Review: Theories of Presupposition

Reviewed Work(s): Context and Presupposition by R. van der Sandt

Review by: N. Burton-Roberts
Source: Journal of Linguistics , Sep., 1989, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Sep., 1989), pp. 437-454
Published by: Cambridge University Press

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/4176013

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J. Linguistics 25 (I989), 437-454. Printed in Great Britain

REVIEW ARTICLE

Theories of presupposition
N. BURTON-ROBERTS

University of Newcastle upon Tyne

(Received 2I March I989)

R. van der Sandt, Context and presupposition. (Croom Helm Linguistics

Series.) London: Croom Helm, I988. Pp. xvii+249.

Despite several attempts to pack presupposition off to bed as a theoretical

concept, I am pleased to say that it has refused to lie down. So let me say at
the outset that I welcome Context and presupposition; it is a thought-
provoking contribution to a long-running and ongoing debate. In what
follows I shall of course attempt to give an account of the theory it presents,
but I shall also take this opportunity of standing back a bit and raising some
general questions about presupposition and theories of presupposition.1

I. THE DEFINITION PROBLEM IN THEORIES OF PRESUPPOSITION

What do we require of a theory of presupposition as such? We require,

surely, that such a theory predict and explain at least the known empirical
facts about presupposition.
One of the more intriguing well-known facts about presupposition is that,
when the presuppositions of different atomic sentences conflict with one
another, all such presuppositions are neutralized in (filtered out of)
disjunctions containing those atomic sentences, with a consequent resolution
of the conflict. This phenomenon (which is not restricted to disjunction) is
exemplified in (I).

(I) Either John's regretting he went to the party or he's regretting he

stayed away from it.
(2) (a) John's regretting he went to the party.
(b) John went to the party.
(3) (a) John is regretting he stayed away from it.
(b) John stayed away from the party.

The presupposition (2 b) of the first disjunct (2 a) conflicts with the

presupposition (3 b) of the second disjunct (3 a). But there is no conflict in (i)
itself since (I) presupposes neither of the presuppositions of its disjuncts. The

[I] I am grateful to Nigel Vincent for comments on a partial earlier draft.

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 JOURNAL OF LINGUISTICS

interest of this lies in the fact that disjunctions do (m

presuppose what their disjuncts presuppose.
Presumably it is in the NATURE of the presuppositional relation (P) that
presuppositions behave in this way. A proper understanding of the nature of
P would entail an understanding of the resolution of P-conflict. So a theory
of presupposition should (a) characterize the nature of P by including a
definition of P and (b) demonstrate what follows from that definition. If this
particular fact about presuppositional behaviour follows from that definition,
the latter satisfies a necessary condition for being a correct definition of P and
the theory that includes it may be regarded as predicting the fact and as going
some (if not all) of the way towards explaining it. We can then use the fact
as a test of any genuine definition of P and of the theory that includes it.
Are these assumptions about theory, definition, prediction, and ex-
planation contentious? I take it that they are not. Why spell them out then?
On page 203, van der Sandt offers the following definition of presupposition.

(D-7) For any p and c such that A (p, c)

P(T, [x]c, c) iff

(i) XsEP (p)

(2) for any k E EP (p):
Con (P(c) U {[xLc kbie})
(3) A (9, c/[X]c)
This is to be read as follows. For any sentence p and context c such t
assertion of p is Acceptable in that context, p PRESUPPOSES the prop
expressed by X in that context if and only if: (i) X is in the set of E
Presuppositions of p; (2) for any other sentence (i-) in the set of Elem
Presuppositions of q, the set of propositions constituted by that
toegether with the propositions expressed by X and i/ is Consistent;
the assertion of p is Acceptable when that context is expanded
addition of the proposition expressed by X.
Each of the conditions (I), (2), and (3) requires comment, but it i
is relevant to the example of the resolution of presuppositional conflict. It
is part of the explicit content of condition (2) that no 'Elementary
Presupposition' of a sentence survives as a presupposition of that sentence if
it is inconsistent (i.e. conflicts) with any other 'Elementary Presuppositi
of that sentence. Condition (2) thus constitutes an explicit STATEMENT
DESCRIPTION of the empirical fact (of the resolution of presuppositional
conflict) that would have to be PREDICTED by any EXPLANATION of it. Clearly,
this fact cannot be used as an empirical test of this 'definition' of
presupposition, for the fact is stipulated in the definition. If only for this
reason (temporarily ignoring condition (i), for example), I cannot regard D-
7 as an advance in our understanding of the nature of presupposition.
In fairness, the discussion must be generalized at this point, for van der

