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Brain drain or banal everyday lives: Malaysians (and ex-Malaysians)

negotiating emotional geographies of diasporic citizenship and mobilities

Chapter · July 2012

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The 8th International Malaysian Studies Conference (MSC8)

“Transition And Transformation:

State, Market & Culture In a Period of Rapid Change”

9-11 July 2012 (Monday – Wed.)

Title of Presentation:
AUTHOR & KOH SIN YEE
INSTITUTION Department of Geography and Environment
London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE)
Email: s.y.koh@lse.ac.uk
TITLE Brain Drain or Banal Everyday Lives:
Malaysians (and ex-Malaysians) Negotiating Emotional
Geographies of Diasporic Citizenship and Mobilities

PRINCIPAL CONVENOR
Malaysian Social Science Association (MSSA / PSSM)

CO-CONVENOR & HOST

Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, Bangi, Selangor

CO-CONVENOR
Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities (FSSK), UKM
Institute of Occidental Studies (IKON), UKM
Institute of Ethnic Studies (KITA), UKM
 BRAIN DRAIN OR BANAL EVERYDAY LIVES:
MALAYSIANS (AND EX-MALAYSIANS) NEGOTIATING EMOTIONAL
GEOGRAPHIES OF DIASPORIC CITIZENSHIP AND MOBILITIES

Introduction
The World Bank (2011b) estimates that the Malaysian diaspora (i.e.
Malaysian-born migrants) has reached 1 million in 2010 compared to 750,000 in 2000,
while the Malaysian brain drain (i.e. tertiary educated Malaysian-born migrants, aged
25+) is estimated to be a third of its overall diaspora. Indeed, Malaysia has been
facing out-migration of its educated population. Emigration rate of Malaysia’s
tertiary-educated population is 10.5 in year 2000, significantly higher than the average
of 6.1 for upper middle income countries and 7.0 for developing countries in East
Asia and Pacific (The World Bank 2011a). Its 1990-2000 trend is comparable to that
of Singapore and Iran (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Emigration rate of tertiary-educated population

Emigration rate =
stock of emigrants
ages 25 and older,
residing in an OECD
country other than
that in which they
were born, with at
least one year of
tertiary education as a
percentage of the
population age 25 and
older with tertiary
education

Source: The World Bank (2011a)

In a bid to tackle brain drain, and in line with the Tenth Malaysia Plan (2011-
2015), the Malaysian government has introduced the New Economic Model (NEM)
with an objective of achieving a high-income status country by the year 2020. The
government aims to achieve targets in National Key Economic Areas (NKEAs)
amounting to an increase of some 2.766 million jobs and RM1,072.3 billion in GNI

2
contributions by the year 2020 (Table 1). Talent Corporation Malaysia (TalentCorp)
is tasked to attract overseas Malaysians and foreigners to relocate to Malaysia in order
to meet these talent needs. Malaysia’s Deputy Prime Minister has also recently called
the Malaysian diaspora an “asset” with which the country seeks to “cooperate with
and hopefully entice to return in the near future”.

Table 1: NKEA targets

Source: PEMANDU (2012)

Yet, there is obviously a gap in the permanent departure of Malaysians vis-à-

vis targets in talent development, attraction and retention. Between 1990 and 2000,
the number of Malaysian migrants with tertiary education in OECD countries has
increased by 40% (Table 2). In 2010, one in ten tertiary-educated Malaysian migrated
to an OECD country – twice the world average (The World Bank 2011b, 12). Despite
this, programmes such as the 2006 Brain Gain Malaysia (BGM) continue to focus on
“Researchers, Scientist, Engineers and Technopreneurs (RSETs)”. Its predecessor, the
1995 Returning Scientist Programme, attracted 93 researchers, scientists and
engineers, including 23 Malaysians (Bedi and Azizan 2010) – all but one of them has
since left Malaysia (Tan 2010). The revamped 2011 Returning Expert Programme
(REP) administered by TalentCorp requires applicants to have relevant working

3
experience and expertise in the 12 NKEAs. While it is not surprising that these
programmes are highly-selective to meet specific targets, this effectively excludes
tertiary-educated overseas Malaysians who may not fit these criteria, but who may be
able to contribute towards the NEM targets.

