Constitutional Law 2 Art.III – Sec.

5 Freedom of
Religion Case Digest by Tracy R. Calderon

Aglipay vs. Ruiz

G.R. No. 45459. March 13, 1937

FACTS: In May 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he
would order the issuance of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City
of Manila of the 33rdinternational Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman
Catholic Church. The Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, Mons.
Gregorio Aglipay, requested Atty. Vicente Sotto to denounce the matter to the
President.

Despite the protest, the Director of Post publicly announced having sent to the United
States the designs of the postage stamps for printing.The stamps were actually issued
and sold, though the greater part remains unsold. The further sale of the stamps is
sought to be prevented by Mons.Aglipay as it is alleged that the issuance and selling of
the commemorative stamps is for the benefit of a particular sect or religion which
violates Section 3, Paragraph 3, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution or the principle of
separation of church and state.

The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent
Church, seeks the issuance of a writ of prohibition against respondent Director of Posts
from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the 33rd International
Eucharistic Congress. Petitioner contends that such act is a violation of the
Constitutional provision stating that no public funds shall be appropriated or used in the
benefit of any church, system of religion, etc. This provision is a result of the principle of
the separation of church and state, for the purpose of avoiding the occasion wherein the
state will use the church, or vice versa, as a weapon to further their ends and aims.
Respondent contends that such issuance is in accordance to Act No. 4052, providing
for the appropriation funds to respondent for the production and issuance of postage
stamps as would be advantageous to the government.

ISSUE: Whether or Not the issuance and selling of the commemorative postage stamps
violates freedom of religion.

HELD: No. The phrase in Act No. 4052 “advantageous to the government” does not
authorize violation of the Constitution. The issuance of the stamps was not inspired by
any feeling to favor a particular church or religious denomination. They were not sold for
the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. The postage stamps, instead of showing a
Catholic chalice as originally planned, contains a map of the Philippines and the location
of Manila, with the words “Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress.” The focus of
the stamps was not the Eucharistic Congress but the city of Manila, being the seat of
that congress. This was to “to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourists,” the
officials merely took advantage of an event considered of international importance.
Although such issuance and sale may be inseparably linked with the Roman Catholic
Church, any benefit and propaganda incidentally resulting from it was not the aim or
purpose of the Government.

What is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious liberty, not mere religious toleration.
Religious freedom, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverencefor
religion and is not a denial of its influence in human affairs.Religion as a profession of
faith to an active power that binds andelevates man to his Creator is recognized. And, in
so far as itinstills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its influenceis deeply
felt and highly appreciated. When the Filipino people, in the preamble of their
Constitution, implored "the aid of Divine Providence”,in order to establish a government
that shall embody their ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation,
promote the general welfare, and secure to themselves and their posterity the blessings
of independence under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy,they thereby
manifested reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations.The
elevating influence of religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere. In fact,
certain general concessions are indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and
denominations.
Constitutional Law 2 Art.III – Sec.5 Freedom of
Religion Case Digest by Tracy R. Calderon

RULING: The petition for writ of prohibition is denied.

Garces (member of Aglipayan church) vs. Estenzo (presiding judge)
G.R. L-53487. May 25, 1981
FACTS: Two resolutions of the Barangay Council of Valencia, Ormoc City were passed:

a. Resolution No. 5- Reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration every fifth

of April. This provided for the acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and the
construction of a waiting shed. Funds for the said projects will be obtained through the
selling of tickets and cash donations.

b. Resolution No. 6- The chairman or hermano mayor of the fiesta would be the
caretaker of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and that the image would remain in his
residence for one year and until the election of his successor. The image would be
made available to the Catholic Church during the celebration of the saint’s feast day.

