MIKHAIL BORODIN:

SOVIET ADVISER TO SUN YAT-SEN

by

Bruce G. VanVleck

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the

College of Humanities

in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

for the Degree of

Master of Arts

Florida Atlantic University

Boca Raton, Florida

June 1977
 .,

~ Copyright by Bruce G. VanVleck 1977

ii
 MIKHAIL BORODIN:

SOVIET ADVISER TO SUN YAT-SEN

by

Bruce G. VanVleck

This thesis was prepared under the direction of the

candidate's thesis advisor, Dr. Tsung-I Dow, Department
of History, and has been approved b y the members of
his supervisory committee. It was submitted to the
faculty of the College of Humanities and was accepted
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of Master of Arts.

SUPERVISORY COMMITTEE:
-~~~c~~f ~.:; Uclt/
Thesis Advisor

1'177
d Studies

iii
 ABSTRACT

Author: Bruce G. VanVleck

Title: Mikhail Borodin: Soviet Adviser

to Sun Yat-sen

Institution: Florida Atlantic University

Degree: Master of Arts

Year: 1977

The study begins with a survey of the China policies of

the Soviet Government and the Comintern from 1917 to

1922. The revolutionary background of Mikhail Borodin

and Sun Yat-sen is then covered, followed by a descrip-

tion of Canton in 1923 and an account of the events sur-

rounding Borodin's assignment to Canton. The study

then concentrates on Borodin's first four months in

Canton. Particular emphasis is placed on his role in

the preparations for the Kuomintang's 1st National Con-

gress, held in January 1924. The remaining period up

to Sun's death in March 1925 is covered in less detail

due to the relative scarcity of documentation. A sum-

mary of Borodin's activities until his ouster from

China in July 1927 is also included. The study concludes

that Borodin was remarkably successful in influencing

Chinese affairs given the enormous handicaps under

which he labored.

iv
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Abbreviations vi

Introduction 1

Chapter 1
Soviet and Comintern Policy Towards China
1917-1922 6

Chapter 2
Revolutionary Background of Mikhail Borodin
and Sun Yat-sen . 16

Chapter 3
Sun's Struggle to Hold Canton and Borodin's
Assignment to South China . 32

Chapter 4
Borodin's First Month in Canton . 41

Chapter 5
Ch'en Chiung-ming's Offensive . . 51

Chapter 6
Preparations for the First National Congress 60

Chapter 7
The Merchant Volunteers' Revolt . 72

Chapter 8
Sun Yat-sen's Last Days . . 90

Chapter 9
Aftermath and Conclusion 98

Appendix A (Map of South China) 106

Bibliography 107

v
 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CCP - Chinese Communist Party

CEC - Central Executive Committee

CER - Chinese Eastern Railway

Comintern - Communist International

ECCI - Executive Committee of the Comintern

KMT - Kuomintang (Nationalist Party)

Narkomindel - People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs

vi
 INTRODUCTION

"Mysterious Borodin Sways South China." This

headline appeared in the New York Times Magazine in

1926. 1 Nore than half a century later, Borodin remains

a man of mystery. Despite the many books on modern

China in which his name appears, relatively little is

known of the Russian who became virtual ruler of South

China. The following study is intended to shed some

light on the first phase of Borodin's tumultuous four-

year stay in China--his 18 months as adviser and con-

fidant to Dr. Sun Yat-sen, founder of the Koumintang.

The objective of the study is two-fold: to describe

Borodin's activities against the background of the

chaotic events sweeping China and to show how these

activities reflected the foreign policy objectives of

the Soviet Government.

Borodin remained a shadowy figure by choice. His

underground work for Lenin during the 1905 Revolution

and for Lenin and subsequently Stalin after the 1917

Revolution developed in him a propensity for secrecy.

Only for a brief period toward the end of his stay in

China did he actively seek public exposure. Because of

this reluctance to work openly, most of Borodin's life

1
 2

is not extensively documented. Most of the gaps in our

knowledge of his career will probably remain until the

distant day when the Soviet Government finally allows

researchers free access to its archives. Until then we

must be content with as much of the story as we can piece

together. Although the picture that results is in many

ways incomplete, it is sufficient to show that Mikhail

Borodin was a man of impressive diplomatic ability and

great personal charm.

J. T. Murphy, an English Communist who met Borodin

in 1920 and worked with him for a short while in 1922,

wrote that "of all the so-called 'emissaries' of Lenin I

have known, I know of none more expert and capable than

he in winning the confidence and regard of the people to

2
whom he was sent." The rapidity with which Borodin won

Sun Yat-sen's trust and confidence certainly bears out

this evaluation. Borodin's effect on staunchly non-

Communist Westerners whom he met in China, however, was

equally amazing. American consular officer Jay Calvin

Huston had a high regard for him. 3 Dr. James Henry,

president of the Canton Christian College, found him

"a very pleasing personality and received an impression

of sincerity and deep earnestness. He puts one perfectly

,4
at ease. After meeting him, a Western journalist

wrote that

He was a greater contrast to the type of person

whom my fancy had depicted than I could pos-
sibly have imagined. The man who stood before
 3

me was strong and well-proportioned, apparently

in his late forties. All his motions were
easy and graceful. He spoke slowly in a deep,
sympathetic voice. His lined, thin face was
animated by a pair of dark, impressive eyes that
looked as if they belonged to a dreamer or in-
ventor rather than to a desperate fanatic, an
avenger and destroyer. His slow and rather
heavy manner, his casual appearance, and his
short English moustache reminded me of a British
labor leader who had risen from the ranks but
who also hag a long career of political training
behind him.

Still another man who met Borodin in China remembered him

as "a wholesome kindly individual with a needle-sharp mind

and a memory like a filing cabinet.'' To this man, Borodin

seemed more like a big businessman or an engineer than a

6
revo 1 ut~onary. It is indeed unfortunate that a truly
0

comprehensive account of the career of this remarkable

individual may never be known.

* * *

Since it is impossible to fully understand the

significance of Borodin's activities in China without

some knowledge of the policies he was implementing, the

first chapter of this study is devoted to a survey of

Soviet Government and Comintern objectives in China and

how these had evolved between 1917 and 1922. An impor-

tant shift in the thinking of the Soviet leadership took

place during those years . As a result, Borodin's primary

objective in China was to make the Kuomintang (KMT) of

Sun Yat -sen into an effective weapon against British

interests in China. Ironically, Borodin did his job

 4

too well, for it was the revitalized KMT that provided

Chiang Kai-shek with the weapon to crush the Communists

in 1927 and drive Borodin from China.

