Legal Ethics Session 7
On September 1, 1992, the Court of Appeals 5 denied the motion of herein petitioners to
G.R. No. 109493. July 2, 1999.*
1. SPOUSES SERAFIN AQUINO and RUMELIA AQUINO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, ET AL., respondents.
Remedial Law; Attorneys; Pleadings and Practice; Requisites to be complied with in cases
of substitution of attorneys.—In cases of substitution of attorneys the following requisites must
be complied with: (1.) written application for substitution; (2.) written consent of the client; and
(3.) a written consent of the attorney to be substituted. In case the consent of the attorney to
be substituted cannot be obtained, there must at least be proof that notice of the motion for
substitution has been served upon him in the manner prescribed by our rules.
Same; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Failure of an appellant to file an appellant’s brief is
ground for the dismissal of the appeal. —The failure of an appellant to file an appellant’s brief is
ground for the dismissal of the appeal. The dismissal becomes final and executory after fifteen
days from receipt of the judgment or order. In the present case, since it is not denied that Atty.
Barican, the counsel of record, received the copy of the resolution of the Court of Appeals
dismissing the petitioner’s appeal, the dismissal became final and executory after the lapse of
fifteen days.
Same; Same; Forum-Shopping; Petitioners are not guilty of forum shopping; There is
forum shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a
favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another. —We agree with the petitioners
that they are not guilty of forum shopping. There is forum shopping whenever, as a result of an
adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or
certiorari) in another. The rule on forum shopping applies only when two (or more) cases are
still pending. There is only one case, G.R. No. 109493, the present Petition for Review on
Certiorari, pending between the parties in the present case.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
     The Law Firm of Parulan, Soncuya, Lauron, Sese & Associates for petitioners.
     The Government Corporate Counsel for respondent Government Service Insurance
System.
RESOLUTION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from the
Resolution1 of the Court of Appeals dated July 25, 1991, which dismissed the appeal of herein
petitioners.
It appears that Civil Case No. 38-M-89 filed by herein petitioners against the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS) for specific performance, damages and annulment with prayer
for preliminary injunction with the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 12 was
dismissed on March 27, 1989 on the ground that the complaint failed to state a cause of action
against the GSIS.2
The petitioners filed a notice of appeal3 with the RTC. Their appeal was dismissed on July
25, 1991 for failure to file an appellants’ brief within the reglementary period which expired on
May 29, 1991 pursuant to Section 1 (f), Rule 50 of the Rules of Court. 4
1
“recall Entry of Judgment and to reinstate appeal etc., there being no showing therein of any
reason to justify the failure of appellant’s counsel to file appellant’s brief within the reglementary
period and considering that the resolution dated July 25, 1991 dismissing the appeal became
final x x x.”6
On March 15, 1993, the Court of Appeals 7 denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of
its September 1, 1992 Resolution on the ground that it was beyond the power of the Court to
modify the dismissal since the order dismissing the appeal had become final and executory on
August 19, 1991 and Entry of Judgment was issued on November 4, 1991. 8
Hence, this petition where the petitioners assign the following errors:
“I.IT WAS ERROR FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS NOT TO HAVE SERVED A COPY OF ITS
RESOLUTION OF DISMISSAL UPON THE APPELLANT DESPITE KNOWLEDGE THAT THEIR
FORMER COUNSEL OF RECORD HAD DIED.
II.IT WAS ERROR FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO SERVE COPIES OF RESOLUTIONS
UPON THE APPELLANT’S FORMER COUNSEL DE PARTE.
III.IT WAS ERROR FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO DENY APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION ON THESE GROUNDS.
IV.IT WAS ERROR FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO DENY ADMISSION OF THE BRIEF
FOR THE APPELLANT WHICH WAS ALREADY APPENDED TO THEIR MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION.
V.THERE ARE COMPELLING REASONS AS ENUMERATED IN THE APPELLANTS’ BRIEF FOR
THE COURT OF APPEALS TO RESOLVE THE ISSUES ON THE MERITS.”9
The petitioners argue that they were never notified by their counsel of record, Atty. Mala, of the
notice to file an appellant’s brief. Atty. Mala was incapacitated to notify the petitioners of their
obligation as he was in a coma when said notice was served upon him. They argue that when
the Court of Appeals was notified of the death of Atty. Mala when it received the return of the
assailed Resolution of July 25, 1991 10 bearing the notation “RETURN TO SENDER, REASON:
Deceased 8-1-81,” it should have sent resolutions, notices and other processes to the petitioners
themselves for the reason that when the case was brought to the Court of Appeals, they had no
counsel of record and were filing and signing the pleadings themselves. They add that although
Atty. Rosalino Barican continued to be served with copies of resolutions, etc., Atty. Barican
withdrew as their counsel of record while the case was still pending before the RTC of Malolos,
Bulacan. The petitioners also argue that substantial justice demands that they be allowed to
continue their appeal for the reason that as soon as they learned of the dismissal of their
appeal, they immediately procured the services of new counsel who filed an appeal brief
together with a motion for reconsideration. As the procedural lapses were attributable to the
Court of Appeals and their former counsel, they should still be accorded their right to appeal.
Finally, they claim that on the merits, there are compelling grounds to allow the appeal. 11
The respondents, on the other hand, argue that Atty. Barican did not make a formal withdrawal
as counsel of record of the petitioners. It is true that Atty. Mala assisted the petitioners in filing
their notice of appeal but said notice was signed by Serafin Aquino himself. Moreover, Atty. Mala
never entered his appearance as their counsel. In addition, the Motion for the Issuance of a Writ
of Preliminary Injunction12 filed by the petitioners was signed by the petitioner spouses and only
notarized by Atty. Mala. If it was intended that he should be their counsel of record, he should
have signed the motion. The respondents also claim that this petition is already res judicata as
Legal Ethics Session 7
their appeal was dismissed and the decision became final and executory; an entry of judgment
was issued and the case was remanded to the lower court for execution. Finally, the
respondents maintain that the petitioners are guilty of forum shopping and contemptuous
behavior as shown by the different cases filed by the petitioner against them.
In reply,13 the petitioners reiterate that there was a failure of service of a copy of the
resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 21553 dated July 25, 1991 dismissing their
appeal since it never reached their lawyer, Atty. Mala, who died on June 3, 1991; and that Atty.
Barican was no longer their counsel of record. 14 They also claim that CA-G.R. No. 21533 is
not res judicata to G.R. No. 109493 since:
1.There was no judgment on the merits in CA-G.R. No. 21533 since it was dismissed on a
mere technicality.
2.There is no identity of subject matter since CAG.R. No. 21533 sought a review of the
decision of the RTC-Malolos while G.R. No. 109493 seeks a review of the dismissal of
their appeal by the Court of Appeals.
Petitioners also claim that they are not guilty of forum shopping since there was no pending
action when the second and subsequent cases were filed; and that it was the GSIS who initiated
one of the cases, Civil Case No. 301 for unlawful detainer; and that the cases they filed involve
different subject matters, which negates a finding of forum shopping. 15
In their rejoinder,16 respondents assert that Atty. Barican’s withdrawal was never approved
by the Court despite his certification that he withdrew as counsel for petitioners.
We rule that there was a proper service of the Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV
No. 21553 dated July 25, 1991 on the petitioners.
Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states the proper procedure for the withdrawal of
a lawyer as counsel in a case. It provides:
“Section 26—Change of Attorneys—An attorney may retire at anytime from an action or special
proceeding, by the written consent of his client filed in court. He may also retire at anytime from
an action or special proceeding, without the consent of his client, should the court, on notice to
the client and attorney, and on hearing, determine that he ought to be allowed to retire. In case
of substitution, the name of the attorney newly employed shall be entered on the docket of the
court in place of the former one, and the written notice of the change shall be given to the
adverse party x x x.”
Unless the procedure prescribed in the above mentioned section is complied with, the attorney
of record is regarded as the counsel who should be served with copies of the judgments, orders
and pleadings and who should be held responsible for the case. 17 In cases of substitution of
attorneys the following requisites must be complied with:
1.written application for substitution;
2.written consent of the client; and
3.a written consent of the attorney to be substituted.
2
In case the consent of the attorney to be substituted cannot be obtained, there must at least be
proof that notice of the motion for substitution has been served upon him in the manner
prescribed by our rules.18
In the present case, petitioners admit that Atty. Barican represented them in the proceedings
before the lower court but that Atty. Mala substituted Atty. Barican when the case was elevated
to the Court of Appeals. 19 No proof was presented by the petitioners to show compliance with
the above procedural requirements for the withdrawal of Atty. Barican and the substitution of
Atty. Mala in his stead; no written application for substitution or written consent of the client
was filed in court. The Certification made by Atty. Rosalino C. Barican to the effect that he was
the former counsel of record of the petitioners but that he withdrew as their counsel is not
controlling in the absence of compliance with the above procedural requirements. It is therefore
irrelevant that Atty. Mala did not receive the copy of the resolution of the Court of Appeals dated
July 25, 1991 which dismissed their appeal since he was not the counsel of record and had
never entered his appearance as counsel of the petitioners.
Accordingly, the resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 21533 dated July 25,
1991, dismissing the petitioners’ appeal became final and executory because their lawyer of
record, Atty. Barican, was duly served with a copy of that resolution. There was an effective
service upon the petitioners for as far as the Court of Appeals was concerned, Atty. Barican
continued to be their counsel of record.
The failure of an appellant to file an appellant’s brief is ground for the dismissal of the
appeal.20 The dismissal becomes final and executory after fifteen days from receipt of the
judgment or order. In the present case, since it is not denied that Atty. Barican, the counsel of
record, received the copy of the resolution of the Court of Appeals dismissing the petitioner’s
appeal, the dismissal became final and executory after the lapse of fifteen days.
We agree with the petitioners that they are not guilty of forum shopping. There is forum
shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable
opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another. 21 The rule on forum shopping applies
only when two (or more) cases are still pending.22 There is only one case, G.R. No. 109493, the
present Petition for Review on Certiorari, pending between the parties in the present case.
In view of the above conclusions, we deem it unnecessary to discuss the issue of res
judicata.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is hereby DENIED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
     Vitug (Actg. Chairman), Panganiban and Purisima, JJ., concur.
     Romero, J. (Chairman), Abroad, on official business leave.
Petition denied.
Note.—Willful and deliberate forum-shopping constitutes either direct or indirect contempt
of court. (Zebra Security Agency and Allied Services vs. National Labor Relations
Commission, 270 SCRA 476 [1997])
Legal Ethics Session 7
A.C. No. 5019. April 6, 2000.*
2. Judge ADORACION G. ANGELES, complainant, vs. Atty. THOMAS C. UY, JR.,
respondent.
Legal Ethics; Attorneys; The relationship between a lawyer and a client is highly fiduciary
—it requires a high degree of fidelity and good faith. —The relationship between a lawyer and a
client is highly fiduciary; it requires a high degree of fidelity and good faith. It is designed “to
remove all such temptation and to prevent everything  of that kind from being done for the
protection of the client.” Thus, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that
“a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his
possession.” Furthermore, Rule 16.01 of the Code also states that “a lawyer shall account for all
money or property collected or received for or from the client.”
Same; Same; Professional Misconduct; Lawyers are bound to promptly account for money
or property received by them on behalf of their clients and failure to do so constitutes
professional misconduct.—The records do not clearly show whether Attorney Uy had in fact
appropriated the said amount; in fact, Mrs. Del Rosario acknowledged that she had received it
on February 12, 1999. They do show, however, that respondent failed to promptly report that
amount to her. This is clearly a violation of his professional responsibility. Indeed, in  Aya v.
Bigornia, the Court ruled that money collected by a lawyer in favor of his clients must be
immediately turned over to them. In Daroy v. Legaspi, the Court held that “lawyers are bound to
promptly account for money or property received by them on behalf of their clients and failure
to do so constitutes professional misconduct.”
Same; Same; The Supreme Court has the duty to look into dealings between attorneys
and their clients and to guard the latter from any undue consequences resulting from a situation
in which they may stand unequal. —In this light, the Court must stress that it has the duty to
look into dealings between attorneys and their clients and to guard the latter from any undue
consequences resulting from a situation in which they may stand unequal. The present situation
calls for the exercise of this duty.
Same; Same; In the absence of clear evidence of misappropriation, the failure of a lawyer
to promptly report that he received money on behalf of his client will warrant suspension for one
month.—For misappropriating and failing to promptly report and deliver money they received on
behalf of their clients, some lawyers have been disbarred and others have been suspended for
six months. In the present case, the records merely show that respondent did not promptly
report that he received money on behalf of his client. There is no clear evidence of
misappropriation. Under the circumstances, we rule that he should be suspended for one month.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Violation of Canon 16, Code of Professional
Responsibility.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Adoracion G. Angeles for and in her own behalf.
     Angel B. de Veyra for respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Lawyers must promptly account for money or property they receive on behalf of their clients.
Failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct and justifies the imposition of disciplinary
sanctions.
3
The Case and the Facts
In a letter dated February 11, 1999 addressed to the Office of the Chief Justice, Judge
Adoracion G. Angeles of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City (Branch 121) charged Atty.
Thomas C. Uy, Jr. with violation of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Complainant states that respondent’s acts, which had earlier been held contemptible in her
February 10, 1999 Order,1 also rendered him administratively liable. In the said Order, she
narrated the following facts:
“When the case was called for the second time at 11:25 o’clock in the morning, the private
prosecutor Atty. Thomas C. Uy, Jr. appeared. In open court, accused Norma Trajano manifested
that she had alreadv settled in full the civil aspect in Crim. Case No. C-54177 (98) in the total
amount of [t]hirty [s]ix [t]housand [f]ive [h]undred (P36,500.00) [p]esos. She further alleged
that she paid P20,000.00 directly to the private complainant and the balance of P16,500.00 was
delivered to Atty. Thomas C. Uy, Jr., the lawyer of the private complainant and accordingly
produced in open court the receipt for such payment signed by no less than the aforesaid
lawyer. Indeed, the civil liability of the accused had already been satisfied in full.
“However, the private complainant, Primitiva Malansing [Del Rosario] manifested that she
did not receive the amount of [s]ixteen [t]housand [f]ive [h]undred (P16,500.00) [p]esos which
was paid to his lawyer Atty. Thomas C. Uy, Jr., thereby constraining this court to direct Atty.
Thomas C. Uy to turn over the money to the private complainant which he received in trust for
his client. Atty. Uy however argued that his client did not like to accept the money but the
assertion of the lawyer was belied by his own client, the herein private complainant, who
