected toward concrete interests - kno
the expectations held by all of how s
time, this order is a prerequisite for an
that widens the moral opportunity of
their policy to move beyond the pure s
a self-interest softened by the obligatio
in a community. The mutual expectatio
lent to universal moral duties. They ar
applied political ethics; their strength
pend on the degree to which the memb
common ethical framework.
And it is in these international assumptions of what constitut
a legitimate state interest that change has occurred in our era. A
least since the Second World War, international society has be
withdrawing its grant of legitimacy from state interests defined
as to include colonial possessions. "National self-determinatio
for such dependencies has come to be regarded a priori as a justi
fied claim; secession from an existing independent state, in gen-
eral, has not. In 1973-74, the United States declined to test the
general acceptance of a claim to the right to use armed force to se-
cure continued access to Middle East oil. If statements by the
General Assembly are a guide, racial discrimination by govern-
ments like South Africa has been defined as more unjust and a
greater threat to international peace than other forms of tyranny.
States have found they could successfully assert an interest in ex-
tending, for some purposes, their jurisdiction over the ocean floor
from three to as much as two hundred miles from their coastline.
The changing climate of opinion has made it easier for less-dev
oped countries to assert control over foreign corporations with
their territory, harder for any country to defend extraterrito
rights for its citizens abroad.
No one should argue that these changes are indistinguisha
from disinterested justice. But they do show that international s
ciety evolves, even if it does not always progress. Because the u
mate power of effective action rests with states, national statesm
cannot abdicate their responsibility for moral choice to this wo
opinion. Sometimes, when the issue is vital, they must act even
the teeth of it. But they should be very sure of their ground bef

190.80.24.3 on Sun, 15 May 2022 23:18:31 UTC
they do so. In not every case is the fallib

community as clear as in the General Ass
tion that Zionism is a form of racism. Po
can counteract tendencies to national self
due weight to Madison's guide, "the pre
of the impartial world."
Promoting justice in a world of states m
with their evolving national interests. It
in desirable ways the shifting definition o
est- furthering restraints and throwing
or shared interest as subjects for more p
could range from combating terrorism t
against products from the Third World.
tional interest is inseparable from norma
promise great gains-only hard, slow wor
changes in international expectations of
hope to replace power with morality in t
policy. Nor can it be regarded as a substit
ards of ethics that ordinary conduct, bot
tional, consistently flouts. It may, howev
of practical wisdom to problems that wil
tious designs.
NOTES
1 Stanley Hoffmann, Primacy or World Order: American Foreign Policy Since the
Cold War (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978), p. 133.
2 By Kenneth Boulding, in Erwin Knoll and Judith Nies McFadden, eds.,
American Militarism, 1970.: A Dialogue on the Distortion of Our National Priorities and
the Need to Reassert Control over the Defense Establishment (New York: Viking Press,
1969), p. 90.
s David Wood, "In National Interest," Times (London), 9 June 1969, p. 8.
SPhilip W. Quigg, America the Dutiful.: An Assessment of US. Foreign Policy
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1971), p. 107.
5 See the article on "National Interest" by James N. Rosenau.
6 Hans J. Morgenthau, In Defense of the National Interest: A Critical Examination
of American Foreign Policy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), p. 33.
7 Robert C. Johansen, The National Interest and the Human Interest: An Analysis
of US. Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 392.
8 Stephen Krasner may come close. See his Defending the National Interest:
Raw Materials Investments and US. Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1978).
9 See Clarke E. Cochran, "Yves R. Simon and 'The Common Good': A
Note on the Concept," Ethics, 88 (April 1978), 229-39. Or if society can be seen
as a partnership, it is in the sense of Burke's famous passage: "Society is indeed
a contract. Subordinate contracts for objects of mere occasional interest may be
dissolved at pleasure-but the state ought not to be considered as nothing bet-

190.80.24.3 on Sun, 15 ff on Thu, 01 Jan 1976 12:34:56 UTC
ter than a partnership agreement in a trade of pe

bacco, or some other low concern, to be taken up
est, and to be dissolved by the fancy of the part
other reverence, because it is not a partnership i
the gross animal existence of a temporary and pe
nership in all science; a partnership in all art; a pa
in all perfection. As the ends of such a partnersh
generations, it becomes a partnership not only b
but between those who are living, those who are
born" (The Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke,
1901], III:359).
10 Cochran, "Political Science and 'The Public Int
36 (March 1974), 355.
" See Brian Barry, "The Public Interest," The Bi
E. Connolly (New York: Atherton Press, 1969), p
12 U.S., President, Public Papers of the Presidents o
ton, D.C.: Office of the Federal Register, National
1953- ), Jimmy Carter, 1980-81, III:2890.
13 See Raymond Aron's argument that "Political
sembles a carnival, but, beneath the tumultuous
reigns. The majority of citizens obey the same ru
values" (Peace and War: A Theory of International R
and Annette Baker Fox [Garden City, New York
14 See Charles Burton Marshall, "National Inte
bility," Annals of the American Academy of Political an
85.
15 Quoted in David Thomson, Democracy in Fra
York: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 271.
16 See Robert W. Tucker, The Inequality of Nati
1977).
17 See Friedrich Kratochwil, "On the Notion of 'Interest' in International
Relations," International Organization, 36 (Winter 1982), 1-30.
18 White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), p. 65.
19 Quoted in Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for
Power and Peace, 5th ed., revised (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978), p. 9. See
also pp. 8-10.
20 Power and the Pursuit of Peace: Theory and Practice in the History of Relations Be-
tween States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), p. 197. See also
Barry Buzan and R. J. Barry Jones, Change and the Study of International Relations:
The Evaded Dimension (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), esp. chaps. 5 and
6; and the growing literature on evolving international "regimes."
21 See also the views of Alexander Hamilton, in Arnold Wolfers and
Laurence W. Martin, eds., The Anglo-American Tradition in Foreign Affairs: Read-
ings from Thomas More to Woodrow Wilson (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale Uni-
versity Press, 1956), pp. 148-49.
22 Quoted in Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace, pp. 224-25.
23 See Kant's claim, in his Ideas for a Universal History, that "the problem of
establishing a perfect civil constitution is dependent upon the problem of law-
governed relationship between states."
24 See the sections on Kant in Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace, and in
W. B. Gallie, Philosophers of Peace and War (Cambridge University Press, 1979).
25 Kenneth N. Walz, Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1959).
26 Aron, Peace and War, p. 90.