Borodin's defeat in China marked the end of his

career as a professional revolutionary, a career that

began when he was barely in his teens. The second chapter

covers the early years of Borodin and of Sun Yat-sen and

follows the careers of both men up to the eve of their

first meeting. The remaining chapters concentrate on Boro-

din's relationship with Sun, but an effort has been made

to present as complete and accurate a picture as possible

of Canton of the 1920s. Kwangtung province during those

years was a kaleidoscopic cascade of events and person-

alities. Because of the limited nature of this study, no

effort has been made to present a comprehensive picture

of the enormous complexities of Chinese politics, but

some knowledge of the chaotic milieu in which Borodin

labored was deemed necessary for an adequate understanding

of the difficulties of his assignment and the magnitude

of his achievements.
 5

1
John McCook Roots, "My sterious Borodin Sways
South China," New York Times Magazine, 26 December 1926,
p. 9.
2
J. T. Murphy, New Horizons (London: John Lane
The Bodley Head, 1941), p. 89.
3
Robert C. North, Moscow and Chinese Communists,
2nd ed. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963),
p. 39.
4
Jonathan Spence, To Change China (Boston: Little,
Brown and Co., 1969), p. 188.
5
rbid. I pp. 187-88.
6
rbid. I p. 188.
 CHAPTER 1

SOVIET AND COMINTERN POLICY TOWARDS CHINA

1917-1922

Russia's new Bolshevik rulers were determined to

disassociate themselves from the foreign policy legacy

of their tsarist predecessors and to demonstrate to the

world that their victory did, indeed, herald the dawn

of a new day in international relations. Distant China,

cut off from Moscow by White Russian armies and thought

to be unsuitable ground for Communism, received especially

magnanimous treatment. The Chinese people were their

brothers, declared the Bolsheviks, and the Soviet Govern-

rnent, unlike its predecessor, would deal with the Govern-

rnent of China as an equal, not as an inferior. As proof

of their good intentions, the Soviets issued the Karakhan

Manifesto which renounced their share of the Boxer

indemnity and their extra-territorial rights in China,

and declared that all secret Russian treaties concerning

China were null and void. They even went so far as to

state that the strategically important Chinese Eastern

Railway (CER) in Manchuria would be returned to China

. h out compensatlon.
Wlt . 7

When the Bolsheviks first carne to power, they had

expected Red revolution to sweep Europe at any moment.

6
 7

The very survival of the embattled Bolshevik regime was

thought to aepena on th i s lmmlnent uph eav al . ~osco~ ,

therefore, placed a high priority on efforts to foment

Marxist revolution in the West. By the time of the 2nd

Comintern Congress, however, it was becoming apparent

that the example of the Russian Revolution was not going

to be duplicated elsewhere in the immediate future.

Soviet Russia, for the moment at least, appeared destined

to remain a unique phenomenon, the lone bastion of Com-

munism in a hostile capitalist world. By 1923, it had

become obvious to the leaders in Moscow that this sit-

uation was unlikely to change for many years to come.

This realization forced Moscow to give first priority to

the survival of the Soviet state, and secondary priority

8
to the propagation of the revolution abroad.

Although the full impact of this shift in priorities

was not felt in Western Europe for a number of years, it

began influencing policy towards China as early as mid-

1919. As the Bolsheviks pushed the Whites back across

Siberia toward the Pacific, their idealism concerning

China gave way to the same considerations of national

interest that had motivated previous Russian rulers.

Soviet troops were sent into Outer Mongolia, a region

that leaders throughout China regarded as part of their

country, and the area was effectively brought under

Soviet control. Chinese control of the CER was, li k ewise,

considered to be contrary to the best interests of

 8

Soviet Russia, and steps were taken to rectify this

situation as well.

In late 1920, Moscow sent an unofficial representa-

tive named Ignatius Yurin to Peking in the hopes of re-

' ' 9
storlng Russlan centro 1 over t h e ral'1 way. Yurin failed

and in December 1921 was replaced by an official Soviet

10
representative named Alexander Paikes. He too failed

to obtain results, however, and was in turn replaced in

. 1 omat. 11
1 ate 1922 b y Ad o 1 p h Jo ff e, a veteran d lp The

steadily increasing status of these successive negotia-

tors provides clear evidence of the Soviet Government's

deep concern over the future of the CER.

Joffe arrived in Peking in August 1922, and imme-

diately ran into trouble. As a prerequisite to any talks,

the Chinese demanded the complete withdrawal of Soviet

troops from Outer Mongolia and a reaffirmation of the

Soviets' 1919 pledge to return the CER to China without

compensation. Since the Soviet Government was not pre-

pared to comply with either demand, Joffe had to try a

different approach. In September he met in Changchun

with representatives of Japan. Soviet discontent with

Chinese control of the CER stemmed from the fear that

the weak Chinese Government would be pressured into

surrendering control of the railway to Japan whose

hegemony over Manchuria was steadil y increasing.

Apparentl y , Joffe hoped either to reach some sort of

an understanding over the CER directl y with the Japanese

 9

or to use the fear of a Russo-Japanese rapprochement

as leverage to get talks going in Peking. The meeting,

12
however, was a failure on both counts.

* * *

In contrast, the Comintern policy towards China was

characterized by indifference. In the fall of 1920, the

Comintern had dispatched Grigorii N. Vointinskii to

explore the possibility of creating a Chinese Communist

movement. He established his headquarters in Shanghai

and set about propagating the faith. In July 1921 he

and his tiny flock held a National Congress and formally

organized the Communist Party of China. A year later

the young party held its 2nd National Congress and voted

to join the Comintern.

The spread of Communism in China, however, was pro-

ceeding with glacial slowness. A full year after its

founding, the Party could boast of only 100 members in a

13
country of several hundred million people. The Chinese

people's lack of interest in the fledgling CCP was

matched by that of the Comintern leadership. Schooled

in Marxist doctrine and European in their outlook, these

leaders continued to emphasize Europe over Asia, and

14
had little hope for the Chinese proletariat. After all,

if the politically aware proletariat of an advanced indus-

trial state such as Germany were unable to produce a

successful Communist revolution, what chance did the

 10

poorly politicized workers of a backward country like

China have of doing so? They were, therefore, not sur-

prised at the painfully slow growth of the Chinese Com-

munist Party, and probably would have paid them little

attention if it had not been for other considerations.

The Russians had played a prominent role in the

Comintern since its inception, but the unique position of

the Russian Communist Party as the only Comintern member

actually in power anywhere in the world served to grad-

ually elevate the status of the Russians until they

eventually came to dominate the Comintern completely.

Although Russian control of the Comintern was not yet

complete in 1923, it had progressed far enough for Comin-

tern policy to begin strongly reflecting the policy of

the Soviet Government which in turn was placing increasing

stress on the primacy of Russian national interests.

The Comintern's sanctioning of Communist participation in

the KMT was one example of this reflection.

