Statement of Jurisdiction

28TH M.C.
CHAGLA MEMORIAL GOVERNMENT LAW COLLEGE NATIONAL ONLINE

MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2021
MEMORIAL FOR THE RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Counsel on behalf of the Petitioners in the present case has approached the Hon’ble
Supreme Court to initiate the present Writ Petition under Article 321 of the Constitution of
Rashtra for violation of Fundamental Rights enumerated under Part III of the Constitution
and thereby challenge the validity of various activities conducted and constitutionality of the
Order enforced by the Respondent in violation of the law in force. The Petitioner most
humbly and respectfully submits to the jurisdiction of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the
present matter.
The present memorandum sets forth the acts, contentions, and arguments on behalf of the
Respondent.
The laws of Union of Rashtra are pari materia to the laws of Union of India
1
Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part
(1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred
by this Part is guaranteed.
(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, including writs in the nature of
habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the
enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this Part.
(3) Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by clause (1) and (2), Parliament may by
law empower any other court to exercise within the local limits of its jurisdiction all or any of the powers
exercisable by the Supreme Court under clause (2).
(4) The right guaranteed by this Article shall not be suspended except as otherwise provided for by this
Constitution.
28TH M.C. CHAGLA MEMORIAL GOVERNMENT LAW COLLEGE NATIONAL ONLINE
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Respondent humbly submits before the Hon’ble Court that:
1. That, Rashtra is a sovereign democratic republic, governed by the Rule of Law,
having a huge population of about 135 crores. It comprises various States and some
Union Territories, which are directly governed by the Central Government.
2. That, the Constitution is supreme and it divides the executive authority between the
Central Government and the State Governments of Rashtra. Rashtra has a Central
Legislature and each State has its State Legislature.
3. That, NOVID-19, a deadly virus, hit the world and Rashtra around the end of 2019
and the end of January 2020 respectively. It was declared as a global pandemic by the
World Health Organisation on 11th March 2020.
4. That, the Government of Rashtra invoked the provisions of the Disaster Management
Act, 2005 (“the Act”), and through its Order, dated 24th March 2020, constituted the
National Disaster Management Authority (“NDMA”) under Section 3 of the Act
issued an Order directing the Ministries/Departments of the Government of Rashtra,
State/Union Territory Governments and State/Union Territory Authorities to take
preventive measures against NOVID-19. By a second Order, NDMA issued
Guidelines on the measures to be taken by the Ministries/Departments of the
Government of Rashtra, State/Union Territory Governments and State/Union
Territory Authorities for the effective containment of the NOVID-19 pandemic within
Rashtra.
5. That, since the beginning, the Central Government held daily press briefings and
issued press releases. It was also reportedly performing better than other countries.
6. That, around March-April 2021, divergent and inconsistent statistics and information,
having no uniformity, on important subjects relating to NOVID- 19 management were
reported.
7. That, Central government was against the dissemination of such sensitive information
relating to the management of NOVID – 19 disaster and the containment measures in
respect thereof should only be based on officially verified data and sources through
official channels.
8. That, through an Order dated 1st June 2021, the NMDA issued directions and
guidelines for the dissemination of information relating to the containment measures
for NOVID- 19.
9. That, on 15th June 2021, a Writ Petition styled as a Public Interest Litigation before
the Supreme Court of Rashtra under Article 32 of the Constitution of Rashtra was
filed.
10. That, a group of public-spirited individuals, including prominent journalists, doctors,
authors and public policy experts, firstly, challenged the constitutional validity of the
said Order dated 1st June 2021, inter alia, on the grounds of violation of Articles 19
and 21, principle of federalism, along with Section 6 of the Act being ultra vires to the
provisions of the Constitution. Secondly, they challenged the Order being ultra vires
to the provisions of the Act itself. Hence, the present matter.

ISSUES RAISED
[ISSUE 1] WHETHER THE PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION IS MAINTAINABLE UNDER
ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF RASHTRA?
[ISSUE 2] WHETHER THE ORDER ISSUED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF RASHTRA WAS IN
VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF RASHTRA?
[ISSUE 3] WHETHER THE ORDER ISSUED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF RASHTRA WAS
ULTRA VIRES WITH RESPECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE DISASTER
MANAGEMENT ACT 2005 ITSELF?

