Legal Ethics Session 3 1

acceptance of what may be considered as paralegal service. As pointed out by FIDA, some
Bar Matter No. 553. June 17, 1993.*
persons not duly licensed to practice law are or have been allowed limited representation in
MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner, vs. THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.
behalf of another or to render legal services, but such allowable services are limited in scope
and extent by the law, rules or regulations granting permission therefor.
Attorneys; Words and Phrases; Meaning of “Practice of Law.”—Practice of law means any
activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedures, knowledge,
Same; Lawyers may not advertise their services or expertise. —Anent the issue on the
training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a
characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice or render any kind of
lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and
service that involves legal knowledge or skill. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of
objective information or statement of facts. He is not supposed to use or permit the use of any
cases in court. It includes legal advice and counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments and
false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim
contracts by which legal rights are secured, although such matter may or may not be pending in
regarding his qualifications or legal services. Nor shall he pay or give something of value to
a court.
representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal
business. Prior to the adoption of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Canons of
Same; Same; Same.—When a person participates in a trial and advertises himself as a
Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not resort to indirect advertisements for
lawyer, he is in the practice of law. One who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal
professional employment, such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his
rights and then takes the business to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in
photograph to be published in connection with causes in which the lawyer has been or is
court, is also practicing law. Giving advice for compensation regarding the legal status and rights
engaged or concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the
of another and the conduct with respect thereto constitutes a practice of law. One who renders
importance of the lawyer’s position, and all other like self-laudation.
an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is, to that extent,
practicing law.
Same; Exceptions.—Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited.
The canons of the profession enumerate exceptions to the rule against advertising or solicitation
Same; The practice of giving out legal information constitutes practice of law. —What is
and define the extent to which they may be undertaken. The exceptions are of two broad
palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers.
categories, namely, those which are expressly allowed and those which are necessarily implied
Its contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than real.
from the restrictions.
In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it
strains the credulity of this Court that all that respondent corporation will simply do is look for
Same; Same.—The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a
the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore.
manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the canons, of brief biographical
With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client the
and informative data.
intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken as may
be provided-for by said law. That is what its advertisements represent and for which services it
Same; Same.—The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The
will consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential
card may contain only a statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected
definition of “practice of law.”
with, address, telephone number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a
simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates,
Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent corporation does not
firm name or office address, being for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable.
represent clients in court since law practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not limited
merely to court appearances but extends to legal research, giving legal advice, contract drafting,
Same; Legal profession here has been under attack on its integrity. —Secondly, it is our
and so forth.
firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and judicial systems, to allow the
publication of advertisements of the kind used by respondent would only serve to aggravate
Same; Same.—Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI,
what is already a deteriorating public opinion of the legal profession whose integrity has
said reported facts sufficiently establish that the main purpose of respondent is to serve as a
consistently been under attack lately by media and the community in general. At this point in
one-stop-shop of sorts for various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal services
time, it is of utmost importance in the face of such negative, even if unfair, criticisms at times,
from simple documentation to complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of these
to adopt and maintain that level of professional conduct which is beyond reproach, and to exert
services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of
all efforts to regain the high esteem formerly accorded to the legal profession.
lawyers engaged in the practice of law.

Same; Same; The services offered by respondent cannot be performed by paralegals ORIGINAL PETITION in the Supreme Court.
here as distinguished from the United States.—Paralegals in the United States are trained
professionals. As admitted by respondent, there are schools and universities there which offer The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
studies and degrees in paralegal education, while there are none in the Philippines. As the
R E S O L UT I O N
concept of the “paralegal” or “legal assistant” evolved in the United States, standards and
guidelines also evolved to protect the general public. One of the major standards or guidelines
was developed by the American Bar Association which set up Guidelines for the Approval of REGALADO, J.:
Legal Assistant Education Programs (1973). Legislation has even been proposed to certify legal
assistants. There are also associations of paralegals in the United States with their own code of
professional ethics, such as the National Association of Legal Assistants, Inc. and the American
Paralegal Association. In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited
Legal Ethics Session 3 2

Petitioner prays this Court “to order the respondent to cease and desist from issuing Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the issues raised herein, we
advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of Annexes ‘A’ and ‘B’ (of said petition) required the (1) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), (2) Philippine Bar Association (PBA), (3)
and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements pertaining to the Philippine Lawyers’ Association (PLA), (4) U.P. Women Lawyers’ Circle (WILOCI), (5) Women
exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by law.” Lawyers Association of the Philippines (WLAP), and (6) Federacion Internacional de Abogadas
(FIDA) to submit their respective position papers on the controversy and, thereafter, their
The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows: memoranda.3 The said bar associations readily responded and extended their valuable services
and cooperation of which this Court takes note with appreciation and gratitude.
Annex A
The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or not the services offered by
respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in either
SECRET MARRIAGE?    case, whether the same can properly be the subject of the advertisements herein complained of.
P560.00 for a valid marriage.   
Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this case, we deem it proper
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.    and enlightening to present hereunder excerpts from the respective position papers adopted by
the aforementioned bar associations and the memoranda submitted by them on the issues
ANNULMENT. VISA.   
involved in this bar matter.
THE  Please call: 521-0767, 
LEGAL  5217232, 5222041  1. 1.Integrated Bar of the Philippines:
CLINIC, INC.  8:30 am-6:00 pm 
xxx
  7-Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla. 
Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent endeavored to distinguish the two
Annex B terms, i.e., “legal support services” vis-a-vis “legal services”, common sense would readily
dictate that the same are essentially without substantial distinction. For who could deny that
document search, evidence gathering, assistance to layman in need of basic institutional
GUAM DIVORCE 
services from government or non-government agencies like birth, marriage, property, or
DON PARKINSON  business registration, obtaining documents like clearance, passports, local or foreign visas,
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic constitute practice of law?
beginning Monday to Friday during office hours. xxx

Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to make issue with respondent’s
Res. & Special Retiree’s Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. foreign citations. Suffice it to state that the IBP has made its position manifest, to wit, that it
Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic. strongly opposes the view espoused by respondent (to the effect that today it is alright to
advertise one’s legal services).
THE  7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., 
The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its opposition to respondent’s act of
LEGAL  Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy  establishing a “legal clinic” and of concomitantly advertising the same through newspaper
publications.
CLINIC, INC.1 Tel. 521-7232; 521-7251; 
  522-2041; 521-0767  The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision of this Honorable Court to
perpetually restrain respondent from undertaking highly unethical activities in the field of law
It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champertous, practice as aforedescribed. 4
unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community xxx
in the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is
ashamed and offended by the said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as A. The use of the name “The Legal Clinic, Inc.” gives the impression that respondent corporation
hereinbefore quoted. is being operated by lawyers and that it renders legal services.

