Ong 

vs. Ong
FACTS:

William Ong and Lucita Ong have been married for more than 20 years when Lucita filed a
complaint for Legal separation under Article 55 par. (1) of the Family Code.

Lucita alleged that since their third year of marriage, her husband William subjected her to physical
violence like slapping, kicking and pulling her hair and bang her head against the concrete  wall.
And been violent towards their three children. He would scold them using his belt buckle to beat
them. One day after a violent quarrel wherein William hit Lucita on several different parts of her
body, pointed a gun at her and asked her to leave the house which she did.

Lucita’s statements about William’s abusive behavior were corroborated by her sister Linda Lim. Dr.
Vicente Elinzan whom Lucita consulted the day after she left her conjugal home also testified about
her injuries.

The trial court granted Lucitas petition for legal separation which the CA affirmed

William then filed this petition for review on certiorari

-On the decision denying all of Lucita’s allegations and that he never inflicted physical harm on her
or their children.

-He also argued that the real motive of Lucita and her family in filing the complaint is to deprive
him of his control and ownership over his conjugal properties with Lucita.

-That the CA overlooked some facts of the case which warrant an exception to the general rule that
questions of fact cannot be the subject for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

-The CA erred in relying on the testimonies of Lucita her sister and their parents’ doctor Dr. ElinZano
since their testimonies are tainted with relationship and fraud and since Lucita abandoned the family
home she has also given a ground for legal separation and therefore should NOT- be granted one
pursuant to Art. 56par. 4 of The family code – Where both parties have given ground for legal
separation

ISSUE:

WON Lucita Ong should be granted a decree on legal separation

HELD:

The claim that the real motive of Lucita in filing the case is for her family to take control of
the conjugal properties is absurd. Lucita left because of her husband’s repeated physical violence
and grossly abusive conduct. That the physical violence and grossly abusive conduct were brought to
bear upon Lucita have been duly established. He can derive no personal gain from pushing for the
financial interests of her family at the expense of her marriage of 20 years and the companionship of
her husband and children

The assessment of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses is given great respect.
Relationship alone is not enough to discredit and label a witness’ testimony as biased and
unworthy of credence. Witnesses Linda Lim and Dr. Elinzano gave detailed and straightforward
testimonies the court finds that their testimonies are not tainted with bias.
The abandonment referred to by the Family Code is abandonment without justifiable cause for more
than one year. Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct, such does not constitute abandonment
contemplated in the said provision

PETITION DENIED: Lucita should be granted a decree of legal separation

Lapuz-Sy vs Eufemio
FACTS:

Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio Eufemio on August
1953. They were married civilly on September 21, 1934 and canonically after nine days. They had
lived together as husband and wife continuously without any children until 1943 when her husband
abandoned her. They acquired properties during their marriage. Petitioner then discovered that her
husband cohabited with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok on or about 1949. She prayed for the
issuance of a decree of legal separation, which among others, would order that the defendant
Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits. 

Eufemio counterclaimed for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lapuz-Sy on the ground of
his prior and subsisting marriage with Go Hiok. Trial proceeded and the parties adduced their
respective evidence. However, before the trial could be completed, respondent already scheduled to
present surrebuttal evidence, petitioner died in a vehicular accident on May 1969. Her counsel duly
notified the court of her death. Eufemio moved to dismiss the petition for legal separation on June
1969 on the grounds that the said petition was filed beyond the one-year period provided in Article
102 of the Civil Code and that the death of Carmen abated the action for legal separation.
Petitioner’s counsel moved to substitute the deceased Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz. 

ISSUE:

Whether the death of the plaintiff, before final decree in an action for legal separation,
abate the action and will it also apply if the action involved property rights.

HELD:

An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property rights
are involved. These rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the decree
itself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of a
decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes during the pendency of
the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive separation;
and the expected consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn.

The petition of Eufemio for declaration of nullity is moot and academic and there could be no further
interest in continuing the same after her demise, that automatically dissolved the questioned union.
Any property rights acquired by either party as a result of Article 144 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines 6 could be resolved and determined in a proper action for partition by either the
appellee or by the heirs of the appellant.
Teodoro Lerma vs CA
FACTS:

Husband Teodoro Lerma sued his wife and a certain Teddy Ramirez for adultery. Sometime
later, the wife sued Lerma for legal separation with an urgent motion for support pendente lite.
Lerma opposed the motion setting up the wife’s alleged adultery as a defense.

Issue:

W/N the adultery a valid defense?

Held:

Yes, the alleged adultery adultery of the wife is a valid defense if there is a good chance that
this adultery can be proved. And this is true, whether what is asked is support from the husband’s
capital or from the conjugal partnership property, because even in the latter case where conjugal
partnership assets are involved, the right to a separate maintenance is granted only if there is
justifiable cause for it, not when the person asking is, to all appearance, guilty of adultery.

Pacete v. Carriaga
FACTS:

Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint on October 1979, for the Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage between her erstwhile husband Enrico Pacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion, as well as
for legal separation between her and Pacete, accounting and separation of property. She averred in
her complaint that she was married to Pacete on April 1938 and they had a child named Consuelo;
that Pacete subsequently contracted a second marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion and that she
learned of such marriage only on August 1979. Reconciliation between her and Pacete was
impossible since he evidently preferred to continue living with Clarita.

The defendants were each served with summons. They filed an extension within which to file an
answer, which the court partly granted. Due to unwanted misunderstanding, particularly in
communication, the defendants failed to file an answer on the date set by the court. Thereafter, the
plaintiff filed a motion to declare the defendants in default, which the court forthwith granted. The
court received plaintiffs’ evidence during the hearings held on February 15, 20, 21, and 22, 1980.
After trial, the court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff on March 17, 1980.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion for
extension of time to file their answer, in declaring petitioners in default and in rendering its decision
on March 17, 1980 which decreed the legal separation of Pacete and Alanis and held to be null and
void the marriage of Pacete to Clarita.

RULING:

The Civil Code provides that “no decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a
stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the
court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between parties exists.
If there is collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take care that
the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.”

The above stated provision calling for the intervention of the state attorneys in case of uncontested
proceedings for legal separation (and of annulment of marriages, under Article 88) is to emphasize
that marriage is more than a mere contract.

Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further mandates that an action for
legal separation must “in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the
petition,” obviously in order to provide the parties a “cooling-off” period. In this interim, the court
should take steps toward getting the parties to reconcile.

The significance of the above substantive provisions of the law is further or underscored by the
inclusion of a provision in Rule 18 of the Rules of Court which provides that no defaults in actions for
annulments of marriage or for legal separation. Therefore, “if the defendant in an action for
annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting
attorney to investigate whether or not collusion between the parties exists, and if there is no
collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not
fabricated.”

Ilusorio vs Bildner
Facts:

This is a consolidated case of the following:

1. Petitioner (P) Erlinda Ilusorio seeks to reverse the Decision of the CA dismissing her
application for habeas corpus to have the custody of her husband, lawyer Potenciano
Ilusorio (Respondent, “R” for brevity) and enforce consortium.

2. Potenciano filed a petition to annul the portion of the Decision of the CA giving visitation
rights her wife Erlinda to her.

Potenciano is about 86 years of age, possessed extensive properties valued at millions of pesos. He
was, for many years, the Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio Country Club.

Erlinda and Potenciano are married couple, but they separated from bed and board for undisclosed
reasons. They have six (6) children (co-respondents).

On December 30, 1997, Potenciano arrived coming from USA here in the Philippines. He stayed for
five (5) months with Erlinda in Antipolo City. The children, Sylvia and Erlinda, alleged that during
such time, Erlinda gave Potenciano an overdosed amount of Zoloft (instead of 100mg, she gave
200mg); thus, Potenciano’s health deteriorated.

On February 25, 1998, Erlinda filed with the RTC of Antipolo a petition for Guardianship over the
person and property of Potenciano due to latter’s advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight and
impaired judgment.

On May 31, 1998, After attending a corporate meeting, Potenciano did not return to his wife in
Antipolo but rather he went and lived at Makati with his children.
Because of such event, Erlinda filed a petition with the CA for habeas corpus to have the custody of
her lawyer husband, Potenciano. CA denied such petition.