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I. THAT THE PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION IS NOT MAINTAINABLE UNDER
ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF RASHTRA?
The exercise of the writ jurisdiction under Article 32 is largely discretionary in nature,
it is argued that the present petition is not maintainable because of the three reasons: [1.1],
that the nature of the Writ Petition is not maintainable. [1.2] that, the Petitioner has no locus
standi. [1.3] that, there has been no infringement of fundamental rights; and [1.4] that, the
alternative remedies have not been exhausted by the Petitioner.
II. THAT THE ORDER ISSUED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF RASHTRA IS NOT
VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTION OF RASHTRA?
It is contended that firstly, the Order is in consonance with Article 19 of the
Constitution of Rashtra. Secondly, the Order does not violate the provisions of Article 21 of
the Constitution of Rashtra. Thirdly, the Order does not violate the principle of Federalism;
and fourthly, Section of the Disaster Management Act 2005 is intra vires to the Constitution
of Rashtra.
III. THAT THE ORDER ISSUED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF RASHTRA WAS ULTRA
VIRES WITH RESPECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE DISASTER MANAGEMENT
ACT 2005 ITSELF?
It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the Central government was
well within its power as prescribed in the Disaster Management Act 2005 while issuing the
Order. Therefore, the Order is not ultra vires to the Constitution of Rashtra.
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
1. THAT THE PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION IS NOT MAINTAINABLE
UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF RASHTRA.
¶1. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the present Writ Petition
against the Government of Rashtra [“Govt.”] under Article [“Art.] 32 of the Constitution of
Rashtra [“Const.”] is not maintainable. Firstly, the jurisdiction under Art. 32 of the Const. can
be invoked only when Fundamental Rights are violated. It has been held that if a right, other
than a Fundamental Right is claimed to be violated then such questions can be addressed only
in the appropriate proceedings and on an application under Art. 32.2
¶2. In the instant case, it is submitted that no Fundamental Rights of the Petitioner have been
violated, therefore, this petition shall not be considered. Further, the instant Writ Petition is
not maintainable on the grounds that firstly [1.1], the nature of the Writ Petition is not
maintainable, secondly [1.2], the Petitioner has no locus standi, thirdly [1.3], there has been
no infringement of fundamental rights, and fourthly [1.4], that alternative remedies have not
been exhausted by the Petitioner
2
Ramjilal v. Income Tax Officer, AIR 1951 SC 97 (India).
1.1. THAT THE NATURE OF THE WRIT PETITION IS NOT MAINTAINABLE
¶3. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the Govt. has abided by
the Order of the Home Ministry of the Union Government of Rashtra. The restrictions on
Fundamental Rights, if any, were done in accordance with the ‘procedure established by law’.
The Petitioners have not been able to show any violation their fundamental rights and a writ
petition which fails to show the violation of fundamental rights cannot be maintained.3
¶4. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that considering the fact that the
petitioner, were declined to disseminate inconsistent data related to NOVID- 19 management
which could cause widespread panic among the citizens, 4 the petitioner is acting with mala
fide intentions and the prima facie motive behind this petition would be one of vengeance and
not one of actual restoration of justice.
1.2. THAT THE PETITIONER HAS NO LOCUS STANDI
¶5. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the petitioners in the present case do
not have the locus standi to file the petition. The Counsel for the respondents would like to
humbly submit before the Hon’ble Court that the purpose for which Art. 32 can be invoked is
solely for the enforcement of fundamental rights which means that the violation of a
fundamental right is sine qua non for the exercise of rights conferred under Art. 32. 5 It is to
be noted that in the instant case there has been no violation of fundamental rights as is
claimed by the petitioners. The respondents have duly followed all the proper procedures as
established by law and have ably discharged their statutory duties while doing the same.
3
Bhushan Power & Steel Limited v. Rajesh Verma, (2014) 5 SCC 551 (India).
4
Factsheet, ¶6.
5
Federation of Bar Association in Karnataka v. Union of India, AIR 2000 SC 2544
¶6. Through the course of time, it has been seen that the judiciary has relaxed the scope of
locus standi in order to ensure that fundamental rights can be enforced as much as possible 6.
However, the violation of fundamental rights remains a pre-requisite and mandatory
condition for filing of a writ petition that shall be maintainable and without it the petitioners
won’t have locus standi.
¶7. The counsel for the respondents maintains that the petitioners do not have the locus standi
to file the present petition because they fail to prove the violation of fundamental rights.
Hence, the Writ Petition should be dismissed; it need not be heard on merits.7
1.3. THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO INFRINGEMENT OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
¶8. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that in the instant Writ Petition,
the petitioner has failed to conclusively prove the violation of fundamental rights, if any. It is
humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that Art. 32 of the Const. can be invoked only
when there is an infringement of a fundamental right. The Supreme Court in the case of Hindi
Hitrashak Samiti v. Union of India,8 has held that “the jurisdiction conferred on the Supreme
Court under Art. 32 is an important and integral part of the Const. but violation of a
fundamental right is the sine qua non for seeking enforcement of those rights by the Supreme
Court.”
¶9. Similarly, in Shantabai v. State of Maharashtra,9 it was held that “Art. 32 cannot be
invoked simply to adjudge the validity of any legislative or administrative action unless it
adversely affects the fundamental rights of the Petitioner”. Admittedly, in D.C. Wadhwa v.
State of Bihar,10 and Sarojini Ramaswami v. Union of India, 11 the SC entertained Writ
6
Dr. Upendra Baxi v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1983) 2 SCC 308 (India).
7
Charan Lal Sahu v. Giani Zail Singh, AIR 1984 SC 309 (India).
8
AIR 1990 SC 851 (India).
9
AIR 1958 SC 532 (India)
10
11
AIR 1992 SC 2219 (India)
Petitions though no question of Fundamental Right was involved, it did the same as it held
the aforementioned cases as ones of great constitutional importance; there was no other
forum; and there was no other mechanism. 12 It is therefore humbly submitted before this
Hon’ble Supreme Court that the instant case does not satisfy any of the criteria that the SC
laid down while entertaining these Writ Petitions. It does not pose a question of constitutional
importance and it does have other forums and mechanisms for its resolution. The
Respondents humbly submit that there has been no violation of Art 19, Art. 14 and Art. 21.
1.4. THAT ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES HAVE NOT BEEN EXHAUSTED BY THE
PETITIONER
¶10. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that there are alternative remedies
available to the petitioner and as a result of which this petition is not maintainable. 13 Filing a
writ petition where there is an alternative remedy available is an abuse of the procedure laid
down by the law and wastage of the time of the Hon’ble Apex Court. The Supreme Court in
the case of Lokesh Katara v. High Court of Gujarat, 14 refused to entertain a writ petition filed
under Art. 32 stating that the petitioners in the case had a remedy available of moving the
High Court under Art. 226, leaving it open to the petitioners to institute the appropriate
proceedings as they may be advised.
¶11. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Apex Court that Art. 226 can be invoked not
only for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights but for ‘any other purpose’ as well. 15 While
the Supreme Court’s power under Art. 32 is restricted, the High Court’s power is much more
expansive.
12
MP JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUIONAL LAW 1355 (7th ed. 2016).
13
Veerappa Pillai v. Raman & Raman Ltd., AIR 1952 SC 192 (India).
14
(2017) 2 SCC 427 (India).
15
MP JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1355 (7th ed. 2016).
¶12. Furthermore, in Kanubhai,16 this Court held that a petitioner complaining of infraction
of his Fundamental Right should approach the High Court first rather than the Supreme Court
in the first instance. The reason given for this view was that there was a huge backlog of
cases pending before the Supreme Court.
¶13. The court is bound to take cognizance of the petition if his fundamental rights have been
infringed, but only after he has exhausted all existing remedies provided by law and has not
obtained any proper redress. But in this case the petitioner has not exhausted his means of
legal aid and same for redress of his disputes, directly to Supreme Court.
¶14. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the Petitioner can seek
remedy under Art. 226 of the Constitution of Rashtra by approaching the concerned High
Court in a similar way. A letter addressed to the High Court Chief Justice could also result in
the invoking of its epistolary jurisdiction. In the foregoing arguments it has already been
discussed that the High Court provides an equally efficacious remedy to the petitioner. The
Petitioner fails to prove that the SC is the only remedy available to him and thus this Petition
should be dismissed.17
2. THAT THE ORDER IS INTRA VIRES THE CONSTITION OF RASHTRA
¶15. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the Order firstly, does not violates
Article 19 and 21 and 14 of the Const. and is thus constitutional in nature. Secondly, the
Order is in consonance with the concept of federalism and thus is intra vires to the provisions
of the Const.
16
Kanubhai Brahmbhatt v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1987 SC 1159 (India).
17
Himmatlal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1954 SC 403 (India)
¶16. It is humbly contended that the test of reasonableness under Article 19 should be applied
to each statute impugned, and no abstract standard or general pattern of reasonableness can
be laid down as applicable to all cases.18
¶17. It is humbly contended that there is always an initial presumption of validity of law 19
and that due importance should be given to the legislative intent while deciding the
constitutionality of a provision.20
¶18. It is humbly contended that Art. 21 lays down that no person shall be deprived of his life
or personal liberty except according to the 'procedure established by law'. This procedure
cannot be fanciful and arbitrary but must answer the test of reasonableness to satisfy the
requirements of Art. 21.21
2.1. THAT THE ORDER DOES NOT VIOLATES ARTICLE 19 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
RASHTRA
¶19. The Order sought by the Govt. to prohibit the state governments, authorities and person
on publication of the news regarding NOVID- 19 is valid as per the provisions of the Const.
and ICCPR. The prevailing conditions at the time when the order was passed by the Govt.
were that of a global pandemic caused by a deadly virus known as NOVID-19. The world
being hit by the virus sometime around the end of 2019, and the virus eventually entering the
borders of Rashtra around the end of January 2020, steps had to be taken by the Government
of Rashtra for the proper prevention and management of the virus, all while keeping in mind
public interest and public order.
¶20. The Order satisfies the three-part test prescribed under Art. 19(2) of the Const. and 19(3)
of the ICCPR.
18
VG Row v. State of Madras, AIR 1952 SC 196 (India)
19
G K Krishnan v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1975) 1 SCC 375 (India)
20
Gita Hariharan v. Reserve Bank of India (1999) 2 SCC 228 (India).
21
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, 1978 AIR 597 (India).
2.1.1. THAT THE RESTRICTIONS SATISFY THE THREE-PART TEST PRESCRIBED UNDER
ART. 19(2) OF THE CONST. AND 19(3) OF ICCPR.
¶21. State Parties must guarantee the right to freedom of expression, including the right to
seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds. However, these rights are not
absolute in nature and are subject to certain restrictions under the ICCPR and the UDHR. 22
Moreover, in Dharam Dutt v. UOI,23 the Hon’ble Court laid down test to assess the validity of
restrictions imposed on freedom of speech and expression. 24 This test has been widely
accepted and used in multiple judgments across jurisdictions.25
2.1.1.1. That the restrictions are provided by the law.
¶22. The first limb of the test requires that the restriction must be provided for by law. A
norm is ‘prescribed by law’ if it is formulated with sufficient precision so as to enable
citizens to reasonably foresee the consequences which a given action may entail. 26 The term
‘law’ must be flexibly interpreted to encompasses administrative, 27 civil and criminal laws, as
well as a Const.28 It is also clear that in common law systems, legal norms developed through
22
Toby Mendel, Restricting Freedom of Expression: Standards and Principles, Centre for Law and Democracy
(Aug. 18, 2021, 10: 03 PM), http://www.law-democracy.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/10.03.Paper-on-
Restrictions-onFOE.pdf
23
Dharam Dutt v. UOI
24
Commission Regulation 2016/679, General Data Protection Regulation, art. 17(1)(c), 2016 O.J. (L 119);
Gaweda v. Poland, App. No. 26229/95 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 39 (2002); Feldek v. Slovakia, App. No. 29032/95 Eur.
Ct. H.R. (2001); Lohe Issa Konate v. Burkina Faso, App. No. 004/2013 Afr. Ct. H.P.R. ¶ 125 (Dec. 5, 2014).
25
Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, App No. 6538/74 30 Eur. Ct. H. R. (1979) [hereinafter Sunday Times];
Lingens v. Austria, App. No. 9815/82 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 39-40 (1986); Thorgeirson v. Iceland, App. No.
13778/88 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 63, (1992).
26
Sunday Times, Id. at ¶ 49; Kokkinakis v. Greece, App. No. 14307/88 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1993); Malone v. The
United Kingdom, (1984) 7 EHRR 1; Mueller v. Switzerland, (1988) 13 EHRR 212; Connally v. General
Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926); Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971); Kartar Singh v. State of
Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569 (India).
27
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972), p. 522.
28
Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) and others v. Turkey, App Nos. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98 and
41344/98 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 58 (2003).
the case law meet the requisite standard. 29 The restrictions imposed by the Order are in
accordance with Art. 19 of the Const.
¶23. Accordingly, the provisions of Art. 19 provide for reasonable restrictions of public
order, morality, national security, defamation and incitement to an offence on the exercise of
freedom of expression. The information published by the media organizations regarding
NOVID- 19 qualified not just as divergent and inconsistent with government’s data but also,
was on the stage to create a widespread panic among the citizens of Rashtra. 30 Therefore, the
restrictions sought by the govt are justified under Art. 19 of the Const. for the maintenance of
public order and public health in the region.
2.1.1.2. That the restrictions are in pursuance of serving a legitimate aim
¶24. The second part of the test requires that the restrictions must be for the protection of
legitimate and overriding interests of respect for the rights and reputations of others,
protection of national security, public order, public health or morals. This list of interests is
exclusive in terms of a restriction on freedom of expression. 31 Both purpose and effect of
restrictions are relevant in assessing the legitimacy of the aim to be pursued by the
restrictions.32 It is settled law that the anticipated danger should not be remote, conjectural or
far-fetched. It should have a direct nexus with expression. It should be intrinsically dangerous
to the public interest. So is the situation in the case under consideration. The “community
interest” here being the safeguarding of public health, and securing each individual’s right to
live a healthy and illness- free life as enshrined in Art. 21 of the Constitution of Rashtra.
Moreover, being declared as a global pandemic by the World Health Organisation, 33