In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said
advertisements at its instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the
rendering of “legal support services” through paralegals with the use of modern computers and
electronic machines. Respondent further argues that assuming that the services advertised are
legal services, the act of advertising these services should be allowed supposedly in the light of
the case of John R. Bates and Van O’Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona, 2 reportedly decided by the
United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.
While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services to the public, the
advertisements in question give the impression that respondent is offering legal services. The
Petition in fact simply assumes this to be so, as earlier mentioned, apparently because this (is)
the effect that the advertisements have on the reading public.
The impression created by the advertisements in question can be traced, first of all, to the
very name being used by respondent—“The Legal Clinic, Inc.” Such a name, it is respectfully
submitted connotes the rendering of legal services for legal problems, just like a medical clinic
Legal Ethics Session 3
connotes medical services for medical problems. More importantly, the term “Legal Clinic”
connotes lawyers, as the term medical clinic connotes doctors.
Furthermore, the respondent’s name, as published in the advertisements subject of the
present case, appears with (the) scale(s) of justice, which all the more reinforces the impression
that it is being operated by members of the bar and that it offers legal services. In addition, the
advertisements in question appear with a picture and name of a person being represented as a
lawyer from Guam, and this practically removes whatever doubt may still remain as to the
nature of the service or services being offered.
It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely offering “legal support services” as
claimed by it, or whether it offers legal services as any lawyer actively engaged in law practice
does. And it becomes unnecessary to make a distinction between “legal services” and “legal
support services,” as the respondent would have it. The advertisements in question leave no
room for doubt in the minds of the reading public that legal services are being offered by
lawyers, whether true or not.
B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the performance of acts contrary to
law, morals, public order and public policy.
It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the advertisements in question are only
meant to inform the general public of the services being offered by it. Said advertisements,
however, emphasize a Guam divorce, and any law student ought to know that under the Family
Code, there is only one instance when a foreign divorce is recognized, and that is:
Article 26. x x x.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and  a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine Law.
It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code (defines) a marriage as follows:
Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman
entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life.  It is the
foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution  whose nature, consequences, and
incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements
may fix the property relation during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.
By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious that the message being
conveyed is that Filipinos can avoid the legal consequences of a marriage celebrated in
accordance with our law, by simply going to Guam for a divorce. This is not only misleading, but
encourages, or serves to induce, violation of Philippine law. At the very least, this can be
considered “the dark side” of legal practice, where certain defects in Philippine laws are
exploited for the sake of profit. At worst, this is outright malpractice.
Rule 1.02.—A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system.
In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that advertisements such as that shown in
Annex “A” of the Petition, which contains a cartoon of a motor vehicle with the words “Just
Married” on its bumper and seems to address those planning a “secret marriage,” if not
suggesting a “secret marriage,” makes light of the “special contract of permanent union,” the
inviolable social institution,” which is how the Family Code describes marriage, obviously to
emphasize its sanctity and inviolability. Worse, this particular advertisement appears to
3
encourage marriages celebrated in secrecy, which is suggestive of immoral publication of
applications for a marriage license.
If the article “Rx for Legal Problems” is to be reviewed, it can readily be concluded that
the above impressions one may gather from the advertisements in question are accurate. The
Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion example alone confirms what the advertisements suggest.
Here it can be seen that criminal acts are being encouraged or committed (a bigamous marriage
in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity simply because the jurisdiction of Philippine courts
does not extend to the place where the crime is committed.
Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the “legal support services” respondent offers do not
constitute legal services as commonly understood, the advertisements in question give the
impression that respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it offers legal
services, as earlier discussed. Thus, the only logical consequence is that, in the eyes of an
ordinary newspaper reader, members of the bar themselves are encouraging or inducing the
performance of acts which are contrary to law, morals, good customs and the public good,
thereby destroying and demeaning the integrity of the Bar.
xxx
It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined from causing the publication
of the advertisements in question, or any other advertisements similar thereto. It is also
submitted that respondent should be prohibited from further performing or offering some of the
services it presently offers, or, at the very least, from offering such services to the public in
general.
The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal research, electronic data
gathering, storage and retrieval, standardized legal forms, investigators for gathering of
evidence, and like services will greatly benefit the legal profession and should not be stifled but
instead encouraged. However, when the conduct of such business by non-members of the Bar
encroaches upon the practice of law, there can be no choice but to prohibit such business.
Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at bar can be better performed by
specialists in other fields, such as computer experts, who by reason of their having devoted time
and effort exclusively to such field cannot fulfill the exacting requirements for admission to the
Bar. To prohibit them from “encroaching” upon the legal profession will deny the profession of
the great benefits and advantages of modern technology. Indeed, a lawyer using a computer
will be doing better than a lawyer using a typewriter, even if both are (equal) in skill.
Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful not to allow or tolerate the illegal
practice of law in any form, not only for the protection of members of the Bar but also, and
more importantly, for the protection of the public. Technological development in the profession
may be encouraged without tolerating, but instead ensuring prevention of, illegal practice.
There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed to perform all of its services,
but only if such services are made available exclusively to members of the Bench and Bar.
Respondent would then be offering technical assistance, not legal services. Alternatively, the
more difficult task of carefully distinguishing between which service may be offered to the public
in general and which should be made available exclusively to members of the Bar may be
undertaken. This, however, may require further proceedings because of the factual
considerations involved.
It must be emphasized, however, that some of respondent’s services ought to be prohibited
outright, such as acts which tend to suggest or induce celebration abroad of marriages which
are bigamous or otherwise illegal and void under Philippine Law. While respondent may not be
prohibited from simply disseminating information regarding such matters, it must be required to
Legal Ethics Session 3
include, in the information given, a disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law, that
certain course of action may be illegal under Philippine law, that it is not authorized or capable
of rendering a legal opinion, that a lawyer should be consulted before deciding on which course
of action to take, and that it cannot recommend any particular lawyer without subjecting itself to
possible sanctions for illegal practice of law.
If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should be directed exclusively at members
of the Bar, with a clear and unmistakable disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law or
perform legal services.
The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be ignored. But nobody should be
allowed to represent himself as a “paralegal” for profit, without such term being clearly defined
by rule or regulation, and without any adequate and effective means of regulating his activities.
Also, law practice in a corporate form may prove to be advantageous to the legal profession, but
before allowance of such practice may be considered, the corporation’s Article of Incorporation
and By-laws must conform to each and every provision of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and the Rules of Court.5
2. Philippine Bar Association:
xxx
Respondent asserts that it “is not engaged in the practice of law but engaged in giving legal
support services to lawyers and laymen, through experienced paralegals, with the use of
modern computers and electronic machines” (pars. 2 and 3, Comment). This is absurd.
Unquestionably, respondent’s acts of holding out itself to the public under the trade name “The
Legal Clinic, Inc.,” and soliciting employment for its enumerated services fall within the realm of
a practice which thus yields itself to the regulatory powers of the Supreme Court. For
respondent to say that it is merely engaged in paralegal work is to stretch credulity.
Respondent’s own commercial advertisement which announces a certain Atty. Don Parkinson to
be handling the fields of law belies its pretense. From all indications, respondent “The Legal
Clinic, Inc.” is offering and rendering legal services through its reserve of lawyers. It has been
held that the practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court, but includes drawing
of deeds, incorporation, rendering opinions, and advising clients as to their legal right and then
take them to an attorney and ask the latter to look after their case in court  See Martin, Legal
and Judicial Ethics, 1984 ed., p. 39).
It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the practice of law, and such
limitation cannot be evaded by a corporation employing competent lawyers to practice for it.
Obviously, this is the scheme or device by which respondent “The Legal Clinic, Inc.” holds out
itself to the public and solicits employment of its legal services. It is an odious vehicle for
deception, especially so when the public cannot ventilate any grievance for malpractice against
the business conduit. Precisely, the limitation of practice of law to persons who have been duly
admitted as members of the Bar (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court) is to subject the
members to the discipline of the Supreme Court. Although respondent uses its business
name, the persons and the lawyers who act for it are subject to court discipline. The practice of
law is not a profession open to all who wish to engage in it nor can it be assigned to another
(See 5 Am. Jur. 270). It is a personal right limited to persons who have qualified themselves
under the law. It follows that not only respondent but also all the persons who are acting for
respondent are the persons engaged in unethical law practice. 6
3. Philippine Lawyers’ Association:
4
The Philippine Lawyers’ Association’s position, in answer to the issues stated herein, are to
wit:
1.The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;
2.Such practice is unauthorized;
3.The advertisements complained of are not only unethical, but also misleading and
patently immoral; and
4.The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to suppress and punish the Legal Clinic
and its corporate officers for its unauthorized practice of law and for its unethical,
misleading and immoral advertising.
xxx
Respondent posits that it is not engaged in the practice of law. It claims that it merely renders
“legal support services” to lawyers, litigants and the general public as enunciated in the Primary
Purpose Clause of its Article(s) of Incorporation. (See pages 2 to 5 of Respondent’s Comment).
But its advertised services, as enumerated above, clearly and convincingly show that it is indeed
engaged in law practice, albeit outside of court.
As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory services on Persons and Family
Relations Law, particularly regarding foreign divorces, annulment of marriages, secret
marriages, absence and adoption; Immigration Laws, particularly on visa related problems,
immigration problems; the Investment Law of the Philippines and such other related laws.
Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of the aforesaid laws, the legal
principles and procedures related thereto, the legal advices based thereon and which activities
call for legal training, knowledge and experience.
Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited Agrava Case, the activities of
respondent fall squarely and are embraced in what lawyers and laymen equally term as “the
practice of law.”7
4. U.P. Women Lawyers’ Circle:
In resolving the issues before this Honorable Court, paramount consideration should be
given to the protection of the general public from the danger of being exploited by unqualified
persons or entities who may be engaged in the practice of law.
At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a rigorous four-year course of study on
top of a four-year bachelor of arts or sciences course and then to take and pass the bar
examinations. Only then, is a lawyer qualified to practice law.
While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many jurisdictions as an aid to the administration of
justice, there are in those jurisdictions, courses of study and/or standards which would qualify
these paralegals to deal with the general public as such. While it may now be the opportune
time to establish these courses of study and/or standards, the fact remains that at present,
these do not exist in the Philippines. In the meantime, this Honorable Court may decide to take
measures to protect the general public from being exploited by those who may be dealing with
the general public in the guise of being “paralegals” without being qualified to do so.
Legal Ethics Session 3
In the same manner, the general public should also be protected from the dangers which
may be brought about by advertising of legal services. While it appears that lawyers are
prohibited under the present Code of Professional Responsibility from advertising, it appears in
the instant case that legal services are being advertised not by lawyers but by an entity staffed
by “paralegals.” Clearly, measures should be taken to protect the general public from falling
prey to those who advertise legal services without being qualified to offer such services.” 8
A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent, however, seems to give the
impression that information regarding validity of marriages, divorce, annulment of marriage,
immigration, visa extensions, declaration of absence, adoption and foreign investment, which
are in essence, legal matters, will be given to them if they avail of its services. The Respondent’s
name—The Legal Clinic, Inc.—does not help matters. It gives the impression again that
Respondent will or can cure the legal problems brought to them. Assuming that Respondent is,
as claimed, staffed purely by paralegals, it also gives the misleading impression that there are
lawyers involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc., as there are doctors in any medical clinic, when only
“paralegals” are involved in the The Legal Clinic, Inc.
Respondent’s allegations are further belied by the very admissions of its President and
majority stockholder, Atty. Nogales, who gave an insight on the structure and main purpose of
Respondent corporation in the aforementioned “Starweek” article.” 9
5. Women Lawyer’s Association of the Philippines:
Annexes “A” and “B” of the petition are clearly advertisements to solicit cases for the
purpose of gain which, as provided for under the above cited law, (are) illegal and against the
Code of Professional Responsibility of lawyers in this country.
Annex “A” of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an advertisement to solicit cases, but it is
illegal in that in bold letters it announces that the Legal Clinic, Inc., could work out/cause the
celebration of a secret marriage which is not only illegal but immoral in this country. While it is
advertised that one has to go to said agency and pay P560 for a valid marriage in the Philippines
are solemnized only by officers authorized to do so under the law. And to employ an agency for
said purpose of contracting marriage is not necessary.
No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and other countries the trend is towards
allowing lawyers to advertise their special skills to enable people to obtain from qualified
practitioners legal services for their particular needs can justify the use of advertisements such
as are the subject matter of this petition, for one (cannot) justify an illegal act even by whatever
merit the illegal act may serve. The law has yet to be amended so that such as act could
become justifiable.
We submit further that these advertisements that seem to project that secret marriages and
divorce are possible in this country for a fee, when in fact it is not so, are highly reprehensible.
It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how they could go about having a
secret marriage here, when it cannot nor should ever be attempted, and seek advice on divorce,
where in this country there is none, except under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws in the
Philippines. It is also against good morals and is deceitful because it falsely represents to the
public to be able to do that which by our laws cannot be done (and) by our Code of Morals
should not be done.
In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme Court held that solicitation for
clients by an attorney by circulars of advertisements, is unprofessional, and offenses of this
character justify permanent elimination from the Bar.10
6. Federation International de Abogadas:
5
xxx
1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law, such as management
consultancy firms or travel agencies, whether run by lawyers or not, perform the services
rendered by Respondent does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that Respondent is not
unlawfully practicing law. In the same vein, however, the fact that the business of respondent
(assuming it can be engaged in independently of the practice of law) involves knowledge of the
law does not necessarily make respondent guilty of unlawful practice of law.
“x x x Of necessity, no one xxx acting as a consultant can render effective service unless he is
familiar with such statutes and regulations. He must be careful not to suggest a course of
conduct which the law forbids. It seems x x x clear that (the consultant’s) knowledge of the law,
and his use of that knowledge of the law, and his use of that knowledge as a factor in
determining what measures he shall recommend, do not constitute the practice of law x x x. It is
not only presumed that all men know the law, but it is a fact that most men have considerable
acquaintance with the broad features of the law x x x. Our knowledge of the law—accurate or
inaccurate—moulds our conduct not only when we are acting for ourselves, but when we are
serving others. Bankers, liquor dealers and laymen generally possess rather precise knowledge
of the laws touching their particular business or profession. A good example is the architect,
who must be familiar with zoning, building and fire prevention codes, factory and tenement
house statutes, and who draws plans and specifications in harmony with the law. This is not
practicing law.
“But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit a fire tower, replies that it is required
by the statute. Or the industrial relations expert cites, in support of some measure that he
recommends, a decision of the National Labor Relations Board. Are they practicing law? In my
opinion, they are not, provided no separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information,
and the legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem.
“It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.
“If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on his land to engage a lawyer to
advise him and the architect in respect to the building code and the like, then an architect who
performed this function would probably be considered to be trespassing on territory reserved for
licensed attorneys. Likewise, if the industrial relations field had been pre-empted by lawyers, or
custom placed a lawyer always at the elbow of the lay personnel man. But this is not the case.
The most important body of industrial relations experts are the officers and business agents of
the labor unions and few of them are lawyers. Among the larger corporate employers, it has
been the practice for some years to delegate special responsibility in employee matters to a
management group chosen for their practical knowledge and skill in such matters, and without
regard to legal training or lack of it. More recently, consultants like the defendant have tendered
to the smaller employers the same service that the larger employers get from their own
specialized staff.
“The handling of industrial relations is growing into a recognized profession for which
appropriate courses are offered by our leading universities. The court should be very cautious
about declaring [that] a widespread, well-established method of conducting business is unlawful,
or that the considerable class of men who customarily perform a certain function have no right
to do so, or that the technical education given by our schools cannot be used by the graduates
in their business.
“In determining whether a man is practicing law, we should consider his work for any
particular client or customer, as a whole.  I can imagine defendant being engaged primarily to
advise as to the law defining his client’s obligations to his employees, to guide his client along
the path charted by law. This, of course, would be the practice of the law. But such is not the
fact in the case before me. Defendant’s primary efforts are along economic and psychological
lines. The law only provides the frame within which he must work, just as the zoning code limits
Legal Ethics Session 3
the kind of building the architect may plan. The incidental legal advice or information defendant
may give, does not transform his activities into the practice of law.  Let me add that if, even as a
minor feature of his work, he performed services which are customarily reserved to members of
the bar, he would be practicing law. For instance, if as part of a welfare program, he drew
employees’ wills.
“Another branch of defendant’s work is the representation of the employer in the
adjustment of grievances and in collective bargaining, with or without a mediator. This is not per
se the practice of law. Anyone may use an agent for negotiations and may select an agent
particularly skilled in the subject under discussion, and the person appointed is free to accept
the employment whether or not he is a member of the bar. Here, however, there may be an
exception where the business turns on a question of law. Most real estate sales are negotiated
by brokers who are not lawyers. But if the value of the land depends on a disputed right-of-way
and the principal role of the negotiator is to assess the probable outcome of the dispute and
persuade the opposite party to the same opinion, then it may be that only a lawyer can accept
the assignment. Or if a controversy between an employer and his men grows from differing
interpretations of a contract, or of a statute, it is quite likely that defendant should not handle it.
But I need not reach a definite conclusion here, since the situation is not presented by the
proofs.
“Defendant also appears to represent the employer before administrative agencies of the
federal government, especially before trial examiners of the National Labor Relations Board. An
agency of the federal government, acting by virtue of an authority granted by the Congress may
regulate the representation of parties before such agency. The State of New Jersey is without
power to interfere with such determination or to forbid representation before the agency by one
whom the agency admits. The rules of the National Labor Relations Board give to a party the
right to appear ‘in person, or by counsel, or by other representative.’ Rules and Regulations,
September 11th, 1946, S. 203.31. ‘Counsel’ here means a licensed attorney, and ‘other
representative’ one not a lawyer. In this phase of his work, defendant may lawfully do whatever
the Labor Board allows, even arguing questions purely legal.” (Auerbacher v. Wood, 53 A. 2d
800, cited in Statsky, Introduction to Paralegalism [1974], at pp. 154-156.)
1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person engaged in a lawful calling (which may
involve knowledge of the law) is not engaged in the practice of law provided that:
(a)The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem;
(b)The services performed are not customarily reserved to members of the bar;
(c)No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information.
All these must be considered in relation to the work for any particular client as a whole.
1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer, the Code of Professional
Responsibility succinctly states the rule of conduct:
“Rule 15.08—A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation concurrently with the
practice of law shall make clear to his client whether he is acting as a lawyer or in another
capacity.”
1.10 In the present case, the Legal Clinic appears to render wedding services (See Annex
“A”, Petition). Services on routine, straightforward marriages, like securing a marriage license,
and making arrangements with a priest or a judge, may not constitute practice of law. However,
if the problem is as complicated as that described in “Rx for Legal Problems” on the Sharon-
Gabby Concepcion-Richard Gomez case, then what may be involved is actually the practice of
6
law. If a non-lawyer, such as the Legal Clinic, renders such services, then it is engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law.
1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on divorce, absence, annulment of
marriage and visas (See Annexes “A” and “B”, Petition). Purely giving information materials may
not constitute practice of law. The business is similar to that of a bookstore where the customer
buys materials on the subject and determines by himself what courses of action to take.
It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from purely giving information, the Legal
Clinic’s paralegals may apply the law to the particular problem of the client, and give legal
advice. Such would constitute unauthorized practice of law.
“ It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text which purports to say what the law is
amounts to legal practice. And the mere fact that the principles or rules stated in the text may
be accepted by a particular reader as a solution to his problem does not affect this. x x x
Apparently it is urged that the conjoining of these two, that is, the text and the forms, with
advice as to how the forms should be filled out, constitutes the unlawful practice of law. But that
is the situation with many approved and accepted texts. Dacey’s book is sold to the public at
large. There is no personal contact or relationship with a particular individual. Nor does there
exist that relation of confidence and trust so necessary to the status of attorney and client. THIS
IS THE ESSENTIAL OF LEGAL PRACTICE—THE REPRESENTATION AND ADVISING OF A
PARTICULAR PERSON IN A PARTICULAR SITUATION.  At most the book assumes to offer
general advice on common problems, and does not purport to give personal advice on a specific
problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified person. Similarly the defendant’s
publication does not purport ‘to give personal advice on a specific problem peculiar to a
designated or readily identified person in a particular situation—in the publication and sale of the
kits, such publication and sale did not constitute the unlawful practice of law x x x. There being
no legal impediment under the statute to the sale of the kit, there was no proper basis for the
injunction against defendant maintaining an office for the purpose of selling to persons seeking
a divorce, separation, annulment or separation agreement any printed material or writings
relating to matrimonial law or the prohibition in the memorandum of modification of the
judgment against defendant having an, interest in any publishing house publishing his
manuscript on divorce and against his having any personal contact with any prospective
purchaser. The record does fully support, however, the finding that for the charge of $75 or
$100 for the kit, the defendant gave legal advice in the course of personal contacts concerning
particular problems which might arise in the preparation and presentation of the purchaser’s
asserted matrimonial cause of action or pursuit of other legal remedies and assistance in the
preparation of necessary documents (The injunction therefore sought to) enjoin conduct
constituting the practice of law, particularly with reference to the giving of advice and counsel
by the defendant relating to specific problems of particular individuals in connection with a
divorce, separation, annulment of separation agreement sought and should be affirmed.”  (State
v. Winder, 348 NYS 2d 270 [1973], cited in Statsky, supra at p. 101.)
1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are “strictly non-diagnostic, non-
advisory.” It is not controverted, however, that if the services “involve giving legal advice or
counseling,” such would constitute practice of law (Comment, par. 6.2). It is in this light that
FIDA submits that a factual inquiry may be necessary for the judicious disposition of this case.
xxx
2.10. Annex “A” may be ethically objectionable in that it can give the impression (or
perpetuate the wrong notion) that there is a secret marriage. With all the solemnities,
formalities and other requisites of marriages (See Articles 2, et seq., Family Code), no Philippine
marriage can be secret.
Legal Ethics Session 3
2.11. Annex “B” may likewise be ethically objectionable. The second paragraph thereof
(which is not necessarily related to the first paragraph) fails to state the limitation that only
“paralegal services” or “legal support services”, and not legal services are available.” 11
A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase “practice of law” becomes exigent for a
proper determination of the issues raised by the petition at bar. On this score, we note that the
clause “practice of law” has long been the subject of judicial construction and interpretation. The
courts have laid down general principles and doctrines explaining the meaning and scope of the
term, some of which we now take into account.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law,
legal procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to
perform those acts which are characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to
give advice or render any kind of service that involves legal knowledge or skill. 12
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice and
counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments and contracts by which legal rights are
secured, although such matter may or may not be pending in a court.13
In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three
principal types of professional activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them of
their rights and obligations, preparation for clients of documents requiring knowledge of legal
principles not possessed by ordinary layman, and appearance for clients before public tribunals
which possess power and authority to determine rights of life, liberty, and property according to
law, in order to assist in proper interpretation and enforcement of law. 14
When a person participates in a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice
of law.15 One who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the
business to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in court, is also practicing
law.16Giving advice for compensation regarding the legal status and rights of another and the
conduct with respect thereto constitutes a practice of law. 17 One who renders an opinion as to
the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing law. 18
In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod,19 after citing the doctrines in several cases, we
laid down the test to determine whether certain acts constitute “practice of law,” thus:
Black defines “practice of law” as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and
technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in
court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of
pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the
preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It
embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law.”
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and
Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650). A person is also considered to be in the
practice of law when he:
“x x x for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising persons, firms, associations
or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an
advocate in proceedings, pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee,
board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies
and there, in such representative capacity, performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining
or defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a
representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the
law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that
purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102
S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).”
7
This Court, in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176-177),
stated:
“The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and
in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work
done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and
conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).
“Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of
any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing,
the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of
legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs.
Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are
always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of
legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult
and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an
intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as
concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the
lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of
instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold
customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of
sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which
rests upon all attorneys (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1973 ed.], pp. 665-
666, citing In Re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc.
v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139, 144).”
The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. Applying the
aforementioned criteria to the case at bar, we agree with the perceptive findings and
observations of the aforestated bar associations that the activities of respondent, as advertised,
constitute “practice of law.”
The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be
seriously considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent’s own description of
the services it has been offering, to wit:
“Legal support services basically consist of giving ready information by trained paralegals to
laymen and lawyers, which are strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory, through the extensive use
of computers and modern information technology in the gathering, processing, storage,
transmission and reproduction of information and communication, such as computerized legal
research; encoding and reproduction of documents and pleadings prepared by laymen or
lawyers; document search; evidence gathering; locating parties or witnesses to a case; fact
finding investigations; and assistance to laymen in need of basic institutional services from
government or non-government agencies, like birth, marriage, property, or business
registrations; educational of employment records or certifications, obtaining documentation like
clearances, passports, local or foreign visas; giving information about laws of other countries
that they may find useful, like foreign divorce, marriage or adoption laws that they can avail of
preparatory to emigration to that foreign country, and other matters that do not involve
Legal Ethics Session 3
representation of clients in court; designing and installing computer systems, programs, or
software for the efficient management of law offices, corporate legal departments, courts, and
other entities engaged in dispensing or administering legal services.20
While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical
and technical knowhow, such as the installation of computer systems and programs for the
efficient management of law offices, or the computerization of research aids and materials,
these will not suffice to justify an exception to the general rule.
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen
and lawyers. Its contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more
apparent than real. In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage,
divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all that respondent corporation
will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were
merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to
explain to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of
action to be taken as may be provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements represent
and for which services it will consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within
the jurisprudential definition of “practice of law.” Such a conclusion will not be altered by the
fact that respondent corporation does not represent clients in court since law practice, as the
weight of authority holds, is not limited merely to court appearances but extends to legal
research, giving legal advice, contract drafting, and so forth.
The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in the January 13, 1991
issue of the Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the Philippine Star, entitled “Rx for Legal
Problems,” where an insight into the structure, main purpose and operations of respondent
corporation was given by its own “proprietor,” Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales:
This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The Legal Clinic, with offices on the
seventh floor of the Victoria Building along U.N. Avenue in Manila. No matter what the client’s
problem, and even if it is as complicated as the Cuneta-Concepcion domestic situation, Atty.
Nogales and his staff of lawyers, who, like doctors, are “specialists” in various fields, can take
care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and criminal law, medico-legal
problems, labor, litigation and family law. These specialists are backed up by a battery of
paralegals, counsellors and attorneys.
Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the trend in the medical field
toward specialization, it caters to clients who cannot afford the services of the big law firms.
The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. “When they come, we start by analyzing
the problem. That’s what doctors do also. They ask you how you contracted what’s bothering
you, they take your temperature, they observe you for the symptoms, and so on. That’s how we
operate, too. And once the problem has been categorized, then it’s referred to one of our
specialists.”
There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require surgery or follow-up treatment.
These The Legal Clinic disposes of in a matter of minutes. “Things like preparing a simple deed
of sale or an affidavit of loss can be taken care of by our staff or, if this were a hospital, the
residents or the interns. We can take care of these matters on a while you wait basis. Again,
kung baga sa ospital, out-patient, hindi kailangang ma-confine. It’s just like a common cold or
diarrhea,” explains Atty. Nogales.
Those cases which require more extensive “treatment” are dealt with accordingly. “If you had a
rich relative who died and named you her sole heir, and you stand to inherit millions of pesos of
property, we would refer you to a specialist in taxation. There would be real estate taxes and
arrears which would need to be put in order, and your relative is even taxed by the state for the
8
right to transfer her property, and only a specialist in taxation would be properly trained to deal
with that problem. Now, if there were other heirs contesting your rich relative’s will, then you
would need a litigator, who knows how to arrange the problem for presentation in court, and
gather evidence to support the case.”21
That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling.
What is important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the
services it renders which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions against
the advertisements which it has caused to be published and are now assailed in this proceeding.
Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI, said reported facts
sufficiently establish that the main purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts
for various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from simple
documentation to complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of these services are
undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers
engaged in the practice of law.22
It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private respondent
which constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted
as a member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of the
Rules of Court, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law. 23
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly
qualified in education and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an
individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of
moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client and
the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject
to the disciplinary control of the court.24
The same rule is observed in the American jurisdiction wherefrom respondent would wish to
draw support for his thesis. 
The doctrines there also stress that the practice of law is limited to those who meet the
requirements for, and have been admitted to, the bar, and various statutes or rules specifically
so provide.25 The practice of law is not a lawful business except for members of the bar who
have complied with all the conditions required by statute and the rules of court. Only those
persons are allowed to practice law who, by reason of attainments previously acquired through
education and study, have been recognized by the courts as possessing profound knowledge of
legal science entitling them to advise, counsel with, protect, or defend the rights, claims, or
liabilities of their clients, with respect to the construction, interpretation, operation and effect of
law.26The justification for excluding from the practice of law those not admitted to the bar is
found, not in the protection of the bar from competition, but in the protection of the public from
being advised and represented in legal matters by incompetent and unreliable persons over
whom the judicial department can exercise little control. 27
We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent’s position that the concept in the
United States of paralegals as an occupation separate from the law profession be adopted in this
jurisdiction. Whatever may be its merits, respondent cannot but be aware that this should first
be a matter for judicial rules or legislative action, and not of unilateral adoption as it has done.
Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted by respondent, there are
schools and universities there which offer studies and degrees in paralegal education, while
there are none in the Philippines. 28 As the concept of the “paralegal” or “legal assistant” evolved
in the United States, standards and guidelines also evolved to protect the general public. One of
the major standards or guidelines was developed by the American Bar Association which set up
Guidelines for the Approval of Legal Assistant Education Programs (1973). Legislation has even
Legal Ethics Session 3
been proposed to certify legal assistants. There are also associations of paralegals in the United
States with their own code of professional ethics, such as the National Association of Legal
Assistants, Inc. and the American Paralegal Association. 29
In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of what may be
considered as paralegal service. As pointed out by FIDA, some persons not duly licensed to
practice law are or have been allowed limited representation in behalf of another or to render
legal services, but such allowable services are limited in scope and extent by the law, rules or
regulations granting permission therefor.30
Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the absence of constitutional
or statutory authority, a person who has not been admitted as an attorney cannot practice law
for the proper administration of justice cannot be hindered by the unwarranted intrusion of an
unauthorized and unskilled person into the practice of law.31 That policy should continue to be
one of encouraging persons who are unsure of their legal rights and remedies to seek legal
assistance only from persons licensed to practice law in the state.32
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true,
honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts. 33 He is not supposed to
use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory
or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. 34 Nor shall he pay or
give something of value to representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for,
publicity to attract legal business.35 Prior to the adoption of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the Canons of Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not resort
to indirect advertisements for professional employment, such as furnishing or inspiring
newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph to be published in connection with causes in
which the lawyer has been or is engaged or concerning the manner of their conduct, the
magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer’s position, and all other like
self-laudation.36
The standards of the legal profession codemn the lawyer’s advertisement of his talents. A
lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a
manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. 37 The proscription against advertising of
legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental postulate that the
practice of law is a profession. Thus, in the case of The Director of Religious Affairs vs.
Estanislao R. Bayot 38 an advertisement, similar to those of respondent which are involved in the
present proceeding,39 was held to constitute improper advertising or solicitation.
The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:
It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of
the ethics of his profession. It being a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25
of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that “the practice of soliciting cases at law
for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice.” It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant
advertises his wares. Law is a profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his
profession who stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or
offering them to the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with
mercenary activities as the money-changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. “The most
worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, * * * is the establishment
of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced
but must be the outcome of the character and conduct.” (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.)
We repeat, the canons of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is
a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as
9
the outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the
community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a
normal by-product of effective service which is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer
needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the
difference between a normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome result of
propaganda.40
Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The canons of the
profession enumerate exceptions to the rule against advertising or solicitation and define the
extent to which they may be undertaken. The exceptions are of two broad categories, namely,
those which are expressly allowed and those which are necessarily implied from the
restrictions.41
The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent
with the standards of conduct imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and informative
data. “Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer’s name
and the names of his professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses;
branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended
with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational distinction; public or quasi-public
offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and offices in
bar associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities;
the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with
their written consent, the names of clients regularly represented.” 42
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a
mere supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is
published principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his
brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society
program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct,
management or contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the
bar, or to lower the dignity or standing of the profession.43
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain
only a statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address,
telephone number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple
announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm
name or office address, being for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He
may likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not under a designation of special
branch of law.44
Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements for which
respondent is being taken to task, which even includes a quotation of the fees charged by said
respondent corporation for services rendered, we find and so hold that the same definitely do
not and conclusively cannot fall under any of the above-mentioned exceptions.
The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona,45 which is repeatedly invoked and
constitutes the justification relied upon by respondent, is obviously not applicable to the case at
bar. Foremost is the fact that the disciplinary rule involved in said case explicitly allows a lawyer,
as an exception to the prohibition against advertisements by lawyers, to publish a statement of
legal fees for an initial consultation or the availability upon request of a written schedule of fees
or an estimate of the fee to be charged for the specific services. No such exception is provided
for, expressly or impliedly whether in our former Canons of Professional Ethics or the present
Code of Professional Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary rule in the Bates case contains
a proviso that the exceptions stated therein are “not applicable in any state unless and until it is
implemented by such authority in that state.” 46 This goes to show that an exception to the
general rule, such as that being invoked by herein respondent, can be made only if and when
Legal Ethics Session 3 10

the canons expressly provide for such an exception. Otherwise, the prohibition stands, as in the Respondent restrained and enjoined from issuing or causing the publication of the
case at bar. questioned advertisement.