Issues:

1. Whether habeas corpus may be availed by Erlinda to compel Potenciano to live with her in
conjugal bliss?

2. How about the issue of visitation rights?

Decision:

1. Marital rights including overture and living in conjugal dwelling may not be enforced by the
extra-ordinary writ of habeas corpus.

No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife. Coverture
cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other
means process. That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is best left to the man and woman’s
free choice.

2. CA exceeded its authority when it awarded visitation rights in a petition for habeas corpus
because P never prayed for such right.

In this case, Potenciano was found to be of sound mind and possesses the capacity to make own
choices.

With his full mental capacity coupled with the right of choice, Potenciano may not be the subject of
visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, we will deprive him of his right to privacy.

CHI MING TSOI vs. CA

Facts:

 Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao-Tsoi married on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral Intramuros
Manila. After the celebration thereof and wedding reception, the newlyweds proceeded to the
house of husband-defendant’s mother. Contrary to her expectations, instead of consummating their
marriage, husband-defendant just went to bed, slept on one side, then turned his back and went to
sleep. The newlyweds failed to consummate their marriage even on the succeeding nights. The
couple slept together in the same room and on the same bed for almost ten (10) months but there
was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. She claims that she did not even see her
husband’s private parts nor did he see hers.

On January 20, 1989, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufamio
Macalalag, urologist at the Chinese General Hospital. The results of said physical examination
showed that she is healthy, normal and still a virgin, while that of her husband’s examination was
kept confidential. Medications were only prescribed for her husband but the same was also kept
confidential. No treatment was given to her, but for her husband, he was asked by the doctor to
return but he failed to do so.

 Frustrated, the wife filed a case in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in order to annul their
marriage.
 Husband-defendant does not want his marriage annulled since he loves her wife very much, he
has no defect on his part, and there is still chance of reconciliation. However, husband-defendant
claims that if their marriage shall be annulled by reason of psychological incapacity, the fault lies
with his wife. The husband-defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until
their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual contact between them. But the reason for
this, according to the defendant, was that every time he wants to have sexual intercourse with his
wife, she always avoided him and whenever he caresses her private parts, she always removed his
hands. The defendant claims, that he forced his wife to have sex with him only once, but he did not
continue because she was shaking, and she did not like it. So, he stopped. In another physical
examination by Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr., which was submitted in a Medical Report, results showed that
there is no evidence of impotency of husband-defendant

 The trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed such decision and denied the subsequent motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the refusal of a couple to have sexual intercourse with each other
constitutes psychological incapacity.

2. Whether or not there is a necessity to determine who between the couple are
psychologically incapacitated.

Held:

1. Yes, the refusal of a couple to have sexual intercourse with each other constitutes psychological
incapacity. The Court provides that one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code
is “To procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through
sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage.” Constant non- fulfillment of this obligation will
finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In this case, the Court ruled that the
senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is
equivalent to psychological incapacity.

The Court further quoted, “If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform
his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage
tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and
protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse
to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity.”

While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe
mutual love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the
“spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court
order” (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared with
another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say “I could not
have cared less.”

2. No, there is no necessity to determine who between the couple are psychologically incapacitated.
In this case, neither the trial court nor the respondent court made a finding on who between
petitioner and private respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the other, however, the fact
remains that there has never been coitus between them. The Court held that since the action to
declare the marriage void may be filed by either party, i.e., even the psychologically incapacitated,
the question of who refuses to have sex with the other becomes immaterial.
Herein Petitioner alleged that it was his wife who refused to have coitus with him, that the same
may not be psychological but merely a physical disorder. The Court found such defenses
unmeritorious. The Court held that there was nothing in the record to show that he had tried to find
out or discover what the problem with his wife could be. What he presented in evidence is his
doctor’s Medical Report that there is no evidence of his impotency, and he is capable of
erection. Since it is petitioner’s claim that the reason is not psychological but perhaps physical
disorder on the part of private respondent, it became incumbent upon him to prove such a claim.

As stated by the respondent court:

“…if it were true that it is the wife who was suffering from incapacity, the fact that defendant did not
go to court and seek the declaration of nullity weakens his claim. This case was instituted by the wife
whose normal expectations of her marriage were frustrated by her husband’s inadequacy.
Considering the innate modesty of the Filipino woman, it is hard to believe that she would expose
her private life to public scrutiny and fabricate testimony against her husband if it were not
necessary to put her life in order and put to rest her marital status.”

Hence, in view of the foregoing, the petition is denied.

DEL SOCORRO V. WILSEM

FACTS:

Norma A. Del Socorro and Ernst Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland. They were
blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem. Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended by
virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland. Thereafter, Norma and her
son came home to the Philippines. According to Norma, Ernst made a promise to provide monthly
support to their son. However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines, Ernst
never gave support to Roderigo. Respondent remarried again a Filipina and resides again the
Philippines particulary in Cebu where the petitioner also resides. Norma filed a complaint against
Ernst for violation of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to support his minor child with
petitioner. The trial court dismissed the complaint since the facts charged in the information do not
constitute an offense with respect to the accused, he being an alien

ISSUES:

1. Does a foreign national have an obligation to support his minor child under the Philippine
law?

2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his
unjustified failure to support his minor child.

RULING:

1. YES. While it is true that Respondent Ernst is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we
agree with the RTC that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to whether
he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so. This
does not, however, mean that Ernst is not obliged to support Norma’s son altogether. In
international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the
burden of proving the foreign law. In the present case, Ernst hastily concludes that being a national
of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to
support.

While Ernst pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not
obliged to support his son, he never proved the same. It is incumbent upon Ernst to plead and prove
that the national law of the Netherlands does not impose upon the parents the obligation to support
their child. Foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not
authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.
Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable injustice
to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important function of law; hence,
a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of Conflict
of Laws. Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s
obligation to support his child nor penalize the non-compliance therewith, such obligation is still duly
enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the child to be denied of
financial support when the latter is entitled thereto.

2. YES. The court has jurisdiction over the offense (R.A 9262) because the foreigner is living
here in the Philippines and committed the offense here.

Arcaba vs. Tabancura Vda. De Batocael

FACTS:

Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the registered owners of two lots
in Zamboanga del Norte. After the death of Zosima, Francisco and his mother-in-law executed a
deed of extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights, in which the latter waived her ¼ share of the
property. Thereafter, Francisco registered the lot in his name. Having no children to take care of him
after his retirement, Francisco asked his niece Leticia, the latter’s cousin Luzviminda and petitioner
Cirila Arcaba, to take care of his house and store.

Conflicting testimonies were offered as to the nature of the relationship between Cirila and
Francisco. Leticia said that the previous party was lovers since they slept in the same room while
Erlinda claimed that Francisco told her that Cirila was his mistress. On the other hand, Cirila said she
was mere helper and that Francisco was too old for her.

A few months before Francisco’s death, he executed an instrument denominated “Deed of Donation
Inter Vivos” in which he ceded a portion of the lot together with is house to Cirila, who accepted the
donation in the same instrument. The deed stated that the donation was being made in
consideration of the “faithful services she had rendered over the past ten years.” Thereafter,
Francisco died and the respondents filed a complaint against Cirila for declaration of nullity of a deed
of donation inter vivos, recovery of possession and damages. Respondents, who are nieces, nephews
and heirs by intestate succession of Francisco, alleged that Cirila was the common-law wife of
Francisco and the donation inert vivos is void under Article 87 of the Family Code.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the deed of donation inter vivos executed by the late Francisco Comille be
declared void under Article 87 of the Family Code.
HELD:

Yes. The donation made was void under Article 87 of the Family Code. he court in this case
considered a sufficient proof of common law relationship wherein donation is not valid. The
conclusion was based on the testimony of Tabancura and certain documents bearing the signature
of “Cirila Comille” such as application for business permit, sanitary permit and the death certificate
of Francisco. Also, the fact that Cirila did not demand her wages is an indication that she was not
simply a caregiver –employee.

Cohabitation means more than sexual intercourse, especially when one of the parties is already old
and may no longer be interested in sex at the very least, cohabitation is a public assumption of men
and women holding themselves out to the public as such.

Hence, the deed of donation by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the Family Code.