29
Observer and Guardian v. United Kingdom, App. No. 13585/88 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 50-53(1991).
30
Factsheet, ¶5.
31
Mukong v. Cameroon, Comm. No. 458/1991, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/458/1991 (Aug. 10, 1994).
32
R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 SCR 295 (Can.)
33
Factsheet, ¶2.
endangering human life, it would be erroneous to say that the anticipated danger is remote,
conjectural or far- fetched, and that the measures taken by the Government of Rashtra do not
have a direct and proximate nexus or a reasonable connection between the restriction
imposed and the object sought to be achieved.
¶25. In the case at hand, The restriction imposed is neither arbitrary and of an excessive
nature nor does it blindly follow an abstract standard/ general pattern of reasonableness,
instead lays down regulatory measures rather than restrictive ones in a dynamic, pragmatic
and elastic fashion to preserve public health and order, while trying to minimize and mitigate
divergent and inconsistent statistics and information as much as possible as they lead to
widespread panic amongst people including the medical fraternity and was derailing the
efficient management of the NOVID- 19 disaster. Therefore, restrictions imposed were valid
as they serve a legitimate aim of protecting the public health and public order of the citizens
of Rashtra.
2.1.1.3. That the restrictions are necessary for a democratic society
¶26. The necessity element of the test presents a high standard to be overcome by the State
seeking to justify the interference.34 For a norm to be ‘necessary in a democratic society’, it
must correspond to a pressing social need.35 The restrictions imposed must be proportionate
to the legitimate aims being pursued. 36 The proportionality is assessed on the grounds of the
negative impact caused by the limiting measure upon the enjoyment of the right and the
ameliorating effects of the limiting measure.37
34
Supra note 16.
35
Sunday Times, supra note 4, ¶ 62; Klass v. Germany, App. 5029/71 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 59 (1978); Handyside,
supra note 1; Merits, Reparations and Costs, Palamara Iribarne v. Chile, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 135, ¶ 126 (Nov. 22, 2005); Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Uson Ramirez v.
Venezuela, Judgment, (ser. C) No. 207, ¶ 55 (Nov. 20, 2009); Waldock, H, The Effectiveness of the System set
up by the European Convention on Human Rights, (1980) 1 HRLJ 1, p. 9; Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343
(2003); Ramji Lal Modi v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1957 SC 620 (India).
36
Velichkin v. Belarus, Comm. No. 1022/2001, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/85/D/1022/2001 (Nov. 3, 2005) [hereinafter
Velichkin].
37
Burgess v. Australia, Comm. No. 1012/2001, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/85/D/1012/2001 (Oct. 21, 2005).
¶27. The right to freedom of speech and expression includes the right to seek and receive
information.38 But this right is subject to limitations under international law. While the
publication of true and impartial news is an established duty of journalists, govts have the
right to restrict information when it is provided by law and the disclosure threatens to cause
substantial harm or the harm to the public is greater than the public interest in having the
information.39 The restrictions should be limited to matters including law enforcement,
national security, public or individual safety, and the effectiveness and integrity of govt
decision-making processes.40
¶28. The reports published by various media organizations lacks evidence and proof for its
authenticity. The circulation of inconsistent news would further aggravate the already tense
atmosphere in Rashtra. These being the circumstances, there is a substantial need to prevent
the circulation of inconsistent news as it could incite widespread panic which violates the Art.
20(2) of ICCPR.
2.1.2. THAT THE ORDER PASSED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF RASHTRA IS IN
CONSONANCE WITH THE RIGHT TO ACQUIRE INFORMATION AND DISSEMINATE
THE SAME.
¶29. The freedom of speech and expression, as enshrined in Art. 19 of the Const. is the
matrix, the indispensable condition of nearly every other form of freedom, and is the
wellspring of civilization, without which personal liberty and liberty of thought would
shrivel. This freedom, under its purview, ensures a citizen, the right to know, and the right to
38
Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, ¶ 65 (1943); Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U.S. 503, ¶45
(1969); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, ¶ 56 (1938); European Convention on Human Rights art. 10,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 22; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 19, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171.
39
Art. 19, The public's right to know principles on freedom of information legislation, (1999), available at https:
//www.art19.org/data/files/pdfs/standards/righttoknow.pdf.
40
Id.
acquire information and disseminate the same. However, as stated in Thalappalam Ser
Cooperative Bank Limited v. State of Kerala,41 this right, just like any other, is not absolute
and is restricted by reasonable restrictions.
¶30. According to the case of People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) v. Pukhrem
Sharatchandra Singh,42 the right to receive information does not carry with it an unrestricted
right to gather information. A reasonable restriction on the exercise of the right to know or
right to information is always permissible in the interest of the security of the State.
Generally, the exemptions/exceptions under the laws referred to in Art. 19(2) entitled the
Government to withhold information relating to national security (including defence) and
public safety among the plethora of other exemptions available to them.
¶30. For instance, a country such as the Rashtra with a huge population base, which was
quite harshly hit by the global pandemic, encountered major issues which were exacerbated
by the spread of misinformation and inconsistent news. These posed as primary hindrances in
the effective management and prevention of the spread of the deadly virus. In order to
prevent any such hurdles in the preservation of public order and public health, the
Government of Rashtra quite timely and effectively imposed reasonable restrictions along
with proper procedural safeguards on the publishing of statistics and information.
¶31. Moreover, as stated by the Supreme Court in Romesh Thapar v. UOI, 43 ‘public order’ is
an expression of wide connotation and signifies “that state of tranquillity which prevails
among the members of political society as a result of internal regulations enforced by the
Government which they have established.” The measures passed by the Government in the
case at hand aim to exactly do so through its intricately laid down procedure, hence not only
does it pass the test of reasonableness, but it also meets the substantive and procedural
standpoints.
41
Civil Appeal no. 9017 of 2013
42
AIR 1997 SC 568
43
1950 AIR 124
¶32. In Inter Media Publishing Ltd., Calicut v. State of Kerala & others, 44 there was a denial
for Government advertisement to a newspaper on the ground that dissemination of
information through said newspaper poses threat to national security, unity, integrity and
public order. The Court held that in the absence of a const. of any mechanism by way of
formation of a committee to assess and evaluate information and ideas provided in
newspapers, the decision taken to deny Government advertisement is unjustifiable. The Court
directed the Government to constitute a committee to evaluate and assess information
provided in newspapers. Similarly, in the case at hand, a special mechanism and an elaborate
procedure which lays down that the Ministry of Health, Government of Rashtra, within the
time frame of a week from the date of issuance of orders must nominate and designate an
Officer, not below the level of Joint Secretary, as the Designated Officer for the purposes of
Clause 3 Upon receipt of a request for prior written permission under Clause 3, the
Designated Officer shall evaluate the request within three days and either grant or refuse it
for reasons to be set forth in writing.
2.1.3. THAT THE ORDER PASSED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF RASHTRA DOES NOT
INTERFERE WITH THE FREEDOM OF PRESS.
¶33. The Supreme Court has emphasised that the freedom of the press is not so much for the
benefit of the press as for the benefit of the general community because the community has a
right to be supplied with information and the government owes a duty to educate the people
within the limits of its resources. Therefore, the Govt. is quite correct in terms of the
measures taken by them. This is because allowing inconsistent and divergent statistics and
information would rather act in contrary to the preservation of public order and public health
as well as the effective and efficient management prevention of the pandemic. 45 This is quite
44
W.P.(C). No.10727/2013
45
Factsheet, ¶6.
evident from Para 6 of the Moot Proposition which states that such data led to widespread
panic among the public including the medical fraternity. Hence, it can be said that this
aforementioned benefit of the public which flows from the freedom of press is being curtailed
in the current situation.
¶34. According to the cases of Bennett Coleman v. UOI46 and Babulal v. State of
Maharashtra,47 a provision for pre-censorship for a limited period in emergent circumstances
and subject to procedural safeguards is valid. If, however, it is left to the absolute discretion
of the executive authority, it must be held to be unreasonable. Being declared as a global
pandemic by the WHO, it was humanly impossible to foresee the inception and the end of it,
hence justifying the absence of a limited period for the pre-censorship/ sun-set clause.
Moreover, as mentioned in the above arguments and the annexure released by the Govt., a
detailed and comprehensive procedure has already been established which would ensure the
upholding of Art. 19 of the Const. while also keeping in mind the tenets of non-arbitrariness,
justice, equity and good conscience.
2.2. THAT THE ORDER DOES NOT VIOLATE THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 21 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF RASHTRA
¶35. It is most humbly submitted that the significance and sweep of Article 21 make the
deprivation of liberty a matter of grave concern and permissible only when the law
authorising it is reasonable, even-handed and geared to the goals of community good and
State necessity.48 Before a person is deprived of his life and personal liberty, the procedure
established by law must be strictly followed, and must not be departed from to the
disadvantage of the person affected.49 Liberty of a person should not ordinarily be interfered
46
1973 AIR 106.
47
1961 AIR 884
48
Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh, (1978) 1 SCC 240.
49
Bashira v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1968 SC 1313; Narendra Purshotam Umrao v. B.B. Gujral, AIR 1979
SC 420.
with unless there exist cogent grounds.50 Therefore, the Order must be interpreted keeping in
view the aforementioned salutary principles.
¶36. Reasonableness postulates intelligent care and predicates that deprivation of freedom by
refusal of publication of inconsistent information related to NOVID – 19 is not a punitive
purpose but for the bifocal interests of justice to the individual involved and society
affected.51 The UK Supreme Court has held that ‘there is a need to maintain a fair balance
between the general interest of the community and the personal right of the individual.’47 All
deprivation of liberty is validated by social defence.52
¶37. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the liberty of an individual is
precious but cannot be absolute in every situation. 53 Liberty is to be secured through process
of law, which is administered keeping in mind the collective interest of the community. 54 It is
possible that in a given situation, the collective interest of the community may outweigh the
right of personal liberty of the individual concerned.55
¶38. It is thus most humbly submitted before the Hon'ble Supreme Court that in the instant
case, the State does not violate the fundamental rights of the people of Rashtra by putting
certain restrictions on the dissemination of information related to NOVID- 19. In the
landmark case of Indrajit Barua v. State of Assam,56 when the ADAA, 1955 (Assam Act) and
the AFSPA, 1958 (Central Act) were challenged because they condoned abuse of State
powers, the Delhi High Court while upholding both the Acts also held, that what is just fair
and reasonable procedure established by reasonable law as opposed to the procedure which
can be called arbitrary or discriminatory is a question to be answered in the facts and
circumstances of the case.