It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar Association after the Notes.—Lawyers may not engage in forum-shopping by splitting actions or appeals ( Tan
decision in Bates, on the attitude of the public about lawyers after viewing television vs. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 212).
commercials, it was found that public opinion dropped significantly 47 with respect to these
characteristics of lawyers:  Reason for award of attorney’s fees must be stated in the court’s decision ( Policarpio vs.
Court of Appeals, 194 SCRA 729).
Trustworthy...................................................................  from 71% to 14% 
Professional..................................................................  from 71% to 14% 
Honest...........................................................................  from 65% to 14% 
Dignified.......................................................................  from 45% to 14% 

Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and judicial systems, to
allow the publication of advertisements of the kind used by respondent would only serve to
aggravate what is already a deteriorating public opinion of the legal profession whose integrity
has consistently been under attack lately by media and the community in general. At this point
in time, it is of utmost importance in the face of such negative, even if unfair, criticisms at times,
to adopt and maintain that level of professional conduct which is beyond reproach, and to exert
all efforts to regain the high esteem formerly accorded to the legal profession.

In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer, subject to disciplinary action,
to advertise his services except in allowable instances48 or to aid a layman in the unauthorized
practice of law. 49 Considering that Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who is the prime incorporator, major
stockholder and proprietor of The Legal Clinic, Inc. is a member of the Philippine Bar, he is
hereby reprimanded, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts which are
involved in this proceeding will be dealt with more severely.

While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality of the purpose/s
for which the Legal Clinic, Inc. was created should be passed upon and determined, we are
constrained to refrain from lapsing into an obiter on that aspect since it is clearly not within the
adjudicative parameters of the present proceeding which is merely administrative in nature. It
is, of course, imperative that this matter be promptly determined, albeit in a different
proceeding and forum, since, under the present state of our law and jurisprudence, a
corporation cannot be organized for or engage in the practice of law in this country. This
interdiction, just like the rule against unethical advertising, cannot be subverted by employing
some so-called paralegals supposedly rendering the alleged support services.

The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is the concern and
province of the Solicitor General who can institute the corresponding quo warranto action, 50 after
due ascertainment of the factual background and basis for the grant of respondent’s corporate
charter, in light of the putative misuse thereof. That spin-off from the instant bar matter is
referred to the Solicitor General for such action as may be necessary under the circumstances.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent, The Legal
Clinic, Inc., from issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any
form which is of the same or similar tenor and purpose as Annexes “A” and “B” of this petition,
and from conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity, operation or transaction proscribed by
law or the Code of Professional Ethics as indicated herein. Let copies of this resolution be
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Office of
the Solicitor General for appropriate action in accordance herewith.
     Narvasa (C.J.), Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Davide,
Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Meloand Quiason, JJ., concur.
Legal Ethics Session 3
A.C. No. 2519. August 29, 2000.*
TEODORO R. RIVERA, ANTONIO D. AQUINO and FELIXBERTO D. AQUINO,
complainants, vs. ATTY. SERGIO ANGELES, respondent.
Administrative Law; Attorneys; Respondent’s act of deceit and malpractice indubitably
demonstrated his failure to live up to his sworn duties as a lawyer; Supreme Court repeatedly
stressed the importance of integrity and good moral character as part of a lawyer’s equipment in
the practice ofhis profession.—The Court finds merit in the recommendation of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines. Respondent’s act of deceit and malpractice indubitably demonstrated his
failure to live up to his sworn duties as a lawyer. The Supreme Court repeatedly stressed the
importance of integrity and good moral character as part of a lawyer’s equipment in the practice
of his profession. For it cannot be denied that the respect of litigants for the profession is
inexorably diminished whenever a member of the Bar betrays their trust and confidence.
Same; Same; A lawyer has a right to be paid for the legal services he has extended to his
client but such right should not be exercised whimsically by appropriating to himself the money
intended for his clients.—The Court is not oblivious of the right of a lawyer to be paid for the
legal services he has extended to his client but such right should not be exercised whimsically by
appropriating to himself the money intended for his clients. There should never be an instance
where the victor in litigation loses everything he won to the fees of his own lawyer.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Disbarment. The facts are stated in the
resolution of the Court.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On March 25, 1983, complainants filed a Complaint for Disbarment against Atty. Sergio Angeles
on the grounds of Deceit and Malpractice. The Affidavit-Complaint 1 reads as follows:
“1.The undersigned are plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. Q-12841 and Q-13128 of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Branch V at Quezon City;
2.Atty. Sergio Angeles is their counsel of record in the said cases and his office is located
at Suite 335, URC Building, 2123 España, Manila;
3.That after receiving favorable decision from the CFI on May 21, 1973 and sustained by
the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court an alias writ of execution was issued in said
cases;
4.That in the first week of January 1983 we obtained from the CFI a sheriff’s return, dated
November 10, 1982, stating that no leviable property can be found in the premises of the
defendants;
5.That on or before January 13, 1983, we learned that Mr. Rodolfo M. Silva, one of the
defendants in said cases had already given Atty. An-geles a partial settlement of the
judgment in the amount of P42,999.00 (as evidenced by xerox copies of Partial Settlement
of Judgment dated Sep-tember 21, 1982 and Receipt of Payment dated September 22,
1982, hereto attached as Annexes “A” and “B,” respectively), without our knowledge;
11
6.That Atty. Sergio Angeles never informed the undersigned of the amount of P42,999.00
he received from Mr. Silva nor remitted to them even a part of that amount;
7. That a demand letter was sent to Atty. Sergio Angeles which was received by him on
February 17, 1983, but as of this date the under-signed have not yet received any reply.
(See Exhibits “C” and “D” at-tached).”
In his Comment filed on June 21, 1983, respondent denied the accusations and stated that he
has the right to retain the said amount of P42,999.00 and to apply the same to professional fees
due him under the subsequent agreement first with complainant Teodoro Rivera and later with
Mrs. Dely Dimson Rivera as embodied in the Deed of Assignment (Annex “8”) 2 or under the
previous agreement of 20% of P206,000.00.
Complainants, in their Reply,3 vehemently denied the assignment of their rights to
respondent.
Thereafter, this case was referred to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation in our Resolution dated November 21, 1983. The Office of the Solicitor General
considered this case submitted for resolution on April 30, 1985 by declaring respondent’s right to
present evidence as considered waived due to the latter’s failure to appear on the scheduled
hearings. However, the records from said Office do not show any resolution.
In October 1998, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued an Order requiring the parties to
manifest whether or not they are still interested in prosecuting this case, or whether
supervening events have transpired which render this case moot and academic or otherwise.
The copy of said Order sent to the complainants was received by their counsel on October 30,
1998 while the copy to the respondent was returned unclaimed.
Investigating Commissioner Julio C. Elamparo submitted his report on April 29, 1999 finding
respondent Atty. Sergio Angeles guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility
specifically Rule 1.01, Canon 16 and Rule 16.01 thereof and recommends his indefinite
suspension from the practice of law.
The Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines on June 19, 1999, issued a
resolution, the decretal portion of which reads:
“RESOLUTION NO. XIII-99-151 
Adm. Case No. 2519 
Teodoro R. Rivera, et al. vs. 
Atty. Sergio Angeles
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex “A”; and, finding the recommendation fully supported
by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, with an amendment that Atty.
Sergio Angeles is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR for his having been
found guilty of practicing deceit in dealing with his client.”
The Court finds merit in the recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
Respondent’s act of deceit and malpractice indubitably demonstrated his failure to live up to his
sworn duties as a lawyer. The Supreme Court repeatedly stressed the importance of integrity
and good moral character as part of a lawyer’s equipment in the practice of his profession. 4 For
it cannot be denied that the respect of litigants for the profession is inexorably diminished
whenever a member of the Bar betrays their trust and confidence. 5
Legal Ethics Session 3 12

The Court is not oblivious of the right of a lawyer to be paid for the legal services he has
extended to his client but such right should not be exercised whimsically by appropriating to
himself the money intended for his clients. There should never be an instance where the victor
in litigation loses everything he won to the fees of his own lawyer.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Sergio Angeles, is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
ONE (1) YEAR for having been found guilty of practicing deceit in dealing with his client. This
Resolution shall take effect immediately and copies thereof furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant, Integrated Bar of the Philippines and appended to respondent’s personal record.
SO ORDERED.
     Davide, Jr. (C.J., Chairman), Puno, Kapunan and Pardo, JJ., concur.
Respondent Sergio Angeles suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year for
practicing deceit.

Note.—It cannot be denied that the respect of litigants for the profession is inexorably
diminished whenever a member of the Bar betrays their trust and confidence. ( Busiños vs.
Ricafort, 283 SCRA 407 [1998])
Legal Ethics Session 3
Adm. Case No. 3910. August 14, 2000.*
JOSE S. DUCAT, JR., complainant, vs. ATTYS. ARSENIO C. VILLALON, JR. and
CRISPULO DUCUSIN, respondents.
Legal Ethics; Attorneys; A lawyer may be disciplined or suspended for any misconduct,
whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral
character, in honesty, in probity and good demeanor, thus rendering him unworthy to continue
as an officer of the court.—The ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoin lawyers to act with
the highest standards of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the course of his practice of law. A
lawyer may be disciplined or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or
private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, in probity and
good demeanor, thus rendering unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. Canon 7 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that “a lawyer shall at all times uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession.” The trust and confidence necessarily reposed by
clients require in the lawyer a high standard and appreciation of his duty to them. To this end,
nothing should be done by any member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any
degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the profession.
Same; Same; Land Titles; Sales; It is basic law that conveyance or transfer of any titled
real property must be in writing, signed by the registered owner or at least his attorney-in-fact
by virtue of a proper special power of attorney and duly notarized, and a lawyer, is presumed to
know, or ought to know, this process. —It has been established that the subject parcel of land,
with an area of five (5) hectares located in Barrio Pinugay, Antipolo, Rizal, is owned by and
registered in the name of complainant herein, Jose Ducat, Jr. Respondent Villalon insists
nonetheless that the property was orally given to him by complainant’s father, Jose Ducat, Sr.,
allegedly with the complete knowledge of the fact that the subject property belonged to his son,
Jose Ducat, Jr. It is basic law, however, that conveyance or transfer of any titled real property
must be in writing, signed by the registered owner or at least by his attorney-in-fact by virtue of
a proper special power of attorney and duly notarized. Respondent Villalon, as a lawyer, is
presumed to know, or ought to know, this process. Worse, when the transfer was first reduced
in writing in October, 1991 per Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land, purportedly in favor of “Atty.
Arsenio C. Villalon and/or Andres Canares, Jr.,” respondent Villalon knew that it was Jose Ducat,
Sr. who signed the said document of sale without any Special Power of Attorney from the
(registered owner thereof, Jose Ducat, Jr.; and that Jose Ducat, Sr. also signed it for his wife,
Maria Cabrido, under the word “Conforme.”
Same, Same; Public confidence in law and in lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible
and improper conduct of a member of the Bar. —Public confidence in law and lawyers may be
eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the Bar. Thus, every lawyer
should act and comport himself in such a manner that would promote public confidence in the
integrity of the legal profession. Members of the Bar are expected to always live up to the
standards of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility
inasmuch as the relationship between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in nature and
demands utmost fidelity and good faith.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Disbarment.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Castillo, Salazar, Lazaro, Tuazon and Associates for complainant.
DE LEON, JR., J.:
13
Before us is a verified letter-complaint 1 for disbarment against Attys. Arsenio C. Villalon, Jr.;
Andres Canares, Jr. and Crispulo Ducusin for deceit and gross misconduct in violation of the
lawyer’s oath. Investigation proceeded only against respondent Villalon because it was
discovered that Andres Canares was not a lawyer while Atty. Crispulo Ducusin passed away on
February 3, 1996.2
In the letter-complaint,3 complainant alleged that on October 29, 1991, respondent Villalon,
as counsel for the family of complainant, spoke to the father of complainant and asked that he
be given the title over a property owned by complainant located in Pinugay, Antipolo, Rizal and
covered by TCT No. M-3023, Emancipation Patent No. 410414, because he allegedly had to
verify the proper measurements of the subject property. Sometime in November, 1991,
however, complainant and his family were surprised when several people entered the subject
property and, when confronted by the companions of complainant, the latter were told that they
were workers of Canares and were there to construct a piggery. Complainant complained to the
barangay authorities in Pinugay and narrated the incident but respondent Canares did not
appear before it and continued with the construction of the piggery in the presence of armed
men who were watching over the construction. Complainant then went to respondent Villalon to
complain about the people of respondent Canares but nothing was done.
Complainant then filed a case for ejectment against respondent Canares. In his Reply however,
the latter answered that the subject property was already sold by complainant to respondent
Canares in the amount of P450,000,00 as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale of Real
Property dated December 5, 1991 and notarized by respondent Atty. Crispulo Ducusin.
Complainant, however, averred that he never sold the property, signed any document nor
received any money therefor, and he also denied having appeared before respondent Ducusin
who was the notary public for DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is a verified letter-complaint 1 for disbarment against Attys. Arsenio C. Villalon, Jr.;
Andres Canares, Jr. and Crispulo Ducusin for deceit and gross misconduct in violation of the
lawyer’s oath. Investigation proceeded only against respondent Villalon because it was
discovered that Andres Canares was not a lawyer while Atty. Crispulo Ducusin passed away on
February 3, 1996.2
In the letter-complaint,3 complainant alleged that on October 29, 1991, respondent Villalon,
as counsel for the family of complainant, spoke to the father of complainant and asked that he
be given the title over a property owned by complainant located in Pinugay, Antipolo, Rizal and
covered by TCT No. M-3023, Emancipation Patent No. 410414, because he allegedly had to
verify the proper measurements of the subject property. Sometime in November, 1991,
however, complainant and his family were surprised when several people entered the subject
property and, when confronted by the companions of complainant, the latter were told that they
were workers of Canares and were there to construct a piggery. Complainant complained to the
barangay authorities in Pinugay and narrated the incident but respondent Canares did not
appear before it and continued with the construction of the piggery in the presence of armed
men who were watching over the construction. Complainant then went to respondent Villalon to
complain about the people of respondent Canares but nothing was done.
Complainant then filed a case for ejectment against respondent Canares. In his Reply however,
the latter answered that the subject property was already sold by complainant to respondent
Canares in the amount of P450,000,00 as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale of Real
Property dated December 5, 1991 and notarized by respondent Atty. Crispulo Ducusin.
Complainant, however, averred that he never sold the property, signed any document nor
received any money therefor, and he also denied having appeared before respondent Ducusin
who was the notary public for In his Rejoinder,6 respondent Villalon denied the allegations of
complainant and maintained that he is a member of good standing of the Integrated Bar and
that he has always preserved the high standards of the legal profession. Respondent Villalon
Legal Ethics Session 3
expressed his willingness to have the Deed of Sale examined by the National Bureau of
Investigation and reiterated that the subject property was orally given to him by Jose Ducat, Sr.
and it was only in October, 1991 that the conveyance was reduced in writing. He added that the
complainant knew that his father, Jose Ducat, Sr., was the person who signed the said
document for and in his behalf and that this was done with his consent and knowledge.
This Court referred7 the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation,
report and recommendation.
On May 17, 1997, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution adopting and approving
the report and recommendation of its Investigating Commissioner who found respondent Atty.
Villalon guilty, and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for two (2) years and
likewise directed respondent Atty. Villalon to deliver to the complainant his TCT No. M-3023
within ten (10) days from receipt of notice, otherwise, this will result in his disbarment.
The findings of IBP Investigating Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez are as follows:
Complainant and his witness, Jose Ducat, Sr., testified in a straightforward, spontaneous and
candid manner. The sincerity and demeanor they displayed while testifying before the
Commission inspire belief as to the truth of what they are saying. More importantly, respondent
failed to impute any ill-motive on the part of the complainant and his witness which can impel
them to institute the instant complaint and testify falsely against him. To be sure, the testimony
of the complainant and his witness deserves the Commission’s full faith and credence.
Respondent’s evidence, on the other hand, leaves much to be desired. His defense (that he
considered himself the owner of the subject property which was allegedly given to him by Jose
Ducat, Sr.) rings hollow in the face of a welter of contravening and incontrovertible facts.
FIRST, the registered owner of the subject property is complainant Jose Ducat, Jr. Accordingly
respondent (being a lawyer) knew or ought to know that Jose Ducat, Sr. could not possibly give
to him the said property unless the former is duly authorized by the complainant through a
Special Power of Attorney. No such authorization has been given. Moreover, Jose Ducat, Sr. has
vigorously denied having given the subject property to the respondent. This denial is not too
difficult to believe considering the fact that he (Jose Ducat, Sr.) is not the owner of said
property.
SECOND, being a lawyer, respondent knew or ought to know that conveyance of a real
property, whether gratuitously or for a consideration, must be in writing. Accordingly, it is
unbelievable that he would consider himself the owner of the subject property on the basis of
the verbal or oral “giving” of the property by Jose Ducat, Sr. no matter how many times the
latter may have said that.
THIRD, the Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land (Exh. “1” for the respondent and Exh. “A-2” for
the complainant) allegedly executed by Jose Ducat, Sr. in favor of respondent Atty. Arsenio
Villalon and/or Andres Canares, Jr. covering the subject parcel of land which respondent
prepared allegedly upon instruction of Jose Ducat, Sr. is of dubious character. As earlier
adverted to, Jose Ducat, Sr. is not the owner of said property. Moreover, said Deed of Sale of
Parcel of Land is a falsified document as admitted by the respondent himself when he said that
the signature over the typewritten name Maria Cabrido (wife of Jose Ducat, Sr.) was affixed by
Jose Ducat, Sr. Being a lawyer, respondent knew or ought to know that the act of Jose Ducat,
Sr. in affixing his wife’s signature is tantamount to a forgery. Accordingly, he should have
treated the said Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land has (sic) a mere scrap of worthless paper instead
of relying on the same to substantiate his claim that the subject property was given to him by
Jose Ducat, Sr. Again, of note is the fact that Jose Ducat, Sr. has vigorously denied having
executed said document which denial is not too difficult to believe in the light of the
circumstances already mentioned.
14
FOURTH, the Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property (Exh. “2” for the respondent and Exh. “A-
3” for the complainant) allegedly executed by Jose Ducat, Jr. in favor of Andres Canares, Jr.
over the subject property (which respondent claims he prepared upon instruction of Jose Ducat,
Sr.) is likewise of questionable character. Complainant Jose Ducat, Jr. has vigorously denied
having executed said document. He claims that he has never sold said property to Andres
Canares, Jr. whom he does not know; that he has never appeared before Atty. Crispulo Ducusin
to subscribe to the document; and that he has never received the amount of P450,000.00
representing the consideration of said transaction. More importantly, the infirmity of the said
Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property was supplied by the respondent no less when he
admitted that there was no payment of P450,000.00 and that the same was placed in the
document only to make it appear that the conveyance was for a consideration. Accordingly, and
being a lawyer, respondent knew or ought to know the irregularity of his act and that he should
have treated the document as another scrap of worthless paper instead of utilizing the same to
substantiate his defense.8
After a careful consideration of the record of the instant case, it appears that the findings of
facts and observations of the Investigating Commissioner, Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
which were all adopted by its Board of Governors, are well-taken, the same being supported by
the evidence adduced.
The ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoin lawyers to act with the highest standards of
truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the course of his practice of law. A lawyer may be
disciplined or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity,
which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, in probity and good demeanor,
thus rendering unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.9 Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility mandates that “a lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession.” The trust and confidence necessarily reposed by clients require
in the lawyer a high standard and appreciation of his duty to them. To this end, nothing should
be done by any member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the
confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the profession. 10
It has been established that the subject parcel of land, with an area of five (5) hectares located
in Barrio Pinugay, Antipolo, Rizal, is owned by and registered in the name of complainant herein,
Jose Ducat, Jr. Respondent Villalon insists nonetheless that the property was orally given to him
by complainant’s father, Jose Ducat, Sr., allegedly with the complete knowledge of the fact that
the subject property belonged to his son, Jose Ducat, Jr. It is basic law, however, that
conveyance or transfer of any titled real property must be in writing, signed by the registered
owner or at least by his attorney-in-fact by virtue of a proper special power of attorney and duly
notarized. Respondent Villalon, as a lawyer, is presumed to know, or ought to know, this
process. Worse, when the transfer was first reduced in writing in October, 1991 per Deed of
Sale of Parcel of Land,11 purportedly in favor of “Atty. Arsenio C. Villalon and/or Andres Canares,
Jr.,” respondent Villalon knew that it was Jose Ducat, Sr. who signed the said document of sale
without any Special Power of Attorney from the registered owner thereof, Jose Ducat, Jr.; and
that Jose Ducat, Sr. also signed it for his wife, Maria Cabrido, under the word “Conforme.” As
regards the subsequent Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property dated December 5, 1991,
covering the same property, this time purportedly in favor of Andres Canares, Jr. only,
respondent Villalon admitted that there was in fact no payment of P450,000.00 and that the said
amount was placed in that document only to make it appear that the conveyance was for a
consideration.
All these taken together, coupled with complainant Jose Ducat, Jr.’s strong and credible
denial that he allegedly sold the subject property to respondent Villalon and/or Andres Canares,
Jr. and that he allegedly appeared before respondent notary public Ducusin, convince us that
Legal Ethics Session 3 15