These resolutions have been ratified by 272 voters, and projects were implemented.
The image was temporarily placed in the altar of the Catholic Church of the barangay.
However, after a mass, Father Sergio Marilao Osmeña refused to return the image to
the barangay council, as it was the church’s property since church funds were used in
its acquisition. Resolution No. 10 was passed for the authorization of hiring a lawyer for
the replevin case against the priest for the recovery of the image. Resolution No. 12
appointed Brgy. Captain Veloso as a representative to the case. The priest, in his
answer assailed the constitutionality of the said resolutions. The priest with Andres
Garces, a member of the Aglipayan Church, contends that Sec. 8 Article IV1 and Sec
18(2) Article VIII) 2 of the constitution was violated.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation in the freedom of religion

HELD: No. As said by the Court this case is a petty quarrel over the custody of the
image. The image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta
and not for the purpose of favoring any religion nor interfering with religious matters or
beliefs of the barrio residents. Any activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron
saint(such as the acquisition) is not illegal. Practically, the image was placed in a
layman’s custody so that it could easily be made available to any family desiring to
borrow the image in connection with prayers and novena. It was the council’s funds that
were used to buy the image, therefore it is their property. Right of the determination of
custody is their right, and even if they decided to give it to the Church, there is no
violation of the Constitution , since private funds were used. Not every government
activity which involves the expenditure of public funds and which has some religious tint
is violative of the constitutional provisions regarding separation of church and state,
freedom of worship and banning the use of public money or property.

RULING: The petitioners have no cause of action for the annulment of the barangay
resolutions, the lower court's judgment dismissing their amended petition is affirmed.
Constitutional Law 2 Art.III – Sec.5 Freedom of
Religion Case Digest by Tracy R. Calderon

Islamic Da’wah (a corporation that operates under Department of Social Welfare and Development
License No. SB-01-085, is a non-governmental organization that extends voluntary services to the Filipino
people, especially to Muslim communities) vs. Exec. Sec.
G.R. No. 153888. July 9, 2003

FACTS: On October 26, 2001, respondent Office of the Executive Secretary issued EO
46 creating the Philippine Halal Certification Scheme and designating respondent ( Office
of Muslim Affairs) OMA to oversee its implementation. Under the EO, respondent OMA has
the exclusive authority to issue halal certificates and perform other related regulatory
activities. On May 8, 2002, a news article entitled "OMA Warns NGOs Issuing Illegal
'Halal' Certification" was published in the Manila Bulletin, a newspaper of general
circulation. In said article, OMA warned Muslim consumers to buy only products with its
official halal certification since those without said certification had not been subjected to
careful analysis and therefore could contain pork or its derivatives. Respondent OMA
also sent letters to food manufacturers asking them to secure the halal certification only
from OMA lest they violate EO 46 and RA 4109.As a result, petitioner lost revenues
after food manufacturers stopped securing certifications from it.

ISSUE: Is EO 46, insofar as it empowered OMA exclusive authority to issue halal

certificates, valid and constitutional?

HELD: No. OMA was created in 1981 through Executive Order No. 697 (EO 697) "to
ensure the integration of Muslim Filipinos into the mainstream of Filipino society with
due regard to their beliefs, customs, traditions, and institutions." OMA deals with the
societal, legal, political and economic concerns of the Muslim community as a "national
cultural community" and not as a religious group. Thus, bearing in mind the
constitutional barrier between the Church and State, the latter must make sure that
OMA does not intrude into purely religious matters lest it violate the non-establishment
clause and the "free exercise of religion" provision found in Article III, Section 5 of the
1987 Constitution. Without doubt, classifying a food product as halal is a religious
function because the standards used are drawn from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By
giving OMA the exclusive power to classify food products as halal, EO 46 encroached
on the religious freedom of Muslim organizations like herein petitioner to interpret for
Filipino Muslims what food products are fit for Muslim consumption. Also, by arrogating
to itself the task of issuing halal certifications, the State has in effect forced Muslims to
accept its own interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunnah on halal food. Only the
prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the
community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to
show the seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally
unacceptable. In a society with a democratic framework like ours, the State must
minimize its interference with the affairs of its citizens and instead allow them to
exercise reasonable freedom of personal and religious activity.

Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental
law. And the Court has consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is
"designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to
believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he
ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good."

RULING: Petition is granted. EO 46 is declared null and void.