50
Narendra Singh v. State of M.P., 2004 Cri LJ 2842
51
Babu Singh v. State of U.P., (1978) 1 SCC 579.
52
Supra note 39.
53
Subhash Kashinath Mahajan v. The State of Maharashtra, (2018) 4 SCALE 661.
54
Shahzad Hasan Khan v. Ishtiaq Hasan Khan, (1987) 2 SCC 684.
55
Masroor v. State of U.P., (2009) 14 SCC 286.
56
AIR 1983 Del 513 (India).
¶39. Moreover, a law is regarded as wholesome and beneficial if it ensures the liberty of a
more significant number of the members of the society at the cost of a few. 57 If, to save a
large number of lives from the attack of NOVID- 19, certain restrictions are imposed on the
dissemination of information to prevent widespread panic, then it is reasonable in nature.
¶40. It is humbly submitted before the Hon'ble Supreme Court that it is the duty of the State
to preserve law and order.58 The term ‘public order’ and ‘public health’ are not vague. 59 It is
the State's duty to see that the rule of law enunciated by Art. 21 is available to the most
significant number. In the instant case, since the State has constitutional duties to uphold the
multitude of rights of its citizens, maintain public law and order, and work in the greater
social interest, the procedure established by law in the instant case is just, fair and fair
reasonable under Art. 21 of the Constitution of Rashtra.
2.3. THAT THE ORDER IS WELL WITHIN THE AMBIT OF THE PRINCIPLE OF
FEDERALISM.
¶41. As a component of the Federal Structure of the Const., legislative powers have been
divided between the Parliament and State Legislatures. 60 The competing legislatures may not
infringe upon the each other’s legislative domain; 61 though Parliament is legislatively
supreme to the State Legislatures.62 The constitutional vires of the Order was challenged on
the grounds of legislative competence. 63 It is submitted that the said provisions are not ultra
vires the Constitution since: [2.3.1.] the ‘pith and substance’ of the Order lies outside the
legislative domain of the State Legislatures and; [2.3.2] Residuary Powers with respect to
legislative competence is vested with the Parliament.
57
Id.
58
Indrajit Barua v. Assam, AIR 1983 Del 513 (India)
59
60
D.D. BASU, COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, C.K. Thakker & S.S. Subramani & T. S. Doabia
& B. P. Banerjee eds., Vol. 8, 8th ed. 2012, p. 8626.
61
State of Kerala and Ors. v. Mar Appraem Kuri Company Ltd. and Anr., AIR 2012 SC 2375, ¶12.
62
GRANVILLE AUSTIN, THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION – CORNERSTONE OF A NATION, 2nd ed. 1999, p. 195.
63
Factsheet, ¶ 0.
2.3.1. THAT THE ORDER FALLS OUTSIDE THE LEGISLATIVE COMPETENCE OF THE
STATES
¶42. The doctrine of ‘pith and substance’ is one of the key principles of interpretation used to
construe entries classified under the three lists of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. 64
In order to determine whether a particular statute comes within the purview of one legislature
or the other, the pith and substance of the enactment is to be looked into. 65 If the ‘true nature
and character’ of a legislation falls outside the permissible limits assigned to the respective
legislature then such law is ultra vires the constitution.66 The relevant factors which must be
considered in order to ascertain the pith and substance of a statute are: (i) the object and
purpose; (ii) the scope and; (iii) the effect of the provisions. 67 The object and purpose of the
impugned section does not relate to subject-matters enumerated in List II of the Seventh
Schedule.
¶43. We must refer to the various legislative fields under the seventh schedule to ascertain
which relevant subject-matters fall under the exclusive competence of the States. 68 The two
entries in the State List that are remotely related to the subject of disaster management are
entry 14, which deals with agriculture, including protection against pests and plant diseases,
and entry 17 which deals with water, including water supply, drainage and embankments.
However, the legislation on disaster management has been related to entry 23 (social security
and social insurance) in the Concurrent list of the Constitution and the States would also be
able to make their own legislation on the subject.
64
65
Jamshed N. Guzdar v. State of Maharashtra and Ors., AIR 2005 SC 862 at ¶ 88; Prafulla Kumar Mukherjee
and others v. Bank of Commerce Ltd., Khulna, AIR 1947 PC 60 at ¶¶ 35-38.
66
State of Maharashtra v. Bharat Shanti Lal Shah and Ors., (2008) 13 SCC 5 at ¶ 30.
67
Offshore Holdings Pvt. Ltd. v. Bangalore Development Authority and Ors., (2011) 3 SCC 139 at ¶ 64; A. S.
Krishna v. State of Madras, AIR 1957 SC 297 at ¶16.
68
M.P. JAIN INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, Justice Ruma Pal, Samaraditya Pal, eds., 6th ed. 2010, p. 533.
¶44. Due to divergent and inconsistent statistics related to NOVID- 19 there was a threat
perception for the widespread panic among citizens and for that purpose the Central
government put certain restrictions to prevent this. In light of the above, it is submitted that
the primary objective of impugned Order is to prevent the widespread panic across Rashtra
which would address a number of socio-economic problems plaguing the country.
2.3.1.1. That the scope of the impugned Order relates to subjects outside the
legislative competence of the State Legislatures
¶45. The meaning and import of the provisions of an Act have to be enquired into in order to
determine its scope.69 The scope of a parliamentary statute must not fall within the ambit of
legislative fields enumerated in List II.70
¶46. It is humbly submitted before the Hon'ble Supreme Court that according to Art. 254(1)
if any provision of state law is repugnant to a provision in a law made by the Parliament
which it is competent to enact, or to any existing law concerning one of the matters in the
Concurrent List, the Parliamentary law or the existing law prevails over the State law. It does
not matter whether the Parliamentary law has been enacted before or after the law. It is
contended that the Parliament is empowered to make laws on the subject under List 23 of the
Concurrent List. Thereby, it is submitted that the scope of the said provision lies outside the
legislative ambit of State Legislatures.
2.3.1.2. That the effect of the impugned Order relates to matter outside the
legislative competence of the State Legislatures
¶47. Reflecting the object and purpose of the Order, the ostensible effect which the provision
would have would be on matters within the auspices of the Concurrent List which is Social
Security. It is therefore submitted that the ‘pith and substance’ of the impugned section lies
outside the legislative domain of the State Legislatures.

