Legal Ethics Session 4 1

A.C. No. 5379.  May 9, 2003.* RESOLUTION

1. WALTER T. YOUNG, complainant, vs. CEASAR G. BATUEGAS, MIGUELITO NAZARENO
V. LLANTINO and FRANKLIN Q. SUSA, respondents. YNARES-SANTIAGO,  J.:

Attorneys; Legal Ethics; A lawyer must be a disciple of truth.—A lawyer must be a disciple

On December 29, 2000, Atty. Walter T. Young filed a Verified Affidavit-Complaint for disbarment
of truth. He swore upon his admission to the Bar that he will “do no falsehood nor consent to
against Attys. Ceasar G. Batuegas, Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino and Franklin Q. Susa for
the doing of any in court” and he shall “conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his
allegedly committing deliberate falsehood in court and violating the lawyer’s oath. 1
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients.” He should
Complainant is the private prosecutor in Criminal Case No. 00-187627 for Murder,
bear in mind that as an officer of the court his high vocation is to correctly inform the court
entitled “People of the Philippines versus Crisanto Arana, Jr.,” pending before the Regional Trial
upon the law and the facts of the case and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct
Court of Manila, Branch 27. On December 13, 2000, respondents Batuegas and Llantino, as
conclusion. The courts, on the other hand, are entitled to expect only complete honesty from
counsel for accused, filed a Manifestation with Motion for Bail, alleging that the “accused has
lawyers appearing and pleading before them. While a lawyer has the solemn duty to defend his
voluntarily surrendered to a person in authority. As such, he is now under detention.”  2Upon
client’s rights and is expected to display the utmost zeal in defense of his client’s cause, his
personal verification with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) where accused Arana
conduct must never be at the expense of truth.
allegedly surrendered, complainant learned that he surrendered only on December 14, 2000, as
shown by the Certificate of Detention executed by Atty. Rogelio M. Mamauag, Chief of the
Same; Same; Pleadings and Practice; To knowingly allege an untrue statement of fact in
Security Management Division of the NBI.
the pleading is a contemptuous conduct that the Court strongly condemns .—Evidently,
respondent lawyers fell short of the duties and responsibilities expected from them as members
Respondent Susa, the Branch Clerk of Court of RTC of Manila, Branch 27, calendared the
of the bar. Anticipating that their Motion for Bail will be denied by the court if it found that it had
motion on December 15, 2000 despite the foregoing irregularity and other formal defects,
no jurisdiction over the person of the accused, they craftily concealed the truth by alleging that
namely, the lack of notice of hearing to the private complainant, violation of the three-day
accused had voluntarily surrendered to a person in authority and was under detention.
notice rule, and the failure to attach the Certificate of Detention which was referred to in the
Obviously, such artifice was a deliberate ruse to mislead the court and thereby contribute to
Motion as Annex “1”.
injustice. To knowingly allege an untrue statement of fact in the pleading is a contemptuous
conduct that we strongly condemn. They violated their oath when they resorted to deception.
Respondents filed their respective comments, declaring that on December 13, 2000, upon
learning that a warrant of arrest was issued against their client, they filed the Manifestation with
Criminal Procedure; Bail; Whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, reasonable notice
Motion for Bail with the trial court. Then they immediately fetched the accused in Cavite and
of hearing is required to be given to the prosecutor or fiscal, or at least, he must be asked for
brought him to the NBI to voluntarily surrender. However, due to heavy traffic, they arrived at
his recommendation.—In this jurisdiction, whether bail is a matter of right or discretion,
the NBI at 2:00 a.m. the next day; hence, the certificate of detention indicated that the accused
reasonable notice of hearing is required to be given to the prosecutor or fiscal, or at least, he
surrendered on December 14, 2000. They argued that there was neither unethical conduct nor
must be asked for his recommendation.
falsehood in the subject pleading as their client has voluntarily surrendered and was detained at
the NBI. As regards the lack of notice of hearing, they contend that complainant, as private
Same; Same; Motions; Although a motion may be heard on short notice, the movant
prosecutor, was not entitled to any notice. Nevertheless, they furnished the State and City
must show good cause to justify the non-observance of the three-day notice rule. —In the case
prosecutors copies of the motion with notice of hearing thereof. Moreover, the hearing of a
at bar, the prosecution was served with notice of hearing of the motion for bail two days prior to
motion on shorter notice is allowed under Rule 15, Sec. 4(2) of the Rules of Court. 3
the scheduled date. Although a motion may be heard on short notice, respondents failed to
show any good cause to justify the non-observance of the three-day notice rule. Verily, as
For his part, respondent Susa argues in his comment that he was no longer in court when
lawyers, they are obliged to observe the rules of procedure and not to misuse them to defeat
his co-respondents filed the Manifestation with Motion for Bail. Ms. Teofila A. Peña, Clerk III,
the ends of justice.
received the said Motion and noticed that it was set for hearing on December 15, 2000 and the
Certificate of Detention was not attached. However, the presiding judge instructed her to
Legal Ethics; Courts; Court Personnel; Clerks of Court; A clerk of court should not hesitate
receive the Motion subject to the presentation of the Certificate of Detention before the hearing.
to inform the judge if he should find any act or conduct on the part of lawyers which are
Thus, the inclusion of the Motion in the court’s calendar on December 15, 2000 was authorized
contrary to the established rules of procedure .—We are in accord with the Investigating
by the presiding judge and, thus, was done by respondent Susa in faithful performance of his
Commissioner that respondent clerk of court should not be made administratively liable for
ministerial duty. 
including the Motion in the calendar of the trial court, considering that it was authorized by the
presiding judge. However, he is reminded that his administrative functions, although not
In a Resolution dated August 13, 2001, 4 the instant case was referred to the Integrated Bar of
involving the discretion or judgment of a judge, are vital to the prompt and sound administration
the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation or decision.
of justice. Thus, he should not hesitate to inform the judge if he should find any act or conduct
on the part of lawyers which are contrary to the established rules of procedure.
On December 7, 2001, the Investigating Commissioner, Rebecca Villanueva-Maala,
submitted her report and recommendation as follows:
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Disbarment.
“WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that Atty.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court. Ceasar G. Batuegas and Atty. Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino be suspended from the practice of
their profession as a lawyer/member of the Bar for a period of six (6) months from receipt
Legal Ethics Session 4
hereof. The complaint against Atty. Franklin Q. Susa, upon the other hand, is hereby
recommended dismissed for lack of merit.”5
The foregoing Report and Recommendation was adopted and approved by the IBP-Commission
on Bar Discipline in Resolution No. XV-2002-400, to wit:
“RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex “A”; and, finding the recommendation fully supported
by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and in view of respondents’
commission of deliberate falsehood, Atty. Batuegas and Atty. Llantino are hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for six (6) months. The complaint against Atty. Susa is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit.”6
We agree with the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Commissioner.
Respondents Batuegas and Llantino are guilty of deliberate falsehood.
A lawyer must be a disciple of truth. 7 He swore upon his admission to the Bar that he will “do no
falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court” and he shall “conduct himself as a lawyer
according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts
as to his clients.”8 He should bear in mind that as an officer of the court his high vocation is to
correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts of the case and to aid it in doing justice
and arriving at correct conclusion.9 The courts, on the other hand, are entitled to expect only
complete honesty from lawyers appearing and pleading before them. 10 While a lawyer has the
solemn duty to defend his client’s rights and is expected to display the utmost zeal in defense of
his client’s cause, his conduct must never be at the expense of truth. 11
The Court may disbar or suspend a lawyer for misconduct, whether in his professional or
private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity, and
good demeanor, thus proving unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. 12
Evidently, respondent lawyers fell short of the duties and responsibilities expected from
them as members of the bar. Anticipating that their Motion for Bail will be denied by the court if
it found that it had no jurisdiction over the person of the accused, they craftily concealed the
truth by alleging that accused had voluntarily surrendered to a person in authority and was
under detention. Obviously, such artifice was a deliberate ruse to mislead the court and thereby
contribute to injustice. To knowingly allege an untrue statement of fact in the pleading is a
contemptuous conduct that we strongly condemn. They violated their oath when they resorted
to deception.
Respondents contend that their allegation of the accused’s detention was merely a
statement of an ultimate fact which still had to be proved by evidence at the hearing of the
Motion. That they were able to show that their client was already under the custody of the NBI
at the hearing held on December 15, 2000 does not exonerate them. The fact remains that the
allegation that the accused was in the custody of the NBI on December 13, 2000 was false.
In Comia vs. Antona, we held:
It is of no moment that the accused eventually surrendered to the police authorities on the
same date “tentatively” scheduled for the hearing of the application for bail. To our mind, such
supervening event is of no bearing and immaterial; it does not absolve respondent judge from
administrative liability considering that he should not have accorded recognition to the
application for bail filed on behalf of persons who, at that point, were devoid of personality to
ask such specific affirmative relief from the court. 13
2
In this jurisdiction, whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, reasonable notice of hearing is
required to be given to the prosecutor or fiscal, or at least, he must be asked for his
recommendation.14
In the case at bar, the prosecution was served with notice of hearing of the motion for bail
two days prior to the scheduled date. Although a motion may be heard on short notice,
respondents failed to show any good cause to justify the non-observance of the three-day notice
rule. Verily, as lawyers, they are obliged to observe the rules of procedure and not to misuse
them to defeat the ends of justice.15
Finally, we are in accord with the Investigating Commissioner that respondent clerk of court
should not be made administratively liable for including the Motion in the calendar of the trial
court, considering that it was authorized by the presiding judge. However, he is reminded that
his administrative functions, although not involving the discretion or judgment of a judge, are
vital to the prompt and sound administration of justice. 16 Thus, he should not hesitate to inform
the judge if he should find any act or conduct on the part of lawyers which are contrary to the
established rules of procedure.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Attys. Ceasar G. Batuegas, Miguelito
Nazareno V. Llantino are found guilty of committing deliberate falsehood. Accordingly, they are
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months with a warning that a
repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to the personal records of Attys. Ceasar G.
Batuegas and Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies
thereof be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
     Davide, Jr. (C.J., Chairman), Vitug, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Respondents Attys. Ceasar G. Batuegas and Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino suspended from
the practice of law for six (6) months for committing deliberate falsehood, with a warning
against repetition of similar act.
Notes.—Candor in all dealings is the very essence of honorable membership in the legal
profession—a lawyer is obliged to observe the rules of procedure and not to misuse them to
defeat the ends of justice. ( Far Eastern Shipping Company vs. Court of Appeals,  297 SCRA
30 [1998])
Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is prohibited from counseling or
abetting “activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.”
(Oronce vs. Court of Appeals, 298 SCRA 133[1998])
Legal Ethics Session 4 3