Table 2: Number of Malaysians with tertiary-education in OECD countries

Source: Docquier and Marfouk (2004)

On the other hand, how much do we know of the “Malaysian diaspora”? Are
they “assets” of the country, or are they flexible citizens (cf. Ong 1999) pursuing their
respective migration projects? How do the Malaysian diaspora perceive policies such
as the REP? Here, a set of inter-related questions needs to be asked. First, who are the
Malaysian diaspora? Second, do they identify themselves as the Malaysian diaspora?
Third, how do they rationalise their citizenship and migration decisions? Fourth, how
are these negotiated and translated into actual mobilities? Finally, of those who
returned, what are the hidden stories of their trajectories? More importantly, how do
these insights inform Malaysia’s current and future talent retention and reverse brain
drain efforts?

This paper is organised in four sections. The first section introduces the
“Malaysian diaspora” as it is defined by reverse brain drain policies such as the REP.
The second section complicates this by portraying the “real” picture of the Malaysian
diaspora. The third section draws from in-depth interviews with tertiary-educated
Malaysians and ex-Malaysians in Singapore, London, and returnees to Kuala Lumpur
(KL). I focus on (1) the meanings of their Malaysians citizenship, (2) perceptions and
significance of social networks, and (3) shifting priorities and meanings. I conclude in

4
the fourth section by discussing how a focus on the “human face of global mobility”
(Favell et al. 2006) or the banal geographies of everyday lives (Yeoh and Huang 2011)
can inform Malaysia’s talent project.

Defining the “Malaysian Diaspora”

“Diaspora”, originally used in reference to the Jewish dispersal from
Jerusalem, has connotations of exile, displacement, loss, alienation and a yearning for
the homeland. However, there has since been an expansion of the term beyond its
original context. “Diaspora” has been used to refer to a group, an identity, a process, a
movement across borders, and a state of consciousness. In reference to a group, it has
been used to describe practically any “deterritorialised” or “transnational” community,
even those uprooted for economic reasons. More recently, Vertovec (1997) proposes
three ways of conceptualising “diaspora”: (1) as social form; (2) as type of
consciousness; and (3) as mode of cultural production. The first defines a group with
a shared history and geography; the second captures a sense of being “here” and
“there” while not fully belonging to either; and the third entails the construction and
reproduction of an imagined belonging.

With increasing global competition for human capital, the term “skilled
diaspora” (Brinkerhoff 2006) has been used to describe emigrants with desired skills
and capital useful to the development of their sending countries. Consequently, there
has been a “development turn” in the brain drain literature. Debates shift positively
towards brain gain and brain circulation (Wescott and Brinkerhoff 2006), diaspora
engagement strategies (de Haas 2006) and the diaspora as a potential resource for
their origin countries (Hugo 2011). Thus, diasporas have become “transnational
development agents” (Faist 2008) bearing the responsibilities, hopes and expectations
of assisting the development of their sending countries.

In line with this, the term “Malaysian diaspora” started to appear in public
discourse in 2004 (Pereira 2004). The Ministry of Science, Technology and
Innovation (MOSTI) introduced policies to attract overseas Malaysians to return, as
well as having joint ventures with local universities and laboratories to employ
overseas Malaysian scientists. The focus then was to improve Malaysia’s R&D
capability. As a result, the term “Malaysian diaspora” became synonymous with a
5
specific type of overseas Malaysians – those with relevant qualifications and overseas
work experience in industries and professions identified by the government from time
to time. For example, a document outlining the fields of expertise for the previous
Returning Expert Programme ends with a caveat: “The Government of Malaysia
reserves the right to revise the fields of expertise without prior notice” (MOSTI 2005).

