JBRARY: STATE UNIVERSITY OF N'Bv YORK AT B1NGHAMTON

CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D
THE WORLD-SYSTEM
CONTEMPORARY CONDITIONS
FOR THE REPRESENTATION
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Edited by
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University of Minnesota Press

Minneapolis
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Preface to the Revised Edition. vii
Printed in. the United States of .America o n acid-free paper
Acknowledgments xiii
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Introduction: Spaces of Culture, Spaces of Knowledge 1
Culture, globalization, and the w o r l d - s y s t e m : contemporary Anthony King
conditions for the representation of identity / edited b y
A n t h o n y D . King.: 1. The Local and the Global: Globalization and Ethnicity 19
p. cm. Stuart Hall
Papers presented at a s y m p o s i u m h e l d at the State University of
N e w York at Binghamton on A p r i l 1,1989. 2. O l d and N e w Identities, O l d and N e w Ethnicities 41
Originally published: Binghamton : Dept. of A r t and A r t History, Stuart Hall
State University of N e w York at Binghamton, 1991. With, n e w pref.
Includes bibliographical references .and indexes. 3. Social Theory, C u l t u r a l Relativity and the Problem 69
I S B N 0-8166-2953-6 (pb) of Globaiity
1. Culture:—Congresses. 2. Acculturation—Congresses. Roland Robertson
3. Ethnicity—Congresses. I. K i n g , A n t h o n y D .
GN357.C848 1997 4. The N a t i o n a l .and 'the Universal: C a n There Be Such 91.
306—dc21 97-2347 a T h i n g as W o r l d Culture?
Immanuel Wallerstein

The University of Minnesota, is an equal-opportunity educator and 5. Scenarios for Peripheral Cultures 107
employer. UlfHannerz

6. Interrogating Theories of the G l o b a l 129

 CONTENTS

•" T G o i n g Beyond Global. Babble

Janet Abu-Lughod
Preface to the
II. Languages and M o d e l s for C u l t u r a l Exchange
Barbara Aboii-El-Haj
Revised Edition
III. Specificity and Culture
Maureen Turim

IV. The Global, the U r b a n , and the W o r l d

Anthony King

TV. Globalization, Totalization and the Discursive Field

John Tagg

7, The G l o b a l and the Specific:: Reconciling Conflicting SINCE THE ESSAYS IN THIS BOOK WERE FIRST PRESENTED AT A N INTER¬
Theories of Culture national s y m p o s i u m i n upstate N e w York i n 1989, there has been a. phe-
nomenal growth of interest i n the subject of globalization. Yet, relatively
Janet Wolff
little of the literature on this topic has addressed 'the many complex
questions arising from the impact of globalization on specifically cul-
N a m e Index
tural issues or, indeed, of culturéis) on the processes of globalization,
however those two very problematic concepts are interpreted. If this is 1

Subject Index
one good reason for bringing out a second North. American edition of
Notes on Contributors 'this book, another is the continued relevance of 'the many powerful ar-
guments and different perspectives raised by its various contributors.
Encouraged, therefore, by the positive reception accorded the first edi-
tion, the enthusiastic support of editor M i c a h Kleit at the University of
Minnesota Press, and, i n a more pragmatic sense, the somewhat furtive
circulation of its predecessor, 1 start this preface to the revised edition.
2

A s I indicated i n the original edition, each term of the m a i n title is asso-

ciated w i t h the name of particular leading scholars — the authors of the
principal papers h e r e — w h o , over the past two decades, have pioneered

1
In addition to the titles cited here, Public Culture (1988-), the journal of the Society for
Transnational Cultural Studies, and Theory, Culture and Satiety (1983-) provide valuable
guides to the existing literature.
2
Published under the imprint of my parent department, the title never quite made it
into the American edition of Books in Print. Outside North America, the book is published
by Macmillan (London) and, in Japanese, by Tamagawa University Press.
 CULTURE, G L O B A L I Z A T I O N A N D T H E WORLD-SYir f E M
the study of issues that the title suggests, some f ocusing p imarily o n
questions of culture, others on the world political economy, st. il others on
questions of societal transformation and identity formation, .'et., despite
their different positions and different
«..«nu»'» "»"•»* ».* - • conceptual
, v - . languaReiiri3rsMre,
r
° ,° „ .... ;
to a greater or iesser extent, at least two perspectives: to reiection of the
nationally constituted society as the appropriate object of discourse, or
"unit of social and cultural analysis, ar^o^n^jppgpt w a y s ajqdjp vary-
ing degrees, a commitment to conceptualizing "the w o r l d as a w h o l e . "
"" Since the book was first published, these authors, either on their o w n
or i n collaboration with others, have continued to forge ahead, devel-
oping their' ideas and, i n some cases, responding to issues and ques-
tions raised at the 1989 symposium, stimulating our thoughts and ex-
tending our v i s i o n . In addition, a growing number of authors have
3
both interrogated and .reinterpreted notions of globalization and the
world-system, or, as I later suggest, have responded by refusing them.
Other scholars have pursued some of the more focused issues they
prompt: 'the future of national identities and cultures; the rethinking of.
ideas of modernity, religion, and w o r l d history from '^perspective of
globalization; the localization of the global; the transformation of state-
centric assumptions i n the social sciences; and, i n the humanities, ways
of theorizing contemporary novels as examples of the globa lization of
culture. These and many other studies of globalization, i n '. widely dif-
4
ferent fields, are surely indicative of a major paradigm shift taking
place .in.'th.e„way.that the scholarly production of knowledge is being
3
For example, David Morley and Kuan-Hsing Chen, eds., Stuart Hall: Critical Dia-
logues in Cultural Studies (London and New York: Routledge, 1996); Ulf Kannerz, Trans-
national Connections: Culture, People, Places (London and New York: Routledge, 1996);
Roland Robertson, Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture (London, Newbury Park,
and New Delhi: Sage, 1992); and Immanuel Wallerstein, Geopolitics and Geoadture: Essays
on the Changing World-System (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) and After
Liberalism (New York: New Press, 1995). Both in this volume and in other publications,
Robertson, as well as other scholars mentioned here, take up a number of the points made
by Janet Wolff in her concluding critical essay; see note 4 and also essays in Morley and
Chen, Stuart Hall; and Hannerz, Transnational Connections.
"Malcolm Waters, Globalization (London and New York: Routledge, 1995); Tony Spybey,
Globalization and World Society (Cambridge: Polity, 1996); Anthony Giddens, Modernity and
Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modem Age (Cambridge: Polity, 1991); Frederick
Buell, National Culture and the Mem Global System (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1994); Jonathan Friedman, Cultural Identity and Global Process (London, Thousand
Oaks, and New Delhi: Sage, 1994); Mike Featherstone, Scott Lash, and Roland Robertson,
eds., Gbbd Modernities (London, Thousand Oaks, and New Delhi: Sage, 1995); Peter Beyer,
viii
PREFACE TO T H E REVISED EDITION
rethought at the close ot the second millennium, a time i n historical
space w h e n additional symbolic meaning is being invested i n the con-
struction of a new space i n historical time. It is fair to predict 'that schol-
ars i n an increasing number of specialized fields, from architecture to
zoology, not only w i l l look to existing theories of "the w o r l d as a single
place," to' quote Roland Robertson, but also w i l l , through their o w n
fields of expertise and research, refine and develop them.
Illustrative of the emergence of more specialized studies in this area
has been the increasing use of the notion of "global culture." In recently
reviewing some 'twenty books and essays in. which the term either fig-
ures i n the title or is defined and discussed in. the text, 1 became aware
5
of a number of points. First, perhaps, is the very obvious one that the
w o r d " g l o b a l " has acquired a certain fashionable éclat, n o w used, with-
out definition or explanation, where previously " w o r l d w i d e , " "univer-
sal," or "everywhere" w o u l d have sufficed. More seriously, however,
Featherstone writes that as there is a wide variety of responses to the
processes of globalization, there is "little prospect of a unified global
culture, rather there are global cultures i n the p l u r a l . " Yet, meanings
6
accorded to "global culture" differ. Recognizing this, there is a tempta-
tion to suggest a basic distinction between what might, from a spatial
perspective, be termed centripetal and centrifugal uses: i n 'the first, cul-
tural forms, influences, and practices from many parts of the w o r l d lo-
cating at a place or population are seen to create a new "global culture"; 7
Religion and Globalization (London, Thousand Oaks, and New Delhi: Sage, 1994); Bruce
Mazlish jnd Ralph Buultjens, eds.. Conceptualizing Global History (Boulder, Colo.: West-
view, 1993); Rob Wilson and Wimal Dissanayake, eds., Global/Local: Cultural Production and
the Transnational Imaginary (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1996); Peter J. Taylor,
"On the Nation-State, the Global, and Social Science," Environment and Planning A, 28
(1996), with commentaries fromfourteensocial scientists currently writing on globaliza-
tion; Michael. Valdez Moses, The Novel and the Globalization of Culture (Oxford and New
York: Oxford University Press, 1995).
5
Anthony D. King, "The Problem of Global Culture and the Internationalization of
Architecture," in Distanzierte Verstrickungen: Die ambivalente Bindung sociologist Forsch-
ender., an ihren Gegenstand. Festschrift für Peter R. Gleichmann, eds. Eva Barlösius, Elcir.
Kürsat-Ahlers, and Hans-Peter Waldhoff (Berlin: Sigma "Verlag, forthcoming, in German).
The following paragraphs draw from this.
6
Mike Featherstone, "Global Culture: An Introduction," in Global Culture: Nationalism,
Globalization and Modernity, ed. Featherstone (London, Newbury Park, and New Delhi:
Sage:, in association with Theory, Culture and Society, 1990), 8.
7
For example, Karen Fog Qlwig, Global Culture, Island Identity: Continuity and Change
in the Afro-Caribbean Community of Nevis (Philadelphia: Harwood, 1993).
ix
 CULTURE, G L O B A L I Z A T I O N A N D T H E W O R L D - S Y S T E M
i n the second (more commonly), cultural influences or practices, stem-
m i n g from one location, are said to be found, i n various forms, i n many
parts o f the globe. '(Neither of these, incidentally, is a particularly new
8
phenomenon.) "
Such, a dichotomy is all too simple, however. .If there are globally pro¬
'* duced cultures, there are (as Robertson maintains) culturally produced
* views of globality. Where John Dobson assumes the increasing exis-
» tence of a global corporate culture, the more w i d e l y held opinion is
9
— that specific cultural practices and institutions, w h e n not resisted, are
invariably i n d i g i n i z e d , h y b r i d i z e d , subjected to processes of cultural
10 11
translation i n the manner of their reception. Globalization is not a one¬
way process, ñor does it come from a single source... Furthermore, its ef-
fects are not equally distributed i n a. global situation of grossly uneven
^ d e v e l o p m e n t . At¡pr^An|M.durffis Idea of a variety of cultural flows,
12
* - stemming from different social, spatial, .and historical locations (see
— pages 10—11 of the Introduction), along w i t h alternative in terpretatíons,
— still has value. M o r e recently, the less-than-elegant "glocalization," a
^ Japanese marketing neologisn from, the 1980s, has been proposed to
capture the process whereby rhe global is adapted to differentiated
— local conditions. There is, ho- -ever, still a tendency i n many studies to
14
delineate, i n relation to mate.ial, media, or professional cultures, a
— process of global production — legitimate in itself — ye to ignore the
-» very different circumstances < if their recep tion /consur. .ption and the
— meanings invested i n this pro< 'S.s. 15
8
For example, Karla Poewe, eel., C irismatic Christianity as a Gbbal Culture (Columbia:
University of South Carolina Press, 1 94); and other examples in. Waters, Globalization,
among others.
'John Dobson, "The Role of Ethic • in Global Corporate Culture," Journal of Business
Ethics, 9 (1990): 481-488.
10
Cyan Prakash, "Science 'Gone 1 ative' in Colonial India," Representations, 40 (Fall
1992): 153-178.
11
Jan. Nederveen Pieterse, "Glob: zation as Hybridization," in Featherstone, Lash,
and Robertson, Global Modernities, 45- 1
12
Anthony McGrew/"A Global Sot ery?" in Modernity and Us Futures, eds. Stuart Hall,
David Held, and Tony McGrew (Cam! idge: Polity Press, 1992), 62-113.
"Waters, Gktbdimtian, 156-157.
M
Roland Robertson; "Glocalizatii i: Time-Space and Homogeneity-Heterogeneity,"
in Featherstone, Lash, and Robertson, -iobai Modernities, 25-44.
15
We must also acknowledge that ie increasing numbers, of people in the category of
global travelers are likely to be indir d to accord similar meanings- to globalized phe-
nomena and hence the growth of "glo a-talk.™
x xi
PREFACE TO T H E REVISED EDITION
A l l of these interpretations might be said to be "internal" to the no-
tion of the global, encompassed within its boundaries, so to speak. A t
quite a different level, Kenneth Surin writes that "a theory of culture
is something that is produced or created no less than its putative
object...... A 'theory of culture, in this case, global culture, is not about
culture/global culture itself but about the concepts that culture gener-
ates. A theory of culture does not impinge directly on culture but on the
concepts of culture. It is a part of the process by w h i c h every culture
generates for itself its o w n 'thinkabiiity' (and ' u n t h i n k a b i l i t y ' ) . "
16
Yet, all of these views stem from a particular Western episteme. Be-
cause all stress the importance of transnational forces, the practices of
coding and decoding everyday practices that disrupt, disturb, and even
deny the identity of the global are not revealed. One realm of intellec-
17
tual inquiry that aims to do this, namely, the more historically and po-
litically grounded arguments- of post-colonial criticism, though crucial
13
to this topic, is too extensive to be treated here. Moreover, contesta-
18
tions of these representations- of globalization are also likely to be found
i n major w o r l d religions. TJjls,xa»^Ae.very' basicjque^oaflf whether
it is actually possible for different geographical, social, political, reli-
gious, and cultural constituencies to w o r k w i t h the same concepts. A n d
as only some of the works cited here address the question of gender, 19
there is clearly an. urgent need to remedy this. 20
In m y original preface I made, reference to the necessity of thinking
about globality through the arts, in contrast to the (mainly) social sci-
ence perspectives of the authors here. A l t h o u g h a growing body of the-
oretical w o r k on globalization and the arts is emerging, the real answer
to this question is to be found, rather i n the contents and -contexts of
their actual performance and practice rather than in theory — much of it
1
"-Kenneth Surin, "On Producing the Concept of a Global Culture," in Nations, Identities,
Cultures, ed. V. Y. Mudimbe. Special issue- of South Atlantic Quarterly, 94 (1995): 1179-1200.
17
1 am indebted to Abidin Kusno for this comment.
"Reference must be made, however, to Edward Said's Culture and Imperialism (Lon-
don: Chatto and Windus, 1993).
"'For example, Spybey, Globalization and World Society; Robertson, Globalization.
m
See, for example, Doreen Massey, Space, Place and Gender (Cambridge: Polity, 1994).
A preliminary bibliographic search suggests that feminist research and writing are pri-
marily focused on global economic, social, and political issues (including, but not limited
to, the condition of women, as well as peace, health, ecology, and so on) rather than more
generalized studies of globalization.
 CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM

generated through 'the very historically, geographically, and spatially

specific sites of w o r l d and global cities, increasingly significant politi-
21

cal, .and cultural formations 'that, until now, have been conceptualized,
Acknowledgments
and researched more i n economic than social and 'Cultural terms. It 22

is the very specificity and originality of novels, music, dance, video,

poetry, graphics, film, photography, theater arts, painting, architecture,
radio, television, carnival .arts, public sculpture, and their equally dis-
tinctive cultural politics and political effects, their' personal and com-
m u n i t y histories and memories, that w i l l help refine the next gen-
eration of theorizing about globalization in. 'the political, social, and,
especially, cultural sphere, j
Anthony D . King
Binghamton, N Y
September 1996

THE ESSAYS IN THIS COLLECTION WERE FIRST PRESENTED AT A ONE-

11
Paul L. Knox and Peter J. Taylor, eds.. World Cities in a World-System (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1995); Anthony D. King, Global Cities: Post-Imperialism and
the Intermtionalisation of London (London and New York: Roufledge, 1990); Saskia Sassen,
The Global City: New York, London, Ta'kya (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991);
Sharon Zukin, The Cultures of Cities (Cambridge, Mass., and Oxford: Blackwell, 1995).
22
For some initial consideration of the arts in this context see, for example, "The
Global Issue: A Symposium," Art in America, 77 (July 1989),; also Jean Fisher, Global 'Visions:
Towards a New Internationalism in the Visual Arts (London: Kala Press, 1995), and selected
papers in Third Text (1957-;.
day s y m p o s i u m held at the State University of N e w York at Bingham-
ton i n A p r i l 1989 and subsequently revised and edited for publication.
The first two talks, by Stuart H a l l , were given two weeks before the
main symposium; the chapters that appear here represent slightly edited
versions of the transcriptions made from the taped presentations. The
symposium was supported b y grants from the offices of the Dean, Vice-
President and Vice-Provost for Graduate Studies and Research at the
university. I w o u l d like to thank them and also many others w h o helped
organize and make the conference possible, including the speakers; the
associate dean of H a r p u r College, Trudy Cobb Denard; Steve Ross and
Barbara Abou-El-Haj for chairing; Carol Breckenridge, editor of Public
Culture; the A r t History Graduate Students U n i o n , particularly, its then
president, Joe Socki; m y art history colleagues, particularly John Tagg,
Wendy Sorting, and others w h o assisted in various ways; the members
of the Fernand Braudel Center, especially Donna De Voist; George
M c K e e for his advice; M a r i o A . D i Cesare for his help w i t h the produc-
tion of the first edition; Carol Marcy and Joan Scott of the Department,
of A r t History; and especially the staff of the then University Manuscript
Center, Lisa Fegley-Schmidt, Phyllis Antos, Lois Orzel, .and Elizabeth
Regan, for their excellent cooperation and expertise. Finally, my thanks
to A b i d i n Kusr.o and Janet Wolff for their comments on the preface to
this second edition.

xii
 Introduction:
Spaces of Culture,
Spaces of Knowledge

ANTHONY KING

I WANT TO START THIS INTRODUCTION BY LOOKING AT THE THREE

terms u s e d in. the m a i n title of this book and by explaining w h y they
have been p u t together, if somewhat uneasily, to f o r m one single
idea.
C u l t u r e , whether i n its material or symbolic f o r m , is .an attribute
w h i c h people(s) are said to have; globalization is a process a n d the
w o r l d - s y s t e m is a, structure. Each term is a. construct associated, botl
in this, book a n d more generally, w i t h a substantial though dis tine
b o d y of scholarship .and also, w i t h the names of i n d i v i d u a l scholars
modes of i n q u i r y and academic disciplines.
,„ I shall not attempt here to provide m u c h elaboration of the tern
culture w h i c h , especially i n recent years, has undergone yet m o r
transformations of meaning. In the .announcement of the symposiun
w h i c h f o r m e d the basis of this v o l u m e , reference was made to cul
tures as "socially organized systems of m e a n i n g expressed i n p a i
ticular f o r m s " and to " t h e historical .and sociological study of con
crete cultural forms and practices." A s Janet W o l f f points out i n he
concluding chapter, however, the p r i n c i p a l papers here operate bot
w i t h different .and, i n some cases, undifferentiated notions of c u l t u n
the various authors use the term to refer, at different times, to way
 CULTURE/ GLOBALIZATION A N D T H E WORLD-SYSTEM
of life, the arts a n d media, political or religious culture a n d attitudes
to globalization. Both here and elsewhere, I m m a n u e l Wallerstein dif-
ferentiates between culture (usage I) as "the set of characteristics
w h i c h distinguish one group f r o m another" and usage LT, i n the
belles lettres sense, as " s o m e set of phenomena w h i c h are different
from (and 'higher' than) some other set of phenomena w i t h i n a n y
one g r o u p , " an evaluative distinction w h i c h m a n y w o u l d see as part
1
of the cultural problematic, F o r the purposes of this introduction, I
shall try and collapse this distinction between what i n crude terms
one might broadly call older " a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l " notions of culture (i.e.
ways of life, values, beliefs) and " h u m a n i s t i c " ones {arts a n d media)
and adopt W o l f f ' s conceptualisation: i.e. by suggesting that culture i n
its sense of art, literature, f i l m , practices of representation of all
kinds, both draws f r o m and participates i n the construction of culture
as a w a y of life, as a system of values a n d beliefs w h i c h , i n t u r n ,
affects culture as a creative, representational practice, w e can b r i d g e
what is often a gap between these different meanings. In this sense,
the study of culture has become the particular province of C u l t u r a l
Studies. ?,
A s i m o ' d e of academic and. intellectual i n q u i r y , C u l t u r a l Studies is
particularly associated w i t h the establishment, i n 1964, of the Centre
for Contemporary C u l t u r a l Studies at the University of B i r m i n g h a m ,
E n g l a n d , u n d e r the Directorship of R i c h a r d Hoggart, Professor of
English Literature, a n d subsequently, Stuart H a l l , Director between
1968 and 1979. A c c o r d i n g to H a l l / C u l t u r a l Studies arose from, a
2
concern that major cultural transformations were taking place i n
society, not least i n w o r k i n g class culture, yet none of the " t r a d i -
t i o n a l " disciplines were addressing them. The emergence of C u l t u r a l
Studies i n the 1960s was part of a crisis that was to undermine the
humanities a n d social sciences and w h i c h also represented a politic-
ization of academic w o r k . Essentially theoretical i n its orientation,
1
Immanuel Wallerstein, "Culture as the Ideological Battleground of the .Modem
World-System," in Global Culture. Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity, ed. Mike
Featherstone (London, Newbury Park and New Delhi: Sage, 1990)33.
2
Stuart Hall, Dorothy Hobson, Andrew Lowe, Paul Willis, eds., Culture,
Media, Language, Working Papers in Cultural Studies, 1972-9 (London: Hutch-
inson, 1987):7.
3
This paragraph draws on cornm.en.ts made by Stuart Hall at a Round Table
Seminar, Department of Art and Art History, SUNY-Binghamton, 13 March, 1989.
2 3
INTRODUCTION
d r a w i n g on M a r x i s m , semiotics, feminism and. other discourses, Cul¬
tural Studies was not seen as a discipline, but " a n area where dif-
_^ ferent disciplines intersect i n the study of the cultural aspects of
^ society."* Subversive i n intent, the field was consciously concerned
w i t h transforming the practice of p r o d u c i n g knowledge, w i t h issues
of cultural politics, and w i t h asking cultural and theoretical questions
in relation to power.
A l o n g w i t h C u l t u r a l Studies' epistemological, methodological and
theoretical concerns of the 1970s and 1980s w h i c h , as Stuart H a l l ' s
contribution demonstrates here, have constantly been transformed by
n e w critical paradigms, m u c h of the w o r k of C u l t u r a l Studies was
solidly g r o u n d e d i n historical studies of English society, the three
paradigmatic and foundational texts usually being acknowledged as
Richard Boggart's The Uses of Literacy (1958), R a y m o n d W i l l i a m s '
Culture and Society (1961) and E. P. Thompson's The Making of the
English Working Class (1968). Subsequent influential texts such as
5
P a u l W i l l i s ' s Learning to Labor have also f o l l o w e d i n the same geo-
graphical, social and class context.
The question arises, however, as to whether the nationally defined
society is the most appropriate unit either for cultural or for social
analysis, It is immediately apparent here that, i n discussing globaliza-
tion f r o m the particular' point of v i e w of " E n g l i s h n e s s , " of E n g l i s h
cultural identity, Stuart H a l l is m o v i n g between, and o c c u p y i n g , at
least four inter-related yet still identifiable cultural spaces w h i c h I
«m w i l l call those of post-imperialism (Britain), post-colonialism (Jamaica,
Britain/England, the U S A , and other post-colonial spaces elsewhere)
and what he terms " g l o b a l mass c u l t u r e " and the " g l o b a l post-mod¬
e m . " W h i l s t each of these cultural spaces may be seen, hypothetical-
ly, as sub-cultural parts of an equally hypothetical " g l o b a l c u l t u r e , "
o:r maybe just pieces of a larger jigsaw, not all of them would, be use-
f u l for placing the identity of say, a T u r k i s h migrant i n G e r m a n y , the
Vietnamese c o m m u n i t y i n N e w Y o r k or, to change the example, the
built environment of South K o r e a n workers i n the G u l f .
These are precisely the k i n d of issues w h i c h are anticipated b y
Janet W o l f f i n her conclusion: first, w e need a theory of culture "at
Culture, Media, Language, 7.
4
Stuart Hall, "Cultural Studies and the Centre: Some Problematics and Prob-
5
lems," Culture, Media, Language, 16.
 CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM
the. l e v e l of the international"' a n d second, in. suggesting that cultural
theory "has started to m o v e away from its earlier, rather ethnocentric
approach to investigate the global dimensions of cultural p r o d u c t i o n
and c o n s u m p t i o n , " acknowledgement of the l i m i t e d , culture-specific
contexts i n w h i c h earlier cultural theory paradigms operated. If 6 ' " g l o b a l d i m e n s i o n s " possibly focusing on the cultural, spatial, tecj^-
both these propositions are accepted, they .also i m p l y that, i n a d d i t i o n
to needing a " d i f f e r e n t i a t e d " notion of culture, as W o l f f suggests, w e
also need a differentiated notion of " t h e international" a n d " t h e
g l o b a l . " This, to return to m y opening paragraph, is precisely the rea-
son for juxtaposing the contributions of Wallers tein o n the
world-system a n d Robertson on globalization with, a discourse on,
culture. These I shall refer to i n more detail below.
A n y theory of the international, or global, w o u l d need, to recognise
both the totally different presuppositions, as w e l l as conceptualiza-
tions resulting f r o m them, of both these terms: at their simplest, the
w h o l e historical problematic of the formation of nation-states, the
proliferation i n the nineteenth a n d especially twentieth century of the
idea, of the nation, nationalism and national cultures (a result, Robert-
son w o u l d maintain, >t increased globality) a n d the distinctive his-
torical, a n d unequal, conditions i n which, the notion of the "inter-
national" w a s constructed. This topic has a literature w h i c h is far
7
too extensive to quote.. Similarly, concepts of the global and. glob-
alization, especially as they have been foregrounded i n the last t w o
decades, w i t h their i m p l i e d trans- or even a-nationality, their implicit
concern, w i t h " h u m a n k i n d , " " t h e earth," as w e l l as a range of other
issues, w o u l d require very careful u n p a c k i n g . In either case, little
8
could be achieved towards constructing " a theory 6f culture at the
level ofJ:he international" or "investigating the global dimensions of
cultural p r o d u c t i o n " w i t h o u t very specific historically, geographically
* Ulf Hannerz in his . •aper here also- suggests that "what is required is .an
overall conceptualization >f contemporary culture which incorporates a sense of
the pervasiveness of globalization."
1
7
See Anthony D. Kin,;, "Viewing the World, as One: Urban History .and the
World-System," in Urban ism. Colonialism and the World-Economy (London and
New York: Routledge, 19'»a):78„
8
A n early attempt is made in Roland Robertson and Frank Lechner, "Mod-
ernization, Globalization and the Problem of Culture in World-Systems Theory,"
Tneory, Culture and Society, 2 (1985) 3:103-18. According to the Oxford English.
Dictionary, the term "globalization" had. entered the vocabulary at 'the latest by
1962...
4 5
INTRODUCTION
and sociologically informed conceptualizations, of " t h e w o r l d as a
w h o l e " a n d , to somewhat caricature this process, the "international. _
Tev^lJtj^ing^esr^cial notice of the economic, political^cultural a n d
nation-state elements i n the development of the w o r l d "order a n d the
nological, material and representational dimensions of the construc-
tion' of globality.' In any event, such an investigation, by also taking
in different representations of the w o r l d as a w h o l e , or globality,
from different social, spatial or cultural locations i n the w o r l d , w o u l d
require not only a history a n d sociology of knowledge but also a n
historical geography of such, to give equal treatment to contesting
representations of " t h e w o r l d as a w h o l e . " Some of these issues are
addressed b y Robertson i n his paper here.
W h i l s t these m a y be seen as essentially theoretical concerns, it
might be preferable to start by l o o k i n g at m u c h more specific ques-
tions of cultural identity a n d the historical conditions w h i c h have
p r o d u c e d them. H e r e , I shall return to the subject of C u l t u r a l Studies,
its distinct historical relation to the study of E n g l i s h working-class
culture a n d of contemporary culture i n the U K . In particular, as a
contribution to developing a theory of culture at an international
level, I shall try and m a p out some aspects of the geographical, his-
torical, and cultural, specificity of post-colonialism as one distinctive
p r i s m through w h i c h some contemporary c u l t u r a l phenomena can be
approached.
The " E n g l i s h w o r k i n g class," neither economically, socially, c u l -
turally nor spatially, can be understood as an. autonomous unit (irre-
spective of its connection to the larger " B r i t i s h " class structure); its.
constitution resulted from occupying a particular space i n an. inter-
national d i v i s i o n of labor, the other parts of w h i c h were as essential
to its existence as they (the English w o r k i n g class) were as essential
to theirs. The system, of course, as H a l l points out, was the colonial
empire, w h i c h was not only a political a n d economic, but also a
social and cultural system.: w i t h o u t the sugar plantation w o r k e r s i n
9
The source of this concern was prompted by a study of "the production of
a global culture" as represented by the near global diffusion of one particular
item, and settlement type, in the built environment: see Anthony D. King, "The
Global Production of Building Form," in Urbanism, Colonialism and the World-
Economy, 100-29, and The Bungalow: The Production of a Global Culture (London
and New York: Roulledge and Kegan Paul, 1984).
 CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM
the West Indies there c o u l d have been no trade u n i o n labor at the
Thameside's Tate a n d Lyle refinery i n L o n d o n ; w i t h o u t workers i n
the C a d b u r y ' s Cocoa plant i n B i r m i n g h a m , there w o u l d be n o cash
crop cocoa labor i n West Africa.
The cultural system w h i c h was the outcome of this political a n d
economic system is most obviously, and importantly, represented b y
language, but not only that: it includes a mass of variations of c o m -
m o n institutions r a n g i n g f r o m administrative a n d religious practices
to architecture, f r o m university curriculae to literature. A n d histor-
ically, it includes the U n i t e d States w h i c h , for the present, still retains
English as its official language. W i t h o u t this post-colonial, transna-
tional cultural system (and. I am. not i m p l y i n g that it is hegemonic)
the contents of this book w o u l d not be w r i t t e n i n (international)
English.
The shortcomings of any academic p a r a d i g m , be it sociology or
» cultural studies, conceived o n the basis of a " n a t i o n a l society," can be*
m illustrated by t w o examples. W i t h a potentially exponential g r o w t h i n
.» international migration, w i t h many cultures existing far f r o m their
**. places of o r i g i n a n d indeed, not necessarily for' any length of time
«e (vide migrants f r o m K u w a i t , South A f r i c a , the Soviet U n i o n ) , there is
.»> no " n a t i o n a l l y grounded." theoretical p a r a d i g m which, can adequately
«**• handle the epistemological situation. It is not just that, increasingly,
m. m a n y people have no roots; it's also that they have n o soil. Culture
is increasingly deterritorialized.
In the second place, a k n o w l e d g e p a r a d i g m based p r i m a r i l y on a
nationally organized society, or at least, w i t h o u t a larger transnation¬
-** a l frame, can also not cope w i t h cultural phenomena w h i c h , w h i l e
-* clearly related to those of that society, nonetheless circulate i n , out¬
side and around i t , i n the case of the U K , i n the U S A , India, N i g e r i a ,
— South Africa, A u s t r a l i a , H o n g K o n g and elsewhere i n the " E n g l i s h
s p e a k i n g " ecumene. The rapidly expanding post-colonial discourse i n
¿0. English, though itself posing distinctive problems i n regard to its
origins and location of both theoretical a n d political reference, is
<* ample i l l u s t r a t i o n . E d w a r d Said makes a similar point:
10
See, for example, Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, Helen Tiffin, The Empire
101
"** Writes Back, Tticory and Practice in Post-Colonial Literatures (London and New York:
Routlcdge, 1989); Trinh T. Minh-ha, Women, Native, Other. Writing Postcokmiality
«. end Feminism (Bloomington: Indian University Press, 1989); Gayatri C. Spivak,
6 7
INTRODUCTION
— O n e of the canonical topics of m o d e r n intellectual history has
o«° been the development of dominant discourses a n d disciplinary
traditions i n the m a i n fields of scientific, social or cultural i n -
«p» quiry. W i t h o u t any exceptions that 1 k n o w of, the paradigms for
this topic have been d r a w n f r o m what is considered exclusively
Western sources. Foucault's w o r k is one instance of w h a t I mean
^ a n d , i n another d o m a i n , is R a y m o n d W i l l i a m s ' . I mention these
^ t w o formidable scholars because In the m a i n I a m i n almost total
* sympathy w i t h their genealogical discoveries to w h i c h I a m
*m inestimably indebted. Yet for both of them the colonial experi-
M, ence is quite i r r e l e v a n t . . .
Elsewhere i n the same article Said writes:
<*- there have been no full-scale critical studies of the relationship
between m o d e r n Western imperialism a n d its culture, the occlu-
siort of that deeply symbiotic relationship being a. result, of .it.
j»» M o r e particularly, the extraordinary dependence — formal a n d
ideological — of the great F r e n c h and E n g l i s h n o v e l o n the facts
*~ of empire has never been studied from, a theoretical
•-«• viewpoint. 11
W i t h o u t this recognition of the historical specificity of colonialism it
is impossible properly to c o m p r e h e n d one, if not the central p h e n o m -
enon of many contemporary cultures: race and racism. This is w h y the
study of specifically colonial cultures is an essential pre-requisite for the
study of many contemporary post-colonial and post-imperial ones.
*» 17« Post-Colonial Critic (London: Routledge, 1990) and issues of the journal,
••*» Inscriptions brought out by the Group for the Critical Study of Colonial Discourse
s» and Center for Cultural Studies, University of California at Santa Cruz, parlicu-
larly, Travelling Theories, Travelling Theorists, ed. James Clifford and Vivek
Dhareshwar, 1989. The question of whether the "rediscovery" of colonialism,
-~ postcolonialism, postcoleniality and its relevant discourses in particular regions
» and institutions of the US in the late 1980s has more to do with the restructuring,
m through "diversity," of American national cul tural identity rather than social and
cultural movements in the immediate "post-colonial" societies of Africa or Asia
themselves is a problem which still remains to be addressed. Both Lata Man! and
James Clifford provide valuable insights into the role of locality In the production
of cultural theory in Inscriptions, 5, 1989.
"EdwafffSaid, "Intellectuals in the Post-Colonial World," Salamagundi, 70-71
(Spring-Summer 1986),:44-64, 62, 59.
 CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM
A s has been pointed out elsewhere, the first substantial encoun¬
12
ter between (to use a l l terms defined b y the center to describe its
" O t h e r " ) Europe a n d non-Europe, -between what have been called
— " d e v e l o p e d " a n d j " d e v e l o p i n g " societies, between capitalist a n d
m
~ pre-capitalist economies, between w h i t e a n d non-white, between
* people largely of one cultural a n d religious background and those of
m a n y other cultural a n d religious backgrounds, took place i n w h a t
were to become the colonies, not the metropole; i n the periphery, not
**m. tn e C o r e ; i n non-Europe, not Europe, whichever conceptualisation w e
prefer. The first globally multi-racial, multi-cultural, multi-continental
societies"on any substantial scale were i n the periphery, not the core.
They were constructed under the very specific economic, political,
social and cultural'conditions of colonialism and they were largely,
if not entirely, products of the specific social a n d spatial conditions of
-« colonial cities. O n l y since the 1950s (and somewhat earlier i n the 1 c o u l d also be post-imperialism w h i c h is characterised by quite a dif-
U n i t e d States) have such multi-racial, multi-cultural, multi-continen-
* tal urban cultures existed i n a n y substantial w a y i n Europe.
Since the 1950s, different terms have been invented (almost entirely
by " t h e W e s t " to map, i n R o l a n d Robertson's terms, the global c o n d i -
tion: First/Second/Third W o r l d , N o r t h / S o u t h , developed/underde-
veloped/ developing, core/'periphery/semi-periphery, a n d so on. The
First/Second/Third W o r l d categories were first a p p l i e d , u s i n g West-
ern economic a n d social indicators, to measure processes of " d e v e l -
o p m e n t " i n different market and centrally-planned economies. Yet if
this classification were reinterpreted to refer historically to those soci-
eties w h i c h , racially, ethnically, socially and culturally first a p p r o x i -
mated to what today are the culturally diverse, economically, socially
and spatially polarised cities i n the West but also, increasingly, major
cities r o u n d the w o r l d , w h a t is n o w the T h i r d W o r l d w o u l d histori-
cally more accurately be labelled the First W o r l d , a n d the First W o r l d
w o u l d become the T h i r d . In other w o r d s , the culture, society a n d
•» space of early twentieth century Calcutta or Singapore pre-figured
— the future i n a m u c h more accurate w a y than d i d that of L o n d o n o:r
* N e w York. " M o d e r n i t y " was not born i n Paris but rather in. R i o . W i t h
» this interpretation, Euro-American paradigms of a so-called "Post¬
** M o d e r n i s m " have neither m u c h meaning n o r salience outside the
:
*»• narrow geographical confines of Euro-America where they developed.
'Anthony D, King, Urban ism. Colonialism and the World-Economy, 7.
8 9
INTRODUCTION
The point is made more specifically i n Feathersfone's introduction
to Global Culture (1990) where he speaks of " t h i r d cultures" develop-
i n g to facilitate transcultural c o m m u n i c a t i o n : the " t h i r d c u l t u r e "
13
idea has already almost half a. century of history b e h i n d it, grounded
in. ideas of M a l i n o w s k i , though relating specifically to a "colonial,
third c u l t u r e " situation. 14
To conclude this section, therefore, it is clear that, i n certain loca-
tions, a n d certain cultural contexts, even indeed for certain cultural
actors a n d practices, the relevant cultural space to w h i c h the dis-
course belongs is not, certainly, the " n a t i o n a l " society, the " i n t e r n a -
t i o n a l " society nor even the economically a n d politically neutral,
technologically-transformed space of " t h e g l o b a l " but a m u c h more
historically a n d culturally inscribed space of post-colonialism.
T h o u g h dependent on the location, the actors and the institutions, it
ferent distribution of p o w e r . 15
Yet w h i l e post-colonialism a n d post-imperialism fill a fair amount
of the space i n a w o r l d - w i d e cultural system, like the red or blue i n k
w h i c h colored the " i m p e r i a l " parts of old maps of the w o r l d , they d o
not b y any means occupy all of it. A n d w h i l s t I have been focusing
specifically on the English-speaking post-colonial cultural ecumene,
it is equally evident that there are also the French, Spanish, Portu-
guese, D u t c h , Japanese to mention the more important. I now want
to return once again to the question i n m y opening paragraph as to
w h y these three ideas of m y title were put together.
The World-System and Globalization
I have so far been addressing the p r o b l e m of a C u l t u r a l Studies
p a r a d i g m based, if not p r i m a r i l y on the notion of a nationally-consti-
Mike Featherstone, "Global Culture: An Introduction," in Global Culture, ed.
13
Mike Featherstone (London, Newbury Park, New Dehli: Sage, 1990):9.
See Anthony D. King, Colonial Urban Development. Culture, Social Power and
14
Environment (London and New York: Routledge, 1976) 58 et seq.
See note 10 on the role of locality.
15
 CULTURE., G L O B A L I Z A T I O N A N D T H E W O R L D - S Y S T E M
ruled society, at least o n one inadequately related to a larger social
and c u l t u r a l system.
For I m m a n u e l Wallerstein, " t h e only k i n d of social system is a
world-system w h i c h w e define'quite s i m p l y as a unit w i t h a single
division of labor and multiple cultural systems. It follows logically
that there can, however, be t w o varieties of such w o r l d systems, one
w i t h a c o m m o n political system and one without. W e designate these
respectively as w o r l d empires and w o r l d e c o n o m i e s . " 16
Yet just as C u l t u r a l Studies has represented its object w i t h o u t refer-
ence to the rest of the w o r l d (whether through the " w o r l d - s y s t e m , "
the "international l e v e l " or " t h e global"), so the w o r l d - s y s t e m per-
spective has represented the w o r l d , u n t i l relatively recently, w i t h o u t
m u c h reference to culture. One c o u l d therefore add to Wallerstein's
formulation above that there could be two varieties of w o r l d - s y s t e m ,
one w i t h a c o m m o n political (and, I w o u l d a d d , elements of a c o m -
m o n social a n d cultural) system, especially as it is l i n k e d b y l a n -
guage, cultural practices a n d institutions (i.e. the world-empires) and
the second, w i t h o u t a c o m m o n political (but, I w o u l d a d d , w i t h
strong elements of a social and cultural) system (i.e. the w o r l d econ-
omy). In the former, w e might locate H a l l ' s post-colonial a n d post-
Imperial discourse; i n the latter, his propositions about a " g l o b a l
mass c u l t u r e " and a n " A m e r i c a n conception of the w o r l d . " The two,
of course, are inter-related.
The extent to w h i c h one can begin to map out, and develop, even
to the l i m i t e d extent I have done here w i t h colonial and post-colonial
cultures, the conceptual. language w h i c h w o u l d capture the culture of
the capitalist world-economy is a task yet to be undertaken. O n e
m i g h t refer, for example, to A p p a d u r a i ' s five dimensions of global
cultural flows w h i c h move in, non-isomorphic paths:
ethnoscapes produced b y flows of people: tourists, immigrants,
refugees, exiles a n d guest workers. Secondly, there are techno-
scapcs, the machinery and plant flows produced by multinational
and national corporations a n d government agencies. T h i r d l y ,
16
Immanuel Wallerstein, "The R: ; and Future Demise of the World Capi-
talist System: ConceptsforComparati e Analysis," Comparative Studies in Society
and History, 16 (1974):390; also in ibid. Tlte Capitalist World-Economy (Cambridge
University Press, 1979).
10
INTRODUCTION
there arefinanscapes,p r o d u c e d b y the r a p i d flows of money i n
the currency markets a n d stock exchanges. Fourthly, there are
mediascapes, the repertoire of images of information, the flows
w h i c h are p r o d u c e d a n d distributed b y newspapers, magazines,
television .and film. Fifthly, there are ideoscapes, l i n k e d to flows of
images w h i c h are associated w i t h state or counter-state move-
ment ideologies w h i c h are comprised of elements of freedom,
welfare, rights, etc. 17
L i n k e d to these w e may a d d , s i m p l y , the town a n d landscapes w h i c h
are p r o d u c e d b y the global diffusion of information, images, profes-
sional cultures a n d sub-cultures and supported by international capi-
tal flows. It is i n the context of these non-isomorphic flows that w e
18
can n o w t u r n to the third term i n m y title, globalization.
R o l a n d Robertson has spelt out his use of this term i n a n u m b e r of
papers: " t h e crystallization of the entire w o r l d as a single p l a c e , " the
emergence of " t h e global-human c o n d i t i o n " a n d " t h e consciousness
of the globe as s u c h . " O n the face of It, the notion of globalization,
1 9
i n its v e r y neutrality, w o u l d seem to have m u c h i n its favor. E t y m o -
logically, global does not carry as m u c h cultural, religious, historical
baggage w i t h It as does the term world, with. its. historically richer
connotations of w o r l d l y , u n w o r l d l y , this/ next w o r l d etc. L i n g u i s t i -
cally, w o r l d (the historical etymology of w h i c h takes u p four pages
i n the Oxford English Dictionary c o m p a r e d to a mere half page for
globe) is most frequently used to refer to the w h o l e of h u m a n k i n d ,
h u m a n society, the earth or a region of it; globe, however, has a more
limited connotation, referring more specifically to the earth or terres-
trial globe. It is also m u c h easier to set out an. array of grammatical
terms (noun, adjective, verb, etc.) for the latter than the former, (i.e.,
globe, global, globally, globalize, globalization, globality, globe-wide)
Arjun Appadurai, "Disjunction and Difference in the Global Cultural
17
Economy," Global Culture, 295-310, as paraphrased by Featherstone, Introduction,
6-7.
Anthony D. King, "Architecture, Capital and the Globalization of Culture,"
1 8
Global Culture, 397-411.
Roland Robertson, "Globalization and Societal Modernization: A Note on
191
Japan and Japanese Religion," Sociological Analysis, 47 (1987):3S-43; ibid.
"Globalization Theory and Civilizationai Analysis," Comparative Civilizations
Review, 17 (1987):20-30.
11
 CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM
a n d t h o u g h the same is indeed possible for the concept of the w o r l d -
system, (i.e. w o r l d - s y s t e m , world-systemic, world-sys: ?mically, etc.)
it is clear that the concepts covered by these terms are c bviously very
different (for example, the notion of social movements. 1 eing anti-sys-
temic cannot p r o p e r l y be r ' p r o d u c e d i n the global vo :abulary). Yet
if defined i n terms of "the process b y w h i c h the w o : Id becomes a
single p l a c e , " globalization has .also its ambiguities, irrespective of its
silencing of economic, p o l deal or cultural parameter 3. Does it, for
example, merely i m p l y a s .ate of inter-connectedness ? O r does the
inter-connectedness take a special f o r m (as i n an inte national d i v i -
sion of labor)? Does it i m p l y c u l t u r a l homogerdzr tion, c u l t u r a l
synchronization or cultural proliferation? W h a t does ii say about the
direction of cultural flows? Is it the interaction of the local and the
global, w i t h the emphasis o n the former, or vice v.:rsa? Is it the
synchronization of temporality? W h i l s t Robertson speaks to some of
these issues, the questions demonstrate that, on a global scale, culture
has to be thought spatially, politically, economically, socially a n d his-
torically a n d also very specifically.
A s both Barbara A b o u - E I - H a j a n d Janet W o l f f point out i n their
comments, the language of the debate forces particulai positions and
pre-empts particular options. The over-generalising sv eep of global-
ization submerges difference at the local, regional or -lational scale.
A b u - L u g h o d suggests that instead of l o o k i n g at p r o c sses f r o m the
top d o w n (or f r o m the center to the periphery) w e m ght better see
them f r o m the bottom u p . W e might, i n this context, f peak rather of
de-Iocaiization a n d , f o l l o w i n g the arguments of 1 oth H a l l a n d
20
Robertson concerning the oppositional potential of gle >alization, also
refer to re-localization, re-nationalization.
In any event, i n terms of developing a theory of cult ire at an. inter-
national or global level, it seems evident that, dep. ndent on the
sphere of cultural p r o d u c t i o n under discussion, ideas from both the
world-systems perspective as w e l l as globalization h e o i y can be
operationalsed. T o speak o n l y i n terms of the producti on of space, i n
all of its urban, architectural, a n d built form dimertsio i s , 'this can —
both i n the present and. historic past — be very effe :tively u n d e r -
20
Jean Gottman, "What Are Cities Becoming the Centers Of' Sorting Out the
Possibilities," in'Cities, in a Global Society, eds. Richard V... F night and Gary
Gappert (Newbury Park, London, Delhi: Sage, 1989):58-67, 61.
12
INTRODUCTION
stood by reference to " a single division of labor w i t h multiple cultur-
al systems." A n d i n regard to the same realm of cultural production,
Robertson's array of global concepts can be equally effective in help-
ing to explain, if only i n a small, but g r o w i n g sector of built environ-
ments r o u n d the w o r l d , the p r o d u c t i o n of both homogeneity a n d of
difference. The question of whether such phenomena are consumed
21
as homogenous or different, by people w i t h a range of cultural i d e n -
tities, is of course a totally different issue. A n d whilst it is true, as
Janet W o l f f points out, that concepts such as "the West," " T h i r d
W o r l d / F i r s t W o r l d , " " c e n t e r / p e r i p h e r y " are ideologically i m b u e d
constructs p r o d u c e d i n discourse, it is equally the case that such con-
structs are constantly m o b i l i z e d a n d used as if they were real. E v e n
the concept of culture itself, as used by anthropologists, was of
course invented by European theorists to account for the collective
articulations of h u m a n d i v e r s i t y . 22
The papers
H a v i n g given some indication as to w h y these papers, and their
authors, were brought together it w o u l d be abusing an editorial p r i v -
ilege if, i n p r o v i d i n g brief introductions to them, I were to iron out
the v e r y different positions and perspectives they represent. O n e of
the m a n y points w h i c h emerges f r o m Janet Wolff's very comprehen-
sive s u m m i n g u p is that, despite some agreements, the more general
factor is the absence of c o m m o n ground between them as w e l l as the
gap i n connecting the title and subtitle of the v o l u m e . In the f o l l o w -
ing comments, I shall merely set out what I see as some of their
salient and valuable points,
King, Urbmrism, Colonialism mid the World-Economy; ibid.. Global Culture.
21
21
James Clifford, Vie Predicament of Culture (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard
University Press, 1988) 273; for a particularly powerful illustration of the political
use of specific "ideologically imbued constructs produced in discourse" inform-
ing the writer's positionality, see Lata Mani's self-description as "a postcolonial
Third World feminist working on India in the United Slates," in her "Multiple
Mediations: Feminist Scholarship in the Age of Multinational Reception.;*
Inscriptions, 5 (1989):l-24, 5. Mani's article also provides a useful source for the
necessary differentiation of feminist perspectives mentioned in the concluding
chapter by Janet Wolff, particularly the need to locate these perspectives in
relation to a (larger) colonial discourse.
13
 CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM
M o r e perhaps than other contributors, Stuart H a l l addresses both
the sub-title a n d title of the m a i n theme m a p p i n g , i n his first paper,
the w a y i n w h i c h differing configurations of the global and the local
are p r o d u c i n g a n d transforming different subject positions. In look-
i n g at globalization f r o m the point of v i e w of E n g l i s h culture, he
demonstrates not only h o w " E n g l i s h n e s s " was f o r m e d i n the context
of imperialism but h o w the colonised other was constituted as part of
E n g l i s h cultural identity. Yet where both Wallerstein a n d H a n n e r z
see the nation state as the m a i n organizer and p r i s m for constructing
cultural identity, H a l l , for a variety of reasons, sees this relationship
between the state a n d identity eroding, "the o l d political a n d social
terrain of Englishness being broken u p " ; w i t h this erosion comes a
reaction, a narrower and more dangerous definition of identity,
d r i v e n by racism. Particularly interesting are H a l l ' s comments on the
" n e w forms of g l o b a l i z a t i o n " w h i c h have to d o w i t h n e w forms of
global mass culture but w h i c h nevertheless remain, i n terms of tech-
nology, capital, advanced labor, centered i n the West. Yet the other
characteristic of this global mass culture is its peculiar f o r m of ho-
mogenization,
. . . enormously absorptive of things . . . but the homogenization
-*» is never absolutely complete, a n d it does not w o r k for complet
-•a? ness . .. It is w a n t i n g to recognise and absorb those differences
w i t h i n the larger, over-arching f r a m e w o r k of w h a t is essentially
*~ . .an .American inception of the w o r l d . .. It does not attempt to
obliterate (loc , capitals) but operates t h r o u g h them.. It has to
jm. h o l d the fran -work of globalization i n place a n d police that
system: it staj • manages independence within, it, so to speak.
The logic of a ital w o r k s through specificity: a n e w regime of dif-
— ference product b y capital. H a l l adamantly rejects the notion of
- globalization as . ion-contradictory space; it is always contested, and
- is always w i t h <. ntradictions. Indeed, " t h e most p r o f o u n d c u l t u r a l
revolution has c ne about as a consequence of the margins c o m i n g
into representation"; " m a r g i n a l i t y has become a p o w e r f u l space."
The p o w e r of b a l l ' s analysis comes out especially i n his second,
paper w h e r e 'the notion of identity is theorised specifically i n terms
of its political cc ..sequences: identity Is "the guarantee of authentic-
i t y . " The five grt..t de-centerings of m o d e r n thought have ended the
old logic of identity: M a r x , l o d g i n g the i n d i v i d u a l or collective sub-
ject always w i t h i n historical practices; F r e u d , confronting the self
14
INTRODUCTION
w i t h " t h e great continent of the unconscious," m a k i n g it " a fragile
t h i n g " ; Saussure a n d linguistics pre-empting the process of enunci-
ation; the relativisation of the Western episteme by the rise of other
cultures; a n d finally, the displacement of the masculine gaze. These
old. collective identities of class, race, nation, of gender a n d the West
no longer p r o v i d e the codes of identity w h i c h they d i d i n the past;
existence i n the m o d e m w o r l d is m u c h more characterised b y "tech-
nologies of the self." It is i n this context, that H a l l discusses, with, the
immense p o w e r of personal experience, the development of " B l a c k "
as a historical a n d cultural category of identity, the emergence of
Black consciousness i n Jamaica i n the 1970s, "the most p r o f o u n d cul-
tural r e v o l u t i o n i n the Caribbean. M u c h greater than any political
revolution they've ever h a d " .and also i n Britain. The central question
is l i v i n g identity through difference .and. recognizing that " a n y m
politics w h i c h attempts to organize people through, their diversity of
identifications, has to be a struggle which, is conducted positional!}' * »
..,.. the Gramscian notion of the w a r of p o s i t i o n . "
R o l a n d Robertson, also takes u p some of these themes, if i n a dif-
ferent theoretical language. In a globally compressed w o r l d w i t h
increasingly polyethnic, nationally constituted societies, the c o n d i -
tions " o f and for the identification of i n d i v i d u a l a n d collective
selves." become ever more complex. D r a w i n g attention to the civiliza-
tional basis of identity construction, Robertson suggests that " c u l -
t u r e " has become a globally authoritative p a r a d i g m for explaining
difference, a means for locating " t h e O t h e r . " H e poses this question
in the interesting alternative positions of relativism on one h a n d , and
worldism o n the other, a strategy w h i c h , temporarily at least, has the
effect of m a k i n g culture disappear. Despite their quite different posi-
tions, Robertson would, seem to agree w i t h H a l l , at least implicitly, that
capitalism thrives on the celebration, and construction of difference.
For Robertson, any discussion of globalization needs to address
four elemental points of reference — national societies, individuals,
the w o r l d system of societies and h u m a n k i n d . H e r e , he draws atten-
tion to the w a y i n w h i c h globalization has i n v o l v e d the institutional
construction of the i n d i v i d u a l as w e l l as, d r a w i n g on Geertz, the i n -
creasing construction of "foreignness" and the globewide establish-
ment of " m i n o r i t i e s . " E q u a l l y suggestive are his comments on the
substantive, self-reflexive utilisation of theoretical societal constructs
in the development of Japanese society, and the notion that "societal-
i s m " — the commitment to the idea of the national society — is a
15
 CULTURE,, G L O B A L I Z A T I O N A N D T H E W O R L D - S Y S T E M
crucial ingredient of the contemporary f o r m of globalization. Robert-
son, incidentally, is the only contributor to mention that the major
w o r l d religions are m u c h older than national societies: the c u l t u : i of
particular societies resulting f r o m their interactions w i t h other socie-
ties i n the global system.
For Immanuel Wallerstein, the nation-state is the central organizing
unit of culture, a n d nationalism, " t h e quintessential p a r t i c u l a r i s m . "
.Increasingly, nation states resemble each other i n their c u l t u r a l forms.
The notion that there could, be a single w o r l d culture finds deep r e -
sistances, opposed by political chauvinisms and by multiple counter
cultures. C u l t u r e , in, Wallerstein's v i e w , is essentially a reactive force:
M» defining culture is a question of defining boundaries that are esst nti-
«» ally political boundaries of oppression a n d of def ense against opp res-
ist sion. The history of the w o r l d , rather than m o v i n g towards cult iral
homogenization, has demonstrated the opposite: a trend to cultural
differentiation and cultural complexity. W i t h these developments,
"** each i n d i v i d u a l increasingly belongs to m a n y cultures — an alterna¬
- five w a y of saying perhaps, as Stuart H a l l points out, that people
-•• have multiple Cultural identities. Increasingly, one goes through life
-« p i c k i n g u p identities. In this sense, identity construction is never
. finished,
In Wallers tein's v i e w , the state through its. m o n o p o l y of policies
% and resources w i l l over time clearly create a national culture, even if
it d i d not have one before. Where people see themselves belonging to
a " w o r l d c u l t u r e " this is essentially the.culture of dominant-groups,
i a v i e w also made by H a l l though i n reference to globalizing theories
s as "the self-representatton of the dominant particular." It is from the
i state that both cultural uniformity as w e l l -as cultural resist;.nee
i stems: the p o w e r f u l coopt cultural resistance either b y commodify ir.g
it or accommodating it i n a k i n d of cultural corruption. The present
concern w i t h culture, i n the o p i n i o n of Wallerstein, follows from, the
; decline i n faithj i n the economic and. political, arenas as loci of social
progress a n d individual, salvation. " C u l t u r e " and. " i d e n t i t y " are
'4 means to help them regain their bearing.
F o r U l f H a n d e r a , w r i t i n g subsequently to the paper i n c l u d e d here,
there is n o doubt that "there is n o w a w o r l d culture... It is marked by
an organization of diversity rather than the replication of uniformity.
It is created through the increasing interconnectedness of varied local
e n u r e s / as w e l l as through the' development of cultures w i t h o u t a
clear anchorage i n one territory. These are all b e c o m i n g sub-cultures
16
INTRODUCTION
w i t h i n the w i d e r w h o l e . " In this paper, H a n n e r z sees the world,,as
2 3
increasingly becoming a global ecumene of persistent cultural interac-
tion and exchange though w i t h asymmetry between the center and
periphery, the relationship is one-sided. H e also suggests, echoing
comments earlier i n this introduction, that the " F i r s t W o r l d " has
been present i n the consciousness of the " T h i r d W o r l d " m u c h longer
than the " T h i r d W o r l d " has been i n the minds of the " F i r s t . " A s
other speakers, H a n n e r z suggests there is a need for alternative,
m u c h more complex scenarios for the study of cultural homogeniza-
tion a n d , as w i t h the subsequent intervention from Janet A b u -
L u g h o d , d r a w s on concrete ethnographical research from West Africa
to back u p his abstractions.
H a n n e r z proposes four typical frameworks for e x a m i n i n g cultural
process, " o r g a n i z e d as a flow of meanings, by w a y of meaningful
forms, between p e o p l e " : the market, the state, form of life and move-
ments, H e shares w i t h Wallerstein the belief i n the state as a strong
organizational cultural force, constructing subjects culturally as citi-
zens. But whilst recognizing that global cultural flows are u n p a c k e d ,
dismantled and reassembled, H a n n e r z also sees, like H a l l , the auton-
o m y of cultural competence w h i c h exists at the local level. Nonethe-
less, as the local d i v i s i o n of labor is d r a w n into that at the interna-
tional level, some forms of life more than, others are defined more i n
terms of cultural flows f r o m the center, and some people more than,
others are more i n v o l v e d w i t h metropolitan systems of meaning.
W i t h movements (the women's, environmental and peace), Hannerz's
four scenarios offer a considerably more sophisticated w a y of think-
ing about globalization, echoing some of A p p a d u r a i ' s models m e n -
tioned earlier. W i t h these frameworks, he asks h o w people are d r a w n
into w o r l d cultures and h o w , through technology and people, c u l -
tures become separated from territories. Hannerz's attention to the
spatial ordering of culture prompts important questions, about the i n -
herent social a n d spatial units through w h i c h culture is organized:
ethnicity, race, gender and class on one side, and the neighborhood,
city, region, nation and the w o r l d o n the other. These are ideas w o r t h
further development.
The extent to w h i c h the state organizes culture, moreover, clearly
23
Ulf Hannerz, "Cosmopolitans and Locals in World Culture/' Global Culture,
237.
17
 CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM

depends o n material conditions. A n d as A b o u - E l - H a j points out i n

her commentary on the H a n n e r z paper, this is equally true whether 1. The Local and the Global:
i n the core or periphery, w i t h culture constantly being " c o r r u p t e d "
and reconstituted i n both places. G l o b a l culture results f r o m multi¬ Globalization and Ethnicity
- » dimensional cultural flows a n d obviously comes f r o m a n u m b e r of
— different cores or centers. In this context, H a n n e r z suggests that it
24

is likely that increasingly cultural differences are to be found w i t h i n

societies, not between them, a point that I take u p , i n relation to the
cultures of so-called " w o r l d cities," i n m y o w n paper.
I shall not attempt to comment o n the five brief interventions
w h i c h follow the m a i n papers, each of w h i c h raises both a n u m b e r of
substantial issues as w e l l as, i n some cases, basic questions about the
premises a n d organization of the debate. W h i l s t these Interventions
have, for convenience, been gathered together i n one chapter, it
s h o u l d be mentioned that Janet A b u - L u g h o d ' s response w a s partic-
u l a r l y addressed to the papers of Robertson and Wallerstein a n d that
of Barbara A b o u - E l - H a j to that of H a n n e r z . M a u r e e n T u r i m , John
Tagg and myself each addressed the theme of the s y m p o s i u m i n the
context of o u r specific subject fields of cinema, photography a n d
urbanism.
Finally, i n w r i t i n g this introduction, I have made considerable use
of comments f r o m the c o n c l u d i n g paper by Janet Wolff, drafted
.partly prior to a n d also d u r i n g the s y m p o s i u m a n d briefly revised
shortly afterwards. W h e r e these comments closed the " C u r r e n t
Debates i n A r t H i s t o r y " s y m p o s i u m for 1989,1 have extended it into
1990 i n this introduction, not least by reference to recent publications.
Janet W o l f f poses some excellent and fundamental questions and also
provides leads for further research. I w o u l d , however, have to dis-
agree that the project of a dialogue between the different discourses
represented b y the title a n d the sub-title is premature, as she sug-
gests. It has in fact taken place. It w i l l be u p to the readers, reviewers
and others to see whether it provides a basis for the debate to be
developed.
See Carol Breckenridge, Preface, Public Culture, 1 (1988) 1.
STUART HALL
THE DEBATE ABOUT GLOBALIZATION AS A WORLD PROCESS, A N D
its consequences, has been going on n o w i n a variety of different
fields of intellectual w o r k for some time. What I am g o i n g to try a n d
do here is to map some of the shifting configurations of this question,
of the local and the global, particularly i n relation to culture a n d i n
relation to cultural politics. I a m g o i n g to try to discover what is
emerging a n d h o w different subject positions are being transformed
or p r o d u c e d i n the course of the u n f o l d i n g of the n e w dialectics of
global culture. I w i l l sketch i n this aspect towards the e n d of this first
talk and develop it in. the second w h e n I shall address the question of
new and old identities. The question of ethnicity spans the two talks.
I a m going to look at this f r o m what might be thought of as a very
p r i v i l e g e d corner of the process, or rather, an u n p r i v i l e g e d corner, a
declining corner, that is, f r o m the U n i t e d K i n g d o m , a n d particularly,
E n g l a n d . Certainly f r o m the perspective of any historical account of
E n g l i s h culture, globalization is far from a n e w process. Indeed, it is
almost impossible to think about the formation of E n g l i s h society, or
of the U n i t e d K i n g d o m a n d a l l the things that give it a k i n d of p r i v -
ileged place i n the historical narratives of the w o r l d , outside of the
processes that w e identify w i t h globalization.
So w h e n w e are talking about globalization i n the present context,

18
 C U L T U R E , GLOB . L I Z A T I O N A N D T H E W O R L D - S Y S T E M
w e are talking about some of the n e w forms, some of the n e w
rhythms, some of the i.ew impetuses i n the globalizing process. For
'the moment, I do not want to define it more closely than that but I
do want to suggest that it is located w i t h i n a m u c h longer history;
w e suffer increasingly r'rom a process of historical amnesia i n w h i c h
w e think that just because w e are t h i n k i n g about an idea it has only
just started.
A s an entity a n d nat.onal culture, the U n i t e d K i n g d o m rose w i t h ,
and is declining w i t h , c \e of the eras, or epochs, of globalization: that
era w h e n the formatio of the w o r l d market was dominated by the
economies and culture of p o w e r f u l nation-states. It is that relation-
ship between the form...don and transformation of the w o r l d market
and its domination by the economies of p o w e r f u l nation-states w h i c h
constituted the era w i t h i n w h i c h the formation of E n g l i s h culture
took its existing shape. Imperialism was the system b y w h i c h the
w o r l d was engulfed in and by this framework, and also through the
intensification of w o r l d rivalries between imperial formations. In this
p e r i o d , culturally, one sees the construction of a distinct cultural
identity w h i c h I want to call the identity of Englishness. If y o u ask
what the formative conditions are for a national culture l i k e this to
aspire to, a n d then acquire, a w o r l d historical identity, they w o u l d
have a great deal to do w i t h a nation's position as a leading c o m -
mercial w o r l d p o w e r ; it has to do w i t h its position of leadership i n a
highly international and industrializing w o r l d economy, a n d w i t h the
fact that this society a n d its centers have long been placed at the
center of a w e b of global commitments.
But it is not m y purpose to sketch that out. What I a m t r y i n g to
ask something about is. what is the nature of cultural identity w h i c h
belongs w i t h that part cular historical moment? A n d I have to say
: of global processes. It is, in. itself, a k i n d of ethnicity.
that, i n fact, it was def.ned as a. strongly centered, h i g h l y exclusive
and exclusivist f o r m of cultural identity. Exactly w h e n the transfor-
mation to Englishness took place is quite a long story. But one can
see a certain point at w h i c h the particular forms of E n g l i s h identity
feel that they can c o m m a n d , w i t h i n their o w n discourses, the dis-
courses of almost everybody else; not quite everybody, but almost
everyone else at' a certain moment i n history.
Certainly, the colonized Other was- constituted w i t h i n the regimes
of representation of such a metropolitan center. They were placed i n
their otherness, i n their marginality, b y the nature of the " E n g l i s h
eye," the all-encompassing " E n g l i s h e y e . " The " E n g l i s h e y e " sees
20
THE LOCAL A N D THE GLOBAL
everything else but is not so good at recognizing that it is itself actu-
ally l o o k i n g at something. It becomes coterminous w i t h sight itself. It
is, of course, a structured representation nevertheless and it is a cul-
tural representation w h i c h is always binary. That is to say, it is
strongly centered; k n o w i n g w h e r e it is, what it is, it places every-
thing else. A n d the thing w h i c h is w o n d e r f u l about E n g l i s h identity
is that it d i d n ' t only place the colonized Other, it placed everybody
else.
To be E n g l i s h is to k n o w yourself in relation to the French, and the
hot-blooded Mediterraneans, and the passionate, traumatized Russian
soul. Y o u go r o u n d the entire globe: w h e n y o u k n o w what every-
b o d y else is, then y o u are what they are not. Identity is always, i n
that sense, a structured representation w h i c h only achieves its posi-
tive through the n a r r o w eye of the negative. It has to go through the
eye of the needle of the other before it can construct itself. It pro-
duces a very M a n i c h e a n set of opposites. W h e n I speak about this
w a y of being in the w o r l d , being English i n the w o r l d , w i t h a capital
" E " as it were, it is g r o u n d e d not only i n a whole history, a whole
set of histories, a whole set of economic relations, a whole set of cul-
tural discourses, it is also p r o f o u n d l y grounded, i n certain forms of
sexual identity. Y o u cannot think, of what the true-born Englishman
is — I mean, c o u l d y o u imagine advancing into the liberties of a
true-born Englishwoman? It's unthinkable. It was not a phrase that
was a r o u n d . A free-born English person was clearly a free-born
English man. A n d the fully buttoned-up, stiff upper l i p , corsetted
notion of E n g l i s h masculinity is one of the ways i n w h i c h this partic-
ular cultural identity was very f i r m l y stitched into place. This k i n d of
Englishness belongs to a. certain historical moment in the u n f o l d i n g
It has not been polite u n t i l the day before yesterday to call it this
at all. O n e of the things w h i c h happens in E n g l a n d is the long dis-
cussion, w h i c h is just beginning, to try to convince the English that
they are, after all, just another ethnic group. I mean a very interesting
ethnic group, just hovering off the edge of Europe, w i t h their o w n
language, their o w n peculiar customs, their rituals, their myths. Like
any other native peoples they have something w h i c h can be said in
their favor, and'of their l o n g history. But ethnicity, i n the sense that
this is that w h i c h speaks itself as if it encompasses everything w i t h i n
its range is, after all, a. very specific and peculiar f o r m of ethnic
identity. It is located i n a place, i n a specific history. It c o u l d not
21
 CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM
speak except out of a place, out of those histories. It is. located i n rela-
tion to a w h o l e set of notions about territory, about where is home
and w h e r e is. overseas, what is. close to us a n d what is far away. It is
m a p p e d out i n a l l the terms i n w h i c h w e can understand w h a t eth-
nicity is. It is, unfortunately, for a time, the ethnicity w h i c h places all
the other ethnicities, but nevertheless, it is one i n its o w n terms.
If y o u ask something about the nation for w h i c h this was the major
representation and w h i c h c o u l d represent itself, culturally and ideo-
logically, through the image of an E n g l i s h identity, or an E n g l i s h
ethnicity, y o u w i l l see, of course, what one always sees w h e n one
examines or opens u p an ethnicity. It represents itself as. perfectly
natural: born a n Englishman, always w i l l be, condensed, homoge-
nous, unitary. W h a t is the point of an identity if it isn't one thing?
That is w h y w e keep h o p i n g that identities w i l l come o u r w a y
because the rest of the w o r l d is so. confusing: everything else is turn-
i n g , but identities ought to be some stable points of reference w h i c h
were' like that i n the past, are n o w and ever shall be, still points in, a
turning world.
B u t of course, Englishness never was a n d never possibly c o u l d be
that. It was not that either i n relation to those societies w i t h w h i c h it
was deeply connected, both as a commercial a n d global political
p o w e r overseas. A n d one of the best-kept secrets of the w o r l d is that
it was not that i n relation to its o w n territory either. It was only b y
dint of e x c l u d i n g or absorbing all the differences that constituted
Englishness, the m u l t i t u d e of different regions, peoples, classes,
genders that composed the people, gathered together i n the A c t of
U n i o n , that Englishness c o u l d stand Tor everybody i n the British
Isles... It was always negotiated agalnst'difference. It always had. to
absorb all the differences of class, of region, of gender, i n order to
present itself as a homogenous entity. A n d that is something w h i c h
w e are only n o w beginning to see the true nature of, w h e n we are
beginning to come to the end of it. Because w i t h the processes of
globalization, that form of relationship between a. national cultural
identity a n d a nation-state is n o w beginning, at any rate i n Britain, to
disappear. A n d one suspects that it is not only there that it is begin-
n i n g to disappear. That notion of a national formation, of a national
economy, w h i c h could, be represented through, a -national cultural
identity, is under considerable pressure. I ought to try a n d identify
very briefly w h a t it is that is happening which, makes that an untena-
ble configuration to keep i n place for very much. longer.
22.
T H E L O C A L A N D T H E GLOBAL
First of all, i n the British case, it results .from a. long process of eco-
n o m i c decline. F r o m being the leading economic p o w e r i n the w o r l d ,
at the pinnacle of commercial and industrial development, the first
industralizing nation, Britain then became s i m p l y one amongst other,
better, stronger, competing, n e w industrializing nations. It is certainly
no longer at the forefront, or at the cutting edge, of industrial a n d
economic development.
The trend towards the greater internationalization of the economy,
rooted i n the multinational f i r m , built o n the foundations of Fordist
models of mass production, and mass consumption long outran some
of the most important leading instances of this w h i c h one can f i n d i n
the British economy. F r o m the position of being i n the forefront,
Britain has increasingly fallen b e h i n d as the new regimes of accumu-
lation, production, a n d consumption have created n e w leading
nations i n the global economy.
M o r e recently, the capitalist crisis of the seventies has accelerated
the opening u p of n e w global markets, both, c o m m o d i t y markets and
financial, markets, to w h i c h Britain has been required to harness itself
if it were not to be left behind, i n the race. W i t h the horrendous noise
of deindustrialization, Britain is, under Thaicherism, t r y i n g to g r o u n d
itself somewhere close to the leading edge of the n e w technologies
w h i c h have l i n k e d production and markets i n a new surge of interna-
tional global capital. The deregulation of the C i t y is s i m p l y one sign,
of the movement of the British economy and the British culture to
enter the new epoch of financial capital. A n d new multinational pro-
duction, the new new international division of labor, not only links
b a c k w a r d sections of the third w o r l d to so-called advanced sections
of the first w o r l d i n a form, of multinational production, but increas-
ingly tries to reconstitute the b a c k w a r d sectors w i t h i n its o w n society:
those forms of contracting out, of franchising, w h i c h are beginning to
create small dependent local economies w h i c h are l i n k e d into m u l t i -
national production. A l l . of these have broken u p the economic,
political a n d social terrain on w h i c h those earlier notions of English-
ness prospered.
Those are things w h i c h one k n o w s about. Those are the constituent
elements of the process w h i c h is called globalization. I want to a d d
some other things to them because I think w e tend to think about
globalization i n too unitary a w a y . A n d y o u w i l l see w h y I am going
to insist on that point i n a moment.
Something else w h i c h has been breaking u p that older, unitary for-
23
 CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM
mation is certainly the enormous, continuing migrations of labor i n
the post-war w o r l d . There is a tremendous paradox here w h i c h I can-
not help relishing myself; that i n the very moment w h e n finally
Britain c o n v i n c e d itself it h a d to decolonize, it h a d to get r i d of them,
w e a l l came back home. A s they hauled d o w n the flag, w e got o n the
banana boat a n d sailed right into L o n d o n . That is a terrible paradox
because they h a d r u l e d the w o r l d for three h u n d r e d years a n d , at
least, w h e n they h a d made u p their m i n d s to c l i m b out of that role,
at least the others ought to have stayed out there i n the r i m , behaved
themselves, gone; somewhere else, or f o u n d some other client state.
N o , they had always said that this was really home, the streets were
paved w i t h g o l d a n d , bloody hell, w e just came to check out whether
that was so or not. A n d I a m the p r o d u c t of that. I came right i n .
Someone said, " W h y don't y o u live i n M i l t o n Keynes, w h e r e y o u
w o r k ? " Y o u have to live i n L o n d o n . If y o u come f r o m the sticks, the
colonial sticks, w h e r e y o u really w a n t to live is right o n Eros Statue
i n Piccadilly Circus. Y o u don't w a n t to go and live i n someone else's
metropolitan sticks. Y o u w a n t to go right to the center of the hub of
the w o r l d . Y o u might as w e l l . Y o u have been hearing about that ever
since y o u were one m o n t h o l d . W h e n I first got to E n g l a n d i n 1951,
I l o o k e d out and there were W o r d s w o r t h ' s daffodils. O f course, what
else w o u l d y o u expect to find? That's w h a t I k n e w about. That is
w h a t trees and flowers meant. I d i d n ' t k n o w the names of the f l o w -
ers I'd just left b e h i n d i n Jamaica. One has also to remember that
Engiishness has not only been decentered by the the great dispersal
of capital to Washington, W a i l Street and T o k y o , but also by this
enormous influx w h i c h is part of the cultural consequences of the
labor migrations, the migrations of peoples, w h i c h go on at an accel-
erated pace i n the m o d e r n w o r l d .
A n o t h e r aspect of globalization comes from a quite different direc-
tion, from increasing international interdependence. This can be
looked at .in two quite different w a y s .
First, there is the g r o w t h of monetary and regional arrangements
w h i c h link Britain into N A T O , the C o m m o n M a r k e t and similar or-
1
ganizations. There is a g r o w t h of these regional, supranational
organizations a n d connections w h i c h s i m p l y make it impossible, if it
ever was, to try to conceive of w h a t is g o i n g on i n English society as
if it o n l y h a d an internal dynamic. A n d this is a. very p r o f o u n d shift,
a shift i n the conceptions of sovereignty, and of the nation-state. It is
a shift in. the conception, of w h a t the English government can do,
24
THE LOCAL A N D THE GLOBAL
w h a t is i n its control, transformations w h i c h it could b r i n g about by
its o w n efforts. These things increasingly are seen to be Interde-
pendent w i t h the economies, cultures and polities of other societies.
Last but not least is the enormous impact of global ecological inter-
dependence. W h e n the i l l w i n d s of C h e r n o b y l came our w a y , they
d i d not pause at the frontier, produce their passports and say, " C a n
I rain o n y o u r territory n o w ? " They just flowed on i n and rained on
Wales and on places w h i c h never k n e w where C h e r n o b y l was. Re-
cently, we have been enjoying some of the pleasures and anticipating
so ie of the disasters of global w a r m i n g . The sources a n d conse-
qu -nces are miles away. W e c o u l d only begin to do something about
it <. n the basis of some f o r m of ecological consciousness w h i c h has to
ha /e, as its subject, something that is larger than the freeborn E n g -
lishman. The freeborn E n g l i s h m a n cannot do a n y t h i n g about the de-
struction of the rain forest i n Brazil. A n d he h a r d l y k n o w s h o w to
spell ozone.
So, something is escaping here f r o m this older unit w h i c h was the
l y n c h p i n of globalization of an earlier phase; it is beginning to be
eroded. W e w i l l come to look back at this era i n terms of the i m p o r -
tance of the erosion of the nation-state and the national identities
wivich are associated w i t h it.
The erosion of the nation-state, national economies and national
cultural identities is a very complex a n d dangerous moment. Entities
O! p o w e r are dangerous w h e n they are ascending and w h e n they are
declining and it is a moot point whether they are more dangerous i n
the second or the first moment. The first moment, they gobble u p
everybody a n d i n the second moment they take everybody d o w n
w i t h them. So w h e n I say the decline or erosion of the nation-state,
d • not for a moment imagine that the nation-state is b o w i n g off the
s u g e of history. " I ' m sorry, I was here for so long. I apologize for all
the things that I d i d to y o u — nationalism, jingoism, ferocious w a r -
fare, racism. I apologize for all that. Can. I go n o w ? " It is not backing
o f like that. It goes into an even deeper trough of defensive ex-
c usivism.
Consequently, at the very moment w h e n the so-called material
basis of the o l d E n g l i s h identity is disappearing over the horizon, of
L ie West and the East, Thatcherism brings Engiishness into a more
f . r m definition, a narrower but firmer definition than, it ever had
before. N o w we are prepared to go to anywhere to defend it: to the
South Seas, to the South Atlantic. If w e cannot defend it i n reality, w e
25
 CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM
w i l l defend it in; mime... What else can y o u call the Falklands episode?
L i v i n g the past entirely through m y t h . R e l i v i n g the age of the dic-
tators, not Just as farce but as m y t h . R e l i v i n g the whole of that past
through m y t h , a very defensive organization. W e have never been so
close to an embattled defensiveness of a n a r r o w , national definition
of Englishness, of cultural identity. A n d Thatcherism is g r o u n d e d i n
that. W h e n Thatcherism speaks, frequently asking the question, " A r e
y o u one of u s ? " W h o is one of us? W e l l , the numbers of people w h o
are not one of us would, fill a. book. H a r d l y anybody is one of us any
longer. N o r t h e r n Ireland is not one of us because they are bogged,
d o w n i n sectarian warfare. The Scots are not one of us because they
did, not vote for us. The Northeast a n d the N o r t h w e s t are not one of
us because they <are manufactur ng and declining and they have not
j u m p e d on to the enterprise cuT are; they are not on the b a n d w a g o n
to the South, i n their heads. N o i lacks are, of course, not quite. There
may be one or 'two w h o are " h o ; l o r a r y " but y o u cannot really be one
of us. W o m e n cart o n l y be in, thes r traditional roles because if they get
outside their traditional roles t! ey are clearly beginning to edge to
the margins.
- The question, is still asked in the.expectation.that.it m i g h t have
been answered w i t h the same large confidence w i t h w h i c h the
English have always occupied their o w n identities. But it cannot be
occupied i n that w a y any longer. It is produced, w i t h enormous
effort. H u g e ideological w o r k has to go o n every day to produce this
mouse w h i c h people can recognize as the English. Y o u have to look
at everything i n order to produce it. Y o u have to look at the c u r r i c u -
l u m , at the Englishness of E n g l i s h art, at w h a t is truly E n g l i s h poetry,
and y o u have to rescue that f r o m a l l the other things that are not.
E v e r y w h e r e , the question of Englishness is i n contention.
All, I want to say about that is, that w h e n the era of nation-states in
globalization begins to decline, one can see a regression to a vers' de-
fensive and h i g h l y dangerous f o r m of national, identity w h i c h is
driven by a very aggressive f o r m of racism.
That is something of the story of questions of ethnicity and identity
in an, older f o r m of globalization. W h a t Thatcherism and other E u r o -
pean societies are t r y i n g to come to terms w i t h is h o w to enter new
forms of globalization.
The n e w forms of globalization are rather different f r o m the ones
I have just described. O n e of the things w h i c h happens w h e n the
nation-state begins to w e a k e n , becoming less convincing a n d less
26
T H E L O C A L A N D T H E GLOBAL
p o w e r f u l , is that the response seems to go in t w o w a y s simultaneous-
ly. It goes above the nation-state a n d it goes below it. It goes global
and local i n the same moment. G l o b a l and local are the two faces of
the same movement f r o m one epoch of globalization, the one w h i c h
has been dominated b y the nation-state, the national economies, the
national c u l t u r a l identities, to something n e w .
W h a t is this, n e w kind, of globalization? The n e w k i n d of globaliza-
tion, is not E n g l i s h , it is A m e r i c a n . In cultural terms, the n e w k i n d of
globalization has to do with, a n e w f o r m of global mass culture, very
different f r o m that associated w i t h E n g l i s h identity, a n d the cultural
identities associated w i t h the nation-state i n an earlier phase. G l o b a l
mass culture is dominated by the m o d e r n means of cultural p r o d u c -
tion, d o m i n a t e d by the image w h i c h crosses a n d re-crosses linguistic
frontiers m u c h more r a p i d l y and more easily, and, w h i c h speaks
across languages i n a m u c h more Immediate w a y . It is dominated by
all the w a y s In w h i c h the visual and graphic arts have entered direct-
ly into the reconstitution of popular life, of entertainment and of
leisure. It is dominated by television a n d b y f i l m , a n d b y the image,
imagery, a n d styles of mass advertising. Its epitomy is i n all those
forms of mass communication of w h i c h one might think of satellite
television as the prime example. N o t because it is the only example
but because y o u could not understand satellite television w i t h o u t
understanding its g r o u n d i n g in, a, particular advanced national econ-
o m y a n d culture a n d yet its w h o l e purpose is precisely that it cannot
be l i m i t e d any longer b y national boundaries.
W e have just, i n Britain, opened, u p the new satellite T V called
" S k y C h a n n e l , " o w n e d by Rupert M u r d o c h . It sits just above the
Channel. It speaks across to a l l the European societies at once and as
it went u p all the older models of communication i n our society were
being dismantled. The notion, of the British Broadcasting Corporation,
of a p u b l i c service interest, is rendered anachronistic i n a moment.
It is a v e r y contradictory space because, at the same time as send-
ing the satellite aloft, Thatcherism sends someone to watch the satel-
lite. So M r s . Thatcher has put into orbit Rupert M u r d o c h and the " S k y
C h a n n e l " but also, a, new Broadcasting Standards Committee to make
sure that the satellite does not immediately communicate soft pornog-
raphy to all of us after 1,1 o'clock w h e n the children are i n bed.
So this is not an uncontradictory phenomenon. One side of Thatch-
erism, the respectable, traditional side, is watching the free market
side. This is the bifurcated w o r l d that w e live in but nevertheless, in
27
 C U L T U R E , G L O B A L I Z A T I O N A.'- D T H E W O R L D - S Y S T E M
terms of w h a t is likely to carry the nev international global mass i u l -
ture back into the o l d nation-states, th. national cultures of European
societies, if is very m u c h at the leading edge of the transmitters of the
image. A n d as: a consequence of the e- plosion of those n e w forms of
cultural communication a n d cultural r. presentation there has opened
u p a n e w field of v i s u a l representation itself.
It is this field w h i c h 1 a m calling gk bal mass culture. G l o b a l mass
culture has a variety of different char, cteristics but I w o u l d identify
'two. O n e is that it remains centerec .in the West. That is, to say,
Western, technology, the concentratior of capital, the concentration of
techniques, thé concentration, of advai ced labor in. the Western, soci-
eties, a n d the j stories a n d the image y of Western societies: those
remain the d r i v i n g powerhouse of th s global mass culture. In that
sense, it is centered i n the West a n d i always speaks English.
O n the other h a n d , this particular fo m does not speak the Queen's
English any longer. It speaks English as an international language
w h i c h is quite j a different thing. It speaks a. variety of b r o k e n forms
of English: E n g l i s h as it has been invac ed, a n d as it has hegemonized
a variety of other languages w i t h o u t bt ing-able to exclude them f r o m
it. It speaks Anglo-Japanese, Anglo-Fr< .mch, A n g l o - G e r m a n or A n g l o -
English i n d e e d . It is a. n e w f o r m of int :rnatio.nal language, not quite
the same o l d class-stratified, dass-dc mutated, •canonically-secured
f o r m of standard or traditional h i g h b r o w E n g l i s h . That is what I
mean b y "centered i n the W e s t . " It is centered in. the languages of
the West but it is not centered in. the same w a y .
The second most important characteristic of this f o r m of global
mass culture is its peculiar form of homogenization. It is a homogen-
i z i n g f o r m of c u l t u r a l representation, enormously absorptive of
things, as it were, but the homogenization is never absolutely c o m -
plète, and. it does not w o r k for completeness. It is not attempting to
produce little mini-versions of Englishness everywhere, or little
versions of A m e r k a n n e s s . It is wanting to recognize and absorb those
differences w i t h i n the larger, overarch ing framework of w h a t is es-
sentially a n A m e r i c a n conception, of tae w o r l d . That is to say, it is
very p o w e r f u l l y located in. the increasing and. ongoing concentration,
of culture a n d other forms of capital. But it is n o w a f o r m of capital
w h i c h recognizes that it can only, to use a metaphor, rule through
other local capitals, rule alongside and i n partnership with, other eco-
nomic and political elites. It does not attempt to obliterate them; it
operates through them,. It has to hold the w h o l e framework of glob-
28
THE LOCAL A N D THE GLOBAL
alization i n place a n d simultaneously police that system: it stage-
manages independence w i t h i n it, so to speak. Y o u have to think,
about the relationship between the U n i t e d States and Latin A m e r i c a
to discover w h a t I a m 'talking about, h o w those forms w h i c h are dif-
ferent, w h i c h have their o w n specificity, can nevertheless be repene¬
trated, absorbed, reshaped, negotiated, w i t h o u t absolutely destroying
w h a t is specific a n d particular to them,.
W e used to think at an, earlier stage, that If one could s i m p l y iden-
tify the logic of capital, that it. w o u l d gradually engross everything in
the w o r l d . It would, translate everything i n the w o r l d into a k i n d of
replica, of itself, everywhere; that all particularity w o u l d disappear;
that capital i n its o n w a r d , rationalizing march w o u l d not i n the end
care whether y o u were black, green or blue so long as y o u could sell
y o u r labor as a c o m m o d i t y . It w o u l d not care whether you, were
male or female, or a bit of both, p r o v i d e d it c o u l d deal w i t h y o u In
terms of the commodification of labor.
. But the more w e understand, about the development of capital
itself, the more w e understand that that is o n l y part of the story. That
alongside that drive to c o m m o d i t y everything, w h i c h is certainly one
part of its logic, is another critical part of its logic w h i c h w o r k s i n
and t h r o u g h specificity. Capital, has always been quite concerned
w i t h the question of the gendered nature of labor p o w e r . It has never
been able to obliterate the importance to itself of the gendered nature
of labor p o w e r . It has always been able to w o r k i n a n d through, the
sexual d i v i s i o n of labor in, order to accomplish, the commodification
of labor. It has always been able to w o r k between the different ethni-
cally- a n d racially-inflected labor forces. So that notion of the over-
arching, ongoing, totally rationalizing, has been a very deceptive w a y
of persuading ourselves of the totally integrative a n d all-absorbent
capacities of capital itself.
A s a, consequence, w e have lost sight of one of the most profound
insights i n M a r x ' s Capital w h i c h is that capitalism o n l y advances, as
it were, on contradictory terrain. It is the contradictions which, if has
to overcome that produce its o w n forms of expansion. A n d that until
one can. see the nature of that contradictory terrain and precisely h o w
particularity is engaged and h o w it is w o v e n i n , a n d h o w It presents
its resistances, a n d h o w it is partly overcome, and h o w those over-
comings then appear again, w e w i l l not understand it. That is m u c h
closer to h o w we ought to think about the so-called, " l o g i c of c a p i t a l "
i n the advance of globalization itself.
29
 CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM
U n t i l w e m o v e a w a y from the notion of 'this singular, unitary logic
of capital which!does not m i n d where it operates, w e w i l l not fully
understand it. C a n I refer to a n u m b e r of things w e have not been
able to understand as a consequence of reading Capital that w a y ? W e
have not been able to understand w h y anybody is still religious at
the e n d of the twentieth century. It ought to have gone; that is one of
the forms of particularity. W e have not 1 sen able to understand w h y
nationalism, a n o l d f o r m of particularism, is still around. A l l those
particularisms ought b y n o w to have b. en m o d e r n i z e d out of exist-
ence. A n d yet w h a t w e find is that the most advanced forms of m o d -
ern capital o n a global scale are constantly splitting o l d societies into
their advanced a n d their not so advanced sectors. C a p i t a l is constant-
ly exploiting different forms of labor force, constantly m o v i n g be-
tween the sexual d i v i s i o n of labor in order to accomplish its c o m -
modification of social life.
I think it is extremely important to see this more contradictory
notion, this w h o l e line of development w h i c h is leading to different
phases of global expansion, because otherwise w e do not understand
the cultural terrain that is in. front of us.
I have tried then to describe the n e w forms of global economic and
c u l t u r a l p o w e r w h i c h are apparently paradoxical: multi-national but
de-centered. It is hard to understand b i : t I think that is what w e are
m o v i n g into* not the unity of the singular corporate enterprise w h i c h
tries to encapsulate the entire w o r l d w i t h i n its confines, but m u c h
more decentralized and decentered forms of social a n d economic or-
ganization.
N o t everywhere, by any means, but in some of the most advanced
parts of the globalization process w h a t ; ne finds are n e w regimes of
accumulation, m u c h more flexible regimes founded not s i m p l y o n the
logics of mass production and of mass consumption but on n e w flex-
ible accumulation strategies, on segmented markets, on post-Fordist
styles of organization, on lifestyle and identify-specific forms of mar-
keting, d r i v e n by the market, d r i v e n by just-in-time production,
d r i v e n b y the ability to address not the mass audience, or the mass
consumer, but penetrating to the very specific smaller groups, to i n -
dividuals, i n its appeal.
F r o m one point of v i e w , y o u might say that this Is just the o l d
enemy i n a, n e w disguise a n d that actually is the question I a m going
to pose. Is this just the o l d enemy i n a new disguise? Is this the ever-
rolling m a r c h of the o l d f o r m of comn. odification, the o l d f o r m of
30
THE LOCAL A N D THE GLOBAL
globalization, .fully i n the keeping of capital, fully i n the keeping of
the West, w h i c h is s i m p l y able to absorb everybody else w i t h i n its
drive? O r is there something important about the fact that, at a cer-
tain point, globalization cannot proceed w i t h o u t learning to live w i t h
.and w o r k i n g t h r o u g h difference?
If y o u look at one of the places to see this speaking itself, or be-
g i n n i n g to represent itself, it is in the forms of m o d e r n advertising. If
y o u look at these what y o u w i l l see is that certain forms of modern
advertising are still g r o u n d e d on the exclusive, p o w e r f u l , dominant,
h i g h l y masculinist, o l d Fordist imagery, of a very exclusive set of
Identities. But side by side w i t h them are the new exotics, and the
most sophisticated thing is to be i n the new exotica. To be at the
leading edge of m o d e r n capitalism is to eat fifteen different cuisines
i n any one week, not to eat one. It is no longer important to have
boiled beef a n d carrots and Yorkshire p u d d i n g every Sunday. W h o
needs that? Because if y o u are just jetting i n f r o m T o k y o , via Harare,
y o u come i n loaded, not w i t h " h o w everything is the s a m e " but h o w
w o n d e r f u l it is, that everything is different. In one trip around the
w o r l d , i n one weekend, y o u can see every w o n d e r of the ancient
w o r l d . Y o u take it i n as y o u go by, all i n one, l i v i n g w i t h difference,
w o n d e r i n g at p l u r a l i s m , this concentrated, corporate, over-corporate,
over-integrated, over-concentrated, and condensed f o r m of economic
p o w e r w h i c h lives culturally through difference and w h i c h is con-
stantly teasing itself w i t h the pleasures of the transgressive Other.
Y o u see the difference f r o m the earlier f o r m of identity that I was
describing: embattled Britain, in its corsetted form, rigidly tied to the
Protestant Ethic. In E n g l a n d , for a very long time, certainly under
Thatcherism, even, n o w , y o u can only harness people to y o u r project
if y o u promise them a bad time. Y o u can't promise them a good
time. Y o u promise them a good time later on. G o o d times w i l l come.
But y o u first of a l l have to go through a thousand hard winters for
six months of pleasure. Indeed, the whole rhetoric of Thatcherism has
been, one w h i c h has constructed the past i n exactly that w a y . That is
what was w r o n g about the sixties and seventies. A l l that s w i n g i n g ,
all that c o n s u m p t i o n , a l l that pleasurable stuff. Y o u k n o w , it always
ends i n a b a d w a y . You. always have to pay for it i n the end.
N o w , i.ie regime I a m talking about does not have this pleasure/
p a i n economy built into it. It is pleasure endlessly. Pleasure to begin
w i t h , pleasure i n the m i d d l e , pleasure at the e n d , nothing but pleas-
ure: the proliferation of difference, questions of gender a n d sexuality.
31
 CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM
It lives w i t h the n e w man. It p r o d u c e d the n e w m a n before anyone
was ever convinced he even existed. A d v e r t i s i n g p r o d u c e d the image
of the post-feminist man.. Some of us cannot f i n d h i m , but he is
certainly there i n the advertising.. I d o not k n o w whether a n y b o d y is
Kving w i t h h i m currently but he's there, out there i n the advertising.
In E n g l a n d it is these new forms of globalized p o w e r that are most
sensitive to questions of f e m i n i s m . It says, " O f course, there'll be
w o m e n w o r k i n g ! w i t h us. W e must think about the question of
creches. W e must think about equal opportunities for Black people.
Of course, everybody k n o w s somebody of different skin. H o w boring
it w o u l d be just to k n o w people like us. W e don't k n o w people like
us. W e can go anywhere i n the w o r l d a n d w e have friends w h o are
Japanese, you. k n o w . W e were i n East A f r i c a last week a n d then w e
were on safari and w e always go to the Caribbean, etc.?"
This is what I call the w o r l d of the global post-modern. Some parts
of the m o d e r n globalization process are p r o d u c i n g the global post-
modern. The global post-modern is not a unitary regime because it is
still i n tension w i t h i n itself w i t h an older, embattled, more corporate,
more unitary, more homogenous conception of its o w n identity. That
struggle is being i fought out w i t h i n itself a n d y o u may not see it
actually. If y o u don't see it, y o u ought to. Because y o u ought to be
able to hear the w a y i n w h i c h , i n A m e r i c a n society, i n A m e r i c a n cul-
ture, those two voices speak at one and the same time. The voice of
infinite pleasurable consumption a n d what I call "the exotic c u i s i n e "
•and, on the other h a n d , the voice of the moral majority, the more
fundamental and traditional conservative ideas. They are not coming
out of different places, they are coming out of the same place. It is
the same balancing act w h i c h Thatcherism is t r y i n g to conduct by
releasing Rupert M u r d o c h and Sir W i l l i a m Rees M o g g at one a n d the
same time, i n the hope that they w i l l k i n d of h o l d o n to one another.
A n old. petite bourgeois morality w i l l constrain the already dereg-
ulated. Rupert M u r d o c h , Somehow, these two people are g o i n g to live
in the same univérse — together.
So.- the notion of globalization as a non-contradictory, uncontested
space i n w h i c h everything is f u l l y w i t h i n the k e e p i n g of the institu-
tions, so that they perfectly k n o w where it is going, I s i m p l y do not
believe. I think die story points to something else: that i n order to
maintain its global position, capital has h a d to negotiate a n d by
negotiate I m e a n it h a d to incorporate a n d partly reflect the differ-
ences it was t r y i n g to overcome. It h a d to try to get h o l d of, a n d r.eu-
32
THE LOCAL A N D THE GLOBAL
tralize, to some degree, the differences. It is t r y i n g to constitute a
w o r l d i n w h i c h things are different. A n d that is the pleasure of it but
the differences do not matter.
N o w the question is; Is this s i m p l y the final t r i u m p h , the closure of
history b y the West? Is globalization nothing but the t r i u m p h a n d
closure of history b y the West? Is this the final moment of a global
post-modern where it n o w gets h o l d of everybody, of everything,
where there is no difference w h i c h it cannot contain, no otherness it
cannot speak, no m a r g i n a l l y w h i c h it cannot take pleasure out of?
It's clear, of course, that w h e n I speak about the exotic cuisine, they
are not eating the exotic cuisine i n Calcutta. They're eating it i n M a n -
hattan. So do not imagine this, is evenly and equally spread through-
out the w o r l d . I a m talking about a process of p r o f o u n d unevenness.
But I a m nevertheless saying that we shouldn't resolve that question
too q u i c k l y . It is just another face of the final t r i u m p h of the West. 1
k n o w that position. I k n o w It is very tempting. It is what I call ideo-
logical post-modernism: I can't see r o u n d the edge of it and so his-
tory must have just ended. That f o r m of post-modernism I don't b u y .
It is w h a t happens to ex-Marxist French intellectuals w h e n they head
for the desert.
But there is another reason w h y one s h o u l d not see this f o r m of
globalization as s i m p l y unproblematic and uncontradictory, because
I have been talking about what is happening w i t h i n its o w n regimes,
w i t h i n its o w n discourses, I have not yet talked about what is hap-
p e n i n g outside it, what is happening at the margins. So, i n the con-
clusion of this talk, I want to look at the process from the point of
v i e w , not of globalization, but of the local. I want to talk about two
forms of globalization, still struggling w i t h one another: an older,
corporate, enclosed, increasingly defensive one w h i c h has to go back
to nationalism and national cultural identity i n a h i g h l y defensive
w a y , a n d to try to b u i l d barriers around it before it is eroded. A n d
then this other f o r m of the global post-modern, w h i c h is t r y i n g to live
w i t h , and at the same moment, overcome, subíate, get h o l d of, and
incorporate difference.
W h a t has been h a p p e n i n g out there i n the local? W h a t about the
people w h o d i d not go above the globalization but went underneath,
to the local?
The return to the local is often a response to globalization. It is
w h a t people do w h e n , i n the face of a particular f o r m of modernity
w h i c h confronts them i n the form of the globalization I have de-
33
 CULTURE,, G L O B A L I Z A T I O N A N D T H E W O R L D - S Y S T E M
scribed, they opt out of that and say " I don't k n o w .anything about
that any more. I can't control it, I k n o w n o politics, w h i c h can get
h o l d of it. It's too b i g . It's too inclusive. E v e r y t h i n g is o n its sido.
There are some terrains i n between, little interstices, the smaller
spaces w i t h i n w h i c h I have to w o r k . " T h o u g h , of course, one has 10
see this always i n terms of the relationship between uneven! v-
balanced discourses a n d regimes. But that is not all that w e have to
say about the local.
F o r it w o u l d be an extremely o d d a n d peculiar history of this part
of the twentieth century if w e were not to say that the most p r o f o u n d
cultural revolution has come about as a consequence of the margins
c o m i n g into representation — i n art, i n painting, i n f i l m , i n music, in
literature, i n the m o d e m arts everywhere, i n politics, and i n social
life generally. O u r lives have been transformed by the struggle of the
margins to come into representation. N o t just to be placed by the
regime of some other, or i m p e n a l i z i n g eye but to reclaim some f o r m
of representation for themselves.
Paradoxically: i n our w o r l d , marginality has become a p o w e r f u l
space. It is a space of weak p o w e r but it is a space of p o w e r , none-
theless. I n the contemporary arts, I w o u l d go so far as to say that,
increasingly, anybody w h o cares for w h a t is creatively emergent i n
the m o d e r n arts w i l l f i n d that it has something to do w i t h the lan-
guages of the m a r g i n .
The emergence of n e w subjects, n e w genders, new ethnicities, n e w
regions, n e w communities, hitherto excluded f r o m the major forms of
cultural representation, unable to locate themselves except as de-
centered or subaltern, have acquired through struggle, sometimes in
very marginalized ways, the means to speak for themselves for the
first time. A n d the discourses of power i n our society, the discourses
of the dominant regimes, have been certainly threatened by this
de-centered cultural empowerment of the marginal a n d the local.
Just as I tried to talk about homogenization a n d absorption, and
then p l u r a l i t y a n d diversity as characteristic of the n e w forms of the
dominant cultural post-modern, so i n the same w a y one can see
forms of local opposition and resistance going through exactly the
same moment.
Face to face w i t h a culture, an economy and a set of histories
w h i c h seem to be w r i t t e n or inscribed elsewhere, a n d w h i c h are so
immense, transmitted f r o m one continent to another w i t h such extra-
ordinary speed, the subjects of the local, of the m a r g i n , can only
34
THE L O C A L A N D THE GLOBAL
come into representation by, as it were, recovering their o w n h i d d e n
histories. They have to try to retell the story f r o m the bottom u p ,
instead of f r o m the top d o w n . A n d this moment has been of such
p r o f o u n d significance i n the post-war w o r l d that y o u could not
describe the post-war w o r l d w i t h o u t it. Y o u could not describe the
movements of colonial nationalism without that moment w h e n the
u n s p o k e n discovered that they h a d a history w h i c h they c o u l d speak;
they h a d languages other than the languages of the master, of the
tribe. It is an enormous moment . The w o r l d begins to be decolonized
at that moment. Y o u could not understand the movements of m o d -
ern f e m i n i s m precisely without the recovery of the h i d d e n histories.
These are the h i d d e n histories of the majority that never got told.
H i s t o r y w i t h o u t the majority inside it, history as a minority event.
Y o u c o u l d not discover, or try to discuss, the Black movements, c i v i l
rights movements, the movements of Black c u l t u r a l politics i n the
m o d e r n w o r l d , w i t h o u t that notion of the rediscovery of where
people came f r o m , the return to some k i n d of roots, the speaking of
a past w h i c h previously had n o language. The attempt to snatch f r o m
the h i d d e n histories another place to stand i n , another place to speak
f r o m , and that moment is an extremely important moment. It is a
m o m e n t w h i c h always tends to be o v e r r u n and to be marginalized
b y the dominant forces of globalization.
But do not misunderstand me. 1 a m not talking about some ideal
free space i n w h i c h everybody says, " C o m e on i n . T e l l us what y o u
think. I'm glad to hear from y o u . " They d i d not say that. But those
languages, those discourses, it has not been possible to silence in the
last twenty years.
Those movements also have an .extraordinarily complex history.
Because at some time, i n the histories of many of them over the last
twenty years, they have become locked into counter-identities of their
o w n . It is a respect for local roots w h i c h is brought to bear against
the anonymous, impersonal w o r l d of the globalized forces w h i c h we
do not understand. " I can't speak of the w o r l d but I can speak of m y
village. I can speak of my neighborhood, I can speak of my c o m -
m u n i t y . " The race-to-race communities that are knowable, that are
beatable, one can give them a place. One k n o w s what the voices are.
O n e k n o w s what the faces are. The recreation, the reconstruction of
imaginary, knowable places i n the face of the global post-modern
w h i c h has, as it were, destroyed the identities of specific places,
absorbed them into this post-modern flux of diversity. So one under-
35
 CULTURE, i GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM
stands the moment w h e n people reach for those groundings, as it
were, a n d the reach for those groundings is what I c a l l ethnicity.
Ethnicity is the necessary place or space f r o m w h i c h people speak.
It is a v e r y important moment i n the birth a n d development of all the
local .and m a r g i n a l movements w h i c h have 'transformed the last
twenty years, that moment of the rediscovery of their own. ethnicities.
But just as, w h e n one looks at the global post-modern, one sees
that it can go i n both an expansive a n d a defensive w a y , i n the same
sense one sees that the local, the marginal, can also go i n t w o differ-
ent w a y s . W h e n the movements of the margins are so p r o f o u n d l y
threatened b y the global forces of postmodernity, they can them-
selves retreat into their o w n exclusivist and defensive enclaves. A n d
at that point, local ethnicities become as dangerous as national ones.
W e have seen that h a p p e n : the refusal of modernity w h i c h takes the
form, of a. return, a rediscovery of identity w h i c h constitutes a form
of fundamentalism.
But that is not 'the only w a y i n w h i c h the rediscovery of ethnicity
has to go. M o d e r n theories of enunciation always oblige us to recog-
nize that enunciation comes f r o m somewhere. It cannot be unplaced,
it cannot be unpositioned, it is always positioned i n a. discourse. It is
w h e n a discourse forgets that it is placed that it tries to speak every-
b o d y else. It is exactly w h e n Englishness is the w o r l d Identity, to
w h i c h everything else is o n l y a small ethnicity. That is the m o m e n t
w h e n it mistakes itself as a. universal language. But i n fact, it comes
from, a place, out of a specific history, out of a specific set of p o w e r
relationships. It speaks w i t h i n a tradition. Discourse, i n that sense, is
.always placed. So the moment of the rediscovery of a place, a past,
of one's roots, of one's context, seems to me a necessary moment of
enunciation. I d o not think the margins could speak, u p w i t h o u t first
grounding themselves somewhere.
. But the p r o b l e m is, do they have to be trapped i n the place f r o m
w h i c h they begin to speak? Is it going to become another exclusive
set of local identities? M y answer to that is, probably, but not neces-
sarily so. A n d i n closing, I w i l l tell y o u one little local example w h y
I give that answer.
I was i n v o l v e d In a photographic exhibition w h i c h was organized
in L o n d o n b y the C o m m o n w e a l t h Institute. The C o m m o n w e a l t h
Institute h a d this idea; ii. got money f r o m one of the v e r y large,
ex-colonial banks w h o were anxious to pay a little guilt money back
to the societies w h i c h they had exploited for so l o n g , a n d they said:
36
THE LOCAL A N D THE GLOBAL
" W e ' l l give a series of regional prizes i n w h i c h w e ' l l use photog-
raphy; w e k n o w that everybody i n these societies doesn't, have access
to photography but photography is a w i d e s p r e a d m e d i u m . Lots of
people have cameras; it reaches a m u c h w i d e r audience. A n d w e ' l l
ask the different societies that used to be l i n k e d together under the
hegemonic definition, of the C o m m o n w e a l t h to begin to represent
their o w n lives, to begin to speak about their own. communities, to
tell us about the differences, the diversities of life i n these different
societies that used to be all threaded together by the domination of
English, i m p e r i a l i s m . That's what the C o m m o n w e a l t h was, the har-
nessing of a h u n d r e d different histories w i t h i n one singular history.
The history of the C o m m o n w e a l t h . " This was a notion of using the
cultural m e d i u m of photography tp explode that o l d u n i t y a n d pro-
liferate, to diversify, to see the images of life as people i n the margins
represented themselves photographically. The exhibition was judged
in. the far regions of the w o r l d where there are C o m m o n w e a l t h c o u n -
tries, a n d then was j u d g e d centrally. What was that exhibition like?
W e f o u n d precisely what enormous access can be given to such
peoples w h e n the margins are e m p o w e r e d , in. h o w e v e r s m a l l a w a y .
Extraordinary stories, pictures, images of people l o o k i n g at their o w n
societies w i t h the means of m o d e r n representation for the first time.
S u d d e n l y , the m y t h of unity, the u n i f i e d identity of the C o m m o n -
wealth, was s i m p l y exploded. Forty different peoples, w i t h forty dif-
ferent histories, all located i n a different w a y i n relation to the u n -
even, m a r c h of capital across the globe, harnessed at a certain point
w i t h the b i r t h of the m o d e r n British Empire — a l l these things h a d
been brought into one place and stamped w i t h an overall identity.
Y o u w i l l a l l be i n one, contribute to one overall system.. That is what
the system, w a s , the harnessing of these differences. A n d n o w , as that
center begins to w e a k e n , so the differences begin to p u l l away. That
was an enormous moment of the e m p o w e r i n g of difference a n d
diversity. It is the moment of w h a t I call the rediscovery of ethnicity,
of people photographing their o w n homes, their o w n families, their
o w n pieces of w o r k .
W e also discovered t w o other things. In our naivety, w e thought
that -the m o m e n t of the rediscovery of ethnicity, i n this sense, w o u l d
be a rediscovery of w h a t w e called " t h e past," of people's roots. But
the f u n n y thing is that the past has not been sitting d o w n there
w a i t i n g to be discovered. The people from the Caribbean w h o went
home [where is that, y o u know?] to photograph, the past [where is
37

CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM
'that, y o u k n o w ? ] : w h a t explodes through the camera is twent. 'th-
certtury A f r i c a not seventeenth century Africa. The h o m e l a n d is not
w a i t i n g back there for the n e w ethnics to rediscover it. There is a ast
to be learned about, but the past Is n o w seen, and has to be gras •ed
as a history, as something that has to be told. It is narrated, t is
grasped through m e m o r y . It is grasped through desire. It is gras ted
through reconstruction. It is not just a fact that has been waitin ; to
g r o u n d o u r identities. W h a t emerges f r o m this is. n o t h i n g liki an
uncomplicated, dehistoricised, u n d y n a m i c , uncontradictory r ast.
N o t h i n g like that is the image w h i c h is caught i n that moment of
return.
B u t then the second, more extraordinary t h i n g is that people w a n t
to speak right out of that most local moment — w h a t do they w ant
to talk about? E v e r y w h e r e . They w a n t to tell y o u about h o w t iey
came f r o m the smallest village i n the deepest recesses of where •/er
and went straight b y N e w Y o r k to L o n d o n . They w a n t to talk about
w h a t the metropolis, w h a t the cosmopolitan w o r l d looks like to an
ethnic. They were not prepared to come on as " e t h n i c artists." " I w i l l
s h o w y o u m y crafts, m y skills; I w i l l dress u p , metaphorically i n m y
traditions, I w i l l speak m y language for y o u r edification." They :iad
to locate themselves somewhere but they wanted to address pi ob-
lems w h i c h c o u l d no longer be contained w i t h i n a n a r r o w versio.. of
ethnicity. They d i d not w a n t to go back a n d defend something w h i c h
was ancient, w h i c h h a d stood still, w h i c h h a d refused the openin ? to
new things. They wanted to speak right across those boundaries, ..nd
across those frontiers.
W h e n I stopped talking about the global, I asked, is this the clever-
est story the West has ever told or is this a more contradictory phe-
nomenon? N o w I ask exactly the opposite. Is the local just the li ttle
local exception, just w h a t used to be called a blip i n history? It w i l l
not register anywhere, it does not do anything, it is not very p r o -
found. It is just w a i t i n g to be incorporated, eaten u p by the all-see .ng
eye of global capital as it advances across the terrain. O r is it also,
itself, i n an extremely contradictory state? It is also m o v i n g , his.or-
ically being transformed, speaking across older a n d n e w languages.
Think about the languages of m o d e r n contemporary music a n d t r • to
ask, where are the traditional musics left that have never hear i a
modern musical transcription? A r e there any musics left that h i v e
not heard some other music? A l l the most explosive m o d e r n musics
are crossovers. The aesthetics of m o d e r n popular music is the aesthet-
38
T H E L O C A L A N D T H E GLOBAL
ics of the h y b r i d , the aesthetics of the crossover, the aesthetics of the
diaspora, the aesthetics of creolization. It is the mix of musics w h i c h
is exciting to a y o u n g person w h o comes right out of w h a t Europe is
pleased to think of as some ancient civilization, and w h i c h Europe
can control. The West can control it if only they w i l stay there, if
only they w i l l remain simple tribal folks. The moment they want to
get h o l d of, not the nineteenth-century technology to make a l l the
mistakes the West d i d for another h u n d r e d years, but to leap over
that a n d get h o l d of some of the m o d e r n technologies to speak their
o w n tongue, to speak of their o w n condition, then they are out of
place, then the Other is not where it is. The p r i m i t i v e has somehow
escaped f r o m control.
W e l l , I a m not trying to help y o u to sleep better at night, to say it's
really all right, the revolution throbs d o w n there, it's l i v i n g , it's all
ok. Y o u just have to wait for the local to erupt a n d d i s r u p t the
global. I a m not telling any k i n d of story like that. I a m asking that
w e s i m p l y do not think of globalization as a pacific and pacified pro-
cess. It's not a process at the end of history. It is w o r k i n g o n 'the ter-
rain of post-modern culture as a global formation, w h i c h is an ex-
tremely contradictory space. W i t h i n that, w e have, i n entirely new
forms w h i c h w e are only just beginning to understand, the same o l d
contradictions, the same o l d struggle. N o t the same o l d contradic-
tions but continuing contradictions of things w h i c h are trying to get
h o l d of other things, a n d things w h i c h are trying to escape f r o m their
grasp. That o l d dialectic is not at a n e n d . Globalization does not
finish it off.
W i t h the story about the C o m m o n w e a l t h Institute Photography
Exhibition I tried to speak about questions of n e w forms of identity.
But I have just barely signalled that. H o w can w e think the notion of
what these n e w identities might be? W h a t w o u l d be an identity that
is constructed through things w h i c h are different rather than things
w h i c h are the same? This I shall address i n m y second talk.
39
 2. O l d and New Identities,
O l d and New Ethnicities

STUART HALL

IN MY PREVIOUS T A L K , I TRIED TO OPEN OUT THE QUESTIONS

about the local a n d the global f r o m their somewhat closed, somewhat
over-integrated, a n d somewhat over-systematized formulations. M y
argument was that w e need to t h i n k about the processes w h i c h are
n o w revealing themselves i n terms of 'the local a n d the global, i n
those t w o spaces, but w e also need to think of these as more contra-
dictory formulations than w e usually do. Unless w e do, 1 was con-
cerned that we are likely to be disabled i n trying to think those ideas
politically.
I was therefore attempting — certainly not to close out the ques-
tions of p o w e r a n d the questions of appropriation w h i c h I think are
l o d g e d at the v e r y center of any notion of a shift between the dis-
positions of the local and the global i n the emergence of a cultural
politics o n a w o r l d scale — but rather to conceptualize that w i t h i n a
more open-ended a n d contingent cultural politics.
A t the e n d of the talk, however, I was obliged to ask if there is a
politics, i n d e e d , a counter-politics of the local. If there are new
globals a n d n e w locals at w o r k , w h o are the n e w subjects of this poli-
tics of position? What conceivable Identities could they appear in? C a n
identity itself be re-thought and re-lived, i n and through difference?
It is this question w h i c h is what I want to address here. I have
called it " O l d a n d N e w Identities, O l d and N e w Ethnicities" and
 CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM
w h a t I am. going to do first is to return to the question of Identity
and try to look at some of the ways i n w h i c h w e are beginning to re-
conceptualize that w i t h i n contemporary theoretical discourses. I shall
then go back from that theoretical consideration to the g r o u n d of a.
cultural politics. Theory is always a detour on the w a y to something
more important.:
I return to the question of identity because the question of identity
.has returned to us; at any rate, it has returned to us i n British politics
and British cultural politics today. It has not returned i n the same old.
place; It is not trie traditional conception of identity. It is. not going
back, to the o l d identity politics of the 1960s social movements. But it
is, nevertheless, a k i n d of return to some of the g r o u n d w h i c h w e
used to think i n that w a y . I w i l l make a comment at the very end
about what is the nature of this theoretical-political w o r k w h i c h
seems to lose things o n the one side and then recover them i n a dif-
ferent w a y from another side, a n d then have to think them out all
over again just as soon as they get r i d of them.. W h a t is this never- *
ending theoretical w o r k w h i c h Is constantly losing and regaining
concepts? I talk about identity here as a point at w h i c h , o n the one
hand, a w h o l e set; of n e w theoretical discourses intersect a n d where,
on the other, a w h o l e new set of c u l t u r a l practices emerge. I w a n t to
begin b y trying, v e r y briefly, to m a p some of those points of inter-
section theoretically, and then to look at some of their political conse-
quences.
The o l d logics of Identity are ones w i t h w h i c h w e are extremely
f a m i l a r , either philosophically, or psychologically. Philosophically,
the old. logic of identity w h i c h m a n y people have critiqued i n the
form of -the o l d Cartesian subject was often thought i n terms of the
origin of being itself, the g r o u n d of action. Identity is the g r o u n d of
action. A n d w e have i n more recent times a psychological discourse
of the self w h i c h is v e r y similar: a notion of the continuous, self-
sufficient, developmental, u n f o l d i n g , inner dialectic of selfhood. W e
are never quite there, but always o n o u r w a y to it, and w h e n w e get
there, w e w i l l at last k n o w exactly w h o it is w e are...
N o w this logic of identity is very important in. a whole range of
political, theoretical and. conceptual discourses. I a m interested i n it
also as a. k i n d of existential reality because I think the logic of the
language of identity is extremely important to o u r o w n self-con-
ceptions. It contains the notion of the true self, some real self inside
there, h i d i n g inside the husks of all the false selves that we present
42.
O L D A N D N E W IDENTITIES
to the rest of the w o r l d . It is a k i n d of guarantee of authenticity. N o t
u n t i l w e get really inside a n d hear what the true self has to say do
w e k n o w what we are " r e a l l y s a y i n g . "
There is something guaranteed about that logic or discourse of
identity. If gives us a sense of d e p t h , out there, .and i n here. It is spa-
tially organized. M u c h of o u r discourse of the Inside and the outside,
of the self a n d other, of the i n d i v i d u a l a n d society, of the subject and
the object, are g r o u n d e d i n that particular logic of identity. A n d it
1
helps us, I w o u l d say, to sleep w e l l at night.
Increasingly, I think one of the m a i n functions of concepts is that
they give us a good night's rest. Because what they tell us is that
there is a k i n d of stable, only very slowly-changing g r o u n d inside the
hectic upsets, discontinuities and ruptures of history. A r o u n d us his-
tory is constantly breaking i n unpredictable w a y s but w e , s o m e h o w ,
go on b e i n g the same.
That logic of identity is, for good or i l l , finished. It's at an end. for
a w h o l e range of reasons. It's at an e n d i n the first instance because
of some of the great de-centerings of m o d e r n thought. O n e c o u l d dis-
cuss this v e r y elaborately — I c o u l d spend the rest of the time talking
about it but I just want to slot the ideas into place very q u i c k l y by
u s i n g some names as reference points.
It is not possible to hold, to that logic of identity after M a r x because
although M a r x does talk about m a n (he doesn't talk about w o m e n
m a k i n g history but perhaps they were slotted i n , as the nineteenth
century so often slotted w o m e n i n under some other masculine title),
about m e n a n d w o m e n m a k i n g history but under conditions w h i c h
are not of their own. choosing. A n d h a v i n g lodged, either the i n -
d i v i d u a l or collective subject always w i t h i n historical practices, we as
individuals or as groups cannot be, and can never have been, the sole
origin or authors of those practices. That is a p r o f o u n d historical de-
centering i n terms of social practice.
If that was not strong enough, k n o c k i n g us sideways as it were,
F r e u d came k n o c k i n g from, underneath, like H a m l e t ' s ghost, and
said, " W h i l e you're being decentered f r o m left to right like that, let
me.decenter y o u f r o m below a bit, a n d r e m i n d y o u that this stable
language of identity is also set from the psychic life about w h i c h y o u
don't k n o w very m u c h , a n d can't k n o w very m u c h . A n d w h i c h y o u
can't k n o w v e r y m u c h b y s i m p l y taking thought about it: the great
continent of the unconscious w h i c h speaks most clearly w h e n it's
s l i p p i n g rather than w h e n it's saying what it means," This makes the
43
 C U L T U R E , G L O B A L I Z A T I O N A N D T H E WORLD-SYSTEM:
self begin to seem a pretty fragile thing.
N o w , buffeted on one side b y M a r x and upset f r o m below b y
F r e u d , just as it opens its m o u t h to say, " W e l l , at least I speak so
therefore I must be s o m e t h i n g , " Saussure a n d linguistics comes along
a n d says "That's not true either, y o u k n o w . Language was there
before y o u . Y o u can only say something b y positioning yourself i n
the discourse. The tale tells the t e l e r , the m y t h tells the myth-maker,
etc. 'The enunciation is always f r o m some subject w h o is positioned
b y a n d i n discourse." That upsets that. Philosophically, one comes to
the end of any k i n d of notion of a perfect transparent continuity
between o u r language a n d something out there which, can be called
the real, or the truth, without any quotation marks.
These various upsets, these disturbances i n the continuity of the
notion of the subject, a n d the stability of identity, are i n d e e d , w h a t
1 here about th. • great class identities w h i c h have stabilized so m u c h of
modernity is like. It is not, incidentally, modernity itself. That has an
older, a n d longer history. But this is the b e g i n n i n g of modernity as
trouble. N o t modernity as enlightenment and progress, but m o d e r n i -
ty as a problem.
It is also upset by other enormous historical transformations w h i c h
do not have, a n d cannot be given, a single name, but w i t h o u t w h i c h
the story c o u l d not be told. In addition to the three or four that I
have quoted, we c o u l d mention the relativisation of the Western
narrative itself, the Western episteme, b y the rise of other cultures to
prominence, and fifthly, the displacement of the masculine gaze.
N o w , the question of t r y i n g to come to terms w i t h the notion of
identity i n the w a k e of those theoretical decenterings is an extremely
problematic enterprise. But that is not all that has been disturbing the
settled logic of identity. Because as I was saying earlier w h e n I was
talking about the relative decline, or erosion, the instability of the
nation-state, of the self-sufficiency of national economies a n d conse-
quently, of national identities as points of reference, there has s i m u l -
taneously been a fragmentation a n d erosion of collective social i d e n -
tity.
I mean here the great collective social identities w h i c h w e thought
of as large-scale, all-encompassing, homogenous, as unified collective
identities, w h i c h c o u l d be spoken about almost as if they were sin-
gular actors i n their o w n right but w h i c h , indeed, placed, positioned,
stabilized, a n d allowed us to understand and read, almost as a code,
the imperatives of the i n d i v i d u a l self: the great collective social iden-
tities of class, of race, of nation, of gender, and of the West.
44
O L D A N D N E W IDENTITIES
These collective social identities were formed i n , and stabilized by,
the huge, long-range historical processes w h i c h have produced the
m o d e r n w o r l d , just as the theories and conceptualizations that I just
referred to v e r y briefly are w h a t constituted modernity as a form, of
self-reflection. They were staged a n d stabilized b y industrialization,
by capitalism, by urbanization, by the formation of the w o r l d market,
by the social and the sexual division of labor, by the great punctu-
ation of c i v i l and social life into the public a n d the private; by the
dominance of the nation state, a n d b y the identification between
Westernization and the notion of modernity itself.
I spoke i n m y previous talk about the importance, to any sense of
where w e ai • placed i n the w o r l d , of the national economy, the
nation-state :\d of national cultural identities. Let me say a w o r d
our understanding of the immediate a n d not-so-immediate past.
Class w a s the m a i n locator of social position, that w h i c h organized
o u r understanding of the m a i n g r i d and g r o u p relations between
social groups. They linked us to material life through the economy
itself. They p r o v i d e d the code through w h i c h w e read one another.
They provide .1 the codes through w h i c h w e understood each others'
languages. Tney p r o v i d e d , of course, the notions of collective action
itself, that w h i c h w o u l d unlock politics. N o w as I tried to say pre-
viously, the great collective social identities rise and fall and it is
almost as difficult to k n o w whether they are more dangerous w h e n
they are falling than w h e n they are rising.
These great collective social identities have not disappeared. Their
purchase and efficacy i n the real w o r l d that we all occupy is ever
present. B u t the fact is that none of them is, any longer, In either the
social, historical or epistemological place where they were i n our con-
ceptualizations of the w o r l d in the recent past. They cannot any
longer be thought i n the same homogenous form. W e are as attentive
to their inner differences, their inner contradictions, their segmenta-
tions a n d their fragmentations as we are to their already-completed
homogeneity, their unity a n d so o n .
T h e y are not already-produced, stabilities a n d totalities i n the
w o r l d . They do not operate like totalities. If they have a relationship
to o u r identities, cultural a n d i n d i v i d u a l , they d o not any longer have
that suturing, structuring, or stabilizing force, so that we can k n o w
w h a t w e are s i m p l y by a d d i n g u p the s u m of o u r positions in rela-
tion to them. They do not give us the code of identity as I think they
45
 CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM
d i d i n the past.
It is a moot point by anybody w h o takes this argument directly on
the pulses, as to whether they ever functioned i n that w a y . Perhaps
they never functioned i n that w a y . This m a y be, indeed, w h a t the
narrative of the! West is like: the notion that w e told of the story we
told ourselves, about their functioning i n that w a y . W e k n o w that the
great homogenous function of the collective social class is extremely
difficult for any ^ good historian to actually lay his or her finger o n . It
keeps disappearing just over the h o r i z o n , like the organic c o m m u -
nity.
Y o u k n o w the story about the organic c o m m u n i t y ? The organic
community was just always in. the childhood, y o u have left b e h i n d .
R a y m o n d W i l l i a m s has a w o n d e r f u l essay on these people, a range
of social critics w h o say you. can measure the present i n relation to
the past, and y o u k n o w the past because back then it was m u c h
more organic a n d integrated. W h e n was " b a c k then"? W e l l , w h e n I
was a c h i l d , there was always some adult saying, " W h e n I was a
child, it was m u c h more integrated." A n d so, eventually, some of
these great collectivities are rather like those people w h o have an.
activity of historical nostalgia going o n i n 'their retrospective recon-
structions. W e always reconstructed them more essentially, more
homogenously, more u n i f i e d , less contradictorily than they ever
were, once y o u actually k n o w a n y t h i n g about them..
That is one argument. Whatever the past was like, they may have
all marched forth, unified a n d dictating history f o r w a r d , for m a n y
decades i n the past. They sure aren't d o i n g it now...
N o w as I have said, the question of h o w to begin to think ques-
tions of identity, either social, or i n d i v i d u a l , not i n the w a k e of their
disappearance but i n the w a k e of their erosion, of then* fading, of
their not h a v i n g the k i n d of purchase a n d comprehensive explan-
atory p o w e r they h a d before, that is what it seems to me has gone.
They used to be thought of — and it is a w o n d e r f u l l y gendered
definition — as "master concepts," the "master concepts" of class.
It is not tolerable any longer to have a "master concept" like that.
Once it loses its " m a s t e r " status its explanatory reach weakens,
becomes more problematic. W e can. think of some things i n relation
to questions of class, t h o u g h always recognizing its real historical
complexity. Yet there are certain other things it s i m p l y w i l l not, or
cannot, decipher or explain. A n d this brings us face to face w i t h the
increasing social diversity a n d plurality, the technologies of the self
46
O L D A N D N E W IDENTITIES
w h i c h characterize the m o d e r n w o r l d i n w h i c h we live.
W e l l , w e might say, where does this leave any discourse on social
identity at all? H a v e n ' t I n o w abolished it f r o m about as m a n y sides
as I c o u l d think of? A s has been true i n theoretical w o r k over the last
twenty years, the moment a. concept disappears through the left h a n d
door, it returns through the right h a n d w i n d o w , but not i n quite the
same place. There is a w o n d e r f u l moment i n Althusser's text where
he says " I can n o w abolish the notion of ideas." A n d he actually
writes the w o r d " i d e a s " a n d d r a w s a line through it to convince h i m -
self w e need never use the w o r d again.
In exactly the same w a y , the o l d discourse of the subject was
aboEshed, p u t i n a. deep container, concrete p o u r e d over it, w i t h a
half-life of a m i l l i o n years. W e w i l l never look at it again, w h e n ,
b l o o d y hell, i n about five minutes, w e are talking about subjectivity,
and the subject i n discourse, and it has come roaring back i n . So it is
not, I think, surprising that, h a v i n g lost one sense of identity, w e f i n d
w e need it. Where are w e to f i n d it?
O n e of the places that w e have to go to is certainly i n the con-
temporary languages w h i c h have rediscovered but repositioned the
notion of the subject, of subjectivity. That is, principally, and pre-
eminently, the languages of f e m i n i s m a n d of psychoanalysis.
I do not want to go through that argument but I w a n t to say some-
thing about h o w one might begin to think, questions of identity from
this n e w set of theoretical spaces. A n d I have to do this program-
matically. I have to state what I think, from this position, identity is
and is not as a sort of protocol, although each one c o u l d take me a
v e r y l o n g time.
It makes us aware that identities are never completed, never f i n -
ished; that they are always as subjectivity itself is, i n process. That
itself is a pretty difficult task. Though, w e have always k n o w n it a
little bit, we have always thought about ourselves as getting more
like ourselves everyday. But that is a sort of Hegelian notion, of going
forward to meet that w h i c h we always were. I want to open that
process u p considerably. Identity is always i n the process of formation.
Secondly, identity means, or connotes, the process of identification,
of s a y i n g that this here is the same as that, or w e are the same
together, i n this respect. But something w e have learnt f r o m the
w h o l e discussion of identification, i n f e m i n i s m and psychoanalysis,
is the degree to w h i c h that structure of identification is always con-
structed through ambivalence. A l w a y s constructed through splitting.
47
 CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM
Splitting between that w h i c h one is, and that w h i c h is the other. The
attempt to e x p e l the other to the other side of the universe is always
c o m p o u n d e d b y the relationships of love a n d desire. This is a dif-
ferent language f r o m the language of, as it were, the Others w h o are
completely different f r o m onesel i.
This, is the Other that belongs i .side one. This is the Other that one
can only k n o w f r o m the place frc n w h i c h one stands. This is the self
as it is inscribed i n the gaze of the Other. A n d this notion w h i c h
breaks d o w n the boundaries, be ween outside and inside, between
those w h o belong a n d those w h . do not, between those whose his-
tories have been w r i t t e n a n d th >se whose histories they have de-
p e n d e d on but whose histories cf i n o t be spoken. That the u n s p o k e n
silence i n between that w h i c h cai be s p o k e n is the only w a y to reach
for the whole history. There is i o other history except to take the
absences and the silences along TA .th w h a t can be spoken. E v e r y t h i n g
that can be spoken is o n the grou: d of the enormous voices that have .
not, or cannot yet be heard.
T h i s doubleness of discourse, t; i s necessity of the Other to the self,
this inscription of Identity i n th • look of the other finds its artic-
u l a t i o n p r o f o u n d l y i n the ranges of a g i v e n text. A n d I w a n t to cite
one w h i c h I a m sure y o u know but w o n ' t remember necessarily,
t h o u g h it is a w o n d e r f u l , majes ic moment i n Fanon's Black Skin,
White Masks, w h e n he describes h .mself as a y o u n g A n t i l l e a n , face to
face w i t h the white Parisian chi 1 a n d her mother. A n d the c h i l d
p u l l s the h a n d of the mother and jays, " L o o k , M a m a , a black m a n . "
A n d he said, " F o r t h e first time, I <new w h o I was. F o r the first time,
I felt as If I h a d been simultaneously e x p l o d e d i n the gaze, i n the v i o -
lent gaze of the other, a n d at the s. .me time, recomposed as another."
The notion that identity i n that t anse c o u l d be told .as. two histories,
one over here, one over there, ne /er h a v i n g s p o k e n to one another,
never h a v i n g a n y t h i n g to do w i t h me another, w h e n translated f r o m
the psychoanalytic to the historic. 1 terrain, is s i m p l y not tenable any
longer i n a n increasingly globaliz -d w o r l d . It is just not tenable a n y
longer.
People like m e w h o came to En -land the 1950s have been there
m ference is v e r y important, because that little " a , " d i s t u r b i n g as it is,
for centuries; symbolically, w e h . ;-e been there for centuries. I was
c o m i n g home. I am the sugar at the bottom of the English c u p of tea.
I am the sweet tooth, the sugar plantations that rotted generations of
English children's teeth. There are thousands of others beside me that
are, y o u k n o w , the c u p of tea itself. Because they d o n ' t g r o w it i n
43
O L D A N D N E W IDENTITIES
Lancashire, y o u k n o w . N o t a single tea plantation exists w i t h i n the
U n i t e d K i n g d o m . This is the symboiization of English identity — I
mean, w h a t does anybody i n the w o r l d k n o w about an English
person except that they can't get t h r o u g h the day w i t h o u t a cup of
tea?
W h e r e does it come from? C e y l o n — S r i L a n k a , 'India. That is the
outside history that is inside the history of the English. There is no
E n g l i s h history w i t h o u t that other history. T h e notion that identity
has to do with, people that look the same, feel the same, c a i them-
selves the same, is nonsense. A s a process, as a narrative, as a dis-
course, it is always told f r o m the position of the Other.
W h a t is more is that identity is always i n part a narrative, always
i n part a k i n d of representation.. It is always w i t h i n representation.
Identity is not something w h i c h is. f o r m e d outside a n d then w e tell
stories about it. It Is that w h i c h is narrated i n one's o w n self. I w i l l
e
say something about that i n terms of m y o w n narration of identity In
a moment — y o u k n o w , that w o n d e r f u l moment where R i c h a r d 11
says, " C o m e let u s sit down, a n d tell stories about the death of
k i n g s . " W e i , I a m going to tell y o u a story a n d ask. you. to tell one
about yourself.
W e have the notion of identity as contradictory, as composed of
more than, one discourse, as composed always across the silences of
the other, as w r i t t e n i n a n d through ambivalence a n d desire. These
are extremely important w a y s of trying to think an. identity w h i c h is
not a sealed or closed totality.
N o w w e have within, theory some interesting w a y s of t r y i n g to
think difference In this w a y . W e have learnt quite a lot about sexual
difference i n feminist writers. A n d w e have learnt a lot about ques-
tions of difference f r o m people like D e r r i d a . I do think that there are
some important w a y s i n w h i c h Derrida's use of the notion of the dif-
ference between " d i f f e r e n c e " and. "differan.ce," spelt w i t h .an " a , " is
significant. T h e " a , " the anomolous " a " i n Derrida's spelling of dif-
ference, w h i c h he uses as a k i n d of marker that sets u p a disturbance
i n o u r settled understanding of translation of o u r concept of dif-
w h i c h you. can. h a r d l y hear w h e n spoken, sets the w o r d i n m o t i o n to
n e w meanings yet w i t h o u t obscuring the trace of its other meanings
i n its past.
H i s sense of " d i f f e r a n c e , " as one writer has p u t it, remains sus-
p e n d e d between the t w o F r e n c h verbs " t o d i f f e r " a n d " t o defer,"
49
 CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM
both of w h i c h contribute to its textual force, neither of w h i c h can.
fully capture its meaning. Language depends on difference, as Saus¬
sure has s h o w n : the structure of distinctive propositions w h i c h make
up its economy. But where D e r r i d a breaks n e w g r o u n d is i n the
extent to w h i c h " d i f f e r " shades into " d e f e r . "
N o w this notion of a differance is not s i m p l y a set of binary,
reversible oppositions; t h i n k i n g sexual difference not s i m p l y i n terms
of the fixed opposition of male a n d female, but of all those anomol-
ous s l i d i n g positions ever i n process, i n between w h i c h opens u p the
continent of sexuality to increasing points of disturbance. That is
w h a t the odyssey of difference n o w means i n the sense In w h i c h I am.
t r y i n g to use it.
That is about difference, a n d y o u m i g h t ask the question, w h e r e
does identity come .in. to this infinite postponement of m e a n i n g that
is l o d g e d i n D e r r i c k ' s notion of the trace of something w h i c h still
retains its roots i n one meaning w h i l e it is, as it were, m o v i n g to
another, encapsulating another, w i t h endless shiftings, slidings, of
that signifier?
The truth is that D e r r i d a does not help us as m u c h as he m i g h t
here i n t h i n k i n g about the relationship between identity a n d differ-
ence. A n d the appropriators of D e r r i d a i n A m e r i c a , especially i n
A m e r i c a n philosophical and literary thought, help us even less. By
taking Derrida's notion of differance, precisely right out of the
tension between the t w o textual connotations, " d e f e r " a n d " d i f f e r , "
and l o d g i n g it only i n the- endless play of difference, Derrida's
politics is i n that v e r y m o m e n t u n c o u p l e d .
From that moment unrolls that enormous proliferation of extreme-
ly sophisticated, playful, deconstruction w h i c h is a k i n d of endless
academic game. A n y b o d y can d o It, a n d o n and o n it rolls. N o
signifier ever stops; no-one is ever responsible for any meaning; a l l
traces are effaced. The moment anything is lodged, it is immediately
erased. Everybody has a great time; they go to conferences a n d do it,
as it were. The v e r y notion of the politics w h i c h requires the h o l d i n g
of the tension between that w h i c h is both placed a n d not stitched i n
place, by the w o r d w h i c h is always i n motion between positions,
which requires! us to think both positionality a n d movement, both
together, not one and the other, not p l a y i n g w i t h difference, or
" f i n d i n g nights to rest u n d e r " identity, -but living i n the tension of
identity and difference, is u n c o u p l e d .
. We have then to go on t h i n k i n g b e y o n d that mere playfulness into
50
O L D A N D N E W IDENTITIES
the really hard game w h i c h the play of difference actually means to
us historically. For if signification depends u p o n the endless reposi-
tioning of its differential terms, meaning i n any specific instance
depends on the contingent a n d arbitrary stop, the necessary break. It
is a very simple point.
Language is part of an infinite semiosis of meaning. T o say any-
thing, I have got to shut u p . I have to construct a single sentence. I
k n o w that the next sentence w i l l open the infinite semiosis of mean-
ing again, so I w i l l take it back. So each stop is not a natural break.
It does not say, " I ' m about to end a sentence a n d that w i l l be the
t r u t h . " It understands that it is contingent. It is a positioning. It Is the
cut of ideology w h i c h , across the semiosis of language, constitutes
meaning. B u t y o u have to get into that game or y o u w i l l never say
any thing at all.
Y o u think I'm joking. I k n o w graduate students of mine w h o got
into this theoretical fix i n the seventies, one enormous French theore-
tician after another, throwing them aside, until they could not commit
a single w o r d to paper at all because to say anything was to open
oneself to the endless sliding of the signifier. So if they said, what I
think Derrida really, i n — really — ooh — start again, yes, start again.
M e a n i n g is i n that sense a wager. Y o u take a bet. N o t a bet on
truth, but a bet o n saying something. Y o u have to be positioned
somewhere i n order to speak. E v e n if y o u are positioned i n order to
imposition yourself, even if y o u w a n t to take it back, y o u have to
come into language to get out of it. There is no other w a y . That is the
paradox of meaning.
T o t h i n k it only 'in terms of difference and not i n terms of the
relational position between the suturing, the arbitrary, over deter-
m i n e d cut of language w h i c h says something w h i c h is instantly
opened again to the play of meaning; not to think of meaning a l -
w a y s , i n supplement, that there is always something left over, always
something w h i c h goes on escaping the precision; the attempt of
language to code, to make precise, to fix, to halt, etc.; not to think it
i n that w a y is to lose h o l d of the t w o necessary ends of the chain to
w h i c h the n e w notion of identity has to be conceptualized.
N o w I can t u r n to questions of politics. In this conception of an
identity w h i c h has to be thought through difference, is there a gener-
al politics of the local to bring to bear against the great, over-riding,
p o w e r f u l , technologically-based, massively-invested u n r o l l i n g of
global processes w h i c h I was t r y i n g to describe i n m y previous talk
51
 CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM
w h i c h tend to m o p u p all differences, and occlude those differences?
W h i c h means, as it were, they are different — but it doesn't make
any difference that they are different, they're just different.
N o , there is n o general politics, I have n o t h i n g i n the kitbag. There
is nothing I can p u l l out. But I have a little local politics to tell y o u
about. It m a y be that a l l w e have, i n b r i n g i n g the politics of the local
to bear against the global, is a lot of little local politics. I do not k n o w
if that is true or not. But I w o u l d like to s p e n d some time later talk-
ing about the c u l t u r a l politics of the local, a n d of this n e w notion of
identity. F o r it is i n this n e w .frame that identity has come back into
cultural politics i n Britain. The formation of the Black diasporas in.
the p e r i o d of post-war migration i n the fifties and sixties has trans-
f o r m e d E n g l i s h social, economic and political life.
In the first generations, the majority of people h a d the same i l l u -
sion that I d i d : that I w a s about to go back home. That m a y have
been because everybody always asked me: w h e n was I g o i n g back
home? W e d i d think that w e were just going to get back o n the boat;
w e were here for a temporary sojourn. B y the seventies, it w a s per-
fectly clear that we were not there for a temporary sojourn. Some
people w e r e g o i n g to stay and. then the politics of racism really
emerged.
N o w one of the m a i n reactions against the politics of racism i n
Britain was w h a t I w o u l d c a l "Identity Politics O n e , " the first f o r m
of identity politics. It h a d to do w i t h the constitution of some defen-
sive collective identity against the practices of racist society. It h a d to
do w i t h the fact that people were b e i n g blocked out of a n d refused
an identity a n d identification w i t h i n the majority nation, h a v i n g to
f i n d some other roots on w h i c h to stand. Because people have to f i n d
some g r o u n d , some place, some position o n w h i c h to stand. Blocked
out of any access to an English or British identity, people h a d to try
to discover w h o they were. This is the moment I defined i n m y pre-
vious talk. It is the crucial moment of the rediscovery or the search
for roots.
In the course of the search for roots, one discovered not o n l y
where one came f r o m , one began to speak, the language of'that w h i c h
is home i n the genuine sense, that other crucial moment w h i c h is the
recovery of lost histories. The histories that have never been told
about ourselves that w e c o u l d not l e a m i n schools, that were not i n
any books, a n d that w e h a d to recover.
This is an enormous act of w h a t I w a n t to call imaginary political
52
O L D A N D N E W IDENTITIES
re-identification, re-territorialization a n d re-identification, w i t h o u t
w h i c h a counter-politics c o u l d not have been constructed. I do not
k n o w an example of any group or category of the people of the
margins, of the locals, w h o have been able to mobilize themselves,
socially, culturally, economically, politically i n the last twenty or
twenty-five years w h o have not gone through some s u c h series of
moments in. order to resist their exclusion, their marginalization. That
is h o w a n d where the margins begin to speak. The margins begin to
contest, the locals begin, to come to representation.
The identity'Which that w h o l e , enormous political space p r o d u c e d
in Britain, as it d i d elsewhere, was the category Black. I w a n t to say
something about this category w h i c h w e all n o w so take for granted.
I. w i l l tell you. some stories about it.
I w a s brought u p i n a lower m i d d l e class family i n Jamaica. I left
there i n the early fifties to go and study i n E n g l a n d . U n t i l 1 left,
though I suppose 98 per cent of the Jamaican population is either
Black or colored i n one w a y or another, I h a d never ever heard any-
b o d y either call themselves, or refer to anybody else as " B l a c k . "
N e v e r . I heard a thousand other w o r d s . M y grandmother could dif-
ferentiate about fifteen different shades between light b r o w n and
dark b r o w n . W h e n I left Jamaica, there was a beauty contest i n w h i c h
the different shades of w o m e n were graded according to different
trees, so that there was M i s s M a h o g a n y , M i s s Walnut, etc.
People think of Jamaica as a simple society. In fact, it h a d the most
complicated color stratification system i n the w o r l d . Talk about prac-
tical semioticians; a n y b o d y i n m y family could compute a n d calculate
anybody's social status b y grading the particular quality of their hair
versus the particular quality of the family they came f r o m a n d w h i c h
street they l i v e d i n , including p h y s i o g n o m y , shading, etc. Y o u could
trade off one characteristic against another. C o m p a r e d w i t h that, the
n o r m a l class stratification system is absolute child's play.
But the w o r d " B l a c k " was never uttered. W h y ? N o Black people
around? Lots of them, thousands and thousands of them. Black is not
a. question of pigmentation. The Black I'm talking about is a historical
category, a political category., a cultural category. In o u r language, at
certain historical moments, w e have to use the signifier. W e have to
create an equivalence between h o w people look and w h a t their his-
tories are. Their histories are i n the past, inscribed i n their skins, But
it is not because of their skins that they are Black i n their heads.
I heard Black for the first time i n the w a k e of the C i v i l Rights
53
 C U L T U R E , G L O B A L I Z A T I O N A N D T H E WORLD-SYSTEM
movement, i n the w a k e of the de-colonization a n d nationalistic strug-
gles. Black was created as a political category i n a certain historical
moment. It was created as a consequence of certain symbolic and
ideological struggles. W e said, " Y o u have spent five, six, seven
h u n d r e d years elaborating the s y m b o l i s m through w h i c h Black is a
negative factor. N o w I don't want another term. I want that term,
that negative one, that's the one I want. I want a piece of that action.
I want to take it out of the w a y i n w h i c h it has been articulated i n
religious discourse, i n ethnographic discourse', i n literary discourse,
i n v i s u a l discourse. I want to p l u c k it out of its articulation a n d re-
articulate it .in a n e w w a y . "
In that very; struggle is a change of consciousness, a change of
self-recognition, a n e w process of identification, the emergence into
visibility of a n e w subject. A subject that was always there, but
emerging, historically...
Y o u k n o w that story, but I d o not k n o w if y o u k n o w the degree to
w h i c h that story is true of other parts of the Americas. It happened
i n Jamaica, i n the 1970s. In the 1970s, for the first time, Black people
recognized themselves as Black. It was the most p r o f o u n d cultural
revolution i n the Caribbean, m u c h greater than, any political r e v o l u -
tion they have ever had. That cultural revolution i n Jamaica has
never been, matched b y a n y t h i n g as far-reaching as the politics. The
politics has. never caught u p with. it.
Y o u probably k n o w the moment w h e n the leaders of both major
political, parties i n Jamaica tried to grab h o l d of Bob M a r l e y ' s h a n d .
They were trying to p u t their hands o n Black; M a r l e y stood for Black,
and they were t r y i n g to get a piece of the action. If only he w o u l d
look i n their direction he w o u l d have legitimated them. It was not
politics legitimating culture, it was culture legitimating politics.
Indeed, the truth is I call myself a l l k i n d s of other things. W h e n I
went to E n g l a n d , I w o u l d n ' t have called myself an i m m i g r a n t either,
w h i c h is what w e were a l l k n o w n as. It was not until I went back
home i n the early 1960s that m y mother w h o , as a. good middle-class
colored. Jamaican w o m a n , hated, all Black people, (you k n o w , that is
the truth) said to me, " I hope they don't think, you're an. i m m i g r a n t
over there."
A n d ' I said, " W e l l , I just migrated. I've just e m i g r a t e d . " A t that
very moment, I thought, that's exactly what I am, I've just left home —
for good...
I went back to E n g l a n d a n d I became what I'd been named. I h a d
54
O L D A N D N E W IDENTITIES
been hailed as an immigrant. I h a d discovered w h o I was. I started to
tell myself the story of m y migration. j
'Then. Black erupted and people said, " W e l l , you're f r o m the Carib-
bean, i n the midst of this, identifying w i t h what's going o n , the Black
population i n England. You're Black." _ I
A t that v e r y moment, m y son, w h o was two and half, was learning
the colors. I said to h i m , transmitting the message at last, " Y o u ' r e
B l a c k . " A n d he said, " N o . I'm b r o w n . " A n d I said, " W r o n g referent.
M i s t a k e n concreteness, philosophical mistake. I'm not talking about
y o u r paintbox, I ' m talking about y o u r h e a d . " That is something dif-
ferent. The question of learning, learning to be Black. Learning:to
come into an identification.
W h a t that moment allows to h a p p e n are things w h i c h were not
there before. It is not that what one then does was h i d i n g away
inside .as m y true self. There wasn't any bit of that true self in. there
before that identity was learnt. Is that, then, the stable one, is that
w h e r e w e are? Is that where people are?
I w i l l tell y o u something n o w about what has happened to that
Black identity as a matter of cultural politics i n Britain. That notion
was extremely important i n the anti-racist struggles of the 1970s: the
notion that people of diverse societies a n d cultures w o u l d all come to
Britain i n the fifties and sixties as part of that huge w a v e of m i g r a -
tion f r o m the Caribbean, East A f r i c a , the A s i a n subcontinent, Paki-
stan, Bangladesh, from, different parts of India, and all identified,
themselves politically as Black.
What they said was, " W e may be different actual color skins but
vis-a-vis the social system, vis-a-vis the political system of racism,
there is more that unites us than what divides u s . " People begin, to
ask " A r e y o u f r o m Jamaica, are y o u from. T r i n i d a d , are y o u from.
Barbados?" Y o u can. just see the process of d i v i d e and. rule. " N o . Just
address me as I am. I k n o w you. can't tell the difference so just call
me Black. T r y u s i n g that. W e a l l look the same, y o u k n o w . Certainly
can't tell the difference. Just call me Black. Black i d e n t i t y . " A n t i -
racism, i n the seventies was only fought and only resisted i n the c o m -
m u n i t y , in. the localities, b e h i n d the slogan of a. Black politics a n d the
Black, experience.
In. that moment, the enemy was ethnicity. The enemy h a d to be
w h a t w e called " m u l t i - c u l t u r a l i s m . " Because multi-culturalism. was
precisely what I called previously "the exotic." The exotica of differ-
ence. N o b o d y w o u l d talk about racism but they were perfectly pre-
55
 CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM
pared to have "International E v e n i n g s , " w h e n w e w o u l d all come
.and cook o u r native dishes, sing o u r o w n native songs a n d appear i n
our o w n native- costume. It is true that some people, some ethnic
minorities i n Britain, do have indigenous, very beautiful indigenous
forms of dress. I didn't. I h a d to rummage i n the dressing-up box to
f i n d m i n e . I have been de-racinated for four h u n d r e d years. The last
thing I am g o i n g to do is to dress u p i n some native Jamaican cos-
tume a n d appear i n the spectacle of m u lti-culturalism.
H a s the moment of the struggle organized around this constructed
Black identity gone away? It certainly has not. So l o n g as that society
remains i n its. economic, political, cultural, and social relations i n a
racist w a y to the variety of Black and T h i r d W o r l d peoples i n its
midst, .and it continues to do so, that struggle remains.
W h y then don't I just talk about a collective Black identity replac-
i n g the other identities? I can't d o that either and I'll tell y o u w h y .
The truth is that i n relation to certain things, the question of Black,
i n Britain, also has its silences. It had a certain w a y of silencing the*
v e r y specific experiences of A s i a n people, Because t h o u g h A s i a n
people c o u l d identify, politically, i n the struggle against racism, w h e n
they came to u s i n g their o w n culture as the resources of resistance,
w h e n they w a n t e d to write out of their o w n experience a n d reflect on
their o w n position, w h e n they wanted to create, they naturally
1
created w i t h i n the histories of the languages, the cultural tradition,
the positions of people w h o came f r o m a variety of different histor-
ical backgrounds. A n d just as Black was the cutting edge of a politics
vis-a-vis one k i n d of enemy, it c o u l d also, if not understood p r o p e r l y ,
provide a k i n d of silencing i n relation to another. These are the costs,
as w e l l as the strengths, of t r y i n g to think of the notion of Black as
an esseniialism.
W h a t is more, there were not only A s i a n people of color, but also
Black people w h o d i d not identify w i t h that collective identity. So
that one was aware of the fact that always, as one advanced to meet
the enemy, w i t h a solid front, the differences were raging b e h i n d .
Just shut the doors, a n d conduct a raging argument to get the troops
together, to actually hit the other side.
A t h i r d w a y i n w h i c h Black was silencing was to silence some of
the other dimensions that were positioning individuals a n d groups i n
exactly the same w a y . To operate exclusively through an unrecon-
structed conception of Black was to reconstitute the authority of
Black masculinity over Black w o m e n , about w h i c h , as I a m sure y o u
56
O L D A N D N E W IDENTITIES
k n o w , there was also, for a l o n g time, an unbreakable silence about
w h i c h the most militant Black m e n w o u l d not speak.
To organize across the discourses of Blackness and masculinity, of
race a n d gender, a n d forget the w a y i n w h i c h , at the same moment,
Blacks i n the under class were being positioned i n class terms, i n
similar' w o r k situations, exposed to the same deprivations of poor
jobs and lack of promotion that certain members of the white w o r k -
i n g class suffered, was to leave out the critical dimension of position-
ing.
What then does one do w i t h the p o w e r f u l m o b i l i z i n g identity of
the Black experience a n d of the Black c o m m u n i t y ? Blackness as a
political identity i n the 'light of the understanding of any identity is
always complexly composed, always historically constructed. It is
never i n the same place but always positional. O n e always has to
think about the negative consequences of the positionality. Y o u can-
not, as it were, reverse the discourses of any identity s i m p l y by turn-
i n g them upside d o w n . What is it like to live, by attempting to
valorise a n d defeat the marginalization of the variety of Black sub-
jects and to really begin to recover the lost histories of a variety of
Black experiences, w h i l e at the same time recognizing the end of any
essential Black subject?
That is the politics of l i v i n g identity through difference. It is the
politics of recognizing that all of us are composed of multiple social
identities, not of one. That we are all complexly constructed through
different categories, of different antagonisms, and these may have the
effect of locating us socially i n multiple positions of marginality and
subordination, but w h i c h do not yet operate on us i n exactly the
same w a y . It is also to recognize that any counter-politics of the local
w h i c h attempts to organize people through their diversity of identi-
fications has to be a struggle w h i c h is conducted positionally. It is the
beginning of anti-racism, anti-sexism, and anti-classicism as a w a r of
positions, as the G r a m s c i a n notion of the w a r of position.
The notion of the struggles of the local as a w a r of positions is a
very difficult k i n d of politics to get one's head around; none of us
k n o w s h o w to conduct it. N o n e of us even k n o w s whether it can be
conducted. Some of us have h a d to say there is no other political
game so w e must f i n d a w a y of p l a y i n g this one.
W h y is it difficult? It has no guarantees. Because identifications
change and shift, they can be w o r k e d on by political and economic
forces outside of us a n d they can be articulated in different ways,
57
 CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM
There is absolutely no political guarantee already inscribed i n an
identity. There is no reason o n G o d ' s earth w h y the f i l m is g o o d
because a Black person made it. There is absolutely no guarantee that
all. the politics w i l l be right because a w o m a n does it.
There are n o political guarantees of that k i n d . It is not a free-
floating o p e n space because history has lodged on. it the p o w e r f u l ,
tendential organization of a past. W e bear the traces of a past, the
connections of the past. W e cannot conduct this k i n d of cultural
politics w i t h o u t returning to the past but it is never a return of a
direct a n d literal k i n d . The past is not w a i t i n g for us back there to
recoup o u r identities against. It is. always retold, rediscovered, r e i n -
vented. It has to be narrativized. W e go to o u r o w n pasts through
history, through m e m o r y , through desire, not as a literal fact.
It is a very important example. Some w o r k has been done, both in.
feminist history, i n Black history, and i n w o r k i n g class history re-
cently, w h i c h recover the oral testimonies of people w h o , for a very-
long time, f r o m the v i e w p o i n t of the canon, and the authority of the
historian, have not been, considered to be history-makers at all. That
is a very important moment. But it is not possible to use oral his-
tories and testimonies, as if they are just literally, the truth. They
have also to be read. They are also stories, positionings, narratives.
You, are b r i n g i n g n e w narratives into play but y o u cannot mistake
them for some " r e a l , " back there, b y w h i c h history can be measured.
There is no guarantee of authenticity like that i n history. O n e is
ever afterwards i n the narrativization of the self a n d of one's his-
tories. Just as i n trying to .conduct cultural politics as a w a r of p o s i -
tions, one is. always i n the strategy of hegemony. H e g e m o n y is not
the same thing as incorporating everybody, of m a k i n g everybody the
same, though nine-tenths of the people w h o have marginally read
G r a m s c i think that that is w h a t he means. G r a m s c i uses the notion of
hegemony precisely to counteract the notion of incorporation.
H e g e m o n y is not the disappearence or destruction, of difference. It
is the construction of a, collective w i l l through difference. It is the
articulation of differences w h i c h do not disappear. The subaltern
class does not mistake itself for people w h o were born w i t h silver
spoons i n their mouths... They k n o w they are still second on the
ladder, somewhere near the bottom. People are not cultural dopes.
They are not w a i t i n g for the moment w h e n , like an overnight con-
version, false consciousness w i l l fall f r o m their eyes, the scales w i l l
fall, away, a n d they w i l l s u d d e n l y discover w h o they are.
58
O L D A N D N E W IDENTITIES
T h e y k n o w something about w h o they are. If they engage i n
another project it is because it has interpolated them, hailed them,
and established some point of identification w i t h them. It has
brought them, into 'the historical project. A n d that notion of a politics
w h i c h , as it were, increasingly is able to address people through the
multiple identities w h i c h they have — understanding that those iden-
tities d o not r e m a i n the same, that they are frequently contradictory,
that they cross-cut one another, that they tend to locate us differently
at different moments, conducting politics i n the light of the con-
tingent, i n the face of the contingent — is the o n l y political game that
the locals have left at their disposal, i n m y v i e w .
If they are w a i t i n g for a politics of manoeuvre, w h e n a l l 'the locals,
i n every part of the w o r l d , w i l l a l l stand u p at the same moment and
go i n the same direction, and roll back the tide of the global, i n one
great historical activity, it is not going to h a p p e n . I do not believe it
any more; I think it is a dream. In order to conduct the politics really
w e have to live outside of the dream, to w a k e u p , to g r o w u p , to
come into the w o r l d of contradiction. W e have to come into the
w o r l d of politics. There is no other space to stand i n .
O u t of that notion some of the most exciting cultural w o r k is n o w
being done i n E n g l a n d . T h i r d generation y o u n g Black m e n and
w o m e n k n o w they come f r o m the Caribbean, k n o w that they are
Black, k n o w that they are British. They w a n t to speak f r o m all three
identities. They are not prepared to give u p any one of them.They
w i l l contest the Thafcherite notion of Englishness, because they say
this Englishness is Black. They w i l l contest the notion of Blackness
because they w a n t to make a differentiation between people w h o are
Black f r o m one k i n d of society and people w h o are Black from
another. Because they need to k n o w that difference, that difference
that makes a difference i n h o w they write their poetry, make their
films, h o w they paint. It makes a difference. It is inscribed i n their
creative w o r k . They need it as a resource. They are all those identities
together. They are m a k i n g astonishing cultural w o r k , the most
important w o r k In the v i s u a l arts. Some of the most important w o r k
i n f i l m a n d photography and nearly all the most important w o r k i n
p o p u l a r music is c o m i n g f r o m this n e w recognition of identity that I
am speaking about.
V e r y little of that w o r k is visible elsewhere but some of y o u have
seen, though y o u may not have recognized, the outer edge of i t
Some of y o u , for example, may have seen a f i l m made b y Stephen
59
 CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM
Freers a n d H a n i f K u r e i s h i , called My Beautiful Laundrette. This was
originally m a d e as a television f i l m for local distribution o n l y , a n d
s h o w n once at the E d i n b u r g h Festival w h e r e it received an enormous
reception, If y o u have seen My Beautiful Laundrette y o u w i l l k n o w
that it is the most transgressive text there is. A n y b o d y w h o is Black,
w h o tries to identify it, m m across the fact that the central characters
of this narrative are t w o gay m e n . W h a t is more, anyone w h o wants
to separate the identities into their t w o clearly separate points w i l l
discover that one of these Black gay m e n is white a n d one of these
Black gay m e n is b r o w n . Both of them are struggling i n Thatcher's
Britain. O n e of them has an uncle w h o is a Pakistani l a n d l o r d w h o is
t h r o w i n g Black people out of the w i n d o w .
This is a text that n o b o d y likes. E v e r y b o d y hates it. Y o u go to it
l o o k i n g for w h a t are called " p o s i t i v e images" a n d there are none.
There aren't any positive images like that w i t h w h o m one can, i n a
s i m p l e w a y , identify. Because as w e l l as the politics — a n d there is
certainly a politics i n that and i n Kureishi's other f i l m , but it is not a
politics w h i c h Invites easy identification — it has a politics w h i c h is
g r o u n d e d o n the complexity of identifications w h i c h are at w o r k .
I w i l l read y o u something w h i c h H a n i f K u r e i s h i said about the
question of responding to his critics w h o said, " W h y don't y o u tell
us good stories about ourselves, as w e l l as good/bad stories? W h y
are y o u r stories m i x e d about ourselves?" H e spoke about the difficult
m o r a l position of the writer f r o m an oppressed or persecuted c o m -
m u n i t y a n d the relation of that w r i t i n g to the rest of the society. H e
said it is a, relatively n e w one i n E n g l a n d but it w i l l arise more a n d
more as British writers w i t h a colonial heritage a n d f r o m a colonial
or m a r g i n a l past start to declare themselves.
"There is sometimes," he said, " t o o simple a d e m a n d for positive
images. Positive images sometimes require, cheering fictions — the
writer as P u b l i c Relations Officer. A n d I'm glad to say that the more
I looked at My\Beautiful Laundrette, the less positive images I c o u l d
see. If there i s ' t o be a serious attempt to understand present-day
1
Britain w i t h its;mix of races a n d colors, its hysteria a n d despair, then
w r i t i n g about it has to be complex. It can't apologize, or idealize. It
can't sentimentalize. It can't attempt to represent any one g r o u p as
having the total, exclusive, essential m o n o p o l y o n virtue.
A jejune protest or parochial literature, be it black, gay or feminist,
is i n the long ran no more politically effective than w o r k s w h i c h are
merely p u b l i c relations. W h a t w e need n o w , i n this position, at this
60
O L D A N D N E W IDENTITIES
time, is imaginative w r i t i n g that gives us a sense of the shifts and the
difficulties w i t h i n o u r society as a w h o l e .
If contemporary w r i t i n g w h i c h emerges f r o m oppressed groups
ignores the central concerns a n d major conflicts of the larger society,
and if these are w i l l i n g s i m p l y to accept themselves as marginal or
enclave literatures, they w i l l automatically designate themselves as
permanently m i n o r , as a sub-genre. They m u s t not allow themselves
n o w to be rendered invisible a n d marginalized i n this w a y b y step-
p i n g outside of the maelstrom of contemporary h i s t o r y . "
( F o l l o w i n g the lecture, questions were p u t f r o m the audience.)
I have been asked to say more about w h y I speak about the politics
of the local. I d i d not talk about other attempts to construct a n alter-
native politics of the global principally because I have been trying to
trace through the question of ethnicity; the question of positioning, of
placing, w h i c h is w h a t the term ethnicity connotes for me i n relation
to issues of the local a n d the global. A n d also, because i n many
respects, I don't think that those attempts to p u t together an alter-
native politics of the global are, at the moment, very successful.
But the second part of the question is the more important one.
W h y do I only talk about w h a t is local w h e n the questions 1 seem to
be addressing are, of course, v e r y universal, global phenomena?
I d o not make that distinction between the local a n d the global. I
think there is always a n interpretation of the t w o . The question is,
w h a t are the locations at w h i c h struggles might develop? It seems to
me that a counter-politics w h i c h is pitched precisely a n d p r e d o m -
inantly at the level of confronting the global forces that are trying to
remake a n d recapture the w o r l d at the moment, a n d w h i c h are con-
ducted s i m p l y at that level, are not m a k i n g very m u c h headway.
Yet where there does seem the ability to develop counter-
movements, resistances, counter-politics, are places that are localized.
I d o not mean that w h a t they are about are " l o c a l " but the places
w h e r e they emerge as a political scenario are localized because they
are separated f r o m one another; they are not easy to connect u p or
articulate into a larger struggle. So, I use the local a n d the global as
prisms for l o o k i n g at the same thing. B u t they have pertinent appear-
ances, points of appearance, scenarios i n the different locations.
There is, for instance, ecologically, a n attempt to establish a
counter-politics of the planet as a single place a n d that, of course, is
61
 CULTURE, GLO i!ALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM O L D A N D N E W IDENTITIES