respondent Villalon’s acts herein complained of which constitute gross misconduct were duly
proven.
Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper
conduct of a member of the Bar. Thus, every lawyer should act and comport himself in such a
manner that would promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. Members
of the Bar are expected to always live up to the standards of the legal profession as embodied in
the Code of Professional Responsibility inasmuch as the relationship between an attorney and
his client is highly fiduciary in nature and demands utmost fidelity and good faith. 12
Respondent Atty. Arsenio C. Villalon, Jr. suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year
for gross misconduct and warned against repetition of similar act.
Notes.—A lawyer is, first and foremost, an officer of the court—his duties to the court are
more significant than those which he owes to his client. ( City Sheriff, Iligan City vs.
Fortunado, 288 SCRA 190 [1998])
While, indeed, the practice of law is not a business venture, a lawyer, nevertheless, is
entitled to be duly compensated for professional services rendered. ( J.K. Mercado and Sons
Agricultural Enterprises, Inc. v. De Vera,317 SCRA 339 [1999])

We find, however, the IBP’s recommended penalty of two (2) years suspension to be imposed A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath, a patent disregard of
upon respondent Atty. Villalon too severe in the light of the facts obtaining in the case at bar. his duties, or an odious deportment unbecoming of an attorney. ( Tucay vs. Tucay, 318 SCRA
In Cesar V. Roces vs. Atty. Jose G. Aportadera, 13this Court suspended therein respondent Atty. 229 [1999])
Aportadera for a period of two (2) years from the practice of law for two main reasons:

(i)His dubious involvement in the preparation and notarization of the falsified sale of his
client’s property merits the penalty of suspension imposed on him by the IBP Board of
Governors; and

(ii)The NBI investigation reveals that: (1) respondent misrepresented himself to Gregorio
Licuanan as being duly authorized by Isabel Roces to sell her property; (2) it was
respondent who prepared the various deeds of sale over Isabel’s subdivision lots; (3)
Isabel was already confined at a hospital in Metro Manila on January 4, 1980, the deed’s
date of execution; (4) respondent knew that Isabel was hospitalized in Metro Manila
when he subscribed the deed; (5) he knew that Isabel died in Metro Manila soon after
her confinement; and (6) he did not give the seller a copy of the questioned deed of
sale.14

Unlike the circumstances prevailing in the said case of Aportadera, the record does not show
that respondent Villalon had any direct participation in the notarization by respondent notary
public Crispulo Ducusin of the Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property dated December 5,
1991,15which was supposedly signed by complainant Jose Ducat, Jr. who, however, strongly
denied having signed the same. The earlier Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land dated “this ___day of
October 1991,” allegedly signed by Jose S. Ducat, Sr., as vendor, covering the same property, in
favor of respondent “Arsenio S. Villalon and/or Andres Canares, Jr.” was not notarized. The
record also shows that Jose Ducat, Sr. and complainant Jose Ducat, Jr. are father and son and
that they live in the same house at 912 Leo Street, Sampaloc, Manila. It is not also disputed that
respondent Villalon has been the lawyer for a number of years of the family of Jose Ducat, Sr.

WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. ARSENIO C. VILLALON, JR. is hereby found guilty of gross
misconduct, and he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of ONE (1) YEAR with a
warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. Respondent
Villalon is further directed to deliver to the registered owner, complainant Jose Ducat, Jr., the
latter’s TCT No. M-3023 covering the subject property within a period of sixty (60) days from
receipt of this Decision, at his sole expense; and that failure on his part to do so will result in his
disbarment.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Villalon’s personal record in the Office of the
Bar Confidant and copies thereof be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
    
 Mendoza (Actg. Chairman), Quisumbing and Buena, JJ., concur.
     Bellosillo, J. (Chairman), On leave.
Legal Ethics Session 3
1
In Re Salazar
PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME “SYCIP,
SALAZAR, FELICIANO, HERNANDEZ & CASTILLO.” LUCIANO E. SALAZAR,
FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, BENILDO G. HERNANDEZ. GREGORIO R. CASTILLO.
ALBERTO P. SAN JUAN, JUAN C. REYES, JR., ANDRES G. GATMAITAN, JUSTINO H.
CACANINDIN, NOEL A. LAMAN, ETHELWOLDO E. FERNANDEZ, ANGELITO C.
IMPERIO, EDUARDO R. CENIZA, TRISTAN A. CATINDIG, ANCHETA K. TAN, and ALICE
V. PESIGAN, petitioners.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM
NAME “OZAETA, ROMULO, DE LEON, MABANTA & REYES.” RICARDO J. ROMULO,
BENJAMIN M. DE LEON, ROMAN MABANTA, JR., JOSE MA. REYES, JESUS S. J. SAYOC,
EDUARDO DE LOS ANGELES, and JOSE F. BUENAVENTURA, petitioners.
Civil Law; Partnership; Firm Name; Use in the partnership name of the names of
deceased partners contrary to Art. 1815 of the Civil Code; Names in a firm name of a
partnership must be living partners; Reasons. —Inasmuch as “Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano,
Hernandez and Castillo” and “Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta and Reyes” are partnerships,
the use in their partnership names of the names of deceased partners will run counter to Article
1815 of the Civil Code. x x x It is clearly tacit in the above provision that names in a firm name
of a partnership must either be those of living partners and, in the case of non-partners, should
be living persons who can be subjected to liability. In fact, Article 1825 of the Civil Code
prohibits a third person from including his name in the firm name under pain of assuming the
liability of a partner. The heirs of a deceased partner in a law firm cannot be held liable as the
old members to the creditors of a firm particularly where they are non-lawyers. Thus, Canon 34
of the Canons of Professional Ethics “prohibits an agreement for the payment to the widow and
heirs of a deceased lawyer of a percentage, either gross or net, of the fees received from the
future business of the deceased lawyer’s clients, both because the recipients of such division are
not lawyers and because such payments will not represent service or responsibility on the part
of the recipient.” Accordingly, neither the widow nor the heirs can be held liable for transactions
entered into after the death of their lawyer-predecessor. There being no benefits accruing, there
can be no corresponding liability.
Same; Same; Same; Commercial Partnership; Art. 1840 refers to commercial partnership
with goodwill, not professional partnerships; Goodwill cannot arise in a professional partnership .
—Secondly, Article 1840 treats more of a commercial partnership with a good will to protect
rather than of a professional partnership, with no saleable good, will but whose reputation
depends on the personal qualifications of its individual members. Thus, it has been held that a
saleable goodwill can exist only in a commercial partnership and cannot arise in a professional
partnership consisting of lawyers.
Same; Same; Same; Practice of Law; Partnership for the practice of law, nature of .—A
partnership for the practice of law cannot be likened to partnerships formed by other
professionals or for business. For one thing, the law on accountancy specifically allows the use
of a trade name in connection with the practice of accountancy. “A partnership for the practice
of law is not a legal entity. It is a mere relationship or association for a particular purpose. x x x
It is not a partnership formed for the purpose of carrying on a trade or business or of holding
property.” Thus, it has been stated that “the use of a nom de plume, assumed or trade name in
law practice is improper.”
16
Same; Same; Same; Same; Right to practice law, nature of .—“The right to practice law is
not a natural or constitutional right but is in the nature of a privilege or franchise. It is limited, to
persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The
right does not only presuppose in its possessor integrity, legal standing and attainment, but also
the exercise of a special privilege, highly personal and partaking of the nature of a public trust.”
Same; Same; Same; Custom; Continued use of a deceased or former partner’s name in
the firm names of law partnerships not sanctioned by local custom; Reason; Possibility of
deception upon the public where the name of a deceased partner continues to be used. —It is
true that Canon 33 does not consider as unethical  the continued use of the name of a deceased
or former partner in the firm name of a law partnership when such a practice is  permissible by
local custom but the Canon warns that care should be taken that no imposition or deception is
practiced through this use. It must be conceded that in the Philippines, no local custom permits
or allows the continued use of a deceased or former partner’s name in the firm names of law
partnerships. Firm names, under our custom, identify the more active and/or more senior
members or partners of the law firm . A glimpse at the history of the firms of petitioners and of
other law firms in this country would show how their firm names have evolved and changed
from time to time as the composition of the partnership changed. The possibility of deception
upon the public, real or consequential, where the name of a deceased partner continues to be
used cannot be ruled out. A person in search of legal counsel might be guided by the familiar
ring of a distinguished name appearing in a firm title.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Evidence; Concept of Customs; To be admissible
custom must be proved as a fact; Distinctions between juridical custom and social custom. —Not
so in this jurisdiction where there is no local custom that sanctions the practice. Custom has
been defined as a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed (practiced)
as a social rule, legally binding and obligatory. Courts take no judicial notice of custom. A
custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence. A local custom as a source
of right cannot be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly established by
competent evidence like any other fact. We find such proof of the existence of a local custom,
and of the elements requisite to constitute the same, wanting herein. Merely because something
is done as a matter of practice does not mean that Courts can rely on the same for purposes of
adjudication as a juridical custom. Juridical custom must be differentiated from social custom.
The former can supplement statutory law or be applied in the absence of such statute. Not so
with the latter.
Same; Same; Same; Practice of Law; Practice of law not considered money-making trade
but peculiarly related to the administration of justice.—The practice of law is intimately and
peculiarlyrelated to the administration of justice and should not be considered like an ordinary
"money-making trade."
Aquino, J.: dissenting:
Civil Law; Partnership; Firm Name; Use of firm name of deceased partner of law firm;
Purpose of continued use of names of decesed founders of law firms; is a legitimate motivation;
Retention of the name of the deceased partner in the law firm not illegal per se. —Obviously, the
purpose of the two firms in continuing the use of the names of their deceased founders is to
retain the clients who had customarily sought the legal services of Attorneys Sycip and Ozaeta
and the benefit from the goodwill attached to the names of those respected and esteemed law
practitioners. That is a legitimate motivation. The retention of their names is not illegal per se.
That practice was followed before the war by the law firm of James Ross. Notwithstanding the
death of Judge Ross, the founder of the law firm of Ross, Lawrence, Selph and Carrascoso, his
name was retained in the frim name with an indication of the year when he died. No one
complained that the retention of the name of Judge Ross in the firm name was illegal or
unethical.
Legal Ethics Session 3 17

The question involved in these Petitions first came under consideration by this Court in 1953
when a law firm in Cebu (the Deen case) continued its practice of including in its firm name that
RESOLUTION of a deceased partner, C.D. Johnston. The matter was resolved with this Court advising the firm
to desist from including in their firm designation the name of C. D. Johnston, “who has long
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: been dead.”