69
Orissa Cement Ltd. (M/s) v. State of Orissa, AIR 1991 SC 1676 at ¶ 37.
70
Naga People’s Movement of Human Rights v. Union of India, AIR 1998 SC 431 at ¶ 25.
2.3.2. THAT THE RESIDUARY POWERS WITH RESPECT TO LEGISLATIVE COMPETENCE
IS VESTED WITH THE PARLIAMENT
¶48. Entry 97 of List I read with Article 246 and 248 of the Constitution provide for the
scope of Residuary Powers.71 In case a subject-matter cannot be comprehended within the
auspices of any Entry within the three Lists, the power to legislate with regard to such
subject-matter vests with the Parliament. 72 In the event that legislative incompetence of the
State Legislatures with regard to a subject-matter has been established, the Parliament may
claim exclusive competence.73 It is not permissible to interpret Entries under List II too
broadly in order to uphold the legislative competence of the State, the necessary competence
must then vest with the Parliament. 74 Thus, in light of Contention, it is established that the
State Legislatures are incompetent to pass legislation with respect to the subject-matter of the
Disaster Management. Thereby, it is humbly submitted that the said order is intra vires the
Const. and that Parliament has not encroached upon the constitutional powers of the States.
2.4. THAT SECTION 6 OF THE DISASTER MANAGEMENT ACT 2005 IS INTRA VIRES
THE CONSTITUTION OF RASHTRA.
¶49. It was held by the Hon’ble Court in Bachan Singh v. the State of Punjab, 75 that the rule
of law which permeates the entire fabric of the Const. excludes arbitrariness. Broad and
absolute discretionary powers are given to administrative authorities are an antithesis of the
spirit of Art. 14. It is most humbly submitted before this Hon'ble Supreme Court that the
Section 6 of the Disaster Management Act, 2005 [“Act”] is constitutionally valid for three
reasons. Firstly [2.4.1], there is no conferring of unguided and unrestricted power or