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 REVIEW ARTICLE

Sandt is not alone in the general assumptions he brings to bear on the

problem of presupposition. For two decades now, the major preoccupation of
anyone dealing with presupposition has been the so-called PROJECTION
PROBLEM. This is the problem of predicting the behaviour of presuppositions
in compound sentences; that is, whether and when the presuppositions of
atomic sentences (which van der Sandt calls 'Elementary Presuppositions')
are inherited as such by compound sentences containing those atomic
sentences. The facts of presuppositional conflict described above constitute
just one aspect of this general problem. Van der Sandt's treatment continues
this tradition in its exclusive preoccupation with projection (see especially the
flyleaf and I96). Now, this exclusive preoccupation with projection as such
depends on the assumption that it is reasonable to treat of the projection of
presuppositions either independently of the definition of presupposition or
on the assumption that a correct definition of presupposition may be taken
for granted in respect of simple sentences. (Langendoen & Savin (197I) and
Karttunen (1973) are early exponents of this approach.) On this assumption,
'a solution to the projection problem for presuppositions' has come to seem
a coherent autonomous objective.
My opening remarks lead me to question this. Can any putative 'solution
to the projection problem', if it purports to be just that, be a coherent
objective? If we had a correct definition of presupposition in the first place,
the behaviour of presuppositions across the board would follow from it (that
is, a correct definition would pre-empt the projective task). Any putative
autonomous projection solution will either conflict with the definition that
throws up that problem or, in the absence of any serious definition, will not
be a solution to anything.
Has anyone seriously proposed what I am calling an autonomous
projection solution (i.e. one that by-passes the definition problem)? I shall
take Gazdar (1979) as an example, for that treatment has special relevance
to that of Context and presupposition. Gazdar (1979) presents a model for
computing the presuppositions of compound sentences. A presupposition is
defined as a ' pre-supposition' which is consistent with context and hence not
cancelled. 'Pre-suppositions' not consistent with context are cancelled, do
not become (actual) presuppositions. A 'pre-supposition' is assigned to a
sentence on the basis of whether the sentence contains an expression included
on a list of 'pre-supposition inducing' expressions. Now, the only definition
provided of 'pre-supposition' is that a 'pre-supposition' is a potential
presupposition. This clearly does not constitute a (non-circular) definition of
presupposition, nor did Gazdar intend it as such: 'pre-suppositions are
entities whose only role is a technical one in the process of assigning actual
presuppositions to utterances' (Gazdar, 1979: 124). Again, then, rather than
being able to predict the observable behaviour of presuppositions from an
understanding of the nature of the presuppositional relation (as formulated
in a definition), we are left to infer, if we can, the nature of presupposition

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 JOURNAL OF LINGUISTICS

from the observed behaviour of what we pre-theoretically call 'presup-

positions'. (See Stalnaker, I98I, on this point.)
This brings me to condition (i) of D-7. D-7 is offered as a definition
of presupposition but condition (i) makes reference to 'Elementary Presup-
positions' (EP's). EP's are the presuppositions that are assigned to atomic
sentences on the basis of a list of EP-inducing expressions and constructions.
They may be cancelled as actual presuppositions by the other conditions in
D-7. 'Elementary presuppositions' thus play exactly the same technical role
in van der Sandt's theory as 'pre-suppositions' do in Gazdar's theory. Both
theories thus exhibit that preoccupation with providing a solution to the
projection problem while by-passing the definition problem, considerably
reducing, in my view, their interest qua theories of presupposition.
Nor are Gazdar and van der Sandt alone in this. Van der Sandt himself
draws attention to the correspondence between Gazdar's appeal to 'presup-
position' and Karttunen and Peters' appeal to conventional implicature in
the following comments:

Gazdar (I979) uses the term 'pre-supposition' to refer to the elementary

presuppositions of sentences. These hyphenated entities are potential
presuppositions, postulated solely for the purpose of theory con-
struction ... Karttunen & Peters (I979) borrow, exactly for this reason,
Gricean notion of conventional implicature to refer to the elementary
presuppositions of a sentence: conventional implicatures are by definition
unexplained entities conventionally attached to syntactic constructions or
lexical items (36).

Just so. It is surprising, therefore, to find on page 7I: 'I do object to the
idea of "explicating" the reasonably well-established notion of presup-
position in terms of the totally unexplained notion of conventional
implicature'. Given van der Sandt's appeal to EP's, and the connections he
himself establishes between EP, 'pre-supposition', and conventional imp-
licature, this seems a clear case of the pot calling the kettle black. All three
theories begin by stipulating presupposition by convention. In what follows
I am obliged to revert to this point.
Finally, on the general topic of explanation and P-definitions, let me cast
the net wider and indicate briefly how the discussion bears on the Frege-
Strawson definition of presupposition, which I think of as the STANDARD
SEMANTIC DEFINITION. The best known fact about presuppositions is that
they are intuitively preserved under negation. In the standard semantic
theory of P this is taken to be axiomatic, as the defining property of
presupposition (i.e. that theory includes the definition 'A presupposes B if
and only if A entails B and not-A entails B'). But the fact that presuppositions
are intuitively preserved under negation can be seen as just one further aspect
of the behaviour of presuppositions, as yet another empirical phenomenon
that would have to be predicted and explained by any proper theory of P.

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 REVIEW ARTICLE

Looked at this way, this empirical fact is seen not to follow

that definition; on the contrary, the definition consists pr
stipulation of that fact. Since definitions, whatever else they might help to
explain, do not explain themselves, we must be chary in what we incorporate
into them; they must be formulated in such a way that they go above and
beyond any relevant fact that might reasonably be held to be in need of
explanation (this at least is the assumption that informs the theory presented
in Burton-Roberts, I989). But is it reasonable to demand that this most
salient intuitive fact also be explained by a definition of P? In respect of the
standard semantic definition we have nothing to lose in demanding this, for
we already know that this definition creates a monster projection problem
anyway, and this, in terms of the above discussion, means that for
independent reasons it cannot be the correct definition of presupposition.