The same issue was raised before this Court in 1958 as an incident in G. R. No. L-11964,
Two separate Petitions were filed before this Court 1) by the surviving partners of Atty.
entitled Register of Deeds of Manila vs. China Banking Corporation. The law firm of Perkins &
Alexander Sycip, who died on May 5, 1975, and 2) by the surviving partners of Atty. Herminio
Ponce Enrile moved to intervene as amicus curiae. Before acting thereon, the Court, in a
Ozaeta, who died on February 14, 1976, praying that they be allowed to continue using, in the
Resolution of April 15, 1957, stated that it “would like to be informed why the name of Perkins is
names of the firms, the names of partners who had passed awy. In the Court's Resolution of
still being used although Atty. E. A. Perkins is already dead.” In a Manifestation dated May 21,
September2, 1976, both Petitions were ordered consolidated.
1957, the law firm of Perkins and Ponce Enrile, raising substantially the same arguments  as
those now being raised by petitioners, prayed that the continued use of the firm name “Perkins
Petitioners base their petitions on the following arguments:
& Ponce Enrile” be held proper.
1. Under the law, a partnership is notprohibited from continuing its business under a firm
name which includes the name explicity sanctions the practice when it provides in the last
On June 16, 1958, this Court resolved:
paragraph that:
“After carefully considering the reasons given by Attorneys Alfonso Ponce Enrile and Associates
“The use by the person or partnership continuing the business of the partnership name, or  the
for their continued use of the name of the deceased E. G. Perkins, the Court found no reason to
name of a deceased partner as part thereof, shall not of itself make the individual property of
depart from the policy it adopted in June 1953 when it required Attorneys Alfred P. Deen and
the deceased partner liable for any debts contracted by such person or partner-ship.” 1
Eddy A. Deen of Cebu City to desist from including in their firm designation, the name of C. D.
Johnston, deceased. The Court believes that, in view of the personal and confidential nature of
2. In regulating other professions, such as accountancy and engineering, the legislature has
the relations between attorney and client, and the high standards demanded in the canons of
authorized the adoption of firm names without any restriction as to the use, in such firm name,
professional ethics, no practice should be allowed which even in a remote degree could give rise
of the name of a deceased partner;2 the legislative authorization given to those engaged in the
to the possibility of deception. Said attorneys are accordingly advised to drop the name
practice of accountancy—a profession requiring the same degree of trust and confidence in
“PERKINS” from their firm name.”
respect of clients as that implicit in the relationship of attorney and client—to acquire and use a
trade name, strongly indicates that there is no fundamental policy that is offended by the
Petitioners herein now seek a re-examination of the policy thus far enunciated by the Court.
continued use by a firm of professionals of a firm name which includes the name of a deceased
partner, at least where such firm name has acquired the characteristics of a “trade name.” 3
The Court finds no sufficient reason to depart from the rulings thus laid down.
3. The Canons of Professional Ethics are not transgressed by the continued use of the name
A. Inasmuch as “Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo” and “Ozaeta, Romulo, De
of a deceased partner in the firm name of a law partnership because Canon 33 of the Canons of
Leon, Mabanta and Reyes” are partnerships, the use in their partnership names of the names of
Professional Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association declares that:
deceased partners will run counter to Article 1815 of the Civil Code which provides:
“x x x The continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner when permissible by local
“Art. 1815. Every partnership shall operate under a firm name, which may or may not include
custom, is not unethical, but care should be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced
the name of one or more of the partners.
through this use. x x x”4
“Those who, not being members of the partnership, include their names in the firm name,
4. There is no possibility of imposition or deception because the deaths of their respective
shall be subject to the liability of a partner.”
deceased partners were well-publicized in all newspapers of general circulation for several days;
the stationeries now being used by them carry new letterheads indicating the years when their
It is clearly tacit in the above provision that names in a firm name of a partnership must either
respective deceased partners were connected with the firm; petitioners will notify all leading
be those of living partners and, in the case of non-partners, should be living persons who can be
national and international law directories of the fact of their respective deceased partners’
subjected to liability. In fact, Article 1825 of the Civil Code prohibits a third person from
deaths.5
including his name in the firm name under pain of assuming the liability of a partner. The heirs
of a deceased partner in a law firm cannot he held liable as the old members to the creditors of
5. No local custom prohibits the continued use of a deceased partner’s name in a
a firm particularly where they are non-lawyers. Thus, Canon 34 of the Canons of Professional
professional firm’s name;6 there is no custom or usage in the Philippines, or at least in the
Ethics “prohibits an agreement for the payment to the widow and heirs of a deceased lawyer of
Greater Manila Area, which recognizes that the name of a law firm necessarily identifies the
a percentage, either gross or net, of the fees received from the future business of the deceased
individual members of the firm.7
lawyer’s clients, both because the recipients of such division are not lawyers and because such
payments will not represent service or responsibility on the part of the recipient.” Accordingly,
6. The continued use of a deceased partner’s name in the firm name of law partnerships
neither the widow nor the heirs can be held liable for transactions entered into after the death
has been consistently allowed by U.S. Courts and is an accepted practice in the legal profession
of their lawyer-predecessor. There being no benefits accruing, there can be no corresponding
of most countries in the world.8
liability.
Legal Ethics Session 3
Prescinding the law, there could be practical objections to allowing the use by law firms of
the names of deceased partners. The public relations value of the use of an old firm name can
tend to create undue advantages and disadvantages in the practice of the profession. An able
lawyer without connections will have to make a name for himself starting from scratch. Another
able lawyer, who can join an old firm, can initially ride on that old firm’s reputation established
by deceased partners.
B. In regards to the last paragraph of Article 1840 of the Civil Code cited by
petitioners, supra, the first factor to consider is that it is within Chapter 3 of Title IX of the Code
entitled “Dissolution and Winding Up.” The Article primarily deals with the exemption from
liability in cases of a dissolved partnership, of the individual property of the deceased partner for
debts contracted by the person or partnership which continues the business using the
partnership name or the name of the deceased partner as part thereof. What the law
contemplates therein is a hold-over situation preparatory: to formal reorganization.
Secondly Article 1840 treats more of a commercial partnership with a good will to protect rather
than of a professional partnership, with no saleable good will but whose reputation depends on
the personal qualifications of its individual members. Thus, it has been held that a seleable
goodwill can exist only in a commercial partnership and cannot arise in a professional
partnership consisting of lawyers.9
“As a general rule, upon the dissolution of a commercial partnership the succeeding partners or
parties have the right to carry on the business under the old name, in the absence of a
stipulation forbidding it, (s)ince the name of a commercial partnership is a partnership asset
inseparable from the good will of the firm x x x x.” (60 Am Jur 2d, s 204, p. 115) (Italics
supplied)
On the other hand,
“x x x a professional partnership the reputation of which depends on the individual skill of the
members, such as partnerships of attorneys or physicians, has no good will to be distributed as
a firm asset on its dissolution, however intrinsically valuable such skill and reputation may be,
especially where there is no provision in the partnership agreement relating to good will as an
asset. x x x” (ibid, s 203, p. 115) (Italics supplied)
C. A partnership for the practice of law cannot be likened to partnerships formed by other
professionals or for business. For one thing, the law on accountancy specifically allows the use
of a trade name in connection with the practice of accoun-tancy.10
“A partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It is a mere relationship or
association for a particular purpose. x x x It is not a partnership formed for the purpose of
carrying on trade or business or of holding property.” 11 Thus, it has been stated that “the use of
a nom de plume, assumed or trade name in law practice is improper.” 12
“The usual reason given for different standards of conduct being applicable to the practice of
law from those pertaining to business is that the law is a ‘profession.’ x x x
“Dean Pound, in his recently published contribution to the Survey of the Legal Profession, ( The
Lawyer from Antiquity to Modern Times, p. 5) defines a profession as ‘a group of men pursuing
a learned art as a common calling in the spirit of public service,—no less a public service
because it may incidentally be a means of livelihood.’
x x x           x x x           x x x
“Primary characteristics which distinguish the legal profession from business are:
18
1.A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a byproduct, and in which one may
attain the highest eminence without making much money.
2.A relation as an ‘officer of court’ to the administration of justice involving thorough
sincerity, integrity, and reliability.
3.A relation to clients in the highest degree fiduciary.
4.A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness
to resort to current business methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice,
or dealing directly with their clients.”13
“The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is in the nature of a privilege
or franchise.14 It is limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly
ascertained and certified. 15 The right does not only presuppose in its possessor integrity, legal
standing and attainment, but also the exercise of a special privilege, highly personal and
partaking of the nature of a public trust.”16
D. Petitioners cited Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar
Association17 in support of their petitions.
It is true that Canon 33 does not consider as unethical  the continued use of the name of a
deceased or former partner in the firm name of a law partnership when such a practice
is permissible by local custom but the Canon warns that care should be taken that no imposition
or deception is practiced through this use.
It must be conceded that in the Philippines, no local custom permits or allows the continued
use of a deceased or former partner’s name in the firm names of law partnerships. Firm names,
under our custom, identify the more active and/or more senior members or partners of the law
firm. A glimpse at the history of the firms of petitioners and of other law firms in this country
would show how their firm names have evolved and changed from time to time as the
composition of the partnership changed.
“The continued use of a firm name after the death of one or more of the partners designated by
it is proper only where sustained by local custom  and not where by custom this purports to
identify the active members. x x x
“There would seem to be a question, under the working of the Canon, as to the propriety of
adding the name of a new partner and at the same time retaining that of a deceased
partner who was never a partner with the new one .” (H.S. Drinker, op. cit., supra, at pp. 207-
208) (Italics supplied).
The possibility of deception upon the public, real or consequential, where the name of a
deceased partner continues to be used cannot be ruled out. A person in search of legal counsel
might be guided by the familiar ring of a distinguished name appearing in a firm title.
E. Petitioners argue that U.S. Courts have consistently allowed the continued use of a
deceased partner’s name in the firm name of law partnerships. But that is so because it is
sanctioned by custom.
In the case of Mendelsohn v. Equitable Life Assurance Society  (33 N.Y.S. 2d 733) which
petitioners Salazar, et al. quoted in their memorandum, the New York Supreme Court sustained
the use of the firm name Alexander & Green even if none of the present ten partners of the firm
bears either name because the practice was sanctioned by custom  and did not offend any
Legal Ethics Session 3
statutory provision or legislative policy and was adopted by agreement of the parties. The Court
stated therein:
“The practice sought to be proscribed has the sanction of custom and offends no statutory
provision or legislative policy. Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of both the
American Bar Association and the New York State Bar Association provides in part as follows:
‘The continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner, when permissible by local
custom is not unethical, but care should be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced
through this use.’ There is no question as to local custom. Many firms in the city use the names
of deceased members with the approval of other attorneys, bar associations and the courts.  The
Appellate Division of the First Department has considered the matter and reached the conclusion
that such practice should not be prohibited. (Italics supplied)
x x x           x x x           x x x
“Neither the Partnership Law nor the Penal Law prohibits the practice in question. The use
of the firm name herein is also sustainable by reason of agreement between the partners.” 18
Not so in this jurisdiction where there is no local custom that sanctions the practice. Custom has
been defined as a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed (practiced)
as a social rule, legally binding and obligatory. 19 Courts take no judicial notice of custom. A
custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence. 20 A local custom as a
source of right cannot be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly
established by competent evidence like any other fact. 21 We find such proof of the existence of a
local custom, and of the elements requisite to constitute the same, wanting herein. Merely
because something is done as a matter of practice does not mean that Courts can rely on the
same for purposes of adjudication as a juridical custom Juridical custom must be differentiated
from social custom. The former can supplement statutory law or be applied in the absence of
such statute. Not so with the latter.
Moreover, judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws form part of the legal
system.22 When the Supreme Court in the Deen and Perkins cases issued its Resolutions
directing lawyers to desist from including the names of deceased partners in their firm
designation, it laid down a legal rule against which no custom or practice to the contrary, even if
proven, can prevail. This is not to speak of our civil law which clearly ordains that a partnership
is dissolved by the death of any partner. 23 Customs which are contrary to law, public order or
public policy shall not be countenanced.24
The practice of law is intimately and peculiarly related to the administration of justice and
should not be considered like an ordinary “money-making trade.”
“x x x It is of the essence of a profession that it is practiced in a spirit of public service. ‘A trade’
x x x ‘aims primarily at personal gain; a profession at the exercise of powers beneficial to
mankind.’ If, as in the era of wide free opportunity, we think of free competitive self assertion as
the highest good, lawyer and grocer and farmer may seem to be freely competing with their
fellows in their calling in order each to acquire as much of the world’s good as he may within the
limits allowed him by law. But the member of a profession does not regard himself as in
competition with his professional brethren. He is not bartering his services as is the artisan nor
exchanging the products of his skill and learning as the farmer sells wheat or corn. There should
be no such thing as a lawyers’ or physicians’ strike. The best service of the professional man is
often rendered for no equivalent or for a trifling equivalent and it is his pride to do what he does
in a way worthy of his profession even if done with no expectation of reward. This spirit of
public service in which the profession of law is and ought to be exercised is a prerequisite of
sound administration of justice according to law. The other two elements of a profession,
19
namely, organization and pursuit of a learned art have their justification in that they secure and
maintain that spirit.”25
In fine, petitioners’ desire to preserve the identity of their firms in the eyes of the public must
bow to legal and ethical impediments.
ACCORDINGLY, the petitions filed herein are denied and petitioners advised to drop the
names “SYCIP” and “OZAETA” from their respective firm names. Those names may, however,
be included in the listing of individuals who have been partners in their firms indicating the years
during which they served as such.
SO ORDERED.
    
 Teehankee, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez, Guerreroand De Castro, JJ., concur.
     Fernando, C. J., and Abad-Santos, J., take no part.
     Barredo, J., joins Justices Antonio and Aquino in their dissent.
     Makasiar and Antonio, JJ., concur in the dissenting opinion of Justice Ramon C.
Aquino.
     Aquino, J., see attached dissent
CERTIFICATION
FERNANDO C.J.:
The petitions are denied, as there are only four votes for granting them, seven of the Justices
being of the contrary view, as explained in the plurality opinion of Justice Ameurfina Melencio-
Herrera. It is out of delicadeza that the under-signed did not participate in the disposition of
these petitions, as the law office of Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo started with
the partnership of Quisumbing, Sycip, and Quisumbing, the senior partner, the late Ramon
Quisumbing, being the father-in-law of the undersigned, and the most junior partner then,
Norberto J. Quisumbing, being his brother-in-law. For the record, the undersigned wishes to
invite the attention of all concerned, and not only of petitioners, to the last sentence of the
opinion of Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera: “Those names [Sycip and Ozaeta] may,
however, be included in the listing of individuals who have been partners in their firms indicating
the years during which they served as such.” It represents a happy compromise.
DISSENTING OPINION
AQUINO, J.:
I dissent. The fourteen members of the law firm, Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez & Castillo,
in their petition of June 10, 1975, prayed for authority to continue the use of that firm name,
notwithstanding the death of Attorney Alexander Sycip on May 5, 1075 (May he rest in peace).
He was the founder of the firm which was originally known as the Sycip Law Office.
On the other hand, the seven surviving partners of the law firm, Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon,
Mabanta & Reyes, in their petition of August 13, 1976, prayed that they be allowed to continue
using the said firm name notwithstanding the death of two partners, former Justice Roman
Ozaeta and his son, Herminio, on May 1, 1972 and February 14, 1976, respectively.
They alleged that the said law firm was a continuation of the Ozaeta Law Office which was
established in 1957 by Justice Ozaeta and his son and that, as to the said law firm, the name
Ozaeta has acquired an institutional and secondary connotation.
Article 1840 of the Civil Code, which speaks of the use by the partnership of the name of a
deceased partner as part of the partnership name, is cited to justify the petitions. Also invoked
Legal Ethics Session 3 20

is the canon that the continued use by a law firm of the name of a deceased partner, “when
permissible by local custom, is not unethical” as long as “no imposition or deception is practised
through this use” (Canon 33 of the Canons of Legal Ethics).
I am of the opinion that the petition may be granted with the condition that it be indicated
in the letterheads of the two firms (as the case may be) that Alexander Sycip, former Justice
Ozaeta and Herminio Ozaeta are dead or the period when they served as partners should be
stated therein.
Obviously, the purpose of the two firms in continuing the use of the names of their
deceased founders is to retain the clients who had customarily sought the legal services of
Attorneys Sycip and Ozaeta and to benefit from the goodwill attached to the names of those
respected and esteemed law practitioners. That is a legitimate motivation.
The retention of their names is not illegal per se. That practice was followed before the war
by the law firm of James Ross. Notwithstanding the death of Judge Ross the founder of the law
firm of Ross, Lawrence, Selph and Carrascoso, his name was retained in the firm name with an
indication of the year when he died. No one complained that the retention of the name of Judge
Ross in the firm name was illegal or unethical.
Petition denied.

Notes.—To organize a corporation or a partnership that could claim a juridical personality

of its own and transact business as such, is not a matter of absolute right but a privilege which
may be enjoyed only under such terms as the State may deem necessary to impose. ( Ang Pue &
Co. vs. Secretary of Commerce and Industry, 5 SCRA 645).

Although the heir of a partner ordinarily becomes a limited partner for his own protection, yet
the heir may disregard it and instead elect to become a collective or general partner, with all the
rights and obligations of one. (Goquiolay vs. Sycip, 9 SCRA 663).

An action for the liquidation of a partnership is a personal one, which may be brought in the
place of residence of either the plaintiff or the defendant. (Claridades vs. Mercader, 17 SCRA 1).

A general partner cannot sell partnership property without authority from other partners.
(Goquiolay vs. Sycip, 9 SCRA 663).

Condonation by creditor of share in partnership debt of one partner does not increase pro
rata of other partners. (Island Sales, Inc. vs. United Pioneers Construction Company , 65 SCRA
554.)

A partner has no obligation to account to anyone for properties acquired after dissolution of
partnership in absence of proof he violated trust of deceased partner during existence of
partnership. (Lim Tanhu vs. Ramolete, 66 SCRA 425.)

The partnership profits distribution to the partners should be reduced by the amounts of
income tax assessed against the partnership. ( Ona vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue , 45
SCRA 74.)
Legal Ethics Session 3
Bar Matter No. 44. February 10, 1989.*
EUFROSINA YAP TAN, complainant, vs. NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL, respondent.
Bar Matter No. 59. February 10, 1989.*
BENJAMIN CABIGON, complainant, vs. NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL, respondent.
SBC No. 624. February 10, 1989.*
CORNELIO AGNIS and DIOMEDES D. AGNIS, complainants, vs. NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL,
respondent.
Legal Ethics; Lawyers; Admission to the Bar; Lawyer’s Oath; Since respondent
Sabandal has shown contrition and willingness to reform and has submitted proof of his good
moral character and civic consciousness, he may now be allowed to take the lawyer’s oath.— In
several cases wherein reinstatements to the legal profession were allowed, the following criteria
were considered: the person appreciates the significance of his dereliction and he has assured
the Court that he now possesses the requisite probity and integrity necessary to guarantee that
he is worthy to be restored to the practice of law (Magat vs. Santiago, L-43301-45665, April 1,
1980, 97 SCRA 1); the time that has elapsed between disbarment and the application for
reinstatement, his good conduct and honorable dealing subsequent to his disbarment, his active
involvement in civic, educational, and religious organizations (In Re: Juan T. Publico, 102 SCRA
721 [1981]); the favorable indorsement of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as well as the
local government officials and citizens of his community (In Re: Quinciano D. Vailoces, Adm.
Case No. 439, September 30, 1982, 117 SCRA 1); the pleas of his mother and wife for the sake
and the future of his family (Andres vs. Cabrera, SBC-585, February 29, 1984, 127 SCRA 802).
The foregoing criteria may be made applicable to respondent’s case. After the lapse of ten (10)
years from the time respondent took and passed the 1978 Bar Examination, he has shown
contrition and willingness to reform. He has also submitted several testimonials, including one
from the IBP Zamboanga del Norte, attesting to his good moral character and civic
consciousness. AC CORDINGLY, respondent Nicolas El. Sabandal is hereby allowed to take the
lawyer’s oath, with the Court binding him to his assurance that he shall strictly abide by and
adhere to the language, meaning and spirit of the Lawyer’s Oath and the Highest standards of
the legal profession.
PETITION to be admitted to the Philippine Bar and to be allowed to take the lawyer’s oath and
to sign the Roll of Attorneys.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
     Alberto Concha for Eufrosina Yap Tan.
     Nelbert Poculan for respondent.
RESOLUTION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
21
Respondent Nicolas El. Sabandal passed the 1978 Bar Examinations but because of
pending administrative complaints filed against him, he was not allowed to take the lawyer’s
oath. He then filed a Petition to be admitted to the Philippine Bar and to be allowed to sign the
Roll of Attorneys. The complainants, namely, Eufrosina Y. Tan, Benjamin Cabigon, Cornelio
Agnis and Diomedes D. Agnis, opposed the Petition on several grounds.
In a Resolution of this Court en banc promulgated on 29 November 1983,
respondent’s petition was denied, the Court finding, inter alia, that:
“x x x the evidence supports the charge of unauthorized practice of law. While respondent’s
infraction may be mitigated in that he appeared for his in-laws in CAR Cases Nos. 347 and 326
where they were parties, it is clear from the proceedings in CAR Case No. 347 that he clarified
his position only after the opposing counsel had objected to his appearance. Besides, he
specifically manifested ‘Atty. Nicolas Sabandal, appearing for the defendants, Your Honor’
(Exhibit ‘A-1’). He called himself ‘attorney’ knowing full well that he was not yet admitted to the
Bar. Oppositors’ evidence sufficiently shows that respondent had held himself out as an
‘attorney’ in the agrarian, civil and criminal cases mentioned by said oppositors. Respondent
cannot shift the blame on the stenographer, for he could have easily asked for rectification. x x
x Oppositors had also presented evidence of proceedings wherein witnesses testified as to
respondent’s being their lawyer and their compensating him for his services (Exhibits ‘D-8’ and
‘D-9’). It may be that in the Court of a municipality, even non-lawyers may appear (Sec. 34,
Rule 138, Rules of Court). If respondent had so manifested, no one could have challenged him.
What he did, however, was to hold himself out as a lawyer, and even to write the Station
Commander of Roxas, complaining of harassment to ‘our clients’, when he could not but have
known that he could not yet engage in the practice of law. His argument that the term ‘client’ is
a ‘dependent or person under the protection of another and not a person who engages in the
profession’ is puerile.” (126 SCRA 60, at 67 & 68)
A Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Resolution was filed by respondent on 23 January
1984, which was opposed by Complainants, who stated that the “span of time was so short to
determine with sufficient definiteness whether or not respondent has reformed;” that “the
testimonials are self-serving obviously prepared by respondent himself and had them signed by
the signatories who could not refuse him.” In its Resolution of 8 May 1984 the Court denied
reconsideration.
On 23 May 1985 respondent filed an Ex-parte Motion for Reconsideration reiterating his prayer
to be allowed to take the lawyer’s oath, which was again opposed by Complainants, and which
was denied by the Court on 16 July 1985, with the Court stating that no other Motions of this
kind would be entertained.
Undaunted, on 2 December 1985, respondent filed another Motion for Reconsideration and
Appeal for Mercy and Forgiveness, which the Court simply NOTED in its Resolution of 7 January
1986.
In a letter dated 4 December 1986 respondent’s children echoed his appeal to the Court to allow
him to take the lawyer’s oath, which the Court noted without action on 7 July 1987.
On 28 June 1988, respondent filed a second Petition to be allowed to take the lawyer’s oath.
Complainants were required to comment but they have not done so to date.
In a letter dated 23 November 1988 addressed to the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of this
Court, respondent asks for forgiveness, understanding and benevolence and promises that, if
given a chance to be a member of the Philippine Bar, he would always be faithful to the lawyer’s
oath and conduct himself in an upright manner.
Legal Ethics Session 3 22

Whether or not respondent shall be admitted to the Philippine Bar rests to a great extent in the
sound discretion of the Court. An applicant must satisfy the Court that he is a person of good
moral character, fit and proper to practice law.

In several cases wherein reinstatements to the legal profession were allowed, the following
criteria were considered: the person appreciates the significance of his dereliction and he has
assured the Court that he now possesses the requisite probity and integrity necessary to
guarantee that he is worthy to be restored to the practice of law (Magat vs. Santiago, L-43301-
45665, April 1, 1980, 97 SCRA 1); the time that has elapsed between disbarment and the
application for reinstatement, his good conduct and honorable dealing subsequent to his
disbarment, his active involvement in civic, educational, and religious organizations (In Re: Juan
T. Publico, 102 SCRA 721 [1981]); the favorable indorsement of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, as well as the local government officials and citizens of his community (In Re:
Quinciano D. Vailoces, Adm. Case No. 439, September 30, 1982, 117 SCRA 1); the pleas of his
mother and wife for the sake and the future of his family (Andres vs. Cabrera, SBC-585,
February 29, 1984, 127 SCRA 802).

The foregoing criteria may be made applicable to respondent’s case. After the lapse of ten (10)
years from the time respondent took and passed the 1978 Bar Examination, he has shown
contrition and willingness to reform. He has also submitted several testimonials, including one
from the IBP Zamboanga del Norte, attesting to his good moral character and civic
consciousness.