important. A n d if I liad taken the question of ecology rather than ity, a sense of the unfinished character of each of those. It is not that
ethnicity as the p r i s m through w h i c h I spoke, the story w o u l d have they have disappeared but they do not stitch us i n place, locate us, in
been told very differently. I hinted at that i n m y first talk w h e n I said the w a y thvy d i d in the past.
that ecological consciousness was. constituting the sense of the global, Regardii a second question, as to what shifted on us: it was
and this is. not necessarily entirely i n the keeping of the advanced West.
politics. W) -at shifted was our attempt to understand w h y the scenar-
So there is more than one political game bejng p l a y e d . This isn't
io of the revolutionary class subject never appeared. W h a t happened
the only game. B u t if y o u came at it through the question of where
to It?
those w h o have m o v e d into representation, into politics, as it were,
There were a few moments w h e n it appeared... W h e n were those?
through the political movements that have been v e r y p o w e r f u l a n d
W h e n y o u go back historically a n d look at those moments, they were
important i n the post-war w o r l d , and especially i n the last twenty
not o n stage as. they ought to have been either. 1917 is not the subject
years, it is precisely their inability to connect u p into one global p o l i -
tics w h i c h seems to be their difficulty. But w h e n y o u try to f i n d of the unitary, already-identified Russian w o r k i n g class, m a k i n g the
whether they are able to resist, to mobilize, to say something differ- future. It was. not that! The Chinese Revolution is not that either. N o r
ent to globalism at a more local level, they seem to have more p u r - is the seventeenth century, the history of the already formed bour-
chase o n the histórica; present. That's the reason w h y I concentrated geoisie taking the stage. A c t u a l l y , they do not take the political stage
the story f r o m that point of v i e w . But It w o u l d be w r o n g to thinks for another 200 years.
that y o u either w o r k at one or the other, that the t w o are not con- So if it is a bourgeois revolution i n a larger sense, it cannot be
stantly interpenetrating each other. specified i n terms of actual historical actors. So, w e h a d a w a y of
l i v i n g w i t h that for a very long time. It is coming. O f course, it is
W h a t I tried tb say in m y first talk was that what w e usually call
more complex than that but the basic grid is still ok.
the global, far f r o m being something w h i c h , i n a systematic fashion,
But then, one asks oneself, what politics flows f r o m t h i n k i n g it
roils over everything, creating similarity, i n fact w o r k s through par-
never really happened like that, but one day it w i l l ? A f t e r a time, if
ticularity, negotiates particular spaces, particular ethnicities, w o r k s
y o u are really trying to be politically active, i n that setting y o u have
through m o b i l i z i n g particular identities a n d so on. So there is always
to say to yourself: that may be the w r o n g question. It may be that I
a dialectic, a continuous, dialectic, between the local and the global.
a m not actually d o i n g something n o w because 1 think that something
I tried to identify those collective social identities in. relation to cer-
i n the w o r k s , some G o d in. the machine, some law of history w h i c h
tain historical processes... The other ones w h i c h have been talked
I do not understand, is going to make it all right.
about are v e r y Important structurings, such as inside/outside, nor-
It is hard to describe this moment. It is a moment like w a k i n g u p .
mal/ pathological, etc. But they seem to recur: there are w a y s i n
Y o u s u d d e n l y realize y o u are relying on history to do w h a t y o u can-
w h i c h the other identities are l i v e d . Y o u k n o w if y o u are inside the
not do for yourself. Y o u make a bungle of politics but " H i s t o r y , "
class, then y o u belong. If y o u are outside, then there is. something
w i t h a capital " H , " is going to fly out of somebody's m o u t h at five
pathological, not n o r m a l or abnormal, or deviant about y o u .
minutes to m i d n i g h t a n d make it all right. O r " t h e E c o n o m y " is
So I think, of those identities somewhat differently. I think of those
going to march o n the stage and say, " y o u have got it all w r o n g , y o u
as ways of categorizing w h o is inside and w h o is outside i n any of
k n o w . Y o u ought to be over there: y o u are i n the proletariat. Y o u
the other social identities. I was t r y i n g to identify, historically, some
ought to be t h i n k i n g that." Sort us all out, y o u k n o w . A n d we are
of the major ones that I think exist. If y o u say w h o y o u are y o u c o u l d
w a i t i n g for that moment; w a i t i n g , w a i t i n g , w a i t i n g 200 years for it.
say where y o u came f r o m ; broadly speaking, what race y o u belong
M a y b e y o u are w a i t i n g for the w r o n g thing. N o t that the insights,
to, a nation state of w h i c h y o u are a citizen or subject; y o u have a
of that story, that theory, that narrative were w r o n g ; I am not trying
class position, aijt established a n d relatively secure gender position.
to throw that over. I a m t r y i n g to throw over the moment of the
You. k n e w where y o u fitted i n the w o r l d . That is what I meant,
political guarantee that is lodged i n that, because then y o u do not
whereas most of us n o w live w i t h a sense of a m u c h greater p l u r a l -
conduct politics contingently; y o u do not conduct it positionally. Y o u
62 63
 CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM
think someone has prepared the positions for y o u .
This is a v e r y practical issue. Y o u go into the miners' strike, w h i c h '
the British went into i n the early eighties, the only major industrial
s h o w d o w n w i t h the Thatcher government, on the assumption that
the industrial w o r k i n g class was u n i f i e d behind y o u w h e n it was not.
A n d y o u d i d not conduct a politics w h i c h had the remotest chance of
u n i f y i n g it because y o u assumed it was already u n i f i e d .
If y o u said it seven times, it w o u l d be unified. So the miners'
leader said it seven times. " T h e m i g h t of the u n i f i e d industrial w o r k -
ing class is n o w i n a head-to-head w i t h Thatcher." It was not. It was
the w r o n g politics. N o t the w r o n g struggle, but the w r o n g politics,
conducted i n the w r o n g w a y , i n 'the light of some hope that .history
was going to rescue this simpler story out of the more complex one.
If y o u lose enough, battles that w a y , y o u just d o not play that game
any more. Y o u have to play it differently. Y o u have to try a n d make
some politics out of people w h o insist o n remaining different. Y o u
are w a i t i n g for them all to be the same. Before y o u get them inside
the same political movement y o u w i l l be here till doomsday.
Y o u have to make them out of the folks in this r o o m , not out of
something else called socialism or whatever it is. W e made history
out of figments. S u d d e n l y y o u see that it is a k i n d of w a y of sleeping
at night: " I made a botch of that. I lost that o n e . " Y o u k n o w , the w a y
the left constantly told itself that all its losses were victories. Y o u
k n o w , I just w o n that although I lost it. Heroically, I lost it.
Just let us w i n one. Leave the heroism out of it. A n d just w i n a
few. The next time I w i l l be i n a little bit ahead. N o t t w o steps
b e h i n d but feeling g o o d i n myself. That is a moment I a m t r y i n g to
describe existentially. It d i d not h a p p e n like that. It happened in, a
complicated set of ways, But y o u realize at a certain, moment, y o u go
through a, k i n d of transparent barrier that has kept y o u i n a place,
f r o m d o i n g a n d t h i n k i n g seriously, w h a t y o u s h o u l d have been
thinking about. That is w h a t it is like.
Question: C o u l d y o u then say something about w i n n i n g one? C o u l d
y o u say something about what prospect y o u see for r e b u i l d i n g
another politics, other than the one A r t h u r Scargill headed i n the
miners' struggle. A n d what prospect that has for breaking d o w n that
exclusivist, solidified, ego-identified consciousness'
SH: The prospects for that are not very good because the left is still
stuffed w i t h the o l d notion of identity, w h i c h is w h y I a m t h i n k i n g
about it. It is still w a i t i n g for the o l d identities to return to the stage.
64
O L D A N D N E W IDENTITIES
It does not recognize that it is i n a different political game w h i c h is
r e q u i r e d to articulate, precisely, differences that cannot be encap-
sulated any longer and represented i n that unified b o d y . So, w e do
not k n o w whether w e can shift enough of that old. t h i n k i n g to begin
to ask the question. What w o u l d a politics like that be like?
W e k n o w a little bit about it. I do think, w i t h o u t being romantic
about it, that the period of the G L C (Greater L o n d o n Council) i n
L o n d o n was. very prefigurative, but that it cannot be repeated else-
where. It was the b r i n g i n g together of groups and movements w h i c h
remained the same, a n d yet retained their differences, N o b o d y w h o
came into the G L C said "I, w i l l forget I a m an activist black g r o u p
because 1 am, n o w i n the same r o o m as a feminist g r o u p . " W h a t you,
heard there was the very opposite of what w e n o w usually think of
as the conversation of a collective political subject c o m i n g into exis-
tence.
W e think of a nice, polite, consensual discussion; everybody agree-
i n g . W h a t y o u heard there was what democracy is really like: an,
absolutely, b l o o d y - u n e n d i n g r o w . People h a m m e r i n g the table, insist-
ing, " D o not ask me to line u p b e h i n d y o u r banner, because that just
means forgetting w h o I a m . " That r o w , that s o u n d of people actually
negotiating their differences i n the open, b e h i n d the collective p r o -
gram, is the s o u n d I a m w a i t i n g for.
I think it d i d something; it opened some possibilities. It s h o w e d
that it was possible. It h a d exactly what politics always has, w h i c h is
the test, that differences do not remain the same as a, result of the
articulation.
O n e g r o u p has to take o n the agenda of the other. It has to trans-
f o r m itself i n the course of c o m i n g into alliance, or some k i n d of
formation w i t h another. It has to learn something of the otherness
w h i c h created the other constituency. It doesn't mistake itself that it
becomes it but it has to take it o n board. It has to struggle w i t h it to
establish some set of priorities.
That is the sound that one is w a i t i n g for but on the w h o l e , that Is
not the s o u n d one is hearing in the politics opposed to Thatcherism.
O n e is hearing " L e t us go back to the o l d constituencies. Line u p
b e h i n d us. The o l d parties w i l l come a g a i n . " I do not believe it. i
think Thatcherism Is more deep-seated than that; it is actually shak-
i n g the g r o u n d f r o m underneath the possibility of a return to that old,
f o r m of politics. So if y o u ask me w h a t the possibilities are, then the
first stage of it is i n o u r o w n ranks. It is quarrelling among ourselves
65
 CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM
about w h i c h direction to go before one begins to open that out.
But I do think that there are possibilities i n that. I think the reason
w h y , in spite of the fact that the G L C was never below 60-65 percent
i n the popularity ratings, Thatcherism nevertheless destroyed it, w a s
because it understood its prefigurative role. It understood that if it
c o u l d persist, a n d make some changes to the I v e s of a variety of dif-
ferent constituencies i n that city, other peoples w o u l d begin to say,
" H e r e is a different k i n d of m o d e l . H e r e is a different w a y to g o . "
W h a t w o u l d that mean o n a more national scale? W h a t w o u l d that
mean i n another part of the country where the constituencies are
different?
I think Thatcherism understood that .and it b l e w the G L C out of
the water. It destroyed it b y legislative f i a t That tells y o u h o w i m -
portant they k n e w it actually w a s . Thatcherism's p o p u l a r i t y a n d
hegemonic reach precisely arises f r o m the fact that it articulates dif-
ferences. The numbers of people w h o are 100 percent w i t h the project
on, all fronts, are very small indeed. W h a t Thatcherism is fantastic at
is the s k i l l of m o b i l i z i n g the different minorities a n d p l a y i n g one
m i n o r i t y against another. It is In the game of articulating differences.
It always tries to condense them w i t h i n something it calls " t h e
Thatcherite subject" but there is no such thing. That is a political
representation. It is the condensation of a variety of different identi-
ties. It plays on difference, a n d through difference, a l l the time. It
tries to represent that difference as the same. B u t d o not be mistaken
about it. I do not think that is so.
C o n d u c t i n g the counter-hegemonic politics w h i c h I have been try-
ing to describe does not carry any guarantees that it w i l l w i n . A l l
that I a m saying is that there is a difference between the politics of
positionality I have been o u t l i n i n g a n d some unitary politics w h i c h
is successful, w h i c h is Thatcherism. That is not the difference. The
difference is be tween t w o politics of positionality; one well-conducted
and one w h i c h is conducted v e r y half-heartedly, a n d w h i c h is,
indeed, not being conducted at all.
Thatcherism is hegemonic because it is able to address the i d e n -
tities of a variety of people w h o have never been i n the same political
c a m p before. It does that i n a very complex w a y b y always attending,
through its political, social, m o r a l and economic p r o g r a m , to the c u l -
tural a n d Ideological questions. A l w a y s m o b i l i z i n g that w h i c h it
represents as already there. It says " t h e majority of E n g l i s h p e o p l e . "
" T h e majority of the British p e o p l e . "
66
O L D A N D N E W IDENTITIES
It does not have yet a majority. It is s u m m o n i n g u p the majority
and telling y o u that it is already a majority. A n d i n the majority are
a variety of people, people f r o m different classes, people f r o m differ-
ent genders, people f r o m different occupations, people f r o m different
parts of the country. That's what the Thatcherite majority is.
N e x t time r o u n d it w i l l not be exactly the same. It cannot repro-
duce itself. It is not the essential class subject. That is not the politics
of Thatcherism. Indeed, far f r o m it; m y o w n v i e w is that no-one
understands G r a m s c i better than M r s . Thatcher. She has never read
it but she does k n o w that politics nowadays is conducted through
the articulation of different instances. She k n o w s that politics is con-
ducted o n different fronts. Y o u have to have a variety of programs,
that y o u are always trying to b u i l d a collective w i l l because no
socio-economic position w i l l s i m p l y give it to y o u .
Those things she knows. W e read Gramsci til the cows come home
1
and w e do not k n o w h o w to do it. She cannot get a little bit of it off the
ground. It is called "instinctive Gramsci-ism." "Instinctive G r a m s c i - i s m "
is what is. beating us, not the old collective class subject.
Question: This Idea of multiple identities, w h i c h y o u represented i n
some k i n d of " p i e - c h a r t . " Y o u gave an example of people w h o are
Caribbean, British a n d Black. Is there five or ten percent or some-
thing w h i c h can be c a l e d " H u m a n i t y ? "
SH: I d o not think that there is. I think that what w e call 'the global'
is always composed of varieties of articulated particularities. I think
the global is the self-presentation of the dominant particular. It is a
way i n w h i c h the dominant particular localizes and naturalizes itself
and associates w i t h it a variety of other minorities.
W h a t I think it is dangerous to do is to identify the global w i t h
that sort of lowest c o m m o n denominator stake w h i c h w e all have i n
being h u m a n . In that sense, I a m not a humanist. I do not think w e
can mobilize people s i m p l y through their c o m m o n humanity. It m a y
be that that d a y w i l come b u t I do not think w e are there yet. Both
the sources of the p o w e r f u l , a n d the sources of the powerless, w e
both, always, go towards those universal moments through locating;
ourselves, through some particularity. 'So I think of the global as
something h a v i n g more to do w i t h the hegemonic sweep at w h i c h a
certain configuration of local particularities try to dominate the w h o l e
scene, to mobilize the technology .and to incorporate, i n subaltern
positions, a variety of more localized identities to construct the next
historical project.
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 CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM

I a m deliberately u s i n g Gramscian terms — construct the hege-

monic project, the historical project, i n w h i c h is lodged a variety of 3. Social Theory, Cultural Relativity
differences b u t ; w h i c h are a l l committed either i n a dominant, or a
subaltern position, to a single historical project, w h i c h is the project and the Problem of Globality
of globalization^ of the k i n d I think y o u are talking about.
That is w h a t is "universal." I think universal is always i n quotation
marks. It is. the u n i v e r s a l i z i n g aspect, the universalizing project, the
universalizing hope to be universal. It is like M r s , Thatcher's " A l l the
British p e o p l e . " It is a w a y of t r y i n g to say everybody is n o w inside
this particular f o r m of globalization. A n d at that very moment, there
I am. I remain M a r x i s t . A t that very moment, whenever the discourse
declares itself to be closed Is the moment w h e n y o u k n o w it is con-
tradictor}.'. Y o u .know, w h e n it; says, " E v e r y t h i n g is inside m y k n a p -
sack. I have just got h o l d of a l l of y o u . I have a bit of all of y o u n o w .
Y o u are inside the bag,,. C a n I close i t ? " N o .
Something is;just about to open that out a n d present a problem,.
H e g e m o n y , i n that sense, is never completed. It is always t r y i n g to ROLAND ROBERTSON
enclose more differences w i t h i n itself. N o t w i t h i n itself. It doesn't
want the differences to look exactly like it. B u t it wants the projects
of its i n d i v i d u a l a n d smaller identities to be only possible if the
larger one becomes possible. That is h o w Thatcherism locates smaller
1
THE NATIONALISMS OF THE MODERN WORLD ARE NOT THE TRI¬
identities w i t h i n itself. Y o u want to have the traditional family? Y o u u m p h a n t civilizations of yore. They are the ambiguous expression
cannot d o it for yourself because it depends o n larger political a n d of the d e m a n d both for .,.. assimilation into the universal — a n d
economic things. If y o u want to d o that, y o u must come inside m y simultaneously for .,.,. adhering to the particular, the reinvention of
larger project. Y o u must identify yourself w i t h the larger things differences. Indeed, it is universalism through particularism, a n d
inside m y project. That is h o w y o u become part of history. You, particularism through universalism.
become a little c o g in, the larger part of history.
N o w that is a different game f r o m saying, " I want everybody to be Immanuel Wallerstein'
exactly a, replica of m e . " It is a more complicated game. But there Is
a moment w h e n it always declares itself to be universal a n d closed,
and, that is the moment of naturalization. That's the moment w h e n it M o d e r n societies are characterized less b y what they have in c o m -
wants its boundaries to be coterminous w i t h the truth, w i t h the real- m o n or by their structure w i t h regard to well-defined universal
ity of history. A n d that is always the moment w h i c h , I think, escapes exigencies,, than b y the fact of their involvement i n the issue of
it. That's m y hope. Something h a d better be escaping it. universalization ,..,. The need, even the urgency, for 'universal
reference' has never been felt so strongly as i n o u r time ..... The
process of modernization, i s — the challenge hurled at .groups closed

1
Immanuel Wallerstein, The Politics of ike World-Economy (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1984) 166-7.

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 CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM
i n by their o w n contingencies and particularities to form themselves
into an open ensemble of interlocutors and partners . . .
François B o u r r i c a u d
L i k e nostalgia, diversity is not w h a t it used to be; and the sealing
of lives into separate railway carriages to produce cultural renewal
or the spacing of them out w i t h contrast effects to free u p m o r a l
energies are romantical dreams, not u n d a n g e r o u s — [MJoral issues
stemming f r o m cultural diversity . . . that used to arise . . . m a i n l y
between societies . . , n o w increasingly arise w i t h i n them The
day w h e n the A m e r i c a n city was the m a i n m o d e l of cultural frag-
mentation and ethnic t u m b l i n g is quite gone.
C l i f f o r d Geertz '
3 Identity and the Particular-Universal Relationship
Basic Problems
The title of the s y m p o s i u m i n w h i c h this paper was first presented
contained three key terms: culture, globalization and world-system.
Each of these is i n one w a y or another problematic a n d contestable
and it is, I think,;, desirable not merely to identify the m a i n problems
involved i n the uses to w h i c h they may i n d i v i d u a l l y be p u t but also
to address the issue of their constituting an analytical package. To
some extent the rationale i n the latter respect is p r o v i d e d b y the
1
sub-title of the s y m p o s i u m . " C o n t e m p o r a r y G nditions for the R e p -
resentation of Identity" suggests that w e shouk consider the ways i n
which "the representation of i d e n t i t y " is intim itely b o u n d - u p , first,
w i t h cultural aspects of and responses to pre .cesses w h i c h can be
identified as global i n their reach and significance a n d , second, w i t h
an entity w h i c h has been conceptualized as the world-system. That
2
François Bourricaud, "Modernity, 'Universal Reference' and the Process of
Modernization," in Patterns of Modernity, Volume I: The West, ed. S. N . Eisenstadt
(New York: New York University Press,-1987):21.
- * Clifford Geertz, "The Uses of Diversity," Michigan Quarterly, 25, 1
(1986):114-5.
70
S O C I A L T H E O R Y , C U L T U R A L RELATIVITY
stipulation does indeed constitute a relatively sharp focus—and w h i l e
I w i l l not confine myself slavishly to it I w i l l bear it carefully i n m i n d
as a directive for a general, theoretical discussion.
2 I begin b y formulating a general position w i t h respect to the issue
of universalism and particularism i n global context, to w h i c h m y
opening: quotations d r a w attention. I then move to a discussion of
our social-theoretical resources for the analysis of global complexity,
w i t h special, reference to the concept of culture. M u c h of that exercise
involves .an attempt to loosen the notion of culture; but not to the
extent that culture becomes everything and everything becomes cul-
ture, w h i c h is a strong tendency i n a lot of recent w o r k under the
headings of deconstruction, postmodernism, and, more diffusely,
" c u l t u r a l studies."
In addition to 'the ideas of culture, globalization, .and world-system,
the concept of identity is, of course, also problematic. H o w e v e r , I
4
cannot get i n v o l v e d directly i n that thorny issue here. I w i l l instead
s i m p l y take the approach, that, i n a w o r l d w h i c h is increasingly
compressed (and indeed identified as the w o r l d ) and in w h i c h its
most formidable units — namely, nationally constituted societies —
are increasingly subject to the internal, as w e l l as external, constraints
of multiculturaiity or, w h i c h is not quite the same thing, polyeth-
nicity, the conditions of and for the identification of i n d i v i d u a l and
4
See Burkhart Holzner .and Roland Robertson, "Identity and Authority: A
Problem Analysis of Processes of Identification and Authorization," in Hen lily
and Authority: Explorations in the Tiieory of Society, ed. Roland Robertson and
Burkhart Holzner (Oxford: Basil Blackwel.1,1980):l-39. Also see my "Aspects of
Identity and Authority in. Sociological Theory," in ibid.., 218-65. Among the most
important recent contributions to the study of national-identity formation are:
Anthony D. Smith, Theories of Nationalism (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1983);
Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University
Press, 1983); Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 1983);
Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1983); Carol Gluck, Japan's'ModemMyths (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1985); Tom Nairn, Ttte Enchanted Glass: Britain and its
Monarchy (London: Hutchinson Radius, 1988); Harold James, A German Identity:
1770-1990 (New York: Routledge, 1989); Hugh Kiemey, The British Isles (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
71
 CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM
collective selves a n d of individual a n d collective others are becoming
ever more complex. M o r e o v e r , what Bernard M c G r a n e calls " t h e
authoritative p a r a d i g m for interpreting a n d explaining the difference
of the other" has undergone mutation, so that increasingly " ' C u l t u r e '
accounts for the difference of the other." M c G r a n e is concerned
5
w i t h "the history of the different conceptions of difference f r o m
r o u g h l y the sixteenth, to the early twentieth c e n t u r y " — almost
entirely i n the West.' H e sees a shift f r o m "the alienness of the
6
non-European O t h e r " b e i n g interpreted " o n the h o r i z o n of Christian-
ity i n the sixteenth c e n t u r y " through an Enlightenment concern w i t h
the Other as Ignorant, a nineteenth-century use of time as " l o d g e d
between the European, a n d the non-European O t h e r , " to the twenti-
eth-century employment of C u l t u r e . This approach is important i n
7
that it draws specific attention to the civilizational bases of identity
construction a n d representation. O n the other h a n d , it neglects
Oriental a n d other civilizational interpretations of the West — as.
w e l l , for the most part, as concrete "intercivilizational encounters.""
It also does not explicitly address the crucial contemporary question
as to the emergence of a globally "authoritative p a r a d i g m " or globally
con tested paradigms for " i n t e r p r e t i n g a n d explaining the difference of
the other." '9
The overall circumstance of identity representation i n conditions of
great global density a n d complexity poses large analytical problems,
to w h i c h there have been a n u m b e r of responses. A m o n g the most
immediately relevant a n d " e x t r e m e " of these are what I w i l l for the
* Bernard McGrane, Beyond Anthropology (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1989) x. 3 the particularization of universalism, a claim that I w i l l flesh out in ref-
* Ibid., ix.
7
Ibid,, x.
* See Benjamin Nelson, "Civilizational Complexes and Intercivilizational
Encounters," in On the RoadstoModernity: Conscience, Science and Civilizations, ed
Toby E. Huff (Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 1981):80-106"
However, Nelson did not address the issue of the interpenetraiion of national
identities. James in his A German Identity has much to say about that as far as
Germany is concerned.
9
See my "Globality, Global Culture, and Images of World Order," in Social
Change and Modernity, ed. Hans Haferkamp and Neil Smelser (Berkeley: Uni-
versity of California Press, 1991). Also see Roland Robertson and Frank Lechner,
"Modernization, Globalization and the Problem of Culture in World-Systems.
Theory," Theory, Culture & Society, 2, 3 (1985):103-18.
72
S O C I A L T H E O R Y , C U L T U R A L RELATIVITY
sake of convenience call relativism, on the one hand, and worldism, on
the other. Relativism — w h i c h term covers a multitude of " s i n s , "
i n c l u d i n g postmodernism as an ideology of the intelligentsia and
" t h e n e w p r a g m a t i s m " — involves, for the most part, refusal to make
any general, " u n i v e r s a l i z i n g " sense of the problems posed b y sharp
discontinuities between different forms of collective a n d i n d i v i d u a l
l i f e . In. the fashionable phrases, this perspective is anti-founda-
10
tional or anti-totalistic; a n d one of its offshoots is the v i e w that
talking about culture — certainly i n global perspective — almost
inevitably involves participation i n a game of free-wheeling cultural
politics, i n w h i c h culture is regarded as being inextricably b o u n d - u p
w i t h " p o w e r " and "resistance" (or "liberation"). W o r l d i s m is, i n con-
trast, foundational. It is based u p o n the c l a i m that it is possible a n d ,
indeed, desirable to grasp the-world as a whole .analytically; to s u c h
an extent that virtually everything of socioculturel or political interest
w h i c h occurs a r o u n d the globe — Including identity presentation —
can be explained, or at least interpreted i n reference to, the dynamics
of the entire " w o r l d - s y s t e m . . " H o w e v e r , that does not preclude ana-
l y z i n g the formation or representation of identity i n terms of cultural
politics; for m a n y of those w h o emphasize culture as. a " p r i v i l e g e d
area" at the present time make diffuse, h i g h l y rhetorical claims as to
its g r o u n d i n g i n a world-systemic, economic realm.
M y o w n argument w i t h respect to these matters involves the at-
tempt to preserve both direct attention to particularity and difference,
on the one h a n d , a n d to universality and homogeneity, on the other.
It rests largely on the thesis that w e are, i n the late-twentieth century,
witnesses to — a n d participants i n — a massive, twofold process
Involving the interpénétration of the universalization of particularism and
erence to the three quotations, w i t h w h i c h began m y discussion.
Speaking specifically of recent nationalism — w h i c h is, i n a n u m -
ber of respects, paradigmatic of contemporary particularism —
See Zygmunt Baurnan, "Is There a Postmodern Sociology?" Theory, Culture
101
& Society, 5, 2/3 (1988)217-38.
11
A major example is Fredric Jameson. See in particular his Third-World
Literature in the Era of the Multinational Corporation," Social Text (Fall, 1986):65-
88 Also see Scott Lash and John Urry, The End of Organized Capitalism .(Madison:
University of Wisconsin Press, 1987) and David Harvey, The Condition ofPoslmod-
emity (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989).
73
 CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM
Wallerstein insists, i n m y v i e w very correctly, o n the simultaneity of
particularism a n d universaEsm. H o w e v e r , I do not think that he goes
far e n o u g h i n addressing the issue of their direct interpénétration, a
1
shortfall w h i c h can be largely attributed to Wallerstein's adamance i n
g r o u n d i n g the relationship between them i n "the genius and the con-
tradiction of capitalist c i v i l i z a t i o n . " While I think there is m u c h to
12
the v i e w that capitalism amplifies a n d is bound-up w i t h "the ambig-
uous expression of the d e m a n d both for assimilation into the u n i -
versal .and f o r . , . . adhering to the particular," I do not agree w i t h the
implication that the problematic of the interplay between the par-
ticular .and the universal is unique to capitalism. Indeed, I w o u l d
claim that the differential spread of capitalism can partly be ex-
plained, in terms of its accommodation to the historical " w o r k i n g o u t " of
that problematic. N o r d o I agree w i t h the argument that we can, i n
an explanatory sense, trace the contemporary connection between the
t w o dispositions directly to late-twentieth century capitalism (in-
whatever w a y that m a y be defined). Rather, I w o u l d argue that the
consumerist global capitalism of our time is w r a p p e d into the i n -
creasingly thematized particular-universal relationship i n terms of the
connection between globewide, universalistic s u p p l y and local, par-
ticularistic demand. The contemporary market thus involves the
increasing interpénétration of culture and economy: w h i c h is not the
same as arguing, as Fredric Jameson tends to do, that the production
of culture is directed by the " l o g i c " of " l a t e " c a p i t a l i s m . M o r e spe-
13
Wallerstein, 167. Wallerstein also argues in the same passage that "capi-
talist civilization . . . as it hurtles towards its undoing .... becomes in the interim
stronger and stronger." This is undoubtedly both a more sophisticated and a
"safer" point of view than that of another prominent advocate of world-systems
analysis, namely, Christopher Chase-Dunn, who had the misfortune to have the
following statement published in late 1989: "The revolutions In the Soviet Union
and the People's Republic of China have increased our collective knowledge
about how to build socialism despite their only partial successes and their
obvious failures. Their existence widens the space available for other experiments
with socialism" (Global Formation: Structures of the World-Economy, Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1989) 342. The difference between Wallerstein and Chase-Dunn is
important in that it illustrates the contrast between sophisticated and simplistic
forms of "world-systems analysis," Whereas the apparent collapse of communis-
tic socialism in 1989 must surely come as a great disappointment to Utopian
members of that school of thought, there is nothing about 1989 which should
embarrass, "true Wallersteinians," In, fact there is a crucial sense in, which it could
be said, that Wallerstein predicted the collapse of in-ene-country "socialism."
13
Fredric Jameson, "Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capital-
74
SOCIAL T H E O R Y , C U L T U R A L RELATIVITY
cifically, the contemporary capitalist creation of consumers frequently
involves the tailoring of products to increasingly specialized regional,
societal, ethnic, class and gender markets — so-called " m i c r o -
marketing."
Bourricaud, although less specific i n the sense of not indicating a
" d r i v i n g m e c h a n i s m , " comes closer to the mark i n suggesting that
there has emerged a globewide circumstance — i n v o l v i n g what I call
the compression of the w o r l d — w h i c h increasingly constrains m u l t i -
tudes of groups a n d Individuals to face each, other i n what he calls
an "open, ensemble of interlocutors a n d partners." This is what gives
rise to the issue of " u n i v e r s a l i z a t i o n " — and also accentuates the issue
of particularization. Bourricaud draws attention to a critical issue
w h i c h must surely lie at the center of any discussion of globalization
a n d culture — namely, the ideational a n d pragmatic aspects of inter-
action and communication between collective a n d i n d i v i d u a l actors
on the global scene. This is an aspect of global "reality construction"
w h i c h has been grossly neglected. H o w e v e r , B o u r r i c a u d does not go
far enough. M i s s i n g from, his formulation, is concern w i t h the terms i n
w h i c h interaction between different particularisms may occur. To h i m
the issue of universalization is apparently a more-or-less purely con-
tingent matter arising f r o m the p r o b l e m of " h o w to get a l o n g " i n a
compressed w o r l d and thus has little or no cultural autonomy —
although, i n a l l fairness, it should be said that 'Bourricaud is m a i n l y
trying to move us a w a y f r o m the purely logical or ideal solutions to
the p r o b l e m of w o r l d order w h i c h some of the more philosoph-
ically-minded anthropologists and sociologists have offered i n recent
years i n the face of sharp cultural discontinuities, i n particular Louis
Dumont. 14
I a m emphasizing t w o m a i n points w i t h respect to the interesting
w a y s i n w h i c h Wallerstein and Bourricaud have raised the universal-
ism-particularism issue. First, I am arguing that the latter is a basic
feature of the h u m a n condition, which, was given substantial and
extremely consequential historical thematization w i t h the rise of the
ism," New left Review, 146 i(1984):53-92. For a neoMarxist, or "Postmarxist," view
which gives more autonomy to culture, see Lash and Urry.
14
Louis Dumont, Essais Sur L'lndividtialisme (Paris:, Editions du Seuil, 1983).
This, however, is not 'intended as a pejorative comment on Dumont's pioneering
work on what he calls, in a very abstract sense, the major civilizatlonal ideologies.
75
 CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM
great religiocultural traditions, d u r i n g what K a r l Jaspers called the
A x i a l P e r i o d . Those traditions were, i n large part, developed pre-
15
cisely a r o u n d w h a t has come to be called the universalism-
particularism theme and their significance i n that regard has contin-
u e d into our time. A major example of great contemporary relevance
has to do w i t h the w a y i n w h i c h Japan acquired the substantive
theme of universality through its encounters w i t h and modifications,
along nativistfcj lines, of Confucianism a n d M a h a y a n a B u d d h i s m .
Japan's crystallization of a f o r m of "universalistic p a r t i c u l a r i s m "
since its first encounter w i t h C h i n a has, i n fact, resulted i n its acquir-
i n g paradigmatic, global significance w i t h respect to the h a n d l i n g of
the universalism-particularism issue. Specifically, its paradigmatic
status is inherent i n its very l o n g a n d successful history of selective
incorporation an d syncretization of ideas f r o m other cultures i n such
1
a w a y as to particularize the universal a n d , so to say, return the
product of that process to the w o r l d as a uniquely Japanese contribu-.
tion to the u n i v e r s a l .
16
• • Second, I a m jarguing that i n more recent w o r l d history the u n i -
versalism-particularism issue has come to constitute something like
a global-cultural form, a major axis of the structuration of the w o r l d -
as-a-whole. Thus rather than s i m p l y v i e w i n g the theme of univer-
salism as h a v i n g to do w i t h principles w h i c h can a n d s h o u l d be
applied to all and that of particularism as referring to that w h i c h can
and should be applied only " l o c a l l y , " I suggest that the t w o have
become tied together as part of a globewide cultural nexus — united
i n terms of the universality of the experience a n d , increasingly, the
expectation 0/particularity, o n the one hand, and the experience and,
increasingly, the expectation of universality, on the other. The lat- 17
ter — the particularization of universalism — involves the idea of the
universal being given global-human conciseness; while the former —
15
Jaspers, The Origin and Goal of History (New Haven: Yale University
K a r I
Press, 1953).
M important contribution to this aspect of Japanese identity see David
16 F o r
Pollock, The Fracture of Meaning: Japan's Synthesis of China from the Eighth through
the Eighteenth Centuries (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986).
M
See Roland Robertson, "Globalization Theory and Civilization Analysis "
Comparative Civilizations Review, 17 (Fall 1987):20-30 and "Mapping the Global
Condition: Globalization as the Central Concept," Theory, Culture & Society 7 2/3
(19901:15-30. ' ' '
76
SOCIAL THEORY, C U L T U R A L R E L A T I V I T Y
the universalization of particularism — involves the extensive diffusion
of the idea that there is virtually no limit to particularity, to uniqueness,
and thus also to difference and otherness. (One aspect of the latter
tendency is conveyed by Jean Baudrillard's aphorism concerning our
present condition: "It is never too late to revive your origins.") 18
I suggest that along these lines w e may best consider contemporary
globalization i n its most general sense as a f o r m of institutionaliza-
tion of the two-fold process i n v o l v i n g the universalization of par-
ticularism a n d the particularization of universalism. Resistance to con-
temporary globalization — as, for example, some consider to be i n -
v o l v e d o n the more radical side of the general Islamic movement —
w o u l d thus be regarded as opposition not merely to the w o r l d as
one, homogenized system b u t also — a n d , 1 believe, more relevantly
— to the conception of the w o r l d as a series of culturally equal, rela-
tivized, entities or w a y s of life. The first aspect c o u l d w e l l be regard-
e d as a f o r m of anti-modernity, w h i l e the second c o u l d fruitfully be
seen as a f o r m of anti-postmodernity. P u t another w a y , it is around
the universalism-particularism, axis of globalization that the discon-
tents of globally manifest themselves i n reference to n e w , globalized
variations o n the oldish themes of Gesellschaft and Gemeinschaft, The
Gemeinschaft-GcseUschaft theme has constituted a primary focus for the
critique of modernity (most directly i n G e r m a n y ) . It is n o w increas-
i n g l y interwoven w i t h the discourse of globality i n the sense that it
has been " u p g r a d e d " so as to refer to the relationship between the
particular a n d the c o m m u n a l , on the one hand, and the universal and
the impersonal, o n the other. This issue is closely related to what
A r j u n A p p a d u r a i calls " t h e tension between cultural homogenization
and cultural heterogenization" a n d w h i c h he regards as " t h e central
problem of today's global interactions.
A p p a d u r a i (1990:17) argues that " t h e central feature of global cul-
ture today is the politics of the m u t u a l effort of sameness and differ-
ence to cannibalize one another and thus to proclaim their successful
hijacking of the t w i n Enlightenment ideas of the triumphantly u n i -
versal a n d the resiliently p a r t i c u l a r . " This evocative interpretation
20
Jean Baudrillard, America (London: Verso, 1988) 41.
1 8
19
Arjun Appadurai, "Disjunciure and Difference in the Global Cultural
Economy," Public Culture, 2 (Spring 1990):5.
Ibid.,, 17.
20
77

CULTURE,: GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM
is, it should, be noted, connected b y Appadurai to his suggestion that
" t h e theory of global c u l t u r a l interactions . , . w i l l have to move into
something like à h u m a n version of the theory that some scientists are
calling 'chaos' theory,," W h i l e this cannot be the place for a n ade-
21
quate discussion of this complex issue, it s h o u l d be said that A p -
padurai's advocacy of a c t a - t h e o r e t i c approach to global culture -
w h i c h he sees more specifically i n terms of a " d i s j u n c t i v e " series of
" s c a p e s " (ethnoscapes, technoscapes, finanscapes, mediascapes, a n d
ideoscapes) — cjlearly involves denial of the idea of the global institu-
tionalization of the relationship between universalized particularism
and, particularized universallsm.
W h i l e not rejecting the fruitfulness of A p p a d u r a i ' s ideas about
there being empirically disjunctive relationships between different
cultural " s c a p e s " at the global level, I d o insist u p o n the general,
structuring significance of the particular-universal connection — its
crystallization as the elemental f o r m of " g l o b a l l i f e . " Some of m y dif-
ferences-with A p p a d u r a i m a y arise f r o m his implication that the
Enlightenment ideas of universalism a n d particularism were neces-
sarily incongruent. M y o w n interpretation is that they were basically
complementary. A s A n t h o n y Smith has written, of the late eighteenth
century, '"{A)t 'the root of the 'national i d e a l ' is a certain v i s i o n of the
w o r l d . — A c c o r d i n g to this v i s i o n mankind, is 'really' a n d 'naturally'
d i v i d e d into d i s t i n c t . , . . nations. Each nation . . . has its peculiar con-
tribution to make to the w h o l e , the family of n a t i o n s . " O r , to put
22
it more incisively, the idea of nationalism (or particularism) develops
only in, tandem w i t h internationalism.
Finally, as f a r as fleshing-out i n relation to m y introductory quota-
tions is concerned, the citation f r o m Geertz, reminds us strongly of
the fact that globalization, is not s i m p l y a matter of societies, regions
and civilizations being squeezed together in, various problematic
w a y s but also of such occurring w i t h increasing intensity inside n a -
tionally constituted societies. N o w a d a y s , to quote .further f r o m
21
Ibid.,, 20.
2 1
Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism in the Twentieth Century (New York: New
York University Press, 1979) 2. See also Hans Kohn, "Nationalism and Interna-
tionalism," in. History and ike. Idea of Mankind, ed. W. Warren Wagar (Albuquer-
que: University of New Mexico Press, 1971). On a more recent period see Rupert
Emerson, Self-Determinalion Revisited in the Era of'Decolonization (Harvard: Center
for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1964).
78
S O C I A L T H E O R Y , C U L T U R A L RELATIVITY
Geertz, "foreignness does not start at the water's edge but at the
skin's '.., the wogs begin long before Calais.," ' P u b l i s h e d i n 198-6,
23
Geertz's suggestions have acquired a poignant relevance to current
prognoses about Eastern Europe a n d the Soviet U n i o n - for m those
areas the problems of o l d ethnic identity are being played-out w i t h i n
•the context of increasing global thematization, of ethnicity-wiftm-
humankind.
In a n y case, Geertz's observations press u s , infer re, to take seri-
ously into account the position of individuals in the globalization pro-
cess' (I return briefly to the issues of multiculturality and polyethnic-
ity raised b y Geertz at a later point.) There has been a m a r k e d ten-
dency i n many discussions of the world-system, w o r l d society, or
whatever, to ignore individuals - more precisely, the contemporary'
construction of i n d i v i d u a l i s m - for the apparent reason that glob-
alization of alleged necessity refers to very large scale matters, i n con-
trast to the "small-scale" status of individuals, This b o w i n the direc-
tion of the textbook w i s d o m w h i c h distinguishes microsociological
f r o m macrosociological approaches i n terms of naive conceptions of
scale a n d complexity is, 1 believe, misplaced. Thus I have i n m y own,
w o r k insisted, that individuals are as m u c h a part of the globalization
process as any other basic category of social-theoretical discourse. To
be more specific, I have argued that there are, analytically speaking,
four elemental points of reference for any discussion of contemporary
globalization - namely, national societies, individuals, the world system
of societies (international relations) a n d humankind. ' M y general
2
argument i n m a k i n g this set of distinctions is that globalization
increasingly involves thematization of these four elements of the
global-human condition (rather than the world-system). (In that per-
spective it m a y be seen, that there are t w o major particularistic ele-
ments i n the w o r l d as a w h o l e - individuals a n d societies - and
t w o major universalistlc elements: the system of societies, o n the one
h a n d , a n d h u m a n k i n d , the species aspect, on, the other.) A n y g i v e n
element is constrained b y the other three. F o r example, individuals as
23 Geertz 112
» This model, was first introduced, along somewhat different lines, in Roland
Robertson and JoAr.r. Chirfco, "Humanity, 9^^™.^™^*™% S
gious Resurgence: A Theoretical Exploration," Sociological Analysis, 46 (Fall,
1985):219-42,
79

CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM
such are increasingly constrained by being members of societies,
members of an increasingly thematized and threatened h u m a n spe-
cies a n d greatly affected by the vicissitudes of international relations.
Thus late-twentieth century globalization involves the institutionali-
zation of both the universalization of particularism and the partic-
ularization of universalism and can be more specifically indicated as
consisting i n the interpenetrating processes of societalization, i n d i -
v i d u a l i z a t i o n , the consolidation of the international system of soci-
eties, a n d the concrétisation of the sense of h u m a n k i n d . 25
R e t u r n i n g directly to 'the i n d i v i d u a l , m y p r i m a r y claim is that glob-
alization has i n v o l v e d and continues to involve the institutionalized
construction of the i n d i v i d u a l . E v e n more specifically, w e must recog-
nize that world-political culture has led to a globewide institution-
alization of "the life c o u r s e " — w h i c h has, John M e y e r maintains,
t w o dimensions: "aspects of the person that enter into rationalized
social organization" a n d "the public celebration o f . . . the 'private' or
subjective i n d i v i d u a l " » M u c h of that has been and continues to
be mediated by state structures, but international nongovernmental
organizations have also increasingly mediated and promoted i n d i v i d -
ualism, i n the areas of education, h u m a n rights, the rights of w o m e n ,
health, and so on. In s u m , the globewide encouragement of i n d i v i d -
ualism i n association w i t h increasing polyethnicity and multicultural-
ity — themselves encouraged by large migrations and " d i a s p o r a -
t i o n s " — has been crucial i n the move towards the circumstance of
"foreignness" described so w e l l by Geertz. A t the same time w h a t
M e y e r calls the celebration of subjective identity relative to involve-
ment i n "rationalized social organization" has p l a y e d a major part i n
the virtually globewide establishment of various " m i n o r i t y " forms of
personal a n d collective identification — among w h i c h gender has
been of particular significance.
A t the conference w h i c h has f o r m e d the basis for the present
v o l u m e , a n d thus also of this paper, an important question was
raised as to the place of w o m e n i n m y conception of globality a n d
25
Elsewhere I have sketched a model of distinct phases of globalization in
modem world history. See Robertson, "Mapping the Global Condition."
26
I o l m
- Meyer, "Self and the Life Course: Institutionalization and Its
w
Effects," in Institutional Structure: Constituting State, Society and the Individual ed.
George Thomas et al. (Beverly Hills, California: Sage):243-1.
80
S O C I A L T H E O R Y , C U L T U R A L RELATIVITY
globalization. W h i l e I cannot present here anything resembling an
appropriate reaction to that query, t w o sets of short reflections are
possible. First, i n empirical terms, it should be said that m y o w n
experience of the female response to the discourse of globalization is
that w o m e n take to it as eagerly as m e n , particularly w i t h respect to
the humankind component of m y m o d e l — the latter tendency h a v i n g
been confirmed to me by others, i n c l u d i n g female teachers w o r k i n g
i n the field of international (or global) studies. O n the other hand, it
can be reasonably argued that that " f a c t " s h o u l d not be regarded
uncritically.. Is not the assignment of w o m e n to the most " f a m i l i a l "
aspect of the globalization process a macroreplication of the his-
torically subordinate status of w o m e n inside societies a n d c o m m u -
nities? M y answer to that is ambiguous — for w h o can tell where the
m a x i m u m leverage is going to be as far as the patterning of the
world-as-a-whole is concerned? Certainly the entire question of
global ecology a n d the fate of h u m a n k i n d as a species w i l l be central
to the politics of the global-human condition, i n the c o m i n g decades.
It could be the case that concern w i t h h u m a n k i n d w i l l be " i n s t i t u t i o n -
a l i z e d " as " m e r e l y " a female issue; but yet it c o u l d , alternatively,
come to be a p o w e r f u l basis for feminism. The w a y s i n w h i c h w o m e n
participate in the discourse of globalization is obviously the most vital
factor. A t this stage w e do not have m u c h to inform us. There is,
most certainly, an " i n t e r n a t i o n a l " w o m e n ' s movement. There are also
signs of serious attempts to address directly the actual insertion of
w o m e n in. the globalization process, the recent book b y C y n t h i a
Enloe being an interesting example.. Enloe attempts to make " f e m i -
27
nist sense of international politics" b y d r a w i n g attention to the role
of women, i n the m a k i n g of the contemporary system of international
relations — as wives of male diplomats, as prostitutes for male m e m -
bers of a r m e d forces, as victims of sex-tourism, as instruments of
global advertising, a n d so on. Specifically, Enloe casts the w o m a n as
a "global victim."
Cynthia Enloe, Bananas, Beaches & Bases: Making Feminist Sense of Interna-
2 7
tional Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).
81
 CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM
Social Theory and Global Culture
There seems to be something of a consensus a m o n g those sociolo-
gists w h o have been d o i n g w o r k directly o n the global circumstance
that the m a i n traditions of social theory are inadequate to the task of
illuminating discussion of the w o r l d as a whole a n d the m a k i n g
thereof. Wallerstein has probably p u t the matter most sharply i n
arguing that " w o r l d - s y s t e m s analysis" is a protest against the received
'tradition of social science as a w h o l e . I have great sympathy w i t h
28
the general, if not the specific, thrust of that claim a n d I w i l l n o w
outline some of m y o w n m a i n v i e w s i n that respect, i n relation to the
substantive task at h a n d a n d m a i n l y i n reference to m y o w n " o f f i -
c i a l " discipline of sociology, w h i c h has played a significant role i n
the actual patterning of twentieth-century globalization; b u t w h i c h
has not, to p u t it m i l d l y , done m u c h i n its mainstream to focus ana-
lytically a n d interpretively on globalization as a n historical p h e n o m -
enon of increasingly salient contemporary significance. 29
There can be little doubt that sociology took its classical shape d u r -
i n g the declining years of the nineteenth century and the first quarter
of the present century i n p r i m a r y reference to what has come to be
called the p r o b l e m of modernity, on the one h a n d , and the mode of
operation of the nationally constituted society, on the other — w i t h
the society-individual problematic b e i n g central to both. I n such a
perspective there was little or no r o o m for the analysis of cultural dif-
ferences except i n terms of analytical contrasts between civilizations
and civilizational traditions; since it was w i d e l y assumed that the
m o d e r n f o r m of society was culturally homogenous or h a d to become
so i n order to achieve viability. O b v i o u s l y M a x Weber h a d no clear
sociological sense of, certainly n o l i k i n g for, what w e have come to
call a pluralistic society. In one w a y or another the leading classical
sociologists promoted the idea — if only implicitly — that what later
came to be called a central value system w a s a n essential feature of
M
Immanuel Wallerstein, "World-Systems Analysis," in Social Theory Today,
ed. Anthony Giddens and Jonathan H . Turner (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1987}:309.
2 9
Some of the following thoughts on and documentation with respect to this
subject are developed in my "After Nostalgia? Wilful Nostalgia and the Phases
of Globalization," in Theories of Modernity and Poslmodemitu, ed. Bryan S Turner
(London: Sage, 1990):45-61.
82
SOCIAL T H E O R Y , C U L T U R A L RELATIVITY
viable national societies a n d that i n external terms each society
s h o u l d develop a sense of its o w n collective identity. In that respect
some sociologists of that period became very influential outside
Western E u r o p e .
Social-scientific ideas — notably those of the E n g l i s h utilitarians
and the French positivists — h a d , of course, been influential among
dominant, " l i b e r a l " elites i n n e w l y independent L a t i n A m e r i c a n soci-
eties d u r i n g the nineteenth century; but such turn-of-the-century
people as Dürkheim, Toennies, Spencer a n d M a x W e b e r h a d a partic-
ular' impact i n E u r o p e a n a n d A s i a n countries In terms of their ideas
concerning such matters as culture a n d national identity, as w e l l as
those relating to the issue of what f o r m a m o d e r n national society
s h o u l d take. F o r example Spencer — whose w o r k w a s very influ-
ential i n late-nineteenth century Japan a n d C h i n a — explicitly a d -
vised the M e i j i political elite to establish a f i r m tradition-based
Japanese identity, D u r k h e i m ' s ideas o n the theme of c i v i l religion
were influential i n the establishment of the new T u r k i s h republic i n
the 1920s, w h i l e the G e r m a n theme of Gemeinschaft v . Gesellschaft (or
culture v . civilization) was w i d e l y manipulated i n East A s i a a n d else-
where. (The M e i j i elite decided quite early to erect a nationally
organized c o m m u n i t y — to try to have both Gemeinschaft and Gesell-
schaft.)
T h u s even t h o u g h it is conventional to think of Western social sci-
ence as h a v i n g developed more or less solely i n the West itself (with
the partial exception of its M a r x i a n component), the fact of the matter
is that i n a great array of different juxtapositions it f o u n d its w a y into
the life-courses of a large n u m b e r of non-Western societies w e l l
before the peaking of Western social-scientific theories of societal
modernization i n the late 1950s a n d early 1960s (in relation to the
emergence of the T h i r d W o r l d as a global presence). B y the e n d of
the first quarter of the twentieth century Western social science h a d
become a " c u l t u r a l resource" i n a n u m b e r of global regions — most
notably i n East A s i a , w h e r e there w a s a long-standing cultural ten-
dency to juxtapose superficially contradictory sets of ideas i n syn-
cretic f o r m . Thus w h i l e Western social scientists — most outstanding-
ly M a x W e b e r — were busy comparing East a n d West as an analy tical
exercise (with strong political and ideological overtones), the objects
of the comparison (more accurately, intellectual and political elites)
were busy sifting a n d i m p l e m e n t i n g packages of Western ideas for
83
 CULTURE; GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM
v e r y concrete political, economic a n d cultural reasons. 30
The irony i n this is, of course, that i n spite of the diffusion of their
ideas to the v e r y societies w h i c h they were contrasting w i t h the West
there was exceedingly little sense among the leading sociologists of
the classical period that a n increasing n u m b e r of societies around the
w o r l d were in v a r y i n g degrees subject — often very w i l l i n g l y — to
their ideas concerning the functioning a n d operation of m o d e r n ,
nationally constituted societies; although those ideas were invariably
recast f o r local purposes. In. other words they h a d little sense of the
possibility of national societies being subject.to generalized, external
expectations as to h o w societies c o u l d establish and maintain viability
— that they themselves were actually central to the formation of an
increasingly global sense of h o w a society s h o u l d be constructed.
They were, i n a w o r d , insensitive to what has come to be called glob-
alization — particularly cultural aspects thereof.
To be sure, Dürkheim became increasingly conscious of w h a t he
called a n "international l i f e " to w h i c h i n d i v i d u a l societies became i n -
creasingly subject and w a s actually engaged i n w o r k on the more-or-
less logical — rather than the contingent-sociological — question of
how culturally different societies c o u l d f o r m a n ensemble of societies
i n moral terms,;For the most part, however, the dominant idea i n the
foundational period of sociology w a s — insofar as international or
global matters were attended to at all — that societies were engaged
i n something like a D a r w i n i a n struggle, a. v i e w w h i c h w a s to be
found particularly i n those quite numerous societies w h i c h w e r e d i -
rectly influenced b y so-called Social Darwinism, a n d , less explicitly, i n
the orbits in w h i c h M a x W e b e r w a s particularly influential. M y m a i n
point here is. thus that not merely has sociology suffered greatly from
its inattention to extra-societal issues but that it still remains remarkably
ill-equipped to deal w i t h inter-societal let alone global matters, although
clearly considerable effort is currently being exerted i n order to rectify
that circumstance. A s I have said, one of its major liabilities i n this
regard has been its general acceptance of something like a dominant
ideology or common culture thesis at the level of nationally constituted
societies. A n d it is to that specific issue w h i c h I n o w turn.
3 0
For an instructive discussion of the Japanese reception of Max Weber's
ideas in Japan, see' Takeshi Ishida, Japanese Political. Culture (New Brunswick, New
Jersey: Transaction Books, 1983) 51-68. More generally see ibid., 69-86.
84
SOCIAL T H E O R Y , C U L T U R A L RELATIVITY
A s Margaret A r c h e r has argued, sociological discussion of cultural
phenomena has been plagued by " t h e m y t h of cultural integration,"
according to w h i c h all societies that are considered to be viable are
normatively integrated, with, culture p e r f o r m i n g the major function
i n that r e g a r d . A r c h e r ' s p r i m a r y concern is to distinguish between
31
culture as an objective, ideational phenomenon — possessing con-
siderable autonomy i n terms of its o w n inner " l o g i c " (but not neces-
sarily consistency) — f r o m agents w h o , i n specific circumstances,
seek to comprehend, invoke, manipulate a n d act i n reference to sys-
tems, of ideas. Those analysts w h o consider culture to be almost ex-
clusively of significance i n terms of its capacity to constrain action
(and. social structure) are classified b y A r c h e r as " d o w n w a r d con-
flationists." The basic m y t h of cultural integration derives mainly
f r o m the latter, most particularly f r o m anthropological functionalists
of the 1930s, a n d was incorporated, i n Archer's v i e w , into sociolog-
ical structural-functionalism i n the 1940s a n d 1950s.
O n the other h a n d , w e have also, according to A r c h e r , witnessed
more recently another f o r m of the m y t h of cultural integration, aris-
ing f r o m M a r x i s t a n d neoMarxist schools of thought. Deeply con-
cerned about the problem of the persistence of capitalism, a consid-
erable n u m b e r of M a r x i a n social scientists have p r o d u c e d their o w n
versions of " t h e m y t h . " A r c h e r classifies this as " u p w a r d confla-
3 2
t i o n i s m , " on. the grounds that i n contrast to d o w n w a r d conflation it
involves the notion of culture d e r i v i n g f r o m a n d being i m p o s e d by
one set of agents upon, other members of a collectivity a n d pays little
attention to the idea of culture having some k i n d of inner logic. In
both d o w n w a r d a n d u p w a r d conflation the upshot is, to a l l intents
.and purposes, the same, i n spite of differing conceptions of h o w the
result is achieved. C u l t u r e is to be considered p r i m a r i l y as a con-
straint.
A r c h e r also deals with, a third approach, w h i c h involves the refusal
or analytical inability to distinguish between culture a n d action (or
between culture and. social structure). " C e n t r a l c o n f l a t i o n i s m " — of
3 1
Margaret Archer, Culture and Agency: The Place of Culture in Social Theory
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988),
S i
For discussion see; Nicholas Abercrombie. Stephen Hill and Bryan S.
Turner, The Dominant Ideology Thesis (London: Allen and Unwin, 1980). Also see
Dominant Ideologies, ed. Abercrombie, Hill and Turner (London: Unwin Hyman,
1990).
85
 C U L T U R E , G L O B A L I Z A T I O N A N D THE W O R L D - S Y S T E M
w h i c h A n t h o n y G i d d e n s ' structuration theory is p r o v i d e d as a major
example — is actually the target of m u c h of A r c h e r ' s harshest crit-
icism, since it leaves r o o m neither for action i n relative independence
of culture nor for the objective, ideational status of the latter. I n any
1
case, m y p r i m a r y reason for rehearsing the central thrust of Archer's
argument is that she helps clear the w a y for a definite sociological
m o v e away f r o m the o l d culture-as-integrating approach. I n par-
ticular, she d r a w s attention to the issue of the different ways i n
w h i c h ideational patterns may be interpreted, e m p l o y e d , reconstitut-
ed and expanded u n d e r a variety of situational circumstances. O n the
other h a n d , there are, most certainly, weaknesses i n A r c h e r ' s Culture
and Agency. Probably the most significant is her rationalistic bias,
w h i c h precludes her f r o m attending to expressive m e a n i n g and to
morality. She also sets-up an implausible distinction between social
•and cultural, action and does not attend directly to interaction be-
tween a n d interpénétration, of societal cultures.
It w o u l d seem that the m y t h of cultural integration was, indeed,
closely b o u n d to the perception of the national society as a h o m o -
genized entity a n d thus it needs to be periodized just as m u c h as
does the idea of the culturally homogenous, state-governed society.
In the latter respect I can d o no better than invoke W i l l i a m M c N e i l l ,
w h o has p r o v i d e d three reasons for "the prevalence of polyethnicity
i n civilized societies before 1750 . . . (C)onquest, disease, a n d trade all
w o r k e d i n that direction, most pronouncedly i n the M i d d l e East, a n d
somewhat less forcefully towards the extremities of the Eurasian
ecumene." I n the latter "ethnic diversity d i m i n i s h e d , though even i n
remote offshore islands, like medieval Japan, .and Britain, aliens
p l a y e d significant roles as bearers of special s k i l l s , " 33
McNeill
argues generally that the idea of an ethnically homogenous society is
fundamentally " b a r b a r i c . " In any case, w i t h the French R e v o l u t i o n
and the n e w conception of citizens constituting a single nation a n d
possessing rights and duties to participate i n public life, t r i u m p h e d
nationalism as, to quote M c N e i l l again, "the central, reality of m o d e r n
times.." T h e major issue i n the present context is whether a n d i n
34
what w a y s w e can develop modes of understanding of the m o d e r n
3 3
William H . McNeill, Pohethniciiy and National Unity in World History
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985) 33.
Ibid., 34.
3 4
86
SOCIAL. T H E O R Y , C U L T U R A L RELATIVITY
circumstances of polyethnicity a n d multiculturality, on the one hand,
a n d globality, o n the other w h i c h w i l l not involve repetition of main-
stream sociology's enchantment w i t h the national society.
Let m e emphasize in. this connection that I a m not arguing that the
nationally constituted society is about to whither away. To the con-
trary it is being r e v a m p e d i n various parts of the w o r l d as the multi-
cultural society, w h i l e " o l d E u r o p e a n " and other nationalisms have
reappeared — but i n n e w global circumstances — i n the context of
the: w o r l d - p o l i t i c a l ferment of 1989. I have, i n any case, insisted, that
"sQcietalism" — the commitment to the idea of the national society
— is a crucial ingredient of the contemporary f o r m of globalization
(the rendering of the w o r l d as a single place). Rather m y point is
35
that w e s h o u l d not carry into the study of globalization the k i n d of
v i e w of culture w h i c h w e inherit from, the conventional analysis of
the national society. M u c h of our difficulty i n t h i n k i n g about culture
at the global level stems f r o m our experience in. the latter respect —
specifically conceiving of societies as unitary and larger units, i n c l u d -
i n g the world-as-a-whole, as lacking i n such. T o a significant ex-
36.
tent the unitary v i e w of the nationally-constituted society is an aspect
of global culture.
A p a r t f r o m limitations stemming f r o m the derivation of the notion
of culture f r o m a particularly unitary notion of society (one w h i c h
was also projected by anthropologists onto p r i m a l societies d u r i n g
the crucial take-off phase of recent globalization, 1880-1925), the
other m a i n p r o b l e m about t h i n k i n g of culture i n global terms derives
f r o m the fact that the dominant image of w h a t is often called global
interdependence has been centered on the global, economy — although
the.self-serving idea of "the global v i l l a g e , " p r o m o t e d b y television,
commentators remains a close a n d also misleading contender, as does
" p l a n e t earth."
35
See also John W. Meyer, "The World Polity and the Authority of the
Nation-State," in Studies of the Modern World-System, ed. Albert Bergesen (New
York: Academic Press; 1980}:109-37; and Frank J. Lechner, "Cultural Aspects of
the Modem World-System," in Religious Politics in Global and Comparative Perspec-
tive, ed. William H . Swatos, Jr. (New York: Greenwood Press, 1989):ll-28.
For an important critique of the unitary conception of society in a socio-
3 6
logically-based world-historical frame of reference, see Michael. Mann, The Sources
of Social Power: Volume .', A History of Power from the Beginning to A.D. 1760
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).
87
 CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM
I
The m a i n difficulty w i t h the primarily-economic attitude parallels
the p r o b l e m arising from, o u r having been h e l d i n thrall b y the idea
of the homogenous national society. Because there has, indeed,
occurred a v e r y r a p i d crystallization of a global economy in relatively
recent times we are tempted into t h i n k i n g that that is what defines or
determines globalization i n general. S u c h a v i e w , unfortunately, over-
looks a n u m b e r of historical developments w h i c h — however loosely
— are b o u n d u p w i t h the notion of global culture. M o r e o v e r concen-
tration almost exclusively on the global economy exacerbates the ten-
dency to think that w e can only conceive of global culture along the
axis of Western hegemony a n d non-Western cultural resistance.
W h i l e it- w o u l d be extremely foolish to reject the relevance of that
perspective i t has a n u m b e r of serious liabilities.
A s is well k n o w n , there has recently been considerable expansion
of the rhetoric of globality, globalization, internationalization, and so
o n . In fact there appears to have crystallized across the w o r l d a rela-
tively autonomous m o d e of discourse concerning such themes. P u t
another way, "globe t a l k " — the discourse of globality — has be-
come relatively autonomous, although its contents a n d the interests
that sustain them vary considerably f r o m society to society a n d also
within societies. The discourse of globality is thus a vital component
of contemporary global culture. It consists largely i n the shifting a n d
contested terms i n w h i c h the world-as-a-whole is " d e f i n e d . " T o p u t
it more specifically, images of w o r l d order (and disorder) — i n c l u d -
i n g interpretations of a n d assertions concerning the past, present a n d
future of particular societies, civilizations, ethnic groups and regions
— are at the center of global culture.
A l o n g such lines w e can readily conceive of global culture as hav-
i n g a very l o n g history. " T h e idea of h u m a n k i n d " is at least as o l d as
Jaspers' A x i a l A g e , i n w h i c h the major w o r l d religions a n d meta-
physical doctrines arose, many centuries before the rise of national
communities or societies. Throughout that l o n g p e r i o d civiliza-
37
tions, empires a n d other entities have been almost continuously faced
w i t h the p r o b l e m of response to the w i d e r , increasingly compressed
and b y n o w global, context. The w a y s i n w h i c h such entities (in
38
37
See Wagar, ed.
- See; my "Globality, Global Culture and Images of World Order." Also- see
38
Harvey, Tue Condition ofPostmodemHy, 350-9, for a Marxist discussion of respons-
88
SOCIAL T H E O R Y , C U L T U R A L RELATIVITY
relatively recent history, national societies, i n particular) have at one
and the same time attempted to learn f r o m others a n d sustain a sense
of identity — or, alternatively, isolate themselves f r o m the pressures
of contact — also constitute a n important aspect of the creation of
global c u l t u r e . E v e n more specifically the cultures of particular
39
societies are, to different degrees, the result of their interactions w i t h
other societies i n the global system. In other w o r d s , national-societal
cultures have been differentially formed i n interpénétration w i t h sig-
nificant others. B y the same token, global culture itself is partly
40
created i n terms of specific interactions between a n d among national
societies.
The issue of "selective response" is thus particularly important i n
any attempt to grasp w h a t might be meant b y the term " g l o b a l c u l -
t u r e , " because it indicates the contemporary phenomenon of partic-
ular national societies becoming positive or negative paradigms as far
as involvement i n globalization is concerned. The global thematizaiion
of the Soviet-based peresiroika/glasnost motif has played a large part
i n this respect. It has brought into the forefront of global discourse
the p r o b l e m of the relationship between societal identity and partici-
pation i n the globalization process. A t the same time the global p o p -
ularity of the perestroika/glasnost motif reminds us that a l l societies-
have been under the -constraint to institutionalize a connection be-
tween inwardness and outwardness.
In combination w i t h m y discussion of the universalism-partic-
ularism issue I have indicated some of the more neglected aspects of
the analysis of global culture. M y general argument has been that
commitment to the idea of the culturally cohesive national society
has b l i n d e d us to the various w a y s i n w h i c h the w o r l d as a whole
has been increasingly " o r g a n i z e d " around sets -of shifting definitions
of the global circumstance. In fact it w o u l d not be too- m u c h to say
es to "time-space compression."
3 9
For an excellent study of what is called "selective receptiveness," see Erik
Cohen, "Thailand, Burma and Laos—an Outline of the Comparative Social
Dynamics of Three Theravada Buddhist Societies in the Modem Era," in Patterns
of Modernity, Volume II: Beyond the West, ed. S.N. Eisenstadt (New York: New
York University Press, 1987):192-216.
4 0
For a case study, see my "Japan and the USA: The Interpénétration of
National Identities and the Debate About Orientalism," in Dominant Ideologies, ed.
Abercrombie, Hill and Turner, 182-98.
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 CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM

that the idea of global culture is just as meaningful as the idea of

national-societal, or local, culture. 4. The National and the Universal:
C a n There Be Such a Thing
as W o r l d Culture?

IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN

THE VERY CONCEPT OF " C U L T U R E " POSES US WITH A GIGANTIC

paradox. O n the one hand, culture is by definition particularistic. C u l -
ture is the set of values or practices of some part smaller than some
w h o l e . This is true whether one is u s i n g culture i n the anthropo-
logical sense to mean, the values and/or the practices of one group as
opposed to any other group at the same level of discourse (French vs.
Italian, culture, proletarian vs. bourgeois culture, Christian vs. Islamic
culture, etc.), or whether one is u s i n g culture i n the belles-lettres
sense to mean the " h i g h e r " rather than the " b a s e r " values and/or
practices w i t h i n any g r o u p , a meaning w h i c h generally encompasses
culture as representation, culture as the production of art-forms. In 1

either usage, culture (or a culture) is what some persons feel or do,
unlike others w h o do not feel or do the same things.
But on the other h a n d , there can be no justification of cultural
values and/or practices other than b y ref erence to some presumably
u n i v e r s a l or universalis! criteria. Values are not good because m y
group holds them; practices are not good because m y group does

1
1 have elaborated on the distinction between these two usages of "culture"
in a previous paper, "Culture as the Ideological Battleground of the Modem.
World-System" in Mike Featherstone, ed. Global Culture. Nationalism, Globalization
and Modernity (London, Newbury Park and Delhi: Sage, 1990):31-56.

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 CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM
them. To argue the contrary w o u l d be hopelessly solipsistic a n d force
us either into an absolutely p a r a l y z i n g cultural relativism (since the
argument w o u l d h o l d equally for any other group's values and/or
practices) or into an absolutely murderous xenophobia (since no
other group's values and/or practices c o u l d be g o o d a n d therefore
could be tolerated).
f i n the more particularistic arena of art forms, w h i c h country does not
If I have chosen as the theme " t h e national and the u n i v e r s a l , " that
is, if I have chosen the national as m y prototype of the particular, it
is because, i n o u r m o d e m world-system, nationalism is the quintes-
sential (albeit not the only) particularism, the one w i t h the w i d e s t ap-
peal, the longest staying-power, the most political clout, a n d the
heaviest .armaments in its support.
M y query is, can there conceivably be such, a t h i n g as a world, c u l -
ture? This m a y seem an absurd question, given two facts. First, for
thousands of years n o w , some people at least have p u t forward ideas
w h i c h they have asserted to be universal values o r truths. A n d sec-
o n d l y , for some 200 years n o w , a n d even, more intensively for the
last 50 years, m a n y (even most) national governments as w e l l as
w o r l d institutions have asserted the validity and. even the enforce-
ability of such values or truths, as i n the discussion about h u m a n
rights, concerning w h i c h the U n i t e d Nations proclaimed i n 1948 a
Universal. Declaration.
If I insist that the paradox is gigantic, it is because it is not only a
logical paradox but .an historical paradox. The so-called nation-states,
o u r p r i m a r y cultural container (not o u r only cultural container by
any means,; b u t today our p r i m a r y one), are of course relatively
recent creations. A w o r l d consisting of these nation-states came into
existence e v e n partially only i n the sixteenth century. Such, a w o r l d
was theorized a n d became a, matter of w i d e s p r e a d consciousness
even later, o n l y in the nineteenth century. It became a n inescapably
universal p h e n o m e n o n later still, i n fact o n l y after 1945.
Side by side with the emergence of such nation-states, each w i t h
frontiers, each with, its o w n invented 'traditions, the w o r l d has been,
m o v i n g , so it is said, towards a w o r l d consciousnesses, a conscious-
ness of something called h u m a n i t y — a universal, persona b e y o n d
even that of the so-called w o r l d religions, w h i c h i n practice tended to
include inside their universe only those w h o shared the religion.
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THE NATIONAL A N D THE UNIVERSAL
A n d . to top off this d u a l track — the historical creation of the
particular nations side by side w i t h the historical creation of u n i v e r -
sal h u m a n i t y — w e f i n d a very curious anomaly. O v e r time, the
particular nation-states have come to resemble each other more a n d
more i n their' cultural forms. W h i c h state today does not have certain
standard political forms: a legislature, a constitution, a bureaucracy,
trade unions, a national currency, a school system? F e w indeed! E v e n
have its songs, its dances, its plays, its museums, its paintings, a n d
today its skyscrapers? A n d are not the social structures that guaran-
tee these art forms increasingly similar? It is almost as though the
more intense the nationalist fervor i n the w o r l d , the more identical
seem the expressions of this nationalism. Indeed, one of the major na-
tionalist demands is always, is it not?, the obtaining of some f o r m
that more privileged countries already have.
This is i n part, no doubt, the result of cultural diffusion. The means
of. transport a n d c o m m u n i c a t i o n at our disposition are ever better.
W e all k n o w more about what are for us the far corners of our earth
than d i d previous generations. But it should also lead us to reflect on
w h a t pressures exist such that we are asserting our cultural differenc-
es a n d exclusions i n such clone-like fashion?
Let us deal w i t h t w o opposite modes of explaining this phenome-
n o n that have been put f o r w a r d repetitively. O n e is the thesis of the
linear tendency towards one w o r l d . O r i g i n a l l y , it is argued, the globe
contained a very large n u m b e r of distinct and distinctive groups.
O v e r time, little by little, the scope of activity has expanded, the
groups have merged, a n d bit b y bit, w i t h the aid of science a n d tech-
nology, w e .are arriving at one w o r l d — one political w o r l d , one eco-
nomic w o r l d , one cultural w o r l d . W e are not yet there, but the future
looms, clearly before us.
The second explanation suggests a rather different course but the
outcome predicted is more or less the same. The historic differences
of a l l groups, it is argued, have always been superficial. In certain
k e y structural w a y s , all groups have always been the same. There
have no doubt been several different such structures, but they make
up a patterned sequence. This is of course the stage theory of h u m a n
development, so p o p u l a r i n m o d e r n social science since its onset.
Since, i n this m o d e of theorizing, a l l "societies" go through parallel
stages, w e end u p w i t h the same result as i n the theory of a secular'
tendency towards one w o r l d . W e e n d u p w i t h a single h u m a n society
93
 CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM
and therefore necessarily w i t h a w o r l d culture.
But can there be a w o r l d culture, I have asked? N o t s h o u l d there
be one — I w i l l return to that question — but can there be one?
There seems clearly to be some deep resistance to the v e r y idea. It
takes the f o r m on the one h a n d of the m u l t i p l e political chauvinisms
w h i c h constantly seem to resurface a r o u n d the globe. It takes the
f o r m as w e l l of the m u l t i p l e so-called countercultures w h i c h also
seem to surge u p constantly, and whose rallying-cry, whose a de
coeur, always seems to be the struggle against u n i f o r m i t y .
I d o not think that either of the t w o classic explanations — the
secular tendency towards one w o r l d , or the stage theory of h u m a n
development — are very h e l p f u l models. N o doubt both capture
some elements of the empirical reality we think w e k n o w , b u t both
also disregard some v e r y visible phenomena. A n d both require leaps
of inference (leaps of faith?) that seem quite hazardous.
I w o u l d rather start w i t h a m o d e l of successive historical systems
i n w h i c h w h a t is certain is only that there has been a n d w i l l be a suc-
cession of systems, leaving quite open w h a t both its content ana its
f o r m might be.
M y basic reason for an initial skepticism about the concept of a
w o r l d culture stems f r o m the sense that defining a culture is a ques-
tion of defining boundaries that are essentially political — boundaries
of oppression, a n d of defense against oppression, The boundaries must
necessarily be arbitrary i n the sense that the case for d r a w i n g the
boundaries at one point rather than at another is s e l d o m (perhaps
never) logically tight. W h o is an A r a b ? W h a t is g o o d music? or even
w h a t is music? Is C o n f u c i a n i s m a religion? It is clear that the b o u n d -
aries d e p e n d o n definitions, and that these definitions are not u n i v e r -
sally shared, or even consistent over time. Furthermore, of course., at
any g i v e n time, all A r a b s do not speak A r a b i c , all E n g l i s h m e n are not
individualists, some Jews a n d some M o s l e m s are atheists. That is to
say, it is clear that however a culture is defined, not a l l members of
the designated g r o u p h o l d its p r e s u m e d values or share its p r e s u m e d
practices. H e n c e , i n w h a t sense does such a g r o u p share a culture?
A n d w h y are the boundaries d r a w n where they are d r a w n ?
Let me begin the discussion w i t h an example from the 10th century,
A t that time, a .change i n the social relations of p r o d u c t i o n was oc-
curring i n western E u r o p e w h i c h historians call incasteUamento (from
the Italian w o r d for castle). It i n v o l v e d the b u i l d i n g of a castle b y a
p o w e r f u l person, w h o sought to use this castle as a base to force the
94
THE N A T I O N A L A N D T H E UNIVERSAL
juridical and economic submission of the local peasantry — both the
freeholders and the tenant-farmers — to the seignior of the castle.
These seigniors successfully asserted their right to c o m m a n d , to con-
strain, a n d to apprehend these peasants. W h a t is interesting i n terms
of this discussion is that, as part of this process of social transforma-
tion, the terminology changed.
It seems that by the 11th century these rights that the seigniors had
basically u s u r p e d by force i n the 10th century were being officially
termed " u s a g e s " a n d " c u s t o m s . " Thus w e see, i n this case at least,
2
that the w o r d " c u s t o m , " a basic term i n cultural discourse, was used
to describe w h a t we k n o w to have been a p o w e r that was u s u r p e d
only a relatively short time before. In effect, calling this practice a
custom w a s a w a y of legitimating it, that is, of r e d u c i n g the amount
of current force required to enforce it. C a l l i n g it a " c u s t o m " w a s an
effort to transform it into a " r i g h t . " The effort presumably succeeded,
more or less.
N o doubt, not every peasant internalized fully the idea that the
dues to the seignior were the latter's " r i g h t , " but m a n y d i d , a n d
most c h i l d r e n were thereupon being socialized into this culture, even
as they were also learning a given language, identifying w i t h particu-
lar religious practices, and being taught to consider certain objects
beautiful. A perceptive visitor traveling f r o m one region to another
c o u l d have described h o w the cultures of different regions v a r i e d .
This same traveler no d o u b t m i g h t have noticed as w e l l boundary
uncertainties, w h e r e one culture's reach b l u r r e d into that of a neigh-
b o r i n g culture. The more foreign the visitor the larger the arena he
m a y have considered to constitute the boundaries of a single culture.
W h a t m a y have seemed a " C h i n e s e " cultural zone to M a r c o Polo
m a y have been visualized as a series of smaller zones to a merchant
b o r n w i t h i n M a r c o Polo's " C h i n e s e " cultural zone.
W h a t m i g h t be called the fluidity of culture has. always been a
social reality, and can only have become intensified w i t h the increas-
ing density of h u m a n settlement. Perhaps, i n 100,000 B . C . w h e n h u -
manity m a y have consisted of a series of small bands l i v i n g distantly
f r o m each other, each such band was relatively culturally homoge-
neous. But it makes no sense whatsoever today, or even for the
period of so-called recorded history, to conceive of ourselves as l i v -
2
See Isaac Johsua, Le face cachée du Moyen Age (Paris: La Brèche, 1988) 21.
95
 CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM
i n g i n culturally homogenous bands. E v e r y i n d i v i d u a l is the meeting-
point of a v e r y large number' of cultural traits. If one imagined a
series of groups consisting of all persons w h o h e l d each of the partic-
ular traits f o u n d i n a single i n d i v i d u a l , each s u c h g r o u p w o u l d be
composed of a different list of persons, although no doubt there
w o u l d be substantial overlapping. Still, it means that each i n d i v i d u a l
is i n effect a u n i q u e composite of cultural characteristics. To use a
metaphor of p a i n t i n g , the resulting collective cultural landscape is a
v e r y subtle b l e n d i n g of an incredibly large n u m b e r of colors, even if
w e restrict ourselves to l o o k i n g only at a relatively s m a l l unit (small
spatially, s m a l l demographically).
In this sense; the history of the w o r l d has been the very opposite
of a t r e n d towards cultural homogeneization; it has rather been a
trend towards cultural differentiation, or cultural elaboration, or c u l -
tural complexity. Yet w e k n o w that this centrifugal process has not at
all tended towards a T o w e r of Babel, pure cultural anarchy. There
seems to have [been gravitational forces restraining the centrifugal
tendencies and organizing them. In our m o d e m world-system, the
single, most powerful such gravitational force has been the nation-state.
In the u n f o l d i n g of the capitalist w o r l d - e c o n o m y , the nation-states
that were c o m i n g into existence were a v e r y special k i n d of state. For
they defined themselves i n function of other states, together w i t h
w h o m they f o r m e d an interstate system. The nation-state h a d b o u n d -
aries that were f i x e d not merely b y internal decree but just as m u c h
b y the recognition of other states, a process often formalized i n
treaties. N o t o n l y d i d the nation-state have boundaries, but there was
a very strong tendency to b o u n d the states such that a l l their parts
were contiguous to each other, i n w h i c h case the outer boundaries of
the state were constituted by a single continuous line, hopefully not
containing enclaves w i t h i n it. This is of course a p u r e l y f o r m a l con-
sideration of political geography, but It w o u l d be a mistake not to
notice h o w forceful and h o w constant has been the pressure to c o m -
p l y w i t h such a m o r p h o l o g y .
There was- some additional de facto rules i n the creation of the i n -
terstate system; There were to be n o no-man's-lands, no zones that
were not part of some particular state. A n d all these resultant states
were to be juridically equal, that is, they were each to be " s o v e r -
e i g n . " This presumably meant that the authorities i n any state h a d
not o n l y f u l l but also exclusive authority w i t h i n the boundaries of the
state, a n d that noone escaped the authority of some state.
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THE NATIONAL A N D THE UNIVERSAL
O f course, it took several h u n d r e d years to include all parts of the
globe w i t h i n this system, to make each part share the same f o r m a l
characteristics, a n d to have the volatile boundaries settle d o w n . W e
are not really altogether there yet. But, compared to say 1648, w h e n
the Treaty of Westphalia was signed, consolidating the then existing
European state-system, the post-1945 era of the w o r l d - s y s t e m (the era
of the U n i t e d Nations) is a m o d e l of juridical clarity a n d stability.
The system as it developed was not o n l y a system structuring
state-units but also one defining the relationship of each i n d i v i d u a l
to the nation-states. B y the nineteenth century, the concept of " c i t i -
z e n " w a s w i d e s p r e a d . Every i n d i v i d u a l was p r e s u m e d to be a parti-
cipant member of one sovereign unit, but o n l y of one. To be sure, we
have wrestled ever since w i t h the problem of "stateless persons" as
w e l l as w i t h that of " d o u b l e nationality," but the trend pattern has
been clear.
T h u s were created a series of clearly-bounded entities of contigu-
ous territory w i t h a specified list of member-individuals. There
remained the issue of h o w one acquired citizenship. A n d this issue
posed itself at t w o moments i n the life cycle: at birth, a n d later i n life.
A t birth, there are really o n l y t w o non-arbitrary possibilities: one ac-
quires citizenship genetically (via the parents) or geographically (via
the location of the birthplace). T h o u g h w h i c h of these methods is to
be used has been a matter of constant passionate political debate, the
overall trend has been f r o m reliance o n genetic inheritance to reliance
"on geographic rights. Later i n life, there are also o n l y t w o possibili-
ties: either it is possible legally to change citizenship, or it is not. W e
have m o v e d f r o m impossibility to possibility, and the latter d o u b l y :
possibility of acquiring a new citizenship; possibility of relinquishing
an old one. The codification of all of this has been complex, and the
process is- still not completed, but the direction has been clear.
If w e take these political processes as given, then it is clear that
they have posed incredible " c u l t u r a l " problems. E v e r y i n d i v i d u a l be-
longs juridically to one unit only, a n d each such unit is called u p o n
to make a series of cultural decisions, most of them legally b i n d i n g .
M o d e r n states have official languages, school systems w i t h specific
curricula, armies that require specific behavior, laws about migration
across boundaries, laws about family structures and property (includ-
ing inheritance), etc. In all of these arenas, some decisions must be
made, and one can see w h y states in general s h o u l d prefer uniformi-
ty w h e n e v e r it is politically possible. In addition to these arenas
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 CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM
w h e r e decisions are inescapable, there is a further arena where states
c o u l d theoretically r e m a i n neutral but i n practice are pressed to make
political decisions. Since the state has become the major mechar .sm
of allocating social income, the states are pressed to offer financial
support to both the sciences a n d the arts, i n all their m u l t i p l e foi tns.
A n d since the money available is inherently limited, the state must
m a k e choices i n both the sciences a n d the arts. Clearly, i n a n y g i v e n
state, after 100 years of m a k i n g such decisions, it is very clear that a
" n a t i o n a l " culture w i l l exist even if it didn't exist at the outset. A
particular past, a heritage is institutionalized.
But there is a second reality, w h i c h is economic. O u r m o d e r n
w o r l d - s y s t e m is a capitalist w o r l d - e c o n o m y . It functions b y g i v i n g
priority to the ceaseless accumulation of capital, a n d this is o p t i m i z e d
by the creation of a geographically v e r y w i d e d i v i s i o n of labor, today
a d i v i s i o n of labor that is w o r l d w i d e . A d i v i s i o n of labor requires
flows — flows of commodities, f l o w s of capital, flows of labor; not
u n l i m i t e d or unrestricted f l o w s , but significant ones. This means that
the state boundaries must be permeable, a n d so they are. A t the v e r y
m o m e n t that one has been creating national cultures each distinct
from, the other,! these flows have been breaking d o w n the national
distinctions. In parts, the flows have broken d o w n distinctions by
simple diffusion. W e talk, of this w h e n we speak, of the steady inter-
nationalization of culture, w h i c h has become striking e v e n i n realms
where it seemed least likely — i n everyday life: food habits, clothing
styles, habitat; a n d i n the arts.
H o w e v e r , a l l has not been smooth i n this diffusion process. People
cross frontiers regularly, and not merely as temporary visitors. Peo-
ple m o v e i n order to w o r k , but they do this i n t w o different w a y s , o:r
at t w o different levels. A t the top of the occupation scale, people
m o v e regularly f r o m rich countries to poor ones, and such persons
1
are n o r m a l l y sojourners, rather than, emigrants. They neither " a s s i m i -
l a t e " n o r w i s h to assimilate; n o r d o the receiving states w i s h them to
assimilate. C u l t u r a l l y they tend to f o r m relatively discrete enclaves i n
their country of sojourn. 'They often see themselves as bearers of
w o r l d culture, w h i c h means i n fact bearers of the culture of dominant
groups i n the w o r l d - s y s t e m .
The bigger issue is the other k i n d of migration, of persons at the
lower e n d of the occupational scale, going f r o m poorer countries to
richer ones. These persons are In cultural conflict w i t h the receiving
country. They often stay permanently, or try to stay. W h e n they w i s h
98
T H E NATIONAL A N D T H E UNIVERSAL.
to assimilate into the national culture of the receiving country, they
are often rejected. A n d w h e n they reject assimilation, they are often
required, to assimilate. They become, usually quite officially, a " m i -
nority."
" M i n o r i t i e s " are not rare today; quite the opposite. E v e r y country
has one or several; a n d they have them more and more. So just as
there is a dialectic of creating simultaneously a homogeneous w o r l d
and distinctive national cultures w i t h i n this w o r l d , so there is a dia-
lectic of creating simultaneously homogeneous national cultures and
distinctive ethnic groups or " m i n o r i t i e s " w i t h i n these nation-states.
'There is h o w e v e r one critical difference i n the two dialectics. In the
t w o parallel contradictions — tendency to one w o r l d vs. tendency to
distinctive nation-states, a n d tendency to one nation vs. tendency to
distinctive ethnic groups w i t h i n each state — it has been the states
w h i c h have h a d the u p p e r h a n d i n both contradictions. The states
have h a d this u p p e r hand for one simple reason: they have con-
trolled the most physical force. But the states have p l a y e d opposite
roles i n the t w o contradictions., In one case, they have used, their
force to create cultural diversity, a n d i n the other case to create c u l -
tural uniformity. This has made the states the most p o w e r f u l cultural
force i n the m o d e r n w o r l d and the most schizophrenic. A n d this is
true of the states, whether w e are referring to relatively p o w e r f u l
states like the U . S . A . , France, or the U.S.S.R., or to relatively weak
states like Ecuador, Tunisia, or Thailand.
II
C u l t u r e has always been a w e a p o n of the p o w e r f u l . That was what
I sought to illustrate w i t h my very brief reference to m e d i e v a l E u -
rope. But culture has always cut both ways. If the p o w e r f u l can legit-
imate their expropriations by transposing them into " c u s t o m s , " the
w e a k can appeal to the legitimacy of these same " c u s t o m s " to resist
n e w a n d different expropriations, This is an u n e q u a l battle to be
sure, b u t not one that has h a d no effect.
W h a t is striking about the political his tor/ of the m o d e r n w o r l d -
system, as it has historically developed, is the ever more frequent
and ever more efficacious utilization by oppressed elements of what
m i g h t generically be called cultural resistance. O f course cultural re-
sistance is an eternal theme. There have l o n g been relatively stable
p o p u l a r cultures w h i c h have asserted their values and their forms
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 CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM
against elite cultures. A n d there have l o n g been conjunctural counter-
cultures i n the sense of groups w h o have deliberately sought to w i t h -
d r a w f r o m the control systems to w h i c h they were subjected. This
has often been l i n k e d with, p r o d u c t i o n i n the arts i n the f o r m of bo-
hemias, or with: p r o d u c t i o n of utopias i n 'the f o r m of n e w religions.
But the conjunctural countercultures have regularly been recuperated,
losing their bite. A n d the v e r y stability of p o p u l a r cultures has been
their weakness as w e l l as their strength. They have more often led to
social anesthesia than to social revolution.
W h a t is n e w i n c u l t u r a l resistance today is the result of the socio-
logical invention of antisystemic movements i n the nineteenth centu-
ry, h a v i n g the key idea that opposition must be organized if it is to
succeed i n transforming the w o r l d . Cultural resistance today is very
often organized resistance — not spontaneous resistance or eternal
resistance, but p l a n n e d resistance.
P l a n n i n g cultural resistance is like p l a n n i n g political resistance: its
efficacity is also its fatal f l a w . W h e n an antisystemic movement or-
ganizes to overthrow or replace existing authorities in, a state, it p r o -
vides itself w i t h a very strong political w e a p o n designed to change
the w o r l d i n specific ways. But, by so organizing, it simultaneously
integrates itself a n d its militants into the v e r y system it is- opposing.
It is u t i l i z i n g the structures of the system to oppose the system,
w h i c h however! partially legitimates these structures. It is contesting
the ideology of the system by appealing to antecedent, broader ideol-
ogies (that is, more " u n i v e r s a l " values), and by so d o i n g is accepting
i n part the terms of the debate as defined by the dominant forces.
This is a contradiction w h i c h a movement of political resistance can-
not escape, a n d w i t h w h i c h it must cope as best it can.
The same thing is true of organized, cultural resistance. This is not
surprising since cultural resistance is part and parcel of political re-
sistance. If w e deliberately assert (or reassert) particular cultural
values that have been neglected or disparaged i n order to protest
against the i m p o s i t i o n of the cultural values of the strong u p o n the
weaker, w e are to be sure strengthening the weaker i n their political
struggles, w i t h i n a g i v e n state, w i t h i n the world-system as a whole.
But w e are then pressed to prove the validity of our asserted (or re-
asserted) values in. terms of criteria laid down, by the p o w e r f u l .
A c c u s e d of being " u n c i v i l i z e d , " the proclaimers of the (re)asserted
cultural values \ suggest that it is they w h o are truly " c i v i l i z e d . "
" C i v i l i z a t i o n " (or some equivalent term) thereupon, becomes the u n i -
100
THE NATIONAL A N D THE UNIVERSAL
versai criterion by w h i c h one judges particular cultural acts — whether
these are acts of artistic performance, or acts of religious ritual, or acts
of the esthetic utilization of space and time. The planners of cultural
resistance, i n planning the assertion of some particular culture, are in.
effect (re)legitimating the concept of universal values.
The systemic cooption of cultural resistance occurs i n two opposite
w a y s , w h i c h combine to deprive the cultural resistance of its raison
d'être, resistance. O n the one hand, the p o w e r f u l of the w o r l d seek to
commodity and thereby denature the practices of cultural resistance.
They create h i g h market demand for the forms of avant-garde
(and/or exotic) artistic production... They create high-tech market net-
w o r k s for the distribution of previously artisanal or illicit production
of the means of everyday life; that is, they transform a private do-
m a i n into a semipublic one. They assign public space, delimited pub-
lic space, to the non-standard linguistic, religious, even juridical
forms.
But it is more than a matter of mere cooption, of a k i n d of cultural
corruption. It is as m u c h the fact that any movement of cultural re-
sistance that succeeds, even partially, i n m o b i l i z i n g significant sup-
port must deal w i t h the consequences of w h a t Weber called the
" r o u t i n i z a t i o n of charisma." There are, it seems to me, only 'two-
w a y s to deal w i t h the routinization of charisma. O n e can reduce the
difference of substance to- a difference of form. Thereby one may
guarantee the s u r v i v a l of the organization that originally promoted
the resistance, but at the sacrifice of the quality of its "resistance." O r
one can reassert the quality of its resistance b y shifting f r o m a policy
of self-assertion to a policy of proselytization. This too- m a y enable
the. organization to survive, but o n l y as- a protagonist of some univer-
sal. It is the shift f r o m p r o c l a i m i n g an alternative art-form, an alterna-
tive religion, an alternative epistemology to p r o c l a i m i n g a singular
truth that deserves to be i m p o s e d .
Thus the case of cultural resistance involves the same dilemmas as
resistance at the level of political p o w e r i n the n a r r o w sense. The
contradictions of p l a n n e d resistance are inescapable, a n d the move-
ments m u s t cope w i t h them as best they can.
O f course, one can try to take a different tack. O n e can move i n the
direction, of anarchy or Iibertarianism as a strategy. O n e -can argue
that the o n l y mode of c u l t u r a l resistance, the o n l y mode of cultural
assertion, that is of value is that of the franc-tireur, of the i n d i v i d u a l
against the mass (all masses, any mass). A n d surely this has been
101
 C U L T U R E , GLOBALIZATION A N D T H E WORLD-SYS1 E M
tried, time and again — whether i n the f o r m of so-called art for art's
sake, o:r i n the f o r m of w i t h d r a w a l into small communes, or i n the
f o r m of n i h i l i s m , or i n the f o r m of schizophrenia. W e s h o u l d not dis-
miss these diverse modes of resistance out of h a n d .
There .are enormous advantages to these modes of cultural resis-
tance, to w h i c h one m i g h t give the label " i n d i v i d u a l i s t . " They are
easy to pursue i n the sense of not r e q u i r i n g the effort of organizing
them, or at least r e q u i r i n g less effort. They are relatively spontaneous
a n d need less to take account of dominant values. They become
therefore somewhat more difficult for the authorities to control, a n d
thereupon to coopt. They do not seek organizational t r i u m p h , a n d
hence are less likely to breed among those w h o practice such modes
the temptation to justify themselves i n the universalistic language of
the dominant culture. Individualistic modes of resistance are for a l l
these reasons more total as resistance than planned social modes,
This being the case, such modes however create their o w n difficul-
ties i n turn. Because individualistic modes involve so m u c h less'
social organization, the holders of cultural p o w e r can a n d d o treat
them either w i t h the disdain that requires no notice, or b y severe re-
pression, w h i c h is harder to combat precisely because of the relative
lack of social organization.
Thus, the individualist forms of cultural resistance have exactly the
opposite advantages and disadvantages of the planned forms of c u l -
tural resistance. It is not at all clear that the balance-sheet i n the e n d
is any more positive. Furthermore, can i n d i v i d u a l resistance be called
cultural resistance? If one pursues activities w i t h reference only to
one's inner ear, i n what sense is one sharing a culture w i t h anyone
else, even w i t h other individualist resisters? A n d i f the answer is that
the inner ear is a guide to the true path, is this not an appeal to u n i -
versalis! values w i t h a vengeance, since i n this case, the c l a i m to u n i -
versalism lacks a n y control whatsoever of social dialogue?
I have never thought, and d o not think, that w e can successfully
escape the contradictions of p l a n n e d cultural resistance b y t u r n i n g i n -
w a r d . It m a y be .quite the opposite: it is perhaps the case that w e can
m i n i m i z e these contradictions (one can of course never escape them
entirely) of p l a n n e d cultural resistance only b y afuite en avant of be-
i n g still more social i n o u r outlook.
102
THE N A T I O N A L A N D THE UNIVERSAL
iff
This therefore brings us to the issue of w o r l d culture. W o r l d
culture, the h u m a n i s m of many sages, has l o n g been advocated o n
these grounds, that it alone permits one to overcome the provincial-
i s m — hence both the limitations to m o r a l g r o w t h , and the obscuran-
tism. — of cultural particularisms.
Let us eliminate f r o m our discussion the naive conceptualizations
of w o r l d culture, those that barely disguise an attempt to impose a
particular culture i n the guise of a mission civilisatrice. S u c h naive con-
ceptualizations are to be sure commonplace, but they are a n easy
target of our criticism. Let us take its more sophisticated version, the
advocacy of what Leopold-Sedar Senghor has called, i n a celebrated
phrase, le rendez-vous du donner et du recevoir: C a n there be such a
rendez-vous, a n d what w o u l d it look like?
In a sense, the concept of the university is itself supposed to consti-
tute this rendez-vous, A f t e r all, the w o r d s , university a n d univer-
salism, have the same etymological root. A n d , curiously, i n medieval
E u r o p e a n usage, a universitas was also the name g i v e n to a f o r m of
particular c u l t u r a l c o m m u n i t y . Was it then that the university i n the
sense of the universal was being suggested, as the meeting-place of
the universities i n the sense of particular'communities? It is certainly
d o u b t f u l that this is what they have been historically, b u t it is regu-
larly suggested that this is what they s h o u l d become today a n d i n
the future.
The post-1968 discussion i n many universities of the concept of
" c u l t u r a l d i v e r s i t y " (and its implications for curricula) is one more
instance of this call. W e face the very bizarre situation today of a
major debate within. U . S . universities between, on the one side, those
w h o advocate a universe of cultures v i a the promotion of Black
studies or w o m e n s ' studies or the extension (if not the elimination) of
the so-called canons i n literature, and, o n the other side, those w h o
advocate a universal culture v i a the promotion of courses i n Western
civilization. T r u l y the w o r l d is upside d o w n . O n e arrives, it seems to
be argued b y both sides, at the universal v i a the particular (although
they differ as to w h i c h particular).
Still, is this call for cultural diversity, as Sartre suggested of N e g r i -
tu.de, a H e g e l i a n negation of the negation? W i l l not only the states,
but the national cultures, wither away, sometime i n the future? A n d
if they were to w i t h e r away, is that the image at last of the good
103
 CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM THE NATIONAL A N D THE UNIVERSAL

society? or is it some n e w hell of robot-like uniformity? W o u l d this constant tendency to move away from both libertariarosm and equality
be the fulfilment of the o l d anti-socialist joke: (Orator:) " C o m e s the In this v i s i o n of the best future I can envisage, there w o u l d indeed
revolution, everyone w i l l eat strawberries -and c r e a m " ; (Worker i n be a place, a n d a permanent place, for cultural resistance. The w a y to
audience:) " B u t I don't like strawberries and cream"; (Orator:) " C o m e s combat the falling away f r o m liberty and equality w o u l d be to create
the revolution, y o u w i l l have to like strawberries a n d cream"? and recreate particularistic cultural entities - arts, sciences, identi-
I believe w e have too l o n g avoided t h i n k i n g seriously about the ties; always n e w , often claiming to be o l d - that w o u l d be social
(not individual), that w o u l d be particularisms whose object (avowed or
cultural implications of a post-capitalist future, g i v e n our quite u n -
not) w o u l d be- the restoration of the universal reality of liberty and
derstandable preoccupation with, the difficulties of a. capitalist pres-
ent. Suppose it is true, as I myself believe, that there can be n o liberty equality. . ,
outside an egalitarian w o r l d , a n d no equality outside a libertarian Of course, this may not be a description only of a hypothetical
w o r l d , what then follows i n the realm of culture — i n the arts a n d i n future; this may in part be a description of the present w e are l i v i n g .
the sciences? Is a libertarian w o r l d one i n w h i c h everyone follows
his/her inner ear? Is an egalitarian w o r l d one i n w h i c h w e a l l share
equally the same universal values?
A n d if, as I have tended to argue here, culture is a collective ex-
pression that is combative, that requires an other, i n this putative
libertarian-egalitarian w o r l d , does " c u l t u r e " exist?
I c o u l d retreat at this point and say I don't k n o w , w h i c h is true. I
c o u l d also retreat at this point a n d say that, to solve the problems of
the present, the answers to these hypothetical questions can wait, but
I do not really believe this to be true. It is n o accident, it seems to me,
that there has been so m u c h discussion these past 10-15 years about
the problematic of " c u l t u r e . " It follows upon, the decomposition of
1

the nineteenth-century double faith i n the economic and political

arenas as loci of social progress a n d therefore of i n d i v i d u a l salvation.
Some r e t u r n to (God, a n d others look to " c u l t u r e " or " i d e n t i t y " or
some other realistic i l l u s i o n to help them regain their bearing.
I a m skeptical w e can f i n d o u r w a y via a. search for a p u r i f i e d
w o r l d culture. B u t I a m also skeptical that h o l d i n g on to national or
to ethnic or to any other f o r m of particularistic culture can be any-
thing more than a crutch. Crutches are not foolish. W e often need
them to restore o u r wholeness, but crutches are by definition transi-
tional and. transitory phenomena.
M y o w n h u n c h is to base our utopistics o n the inherent lack of
long-term equilibria i n any phenomena — physical, biological, or
social. Hence we shall never have a stable libertarian/egalitarian
w o r l d . W e may h o w e v e r achieve a world-system that is structured so
as to tend in. the direction of being libertarian a n d egalitarian. I a m
not at .all sure what such a. structure w o u l d look like. But whatever
it might be, I assume that there w o u l d also be w i t h i n its operation a

104 105
 5. Scenarios for Peripheral Cultures

ULF HANNERZ

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY HAS BEEN A UNIQUE PERIOD IN WORLD

cultural history. ' H u m a n k i n d has finally b i d farewell to that w o r l d
1

w h i c h could w i t h some credibility be seen as a cultural mosaic, of

separate pieces w i t h hard, well-defined edges. Because of the great
increase i n the traffic in. culture, the large-scale transfer of m e a n i n g
systems and symbolic forms, the w o r l d is increasingly becoming one
not only i n political .and economic terms, as i n the climactic p e r i o d of
colonialism, but i n terms of its cultural construction as w e l l ; a global
ecumene of persistent cultural interaction and exchange. This, h o w -
ever, is no egalitarian global village. W h a t we see n o w is quite f i r m l y
structured as a n asymmetry of center and periphery. W i t h regard to
cultural flow, the periphery, out there i n a distant territory, Is more
the taker than the giver of meaning and meaningful f o r m . M u c h as
w e feel called u p o n to make note of any examples of counterflow, it
is difficult to a v o i d the conclusion that at least as things stand n o w ,
the relationship is lopsided,