Communist membership in a bourgeois party such as

the KMT was totally at odds with Marxist doctrine, and

the Comintern leaders showed great reluctance in granting

their approval. They were particularly critical of the

.
Ch 1nese . . 15 an d t h e d ec1s1on
b ourgeo1s1e, . . to a 11 ow c ommun1s
. t
entry into the KMT clearly violated their ideological

principles. Nevertheless, permission was granted because

it served the interests of Soviet Russia.

 11

The KMT with its base of operations in Kwangtung

province was ideally situated to strike a severe blow

at Russia's archenemy, Great Britain, whose sphere of

influence was South China. Despite predictions by Lenin,

however, that Asian bourgeois revolutionary parties such

. . . 1'lSt, 16
as t h e KMT wou ld natura 11y b e strong 1 y antl-lmperla

the KMT preferred to direct its emnity towards Peking

rather than Great Britain. It was hoped, therefore,

that once inside the KMT, the Chinese Communists could

rechannel KMT policy in an anti-imperialist direction.

This objective was the principal subject of the

17
Comintern's first formal instructions to the CCP.

The instructions were in the form of an ECCI resolution

on the expected attitude of the CCP towards the KMT which

was passed on January 12, 1923, about six months after

18
the Chinese Communists joined the Comintern. The

resolution agreed that the present weakness of the CCP

made Communist membership in the ~~T expedient, but

warned the CCP that it must retain its own identity as

19
a party at all costs. It then went on as follows:

5. In regard to foreign policy the CCP

should oppose any overtures of the Kuomintang
to the capitalist Powers and their agents, the
Chinese war lords, and those hostile to pro-
letarian Russia.
6. On the other hand the CCP should try
to persuade the Kuomintang to unite its forces
with those of Soviet Russia for a common struggle
~ga~nst ~uropean, American, and Japanese imper-
lallsm. 2
 12

Four months later, just prior to the 3rd National

CCP Congress, the ECCI issued another set of instructions.

It reiterated its position that "the central task for

China is 'the national revolution against imperialists

and their domestic feudal agents'. Moscow,

however, was concerned that the KMT had not done enough

to win the support of the peasant masses. "The national

revolution and the creation of an anti-imperialist front"

could not possibly succeed without peasant support. It

was, therefore, "essential to persuade the entire mass

of poor peasants of the necessity of the fight against

foreign imperialism." It was suggested that issues such

as the foreign control of the customs might be used to

22
arouse the peasantry. In addition, the Chinese Com-

munists were told that they

must steadily push the Kuomintang on to the

side of agrarian revolution. In the areas
occupied by Sun Yat-sen's forces it is essen-
tial to get put through the confiscation of
the land in favour of the poor peasantry, and
a whole series ~~ other revolutionary
measures. . . .

The instructions then went on to stress once again

that they

must fight by all means within the Kuomintang

against any military agreement between Sun
Yat-sen and the warlords, who are the agents
of foreign capital and hostile to Soviet
Russia, which is the ally both of the West
European proletariat and o~ the oppressed
peoples of the East.
4
 13

You will note that the struggle was directed against the

enemies of Soviet Russia. The proletariat of Western

Europe, once the chief concern, were now relegated to a

secondary position as merely allies of the Soviet state.

This document also instructed the CCP to achieve

mass party status by organizing the proletariat into

25
unions and to press the KMT to unconditionally support

th e wor k ers I
movement 1n Ch 1na.
• ' 26 It is tempting to

assume that these instructions regarding the Chinese

proletariat were included merely to deceive the CCP as

to the Comintern's real intentions. This, however, was

probably not the case. As has been mentioned before,

Marxist doctrine was deeply rooted in the thinking of

the Comintern leadership, and compromises with Marxist

dogma were not easily made or accepted. Since this

section in the instructions stated the objectives that

the Comintern leaders, despite t heir lack of confidence

in the CCP's prospects, would have preferred to pursue

in China, it seems logical to assume that it was written

in good faith and not simpl y as a d eception. This sin-

cerity, however, does not alter the fact that the policy

towards the KMT as it was subsequentl y implemented placed

far more emphasis on anti-imperialism than on the spread

of Communism.
 14

7
Allen S. Whiting, Soviet Policies in China 1917-
1924 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1953), p. 30.
On July 25, 1919, the Council of People's Commissars
(Sovnarkom) issued what has become known as the Karakhan
Manifesto. Addressed to "the Chinese nation and the
Governments of Southern and Northern China," it included
the following phrase: "The Soviet Government returns
to the Chinese people without compensation of any kind
the Chinese Eastern Railway. " The Soviets had
second thoughts almost immediately and deleted the passage
containing this phrase from the version that appeared in
the Soviet press. Subsequently, they denied steadfastly
that the offer had ever been made, but through some un-
known blunder, the passage was not deleted from the copy
of the Manifesto that was sent to the Chinese Government
in Peking. This mistake was to cause enormous diffi-
culties for the Soviet representatives who would later
go to Peking to try to negotiate a new railway treaty
favorable to Russia.
8
This shift in priorities was, of course, not uni-
versally accepted, and in fact was one of the main issues
upon which Trotsky and Stalin disagreed at a somewhat
later date. The tactic which Stalin called "Socialism
in One Country" did not become a rigid Soviet policy
until after Stalin defeated his domestic opponents in
the late 1920s and early 1930s. In the early 1920s
the shift to the emphasis on Russia first was only just
beginning to be put into effect.
9
cheng Tien-fong, A History of Sino-Russian Rela-
tions (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1957),
p. 111; 0. Edmund Clubb, Twentieth Century China (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1964), p. 115.
10
Cheng, p. 111.
11 h o
W l tlng, p. 191 .
0

12
rbid., p. 185.
13
Cheng, p. 122.
14 wh ltlng, p. 102.
0 0

15
rbid.
 15

16
A small number of articles by Lenin between 1912
and 1917 dealt with the problem of bringing Asia's slumber-
ing peasant masses into the European class struggle.
Ruling out the possibility of true Marxist revolution
in economically backward Asia, he concluded that only
bourgeois nationalist revolutions were likely. These he
predicted would be strongly anti-imperialist in nature
because the native bourgeoisie would preceive that their
own development was being hindered by foreign control
of their economy. These revolutions would, therefore,
aid the European proletariat by disrupting the large
Asian financial investments of the European bourgeoisie.
17
xenia Joukoff Eudin and Robert C. North, Soviet
Russia and the East 1920-1927 (Stanford: Stanford Uni-
versity Press, 1957), p. 344.
18
Isaacs, p. 59n.
19 E d'
u ln an d Nort h , S ovlet
. Russla
. an d t h e East,
p. 344.
20 Jane Degras, e d . , Th e Communlst
. '
Internatlonal
1919-1943, vol. 2 (London: Oxford University Press,
1960) 1 P• 6.
21
Eudin and North, Soviet Russia and the East,
p. 345.
22
Degras, p. 25.
23
rbid. I p. 26.
24
Ibid.
25
rbid. I pp. 25-26.
26
Eudin and North, Soviet Russia and the East,
p. 345.
 CHAPTER 2

REVOLUTIONARY BACKGROUND OF MIKHAIL BORODIN

AND SUN YAT-SEN

Mikhail Borodin's real name was Mikhail Markovich

Grusenberg. He was born in 1884 in the tiny village of

. h'1, t h e son o f poor Russ1an
Yanov1c . Jews. 27 Although

Russian by birth, he grew up in what is today Latvia.