manifested in open court x x x her willingness to accept the money. The Court again directed
Atty. Uy to produce the money but the latter argued that he kept it in his office. Consequently,
the Court suspended the proceedings to enable Atty. Uy to get the money from his law office
which is located only at the second floor of the same building where this court is located.
“Unfortunately, it is already 12:15 o’clock past noon but Atty. Uy did not show up anymore
and not even his shadow appeared in Court.
“It cannot be denied that the act of Atty. Thomas Uy in deliberately failing to return to the
Court [the] proceedings [of which] were suspended just because of his representations, mirrors
not only an undisguised disobedience of a court order but also manifests his propensity to mock
the dignity of the Court. Disgustingly, he deliberately ignored his solemn oath to conduct himself
as befitting the status of an officer of the court.
“Indeed, this gross misbehavior of Atty. Uy cannot simply be ignored for it is a raw
challenge to the authority of the Court.
“It must also be pointedly emphasized that Atty. Thomas Uy committed a brazen
violation of the provisions of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:
“x x x      x x x      x x x
“Obviously, Atty. Thomas Uy fell short of the duties expected from him as a member of the
bar.”
In compliance with this Court’s March 24, 1999 Resolution, Respondent Uy 2 filed his Comment
on June 7, 1999. Denying that he violated Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
he explained:
“1).In a criminal case, then pending before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 121 of
Kalookan City, Metro Manila, presided by the complainant Honorable Adoracion G.
Angeles, entitled ‘People of the Philippines vs. Norma Trajano, et al.,’ Criminal Case No.
C-54176-77 (98), Atty. Thomas C. Uy, Jr., herein referred to as [r]espondent, was
Legal Ethics Session 7
engaged as [p]rivate [p]rosecutor of the complainant therein, Mrs. Primitiva Malansing
Del Rosario. At the outset Norma Trajano, accused in said criminal case, expressed her
desire and offered to settle the civil aspect of the criminal case against her to which
Primitiva Del Rosario acceded. On separate hearings, Norma Trajano made installment
payments to Primitiva Del Rosario some of which payments were duly acknowledged by
the latter in the presence of [r]espondent;
“2).On a previously cancelled date of hearing of the aforesaid criminal case x x x on
December 14, 1998, Norma Trajano went to the office of the [r]espondent at about 8:45
o’clock in the morning, x x x and met Mr. Romeo C. Jamisola, Jr., who is acting as
[r]espondent’s personal secretary and at the same time the liason officer of the law firm
De Veyra, Uy and Associates x x x. Mr[.] Romeo Jamisola, Jr., is the lone staff of the law
firm x x x. Respondent was at that time not in the office as he was attending a hearing
before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 122, Kalookan City, Metro Manila, x x x
“3).On the aforesaid date and time (December 14, 1998) at the office of the
[r]espondent, Norma Trajano told Mr. Romeo Jamisola, Jr. that she will make another
partial payment to Primitiva M. Del Rosario because she cannot attend the hearing the
following day (8[:]30 o’clock a.m. of December 15, 1999) before Judge Adoracion G.
Angeles due to a conflict of schedule with her [other] case in the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 19, Malolos, Bulacan, where she is likewise the accused for [e]stafa[.] Mr. Romeo
Jamisola told Norma Trajano to wait for a while as he will fetch [r]espondent at the
ground floor in the sala of the Honorable Remigio E. Zari. Respondent, upon being
informed of the presence of Norma Trajano in the office of the [r]espondent by Romeo
Jamisola, Jr. went to his office and Norma Trajano immediately told [r]espondent that
she knew that the setting for that day (December 14, 1998) was previously cancelled and
that she cannot attend the hearing the following day (8[:]30 o’clock a.m. December 15,
1998) and further told the [r]espondent that she (Norma Trajano) will make another
partial payment to Primitiva M. Del Rosario and that she will just leave her payment in the
sum of [s]ixteen [t]housand [five hundred] [p]esos (P16,500.00), Philippine [c]urrency, in
the office of the [r]espondent. Respondent then told Norma Trajano to inform Primitiva
M. Del Rosario first but Norma Trajano replied that she will just call Primitiva [Del
Rosario]. Nonetheless, [r]espondent told Romeo Jamisola, Jr. to call Primitiva Del Rosario,
using the office phone, and let her talk with Norma Trajano, and, if Primitiva Del Rosario
agreed [r]espondent instructed Romeo Jamisola, Jr., to just prepare a receipt.
Respondent, fearing that his case (People vs. Rommel Senadrin, et al. above-stated)
might have been called in the calendar, immediately left the office and proceeded [at] the
sala of the Honorable Remigio E. Zari. Respondent, after the hearing x x x, returned to
his office and upon learning that his signature was affixed by Romeo Jamisola. Jr. upon
the insistence of Norma Trajano scolded Romeo Jamisola, Jr. and for his unsuccessful
attempt to contact first Primitiva Del Rosario before receiving the sum of money left by
Norma Trajano;
“4).The following day [o]n the morning of December 15, 1998, [r]espondent arrived at
his office and met Primitiva Del Rosario and her daughter Aurora Del Rosario and
immediately the trio appeared before the sala of Judge Adoracion G. Angeles in the
hearing of the Norma Trajano case. Returning [to] the office of the [r]espondent after the
hearing, Primitiva Del Rosario and Aurora Del Rosario, being earlier informed that on
December 14, 1998 Norma Trajano went [to] his office and made partial payment in the
sum of P16,500 thru Mr. Romeo Jamisola, Jr., the [r]espondent told Mr. Romeo Jamisola
to get the money from the filing cabinet and while the money in the envelope [was]
being handed over to Primitiva Del Rosario, [the latter] and her daughter x x x , however,
told [r]espondent to just let the money in the sum of P16,500.00 be kept at the office of
the [r]espondent so that future payments of Norma Trajano will be save[d] in whole and
4
for them to avoid spending the same as what had happened to the past installment
payments of Norma Trajano. Respondent then acceded to the request of Primitiva Del
Rosario and her daughter and told them that they can get the money anytime they want
from the [r]espondent’s office. Hence, the money was kept locked [in] the filing cabinet
of the [respondent where he used to keep all his personal file[s].
“5).On December 23, 1998, early before noon, Primitiva Del Rosario and her daughter
Aurora Del Rosario, on a prior invitation, attended the Christmas Party of the office of
[r]espondent and undersigned counsel, x x x Respondent, after the x x x lunch, instructed
Mr. Romeo Jamisola, Jr., to give the sum of money (P16,500.00) and for Primitiva Del
Rosario to receive the same for fear of a repetition of a burglary incident before, where
some cash and minor office appliances of undersigned were lost. Primitiva Del Rosario,
however, insisted that said sum of money be kept at the office of the [r]espondent to
save in whole the installment payments of Norma Trajano and that [was] the wish of her
son Fernando ‘Bong’ Del Rosario, who is a long time friend and a compadre of the
[r]espondent. Respondent, respecting the trust reposed upon hint by Primitiva Del
Rosario, her daughter Aurora Del Rosario, and son Fernando Del Rosario, acceded to hold
in trust the said sum of [s]ixteen [t]housand [f]ive [h]undred (P16,500.00) [p]esos,
Philippine [c]urrency, which [was] locked and safely kept [in] the filing cabinet of the
[r]espondent until February 12, 1999; x x x;
“6).On February 10, 1999 [during] the hearing of the Norma Trajano case before the
Hon. Adoracion G. Angeles, [r]espondent appeared shortly before 10:30 o’clock in the
morning, pursuant to a ‘Motion to Call Case at 10:30 o’clock in the Morning’ x x x.
“7).When the said Norma Trajano [case] x x x was called on second call at 11[:]25 a.m.,
[i]n said February 10, 1999 hearing, respondent was first scolded by the Honorable Court
(Judge Adoracion G. Angeles) x x x [for] giving more preference to the Metropolitan Trial
Court than her Court. Resp[o]ndent, however, beg[ged the] indulgence of the Honorable
Court (Judge Adoracion G. Angeles) and explained why [he] first attend[ed] the
Mandaluyong hearing of Manny Chua’s case, to wit; x x x.
“8).That it was during the course of [the] litany of sermon, [i]n that hour, made by the
Honorable Court addressed to the [r]espondent that Norma Trajano x x x butted in and
informed the Honorable Court (Judge Adoracion G. Angeles) that she will be tendering
another partial payment; it was at that moment that Judge Adoracion G. Angeles asked
Norma Trajano how much had she paid Primitiva Del Rosario, and, Norma [T]rajano
answered that she had already paid P36,500.00 as full payment for one case, and that of
the P36,500, P20,000.00 was paid to Primitiva Del Rosario and HESITANTLY said that the
P16,500 was paid to the [r]espondent. Judge Angeles then took the receipt from Norma
Trajano and had it xeroxed by a personnel of the Court. The carbon duplicate original of
the Receipt, dated [D]ecember 14, 1998, showing the receipt by the office of the
[r]espondent, through Romeo Jamisola, Jr., whose printed [name] was pre[ceded] by the
word ‘By,’ indicating that he received the sum of money on behalf of or in representation
of the [r]espondent, is hereto [attached] and marked as ANNEX ‘5,’ to form part hereof;
“9).That it was perhaps due to the belief [in] and the immediate impression of Judge
Adoracion G. Angeles [of the] answer of Norma Trajano that prompted Judge Angeles to
ask, instantaneously in a loud manner, Primitiva Del Rosario ‘IN TAGALOG,’ the question,
‘NATANGGAP MO BA KAY ATTY. UY ANG PERA NA P16,500.00.?’ Primitiva Del Rosario, a
seventy-year-old, who was shocked by the tone and the manner she was asked by Judge
Angeles simply just answered ‘HINDI PO, KASI GUSTO [KO] PO NA MABUO ANG PERA.’
Primitiva Del Rosario, however, tried to explain her answer ‘HINDI PO’ and why she did
Legal Ethics Session 7
not yet [receive] the money from the [r]espondent by raising her hand but was
prevented by Judge Adoracion G. Angeles from further answering by telling Primitiva Del
Rosario to stop. With that answer of Primitiva Del Rosario, [r]espondent butted in to
explain Primitiva Del Rosario’s answer of ‘HINDI PO’ and her having not yet received the
sum of money, subject of the inquisition of Judge Angeles by manifesting to wit; x x x
that Primitiva Del Rosario did not get the money when x x x handed the same on
December 15, 1998 because she wanted [it] to be save[d] in whole together with the
future installment payments of Norma Trajano and to be kept in the office of the
[r]espondent as wished by her son Bong Del Rosario; and, that the said sum of money
[was] kept in the filing cabinet in the office of the [r]espondent. All explanation[s] of the
[r]espondent went to x x x naught as the [r]espondent was cut short by x x x Judge
Angeles, [who] in a loud and angry voice orally directed the [r]espondent to get the
money from [r]espondent’s office and give the same to Primitiva Del Rosario. It was
already 11:45 o’clock in the morning, more or less, and the [r]espondent was given
fifteen (15) minutes to comply; [r]espondent requested Judge Angeles to be
accompanied by Primitiva Del Rosario and her daughter Aurora Del Rosario but both were
ordered to stay in court by Judge Angeles;
“10).Respondent in compliance with the oral order of Judge Angeles immediately
proceeded [to] his office but only to find out that Romeo Jamisola, Jr., who [held] the
only key [to r]espondent’s filing cabinet, was on errand x x x that morning of February
10, 1999 [for] Atty. Angel B. De Veyra (the Undersigned Counsel) [who had sent him] to
the offices of the solicitor general in Makati City, and, the City Prosecutor’s Office of
Manila to [furnish copies to] both offices; x x x;
“11).Respondent, expecting that Romeo Jamisola, Jr. would [arrive] before 12[:]00 noon,
x x x waited for Romeo Jamisola, Jr. while at the same time called up [his] wife to
immediately [come] to his office to spare the sum of P16,500.00 as Romeo Ja[mi]sola
may not [arrive] [within] the time allotted by Judge Angeles. The wife of respondent,
however, arrived at about 12:25 P.M., more or less, ahead of Romeo Jamisola, Jr. and
spared [r]espondent the sum of P16,500.00 and [r]espondent immediately went [to] the
fourth floor, where the sala of Judge Angeles [was] located but unfortunately the session
was already adjourned. Respondent then talked to ‘Armand,’ one of the court personnel
and is known as the door keeper of the chamber of Judge Angeles, and [requested that
he be allowed to go inside the chamber to show [his] compliance, though late.
Respondent, however, was told by ‘Armand’ that Judge Angeles was on her lunch break
and that it [was] better for [r]espondent to take his lunch too and return a little later;
“12).At about 1:30 o’clock in the afternoon of that day (February 10, 1999) [r]espondent
returned [to] the sala of Judge Angeles together with Primitiva Del Rosario and her
daughter Aurora Del Rosario, who likewise returned to the court, to seek an audience in
[the] chamber [of] Judge Angeles. Said audience with Judge Angeles was desired by
Primitiva Del Rosario to let Judge Angeles [witness] the giving of the money to Primitiva
Del Rosario. But request[s] for the same, through ‘Armand,’ were twice denied by Judge
Angeles because at that time Judge Angeles was being interviewed by several media
personnel of some TV stations. The Del [Rosarios], however, left earlier upon knowing
that Judge Angeles denied their request for an audience. [They] told [r]espondent that
they will be back the following day. It was only when Romeo Jamisola arrived at about
3:00 o’clock, more or less, in the afternoon and went at the fourth floor at the premises
of the sala of Judge Angeles and informed the [r]espondent that he carried with him the
key to [r]espondent’s cabinet and the presence of some [squatter] families of Batasan
Hills, Quezon City at the office of the [r]espondent, who has an appointment with the
[r]espondent, that the [r]espondent left the premises of the sala of Judge Angeles, [sic]
Respondent, at his office ordered Romeo Jamisola, Jr. to open the filing cabinet and
5
returned to the premises of the sala of Judge Angeles alone at about 4:00 o’clock P.M.
after his meeting with the squatter families. But again, his request to ‘Armand’ to talk
with Judge Angeles, after the media interview, was denied. At about 5:30 o’clock in the
afternoon, ‘Armand,’ the court personnel, served the Order, of said date, February 10,
1999 at the office of the [r]espondent;
“13).In the early afternoon of the following day, February 11, 1999, [r]espondent
together with Primitiva Del Rosario and her daughter Aurora Del Rosario went again [to]
the sala of Judge Angeles x x x to seek an audience with Judge Angeles. Their request x
x x w[as] likewise in vain. Primitiva Del Rosario, after the last attempt to seek audience
with Judge Angeles and already tired of going [to] and [from] the sala of Judge Angeles,
decided on February 12, 1999, to receive the sum of money in the amount of P16,500.00
from the office of the [r]espondent, through, Romeo Jamisola, Jr. and executed a
Sinumpaang Salaysay, x x x;
“14).The Sinumpaang Salaysay of Primitiva Del Rosario, dated February 16, 1999 as well
as the Acknowledgment Receipt, dated February 12, 199[9] was attached to a
Manifestation caused to be filed by the [r]espondent on March 3, 1999 when the
respondent was confined in Fatima Hospital in Valenzuela City, Metro Manila on March 2,
1999;
“15).Learning of the instant administrative case against the [respondent, Bong Del
Rosario, the son of Primitiva Del Rosario, upon whose wish the subject sum of money
was kept at the office of the [respondent to save the same in whole as well as the future
installment payments of Norma Trajano executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay, attesting [to]
and confirming the statement of [his] mother Primitiva Del Rosario, x x x” 3
Stripped of unnecessary verbiage, the Comment contends that the respondent kept the money
in his office because that was the alleged wish of both his client and her son. He allegedly
informed them of such money and tried to give it to them, but they insisted that he retain it. He
further maintained that it was only after Judge Angeles issued the February 10, 1999 Order that
his client relented and accepted the money on February 12, 1999.
After the judge filed her Reply on June 30, 1999, this Court referred the case to the Office of the
Bar Confidant for report and recommendation. The Court dispensed with the normal referral to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines because the records were complete and the question raised
was simple. No further factual investigation was necessary in the premises.
Bar Confidant’s Report and Recommendation
Recommending that Atty. Thomas C. Uy, Jr. be suspended from the practice of law for one
month, the Office of the Bar Confidant in its Report and Recommendation dated December 15,
1999 said:
“x x x [I]t is clear that it is the sworn duty of a member of the bar to be accountable, at all
times, for anything which he receives for and in behalf of his client.
“In the case at bar, this Office is more inclined to believe the story of the complainant.
“First, it cannot be disputed that the transcript of stenographic notes is the most reliable
record of what indeed transpired (and what words were uttered by the parties involved) on
February 10, 1999 at the hearing of Crim. Case No. C-54176-77 (98). Records clearly show that
the private complainant in the criminal case, when asked by Judge Angeles as to the
whereabouts of the P16,500.00, spontaneously replied that she had no knowledge of the same;
in effect saying that Atty. Uy has not given her the subject P16,500.00. If, indeed, Primitiva Del
Legal Ethics Session 7 6