1
In this presentation I draw on. perspectives developed within the research
project "The World System of Culture," based in the Department of Social
Anthropology, University of Stockholm, and supported by the Swedish Research
Council for the Humanities, and Social Sciences.
 CULTURE/GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM
W e do not assume that this is the e n d point of these globalizing
developments. The shaping of w o r l d culture is an ongoing process,
t o w a r d future a n d still uncertain states. B u t perhaps one conceivable
outcome has come to dominate the imagery of the c u l t u r a l future,, as
a master scenario against w h i c h every alternative scenario has to be
measured. Let us call it a scenario of global homogenization of c u l -
ture. 'The murderous threat of cultural imperialism is here rhetori-
cally depicted as i n v o l v i n g the high-tech culture of the metropolis,
w i t h p o w e r f u l organizational backing, facing a defenseless, s m a l l -
scale folk culture. But " c u l t u r a l i m p e r i a l i s m , " it also becomes clear,
has more to do! w i t h market than w i t h empire. The alleged prime
m o v e r behind the p a n - h u m a n replication of u n i f o r m i t y is- late West-
ern capitalism, l u r i n g forever more communities into dependency on
the fringes of an e x p a n d i n g w o r l d - w i d e consumer society. H o m o g e -
n i z a t i o n results m a i n l y f r o m the center-to-periphery flow of c o m m o d -
itized culture. Consequently, the c o m i n g homogeneous w o r l d culture
according to this v i e w w i l l by and large be a version of contempo-
rary Western culture, a n d the loss of local culture w o u l d s h o w itself
most distinctively at the periphery.
This master scenario has several things going for it. A quick look
at the w o r l d today affords it a certain intrinsic plausibility; it may
seem l i k e a mere continuation of present trends. It has, of course, the
great advantage of simplicity. A n d it is dramatic. There is the sense
of fatefulness, the prediction of the irreversible loss of large parts of
the combined heritage of humanity. A s m u c h of the diversity of its
behavioral repertoire is w i p e d out, H o m o Sapiens becomes more like
other species — i n large part m a k i n g its o w n environment, i n con-
trast w i t h them, but at the same time adapting to it i n a single,
h o w e v e r complex w a y .
There is also another scenario for global cultural process, although
more subterranean; thus not so often c o m i n g out to compete openly
w i t h the global homogenization scenario. W e may call it the p e r i p h -
eral corruption scenario, for what it portrays as a recurrent sequence
is one where the center offers its h i g h ideals and its best k n o w l e d g e ,
given some institutional form, a n d where the periphery first adopts
them and then soon corrupts them. The scenario shows elected heads
of state becoming presidents for life, then bizarre, merciless emper-
ors. It shows Westminster a n d Oxbridge models being s w a l l o w e d by
the bush. The center, i n the e n d , cannot w i n ; not at the periphery.
108
SCENARIOS FOR P E R I P H E R A L C U L T U R E S
Biases
The peripheral corruption scenario Is there for the people of the
center to d r a w on w h e n they are pessimistic about their o w n role i n
i m p r o v i n g the w o r l d , and d o u b t f u l and/or cynical about the p e r i p h -
ery. It is deeply ethnocentric, i n that it posits a very uneven distribu-
tion of virtue, and i n that it denies the validity a n d w o r t h of any
transformations at the periphery of w h a t was originally d r a w n f r o m
the center. There is little question of cultural difference here, but
rather of a difference between culture and non-culture, between
civilization and savagery.
The global homogenization scenario m a y have a greater intellectual
appeal than its shadowy competitor, but I think a brief exercise i n the
sociology of knowledge may suggest that this is because m a n y of us
share some sources of bias w h i c h contribute to m a k i n g it plausible.
First of all, this scenario, too, may d r a w on a certain k i n d of ethno-
centrism. The global homogenization scenario focuses o n things that
we, as observers and commentators f r o m the center, are very familiar
w i t h : our fast foods, our soft drinks, our sitcoms. The idea that they
are or w i l l be everywhere, and enduringly p o w e r f u l everywhere,
makes o u r culture even more important and w o r t h arguing about,
and relieves us of the real strains of h a v i n g to engage w i t h other
l i v i n g , complicated, p u z z l i n g cultures. G r i e v i n g for the vanishing
Other is after all i n some w a y s easier than confronting it live a n d
kicking.
Furthermore, the homogenization scenario Is directly tied to a line
of domestic cultural critique. There are surely those w h o see the
w o r l d w i d e spread of their culture as a cause for celebration, but for
m a n y of us it w o u l d be something to regret. A n d those at the center
w h o have taken the greatest, reasonably consistent interest i n the cir-
cumstances of life at the periphery, for some decades at least n o w ,
have usually been those w h o are also critically inclined t o w a r d m a n y
of the effects of the market economy back home. The homogenization
scenario, then, allows the export, a n d globalization, of cultural, cri-
tique; or alternatively formulated, b r i n g i n g i n fuel f r o m the periphery
for local debates at the center.
Finally, one may have some doubts about the sense of time i n the
homogenization scenario. If indeed there is often an idea that p e r i p h -
eral cultures come defenseless, unprepared to the encounter w i t h
metropolitan culture, that they are insufficiently organized a n d are
109
 CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM
taken by surprise, then this notion w o u l d frequently entail a measure
of ignorance of the continuous historical development of center-
periphery contacts. It, may w e l l be that the First W o r l d has been
present i n the consciousness of m a n y T h i r d W orld people a great
T
deal longer than the T h i r d W o r l d has been on the minds of most
First W o r l d people. The notion of the sudden engagement between
the cultures of center 'and periphery m a y thus i n large part be an
imaginative by-product of the late a w a k e n i n g to global realities of
many of us inhabitants of the center.
Perhaps all of us began long ago to nourish doubts about the t w o
scenarios I have identified, and w o u l d be ready on d e m a n d to i m -
provise a critique bf each. Yet some of their continued viability as
constructs i n the m i n d of the general public m a y d e p e n d o n a lack of
available alternatives, alternatives w h i c h w o u l d also offer w a y s of
t h i n k i n g a n d talking about w h a t m a y h a p p e n at the periphery i n a
w o r l d of increasingly connected culture. A s any such scenario that
w e w o u l d f i n d reasonably satisfactory w o u l d probably have to be-
more complicated fhan these t w o , a n d thus more d e m a n d i n g of o u r
a n d e v e r y b o d y else's patience, it might automatically be at some rhe-
torical disadvantage. Yet if it can both identify the weaknesses of the
competitors a n d use whatever grain of truth m a y be i n them, it
m i g h t do better i n Jong-term, credibility.
A s an anthropologist, I m a y have other biases than those w h i c h
seem to be built into the global homogenization a n d peripheral cor-
r u p t i o n scenarios. Anthropologists are perhaps forever rooting for d i -
versity; some wouljd suggest w e have a vested interest i n it. In any
case, I see the scrutiny of such scenarios, and. attempts to formulate
alternatives to them, as an important task for a macroanthropology
of contemporary culture — not the only task, but not a v e r y special
one set aside in. its o w n intellectual c o m e r either. W h a t is required is
rather an overall conceptualization of contemporary culture w h i c h
incorporates a sense of the pervasiveness of globalization. I also think
that this is a task.which one m a y w e l l try and deal w i t h i n relatively
general terms. Anthropologists, again, may have some predilection
for variability a n d for the particular, exceptional, a n d unique, but I
do not think it serves us w e l l to respond to the scenario of global
homogenization, or that of peripheral corruption, only as ethnog-
raphers w i t h a m y r i a d of stories. If w e want a n -alternative to them,
it h a d better be at allevel of generality where the points of difference
-can be readily recognized.
Yet I w o u l d h a r d l y be an anthropologist if there were not some
110
SCENARIOS FOR P E R I P H E R A L C U L T U R E S
concrete ethnography l u r k i n g behind m y abstractions, and I should
say that it is a more general familiarity w i t h , as w e l l as specific re-
search experiences i n , West A f r i c a n u r b a n life that have -done most to
provoke m y interest i n the center-periphery relationships of w o r l d
culture a n d to shape m y gut reactions to the scenarios I have pointed
to.
In a Nigerian tenon
Let me therefore say just something about the modest m i d d l e
N i g e r i a n t o w n w h i c h I k n o w best, its people a n d the settings in
w h i c h m e a n i n g flows there. Some sixty years ago this t o w n was just
-coming into existence, at a n e w junction of the railroad built b y the
British colonial government. It is a c o m m u n i t y , then, w h i c h has
k n o w n no existence outside the present w o r l d system. The Inhabit-
ants are railroad workers, taxi' drivers, bank clerks, doctors a n d
nurses, petty traders, tailors, shoe shiners, teachers a n d school chil-
dren, policemen, preachers and. prostitutes, bar owners and truck
pushers, praise singers and peasant w o m e n w h o come i n for the day
to sell, produce i n the market place. A p a r t from, attending to w o r k ,
townspeople s p e n d their time i n their rooms a n d yards, managing
household affairs; going u p and d o w n the streets to greet one anoth-
er; s h o p p i n g ; a r g u i n g a n d d r i n k i n g In the beer a n d palmwine bars;
or especially if they are y o u n g m e n , taking in. a show at the -open-air
m o v i e theater. Since about fifteen, years ago, w h e n electricity finally
came to town at a. time w h e n the N i g e r i a n oil economy was b o o m -
ing, they m i g h t w a t c h T V — a l l of a. s u d d e n there were a great many
antennae -over the rusting zinc roofs. People h a d battery-operated rec-
o r d players l o n g before, a n d there were several record stores, but a
n u m b e r of them have since closed d o w n . The listeners n o w prefer
cassettes, and there are hawkers selling them, mostly pirate editions,
from, the backs of their bicycles. People also go to their churches or
mosques. (A couple of years ago, actually, a, visiting preacher chose
his w o r d s u n w i s e l y , a n d Christians and M u s l i m s i n the t o w n pro-
ceeded to b u r n d o w n a n u m b e r of each other's houses of worship.)
Where meaning flows: market, state, form of life, and movement
N o w let me take a r o u n d of collective h u m a n existence such as this
apart, to see h o w culture is arranged w i t h i n it. C u l t u r e goes on
111
 CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM
everywhere i n social life, organized as a f l o w of meanings, b y w a y of
m e a n i n g f u l forms, between people. B u t it does so along rather dif-
ferent principles i n different contexts. For a comprehensive account-
i n g of c u l t u r a l f l o w , it is useful, I think, to distinguish some s m a l l
n u m b e r of t y p i c a l social frameworks i n w h i c h it occurs; frameworks
w h i c h i n part because of globalization recur i n contemporary life
n o r t h and south, east a n d west; i n an A f r i c a n t o w n as w e l l as i n
E u r o p e or A m e r i c a . The frameworks are recurrent, that is, even as
their cultural contents are different. The totality of cultural process,
then, can be seen w i t h i n these frameworks a n d i n their interrelations.
To begin w i t h , one m a y look at these frameworks i n synchronic
terms. But time can be made to enter i n , a n d w e can then return to
the p r o b l e m of scenarios-, as a matter of the cumulative consequences
of cultural process. A l l this, obviously, I can only hope to sketch
r o u g h l y here.
I see p r i m a r i l y four of these typical frameworks of cultural process.
Whatever culture flows outside these four, I w o u l d claim, amounts to
rather little. The global homogenization scenario, as I have described
it, is preoccupied w i t h only one of these, that of the market, so if
anything significant at all goes on i n the other three, that scenario
w o u l d obviously have to be m a r k e d " i n c o m p l e t e . " B u t let us begin
there. In the market framework, cultural commodities are m o v e d , A l l
commodities presumably carry some meaning, but i n some cases i n -
tellectual, esthetic or emotional appeal is all there is to a c o m m o d i t y ,
or a very large part of it, a n d these are what w e w o u l d p r i m a r i l y
have i n m i n d as we speak of cultural commodities. In the market
framework, meanings and meaningful forms are thus produced "and
disseminated b y specialists i n exchange for material compensation,
setting u p asymmetrical, more or less centering relationships between
producers a n d consumers. The market also attempts expansively to
bring more a n d more of culture as a whole into its framework, its
agents are i n competition w i t h one another, and they also keep inno-
vating to foster n e w demand. There is, i n other words, a built-in ten-
dency toward instability i n this framework. Let me say no more
about i t a t f h i s point.
The second framework of cultural process is that of the state, not
as a bounded physical area but as organizational form. The state is
engaged i n the management of m e a n i n g i n various w a y s . To gain
legitimate- authority state apparatuses nowadays tend' to reach out
112
SCENARIOS FOR P E R I P H E R A L C U L T U R E S
w i t h different degrees of credibility a n d success t o w a r d their subjects
to foster the ide.i that the state is a nation, and to construct them c u l -
turally as citizens. This involves a degree -of homogenization as a
goal of cultural engineering. O n the other h a n d , the state also takes
an interest i n shaping such differences among people as are desirable
for the purpose of fitting categories of individuals .into- different slots
i n the structure of p r o d u c t i o n .and reproduction. B e y o n d such i n -
volvements i n cultural process, some states more than others -engage
in what one may describe as cultural welfare, t r y i n g to provide their
citizenry w i t h " g o o d c u l t u r e " ; that is, meanings a n d m e a n i n g f u l
forms h e l d to meet certifiable intellectual a n d esthetic standards. N o t
least w o u l d this cultural welfare p r o v i d e the instruments people may
use i n d e v e l o p i n g constructive reflexive stances t o w a r d themselves
and their w o r l d .
The state framework for -cultural process again involves a signifi-
cant asymmetr • between state apparatus a n d people. It concentrates
resources at tiV center for long-term cultural w o r k , a n d the flow of
meaning is mostly f r o m the center outward.. In at least one current
2
of the cultural f l o w w h i c h the state sets i n motion, the tendency may
be t o w a r d a stability of meaning — the idea of the nation is usually
tied to conceptions of history a n d tradition. But then again, w e
s h o u l d k n o w b y n o w that such conceptions may i n fact be spurious
a n d quite contestable. ' 3
The t h i r d framework of cultural process I w i l l identify, for lack of
a more precise term, as that of " f o r m of l i f e . " It is surely a frame-
w o r k of major importance, i n that it involves the everyday practicali-
ties of p r o d u c t i o n and reproduction, activities going o n i n w o r k
places, domestic settings, neighborhoods, and some variety -of other
places. W h a t characterizes cultural process here is that f r o m d o i n g
2
In Karl Polanyi's terminology, we may say that the cultural economy here
is redistributive. See Karl Polanyi, "The Economy as Instituted Process," in Trade
and Market in the Early Empires, eds. Karl Polanyi, Conrad A . Arensberg and
Harry W. Pearson (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1957).
3
This is in line with Immanuel Wallerstein, The Politics of the World-Economy
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984) :162, although the main -current
source for this understanding is Eric J. Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds.. The
Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
113
 CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM
the same things over a n d over again, a n d seeing and hearing others
d o i n g the same things a n d saying the same things over a n d over
again, a great deal of redundancy results. Experiences and interests
coalesce into habitual perspectives a n d dispositions, W i t h i n this
f r a m e w o r k , too, people's mere going about things entails a free and
reciprocal cultural flow. In contrast w i t h the market a n d state frame-
w o r k s , there are n o specialists in the production a n d dissemination
of m e a n i n g as such w h o are to be materially compensated for cultur-
al w o r k . W h i l e every f o r m of life includes some people a n d excludes
a, great m a n y others,- there are not "necessarily well-defined b o u n d -
aries between them, and people may develop some conception of
each other's forms of life through m u c h the s a m e l d r i d of everyday""
looking and listening, although probably w i t h less precision. A s "a
whole, encompassing the variety o f particular f o r m s ' ó f life, this
framework involves cultural processes w h i c h are diffuse, uncentered,
The " c o m m a n d i n g h e i g h t s " of culture, as it were, are not here. A s
the everyday activities are practically adapted to material c i r c u m -
stances, there is not m u c h reason to b r i n g about .alterations i n culture
here, as l o n g as the circumstances do not change. In the f o r m of life
framework, consequently, there is a tendency t o w a r d stability i n c u l -
tural process.
In contemporary complex societies, the d i v i s i o n of labor is the
dominant factor i n shaping forms of life, p r o v i d i n g material bases as
w e l l as central experiences. But as the reciprocity a n d redundancy of
the f l o w of m e a n i n g between people i n v o l v e d w i t h one another at
w o r k , i n domesticity a n d i n sociability seem similar enough, I think
of this as a single f r a m e w o r k .
L o o k i n g n o w at m y N i g e r i a n t o w n , or at peripheral societies gener-
ally, one can see that the variety of forms of life .are d r a w n into the
w o r l d system i n somewhat different ways, as the local d i v i s i o n of
labor is entangled with, the international d i v i s i o n of labor. There are
still people, fairly self-sufficient agriculturalists i n the vicinity of the
t o w n , w h o seem only rather incompletely integrated into the w o r l d
system i n material terms: w h o just barely make it into the periphery.
O n the other h a n d , there are people like the railroad employees
whose m o d e of existence is based on the fact that the desire arose,
some time early i n this century, to carry tin and groundnuts f r o m In-
land N i g e r i a to the w o r l d .
But then also some forms of life more than others become defined,
w i t h precision and overall, i n terms of culture w h i c h has flown a n d
114
S C E N A R I O S FOR P E R I P H E R A L C U L T U R E S
continues to- f l o w f r o m center to periphery. It is true that through
their livelihoods at least, the peasant w o m e n w h o come to market in
the N i g e r i a n t o w n , or the praise singer w h o performs for local nota-
bles, are not very m u c h i n v o l v e d w i t h metropolitan meaning sys-
tems; the railroader, the bank clerk a n d the doctor are rather more.
Yet there is no one-to-one relationship either between the specificity
of such c u l t u r a l definition and degree of w o r l d system material i n -
volvement. In many places on the periphery, there are forms of life
o w i n g their material existence, such as it may be, very immediately
to the w o r l d system. — forms of life r e v o l v i n g a r o u n d o i l wells,
copper mines, coffee plantations, A n d yet the plantation w o r k e r may
earn his. l i v i n g w i t h a. relative m i n i m u m of particular technological or
organizational skills originating at the center.
To the extent that forms of life, or segments of the d a i l y r o u n d
w h i c h they encompass, are not subjected to any higher degree of c u l -
tural definition f r o m the center, by w a y of the international division,
of labor or otherwise, there is r o o m for more cultural autonomy. A n d
of course, the strength of the culture existing i n such reserves may be
such that it also reaches back to penetrate into segments more direct-
ly a n d more extensively defined b y the center. This is p u t t i n g things
very briefly; w e come back to the implications.
For the f o u r t h a n d final, f r a m e w o r k of cultural process i n contem-
porary life I w o u l d nominate that of movements, more intermittently
part of the c u l t u r a l totality than the other three, although it can h a r d -
l y be gainsaid that especially i n the last quarter-century or so, they
have h a d a major influence — examples of this being the w o m e n ' s
movement, the environmental movement, and the peace movement.
In the present context of considering center-periphery links of cul-
ture, I w i l l say less about the movement framework, however, and
m e n t i o n it here mostly for the sake of completeness. It Is undoubt-
4
4
Movements tend to be less centralized in their management of the cultural
flow than what we usually find in the state and market frameworks, .and there
is also, less concentration of material resources. In this they are more like forms
of life, out of which they of course tend to emerge as people within the latter
become dissatisfied with existing conditions or are threatened by changes. As
compared with what goes on within the form of life framework itself, on the
other hand, movements foster a more deliberate .and explicit flow of meaning,
.and are more outward-oriented, missionizmg. Insofar as they are oriented toward
specific changes or toward averting such changes, they are also more inherently
unstable — they tend to succeed or fail.
115
 CULTURE,; G L O B A L I Z A T I O N A N D T H E W O R L D - S Y S T E M
edly true, as R o l a n d Robertson notes, that globalization often forms
5
an important part of the background for the rise of contemporary
movements. Yet it seems to me that the great transnational move-
ments of recent times have not i n themselves seemed to become fully
organized i n a reach all the w a y between center .and periphery. Some
rather combine center and semi-periphery, others parts of the periph-
ery.
M a r k e t , state; f o r m of We a n d movement can be rather c o m m o n -
sensically distinguished, but w e see that they differ i n their centering
a n d decentering tendencies, i n their politics of culture a n d i n their
cultural economies. They .also have their o w n tendencies w i t h respect
to the temporal dimension of culture. A t the same time, it is true that
m u c h of what goes on. i n culture has to do w i t h their interrelations.
States, markets and. movements are ultimately only successful if they
can get forms of life to open u p to them. States sometimes compete
i n markets; nationalist movements have been k n o w n to- transform,
themselves into, states; some movements create internal markets, a n d
they can be n e w s w o r t h y a n d thus commoditizable i n the market;
forms of life can be selectively c o m m o d i t i z e d as life style news; and
so o n , indefinitely. These entanglements, i n v o l v i n g often m u t u a l l y
contradictory tendencies, keep the totality alive, shifting, continuous-
ly unstable.
The frameworks at the periphery
A p a r t f r o m w h a t I have already said about forms of life, then,
w h a t are the characteristics of the frameworks and. their interrelations
i n the cultural process of the periphery, and h o w do they affect the
w a y the periphery is d r a w n into w o r l d culture, n o w a n d i n the
future? W h a t is. not least significant here are the different although
internally diverse ways i n w h i c h the frameworks relate to space.
The connection between cultural process and territory, w e s h o u l d
r e m i n d ourselves here, is only contingent. A s socially organized
meaning, culture is p r i m a r i l y a phenomenon of interaction, and o n l y
5
Roland Robertson, "Global ity, Global Culture and Images of World Order,"
in Social Change and Modernity, eds. Hans Haverkamp and Neil. Smelser (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1991).
116
S C E N A R I O S FOR P E R I P H E R A L C U L T U R E S
if interactions are tied to particular spaces is culture likewise so.
W h e n culture, as i n the w o r k s of classical .anthropology, was alto-
gether a matter of a flow of meaning in face-to-face relationships be-
tween, people w h o do not move a r o u n d m u c h , it could be a simple
e n o u g h matter to think, of cultures i n the p l u r a l as entities located i n
territories. W h e n cultural technology allows alternatives to face-to-
face contacts a n d w h e n people become increasingly footloose any-
w a y , then it all gets more complicated. W i t h the globalization of c u l -
ture, that is certainly where we are n o w .
But to reiterate, the frameworks for cultural process relate differ-
ently to territoriality... A s the state is i n itself an organization of terri-
tory, this is the framework i n w h i c h there is the greatest vested inter-
est i n a spatial definition of culture. E v e n where the state as an agent
is closely coordinated w i t h the agents of a transnational market econ-
o m y , it is likely to maintain some of its autonomy of action, some of
its effectiveness a n d ^ d i s p e n s a b i l i t y as a broker between the transna-
tional a n d the local, t h r o u g h appeals i n which, the idea of the nation
mediates between state a n d f o r m of life. This may entail some disre-
gard for, or even suppression of, the diversity of forms of fife exist-
i n g w i t h i n the territorial boundaries of the state. L o o k i n g o u t w a r d , it
is i n the peripheral state apparatuses that what w i t h i n the transna-
tional market framework is called " t h e free flow of i n f o r m a t i o n "
meets with, most resistance, a n d it is f r o m there that " a n e w interna-
tional information o r d e r " is proposed to constrain it. A n d it is like-
wise w i t h i n the peripheral state apparatuses that campaigns for na-
tional distinctiveness often emanate — away w i t h miniskirts, neckties
' a n d Christian names, i n w i t h presidential hippopotamus-hide fly-
w h i s k s and the management of tradition b y " c u l t u r a l .animateurs"
e m p l o y e d b y the M i n i s t r y of C u l t u r e or the district commissioner,. 6
Some peripheral states do more w i t h this than others, N i g e r i a , w i t h
its rather deep internal cleavages a n d a rapid, turnover of political
regimes, has not used its state apparatus v e r y insistently or consis-
tently for such promotional efforts — the prime example that w o u l d
come to the m i n d of an Africanist w o u l d rather be the Zairean " a u -
thenticity" campaigns, of M o b u t u Sese Seko. 7
* On "cultural animateurs," .see Roy Shaw, "The Cultural 'Animateur' in
Contemporary Society," Colliers d'Histoire Mondiale, 14 (1972):460~72.
7
On authenticity in Zaire, see Thomas M . Callaghy, "State-Subject Commur.i-
117
 CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM
World-system theory i n the Wallersteinian version, as I have so far
understood it, may not have h a d m u c h time for culture at all, but
w h e n culture has entered i n , mostly as a matter of ideology and a
manipulative use of tradition, it is this k i n d of spatial o r d e r i n g of it,
to b o u n d periphery f r o m center, w h i c h has been emphasized. Y e t the
part of the state i n the global organization of culture is certainly
ambiguous a n d contradictory. Contemporary state forms, a n d con-
temporary ideas of nation and nationalism, are themselves i n large
part items of transnational diffusion. A n d for the peripheral state, to
p r o v i d e for the; material welfare of its citizenry and to stay i n b u s i -
ness as a competitor w i t h i n the international system, it has h a d to be
heavily i n v o l v e d i n the wholesale importation of culture f r o m center
to periphery. A s it reconstructs society w i t h i n its territory into a f o r m
w h i c h is more or less globally recurrent, institutions are introduced
w h i c h are fundamentally inspired b y a n d modeled o n those of the
w o r l d system centers. M o r e o v e r , these institutions require standard;,
ized competences, guaranteed by educational systems w h i c h are at
least in principle, in terms of their objectives, remarkably u n i f o r m be-
tween states. The schools, indeed, are the most conspicuous means
b y w h i c h the state-organized flow of culture reaches into the N i g e r i -
an t o w n . i is seen to be for the time being not really different, but b a c k w a r d and
Forms of life v a r y in the strength of their territorial .anchorage. The
daily r o u n d of activities for some people m a y still remain in one
place, over a lifetime. But for others it is a matter of m u c h c o m i n g
and going. In contemporary N i g e r i a n u r b a n life, one of the recurrent
events of the ritual order is the sendoff party — and w h i l e i n a s m a l l
t o w n like the one I have described, the c i v i l servants or bank clerks
or teachers or students may not be likely to be transferred v e r y far
a n d usually stay in N i g e r i a , if y o u go to a larger city y o u w i l l r u n
into the cosmopolitan entrepreneurs, managers, professionals and i n -
tellectuals, the jet set a n d perhaps potential brain drain, often staying
conveniently close to an international airport, but also constantly
maintaining contact w i t h the center through the written w o r d or
other m e d i a . H e r e the f o r m of life makes the l i n k between culture
cation in Zaire; Domination -and the Concept of Domain Consensus," Journal, of
Modern African Studies, 18 (1980):469-492; for a portrayal, of its re-exported form
in Togo, see George Packer, The Village of Waiting (New York: Vintage,
1988)::lQlff. 6
118
SCENARIOS FOR P E R I P H E R A L C U L T U R E S
and territory rather tenuous; and one may observe that the state, as
it culturally constructs people to take u p the positions i n question
w i t h i n the d i v i s i o n of labor, and insofar as it also constitutes m u c h of
that d i v i s i o n of labor itself, ensures that there w i l l be people whose
horizons transcend Its o w n territorial boundaries.
W i t h i n the market framework, i n line w i t h the scenario of global
homogenization, we m a y expect the l i n k between territory and c u l -
tural process to be rather weak. N a t i o n a l boundaries may be ignored,
subverted or devalued, rather than celebrated, Some transnational
cultural c o m m o d i t y f l o w is indeed based on m i n i m a l attention to any
particular, differentiated characteristics on the part of consumers.
This is true of what K a r i n Barber, i n an o v e r v i e w of A f r i c a n p o p u l a r
culture, has aptly called " c u l t u r a l d u m p i n g " — " a k i n to the d u m p -
ing of expired drugs and non-functional b u s e s . " 8
The cost of taking o l d westerns, soap serials or s k i n flicks (to
choose o n l y examples f r o m the screen) to their final b u r i a l place at
the periphery is so l o w that whatever they m a y earn is almost pure
profit; an unanticipated addition to w h a t they made i n those markets
for w h i c h they were actually p r o d u c e d . The global homogenization
scenario takes a special, perhaps temporary twist here: the periphery
third-rate. So it can be treated to leftovers.
If there is one tendency w i t h i n the market f r a m e w o r k to homoge-
nize and reach as w i d e l y as possible w i t h the same single product,
however, there is also the alternative of limiting the competition b y
f i n d i n g a particular niche for a more specialized product. In focusing
on the market as the major force of global homogenization, one of
our scenarios for peripheral cultures rather too m u c h ignores this
alternative. B u t since that scenario is so often preoccupied w i t h the
commodities of popular culture, whether i n the f o r m of music, tele-
1
vision, f i l m , fashion or the written w o r d , let us observe that m u c h of
w h a t the entrepreneurs of popular culture i n the T h i r d W o r l d are
d o i n g these days involves carving out such niches: nobody w i t h any
experience of West A f r i c a n urban life can fail to be impressed w i t h
the continuously changing variety of popular music — highlife, juju,
Afrobeat, apala or whatever... Peter M a n u e l , i n his ethnomusicological
' Karin Barber, "Popular Arts in Africa," African Studies Review, 30 (1987) 3:
1-18,
119
 CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM
survey of the field, concludes that " i t may seem that every prominent
West A f r i c a n musician has coined some label for his particular fusion
of traditional a n d m o d e r n s o u n d s . " O n N i g e r i a n television, a large
9
part of the p r o g r a m m i n g is indeed a matter of cultural d u m p i n g , o l d
A m e r i c a n serials w h i c h those of us w h o are at the center m a y barely
e v e n remember any longer. But i n m y N i g e r i a n t o w n , it seemed that
they often d r e w little attention or involvement. W h a t engaged v i e w -
ers, a n d this is also what the beginnings of N i g e r i a n m e d i a research
suggest, were the Nigerian, sitcoms, s h o w i n g incidents- a n d people of
a more familiar k i n d . I note also what K a r i n Barber says about
1 0
m o v i e - g o i n g i n small towns i n ; outhwestern N i g e r i a . Some years
ago, the theaters s h o w e d mostly A m e r i c a n , H o n g k o n g or Indian
films, b u t according to Barber, they have n o w become increasingly
h a r d to f i n d . Locally p r o d u c e d f i L n s , i n the language of the area a n d
using the personnel, style a n d themes of a well-established tradition
of traveling popular theater, havi • replaced the imports.
These entrepreneurs m a y not aave the material, resources of the
culture businesses of the center, but like local entrepreneurs any-
where, they k n o w their' territory; their particular asset is cultural
competence, cultural sensibility. A n d this derives f r o m an involve-
ment w i t h local forms of life. C o m i n g out of these themselves, indeed
b e i n g still i n them, they are tuned in to the tastes a n d concerns w h i c h
can p r o v i d e markets for particular commodities, a n d thus niches for
their enterprises. To a degree this m a y entail c o m m o d i t i z i n g mean-
ings a n d cultural forms w h i c h were previously contained w i t h i n the
free-flow c u l t u r a l economy of a f o r m of life, but often this is o n l y
made possible t h r o u g h their incorporation into new syntheses w i t h
technology, organizational forms, a n d modes of expression d r a w n
f r o m the global f l o w of culture.
W h i c h is to say that this flow does not necessarily constitute an i n -
divisible w h o l e . A l o n g the w a y , somewhere, it can be u n p a c k e d as a
m u l t i t u d e of separate parts — the cultural technology, such as m e d i a
or musical instruments; the symbolic forms or genres t h r o u g h w h i c h
9
Peter Manuel, Popular Musics of the Non-Western World (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1988).
See O. O. Oreh, "Masquerade and other Plays on Nigerian Television" and
1 0
Theo Vincent, "Television Drama in, Nigeria: A Critical Assessment," in Mass
Communication, Culture and Society in West Africa, ed., Frank Okwu Ueboaiah
(Munich: Hans Zell/K. G . Saur, 1985).
120
SCENARIOS FOR P E R I P H E R A L C U L T U R E S
meanings can be communicated; the meanings themselves. A n d
where they are taken apart, they can also be assembled i n n e w ways,
c o m b i n e d w i t h parts of other, often local derivation. A t w h i c h times
some of the Imported components may certainly also be discarded, as
rubbish.
Perhaps so m u c h of this creativity passes quite neglected in, the
global homogenization scenario for the twin, reasons that f r o m a van-
tage point at the center, many of us really do not see it, a n d since it
is so m u c h a phenomenon of the market, some prefer not to see it.
Yet it is there i n the arenas where the force of global homogenization
Is usually taken to be at its strongest, a n d it often seems to compete
with, considerable success.
Prospects: saturation and maturation
Let me approach n o w the question of longer-term trends of cultur-
al process at the periphery. The interactions between the several
frameworks of cultural process d e p e n d on their respective contents
a n d modes of organization as w e l l as their relative strengths, w h i c h
m a y change over time. The "movement framework, about w h i c h I
have said least here, obviously waxes a n d wanes, The state, especial-
l y apart f r o m what it does in, the field of education, is quite variably
strong. It may speak, i n a very l o u d voice i n its celebration of national
ideology, or it may be barely audible. W i t h regard to what I de-
scribed before as policies of cultural welfare, one has to be especially
aware that peripheral states are often what G u n n a r M y r d a l some
twenty years ago described as "soft states," w i t h very l i m i t e d capaci-
ty for policy i m p l e m e n t a t i o n . This tends to be obvious e n o u g h i n
11
the area of cultural policy.
Clearly the performance of the state i n managing cultural flow de-
pends i n some significant part on material conditions. The soft state
is often an i m p o v e r i s h e d state w h i c h may i l l .afford to maintain a
p o w e r f u l cultural apparatus. The factor of material bases is n o less
important w i t h i n the market framework — w h e n culture Is com-
m o d i t i z e d , it has to be materially compensated for.
This simple but fundamental fact seems often to be treated i n a
11
Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama (New York: Pantheon, 1968).
121
 CULTURE/GLOBALIZATION A N D T H E W O R L D - S Y S T E M
rather cavalier manner w i t h i n the global homogi>nizarion scenario.
O n e w o u l d have to take a range of possibilities .in to account here... If
the involvement of the periphery w i t h the international d i v i s i o n of
labor is not to its advantage-, at any one time or over time, this w o u l d
rather suggest that the periphery through its involvement w i t h 'the
w o r l d system becomes a poorer market for a transnational flow of
c u l t u r a l commodities; w i t h the possible exception, of w h a t w e have
labeled " c u l t u r e d u m p i n g , " w h i c h m a y involve l o w , affordable
prices, but otherwise often unattractive goods. Conversely, of course,
if some part of the periphery becomes nouveau riche, it m a y be
flooded w i t h the cultural commodities of the center. In recent times,
again, the economies of some parts of the periphery, i n c l u d i n g
N i g e r i a , have been o n a rollercoaster ride, and it is not altogether' ob-
vious what are the longer term implications of such shifts i n 'the c u l -
tural market, O n e question, is certainly at w h a t points local entrepre-
neurs w i l l become more active i n i m p o r t substitution, a n d i n what^.
form.
There are noteworthy uncertainties here, then, which, w e have to
bear i n m i n d even as w e try to think of what m a y be trends of cumu- .
lative change. This m u c h granted, I propose that it m a y be useful, to
identify two tendencies i n the longer-term reconstruction of peripher-
al cultures w i t h i n the global ecumene. O n e might think of each (al-
though as w i l l be noted later, I prefer not to) as a distinctive scenario
of future cultural history, a n d i n these terms they w o u l d bear some
resemblance to the global homogenization scenario a n d the peripher-
al c o r r u p t i o n scenarios respectively.
I w i l l call one the saturation, tendency, a n d the other the matura-
tion tendency. The saturation tendency is that w h i c h m a y be seen as
a version, of the global homogenization scenario, w i t h some more de-
tailed interest i n historical sequence. It w o u l d suggest that as the
transnational cultural influences, of whatever sort but i n large part
certainly market organized, a n d operating i n a continuously o p e n
structure, u n e n d i n g l y p o u n d o n the sensibilities of the people of the
periphery, peripheral culture w i l l step b y step assimilate more a n d
more of the i m p o r t e d meanings a n d forms, becoming gradually i n -
distinguishable from the center. A t any one time, what is considered,
local culture is a little more penetrated b y transnational forms than
what w e n t before it as local culture, although at any one time, u n t i l
the end. point is reached, the contrast between local and transnational,
m a y still be d r a w n , a n d still be regarded as significant. The cultural
122
SCENARIOS FOR P E R I P H E R A L CULTURE'S
differences celebrated a n d recommended for safeguarding n o w may
o n l y be a pale reflection of w h a t once existed, a n d sooner or later
they w i l l be gone as well.
W h a t is suggested here is that the center, through the frameworks
of c u l t u r a l process w i t h i n w h i c h the transnational f l o w passes most
readily, .and a m o n g w h i c h the market framework is certainly conspic-
uous, c u m u l a t i v e l y colonizes the m i n d s of the periphery, w i t h a cor-
responding institutionalization of its forms, getting the periphery so
" h o o k e d " that soon e n o u g h there is no real opportunity for choice.
The mere fact that these forms originate in. the center makes them,
even more attractive, a peculiar but undeniable aspect of c o m m o d i t y
esthetics in. the p e r i p h e r y . This, colonization is understood to pro-
12
ceed t h r o u g h relentless cultural bombardment, t h r o u g h the r e d u n -
dancy of its seductive messages. A s the market f r a m e w o r k interpene-
trates w i t h that of forms of life, the latter becomes reconstructed
* a r o u n d their dependence o n w h a t w a s initially alien, u s i n g It for
their practical adaptations, seeing themselves w h o l l y or at least par-
1
tially t h r o u g h It.
It w o u l d appear, however, that one can turn this sort of argument
at least some of the w a y around. The form, of life framework, as I
have said, also has a redundancy of its o w n , built u p through its ever
recurrent daily activities, perhaps at least as strong as, or stronger
than, any redundancy that the market framework can ever achieve...
It m a y involve interpersonal relationships, resulting configurations of
self a n d other, characteristic uses of symbolic m o d e s , There is per-
13
haps a core here to w h i c h the market framework cannot reach, not
even i n the longer term, a core of culture w h i c h is not itself easily
c o m m o d i t i z e d a n d to w h i c h the commodities of the market are not
altogether relevant.
The inherent cultural p o w e r of the f o r m of life f r a m e w o r k c o u l d
I have exemplified this in the Nigerian context in. Ulf Harmerz, "Bush and
1 2
Beento: Nigerian Popular Culture and the World." Paper presented 'in session on
Transnational Practices and Representations of Modernity, Annual Meeting of the
American. Anthropological Association, Chicago, November 18-22,1987.
B
I am reminded here of Wolfs comment that what is referred to as "nation-
al character''' is often lodged in such contexts and relationships. See Eric R. Wolf,
"Kinship, Friendship and Patron-Client Relations in Complex Societies," in The
Social Anthropology of Complex Societies, ed. Michael Banton (London: Travistock,
1966).
123
 CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM
perhaps also be such that it colonizes the market framework, rather
than vice versa. This is more i n line w i t h what I see as the matura-
tion tendency;'a notion w h i c h has its affinities w i t h the peripheral
corruption scenario, although probably w i t h other evaluative over-
tones. The p e r i p h e r y , it is understood here, takes its time reshaping
metropolitan culture to its o w n specifications. It is i n phase one, so to
speak, that the metropolitan forms i n the periphery are most m a r k e d
by their p u r i t y ; b u t o n closer scrutiny they t u r n out to stand there
fairly ineffective, perhaps vulnerable, i n their relative isolation. In a
phase t w o , a n d i n innumerable phases thereafter, as they are made to
interact w i t h whatever else exists, i n their n e w setting, there m a y be
a m u t u a l influence, but the metropolitan forms are s o m e h o w n o
longer so easily recognizable — they become h y b r i d i z e d . In these
later phases, the terms of the cultural market for one thing .are i n a
reasonable measure set f r o m w i t h i n the peripheral forms of life, as
these have come to be constituted, h i g h l y variable of course i n the
degree to w h i c h they are themselves culturally defined i n the terms
d r a w n f r o m the center.
O b v i o u s l y w h a t I have already said about the creativity of p o p u l a r
culture i n m u c h of the T h i r d W o r l d , .and not least i n W e s t A f r i c a , fits
i n here. L o c a l c u l t u r a l entrepreneurs have gradually mastered, the
alien cultural forms w h i c h reach them through the transnational c o m -
m o d i t y f l o w and i n other w a y s , taking them apart, tampering a n d
tinkering w i t h them i n such a w a y that the resulting n e w forms are
more responsive to, a n d at the same time i n part outgrowths of, local
everyday life.
In this connection I s h o u l d return to the doubts I expressed before
about the sense of time, or perhaps lacking sense of time, i n the
scenario of global homogenization. The onslaught of transnational i n -
fluences, as often described or hinted at, seems just a bit too s u d d e n .
In West A f r i c a , such influences have been filtering into the coastal so-
cieties for centuries already, although i n earlier periods o n a smaller
scale a n d b y modest means. There has been time to absorb the for-
eign influences, a n d to m o d i f y the modifications i n t u r n a n d to fit
shifting cultural forms to developing social structures, to situations
a n d emerging-audiences. This, then, is the local scene w h i c h is
14
For discussions of this in the context of West African popular music, see
1 4
John M. Chernoff, "Africa Come Back: The Popular Music of West Africa," in
124
S C E N A R I O S FOR P E R I P H E R A L C U L T U R E S
already i n place to meet the transnational culture industries of the
twentieth century. It is not a scene where the peripheral culture is
utterly defenseless, but rather one where locally e v o l v i n g alternatives
to imports are available, and where there are people at h a n d to keep
p e r f o r m i n g innovative acts of cultural brokerage.
The periphery in creoiization
I s h o u l d b e g i n to p u l l things together. It is probably evident that I
place some emphasis o n the theme of maturation, a n d that I continue
to resist the idea of saturation, at least i n its u n q u a l i f i e d f o r m , w h i c h
is that of global homogenization. In fact, i n that f o r m , it has s u s p i -
ciously m u c h i n c o m m o n w i t h that 1940s or 1950s imagery of mass
culture w i t h i n the metropole w h i c h s h o w e d a faceless, undifferentiat-
ed c r o w d d r o w n i n g i n a flood of mediocre but mass-produced c u l -
tural commodities. Since then, metropolitan scholarship at home has
mostly m o v e d a w a y f r o m that imagery, t o w a r d m u c h more subtle
conceptions of the differentiation of publics, and the contextuallzed
reception of culture industry products. E x p o r t i n g the older, rather
w o r n o u t a n d c o m p r o m i s e d notion to the periphery, consequently,
looks suspiciously like another case of cultural d u m p i n g . 1 5
It is no doubt a trifle unfortunate that there seems to be no single
scenario to p u t i n the place of that of global homogenization, w i t h
similarly strong — but more credible — claims to predictive p o w e r .
But then prediction is not something the h u m a n sciences have been
very g o o d at, and i n the case of the global ordering of culture, what
I have said may at least contribute to some understanding of w h y
this is so. The diversity of Interlocking principles for the organization
of cultural process involves too m a n y uncertainties to allow us to say
m u c h that is v e r y definite w i t h regard to the aggregate outcome.
Repercussions: A Celebration of African-American Music, eds. Geoffrey Haydon .and
Dennis Marks .(London: Century, 1985) and Christopher A. Waterman, "Asiko,
Sakara and Palmwine: Popular Music and Social Identity in Inter-War Lagos,"
Urban Anthropology, 17 (1988):229-258.
Cf. the critical discussion of media research in the 'cultural dependency'
1 5
framework in J. O. Boyd-Barrett, "Cultural Dependency and the Mass Media," in
Culture, Society and the Media, eds. Michael Gurevilch, Tony Bennett, James
Curran and Janet Woollacott (London: Methuen, 1982).
125
 CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM
A f e w points about h o w things seem to be g o i n g m a y at least sen-
sitize to some issues i n s t u d y i n g culture i n the w o r l d , n o w a n d i n the
future. T h e center-periphery structure is one undeniable fact. W h e n
s t u d y i n g culture, w e n o w have to think, about the f l o w between
places as w e l l as that within, them. E a c h society at the periphery, each
T h i r d W o r l d society, has its o w n cultural distinctiveness, b u t it is not
as absolute as it has been (which was never quite absolute). Increas-
ingly, distinctiveness is a matter of degree, as it has l o n g been within,
that N o r t h Atlantic ecumene made u p of a n u m b e r of societies of the
center a n d the semi-periphery; let us say between the U n i t e d States,
G e r m a n y , S w e d e n a n d Portugal. Interactions of m a n y sorts have
been going o n i n this ecumene over a v e r y long time a n d the cultural
affinities are obvious, yet nobody w o u l d deny that there are 'differ-
ences as w e l l . Increasingly, however, w e f i n d the cultural differences
w i t h i n societies, rather than be tween them. If y o u look w i t h i n some
society for what is most uniquely distinctive, y o u w i l l perhaps look
among peasants rather than, bank managers, i n the country rather
than i n the city, a m o n g the o l d rather than the y o u n g . A n d obviously
the reason is that through the operation of the v a r i e d frameworks for
cultural process, a n d the interaction between them, some meanings
and m e a n i n g f u l forms become m u c h more localized, m u c h more tied,
to space, than others. U s i n g the w o r d "societies" i n the p l u r a l as, w e
often, do i n a loose manner, conflating its meaning w i t h that of
"states," w h i c h refers to undeniably territorial phenomena, w e are
m i s l e d t o w a r d a very partial understanding of contemporary cultural
process, as some of its frameworks are not contained w i t h i n particu-
lar states.
If there is any term which, has m a n y of the right associations b y
w h i c h to describe the ongoing, historically cumulative cultural inter-
relatedness between center a n d periphery, it is, I think, "creoliza-
t i o n , " a b o r r o w i n g f r o m particular social a n d cultural histories b y
way of a more generalized linguistics. ' I w i l l not d w e l l o n the
1 6
potential of a creolization scenario for peripheral cultures very l o n g
1 have discussed the idea, of creolization in earlier publications. See Ulf
1 6
Hannerz, "The World in Creolization," Africa, 57 (1987):546-59 and "American
Culture: Creolized, Creolizing," i n American Culture: Creolized, Creolizing, and
Other Lecturesfromthe NAAS Biennial Conference in Uppsala, May 28-31,1987, ed.
Erik Asard (Uppsala: Swedish Institute for North American Studies).
126
SCENARIOS FOR P E R I P H E R A L C U L T U R E S
here, and, it m a y be that what I take f r o m a rather volatile field of
linguistic thought is little more than a r o u g h metaphor. Y e t it has a
n u m b e r of components w h i c h are appropriate enough. I like it
because it suggests that cultures, like languages, can be intrinsically
of m i x e d origin, rather than historically pure a n d homogeneous. It
clashes conspicuously, that is to say, w i t h received assumptions
about culture c o m i n g out of nineteenth century European national-
ism. A n d the similarities between " c r e ó l e " and "create" are not
fortuitous. W e have a, sharper sense than usual, that creóle cultures
result as people actively engage i n m a k i n g their o w n syntheses. W i t h
regard to the entire cultural inventory of h u m a n i t y , creolization m a y
involve losing some, but certainly gaining some, too. There is also in,
the creolization scenario the notion of a more or less open c o n t i n u -
u m , a gradation of l i v i n g syntheses w h i c h can be seen to match the
cultural distance between, center a n d periphery. A n d just as it is
understood to involve a political economy of language, so the creoli-
zation c o n t i n u u m can be seen i n its organization, of diversity to entail
a political economy of culture.
Furthermore, there is the dimension of time. L o o k i n g b a c k w a r d ,
the creolist point of v i e w recognizes history. Creole cultures are not
instant products of the present but have h a d some time to develop
and d r a w themselves together to at least some degree of coherence;
generations have already been b o r n into them, but have also kept
w o r k i n g o n t h e m . L o o k i n g f o r w a r d , the creolization scenario is
17
open-ended. This is perhaps an intellectual copout, but again, proba-
bly .an inevitable one. It suggests that the saturation a n d maturation
tendencies are not necessarily alternatives, but c a n appear i n real life
i n t e r w o v e n w i t h one another. W h e n the peripheral culture absorbs
the i n f l u x of meanings and symbolic forms f r o m the center and trans-
forms them to make them i n some considerable degree their o w n ,
they m a y at the same time so increase the cultural affinities between
the center a n d the periphery that the passage of more cultural i m -
ports is facilitated. W h a t the e n d state of all this w i l l be is impossible
to say, but it is possible that there is none.
A l o n g the creolizing c o n t i n u u m , then, I see the various frameworks
for c u l t u r a l process exercising their continuous Influence. Forms of
17
Cf. Johannes Fabian, "Popular Culture in Africa: Findings and Conjec-
tures," Africa, 48 (1978):315-334.
127
 CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM

life, variously place-bound, take their positions on it, a n d help tie it

together as- the p e o p l e i n v o l v e d also observe each other; the people
6. Interrogating Theories
i n the small t o w n i d o l i z i n g the jet set, perhaps, a n d the jet set m y t h o -
l o g i z i n g the peasants. They m a y o p e n themselves to v a r y i n g degrees
of the Global
to the transnational cultural f l o w of the market, or allow m i d d l e m e n
to occupy the c u l t u r a l space between the center a n d whatever is their
place o n the periphery. O r they may d o both, since the t w o need not
be m u t u a l l y exclusive. N o w a n d then a movement f r o m the metropo-
lis perhaps comes traveling along the c o n t i n u u m . A t other times,
what the metropolis offers may clash instead w i t h a movement gen-
erated at the periphery., A n d finally, a w o r d about the state. W e have
seen, that the state is both a large-scale importer of culture f r o m the
center and a g u a r d i a n of either more or less authentic traditions f r o m
the periphery. B u t i n between, frequently, there is nothing, or not
very m u c h . Perhaps it is inevitable that the state, for the sake of its
o w n legitimacy, is a promotor of uncreolized authenticity. Yet it is
also possible that this is a rather quixotic struggle, a p r o d u c t i o n of
culture of dubious merit i n the v i e w of large parts of the citizenry
whose m i n d s are elsewhere. It may be a perverse proposal, but it I. J A N E T A B U L U G H O D
c o u l d be that to p l a y its part i n cultural welfare, to cooperate w i t h
that citizenry i n shaping intellectual and esthetic instruments w h i c h n. B A R B A R A A B O U - E L - H A J
h e l p people see w h e r e they are a n d w h o they are today, a n d decide
w h e r e they want to go, the state has- to be more self-consciously, but HI. M A U R E E N T U R I M
not self-deprecatingly, a participant i n a m i x e d cultural economy, a
creóle state. IV. A N T H O N Y K I N G