As a young boy he became acquainted with members of

the Latvian Social Democratic movement. While still a

student, he joined the Jewish Socialist Party (Bund),

and at the age of nineteen, he became a member of the

Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (RSDLP). The

same year he joined the RSDLP, 1903, it split into the

Menshevik and Bolshevik fractions. Borodin became a

28
Bolshevik.

His first real taste of action as a revolutionary

carne during the 1905 Revolution. Like many other Bol-

sheviks, Borodin was living in Switzerland, not Russia,

when the long smoldering discontent in the fatherland

finally erupted into fiery rebellion. The Bolshevik

group in Geneva needed someone to carry Lenin's directives

back into Russia, and they selected Borodin. From then

until early 1906, he worked in the Riga Committee of the

RSDLP. At the Tarnrnerfors Conference in December 1905,

16
 17

and again in April 1906 at the Unity Congress in Stock-

holm, Borodin served as the representative of the Riga

29
group. Upon his return from the Stockholm meeting,

however, he was arrested and after a short sentence went

into exile abroad. 30

Using the name Berg, a shortened form of his real

name, he emigrated to the United States, arriving in

Chicago via stops in London, Boston, and Valparaiso,

Indiana. While in Valparaiso, he had met and married

Fanya Senyonovna Orluk, a young girl from Vilna, Lith-

uania. Borodin and his young bride set up housekeeping

.
on Ch lcago I s wes t S l' d e, an db egan t o ralse
. a f aml' l y. 31

In 1908 they established the Berg Progressive Preparatory

School for immigrant children. In addition to running the

small school, Borodin became an active member of the Amer-

· ican Socialist Party, helped publish a magazine called

Amerikanskii Rabochii (American Worker) , and served as

treasurer of the Russian Political Prisoners Aid Society.

During these years his radical politics brought him to

the attention of the authorities, who viewed his activ-

. .
ltles . h a Jaun
Wlt . d'lCe d eye. 32

Shortly after the Bolsheviks seized power in Russia,

some of Borodin's old comrades invited the exile to return

home. Borodin and his wife quickly answered the call,

but with World War I still raging in Western Europe and

Russia on the brink of civil war, they were unable to

33
reach Moscow until July 1918. The following month,
 18

however, Borodin was headed back to the United States.

His mission was the delivery of Lenin's "Letter to Amer-

ican Workers," but apparently his notoriety with the

American authorities gave him second thoughts, and he

decided that the letter would be far safer in the hands

of a more obscure courier. Entrusting it to a Soviet

agent who worked as a stoker on an American liner, he

returned to Russia. 34

Back in Moscow, Borodin went to work in the People's

Commissariat for Foreign Affairs (Narkomindel). His

real work, however, did not begin until March 1919 when

the Communist International (Comintern) was formed. He

participated in the founding congress, and the fledgling

organization named him as its first emissary to the

United States. Using the name Brantwein, he arrived in

New York posing as a representative of the Russian Red

35
Cross. With him he carried a suitcase full of tzarist

crown jewels, but his scheme to sell them went awry, and

by mid 1919 he had gone to Mexico. 36

37
There he met M. N. Roy, a radical from India.

They became friends, and in the course of lengthy checker

matches, Borodin converted Roy to Communism. In September

1919, with Borodin's encouragement, Roy founded the Mex-

ican Communist Party from a splinter group of the tiny

Mexican Socialist Party. The following summer Borodin

arranged for Roy to attend the Second Congress of the

. ' . communls
. t 38
Comlntern as a represen-catlve of t h e Mexlcan
. s.
 19

In December, Borodin went to Spain to meet with

Socialist and Anarcho-Syndicalist leaders who favored

Comintern membership for the Spanish Socialist Party.

His stay in Spain, however, was brief. Sometime in the

later part of January 1920, he boarded a cargo ship

bound for Amsterdam where he was to represent the Comin-

tern at an international conference planned as a prelude

to the establishment of a Comintern bureau in Western

Europe. Borodin did not arrive until the second day of

the conference, and when he entered the meeting hall,

he discovered the Dutch police in an outer room recording

the meeting on a dictaphone. His discovery brought the

conference to an abrupt end. Pursued by the police, the

delegates went into hiding. For more than a week, Boro-

din and several others took shelter in AQersfoort at the

home of a Dutch Communist named Rutgers. 39

It had been decided just prior to disbanding that

the delegates would all try to reach Moscow in time for

the 2nd Comintern Congress in June. As the police were

watching all the trains, Borodin and J. T. Murphy, an

English Communist, decided to leave the country on foot.

They walked the 70 some miles to the German border,

slipped across under the cover of night, and boarded a

train for Berlin. They arrived there on March 13, the

day the Kapp putsch began, on board the last train to

enter Berlin before the city was brought to a standstill

by a General Strike. When the putsch ended the following

 20

week, Borodin said good-bye to Murphy and set off alone

across Poland. The journey was extremely perilous as

Russia and Poland were at war, but by early June he was

40
safely back in Soviet territory.

He arrived in Moscow about a week before the opening

of the Comintern Congress, and immediately reported to

Lenin on his travels. Lenin had just completed a pamph-

let called "Left-Wing" Communism--an Infantile Disorder,

which was to be circulated among the Communists of Ger-

many and Great Britain, and he asked Borodin to handle

the final English translation of it. Shortly after

completing this work for Lenin, he left for Mexico on

41
still another Comintern mission.

Armed with a national passport he obtained in

Mexico, Borodin entered the United States. His mission

was to infiltrate the unions associated with the American

Federation of Labor, creating unrest among the workers

and establishing Communist cells. The State Department

I

soon became aware of his activities, however, and his

42
stay here was brief.

In January 1921, he was sent to Berlin as a Comin-

tern envoy, 43 b ut Moscow contlnue

. d to re l y on h'lS exper-

tise on American affairs. In July Lenin asked him for

information on a minor farm labor group in North Dakota,

and he subsequently wrote an analysis of them for the

official Comintern journal, Kommunisticheskii Interna-

44
tsional.
 21

From August to December he attended meetings of the

.
Executlve .
Commlttee o f t h e Comlntern
. ( ECCI ) . 45 During

these meetings, Borodin began to emerge as something of

an expert on affairs in Great Britain as well as the

United States. Articles by him criticizing the Com-

munist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) for its lack of

influence with the British masses and the trade unions

appeared in two consecutive issues of Kommunisticheskii

.
I nternatslona 1 . 46 The following February, Borodin

served as a member of the British commission at the first

enlarged plenum of the ECCI. In March he attended further

ECCI meetings then departed for England. He arrived there

later the same month using a false passport that gave

47
his name as George Brown.