Nobleza v. Nuega
FACTS:

Respondent Shirley B. Nuega (Shirley) was married to Rogelio A. Nuega (Rogelio) on

September 1, 1990. Upon the request of Rogelio, Shirley sent him money for the purchase of a
residential lot in Marikina where they had planned to eventually build their home. The following
year, or on September 13, 1989, Rogelio purchased the subject house and lot for One Hundred Two
Thousand Pesos (P102,000.00) from Rodeanna Realty Corporation. Shirley claims that upon her
arrival in the Philippines sometime in 1989, she settled the balance for the equity over the subject
property with the developer through SSS8 financing. She likewise paid for the succeeding monthly
amortizations.

On September 1, 1990, Shirley and Rogelio got married and lived in the subject property. The
following year, Shirley returned to Israel for work. While overseas, she received information that
Rogelio had brought home another woman, Monica Escobar, into the family home. She also learned
and was able to confirm upon her return to the Philippines in May 1992, that Rogelio had been
introducing Escobar as his wife.

In June 1992, Shirley filed two cases against Rogelio: one for Concubinage before the Provincial
Prosecution Office of Rizal, and another for Legal Separation and Liquidation of Property before the
RTC of Pasig City. In between the filing of these cases, Shirley learned that Rogelio had the intention
of selling the subject property. Shirley then advised the interested buyers one of whom was their
neighbor and petitioner Josefina V. Nobleza (petitioner) – of the existence of the cases that she had
filed against Rogelio and cautioned them against buying the subject property until the cases are
closed and terminated. Nonetheless, under a Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 29, 1992,
Rogelio sold the subject property to petitioner without Shirley’s consent in the amount of Three
Hundred Eighty Thousand Pesos (P380,000.00), including petitioner’s undertaking to assume the
existing mortgage on the property with the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation and to
pay the real property taxes due thereon.

ISSUE:

Is the Deed of Sale null and void for lack of the consent of the wife?
HELD:

Yes. The petitioner is not a buyer in good faith. A buyer cannot claim to be an innocent
purchaser for value by merely relying on the TCT of the seller while ignoring all the other
surrounding circumstances relevant to the sale.

The nullity of the sale made by Rogelio is not premised on proof of respondent’s financial
contribution in the purchase of the subject property. Actual contribution is not relevant in
determining whether a piece of property is community property for the law itself defines what
constitutes community property.

Article 91 of the Family Code thus provides:

Art. 91. Unless otherwise provided in this Chapter or in the marriage settlements, the community
property shall consist of all the property owned by the spouses at the time of the celebration of the
marriage or acquired thereafter.

The only exceptions from the above rule are: (1) those excluded from the absolute community by
the Family Code; and (2) those excluded by the marriage settlement.

Under the first exception are properties enumerated in Article 92 of the Family Code, which states:

Art. 92. The following shall be excluded from the community property:

(1) Property acquired during the marriage by gratuitous title by either spouse and the fruits as well
as the income thereof, if any, unless it is expressly provided by the donor, testator or grantor that
they shall form part of the community property;

(2) Property for personal and exclusive use of either spouse; however, jewelry shall form part of the
community property;

(3) Property acquired before the marriage by either spouse who has legitimate descendants by a
former marriage, and the fruits as well as the income, if any, of such property.

Since the subject property does not fall under any of the exclusions provided in Article 92, it,
therefore, forms part of the absolute community property of Shirley and Rogelio. Regardless of their
respective contribution to its acquisition before their marriage, and despite the fact that only
Rogelio’s name appears in the TCT as owner, the property is owned jointly by the spouses Shirley
and Rogelio.

Tan v. Andrade
FACTS:

Rosario Vda. De Andrade was the registered owner of four parcels of which she mortgaged
to one Simon Diu, who foreclosed on the same. When the redemption period was about to expire,
Rosario sought the assistance of Bobby Tan who agreed to redeem the subject properties.
Thereafter, Rosario sold the same to Bobby and her son, Proceso as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute
Sale.

Proceso executed a Deed of Assignment, ceding to Bobby his interests over the properties.
The Deed of Assignment was signed by Henry, one of Rosario’s sons, as instrumental witness. Bobby
extended an Option to Buy the subject properties to Proceso, giving the latter until 7:00 in the
evening of July 31, 1984 to purchase the properties for the sum of P310,000. When Proceso failed to
purchase them, Bobby consolidated his ownership over the properties, and the TCTs were issued in
his name.

On October 7, 1997, Rosario’s children, including Proceso and Henry, filed a complaint for
reconveyance and annulment of deeds and damages against Bobby before the RTC. They alleged
that the initial transaction between Rosario and Bobby was actually an equitable mortgage which
was entered into to secure Rosario’s indebtedness with Bobby. They also claimed that since the
subject properties were inherited by them from their father, the subject properties were conjugal in
nature, and thus, Rosario had no right to dispose of their respective shares.

The RTC dimissed the complaint. On appeal, the CA upheld the trial court’s ruling.

ISSUE:

Whether the properties belong to the conjugal partnership of Rosario and her late husband
and co-owned by her and her children.

HELD:

NO Pertinent to the resolution of this second issue is Article 160 of the Civil Code38 which
states that "[a]ll property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless
it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife." For this presumption to
apply, the party invoking the same must, however, preliminarily prove that the property was indeed
acquired during the marriage. As held in Go v. Yamane:

x x x As a condition sine qua non for the operation of [Article 160] in favor of the conjugal
partnership, the party who invokes the presumption must first prove that the property was acquired
during the marriage.

In other words, the presumption in favor of conjugality does not operate if there is no
showing of when the property alleged to be conjugal was acquired. Moreover, the presumption may
be rebutted only with strong, clear, categorical and convincing evidence. There must be strict proof
of the exclusive ownership of one of the spouses, and the burden of proof rests upon the party
asserting it.

In this case, records reveal that the conjugal partnership of Rosario and her husband was
terminated upon the latter’s death on August 7, 1978 while the transfer certificates of title over the
subject properties were issued on September 28, 1979 and solely in the name of "Rosario Vda. de
Andrade, of legal age, widow, Filipino." Other than their bare allegation, no evidence was adduced
by the Andrades to establish that the subject properties were procured during the coverture of their
parents or that the same were bought with conjugal funds. Moreover, Rosario’s declaration that she
is the absolute owner of the disputed parcels of land in the subject deed of sale was not disputed by
her son Proceso, Jr., who was a party to the same. Hence, by virtue of these incidents, the Court
upholds the RTC’s finding that the subject properties were exclusive or sole properties of Rosario.

BAUTISTA FERRER vs. SPS. FERRER

Facts:
 Petitioner Josefa alleged that she is the widow of Alfredo Ferrer (Alfredo), a half brother of
respondents Manuel M. Ferrer (Manuel) and Ismael M. Ferrer (Ismael).

Before her marriage to Alfredo, the latter acquired a piece of lot.

He applied for a loan with the SSS to build improvements thereon, including a residential
house and a two-door apartment building.

However, he stopped paying rentals thereon, alleging that he had acquired ownership over
the property by virtue of a Deed of Sale executed by Alfredo in favor of respondents, Manuel and
Ismael and their spouses.

When her husband was already bedridden, respondents Ismael and Flora Ferrer made him
sign a document, purported to be his last will and testament. The document, however, was a Deed
of Sale covering Alfredos lot and the improvements thereon.

Learning of this development, Alfredo filed with the RTC of Pasig, a Complaint for Annulment
of the said sale against respondents.

RTC:

RTC dismissed the same. RTC found that the terms and conditions of the deed of sale are not
contrary to law, morals, good customs, and public policy, and should be complied with by the parties
in good faith, there being no compelling reason under the law to do otherwise. CA: The dismissal
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

SC: Subsequently, on 7 November 1994, this Court, in G.R. No. L-117067, finding no reversible error
committed by the appellate court in affirming the dismissal of the RTC, affirmed the Decision of the
Court of Appeals.

According to petitioner, the ruling of the RTC shows that, when Alfredo died on 29 September 1999,
or at the time of the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, she had the right to be reimbursed for
the cost of the improvements on Alfredo’s lot.

She alleged that the cost of the improvements amounted to P500,000.00; hence, one-half thereof
should be reimbursed and paid by respondents as they are now the registered owners of Alfredo’s
lot.

She averred that respondents cannot claim lack of knowledge about the fact that the improvements
were constructed using conjugal funds as they had occupied one of the apartment buildings on
Alfredo’s lot, and even paid rentals to petitioner.