ACCORDINGLY, respondent Nicolas El. Sabandal is hereby allowed to take the lawyer’s oath,
with the Court binding him to his assurance that he shall strictly abide by and adhere to the
language, meaning and spirit of the Lawyer’s Oath and the highest standards of the legal
profession.

SO ORDERED.

     Fernan, (C.J.), Narvasa, Gutierrez Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Cortés, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Respondent allowed to take the lawyer’s oath.

Note.—The practice of law being clothed with public interest, the holder of this privilege must
submit to a degree of control for the common good to the extent of the interest he has created.
(Marcial A. Edillis, 84 SCRA 554).

——o0o——
Legal Ethics Session 3
Adm. Case No. 1053. August 31, 1981.*
SANTA PANGAN, complainant, vs. ATTY. DIONISIO RAMOS, respondent.
Attorneys; Dismissal of the bigamy charge will not necessarily result in the dismissal of
the immorality charge against a lawyer.— Respondent, however, submits that having been
acquitted by the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXI, of the charge of bigamy, the
immorality charges filed against him in this disbarment case should be dismissed. The acquittal
of respondent Ramos upon the criminal charge is not a bar to these proceedings. The standards
of legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape the
penalties of the criminal law. Moreover, this Court in disbarment proceedings is acting in an
entirely different capacity from that which courts assume in trying criminal cases.
Same; Persistent use of an additional initial not appearing in the Roll of Attorneys
despite warning by the Court to refrain from such use suggests lack of candor and respect for
the Court.—This Court has already severely reprimanded respondent from using a name other
than authorized name in the “Roll of Attorneys” and was warned that a repetition of the same
overt act may warrant his suspension or disbarment from office in the future. Notwithstanding
such reprimand and warning, however, respondent repeated the same overt act of using
unauthorized name in two pleadings filed before the Court of First Instance of Manila. His
explanation that he had done so inadvertently because of poor eyesight appears unsatisfactory.
He should have employed more caution and prudence in filing pleadings before courts
considering the fact that he had already been warned and reprimanded by this Court.
Respondent’s conduct, thus, suggests lack of candor and respect in his dealing with this Court.
He has violated his oath of office of assuming the duty of good faith and honorable dealings
with the court, of being respectful to it and of being obedient to its rules and lawful orders.
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
RESOLUTION
DE CASTRO, J.:
On November 29, 1971, Santa Pangan filed before this Court a verified complaint
charging respondent Atty. Dionisio Ramos with gross immorality, the latter having
misrepresented himself as still “single” when he started courting complainant, proposed
marriage to her and finally succeeded in marrying her even with full consciousness that his first
marriage to his first wife was still valid and subsisting.1 (A Criminal Case for bigamy was also
23
filed by the complainant against the respondent in the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch
XXI, docketed as Criminal Case No. 15528).
In his answer to the complaint, respondent denied the material allegations thereof for
being without legal or factual basis. He prayed for the dismissal of the complaint for failure to
state a cause of action against respondent.2
The case was referred to the Office of the Solicitor General for report, investigation
and recommendation. On June 1, 1976, the Solicitor General submitted his report finding
respondent Ramos guilty as charged, with a recommendation for his suspension from the
practice of law for a period of three (3) years, pursuant to Section 7, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court.3 Subsequently, the corresponding complaint for his suspension from the practice of law
was filed.
On September 13, 1976, respondent filed his answer to the complaint and moved for
the appointment of a commissioner to hear and take additional evidence in his behalf, which,
however, was denied by the Court per its Resolution of October 6, 1976. At the hearing of
February 25, 1977, respondent, acting as counsel for his own behalf, moved for the presentation
of additional evidence, which was, however, opposed by complainant’s counsel on the ground
that respondent is resorting to dilatory tactics. At the hearing of September 2, 1977,
complainant and respondent appeared and the Court set the hearing of the case for the purpose
of reception of additional evidence before its Legal Officer-Investigator.
Meanwhile, on September 7, 1979, the Court, speaking through Justice Felix Antonio,
severely REPRIMANDED respondent Dionisio Ramos, with warning that a repetition of the same
overt act may warrant his suspension or disbarment from the practice of law.4 The reprimand
was administered because respondent used the name “Pedro D.D. Ramos” in connection with
Criminal Case No. 35906. He averred that he had a right to do so because in his Birth Certificate
his name is “Pedro Dionisio Ramos,” and his parents are Pedro Ramos and Carmen Dayaw, and
that the “D.D." in “Pedro D.D. Ramos” is but an abbreviation of “Dionisio Dayaw” his other given
name and maternal surname. The Court opined that “respondent in effect resorted to deception.
He demonstrated lack of candor in dealing with the courts.”
At the hearing of October 23, 1979, Solicitor Celia Reyes appeared submitting the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXI, in Criminal Case No. 15528,
acquitting respondent of the charges of bigamy on grounds of insufficiency of evidence, for
having contracted the second marriage with the complainant.
On January 15, 1980, the Legal Officer-Investigator submitted his report concurring in
the findings of the Solicitor General, although he recommended a penalty of a minimum five-
year suspension from the practice of law, with prospect for the imposition of a total disbarment
from the practice of law, as the Court finds fit and appropriate.5
On February 27, 1981, counsel for complainant filed its motion to expedite disposition
of the case, further alleging that respondent Ramos is still using the name of Pedro Dionisio
Ramos and P.D.D. Ramos in two pleadings filed before the Court of First Instance of Manila,
disregarding the Resolution of this Court dated September 7, 1979.6 Commenting, respondent
admitted the allegations of complainant’s counsel but alleged that he signed the pleadings
inadvertently because of poor eyesight.
The facts, as found by the Solicitor General who investigated the case, and the Legal
Officer-Investigator before whom the additional evidence was presented, are as follows:
Respondent was admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1964. He was legally married to and living
with Editha Encarnado, the marriage with her having been celebrated on September 4, 1963.
Both complainant and respondent were officemates in the Office of Councilor Lito Puyat, City
Legal Ethics Session 3
Hall, Manila since 1967. With the convenience thus offered, respondent, representing himself to
be “single,” began courting complainant, proposed civil marriage to her to be later followed with
a church celebration after which they will live together as husband and wife. From January 1968
to February 1971, they had carnal knowledge of each other in various hotels in Manila,
particularly the Golden Gate Motel and Salem Motel. Sometime in June 1970, complainant
informed respondent that she was pregnant. Whereupon, both agreed to get a quick marriage.
Accordingly, complainant and respondent filed their respective applications for a marriage
license (Exhs. “H", “H-1" and “H2") and based thereon, they obtained a marriage license issued
on June 16, 1970 (Exh. “D") and celebrated their marriage before Minister Isidro L. Dizon on
June 18, 1970 (Exh. “B"). After the marriage, complainant and respondent agreed to have a
church marriage before they live together as husband and wife, although they continued to have
sexual trysts. Respondent was invited by complainant to meet the latter’s mother to whom
respondent expressed his desire to marry complainant, and to vvhich proposal complainant’s
mother agreed, provided respondent bring his parents with him to ask for complainant’s hand.
Several weeks had passed and respondent failed to bring his parents to complainant’s home.
Complainant and her mother became suspicious. They made inquiries about the personal status
of respondent and they ultimately discovered that respondent was already married to one Editha
Encarnado (Exhs. “C" and “E"). After discovering that respondent was a married man,
complainant resigned from her job as receptionist from the office of Councilor Lito Puyat. She
stopped having intimate relationship with respondent and because of the humiliation and
embarassment she suffered before her friends and officemates, she filed the present disbarment
case.
Upon the other hand, respondent tried to prove, through his affidavit subscribed
before Asst. City Fiscal Primitivo Peñaranda of Manila, that he never misrepresented himself to
be “single” and that complainant knew at the outset of his married status; that it was purely
complainant’s wish to carry on a love affair with him as described in his affidavit; that he was
threatened and forced to sign blank marriage contract forms and applications for marriage
license by the brothers of the complainant who are allegedly notorious police characters; that
his signature in the marriage contract (Exh. B) was forged and falsified; that the marriage
contract was only celebrated as a cover-up of the pregnancy of the complainant; and that the
disbarment proceedings were initiated by complainant because he refused to elope with
complainant and abandon his wife Editha Encarnado, and he stopped giving her money and
avoided seeing her again.
Upon a review of the record, We are convinced that respondent Dionisio Ramos is
guilty of grossly immoral conduct which warrants proper action from this Court. His own
declarations in his affidavit corroborate this imputation of immorality. Thus, in his affidavit
subscribed before Asst. Fiscal Primitivo Peñaranda of Manila on Feb. 22, 1967, respondent
frankly admitted having carnal relations with complainant for several times. What is more,
respondent claimed that he was threatened and forced by complainant’s brothers to celebrate
the marriage dated June 18, 1980, but in the same breath, he admitted having carnal affair with
complainant after the celebration of the marriage. Worse still, respondent misrepresented his
civil status as “single”, courted complainant, proposed marriage to her—knowing his legal
impediments to marry complainant, respondent’s motives were clearly and grossly immoral—
won her confidence and married her while his first marriage to his present wife still validly
subsists.
In Villasanta vs. Peralta,7 where respondent was disbarred because he made love with
complainant, procured the preparation of a false marriage contract and arranged a false
wedding with complainant while his first wife was still alive and their marriage still valid and
existing, this Court held: “the act of respondent of contracting the second marriage (even his act
in making love to another woman while his first wife is still alive and their marriage still valid and
existing) is contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality. Respondent made a mockery of
marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity.”
24
It is of importance that members of the ancient and learned profession of law must
conform with the highest standards of morality. As stated in paragraph 29 of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics: ‘The lawyer should aid in guarding the Bar against the admission to the
profession of candidates unfit or unqualified because deficient in either moral character or
education. He should strive at all times to uphold the honor and to maintain the dignity of the
profession and to improve not only the law but also the administration of justice."8
Respondent, however, submits that having been acquitted by the Court of First
Instance of Manila, Branch XXI, of the charge of bigamy, the immorality charges filed against
him in this disbarment case should be dismissed. The acquittal of respondent Ramos upon the
criminal charge is not a bar to these proceedings. The standards of legal profession are not
satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of the criminal law.
Moreover, this Court in disbarment proceedings is acting in an entirely different capacity from
that which courts assume in trying criminal cases.9
This Court has already severely reprimanded respondent from using a name other
than the authorized name in the “Roll of Attorneys” and was warned that a repetition of the
same overt act may warrant his suspension or disbarment from office in the future.
Notwithstanding such reprimand and warning, however, respondent repeated the same overt
act of using an unauthorized name in two pleadings filed before the Court of First Instance of
Manila. His explanation that he had done so inadvertently because of poor eyesight appears
unsatisfactory. He should have employed more caution and prudence in filing pleadings before
courts considering the fact that he had already been warned and reprimanded by this Court.
Respondent’s conduct, thus, suggests lack of candor and respect in his dealing with this Court.
He has violated his oath of office of assuming the duty of good faith and honorable dealings
with the court of being respectful to it and being obedient to its rules and lawful orders.
In the light of the foregoing, the Court finds that respondent committed a grossly
immoral act, as found both by the Solicitor General and this Court’s Legal Officer-Investigator,
and as recommended by the Solicitor General, respondent is hereby suspended from the
practice of law for a period of three (3) years, for gross immorality, and an additional one (1)
year for his willful disregard of a lawful order against his using an unauthorized name, in serious
disrespect of this Court.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo (Chairman), Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., and Guerrero,* JJ., concur.
Abad Santos, J., is on leave.
Respondent suspended from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years, for gross
immorality, and an additional one (1) year for using an unauthorized name.
Notes.—It is the duty of a legal counsel to do his work with thoroughness. (Tan Kui vs. Court of
Appeals, 54 SCRA 199).
Failure of counsel de oficio to file the appellant’s brief on time is a mark of neglect. (People vs.
Villar, Jr., 46 SCRA 107).
A lawyer may not be allowed to retire from the practice of law while facing contempt charges.
(Montecillo vs. Gica, 60 SCRA 234),
The suspension of a lawyer is not intended primarily as a punishment, but as a measure of
protection of the public and the profession. (Magat vs. Santiago, 97 SCRA 1).
Legal Ethics Session 3 25

Notices sent to an attorney who entered a formal appearance without proper substitution are
not valid. (Ibasan vs. Republic, 97 SCRA 100).

Lawyers should exercise great care and circumspection in the preparation of their pleadings and
to refrain from using abrasive and offensive language. (Yangson vs. Salandanan, 68 SCRA 42).

Undue interest of respondent lawyer in prosecuting a paternity suit against complainant, in

refusing to return the original of an affidavit executed by complainant acknowledging paternity
of a child, and instigating the filing of an administrative charge against complainant are
actuations calling for disciplinary action against respondent lawyer; Penalty for lawyer for
misconduct is suspension from the practice of law for 6 months. (Ala vs. Atencia, 84 SCRA 599.)

Case is considered closed and dropped upon manifestation of respondent attorney. That he
already married the petitioner who filed disbarment complaint for alleged failure of respondent
to marry her after she surrendered her virginity to him. (Banzuela vs. Tabiliran, Jr., 79 SCRA
508.)

Intimacy between a man and woman who are not married is neither so corrupt as to constitute
a criminal act nor so unprincipled as to warrant disbarment or disciplinary action against the
man as a member of the bar. (Reyes vs. Wong, 63 SCRA 667.)

Immoral conduct of the respondent must be established by clear and convincing proof,
disclosing a case that is free from doubt as to compel the exercise by the court of its disciplinary
action. (Reyes vs. Wong, 63 SCRA 667.)

——o0o——
Legal Ethics Session 3
Adm. Case No. L-363. July 31, 1962.
IN RE: DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ATTY. DIOSDADO Q.
GUTIERREZ,respondent.
Attorneys-at-law; Disbarment; Conviction of crime involving moral turpitude. —Under
Section 5, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, a member of the bar may be removed or suspended
from his office as attorney by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude.
Murder is such a crime.
Same; Same; Same; "Moral turpitude" construed.—The term "moral turpitude" includes
every thing which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. (In re Base, 41
Phil. 275). As used in disbarment statutes, it means an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in
the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellowmen or to society in general,
contrary to the accepted rule of right and duty between man and man. (State ex rel. Conklin
vs.Buckingham, 34 P. 2nd 49; 5 Am. Jur. Sec. 279, pp. 428-429.)
Same; Same; Same; Effect of Pardon.—The rule that pardon operates to wipe out the
conviction and is a bar to any proceeding for the disbarment of the attorney after the pardon
has been granted applies only where the pardon is absolute, but net when, as in this case the
pardon granted is conditional and merely remitted the unexecuted portion of the penalty. In
such a case, the attorney must be judged upon the fact of his conviction for the crime he has
committed.
Same; Requisite for the Practice of Law.—The practice of law is a privilege accorded only
to those who measure up to certain rigid standards of mental and moral fitness. For the
admission of a candidate to the bar the Rules of Court not only prescribe a test of academic
preparation but require satisfactory testimonials of good moral character. These standards are
neither dispensed with nor lowered after admission; the lawyer must continue to adhere to them
or else incur the risk of suspension or removal.
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING in the Supreme Court. Disbarment.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
26
     Victoriano A. Savellano for complainant.
     Nestor M. Andrada for respondent.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
Respondent Diosdado Q. Gutierrez is a member of the Philippine Bar, admitted to it on October
5, 1945. In criminal case No. R-793 of the Court of First Instance of Oriental Mindoro he was
convicted of the murder of Filemon Samaco, former municipal mayor of Calapan, and together
with his co-conspirators was sentenced to the penalty of death. Upon review by this Court the
judgment of conviction was affirmed on June 30, 1956 (G.R. No. L-7101), but the penalty was
changed to reclusion perpetua. After serving a portion of the sentence respondent was granted
a conditional pardon by the President on August 19, 1958. The unexecuted portion of the prison
term was remitted "on condition that he shall not again violate any of the penal laws of the
Philippines."
On October 9, 1958 the widow of the deceased Filemon Samaco, victim in the murder case,
filed a verified complaint before this Court praying that respondent be removed from the roll of
lawyers pursuant to Rule 127, section 5. Respondent presented his answer in due time,
admitting the facts alleged by complainant regarding his previous conviction but pleading the
conditional pardon in defense, on the authority of the decision of this Court in the case of  In re
Lontok, 43 Phil. 293.
Under section 5 of Rule 127, a member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme Court by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude. Murder is, without doubt, such a crime. The term "moral turpitude" includes
everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. In re Carlos S.
Basa, 41 Phil. 275. As used in disbarment statutes, it means an act of baseness, vileness, or
depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellowmen or to society in
general, contrary to the accepted rule of right and duty between man and man. State ex rel.
Conklin v. Buckingham, 84 P. 2nd 49; 5 Am. Jur. Sec. 279, pp. 428-429.
The only question to be resolved is whether or not the conditional pardon extended to
respondent places him beyond the scope of the rule on disbarment aforecited. Reliance is placed
by him squarely on the Lontok case. The respondent therein was convicted of bigamy and
thereafter pardoned by the Governor-General. In a subsequent proceeding for his disbarment on
the ground of such conviction, this Court decided in his favor and held: "When proceedings to
strike an attorney's name from the rolls are founded on, and depend alone, on a statute making
the fact of a conviction for a felony ground for disbarment, it has been held that a pardon
operates to wipe out the conviction and is a bar to any proceeding for the disbarment of the
attorney after the pardon has been granted."
It is our view that the ruling does not govern the question now before us. In making it the
Court proceeded on the assumption that the pardon granted to respondent Lontok was
absolute. This is implicit in the ratio decidendi of the case, particularly in the citations to support
it, namely. In Re Emmons, 29 Cal. App. 121; Scott vs. State, 6 Tex. Civ. App. 343; and Ex parte
Garland, 4 Wall, 380. Thus in Scott vs. State the court said:
"We are of opinion that after he received an unconditional pardon the record of the felony
conviction could no longer be used as a basis for the proceeding provided for in article 226. This
record, when offered in evidence, was met with an unconditional pardon, and could not,
therefore, properly be said to afford "proof of a conviction of any felony." Having been thus
cancelled, all its force as a felony conviction was taken away. A pardon falling short of this
would not be a pardon, according to the judicial construction which that act of executive grace
was received. Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 344; Knote v. U.S., 95 U.S. 149, and cases there
cited; Young v. Young, 61 Tex. 191."
Legal Ethics Session 3 27

And the portion of the decision in Ex parte Garland quoted with approval in the Lontok case is as
follows:

"A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offender;
and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out the existence of guilt, so
that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offense.
If granted before conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and disabilities, consequent upon
conviction, from attaching; if granted after conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities,
and restores him to all his civil rights; it makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new
credit and capacity."

The pardon granted to respondent here is not absolute but conditional, and merely remitted the
unexecuted portion of his term. It does not reach the offense itself, unlike that in Ex parte
Garland, which was "a full pardon and amnesty for all offenses by him committed in connection
with the rebellion (civil war) against the government of the United States."

The foregoing considerations rendered In re Lontok are inapplicable here. Respondent

Gutierrez must be judged upon the fact of his conviction for murder without regard to the
pardon he invokes in defense. The crime was qualified by treachery and aggravated by its
having been committed in band, by taking advantage of his official position (respondent being
municipal mayor at the time) and with the use of a motor vehicle. People vs. Diosdado
Gutierrez,supra. The degree of moral turpitude involved is such as to justify his being purged
from the profession.