The weaknesses that he had criticized in his arti-

cles finally led the CPGB to appoint a three-man commis-

48
sion to draft plans for reorganizing the party. The

Comintern assigned Borodin to oversee the work. Under

his supervision, the commission produced a plan that

transformed the CPGB from a loosely federated structure

into a highly centralized, highly disciplined Bolshevik

style party. In October at the Battersea congress, the

CPGB approved the reorganization plans. Borodin, however,

was unable to attend; he was serving time in a Scottish

J. al'1 . 49

' In August he had been arrested in Glasgow where he

had gone to deliver a propaganda speech. He was tried in

 22

the Glasgow Sheriff Court, and pleaded guilty to four

violations of the Aliens Order. On August 29 the court

sentenced him to six months at hard labor, and recom-

mended him for deportation. In early 1923 he completed

his sentence. Upon his release, he was promptly expelled

from the country. 50

Returning to Moscow, Borodin joined the staff of

the English language edition of Kommunisticheskii Inter-

.
nats1ona 1 . 51 According toM. N. Roy, Borodin was un-

happy with this assignment, but he had little choice.

Old suspicions concerning his conduct during the ill-

fated jewel smuggling operation in 1919, suspicions

Borodin thought had long since been laid to rest, were

being raised again, and the minor editorial post was

52
the most responsible position he could obtain. Little

did he know that within a few months he would embark on

the most important mission of his career.

* * *

Like Borodin, Sun Yat-sen began his career as a

revolutionary in the early 1890s. In 1894 he helped

organize the Hsing Chung Hui (China Renaissance Society) ,

whose primary goal was to end Manchu rule in China. In

1905 Sun merged two minor revolutionary parties with the

Hsing Chung Hui, and formed the T'ung Meng Hui (Alliance

Society) . By the time the Manchu dynasty was finally

toppled in 1911, Sun's stature was such that he was

 23

elected Provisional President of China. On January l,

1912, he assumed the post, but voluntarily stepped down

53
on February 15 in favor of Yuan Shih-k'ai.

Yuan, whose political power stemmed from his

control of the military, harbored ambitions of becoming

the new Emperor of China, and his rule became increasingly

authoritarian. Sun Yat-sen's party, which had changed

its name to the Kuomintang (Nationalist Party) in the

fall of 1912, was outlawed in November 1913, and the

following January Yuan dissolved Parliament. Sun and

his followers became the bitter enemies of the Peking

regime. Yuan's death in 1916, however, did not end Sun's

feud with the Peking Government. Under Yuan's rule,

Peking's grip on provincial militarists had weakened

considerably. With the death of Yuan, the chaos in~

creased rapidly. As the warlords of Northern China

began to vie among themselves for dominance in Peking,

the militarists in other regions began to rule their own

provinces in complete disregard of any central political

. 54
aut h orlty.

First in Shanghai then in South China, Sun tried

to establish a viable rival government. In September

1917 a Military Government with Sun as Generalissimo was

formed in Canton. The Southern militarists upon whom Sun

depended for support, however, were more interested in

personal aggrandizement than in revolution, and by the

 24

spring of 1918, they had so weakened Sun's position that

55
he left the city.

Sun did not return to Canton until late 1920. He

announced that the Military Government was again function-

ing, but he had not yet rectified his major weakness;

he still had no military power of his own. On this occa-

sion the real power in Canton was in the hands of Ch'en

Chiung-ming, who as Minister of War, Governor of Kwang-

tung, Commander-in-Chief of the Kwangtung Army, and High

Inspecting Commissioner for Kwangtung and Kwangsi, dom-

inated the military establishment. Although Sun had

himself elected Provisional President of China in the

spring of 1921, his authority rested on ~ery shaky ground.

Differences arose between Sun and General Ch'en, who was

no revolutionary. Finally in June 1922, Ch'en launched

. 56
a coup that drove Sun from Canton once more.

Sun arrived in Shanghai in August, and the CCP

quickly sent emissaries offering a CCP-KMT alliance.

By this time, both the Comintern leaders and the Chinese

Communists themselves had, with great reluctance, come to

agree that the CCP was destined to remain ineffectual

unless it could form some sort of alliance with Sun's

party. Sun, however, proved totally unreceptive to the

Communists' offer of an equal partnership. Despite his

professed admiration for the Russian Revolution, Sun's

orientation had always been pro-Western, and though still

smarting from his recent defeat by Ch'en Chiung-ming,

 25

the only concession he would make was to allow individual

Communists to join the KMT. The tiny Communist Party

simply had nothing with which to bargain. Sun desperately

needed money and arms, and the Chinese Communists had

. h er. 57
nelt Sun, however, did not exclude the possibility

that Soviet Russia might lend him the needed support, and

when Joffe, still trying to create some leverage with

the Peking regime, proposed a meeting between he and Sun,

arrangements were quickly made. The talks between Joffe

58
and Sun were begun in Shanghai on November 25, 1922

and continued into 1923. On January 26, a joint mani-

festo on the discussions was issued by the two men.

The manifesto represented a victory for both Sun

and Joffe. Joffe reassured Sun that the Soviet Govern-

ment had no intention of trying to establish Communism

in China, that it had no intention of causing Outer

Mongolia to secede from China, and that it stood behind

its promises about the CER. Joffe also informed Sun

that, in the opinion of the Soviet Government, national

unification was China's most pressing need, and he ex-

pressed Russia's willingness to support Sun's efforts

toward this end. Sun Yat-sen, in turn, agreed with Joffe

that an interim agreement on the management of the CER

was needed until a permanent settlement could be reached.

He also appeared to acknowledge that Russia did, in

fact, have some legitimate rights to the railway. Sun

also stated that he considered the continued presence

 26

of Soviet troops in Outer Mongolia to be in the best

59
interest of China.

The Sun-Joffe talks were a diplomatic fencing

match between two wary and skillful opponents. Joffe

lied to Sun about the Soviet Union's true intentions

both in China and in Outer Mongolia, and he deftly

avoided admitting that the Soviets had ever promised to

return the CER to China gratis. Although Sun may really

have been taken in by these assurances, he certainly did

not give away anything in return for them. In the mani-

festo, he did little more than side with Joffe against

their common opponents in Peking. In the case of the CER,

Sun merely agreed with Joffe that the issue should be

settled through Sino-Soviet negotiations. In the case

of the Soviet troops in Outer Mongolia, Sun said only

what was in his own best interest. Despite his recent

ouster from Canton, Sun was already planning new mili-

tary operations against Peking. The plans called for

Sun's return to Canton, unification of the southwestern

60
provinces for use as a base, and then a new Northern

Expedition which would establish him in Central China

and Mongolia. 61 Sun, therefore, had good reason to en-

dorse the continued presence of Soviet forces in Outer

Mongolia; he was anticipating their use in his own cause.