Petitioner prayed that respondents be ordered to render an accounting from September, 1991, on
the income of the boarding house constructed thereon which they had appropriated for themselves,
and to remit one-half thereof as her share. Finally, petitioner sought from respondents moral and
exemplary damages, litigation and incidental expenses.

Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss, contending that petitioner had no cause of action against
them, and that the cause of action was barred by prior judgment.

RTC:

RTC rendered an Order, denying the Motion to Dismiss.

 According to the RTC, no pronouncement as to the improvements constructed on Alfredos
lot has been made in Civil Case No. 61327, and the payment of petitioners share in the conjugal
partnership constitutes a separate cause of action.A subsequent Order [11] dated 17 January 2003
was issued by the RTC, denying respondents Motion for Reconsideration.

CA:

Aggrieved, respondents elevated the case to the Court of Appeals by way of a Petition for
Certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the RTC in
denying the dismissal. On 16 August 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision granting the
Petition. It held that petitioners Complaint is not the proper action for the respondent to enforce her
right of reimbursement of the cost of the improvements on the subject property.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereon. However, on 17 December 2004,
the Court of Appeals rendered a Resolution denying the motion. Hence, the present recourse.

ISSUE:

WON respondents have an obligation to respect her right to be reimbursed

HELD:

NO. While it made a reference to the right of the spouse as contemplated in Art. 120 22 of
the family code to be reimbursed for the cost of the improvements, the obligation to reimburse rests
on the spouse upon whom ownership of the entire property is vested. There is no obligation on the
part of the purchaser of the property, in case the property is sold by the owner-spouse.

Indeed, Article 120 provides the solution in determining the ownership of the improvements that
are made on the separate property of the spouses at the expense of the partnership or through the
acts or efforts of either or both spouses.

Thus, when the cost of the improvement and any resulting increase in value are more than the value
of the property at the time of the improvement, the entire property of one of the spouses shall
belong to the conjugal partnership, subject to reimbursement of the value of the property of the
owner-spouse at the time of the improvement; otherwise, said property shall be retained in
ownership by the owner-spouse, likewise subject to reimbursement of the cost of the improvement.
The subject property was precisely declared as the exclusive property of Alfredo on the basis of
Article 120 of the Family Code. What is incontrovertible is that the respondents, despite the
allegations contained in the Complaint that they are the buyers of the subject premises, are not
petitioners’ spouse nor can they ever be deemed as the owner-spouse upon whom the obligation to
reimburse petitioner for her costs rested. It is the owner-spouse who has the obligation to reimburse
the conjugal partnership or the spouse who expended the acts or efforts, as the case may be.
Otherwise stated, respondents do not have the obligation to respect petitioners right to be
reimbursed. The right of the respondents to acquire as buyers the subject premises from alfredo
under the assailed Deed of Sale in Civil Case No. 61327 had been laid to rest. This is because the
validity of the Deed of Sale had already been determined and upheld with finality. The petition is
denied.

BARRIDO v. NONATO
Facts:

In the course of the marriage of respondent Leonardo V. Nonato and petitioner Marietta N. Barrido,
they were able to acquire a property... consisting of a house and lot

On March 15, 1996, their marriage was declared void on the ground of psychological incapacity.

Nonato asked Barrido for partition, but the latter refused.

Thus,... Nonato... filed a Complaint for partition

Barrido claimed... that the subject property had already been sold to their children

MTCC rendered a Decision... ordering the conjugal property... adjudicated to the defendant Marietta
Nonato,... the spouse with whom the majority of the common children choose to remain.

RTC reversed the ruling of the MTCC

It found that even though the MTCC aptly applied Article 129 of the Family Code, it nevertheless
made a reversible error in adjudicating the subject... property to Barrido.

ordering the parties

(1) to equitably partition the house and lot

(2) to reimburse Joseph Raymund and Joseph Leo Nonato of the amount advanced by them in
payment of the debts and obligation

(3) to deliver the presumptive legitimes of Joseph Raymund and Joseph Leo Nonato pursuant to
Article 51 of the Family Code... the CA affirmed the RTC Decision

Issues:

IS CONJUGAL AFTER BEING SOLD TO THE CHILDREN

Ruling:

The records reveal that Nonato and Barrido's marriage had been declared void for
psychological incapacity under Article 36[10] of the Family Code.

During their marriage, however, the conjugal partnership regime governed their property relations.

Article 147 specifically covers the effects of void marriages on the spouses' property relations.

Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry
shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership.

Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through
their joint... efforts.

The rules which are... set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or the
conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages, are
irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between common-law spouses or
spouses of... void marriages.

Here, the former spouses both agree that they acquired the subject property during the subsistence
of their marriage. Thus, it shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or
industry, and shall be jointly owned by them in equal shares. 
Barrido, however, claims that the ownership over the property in question is already vested on their
children, by virtue of a Deed of Sale. But aside from the title to the property still being registered in
the names of the former spouses, said document of sale does not... bear a notarization of a notary
public. It must be noted that without the notarial seal, a document remains to be private and cannot
be converted into a public document, making it inadmissible in evidence unless properly
authenticated.

Therefore, the subject property remains to be owned in common by Nonato and Barrido, which
should be... divided in accordance with the rules on co-ownership.

Principles:

Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with
each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their
wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property... acquired by both of
them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

The rules which are... set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or the
conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages, are
irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between common-law spouses or
spouses of... void marriages.

MANOTOK REALTY v. CA
Facts:

Felipe Madlangawa... claims that he has been occupying a parcel of land in the Clara de
Tambunting de Legarda Subdivision... since 1949 upon permission being obtained from Andres
Ladores... with the understanding that the... respondent would eventually buy the lot.

the lot,... the owner of t

Clara Tambunting... died and her entire estate, including her paraphernal properties which covered
the lot occupied by the private respondent were placed under custodia legis.

the private respondent made a deposit for the said lot in the sum of P1,500.00 which was received
by Vicente Legarda, husband of the late owner... private respondent did not pay or was unable to
pay this balance because after the death of the testatrix, Clara Tambunting de Legarda, her heirs
could not settle their... differences.

Don Vicente Legarda was appointed as a special administrator of the estate

Meanwhile the private respondent remained in possession of the lot in question.

the petitioner became the successful bidder and vendee of the Tambunting-Legarda Subdivision

In its effort to clear the Tambunting Subdivision of its squatters and occupants, the petitioner caused
the publication of several notices... private respondent was one of the many occupants who refused
to vacate the lots they were occupying... he petitioner filed the action below to recover the said lot

Issues:
 In this petition, the petitioner maintains that the Court of Appeals committed a reversible
error in holding that the sale by Don Vicente Legarda in favor of the private respondent is valid,
binding, and enforceable against the petitioner.

petitioner contends that since there is no dispute that the property in question was the paraphernal
property of Clara Tambunting,... no authority whatsoe

Vicente Legarda had no a... o the private... ever to sell the said property to the private respondent...
on May 12, 1950 since... the former was appointed as administrator of the estate of Clara
Tambunting only on August 28, 1950

Ruling:

There is nothing in the records that will show that Don Vicente Legarda was the
administrator of the paraphernal properties of Dona Clara Tambuting during the lifetime of the latter

Thus, it cannot be said that the sale with was entered into by the private respondent and

Don Vicente Legarda had its inception before the death of Dona Clara Tambunting and was entered
into by the former for and on behalf of the latter, but was only consummated after her death.

n Vicente Legarda, therefore, could not have validly disposed of the lot in... dispute as a continuing
administrator of the paraphernal properties of Dona Clara Tambunting.

After the appointment of Don Vicente Legarda as administrator of the estate of Dona Clara
Tambunting, he should have applied before the probate court for authority to sell the disputed
property in favor of the private respondent. If the probate court approved the request,... then Don
Vicente Legarda would have been able to execute a valid deed of sale in favor of the respondent.
Unfortunately, there was no effort on the part of the administrator to comply with the above-
quoted rule of procedure nor on that of the respondent to protect his... interests or to pay the
balance of the installments to the court appointed administrator.

Principles:

sale between Don Vicente Legarda and the private respondent is void ab initio, the former being
neither an owner nor administrator of the subject property. Such being the case, the sale cannot be
the... subject of the ratification by the Philippine Trust Company or the probate court.