71
72
Second G.T.O. v. Nazareth, AIR 1971 SC 999 at ¶ 10; Mittal v. Union of India, AIR 1983 SC 1 at ¶¶ 70-72.
73
International Tourist Corpn. v. State of Haryana, AIR 1981 SC 774, ¶ 7.
74
State of West Bengal v. Kesoram Industries, (2004) 10 SCC 201, ¶ 251.
75
discretion on an authority, secondly [2.4.2], there is no administrative discrimination under
the impugned Act, thirdly [2.4.3], there is no arbitrary state action.
2.4.1. THAT THERE IS NO CONFERRING ABSOLUTE DISCRETION
¶50. It is humbly submitted before the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the impugned Section
does not confer absolute or unguided discretionary powers on the administrative authorities.
Thus, it does not attract Art. 14. In the impugned Act, the State has elaborated on the
restrictions to be placed on the dissemination of information related to NOVID- 19 and these
restrictions are not absolute in nature.
¶51. Regarding laying down principles or guiding norms, it has been held, for instance, that it
is not essential that the same section in the Statute which confers the power should also lay
down the rules of guidance or the policy for the administrator to follow. If the same can be
gathered from the preamble or the extended title of the Statute and the other provisions
therein, the discretion would not be regarded as uncontrolled or unguided, and the Statute in
question will not be invalid.76 At times, even vague policy statements to guide administrative
discretion have been held by this Court as complying with Art. 14. 77 The State has mentioned
the object sought to be achieved by the Order in ¶6, that the restrictions will be imposed only
on those information which are inconsistent with the official statistics to avoid widespread
panic. In furtherance of same, the State has further defined the procedure which will be
followed while allowing or rejecting the publication of that particular news. The policy
mentioned is not vague and cannot qualify as conferring of absolute discretion.
¶52. Furthermore, this Court has shown a good deal of tolerance and deference towards
conferment of discretion in the past. Several cases in which the conferment of broad
76
77
Chandrakant Saha v. Union of India, AIR 1979 SC 314; Organo Chemical Industries v. Union of India, AIR
1979 SC 1803; New India Industrial Corp. Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1980 Del 277; R.R. Verma v. Union of
India, AIR 1980 SC 1461 (India).
discretion has been upheld on grounds such as the statutory provision conferring power have
sufficient guidelines, principles, or policies to regulate the exercise of power. 78 In the instant
case, while broad discretionary power may have been conferred, it is subjected to enough
guidelines and is in no way absolute.
2.4.2. THAT THERE IS NO ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRIMINATION
¶53. It is humbly submitted before the Apex Court that the Regulation itself does not suffer
from any such vice. However, the administrative authority may implement it in a
discriminatory manner or may not follow the policy or principle laid down in the Act to
regulate the discretion it does not satisfy Art. 14. In the instant case, there has been no
"arbitrary application of the laws." there has been a precise classification, i.e., what news are
allowed and what are not.
¶54. Moreover, it was held in Pannalal Binjraj v. Union of India 79 that the administration
would have a good defence if it can prove bona fides. The object sought to be achieved by the
impugned order is a noble one, i.e., to prevent the spread of NOVID- 19 in the State of
Rashtra, and prevent widespread panic.
2.4.3. THAT THERE IS NO ARBITRARY STATE ACTION.
¶55. This Hon'ble Court has held that arbitrary state action infringes Art. 14. 80 If a law is
arbitrary or irrational, it will fall foul of Art. 14. This Court also held in Style 81 and Dolly
Chanda82 among others, state actions should be guided by reason and not humour, whim, the
caprice of personal predilections of the person entrusted with the task on behalf of the State,
and exercise of all powers must be for public good instead of being an abuse of power. In the
78
Sukhwinder Pal Bipan Kumar v. the State of Punjab, AIR 1982 SC 65 (India); Shiv Dutt Rai Fateh Chand v.
Union of India, AIR 1984 SC 1194, 1212 (India).
79
80
A.P. Aggarwal v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi, AIR 2000 SC 205 (India).
81
(Dress Land), (Style (Dress Land) v. Union Territory, Chandigarh (1999) 7 SCC 89, 100 (India)).
82
Dolly Chanda v. Chairman, Jee, (2005) 9 SCC 779 (India).
instant case, it is submitted that the State is guided by both public good and reason. The
validity of the legislation draws from the fact that it was forwarded in accordance with
citizens' public interests and rights. It is not arbitrary but rather just, fair, and reasonable. It
provides a reasonable classification and procedure, which is. In light of the spread of
NOVID- 19, which can lead to widespread panic across the nation and take away the many
fundamental rights of the Rashtra citizens enshrined under Part III of our Constitution, this
Regulation is in furtherance of public good and interest.
¶56. Lastly, the mere fact that some hardship or injustice is caused to someone is no ground
to strike down the rule altogether if otherwise, the rule appears to be just, fair and reasonable,
and not unconstitutional.83
3. THAT THE ORDER ISSUED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF RASHTRA IS
INTRA VIRES THE PROVISIONS OF THE DISASTER MANAGEMENT ACT
2005
¶57. It is humbly submitted before the hon’ble court that as per the provision of section 6(2)
(a) of the act, the National Authority is responsible for laying down the policies on disaster
management for ensuring timely and effective response to disaster without prejudice to
generality of the provisions of sub-section (1), which authorises the government to lay down
the policies, plans and guidelines for disaster management which incorporates the issuing of
the above mentioned order because the spread of inconsistent and misinformation could be a
reason for widespread panic and alleviating the situation thus helps in mitigation of the
disaster situation. In the instant case, clause 1(A) of the order is thus within its authority to
give orders to regulate information relating to the total number of persons infected by
NOVID-19, persons recovered and deaths from NOVID-19.