These discussions with Joffe marked a turning point

ln the relations between Sun Yat-sen and Moscow. Al-

though Sun had conducted an intermittent correspondence

 27

with Soviet leaders in Moscow ever since 1917, and had

had a few meetings with Comintern representatives in

62
China as we11, the Sun-Joffe talks were the first time

that Moscow had indicated a willingness to lend Sun

active support.

The Accord, however, mentioned Soviet aid only in

general terms. Sun would probably have preferred to

work out the details with Joffe personally, but his

political fortunes had taken a sudden turn for the bet-

ter on January 15 when a pro-Sun coup had driven Ch'en

Chiung-ming from Canton. Sun, who was soon to depart

for the South, ordered Liao Chung-k'ai to continue the

discussions with Joffe. Not long after the Accord was

made public, however, Joffe left for Japan, ostensibly

for reasons of health. 63 Liao accompanied him. For a

month they conferred at the hot-springs resort of Atami.

Together, they drafted plans for a Chinese military aca-

demy similar to the ones developed by Trotsky for training

Soviet Party officers. In addition, they talked at length

. .
a b out reorganlzlng t h e I01T. 64
 28

27
Yanoviche is located i n Ru ss ia about 1~ ~iles
northeast of Vitebsk.
28
vera Vladimirovna Vishnyakova-Akimova, Two Years
in Revolutionary China 1925-1927, trans. Steven I. Levine
(Cambridge: East Asian Research Center, Harvard Univer-
sity, 1971), p. 154; Branko Lazitch and Milorad M.
Drachkovitch, Biographical Dictionary of the Comintern
(Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1973), p. 34;
New York Times, 3 September 1953 (Borodin's obituary).
29
Borodin used the name Kirill while working in
the Riga committee. He appears in the protocol of the
Unity Congress, however, as Vanyushin.
30 . h
V~s nya k ova-Ak.~mova, p. 154; Laz~tch
. and Drach-
kovitch, Biographical Dictionary, p. 34; New York Times,
3 September 1953.
31
Borodin had two sons. The oldest, Fred, was born
in the United States in about 1910. The second son,
Norman, may also have been born in this country, but
this is uncertain.
32
vishnyakova-Akimova, pp. 53, 155, 220; New York
Times, 3 September 1953; 0. Edmund Clubb, China and
Russia (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971),
p. 222; North, Moscow and Chinese Communists, p. 72.
33
According to Mark J. Gayn, Journey From the East
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1944), p. 121, Borodin and
his wife went first to Mexico to "foment revolution" and
proceeded on to Moscow only after being expelled by the
Mexican authorities.
34
vishnyakova-Akimova, pp. 155-56; New York Times,
3 September 1953.
35
Branko Lazitch and Milorad M. Drachkovitch,
Lenin and the Comintern, vol. 1 (Stanford: Hoover
Institution Press, 1972), p. 153.
36
vishnyakova-Akimova, p. 156; Lazitch and Drach-
kovitch, Biographical Dictionary, p. 34; Robert C. North
and Xenia J. Eudin, M. N. Roy's Mission to China, docu-
ments trans. Helen I. Powers (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1963), p. 12.
 29

37
Manabendra Nath Roy was part of a group financed ·
by Germany during World War I whose purpose was the over-
throw of the British in India and other colonial areas.
In 1917 Roy was arrested in New York City for conspiring
with German agents, but he jumped bail and fled with his
wife to Mexico.
38
North and Eudin, Roy's Mission, p. 12; Helmut
Gruber, Soviet Russia Masters the Comintern (Garden City,
N.Y.: Anchor/ Doubleday, 1974), pp. 241-52; Rollie E.
Poppino, International Communism in Latin America (Glen-
coe, California: The Free Press of Glencoe (division
of Macmillan Co.) 1964), pp. 63, 154; Lazitch and Drach-
kovitch, Lenin, p. 389n.
39
Lazitch and Drachkovitch, Biographical Dictionary,
p. 34; New York Times, 3 September 1953; Murphy, pp. 87-89.
40
Murphy, pp. 88, 90-93, 99, 117.
41
rbid., pp. 117-18. Borodin assisted in the final
preparations for the Second Congress in other ways besides
the translation for Lenin, and it seems logical to assume
that he subsequently attended some sessions of the Con-
gress. There is, however, no record of his having done
so.
42
New York Times, 3 September 1953; Anatol M.
Kotenev, New Lamps for Old (Shanghai: North-China Daily
News and Herald Ltd., 1931; reprint ed., New York: AMS
Press Inc., 1971), p. 212.
43
Lazitch and Drachkovitch, Biographical Dictionary,
p. 34.
44
Adam B. Ulam, The Bolsheviks (New York: Mac-
millan Co., 1965), pp. 508-09.
45 Lazitch and Drachkovitch, Biographical Dictionary,
p. 34. Some accounts such as T'ang Leang-Li's Inner
History of the Chinese Revolution, Louis Fischer's
Soviets in World Affairs, and Conrad Brandt's Stalin's
Failure in China state that Borodin served in Turkey at
an unspecified time as ad vi ser to Kemal Pasha. If thi s
is true, it must have occurred in 1921, a time when the
Soviet Union was suppl y ing arms and money to Kemal. Al-
though Borodin became envoy to Berlin in January, his
exact movements from then until mid-year are uncertain.
Since his previous missions had all been brief, there is
no reason to assume that his assignment in Berlin lasted
for six months. Although none of the more detailed
accounts of Borodin's career as a Comintern agent make
 30

any · reference to an assignment in Turkey, the original

source of the story seems to have been Borodin himself
(see Klaus Mehnert, Peking and Moscow, trans. Leila
Vennewitz (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1963; New
American Library, 1964), p. 263).
46
Edward Hallet Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution
1917-1923, vol. 3 (New York: Macmillan Co., 1961),
p. 421.
47
Lazitch and Drachkovitch, p. 34; Murphy, p. 184;
Times (London), 30 August 1922.
48 Th e commlSSloners
. . .
were Harry Inkpln, Harry Po 11"1tt,
and R. Palme Dutt.
49
Gruber, p. 109n; William Gallacher, The Rolling
of the Thunder (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1947 ;
reprint ed., Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms,
1967)' p. 156.
50
Times (London), 30 August 1922; Lazitch and
Drachkovitch, Biographical Dictionary, p. 34.
51
Lazitch and Drachkovitch, Biograph i cal Dictionary,
p. 34; Vishnyakova-Akimova, p. 156.
52
North, Moscow and Chinese Communists, p. 73.
This information is contained in a letter written to
North by Roy in 1953. Roy was an old man by then, and
his account contains several obvious chronological errors.
There is, however, no reason to doubt the gist of what
he says about Borodin's general predicament or Karakhan's
friendship and offer of aid which will be discussed in
a later section.
53
clubb, Twentieth Century China, pp. 35-36, 42-43.
54
Ibid. , pp. 4 7, 50.
55
rbid., pp. 61, 65-66, 72-73.
56
rbid., p. 103; The China Year Book 1928, ed.
H. G. W. Woodhead (Tientsin, China: Tientsin Press,
n.d.), p. 1316.
57
For Communists to join and submit to the disci-
pline of a bourgeois party such as the KMT defied the
most basic tenets of Marxism. When it became fairly
obvious, however, that Sun Yat-sen would allow no other
form of collaboration with the Chinese Communists, this
un-Marxian tactic was finall y adopted, as there seemed
to be no other viable alternative.
 31