2. PRESUPPOSITION, TRUTH-CONDITIONAL SEMANTICS, AND

CONTEXT

From the failure of the standard semantic definition of P,

to say sweeping) conclusion is often derived: that P cannot be a semantic
phenomenon; that is, that P COULD not be defined on sentences in terms of
a truth-conditional relation distinct from standard entailment (and involving
truth-value gaps) nor, given any such definition, could the projection of
presuppositions be left to the mercies of any compositional function such as
a propositional calculus. I view this conclusion as a non-sequitur (since, from
the failure of standard semantic presupposition, it merely follows that if P is
to be given a semantic definition, then the standard semantic definition
cannot be it). Nevertheless, it has stimulated the development of pragmatic
approaches to presupposition which must be judged on their merits. Van der
Sandt presents one such theory. It is pragmatic in that its main thesis is that
P is a context-dependent phenomenon, and as such is associated with
utterances not sentences.
The first two-thirds of the book are devoted to a thoroughgoing critique
of previous approaches to presupposition, both semantic and pragmatic.
Chapter 3 is a particularly thorough critique of the (now-abandoned)
attempt to reduce P to conversational implicature. Here I shall focus on van
der Sandt's arguments against any kind of semantic (truth-conditional/
functional) approach.
In this connection, it is worth considering the implications of one of his
main objections to Gazdar's theory. He rightly criticizes Gazdar for failing
to attend to a fundamental conceptual issue: the mutual incompatibility of
ASSERTION and PRESUPPOSITION (I17-II8, I28-I30). As he observes, what is
asserted is thereby not presupposed. Does this matter? It matters for the
following reason. Compare (4), (5), and (6).

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 JOURNAL OF LINGUISTICS

(4) The king of France is wise.

(5) France is rich and the king of France is wise.
(6) There is a king of France and the king of France is wise.
(7) There is a king of France
Part of the task of any theory of presupposition is to capture the fact that (5)
does, but (6) does not, PRESUPPOSE what (4) presupposes, namely (7). (6) does
not, precisely because it ASSERTS (7). Any account of this aspect of the
projection of presuppositions must then attend to this mutual incompatibilit
of assertion and presupposition. Gazdar's theory makes the wrong prediction
for (6). But how do we (including van der Sandt) know that Gazdar's theory
fails in this respect? We know this because, in that theory, it is possible for
a proposition to be standardly entailed and presupposed simultaneously;
that is, standard entailment and presupposition are not mutually exclusive.
In (4) and (5), the king of France, as a referring expression, induces (7) as both
a standard entailment and a presupposition in this theory. In those two
examples, this presents no problem, for the theory is only concerned with
predicting whether or not (7) is PRESUPPOSED. It is left to us to add the
corollary that, since (4) and (5) presuppose (7), they do not assert (7). The
problem emerges as an empirical problem for the theory in (6), for there (7)
is a standard entailment of (6) via its first conjunct, independently of the
referring expression and hence independently of any presupposition.
Intuitively, we respond to this by saying that (7) is asserted (and not
presupposed) by the first conjunct of (6) and hence by (6) itself.
In raising this valid objection to Gazdar's theory, van der Sandt appears
to share with me the following assumption: that standard entailment as such
(i.e. when not associated with any of these unexplained relations such as
'elementary presupposition' or 'pre-supposition') constitutes the truth-
conditional counterpart of the speech act concept of assertion (see van der
Sandt's reiterated use of 'asserted or entailed' (e.g. 129, I6I)). Now, this
assumption, combined with the fact that assertion and presupposition are
mutually exclusive, would seem to imply that standard entailment as such
cannot serve as the truth-conditional component of any counterpart of a
speech act concept of presupposition; in other words that, as far as truth-
conditionality is concerned, the relations of standard entailment and
presupposition are mutually incompatible. The significance of this lies in the
fact that it is generally acknowledged that at least some intuitive
presuppositions are truth-conditional (it has never been disputed, for
example, that (4) and (5) intuitively presuppose (7) and that, since (7) is not
true, (4) and (5) cannot be true). From this in turn it would follow that we
require to reconstruct a truth-conditional complementarity between standard
entailment and presupposition, a distinction between two mutually in-
compatible types of entailment. This is equivalent to the call for a semantic
definition of presupposition (though, given the above remarks, it will have to
be distinct from the standard semantic definition).

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 REVIEW ARTICLE

I imagine that van der Sandt would want to reject this line of thought. But
the question here is: does the theory of Context and presupposition in itself
explicitly contradict that conclusion? In the first place, it depends on how his
theory reconstructs the complementarity of assertion and presupposition,
and this in turn depends on what alternative definition of assertion is offered.
This takes us to the core of the theory and I defer considering it because there
are a couple of prior general considerations.
First, it has already been noted that the theory appeals to an undefined
relation of 'Elementary Presupposition', and that EP's are assigned to
SENTENCES. Given this, it appears to me that the theory does not contradict
that conclusion; it simply side-steps the issue, as Gazdar's theory does.
Moreover, it might even be argued that a compatibility between van der
Sandt's theory and a semantic theory of presupposition is indicated by the fact
that EP's are assigned to sentences on the basis of sentential properties which
are at least in part semantic.
The second (related) consideration is more general and involves the notion
of 'context'. As indicated, Context and presupposition is committed to, and
is a response to, a view of presupposition as a context-dependent
phenomenon. In developing a pragmatic (context-dependent) theory of P,
van der Sandt sees himself as developing a theory which thereby contradicts
any sentence-semantic theory of P. This may seem reasonable; any semantic
theory of presupposition will define P on SENTENCES and is committed to
coming up with a compositional account of presupposition projection for
compound sentences. Since sentences as such do not occur, they do not occur
in context (it is utterances that occur in context). From this it follows that
any sentence-semantics of presupposition gives a non-contexual account of
presupposition. Hence the incompatibility.
This incompatibility is only apparent, however. It depends on how we
understand the expression 'any sentence-semantics of P gives a non-
contextual account of P'. A sentence-semantics of P, whatever else it might
be, is a theory of sentence-semantic presupposition; i.e. it is (by definition) a
theory of those aspects of the general concept of presupposition that CAN be
dealt with linguistically, exclusively in terms of sentences, without reference
to context. Such a theory is only necessarily incompatible with a pragmatic
(context-dependent) theory of P if it claims to be an exhaustive theory of P.
In and of itself, though, no such theory excludes the possibility of a
pragmatics of P, though it does imply some division of labour. To my
knowledge, no one is demanding that it is up to the semantics to tell the
whole story of what can and cannot be understood from the utterance of a
sentence in a context. A pragmatic theory contradicts the partial story told
by a semantic theory only if it succeeds in telling the story itself. But, again,
it is difficult to see how this could be claimed for a pragmatic theory in which
(undefined) 'Elementary Presuppositions' are assigned to SENTENCES.
By way of illustration, consider (8)-(Io). (8) presupposes (I I) by virtue of