Rosario requested Atty. Uy to keep the money as far back as December 1998, then she should
have told the same to Judge Angeles.
“Atty. Uy’s allegation that Judge Angeles prevented Primitiva Del Rosario from saying in
open court the words ‘HINDI PO KASI GUSTO KO PO NA MABUO ANG PERA does not have any
proof as nothing of that sort appears in the transcript of stenographic notes. Atty. Uy has not
even bothered to refute the truth of the contents of the stenographic notes, all the more
bolstering this Office’s opinion that the said notes are accurate and truthful.
“Second, the affidavits executed by Primitiva Del Rosario and her son, Fernando Del Rosario,
dated February 16, 1999 and June 7, 1999, respectively, attesting to Atty. Uy’s averment that
his act of personally keeping the subject P16,500.00 was with and at their request cannot be
given much credence to outweigh the arguments of Judge Angeles. The said affidavits, both
executed after February 10, 1999, are suspect. Caught by surprise when Judge Angeles inquired
of the whereabouts of his client’s money, Atty. Uy x x x resorted to seeking the help of his client
to corroborate his defense. Being the clients of Atty. Uy, Primitiva Del Rosario and her son could
have been persuaded to help extricate their counsel from the latter’s predicament.
“In the absence of any contradicting evidence to dispute the allegation that Atty. Uy failed
to immediately remit to his client the money due the latter, it is safe to conclude that Atty. Uy
has violated his sworn duty to uphold, at all times, the trust and confidence reposed in him by
his client(s).
x x x      x x x      x x x
Respondent maintains that on December 15, 1998 he informed Mrs. Del Rosario about the
payment. He further avers that he kept the money upon her instruction, as she had allegedly
wanted “future payments x x x [to] be saved in whole and for them to avoid spending the same
as what had happened to the past installment payments x x x.” 7This assertion allegedly finds
support in her answer to the question of Judge Angeles, who had asked her whether she had
received the disputed payment: “Hindi po kasi gusto [ko] po na mabuo ang pera.”
The Court is not persuaded. Respondent’s assertions are contradicted by the following
transcript of stenographic notes: 
“Court:  This P 16,500, did you turn it over to the private complainant? 
Atty. Uy:  No your Honor, because she wanted the full amount of the settlement.
Court:      Private complainant, is it true that you did not 
  want to accept
the money? 
Mrs. Del Rosario:      Hindi po, sila po ang nagbigayan. 
Court:      Hindi pa ibinibigay sa inyo ni Atty. Uy? 
Mrs. Del Rosario:      Hindi po. 
     x x x      x x x      x x x 