Alvendia and Jesus Alvendia were the holders of Foreshore Lease Applications Nos. V-1284 and
Adm. Case No. 2152. April 19, 1991.*
2807 covering portions of public land situated in Barrio Baluarte, Municipality of Bulacan,
2. TEODORO I. CHAVEZ, complainant, vs. ATTY. ESCOLASTICO R. VIOLA, respondent.
Province of Bulacan, and that lease contracts4 had been executed in their favor by the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Respondent prayed in the complaint that his clients (the
Attorneys; The lawyers’ first duty is not to their clients but rather to the courts, that they
Alvendias) be declared “bona fide lessees of the land in controversy x x x.” 5 In an Order dated 2
are above all officers of court sworn to assist the courts in rendering justice to all and sundry,
October 1969,6 the CFI dismissed the complaint filed in Civil Case No. 3330-M for non-
and only secondarily are they advocates of the exclusive interests of their clients.— It is well to
appearance of the Alvendias.
stress again that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those
who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the
On 18 June 1966, Congress passed Republic Act No. 470, which provides:
conferment of such privilege. One of those requirements is the observance of honesty and
“SECTION 1. The parcel of public domain comprising a portion of the foreshore fronting the
candor. It cannot be gainsaid that candidness, especially towards the courts, is essential for the
Manila Bay along the Province of Bulacan x x x is hereby withdrawn from sale or settlement and
expeditious administration of justice. Courts are entitled to expect only complete candor and
reserved for communal fishing ground purposes which shall hereafter be called the Bulacan
honesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading before them. A lawyer, on the other hand, has
Fishing Reservation.”7 (Italics supplied)
the fundamental duty to satisfy that expectation. Otherwise, the administration of justice would
gravely suffer if indeed it could proceed at all. It is essential that lawyers bear in mind at all
It appears that the foreshore land being occupied by the Alvendias was part of the communal
times that their first duty is not to their clients but rather to the courts, that they are above all
fishing ground reserved by Republic Act No. 470.
officers of court sworn to assist the courts in rendering justice to all and sundry, and only
secondarily are they advocates of the exclusive interests of their clients. For this reason, he is
On 8 November 1977, respondent filed, on behalf of the Alvendias, Amended Application for
required to swear to do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court.
Original Registration of Title8 in Land Registration Case (“LRC”) No. 3711-M with the then CFI of
Bulacan praying that the land covered by Psu-141243, Amd. 2 9 be registered in the name of the
Same; Same; Respondent has been deplorably lacking in the candor required of him as a
spouses Alvendias. Respondent alleged in the Amended Application that the applicant Alvendias
member of the Bar, and an officer of the court, he is found guilty of committing a falsehood in
were the owners of the land,  they having acquired the same from one Teresita Vistan by sale
violation of his lawyer’s oath, thus, he is suspended from the practice of law for a period of five
sometime in 1929.
(5) months.—It is clear to the Court that respondent Viola violated his lawyer’s oath and as well
Canon 22 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which stated that “[t]he conduct of the lawyer
It is petitioner’s contention that respondent, in filing the Amended Application for Original
before the court and with other lawyers should be characterized by candor and fairness” (now
Registration of Title in LRC No. 3711-M stating that his clients were the owners of the property
Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prescribing that “[a] lawyer owes candor,
applied for despite his full knowledge of the fact that his clients were mere lessees of the land in
fairness and good faith to the courts). He has been deplorably lacking in the candor required of
controversy as so described in the complaint respondent had filed in Civil Case No. 3330-M, had
him as a member of the Bar and an officer of the court. In his apparent zeal to secure the title
willingly aided in and consented to the pursuit, promotion and prosecution of a false and
to the property involved for his clients, he disregarded his overriding duty to the court and to
unlawful application for land registration, in violation of his oath of office as a member of the
the law itself. Wherefore, finding respondent Escolastico R. Viola guilty of committing a
Bar.
falsehood in violation of his lawyer’s oath and of the Canons of Professional Ethics (now the
Code of Professional Responsibility), the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the
In his Answer, 10 respondent alleged that the Application for Original Registration of Title was
practice of law for a period of five (5) months, with a WARNING that commission of the same or
originally instituted by one Atty. Montesclaro, and when said lawyer withdrew his appearance
similar offense in the future will result in the imposition of a more severe penalty. A copy of this
therein, respondent filed the Amended Application for Original Registration of Title; that he
Resolution shall be spread on the personal record of respondent in the Office of the Bar
believed his clients had the right to apply for the registration of the land; and that assuming his
Confidant.
clients did not in fact have any such right, the court where the Application for Original
Registration of Title was filed had not yet passed upon it; hence, this complaint for disbarment
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court. Gross misconduct. was filed prematurely.

The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court. Complainant filed a Reply to the Answer.11
RESOLUTION
In a Resolution dated 29 October 1980, the Court resolved to refer the case to the Solicitor
General for investigation, report and recommendation.
PER CURIAM:
On 11 March 1981, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss 12 the complaint for disbarment. In
1
In a letter-complaint dated 9 May 1990  addressed to this Court, complainant Teodoro I. Chavez said Motion, he alleged—for the second time—that he was not the original lawyer who filed the
prayed for the disbarment of or other appropriate penalty upon respondent Escolastico R. Viola, application in the land registration case, but a certain Atty. Montesclaro. Respondent further
a member of the Philippine Bar, for gross misconduct or malpractice. alleged:

The letter-complaint stated that respondent Viola was engaged by Felicidad Alvendia, Jesus
Alvendia and Jesus Alvendia, Jr. as their counsel in connection with Civil Case No. 3330-M 2 filed
sometime in 1966 with the then Court of First Instance (“CFI”) of Bulacan against Teodoro
Chavez (herein complainant), Lucia dela Cruz, Alpon dela Cruz and Eugenio dela Cruz. In the
complaint,3 respondent alleged, on behalf of the Alvendias (plaintiffs therein), that Felicidad
“x x x Your respondent, not content with just having conferred with Atty. Montesclaro when he
took over, even went to the extent of verifying from the Bureau of Lands if the application was
proper. The Legal Department of the Bureau of Lands assured your respondent that it was. He
was informed that judicial application for registration is one of the methods of acquiring such
lands, said lands being ‘alienable and disposable.’ There are, however, other means of obtaining
Legal Ethics Session 4 4

the said lands, but the applicants (with Atty. Montesclaro) chose the present action for land
registration.
Undersigned wishes to point out that he merely took over from the original lawyer when said
counsel withdrew his appearance. Your respondent, hence, was in good faith when he took over
the land registration case, subject matter of this present administrative investigation.”
The Court, in a Resolution dated 8 June 1981, forwarded the Motion to Dismiss to the Solicitor
General.
In a Report13 dated 28 February 1990, the Solicitor General stated that:
“In his answer to the letter complaint, respondent avers that his clients, i.e., the Alvendias, have
the right to apply for registration of the land in question. However, respondent does not deny
that he prepared and signed the Amended Application for Original Registration of Title in Land
Reg. Case No. 3711-M wherein he alleged that the Alvendias are the owners of the land covered
by Psu 141243, Amd. 2. Respondent does not offer any explanation at all as to why his
submission in said application was diametrically opposite to his allegations in the complaint in
the earlier Civil Case No. 3330-M that the Alvendias were permittees and later the lessees of the
same property.
the Code of Professional Responsibility prescribing that “[a] lawyer owes candor, fairness and
good faith to the courts). He has been deplorably lacking in the candor required of him as a
member of the Bar and an officer of the court. In his apparent zeal to secure the title to the
property involved for his clients, he disregarded his overriding duty to the court and to the law
itself.
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Escolastico R. Viola guilty of committing a falsehood in
violation of his lawyer’s oath and of the Canons of Professional Ethics (now the Code of
Professional Responsibility), the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice of
law for a period of five (5) months, with a WARNING that commission of the same or similar
offense in the future will result in the imposition of a more severe penalty. A copy of this
Resolution shall be spread on the personal record of respondent in the Office of the Bar
Confidant.
      Fernan (C.J.), Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Respondent suspended from the practice of law for a period of five (5) months.
Note.—An attorney’s ready admission of falsifying the truth in his motion to dismiss which
did not cause material damage constrains court not to be more severe with him. He is
suspended for one month. (Martin vs. Moreno, 128 SCRA 315.)

It is evident, then, that respondent has knowingly made a false statement to the court in
the land registration case. As proven by complainant, respondent has willingly aided and
consented in the filing and prosecution of a groundless, if not false, application for land
registration, in violation of his oath as a lawyer and member of the bar. 14

It is well to stress again that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the
State on those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required
by law for the conferment of such privilege. 15 One of those requirements is the observance of
honesty and candor. It cannot be gainsaid that candidness, especially towards the courts, is
essential for the expeditious administration of justice. Courts are entitled to expect only
complete candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading before them. A lawyer,
on the other hand, has the fundamental duty to satisfy that expectation. Otherwise, the
administration of justice would gravely suffer if indeed it could proceed at all. It is essential that
lawyers bear in mind at all times that their first duty is not to their clients but rather to the
courts, that they are above all officers of court sworn to assist the courts in rendering justice to
all and sundry, and only secondarily are they advocates of the exclusive interests of their clients.
For this reason, he is required to swear to do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
court.16

In the instant case, respondent Viola alleged in an earlier pleading that his clients were
merely lessees of the property involved. In his later pleading, he stated that the very same
clients were owners of the same property. One of these pleadings must have been false; it
matters not which one. What does matter is that respondent, who, as a member of the ancient
and learned profession of the law, had sworn to do no falsehood before the courts, did commit
one. It was incumbent upon respondent to explain how or why he committed no falsehood in
pleading two (2) incompatible things; he offered no explanation, other than that he had not
originated but merely continued the registration proceedings when he filed the Amended
Application, and that he really believed his clients were entitled to apply for registration of their
rights. Respondent’s excuses ring very hollow; we agree with the Solicitor General and the
complainant that those excuses do not exculpate the respondent.

It is clear to the Court that respondent Viola violated his lawyer’s oath and as well Canon 22
of the Canons of Professional Ethics which stated that “[t]he conduct of the lawyer before the
court and with other lawyers should be characterized by candor and fairness” (now Canon 10 of
Legal Ethics Session 4 5