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 JOURNAL OF LINGUISTICS

containing the referring expression her son. Any theory of P is required to

predict that the conditional sentence (9) does, while the conditional sentence
(io) does not, inherit this presupposition.

(8) Mrs Golightly won't be pleased to hear of her son's behaviour.

(g) If Mrs Golightly has any sense of decency, she won't be pleased to
hear of her son's behaviour.
(io) If Mrs Golightly is the mother of that boy, she won't be pleased to
hear of her son's behaviour.
(i I) Mrs Golightly has a son.

A sentence-semantics of P must predict these facts on the basis of the

sentences themselves and their semantic properties. Almost certainly, a
semantic account of the distinction between (9) and (io) will be tied, directl
or indirectly, to the fact that the antecedent of (9) is semantically independe
of the presupposition of its consequent, while that of (io) semantically entails
that presupposition. In the latter case, the semantic content of the antecedent
has the effect of neutralizing the presupposition of the consequent. Let us
assume that there is some semantic definition of P from which this distinction
between (g) and (io) does fall out automatically - and on that basis.
Now, it is well-known that contextual assumptions on the part of utterers
affect the placement of nuclear stress. A sentence-semantics does not take
account of utterers' contextual assumptions, by definition. Hence stress
patterns induced by utterers' contextual assumptions fall outside the scope of
any sentence-semantics of P. I take it that in default of any contextual
assumptions (i.e. when (IO) is considered as a SENTENCE), the antecedent of
(io) would receive nuclear stress on boy. But consider now the intuitive effect
of a nuclear stress on that in an UTTERANCE of (IO). In some sense of
'presuppose', such an utterance would indicate that the speaker was, within
the antecedent itself, presupposing that Mrs Golightly had a son, for it would
be most appropriate to utter (8) in this way in a context in which her having
a son is not at issue (the question at issue then being which boy is her son).
In an utterance with that stressing, then, the antecedent itself evinces (I I) as
a pragmatically induced (stress-related) presupposition, quite independently
of whether or not (I I) is semantically presupposed in the consequent. This is
shown by the utterance (I2).
(12) 'If Mrs Golightly is the mother of THAT boy, she's got problems.'

Neither the antecedent nor the consequent of the SENTENCE uttered in (12)
presupposes (II); nevertheless we do intuitively perceive that such an
UTTERANCE (i.e. its utterer) does.2

[2] By D-7, 9 presupposes Vt only if Vt is assigned as an 'EP' to the sentence p. If p = th

sentence uttered in (I2) and Vt = the proposition expressed by (I I), this has the unfortuna
consequence that the utterance (I2) does NOT presuppose (II), for the sentence uttered
contains no expression or construction by which it would be assigned (i i) as an 'EP'. It is
one thing for a sentence-semantic theory of P to predict that the SENTENCE uttered in (12)

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So there is pragmatic (context-dependent) work to be done here (perhaps

of the sort proposed by Sperber and Wilson, I986: Ch. 4.5). But there is no
conflict in the idea that, semantically, (I0) itself (as a sentence) does not
presuppose Mrs Golightly has a son, but that utterances of (Io) may evince
this presupposition in certain contexts. Indeed, the absence of a sentence-
semantic presupposition should form part of the explanation of why, if an
UTTERANCE of (I0) is to evince that presupposition, its antecedent must be
uttered with nuclear stress on that (i.e. why it does not evince the
presupposition with any other nuclear stress). All that we require of the
semantic theory is that it reconstruct (semantically) a concept of
presupposition that is at least consistent with this pragmatic concept.
In discussions of the context-dependence of presupposition, example-pair
like (I3) and (14) have become famous.

(I3) If Nixon has invited Angela Davies to the White House, he will regret
having invited a black militant.
(I4) If Nixon has invited Senator McCarthy's wife to the White House,
he'll regret having invited a black militant.
(I5) Nixon has invited a black militant (to the White House).