Constitutional Law 2 Art.III – Sec.5 Freedom of
Religion Case Digest by Tracy R. Calderon

Taruc vs. Bishop de la Cruz

G.R. No. 144801 March 10, 2005

FACTS: The case was an appeal under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court of the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 45480 which reversed and set
aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Surigao City, Branch 32 in Civil Case
No. 4907 and ordered said case dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The petitioners were
lay members of the Philippine Independent Church (PIC) in Socorro, Surigao del Norte.
Respondents Porfirio de la Cruz and RustomFlorano were the bishop and parish priest,
respectively, of the same church in that locality. Petitioners, led by DominadorTaruc,
clamored for the transfer of Fr. Florano to another parish but Bishop de la Cruz denied
their request. It appears from the records that the family of Fr. Florano’s wife belonged
to a political party opposed to petitioner Tarucs. Bishop de la Cruz, however, found this
too flimsy a reason for transferring Fr. Florano to another parish. Meanwhile, hostility
among the members of the PIC in Socorro, Surigao del Norte worsened when petitioner
Taruc tried to organize an open mass to be celebrated by a certain Fr. Renato Z.
Ambong during the town fiesta of Socorro. When Taruc informed Bishop de la Cruz of
his plan, the Bishop tried to dissuade him from pushing through with it because Fr.
Ambong was not a member of the clergy of the diocese of Surigao and his credentials
as a parish priest were in doubt. The Bishop also appealed to petitioner Taruc to refrain
from committing acts inimical and prejudicial to the best interests of the PIC.

Bishop de la Cruz, however, failed to stop Taruc from carrying out his plans. On
June 28, 1993, Bishop de la Cruz declared petitioners expelled/excommunicated from
the Philippine Independent Church.

Petitioners appealed to the Obispo Maximo and sought reconsideration of the

above decision. In his letter to Bishop de la Cruz, the Obispo Maximo opined that Fr.
Florano should step down voluntarily to avert the hostility and enmity among the
members of the PIC parish in Socorro.In the meantime, Bishop de la Cruz was
reassigned to the diocese of Odmoczan and was replaced by Bishop Rhee M. Timbang.
Like his predecessor, Bishop Timbang did not find a valid reason for transferring Fr.
Florano to another parish. He issued a circular denying petitioners persistent clamor for
the transfer/re-assignment of Fr. Florano. Petitioners were informed of such denial but
they continued to celebrate mass and hold other religious activities through Fr. Ambong
who had been restrained from performing any priestly functions in the PIC parish of
Socorro, Surigao del Norte.

Because of the order of expulsion/excommunication, petitioners filed a complaint

for damages with preliminary injunction against Bishop de la Cruz before the Regional
Trial Court. They impleaded Fr. Florano and one Delfin T. Bordas on the theory that
they conspired with the Bishop to have petitioners expelled and excommunicated from
the PIC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the courts have jurisdiction to hear a case involving the
expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution

HELD: No. Section 5, Article III or the Bill of Rights of the 1987 Constitution specifically
provides that:

Sec. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the

free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test
shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights. In our jurisdiction, we hold the
Church and the State to be separate and distinct from each other. We agree with the
Court of Appeals that the expulsion/ex- communication of members of a religious
institution/organization is a matter best left to the discretion of the officials, and the laws
and canons, of said institution/organization. It is not for the courts to exercise control
over church authorities in the performance of their discretionary and official functions.
Constitutional Law 2 Art.III – Sec.5 Freedom of
Religion Case Digest by Tracy R. Calderon

Rather, it is for the members of religious institutions/ organizations to conform to just

church regulations. We would, however, like to comment on petitionersÊ claim that they
were not heard before they were expelled from their church. The records show that
Bishop De la Cruz pleaded with petitioners several times not to commit acts inimical to
the best interests of PIC. They were also warned of the consequences of their actions,
among them their expulsion/excommunication from PIC. Yet, these pleas and warnings
fell on deaf ears and petitioners went ahead with their plans to defy their Bishop and
foment hostility and disunity among the members of PIC in Socorro, Surigao del Norte.
They should now take full responsibility for the chaos and dissension they caused.

RULING: Petition denied.

