Venue

THEODORE AND NANCY AND v. SPOUSES ALAN AND EM ANG

G.R. NO. 186993, August 22, 2012
Reyes, J:

DOCTRINE:

Should the non-resident Plaintiff institute a personal action through a representative, the proper venue is
that of the Defendant’s residence, for the representative’s residence is of no value for the latter not being a
real party in interest in the case filed.

FACTS:

Respondents, who are residing in Bacolod City, obtain a loan from Petitioners amounting to US$300,000,
secured by a promissory note; however, Respondents failed to comply with their obligations. Petitioners,
who are residing in Los Angeles, California, executed an SPA in favor of Atty. Aceron for the latter to
institute a complaint for collection of sum of money. The complaint was filed before the RTC of Quezon
City (Atty. Aceron’s residence); Respondent contents that the venue is improper for the case may only be
filed either in Petitioner’s residence or that of the Respondents, and that since Petitioners live abroad, the
case must have been instituted in RTC of Bacolod.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not venue is improperly laid

HELD:

Yes, the complaint should have been filed before RTC of Bacolod for it is the Respondent’s residence.
The complaint for collection of sum of money is a personal action, and the rules give the Plaintiff an
option to choose the venue of the action, namely his place of residence, or that of the Defendants. Since
the Petitioner in this case is a non-resident, he has no option but to file the complaint before the residence
of the Respondents, and that residence of Atty. Aceron as the representative of the Petitioners is of no use
in determining the venue for he is merely a representative and that he has no personal capacity to file the
case nor is he a real party in interest.
PAGLAUM MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP v. UNION BANK OF THE PHIL.
G.R. NO. 179018, June 18, 2012
Sereno, J:

DOCTRINE:

As a general rule, real actions shall be commenced and tried in the court that has jurisdiction over the area
where the property is situated, subject to the exception that real actions can be commenced and tried in a
court other than where the property is situated in instances where the parties have previously and validly
agreed in writing on the exclusive venue thereof. In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, the
venue stipulation should only be deemed as an agreement on an additional forum, and not as a restriction
on a specified place.

FACTS:

Three (3) parcels of land situated in the Province of Cebu are co-owned by Paglaum and by the Mr. Dy
(President of Health Tech). Union Bank extended Health Tech with a loan, secured by three real estate
mortgages executed by Paglaum on behalf of Health Tech. One of the REM stipulated that venue of all
suits arising from said document shall be in Makati, or in place where any of the mortgaged property is
located; the other on stipulated Cebu City and Metro Manila, or in the place where any of the mortgaged
property is located; and the last one has a blank stipulation as to specific place, or where the mortgaged
property is located. Health Tech remised in its obligations, causing the restricting of the loan agreement,
but this time, the venue of actions stipulated is in Makati City. Upon failure to comply with Health Tech’s
obligations, Union Bank filed an action for foreclosure of the REM before the RTC of Makati, which was
contested by Petitioners as an improper venue for the properties where located in Cebu.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not the stipulation as to venue on the restructured agreement governs

HELD:

Yes, the venue stipulation contained in the restricted agreement governs for being a restrictive venue
stipulation. The words used are “waiving any other venue” plainly shows that the choice of Makati City
as the venue for actions arising out of or in connection with the agreement and the REMs is exclusive.
Furthermore, the venue stipulations contained in the REMs are not restrictive in nature
SPOUSES HERMES AND ARACELI OCHOA v. CHINA BANKING CORPORATION
G.R. NO. 192877, March 23, 2011
Nachura, J:

DOCTRINE:

Act. No. 3135, being a special law, governs the venue of the extrajudicial foreclosure sales of REMs, and
not the general provisions on venue embodied in the Rules of Court. The stipulations provided in the
REM governs only to actions arising from or related to the mortgage.

FACTS:

Petitioners mortgaged their real property located in Paranaque City in favor of the bank, where in the
latter was granted a special power to foreclose it extrajudicially. The parties stipulated that the exclusive
venue is Makati City; however, Act No. 3135, as amended (An Act to Regulate Sale of Property under
Special Powers inserted in or annexed to Real-Estate Mortgages) provides that the sale of property cannot
be made legally outside of the province in which the property sold is situated.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the stipulation in the REM governs the venue for the extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage
despite the existence of Act No. 3135

HELD:

No, Act. No. 3135, being a special law, governs the venue of the extrajudicial foreclosure sales of REMs,
and not the general provisions on venue embodied in the Rules of Court. The stipulations provided in the
REM governs only to actions arising from or related to the mortgage, such as Petitioner’s complaint for
Annulment of Foreclosure, Sale, Sale, and Damages.
RADIOWEALTH FINANCE COMPANY v. ALFONSO O. PINEDA, JR.
G.R. NO. 227147, July 30, 2018
Perlas-Bernabe, J:

DOCTRINE:

Even if it appears that venue has been improperly laid, it is well-settled that the courts may not motu
proprio dismiss the case on the ground of improper venue. Without any objection at the earliest
opportunity, as in a motion to dismiss or in the answer, it is deemed waived.