“In the instant case, Atty. Uy, upon receipt of the P16,500.00 from the accused in the Court:      Nasaan iyong P16,500? Huwag kayong matakot. 
criminal case, should have promptly remitted the same to his client, Primitiva Del Rosario. Had
Mrs. Del Rosario: Aywan ko po sa kanilang dalawa. ”8
Judge Angeles not inquired of the whereabouts of the money, the same would have remained
with Atty. Uy, to the prejudice of the latter’s client.” 4
If it were true that Mrs. Del Rosario was informed about the payment and that she entrusted it
This Court’s Ruling to respondent, she would have known its whereabouts. That she did not know it showed the
We agree with the findings and the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant. falsity of his claim.
Administrative Liability of Respondent
It is noteworthy that respondent did not dispute the foregoing transcript although it belied
The relationship between a lawyer and a client is highly fiduciary; it requires a high degree of
his allegation that Mrs. Del Rosario’s express wish was to have the payments in full.
fidelity and good faith. It is designed “to remove all such temptation and to prevent everything
of that kind from being done for the protection of the client.” 5
Neither are we convinced by the affidavits of Mrs. Del Rosario and her son, both of whom
affirmed their intention to have their money in the safekeeping of respondent. It should be
Thus, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that “a lawyer shall hold in
stressed that he was her counsel and the compadre of her son. Moreover, the affidavits were
trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession.” Furthermore,
executed after the filing of this Complaint. As the Office of the Bar Confidant observed, these
Rule 16.01 of the Code also states that “a lawyer shall account for all money or property
considerations militate against the credibility of the affiants. In any event, their affidavits fail to
collected or received for or from the client.” The Canons of Professional Ethics is even more
explain adequately why Mrs. Del Rosario, during the hearing on February 10, 1999, did not
explicit:
know where her money was.
“The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain he abuses
or takes advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his client.
The records do not clearly show whether Attorney Uy had in fact appropriated the said amount;
in fact, Mrs. Del Rosario acknowledged that she had received it on February 12, 1999. They do
“Money of the client collected for the client or other trust property coming into the
show, however, that respondent failed to promptly report that amount to her. This is clearly a
possession of the lawyer should be reported and accounted for promptly and should not under
violation of his professional responsibility. Indeed, in Aya v. Bigornia,9 the Court ruled that
any circumstances be commingled with his own or be used by him.”6
money collected by a lawyer in favor of his clients must be immediately turned over to them.
In Daroy v. Legaspi,10 the Court held that “lawyers are bound to promptly account for money or
In the present case, it is clear that respondent failed to promptly report and account for the
property received by them on behalf of their clients and failure to do so constitutes professional
P16,500 he had received from Norma Trajano on behalf of his client, Primitiva Del Rosario.
misconduct.”
Although the amount had been entrusted to respondent on December 14, 1998, his client
revealed during the February 10, 1999 hearing that she had not yet received it. Worse, she did
Verily, the question is not necessarily whether the rights of the clients have been
not even know where it was.
prejudiced, but whether the lawyer has adhered to the ethical standards of the bar. 11 In this
case, respondent has not done so. Indeed, we agree with the following observation of the Office
of the Bar Confidant:
Legal Ethics Session 7 7