In other words, to be recognised officially as a “Malaysian diaspora”, the

overseas Malaysian must meet eligibility criteria defined by shifting goal posts. This
selective interpretation of the “Malaysian diaspora” has also extended into recent
policies such as the REP. For example, there have been some changes to the fields of
expertise defined in 2005 and in 2011 (Figure 2). While industries such as financial
services, education and healthcare have been retained, others such as science and
technology, arts and culture, maritime and aerospace have been dropped. Instead, new
areas such as Greater KL/Klang Valley, wholesale and retail, and tourism have been
identified. Applicants to the REP must be currently employed and residing overseas
for a minimum of three years prior to application. In addition, they must have
minimum overseas working experience in accordance to their qualifications. This
range from 10 years for Diploma holders, 6 years for Bachelor degree holders, 4 years
for Master degree holders, and 2 years for PhD degree holders.

Figure 2: Comparing fields of expertise and NKEAs

Source: MOSTI (2005); PEMANDU (2012)

Calculating backwards, the estimated minimum age for one to be eligible to

apply for REP is between 27 to 31 years (Table 3). It is clear that the “Malaysian

6
diaspora”, as it is currently defined, refers to tertiary-educated professionals who are
at least in their late-20s or early-30s. This age group would have been married, as the
mean age at first marriage for Malaysia residents is 28.0 for males and 25.7 for
females in 2010 (DOSM 2011). Taking into account Malaysians who are Singapore
residents, the median age at first marriage for Singapore residents is 30.0 for males
and 27.6 for females in 2010 (NPTD et al. 2011, 10); while that for Singapore
residents with university qualifications is 30.1 for males and 28.2 for females in 2009
(DOSS 2010, 11). This has implications for Malaysia’s talent project, which I will
elaborate later.

Table 3: Estimated minimum age for applicants to be eligible to apply for

Returning Expert Programme (REP)

The “Real” Malaysian Diaspora

However, not all overseas Malaysians are RSETs, nor are they all engaged in
the 12 NKEAs. In narrowly-defining the Malaysian diaspora as people employed in
specific industries in line with the current needs of the country, is the Malaysian
government ignoring the elephant in the room? What is the profile of the “real”
Malaysian diaspora, particularly in terms of their (1) education qualifications; (2)
employment sectors; (3) reasons for emigration; and (4) durations of stays in their
host countries? To answer these questions, I draw from a range of official statistics,
secondary survey results, and interviews I conducted with tertiary-educated
Malaysian-born migrants in London, Singapore and returnees to KL.

7
 First, the World Bank (2011b) projections suggest that a third of Malaysian
emigrants are tertiary-educated. Actual proportions, however, differ in each
destination country. Year 2010 estimations in terms of numbers and percentages of
overall migrant stocks are: Singapore (121,662; 31.5%), Australia (51,556; 50.8%),
United States (34,045; 55.7%), United Kingdom (16,609; 25.4%), Canada (12,807;
53.2%), Brunei (10,208; 13.3%) and New Zealand (6,708; 41.9%) (Figure 3).
Controlling for age of entry to OECD countries, Beine, Docquier and Rapoport (2011)
use this as a proxy to determine whether migrants gained education before or after
migration. They found that Malaysia’s brain drain ratios (vis-à-vis brain drain 0+) are
85.7% for brain drain 12+, 75.7% for brain drain 18+, and 61.7% for brain drain 22+.
These are considered one of the lower ratios for countries with over 0.25 million
population. This implies that emigrants from Malaysia obtain their education after
migration (i.e. migrated for overseas education).

Figure 3: Estimated Malaysian diaspora and brain drain (25+), 2010

450 70%
Thousands

400 55.7%
53.2% 60%
50.8%
350
41.9% 50%
300
250 31.5% 40%

200 25.4%
30%
150
13.3% 20%
100
10%
50
0 0%
SG AUS US UK CND BRN NZ

Diaspora Brain drain as % of diaspora

Source: The World Bank (2011b, 140)

Second, OECD data based on year 2000 censuses show that the top three
sectors engaged by tertiary-educated Malaysian diasporas in OECD countries are:
health and social work; real estate, renting and business activities; and education
(OECD 2012b). Slight differences are seen in certain countries, such as in New
Zealand, where the top sectors are financial intermediation; construction; and public
administration and defence (Figure 4). Comparing this to NKEA target sectors, there

8
is obviously a slight mismatch – majority of the “real” tertiary-educated Malaysian
diaspora in OECD countries are engaged in sectors that are not one of the NKEAs.
How then will they be eligible for, and/or interested in, reverse brain drain policies
such as the REP?