58 . Wl' lb ur an d Ju 1 le
' Llen-ylng
. .
C. Martln How, e d s.,
Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers
In China 1918-1927, with introductory essays by eds.
(New York: Octagon Books (division of Farrar, Straus
and Giroux), 1972), p. 142.
59
The China Year Book 1923, p. 863; Conrad Brandt,
Benjamin Schwartz, and John K. Fairbank, A Documentary
History of Chinese Communism (Cambridge: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1952, reprint ed., New York: Atheneum,
1966)' p. 71.
60
wilbur and How, p. 142.
61
N. Mitarevsky, World Wide Soviet Plots (Tientsin,
China: Tientsin Press, Ltd., n.d.), p. 131; Whiting,
p. 243.
62
In 1917 Sun wrote to Lenin congratulating him on
the Bolshevik victory. During the next few years, Sun
and Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs Georgii Chicherin
occasionally exchanged letters. During 1921 and 1922,
Sun met on different occasions with both the top Comintern
agents in China, G. Vointinskii and G. Maring (a Dutch
Communist whose real name was Hendricus Sneevliet) .
Neither the correspondence nor the meetings produced any
lasting results.
63
Joffe's journey was only partially for reasons of
health. It was also to place additional pressure on Peking
to begin negotiations. Ironically, Joffe passed up the
chance when he had it. In the spring of 1923, the Peking
regime finally gave indications that it was ready to begin
talks, but Joffe lingered on in Japan until the moment had
passed. Peking returned to its original stand, and the
negotiations that Joffe was meanwhile conducting with the
Japanese Government ended with no tangible gain for the
Soviet Union. As a result, Moscow recalled him. In late
July Lev Karakhan was named to replace Joffe in Peking.
64
wilbur and How, p. 143. Sun had told a meeting
of KMT members on September 4, 1922, that he had decided
to reorganize the party.
 CHAPTER 3

SUN'S STRUGGLE TO HOLD CANTON AND BORODIN'S

ASSIGNMENT TO SOUTH CHINA

On January 15, 1923, while Sun and Joffe were still

meeting in Shanghai, a small group of military leaders

loyal to Sun Yat-sen staged a coup against Ch'en Chiung-

ming. Although Ch'en was driven from the city, he re-

treated only as far as his native town of Waichow, a

stronghold on the East River less than 100 miles from

Canton. Despite the rather indecisive outcome of the

coup, Sun returned to Canton on Feburary 21, and reas-

. post as h ea d o f t h e Ml. 1'ltary Government. 65
surne d h lS

In April fighting erupted between Yunnanese troops

loyal to Sun and troops from Kwangsi loyal to General

Ch'en. At first Sun's troops were victorious, and on

May 17 they laid seige to Waichow. Then the resistance

of Ch'en's forces stiffened, and a prolonged stalemate

ensued. 66 The North River area, parts of the West

River area, and several key sections of the province's

two railways were held by Yunnanese loyal to Sun, but

the East River area remained firmly in the hands of

General Ch'en, most of the southwestern corner of Kwang-

tung was held by militarists considered to be allies of

Ch'en, and Waichow, although under continuous siege for

67
months, remained unconquered throughout the summer.

32
 33

In order to break the impasse, Sun needed outside

military aid, but the Soviet Union, despite Joffe's

pledge of support, had made no move to lend Sun any

active military assistance. Consequently, Sun looked

elsewhere for help. As previously mentioned, Sun's

orientation had always been pro-Western, and only the

repeated refusal of the Western Powers to support him

had caused Sun to turn to the Soviets in the first place.

Now, with the military situation becoming critical and

with no immediate prospect of Russian aid, he decided

to make one last effort to secure aid in the West. He

dispatched his aide-de-campe, Morris A. Cohen, to re-

cruit Canadian and American war veterans to help him

reorganize and modernize his army, and he sent his

personal secretary, Eugene Chen, to Hong Kong and Lon-

don to ask the British authorities for assistance. When

both these missions failed, he even tried to obtain aid

68
from Germany, but this attempt also ended in failure.

Sun was left with little choice. As he told Arthur

Ransome,

The Republic is my child. It is in danger

of drowning. I call for help to Eng-
land and America. They stand on the bank
and jeer at me. Now there comes a Russian
straw. Drowning, I clutch at it. England
and America on the bank shout to me on no
account to clutch that Russian straw. But
do they help me? No. . . . I know that i5
9
is a straw, but it is better than nothing.

Sun's failure to obtain aid from the West in the

summer of 1923 finally drove him into the arms of the

 34

Soviet Union. Early in August, he sent General Chiang

Kai-shek to Russia to study the Soviet system, particu-

1 ar 1 y t h e ml'1 ltary,
' 70 and to obtain a supply of weapons. 71

The following month, Sun received a message of greetings

from Lev Karakhan, Moscow's new man in Peking. The

message read in part: "I count on your support, Dr. Sun,

old friend of Russia, in my responsible task of estab-

72
lishing close contact between our two peoples." Sun

sent a reply in which he requested that Karakhan send

him a representative with whom he could discuss mutual

. 73
re 1 atlons. The Soviets complied by sending Mikhail

Borodin.

* * *

In late July 1923, only a few months after Borodin

returned to Moscow from his jail cell in Scotland, the

Narkomindel named one of its Deputy Commissars, Lev M.

74
Karakhan, to replace Adolph Joffe in Peking. Karakhan

was an old friend of Borodin, and aware that Borodin was

unhappy with his current assignment, offered him a place

75
with his mission. Borodin gladly accepted, and on

August 2 he departed Moscow as a member of Karakhan's

76
entourage.