Constitutional Law 2 Art.III – Sec.5 Freedom of
Religion Case Digest by Tracy R. Calderon

Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers

September 12, 1974

FACTS: Victoriano was a member of the INC and an employee of the Elizalde Rope
Factory. He was also a member of the Union which had a CBA containing a closed
shop provision. Under their CBA, membership in the Union is required as a condition
for employment. Being a member of the INC which prohibits the affiliation of its
members with any labor organization, Victoriano resigned from the Union. The Union
then asked the Company to terminate him for violating the CBA condition, invoking
the union security clause. Under RA 875, the Company had liberty impose conditions
as a requirement for continued employment. Later, RA 3350 was enacted amending RA
875 which exempted members of religious sects from the affiliation with labor
organizations. Victoriano now questions his dismissal. The Company and the Union
however invoke the unconstitutionality of RA 3350 insofar as it impairs the obligation of
contracts. This is because while the Union is obliged to comply with its closed shop
provision, the amendment relieves the employer company from its reciprocal obligation
of cooperation in the maintenance of the union membership as a condition for
employment. The Union also averred that said Act discriminates in favor of members of
said religious sects. They also contend that Republic Act No. 3350 violates the
constitutional prohibition against requiring a religious test for the exercise of a civil right
or a political right.

ISSUE:  Whether or not RA 3350 is constitutional.

HELD:  YES. The right to religion prevails over contractual or legal rights. As such, an
INC member may refuse to join a labor union and despite the fact that there is a close
shop agreement in the factory where he was employed, his employment could not be
validly terminated for his non-membership in the majority therein. Further, the right to
join a union includes the right not to join a union. The law is not unconstitutional. It
recognizes both the rights of unions and employers to enforce terms of contracts and at
the same time it recognizes the workers’ right to join or not to join union. But the RA
recognizes as well the primacy of a constitutional right over a contractual right.

RULING: The instant appeal is dismissed.

Constitutional Law 2 Art.III – Sec.5 Freedom of
Religion Case Digest by Tracy R. Calderon

Ebralinag vs. Division Superintendent

G.R. No. 95770, March 1, 1993

FACTS: The petitioners in both (consolidated) cases were expelled from their classes
by the public school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national
anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as required by Republic Act No. 1265 (An Act
making flag ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions) of July 11, 1955 , and
by Department Order No. 8 (Rules and Regulations for Conducting the Flag Ceremony
in All Educational Institutions) dated July 21, 1955 of the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports (DECS) making the flag ceremony compulsory in all educational
institutions.

Jehovah's Witnesses admitted that they taught their children not to salute the flag, sing
the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge for they believe that those are "acts
of worship" or "religious devotion" which they "cannot conscientiously give to anyone or
anything except God". They consider the flag as an image or idol representing the
State. They think the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and
pledge transcends constitutional limitations on the State's power and invades the
sphere of the intellect and spirit which the Constitution protect against official control.

ISSUE: Whether or not school children who are members or a religious sect may be
expelled from school for disobedience of R.A. No. 1265 and Department Order No. 8

HELD: No. Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest
priority and the amplest protection among human rights, for it involves the relationship
of man to his Creator

The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of religious
freedom is the existence of a grave and present danger of a character both grave and
imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other
legitimate public interest, that the State has a right (and duty) to prevent." Absent such a
threat to public safety, the expulsion of the petitioners from the schools is not justified.
(Teehankee)

The petitioners further contend that while they do not take part in the compulsory
flag ceremony, they do not engage in "external acts" or behavior that would offend their
countrymen who believe in expressing their love of country through the observance of
the flag ceremony. They quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony to show
their respect for the right of those who choose to participate in the solemn proceedings.
Since they do not engage in disruptive behavior, there is no warrant for their expulsion.

The Court is not persuaded that by exempting the Jehovah's Witnesses from saluting
the flag, singing the national anthem and reciting the patriotic pledge, this religious
group which admittedly comprises a "small portion of the school population" will shake
up our part of the globe and suddenly produce a nation "untaught and uninculcated in
and unimbued with reverence for the flag, patriotism, love of country and admiration for
national heroes" . What the petitioners seek only is exemption from the flag ceremony,
not exclusion from the public schools where they may study the Constitution, the
democratic way of life and form of government, and learn not only the arts, sciences,
Philippine history and culture but also receive training for a vocation of profession and
be taught the virtues of "patriotism, respect for human rights, appreciation for national
heroes, the rights and duties of citizenship, and moral and spiritual values (Sec. 3[2],
Art. XIV, 1987 Constitution) as part of the curricula. Expelling or banning the petitioners
from Philippine schools will bring about the very situation that this Court had feared
in Gerona. Forcing a small religious group, through the iron hand of the law, to
participate in a ceremony that violates their religious beliefs, will hardly be conducive to
love of country or respect for dully constituted authorities.