83
A.P. Coop. Oil Seeds Growers Federation Ltd. v. D. Achyuta Rao, (2007) 13 SCC 320 (India).
¶58. It is humbly submitted before the hon’ble court that the provision of section 6(2)(a) of
the act, the National Authority is responsible for laying down the policies on disaster
management for ensuring timely and effective response to disaster, which could include the
steps to ensure the regulation of information availability of the subjects such as medical
oxygen and drugs, health infrastructure for treatment, etc, mentioned in the order because this
could help in mitigating the disaster as the availability of resources depends on such data and
inconsistency with respect to the same could disturb the distribution of the resources and
necessary equipment within the country. The NDMA in the instant case through clause 1(B)
of the order has done the same being in the purview of the section 6(2)(a) of the act.
¶59. It is submitted before the apex court that section 6(2)(i) of the act authorises the
government to take measures for the prevention of disaster, or the mitigation, or preparedness
and capacity building for dealing with the threatening disaster situation or disaster which
includes the regulation of information pertaining to important subjects, the inconsistency, and
related misinformation could hamper the effective containment of the NOVID-19 pandemic
and thus the order is within the scope of the section 6(2)(i).
¶60. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble court that Clause 2 of the order is not ultra
vires with respect to the section 22(2)(n) as the clause provides central government the power
to disseminate information but does not restrict the state government to disseminate
information and the state could do the same after going through the official channel so that
the information could be verified and the panic which was widespread due to the inconsistent
and divergent information could be restricted and the State Executive Committee still has the
responsibility to act as the coordinating and monitoring body which would include collecting
and disseminating information for management of disaster in the State as per section 22(1) of
the act and provide information to the National Authority relating to different aspects of
disaster management as per section 22(2)(n) of the act.