The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who measure up to certain rigid
standards of mental and moral fitness. For the admission of a candidate to the bar the Rules of
Court not only prescribe a test of academic preparation but require satisfactory testimonials of
good moral character. These standards are neither dispensed with nor lowered after admission:
the lawyer must continue to adhere to them or else incur the risk of suspension or removal. As
stated in Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 263, 27 Law ed., 552, 556: "Of all classes and professions, the
lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their sworn servant; and for him, of all
men in the world, to repudiate and override the laws, to trample them under foot and to ignore
the very bonds of society, argues recreancy to his position and office and sets a pernicious
example to the insubordinate and dangerous elements of the body politic."

WHEREFORE, pursuant to Rule 127, Section 5, and considering the nature of the crime for
which respondent Diosdado Q. Gutierrez has been convicted, he is ordered disbarred and his
name stricken from the roll of lawyers.
     Bengzon, C.J., Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and Regala, JJ., concur.
     Padilla, J., took no part.
Respondent disbarred.

Note.—To the same effect is In re Avanceña, Adm. Case No. 407, Aug. 15, 1967, 20 SCRA
1012.
Legal Ethics Session 3
Adm. Case No. 944. July 25, 1974.*
FLORA NARIDO, complainant, vs. ATTORNEY JAIME S. LINSANGAN, respondent.
Attorneys; Complaint for violation of attorney’s oath by submitting a perjured statement;
When complaint deemed without merit; Case at bar.— It was found as a fact that there was
nothing improper in presenting such affidavit, its alleged falsity not being proven. Even if it were
otherwise, still there was no showing of respondent having violated his attorney’s oath for
submitting a perjured affidavit. With respect to the other allegations in the complaint, suffice it
to say that there is no evidence showing the attorney’s awareness of the falsity thereof,
assuming arguendo that they are indeed false. As testified by the attorney, he has no intention
whatsoever of misleading any court or judicial body, or of violating his attorney’s oath.
Same; Complaint for instigating the client to file an administrative case against another
attorney; When complaint deemed without merit; Case at bar. —It seems unkind to allude evil
motive to the attorney. It is perhaps more apt to state that his missionary zeal to fight for the
rights of his clients triggered him into filing the administrative case. He should be admired for
his dedication in championing the cause of the poor. His client is a destitute woman. She needed
every centavo of the award. To her, any delay in the payment thereof meant grave injustice; it
meant deprivation and starvation. Faced with the dilemma of his client, the attorney had to rise
to the challenge. In view of this, it is more in keeping with Christian precept to say that it must
have been the plight of his client—rather than his alleged financial interest—that compelled him
to advise his client to file the case against the other attorney.
Same; Mutual bickering and recrimination between attorneys should be avoided; Reason.
—Mutual bickerings and unjustifiable recriminations, between brother attorneys detract from the
dignity of the legal profession and will not receive any sympathy from this court.
ADMINISTRATIVE CASES in the Supreme Court.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
RESOLUTION
FERNANDO, J.:
The spectacle presented by two members of the bar engaged in bickering and recrimination is
far from edifying, although it is understandable, if not justifiable, that at times zeal in the
defense of one’s client may be carried to the point of undue skepticism and doubt as to the
motives of opposing counsel. Some such reflection is induced by these two administrative cases
wherein respondents Jaime S. Linsangan and Rufino B. Risma, who represented adverse parties
in a workmen’s compensation case, did mutually hurl accusation at each other. The charge
against respondent Linsangan filed by a certain Flora Narido is that he violated the attorney’s
oath by submitting a perjured statement. When required to answer, not only did he deny the
complaint but he would also hold respondent Risma accountable for having instigated his client,
the complainant, Flora Narido, to file a false and malicious complaint resulting in what
respondent Linsangan called “embarrassment, humiliation and defamation” of a brother in a
profession.
On September 9, 1971, this Court referred the above .administrative cases to the Solicitor
General for investigation, report and recommendation. Such report and recommendation was
submitted on May 31 of this year.
1.Insofar as the first case against respondent Jaime S. Linsangan is concerned, the report
contains the following: “In support of her complaint filed with this Honorable Court,
28
complainant Narido heavily relies on the refusal of respondent Linsangan to withdraw—
despite warning—the affidavit of Milagros M. Vergel de Dios * * *, which affidavit Narido
claims to be perjured. * * * Mrs. Narido and Atty. Risma threatened Atty. Linsangan with
disbarment should he insist in offering the affidavit of Mrs. Vergel de Dios." 1 Nonetheless,
such affidavit was filed. It was found as a fact that there was nothing improper in
presenting such affidavit, its alleged falsity not being proven. Even if it were otherwise,
still there was no showing of respondent having violated his attorney’s oath for
submitting a perjured affidavit. Thus the report continues: “With respect to the other
allegations in the affidavit, suffice it to say that there is no evidence showing Atty.
Linsangan’s awareness of the falsity thereof, assuming arguendo that they are indeed
false. As testified by Atty. Linsangan he has no intention whatsoever of misleading any
court or judicial body, or of violating his attorney’s oath."2
2.As for the charge against Attorney Risma, the report stated the following: “This
administrative complaint stemmed from the belief of Atty. Linsangan that Atty. Risma ‘by
virtue of his financial interest in the Award,’ instigated the filing of Administrative Case
No. 944 ‘in order to accomplish a short cut in winning a case even by intimidation or
unfounded threats, by depriving a party of due process and at the expense,
embarrassment, humiliation, and defamation of his undersigned brother-respondent/ * *
* It seems unkind to allude evil motive to Atty. Risma. It is perhaps more apt to state
that Atty. Risma’s missionary zeal to fight for the rights of his clients triggered him into
filing Administrative Case No. 944. We should admire Atty. Risma’s dedication in
championing the cause of the poor. Mrs. Narido, his client, is a destitute woman. She
needed every centavo of the award. To her, any delay in the payment thereof meant
grave injustice; it meant deprivation and starvation. Faced with the dilemma of his client,
Atty. Risma had to rise to the challenge. In view of this, it is more in keeping with
Christian precepts to say that it must have been the plight of Mrs. Narido—rather than his
alleged financial interest—that compelled Atty. Risma to advise his client to file the case
against Atty. Linsangan. * * * There being no direct evidence to show the alleged bad
faith of Atty. Risma in advising his client to file Administrative Case No. 944 against Atty.
Linsangan, the benefit of the doubt should be resolved in favor of Atty. Risma.
Consequently, the charge of instigating the filing of ‘disbarment proceedings against a
brother attorney with improper motives and without just ground’ necessarily fails." 3
3.From the above, it was the recommendation that on such charges, both respondents
should be exculpated. It being shown in the investigation, however, although it was not
one of the charges in the counter-complaint filed against him that respondent Risma
would seek to collect fifteen per cent of the recovery obtained by his client, contrary to
the explicit provision in the Workmen’s Compensation Act allowing only a maximum of ten
per cent and that only where the case is appealed, there was likewise a recommendation
for admonition or reprimand. The aptness of such a penalty was predicated on the fact
that respondent Risma had not received a single centavo from the client. Moreover, it
was clear such contract for attorney’s fees would not be enforced. In the meanwhile, he
had been serving his poverty-stricken client faithfully and well, even advancing some of
the necessary expenses. What was recommended commends itself for acceptance.
4.This further observation is not amiss. The two respondents would be well-advised to
heed these words from Justice Laurel, announced in Javier v. Cornejo:4 “It should be
observed, in this connection, that mutual bickerings and unjustifiable recriminations,
between brother attorneys detract from the dignity of the legal profession and will not
receive any sympathy from this court."5
5.One last word. The report submitted by the Solicitor General is characterized by
thoroughness and diligence, but its quality would have been improved had there been on
Legal Ethics Session 3 29

the part of the Solicitor concerned a more adequate grasp of notable opinions of this
Court on legal ethics from Justice Malcolm on, thus obviating the need for reliance on
secondary authorities, both Philippine and American.

WHEREFORE, the complaint in Administrative Case No. 944 against respondent Jaime S,
Linsangan is dismissed for lack of merit. Respondent Rufino B. Risma in Administrative Case No.
1025 is exculpated from the charge of having instigated the filing of an unfounded suit. He is,
however, admonished to exercise greater care in ascertaining how much under our law he could
recover by way of attorney’s fees. The contract entered into between him and his client as to his
being entitled to fifteen per cent of the award granted her in a workmen’s compensation suit is
declared to be of no force and effect, the penalty imposed being that of admonition merely only
because he had made no effort to collect on the same and had even advanced expenses for a
poor client. Let a copy of this resolution be spread on the records of both respondents.
     Makalintal,
C.J., Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, Fernandez, Muñoz
Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur.
Complaint (Adm. Case No. 944) dismissed; respondent (Adm. Case No. 1025) admonished.

Notes.—(a) Administrative complaints.—The courts have summary jurisdiction to protect

the rights of the parties and the public from any conduct of the attorneys prejudicial to the
administration of justice (Hilado vs. David, L-961, September 21, 1949). After an administrative
complaint has been filed against an attorney, seeking disciplinary action or disbarment, it cannot
be dismissed at the will of the complainant, nor is it necessarily a defense that complainant is in
pari delicto (Mortel vs. Aspiras(Adm. Case No. 145, December 28, 1956). Any person may bring
to the Supreme Court’s attention the misconduct of any lawyer, and action will usually be taken
regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant, if the facts proven so warrant
(Katalbas vs. Tupas, Adm. Case No. 328, April 30, 1959).

(b) Proceedings against lawyer confidential.—All proceedings on the suspension and

disbarment of lawyers and all proceedings on the suspension or removal of judges of first
instance shall be considered confidential until the final disposition of the matter (Murillo vs.
Superable, Adm. Case No. 341, March 23, 1960). The rule making all proceedings against
attorneys and judges confidential also protects the press, for even a verbatim copy of the
complaint against an attorney in a newspaper might be actionable (Murillo vs. Superable, ibid.).
Legal Ethics Session 3 30

Adm. Case No. 219. September 29, 1962.

In answer, respondent Atty. Patalinghug stated that when he entered his appearance on
CASIANO U. LAPUT, petitioner, vs. ATTY.FRANCISCO E.F. REMOTIGUE and
January 11, 1955 the administratrix Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera had already lost confidence in
ATTY.FORTUNATO R. PATALINGHUG, respondents.
her lawyer, the herein petitioner, and had in fact already with her a pleading dated January 11,
1955, entitled “Discharge of Counsel for the Administration and Motion to Cite Atty. Casiano
Attorney and client; Administrative charges for unethical conduct; Appearance as counsel
Laput”, which she herself had filed with the court.
after client has dismissed former counsel not improper. —A lawyer was dismissed by his client
because the latter no longer trusted him, In his stead the client contracted the services of
In answer, respondent Atty. Remotigue stated that when he filed his appearance on
another lawyer, who, to safeguard the interest of his client, prepared the papers for the
February 7, 1955, the petitioner has already withdrawn as counsel.
revocation of the power of attorney previously executed in favor of the first lawyer. After the
After separate answers were filed by the respondents, the Supreme Court referred the case to
second lawyer had filed his appearance in court, the first lawyer voluntarily withdrew as counsel
the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. The Solicitor General
and, simultaneously, filed a motion for the payment of his attorney’s fees. Held: The appearance
recommended the complete exoneration of respondents.
of the second lawyer is not unprofessional, unethical or improper; the first lawyer’s voluntary
withdrawal as counsel and his filing of a motion for the payment of his fees amounted to an
It appears and it was found by the Solicitor General that before respondent Atty. Fortunato
acquiescence to the appearance of the second lawyer.
Patalinghug entered his appearance, the widow administratrix had already filed with the court a
pleading discharging the petitioner, Atty. Casiano Laput. If she did not furnish Atty. Laput with a
ORIGINAL COMPLAINT charging respondents with unprofessional and unethical conduct. copy of the said pleading, it was not the fault of Atty. Patalinghug but that of the said widow. It
appears that the reason why Mrs. Barrera dismissed petitioner as her lawyer was that she did
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. not trust him any longer, for one time she found out that some dividend checks which should
have been sent to her were sent instead to petitioner, making her feel that she was being
LABRADOR, J.: cheated by petitioner. Moreover, she found that withdrawals from the Philippine National Bank
and Bank of the Philippine Islands have been made by petitioner without her prior authority.
This is an original complaint filed with this Court charging respondents with unprofessional and
We see no irregularity in the appearance of respondent Atty. Fortunato Patalinghug as
unethical conduct in soliciting cases and intriguing against a brother lawyer, and praying that
counsel for the widow; much less can we consider it as an actual grabbing of a case from
respondents be dealt with accordingly.
petitioner. The evidence as found by the Solicitor General shows that Atty. Patalinghug’s
professional services were contracted by the widow, a written contract having been made as to
The facts which led to the filing of this complaint are as follow: In May, 1952, petitioner was
the amount to be given him for his professional services.
retained by Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera to handle her case (Sp. Proc. No. 2-J) in the Court of
First Instance of Cebu, entitled “Testate Estate of Macario Barrera”. By January, 1955, petitioner
Petitioner’s voluntary withdrawal on February 5, 1955, as counsel for Mrs. Barrera after
had contemplated the closing of the said administration proceedings and prepared two
Atty. Patalinghug had entered his appearance, and his (petitioner’s) filing almost simultaneously
pleadings: one, to close the proceedings and declare Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera as universal
of a motion for the payment of his attorney’s fees, amounted to an acquiescence to the
heir and order the delivery to her of the residue of the estate and, second, a notice for the
appearance of respondent Atty. Patalinghug as counsel for the widow. This should estop
rendition of final accounting and partition of estate. At this point, however, the administratrix
petitioner from now complaining that the appearance of Atty. Patalinghug was unprofessional.
Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera refused to countersign these two pleadings and instead advised
petitioner not to file them. Some weeks later, petitioner found in the records of said proceedings
Much less could we hold respondent Atty. Remotigue guilty of unprofessional conduct inasmuch
that respondent Atty. Fortunato Patalinghug had filed on January 11, 1955 a written appearance
as he entered his appearance, dated February 5, 1955, only on February 7, same year, after
as the new counsel for Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera. On February 5, 1955 petitioner voluntarily
Mrs. Barrera had dispensed with petitioner’s professional services on January 11, 1955, and
asked the court to be relieved as counsel for Mrs. Barrera. On February 7, 1955, the other
after petitioner had voluntarily withdrawn his appearance on February 5, 1955.
respondent, Atty. Francisco E. F. Remotigue, entered his appearance, dated February 5, 1955.
With respect to the preparation by Atty. Patalinghug of the revocations of power of attorney
Complainant here alleges that the appearances of respondents were unethical and improper
as complained of by petitioner, the Solicitor General found that the same does not appear to be
for the reason that they had nursed the desire to replace the petitioner as attorney for the
prompted by malice or intended to hurt petitioner’s feelings, but purely to safeguard the interest
estate and the administratrix and, taking advantage of her goodwill, intrigued against the
of the administratrix. Evidently, petitioner’s pride was hurt by the issuance of these documents,
preparation of the final inventory and accounting and prodded Mrs. Barrera not to consent to
and felt that he had been pictured as a dishonest lawyer; for he filed a case before the City
petitioner’s decision to close the administration proceedings; that before their appearance, they
Fiscal of Cebu against Atty. Patalinghug and the widow for libel and falsification. It was shown,
brought petitioner’s client to their law office and there made her sign four documents captioned
however, that the case was dismissed.
“Revocation of Power of Attorney” and sent the same by mail to several corporations and
establishments where the estate of Macario Barrera is owner of certificates of stocks and which
No sufficient evidence having been submitted to sustain the charges, these are hereby
documents purported to disauthorize the petitioner from further collecting and receiving the
dismissed and the case closed.
dividends of the estate from said corporations, when in fact and in truth the respondents fully
     Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista
knew that no power of attorney or authority was given to the petitioner by his client, the
Angelo, Concepcion, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ.,concur.
respondents (motive being to embarrass petitioner to the officials, lawyers and employees of
Case dismissed.
said corporations, picturing him as a dishonest lawyer and no longer trusted by his client—all
with the purpose of straining the relationship of the petitioner and his client, Nieves Rillas Vda.
de Barrera; and that Atty. Patalinghug entered his appearance without notice to petitioner.
Legal Ethics Session 3 31

Notes.—It is the duty of an attorney not only to abstain from all offensive personality and
to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required
by the justice of the cause with which he is charged (Rule 138, Sec. 20 [f], Rules of Court), but
also to observe and maintain the respect due to the court of justice and judicial officers (Rule
138, Sec. 20 [b], Rules of Court).

Malpractice is one of the grounds for removal or suspension of a member of the bar. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice (Rule 138, Sec. 27, Rules of Court).
Legal Ethics Session 3 32

published some objectionable features or articles in the paper. The 3-member Student
A.C. No. 4807. March 22, 2000.*
Disciplinary Tribunal was immediately convened, and after a series of hearings, it found the
MANUEL N. CAMACHO, complainant, vs. ATTYS. LUIS MEINRADO C. PANGULAYAN,
students guilty of the use of indecent language and unauthorized use of the student publication
REGINA D. BALMORES, CATHERINE V. LAUREL and HUBERT JOAQUIN P. BUSTOS of
funds. The body recommended the penalty of expulsion against the erring students.
PANGULAYAN AND ASSOCIATES LAW OFFICES, respondents.
The denial of the appeal made by the students to Dr. Amable R. Aguiluz V, AMACC
Administrative Law; Attorneys; Respondent fell short of the demands required of him as a
President, gave rise to the commencement of Civil Case No. Q-97-30549 on 14th March 1997
lawyer and as a member of the Bar.—Although aware that the students were represented by
before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, of Quezon City. While the civil case was still pending,
counsel, respondent attorney proceeded, nonetheless, to negotiate with them and their parents
letters of apology and Re-Admission Agreements were separately executed by and/or in behalf
without at the very least communicating the matter to their lawyer, herein complainant, who
of some of the expelled students, to wit: Letter of Apology, dated 27 May 1997, of Neil Jason
was counsel of record in Civil Case No. Q-97-30549. This failure of respondent, whether by
Salcedo, assisted by his mother, and Re-Admission Agreement of 22 June 1997 with the AMACC
design or because of oversight, is an inexcusable violation of the canons of professional ethics
President; letter of apology, dated 31 March 1997, of Mrs. Veronica B. De Leon for her daughter
and in utter disregard of a duty owing to a colleague. Respondent fell short of the demands
Melyda B. De Leon and Re-Admission Agreement of 09 May 1997 with the AMACC President;
required of him as a lawyer and as a member of the Bar.
letter of apology, dated 22 May 1997, of Leila Joven, assisted by her mother, and Re-Admission
Agreement of 22 May 1997 with the AMACC President; letter of apology, dated 22 September
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Violation of the Code of Professional Ethics. 1997, of Cleo Villareiz and Re-Admission Agreement of 10 October 1997 with the AMACC
President; and letter of apology, dated 20 January 1997, of Michael Ejercito, assisted by his
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. parents, and Re-Admission Agreement of 23 January 1997 with the AMACC President.