Partosa-Jo v. Court of Appeals

FACTS:

The petitioner, Prima Partosa-Jo, is the legal wife of Jose Jo, herein private respondent. The
latter admitted to have cohabited with 3 women and fathered 15 children. Prima filed a complaint
against the husband for judicial separation of conjugal property in addition to an earlier action for
support which was consolidated. RTC decision was a definite disposition of the complaint for support
but none of that for the judicial separation of conjugal property. Jose elevated the decision to CA
which affirmed rulings of the trial court. The complaint on the separation of property was dismissed
for lack of cause of action on the ground that separation by agreement was not covered in Art. 178
of the Civil Code. Prima contested that the agreement between her and Jose was for her to
temporarily live with her parents during the initial period of her pregnancy and for him to visit and
support her. They never agreed to be separated permanently. She even returned to him but the
latter refused to accept her.

ISSUE:

WON there is abandonment on the part of Jose Jo to warrant judicial separation of conjugal
property.

RULING:

The petition was granted and in favor of the petitioner and that the court ordered the
conjugal property of the spouses be divided between them, share and share alike. The division will
be implemented after the determination of all the properties pertaining to the said conjugal
partnership including those that may have been illegally registered in the name of the persons. SC is
in the position that respondent court should have made the necessary modification instead of
dismissing the case filed.

Art. 178. The separation in fact between husband and wife without judicial approval, shall not affect
the conjugal partnership, except that:

(3) If the husband has abandoned the wife without just cause for at least one year, she may petition
the court for a receivership, or administration by her of the conjugal partnership property or
separation of property.

For abandonment to exist there must be an absolute cessation of marital relations, duties and rights,
with the intention of perpetual separation. The fact that Jo did not accept her demonstrates that he
had no intention of resuming their conjugal relationship. From 1968 until 1988, Jose refused to
provide financial support to Prima. Hence, the physical separation of the parties, coupled with the
refusal by the private respondent to give support to the petitioner, sufficed to constitute
abandonment as a ground for the judicial separation of their conjugal property.

TODA vs. CA
FACTS:

In June 1951, Benigno Toda Jr and Rose Marie Tuason-Toda got married and blessed with
two children. However, their conjugal union was jeopardized because of individual differences and
the alleged Benigno’s infidelity thereby prompting Rose Marie to file for petition for termination of
conjugal partnership on the ground of alleged mismanagement and dissipation of conjugal funds
against Benigno.

After hearings were held, both parties agreed to a joint petition for judicial approval of the
dissolution of their conjugal partnership which was signed on March 30, 1981, embodied a
compromise agreement allocating to the spouses their respective shares in the conjugal partnership
assets and dismissing the previous appeals made before the CA and SC. Said petition was approved
by the Trial Court in its order of June 9,1981. Further, the trial court issued several orders pertaining
to the interpretation and implementation of the said compromise agreement.

After hearings were held, both parties agreed to a joint petition for judicial approval of the
dissolution of their conjugal partnership which was signed on March 30, 1981, embodied a
compromise agreement allocating to the spouses their respective shares in the conjugal partnership
assets and dismissing the previous appeals made before the CA and SC. Said petition was approved
by the Trial Court in its order of June 9,1981. Further, the trial court issued several orders pertaining
to the interpretation and implementation of the said compromise agreement.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the compromise agreement takes effect on the time when it was approved
by the trial court

HELD:

YES. The Supreme Court is in agreement with the Court of Appeals that the compromise
agreement in this case shall become effective only on June 9, 1981, the date when it was approved
by the trial court and not March 30,1981 when it was signed by the parties involved. Under Article
134 of the Family Code: “in the absence of the express declaration in the marriage settlements, the
separation of the property between the spouses during the marriage shall not take place save in
virtue of a judicial order.” Hence, the separation of property is not effected by mere execution of a
contract or agreement of the parties but by the decree by the court approving the same.

Therefore, it becomes effective only upon the judicial approval, without which it is void. Article 137
of this code explicitly provides that the conjugal partnership is dissolved only upon the issuance of a
decree of separation of property.

MAXEY VS CA
FACTS:

petition for review involves the rights of a woman over properties acquired in 1912
principally through the efforts of the man she was living with and at a time when the two were not
yet legally married.

Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales (both deceased) lived together as husband and wife, that out
of said union were born six (6) children, among them are the herein plaintiffs, namely: John or
Carlos, Lucille, Margaret, Florence, Fred and George, all surnamed Maxey;

during the period of their (Melbourne and Regina) cohabitation, , the late Melbourne Maxey
acquired the parcels of land

Melbourne Maxey, through his attorney-in-fact Julia Pamatluan Maxey (his new wife after Regina
died), sold in favor of the defendants-spouses Macayra the parcels of land

since thereof, the defendants-spouses have taken immediate possession thereof continuously up to
the present.

Plaintiffs instituted the present case praying for the annulment of the documents of sale covering
the subject parcels of land and to recover possession thereof with damages from the herein
defendants-spouses, alleging, among others, that the aforesaid realties were common properties of
their parents, having been acquired during their lifetime and through their joint effort and capital;
and that the sales of the of the said lands in favor of the defendants-spouses, after the death of their
mother, Regina Morales, was executed by their father, Melbourne Maxey, without their knowledge
and consent;.
defendants-spouses deny the material allegations of the complaint and assert by way of affirmative
defenses that they are the true and lawful owners and possessors of the properties in question
having purchased the same in good faith and for value from Melbourne Maxey during his lifetime in,
based upon the reasonable belief that the latter is the me and exclusive owner of the said parcels of
land and that since then, they have been in possession thereof openly, exclusively and continuously
in concept of owners.

Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales started living together in 1903. Their children claim that their
parents were united in 1903 in a marriage performed "in the military fashion". Both the trial court
and the appellate court rejected this claim of a "military fashion" marriage.

the disputed properties were acquired in 1911 and 1912 before the 1919 church marriage. Regina
Morales Maxey died in 1919 sometime after the church wedding.

The husband remarried and in 1953, his second wife Julia Pamatluan Maxey, using a power of
attorney, sold the properties to the respondent spouses, Mr. and Mrs. Beato C. Macayra.

The court ruled in favor of petitioner but CA reversed it.

The Court of Appeals, however, found the parcels of, land to be exclusive properties of the late
Melbourne Maxey. It set aside the decision of the trial court, because no proof that the properties in
question were acquired through the joint efforts of Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales.

ISSUE:

WON THE PROPERTIES IN QUESTION IS EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY OF MELBOURNE MAXEY.

HELD:

NO. The Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeals correctly rejected the argument
that Act No. 3613, the Revised Marriage Law, recognized "military fashion" marriages as legal.

The Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeals both ruled that Melbourne Maxey and Regina
Morales were married only in 1919. This is a finding of fact which we do not disturb at this stage of
the case.

Considerations of justice dictate the retroactive application of Article 144 of the Civil Code to the
case at bar. Commenting on Article 2252 of the Civil Code which provides that changes made and
new provisions and rules laid down by the Code which may prejudice or impair vested or acquired
rights in accordance with the old legislation shall have no retroactive effect,

Prior to the effectivity of the present Civil Code on August 30, 1950, the formation of an informal
civil partnership between a man and wife not legally married and their corresponding right to an
equal share in properties acquired through their joint efforts and industry during cohabitation was
recognized through decisions of this Court.

With the enactment of the new Civil Code, Article 144 codified the law established through judicial
precedents but with the modification that the property governed by the rules on co-ownership may
be acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry. Even if it is only the man who
works, the property acquired during the man and wife relationship belongs through a fifty-fifty
sharing to the two of them.

This new article in the Civil Code recognizes that it would be unjust and abnormal if a woman who is
a wife in all aspects of the relationship except for the requirement of a valid marriage must abandon
her home and children, neglect her traditional household duties, and go out to earn a living or
engage in business before the rules on co-ownership would apply.

This article is particularly relevant in this case where the "common-law" relationship was legitimated
through a valid marriage 34 years before the properties were sold.

No matter how large the income of a working wife compared to that of her husband, the major, if
not the full responsibility of running the household remains with the woman. She is the
administrator of the household. The fact that the two involved in this case were not legally married
at the time does not change the nature of their respective roles.