This administrative case stemmed from the events of the proceedings in Crim. Case No. 5144,
Adm. Case No. 7006. October 9, 2007.*
entitled People v. Luis Bucalon Plaza, heard before the sala of Presiding Judge Jose Manuel P.
3. RE: SUSPENSION OF ATTY. ROGELIO Z. BAGABUYO, FORMER SENIOR STATE
Tan, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Surigao City, Branch 29.
PROSECUTOR
Crim. Case No. 5144 was originally raffled to the sala of Judge Floripinas C. Buyser, RTC of
Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Disbarment; Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
Surigao City, Branch 30. In an Order dated March 14, 2002, Judge Buyser denied the Demurrer
mandates a lawyer to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers
to the Evidence of the accused, declaring that the evidence thus presented by the prosecution
and [he] should insist on similar conduct by others. —Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts
was sufficient to prove the crime of homicide and not the charge of murder. Consequently, the
who are empowered to appear, prosecute and defend; and upon whom peculiar duties,
counsel for the defense filed a Motion to Fix the Amount of Bail Bond. Respondent Atty. Rogelio
responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence. Membership in the bar
Z. Bagabuyo, then Senior State Prosecutor and the deputized prosecutor of the case, objected
imposes upon them certain obligations. Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
thereto mainly on the ground that the original charge of murder, punishable with reclusion
mandates a lawyer to “observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial
perpetua, was not subject to bail under Sec. 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.1
officers and [he] should insist on similar conduct by others.” Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 states that
a lawyer “shall submit grievances against a judge to the proper authorities only.”
In an Order dated August 30, 2002, 2 Judge Buyser inhibited himself from further trying the
case because of the “harsh insinuation” of Senior Prosecutor Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo that he “lacks
Same; Same; Same; A lawyer’s statements against the judge, made to the mass media
the cold neutrality of an impartial magistrate,” by allegedly suggesting the filing of the motion to
while a criminal case is still pending in court, violates Rule 13.02 of Canon 13, which states that
fix the amount of bail bond by counsel for the accused.
“a lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to
arouse public opinion for or against a party.” —Respondent violated Rule 11.05 of Canon 11
The case was transferred to Branch 29 of the RTC of Surigao City, presided by Judge Jose
when he admittedly caused the holding of a press conference where he made statements
Manuel P. Tan. In an Order dated November 12, 2002, Judge Tan favorably resolved the Motion
against the Order dated November 12, 2002 allowing the accused in Crim. Case No. 5144 to be
to Fix the Amount of Bail Bond, and fixed the amount of the bond at P40,000.
released on bail. Respondent also violated Canon 11 when he indirectly stated that Judge Tan
was displaying judicial arrogance in the article entitled, Senior prosecutor lambasts Surigao
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order dated November 12, 2002,
judge for allowing murder suspect to bail out , which appeared in the August 18, 2003 issue of
which motion was denied for lack of merit in an Order dated February 10, 2003. In October,
the Mindanao Gold Star Daily. Respondent’s statements in the article, which were made while
2003, respondent appealed from the Orders dated November 12, 2002 and February 10, 2003,
Crim. Case No. 5144 was still pending in court, also violated Rule 13.02 of Canon 13, which
to the Court of Appeals (CA).
states that “a lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case
tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party.” In regard to the radio interview given to
Instead of availing himself only of judicial remedies, respondent caused the publication of an
Tony Consing, respondent violated Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
article regarding the Order granting bail to the accused in the August 18, 2003 issue of the
Responsibility for not resorting to the proper authorities only for redress of his grievances
Mindanao Gold Star Daily. The article, entitled “ Senior prosecutor lambasts Surigao judge for
against Judge Tan. Respondent also violated Canon 11 for his disrespect of the court and its
allowing murder suspect to bail out,” reads:
officer when he stated that Judge Tan was ignorant of the law, that as a mahjong  aficionado, he
was studying mahjong instead of studying the law, and that he was a liar.
“SENIOR state prosecutor has lashed at a judge in Surigao City for allowing a murder suspect to
go out on bail.
Same; Same; Courts; The Court is not against lawyers raising grievances against erring
judges but the rules clearly provide for the proper venue and procedure for doing so, precisely
Senior state prosecutor Rogelio Bagabuyo lambasted Judge Manuel Tan of the Regional
because respect for the institution must always be maintained. —As a senior state prosecutor
Trial Court (RTC) Branch 29 based in Surigao City for ruling on a motion that sought a bailbond
and officer of the court, respondent should have set the example of observing and maintaining
for Luis Plaza who stands charged with murdering a policeman . . . .
the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers. Montecillo v. Gica, 60 SCRA 234 (1974),
held: It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude. As an
Plaza reportedly posted a P40-thousand bail bond.
officer of the court, it is his duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the court to which he
owes fidelity, according to the oath he has taken. Respect for the courts guarantees the stability
Bagabuyo argued that the crime of murder is a non-bailable of-fense. But Bagabuyo
of our democratic institutions which, without such respect, would be resting on a very shaky
admitted that a judge could still opt to allow a murder suspect to bail out in cases when the
foundation. The Court is not against lawyers raising grievances against erring judges but the
evidence of the prosecution is weak.
rules clearly provide for the proper venue and procedure for doing so, precisely because respect
for the institution must always be maintained.
But in this murder case, Bagabuyo said the judge who previously handled it, Judge
F[lori]pinas B[uy]ser, described the evidence to be strong. B[uy]ser inhibited from the case for
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court. Suspension. an unclear reason.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. xxx

Bagabuyo said he would contest Tan’s decision before the Court of Appeals and would file
AZCUNA, J.: criminal and administrative charges of certiorari against the judge.

Bagabuyuo said he was not afraid of being cited in contempt by Judge Tan.
Legal Ethics Session 4
“This is the only way that the public would know that there are judges there who are
displaying judicial arrogance.” he said.”3
In an Order dated August 21, 2003, the RTC of Surigao City, Branch 29, directed respondent
and the writer of the article, Mark Francisco of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily, to appear in court
on September 20, 2003 to explain why they should not be cited for indirect contempt of court
for the publication of the article which degraded the court and its presiding judge with its lies
and misrepresentation.
The said Order stated that contrary to the statements in the article, Judge Buyser described the
evidence for the prosecution as not strong, but sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused only
for homicide. Moreover, it was not true that Judge Buyser inhibited himself from the case for an
unclear reason. Judge Buyser, in an Order dated August 30, 2002, declared in open court in the
presence of respondent that he was inhibiting himself from the case due to the harsh insinuation
of respondent that he lacked the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
On the scheduled hearing of the contempt charge, Mark Francisco admitted that the
Mindanao Gold Star Daily caused the publication of the article. He disclosed that respondent, in
a press conference, stated that the crime of murder is non-bailable. When asked by the trial
court why he printed such lies, Mr. Francisco answered that his only source was
respondent.4 Mr. Francisco clarified that in the statement alleging that Judge Buyser inhibited
himself from the case for an unclear reason, the phrase “for an unclear reason,” was added by
the newspaper’s Executive Editor Herby S. Gomez. 5 Respondent admitted that he caused the
holding of the press conference, but refused to answer whether he made the statements in the
article until after he shall have filed a motion to dismiss. For his refusal to answer, the trial court
declared him in contempt of court pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. 6 The Court’s
Order dated September 30, 2003 reads:
ORDER
Mr. Mark Francisco for publishing this article which is a lie clothed in half truth to give it a
semblance of truth is hereby ordered to pay a fine of P10,000. Prosecutor Bagabuyo, for
obstinately refusing to explain why he should not be cited for contempt and admitting that the
article published in the Mindanao Gold Star Daily on August 18, 2003 and quoted in the Order of
this Court dated August 21, 2003 which is contemptuous was caused by him to be published, is
hereby adjudged to have committed indirect contempt of Court pur-suant to Section 3 of Rule
71 of the Rules of Court and he is hereby ordered to suffer the penalty of 30 days in jail. The
BJMP is hereby ordered to arrest Prosecutor Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo if he does not put up a bond
of P100,000.00.
SO ORDERD.”7
Respondent posted the required bond and was released from the custody of the law. He
appealed the indirect contempt order to the CA.
Despite the citation of indirect contempt, respondent presented himself to the media for
interviews in Radio Station DXKS, and again attacked the integrity of Judge Tan and the trial
court’s disposition in the proceedings of Crim. Case No. 5144.
In an Order dated October 20, 2003, the RTC of Surigao City, Branch 29, required respondent to
explain and to show cause within five days from receipt thereof why he should not be held in
contempt for his media interviews that degraded the court and the presiding judge, and why he
should not be suspended from the practice of law for violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility, specifically Rule 11.05 of Canon 118 and Rule 13.02 of Canon 13.9
6
In the Order, the trial court stated that respondent was interviewed by Jun Clergio, and that
the interview was repeatedly aired on September 30, 2003 and in his news program between
6:00 and 8:00 a.m. on October 1, 2003. He was also interviewed by Tony Consing on October 1
and 2, 2003, between 8:00 and 9:00 a.m. in his radio program. In those radio interviews,
respondent allegedly called Judge Tan a judge who does not know the law, a liar, and a dictator
who does not accord due process to the people.
The hearing for the second contempt charge was set on De-cember 4, 2003.
On November, 20, 2003, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to File
Answer to Contempt alleging that he was saddled with work of equal importance and needed
ample time to answer the same. He also prayed for a bill of particulars in order to properly
prepare for his defense.
In an Order dated November 20, 2003, the trial court denied the motion. It stated that a bill
of particulars is not applicable in contempt proceedings, and that respondent’s actions and
statements are detailed in the Order of October 20, 2003.
On the scheduled hearing of December 4, 2003 respondent neither appeared in court nor
informed the court of his absence. The trial court issued an Order dated December 4, 2003
cancelling the hearing “to give Prosecutor Bagabuyo all the chances he asks for,” and ordered
him to appear on January 12, 2004 to explain in writing or orally why he should not be cited in
contempt of court pursuant to the facts stated in the Order dated October 20, 2003. However,
respondent did not appear in the scheduled hearing of January 12, 2004.
On January 15, 2004, the trial court received respondent’s Answer dated January 8, 2004.
Respondent denied the charge that he sought to be interviewed by radio station DXKS. He,
however, stated that right after the hearing of September 30, 2003, he was approached by
someone who asked him to comment on the Order issued in open court, and that his comment
does not fall within the concept of indirect contempt of court. He also admitted that he was
interviewed by his friend, Tony Consing, at the latter’s instance. He justified his response during
the interview as a simple exercise of his constitutional right of freedom of speech and that it was
not meant to offend or malign, and was without malice.
On February 8, 2004, the trial court issued an Order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, finding preponderant evidence that Prosecutor Bagabuyo has grossly violated the
Canons of the legal profession and [is] guilty of grave professional misconduct, rendering him
unfit to continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an
attorney, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law.
Likewise, he is also found guilty of indirect contempt of court, for which he is hereby
ordered to suffer the penalty of IMPRISONMENT for ninety (90) days to be served at the
Surigao City Jail and to pay the maximum fine of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00).
Future acts of contempt will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of the relevant records be immediately forwarded to the Supreme Court for
automatic review and for further determination of grounds for [the] disbarment of Prosecutor
Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo.”10
The trial court found respondent’s denials to be lame as the tape of his interview on October 2,
2003, duly transcribed, showed disrespect of the court and its officers, thus: 
TONY CONSING: Fiscal, nanglabay ang mga oras, nanglabay ang gamay’ng panahon ang
samad sa imong kasingkasing nagpabi-lin pa ba ni. O ingnon nato duna
na bay pagbag-o sa imong huna-huna karon?
Legal Ethics Session 4 7