190.80.24.3 on Sun, 15 May 2022 23:18:31 UTC
27 See the work of Thomas Cook and Malcolm Moos in "The American
Idea of International Interest," American Political Science Review, 47 (M
1953), 31-42; "Hindrances to Foreign Policy: Individualism and Legalis
Journal of Politics, 15 (February 1953), 114-39; "Foreign Policy: The Realis
Idealism," American Political Science Review, 46 (June 1952), 343-56; and P
Through Purpose: The Realism of Idealism as a Basis for Foreign Policy (Baltim
The Johns Hopkins Press, 1954).
28 Bernard Crick, In Defense of Politics, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of
cago Press, 1972), p. 24. See also Eugene David Weinstein, "The Ign
Lie - National Interest Ideology in American Civilization" (Ph.D. disserta
University of Minnesota, 1967).
29 Quoted in Martin Gilbert and Richard Gott, The Appeasers (Lond
Lowe and Brydone, 1967), pp. 312-32. See also Morgenthau, In Defense o
National Interest, p. 37; Robert W. Tucker, "Professor Morgenthau's Theor
Political 'Realism " American Political Science Review, 46 (March 1952), 223;
Seabury,, Power, Freedom, and Diplomacy: The Foreign Policy of the United Sta
America (New York: Random House, 1963), pp. 144-46. The basic stateme
the transmutation of individual altruism into group egoism remains Rein
Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics (New
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1932).
30 Charles R. Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Prince
Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 55. See also p. 176.
31 See Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdepende
World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977).
32 See Morgenthau, In Defense of the National Interest, pp. 36-39, and Poli
Among Nations, p. 11; Kratochwil, "On the Notion of 'Interest' "; Hedley B
The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics (New York: Colu
University Press, 1977); Martin Wight, Power Politics, eds. Hedley Bul
Carsten Holbraad (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1978), esp. pp. 100-1
Observance of the informal rules of the balance of power varies from era t
in the same pattern.
33 Though not all-see Herbert J. Storing, with the editorial assistan
Murray Dry, What the Anti-Federalists Were For (Chicago: University of Chi
Press, 1981); Paul Eidelberg, A Discourse on Statesmanship: The Design and T
formation of the American Polity (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois P
1971).
3 See Albert O. Hirschmann, The Passions and the Intkrests: Political Arguments
for Capitalism before Its Triumph (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977),
esp. pp. 7-66; J.A.W. Gunn, Politics and the Public Interest in the Seventeenth Century
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969).
35 All quotations from Tocqueville are taken from Democracy in America,
trans. Henry Reeve, 2 vols., 4th ed. (New York: J. & H. G. Langley, 1840), II:
bk. 2, chaps. 8 and 14. See also John Stuart Mill, in his introduction to the
first English translation of Tocqueville's work, on the effect on the citizen of
participation in public affairs: "He becomes acquainted with more varied busi-
ness, and a larger range of considerations. He is made to feel that besides the
interests which connect him with them; that not only the common weal is his
weal, but that it partly depends on his exertions." Much the same could be said
of statesmen in the eras of closest international society.
36 The phrase is used by Arnold Wolfers in his introduction to The Anglo-
American Tradition in Foreign Affairs, pp. ix-xxxvii.

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The National Interest: Normative Foundations

Author(s): W. David Clinton

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/1407381

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The analyst who addresses the normative strength

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moral worth.8 The national interest d

To demonstrate that national interest is not only ethically sig-

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necessary, by its lights and for its ends. It

If world politics remains, in the last analysis, the politics of

DEFINING NATIONAL INTEREST

To approach the normative issue, it is necessary first to sep

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bers of a subgroup. Individuals in socie

Today, as people have become ever more doubtful of the ability

As Carter's plea makes clear, countries do not automatical

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smaller, more particular groups have t

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interest they define will be quite clo

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On the other hand, because the overall

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acknowledge that states do not always d

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prevailing ideas on the rights and duties of

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For the relationship between interest a

In the existence of separate states we hav

The very fact that the standards of international society change

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earth; yet, just as a leader may mistake wh

An attention to the judgment of other na

CONNECTING THE THREE LEVELS

There remains the question of the manner in which these two

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leaders and citizens alike to devote themselves to moral stands and

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that adopted by the Concert of Europe, at

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state interests, not the advancing of th

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could be seen in the fact that war in self-defense would continue to

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state," that distrusts concentrated power,

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the new [Nazi] Germany which we [in

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meanings of national interest fulfill two

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founded on reason, which would direct the statesman to the

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goal, the national interest, which is in t

CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS AND STANDING ASSUMPTIONS

The contribution of national-interest thinking to the ethical

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ters."35 On the other hand, the spirit of

The principle of interest rightly under

Tocqueville may have underestimated the

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and economic position is safe - that is,