Figure 4: Sectors engaged by tertiary-educated Malaysian migrants in selected

OECD countries

Australia United States

United Kingdom Canada

New Zealand

Source: OECD (2012b)

9
 Third, surveys of the Malaysian diaspora indicate that they consider the main
reasons for Malaysian emigration – as a social trend and not their own reasons – are
(1) better career prospects overseas, (2) sense of social injustice, (3) more attractive
salary or benefits overseas, and (4) study and stay on (The World Bank 2011b; Wake
Up Call Malaysia 2012). Individual reasons for emigration, however, appear to be
firstly for education, secondly a combination of overseas education followed by work,
and thirdly for work (Figure 5). Indeed, this is also prevalent amongst my interview
respondents.

Figure 5: Reasons for residing in current location according to age groups

Excluding other responses e.g.

“work and family”, “study and
family”, “parents’ work”, “born
here”, “migration”, “travel”

Source: Wake Up Call (2012)

However, there are diversities in leaving Malaysia for education purposes.

First, some left in primary or secondary school stages in anticipation of difficulties in
getting public university places. Second, some were recruited to study in Singapore at
various education levels (e.g. through ASEAN Scholarship and university tuition
grants). Third, there are those residing in Johor who commute daily to Singapore for
primary, secondary, and junior college education. Fourth, some students from Chinese
independent schools pursue university degrees in Singapore and Taiwan where their
Unified Examination Certificate (UEC) are recognised. Finally, some were sent
overseas under Malaysian government scholarships. Thus, the culture of migrating (cf.
Cohen and Sirkeci 2011) for education require much more careful examination as

10
there are differences across ethnicity, class, parents’ experience of overseas education,
presence of family members overseas, etc.

Fourth, based on year 2000 censuses, majority of tertiary-educated Malaysians

in OECD countries have resided there between 10 to 20 years (Figure 6). This is
followed by stays of more than 20 years. If, following Beine et al.’s (2011) findings,
we assume that Malaysian emigrants leave the country between 12-18 years old, they
would be in the age range of 22 to 38 years old after residing for 10 to 20 years
overseas. This is a young and economically active age group who are still relatively
mobile. However, returning to Malaysia is only one of their many mobility options.
On the other hand, given the tendency for longer durations of stays, how feasible will
it be for the Malaysian diaspora to relocate back to Malaysia after they have
established their lives elsewhere? This is especially so for those with foreign spouses
and children (particularly Malaysian women married to foreign husbands), for whom
difficulties of securing permanent resident status has been an obstacle for returning to
Malaysia.

Figure 6: Durations of stays of tertiary-educated Malaysian-born migrants in

selected OECD countries

Source: OECD (2012a)

Interestingly, despite long durations of stays in destination countries, the

Malaysian diaspora continue to harbour strong emotional belonging to Malaysia and

11
imagine an eventual return some day. However, this may not be actualised.
Comparing survey responses to the same questions in two separate surveys, we see
high levels of self-assessed emotional attachment to Malaysia, yet a very different
picture in terms of plans for actual return to Malaysia (Figure 7). The World Bank
(2011b) online survey of n=194 had 53% respondents between the ages of 15-24,
52% students, and 79% single persons. On the other hand, Wake Up Call (2012)
online survey of n=518 consisted of 61.9% respondents between the ages of 21-30,
and 14.3% between the ages of 31-40. While this survey did not collect employment
and marital status details, the skew towards the 21-40 age group suggest that
respondents were non-students and perhaps more likely to be married. Interestingly,
while majority of the respondents in the second survey indicate a stronger sense of
emotional attachment to Malaysia, they also indicate a lesser intention to return to
Malaysia.