Should Article 144 of the Civil Code be applied in this case? Our answer is "Yes" because there is no
showing that vested rights would be impaired or prejudiced through its application.

The disputed properties were owned in common by Melbourne Maxey and the estate of his late
wife, Regina Morales, when they were sold.

petitioners should return one-half of the P1,300.00 purchase price of the land while the private
respondents should pay some form of rentals for their use of one-half of the properties.

the petition for review on certiorari is hereby granted. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
reversed and set aside insofar as one-half of the disputed properties are concerned. The private
respondents are ordered to return one-half of said properties to the heirs of Regina Morales.

BUENAVENTURA vs CA
FACTS:

Defendant spouses Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito are the parents of plaintiffs
Consolacion, Nora, Emma and Natividad as well as of defendants Fidel, Tomas, Artemio, Clarita,
Felicitas, Fe, and Gavino, all surnamed JOAQUIN. (Note: So there are two sets of children here.)
Sought to be declared null and void ab initio are certain deeds of sale of real property executed by
Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito in favor of their co-defendant children and the
corresponding certificates of title issued in their names. The plaintiffs in this case sought for the
declaration of nullity of the six deeds of sale and certificates of title in favor of the defendants.

They alleged that certain deed of sale were null and void ab initio because they are
simulated. They said that: a. Firstly, there was no actual valid consideration for the deeds of sale xxx
over the properties in litis; b. Secondly, assuming that there was consideration in the sums reflected
in the questioned deeds, the properties are more than three-fold times more valuable than the
measly sums appearing therein; c. Thirdly, the deeds of sale do not reflect and express the true
intent of the parties (vendors and vendees); and d. Fourthly, the purported sale of the properties in
litis was the result of a deliberate conspiracy designed to unjustly deprive the rest of the compulsory
heirs (plaintiffs herein) of their legitime.

Defendants, on the other hand aver (1) that plaintiffs do not have a cause of action against
them as well as the requisite standing and interest to assail their titles over the properties in litis; (2)
that the sales were with sufficient considerations and made by defendants parents voluntarily, in
good faith, and with full knowledge of the consequences of their deeds of sale; and (3) that the
certificates of title were issued with sufficient factual and legal basis. RTC ruled in favor of the
defendants (respondents in this case) and dismissed the complaint. Upon appeal, the CA upheld
RTC’s ruling.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the Deeds of Sale are void for lack of consideration. NO

2. Whether the Deeds of Sale are void for gross inadequacy of price. NO

HELD:

1ST ISSUE:

THERE WAS A CONSIDERATION. If there is a meeting of the minds of the parties as to the
price, the contract of sale is valid, despite the manner of payment, or even the breach of that
manner of payment. If the real price is not stated in the contract, then the contract of sale is valid
but subject to reformation. If there is no meeting of the minds of the parties as to the price, because
the price stipulated in the contract is simulated, then the contract is void. Article 1471 of the Civil
Code states that if the price in a contract of sale is simulated, the sale is void.

It is not the act of payment of price that determines the validity of a contract of sale.
Payment of the price has nothing to do with the perfection of the contract. Payment of the price
goes into the performance of the contract. Failure to pay the consideration is different from lack of
consideration. The former results in a right to demand the fulfillment or cancellation of the
obligation under an existing valid contract while the latter prevents the existence of a valid contract.

Petitioners failed to show that the prices in the Deeds of Sale were absolutely simulated. To
prove simulation, petitioners presented Emma Joaquin Valdoz’s testimony stating that their father,
respondent Leonardo Joaquin, told her that he would transfer a lot to her through a deed of sale
without need for her payment of the purchase price. The trial court did not find the allegation of
absolute simulation of price credible. Petitioners’ failure to prove absolute simulation of price is
magnified by their lack of knowledge of their respondent siblings’ financial capacity to buy the
questioned lots. On the other hand, the Deeds of Sale which petitioners presented as evidence
plainly showed the cost of each lot sold. Not only did respondents’ minds meet as to the purchase
price, but the real price was also stated in the Deeds of Sale. As of the filing of the complaint,
respondent siblings have also fully paid the price to their respondent father.

2ND ISSUE:

THE GENERAL RULE IS THAT INADEQUACY OF CONSIDERATION SHALL NOT INVALIDATE A

CONTRACT. Art. 1355. Except in cases specified by law, lesion or inadequacy of cause shall not
invalidate a contract, unless there has been fraud, mistake or undue influence. Article 1470 of the
Civil Code further provides: Art. 1470. Gross inadequacy of price does not affect a contract of sale,
except as may indicate a defect in the consent, or that the parties really intended a donation or
some other act or contract. (Emphasis supplied) Petitioners failed to prove any of the instances
mentioned in Articles 1355 and 1470 of the Civil Code which would invalidate, or even affect, the
Deeds of Sale. Indeed, there is no requirement that the price be equal to the exact value of the
subject matter of sale. All the respondents believed that they received the commutative value of
what they gave. Ruling: In the instant case, the trial court found that the lots were sold for a valid
consideration, and that the defendant children actually paid the purchase price stipulated in their
respective Deeds of Sale. Actual payment of the purchase price by the buyer to the seller is a factual
finding that is now conclusive upon us. WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals
in toto.

Uy v. Lacsamana
DOCTRINE: Persons living together in apparent matrimony are presumed, absent any counter
presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. Properties acquired during
cohabitation are presumed co-owned unless there is proof to the contrary.

FACTS:

1. Uy filed with RTC Batangas a complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Documents with
Damages against Petra Rosca and Sps. Lacsamana.

2. Uy alleged that he was the lawful husband of Rosca, living together as husband and wife
from 1944 until 1973 (29 years) when they separated (because of Uy’s alleged affair). a. They had 8
children.

3. Subject of this case is a piece of residential land Rosca bought from Sps. Manuel.

4. This property, together with the house Rosca built was then subsequently sold to Sps.
Lacsamana.

5. Uy alleges that the property is part of the sale of Rosca to Sps. Lacsamana was void for
failure to obtain his marital consent, the property being conjugal in nature.

6. Uy then filed a complaint, praying that the Deed of Sale (executed by Rosca in favor of
Sps. Lacsamana) be declared null and void with respect to his rights, interest, and ownership and
damages. a. Rosca defense: purchase of land was from her paraphernal funds and that she was
never married to Uy.

7. Upon Uy’s death, 2 daughters substituted. Upon Rosca’s death and Sps. Lacsamana’s sale
of the property to Buena, Buena substituted.

8. RTC: no valid marriage between Uy and Rosca, Deed of Sale by Rosca in favor of
Lacsamana was valid; CA- affirmed RTC; MR- denied.

ISSUES:

WON Deed of Sale executed by Rosca alone, without Uy's consent, in favor of Spouses
Lacsamana, is valid.

RULING:

YES. Valid Deed of Sale. 1. Validity of sale of property by Rosca alone is anchored on whether
Uy and Rosca had a valid marraige. 2. There is a presumption established in our Rules "that a man
and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage.” Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always presume marriage. However, this
presumption may be contradicted by a party and overcome by other evidence.

Marriage may be proven by any competent and relevant evidence.

a. Testimony by one of the parties or witnesses, person who officiated at the solemnization
 b. Documentary evidence – marriage contract RTC findings – Uy and Rosca not legally
married. a. In his Petition for Naturalization as a Filipino citizen filed before CFI, Uy said, "I am
married (not legally)." b. The Sworn Statement of Batangas Governor executed in support of the Uy's
Petition for Naturalization categorically states, that Uy was married (not legally). c. The Immigrant
Certificate of Residence - Uy also known by his Chinese name of Uy Suan Tee, regarded himself as
"single" when filling up his civil status therein. d. Alien Certificate e. Affidavit of a prominent citizen
of Batangas – not legally married f. Rosca’s testimony thay they were not legally married because
their marriage was not consummated (because of WW2) With the presumption of marriage
sufficiently overcome, the onus probandi of Rosca shifted to Uy to prove the marriage but Uy failed
to present any additional proof of such.