  (Fiscal, after the lapse of time, are you still hurt? Or have you not to appeal.” Then he came back and said, “BJMP, arrest Bagabuyo.”) 
changed your mind yet?)    x x x 
BAGABUYO:  Ang akong huna-huna kon aduna man ugaling pagbag-o ang pagsiguro, BAGABUYO:  . . . P100,000.00 ang iyang guipapiyansa. Naunsa na? Dinhi makita nimo
ang mga Huwes nga dili mahibalo sa balaod tangtangon pagka abogado, ang iyang
mao kana. pagka gross
  (If my mind has changed at all, it is that I ensure that all judges who are ignorance of the
ignorant of the law should be disbarred. That’s it.)  law. . . . 
  x x x    (He imposed a bail of P100,000.00. How come? This is where
BAGABUYO:  Mao kana ang tinuod, Ton, ug kining akong guibatonan karon nga will see his gross ignorance of the law. . . . ) 
hunahuna mahitungod nianang mga Huwes nga dili kahibalo sa balaod,   x x x 
magkadugay magkalami. Kada adlao nagatoon ako. Nagabasa ako sa TONY CONSING:  So karon, unsay plano nimo karon?
mga bag-ong jurisprudence ug sa atong balaod aron sa pag- siguro   (So what is your plan now?) 
gayod nga inigsang-at unya nako sa kaso nga disbarment niining di ma- BAGABUYO:  Sumala sa akong gui-ingon moundang lang ako kon matangta
hibalo nga Huwes, sigurado gayod ako nga katangtangan siya sa siya sa pagka abogado. . . .
lisensiya . . . . Ang kini nga Huwes nga dili mahibalo sa   (As I have said, I will only stop if he is already disbarred. . . .)
balaod, pagatangtangon na, dili la-mang sa pagka-Huwes kon dili sa
pagka-abogado. Tan-awa ra gyod kining iyang gibuhat nga Order,   x x x 
Ton, ang iyang pagkabakakon . . . . BAGABUYO:  Nasuko siya niini kay hambugero kuno, pero angayan niyang
  (That’s true, Ton, and this conviction I have now about judges who are an nga ang trabajo sa Huwes dili ang pagtan-aw kon ang taw
ignorant of the law is made firmer by time. I study everyday. I read new hambugero . . . . Ug ang akong gisulti mao lamang ang balao
jurisprudence and the law to insure that when I file the disbarment case siya in fact at that time I said he is not conversant of the law,
against this Judge who does not know his law, I am certain that he loses regards to the case of murder. . . . 
his license. . . . This judge who is ignorant of the law should not only be   (He got angry because I was allegedly bragging but he should
removed as a judge but should also be disbarred. Just take a look at his that it is not for a judge to determine if a person is a
Order, Ton, and see what a liar he is . . . .)  braggart. . . .And what I said was based on the law. In fact, a
  x x x  time, I said he is not conversant of the law, with regards to th
BAGABUYO:  Yes, nag-ingon ang iyang Order. . . . Ngano nga nakaingon ako case of murder . . . .) 
nga bakakon kini, nag-ingon nga kini konong order given in open
court, ang kalooy sa dios, ang iyang order sa Korte wala siya mag- ingon
ug kantidad nga P100,000.00 nga bail bond. . . . 
  x x x 
  (Yes, his Order said that . . . . Why did I say that he is a liar? It states
BAGABUYO:  Ah, mi sit down sab ako, contempt ra ba kadto . . . . Mao kan
that this Order was “given in open court,” and in God’s mercy, he did not
pero unsa may iyang katuyoan—ang iyang katuyoan nga ipa-a
state the amount of P100,000.00 as bail bond. . . .) 
ako didto kay didto, iya akong pakauwawan kay iya kong si-ko
BAGABUYO:  Kay dili man lagi mahibalo sa balaod, ako siyang gui-ingnan, Your Honor,
iya kong ipa-priso, pero kay di
I have the right to appeal. Mibalik dayon, ug miingon siya, BJMP arrest
Baga-buyo.  man lagi mahibalo sa balaod, ang
  (Because he does not know the law, I said, “Your Honor, I have the right iyang gui orderan BJMP, intawon
Legal Ethics Session 4
por dios por Santo,Mr. Tan,
pagbasa intawon ug balaod,
naunsa ka ba Mr. Tan? Unsa may
imong hunahuna nga kon ikaw
Huwes, ikaw na ang diktador, no
way, no sir, ours is a democratic
country where all and everyone is
entitled to due process of law—you
did not accord me due process of
law . . . .  Statement of Facts of respondent’s suspension from the practice of law, dated July 14, 2005,
  (I sat down. . . . That’s it. But what was his
purpose? He made me come in order to humiliate me
because he wanted me arrested, he wanted me
imprisoned, but because he is ignorant of the law, he
ordered the BMJP. For God’s sake, Mr. Tan, what’s
wrong with you, Mr. Tan? Please read the law. What is
your thinking? That when you are a judge, you are
also a dictator? No way, no sir, ours is a democratic
country where all and everyone is entitled to due
process of law—you did not accord me due process of
law. . . .) 
TONY CONSING:  So mopasaka kang disbarment, malaumon kita nga
maaksiyonan kini, with all this problem sa Korte
Suprema.
  (So you are filing a disbarment case? We hope that
this be given action with all the problems in the
Supreme Court.) 
BAGABUYO:  Dili ako mabalaka niana kay usa ka truck ang
akong jurisprudence, nga ang mga Huwes nga di
mahibalo sa balaod pagatangtangon gayod sa ilang
pagka Huwes. . . . Apan unsa man intawon ang balaod
ang iyang gibasa niini nadunggan ko nga kini kuno
siya mad-jongero, mao bitaw na, madjong ang iyang
guitunan?
(I am not worried because I have a truckload of
jurisprudence that judges who are ignorant of the law
must be removed from the Bench. But what law has he
been reading? I heard that he is a
8
mahjong aficionado (mahjongero) and that is why he is
studying mahjong.11
The trial court concluded that respondent, as a member of the bar and an officer of the court, is
duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of the court, and should not promote distrust in
the administration of justice.
The trial court stated that it is empowered to suspend respondent from the practice of law
under Sec. 28, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court 12 for any of the causes mentioned in Sec. 27 13 of
the same Rule. Respondent was given the opportunity to be heard, but he opted to be silent.
Thus, it held that the requirement of due process has been duly satisfied. 
In accordance with the provisions of Sec. 29, 14Rule 138 and Sec. 9,15 Rule 139 of the Rules of
Court, the RTC of Surigao City, Branch 29, transmitted to the Office of the Bar Confidant the
together with the order of suspension and other relevant documents.
In its Report dated January 4, 2006, the Office of the Bar Confidant found that the article in
the August 18, 2003 issue of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily, which maligned the integrity and
independence of the court and its officers, and re-spondent’s criticism of the trial court’s Order
dated November 12, 2002, which was aired in radio station DXKS, both in connection with Crim.
Case No. 5144, constitute grave violation of oath of office by respondent. It stated that the
requirement of due process was complied with when respondent was given an opportunity to be
heard, but respondent chose to remain silent.
The Office of the Bar Confidant recommended the implementation of the trial court’s order of
suspension dated February 8, 2004, and that respondent be suspended from the practice of law
for one year, with a stern warning that the repetition of a similar offense will be dealt with more
severely.
The Court approves the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant. It has been
reiterated in Gonzaga v. Villanueva, Jr. 16 that:
“A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath, a patent disregard of his
duties, or an odious deportment unbecoming an attorney. Among the grounds enumerated in
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court are deceit; malpractice; gross misconduct in office;
grossly immoral conduct; conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; any violation of the
oath which he is required to take before admission to the practice of law; willful disobedience of
any lawful order of a superior court; corrupt or willful appearance as an attorney for a party to a
case without authority to do so. The grounds are not preclusive in nature even as they are
broad enough as to cover practically any kind of impropriety that a lawyer does or commits in
his professional career or in his private life. A lawyer must at no time be wanting in probity and
moral fiber which are not only conditions precedent to his entrance to the Bar, but are likewise
essential demands for his continued membership therein.”
Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts who are empowered to appear, prosecute and
defend; and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a
consequence.17 Membership in the bar imposes upon them certain obligations. 18 Canon 11 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility mandates a lawyer to “observe and maintain the respect due
to the courts and to judicial officers and [he] should insist on similar conduct by others.” Rule
11.05 of Canon 11 states that a lawyer “shall submit grievances against a judge to the proper
authorities only.”
Legal Ethics Session 4 9

Respondent violated Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 when he admittedly caused the holding of a press Notes.—Judges should exercise their contempt powers judiciously and sparingly, with
conference where he made statements against the Order dated November 12, 2002 allowing the utmost restraint, and with the end in view of utilizing their contempt powers for correction and
accused in Crim. Case No. 5144 to be released on bail. preservation, not for retaliation or vindication. (Pacuribot vs. Lim, Jr., 275 SCRA 543 [1997])

Respondent also violated Canon 11 when he indirectly stated that Judge Tan was displaying The salutary rule is that the power to punish for contempt must be exercised in the
judicial arrogance in the article entitled, Senior prosecutor lambasts Surigao judge for allowing preservative not vindictive principle, and on the corrective, not retaliatory idea of punishment—a
murder suspect to bail out, which appeared in the August 18, 2003 issue of the Mindanao Gold judge anywhere should be the last person to be perceived as a petty tyrant holding imperious
Star Daily. Re-spondent’s statements in the article, which were made while Crim. Case No. 5144 sway over his domain. (Rodriguez vs. Bonifacio, 344 SCRA 519 [2000])
was still pending in court, also violated Rule 13.02 of Canon 13, which states that “a lawyer shall
not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public
opinion for or against a party.”

In regard to the radio interview given to Tony Consing, respondent violated Rule 11.05 of
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for not resorting to the proper authorities
only for redress of his grievances against Judge Tan. Respondent also violated Canon 11 for his
disrespect of the court and its officer when he stated that Judge Tan was ignorant of the law,
that as a mahjong aficionado, he was studying mahjong instead of studying the law, and that he
was a liar.

Respondent also violated the Lawyer’s Oath, as he has sworn to “conduct [himself] as a
lawyer according to the best of [his] knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to
the courts as to [his] clients.”

As a senior state prosecutor and officer of the court, respondent should have set the
example of observing and maintaining the respect due to the courts and to judicial
officers. Montecillo v. Gica 19 held: 

“It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude. As an officer of
the court, it is his duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the court to which he owes fidelity,
according to the oath he has taken. Respect for the courts guarantees the stability of our
democratic institutions which, without such respect, would be resting on a very shaky
foundation.”
The Court is not against lawyers raising grievances against erring judges but the rules clearly
provide for the proper venue and procedure for doing so, precisely because respect for the
institution must always be maintained.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo is found guilty of violating
Rule 11.05, Canon 11 and Rule 13.02, Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and
of violating the Lawyer’s Oath, for which he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1)
year effective upon finality of this Decision, with a STERN WARNING that the repetition of a
similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to
respondent’s personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the
Department of Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
     Puno (C.J.), Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-
Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Garcia, Velasco,
Jr., Nachura and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year for violation
of Rule 11.05, Canon 11 and Rule 13.02, Canon 13, Code of Professional Responsibility and for
violating the Lawyer’s Oath, with stern warning against repetition of similar offense.
Legal Ethics Session 4 10