It would not be surprising, therefore, to find such examples cited in the book
under review. And they duly are (47-48, I54-I55, and 220 n. I). They are
also duly cited, equally recently, in Kempson (I988), and in support of
exactly the same argument. Van der Sandt and Kempson regard such
examples as providing compelling evidence against any theory of semantic
presupposition. It is not my purpose to deny that such examples indeed
demonstrate the context-dependence of some general concept of pre-
supposition. However, I do want to question the view that they constitute
counter-evidence to any theory of semantic presupposition.
Notice first that neither of the antecedents of (I3) and (14) semantically
entails the presupposition of the consequent, (I5). So, by the semantic
account of the presuppositions of conditional sentences described above (for
(9) and (io)), both of these SENTENCES as such would be characterized as
inheriting (and thus presupposing) that presupposition. However, it is
evident that if we bring the real-world knowledge/assumptions that might
form part of a context of UTTERANCE for (I3) and (14) to bear on these
examples, a different picture may (or may not) emerge. As a matter of fact,
Angela Davies was a black militant and Senator McCarthy's wife was not.
Knowledge of this non-linguistic fact on the part of an utterer of (I3) would
have the effect of tying its antecedent in with its consequent (if Angela Davies

does not presuppose (II); this does not constitute failure in such a theory, for the
phenomenon here is pragmatic and as such lies beyond the domain of the theory. It is quite
another thing for a pragmatic theory to emerge with the result that this UTTERANCE does
not presuppose (I i). This pragmatic prediction is simply incorrect and constitutes failure
within the purported domain of the theory.

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 JOURNAL OF LINGUISTICS

is a black militant and if Nixon has invited her, then he has

militant). In short, semantically the antecedents of (I3) and (I4) are
independent of their consequents, but non-linguistic facts in the contex
utterance may serve to make them dependent in the minds of utterers. An
utterer who assumed that Angela Davies was a black militant would NO
then be presupposing that Nixon had invited a black militant in uttering (I
The pragmatic facts about the presuppositions of (I 3) might thus appear to
conflict with the semantic predictions for (I3).
But they don't. On the contrary, these pragmatic facts are entirely
consistent with, and indeed a predictable extrapolation of, the semantic facts
as characterized above. To see this, consider the following sentence.

(I 6) Angela Davies is a black militant and if Nixon has invited Angela

Davies to the White House, he'll regret having invited a black
militant.

In constructing this new SENTENCE (I6), I have taken a sentence expressing

the proposition which formed part of the context of UTTERANCE of (I
envisaged above and paired it (by means of conjunction) with the origina
sentence (I 3). Since this is not the place to demonstrate it (but it is
demonstrable - see Burton-Roberts, I989 Chs. 6-8), I am obliged to ask the
reader to assume the following: that any sentence-semantics that succeeds in
predicting the sentence-semantic presuppositions of (0, (5)s(6), (9)-(Io), and
(I 3)-(4), succeeds in predicting that (i 6) as a sentence, does NOT presuppose
(I 5). Now van der Sandt, with Gazdar, regards a context as representable by
a consistent set of propositions which is paired with the proposition
expressed by the uttered sentence. My argument, then, is this. By whatever
principle a sentence-semantics predicts that sentence (I 3) presupposes (I5
while predicting that (i6) does not presuppose (I5), that same principle may,
with total consistency, be called upon and extrapolated to predict that, when
(I 3) is actually uttered in a context that includes the proposition that Angela
Davies is a black militant, the utterer of (I 3) would not be presupposing (I 5).
In short, I am suggesting that a successful sentence-semantics of P will
provide the basis for a semantics of pragmatic representation (or, if you like,
a semantics for 'the language of thought').
I have argued that a theory of sentence-semantic presupposition need not
be incompatible with a pragmatic (speaker-orientated) theory of utterance
presupposition. The argument depends of course on maintaining a consistent
distinction between the concept of 'sentence' and the concept of 'speaker's
utterance of a sentence'. It appears to me that both Kempson and van der
Sandt blur this distinction, consistently attributing to the sentence itself what
is, by their own admission, only true of certain speakers' utterances of the
sentence. For example, Kempson talks of [(I3)] itself as not presupposing
(I5), thereby suggesting that (I 3) as a SENTENCE does not presuppose (I5), a
suggestion that would indeed contradict any adequate semantic theory. But

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her argument concerns not (I3) itself, but UTTERANCES of (I 3) by certain

speakers. The same goes for van der Sandt: 'It depends on the context of
utterance and the assumptions made by the interlocutors ... whether (2) iS
preserved as a presupposition of the whole SENTENCE' (I54) (my caps).
Consider finally van der Sandt's claim that such examples 'amply justify the
conclusion that the presuppositions OF A SENTENCE cannot be computed
solely on the basis of its elementary presuppositions and its mode of
composition' (I60) (my caps). Van der Sandt's observations on the
presuppositions that may be induced in the (linguistic or non-linguistic)
context of UTTERANCE do not justify this conclusion about sentence-
semantic presupposition at all, let alone 'amply'.

3. PRESUPPOSITION AND CONTEXTUAL ACCEPTABILITY

Having discussed conditions (i) and (2) of van der Sandt's P-definition (D-
7), I come to the crucial third condition. He expresses the intuitive content
of condition (3) as follows: 'a sentence [sic] can only presuppose a
proposition in a context if [the assertion of] this sentence is acceptable given
the contextual assumption of the proposition in question' (203). This
condition thus depends on a definition of acceptability [of an assertion] in a
context. This is given by D-5 on page 20I.3 (In fact, as van der Sandt points
out (20I), D-5 does not represent a definition of acceptability; but these
necessary conditions on acceptability 'are sufficient to compute the projection
cases '.)