“Keeping the money in his possession without his client’s knowledge only provided Atty. Uy the
tempting opportunity to appropriate for himself the money belonging to his client . This situation
should, at all times, be avoided by members of the bar. Like judges, lawyers must not only be
clean; they must also appear clean. This way, the people’s faith in the justice system would
remain undisturbed.”12

In this light, the Court must stress that it has the duty to look into dealings between attorneys
and their clients and to guard the latter from any undue consequences resulting from a situation
in which they may stand unequal.13 The present situation calls for the exercise of this duty.

For misappropriating and failing to promptly report and deliver money they received on behalf of
their clients, some lawyers have been disbarred 14 and others have been suspended for six
months.15 In the present case, the records merely show that respondent did not promptly report
that he received money on behalf of his client. There is no clear evidence of misappropriation.
Under the circumstances, we rule that he should be suspended for one month.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Thomas C. Uy, Jr. is hereby SUSPENDED for one month. He is warned

that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Let copies of this
Decision be served on Atty. Thomas C. Uy, Jr. at his given address or any other known one.
Copies of this Decision shall also be entered in his record as attorney and served on the IBP, as
well as the Court Administrator who shall circulate them to all the courts in the country for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
     Melo (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Respondent suspended for one (1) month and warned against repetition of similar acts.

Notes.—A lawyer is guilty of grave professional misconduct where he received from a client
compensation to handle the latter’s case in the trial court, but the same was dismissed for lack
of interest and failure to prosecute. He had abandoned his client in violation of his contract
ignoring the most elementary principles of professional ethics. ( Richards vs. Asoy, 152 SCRA
45 [1987])

Responsible litigants need not be told that only pleadings formulated with intellectual
honesty on facts duly ascertained can subserve the ends of justice and dignify the cause of the
pleader. (Komatsu Industries [Phils.], Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 289 SCRA 604 [1998])
Legal Ethics Session 7 8