himself and relegated to insignificance the limelight on himself and relegated to insignificance
No. L-36800. October 21,1974.*
the principal issue raised in the petition for certiorari to review the entitled "Francisco M. Gica vs.
4. JORGE MONTECILLO and QUIRICO DEL MAR, petitioners, vs. FRANCISCO M. GICA,
Hon. Santiago O. Tañada, et al" which was denied due course by this Court's resolution dated
MAGNO S. GATMAITAN, JOSE N. LEUTERIO, and RAMON G. GAVIOLA, Justices of the
May 14,1973, for lack of merit.
Court of Appeals, respondents. In Re Quirico del Mar, For Disciplinary action as member of the
Philippine Bar, respondent.
Although the petition for certiorari has been denied, it becomes imperatively necessary to
elucidate upon the antecedents of this case even if Our only justification in so doing is to seek a
Attorneys; Contempt; A lawyer may not be allowed to retire from practice of law while
reason or motive for the acts of contempt perpetrated by respondent Quirico del Mar that might
facing contempt charges.—With full realization that a practising lawyer and officer of the court
serve to lighten the enormity of his wrongdoing as a member of the Bar.
facing contempt proceedings cannot just be allowed to voluntarily retire from the practice of
law, an act which would negate the inherent power of the court to punish him for contempt in
As a result of an alleged slander committed by Jorge Montecillo on Francisco M. Gica (the former
defense of its integrity and honor, We resolved, by resolution of January 10,1974, to deny said
allegedly calling the latter "stupid" or a "fool"), Mr. Gica filed a criminal complaint for oral
prayer of Atty. del Mar without prejudice to his making arrangement directly with his client.
defamation against Montecillo (Criminal Case No. R-28782 in Branch VII of the Cebu City Court)
and a case for damages arising from the same incident (Civil Case No. R-13075 in Branch VI of
Same; Same; Lawyers have a duty to maintain respect for the courts and judicial officers.
the Cebu City Court). Montecillowas acquitted in Criminal Case No. R-28782, and in  Civil Case
—To aged brethren of the bar it may appear belated to remind them that second only to the
No. R-13075, the Cebu City Court found that Montecillo did not call Gica "stupid". Finding the
duty of maintaining allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to support the Constitution
counter-claim of Montecillo meritorious, the City Court rendered judgment against Gica for him
and obey the laws of the Philippines, is the duty of all attorneys to observe and maintain the
to pay Montecillo five hundred pesos as moral damages, two hundred pesos as compensatory
respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers. But We do remind them of said duty to
damages and three hundred pesos as attorney's fees, plus costs.
emphasize to their younger brethren its paramount importance. A lawyer must always
remember that he is an officer of the court exercising a high privilege and serving in the noble
Francisco Gica appealed from the decision of the City Court of Cebu in Civil Case No. R-
mission of administering justice.
13075 to the Court of First Instance of Cebu presided by Hon. Santiago O. Tañada, but the
Same; Same; It is contumely for a lawyer to resort to veiled threats for purpose of
Court of First Instance upheld the decision of the City Court. The case was then elevated to the
making courts reconsider their decisions.—The intemperate and imprudent act of respondent del
Court of Appeals by petition for review by petitioner Francisco M. Gica and it was docketed
Mar in resorting to veiled threats to make both Courts reconsider their respective stand in the
therein as CA-G. R. No. 46504-R.
decision and the resolution that spelled disaster for his client cannot be anything but pure
contumely for said tribunals. It is manifest that respondent del Mar has scant respect for the two
The Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals in a decision penned by the Hon. Magno S.
highest Courts of the land when on the flimsy ground of alleged error in deciding a case, he
Gatmaitan and concurred in by Associate Justices Jose N. Leuterio and Ramon G. Gaviola, Jr.
proceeded to challenge the integrity of both Courts by claiming that they knowingly rendered
(promulgated on Sept. 27, 1972), reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu;
unjust judgment. In short, his allegation is that they acted with intent and malice, if not with
ruled in favor of petitioner Gica on the ground that the preponderance of evidence favored
gross ignorance of the law, in disposing of the case of his client.
petitioner Francisco M. Gica on the principle that positive must prevail over the negative
evidence, and that "some words must have come from Montecillo's lips that were insulting to
Same; Same; Same.—We note with wonder and amazement the brazen effrontery of
Gica". The appellate court concluded that its decision is a vindication of Gica and, instead,
respondent in assuming that his personal knowledge of the law and his concept of justice are
awarded him five hundred pesos as damages,
superior to that of both the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. His pretense cannot but
tend to erode the people's faith in the integrity of the courts of justice and in the administration
It is from this point that trouble began for respondent Atty. Quirico del Mar when, as counsel for
of justice. He repeatedly invoked his supposed quest for law and justice as justification for his
Montecillo, he moved for a reconsideration of the Appellate Court's decision with a veiled threat
contemptuous statements without realizing that, in seeking both abstract elusive terms, he is
by mentioning the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on "Knowingly rendering unjust
merely pursuing his own personal concept of law and justice. He seems not to comprehend that
judgment" and "judgment rendered through negligence", and the innuendo that the Court of
what to him may be lawful or just may not be so in the minds of others. He could not accept
Appeals allowed itself to be deceived. When the Appellate Court denied the motion for
that what to him may appear to be right or correct may be wrong or erroneous from the
reconsideration in its Resolution of October 24, 1972, it, observed that the terminology of the
viewpoint of another. We understand that respondent's mind delves into the absolute without
motion insinuated that the Appellate Court rendered an unjust judgment, that it abetted a
considering the universal law of change. It is with deep concern that We view such a state of
falsification and it permitted itself to be deceived. It admonished Atty. del Mar to remember that
mind of a practising lawyer since what We expect as a paramount qualification for those in the
threats and abusive language cannot compel any court of justice to grant reconsideration.
practice of law is broadmindedness and tolerance coupled with keen perception and a sound
Respondent del Mar persisted and in his second motion for reconsideration, filed without leave
sense of proportion in evaluating events and circumstances.
of court, made another threat by stating that "with almost all penal violations placed under the
jurisdiction of the President of the Philippines, particularly Articles 171, 204 and 205 of the
PETITION for certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals. Revised Penal Code, as Commander in Chief of the AFP, by virtue of the proclamation of martial
law, the next appeal that will be interposed, will be to His Excellency, the President of the
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Philippines."