Following the execution of the letters of apology and Re-Admission Agreements, a Manifestation,
VITUG, J.: dated 06 June 1997, was filed with the trial court where the civil case was pending by Attorney
Regina D. Balmores of the Pangulayan and Associates Law Offices for defendant AMACC. A copy
of the manifestation was furnished complainant. In his Resolution, dated 14 June 1997, Judge
Respondent lawyers stand indicted for a violation of the Code of Professional Ethics, specifically
Lopez of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court thereupon dismissed Civil Case No. Q-97-30549.
Canon 9 thereof, viz.:
On 19 June 1999, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (“IBP”)
“A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subject of controversy with a party
passed Resolution No. XIII-99-163, thus:
represented by counsel, much less should he undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter
with him, but should only deal with his counsel. It is incumbent upon the lawyer most
“RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
particularly to avoid everything that may tend to mislead a party not represented by counsel and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made
he should not undertake to advise him as to law.”
part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex ‘A,’ and, finding the recommendation fully supported
by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, with an amendment Atty. Meinrado
Atty. Manuel N. Camacho filed a complaint against the lawyers comprising the Pangulayan and
Pangulayan is suspended from the practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS for being remiss in his
Associates Law Offices, namely, Attorneys Luis Meinrado C. Pangulayan, Regina D. Balmores,
duty and DISMISSAL of the case against the other Respondents for they did not take part in the
Catherine V. Laurel, and Herbert Joaquin P. Bustos. Complainant, the hired counsel of some
negotiation of the case.”
expelled students from the AMA Computer College (“AMACC”), in an action for the Issuance of a
Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and for Damages, docketed Civil Case No. Q-97-
It would appear that when the individual letters of apology and Re-Admission Agreements were
30549 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, of Quezon City, charged that respondents, then
formalized, complainant was by then already the retained counsel for plaintiff students in the
counsel for the defendants, procured and effected on separate occasions, without his
civil case. Respondent Pangulayan had full knowledge of this fact. Although aware that the
knowledge, compromise agreements (“Re-Admission Agreements”) with four of his clients in the
students were represented by counsel, respondent attorney proceeded, nonetheless, to
aforementioned civil case which, in effect, required them to waive all kinds of claims they might
negotiate with them and their parents without at the very least communicating the matter to
have had against AMACC, the principal defendant, and to terminate all civil, criminal and
their lawyer, herein complainant, who was counsel of record in Civil Case No. Q-97-30549. This
administrative proceedings filed against it. Complainant averred that such an act of respondents
failure of respondent, whether by design or because of oversight, is an inexcusable violation of
was unbecoming of any member of the legal profession warranting either disbarment or
the canons of professional ethics and in utter disregard of a duty owing to a colleague.
suspension from the practice of law.
Respondent fell short of the demands required of him as a lawyer and as a member of the Bar.
In his comment, Attorney Pangulayan acknowledged that not one of his co-respondents had
The allegation that the context of the Re-Admission Agreements centers only on the
taken part in the negotiation, discussion, formulation, or execution of the various ReAdmission
administrative aspect of the controversy is belied by the Manifestation 1 which, among other
Agreements complained of and were, in fact, no longer connected at the time with the
things, explicitly contained the following stipulation; viz.:
Pangulayan and Associates Law Offices. The Re-Admission Agreements, he claimed, had nothing
to do with the dismissal of Civil Case Q-97-30549 and were executed for the sole purpose of
“1. Among the nine (9) signatories to the complaint, four (4) of whom assisted by their
effecting the settlement of an administrative case involving nine students of AMACC who were
parents/guardian already executed a Re-Admission Agreement with AMACC President, AMABLE
expelled therefrom upon the recommendation of the Student Disciplinary Tribunal. The students,
R. AGUILUZ V acknowledging guilt for violating the AMA COMPUTER COLLEGE MANUAL FOR
namely, Ian Dexter Marquez, Almira O. Basalo, Neil Jason R. Salcedo, Melissa F. Domondon,
DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS and agreed among others to terminate all civil, criminal and
Melyda B. De Leon, Leila D. Joven, Signorelli A. Santiago, Michael Ejercito, and Cleo B. Villareiz,
were all members of the Editorial Board of DATALINE, who apparently had caused to be
Legal Ethics Session 3 33

administrative proceedings which they may have against the AMACC arising from their previous
dismissal.
“x x x      x x x      x x x

“3. Consequently, as soon as possible, an Urgent Motion to Withdraw from Civil Case No. Q-
97-30549 will be filed them.”

The Court can only thus concur with the IBP Investigating Commission and the IBP Board of
Governors in their findings; nevertheless, the recommended six-month suspension would appear
to be somewhat too harsh a penalty given the circumstances and the explanation of respondent.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Luis Meinrado C. Pangulayan is ordered SUSPENDED from

the practice of law for a period of THREE (3) MONTHS effective immediately upon his receipt of
this decision. The case against the other respondents is DISMISSED for insufficiency of
evidence.

Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal record of respondent as an attorney
and as a member of the Bar, and furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
    
 Melo, (Chairman), Panganiban, Purisima and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Respondent Atty. Meinrado C. Pangulayan suspended from practice of law for three (3) months.
Case against other respondents dismissed.

Note.—Every lawyer should at ALL TIMES weigh his actions according to the sworn
promises he makes when taking the lawyer’s oath. (In Re: Al Argosino, 270 SCRA 26[1997])
Legal Ethics Session 3
Adm. Case No. 1261. December 29, 1983.*
TAN TEK BENG, complainant, vs. TIMOTEO A. DAVID, respondent.
Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Disbarment; Malpractice; Practice of soliciting cases at law for
the purpose of gain either personally or through paid agents is void and tantamount to
malpractice; Malpractice, defined.—We hold that the said agreement is void because it was
tantamount to malpractice which is "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers" (Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court).
Malpractice ordinarily refers to any malfeasance or dereliction of duty committed by a lawyer.
Section 27 gives a special and technical meaning to the term "malpractice" (Act No. 2828,
amending sec. 21 of Act No. 190). That meaning is in consonance with the elementary notion
that the practice of law is a profession, not a business. "The lawyer may not seek or obtain
employment by himself or through others for to do so would be unprofessional" (2 R.C.L. 1097
cited in In re Tagorda, 53 Phil. 37, 42; Malcolm, J., Jayme vs. Bualan, 58 Phil. 422; Arce vs.
Philippine National Bank, 62 Phil. 569).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Lawyer guilty of malpractice for entering into a void
and unethical agreement between him and a paid agent who solicits cases for the lawyer. —We
censure lawyer David for having entered and acted upon such void and unethical agreement.
We discountenance his conduct, not because of the complaint of Tan Tek Beng (who did not
know legal ethics) but because David should have known better.
Same; Same; Same; Unprofessional conduct in an attorney, meaning of. —"Unprofessional
conduct in an attorney is that which violates the rules or ethical code of his profession or which
is unbecoming a member of that profession" (Note 14, 7 C. J.S. 743).
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Basilio Lanoria for complainant.
     Timoteo A David for and in his own behalf.
AQUINO, J.:
The issue in this case is whether disciplinary action should be taken against lawyer Timoteo A.
David (admitted to the bar in 1945) for not giving Tan Tek Beng, a nonlawyer (alleged
missionary of the Seventh Day Adventists), one-half of the attorney's fees received by David
from the clients supplied by Tan Tek Beng. Their agreement reads:
"December 3, 1970
"Mr. Tan Tek Beng 
"Manila
"Dear Mr. Tan:
In compliance with your request, I am now putting into writing our agreement which must be
followed in connection with the accounts that you will entrust to me for collection. Our terms
and conditions shall be as follows:
"1.On all commission or attorney's fees that we shall receive from our clients by virtue of
the collection that we shall be able to effect on their accounts, we shall divide fifty-fifty,
34
Likewise you are entitled to commission, 50/50 from domestic, inheritance and
commercial from our said clients or in any criminal cases where they are involved.
"2.I shall not deal directly with our clients without your consent.
"3.You shall take care of collecting our fees as well as advances for expenses for the
cases referred to us by our clients and careful in safeguarding our interest.
"4,It is understood that legal expenses that we shall recover from the debtors shall be
turned over to our clients. Other clients who directly or indirectly have been approached
or related (sic) to you as a result of your labor are your clients.
"I hereby pledge in the name of God, our Heavenly Father, that I will be sincere, honest
and fair with you in connection with our transactions with our clients. Likewise you must be
sincere, honest and fair with me.
Very truly yours,                          
(Sgd.) Illegible           
TIMOTEO A. DAVID
"P.S.
I will be responsible for all documents entrusted me by our clients.
(Sgd.) Initial
"CONFORME to the above and likewise will reciprocate my sincerity to Atty. David as stated
in the last paragraph of this letter.
(Sgd.) Tan Tek Beng      
MR. TAN TEK BENG"
The foregoing was a reiteration of an agreement dated August 5, 1969. Note that in said
agreement lawyer David not only agreed to give one-half of his professional fees to an
intermediary or commission agent but he also bound himself not to deal directly with the clients.
The business relationship between David and Tan Tek Beng did not last. There were mutual
accusations of doublecross. For allegedly not living up to the agreement, Tan Tek Beng in 1973
denounced David to Presidential Assistant Ronaldo B. Zamora, to the Office of Civil Relations at
Camp Crame and to this Court. He did not file any civil action to enforce the agreement.
In his 1974 comment, David clarified that the partnership was composed of himself as
manager, Tan Tek Beng as assistant manager and lawyer Pedro Jacinto as president and
financier. When Jacinto became ill and the costs of office maintenance mounted, David
suggested that Tan Tek Beng should also invest some money or shoulder a part of the business
expenses but Tan Tek Beng refused.
This case was referred to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation.
Hearings were scheduled from 1974 to 1981. It was proposed that respondent should submit a
stipulation of facts but that did not materialize because the scheduled hearings were not held
due to the nonavailability of Tan Tek Beng and his counsel.
On September 16, 1977 Tan Tek Beng died at the Philippine Union Colleges Compound,
Baesa, Caloocan City but it was only in the manifestation of his counsel dated August 10, 1981
that the Solicitor General's Office was informed of that fact. A report on this case dated March
21, 1983 was submitted by the Solicitor General to this Court
Legal Ethics Session 3 35

We hold that the said agreement is void because it was tantamount to malpractice which is
"the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid
agents or brokers" Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court). Malpractice ordinarily refers to any
malfeasance or dereliction of duty committed by a lawyer. Section 27 gives a special and
technical meaning to the term "malpractice" (Act No. 2828, amending sec. 21 of Act No. 190).
It is presumed that an attorney performed his duties in accordance with his oath. This
presumption must be rebutted by a clear preponderance of evidence. Where complainant admits
that she did not cohabit with the respondent lawyer and could not substantiate the allegations in
her complaint, the presumption of innocence is not overcome. (Maderazo vs. Del Rosario, 73
SCRA 540.)

That meaning is in consonance with the elementary notion that the practice of law is a
profession, not a business. 'The lawyer may not seek or obtain employment by himself or
through others for to do so would be unprofessional" (2 R.C.L. 1097 cited in In re Tagorda, 53
Phil. 37, 42; Malcolm, J., Jayme vs. Bualan, 58 Phil. 422; Arce vs. Philippine National Bank, 62
Phil. 569). The commercialization of law practice is condemned in certain canons of professional
ethics adopted by the American Bar Association:

"34.Division of Fees.— No division of fees for legal services is proper,  except with another
lawyer, based upon a division of service or responsibility."

"35.Intermediaries.—The professional services of a lawyer should not be controlled or

exploited by any law agency, personal or corporate, which intervenes between client and
lawyer. A lawyer's responsibilities and qualifications are individual He should avoid all
relations which direct the performance of his duties by or in the interest of such
intermediary. A lawyer's relation to his client should be personal, and the responsibility
should be direct to the client. x x x"

"38.Compensation, Commissions and Rebates.—A lawyer should accept no compensation,

commissions, rebates or other advantages from others without the knowledge and
consent of his client after full disclosure." (Appendix, Malcolm, Legal Ethics).

We censure lawyer David for having entered and acted upon such void and unethical agreement
We discountenance his conduct, not because of the complaint of Tan Tek Beng (who did not
know legal ethics) but because David should have known better.

"Unprofessional conduct in an attorney is that which violates the rules or ethical code of his
profession or which is unbecoming a member of that profession" (Note 14, 7 C.J.S. 743).

WHEREFORE, respondent is reprimanded for being guilty of malpractice. A copy of this

decision should be attached to his record in the Bar Confidant's office.
SO ORDERED.
     Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castroand Escolin, JJ., concur.
     Makasiar (Chairman), J., no part.
Respondent reprimanded.

Notes.—The preparation and ratification of an immoral affidavit are disgraceful acts which
constitute gross misconduct in office and a violation of the attorney's oath. for which attorneys
may be disciplined by the courts. (Acuña vs. Dunca, 2 SCRA 289.)

The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is in the nature of a
privilege or franchise. It is limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications
duly ascertained and certified. (In re: Sycip, 92 SCRA 1.)
Participation of a lawyer in transactions that led to fraudulent issuance of a transfer
certificate of title in his client's name violative of his oath as a member of the bar. ( Vda, de Laig
vs. Court of Appeals, 86 SCRA 637.)
Legal Ethics Session 3
[A.C. No. 1261. December 29, 1983.]
TAN TEK BENG , complainant, vs. TIMOTEO A. DAVID , respondent.
Basilio Lanoria for complainant.
Timoteo A. David for and in his own behalf.
SYLLABUS
1. LEGAL ETHICS; MEMBER OF THE BAR; SOLICITING CASES AT LAW FOR THE
PURPOSE OF GAIN; CONSTITUTES MALPRACTICE. — Where in the agreement lawyer David
not only agreed to give one-half of his professional fees to an intermediary or commission
agent but he also bound himself not to deal directly with the clients, the Court held that the
said agreement is void because it was tantamount to malpractice which is "the practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers" (Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court). Malpractice ordinarily refers to any
malfeasance or dereliction of duty committed by a lawyer. Section 27 gives a special and
technical meaning to the term "malpractice" (Act No. 2828, amending Sec. 21 of Act No.
190). That meaning is in consonance with the elementary notion that the practice of law is
a profession, not a business. "The lawyer may not seek or obtain employment by himself or
through others for to do so would be unprofessional" (2 R.C.L. 1097 cited in In re Tagorda,
33 Phil. 37, 42).
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; UNPROFESSIONAL CONDUCT; CAUSE FOR CENSURE. — The
commercialization of law practice is condemned in certain canons of professional ethics
adopted by the American Bar Association. "Unprofessional conduct in an attorney is that
which violates the rules or ethical code of his profession or which is unbecoming a
member of that profession" (Note 14, 7 C.J.S. 743). We censure lawyer David for having
entered and acted upon such void and unethical agreement. We discountenance his
conduct, not because of the complaint of Tan Tek Beng (who did not know legal ethics)
but because David should have known better.
DECISION
AQUINO , J : p intermediary or commission agent but he also bound himself not to deal directly with the
The issue in this case is whether disciplinary action should be taken against lawyer
Timoteo A. David (admitted to the bar in 1945) for not giving Tan Tek Beng, a nonlawyer
(alleged missionary of the Seventh Day Adventists), one-half of the attorney's fees received
by David from the clients supplied by Tan Tek Beng. Their agreement reads:
"December 3, 1970
"Mr. Tan Tek Beng
"Manila
"Dear Mr. Tan:
In compliance with your request, I am now putting into writing our agreement
which must be followed in connection with the accounts that you will entrust to
me for collection. Our terms and conditions shall be as follows:
"1. On all commission or attorney's fees that we shall receive from our clients
36
by virtue of the collection that we shall be able to effect on their accounts, we
shall divide fifty-fifty. Likewise you are entitled to commission, 50/50 from
domestic, inheritance and commercial from our said clients or in any criminal
cases where they are involved.
"2. I shall not deal directly with our clients without your consent.
"3. You shall take care of collecting our fees as well as advances for
expenses for the cases referred to us by our clients and careful in safeguarding
our interest.
"4. It is understood that legal expenses that we shall recover from the debtors
shall be turned over to our clients. Other clients who directly or indirectly have
been approached or related (sic) to you as a result of your labor are your clients.
"I hereby pledge in the name of God, our Heavenly Father, that I will be sincere,
honest and fair with you in connection with our transactions with our clients.
Likewise you must be sincere, honest and fair with me.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) Illegible
TIMOTEO A. DAVID
"P.S.
I will be responsible for all documents entrusted me by our clients.
(Sgd.) Initial
"CONFORME to the above and likewise will reciprocate my sincerity to Atty. David
as stated in the last paragraph of this letter.
(Sgd.) Tan Tek Beng
MR. TAN TEK BENG"
The foregoing was a reiteration of an agreement dated August 5, 1969. Note that in said
agreement lawyer David not only agreed to give one-half of his professional fees to an
clients.
The business relationship between David and Tan Tek Beng did not last. There were mutual
accusations of doublecross. For allegedly not living up to the agreement, Tan Tek Beng in
1973 denounced David to Presidential Assistant Ronaldo B. Zamora, to the Office of Civil
Relations at Camp Crame and to this Court. He did not file any civil action to enforce the
agreement.
In his 1974 comment, David clarified that the partnership was composed of himself as
manager, Tan Tek Beng as assistant manager and lawyer Pedro Jacinto as president and
financier. When Jacinto became ill and the costs of office maintenance mounted, David
suggested that Tan Tek Beng should also invest some money or shoulder a part of the
business expenses but Tan Tek Beng refused. prcd
This case was referred to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation. Hearings were scheduled from 1974 to 1981. It was proposed that
respondent should submit a stipulation of facts but that did not materialize because the
scheduled hearings were not held due to the nonavailability of Tan Tek Beng and his
Legal Ethics Session 3 37

counsel.
On September 16, 1977 Tan Tek Beng died at the Philippine Union Colleges Compound,
Baesa, Caloocan City but it was only in the manifestation of his counsel dated August 10,
1981 that the Solicitor General's Office was informed of that fact. A report on this case
dated March 21, 1983 was submitted by the Solicitor General to this Court.
We hold that the said agreement is void because it was tantamount to malpractice which
is "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers" Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court). Malpractice ordinarily
refers to any malfeasance or dereliction of duty committed by a lawyer. Section 27 gives a
special and technical meaning to the term "malpractice" (Act No. 2828, amending sec. 21
of Act No. 190).
That meaning is in consonance with the elementary notion that the practice of law is a
profession, not a business. "The lawyer may not seek or obtain employment by himself or
through others for to do so would be unprofessional" (2 R.C.L. 1097 cited in In re Tagorda,
53 Phil. 37, 42; Malcolm, J., Jayme vs. Bualan, 58 Phil. 422; Arce vs. Philippine National
Bank, 62 Phil. 569). The commercialization of law practice is condemned in certain canons
of professional ethics adopted by the American Bar Association:
"34. Division of Fees. — No division of fees for legal services is proper, except
with another lawyer, based upon a division of service or responsibility."

"35. Intermediaries. — The professional services of a lawyer should not be

controlled or exploited by any law agency, personal or corporate, which intervenes
between client and lawyer. A lawyer's responsibilities and qualifications are
individual. He should avoid all relations which direct the performance of his
duties by or in the interest of such intermediary. A lawyer's relation to his client
should be personal, and the responsibility should be direct to the client. . . ."
"38. Compensation, Commissions and Rebates. — A lawyer should accept no
compensation, commissions, rebates or other advantages from others without the
knowledge and consent of his client after full disclosure." (Appendix, Malcolm,
Legal Ethics).

We censure lawyer David for having entered and acted upon such void and unethical
agreement. We discountenance his conduct, not because of the complaint of Tan Tek
Beng (who did not know legal ethics) but because David should have known better.
LLphil

"Unprofessional conduct in an attorney is that which violates the rules or ethical

code of his profession or which is unbecoming a member of that profession" (Note 14,
7 C.J.S. 743).
WHEREFORE, respondent is reprimanded for being guilty of malpractice. A copy of this
decision should be attached to his record in the Bar Confidant's office.
SO ORDERED.

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Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro and Escolin, JJ., concur.
Makasiar (Chairman), J., took no part.