Figure 7: Comparing survey results

I feel a strong sense of patriotism for, I intend to return to Malaysia for good
and/or emotional attachment to, Malaysia at some point in my life

So what do we know of the “real” Malaysian diaspora? We know that (1) at

least a third of the overall diaspora are tertiary-educated, although the proportion
differs in different destination countries; (2) most leave Malaysia for education in the
first place, and stayed on for work thereafter; (3) they tend to be engaged in different
kinds of economic activities in different destination countries, with health and social
work predominantly in Australia and the UK and real estate, renting and business
activities predominantly in Canada and the US; (4) most reside for at least 10 years

12
and beyond outside of Malaysia; and (5) although there is a high sense of emotional
affiliation to Malaysia, this may not translate into actual returns. These are important
in providing the contexts for which to understand the “real” Malaysian diasporas’
motivations for migration and/or return.

Perspectives of the “Real” Malaysian Diaspora

To further understand the stories behind migration of the “real” Malaysian
diaspora, I conducted in-depth interviews with tertiary-educated Malaysians in
Singapore, London, and returnees to Malaysia between July 2011 to April 2012. I
recruited people who are at least 25 years old, and who have resided outside Malaysia
for at least 2 years. I interviewed 25 Singapore respondents, 11 London/UK
respondents, 18 returnees, and 5 respondents currently residing in other global
locations. In this section, I examine how they negotiate their citizenship and migration
decisions throughout their migration trajectories. I pay particular attention to the
contradictions of having a strong emotional attachment to Malaysia yet ambivalence
towards actual return and/or citizenry actions.

Meanings of Citizenship: Leaving Yet Never “Leaving” Malaysia

According to Isin and Wood (1999, 20), citizenship and identity are both
group markers. However, citizenship carries legal-political weight, while identity
carries socio-cultural weight. Indeed, when asked about what their Malaysian
citizenship meant to them, most of my respondents immediately talk about three
things: the practical aspects (i.e. legal-political), the natural aspects and the socio-
cultural aspects. For the practical aspects, Malaysian citizenship is equated to the
Malaysian passport and the right/possibility to return to Malaysia in the future. Some
refer to citizenship offering political rights in voting or having a say in the country’s
affairs as a citizen, but this is seldom raised. Majority have not voted before (62% of
Singapore respondents, 73% of London/UK respondents, 60% of returnees, and 75%
of global respondents).

For the natural aspects, Malaysian citizenship is thought of as something

acquired naturally by virtue of being born as a Malaysian. For example, Sue (25,
single, in Singapore) explains:

13
 Malaysian citizenship? It’s like a … it’s something that I am born with. That’s
how I see, because when I was born … I was like, you know, born as a
Malaysian, that kind of thing. Something that carries with me. Like in my
blood forever, that kind.
Consequently, this citizenship by birth translates into an “original” identity that is
assumed to be acquired by birth as well. Interestingly, this also applies to those who
did not grow up in Malaysia. For Tom (38, married, in Singapore), despite growing up
in Singapore as a toddler and residing there since, his Malaysian citizenship is “after
all [his] original identity”. However, he is quick to acknowledge that this is never a
“complete” sense of belonging – his “roots” are embedded in Malaysia, yet the
“shoots” had grown in Singapore.

Finally, the socio-cultural aspects are elaborated as (1) presence of their family
and friends in Malaysia; (2) childhood memories and growing-up years shaping who
they are; and (3) an imagined shared sense of belonging with fellow Malaysians.
Hence, there seems to be a tendency to conflate the Malaysian citizenship with a
sense of familial belonging rather than a national belonging. In addition, many are
quick to point out that their sense of emotional belonging to Malaysia lies with the
family or ethnic community, not with the government. In a way, the natural and socio-
cultural aspects of the Malaysian citizenship overlap and reinforce each other.