¶61. It is submitted that the order issued authorises the Central government with the
responsibility to disseminate information and the official information could be put forth as
per clause 2 of the order but after getting approval from the Designated Officer of the
Ministry of Health, Government of Rashtra as per clause 3 and 4 of the issued order, any
verified information could be disseminated. The aforementioned clauses are not ultra vires
with respect to the section 24(k) of the act which says that for assisting and protecting the
community affected by disaster or providing relief to such community or, preventing or
combating disruption or dealing with the effects of any threatening disaster situation, the
State Executive Committee may disseminate information to public as the state still have right
to disseminate information.
¶62. This Order includes that all forms of media, including social media are covered by the
order as per clause 4 which is in accordance with section 67 of the DMA which mentions
about the directions which are given to media for communication of warnings, etc, which
include the Government to give direction to any authority or person in control of any audio or
audio-visual media or such other means of communication as may be available to carry any
warning or advisories regarding any threatening disaster situation or disaster. Thus, the clause
is intra vires with respect to the provision of the act.
¶63. It is most humbly submitted before the Hon’ble court that clause 4 which talks about the
appointment of an Officer for approving the dissemination of information is well within the
ambit of section 69 of the DMA, and thus intra vires as the said section implies that the
National Executive Committee by general or special order in writing, may delegate to the
Chairperson or any other member or to any officer, subject to such conditions and limitations
specified in the order, such of its powers and functions under this Act as it may deem
necessary.

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28TH M.C.

CHAGLA MEMORIAL GOVERNMENT LAW COLLEGE NATIONAL ONLINE

The Respondent humbly submits before the Hon’ble Court that:

1. That, Rashtra is a sovereign democratic republic, governed by the Rule of Law,

Union Territories, which are directly governed by the Central Government.

Legislature and each State has its State Legislature.

World Health Organisation on 11th March 2020.

National Disaster Management Authority (“NDMA”) under Section 3 of the Act

issued an Order directing the Ministries/Departments of the Government of Rashtra,

State/Union Territory Governments and State/Union Territory Authorities to take

preventive measures against NOVID-19. By a second Order, NDMA issued

Guidelines on the measures to be taken by the Ministries/Departments of the

Government of Rashtra, State/Union Territory Governments and State/Union

6. That, around March-April 2021, divergent and inconsistent statistics and information,

having no uniformity, on important subjects relating to NOVID- 19 management were

relating to the management of NOVID – 19 disaster and the containment measures in

guidelines for the dissemination of information relating to the containment measures

for NOVID- 19.

10. That, a group of public-spirited individuals, including prominent journalists, doctors,

to the provisions of the Act itself. Hence, the present matter.

[ISSUE 1] WHETHER THE PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION IS MAINTAINABLE UNDER

ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF RASHTRA?

[ISSUE 2] WHETHER THE ORDER ISSUED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF RASHTRA WAS IN

VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF RASHTRA?

[ISSUE 3] WHETHER THE ORDER ISSUED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF RASHTRA WAS

ULTRA VIRES WITH RESPECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE DISASTER

MANAGEMENT ACT 2005 ITSELF?

I. THAT THE PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION IS NOT MAINTAINABLE UNDER

ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF RASHTRA?

alternative remedies have not been exhausted by the Petitioner.

II. THAT THE ORDER ISSUED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF RASHTRA IS NOT

VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTION OF RASHTRA?

It is contended that firstly, the Order is in consonance with Article 19 of the

VIRES WITH RESPECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE DISASTER MANAGEMENT

ACT 2005 ITSELF?

1. THAT THE PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION IS NOT MAINTAINABLE

UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF RASHTRA.

in the appropriate proceedings and on an application under Art. 32.2

been exhausted by the Petitioner

petitioner, were declined to disseminate inconsistent data related to NOVID- 19 management

not one of actual restoration of justice.

1.2. THAT THE PETITIONER HAS NO LOCUS STANDI

However, the violation of fundamental rights remains a pre-requisite and mandatory

won’t have locus standi.

1.3. THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO INFRINGEMENT OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

1.4. THAT ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES HAVE NOT BEEN EXHAUSTED BY THE

proceedings as they may be advised.

cases pending before the Supreme Court.

2. THAT THE ORDER IS INTRA VIRES THE CONSTITION OF RASHTRA

be laid down as applicable to all cases.18

requirements of Art. 21.21

public interest and public order.

ART. 19(2) OF THE CONST. AND 19(3) OF ICCPR.

accepted and used in multiple judgments across jurisdictions.25

2.1.1.1. That the restrictions are provided by the law.

norm is ‘prescribed by law’ if it is formulated with sufficient precision so as to enable

accordance with Art. 19 of the Const.