ESGUERRA, J.: The Appellate Court in its resolution of Nov. 27,1972, noticed that notwithstanding its
admonition in its resolution of Oct. 24, 1972, for Atty. del Mar to refrain from abusive language
and threats, he reiterated his threats, and that the Appellate Court, impelled to assert its
Petitioner Atty. Quirico del Mar of Cebu City in G. R. No. L36800, and as respondent in contempt
proceedings both in the Court of Appeals and in this Court, virtually focused the limelight on
Legal Ethics Session 4
authority, ordered respondent del Mar to explain within 10 days (and to appear on January
10,1973) why he should not be punished for contempt of court.
On December 5, 1972, respondent del Mar made a written explanation wherein he said that
the Appellate Court could not be threatened and he was not making any threat but only
informing the Appellate Court of the course of action he would follow. On the same date,
respondent sent a letter to the Justices of the 4th Division of the Court of Appeals informing
them that he sent a letter to the President of the Philippines, furnishing them a copy thereof,
and requesting the Justices to take into consideration the contents of said letter during the
hearing of the case scheduled for January 10,1973. Not content with that move, on December 8,
1972, respondent sent another letter to the same Justices of the Court of Appeals wherein he
reminded them of a civil case he instituted against Justices of the Supreme Court for damages in
the amount of P200,000 for a decision rendered not in accordance with law and justice, stating
that he would not like to do it again but would do so if provoked. We pause here to observe that
respondent del Mar seems to be of that frame of mind whereby he considers as in accordance
with law and justice whatever he believes to be right in his own opinion and as contrary to law
and justice whatever does not accord with his views. In other words, he would like to assume
the role of this Court, personally and individually, in the interpretation and construction of the
laws, evaluation of evidence and determination of what is in accordance with law and justice.
The documented incidents as narrated in the Appellate Court's Resolution of March 5, 1973,
cannot more eloquently depict the very manifest and repeated threats of respondent del Mar to
bludgeon the Justices of the Fourth Divison into reconsidering its decision which happened to be
adverse to respondent's client. Respondent del Mar, instead of presenting lucid and forceful
arguments on the merits of his plea for a reconsideration to convince the Justices of the Fourth
Division of the alleged error in their decision, resorted to innuendos and veiled threats, even
casting.- downright aspersion on the Justices concerned by insinuating that for their decision
they could be criminally and civilly liable for knowingly rendering unjust judgment, or doing it
through ignorance.
We quote with approval this portion of the Appellate Court's Resolution (March 5,1973):
"A just man can never be threatened, p. 145, rollo, is not at all true; any man, just or unjust,
can be threatened; if he is unjust, he will succumb, if he is just, he will not, but the offense is
committed, whether the threats do or do not succeed. As to his (respondent del Mar's) reference
to the New Society, p. 150, in his letter to his Excellency, complaining against those justices, let
it be said that precisely it was under the Former Society that there had been so much disrespect
for the constituted authorities, there was abuse, worse than abuse, there was arrogant abuse,
of the so-called civil liberties, against the authorities, including the courts, not excluding even
the President; it is this anarchy that is the program to cure in the New."
This Resolution of the Appellate Court of March 5, 1973, fittingly concluded that "counsel del
Mar is found guilty of contempt and condemned to pay a fine of P200.00 and ordered
suspended from the practice of law and pursuant to Sec. 9 of Rule 139, let certified copies of
these papers be elevated to the Honorable Supreme Court". We upheld the Court of Appeals
and gave full force and effect to this order of suspension from the practice of law when in Our
resolution dated Nov. 19, 1973, the Judicial Consultant of this Court was directed to circularize
all courts about the order of the Court of Appeals suspending Atty. Quirico del Mar from the
practice of law.
Not satisfied with the wrong that he had already done against Associate Justices Magno S.
Gatmaitan, Jose N. Leuterio and Ramon Gaviola, Jr., respondent del Mar sued the three Justices
for damages in Civil Case No. R-13277 of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, trying to hold
them liable for their decision in CA-G. R. No. 46504-R; that the case for damages (R-13277) was
terminated by compromise agreement after Mr. del Mar himself moved for the dismissal of his
11
complaint, apologized to the Court of Appeals and the Justices concerned, and agreed to pay
nominal moral damages in favor of the defendants-justices. This is the undeniable indication
that respondent del Mar did not only threaten the three Justices of the Appellate Court but he
actually carried out his threat, although he did not succeed in making them change their minds
in the case they decided in accordance with the exercise of their judicial discretion emanating
from pure conviction.
To add insult to injury, respondent del Mar had the temerity to file his motion on October
10,1973, before Us, asking that his suspension from the practice of law imposed by the Court of
Appeals be ignored because of the amicable settlement reached in Civil Case No. R-13277 of the
Court of First Instance of Cebu which was the action for damages filed against the three Justices
of the Appellate Court.
Respondent del Mar's ire at the Appellate Court, fanned by the wind of frustration, turned
against Us when We denied on May 14, 1973, his petition for review on certiorari of the decision
of the Appellate Court, G. R. No. L-36800, for on May 25, 1973, he filed his motion for
reconsideration and wrote a letter addressed to the Clerk of this Court requesting the names of
the Justices of this Court who supported the resolution denying his petition, together with the
names of the Justices favoring his motion for reconsideration. This motion for reconsideration
We denied for lack of merit in Our resolution dated June 15, 1973. He, then, filed a
manifestation dated July 1, 1973, before Us, stating brazenly, among other things, "I can at this
time reveal to you that, had your Clerk of Court furnished me with certified true copies of the
last two Resolutions of the Supreme Court confirming the decision of the Court of Appeals in the
case entitled Francisco M. Gica vs. Jorge Montecillo, I would have filed against the Justices
supporting the same, civil and criminal suits as I did to the Justices of the Court of Appeals who,
rewarding the abhorent falsification committed by Mr. Gica,  reversed for him the decisions of the
City Court and the Court of First Instance of Cebu, not with a view to obtaining a favorable
judgment therein but for the purpose of exposing to the people the corroding evils extant in our
Government,so that they may well know them and work for their extermination" (Italics
supplied. In one breath and in a language certainly not complimentary to the Appellate Court
and to Us, respondent del Mar again made his veiled threat of retribution aimed at the Appellate
Court and at Us for Our judicial acts in CA-G. R. No. 46504-R and G. R. No. L-36800.
Our immediate reaction to this manifestation, dictated by the impulse of placing on a
pedestal beyond suspicion the integrity and honor of this Court and that of any of our other
courts of justice, was to require by Resolution of July 16,1973, respondent del Mar to show
cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against him for the contemptuous statements
contained in his manifestation.
At this juncture, We pause to reexamine the act of the Appellate Court in CA-G. R. No.
46504-R and our own in G. R. No. L-36800 to determine what error we might have committed
to generate such a vengef ul wrath of respondent del Mar which drove him to make his
contemptuous statements.
The crucial issue in the case of oral defamation filed by Francisco M. Gica against Jorge
Montecillo is as to what was the statement really uttered by Montecillo on the occasion in
question—"binuang man gud na" (That act is senseless or done without thinking) or "buang
man gud na siya" (He is foolish or stupid). If the statement uttered was the former, Montecillo
should be exonerated; if the latter, he would be liable. The Appellate Court on evaluating the
evidence ruled that the preponderance thereof favored Gica, "on the principle that the positive
evidence must prevail over the negative" and, therefore, what was really uttered by Montecillo
on that occasion was "buang man gud na siya" (He is foolish or stupid),' thus making him liable
for oral defamation. When We denied in G. R. No. L-36800the petition for review on certiorari of
the Appellate Court's decision in CA-G. R. No. 46504-R, We did so because We could find no
Legal Ethics Session 4
reason for disturbing the Appellate Court's finding and conclusion on the aforementioned lone
question of fact which would warrant overturning its decision.
On July 13,1973, Our resolution of May 14,1973, denying the petition for review on
certiorari of the decision of the Appellate Court in CA-G. R. No. 46504-R, became final and
executory and the Court of Appeals was so informed.
To Our resolution of July 16, 1973, requiring respondent del Mar to show cause why he should
not be disciplined for his statements contained in his manifestation of July 1, 1973, he submitted
an explanation dated August 1, 1973, wherein he stated that "x x x, he is attaching hereto the
criminal case he filed with the President of the Philippines (copy marked as Annex "A") and the
civil case he instituted in the Court of First Instance of Cebu (copy marked as Annex "B") against
Justices Magno S. Gatmaitan, Jose N. Leuterio and Ramon G. Gaviola, Jr., which embody the
corroding evils he complained of as extant in the Government needing correction. He would
have followed suit were it not for the fact that he is firmly convinced that human efforts in this
direction will be fruitless. As manifested, he, therefore, decided to retire from a life of militancy
to a life of seclusion, leaving to God the filling-up of human deficiencies" (Italics supplied).
This so-called explanation is more, in its tenor, of a defiant justification of his contemptuous
statements contained in the manifestation of July 1, 1973. Its contents reveal a continued veiled
threat against the Justices of this Court who voted to deny del Mar's petition for review on
certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. No. 46504-R.
Our resolution of September 4, 1973, required respondent Atty. Quirico del Mar to appear
personally at the hearing of his explanation on November 5, 1973. On September 26, 1973,
respondent filed an additional explanation with this Court, wherein he stated, among other
things: "Graft, corruption and injustice are rampant in and outside of the Government. It is this
state of things that convinced me that all human efforts to correct and/or reform the said evils
will be fruitless and, as stated in my manifestation to you, I have already decided to retire from
a life of militancy to a life of seclusion, leaving to God the filling-up of human def iciencies."
Again We noticed that the tenor of this additional explanation is a toned-down justification (as
compared to his explanation of August 1, 1973) of his previous contemptuous statements
without even a hint of apology or regret. Respondent is utilizing what exists in his mind as state
of graft, corruption and injustice allegedly rampant in and outside of the government as
justification for his contemptuous statements. In other words, he already assumed by his own
contemptuous utterances that because there is an alleged existence of rampant corruption,
graft, and injustice in and out of the government, We, by Our act in G. R. No. L-36800, are
among the corrupt, the grafters and those allegedly committing injustice. We are at a complete
loss to follow respondent del Mar's logic and We certainly should, with understanding
condescension, commiserate in the pitiable state of mind of a brother in the legal profession
who seems to have his reasoning and sense of proportion blurred or warped by an all-
consuming obsession emanating from a one-track mind that only his views are absolutely
correct and those of others are all wrong.
When this Court in the resolution dated November 19, 1973, directed the Judicial Consultant
to circularize to all courts concerning the order of the Court of Appeals suspending Atty. Quirico
del Mar from the practice of law, respondent del Mar filed a motion for reconsideration on
December 12, 1973, requesting Us to reconsider said directive. In Our resolution dated
December 17, 1973, respondent del Mar, after he had been interpellated by the Court, was
given a period of five days to submit a memorandum in support of his explanation. In view of
respondent's manifestation that there was no need for further investigation of the facts involved,
in accordance with Section 29 of Rule 138, We resolved that the matter be deemed submitted
for decision.
12
In the memorandum entitled "Explanation" dated December 20, 1973, respondent del Mar
stated that he suffered repeated strokes of high blood pressure which rendered him dizzy and
unstable mentally and physically; that his sight is blurred and his reasoning is faulty; he easily
forgets things and cannot readily correlate them; that for any and all mistakes he might have
committed he asked for forgiveness; he reiterated that "blunders" were committed by the Court
of Appeals in its decision and that the Justices thereof knowingly rendered the same in violation
of Article 204 of the Penal Code; he persisted in his view that the Court of Appeals committed an
error in its decision; justified his act of invoking Article 204 of the Penal Code in trying to make
the Appellate Justices liable; that he was high in his academic and scholastic standing during his
school days; that "with all the confusion prevailing nowadays, the undersigned has decided for
reasons of sickness and old age to retire from the practice of law. He hopes and expects that,
with the approval thereof by the Supreme Court, he could have himself released from the
obligation he has contracted with his clients as regards all his pending cases."
It is Our observation that the tenor of this explanation although pleading mental and physical
ailment as a mitigation of the contemptuous acts, is still that of arrogant justification for
respondent's previous statements. We quote:
"The undersigned was asked if he had not filed against the Justices of the Supreme Court a case
for damages against them. He answered in the affirmative, but the case was dismissed by Judge
Villasor, of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, because of an American ruling that a justice of
the Supreme Court of the Philippines cannot be civilly held liable. The ruling cited was rendered
during the American regime in the Philippines which was still subject to the jurisdiction of the
American laws. But the Philippines is now independent and Article 204 of the Penal Code still
remains incorporated therein for observance and fulfillment. Up to now, there is not yet any def
inite ruling of the Supreme Court thereon"
While still persistently Justifying his contemptuous statements and at the same time pleading
that his physical and mental ailment be considered so that We may forgive respondent del Mar,
he shrewdly stated at the end of his explanation that he has decided for reasons of sickness and
old age to retire from the practice of law, in practical anticipation of whatever penalty We may
decide to impose on him and thus making it appear that he has voluntarily done so with honor
and in complete evasion of whatever this Court may decide to do in this case.
With full realization that a practicing lawyer and officer of the court facing contempt
proceedings cannot just be allowed to voluntarily retire from the practice of law, an act which
would negate the inherent power of the court to punish him for contempt in defense of its
integrity and honor, We resolved, by resolution of January 10,1974, to deny said prayer of Atty.
del Mar without prejudice to his making arrangement directly with his clients.
To aged brethren of the bar it may appear belated to remind them that second only to the
duty of maintaining allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to support the Constitution
and obey the laws of the Philippines, is the duty of all attorneys to observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers (Sec. 20 (b) Rule 138, Rules of Court).
But We do remind them of said duty to emphasize to their younger brethren its paramount
importance. A lawyer must always remember that he is an officer of the court exercising a high
privilege and serving in the noble mission of administering justice.
It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude (People vs.
Carillo, 77 Phil. 572). As an officer of the court, it is his duty to uphold.the dignity and authority
of the court to which he owes fidelity, according to the oath he has taken. Respect for the
courts guarantees the stability of our democratic institutions which, without such respect, would
be resting on a very shaky foundation. (In re Sotto 82 Phil. 595).
As We stated before:
Legal Ethics Session 4
"We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment. That is his privilege.
And, he may suffer frustration at what he feels is others' lack of it. This is his misfortune. Some
such frame of mind, however, should not be allowed to harden into a belief that he may attack a
court's decision in words calculated to jettison the time-honored aphorism that courts are the
temples of right. He should give due allowance to the fact that judges are but men; and men
are encompassed by error, fettered by fallibility.
x x x x x x x x x x x x. To be sure, lawyers may come up with various methods, perhaps
much more effective, in calling the Court's attention to the issues involved. The language vehicle
does not run short of expressions, emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory,
illuminating but not offensive" (Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer G. R. No. L-22979, June
26,1967; 20 SCRA 441, 444-445)
Criminal contempt has been defined as a conduct that is directed against the dignity and
authority of the court or a judge acting judicially. It is an act obstructing the administration of
justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect (17 C. J. S. 7).
We have held that statements contained in a motion to disqualify a judge, imputing to the
latter conspiracy or connivance with the prosecutors or concocting a plan with a view to
securing the conviction of the accused, and implicating said judge in a supposed attempt to
extort money from the accused on a promise or assurance of the latter's acquittal, all without
basis, were highly derogatory and serve nothing but to discredit the judge presiding the court in
an attempt to secure his disqualification. Statements of that nature have no place in a court
pleading and if uttered by a member of the bar, constitute a serious disrespect. We said:
"As an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not
destroy unnecessarily the high esteem and regard towards the court  so essential to the proper
administration of justice"(Italics supplied). (People vs. Carillo, 43 O.G. No. 12, p. 5021; De Joya
et al vs. C. F. I. of Rizal and Rilloraza 52 O. G. 6150).
As already stated, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG. R. No. 46504-R was based on its
evaluation of the evidence on only one specific issue. We in turn denied in G. R. No. L36800 the
petition for review on certiorari of the decision because We found no reason for disturbing the
appellate court's finding and conclusion. In both instances, both the Court of Appeals and this
Court exercised judicial discretion in a case under their respective jurisdiction. The intemperate
and imprudent act of respondent del Mar in resorting to veiled threats to make both Courts
reconsider their respective stand in the decision and the resolution that spelled disaster for his
client cannot be anything but pure contumely for said tribunals.
It is manifest that respondent del Mar has scant respect for the two highest Courts of the
land when on the flimsy ground of alleged error in deciding a case, he proceeded to challenge
the integrity of both Courts by claiming that they knowingly rendered unjust judgment. In short,
his allegation is that they acted with intent and malice, if not with gross ignorance of the law, in
disposing of the case of his client.
We note with wonder and amazement the brazen effrontery of respondent in assuming that his
personal knowledge of the law and his concept of justice are superior to that of both the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. His pretense cannot but tend to erode the people's
faith in the integrity of the courts of justice and in the administration of justice. He repeatedly
invoked his supposed quest for law and justice as justification for his contemptuous statements
without realizing that, in seeking both abstract elusive terms, he is merely pursuing his own
personal concept of law and justice. He seems not to comprehend that what to him may be
lawful or just may not be so in the minds of others. He could not accept that what to him may
appear to be right or correct may be wrong or erroneous from the viewpoint of another. We
13
understand that respondent's mind delves into the absolute without considering the universal
law of change. It is with deep concern that We view such a state of mind of a practicing lawyer
since what We expect as a paramount qualification for those in the practice of law is
broadmindedness and tolerance, coupled with keen perception and a sound sense of proportion
in evaluating events and circumstances.
For a lawyer in the twilight of his life, with supposed physical and mental ailments at that,
who dares to challenge the integrity and honor of both the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals,
We have nothing but commiseration and sympathy for his choosing to close the book of his long
years of law practice not by voluntary retirement with honor but in disciplinary action with
ignominy and dishonor. To those who are in the practice of law and those who in the future will
choose to enter this profession, We wish to point to this case as a reminder for them to imprint
in their hearts and minds that an attorney owes it to himself to respect the courts of justice and
its officers as a fealty for the stability of our democratic institutions.
WHEREFORE, the resolution of the Court of Appeals in CAG. R. No. 46504-R, dated March
5, 1973, suspending Atty. Quirico del Mar from the practice of law, as implemented by Our
resolution of November 19,1973, is hereby affirmed.
Respondent Atty. Quirico del Mar, for his misconduct towards the Supreme Court, shall be,
as he is hereby, suspended from the practice of law until further orders of this Court, such
suspension to take effect immediately. (In re Almacen, No. L-27654, Feb. 18,1970,31 SCRA, p.
562.)
The Judicial Consultant of this Court is directed to circularize all courts and the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines regarding the indefinite suspension of Atty. Quirico del Mar from the
practice of law.
SO ORDERED.
     Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Fernandez, Muñoz
Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur.
     Fernando, J., did not take part.
Resolution affirmed; respondent indefinitely suspended from the practice of law.
Notes.—lt is the lawyer's duty as a member of the Bar "to abstain from all offensive
personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness,
unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged." (Surigao Mineral
Reservation Board vs. Cloribel, 31 SCRA1).
Every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public officers. This
right is not diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a judicial authority  (U.S. vs.
Bustos, 37 Phil. 731; In re Gomez, 43 Phil. 376; Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 736; Austria vs.
Masaquel, L-22536, Aug. 31,1967; Cabansag vs. Fernandez, L-8974, Oct. 18,1967) or that it is
articulated by a lawyer (In re Gomez, 43 Phil. 376). Such right is especially recognized where
the criticism concerns a concluded litigation (In re Lozano and Quevedo, 54 Phil. 801; In re
Abistado, 57 Phil. 668; People vs. Alarcon; In re Contempt Proceedings, Mangahas, 69 Phil.
265), because then the court's actuations are thrown open to public consumption (Strebel vs.
Figueras, 96 Phil. 321).
It is, however, a cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall
not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on
the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other.
Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect a lawyer owes to the
courts. It is such a misconduct that makes a lawyer subject to disciplinary action. (In re
Almacen, 31 SCRA 580).
Legal Ethics Session 4 14