This clear disjunction between the political and the natural/socio-cultural

aspects of citizenship enables the Malaysian diaspora to live a diasporic life outside of
the country, yet not exercising or bothered about the inability to exercise their
political rights. Furthermore, emphasis is placed more on the socio-cultural meanings
of their Malaysian citizenship. Alan (38, married, in Singapore) articulates this:
It’s just a name. To me it’s just a term. It’s … compared to some of my friends
I think Malaysian citizenship offer me a lot of convenience. For example when
you want to visit other countries, the visa is actually not as problematic as
some other countries. And … also I think Malaysia I have a lot of friends there,
grow up together since young. So those ties are not easily forgotten. So in
terms of Malaysia that is what ties me. The friendship, the family, yeah.

14
 In this sense, the Malaysian citizenship is intertwined and conflated with
conceptualisations of “Malaysia” as “family”, “identity”, “growing-up years”, and
“possible place for retirement”. These anchoring concepts provide a sense of
grounding and permanency – or “moorings” as Moon (1995) calls them. As a result, it
is possible for the Malaysian diaspora to physically leave “Malaysia” the
geographical country, yet never mentally or emotionally leaving “Malaysia” the
concept to which they attach their perpetual identity and belonging. This creates a
permanent sense of belonging that is equated to “the umbilical cord that cannot be
cut”, a metaphor that Eunice (38, married, in the UK) used. However, this also means
that a strong emotional belonging to Malaysia and a longing for return may not
translate into reality.

Perceptions and the Significance of Social Networks

Perceptions formed of the government impact on how the Malaysian diaspora
considers the government’s policies. These perceptions have been influenced by
social networks and the media, as well as impressions accumulated through the
parents’ generation. In the end, it doesn’t quite matter whether the perceptions are real
or not – invariably they would have stopped the Malaysian diaspora from placing
complete trust in government policies. This is evident in my conversation with Tim
(28, single, in the UK) about applying to the REP:
Author : And the other thing also like what you said, the selection criteria are
not made known. So yeah, I mean, even if I think about it from my
own position, if I apply for it, I will also apply with caution, actually.
Yeah (laughs).
Tim : Yeah, I think that’s the common thing. I think that’s sensible. That’s
what we all do. Because we know the government, we know what’s
going to happen. Because it has been happening since we were born
in Malaysia. Unless there is a change – which I doubt it. Or maybe
there will be a change, but who knows when it will happen. Then we
must take everything, you know, that deals with the government with
caution. Because you never know when you get backstabbed, when it
gets backfired. So we need to have a back-up plan.
Author : Mmm, that’s interesting. Why do you think we have this kind of
mentality?
15
 Tim : I think it’s because the way we were brought up, the way we were
told. The way … well, the things that we have read in the newspapers
since the first day we start reading newspapers. And you know, things
that we heard from other people. And then you know, you live in
Malaysia for … well, I lived in Malaysia for 20 years, and this is the
impression I get. And I think most of us get same impressions too.
Um … and if you ask me why, I … I … I don’t know.

The presence of family, friends and contacts in and outside of Malaysia clearly
influences how the Malaysian diaspora carry out their citizenship and migration
trajectories. In all conversations I had with my respondents, mentions will be made of
siblings, relatives and colleagues living in various global locations. For those who are
contemplating further migration, advice is sought from contacts located in these
potential destinations. John (34, married, in KL) returned to Malaysia after a 6-year
stint in Singapore where he still maintains his permanent residence status. After 3
years in KL, he has been talking to contacts in Australia and the US to get a sense of
whether these would be suitable migration destinations for him and his family. Derek
(30, single, in the UK) is uncertain about his stay in the UK, but is looking at the
possibility to relocate to Canada. His relatives are there, which will make the
transition smoother. In addition, once he is established there, he could also bring his
parents over to live with him. Amongst the returnees, 15 out of 18 of them returned to
their city/town of origin. The remaining 3 non-KLites who are currently located there
have existing social networks in KL (family and friends from their hometown) prior
to their return.