FACTS:

Petitioner extended a loan to the Respondent, secured by a Chattel Mortgage, and a Promissory Note
containing a stipulation that any action to enforce payment of any sums due under said Note shall
exclusively be brought before the proper court within the National Capital Judicial Region or in any place
where Petitioner has a branch/office, at its sole option. Due to Respondent’s default, Petitioner instituted a
suit for sum of money and damages with application for a Writ of Replevin before the RTC in San Mateo,
Rizal, where Petitioner has a branch office. RTC dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction, pointing out
that Petitioner’s principal place of business is Mandaluyong City, and that Respondent’s residence is
Porac, Pampanga.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not RTC erred in dismissing the case

HELD:

Yes, RTC erred in dismissing the case, for despite the general provisions on venue of action, the Rules of
Court provides for exception such as when the stipulation as to venue is restrictive in nature, like in this
case. The venue has been properly laid. Furthermore, even if it appears that venue has been improperly
laid, it is well-settled that the courts may not motu proprio dismiss the case on the ground of improper
venue. Without any objection at the earliest opportunity, as in a motion to dismiss or in the answer, it is
deemed waived.
LEY CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT v. MARVIN MEDEL SEDANO
G.R. NO. 222711, August 23, 2017
Perlas-Bernabe, J:

DOCTRINE:

Stipulation in the contract that all actions or cases in relation to the contract shall be filed with the RTC of
Pasay City, to the exclusion of all other courts, does not mean to curtail the jurisdiction of all other courts,
for the law is deemed written in every contract and that the law confers jurisdiction, not the stipulations.
This stipulation is that of limiting the venue, and not related in the jurisdiction of the courts.

FACTS:

A parcel of land owned by Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC) was leased to the
Petitioner, which in turn subleased it to the Respondent. In the lease contract, there is a stipulation that
“all actions or cases filed in connection with this case shall be filed with the RTC of Pasay City, exclusive
of all others.” Later on, Respondent stopped paying rentals to the Petitioner since PNCC demanded the
direct remittance of rentals to it. A complaint for Collection of Sum of Money and Damages was filed by
Petitioner before the RTC Valenzuela against Respondent, which granted Respondent’s motion and
dismissed the case due to improper venue, and upheld the stipulation in the lease contract.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not RTC Valenzuela erred in ruling that the venue was improperly laid

HELD:

No. RTC Valenzuela correctly held that the venue was improperly laid since the contract already
provided that all actions or cases involving breach thereof should be filed with the RTC of Pasig, and that
the Petitioner’s complaint falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC; hence, the contractual stipulation
should have been followed.
HYGIENIC PACKAGING CORPORATION v. NUTRI-ASIA
G.R. NO. 201302, January 23, 2019
Leonen, J:

DOCTRINE:

The venue for the collection of sum of money case is governed by Rule 4, Section 2 of the Rules of Court.
Unless the parties enter into a written agreement on their preferred venue before an action is instituted,
the plaintiff may commence his or her action before the trial court of the province or city either where he
or she resides, or where the defendant resides. If the party is a corporation, its residence is the province or
city where its principal place of business is situated as recorded in its Articles of Incorporation.

FACTS:

Petitioner supplies Respondents with KG Orange bottles and Ratchet Caps among others, and their every
transaction was covered by a Purchase Order stipulating among others that arbitration of all disputes
arising in connection with the contract shall be referred to an Arbitration Committee, in accordance with
the Philippine Arbitration Law, which is composed on three (3) members, chosen by each parties with the
third member chosen by both parties. Later on, a complaint for sum of money was filed by Petitioner
before the RTC of Manila pursuant to the stipulation in the Sales Invoice, which was contested by
Respondent arguing that the case should be dismissed due to non-compliance with the arbitration.
Furthermore, it was contested that the venue was improperly laid for it should have been filed either
before the trial courts of San Pedro, Laguna, or Pasig City, where the principal places of business of the
parties are located, and that the venue stipulated in the Sales Invoice is non-binding for Respondent’s lack
of express conformity.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not the action for collection of sum of money was properly filed

HELD:

No. The Purchase Orders and the Sales Invoice are reference as to the parties’ contract of sale, but records
do not show that they have a contract in relation to the venue of any civil action arising from their
business transaction. Since no contractual stipulation can be enforced on the venue, the action is governed
by Rule 4 – Venue of Actions of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, and since the action is a
personal one and the parties are corporations, the action shall be filed in the place where the Petitioner’s
or Respondent’s principal office is located as stated in its Articles of Incorporation, which is San Pedro,
Laguna for the Petitioner, and Pasig City for the Respondent.
VIRGILIO C. BRIONES v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 204444, January 14, 2015
Perlas-Bernabe, J:

DOCTRINE:

In cases where the complaint assails only the terms, conditions, and/or coverage of a written instrument
and not its validity, the exclusive venue stipulation contained therein shall still be binding on the parties,
and thus, the complaint may be properly dismissed on the ground of improper venue. However, a
complaint directly assailing the validity of the written instrument itself should not be bound by the
exclusive venue stipulation contained therein and should be filed in accordance with the general rules on
venue.To be sure, it would be inherently consistent for a complaint of this nature to recognize the
exclusive venue stipulation when it, in fact, precisely assails the validity of the instrument in which such
stipulation is contained.

FACTS:

Virgilio filed a complaint for Nullity of Mortgage, Cancellation of TCT, and Damages against Cash Asia
before the RTC of Manila, alleging among others that Virgilio is the owner of a certain property, and that
his sister informed him that said property has been foreclosed and a writ of possession had already been
issued in favor of Cash Asia. Records show that certain loans were obtain with the property as the
security, but Virgilio argues that he never contracted any loan from Cash Asia, and that he has been living
and working in Vietnam. Cash Asia argues that the venue is improperly laid for the subject contracts bear
the stipulation that “all legal actions arising out of the notice in connection with the Real Estate Mortgage
shall only be brought in or submitted to the jurisdiction of the proper court of Makati City.”

ISSUE:

Whether or Not the venue was improper

HELD:

No. The action was properly filed in the proper venue. A complaint directly assailing the validity of the
written instrument itself should not be bound by the exclusive venue stipulation contained therein and
should be filed in accordance with the general rules on venue. To be sure, it would be inherently
consistent for a complaint of this nature to recognize the exclusive venue stipulation when it, in fact,
precisely assails the validity of the instrument in which such stipulation is contained. It must be
emphasized that Virgilio’s complaint directly assails the validity of the subject contracts, claiming forgery
in their execution; hence, Virgilio cannot be expected to comply with the aforesaid venue stipulation, as
his compliance therewith would mean an implicit recognition of their validity. Pursuant to the general
rules on venue, Virgilio properly filed his complaint before a court in the City of Manila where the
subject property is located.

d) Parts of Pleading
METROPOLITAN BANK v. HON. SALVADOR ABAD SANTOS
G.R. NO. 157867, December 15, 2009
Brion, J:

DOCTRINE:

The ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession filed by the respondent is not an initiatory
pleading. Although the private respondent denominated its pleading as a petition, it is, nonetheless, a
motion.

FACTS:

De Koning obtained a loan from Metrobank secured by a Real Estate Mortgage. Due to non-payment
despite demand, Metrobank instituted an extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings against the REM until such
time that the redemption period lapsed. Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of Metrobank as the
highest bidder, so it demanded the possession of the mortgaged property but De Koning refused; hence,
Metrobank filed an ex parte petition for a writ of possession over the foreclosed property before the RTC
Makati. De Koning filed a motion to dismiss due to failure of Metrobank to attach a certification against
forum shopping as provided under Rule 7 Section of the Rules of Court for initiatory pleadings.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an ex parte petition for a writ of possession is an initiatory pleading

HELD:

No. The ex parte petition for a writ of possession is not an initiatory pleading. Although denominated as a
pleading, said ex parte petition is actually a motion, which is confined to incidental matters in the
progress of the cause. Since the ex parte petition for a writ of possession is neither a complaint nor an
initiatory pleading, a certificate against non-forum shopping is not required.
SOUTH COTABATO COMMUNICATIONS CORP. v. HON. PATRICIA A. STO TOMAS
G.R. NO. 173326, December 15, 2010
Leonardo-De Castro, J:

DOCTRINE:

The following officials or employees of the company can sign the verification and certification without
need of a board resolution: (1) the Chairperson of the Board of Directors, (2) the President of a
corporation, (3) the General Manager or Acting General Manager, (4) Personnel Officer, and (5) an
Employment Specialist in a labor case.