When a lawyer's integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he denies the
charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence for the relator and
show proofs that he still maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity, which at all
times is expected of him. (Quingwa vs. Puno, 19 SCRA 439).
Legal Ethics Session 4
A.C. No. 7199. July 22, 2009.*
[Formerly CBD 04-1386.]
5. FOODSPHERE, INC., complainant, vs. ATTY. MELANIO L. MAURICIO, JR., respondent.
Legal Ethics; Attorneys; It is necessary for every lawyer to act and comport himself in a
manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession, which
confidence may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the bar. —
The Court, once again, takes this occasion to emphasize the necessity for every lawyer to act
and comport himself in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal
profession, which confidence may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a
member of the bar. By the above-recited acts, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which mandates lawyers to refrain from engaging in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. For, as the IBP found, he engaged in deceitful conduct
by, inter alia, taking advantage of the complaint against CDO to advance his interest—to obtain
funds for his Batas Foundation and seek sponsorships and advertisements for the tabloids and
his television program.
Same; Same; A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a
pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party. —The respondent lawyer
also violated Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates: A lawyer
shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public
opinion for or against a party. For despite the pendency of the civil case against him and the
issuance of a status quo order restraining/enjoining further publishing, televising and
broadcasting of any matter relative to the complaint of CDO, respondent continued with his
attacks against complainant and its products. At the same time, respondent violated Canon 1
also of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates lawyers to “uphold the
Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes." For he
defied said status quo order, despite his (respondent’s) oath as a member of the legal
profession to “obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities.”
Same; Same; While a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such
enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language—language abounds with
countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory,
illuminating but not offensive .—Respondent violated Canon 8 and Rule 8.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibilitywhich mandate, viz.: “CANON 8—A lawyer shall conduct himself with
courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing
tactics against opposing counsel. Rule 8.01—A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use
language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper,”—by using intemperate
language. Apropos is the following reminder in Saberon v. Larong, 551 SCRA 359 (2008): “To be
sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members of the bar to use strong
language in pursuit of their duty to advance the interests of their clients. However, while a
lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify
the use of offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with countless possibilities for
one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.
On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive
personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor and reputation of a party or witness,
unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. In keeping with the dignity
of the legal profession, a lawyer’s language even in his pleadings must be dignified.”
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court. Disbarment.
  