D-5. a. A(p, c) only if P(c) # [p],

b. A(p, c) only if Con (P(c) U {[p],})
c. If p is not of the form [X A #f], [X v 3b] or [X -- 3f] and p contains
an embedded sentence 6 such that
(i) 6 is not the complement of a verb of propositional attitude
(believe, hope...) and
(ii) 6eEP(9), then
A(p, c) only if A(6, c)
d. If p is the form [X A 3b] or [XL-*>/] then
A(p, c) only if A(X, c) and A(#Y, c/[X,])
e. If p is of the form [X v i] then
A(9, c) only if A(X, c/[V,]) and A(3Y, c/[X,])
In what follows I shall not attempt to be comprehensive and I shall reserve
any critique of the concepts involved. My purpose is to show how the basic
systems of the theory work for a few central examples. I have some problems
here though.

[3] D-5, as presented in Context and presupposition, incorporates several mistakes. I have
confirmed with the author that he intends the version presented here.

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 JOURNAL OF LINGUISTICS

Conditions (a) and (b) express the idea that an assertion is acceptable only
if the proposition it expresses is consistent with, but not entailed by, the set
of propositions that constitute the context. The idea here is that assertions
are only acceptable if they express 'new information'. Condition (c) is
primarily designed to cover modal sentences (necessary/possible that S);
these are acceptable in a context only if the embedded sentence is acceptable
(by the other conditions) in that context. Condition (d) captures a pragmatic
asymmetry in conjunctions and conditionals: a conjunctive(/conditional)
assertion is acceptable in a context only if the assertion of the first
conjunct(/antecedent) is acceptable in that context and only if the assertion
of the second conjunct(/consequent) is acceptable in that context increm-
ented by the proposition expressed by the first conjunct(/antecedent). By
contrast, condition (e) for disjunctions is symmetric: a disjunctive assertion
is acceptable in a context only if the assertion of each of its disjuncts is
acceptable in that context incremented by the other disjunct. This distinction
between conjunctions/conditionals and disjunctions is well taken.
By way of illustration, take the following example:

(I7) John has children and John's children are ambitious.

(i8) John has children.

We have seen that intuitively the second conjunct of (X7) presupposes (I8),
but the conjunction as a whole does not. How do D-7 and D-5 predict this?
To answer this, we first consult D-7. (i8) is assigned as an 'EP' to (i7) by
virtue of its containing the referring expression John's children, so condition
(i) is satisfied. This 'EP' does not conflict with any other 'EP' of (I7), SO
condition (2) iS satisfied. By condition (3), (I7) presupposes (i8) only if the
assertion of (I 7) is acceptable given the contextual assumption of (i 8). To see
whether this latter condition is met, we consult D-5. Conditions (a), (b) and
(d) are the relevant ones. Collectively they amount to this: the assertion of (I7)
is acceptable only if the first conjunct provides information which is new with
respect to the context and consistent with context; furthermore, the first
conjunct is taken as part of the context for the second, so the second must
(and in our case does) provide consistent 'new information' over and above
the first. Clearly, by these conditions, (I 7) will be acceptable only in a context
that does NOT include (i8). But, by D-7: (3), (17) presupposes (i8) only if (I7)
is acceptable in a context that does include (i8). Since the conditions for
acceptability of (I 7) (via its first conjunct) conflict with those for the
presupposition of (i 8), it follows that the assertion of (I7) will not
presuppose (I8) in any context in which it is acceptable. This is a correct
prediction.
In due to course, I shall raise the question of what it is for a proposition
to be contained in the context and how we know of any particular
proposition that it actually is. For the moment let's assume, with van der
Sandt, that 'previously asserted or presupposed' provides a touchstone for

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this. In that case, the prediction that (I7) does not presuppose (I8) is a reflex
of the non-acceptability of the following 'text'.

(I9) !John has children ... John has children and his children are
ambitious.

The theory fares less well with (20), however. Intuitively, (20) presupposes
(I8).

(20) John is ambitious and John's children are ambitious.

Conditions (I) and (2) of D-7 are satisfied. Again, condition (3) sends us to D-
5 (a), (b), and (d). Provided the first conjunct gives new information with
respect to the context and the second conjunct does so with respect to the
first, the assertion of (20) is acceptable. Let us first assume that this is so.
Now the conditions on the acceptability of the assertion of (20) are
compatible with the conditions for (20) to presuppose (i8). Thus (20) remains
acceptable in a discourse context in which the presupposition has already
been asserted:

(2I) John has children ... John is ambitious and John's children are
ambitious.

So (20) is correctly predicted to presuppose (I8) in that context. But consider

now a context in which it has previously been asserted that John is ambitious
(call this context a). By D-5 (a), (b) and (d), the assertion of (20) will not be
acceptable in context a. See (2I a).

(2i a) !John is ambitious ... John is ambitious and his children are
ambitious.

Now, by the first line of D-7 ('For any p and c such that A(p, c)')
presupposition is only defined for assertions that are acceptable with respect
to context. Since (20) is not acceptable in context a, the theory does not tell
us whether or not (20) presupposes (I8) in that context. Yet I have the
intuition that, notwithstanding the non-acceptability of the assertion of (20)
in that context, it does still presuppose (I8).
Now, it might be asked: who cares whether (20) presupposes (i8) in that
context given that its assertion is unacceptable in that context (indeed the
theory treats this as a 'Don't care'). The following example (actually cited by
van der Sandt (Ioo)) shows that 'Don't care' should be made to care.