FACTS:

A complaint was filed before the DOLE against DXCP Radio Station, prompting the former to conduct an
inspection and render a report containing violations of labor standards. This was appealed to the DOLE
Secretary, but was dismissed and as well as the Motion for Reconsideration. The case was appealed to the
Court of Appeals via petition for certiorari, but was also dismissed because of procedural infirmities such
as but not limited to the Petition was not verified and there is not certificate of non-forum shopping.
Petitioner contends that there are two (2) petitioners and that one of them, Guavain Benzonan, signed the
verification and the certificate of non-forum shopping in his capacity as representative of the corporation
as shown in the Secretary’s Certificate; but the Court of Appeals ruled that Benzonan did not initiate the
petition in his own capacity and that the Secretary’s Certificate merely authorized him to represent the
corporation and cause the preparation and filing of a Motion for Reconsideration before the Court of
Appeals.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not the requirements on verification and certificate of non-forum shopping has not been
complied

HELD:

No. There is substantial compliance on the requirement of verification and certificate of non-forum
shopping for Benzonan being the President of the corporation and is also named as co-respondent of
petitioner-corporation in the labor case which is the subject matter of the civil action for certiorari filed
before the Court of Appeals, Benzonan is in position to verify the truthfulness and correctness of the
allegations in the petition. Furthermore, in previous cases, the Supreme Court ruled that the following
officials/employees of the company can sign the verification and certification even without the need of a
board resolution: (1) the Chairperson of the Board of Directors, (2) the President of a corporation, (3) the
General Manager or Acting General Manager, (4) Personnel Officer, and (5) an Employment Specialist in
a labor case. Lastly, the Court ruled that the requirement of the certificate of non-forum shopping
although obligatory, is not jurisdictional; hence, can be relaxed under the rule of substantial compliance.

NELLIE VDA DE FORMOSO v. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK

G.R. NO. 154704, June 1, 2011
Mendoza, J:

DOCTRINE:

Failure to comply with the requirements against certificate of non-forum shopping shall not be curable by
mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall because for the dismissal of the
case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a
false certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect
contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts
of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be
ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for
administrative sanctions. 

FACTS:

Petitioner Nellie and her children executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor of Primitivo Malcaba
authorizing him to secure all papers and documents including the owner’s copies of the titles of real
properties mortgaged to the PNB. Later on, those properties were sold by the Formosos to Primitivo, and
the latter went to PNB to fully pay the obligation, but PNB refused to accept Primitivo’s tender of
payment. Petitioner filed a Complaint for Specific Performance against PNB before the RTC and the
court rendered a decision favorable to the Petitioners, but the other damages prayed for were denied due
to lack of evidence. This prompted Petitioners to appeal before the Court of Appeals, but the verification
and certificate of non-forum shopping were only signed by Primitivo and there is no document showing
that he has been authorized to sign as well for and in behalf of other Petitioners.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not all Petitioners must sign the verification and certificate of non-forum shopping in a
petition for certiorari wherein only questions of law are involved

HELD:

Yes, Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules states that a pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has
read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his knowledge and belief; hence,
should be signed by all the Petitioners. The certificate of non-forum shopping should be signed by all the
petitioners or plaintiffs in a case, and that the signing by only one of them is insufficient. The attestation
on non-forum shopping requires personal knowledge by the party executing the same, and the lone
signing petitioner cannot be presumed to have personal knowledge of the filing or non-filing by his co-
petitioners of any action or claim the same as similar to the current petition.

RAMON K. ILUROSIO ET. AL. v. SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO

G.R. NO. 210475, April 11, 2018
Peralta, J:

DOCTRINE:

The pleading shall specify the relief sought, but it may add a general prayer for such further or other relief
as may be deemed just or equitable. In addition to that, a general prayer “for other legal and equitable
reliefs” appearing on a complaint or pleading (a petition in this case) normally enables the court to award
reliefs supported by the complaint or other pleadings, by the facts admitted at the trial, and by the
evidence adduced by the parties, even if these reliefs are not specifically prayed for in the complaint.

FACTS:

Sylvia filed a complaint for libel against Petitioners which was docketed with RTC Manila. The exchange
of pleadings revealed that the charge was actually dismissed by the DOJ Investigating Panel and Sylvia’s
Motion for Reconsideration was denied; however, the Presiding Judge ruled that there exists a probable
cause for the issuance if warrant of arrest against Petitioners. The judge was inhibited and the case was re-
raflled to a different branch of RTC Manila. Later on, the case was further elevated before the Court of
Appeals via petition for certiorari with prayer for TRO and/or WPI but was denied due to lack of
principal action on which the prayer for injunction relief rests. Petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration and/or Admit Amended Petition for Certiorari, but was denied due to the lapse of
reglementary period.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not a relief can be granted if the pleading did not specify the relief sought but has in its face a
general prayer for such further or other relief as may be deemed just or equitable

HELD:

Yes, The pleading shall specify the relief sought, but it may add a general prayer for such further or other
relief as may be deemed just or equitable. While the petition did not categorically state the reversal and
setting aside of the Order dated April 3, 2013 as one of the specific reliefs desired, causing the CA to
hastily conclude that there was no principal action sought by petitioners, it did contain a general prayer
“for other legal and equitable reliefs.” This general prayer should be interpreted to include the plea for
the nullity of the Order because it is already evident from the allegations contained in the body of the
petition.