RULING: Petition granted. Orders annulled and set aside.

Constitutional Law 2 Art.III – Sec.5 Freedom of
Religion Case Digest by Tracy R. Calderon
Constitutional Law 2 Art.III – Sec.5 Freedom of
Religion Case Digest by Tracy R. Calderon

German vs. Barangan

135 SCRA 514

FACTS: One afternoon in October 1984, Reli German et al went to JP Laurel Sreet to
pray and worship at the St. Luke Chapel. But they were barred by General Santiago
Barangan from entering the church because the same is within the vicinity of the
Malacañang. And considering that German’s group is expressively known as the August
Twenty One Movement who were wearing yellow shirts with clench fists, Barangan
deemed that they were not really there to worship but rather they are there to disrupt the
ongoings within the Malacañang.

ISSUE: Whether or not the bar disallowing petitioners to worship and pray at St. Luke’s
is a violation of their freedom to worship and locomotion.

HELD: No. In the case at bar, German et al were not denied or restrained of their
freedom of belief or choice of their religion, but only in the manner by which they had
attempted to translate the same into action. There has been a clear manifestation by
Barangan et al that they allow German et al to practice their religious belief but not in
the manner that German et al impressed. Such manner impresses “clear and present
danger” to the executive of the state hence the need to curtail it even at the expense of
curtailing one’s freedom to worship.

RULING: Instant petition is dismissed.

Constitutional Law 2 Art.III – Sec.5 Freedom of
Religion Case Digest by Tracy R. Calderon

Pamil vs. Teleron

86 SCRA 413, December 2, 2011

FACTS: In 1971, Fr. Margarito Gonzaga, a priest, won the election for mayoralty in
Alburquerque, Bohol. He was later proclaimed as mayor therein. Fortunato Pamil, a rival
candidate filed a quo warranto case against Gonzaga questioning the eligibility of
Gonzaga. He argued that as provided for in Section 2175 of the 1917 Revised
Administrative Code:
…in no case shall there be elected or appointed to a municipal office ecclesiastics,
soldiers in active service, persons receiving salaries or compensation from provincial or
national funds, or contractors for public works of the municipality.
In this case, the elected mayor is a priest. However, Judge VictorinoTeleron ruled that
the Administrative Code is repealed by the Election Code of 1971 which now allows
ecclesiastics to run.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 is no
longer operative?

HELD: The Supreme Court decision was indecisive. Under the 1935 Constitution, “No
religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.” If the the
doctrine of constitutional supremacy is to be maintained, then Section 2175 shall not
prevail, thus, an ecclesiastic may run  for elective office. However, this issue proved to
have divided the Supreme Court because it failed to obtain the majority vote of eight (8)
which is needed in order to declare Section 2175 of the RAC to be unconstitutional. For
this, the petition filed by Pamil must be granted and the decision of the lower court
reversed and set aside. Fr. Gonzaga is hereby ordered to vacate the mayoralty position.
It was also pointed out (in the dissenting opinions) that how can one who swore to serve
the Church’s interest above all be in duty to enforce state policies which at times may
conflict with church tenets. This is in violation of the separation of the church and state.
The Revised Administrative Code still stands because there is no implied repeal.

RULING: Decision reversed.

Constitutional Law 2 Art.III – Sec.5 Freedom of
Religion Case Digest by Tracy R. Calderon

INC vs. CA, 259 SCRA 529

FACTS: Petitioner has a television program entitled "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" aired on
Channel 2 every Saturday and on Channel 13 every Sunday. The program presents
and propagates petitioner's religious beliefs, doctrines and practices often times in
comparative studies with other religions. Petitioner submitted to the respondent Board
of Review for Moving Pictures and Television the VTR tapes of its TV program Series
Nos. 116, 119, 121 and 128. The Board classified the series as "X" or not for public
viewing on the ground that they "offend and constitute an attack against otherreligions
which is expressly prohibited by law." On November 28, 1992, it appealed to the Office
of the President the classification of its TV Series No. 128 which allowed it through a
letter of former Executive Secretary Edelmiro A. Amante, Sr., addressed for Henrietta S.
Mendez reversing the decision of the respondent Board. According to the letter the
episode in is protected by the constitutional guarantee of free speech and expression
and no indication that the episode poses any clear and present danger. Petitioner also
filed Civil Case. Petitioner alleged that the respondent Board acted without jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion in requiring petitioner to submit the VTR tapes of itsTV
program and in x-rating them. It cited its TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, 121 and
128. In their Answer, respondent Board invoked its power under PD No. 19861 in
relation to Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code. The Iglesia ni Cristo insists on the
literal translation of the bible and says that our (Catholic) veneration of the Virgin Mary
is not to be condoned because nowhere it is found in the bible. The board contended
that it outrages Catholic and Protestant's beliefs. RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. CA
however reversed it hence this petition.