V. JOHN T A G G

128
 6. I. Going Beyond Global Babble

JANET ABU-LUGHOD

ONE CANNOT THINK OF A LARGER DOMAIN T H A N GLOBAL NOR A

broader topic than culture, especially if one wants also to understand
(a) h o w structural characteristics and politics shape culture-creation and
flows (as does Wallerstein), (b) the processes whereby s u c h flows are
unevenly articulated (as does Hannerz), or (c) the form and content of
the n e w globalized culture (as does Robertson). The topic seems too
b i g to handle. E v e n t h o u g h I consider myself a macrosociologist, I
felt uncomfortable w i t h the h i g h level of abstraction of m u c h of the
discourse I read i n preparation for this session. The field, if not con-
trolled, can degenerate into what w e m i g h t c a l l "global-babble."' In
m a n y w a y s I was more comfortable w i t h the approaches of U l f H a n -
nerz (and Stuart H a l l , whose lectures I read later), since both try to
capture the ambiguities and nuances of the concrete, as they are e m -
b e d d e d i n the lives of people.
That is- what I should like to address, but I w o u l d like to expand
H a n n e r z ' s approach to capture more of the cross-currents. H i s f l o w
is still too one-way, from, center to periphery; there is more move-
ment f r o m the periphery to the core than his exposition suggests (a
point captured brilliantly b y Stuart H a l l ) . A n d h a d I more time, I
w o u l d even argue that multiple cores are proliferating and some c u l -
tural p o w e r differences are actually decreasing. O n l y o u r o w n not-
 CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM
fully globalized perspective makes us b l i n d to h o w the c u l t u r e ; of
rising cores i n A s i a are d i f f u s i n g w i t h i n their o w n circuits.
H o w to get a handle on this gigantic and amorphous topic? Let rne
try to concretize v i a three cases.
First, i n the traditional m e d i e v a l city of Tunis, i n a fashion \ „>ry
typical of an " I s l a m i c " city, two suqs (linear bazaars) radiate f: i m
the great Z a y t u n i y a M o s q u e w h i c h always constituted the geogra; hie
focal point a n d organizing principle of the o l d city. O n e s u q le ids
f r o m the mosque to the gateway that connects the m e d i e v a l con- to
the French-built n e w city, a n d was once the s u q . A second sets oi t at
right angles to another exit f r o m the formerly w a l l e d city. O v e r the
years, a remarkable fissure has been d e v e l o p i n g i n these suqs, w h i c h
m a y p r o v i d e a parable for the w o r l d .
The first suq n o w specializes i n T u n i s i a n handicrafts, " t r a d i t i o n a l "
goods, etc. It has kept its exotic architecture and multicolored col-
umnades. The plaintives sound of the ancient nose flute and the
w h i n i n g of A r a b i c music p r o v i d e background for the E u r o p e a n tour-
ists i n their shorts a n d T-shirts, who amble i n twos a n d threes,
s t o p p i n g to look a n d to b u y . F e w natives, except for sellers, are to be
seen. The second s u q , formerly less important, is currently a bustling
madhouse. It is packed w i t h partially v e i l e d w o m e n a n d y o u n g e r
T u n i s i a n .girls i n blouses a n d skirts, w i t h m e n i n knee-length tu-
nic/toga outfits or i n a variety of pants and shirts, w i t h c h i l d r e n
everywhere. F e w foreigners can be seen. The background to the d i n
is blaring rock a n d r o l l music, a n d p i l e d h i g h o n the pushcarts that
line the w a y are transistor radios, watches, blue Jeans (some p re-
washed), rayon si arves, L u x face a n d O m o l a u n d r y soaps. H e r e is
H a n n e r z ' s " m a r k e t , " the w o r l d of commodities. But note that, i n the
globalization of cultural artifacts that Hannerz describes, a t w o - w a y
process of "objectification" is going on.
O n the outskirts of the same city, m e n sit cross-legged on the floors
of crude w o r k s h o p s , h a n d s e w i n g the finishing touches o n G u c c i
purses. In. other sweatshops w o m e n sew seams o n couturier cre-
ations. H e r e , w i t h o u t any doubt, is Wallerstein's international d i v i -
sion of labor, w i t h undeniable economic hegemony.
In the Census Office of the T u n i s i a n government, w h e r e I h a d
come to negotiate fox access to census data (collected, f o l l o w i n g the
advice of the U n i t e d Nations, to make it u n i f o r m a n d comparable to
the data of over 100 other nations) w e discuss i n F r e n c h the me-
chanics of data transfer — I B M , C o n t r o l Data, sept piste or neuf piste
132
I N T E R R O G A T I N G THEORIES O F T H E G L O B A L
(7 or 9 track tape). H e r e is the u p p e r circuit of hi-tech/ communica-
tion, fully globalized, but w i t h i n the nation-state. H e r e is Robertson's
global GeseUschafi. But only a few are privileged to it. I may have
more i n c o m m o n w i t h these T u n i s i a n demographers than w i t h m y
cleaning w o m a n , but she has more i n c o m m o n w i t h me than w i t h a
T u n i s i a n domestic servant.
I present the second anecdote w i t h a real cautionary. M y eldest
daughter, w h o is an anthropologist, l i v e d for several years w i t h a
g r o u p of sedentarized bedouins i n the western desert of Egypt. She
recently returned for a, visit. S t o p p i n g i n Cairo, she learned that the
newest, most p o p u l a r singer i n the country — his cassettes p l a y i n g
everywhere — w a s a. y o u n g male b e d o u i n rock singer' whose music
combines b e d o u i n rhythms (actually, the " d a n c i n g h o r s e " patterns)
w i t h western style music. A m o n g the presents she took to the
" t r i b e , " then, were some of his cassettes, m u c h appreciated by the
y o u n g girls w h o found the singer's picture, on the cassette cover,
" s e x y . " The older w o m e n commented that he looked " f u n n y . " There
was clearly something w r o n g w i t h his eyes (i.e., the older w o m e n
d i d n ' t recognize his encoded sidelong glance as seductive). A proper
m a n stares seriously ahead...
N o w , this genre of m i x e d western a n d " o r i e n t a l " music is prolifer-
ating all over the w o r l d . I was first introduced to it b y a Belgian-
A m e r i c a n political scientist w h o fell i n love w i t h it i n G e r m a n y ,
where T u r k i s h migrant laborers h a d evolved a. similar syncretic
genre! I'm m a k i n g a. copy of m y daughter's tape to pass on to the
Belgian, w h o w i l l probably send a copy to his G e r m a n friends. F r o m
an ethnocentric point of v i e w , w h a t we tend to see is the westerniza-
tion of oriental music, but I w o u l d like to propose an alternative
diagnosis. W h a t we are seeing is the orientalization of western music.
A s the early sociologists of A m e r i c a n assimilation pointed out, it is a
t w o - w a y street.
T h u s far, m y comments have been supportive of the convergence
thesis. G r a n t e d , I see more movement from, the periphery to the
center than most people do. (Listen to p o p u l a r music i n the States
these days a n d y o u ' l l p i c k u p third w o r l d influences; w a l k d o w n the
streets of N e w Y o r k and y o u ' l l see third w o r l d culture i m p o r t e d and
affecting Americans.) I do not d e n y the hegemonic influence of west-
ern, patterns i n the diffusion of the " n a t i o n state" (although form
s h o u l d never be confused w i t h content, w h i c h varies w i d e l y ) , nor do
I ignore the influence of central institutions, even that of otherwise
133
 CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM
impotent international organizations, i n creating a western-based
m o d e l of " m o d e r n " society w i t h relatively u n i f o r m aspirations if not
characteristics.
But culture is more than " t r a i t s , " everyday practices, a n d even i n -
stitutions — economic, educational, technological, a n d political. The
early anthropologists insisted it was, fundamentally, beliefs, " w o r l d ,
v i e w s , " a n d special constructions of reality. In the last analysis, that
is what constitutes the hallmark of civilizations, i n Wallerstein's v i e w ,
or of true globalization, i n Robertson's work, A n d here w e seem a
l o n g w a y f r o m convergence.
M y t h i r d example, then, is d r a w n f r o m the Satanic Verses — the
author, the book, the reception, the battle ikies that have been d r a w n
about it. This case allows us to lay bare Just what is syncretizing,
w h a t is globalizing, and what remains unconvergent i n our so-called
global village!
Let us e m p l o y Robertson's Weberian device of ideal types, A
French historian (Chaunu) has used the term univers cloisonnée to de-
scribe the cultural condition of the globe before the formation of a
western-hegemonic w o r l d system. W h i l e one can. argue that there
were more connections a n d linkages crossing the mosaic pieces of
culturally distinctive regions than this term conveys (and I argue this
i n m y book, Before European Hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250¬
1350), the basic point is w e l l taken.
N o w , i n such a w o r l d , the recent cause célèbre c o u l d not have H a p -
pened, Salman Rushdie w o u l d most probably have stayed w h e r e he
was born — o n the Indian subcontinent. H e would, have written i n a
language and genre of his region. A n d if he h a d w r i t t e n heresy, he
w o u l d have been burned, at the stake (as happened, in. Europe), i m -
paled or halved, at the waist (if i n the M i d d l e East), or met w i t h
whatever sad fate was traditional i n his region. Furthermore, he
w o u l d have been aware of what he was d o i n g a n d the risk he was
r u n n i n g — because he w o u l d have been addressing an audience of
people w i t h i n his piece of the mosaic. M o r e o v e r , he w o u l d have em-
p l o y e d , albeit imaginatively a n d creatively, a genre of his cul-.ure.
Thus, he w o u l d k n o w that he communicated, what he intended, .and
his readers w o u l d k n o w w h a t he meant by.it. If indeed, he were a.
renegade a n d an. exile — a n d earlier w o r l d history contains not a few
of these, individuals w h o left their original culture, adopted the w a y s
of others, sometimes rose to prominence i n their n e w cultures — he
might have chosen to write a book, even a brutally sarcastic one,
134
I N T E R R O G A T I N G THEORIES OF T H E G L O B A L
about his culture of origin. But i n a cloissoneed universe, there is al-
most no w a y his w o r k could have become k n o w n in the place he left.
That d i d not happen. N o r d i d its opposite.
A t the other extreme of globalization is .an ideal type of instanta-
neous, indiscriminate .and complete diffusion, of all cultural products,
w i t h no need for intermediate interpretation. W e are still very far f r o m
that. Rather, w h a t w e are experiencing is r a p i d , incomplete and h i g h -
ly differentiated flows i n global transmission. W e have a globalizing
but not necessarily homogeneous culture. W h i l e i n the last analysis,
w e think that this is good, enriching, and generative, we have not
f i g u r e d out h o w to live w i t h the dilemmas it creates.
Clearly, w e w i l l need a lot of verstehen and w i l l have to develop
m u c h more tolerance for the w o r l d views of others, no matter h o w
offensive w e f i n d them. Communications have irretrievably shattered
the cloissoneed character of cultural boundaries; there is. no longer
a n y place to hide. Wallerstein sees w i t h radical v i s i o n the equally
abhorrent choices — between a universalism based u p o n xenophobia
and a globalization, based u p o n a p a r a l y z i n g cultural relativism. I
think, however, that a t h i r d w a y is conceivable, at least romantically,
namely: m u t u a l awareness, sensitivity a n d , if not acceptance, an
attempt to interpret a n d evaluate the beliefs and acts of others on
their o w n , not our, terms, This need not lead to bland cultural rela-
tivism. It need not Imply no values. O n e could still believe and
prefer, one c o u l d choose to associate or disassociate, but one w o u l d
have to learn to grant to the other his/her contextual wholeness. If w e
cannot go back to ignorance, w e must move ahead to understanding.
Let us return to the Rushdie case. What, indeed, happened? I have
been insisting to m y arm-chair theorist friends that, before pontificat-
i n g o n the case, they read i n f u l l not only the Satanic Verses (rather
than just the offensive excerpts) but some of his earlier w o r k s , espe-
cially Midnight's Children. For here is a satirist of rapier w i t , for
w h o m n o t h i n g is sacred — neither M r s , Thatcher, w h o m he calls
throughout M r s . Torture; nor the anglophile Indian poseur (who i n
the n o v e l turns into, or believes he has turned into, the devil); nor the
Indian p o p - m o v i e star (who play gods so often that he becomes, or
thinks he has become, the good angel, G a b r i e l , transmitting G o d ' s
message to M o h a m m e d ) ; nor even the inviolate i m m u t a b i l i t y of the
K o r a n . (It r e m i n d s one of P o s t - D a r w i n discussions i n the west about
" w h o wrote the B i b l e " and of the so-called " m o n k e y " trial.)
In the course of this James-Joycean-novel of puns a n d broadside
135
 CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM I N T E R R O G A T I N G THEORIES OF T H E G L O B A L

hilarity, of dream, sequences narrated conventionally a n d of bizarre about a deeper theory of global culture than w e n o w have, and h o w ,
" l i f e " sequences narrated fantastically, one grasps immediately that i n g r o u n d e d fashion, w e s h o u l d be l o o k i n g for it.
the genre is pure post-modern West, In its intent as veiled social crit-
icism, the n o v e l descends linearly f r o m Rabelais a n d Swift. Yet it uses
the raw matter u p o n w h i c h all writers must d r a w — his o w n experi-
ences, his o w n stream of consciousness associations, his o w n " c u l -
t u r e , " w h i c h , i n this case, is Islamic and eastern, as w e l l as British
and cosmopolitan.
The audience i t addresses — the English-speaking literati — recog-
nizes the genre but not a large part of the " c u l t u r e . " The people w h o
c o u l d understand the cultural content cannot recognize the genre.
A s w e have noted, i n the univers cloissonnee, these t w o culture
zones w o u l d have been buffered b y distance a n d communication bar-
riers. But today's global village offers f e w such protections. Rather,
n e w s of Rushdie's n o v e l reaches M u s l i m bilinguals w h o perceive it
as sacrilegeous ;— w h i c h it clearly is. They report this to their state;,
officials, perhaps excerpting and translating the passages they f i n d
most offensive. The w o r k is b a n n e d here and there (and not only i n
M u s l i m countries), is c o n d e m n e d , a n d finally, the head of a n Islamic
state condemns jnot just the book but the author. Inter alia, h u n d r e d s
of M u s l i m s i n N e w Y o r k demonstrate i n front of Barnes a n d N o b l e
bookstore a n d i n front of V i k i n g publishers, whose office receives a
b o m b threat. (Up the street, fundamentalist Christians are picketing
The Last Temptation of Christ.)
Nor is the response of western writers m u c h more enlightened.
Rallies are h e l d a n d famous authors declare their fealty to freedom of
expression. (Do they deplore western censorship? Do- they notice it?)
1

They passionately express their condemnation of K h o m e i n i ' s " b a r b a -

r i s m . " Talk of trade retaliation surfaces. (So far, I haven't heard
" N u k e 'em.") V i r t u a l l y none of these authors has read the book. But
even if they were to read it, w i l l they ever be able to understand the
response of a believing M u s l i m to this attack on a most fundamental
tenet of the religion, the pristine God-givenness of the K o r a n , its i m -
mutability, a n d M o h a m m e d as p u r e m e d i u m for its transmission?
:

C a n they be offended b y an attack on w h a t they don't believe?

This real event i n such recent m e m o r y (Rushdie is still i n h i d i n g
and the book is selling like hot-cakes) can stand as a very concrete i n -
stance of how globalized a n d yet how unglobalized C U L T U R E has be-
come. H o w one analyzes w h a t happened i n t'Affaire Rushdie, .and
h o w one resolves the real conflict i n v o l v e d i n it can give some hints

136 137
 6. II. Languages and Models
for Cultural Exchange

BARBARA ABOU-EL-HAJ

U L F H A M N E R Z HAS CHARACTERIZED AS ETHNOCENTRIC (i WOULD

say Eurocentric) current theorizations w h i c h conceive art emerging
global culture u n f o l d i n g asymmetrically i n homogenized or corrupt
forms generalized f r o m west to east, f r o m n o r t h to south. Eurocentric
is a relatively m i l d expression we apply to comparative studies
w h i c h fall short of their intentions because i n fact they perpetuate o l d
regimes of t h i n k i n g , continue into a hegemonic future the colonial
past .and imperialist present. The predicted scenarios, for a homoge-
n i z e d or corrupt global culture, look like contemporary a n d decep-
tively m i l d e r versions of their colonial predecessor, the quasi-sci-
entific theory of vanishing races incapable of competing w i t h E u r o p e -
an, civilization, d o o m e d to extinction, w h i c h justified efforts to assimi-
late or remove a n d finally to annihilate indigenous peoples. In their
m o d e r n forms a n d systematizing language, theories of homogeniza-
tion a n d c o r r u p t i o n offer their h u m a n subjects as little alternative to
massive subordination as was offered native A m e r i c a n s w h o , w h e n
not k i l l e d outright, were " p r o t e c t e d " by the Indian R e m o v a l A c t of
I 1830. A n associated theory predicated the rise of the West u p o n the
1

1
K. S. Might, " 'Doomed to Perish": George Catlin's Depictions of the Man-
 CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM
decline of the East, a " m o d e l of cultural study crystallized i n the
early colonial p e r i o d , 1750-1850" for the Orient and v e r y m u c h alive
a m o n g leading " o r i e n t a l i s t s . "
2
In place of homogenization a n d corruption, H a n n e r z offers a set of
energizing variables: not global cultural p r o d u c t i o n / local reproduc-
tion, but reciprocity a n d synthesis, premised on the transforming
nature of m u t u a l cultural " f l o w s . " This formulation has a clear
advantage in its capacity to decenter the p o w e r f u l core-periphery
f o r m u l a w h i c h makes of world-systems i n practice, if not in theory,
a one-way penetration f r o m center to m a r g i n , f r o m strong to w e a k ,
f r o m aggressive to passive and concentrates analytic energy o n the
global over thé local. In the older practice culture is reflexive of
unequal power; relations operating i n the sphere of ideology. D o m i -
nant culture is generated by groups whose concentration of p o w e r
allows them to structure core a n d peripheral relations in favor of
themselves and at the expense of those w h o are their economic, polit-
ical a n d social objects. In the alternative suggested b y H a n n e r z a n d
argued b y I m m a n u e l Wallerstein, culture is an arena for struggle a n d
transformation.
Yet reciprocity a n d synthesis seem also m i l d , suggest a capacity for
equal exchanges i n a w o r l d r i d d l e d w i t h unequal exchanges. In
Gramsci's terms, w e might argue that the parameters of consensus,
of hegemony, are never guaranteed, but p r o f o u n d l y volatile, charged
f r o m both directions i n a tense exchange between manipulators and
their intended objects, eloquently addressed by Stuart H a l l i n the
o p e n i n g essays. Yet, h o w are w e to reconcile this volatility w i t h the
apparent p o w e r of c u l t u r a l forms to serve so p r o d i g i o u s l y the capaci-
ty of dominant groups to reproduce themselves o n their o w n terms,
to mobilize their v i s i o n into national and even global c u l t u r a l norms?
The tendency to emphasize the center in cultural analyses is pre-
m i s e d o n the core-periphery m o d e l a n d its analyses of visible a n d
p r o f o u n d l y u n e q u a l distribution of material and cultural p o w e r be-
tween centers where industrial a n d financial capital are concentrated
and peripheries where they are not. In this m o d e l the remnants of
dan," Art Journal (Depictions of the Dispossessed, ed. C. F. Klein), 49 (1990)119-24.
2
P. Gran, Islamic Roots of Capitalism, Egypt, 1760-1840 (Austin: University of
Texas Press, 1979) x l , and, of course, E. Said, Orientalism (New York: Penguin,
1978).
140
I N T E R R O G A T I N G THEORIES OF T H E G L O B A L
Eurocentrism l u r k i n the unequal attention given to the local stake i n
the reception a n d alliance w i t h global p o w e r brokers, i n strategies for
a hierarchical distribution of p o w e r i n local arenas m a r k e d as m u c h
by local class divisions as by international regimes of power.
Seemingly clear cases of local ambitions shaped b y global interests
can be p r o f o u n d l y local i n their formation, for example nationalism,
a E u r o p e a n creation and a E u r o p e a n import. A p p e a l s to global polit-
ical culture, i n the f o r m of nationalism and i n the context of de-
colonization, served particularly w e l l to consolidate for local elites
positions of p o w e r vacated b y the colonial predecessors w i t h w h o m
they were formerly allied. In these instances, locally-formed hierar-
chies were the essential condition for colonial a n d post-colonial
regimes so often orchestrated b y the same groups. F r o m a western
perspective, the cultural spheres of these political a n d economic
processes i n education, i n shaping nationalizing histories, seem to
epitomize a subordination of local to global culture. Perhaps the
more significant pattern is the appropriation of global cultural forms
because they suit so w e l l the ambitions of local elites. U l f H a n n e r z
has described parallel agendas i n peripheral states to "construct t w o
(contradictory) cultures: the one of homogenization, as citizens w i t h
a coherent national identity; the other as differences, especially
t h r o u g h education, to fit categories of i n d i v i d u a l s into different slots
in. the structure of production a n d r e p r o d u c t i o n , " what I m m a n u e l
Wallerstein called dialectic and schizophrenia.
A n instructive case of globally f o r m e d but locally p r o d u c e d histori-
cal culture can be observed i n near Eastern historiography where
Orientalist paradigms have been reproduced not only by those
trained i n E u r o p e and the U n i t e d States, but also in. M i d d l e Eastern
universities. A generation of scholars, i n c l u d i n g Turks, has created,
modernist, a n d by definition secular, national histories predicated, on
the virtual exclusion of four to five h u n d r e d years of O t t o m a n his-
tory. Clearly these respond, to global patterns, to the o v e r w h e l m i n g
historical paradigm, of western imperialism:: modernization theory. In
this local f o r m modernity Is assimilated to the secular nation state.
The O t t o m a n multi-ethnic, multi-regional empire is conceived only i n
its regressive, theocratic f o r m , shaped b y centuries of European fear
a n d competition. N e v e r is it conceived as a defeated alternative
(transformed to be sure) to that European nation-state m o d e l whose
current d o m i n a t i o n of local political systems appears inevitable only
in. retrospect, and in. 1989-1990 increasingly transitional as a political
141
 CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM
formation. ' 3
Because the nation-state has been the political f o r m u n d e r w h i c h
international capital expanded, it does not f o l l o w that this political
f o r m a n d its c u l t u r a l expression arise only f r o m the center nor that it
w o u l d have achieved its massive success w i t h o u t a corresponding
local formation of merchant capital to receive global industrial and f i -
nancial capital. S i m i l a r l y c u l t u r a l forms w h i c h help to shape capitalist
social relations arise also i n the periphery. " T h e non-Western re-
4 image, don't seem adequate to the task of p r o v i d i n g descriptive or
gions collaborating i n the larger social transformation of the late
eighteenth century h a d indigenous roots for their o w n m o d e r n capi-
talist cultures, f o r m e d through processes of indigenous struggle a n d
in some f o r m of struggle w i t h the European, part of the system, I am
convinced that, properly understood, the industrial revolution was a
global event, a n d I question the strong tradition i n the West to as-
s u m e a proprietary relationship to it." In this formulation, class d i -
5
visions occupy the center not the periphery and w h e n w e ask whose
interests are served by the wholesale exclusion of a half m i l l e n n i u m
of O t t o m a n rule, w e m a y answer perhaps the v e r y same post-colonial
architects of m o d e r n , M i d d l e Eastern nation-states whose sources of
p o w e r were f o r m e d indigenously a n d locally, i n l a n d and i n mer-
chant capital.
Who is central and who peripheral?
O u r ambition to do equal justice to global .and local, is l i m i t e d at
the outset b y o u r failure to generate a comparative language beyond,
1
the set of tidy binaries w h i c h reproduce the global regime i n the v e r y
attempt to eviscerate it: center/periphery, core/periphery, west-
ern/non-western, developed/ developing, etc. The periphery is, in.
H a n n e r z ' s phrase, " b y no means a defense-less v i c t i m " ; rather it has
powerfully shaped the center, sweats f r o m its pores, In truth the
centers are somehow difficult to locate, to isolate. They are not c o n -
cordant w i t h national or even hemispheric boundaries. In the U n i t e d
3
R.A. Abou-EI-Haj, "The Uses of the Past. Recent Arab Historiography of
Ottoman Rule," International Journal of Middle East Studies, 1.4 (1982).
4
Maxime Rodinson, Islam and Capitalism, Eng. trans. B, Pearce (New York:
Penguin, 1973) 118-37.
5
From Gran's introduction to his study of Egyptian .cultural and material life,
1760-1840, p. xii.
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I N T E R R O G A T I N G THEORIES O'F T H E G L O B A L
States and U n i t e d K i n g d o m , w h o indeed controls wealth? Between
west a n d east, north .and south, w h o are the debtors a n d w h o the
debtees? G l o b a l capital w o r k s precisely across national frontiers, its
boundaries formed by an international division of labor. In what rela-
tion does the underclass of N e w Y o r k C i t y stand to that of Rio? The
l o n g progression of binary oppositions, divorced over time f r o m their
colonial a n d i m p e r i a l roots, even w h e n d e p r i v e d of their spatial
analytic p o w e r to fluid and volatile spheres of activity. If w e cannot
phrase an alternative, if an adequate language eludes us, h o w can w e
visualize a comparative theorization of culture(s)?
Global/local is a qualitative step f o r w a r d . It suggests no charged
hierarchical divisions, is less concordant w i t h spatial boundaries or
geographical regions, is capable of encompassing u n e q u a l distribu-
tion within as w e l l as between national and regional entitles. In H a n -
nerz's formulation, cultures freely shape syntheses between the
global and the local, " t h o u g h always understood as themselves
shaped by the international division of labor." Synthesis suggests
reciprocal transformations, but abstractly, passively, a n d i n this re-
spect w e m a y remain not too distant f r o m the core-periphery m o d e l
w i t h its i m p l i c i t treatment of the " t h i r d w o r l d " as receiver, over-
w h e l m e d by the authority, the sheer wealth of metropolitan culture
distributed through the mass m e d i a apparatus of global technology.
H a n n e r z resists this passive characterization as an "Imaginary by-
product of the awakening to global realities of many of us inhabit-
ants of the center." So his scenario gives to local culture the capacity
not o n l y to take, but to give, to synthesize, to transform. H o w cultur-
al transformations may shape material transformations receives little
attention, although his " m o v e m e n t s " category may be the space for
this discussion. The "international division of l a b o r " just begins to
touch u p o n the horrific forms of subordination imposed b y unequal
exchanges, material, political, cultural. Sweat-shop labor i n north
A f r i c a and east Los Angeles transgress spatial divisions.
T o describe processes of cultural synthesis a n d transformation
H a n n e r z offers " c r e o l i z a t i o n , " a " c o r r u p t m e t a p h o r " n o w m a i n -
streamed top d o w n to describe a true cultural dialectic, its former
racist baggage of debasement subverted. For those of us outside
anthropological and sociological discourse, the after-image lingers
uncomfortably. Beyond our p r i m a r y categories, global/local, w e have
yet to f i n d a language capable of describing equal exchange i n a
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 CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM

w o r l d of u n e q u a l exchanges. Is o u r vocabulary so i m p o v e r i s h e d
because there is no such t h i n g to be described, or because w e have 6. III. Specificity and Culture
such difficulty envisaging it?

M A U R E E N TURIM

I BEGIN WITH A QUESTION: DOES CULTURAL HEGEMONY SIMPLY

follow f r o m , overlap w i t h , a n d m i m i c economic a n d political d o m i n a -
tion? If so, then the study of culture w o u l d reveal an exceedingly
simple narrative, an illustration of activities enacted i n these other
spheres alone. If the current economic moment is one of globaliza-
tion, culture w o u l d s i m p l y follow that pattern, emanating f r o m those
areas w h i c h control the rest of the w o r l d , H o w e v e r , i n s t u d y i n g c u l -
ture, I f i n d the situation far more complex, I a m r e m i n d e d of a pas-
sage i n a particular cinematic text, N a g i s a Oshima's Merry Christmas,
Mr. Lawrence u p o n w h i c h I have w o r k e d , a n d its relationship to a
source text, Lawrence V a n D e r Post's The Sower and the Seed. A char-
acter i n the novel, Jack Celliers, is portrayed as t h i n k i n g :

H e felt that the first necessity i n life was to make the universal
specific, the general particular, the collective i n d i v i d u a l a n d what
was unconscious in us conscious.

This is a conclusion that Celliers arrives at after an emotionally

devastating personal crisis. H e is A f r i k a a n s , attending a British-style
boys' school w h e r e his hunchback younger brother is also enrolled.
D u e to the conformity exiged b y this context, he fails to defend his
deformed brother f r o m harassment. This failure to act precipitates an
unsettling of the self that permeates the rest of the novel.
W h i l e I don't subscribe to the oppositions offered i n the quoted
passage, I a m struck by its will towards transformation, evidenced i n
the desire to make the universal specific. I cite it to raise basic ques-
\
tions about o u r patterns of logic, o u r w a y s of thinking. Are they dia-
lectic? Do they m o v e b e y o n d the dialectic? D o they Incorporate the

144
 CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM
specific a n d multiplicity that feminist criticism, particularly, has intro-
d u c e d into o u r discourse? These seem to be v e r y important questions
i n this context, ones that call for anti-totalizing theories.
The models that have been dealt w i t h by the essays i n this v o l u m e
are largely econocentric. The debate is over the f o r m market i m p e r a -
tive takes. It has not been o n the role the market imperative has i n
the p r o d u c t i o n and reception of culture.
One of the problems for me has been the absence of images, the
absence of s o m i d i n addressing this 'throughout the conference. W e
have hermetically sealed o u r discourse off from, the v e r y objects and
effects that w e are meant to be considering. I want, therefore, i n the
rest of this intervention, to introduce some specific examples to begin
a discussion of h o w the p r o d u c t i o n of culture needs to be analyzed.
One comes f r o m the A c a d e m y A w a r d s presentation of 1989. The
A c a d e m y A w a r d s conjoin two industries, two parts of culture p r o -
duction, television and. the film industry, that are increasingly inter-,
'twined. M o r e o v e r , this time, immense attention was devoted to the
fact that the A c a d e m y A w a r d s presentation itself was distributed b y
satellite and exhibited globally. It was continually discussed: this was
on satellite and ninety-one countries were receiving it, either directly
or b y delay (at w h i c h point it w o u l d be translated). The spectators
w o u l d be counted i n the billions.
Early o n , however, there was a disjuncture i n the manner this text
self-consciously signalled the global reception of culture. Comedienne
L i l y T o m l i n came center stage after the first lavish a n d grotesque
p r o d u c t i o n n u m b e r to joke about just this phenomenon, even as she
presented it. She said, "Imagine the entire w o r l d t r y i n g to figure out
what that m e a n t . " H e r moment of irony, reflexivity and contradiction
points out w h a t w e need to study i n what w e might call dominant
global culture. W e k n o w culture is being p r o d u c e d for global con-
sumption, b u t w e don't k n o w w h a t the w o r l d makes of w h a t it re-
ceives a n d w e can not assume inherent meanings, whatever w e
might take those to mean. C u l t u r e is m a r k e d b y a k i n d of p o l y v a -
lence of meaning, a kind, of multiplicity that is highly contextual a n d
even internally contused. K n o w i n g the site a n d means of p r o d u c t i o n
and the manner of distribution w i l l not necessarily reveal h o w the
texts of culture are consumed.
There is a lot more to say about the awards, not the least of w h i c h
is to highlight the award, to the N a t i o n a l F i l m Board of Canada at the
very moment that the U.S.-Canadian trade agreements threaten to an-
146
I N T E R R O G A T I N G THEORIES OF T H E G L O B A L
nihilate remnants of a specifically Canadian culture. But the point is
that the A c a d e m y A w a r d s give us one w a y of l o o k i n g at the A m e r i -
can d o m i n a t i o n of culture .in the w o r l d right n o w , a moment i n
w h i c h certain myths continue to circulate even if this process is filled
w i t h p u z z l i n g uncertainties.
A second example. Early i n 1989, the French government presented
a position paper i n w h i c h the M i n i s t e r of Culture, Jack L a n g , re-
s p o n d e d to the fact that currently two thirds of the box office receipts
i n France were going to A m e r i c a n films. O v e r French f i l m history
there have been governmental controls and even quotas o n the i m -
portation of foreign films meant to stop this A m e r i c a n domination;
a i m i n g only at the n u m b e r of films screened, these controls can not
address the w a y A m e r i c a n films sell more tickets. Further attempts
must be made to rescue the European f i l m industry. W e have to ask,
if it is necessary to intervene to rescue the European f i l m industry,
what is going on i n the rest of the w o r l d ? Does this signal the end of
French culture or G e r m a n culture?
A look at a f i l m like W i m Wender's Paris, Texas m i g h t lead us to
say not yet. It was made by a G e r m a n director w i t h A m e r i c a n money
and distributed by A m e r i c a n firms, but offers a European sensibility
on an A m e r i c a n subject. In terms of the dichotomy between financial
investment and profit o n one h a n d and notions of national identity
and national discourses, y o u can have incredible splits. Y o u can have
A m e r i c a marketing Europe back to Europe. The same is true of every
other country. W e have a w o r l d system, but the lines of p o w e r and
influence change direction d e p e n d i n g on what aspect of production
or reception are under scrutiny; the p r o d u c t i o n of meanings contin-
ues to confuse. W e can not s i m p l y assume w e k n o w the vectors
shaped b y articulations.
M y t h i r d illustration: a short article i n an advertising supplement
t o ; t h e New York Times (March 26, 1989) b y a Japanese musician
R i u i c h i Sakamoto. H e argues that there are various trade imbalances,
one to w h i c h he is subject. N o one i n A m e r i c a is b u y i n g foreign c u l -
ture, w h i l e Japanese people b u y A m e r i c a n music all the time. Saka-
moto is exaggerating and moreover his argument is being positioned
ideologically i n Japanese advertising against trade regulations; not
only is his music w e l l k n o w n i n the U.S., but (to return to the Acade-
m y A w a r d s ) he w o n an Oscar for his score for The Last Emperor and
became internationally k n o w n as the star of Merry Christmas, Mr,
Lawrence, Yet there is something to his complaint; the culture indus-
147
 CULTURE, .GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM

tries i n the U n i t e d States are not suffering on the w o r l d market. They

are amongst the most productive a n d rich industries that the U . S .
have. Yet increasingly, they are o w n e d by Japanese " p a r e n t " con-
cerns or are dependent o n Japanese investors.
A s somebody w h o studies culture, the significance of these changes
is all very apparent to me. Y e t global economic models leave us
almost bereft of a methodology for approaching the i n d i v i d u a l w o r k s
themselves. Certainly, in, l o o k i n g at something like Merry Christmas,
Mr. Lawrence w e must consider that it is a f i l m made for the global
market. It's m a d e w i t h N e w Zealand a n d British money for interna-
tional distribution. Its Japanese director couldn't f i n d Japanese m o n e y
w i l l i n g to back h i m .
Y e t the strategy of the f i l m is to tell the enemy's story, i n this case,
the enemy f r o m W o r l d W a r n , as embodied i n the British a n d South,
A f r i c a n characters. It seeks to share i n the manner i n w h i c h they
v i e w e d the Japanese. This serves a debate about language, about the
psyche a n d about identity, articulated a r o u n d the trope of homosexu-
ality a n d homosocial bonds. T w o rock stars play the lead roles,
R i u i c h i Sakamoto and D a v i d B o w i e . This juxtaposition, this place-
ment of contemporary stars into historical personas plays out w i t h
grand theatricality a conflict of identity and sexual attraction u n d e r l y -
i n g absolute conflict. The Japanese c o m m a n d accuses Celliers (Bowie)
of willfulness; his crime is assertion of the self. H i s crime is not his
being the enemy, not his taking of British commands, but rather a
willful, disobedience at a l l points of c o m m a n d . Because of that, the
f i l m makes a v e r y critical incursion into Japanese culture, where the
projection of a self a n d a w i l l remains culturally dangerous. Its read-
ings elsewhere i,might be quite different; I have heard it read i n the
U.S. as Japanese cultural justification of their w a r effort because a
British officer forgives his c o n d e m n e d former captor after the war,
Contradictory readings, unclear meanings, patterns of investment
sometimes inverse to identities expressed a n d the nagging uncertain-
ties of cultural reception — all combine to create a distortion to the
m a p w e m i g h t attempt to d r a w of o u r global culture. M y examples,
m y arguments, are meant as questions.
6. IV. The Global, the Urban,
and the World
ANTHONY KING
WHAT CONTRIBUTIONS C A N THESE VARIOUS T H E O R I Z A T I O N S O F
"the world, as a single p l a c e " make t o w a r d the understanding of con-
temporary c u l t u r a l practices a n d of cultural transformations i n the
contemporary w o r l d ? In attempting to answer this question, I want
to address the topic of " c u l t u r e , globalization and the w o r l d - s y s t e m "
i n relation to three themes.
First, i n regard to transformations i n the built environment, i n
architecture, i n the physical and spatial f o r m of cities, a n d the mean-
ing a n d significance of these changes, at a global scale; second, i n
relation to the views expressed i n the p r i n c i p a l papers here concern-
ing the significance of the nation-state in, the p r o d u c t i o n of culture
and the development of national cultures and identities. Finally, I
want to make a few observations about the implications of globaliza-
tion theory a n d the world-systems perspective for the study of c u l -
tural practice, .and especially, the understanding of cultures on a
global scale.
In the first instance, it w o u l d seem that a great deal might be
learnt, a n d m a n y of the abstract theorizations aired here could be
operationalized a n d tested b y s t u d y i n g certain aspects of the material
world, as they have been physically a n d spatially produced and
expressed. O f course, this assumes that there is indeed an objective,

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 CULTURE, G L O B A L I Z A T I O N A N D T H E W O R L D - S Y S T E M
" r e a l " material w o r l d w h i c h exists independently of the discourses
w h i c h are used to represent it. For people w i t h an interest i n archi-
tecture, i n b u i l d i n g a n d u r b a n f o r m , phrases used i n o u r debates
such as constructions of ethnicity, concrete cultural practices, ideas
grounded i n notions of the class subject, or discussions about the
erosion or rebuilding of national identities, have an i m m e d i a c y a n d
p h y s i c a l referent w h i c h p r o m p t m e to start l o o k i n g for their v i s u a l
and spatial representation. Let me take some ideas from, the m a n y of-
fered b y the p r i n c i p a l contributors to this s y m p o s i u m a n d illustrate
more precisely w h a t I mean,
Stuart H a l l discusses at length, the topic of " o l d and n e w identi-
ties" particularly w i t h reference to E n g l a n d , though, m a n y of his i n -
sights are, of course, equally applicable elsewhere. This is especially
the case i n relation to the conditions creating the o l d collective social
identities of class, region, gender, or race, as w e l l as the "distinctive
ethnic identity of Englishness." H e also addressed the n e w conditions
of international interdependence, national economic decline, interna-
tional labor migration, a n d the " d e c l i n e of the masculine g a z e "
w h i c h are contributing to these n e w identities.
Yet these transformations i n subjectivity do not occur i n a spatial
v a c u u m , nor on an environmental tabula rasa. The o l d identities of
class, region, gender, nation — of the whole place of Britain i n the
old, nineteenth century international division of labor — are mas-
sively and, monumentally inscribed o n the English landscape, in, its
cities, its politically p r o d u c e d house forms, its socially and culturally
significant distinctions between " t o w n " a n d " c o u n t r y " a n d the
socially constructed terminology a n d mental .images i n which, 'these
not-so-subtle distinctions are w r i t t e n — " c o u n t r y h o u s e , " " c o u n c i l
estate," " t o w e r b l o c k , " " i n n e r c i t y . " The material w o r l d constructs
the mental, a n d 'the mental, the material. Cultures are constituted i n
space a n d u n d e r specific economic and social conditions: they are
physically a n d spatially .as. w e l l as socially constructed, whether i n
regard to the economic basis of people's lives, the regions a n d places
they inhabit, the degrees of segregation between them, the symbolic
meanings of the w o r l d they create, the w a y they represent them-
selves through d w e l l i n g s , or the v i s u a l markers they use to c o m m u -
nicate meaning. These are a l l part of what B o u r d i e u refers to as the
general habitus, a system of dispositions, a w a y of b e i n g , Built 1
1
Pierre: Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge
150
I N T E R R O G A T I N G THEORIES OF T H E G L O B A L
environments a n d space are more than a " m e r e representation of
social o r d e r " or a " m e r e e n v i r o n m e n t " i n w h i c h social relations and
action takes place; physical a n d spatial form, actually constitute as
well, as represent social and cultural existence: society is to a very
large extent constituted t h r o u g h the buildings a n d spaces it creates, 2
In. .any discussion about identities, the built environment of space .and
place is a crucial, critical factor w h i c h both inhibits as w e l l as facili-
tates the construction of n e w i n d i v i d u a l as w e l l as social identities.
O r w e may take one of the questions posed, by I m m a n u e l Waller-
stein: h o w are boundaries d r a w n r o u n d specific cultures?
" B o u n d a r i e s " are constantly being d r a w n r o u n d cultures, and
sub-cultures, i n terms of p o w e r , economic, political or social; territori-
al markers establish specific domains, whether laid d o w n b y the
state, the market, b y ethnic groups, or b y people w h o are inside, or
outside. C u l t u r a l insignia can be v i s u a l or spatial, static or carried,
around.
T h i r d , w e m i g h t take a suggestion made b y U l f H a n n e r z , that w e
lack, sufficient scenarios for conceptualizing the processes of global-
ization. If w e take globalization to refer to " t h e processes b y w h i c h
the w o r l d becomes a single p l a c e " or " t h e consciousness of the globe
as s u c h " then it s h o u l d not be difficult to f i n d examples of h o w the
transnationalization of capital is. changing the social organization of
space a n d f o r m o n a global scale. R o l a n d Robertson has suggested
3
that w h i l s t concepts, of the w o r l d or global economy are easy enough
to demonstrate, notions of the w o r l d or global culture are less so. Yet
i n the nineteenth century, the gardens of the u r b a n w o r k i n g class
l i v i n g in c r a m p e d r o w s of industrial h o u s i n g i n Britain w e r e i n the
tea plantations of 'India or the sugar estates of 'the West Indies. "This
is a single space economy and a single c u l t u r a l landscape, a n d needs
to be examined as s u c h . 4
University Press, 1977) 214.
1
L. Prior, "The architecture of the hospital: a study of spatial organization
.and medical knowledge," British Journal of Sociology 39 (1) (1988):86-113.
* See Anthony King. "Architecture, Capital and the Globalization of Culture,"
in. Global Culture. Nationalism, Globalization and. Modernity, ed. Mike Featherstone
(London, Newbury Park, New Delhi: Sage, 1990):397-411.
4
See "Buildings, architecture and the new international division of labor,"in
Anthony D. King,' Urbanism, Colonialism and the World-Economy (London .and New
York: Routledge, 1990):130-149.
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 C U L T U R E , G L O B A L I Z A T I O N AN1 T H E W O R L D - S Y S T E M
Elsewhere, H a n n e r z writes that, inert isingly, w e f i n d cultural dif-
ferences w i t h i n societies rather than b e t /een them. I w o u l d take this
further to suggest that if there is a " g l o b J c u l t u r e " emerging it is the
culture of contemporary post- (or eve.... i n places, pre-) industrial
capitalist: u r b a n i s m ; this m a y be what Stuart H a l l calls " g l o b a l mass
c u l t u r e " or rather, " g l o b a l u r b a n i t y " c haracteristic of 'the contem-
porary w o r l d city. It is neither rraiisnatk aal n o r international, each of
w h i c h implies relations either between or across nations, but is global
i n Robertson's sense of " t h e w o r l d becoming a single p l a c e . " N o r a m
I referring here to Wallerstein's elite w l > believe they live i n a w o r l d
culture. I refer rather to the culture, botr material, social a n d s y m b o l -
ic, w h i c h enables an increasing n u m l er of scientists, academics,
artists a n d other elites (and perhaps also a less p r i v i l e g e d population)
of w i d e l y different nationalities, languages, ethnicities and races to
communicate more easily w i t h each otl er than w i t h others of their
o w n ethnic or national b a c k g r o u n d i n t le less globalized regions of
their society. Of course, such a " g l o b a l u l t u r e " c o u l d also be called
another form of localism.
L e t me t u r n to the subject of nation., i t y and of national cultures
and. identities, all of w h i c h have been mentioned i n the previous
papers.
T w o or three of the contributors have d r a w n attention to a n d even
p r i v i l e g e d the role of the state as the principal " o r g a n i z e r " of culture:
it is also w o r t h m e n t i o n i n g that w h i l e H a n n e r z notes a strengthening^
of national identity o n the periphery, H . i l l points to its erosion at the
core.
Yet if, as Wallerstein suggests, the nation-state is the m a i n force be-
hind, "state organized c u l t u r e , " i n the form of the w h o l e apparatus of
museums, educational systems, national archives, art galleries a n d
the rest, w h y are these a l l so m u c h a l i i a? (This, of course, Is a rela-
tive statement). W h a t is it that account for their initial conception?
There are clearly other p o w e r f u l forces rganizing " o f f i c i a l " cultures
apart f r o m the nation-state, just as there are p o w e r f u l forces organiz-
i n g a n d influencing " u n o f f i c i a l " or " p u b l i c cultures."
O n e insight into this question m i g h t be gained b y e x a m i n i n g the
institutions and practices of w h a t I w o u l d term the international (or
1
is it global?) professional sub-cultures, c. f museology, of architecture,
or u r b a n p l a n n i n g and especially, the c rigin of their o w n , often, u n -
questioned, supranational ideologies. In general terms, these have
developed not s i m p l y i n "the W e s t " but under the v e r y distinctive
1.5.2
I N T E R R O G A T I N G THEORIES OF T H E G L O B A L
imperatives of a capitalist mode of production w h i c h has pre-empted
global perceptions of " m o d e r n i t y . " A s R i c h a r d H a n d l e r has written:
that most nation-states (and. many " m i n o r i t y g r o u p s " as well)
n o w seek to objectify unique cultures for themselves; that they
import Western (including anthropological) definitions of what
culture is; that they import Western technical routines to manage
their objectified cultures; that they promote their " c u l t u r a l self-
i m a g e " internationally i n an effort-to w o o the economically c r u -
cial tourist trade; that, i n short, everyone wants to put (their)
o w n culture i n (their) o w n museums — all this indicates that
modernity has not only conquered the w o r l d , but has ushered i n
a " p o s t m o d e r n " global society of objectified culture, pseudo-
events and spectacles. 5
T h o u g h what is problematic i n H a n d l e r ' s comment here is his use of
" m o d e r n i t y " to describe what, in. the majority of cases, is the product
of the capitalist w o r l d - e c o n o m y . The extent to w h i c h states (or for
that matter, towns a n d cities) do not have their o w n historical muse-
u m s , d o not have self-conscious " c u l t u r a l p o l i c i e s , " do not have " h i s -
t o r i c a l l y - i n f o r m e d " conservation policies a n d , if i n the (sic) " n o n -
W e s t e r n " w o r l d , are not concerned about problems of " c u l t u r a l ho-
m o g e n i z a t i o n , " " n a t i o n a l i d e n t i t y " a n d " W e s t e r n i z a t i o n , " is the most
accurate a n d telling comment o n the uniqueness of their cultures a n d
sub-cultures; the degree to w h i c h cultures are self-consciously " d i f -
ferent" is an indication of h o w m u c h they are the same.
Let m e conclude b y addressing w h a t I see as some of the i m p l i c a -
tions of " g l o b a l i z a t i o n " for the development of n e w theoretical
models for s t u d y i n g cultural p r o d u c t i o n on a global scale; for it
w o u l d seem evident that globalization must make necessary totally
n e w forms of knowledge i n m a n y different spheres. To do this, I
w a n t to r e t u r n to Stuart H a l l ' s story f r o m Fanon's Black Skins, White
5
Richard Handler, "Heritage and Hegemony: Recent works on historic
preservation and interpretation," Anthropological Quarterly, 60 (1987):137-41.1 .am
indebted to Larry McGinn is for this reference.
With regard to "global professionalism," the internationalization of the legal
field under the conditions of contemporary capitalism, is discussed by Yves
Dezalay, "The Big Bang and the Law: The internationalization and restructure:ion
of the legal field," in Featherstone, 279-94.
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 CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM

Masks, on the discovery of identity, and to quote H a l l ' s comment:

" t h e notion of two histories, one over here, one over there, never 6. V. Globalization, Totalization and
h a v i n g spoken to one another, never h a v i n g h a d any thing to do w i t h
one .another, is s i m p l y not tenable any longer i n .an increasingly glob- the Discursive Field
alized w o r l d . "
If this means, o n one h a n d , the w h o l e unearthing of b u r i e d histo-
ries, it also means, on the other, the development of some k i n d of
c o m m o n conceptual language. It puts into question the entire set of
labels, periodizations, categorizations w h i c h (generally i n a totally
Eurocentric w a y ) " a r t , " "architecture," a n d " c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t i o n " are
generally discussed. O f course, it is naive to assume that histories
a n d cultures w h i c h contest representations of each other o n the basis
of region, religion, gender, race, class, ethnicity or other criteria
w o u l d ever have a c o m m o n conceptual vocabulary, or agreed set of
categorizations. Yet it does assume the existence of some k i n d of the-
oretical arena i n w h i c h these contestations can take place. C u r r e n t
conceptualizations such as those offered b y theories of globalization,
the world-systéms perspective, postmodernism, post-colonialism,
post-imperialism (all, incidentally, c o m i n g out of "the West") are of- JOHN TAGG
fered as this arena, though they are also, of course, i n that arena
themselves. Questions concerning the cultural effects of globalization,
i n c l u d i n g the possibilities of a " g l o b a l c u l t u r e , " may suggest to some
that this marks the e n d point of a long debate; it is evident f r o m the EVERYTHING BECAME DISCOURSE — PROVIDED WE C A N AGREE
papers here that, on the contrary, it is rather the beginning. on this w o r d — that is to say, a system i n w h i c h the central sig-
nified, the o r i g i n a l or transcendental signified, is never abso-
lutely present outside a system of differences. 1

Jacques D e r r i d a

I have been asked to say something about the proliferation of pho-

tographies i n the context of this debate on " C u l t u r e , Globalization
a n d the W o r l d - S y s t e m . " The p r o b l e m is that 1 have also been asked
to be brief a n d this m a y impose o n w h a t I w a n t to say a certain neg-
ative tone: a refusal of a place i n the debate and of its mode of
theorizing, w i t h o u t being able to go o n to construct i n detail the be-
ginnings of other k i n d s of account. The difficulty is partly the present

1
Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1978) 280.

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 CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM
context, not o n l y this conference, but also the present state of the
field of research w h i c h has h a r d l y b e g u n to p r o v i d e adequate materi-
als for extensive accounts of the w o r l d - w i d e dissemination of photog-
raphy. It is, i n d e e d , one of the great merits of today's debate that it
directs o u r attention so forcefully to this need. .And yet, I would still
be resistant to the v i e w that it is only empirical research that stands
between us .and a comprehensive account. Quite b l u n t l y , I w o u l d
suggest that the very desire for such an account is tied to notions of
social totality and historiographical representation that are untenable. If
w e .are to talk of global systems, then w e shall have to ask. whether
concepts of globalization can be separated from theoretical totalizations.
H e r e , it w o u l d seem that I am. i n agreement w i t h R o l a n d Robertson,
mat it w o u l d 'be difficult to see as .anything but reductive a n d econo-
mistic Immanuel Wallerstein's injunction to w o r k against the " v e r y
logical consequence" of "'the process of m a s k i n g the 'true existential
situation," and "trace the actual development of the ' c u l t u r e ' . . . over
time w i t h i n 'the historical system, w h i c h has g i v e n birth to this exten-
sive .and confusing use of the concept of culture, the m o d e r n w o r l d -
system w h i c h is a capitalist w o r l d - e c o n o m y . " S u c h " l o g i c " seems to
2 other types of theoretical production. F o r the so-called deconstruc-
p u t us back, once more, i n the p r i m i t i v e architecture of the base .and
superstructure m o d e l of the social w h o l e . N o matter h o w m a n y stair-
cases a n d landings are inserted, we still f i n d ourselves t r u d g i n g u p
and d o w n the same'metaphorical tenement, from, 'the ground-floor'
shopfronts a n d w o r k s h o p s to the garrets i n the roof, w h e r e the
painters and photographers of bohème always have their studios.
The c o m m u n a r d s have not yet pierced, the walls a n d floors of this
d w e l l i n g . The o n l y difference seems to be that the local storefront
n o w opens o n a. great global, thoroughfare, b e y o n d even H a u s s -
mann's imagination. 'The vista is. expansive but, like Daguerre's
diorama, its illusion of realism depends o n o u r identifying w i t h the
imposed convention of its single, .fixed perspective. A s a representa-
tion of a social totality, it claims both too little a n d too m u c h for
what it wishes to see as a determinant space: evacuating f r o m the
" e c o n o m i c , " cultural practices that have been increasingly structural
to it, a n d collapsing the political effectivity of material modes of p r o -
2
Irruxtanuel Wallerstein, "Culture .as the IdeolGgieal tetteground of the
Modem World-Systent" in Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization and Moderni-
ty, ed. Mike Featherstone (London, Newbury Park and Delhi: Sage, 1991):35.
156
I N T E R R O G A T I N G THEORIES OF T H E G L O B A L
duction of meaning through a reflectionist concept of representation.
By contrast, I m i g h t agree w i t h R o l a n d Robertson that, far from
being economically fixed and culturally masked, concepts of global-
ism, have no status outside the fields of discourse and practice that
constitute them. B u t here, too, I w o u l d have to depart from the w a y
the construction of a range of representations of globality seems to be
thought of by Robertson as the effect or expression of a, real process
of globalization, and even a " g l o b a l - h u m a n c o n d i t i o n , " l y i n g b e h i n d
its " i m a g e s " a n d knowable, somehow, outside the processes of repre-
sentation. Closely related to this is Robertson's c l a i m for his o w n
3
position that "globalization theory contains the seed of an account as
to why there are current i n t e l e c t u a l fashions of deconstruction, o n the
one h a n d , .and postmodernist v i e w s concerning the 'confluence of
everything w i t h everything else', on the o t h e r . " For all his convic-
4
tion, that he is .also opposed to " w h a t poststructuralists .and postmod-
ernists n o w call a ' g r a n d n a r r a t i v e ' , " Robertson w o u l d still seem to
5
be privileging some sort of master knowledge: a metatheory that can,
like Wallerstein's or Jameson's reading of M a r x i s m , account for a l l
tionists a n d postmodernists, one might reply that Robertson's notion
of the world-as-a-single-place w o u l d seem to be caught i n precisely
w h a t the Derridians might think of as a "metaphysics of presence,"
or the Lacanians as a projection, onto the isolated image of the planet
of an Imaginary wholeness that represses the multiple and heteroge-
neous positioning effects of language. Put briefly, the w o r l d that is
systematic or one place can never be a w o r l d of discourse: this w o r l d
is never present to itself; it never constitutes an accomplished totality.
Before I a m indicted of idealism, let me begin to trace out some-
thing of w h a t this, m i g h t mean i n relation to m y designated " a r e a " of
photographies.* Perversely, perhaps, I can begin by conceding i m m e -
3
Roland, Robertson, "Globality, Global Culture .and Images of World Order,"
in Social Change and Modernity, ed. Hans. Haferkamp & Neil Smelser (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1991).
* Roland Robertson, "Globalization Theory and Civilizational Analysis,"
Comparative Civilizations Review, 17 (Fall 1987):22.
* Robertson, "Globality, Global Culture and Images of World Order," 4.
* For a, more argued treatment of some of the themes sketched here, see: John
Tagg, The Burden of Representation, Essays on Photographies and Histories (London:
Maanillan, and Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1988).
157
 CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM
diately the Importance of the perspectives opened b y a n understand-
i n g of the geographical expansion a n d increasing structural integra-
tion of capitalist production. This might have to be qualified to the
extent that a neglect of specific local factors, such as national frame-
works of patent and copyright l a w , w o u l d leave one unable to
explain the different patterns of exploitation of the early daguerreo-
type a n d calotype processes or, indeed, the u n e v e n constraints o n the
later development of national photographic a n d , subsequently, film
industries. H o w e v e r , it is equally clear that a n a r r o w l y national focus
w o u l d not allow one e v e n to pose the question of the extraordinarily
r a p i d proliferation of photographie practices i n the nineteenth centu-
r y , from the dissemination of daguerreotypes i n the 1840s, through
the entrepreneurial phase of mass p r o d u c e d portraiture, to the fully
corporate stage of d r y plate, camera a n d photofinishing industries of
the 1880s a n d 90s.
It is also true that this latter development created crucial conditions
not only for the vast expansion of the photographic economy, but
also for the transformation of its institutional structures, i n part as a
reaction to the emergence of a broadly based, economically signifi-
cant a n d aesthetically troubling sphere of amateur practice. To ac-
1 promise of an immediate a n d transparent means of representation, a
knowledge this is not, however, to grant that we could ever derive
the categories, constraints and motivations, or the cultural subordina-
tion, of amateur photographies f r o m the technological and economic
shifts themselves. T o talk about the emergence of amateur photogra-
phies is to talk of the tracing out of n e w levels of meaning and prac-
tice, n e w hierarchies of cultural institutions, a n d n e w structures and
codes of subjectivity: processes unquestionably b o u n d u p w i t h tech-
nological innovation a n d the restracturing of p r o d u c t i o n and market-
ing, but equally part of the m o m e n t u m of a reconstitution of the
family, sexuality, consumption and leisure that plots a n e w economy
of desire and domination. A n d if we can follow this overdetermined
development across a radiating cultural geography, it is never as a
simple u n r o l l i n g economically a n d technologically d r i v e n process.
The formation of amateur photographies h a d always to be negotiated
i n and across the fields of specific national structures, cultural con-
ventions, languages, practices, constructed traditions a n d institutions.
So far from, expressing 'the necessity of a. purely economic or even ideo-
logical process, amateur practices constituted a discursiveformationi n the
fullest sense, saturated with relations of power, structuring new effects
of pleasure, and generating n e w forms of subjectivity that have then to
158
I N T E R R O G A T I N G THEORIES OF T H E G L O B A L
be seen as determinant conditions of capitalist growth in themselves.
W e might take as .another example the widespread emergence of
instrumental photography, d r a w i n g on older practices of cartography
a n d mechanical d r a w i n g and closely allied to the development of
social, statistics a n d specialized forms of w r i t i n g . Its very function i m -
plied a. universal a n d objective technique that w o u l d transcend the
limits of all existing notational languages. Yet, for it to w o r k , whan
h a d to be set i n place were local discursive structures whose power!
and effectivity were never given i n the technology, but h a d to be p r o !
duced a n d negotiated across a constellation of n e w apparatuses thaj]
reconstituted the social as object of n e w disciplinary practices and
technical discourses whose political character w a s elided. The institu-
tionalization of record photography was not, therefore, just a matter
of overcoming conservative resistance to a n e w technology, but a
struggle over n e w languages .and techniques a n d the agencies that
claimed to control them. The notion of evidentiality, on w h i c h instru-
mental photographs depended, was not already and unproblematic-
ally i n place: it h a d to be p r o d u c e d and institutionally sanctioned.
A n d if, more generally, photography was taken to h o l d out the
universal and democratic language, and a tool for a universal science,
then these claims, too, have to be treated as the specific, historical
stakes of a politico-discursive struggle.
W h a t I a m arguing, against any totalizing or teleological v i e w , is
that the meaning a n d value of photographic practices cannot be ad-
judicated outside specific language games. N o r can a single range of
technical devices guarantee the unity of the field of photographic
meanings, A. technology has no inherent value outside its. mobiliza- u
tions i n specific discourses, practices, institutions a n d relations of jj
power. Import: and status have to be produced and effectively institu- j/
tionalized and such institutionalizations do not describe a unified
field or the w o r k i n g out of some essential causality. Even, as they
interlink i n more or less extended chains, they are negotiated locally
a n d discontinuously a n d are productive of value .and meaning. A n d
it is on this same g r o u n d that they w o u l d have to be challenged.
It is b e y o n d m y brief — a n d m y time — to pursue the conse-
quences of this discursive .analysis for notions of a w o r l d or global
culture. Returning to the models w i t h w h i c h I began, I might, h o w e v -
er, underline the following a w k w a r d points. In the first place, once
one allows any effectivity to discursive practices i n constituting
159
 CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM

meaning and Identity a n d generating effects of p o w e r , then there is

no longer any w a y of m v o k i n g another, determinant and exterior tier 7. The Global and the Specific:
of " s o c i a l " explanation. But, beyond this, once one confronts the
openness a n d indeterminacy of the relational a n d differential logic of Reconciling Conflicting
the discursive field, then notions, of social totality have to be radically
displaced. A s Ernesto Laclau and Chantal M o u f f e have argued: Theories of Culture
The incomplete character of every totality necessarily leads us to
abandon, as. a terrain of .analysis, the premise of " s o c i e t y " as a
sutured a n d self-defined totality. " S o c i e t y " is not a v a l i d object
of discourse. There is n o single u n d e r l y i n g principle f i x i n g —
and hence constituting — the w h o l e field of differences. 7