Same; Same; The rule is settled that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any
Adm. Case No. 2040. March 4, 1998.*
misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in
3. IMELDA A. NAKPIL, complainant, vs. ATTY. CARLOS J. VALDES, respondent.
moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.—In the case at bar, complainant is not
charging respondent with breach of ethics for being the common accountant of the estate and
Administrative Law; Attorneys; As a rule, a lawyer is not barred from dealing with his
the two creditors. He is charged for allowing his accounting firm to represent two creditors of
client but the business transaction must be characterized with utmost honesty and good faith. —
the estate and, at the same time, allowing his law firm to represent the estate in the
As a rule, a lawyer is not barred from dealing with his client but the business transaction must
proceedings where these claims were presented. The act is a breach of professional ethics and
be characterized with utmost honesty and good faith. The measure of good faith which an
undesirable as it placed respondent’s and his law firm’s loyalty under a cloud of doubt. Even
attorney is required to exercise in his dealings with his client is a much higher standard than is
granting that respondent’s misconduct refers to his accountancy practice, it would not prevent
required in business dealings where the parties trade at “arms length.” Business transactions
this Court from disciplining him as a member of the Bar. The rule is settled that a lawyer may be
between an attorney and his client are disfavored and discouraged by the policy of the law.
suspended or disbarred for ANY misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long
Hence, courts carefully watch these transactions to assure that no advantage is taken by a
as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.
lawyer over his client. This rule is founded on public policy for, by virtue of his office, an
Possession of good moral character is not only a prerequisite to admission to the bar but also a
attorney is in an easy position to take advantage of the credulity and ignorance of his client.
continuing requirement to the practice of law.
Thus, no presumption of innocence or improbability of wrongdoing is considered in an attorney’s
favor.
Same; Same; In the case at bar, respondent exhibited less than full fidelity to his duty to
observe candor, fairness and loyalty in his dealings and transactions with his clients.—Public
Same; Same; Respondent’s misuse of his legal expertise to deprive his client of the Moran
confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a
property is clearly unethical.—It ought to follow that respondent’s act of excluding the Moran
member of the bar. Thus, a lawyer should determine his conduct by acting in a manner that
property from the estate which his law firm was representing evinces a lack of fidelity to the
would promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. Members of the Bar are
cause of his client. If respondent truly believed that the said property belonged to him, he
expected to always live up to the standards embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility
should have at least informed complainant of his adverse claim. If they could not agree on its
as the relationship between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in nature and demands
ownership, respondent should have formally presented his claim in the intestate proceedings
utmost fidelity and good faith. In the case at bar, respondent exhibited less than full fidelity to
instead of transferring the property to his own corporation and concealing it from complainant
his duty to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in his dealings and transactions with his clients.
and the judge in the estate proceedings. Respondent’s misuse of his legal expertise to deprive
his client of the Moran property is clearly unethical.
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court. Misconduct.
Same; Same; Respondent violated Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which provides that a lawyer owes fidelity to his client’s cause and enjoins him to be mindful of The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
the trust and confidence reposed on him.—Respondent seeks to exculpate himself from this      Alampay, Gatchalian, Mawis, Carranza & Alampayfor complainant.
charge by disclaiming knowledge or privity in the preparation of the list of the estate’s liabilities.      San Juan, Africa, Gonzalez & San Agustin for respondent.
He theorizes that the inclusion of the loans must have been a mere error or oversight of his
accounting firm. It is clear that the information as to how these two loans should be treated PUNO, J.:
could have only come from respondent himself as the said loans were in his name. Hence, the
supposed error of the accounting firm in charging respondent’s loans against the estate could
The friendship of JOSE NAKPIL and respondent CARLOS J. VALDES dates back to the ’50s during
not have been committed without respondent’s participation. Respondent wanted to “have his
their school days in De La Salle and the Philippine Law School. Their closeness extended to their
cake and eat it too” and subordinated the interest of his client to his own pecuniary gain.
families and respondent became the business consultant, lawyer and accountant of the Nakpils.
Respondent violated Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a
lawyer owes fidelity to his client’s cause and enjoins him to be mindful of the trust and
In 1965, Jose Nakpil became interested in purchasing a summer residence in Moran Street,
confidence reposed on him.
Baguio City.1 For lack of funds, he requested respondent to purchase the Moran property for
him. They agreed that respondent would keep the property in trust for the Nakpils until the
Same; Same; The proscription against representation of conflicting interests finds
latter could buy it back. Pursuant to their agreement, respondent obtained two (2) loans from a
application where the conflicting interests arise with respect to the same general matter and is
bank (in the amounts of P65,000.00 and P75,000.00) which he used to purchase and renovate
applicable however slight such adverse interest may be.—As regards the third charge, we hold
the property. Title was then issued in respondent’s name.
that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests. It is generally the rule, based on
sound public policy, that an attorney cannot represent adverse interests. It is highly improper to
It was the Nakpils who occupied the Moran summer house. When Jose Nakpil died on July
represent both sides of an issue. The proscription against representation of conflicting interests
8, 1973, respondent acted as the legal counsel and accountant of his widow,
finds application where the conflicting interests arise with respect to the same general matter
complainant IMELDA NAKPIL. On March 9, 1976, respondent’s law firm, Carlos J. Valdes &
and is applicable however slight such adverse interest may be. It applies although the attorney’s
Associates, handled the proceeding for the settlement of Jose’s estate. Complainant was
intentions and motives were honest and he acted in good faith. However, representation of
appointed as administratrix of the estate.
conflicting interests may be allowed where the parties consent to the representation, after full
disclosure of facts. Disclosure alone is not enough for the clients must give their informed
The ownership of the Moran property became an issue in the intestate proceedings. It
consent to such representation. The lawyer must explain to his clients the nature and extent of
appears that respondent excluded the Moran property from the inventory of Jose’s estate.  On
the conflict and the possible adverse effect must be thoroughly understood by his clients.
February 13, 1978, respondent transferred his title to the Moran property to his company, the
Caval Realty Corporation.
Legal Ethics Session 7
On March 29, 1979, complainant sought to recover the Moran property by filing with the
then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Baguio City an action for reconveyance with
damages against respondent and his corporation. In defense, respondent claimed absolute
ownership over the property and denied that a trust was created over it.
During the pendency of the action for reconveyance, complainant filed this administrative
case to disbar the respondent. She charged that respondent violated professional ethics when
he:  “probably for the purchase” did not imply a consummated transaction but a projected
I.Assigned to his family corporation the Moran property ( Pulong Maulap) which belonged
to the estate he was settling as its lawyer and auditor.
II.Excluded the Moran property from the ‘inventory of real estate properties’ he prepared
for a client-estate and, at the same time, charged the loan secured to purchase the said
excluded property as a liability of the estate, all for the purpose of transferring the title to
the said property to his family corporation.
III.Prepared and defended monetary claims against the estate that retained him as its
counsel and auditor.2
On the first charge, complainant alleged that she accepted respondent’s offer to serve as lawyer
and auditor to settle her husband’s estate.  Respondent’s law firm then filed a petition for
settlement of the estate of the deceased Nakpil but did not include the Moran property in the
estate’s inventory. Instead, respondent transferred the property to his corporation, Caval Realty
Corporation, and title was issued in its name. Complainant accused respondent of maliciously
appropriating the property in trust knowing that it did not belong to him.  She claimed
that respondent has expressly acknowledged that the said property belonged to the late Nakpil
in his correspondences3 with the Baguio City Treasurer and the complainant.
On the second charge, complainant alleged that respondent’s auditing firm (C.J. Valdes &
Co., CPAs) excluded the Moran property from the inventory of her husband’s estate, yet
included in the claims against the estate the amounts of P65,000.00 and P75,000.00, which
respondent represented as her husband’s loans applied “probably for the purchase of a house
and lot in Moran Street, Baguio City.”
As to the third charge, complainant alleged that respondent’s law firm (Carlos J. Valdes and
Associates) filed the petition for the settlement of her husband’s estate in court, while
respondent’s auditing firm (C.J. Valdes & Co., CPAs) acted as accountant of both the estate and
two of its creditors. She claimed that respondent represented conflicting interests when
his accounting firm prepared the list of claims of creditors Angel Nakpil and ENORN, Inc. against
her husband’s estate which was represented by respondent’s law firm.  Complainant averred that
there is no distinction between respondent’s law and auditing firms as respondent is the senior
and controlling partner of both firms which are housed in the same building.
We required respondent to answer the charges against him. In his ANSWER,4 respondent
initially asserted that the resolution of the first and second charges against him depended on the
result of the pending action in the CFI for reconveyance which involved the issue of ownership
of the Moran property.
On the merit of the first charge, respondent reiterated his defense in the reconveyance case
that he did not hold the Moran property in trust for the Nakpils as he is its absolute owner.
Respondent explained that the Nakpils never bought back the Moran property from him, hence,
the property remained to be his and was rightly excluded from the inventory of Nakpil’s estate.
9
As to the second charge, respondent denied preparing the list of claims against the estate
which included his loans of P65,000.00 and P75,000.00 for the purchase and renovation of the
Moran property. In charging his loans against the estate, he stressed that the list drawn up by
his accounting firm merely stated that the loans in respondent’s name were applied
“probably for the purchase of the house and lot in Moran Street, Baguio City.” Respondent
insisted that this was not an admission that the Nakpils owned the property as the phrase
acquisition.
Respondent also disclaimed knowledge or privity in the preparation of a letter (Exhibit “H”) of
his accounting firm to the Baguio City treasurer remitting the real estate taxes for the Moran
property on behalf of the Nakpils.  He contended that the letter could be a mere error or
oversight.
Respondent averred that it was complainant who acknowledged that they did not own the
Moran property for: (1) complainant’s February 1979 Statement of Assets and Liabilities  did not
include the said property, and; (2) complainant, as administratrix, signed the  Balance Sheet of
the Estate where the Moran property was not mentioned.
Respondent admitted that complainant retained the services of his law and accounting firms
in the settlement of her husband’s estate.5 However, he pointed out that he has resigned from
his law and accounting firms as early as 1974.  He alleged that it was Atty. Percival Cendaña
(from the law firm Carlos Valdes & Associates) who filed the intestate proceedings in court in
1976.
As to the third charge, respondent denied there was a conflict of interest when his law firm
represented the estate in the intestate proceedings while his accounting firm (C.J. Valdes & Co.,
CPAs) served as accountant of the estate and prepared the claims of creditors Angel Nakpil and
ENORN, Inc. against the estate. He proffered the following reasons for his thesis: First, the two
claimants were closely related to the late Nakpil.  Claimant ENORN, Inc. is a family corporation of
the Nakpils of which the late Nakpil was the President. Claimant Angel Nakpil is a brother of the
late Nakpil who, upon the latter’s death, became the President of ENORN, Inc. These two
claimants had been clients of his law and accounting firms even during the lifetime of Jose
Nakpil. Second, his alleged representation of conflicting interests was with the knowledge and
consent of complainant as administratrix. Third, there was no conflict of interests between the
estate and the claimants for they had forged a modus vivendi, i.e.,  that the subject claims would
be satisfied only after full payment of the principal bank creditors. Complainant, as
administratrix, did not controvert the claims of Angel Nakpil and ENORN, Inc. Complainant has
started paying off the claims of Angel Nakpil and ENORN, Inc. after satisfying the banks’ claims.
Complainant did not assert that their claims caused prejudice to the estate. Fourth, the work of
Carlos J. Valdes & Co. as common auditor redounded to the benefit of the estate  for the firm
prepared a true and accurate amount of the claim. Fifth, respondent resigned from his law and
accounting firms as early as August 15, 1974 .6 He rejoined his accounting firm several years
later. He submitted as proof the SEC’s certification of the filing of his accounting firm of an
Amended Articles of Partnership. Thus, it was not he but Atty. Percival Cendaña, from the firm
Carlos J. Valdes & Associates, who filed the intestate proceedings in court. On the other hand,
the claimants were represented by their own counsel Atty. Enrique O. Chan. Sixth, respondent
alleged that in the remote possibility that he committed a breach of professional ethics,  he
committed such “misconduct” not as a lawyer but as an accountant who acted as common
auditor of the estate and its creditors. Hence, he should be held accountable in another forum.
On November 12, 1979, complainant submitted her REPLY.7 She maintained that the
pendency of the reconveyance case is not prejudicial to the investigation of her disbarment
Legal Ethics Session 7
complaint against respondent for the issue in the latter is not the ownership of the Moran
property but the ethics and morality of respondent’s conduct as a CPA-lawyer.
Complainant alleged that respondent’s Annexes to his Reply (such as the Statement of Assets &
Liability of the Nakpils and the Balance Sheet of the Estate) which showed that complainant did