ISSUE: WON the "ang iglesia ni cristo" program is not constitutionally protected as a
form of religious exercise and expression.

HELD: Yes. Any act that restrains speech is accompanied with presumption of
invalidity. It is the burden of the respondent Board to overthrow this presumption. If it
fails to discharge this burden, its act of censorship will be struck down. This is true in
this case. So-called "attacks" are mere criticisms of some of the deeply held dogmas
and tenets of otherreligions . RTC’s ruling clearly suppresses petitioner's freedom of
speech and interferes with its right to free exercise of religion. “attack” is different from
“offend” any race or religion. The respondent Board may disagree with the criticisms of
otherreligions by petitioner but that gives it no excuse to interdict such criticisms,
however, unclean they may be. Under our constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the
State to favor any religion by protecting it against an attack by another religion.Religious
dogmas and beliefs are often at war and to preserve peace among their followers,
especially the fanatics, the establishment clause of freedom of religion prohibits the
State from leaning towards any religion. Respondent board cannot censor the speech of
petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo simply because it attacks otherreligions, even if said religion
happens to be the most numerous church in our country. The basis of freedom of
religion is freedom of thought and it is best served by encouraging the marketplace of
dueling ideas. It is only where it is unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and
grave danger to the security and welfare of the community that infringement of religious
freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest extent necessary to avoid the danger.
There is no showing whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring about especially
the gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech,
includingreligious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the
showing of a substantive and imminent evil. It is inappropriate to apply the clear and
present danger test to the case at bar because the issue involves the content of speech
and not the time, place or manner of speech. Allegedly, unless the speech is first
allowed, its impact cannot be measured, and the causal connection between the speech
and the evil apprehended cannot be established. The determination of the question as
to whether or not such vilification, exaggeration or fabrication falls within or lies outside
the boundaries of protected speech or expression is a judicial function which cannot be
arrogated by an administrative body such as a Board of Censors." A system of prior
restraint may only be validly administered by judges and not left to administrative
agencies.
Constitutional Law 2 Art.III – Sec.5 Freedom of
Religion Case Digest by Tracy R. Calderon
Constitutional Law 2 Art.III – Sec.5 Freedom of
Religion Case Digest by Tracy R. Calderon

Estrada vs. Escitur, 429 SCRA 1

FACTS: Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. She has
been living with Quilapio, a man who is not her husband, for more than twenty five years
and had a son with him as well. Respondent’s husband died a year before she entered
into the judiciary while Quilapio is still legally married to another woman. Complainant
Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate respondent. According to
complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain employed therein for it will
appear as if the court allows such act. Respondent claims that their conjugal
arrangement is permitted by her religion—the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch
Tower and the Bible Trace Society. They allegedly have a ‘Declaration of Pledging
Faithfulness’ under the approval of their congregation. Such a declaration is effective
when legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union.

ISSUE: Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for such conjugal
arrangement.

HELD: No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right to
freedom of religion. The free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the
fundamental rights in our Constitution. As Jefferson put it, it is the most inalienable and
sacred of human rights. The State’s interest in enforcing its prohibition cannot be merely
abstract or symbolic in order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free exercise
claim. In the case at bar, the State has not evinced any concrete interest in enforcing
the concubinage or bigamy charges against respondent or her partner. Thus the State’s
interest only amounts to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced prohibition.
Furthermore, a distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality
should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular
morality. The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality
approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the
Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of
morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests.
Assuming arguendo that the OSG has proved a compelling state interest, it has to
further demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means possible so that
the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal
of the state. Thus the conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for it constitutes an
exemption to the law based on her right to freedom of religion.