If the " s o c i a l " exists — a n d here w e might usefully substitute the

" g l o b a l " — It is o n l y "as an effort to construct that°impossible ob-
ject," b y a temporary a n d unstable domination of the field of dis-
8

cursivity, i m p o s i n g a partial fixity that w i l l be overflowed b y the ar- JANET WOLFF

ticulation of n e w differences. There is n o e n d to this history. " W h o l e -
ness" cannot t h r o w d o w n its " c r a t c h e s " and walk, restored. W e
9

have lost the guarantees of an immanent objective process, but 'that

.very lack opens the w a y to the multiplication of forms of subversion
a n d the imagination of n e w identities, i n w h i c h cultural strategies
can no longer be contained i n a secondary role.
Ernesto Laclau & Chantal. Mouffe, Hegemony and SocMist Strategy. Towards
a Radical Democratic Politics (London, Verso, 1985) 111,
8
Ibid., 112
' ^ Immanuel Wallerstein, " H i e Universal and the National. Can There Be
IT WAS A BRAVE A N D FAR-SIGHTED VISION THAT COLLECTED SUCH
disparate scholars a n d perspectives i n the same s y m p o s i u m . Certain-
ly, it was time that those interested i n the global dimensions of cul-
ture met together a n d began the process of learning f r o m one .another
the theoretical developments a n d g r o w t h i n k n o w l e d g e w h i c h relate
to this issue. World-systems theory, already e q u i p p e d to provide an
account of the complex interconnectedness of the global system, par-
ticularly w i t h regard to its economic and political dimensions, has re-
cently b e g u n to recognize the importance of culture i n these pro-
cesses. G l o b a l i z a t i o n theories, w h i c h have generally p r i v i l e g e d cul-
ture (or at least a specific notion of " c u l t u r e " ) , seemed ready to bene-
fit f r o m a better understanding of the u n d e r l y i n g social and material
relations i n w h i c h culture is p r o d u c e d (and w h i c h it, i n turn, ( r e p r o -
duces). A n t h r o p o l o g i c a l theories of culture, rich i n those empirical i n -
vestigations w h i c h enable us to reject simplistic general theories, are
w e l l placed, to combine ethnography w i t h a more wide-ranging
understanding of the relations of culture and, society, center a n d pe-
riphery. A n d cultural theory, w h i c h includes recent developments i n
art, film and literary criticism, as w e l l as cultural studies, has started
to move away f r o m its earlier rather ethnocentric approach, and to
1

Such a Thing as a World Culture?" in this volume. investigate the global dimensions of cultural production and con-

160
 CULTURE, G L O B A L I Z A T I O N A N D T H E W O R L D - S Y S T E M
sumption. H e r e we: h a d representatives of each of these traditions
1
closeted together for a day, .and w i l l i n g to listen a n d to reconsider
these issues f r o m n e w points of v i e w .
T w o rather strange things occurred. In the first place, it appeared
that there was general agreement a m o n g the three m a i n speakers at
the conference. V a r i e d t h o u g h their contributions were, w h a t was
2
never at issue were the fundamentally different (and perhaps i n c o m -
patible) theoretical positions on w h i c h they were based. I m m a n u e l
Wallerstein's M a r x i s t perspective is obviously committed to the v i e w
that relations of p r o d u c t i o n are p r i m a r y i n social process a n d social
change. A l t h o u g h s u c h a v i e w can be m o d i f i e d to take account of the
effectivify of culture (that is, it need not be a crude economic deter-
minist model), it is not compatible w i t h an approach, such as that of
Roland Robertson, w h i c h denies the p r i m a c y of the economic.
Robertson's commitment is to a "voluntaristic w o r l d system t h e o r y "
w h i c h stresses the 'independent dynamics of global culture' (inde-
pendent, that is, f r o m polity a n d economy), a n d the cultural p l u r a l -
i s m of the m o d e m w o r l d system. H i s argument is that it is p r i m a r i l y
consciousness of a n d response to globalization w h i c h affects a n d
permeates the lives of people a n d societies. This stress o n the sub-
5
jective, at odds w i t h Wallerstein's perspective, also sits uneasily w i t h
U l f H a n n e r z ' s more pragmatic analysis, w i t h its focus on actual social
See, for example, Maiek Alloula, The Colonial Harem (Minneapolis: Universi-
ty of Minnesota Press, : 1986); Pratibha Parmar, "Hateful Contraries: Media
Images of Asian Women," Ten 8, no. 16,1984. Reprinted In Looking On, Images of
Femmmtty m the Visual Arts and Media, ed. Rosemary Betterton .(London* Pandora
Press, 1987); Horrti K. Bhabha, "Signs Taken for Wonders: Questions of Ambiva-
lence and Authority Under a Tree Outside Delhi, May 1817," in 'Race', Writing
and Difference, ed. Henry: Louis Gates, Jr. (Chicago: University of 'Chicago Press'
1986); Gayatri Chakravorty Sptvak, "Can the Subaltern Speak?," in Marxism and
the Interpretation of Culture, eds. Gary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (Urbana
and Chicago: University,of Illinois Press, 1988).
2
Immanuel Wallerstein, Roland Robertson, Ulf Hannerz; Stuart Hall's
lectures were delivered prior to the day of the symposium.
3
Roland Robertson, "The Sociological Significance of Culture: Some General
Considerations," Theory, Culture and Society, 5 (1988):20.
* Roland Robertson and Frank Lechner, "Modernization, Globalization and
~™ ! S e m o f
World-Systems Theory," Theory, Culture and Society, 2
C u l t u r e m
(1985)103. -
. * Robertson 1988,22; Roland Robertson, "Globalization Theory and Civliza-
ttonal Analysis,"* Comparative Civilzations Review, 17 (Fall 1987):23-4.
162
T H E G L O B A L A N D T H E SPECIFIC
and economic processes at the periphery. O n the other hand, H a n -
nerz's conception of the operation of the economy (labour, c o m m o d i -
ties, markets) is different again, i n theoretical orientation and i n level
of analysis, f r o m that of Wallerstein.
Secondly, the real split in, the day's proceedings occurred late i n
the afternoon, w h e n it became clear that the discourse of those w o r k -
i n g i n c u l t u r a l theory was of such a radically different order that
6
the earlier proceedings had, no w a y of transforming this particular
debate (or, for that matter, vice versa). The w a y s i n w h i c h art histori-
ans, f i l m theorists a n d others explore the international dimensions of
cultural p r o d u c t i o n a n d dissemination seemed to have nothing i n
c o m m o n w i t h those other approaches.
The first of these phenomena was the one more in, need of explana-
3
tion. For what became increasingly clear to those listening to the
4
papers delivered was the fact that there was no real debate. Indeed,
despite the g o o d intentions of the organizers and the contributors, w e
m i g h t conclude that such a dialogue is premature. In fact, there were
far more serious divisions between the speakers than became appar-
ent, i n what w a s , for the most part, a polite, friendly a n d open-
m i n d e d discussion.
Those w h o k n e w the w o r k of the m a i n speakers were probably ex-
pecting three major points of disagreement, none of w h i c h materi-
alized. In the first place, w e might have predicted an opposition be-
tween " e c o n o m i s m " a n d " c u l t u r a l i s m . " This is an issue w h i c h
R o l a n d Robertson has already taken u p w i t h I m m a n u e l Wallers tein.
Despite Wallerstein's attempt at this S y m p o s i u m to take u p questions
of " c u l t u r e , " it is clear to me that n o t h i n g has changed i n the very
different: points of v i e w , a n d i n d e e d conceptual f r a m e w o r k s , of
these t w o writers. A n d yet this key question was absent f r o m their
debate.: t t
Secondly, w e might have expected an opposition between grand
sociological t h e o r y " a n d "concrete ethnography," k n o w i n g that the
speakers were f r o m different disciplines, a n d k n o w i n g , too, some-
thing about their style of w o r k . A g a i n , the opportunity was not taken
u p by either side to comment on the limitations of the other ap-
proach. Rather, the gentlemanly juxtaposition, of papers suggested.
* In particular John Tagg and Maureen Turim.
7
See, for example, Robertson and Lechner, 1985.
163
 CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM
(wrongly) that somehow these different approaches were different
but compatible.
A n d thirdly, some k n o w l e d g e of the different theoretical orienta-
tions of the speakers w o u l d have l e d us to expect an opposition be-
tween "systems t h e o r y " and " v o l u n t a r i s m , " the latter emphasising
action over structural constraint, a n d insisting on 'the role of motivat-
ed h u m a n behavior i n effecting social change. This, too, is something
w h i c h has been at issue i n earlier publications. A n d although m a n y
8.
contemporary versions of M a r x i s t theory eschew determinism a n d
emphasize the constitutive role of h u m a n action, i n the context of
structural features of the social formation, there is no doubt that the
9
M a r x i s m of world-systems theory is not (yet?) such a version. N e v e r -
theless, there w a s silence on this issue at the s y m p o s i u m .
Despite the appearance of reconciliation a n d cooperation w h i c h
characterized most of the day's proceedings, it was clear that little
has changed i n t h e ; m a i n focus of the three m a i n speakers. R o l a n d
Robertson is still p r i m a r i l y concerned w i t h the experience of globaliza-
tion a n d g l o b a l l y , a n d the ways i n w h i c h this experience n o w per-
vades a n d affects social life throughout the w o r l d , (Indeed, " g l o b a l -
t y " i n Robertson's analysis can almost be defined as consciousness of
the w o r l d as one place, its existence — or, as we might say i n an en-
tirely different discourse, its " m a t e r i a l i t y " — consisting precisely i n
its centraliry to h u m a n consciousness,) Immanuel Wallerstein, o n the
other hand, retains a central focus on the reality of the structures of
the w o r l d system — those economic and political relations w h i c h
constitute the interconnectedness of the contemporary w o r l d . U l f
Hannerz's m a i n preoccupation is w i t h the processes of cultural rela-
tions between different sectors a n d communities, a n d although he
employs some of the vocabulary of w o r l d systems theory (particular-
l y ' t h e notions of " c e n t e r " a n d " p e r i p h e r y " ) , his w o r k is different
from W a l e r s t e i n ' s i n its agnosticism on the question of p r i m a r y
structuring features of the w o r l d economy.
These differences, as I have said, were never articulated, either i n
the papers themselves or i n the discussion among the speakers. In-
Robertson, 1988.
8
For example, Anthony Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory (London:
9
Macmillan, 1979); Veronica Beechey and James Donald, eds. Subjectivity and Social
Rdations (Miton Keynes/Philadelphia: Open University Press, 1985).
164
T H E G L O B A L A N D T H E SPECIFIC
stead, w e were left w i t h the cosy impression that w e were all ad-
dressing the same questions. In particular, the f o l l o w i n g appeared to
be at issue:
— H o w useful is it to see contemporary societies as a w o r l d -
system/in terms of globalization? (The different formulations, of
course, disguise different perspectives, a n d i m p l y accordingly differ-
ent k i n d s of answer.)
— H o w extensive is this process of globalization? H a s it l e d to an
increasing, or even complete, homogeneity across social systems?
— W h a t is the role of culture i n the world-system/globalization
process?
— W h a t are the cultural relations between (and within) states i n
the context of the world-system/global system?
Consensus seemed to have been reached, implicitly where not explic-
itly, on a number of points:
— There is, i n d e e d , a world-system (or, the w o r l d is a single, inter-
connected, place). There are important w a y s i n w h i c h the w o r l d is
interconnected, and it makes sense, therefore, to talk about globaliza-
tion.
— H o w e v e r , w e have to recognize the persistent (or, it sometimes
seemed to be suggested, consequent ) diversity of cultures. That is,
10
cultures continue to be diverse, and some of the w a y s i n w h i c h they
continue to be diverse are actually a product of increasing globaliza-
tion, for example the extension of multi-national capital a n d of c u l -
tural products a n d m e d i a industries across the globe.
— C u l t u r e is of central importance to social and economic process-
es (though this importance is conceptualized very differently accord-
ing to the particular 'theory of culture/society employed).
— W e need an interdisciplinary approach to the study of culture i n
a global context. 11
13
See Ulf Hannerz in. this volume; also "The World in Creolization," Africa,
57 (1987):546-559.
11
This belief was not necessarily clearly stated at the symposium, but has
been argued by each of the three main speakers. See Immanuel Wallerstein,
"World-Systems Analysis," in Social Theory Today, eds. Anthony Giddens and
Jonathon H . Turner ' (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987); Robertson, 1988; Ulf
Hannerz, "Theory in Anthropology: Small is Beautiful? The Problem of Complex
Cultures," Comparative Studies in Society and History, 28 (1986):326-7.
165
 CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM
So far, I have stressed the (unacknowledged) conflicts between the
m a i n speakers (and, w e c o u l d a d d , between their' w o r k a n d the per-
spective a n d orientation of Stuart H a l l ' s t w o lectures, w i t h w h i c h
each of the three speakers has serious differences). I want n o w to
suggest that what:they share is a failure to deal adequately w i t h the
question of culture i n a global context. Ironically, g i v e n one of their
agreed commitments, this failure results f r o m a n insufficiently inter-
disciplinary approach to the subject. For where they are all enthusias-
tic about the crossing of discipline boundaries w i t h i n the social sci-
ences, none of t h e m has taken on the challenge of recent w o r k i n the
humanities w h i c h ' provides a far more sophisticated analysis of c u l -
tural processes, texts and institutions. This means that their theo-
12
ries and approaches remain unable to analyse c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t i o n
and cultural texts,: I shall identify five problematic areas here; w h a t
they have i n c o m m o n is an inability to take account of, first, social
process and secondly representation.
|[I] A l l three papers take as unproblematic such concepts as " W e s t "
and " T h i r d W o r l d i " " c e n t e r " a n d " p e r i p h e r y , " " m e t r o p o l i t a n " a n d
" l o c a l " cultures, as if the objects they described were coherent, i d e n -
tifiable entities. B u t each of these pairs is a construct, whose apparent
identity is the p r o d u c t of a discourse a n d w h i c h (to switch to a some-
what different discourse myself) is ideologically i m b u e d . W e ought,
therefore, to be taking these terms as problematic, a n d exploring h o w
the terms, a n d o u r conceptions of those entities, have been construct-
ed. The " d o m i n a n t " term i n each (West, center, metropolis, a n d so
on), as Stuart H a l l demonstrated i n the first of his lectures, is defined
in difference — constructed i n opposition to the Other. It is not a
monolithic, pre-existing, real subject, i n any sense.
The " s u b o r d i n a t e " term '(Third. W o r l d , periphery, local culture) is
equally an invention, p r o d u c e d i n a variety of post- and anti-colonial
discourses (including M a r x i s m , ethnography, theories of develop-
ment). It posits, or i m p l i e s the existence of cultural a n d political sub-
See, for example, Terry Eagleton, literary Theory. An Introduction (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1983); Constance Penley, ed., Feminism and Film Theory (London:
Routledge, 1988); Richard Leppert and Susan McClary, eda., Music and Society.
The Politics and Composition, Performance and Reception (Cambridge; Cambridge
University Press, 1987); Tony Bennett et al., eds., Culture, Ideology .and' Social
Process (Batsford, 1981).
166
T H E G L O B A L A N D T H E SPECIFIC
jects, whose constitution a n d whose contradictory features are there-
by obscured. Recent w o r k i n anthropology has s h o w n that ethnog-
raphers, too, w o r k w i t h cultural constructs of the societies they
s t u d y . Rather than s i m p l y describing a n d presenting cultures,
13
they invent them i n a certain sense, t h r o u g h the discourses a n d
models of their o w n investigation: they identify a n d label the g r o u p
of the Other, attributing to it an essential identity w h i c h it does not
possess.
A n approach w h i c h took account of the discursive constitution of
" c u l t u r e s " — the ways i n w h i c h they are represented — w o u l d al-
ready have access to the relations between cultures, here generally
formulated s i m p l y as a p r o b l e m to be addressed. For those cultures
are constructed i n relation to one another, produced, represented and
perceived through the ideologies a n d narratives of situated discours-
es. This is not, of course, to deny the " r e a l i t y " of relations of social
a n d economic inequality between groups and between cultures. It is
to insist that w e do not make the mistake of granting these groups or
cultures some "essential" existence, d e n y i n g the linguistic and other
strategies through w h i c h they are negotiated and produced. John
Tagg's paper i n this volume addresses this issue directly.
[2] A l l three of the m a i n papers operate w i t h an undifferentiated
notion of "culture..." It is true that U l f H a n n e r z went to some trouble
to itemize four " f r a m e w o r k s " of the cultural process (the market, the
State, forms of life, and social movements), though it is not entirely
clear whether these categories are intended to be exclusive, whether
they are exhaustive, or whether they are equivalent (three different
issues). Nevertheless, H a n n e r z shares w i t h Robertson and Wallerstein
a retention of a concept of " c u l t u r e " w h i c h confuses a variety of p r o -
cesses, practices a n d levels of analysis. The authors often move w i t h -
out comment f r o m one meaning to another; at other times they re-
strict themselves, also w i t h o u t comment, to one particular meaning.
" C u l t u r e " therefore can mean: (i) ways of life (Hannerz); (ii) the arts
and m e d i a (Hannerz; also H a l l ) ; (iii) political, or perhaps religious,
culture (Wallerstein; also Hall); (iv) attitudes to globalization (Robert-
son).
For an elaboration of this argument, see James Clifford, The Predicament of
1 3
Culture (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988).
167
 CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM
• In fact, this loosely e m p l o y e d term describes a variety of different
processes, institutions and discourses, whose separation a n d careful
•analysis is crucial to any discussion of culture i n the global context.
W e need to look v e r y carefully at the interrelations between these
areas, and to examine the specific institutions, social processes,
regimes of representation a n d so on, a n d their relationship to other
" c u l t u r a l " factors. This is a p r o b l e m I return to at the e n d of m y
paper.
[3] A l l three of the m a i n speakers ignore the level of the economic
and the social. This might seem a peculiarly inappropriate comment
to make about Immanuel Wallerstein, w h o has been criticized (by
Robertson amongst others) for an over-emphasis o n the economic, B u t
i n the paper presented to this conference, i n his concern to p a y due
attention to the operations of " c u l t u r e , " he entirely by-passes ques-
tions of economic a n d material factors w h i c h pertain to.culturahpxo-
..duction a n d dissemination, H i s only references, to a potentially mate-
rialist theory of culture (a theory for w h i c h I myself w i l l argue) are
of the order of stating that the capitalist w o r l d economy produces
cultural diffusion. W e need to k n o w how this occurs. W h a t are the
primary economic structures w h i c h enable, contain a n d affect cultural
production? In w h a t circumstances does cultural resistance become
possible? W e need, as the contributions of John Tagg and M a u r e e n
T u r i m make clear, a w a y of investigating the nature a n d effects of the
cultural industries, on a national a n d international l e v e l W e need to
examine the role of technology, o w n e r s h i p , a n d c u l t u r a l markets.
In other w o r d s , rather than s i m p l y situating a w e l l - m e a n i n g discus-
sion of " c u l t u r e " w i t h i n a pre-formulated m o d e l of international eco-
nomic relations, w e have to explore the cultural economic relations
themselves,
• B y the same token, attention must be p a i d to the social processes
involved i n p r o d u c t i o n of culture. A n economism w h i c h gallantlyi
switches, its attentions to the operations of culture is still economism.
Rather, it s h o u l d undertake a radical reform of its assumptions, b y
acknowledging the mediation of the economic a n d the cultural
through the level of the social. It m u s t look, for example, at social
class, relations of gender a n d of race, a n d at other social groups (sub-
cultures, professional groups, and so on), a n d grasp the w a y s i n
w h i c h they mediate, through their practices, values a n d institutions,
the production of culture. CujtmeJ§,produced, i n a range o f c o m p l e x .
168
T H E G L O B A L . A N D T H E SPECIFIC
a n d oftenconfa-adtoc^ A s A d o r n o pointed out fifty
years ago i n his critical comments to Walter Benjamin, culture is n o t .
s i m p l y the reflection or expression of the economic, but it is p r o - [
cessed through social relations (and, we might a d d , systems of repre- *
sentation). Objecting to the simple connection Benjamin makes be-
t w e e n themes i n Baudelaire's w o r k a n d economic features of the pe-
riod (such as the d u t y on w i n e ) , A d o r n o urges that he recognize that
the "materialist determination of cultural traits is only possible if it is
mediated t h r o u g h the total social process." 14
[4] Related to this last argument is the indifference of a l l three papers
to the question of gender. There are at least three reasons w h y we
15
cannot discuss culture w i t h o u t discussing gender. In the first place,
identity is always gendered identity. In his first paper, Stuart H a l l
demonstrated this v e r y clearly, w h e n he talked about the identity of
the " E n g l i s h m a n " as precisely that. Political a n d other ideologies thus
operate t h r o u g h notions of gender difference. This means that it is
crucial to incorporate the feminist perspective into the discussion of
culture a n d globalization. Discursive oppositions (West and n o n -
West, self a n d Other, West and Orient, .and so on) are also complexly
i n t e r w o v e n w i t h meanings and discourses of gender. A s John Tagg
emphasizes i n his paper, c u l t u r a l practices a n d institutions are also
b o u n d u p w i t h questions of f a m i l y , sexuality a n d desire.
Secondly, w e must recognize that the majority of studies of " t h i r d -
w o r l d " cultures have described the experiences of m e n at the ex-
pense of those of w o m e n . A s i n every other intellectual a n d academic
pursuit u n t i l recently, w o m e n have remained more or less invisible
as a result of gender-biased investigations. Feminist anthropologists
have b e g u n to intervene i n this, field, t h o u g h too often o n l y by
a d d i n g ethnographies of w o m e n to existing ethnographies of m e n
(and thereby leaving unchallenged the very terms of a discipline
w h i c h persists i n f i n d i n g the issue of gender irrelevant to its con-
cerns). W e m i g h t start here b y taking seriously, a n d taking further,
U l f H a n n e r z ' s stress o n divisions of labor, since such divisions are
1 4
Theodor Adorno, "Letters, to Walter Benjamin," in Ernst Bloch et a l ,
Aesthetics and Politics (London: New Left Books, 1977):129.
1 5
In the revised version of his paper, Roland Robertson does begin to address
this issue.
169
 CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM
.always (amongst other 'things) gender-based,
• • T h i r d l y , the continuing failure across the social, science disciplines
to connect the public w o r l d of politics, economics, a n d institutions
w i t h the domestic sphere a n d w i t h the sexual d i v i s i o n of labor must
be addressed i n this context as w i t h i n sociology generally. Just as the
early development of industrial capitalism cannot be described,
p u r e l y i n terms of p r o d u c t i o n a n d profit, labor and, capital, econom-
ics a n d politics, w i t h o u t w i d e n i n g o u r scope to grasp the location of
these processes w i t h i n relations of gender and the family, so contem-
porary relations o f the w o r l d system must be perceived as u n a v o i d -
ably implicated i n the sexual d i v i s i o n of labour and i n the practices
•and, ideologies of the "separation of spheres." Feminist sociologists
and historians have shown, the inadequacy of our conception of the
1
nineteenth century as a p e r i o d i n which, there w a s an increasing d i -
vision between the public a n d the'private, the male and the female
spheres, w h i c h w e r e clearly demarcated. Rather, the p u b l i c a n d
16
private spheres were interconnected, a n d interdependent, i n m a n y
crucial respects. Women, were still actively (if often indirectly) i n -
v o l v e d i n their husbands' w o r k . F a m i l y a n d marriage contacts were
central to business a n d w o r k procedures. Financial aspects of enter-
prise were often located i n the domestic sphere (fathers-in-law l e n d -
i n g money, for example). I a m arguing here, then, that w e m u s t be
prepared to investigate the interrelations of public: a n d private, of the
economy a n d the domestic, of male a n d female roles, a n d of ideolo-
gies of w o r k a n d politics a n d ideologies of gender, i n our attempt to
theorize the global! dimensions of culture and. society.
[5] Finally, the papers are "pre-theoretical" with, regard to develop-
ments i n cultural itheory. N o n e of them is able to recognize the
•nature of culture as representation, nor its. constitutive role w i t h regard
to ideology a n d social relations. They operate w i t h a notion of " c u l -
t u r e " as an identifiable realm or set of beliefs, objects a n d practices,
more or less determined b y social and economic relations, w i t h more
or less independence f r o m a n d effectivity on the social process. C u l -
tural theory, however, has stressed the " m a t e r i a l i t y " of culture, by
w h i c h is meant the "determinacy and effectivity of signifying practic-
. ••." See Leonore Davidoff .and Catherine Hall, Family Fortimes, Men and Warnen
16
ofthe English. Middle Ctess, 1780-1850 (London: Hutchinson, 1987),
170
T H E G L O B A L A N D T H E SPECIFIC
es t h e m s e l v e s . " Codes and conventions, narrative structures, and,
17
systems of representation i n texts (literary, visual, filmic) produce ••
m e a n i n g a n d inscribe ideological positions. In a rather extended |
sense of the w o r d " m a t e r i a l , " then, they are perceived as h a v i n g
their o w n level of determinacy. Thus, w o r k i n literary studies a n d art
history has analysed the constitutive nature of representation. 18
This limitation i n world-system and globalization theories i n fact
lies b e h i n d some of the earlier problems I have identified. The debate
about " e c o n o m i s m " thus takes place at the w r o n g level, a n d its res-
olution i n the terms in which, it is usually phrased still w o u l d net
provide an adequate w a y of comprehending the relationship between
culture a n d society. It is not, that is to say, a. question of counterpos-
ing to a mechanistic, deterministic v i e w (economism) a " b e t t e r " ac-
count, stressing the "relative a u t o n o m y " of culture, or e m p h a s i z i n g
the effects of culture i n social change. N o r is it a question of investi-
gating " c u l t u r a l response" to economic factors. W h a t is at issue here,
is the integral place of culture in social processes a n d i n social
change: the cultural formation and identity of social groups, as w e l l
as of ideologies, discourses, and practices. To take the example of
gender, w e have to recognize that w o m e n do not s i m p l y discover the
reflection of their 'real' situation, or even the presentation of ideolo-
gies of that situation, i n paintings, novels, religious tracts. Rather, it
is i n those very texts that ideologies are constructed, a n d that social
relations are forged. The very codes of art a n d literature, the narra-
tive structures of the text, are part of the ongoing process of the con-
struction of m e a n i n g and, hence, of the social w o r l d .
These are the m a i n difficulties confronted by the approaches taken
b y the three m a i n papers. The authors are, as I have said, committed
to crossing the boundaries between sociology, anthropology, a n d eco-
nomic a n d political history. In suggesting that their p r o b l e m is a lack
of interdisciplinarity, I mean that an openness to other disciplines i n
the social sciences a n d , particularly, the humanities is a necessary
17
Rosalind Coward, "Class, 'Culture' and the Social Formation," Screen, 18,
1 (1977):91,
For example, Cora Kaplan," "Like a Housemaid's Fancies': The Representa-
1 8
tion of Working-CIass Women, in Nineteenth-Century Writing," in Grafts. Feminist
Cultural Criticism, ed. Susan Sheridan (London: Verso, 1988). Lynda Nead, "The
Magdalen in Modem Times: The Mythology of the Fallen Woman in
Pre-Raphaelite Painting," in Betterton, 1987.
171
 CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION A N D THE WORLD-SYSTEM T H E G L O B A L A N D T H E SPECIFIC

first step to addressing these difficulties, a n d it w o u l d also begin, to
: - bridge the gap between the concerns of these papers .and those of the
other speakers at the symposium.. In particular, social history w o u l d
illuminate the processes a n d social relations i n v o l v e d i n identity
formation; cultural theory w o u l d facilitate a grasp of the nature,
complexity a n d operation of " c u l t u r e ; " a n d f e m i n i s m w o u l d ensure
a constant recognition of the centrality of questions of gender i n any
analysis of culture a n d society, at the national a n d international level.
The p r o b l e m , i n the e n d , is in connecting 'the title a n d the sub-title
of the s y m p o s i u m (and of this volume). The hope of the organizers
was that this connection c o u l d be made, a n d indeed, as I hope I have
begun to show, such a, development is essential a n d pressing. Leav-
ing aside for the moment the matter of the particular theoretical
implications of the terms " g l o b a l i z a t i o n " a n d " w o r l d - s y s t e m , " the
fact is that w e need a theory of culture at the level of the internation-
al, w h i c h is sensitive to the w a y s i n w h i c h identity is constructed a n d
represented i n culture and, i n social relations. Stuart H a l l ' s t w o
papers indicate, i n a p r e l i m i n a r y w a y , h o w this might be accom-
plished. The three papers under discussion here, however, have
focussed o n the m a i n title of the s y m p o s i u m , ignoring the challenges
of the sub-title. O f course the very title and sub-title encode diverse
discourses, w h i c h are only w i t h difficulty reconciled, a n d it m a y be
after all that the project of a dialogue is premature.
A central p r o b l e m , increasingly apparent throughout the s y m p o -
s i u m , and already indicated at several points i n this paper, is the
definition of " c u l t u r e . " R o l a n d Robertson has argued that his solu-
tion is not to define " c u l t u r e , " since the term has a complex history
and is used i n so m a n y different w a y s . But this clearly w i l l not do.
19
reception): the necessary emphasis on the constitutive role of culture
can otherwise too easily become a n e w idealism. B e h i n d these cultur-
al processes and institutions lie the social relations i n w h i c h they
exist (and w h i c h they also produce). A n d those social relations, as
w e l l as cultural texts a n d institutions, operate i n the global context —
a context, i n t u r n , w h i c h consists of economic a n d material factors,
social relations, and ideologies.
B u i l d i n g an adequate m o d e l of culture and representation i n the
global context w i l l not be an easy matter. The proceedings of the
s y m p o s i u m have at least made apparent what is n o w required:
namely an account of culture in the contemporary w o r l d w h i c h
grasps the fundamental economic factors i n an international capitalist
economy; w h i c h analyzes the cultural industries i n this connection;
w h i c h combines this w i t h specific studies of local societies and their
relationship to " c u l t u r a l i m p e r i a l i s m " ; a n d w h i c h is based on an
understanding of the complex relations of social formations, social
and cultural processes and institutions, and the ideologies and
systems of representation w h i c h create, maintain a n d subvert these.

What is important is that w e resist too n a r r o w a definition of " c u l -

ture," w h i c h w o u l d outlaw m a n y of its other c o m m o n uses. Rather,
w e must f i n d a w a y of exploring the relationships between (for
example), culture as values and beiefs, and culture as arts a n d
media. C u l t u r a l studies a n d cultural theory offer the beginning of
such an analysis, h i g h l i g h t i n g as they d o the ways i n w h i c h cultural
texts participate i n the construction of w i d e r cultural values a n d
ideologies. But this, i n t u r n , must be l i n k e d w i t h the sociological (and
historical) analysis of institutions of cultural production (and cultural

Robertson, 1988, 4.

172 173
 Name Index

Abercrombie, N., 85, 89 Barbados, 55

Abou-El-Haj, R A . , 142 Barber, K., 119,120
Abou-El-Haj, B., vil, xi, 12,18, Barnes & Noble, 136
139-144 Baudelaire, 169
Abu-Lughod, J., xi, 17,18,131-7 Baudrillard, J., 77
Academy Awards, 146 Bauman, Z., 73
Adorno, T., 169 Beechey, V., 164
Africa, 38,126,127,143 Benjamin, W., 169
Africa, East, 32,55 Bennet, T., 125,166
Africa, South, 6 Bergeson, A., 87
Africa, West, 6, 111, 120,124 Betterton, R., 162
Alloulah, M., 162 Bhabha, H., 162
Althusser, L., 47 Birmingham, x, 2, 6
America, North, 27, 28, 50,112,147 Bloch, E., 169
(See also USA, Canada) Bourdieu, P , 150
America, Latin, 29 Bourricaud, F., 70, 75
Anderson, B., 71 Bowie, D., 148
Appadurai, A., 10,11,17,77, 78 Boyd, Barratt, J. A., 125
Archer, M , 85 Brazil, 25
Arensberg, C , 113 Breckenridge, C , 18
Asard, E„ 126 Britain, British Isles, 3,15, .22, 23,
Ashcroft, B., 6 27, 31, 52, 55, 56, 86
Asia, 55> 132 British Broadcasting Corporation,
Australia, 6 27
British Empire, 37
Bangladesh, 55 Broadcasting Standards Committee,
Danton, k i , 123 27
 N A M E INDEX N A M E INDEX,

Cadbury's Cocoa, 6 Endoe, C , 81 16,19-68,131,140', 150,151,152, 'Lacanians, 157

Ca iro, xi, 133 154,166,167,169 Laclau, E., 160
England, 3,19, 21,24,31,32,48,53,
Calais, 79 Handler, R-, 153 Lancashire/ 49
54, 55,150
'Calcutta, 8,33 Hannerz, U . , xi, 4,14,16,17, Lang, J.„ 147
Eros statue, 24
Callaghy, T., 117 18,107-28,123,131,132,139, Lash, S., 73, 75
Euro-America, 9
Canada, National Film Board of, 140,141,142,152,162,165, Lechner, F., 4, 72, 87
Europe, Eastern, 79
146 167,169 Leppert, R., 73,166
Europe,-an, 39, 83, 87, 94, 99,112,
Caribbean, 15, 32, 37, 55, 59 Harare, 31 London, 6, 24,38
134,141,147
Center for Contemporary Cultural Harvey, D., 73 Los Angeles, 143
Studies, x, 2 Fabian, J,, 127 Haussmann, 156
Ceylon, see Sri Lanka Falklands, 26 Haydon, G., 125 Mahogany, Miss, 53
Chase-Dunn, G , 74 Fanon, F., 48,154 Hight, K. S., 139 Manhattan, 33
Chernobyl, ,25 Featherstone, M,.,, 9,91 Hill, S., 85,89 Mani, L„ 7,13
Chernoff, J., 124 Foucault, M . , 7 Hobsbawm, E. J., 71,113 Mann, M . , 87
China, 74, 76, 83 France, 99 Hoggart, R., x, 3 Manuel, P., 119,120
Chinese Revolution, 63 Freers, S., 60' Holzner, B., x, 71 Marco Polo, 95
Chirico, J., 79 Freud, S , 14, 43 Hong Kong, 6,120 Marks, D., 125
Civil .Rights Movement, 53 Huff, T,, 72 Marley, Bob, 54
Clifford, J., 7,13,167 Gappert, G . , viii, 12 Marx, K., 14, 28, 43, 44
Cohen, E„ 89 Gates, H . L., 162 IBM, 132 McGrane, B., 72
Common, Market, 24 ; Geertz, C , 15, 70, 78, 79 India, 6, 49, 55,120 Mcl ary, S., 166
Commonwealth Institute, 36,39 Indies, West, 6 McNeill, W. H . , 86
Gellner, E , 3, 71
Coward, R,., 171 Ireland, Northern, 26 Meyer, J. W„ 80,87
Germany, 126, 133'
Curran, J., 125 Ishida, Takesha, 84 Middle East, 86,141,142
Giddens, A., 82,164,165
1

Milton Keynes, 24
Gluck, G , 71
Daguerre, 156 Jamaica, 3,15, 24, 53, 54 Minh-Ha, Trinh, 6
Gottmann, J., 12
Davidoff, L , 170 ; James, H . , 71 Mobuto, Sese Seko, 117
Gramsci, A , 57,58, 67, 68,140
Derrida, J„ 49, 50, 51,155,157 Japan, 11, 76, 83, 86,148 Mogg, Sir W. R., 32
Gran, P., 140,142
Dezelay, Y., 153 !
Greater London Council, 65 Jaspers, K., 76, 88 Mohammed, 135,136
Dhareshwar, V., 7 Griffiths, G . , 6 Johsua, I., 95 Morocco, xi
Donald, J., 164 i Grossberg, L., 162 Mouffe, C , 160
Dumont, L., 75 Kaplan, C , 171 Murdoch, R., 27, 32
Group for Critical Study of Colonial
'Dürkheim, E„ ,83,84 J Khomeini, 136 My Beautiful Laundreite, 60
Discourse, Santa Cruz, 7
Kierney, H , 71 Myrdall, G , 121
Gucci, 132
Eagleton, T„ 166' Gulf, 3 King, A . D., 1-18,4,5,9,11,13,
Ecuador, 99 Gureviteh, M . , 125 149-54,151 Nairn, T'., 71
Edinburgh Festival, 60 ; Knight, R. V., viii, 12 NATO , 24
1

Egypt, 133 Haferkamp, H., 72 Kohn, H . , 78 Nead, L , 171

Eisenstadt, 5.N., 70, 89 Hall, C , 170 Kureishi, H . , 60 Nelson, B., 72
Emerson, R., 78 Kuwait, 6 Nelson, C , 162
H a l l S„ x, xi, 2,3,5,10,12,14,15,

176 177
 N A M E INDEX N A M E INDEX

Netti, P., x Scargill, A., '64 Urry, J„ 73, 75 Washington, 24

New York, 3, 38,136,143 Scots, 26 USA, 3, 6, 28,99,126,141,143,148 Waterman, C. A., 125
New Zealand, 148 Senghor, L., 103 (See .also America, North) Weber, M . , 82, 83,84
Nigeria, 6> 111, 114,117,118,120 Shaw, R., 117 USSR, 99 Wender, W i m , 147
Singapore; 8 Westminster, 108
Oreh, O. O., 120 Sky Channel, 27 Van der Post, L., 145 Westphalia, Treaty of, 97
Oshima, Nagisa, 145 Smelser, N . , 27 Vincent, T., 120 Williams, R., x, 3,7, 46
Oxbridge, 108 Smith, A . D„ 71, 78 Willis, P., 2, 3
Oxford English Dictionary, 4,11 South Seas, 25 Wagar, W., 78, 88 Wolff, J., xi, xii, 1,2, 3, 4,12,
South Atlantic, 25 Wall Street, 24 13,18,161-73.
Packer, G„ 118 Soviet Union, 6, 79 Wallerstein, I., xi, 2, 4,10,14, Wolff, E., 123
Pakistan, 55 Spencer, H . , .83 16,18, 69, 74,82, 91-105,113, Wollacott, J., 125
Paris, 8 Spivak, G . C , 7,162 118,131,132,134,140,141, Wordsworth, W.., 24
Parmar, P., 162 Sri Lanka, 49 151,152,156,157,160,162,
Pearson, H . W., 113 Swatos, W, FL, 87 163,164,165', 167,168 Zayrunia Mosque, 132.
Penley, C , 166 Sweden, 126
Piccadilly Circus, 24 Swift, J., 136
Polanyi, Karl, 113
Pollock D., 76 Tägg, J,, vii, xii, 18,155-60,157,163,
Portugal, 126 167,168
Prior, L,, 151 Tate and Lyle, 6
Thailand, 99
Raba t, xi Thatcher, M . , 27, 64, 67,135
Rabelais, 136 Thomas, G„ 80
Ranger, T, 71,113 Thompson, E. P., 3
Richard II, 49 Tiffin, H . , 6
Mo, 8,143 ; Toermies, F., 83
Robertson, R„ x, xi, 4,8,11,12,15, Tokyo, 24,31
18, 69-90, 71, 72, 76, 79, 82,116, Tomlin, L., 146
131,132,134,151,156,157,162, Trinidad, 55
163,164,167,168,172 Tunis, 132
Rabat, xi Tunisia, 99
Rodinsort, M . , 142 Turim, M . , xii, 18,145-8,163,168
Rushdie, S., 134,135,136 Turner, J., 82,165
Turner, B., 82,85,89
Said, E„ 6, 7,140
Sakamoto, R„ 147,148 Ugboajah, F., 120
Sartre, J. P, 103 UK, 6, 19, 20, 49,143 {See also Brit-
Satanic Verses, 134,-135 ain, England)
Saussure, F., 15,44 United Nations, 92, 97

178 179
 SUBJECT INDEX

dumping, 122,125 East, 83

Subject Index hegemony, 145 ecological interdependence, 25,
identity (see also identity), 7,14, ecology, 62, 81
20, 33 economic.-s, 12, 145, 148, 150,151,
insignia, 151 168,173
landscape, 151 economy, global (see also world
imperialism, 108,173 economy. Capitalist world
policy, 121,153 economy), 87, 88,132
politics, 19, 41, 42, 52, 58 education, 80,118,121,141,152
resistance, 100,101, 105, 168. "English eye", 20
revolution, 54 English language, 28
studies, vii, x, xii, 2, 3, 4, 6,10, Englishness, 14, 20, 22, 36
71,163 Enlightenment, 72, 77, 78
technology, 120 environmental movement, 17,115
theory, 163,170 esthetic instruments, 12,8
advertising, 27,31,32,81,147 Capital Marx's, 29', 30, 32, 37 culturalism, 163 esthetics, 38, 39
American society, culture, 32 capitalism, 15, 29, 31, 73, 74,108, culture industries, 125,173 esthetics, commodity, 123
Americanness, 28 170 culture, viii, ix, xii, 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 9, ethnicity, ix, xi, 17, 21, 22, 26, 34,
anthropology,-ists, 75, 87,110,117, capitalist, 8,104,142,153,157 10,12,14,15,16,17,18, 23, 26, 36, 37, 41, 55,150
133,167,169,171 capitalist world-economy, 10, 96, 27, 28,33,34,41,42, 56, 59, 70, ethnoscapes, 10, 78
Arabs, 94 153,156,168,173 71, 72, 75, 85, 91, 94, 95, 99,100, Eurasian ecumene, 86
architecture,-ural, ix, x, 12,132,149, Cartesian subject, 42 102,104,112,114, 115, 117,118, Eurocentricism, 139,141,154
150,151,152,154 : Christianity, 72 119,120,122,125,126,127,131, European theorists, 13
archives, national, 152 cinema, x, 18,145 (see also film) 134,136,140,145,146,148,153, ex-Marxist French intellectuals, 33
art history, x cities, colonial, 8 161,162,165,167,168,169,170,
art,-s, x, xii, 26, 27, 34, 59, 91, 93, 98, citizenship, 97 172 family, 158,169, 170
100,101,102,105,152,154,161, ciry,-ies, 17,118,132,149, 150,152, culture, global, 3, 9, 19, 78, 82, 87, fashion, 119
171,172 153 88, 89,137,139,141,151,152, feminism,,, 3, 32, 35, 47, 60, 65, 169,
axial period, 76, 88 civilization,^, 100, 109,134 154,159,162 170,172
colonial,-ism, xi, 7, 8,13, 35, 60, 111, culture, world, 16, 91, 94, 98, 103, feminist criticism, studies, x, xii, 146
Black, 15,35,53,54,55,56, 57,58, 139,141,143 111, 116 film, 59,119,120,146,147, 148,161,
59, 65,103 colonies, 8 171 (see also cinema)
boundaries, 151 community, organic, 46 Darwinian struggle, 84 finanscapes, 11, 78
Buddhism, Mahayana, 76 conflationism, 85 decolonization, 78 First World, 8,13,17, 110
built environment, ix, 12,13,149, Confucianism, 75, 94 deconstruction, 50 foreignness, 15, 80
150 country, 150 deregulation, 23 "form of life", 113,116
creolization, 39,126,143 difference, difference, 49, 50, 51, 52, French Revolution, 86
critical theory, x, xii 59, 68, 72,153
capital, viii, xi, 28,29,30,31, 98, cultural animateurs, 117 discursive formation, 158 gay literature, 60
• 140,143,151,165 categories, ix diversity, 110 gaze, 48

181
 SUBJECT I N D E X
SUBJECT INDEX

Gemeinschaft, 77,83 105,149,150,151,152,154,160 modernization theory, 141 pastiniper.ali.sm, 3, 7,154

gender, ix, 15,17,22,31,34,62,75, ideo!ogy,-ies, 100,118,140,170,173 modernization, x poststructuralists, 157
80; 150,168,169,170 images, absence of, 146 movements, 115 postmodemity,-ism, x, 8, 34, 36, 39,
Gesellschaft, 77,83,133 imperialism, 7 multicultaralism, 55, 56, 79 71, 73, 74, 77,136,153,154,157
Glasnost 89 incasteilamento, 94 multiculturality, 71, 87 Protestant Ethic, 31
global mass culture, 3,10,27, 28, individualization, 80 muscology, 152 psychoanalysis, 47
152 international division of labor, 23, museums, 153
global postmodern, 3, 32, 33, 35, 36, 115,122,132,143,151 music, 38, 94,119,120,125,132, race, ix, 7,15, 60, 62,150,168
global urbanity, 152 international interdependence, 24 133,147 racism, 7,14, 26, 55, 56
globality, 4,5,11, 77,80, .88,164 mterna'tionalism, 78 region. 17, 22,150
globalization, viii, x, xi, xii, 1,4, 9, internationalization, 23,88 relativism, 15, 73, 92,135
nation-states, 4,17, 20, 24, 25, 26,
11,12,14,16,17,19, 20, 22, 23, Islamic movement, 77 religiones, 79, 83, 88, 92, 95,101
27, 44,62,78, 87, 93,96,97, 99,
24,26, 27,29,30,31,32, 33,35, relocalization, 12
133,141,142,152
39, 68,70, 71, 75, 76,78, 79,80, knowledge, 4,6 renationalization, 12
national society, 9,15
84, 87,110,112,116,117,132, representation, 14,16, 20, 21, 2.8, 34,
nationalism, 4,16, 30, 33, 35, 69, 71,
134,135,145,149,151,153,154, labor, 6, 17, 23, 24, 29, 30,150 (see 78, 87, 92, 93, 96,118,127 35, 37, 49, 66, 67, 70, 73,150,151,
156,161,162,164,167,169,172 also international division of new international information 156,159,167,173
labor) order, 117 "routinization of charisma", 101
habitat, 98 landscapes, 11,150 non-European, 72
habitus, 150 language, 44, 50, 51, 95, 97,120, school systems, 93, 97
health, 80 127,139,142,148,152,157 objectification, 132 sciences, 98
hegemony, 58 leisure, 158 orientalists, 140 semiotics, 3
heterogenization, cultural, 77 linguistics, 15,44 Ottoman history, 141 sexual, division of labor, 30, 45
history, intellectual, 7 literary criticism, 161 difference, 49
history, economic and political, 171 texts, 171 identity, 21
painting, ix
history, social, 172 literature, 171 sexuality, 50,158,169
particularism, 71, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77,
homogeneity, 73, 86, 95, 98 locality, ix social science, 83
78, 89,103,145
homogenization, viii, 28,34,77,96, peace movement, 17,115 social theory, 82
108,109,112,113,119,120,122, market, 112,116,123,132,146,151 perestroika, 89 socialism, 64, 74
124,125,135,139,140,141,153 Marxism,-ist, 3,85,88 "peripheral corruption", 108,109, societalism, 15, 87
house forms, 150 masculine gaze, 15, 44 124,139 societalization, 80
human rights, 80, 92 ! masculinity, 21, 31,56, 57 photography,-ies, 18, 37, 59,155, society, nationally-defined, 3,1.0,15
hurnanity, 92 master concepts, 46 15?, 158,159 society ,-ies, 79, 93,126
humankind, 79, 81, 88,107 media, 118,119,125 planfatfons, 48, 49,115,151 sociology, 75, 82,171
mediascapes, 11,78 poIit.ics,-ical, 50, 51, 52. 57, 59, 61, South Korean workers, 3
ideascapes, 11, 78 men, 43,169 62, 63, 81,100,117,150,156,169 space, 116,117,150,151
identity, 7,14,15,16, 20, 21, 22, 26, minorities, 15, 99 polyethnicity, 71, 79,86,87 space, production of, 12
30,31,32,33,35> 37,39,41,42, mission civilisatrice, 103 post-Fordist, 30 space economy, 151
43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 50, 52, 53, 545, mode of production, ix postcolonial,-ism, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9,10, state,-s, 17,112,113,116,126,128
55,56,57, 62, 64, 70, 83, 89,104, modernity, x, 8,44,45, 77,82,153 13,141,142,154,166 structu ration theory, 86

182 183
 SUBJECT I N D E X

technology, 93,120,133,159 visual representation, 150

technoscapes, 10
television, 27,87,119,120,146
texts, 171 Notes on Contributors
territory, 116,118,119,126 war of positions, 57
Thatcherism, 23,25, 26, 27,31,32, West, the, 13,15, 28,33,38,39,44,
66 46,62,83,152,154,166,169
Third World, 8,13,17, 23, 83,110, Western episteme, 44
124,126,133,143,166 Westernization, 153
time, 127 women, 26, 43, 58, 80, 81,103, 111,
totalizations, 156 132,133,169,170; 171
town, 150 women's movement, 17,115 Barbara A b o u - E l - H a j is associate professor of art history at Bingham-
townscapes, 11 working class, English, 4, 58,151 ton University, State University of N e w York. She is the author of The
Turkish migrants, 3,133 world consciousness, 92 Medieval Cult of Saints: Formations and Transformations (Cambridge a n d
world cities, 18,152 N e w York: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
uni vers cloisonnée, 134 world economy, viii, 20,98,151,
universal, 68, 91,100 153 (see also capitalist world , Janet A b u - L u g h o d is professor of sociology and director of R E A L M
universalization, 69, 75, 77 economy) (Urban Research) Center o n Lower Manhattan, N e w School for Social
universalism, 71, 73, 74, 75, 76, 78, world culture, 16, 91, 94, 98,103, Research. H e r most recent book is The World System in the Thirteenth
80, 89,103,145 111, 116 Century: Dead-End or Precursor? (Washington, D . C . : American Historical
urban design, ix world, 11,17 Association, 1994).
urban form, 150 world-system,-s, ix, xi, xii, 1, 4, 9,
urban planning, 152 10,11,12, 70,71, 74, 79,82,87, Stuart H a l l is professor of sociology at the Open University, U K . H e
urbanism, xi, 12,18 92, 97,98,100,114,115,118,147, was previously director' of 'the Centre for Contemporary C u l t u r a l
Utilitarians, 83 1
149,154,156,161,162,164,172 Studies at the University of Birmingham. H i s most recent book (with
worldism, 15, 73 D a v i d H e l d a n d Tony M c G r e w ) is Modernity and Its Futures (Cam-
Vietnamese community, 3 writing,, ix, 119 bridge: Polity, i n association w i t h the Open University, 1992). In 1989,
visual markers, 150 H a l l was Distinguished Visiting Scholar i n A r t History at the State U n i -
versity of N e w York at Binghamton.

LTf Hannerz is professor a n d chair of the Department of Social

Anthropology at the University of Stockholm and director of the re-
search project "The W o r l d System of C u l t u r e " there. H i s most recent
book is Transnational Connections (London and N e w York: Routledge,
1996).

A n t h o n y D . K i n g is professor of art history a n d of sociology at

Binghamton University, State University of N e w York. H e is the author
of Global Cities: Post-Imperialism and the Internationalisation of London
(London a n d N e w York: Routledge, 1990) .and editor of Re-Presenting
the City: Ethnicity, Capital and Culture in the 21st-century Metropolis
(London: M a c m i l l a n ; N e w York: N e w York University Press, 1996).
184
R o l a n d Robertson is professor of sociology .and of religious studies at
the University of Pittsburgh. H e is the author' of numerous books, and
papers on various aspects of the global situation, including Globaliza-
tion: Social Theory and Global Culture (London, N e w b u r y Park, and
Delhi: Sage, 1992).

J o h n Tagg is professor of art history at Binghamton University, State

University of N e w York, and (1996-97) Fellow at the Society of H u -
manities, Cornell University. H i s most recent book is Grounds of Dispute:
Art History, Cultural Politics, and the Discursive Field (London: Macmillan;
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992).

M a u r e e n Turirn • is professor of f i l m studies and English at the U n i -

versity of Florida, Gainesville. H e r most recent book is Flashbacks in
Film: History and Memory (London and N e w York: Routledge, 1989).

Immanuel Wallerstein is Distinguished Professor of Sociology and d i -

rector of the F e m a n d Braudel Center for the Study of Economies, H i s -
torical Systems, and Civilizations at Bmghamton University, State U n i - *"
versify of N e w York. His. most recent book is After Liberalism (New
York: N e w Press, 1995).

Janet W o l f f is professor of art history and director of the V i s u a l and

Cultural Studies Program at the University of Rochester. H e r most re-
cent book is Resident Alien: Feminist Cultural Criticism (Cambridge::
Polity, 1995).

186