(22) If Godel knows that Fermat's theorem is true, then Fermat's theorem
is true.

(23) Fermat's theorem is true.

Considered as an ordinary (non-metalinguistic) assertion, (22) is un-

acceptably circular. And it is characterized by D-5 :(d) as non-acceptabl
the reader may check. Presupposition is therefore not defined for (22); the
theory treats the presuppositional status of (23) in (22) as a 'Don't care'.

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 JOURNAL OF LINGUISTICS

Against this, I would urge that any adequate explanation of the intuitive
unacceptability of (22) depends on acknowledging that it does presuppose
(23). As van der Sandt observes (222 n. I9) 'it is natural to think of
conditionals as (temporary) suppositions by means of which a conclusion is
established'. The unacceptability of (22) is precisely due to the circularity
induced by the attempt to ESTABLISH a conclusion while PRESUPPOSING it.
Since this explanation appeals to the intuitive fact that (22) does presuppose
(23), we clearly require a (positive) answer to the question of whether (22)
presupposes (23).
Van der Sandt has suggested (personal communication) that this problem
could be overcome by modifying D-7 so as to allow it to define presupposition
for non-acceptable assertions as well as acceptable ones. This could be done
simply by dropping 'such that A(p, c)' from the first line of D-7. In that case
the theory would make the correct prediction for (22), as follows. The
conditions for the acceptability of the assertion of (22) are incompatible with
the condition for (22) to presuppose (23). This has the result that (22) iS
acceptable iff it doesn't presuppose (23) (conversely (22) is non-acceptable iff
it does presuppose (23)). Since (22) is non-acceptable by D-5:(d), it is thus
predicted to presuppose (23).4
However, while yielding a satisfactory result for (22), the modification
yields a less satisfactory result for (20). If (20) is not acceptable in context a,
it will not be acceptable in any expansion of x. In particular, it will not be
acceptable in the context x/[(I8)], the context that differs from a only by
virtue of including the presupposed proposition (I 8). By D-7 :(3), this has the
consequence that, in that context, (20) does NOT presuppose (I8). We may
concede that (2i a) is not acceptable as a 'text', but in this case the
unacceptability is quite independent of the intuitive fact that, even in that
discourse context, (20) does still presuppose (I8).
I hope this discussion has been sufficient to give at least the flavour of van
der Sandt's theory. It constitutes a brave, ingenious, and formal, attempt to
reconstruct the complementarity of assertion and presupposition in
pragmatic terms. This is done by means of the acceptability relation. By the
theory, assertion and presupposition are mutually exclusive because
assertions are only acceptable if they provide new information with respect
to context whereas presuppositions are supposed to belong to the context.
This sounds extremely intuitive and extremely plausible. If you have always
thought of the distinction between presupposition and assertion as being
linked to the distinction between given and new (and as linked to any other
phenomenon that might be characterisable in terms of given and new, e.g.
anaphora (see van der Sandt, ms)), then the formal theory offered in Context
and presupposition might well be what you have been looking for.

[4] This (correct) prediction for (22), incidentally, contradicts van der Sandt's claim (ioo
'We must account for the intuition that if T [presupposes] Vf, [p -- i] does not presup

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Furthermore, it might appear that the theory links presupposition to, and
provides an explanation of, the intuitive concept of what it is to assume a
proposition or take a proposition for granted.
In the section that follows I explain the rather 'hedging' note of this last
paragraph, outlining my reasons for questioning whether the theory really
does provide an explanatory theoretical reconstruction of those intuitive
concepts.

4. THE INSCRUTABILITY OF 'CONTEXT'

It is notoriously difficult to pin presupposition down in terms of an

pre-theoretical idea of given-ness in a context vs new information. The
difficulties arise from the fact that, if presupposition (as a context-dependent
phenomenon) is to be explained in terms of context, we need an independent
theory of context which includes a set of necessary and sufficient conditions
for the inclusion of a proposition in a context, i.e. context must be
characterized in terms independent of presupposition. Van der Sandt is fully
alive to the difficulties involved in this. Chapter 5 includes a thoroughgoing
critique of previous attempts to characterize context for presuppositional
purposes. The author knows what context for presuppositional purposes
CANNOT consist in; but a close reading of this book has failed to reveal to me
any POSITIVE view on this matter, let alone an independent theory of it.
Nevertheless, it has been noted that the distinction between assertion and
presupposition appears to have been reconstructed in terms of the intuitive
concept of 'new information'. It might be thought that 'new information'
could be approached in terms of discourse context or more generally in terms
of mutual knowledge between participants in a discourse. In fact, however,
neither of these approaches can be made to work in explaining presupposition
in contradistinction to assertion. It has long been known that presuppositions
do, as often as not, introduce information that is new with respect to
discourse context and new to the hearer. For example, in saying to you 'My
sister is coming tomorrow', I clearly do presuppose that I have a sister,
irrespective of whether I have previously asserted that I have one and
irrespective of whether I make any assumption about whether you had prior
knowledge that I had one.
So neither mutual knowledge nor given-ness in discourse in fact provides
a criterion for inclusion in context, at least for the purposes of pre-
suppositionality, and van der Sandt's appeal to context (quite rightly) does
not in fact reconstruct the idea of presuppositionality as consisting in
givenness. Yet van der Sandt does appeal to context in his attempt to explain
presuppositionality and the question now arises: what alternative concept
can he appeal to in the attempt to pin context down? The answer is
surprising, intriguing and, I shall argue, ultimately circular. He appeals to the
concept of presuppositionality itself. 'A CONTEXT CONCEIVED OF AS A SET OF
PRESUPPOSITIONS consists of all the propositions that the speaker and the