Shifting Priorities and the Meanings

With longer duration of stays away from Malaysia, the Malaysian diaspora is
aware of their shifting priorities and in accepting that a real return may not materialise.
Bob (32, single, in London) explains why he took up British citizenship:
The thing is, Malaysian passport is part of my identity. And … I will still call
[myself a] Malaysian, to be honest. Because I grew up there and I miss the
culture and the people. And family is back there. But then you, up to a point
you have to think about what is next stage. Will I actually go back to Malaysia?
Will Malaysia give me … in terms of opportunities, in terms of … will
16
 Malaysia industry meet my requirements, my needs? My needs such as my
pay, the convenience when I’m in London. That weighing against, you know,
living again … away from family. So I … It’s not an easy decision, I suppose.
But you know … But I tell myself I only go back once a year, or twice. And
every time I’m back, 3 weeks. So there’s really no difference, whether I’m
British or Malaysian.

For returnees, what seemed to be unimportant previously in their

considerations for migration became important due to changing circumstances. Sam
(38, married, in KL) returned to Malaysia after a short stint in Singapore because he
felt that the Singapore market was too small, the environment too stifling, and the
industry less dynamic compared to that in Malaysia. However, after 14 years in KL,
he is now contemplating migrating to Australia:
Recently I started to have a change in mind. That’s because I became a
father. … I worry about the crime rate and safety in Malaysia. …Another
important factor is my children’s competitiveness. … If they want to compete
with others – if they want to – will they be able to do so 10 or 20 years later,
under our current education system and environment? No, they can’t. … It’s
not that I want them to be competitive. It’s more like when they want to
compete with others, will they be ready? … I feel that I should provide them
the conditions so that they can make that choice. I will move towards that
direction.
While previously KL seemed like the best place to be for him career-wise and
lifestyle-wise, it is now no longer the best place to be for his children’s future.

Those who have set out on their migration projects with a definite view of
returning to Malaysia often find that life deals a completely different card. As a result,
they have had to adjust their original dream to return. They ultimately settle into
resigned acceptance that Malaysia, as it is in their immediate and future lifetime, may
not be suitable for their circumstances. Eunice and her Malaysian husband “never
intended to stay [in the UK]” as “the plan was always to go back [to Malaysia].”
However, their child was diagnosed with a learning disability. The couple realised
that their child would never get the same support system they could get in the UK.
Furthermore, as a British citizen, their child would have access to social welfare and
17
other kinds of support in the future when they will no longer be there to care for him.
Thus, they acknowledge their eventual conversion to British citizenship in the near
future albeit with some emotional reluctance.

Alice (late 50s/early 60s, married, in Singapore) lived in Singapore for more
than 30 years before finally taking-up Singapore citizenship. To her, making the
switch has been a gradual process. However, she experienced a period of personal
struggle as she had never thought of emigration or leaving Malaysia in the first place.
So 10 years ago I was confronted with a personal problem. But I look at my
children one day, and I look at my family, my husband is Singaporean … and
then my parents had passed away, my sister passed away … And I had meant
to actually … Somehow in your vague idealized notion, you say: “Oh one day
I will return to Malaysia.” Live with my parents whom I’ve been separated for
so long, even though I would visit of course, and my sister – I even bought a
place for her thinking that I will … she and I were very close – but then
suddenly, and now they are gone … I forgot that time can pass and people can
go. And it’s been 30 years. And I said “What’s this all for?” You know?
While previously it was important for her to keep her Malaysian citizenship because it
signifies her hopes for an eventual return, this is no longer so.

Discussion and Conclusion

I have argued that the official “Malaysian diaspora” is a selective definition
with changing criteria according to the government’s perceived needs. I have also
argued that we need to examine who the real “Malaysian diaspora” are in order to
understand their citizenship and migration trajectories. This contextual lens allows us
to view Malaysia’s brain drain and talent project from the perspectives of the target
audience. Following results from previous studies (The World Bank 2011b; Wake Up
Call Malaysia 2012), I focus on why the Malaysian diaspora sustain a strong sense of
emotional belonging to Malaysia and high hopes of returning, and examine reasons
why this may not translate into actual returns.