Since Uy failed to discharge the burden that he was legally married to Rosca, their property
relations would be governed by Article 147 of the Family Code which applies when a couple living
together were not incapacitated from getting married ------ co ownership of properties is presumed
unless there is proof to the contrary. Rosca was able to prove that the subject property is not co-
owned but is paraphernal.

a. Land Registration Commission Resolution recognized Rosca as sole registered owner of

the property.

b. Deed of Sale with Sps. Manuel, where Uy stood as a mere witness so he admitted the
paraphernal nature of Rosca’s property

c. In the loan application of Rosca, affidavit of ownership stated Petra Rosca, married to Luis
G. Uy. i. Word “married to” is merely descriptive of Rosca's status at the time the property was
registered in her name. ii. Otherwise, if the property was conjugal, the title to the property should
have been in the names of Luis Uy and Petra Rosca.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 14 September
2011 and Resolution dated 1 March 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 93786.

PELAYO v. PEREZ
Facts:

David Pelayo (Pelayo), by a Deed of Absolute Sale executed on January 11, 1988, conveyed
to Melki Perez (Perez) two parcels of agricultural land (the lots) situated in Panabo, Davao which are
portions of Lot 4192, Cad. 276 covered by OCT P-16873.

Loreza Pelayo (Loreza), wife of Pelayo, and another one whose signature is illegible witnessed the
execution of the deed.

Loreza, however, signed only on the third page in the space provided for witnesses on account of
which Perez' application for registration of the deed with the Office of the Register of Deeds in
Tagum, Davao was denied.

Perez thereupon asked Loreza to sign on the first and second pages of the deed but she refused,
hence, he instituted on August 8, 1991 the instant complaint for specific performance against her
and her husband Pelayo (defendants).

Issues:
 The CA made a novel ruling that there was implied marital consent of the wife of petitioner
David Pelayo.

Ruling:

We agree with the CA ruling that petitioner Lorenza, by affixing her signature to the Deed of
Sale on the space provided for witnesses, is deemed to have given her implied consent to the
contract of sale.

Sale is a consensual contract that is perfected by mere consent, which may either be express or
implied

A wife's consent to the husband's disposition of conjugal property does not always have to be
explicit or set forth in any particular document,... so long as it is shown by acts of the wife that such
consent or approval was indeed given.

In the present case, although it appears on the face of the deed of sale that Lorenza signed only as
an instrumental witness, circumstances leading to the... execution of said document point to the fact
that Lorenza was fully aware of the sale of their conjugal property and consented to the sale.

It has been held that the contract is valid until the court annuls the same and only upon an action
brought by the wife whose consent was not obtained.

In the present case, despite respondent's repeated demands for Lorenza to affix her... signature on
all the pages of the deed of sale, showing respondent's insistence on enforcing said contract,
Lorenza still did not file a case for annulment of the deed of sale. It was only when respondent filed a
complaint for specific performance on August 8, 1991 when... petitioners brought up Lorenza's
alleged lack of consent as an affirmative defense. Thus, if the transaction was indeed entered into
without Lorenza's consent, we find it quite puzzling why for more than three and a half years,
Lorenza did absolutely nothing to seek the... nullification of the assailed contract.

The foregoing circumstances lead the Court to believe that Lorenza knew of the full import of the
transaction between respondent and her husband; and, by affixing her signature on the deed of sale,
she, in effect, signified her consent to the disposition of their conjugal property.

FAVIS V. GONZALES
FACTS:

Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. (Dr. Favis) was married to Capitolina Aguilar (Capitolina) with whom he
had seven children. When Capitolina died in March 1994. Dr. Favis married Juana Gonzalez (Juana),
his common-law wife with whom he sired one child, Mariano G. Favis (Mariano), he executed an
affidavit acknowledging Mariano as one of his legitimate children. Mariano is married to Larcelita D.
Favis (Larcelita), with whom he has four children.

Dr. Favis died intestate on July 29, 1995. On October 16, 1994, prior his death, he allegedly executed
a Deed of Donation transferring and conveying properties in favor of his grandchildren with Juana.
Claiming the said donation prejudiced their legitime, Dr. Favis children with Capitolina, petitioners
herein, filed an action for annulment of the Deed of Donation, inventory, liquidation, liquidation and
partition of property before the RTC against Juana, Sps. Mariano and Larcelita and their
grandchildren as respondents.
RTC nullified the Deed of Donation. The trial court found that Dr. Favis, at the age of 92 and plagued
with illnesses, could not have had full control of his mental capacities to execute a valid Deed of
Donation.

The Court of Appeals ordered the dismissal of the petitioners nullification case. The CA motu proprio
ordered the dismissal of the complaint for failure of petitioners to make an averment that earnest
efforts toward a compromise have been made, as mandated by Article 151 of the Family Court.

ISSUE:

May the appellate court dismiss the order of dismissal of the complaint for failure to allege
therein that earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made?

HELD:

The appellate court committed egregious error in dismissing the complaint.

The appellate court committed egregious error in dismissing the complaint. The appellate courts
decision hinged on Article 151 of the Family Code, Art.151.No suit between members of the same
family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition those earnest
efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no
such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed.

The appellate court correlated this provision with Section 1, par. (j), Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, which provides: Section 1. Grounds. - Within the time for but before filing the answer to
the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the
following grounds:(j) That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with.

The appellate courts reliance on this provision is misplaced. Rule 16 treats of the grounds for a
motion to dismiss the complaint. It must be distinguished from the grounds provided under Section
1, Rule 9 which specifically deals with dismissal of the claim by the court motu proprio. Section 1,
Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 1, Rule 9 provides for only four instances when
the court may motu proprio dismiss the claim, namely: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter; (b) litis pendentia; (c) res judicata; and (d) prescription of action.

It was in Heirs of Domingo Valientes v. Ramas cited in P.L. Uy Realty Corporation v. ALS Management
and Development Corporation where we noted that the second sentence of Section 1 of Rule 9 does
not only supply exceptions to the rule that defenses not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in
the answer are deemed waived, it also allows courts to dismiss cases motu proprio on any of the
enumerated grounds. The tenor of the second sentence of the Rule is that the allowance of a motu
propio dismissal can proceed only from the exemption from the rule on waiver; which is but logical
because there can be no ruling on a waived ground.

A failure to allege earnest but failed efforts at a compromise in a complaint among members of the
same family, is not a jurisdictional defect but merely a defect in the statement of a cause of action.

In the case at hand, the proceedings before the trial court ran the full course. The complaint of
petitioners was answered by respondents without a prior motion to dismiss having been filed. The
decision in favor of the petitioners was appealed by respondents on the basis of the alleged error in
the ruling on the merits, no mention having been made about any defect in the statement of a cause
of action. In other words, no motion to dismiss the complaint based on the failure to comply with a
condition precedent was filed in the trial court; neither was such failure assigned as error in the
appeal that respondent brought before the Court of Appeals.
Therefore, the rule on deemed waiver of the non-jurisdictional defense or objection is wholly
applicable to respondent. If the respondents as parties-defendants could not, and did not, after filing
their answer to petitioners complaint, invoke the objection of absence of the required allegation on
earnest efforts at a compromise, the appellate court unquestionably did not have any authority or
basis to motu propio order the dismissal of petitioners complaint.

The correctness of the finding was not touched by the Court of Appeals. The respondents opted to
rely only on what the appellate court considered, erroneously though, was a procedural infirmity.
The trial court's factual finding, therefore, stands unreversed; and respondents did not provide us
with any argument to have it reversed.

The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside and the Judgment of the Regional Trial
Court is AFFIRMED. GRANTED.

Modequillo v. Breva
FACTS:

The sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land located at Poblacion Malalag, Davao del Sur
on July 1988, registered in the name of Jose Mondequillo and a parcel of agricultural land located at
Dalagbong Bulacan, Malalag, Davao de Sur also registered in the latter’s name. A motion to quash
was filed by the petitioner alleging that the residential land is where the family home is built since
1969 prior the commencement of this case and as such is exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment under Article 152 and 153 except for liabilities mentioned in Article 155 thereof, and
that the judgment sought to be enforced against the family home is not one of those enumerated.
With regard to the agricultural land, it is alleged that it is still part of the public land and the transfer
in his favor by the original possessor and applicant who was a member of a cultural minority. The
residential house in the present case became a family home by operation of law under Article 153.

ISSUE:

WON the subject property is deemed to be a family home in as much as it does not fall
under the exemption from execution.