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Melanio L. Mauricio for respondent.
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
15
Foodsphere, Inc. (complainant), a corporation engaged in the business of meat processing and
manufacture and distribution of canned goods and grocery products under the brand name
“CDO,” filed a Verified Complaint 1 for disbarment before the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD)
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) against Atty. Melanio L. Mauricio, Jr., popularly
known as “Batas Mauricio” (respondent), a writer/columnist of tabloids including Balitang
Patas BATAS, Bagong TIKTIK, TORO and HATAW!, and a host of a television program KAKAMPI
MO ANG BATAS telecast over UNTV and of a radio program Double B-BATAS NG BAYAN aired
over DZBB, for (1) grossly immoral conduct; (2) violation of lawyer’s oath and (3) disrespect to
the courts and to investigating prosecutors.
The facts that spawned the filing of the complaint are as follows:
On June 22, 2004, a certain Alberto Cordero (Cordero) purportedly bought from a grocery in
Valenzuela City canned goods including a can of CDO Liver spread. On June 27, 2004, as
Cordero and his relatives were eating bread with the CDO Liver spread, they found the spread to
be sour and soon discovered a colony of worms inside the can.
Cordero’s wife thus filed a complaint with the Bureau of Food and Drug Administration
(BFAD). Laboratory examination confirmed the presence of parasites in the Liver spread.
Pursuant to Joint DTI-DOH-DA Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1993, the BFAD
conducted a conciliation hearing on July 27, 2004 during which the spouses Cordero demanded
P150,000 as damages from complainant. Complainant refused to heed the demand, however, as
being in contravention of company policy and, in any event, “outrageous.”
Complainant instead offered to return actual medical and incidental expenses incurred by
the Corderos as long as they were supported by receipts, but the offer was turned down. And
the Corderos threatened to bring the matter to the attention of the media.
Complainant was later required by the BFAD to file its Answer to the complaint. In the
meantime or on August 6, 2004, respondent sent complainant via fax a copy of the front page
of the would-be August 10-16, 2004 issue of the tabloid  Balitang Patas BATAS, Vol. 1, No.
122 which complainant found to contain articles maligning, discrediting and imputing vices and
defects to it and its products. Respondent threatened to publish the articles unless complainant
gave in to the P150,000 demand of the Corderos. Complainant thereupon reiterated its counter-
offer earlier conveyed to the Corderos, but respondent turned it down.
Respondent later proposed to settle the matter for P50,000, P15,000 of which would go to
the Corderos and P35,000 to his Batas Foundation. And respondent directed complainant to
place paid advertisements in the tabloids and television program.
The Corderos eventually forged a KASUNDUAN3seeking the withdrawal of their complaint before
the BFAD. The BFAD thus dismissed the complaint. 4Respondent, who affixed his signature to
the KASUNDUAN as a witness, later wrote in one of his articles/columns in a tabloid that he
prepared the document.
On August 11, 2004, respondent sent complainant an Advertising Contract 5 asking
complainant to advertise in the tabloid Balitang Patas BATAS for its next 24 weekly issues at
P15,000 per issue or a total amount of P360,000, and a Program Profile 6 of the television
program KAKAMPI MO ANG BATAS also asking complainant to place spot advertisements with
the following rate cards: (a) spot buy 15-second TVC at P4,000; (b) spot buy 30-second TVC at
P7,700; and (c) season buy [13 episodes, 26 spots] of 30-second TVC for P130,000.
As a sign of goodwill, complainant offered to buy three full-page advertisements in the
tabloid amounting to P45,000 at P15,000 per advertisement, and three spots of 30-second TVC
in the television program at P7,700 each or a total of P23,100. Acting on complainant’s offer,
Legal Ethics Session 4
respondent relayed to it that he and his Executive Producer were disappointed with the offer
and threatened to proceed with the publication of the articles/
columns.7
On August 28, 2004, respondent, in his radio program Double B- Batas ng Bayan at radio
station DZBB, announced the holding of a supposed contest sponsored by said program, which
announcement was transcribed as follows:
“OK, at meron akong pa-contest, total magpapasko na o ha, meron pa-contest si Batas Mauricio
ang Batas ng Bayan. Ito yung ating pa-contest, hulaan ninyo, tatawag kayo sa telepono, 433-
7549 at 433-7553. Ang mga premyo babanggitin po natin sa susunod pero ito muna ang
contest, o, ‘aling liver spread ang may uod?’ Yan kita ninyo yan, ayan malalaman ninyo yan.
Pagka-nahulaan yan ah, at sasagot kayo sa akin, aling liver spread ang may uod atanong
companya ang gumagawa nyan? Itawag po ninyo sa 433-7549 st 433-7553. Open po an[g]
contest na ito sa lahat ng ating tagapakinig. Pipiliin natin ang mananalo, kung tama ang inyong
sagot. Ang tanong, aling liver spread sa Pilipinas an[g] may uod? 8 (Emphasis and italics
in the original; underscoring supplied)
And respondent wrote in his columns in the tabloids articles which put complainant in bad
light. Thus, in the August 31-September 6, 2004 issue of Balitang Patas BATAS, he wrote an
article captioned “KADIRI ANG CDO LIVER SPREAD !” In another article, he wrote “ IBA PANG
PRODUKTO NG CDO SILIPIN!”9 which appeared in the same publication in its September 7-13,
2004 issue. And still in the same publication, its September 14-20, 2004 issue, he wrote another
article entitled “DAPAT BANG PIGILIN ANG CDO.”10
Respondent continued his tirade against complainant in his column LAGING HANDA published in
another tabloid, BAGONG TIKTIK, with the following articles:11 (a) “Uod sa liver spread,”
Setyembre 6, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg. 276);12 (b) “Uod, itinanggi ng CDO,” Setyembre 7, 2004 (Taon
7, Blg. 277);13 (c) “Pagpapatigil sa CDO,” Setyembre 8, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg. 278);14 (d) “Uod sa
liver spread kumpirmado,”Setyembre 9, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg. 279) ;15 (e) “Salaysay ng nakakain ng
uod,” Setyembre 10, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg. 280);16(f) “Kaso VS. CDO itinuloy,”  Setyembre 11, 2004
(Taon 7, Blg. 281);17 (g) “Kasong Kidnapping laban sa CDO guards,” Setyembre 14, 2004 (Taon
7, Blg. 284);18 (h) “Brutalidad ng CDO guards,” Setyembre 15, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.
285);19 (i) “CDO guards pinababanatan sa PNP,” Setyembre 17, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.
287);20 (j) “May uod na CDO liver spread sa Puregold binili,” Setyembre 18, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.
288);21 (k) “Desperado na ang CDO,” Setyembre 20, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg. 290);22 (l) “Atty. Rufus
Rodriguez pumadrino sa CDO,” Setyembre 21, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg. 291) ;23 (m) “Kasunduan ng
CDO at Pamilya Cordero,” Setyembre 22, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg. 292) ;24 (n) “Bakit nagbayad ng P50
libo ang CDO,” Setyembre 23, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg. 293). 25
In his September 8, 2004 column “Anggulo ng Batas” published in Hataw!, respondent
wrote an article “Reaksyon pa sa uod ng CDO Liver Spread.”26
And respondent, in several episodes in September 2004 of his television program Kakampi
Mo ang Batas aired over UNTV, repeatedly complained of what complainant claimed to be the
“same baseless and malicious allegations/issues” against it.27
Complainant thus filed criminal complaints against respondent and several others for Libel and
Threatening to Publish Libel under Articles 353 and 356 of the Revised Penal Code before the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City and Valenzuela City. The complaints were pending
at the time of the filing of the present administrative complaint. 28
In the criminal complaints pending before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela
City, docketed as I.S. Nos. V-04-2917-2933, respondent filed his Entry of Appearance with
Highly Urgent Motion to Elevate These Cases to the Department of Justice,29 alleging:
“x x x x
16
2.N. The question here is this: What gives, Honorable (???) Prosecutors of the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City?
xxxx
2.R. Can an ordinary person like Villarez simply be tossed around, waiting for miracles to
happen?
2.S. Why? How much miracle is needed to happen here before this Office would ever act
on his complaint?
xxxx
8.  With a City Prosecutor acting the way he did in the case filed by Villarez, and with an
investigating prosecutor virtually kowtowing to the wishes of his boss, the Chief Prosecutor, can
Respondents expect justice to be meted to them?
9. With utmost due respect, Respondents have reason to believe that justice would elude
them in this Office of the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City, not because of the injustice of their
cause, but, more importantly, because of the injustice of the system;
10.  Couple all of these with reports that many a government office in Valenzuela City had
been the willing recipient of too many generosities in the past of the Complainant, and also with
reports that a top official of the City had campaigned for his much coveted position in the past
distributing products of the Complainant, what would one expect the Respondents to think?
11. Of course, not to be lost sight of here is the attitude and behavior displayed even by mere
staff and underlings of this Office to people who dare complain against the Complainant in their
respective turfs. Perhaps, top officials of this Office should investigate and ask their associates
and relatives incognito to file, even if on a pakunwari basis only, complaints against the
Complainant, and they would surely be given the same rough and insulting treatment that
Respondent Villarez got when he filed his kidnapping charge here”;30
And in a Motion to Dismiss [the case] for Lack of Jurisdiction 31 which respondent filed, as
counsel for his therein co-respondents-staffers of the newspaper  Hataw!, before the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City, respondent alleged:
“x x x x
5. If the Complainant or its lawyer merely used even a little of whatever is inside
their thick skulls, they would have clearly deduced that this Office has no jurisdiction over this
action.32(Emphasis supplied)
x x x x”
Meanwhile, on October 26, 2004, complainant filed a civil case against respondent and
several others, docketed as Civil Case No. 249-V-04, 33 before the Regional Trial Court,
Valenzuela City and raffled to Branch 75 thereof.
The pending cases against him and the issuance of a status quo order notwithstanding,
respondent continued to publish articles against complainant 34 and to malign complainant
through his television shows.
Acting on the present administrative complaint, the Investigating Commissioner of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) came up with the following findings in his October 5,
2005 Report and Recommendation:35
“I.
xxxx
Legal Ethics Session 4
In Civil Case No. 249-V-04 entitled “Foodsphere, Inc. vs. Atty. [Melanio] Mauricio, et al.,”
the Order dated 10 December 2004 (Annex O of the Complaint) was issued by Presiding Judge
Dionisio C. Sison which in part reads:
“Anent the plaintiff’s prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
included in the instant plaintiff’s motion, this Court, inasmuch as the defendants failed
to appear in court or file an opposition thereto, is constrained to GRANT the said
plaintiff’s prater, as it is GRANTED, in order to maintain STATUS QUO, and that all the
defendants, their agents, representatives or any person acting for and in behalf are
hereby restrained/enjoined from further publishing, televising and/or broadcasting any
matter subject of the Complaint in the instant case more specifically the imputation of
vices and/or defects on plaintiff and its products.”
Complainant alleged that the above-quoted Order was served on respondent by the Branch
Sheriff on 13 December 2004. Respondent has not denied the issuance of the Order dated 10
December 2004 or his receipt of a copy thereof on 13 December 2004.
Despite his receipt of the Order dated 10 December 2004, and the clear directive therein
addressed to him to desists [ sic] from “further publishing, televising and/or broadcasting any
matter subject of the Complaint in the instant case more specifically the imputation of vices
and/or defects on plaintiff and its products,” respondent in clear defiance of this Order came out
with articles on the prohibited subject matter in his column “Atty. Batas,” 2004 in the December
16 and 17, 2004 issues of the tabloid “Balitang Bayan–Toro” (Annexes “Q” and “Q-1” of the
Complaint).
The above actuations of respondent are also in violation of Rule 13.03 of the Canon of
Professional Responsibility which reads: “A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media
regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party.”
II.
xxxx
In I.S. No. V.04-2917-2933, then pending before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Valenzuela City, respondent filed his “Entry of Appearance with Highly Urgent Motion to Elevate
These Cases To the Department of Justice.” In said pleading, respondent made the following
statements:
xxxx
The above language employed by respondent undoubtedly casts aspersions on the integrity
of the Office of the City Prosecutor and all the Prosecutors connected with said Office.
Respondent clearly assailed the impartiality and fairness of the said Office in handling cases filed
before it and did not even design to submit any evidence to substantiate said wild allegations.
The use by respondent of the above-quoted language in his pleadings is manifestly violative of
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides: “A lawyer [s]hall [o]bserve
and [m]aintain [t]he [re]spect [d]ue [t]o [t]he [c]ourts [a]nd [t]o [j]udicial [o]fficers [a]nd
[s]hould [i]nsist [o]n [s]imilar [c]onduct [b]y [o]thers.”
III.
The “Kasunduan” entered into by the Spouses Cordero and herein complainant (Annex “C”
of the Complaint) was admittedly prepared, witnessed and signed by herein respondent. …
xxxx
17
In its Order dated 16 August 2004, the Bureau of Food and Drugs recognized that the said
“Kasunduan” was not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order and policy, and this
accordingly dismissed the complaint filed by the Spouses Cordero against herein complainant.
However, even after the execution of the “ Kasunduan” and the consequent dismissal of the
complaint of his clients against herein complainant, respondent inexplicably launched a media
offensive intended to disparage and put to ridicule herein complainant. On record are the
numerous articles of respondent published in 3 tabloids commencing from 31 August to 17
December 2004 (Annexes “G” to “Q-1”). As already above-stated, respondent continued to come
out with these articles against complainant in his tabloid columns despite a temporary
restraining order issued against him expressly prohibiting such actions. Respondent did not deny
that he indeed wrote said articles and submitted them for publication in the tabloids.
Respondent claims that he was prompted by his sense of public service, that is, to expose
the defects of complainant’s products to the consuming public. Complainant claims that there is
a baser motive to the actions of respondent. Complainant avers that respondent retaliated for
complainant’s failure to give in to respondent’s “request” that complainant advertise in the
tabloids and television programs of respondent. Complainant’s explanation is more credible.
Nevertheless, whatever the true motive of respondent for his barrage of articles against
complainant does not detract from the fact that respondent consciously violated the spirit behind
the “Kasunduan” which he himself prepared and signed and submitted to the BFAD for approval.
Respondent was less than forthright when he prepared said “Kasunduan” and then turned
around and proceeded to lambaste complainant for what was supposedly already settled in said
agreement. Complainant would have been better of with the BFAD case proceeding as it could
have defended itself against the charges of the Spouses Cordero. Complainant was helpless
against the attacks of respondent, a media personality. The actuations of respondent
constituted, to say the least, deceitful conduct contemplated under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.”36 (Underscoring supplied)
The IBP Board of Governors, by Resolution No. XVIII-2006-114 dated March 20, 2006,
adopted the findings and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner to suspend
respondent from the practice of law for two years.
The Court finds the findings/evaluation of the IBP well-taken.
The Court, once again, takes this occasion to emphasize the necessity for every lawyer to act
and comport himself in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal
profession,37 which confidence may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a
member of the bar.
By the above-recited acts, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which mandates lawyers to refrain from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct. For, as the IBP found, he engaged in deceitful conduct by, inter alia, taking
advantage of the complaint against CDO to advance his interest—to obtain funds for
his Batas Foundation and seek sponsorships and advertisements for the tabloids and his
television program.
He also violated Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates:
“A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending
to arouse public opinion for or against a party.”
For despite the pendency of the civil case against him and the issuance of a
status quo order restraining/enjoining further publishing, televising and broadcasting of any
matter relative to the complaint of CDO, respondent continued with his attacks against
complainant and its products. At the same time, respondent violated Canon 1 also of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, which mandates lawyers to “uphold the Constitution, obey the
laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes.” For he defied said
Legal Ethics Session 4 18

status quo order, despite his (respondent’s) oath as a member of the legal profession to “obey
the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities.”
Further, respondent violated Canon 8 and Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which mandate, viz.:
“CANON 8—A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his
professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to his personal record and copies furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to
all courts.
SO ORDERED.
Puno (C.J.), Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Corona, Nachura, Leonardo-De Castro, Brion,
Peralta and Bersamin, JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, J., No part—close relationship to a party.

Rule 8.01—A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper,”
by using intemperate language.

Apropos is the following reminder in Saberon v. Larong:38

“To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members of the bar to
use strong language in pursuit of their duty to advance the interests of their clients.

However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such
enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with
countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory,
illuminating but not offensive.

On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all
offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor and reputation of a party or
witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. In keeping with
the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyer’s language even in his pleadings must be
dignified.”39 (Underscoring supplied)

By failing to live up to his oath and to comply with the exacting standards of the legal
profession, respondent also violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
directs a lawyer to “at all times uphold the integrity and the dignity of the legal profession.” 40

The power of the media to form or influence public opinion cannot be underestimated.
In Dalisay v. Mauricio, Jr. ,41 the therein complainant engaged therein-herein respondent’s
services as “she was impressed by the pro-poor and pro-justice advocacy of respondent, a
media personality,”42 only to later find out that after he demanded and the therein complainant
paid an exorbitant fee, no action was taken nor any pleadings prepared by him. Respondent was
suspended for six months.

On reading the articles respondent published, not to mention listening to him over the radio
and watching him on television, it cannot be gainsaid that the same could, to a certain extent,
have affected the sales of complainant.

Back to Dalisay, this Court, in denying therein-herein respondent’s motion for

reconsideration, took note of the fact that respondent was motivated by vindictiveness when he
filed falsification charges against the therein complainant. 43
To the Court, suspension of respondent from the practice of law for three years is, in the
premises, sufficient.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Melanio Mauricio is, for violation of the lawyer’s oath and breach of
ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility,
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three years effective upon his receipt of this Decision.
He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.