not claim ownership of the Moran property were all prepared by C.J. Valdes & Co. as accountant
of the estate of Jose Nakpil and filed with the intestate court by  C.J. Valdes & Associates  as
counsel for the estate. She averred that these Annexes were not proofs that respondent owned
the Moran property but were part of respondent’s scheme to remove the property from the
estate and transfer it to his family corporation. Complainant alleged that she signed the
documents because of the professional counsel of respondent and his firm that her signature
thereon was required.  Complainant charged respondent with greed for coveting the Moran
property on the basis of defects in the documents he himself prepared.
Complainant urged that respondent cannot disown unfavorable documents (the list of
claims against the estate and the letter regarding Nakpil’s payment of realty tax on the Moran
property) which were prepared by his law and accounting firms and invoke other documents
prepared by the same firms which are favorable to him. She averred that respondent must
accept responsibility not just for some, but for all the representations and communications of his
firms.
Complainant refuted respondent’s claim that he resigned from his firms from March 9, 1976
to “several years later.” She alleged that none of the documents submitted as evidence referred
to his resignation from his law firm. The documents merely substantiated his resignation from
his accounting firm.
In his REJOINDER,8 respondent insisted that complainant cannot hold him liable for
representing the interests of both the estate and the claimants without showing that his action
prejudiced the estate. He urged that it is not per se anomalous for respondent’s accounting
firmto act as accountant for the estate and its creditors. He reiterated that he is not subject to
the jurisdiction of this Court for he acted not as lawyer, but as accountant for both the estate
and its claimants.
He alleged that his accounting firm merely prepared the list of claims of the creditors Angel
Nakpil and ENORN, Inc. Their claims were not defended by his accounting or law firm but by
Atty. Enrique Chan. He averred that his law firm did not oppose these claims as they were
legitimate and not because they were prepared by his accounting firm. He emphasized that
there was no allegation that the claims were fraudulent or excessive and that the failure of
respondent’s law firm to object to these claims damaged the estate.
In our January 21, 1980 Resolution,9 we deferred further action on the disbarment case
until after resolution of the action for reconveyance between the parties involving the issue of
ownership by the then CFI of Baguio. Complainant moved for reconsideration on the ground
that the issue of ownership pending with the CFI was not prejudicial to her complaint which
involved an entirely different issue, i.e.,the unethical acts of respondent as a CPA-lawyer. We
granted her motion and referred the administrative case to the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) for investigation, report and recommendation. 10
In 1983, the CFI of Baguio dismissed the action for reconveyance. The trial court ruled that
respondent held the Moran property in trust for the Nakpils but found that complainant waived
her right over it.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court. The appellate court held that
respondent was the absolute owner of the Moran property.  The Decision was elevated to this
Court.
10
On February 18, 1986, during the pendency of complainant’s appeal to this Court,  the OSG
submitted its Report11 on the disbarment complaint. The OSG relied heavily on the decision of
the Court of Appeals then pending review by this Court. The OSG found that respondent was
not put on notice of complainant’s claim over the property. It opined that there was no trust
agreement created over the property and that respondent was the absolute owner thereof.
Thus, it upheld respondent’s right to transfer title to his family corporation. It also found no
conflict of interests as the claimants were related to the late Jose Nakpil.  The OSG
recommended the dismissal of the administrative case.
Prefatorily, we note that the case at bar presents a novel situation as it involves the
disbarment of a CPA-lawyer for his demeanor in his accounting profession and law practice in
connection with the property of his client.
As a rule, a lawyer is not barred from dealing with his client but the business transaction
must be characterized with utmost honesty and good faith. 12 The measure of good faith which
an attorney is required to exercise in his dealings with his client is a much higher standard than
is required in business dealings where the parties trade at “arms length.” 13 Business transactions
between an attorney and his client are disfavored and discouraged by the policy of the law.
Hence, courts carefully watch these transactions to assure that no advantage is taken by a
lawyer over his client. This rule is founded on public policy for, by virtue of his office, an
attorney is in an easy position to take advantage of the credulity and ignorance of his client.
Thus, no presumption of innocence or improbability of wrongdoing is considered in an attorney’s
favor.14
In the case at bar, we cannot subscribe to the findings of the OSG in its Report. These
findings were based mainly on the decision of the Court of Appeals  in the action for
reconveyance which was reversed by this Court in 1993.15
As to the first two charges, we are bound by the factual findings of this Court in the
aforementioned reconveyance case.16 It is well-established that respondent offered to the
complainant the services of his law and accounting firms by reason of their close relationship
dating as far back as the ’50s. She reposed her complete trust in respondent who was the
lawyer, accountant and business consultant of her late husband. Respondent and the late Nakpil
agreed that the former would purchase the Moran property and keep it in trust for the latter. In
violation of the trust agreement,respondent claimed absolute ownership over the property and
refused to sell the property to complainant after the death of Jose Nakpil. To place the property
beyond the reach of complainant and the intestate court, respondent later transferred it to his
corporation.
Contrary to the findings of the OSG, respondent initially acknowledged and respected the
trust nature of the Moran property. Respondent’s bad faith in transferring the property to his
family corporation is well discussed in this Court’s Decision ,17 thus:
“x x x Valdes (herein respondent) never repudiated the trust during the lifetime of the late Jose
Nakpil. On the contrary, he expressly recognized it.  x x x (H)e repudiated the trust when (he)
excluded Pulong Maulap from the list of properties of the late Jose Nakpil submitted to the
intestate court in 1973. x x x
xxx
“The fact that there was no transfer of ownership intended by the parties x x x can be
bolstered by Exh. “I-2,” an annex to the claim filed against the estate proceedings of the late
Jose Nakpil by his brother, Angel Nakpil, which was prepared by Carlos J. Valdes & Co., the
accounting firm of herein respondent. Exhibit “I-2,” which is a list of the application of  the
proceeds of various FUB loans contracted as of 31 December 1973 by the late Jose Nakpil, x x
x contains the two (2) loans contracted in the name of respondent. If ownership of Pulong
Legal Ethics Session 7
Maulap was already transferred or ceded to Valdes, these loans should not have been included
in the list.
“Indeed, as we view it, what the parties merely agreed to under the arrangement outlined in
Exh. “J” was that respondent Valdes would x x x ‘take over the total loan of P140,000.00 and
pay all of the interests due on the notes’ while the heirs of the late Jose Nakpil would continue
to live in the disputed property for five (5) years without remuneration save for regular
maintenance expenses. This does not mean, however, that if at the end of the five-year period
petitioner (Nakpil) failed to reimburse Valdes for his advances, x x x Valdes could already
automatically assume ownership of Pulong Maulap. Instead, the remedy of respondents Carlos J.
Valdes and Caval Realty Corporation was to proceed against the estate of the late Jose M. Nakpil
and/or the property itself.” (emphasis supplied)
In the said reconveyance case, we further ruled that complainant’s documentary evidence
(Exhibits “H,” “J” and “L”), which she also adduced in this administrative case, should estop
respondent from claiming that he bought the Moran property for himself, and not merely in trust
for Jose Nakpil.18
It ought to follow that respondent’s act of excluding the Moran property from the estate
which his law firm was representing evinces a lack of fidelity to the cause of his client. If
respondent truly believed that the said property belonged to him, he should have at least
informed complainant of his adverse claim. If they could not agree on its ownership, respondent
should have formally presented his claim in the intestate proceedings instead of transferring the
property to his own corporation and concealing it from complainant and the judge in the estate
proceedings. Respondent’s misuse of his legal expertise to deprive his client of the Moran
property is clearly unethical.
To make matters worse, respondent, through his accounting firm, charged the two loans of
P65,000.00 and P75,000.00 as liability of the estate, after said loans were obtained by
respondent for the purchase and renovation of the property which he claimed for
himself. Respondent seeks to exculpate himself from this charge by disclaiming knowledge or
privity in the preparation of the list of the estate’s liabilities. He theorizes that the inclusion of
the loans must have been a mere error or oversight of his accounting firm. It is clear that the
information as to how these two loans should be treated could have only come from respondent
himself as the said loans were in his name. Hence, the supposed error of the accounting firm in
charging respondent’s loans against the estate could not have been committed without
respondent’s participation. Respondent wanted to “have his cake and eat it too” and
subordinated the interest of his client to his own pecuniary gain. Respondent violated Canon 17
of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer owes fidelity to his
client’s cause and enjoins him to be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him.
As regards the third charge, we hold that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting
interests. It is generally the rule, based on sound public policy, that an attorney cannot
represent adverse interests. It is highly improper to represent both sides of an issue. 19 The
proscription against representation of conflicting interests finds application where the conflicting
interests arise with respect to the same general matter20 and is applicable however slight such
adverse interest may be. It applies although the attorney’s intentions and motives were honest
and he acted in good faith.21 However, representation of conflicting interests may be allowed
where the parties consent to the representation, after full disclosure of facts. Disclosure alone is
not enough for the clients must give their informed consent to such representation. The lawyer
must explain to his clients the nature and extent of the conflict and the possible adverse effect
must be thoroughly understood by his clients.22
In the case at bar, there is no question that the interests of the estate and that of its creditors
are adverse to each other. Respondent’s accounting firm prepared the list of assets and liabilities
of the estate and, at the same time, computed the claims of two creditors of the estate.  There is
11
clearly a conflict between the interest of the estate which stands as the debtor, and that of the
two claimants who are creditors of the estate. In fact, at one instance, respondent’s law firm
questioned the claims of creditor Angel Nakpil against the estate.
To exculpate himself, respondent denies that he represented complainant in the intestate
proceedings. He points out that it was one Atty. Percival Cendaña, from his law firm Carlos J.
Valdes & Associates, who filed the intestate case in court. However, the fact that he did not
personally file the case and appear in court is beside the point.  As established in the records of
this case and in the reconveyance case ,23 respondent acted as counsel and accountant of
complainant after the death of Jose Nakpil. Respondent’s defense that he resigned from his law
and accounting firms as early as 1974 (or two years before the filing of the intestate case) is
unworthy of merit. Respondent’s claim of resignation from his law firm is not supported by any
documentary proof. The documents on record24 only show respondent’s resignation from his
accounting firm in 1972 and 1974. Even these documents reveal that respondent returned to his
accounting firm on July 1, 1976 and as of 1978, the intestate proceedings for the settlement of
Jose’s estate had not yet been terminated. It does not escape us that when respondent
transferred the Moran property to his corporation on February 13, 1978, the intestate
proceedings was still pending in court.  Thus, the succession of events shows that respondent
could not have been totally ignorant of the proceedings in the intestate case.
Respondent claims that complainant knew that his law firm Carlos J. Valdes & Associates
was the legal counsel of the estate25 and his accounting firm, C.J. Valdes & Co., CPAs, was the
auditor of both the estate and the two claimants against it. 26 The fact, however, that
complainant, as administratrix, did not object to the set-up cannot be taken against her as  there
is nothing in the records to show that respondent or his law firm explained the legal situation
and its consequences to complainant. Thus, her silence regarding the arrangement does not
amount to an acquiescence based on an informed consent.
We also hold that the relationship of the claimants to the late Nakpil  does not negate the
conflict of interest. When a creditor files a claim against an estate, his interest is per se
adverse to the estate. As correctly pointed out by complainant, if she had a claim against her
husband’s estate, her claim is still adverse and must be filed in the intestate proceedings.
Prescinding from these premises, respondent undoubtedly placed his law firm in a position
where his loyalty to his client could be doubted. In the estate proceedings, the duty of
respondent’s law firm was to contest the claims of these two creditors but which claims were
prepared by respondent’s accounting firm. Even if the claims were valid and did not prejudice
the estate, the set-up is still undesirable.  The test to determine whether there is a conflict of
interest in the representation is probability, not certainty of conflict. It was respondent’s duty to
inhibit either of his firms from said proceedings to avoid the probability of conflict of interest. 
Respondent advances the defense that assuming there was conflict of interest, he could not be
charged before this Court as his alleged “misconduct” pertains to his accounting practice.
We do not agree. Respondent is a CPA-lawyer who is actively practicing both professions.
He is the senior partner of his law and accounting firms which carry his name. In the case at
bar, complainant is not charging respondent with breach of ethics for being the common
accountant of the estate and the two creditors. He is charged for allowing his accounting firm to
represent two creditors of the estate and, at the same time, allowing his law firm to represent
the estate in the proceedings where these claims were presented.  The act is a breach of
professional ethics and undesirable as it placed respondent’s and his law firm’s loyalty under a
cloud of doubt. Even granting that respondent’s misconduct refers to his accountancy practice, it
would not prevent this Court from disciplining him as a member of the Bar. The rule is settled
that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for ANY misconduct, even if it pertains to his
private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or
Legal Ethics Session 7 12