RULING:

No. The subject property is deemed to be a family home but it does not fall under the
exemption from execution of the money judgment aforecited.

Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it is provided that “the provisions of this Chapter shall also
govern existing family residences insofar as said provisions are applicable.” It does not mean that
Articles 152 and 153 of said Code have a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are
deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations
incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code. Article 162 simply means that all existing family
residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code, are considered family homes and are
prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code. Article 162
does not state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive effect.
The debt or liability which was the basis of the judgment arose or was incurred at the time of the
vehicular accident on March 16, 1976 and the money judgment arising therefrom was rendered by
the appellate court on January 29, 1988. Both preceded the effectivity of the Family Code on August
3, 1988. Therefore, this case does not fall under the exemptions from execution provided in the
Family Code.

As to the agricultural land, trial court correctly ruled that the levy to be made shall be on whatever
rights the petitioner may have on the land.

Manacop v. CA
FACTS:

Florante Manacop and his wife Euaceli purchased on March 1972, a residential lot with a
bungalow located in Quezon City. The petitioner failed to pay the sub-contract cost pursuant to a
deed of assignment signed between petitioner’s corporation and private respondent herein (FF Cruz
& Co). The latter filed a complaint for the recovery for the sum of money with a prayer for
preliminary attachment against the former. Consequently, the corresponding writ for the provisional
remedy was issued which triggered the attachment of a parcel of land in Quezon City owned by the
Manacop Construction President, the petitioner. The latter insists that the attached property is a
family home having been occupied by him and his family since 1972 and is therefore exempt from
attachment.

ISSUE:

WON the subject property is indeed exempted from attachment.

RULING:

The residential house and lot of petitioner became a family home by operation of law under
Article 153 of the Family Code. Such provision does not mean that said article has a retroactive effect
such that all existing family residences, petitioner’s included, are deemed to have been constituted
as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and
henceforth, are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. Since petitioner incurred debt in 1987, it preceded
the effectivity of the Code and his property is therefore not exempt form attachment.

Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is
occupied as a family residence. There is no need to constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially as
required in the Civil Code. If the family actually resides in the premises, it is, therefore, a family
home as contemplated by law. Thus, the creditors should take the necessary precautions to protect
their interest before extending credit to the spouses or head of the family who owns the home.

Article 155 of the Family Code also provides as follows:

“The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except:

(1) For nonpayment of taxes;

(2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home;

(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution; and
(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, materialmen and others who have
rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the building.

The exemption provided as aforestated is effective from the time of the constitution of the family
home as such, and lasts so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein.”

In the present case, the residential house and lot of petitioner was not constituted as a family home
whether judicially or extrajudicially under the Civil Code. It became a family home by operation of
law only under Article 153 of the Family Code. It is deemed constituted as a family home upon the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 not August 4, one year after its publication in the
Manila Chronicle on August 4, 1987 (1988 being a leap year).

Article 153 of the Family Code Has No Retroactive Effect

The petition was dismissed by SC.

CABANG vs. BASAY

FACTS:

Deceased Felix Odong was the registered owner of Lot No. 7777, Ts- 222 located in Molave,
Zamboanga del Sur. Said lot was covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 0-2,768 pursuant to
Decree No. N-64 and issued on March 9, 1966. However, Felix Odong and his heirs never occupied
nor took possession of the lot.

On June 16, 1987, plaintiff-appellants bought said real property from the heirs of Felix Odong for
P8,000.00. Consequently, OCT No. 0-2,768 was cancelled and in its stead, Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-22,048 was issued on August 6, 1987 in the name of plaintiff-appellants. The latter also did not
occupy the said property.

Defendant-appellees, on the other hand, had been in continuous, open, peaceful and adverse
possession of the same parcel of land since 1956 up to the present. They were the awardees in the
cadastral proceedings of Lot No. 7778 of the Molave Townsite, Ts-222. During the said cadastral
proceedings, defendant-appellees claimed Lot No. 7778 on the belief that the area they were
actually occupying was Lot No. 7778. As it turned out, however, when the Municipality of Molave
relocated the townsite lots in the area in 1992 as a big portion of Lot No. 7778 was used by the
government as a public road and as there were many discrepancies in the areas occupied, it was
then discovered that defendant-appellees were actually occupying Lot No. 7777.

On June 23, 1992, plaintiff-appellants filed a Complaint for Recovery of Property against defendant-
appellees. The trial court rendered its decision, holding that the rights of the plaintiffs to recover the
land registered in their names, have been effectively barred by laches; and

Aggrieved, plaintiff-appellants filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals assailing the above-
decision. The Court of Appeals, through the then Second Division, rendered a Decision reversing the
assailed decision.

Defendant-appellees thereafter filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court before the Supreme Court docketed as G.R. No. 139601. On October 18, 1999, the Supreme
Court issued a Resolution denying the petition for late filing and lack of appropriate service.
Subsequently, or on February 15, 2000, the Supreme Court Resolution had become final and
executory.

Consequently, the case was remanded to the court a quo and the latter commissioned the Municipal
Assessor of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur to determine the value of the improvements introduced by
the defendant-appellees. During the hearing on May 10, 2002, plaintiff-appellants’ offer to pay
P21,000.00 for the improvement of the lot in question was rejected by defendant-appellees. The
court a quo disclosed its difficulty in resolving whether or not the houses may be subject of an order
of execution it being a family home.

On June 18, 2002, plaintiff-appellants filed their Manifestation and Motion for Execution alleging
therein that defendant-appellees refused to accept payment of the improvements as determined by
the court appointed Commissioner, thus, they should now be ordered to remove said improvements
at their expense or if they refused, an Order of Demolition be issued. The court a quo issued the
herein assailed Order denying the motion for execution.

Respondents thereafter elevated their cause to the appellate court which reversed the trial court in
its May 31, 2007 Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 76755.

ISSUE:

Whether the property is a duly constituted family home which is not subject to execution

RULING:

It bears stressing that the purpose for which the records of the case were remanded to the
court of origin was for the enforcement of the appellate court’s final and executory judgment,
which, among others, declared herein respondents entitled to the possession of Lot No. 7777 of the
Molave Townsite subject to the provisions of Articles 448, 546, 547 and 548 of the Civil Code.
Indeed, the decision explicitly decreed that the remand of the records of the case was for the court
of origin “[t]o determine the rights of the defendants-appellees under the aforesaid article[s] of the
New Civil Code, and to render judgment thereon in accordance with the evidence and this decision.”

A final and executory judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is
meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that
rendered it or by the highest court in the land. Well-settled is the rule that there can be no execution
until and unless the judgment has become final and executory, i.e. the period of appeal has lapsed
without an appeal having been taken, or, having been taken, the appeal has been resolved and the
records of the case have been returned to the court of origin, in which event, execution shall issue as
a matter of right. In short, once a judgment becomes final, the winning party is entitled to a writ of
execution and the issuance thereof becomes a court’s ministerial duty.

Even squarely addressing the issue of whether or not the improvements introduced by petitioners
on the subject land are family homes will not extricate them from their predicament.

The family home is deemed constituted from the time it is occupied as a family residence. From the
time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family
home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as
hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law.

The actual value of the family home shall not exceed, at the time of its constitution, the amount of
P300,000.00 in urban areas and P200,000.00 in rural areas. Under the afore-quoted provision, a
family home is deemed constituted on a house and a lot from the time it is occupied as a family
residence. There is no need to constitute the same judicially or extra-judicially.

There can be no question that a family home is generally exempt from execution, provided it was
duly constituted as such. It is likewise a given that the family home must be constituted on property
owned by the persons constituting it.

Therein lies the fatal flaw in the postulate of petitioners. For all their arguments to the contrary, the
stark and immutable fact is that the property on which their alleged family home stands is owned by
respondents and the question of ownership had been long laid to rest with the finality of the
appellate court’s judgment. Thus, petitioners’ continued stay on the subject land is only by mere
tolerance of respondents.

All told, it is too late in the day for petitioners to raise this issue. Without doubt, the instant case
where the family home issue has been vigorously pursued by petitioners is but a clear-cut ploy
meant to forestall the enforcement of an otherwise final and executory decision. The execution of a
final judgment is a matter of right on the part of the prevailing party whose implementation is
mandatory and ministerial on the court or tribunal issuing the judgment.