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 JOURNAL OF LINGUISTICS

hearer are ready to ASSUME for the purposes of the conversation' (I68 - my
emphasis, NBR). I believe that the circularity is already immanent in the
gloss for 'P(c)' (see 'Notational Conventions' - page xvii): 'the set of
propositions which constitutes the context set of a context c: intuitively the
set of propositions taken for granted in c'. But the concept of assuming a
proposition and the concept of taking a proposition for granted are
intuitively equivalent to the concept of presupposing a proposition. In the
absence of any positive and independent theoretical criteria for inclusion in
'P(c)', we are left with just that intuitive idea. But that is what we started
with and is what needed to be explained.
At the very least, then, I am re-iterating Gazdar's general criticism of
pragmatic definitions of presupposition for their 'propensity to invoke
undefined terms' (1979: 105). In this particular case, though, we may go
further and ask: If a context is 'to be conceived of as a set of presuppositions'
how can van der Sandt's theory rest on the idea that 'The context and the
context set play a central role in the determination of the behaviour of
presuppositions...' (i64)? On the one hand, context determines presup-
position; on the other, presuppositions determine context (act as 'context
selectors').
Let me stress that I am not denying that the system consisting of D-7 and
D-5 may actually work (apart from the problems discussed in the last section,
the ramifications of which I have yet to study). That will take more time to
establish. The point I am making is a conceptual one. I am suggesting that
the basic theoretical constructs in terms of which the theory is elaborated,
insofar as they are defined at all, are defined in terms of each other and thus
remain, as mere theoretical constructs, conceptually inscrutable.
The reader will have noticed my commitment to the possibility of a semantic
theory of presupposition. I concede that presupposition may be a context-
dependent phenomenon. Hence I concede that a context-dependent theory of
presupposition might be desirable. What I doubt is that such a theory is
possible. That is why I regard a non-contextual account as desirable, if
possible. And I believe such a theory is possible. That is, I believe it is possible
to provide a theoretical reconstruction of what it is to take a proposition for
granted, and of the presupposition-assertion complementarity, without
reference to either 'context' or 'information', but one which is nevertheless
compatible with the pre-theoretical link between presuppositionality and
those concepts.
The clue lies with my earlier use of the expression 'at issue' (see the
discussion preceding (I2) above). In ASSERTING a proposition, the speaker
presents the proposition as being 'at issue', as being subject to debate (indeed
(s)he puts it up for debate); in asserting, the speaker countenances (within the
terms of the debate) the possibility of the counter-assertion. The terms of the
debate are laid down by the presuppositions. In PRESUPPOSING a proposition,
the speaker does NOT present the proposition as being subject to debate. For

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whatever reason, (s)he does not allow that the proposition might be 'at
issue', does not countenance the possibility that the hearer might wish to take
issue with it. In such terms, the distinction between assertion and
presupposition can be pre-theoretically characterized in terms of a distinction
in degree and/or kind of commitment. In ASSERTING P, the speaker is
committed to P but countenances the possibility that P may be false (that is
what makes P worth asserting). In PRESUPPOSING P, on the other hand, the
speaker is again committed to P, but committed in such a way as NOT to
countenance the possibility that P may be false. Although characterized in
terms that are entirely independent of context and information, this
approach serves to explain why those concepts should seem so relevant; for
if a proposition has been previously asserted and not contradicted, that fact
would provide one (but only one) good reason why it should not be subject
to debate or 'at issue' in subsequent discussion.
This pre-theoretical idea (which provides the starting point for the semanti
theory developed in Burton-Roberts, I989) has the merit - in my eyes - of
acknowledging that speakers present themselves as evincing a much deeper
kind of commitment in presupposing a proposition than the kind of
commitment they (more wittingly) enter into in actually asserting a
proposition. And if this idea seems right, it should give us pause about any
theory that represents presupposition as a CANCELLABLE relation (i.e. all
recent theories, including the one reviewed here and including semantic
theories with ambiguous negation) - for such theories are bound to represent
presupposition as a WEAKER kind of commitment than the (UNCANCELLABLE)
kind of commitment associated with assertion/standard entailment. The
significance of this lies in the fact that perhaps the most important argument
for pragmatic theories of presupposition rests upon the supposed can-
cellability of the presupposition relation.
This idea also has the merit of making intuitive sense of something that
crops up in almost all theories of presupposition (including that presented in
Context and presupposition (202)) - be they semantic or pragmatic - but
which is generally regarded as not being amenable to intuitive explication.
For it follows from these theories that the tautologies of a language are
included among the presuppositions of every sentence of that language.
Under the above pre-theoretical characterization of presupposition, this is an
entirely natural and welcome result. It seems inevitable that the necessary
truths of a language should be among the propositions which are not subject
to debate and to which speakers of that language are committed WITHOUT
being able to countenance the possibility that they may be false. These are the
ultimate presuppositions, in the sense that they define the 'limits to debate'
(Chomsky, 1979) within the language of which they are necessary truths.

Author's address: School of English,

The University,
Newcastle upon Tyne,
NEI 7RU.
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 JOURNAL OF LINGUISTICS

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Stalnaker, R. (I98I). Review of Gazdar (I979). Lg 56. 902-905.
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