My respondents conflate their Malaysian citizenship with their

conceptualisations of “Malaysia” as “family”, “identity”, “growing-up years”, and
“possible place for retirement”. These “moor” (Moon 1995) their emotional belonging
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to “Malaysia” as they negotiate their transnational mobilities, shifting life course
requirements, and changing perspectives. Keeping their Malaysian citizenship
becomes a symbolic act in maintaining their identity and sense of belonging. However,
the passage of time and changing circumstances complicates the shifting meanings
and significance of citizenship vis-à-vis actual mobilities. Often, the Malaysian
diaspora rationalises that the Malaysian citizenship is only a passport that can be
exchanged for another for pragmatic reasons. This is not in conflict with their
perpetual belonging to “Malaysia” that is anchored in “fixed” things.

However, this sense of sentimental belonging to “Malaysia” may not translate

into actual returns. Instead, individually-motivated returns are often facilitated by
personal preferences, family circumstances, availability of financial resources and
access to social networks. Perceptions formed of “Malaysia”, particularly of the
government and where the country is headed, prevents the Malaysian diaspora from
considering return. The lack of awareness of job opportunities, career prospects and
banalities of everyday living (e.g. safety and security, education prospects for children)
makes return seem like obstacles when they have settled into their comfort zones. For
those who have returned, prior living experiences and the presence of social network
seem to facilitate them making these moves. However, these returns may end up
temporary as they look to re-migrating elsewhere.

By focusing on the negotiations of banal everyday lives, I argue for a

perspective that sees the Malaysian diaspora as human, social actors rather than
valuable talents per se. In providing a nuanced understanding of the Malaysian
diaspora’s citizenship and mobility decision-making, this paper seeks to offer
ethnographically-informed suggestions for Malaysia’s talent project. As Gu (2012)
puts forth, we need to examine the social-psychological dimensions of international
migration. This perspective synthesises the macro-structural, the meso-social, and the
micro-individual spheres in explaining and understanding migration phenomena. In
reference to Malaysia’s brain drain, we need to further study the emotional
geographies (Smith et al. 2009) of the Malaysian diaspora that is tied to the specific
geographical locations along their citizenship and migration trajectories.

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 Although the “Malaysian diaspora” is diverse, general patterns can be traced
according to their destination locations. Further studies into the exact compositions,
migration trajectories, and motivations of the real Malaysian diaspora in each
destination locale could provide rich data in contributing towards a fuller appreciation
of the Malaysian brain drain. For now, suffice to say that the world is changing at an
increasingly faster pace, and so are global flows of capital. As immigration and
emigration countries tweak their citizenship and migration controls, human migration
agents are continually searching for a place that best suit their individual and familial
circumstances. Malaysia’s NEM and talent project is occurring at a time where some
Malaysian diasporas may see return as opportunistic and viable, even if this is a
temporary stay. As Alice puts it,
… sometimes you were just caught in that moment of history. You know,
historical timing. It’s not just personal luck. … So, I would say your decision-
making is partly personal but it’s also located your era. The milieu in which
you live in.
Thus, it is up to the Malaysian government to seize this milieu and to strategise a
talent project that offers what the Malaysian diaspora need at this point in our
historical moment.

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Biodata

Koh Sin Yee (http://personal.lse.ac.uk/kohsy) is a PhD candidate in Human

Geography at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). Her PhD
thesis examines citizenship and mobility trajectories of tertiary-educated Malaysian-
born professionals in London, Singapore and “returnees” to Kuala Lumpur
(www.movingmalaysians.wordpress.com). Concurrently, she is Membership
Secretary and Office Manager for the Association of Ethnicity and Nationalism
(ASEN); and Graduate Teaching Assistant for GY302 Urban Development: Politics,
Policy and Planning. With prior professional working experience in architecture and
urban development in Singapore, her research interests are in migration, citizenship,
urbanization and social change in East and Southeast Asia.

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