good demeanor.27 Possession of good moral character is not only a prerequisite to admission to

the bar but also a continuing requirement to the practice of law.

Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct
of a member of the bar. Thus, a lawyer should determine his conduct by acting in a manner that
would promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. Members of the Bar are
expected to always live up to the standards embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility
as the relationship between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in nature and demands
utmost fidelity and good faith.28 In the case at bar, respondent exhibited less than full fidelity to
his duty to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in his dealings and transactions with his clients. 29

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court finds respondent ATTY. CARLOS J. VALDES guilty of

misconduct. He is suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year effective from
receipt of this Decision, with a warning that a similar infraction shall be dealt with more severely
in the future.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, as well as the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Bar Confidant.
SO ORDERED.
     Regalado (Chairman), Mendoza and Martinez, JJ.,concur.
     Melo, J., No part. Previous associate with respondent.
Respondent found guilty of misconduct and suspended from the practice of law for one
year.

Note.—A lawyer by his deceitful actuations constituting violations of the Code of

Professional Responsibility must be subjected to disciplinary measures for his own good as well
as for the good of the entire membership of the Bar as a whole. (Igual vs. Javier, 254 SCRA
416 [1996])
Legal Ethics Session 7 13

Respondent, however, did not remit the amount to the system. The fact of non-payment was
A.C. CBD No. 167. March 9, 1999.*
certified to by the SSS on October 2, 1989.
4. ATTY. PRUDENCIO S. PENTICOSTES, complainant, vs.PROSECUTOR DIOSDADO S.
IBAÑEZ, respondent.
On November 16, 1990 or over a year later, complainant filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Tarlac a complaint for professional misconduct against Ibañez due to the latter’s failure to remit
Administrative Law; Attorneys; The Court adopts the recommendation of the Integrated
the SSS contributions of his sister-in-law. The complaint alleged that respondent’s
Bar of the Philippines and finds respondent guilty of professional misconduct. —This Court adopts
misappropriation of Encarnacion Pascual’s SSS contributions amounted to a violation of his oath
the recommendation of the IBP and finds respondent guilty of professional misconduct. While
as a lawyer. Seven days later, or on November 23, 1990, respondent paid P1,804.00 to the SSS
there is no doubt that payment of the contested amount had been effected to the SSS on
on behalf of Encarnacion Pascual.
November 23, 1990, it is clear, however, that the same was made only after a complaint had
been filed against respondent. Furthermore, the duties of a provincial prosecutor do not include
In the meantime, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Tarlac
receiving money from persons with official transactions with his office.
Chapter, the court observing that it had no competence to receive evidence on the matter. Upon
receipt of the case, the Tarlac Chapter forwarded the same to the IBP’s Commission on Bar
Same; Same; Court has repeatedly admonished lawyers that a high sense of morality,
Discipline.
honesty and fair dealing is expected and required of a member of the bar. —This court has
repeatedly admonished lawyers that a high sense of morality, honesty and fair dealing is
In his defense, respondent claimed that his act of accommodating Encarnacion Pascual’s
expected and required of a member of the bar. Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
request to make payments to the SSS did not amount to professional misconduct but was rather
Responsibility provides that “[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
an act of Christian charity. Furthermore, he claimed that the action was moot and academic, the
deceitful conduct.”
amount of P1,804.00 having already been paid by him to the SSS. Lastly, he disclaimed liability
on the ground that the acts complained of were not done by him in his capacity as a practicing
Same; Same; The relation between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in
lawyer but on account of his office as a prosecutor.
nature . . . (thus) lawyers are bound to promptly account for money or property received by
them on behalf of their clients and failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct. —It is
On September 3, 1998, the Commission recommended that the respondent be
glaringly clear that respondent’s non-remittance for over one year of the funds coming from
reprimanded, with a warning that the commission of the same or similar offense would be dealt
Encarnacion Pascual constitutes conduct in gross violation of the above canon. The belated
with more severely in the future. On November 5, 1998, the Board of Governors of the
payment of the same to the SSS does not excuse his misconduct. While Pascual may not strictly
Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopted and approved its Commission’s recommendation.
be considered a client of respondent, the rules relating to a lawyer’s handling of funds of a client
is applicable. In Daroy v. Legaspi, this court held that “(t)he relation between an attorney and
This Court adopts the recommendation of the IBP and finds respondent guilty of
his client is highly fiduciary in nature . . . [thus] lawyers are bound to promptly account for
professional misconduct. While there is no doubt that payment of the contested amount had
money or property received by them on behalf of their clients and failure to do so constitutes
been effected to the SSS on November 23, 1990, it is clear, however, that the same was made
professional misconduct.” The failure of respondent to immediately remit the amount to the SSS
only after a complaint had been filed against respondent. Furthermore, the duties of a provincial
gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use. This is a gross
prosecutor do not include receiving money from persons with official transactions with his office.
violation of general morality as well as professional ethics; it impairs public confidence in the
legal profession and deserves punishment.
This court has repeatedly admonished lawyers that a high sense of morality, honesty and fair
dealing is expected and required of a member of the bar. Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Same; Same; Want of moral integrity is to be more severely condemned in a lawyer who
Responsibility provides that “[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
holds a responsible public office. —As stated by the IBP Committee that drafted the Code, “a
deceitful conduct.”
lawyer does not shed his professional obligations upon assuming public office. In fact, his public
office should make him more sensitive to his professional obligations because a lawyer’s
It is glaringly clear that respondent’s non-remittance for over one year of the funds coming
disreputable conduct is more likely to be magnified in the public’s eye. Want of moral integrity is
from Encarnacion Pascual constitutes conduct in gross violation of the above canon. The belated
to be more severely condemned in a lawyer who holds a responsible public office.
payment of the same to the SSS does not excuse his misconduct. While Pascual may not strictly
be considered a client of respondent, the rules relating to a lawyer’s handling of funds of a client
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Misappropriation of SSS Contribution. is applicable. In Daroy v. Legaspi,1 this court held that “(t)he relation between an attorney and
his client is highly fiduciary in nature . . . [thus] lawyers are bound to promptly account for
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court. money or property received by them on behalf of their clients and failure to do so constitutes
     Prudencio S. Penticostes for and in his own behalf. professional misconduct.” The failure of respondent to immediately remit the amount to the SSS
gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use. This is a gross
RESOLUTION
violation of general morality as well as professional ethics; it impairs public confidence in the
legal profession and deserves punishment.2
ROMERO, J.:
Respondent’s claim that he may not be held liable because he committed such acts, not in
Sometime in 1989, Encarnacion Pascual, the sister-in-law of Atty. Prudencio S. Penticostes his capacity as a private lawyer, but as a prosecutor is unavailing. Canon 6 of the Code of
(herein complainant) was sued for non-remittance of SSS payments. The complaint was Professional Responsibility provides:
docketed as I.S. 89-353 and assigned to Prosecutor Diosdado S. Ibañez (herein respondent) for “These canons shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official
preliminary investigation. In the course of the investigation, Encarnacion Pascual gave P1,804.00 tasks.”
to respondent as payment of her Social Security System (SSS) contributions in arrears.
Legal Ethics Session 7 14

As stated by the IBP Committee that drafted the Code, “a lawyer does not shed his professional
obligations upon assuming public office. In fact, his public office should make him more
sensitive to his professional obligations because a lawyer’s disreputable conduct is more likely to
be magnified in the public’s eye.3 Want of moral integrity is to be more severely condemned in a
lawyer who holds a responsible public office.4

ACCORDINGLY, this Court REPRIMANDS respondent with a STERN WARNING that the
commission of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely in the future. LET
copies of this decision be spread in his records and copies be furnished the Department of
Justice and the Office of the Bar Confidant.
SO ORDERED.
     Davide,
Jr. (C.J.), Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, P
ardo, Buena and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Respondent reprimanded and warned against the commission of similar offense.

Note.—It cannot be denied that the respect of litigants for the profession is inexorably
diminished whenever a member of the Bar betrays their trust and confidence. ( Busiños vs.
Ricafort, 283 SCRA 407 [1997])