The Karakhan mission reached Peking on September 2,

and soon afterwards Karakhan sent his message to Sun

77
Yat-sen. When Sun's reply was received, his request

for a diplomatic agent was relayed to Moscow, probably

 35

with Karakhan's recommendation that Borodin be given the

assignment. Since Karakhan seems to have added Borodin

to his entourage simply to help his old friend escape

from his bureaucratic purgatory in Moscow, he may not

have bothered to give Borodin any specific duties. Boro-

din would, in that case, have been readily available for

the new mission to Canton. Whatever the reasoning

78
involved, the Politburo's choice was Borodin, and

Peking was promptly notified. Borodin was given a cover

79
identity as a reporter for the Rosta News Service, was

briefed personally by Karakhan, and by September 23 was

80
on his way to Canton.

The trip south took him about two weeks. Enroute

he stopped in Shanghai and conferred with Chinese Com-

.
mun1st 1 ea d ers. 81 Then on September 29 he resumed his

journey. In order to avoid a stop in Hong Kong, he

chose to travel aboard a small steamer bound directly

for Canton with a load of sheep. At sea the ship en-

countered a typhoon and nearly went to the bottom.

Borodin narrowly escaped the fate of the sheep, all of

which perished. Finally, after an eventful week at sea,

81
he reached the relative safety of Canton on October 6.

* * *

By the time Borodin arrived in Canton, Sun Yat-sen's

hold on power had become extremely tenuous, and his

political future was once more in serious jeopardy.

 36

His most serious difficulties were directly linked to

the poor quality of his army and to his lack of control

over it. The exact size of Canton's army was unknown

even to Sun and his commanders, but knowledgeable ob-

servers estimated it at 30-40,000 men. Roughly half that

number were men from Kwangtung, Kwangsi, and Honan prov-

inces. These soldiers, poorly trained and badly led,

were practically worthless in combat. The remainder

of the army, approximately 15-20,000 men, were mercen-

aries from Yunnan province. Mostl y ex-bandits and

renegades, they were formidable fighters whose ferocity

and combat experience compensated for their lack of

83
ml' 1 ltary
' d lSClp
' . 1 lne.
' They were the backbone of Sun's

army and as such held the key to Sun's future in their

hands. Their loyalty, however, was fragile and costly.

They had used their military superiority to gain control

of most of the traditional sources of revenue such as

the customs from rail traffic, and they showed no sign

of being willing to surrender them to the civilian

84
authorities.

Although these soldiers were strong enough to defy

the Cantonese Government, they were not strong enough to

decisively defeat General Ch'en, and herein lay the prob-

lem for Sun Yat-sen. As the military struggle with

Ch'en dragged on month after month, the cost of the

fighting drained the Government's coffers. With the

existing sources of revenue being used to enrich the

 37

Yunnanese commanders, the Government was left with no

alternative but to create new taxes.

The most obvious source of money was the Cantonese

business community. Licensing fees were established for

such diverse occupations as hotel proprietor and building

contractor. Larger sums were raised by levying special

war-taxes on particular groups of businessmen such as

restaurant operators. These men would be given only a

few days to raise the money among themselves and pay the

assessment, a sum which often amounted to several tens

of thousands of dollars.
85 Although this money was

desperately needed by the Government, the wisdom of

these taxes was questionable. The businessmen were the

single most important group of civilians in Canton at

the time, and the oppressive taxation seriously under-

mined their support of Sun's Government at a critical

. d . 86
per1o

Realizing that licensing fees and special war-taxes

were stopgap measures at best, Sun also made an effort

to obtain a more dependable, long-term source of revenue.

On September 5, he addressed a letter to the Diplomatic

Body asking for a share of the customs surplus collected

in the southwestern provinces of China . In 1919 the

Southern Government had briefly been granted a similar

request, and Sun not only asked that the payments be

resumed, but that arrears be paid back to May 1920 as

well. The request fell on deaf ears. Although the

 38

exchange of notes, threats, and protests went on for

several months, Sun was finally forced to let the

. 87
matter d le.

This failure left Sun's Government critically

short of funds, and forced it to resort to draconian

measures to raise money. Public property, including

some public temples, was sold.

88 When these sales failed

to produce enough money, a search was begun to find

property in private hands that had previously belonged

either to the government or to religious groups. Deeds

were scrutinized, and unreasonably stringent requirements

were demanded to establish ownership. If a property

owner could not satisfy the Government agents, his

property was seized and sold. These measures worked

great hardship and suffering on hundreds of Cantonese

families who were literally turned out into the streets,

but against these arbitrary seizures, the owners had

89
no legal recourse. As the search for revenue intensi-

fied, increasingly larger segments of the Cantonese were

becoming alienated by the Government. There were even

reports that the Cantonese public only refrained from

openly protesting the taxation out of personal respect

90
for Sun.
 39

65
North-China Herald, 19 January 1924.
66
Ibid.
67
Ibid., 1 September 1923.
68
George E. Sokolsky, "The Kuomintang," The China
Year Book 1928, pp. 1320-21.
69
Degras, p. 5.
70
wilbur and How, p. 143.
71
Gruber, p. 354.
72 Wh.1t1ng,
. p. 243.
73
Sokolsky, "The Kuomintang," p. 1321.
74 h' .
W 1 t1ng, p. 208 .
75
North, Moscow and Chinese Communists, p. 73.
See note #52, Chapter II.
76
That Karakhan left Moscow on August 2 is an estab-
lished fact. That Borodin was with him is partially con-
firmed by Vishnyakova-Akimova (p. 156) who says that
Borodin left Moscow in "about July." She then goes on
to give a brief description of Borodin's trip to China
that is, in reality, a description of Karakhan's journey
(p. 157). Also, Clubb in China and Russia, p. 231, states
that Karakhan and Borodin arrived in Peking together.
77 h ' .
W 1t1ng, p. 243 .
78
Harold R. Isaacs, The Tragedy of the Chinese
Revolution, 2nd rev. ed. (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1961), p. 63.
79
Lyon Sharman, Sun Yat-sen, His Life and Its
Meaning (New York: John Day Co., 1934), p. 253. Rosta
stands for Russian Telegraphic Agency. In 1925 it was
reorganized and renamed Tass, the name b y which it is
still known today. In the early 1920s, Rosta was a cover
co~monly used by Soviet agents in China.

80 h. .
W 1t1ng, p. 24 4.
81 Mitarevs
. k y, p. 132.
 40

82
rbid., pp. 130-31. According to Clubb, China
and Russia, p. 231, Borodin was accompanied by another
Soviet agent named Volodya Polyak, but Clubb does not
mention whether Polyak joined Borodin in Peking or during
his stopover in Shanghai.
83
North-China Herald, 17, 24 November, 15 December
1923.
84
rbid., 1 September 1923.
85
rbid., 1, 14 September, 27 October, 10 November
1923.
86
rbid., 20 September, 13 October 1923.
87
The China Year Book 1924-1925, pp. 849-54;
Sokolsky, "The Kuomintang," p. 1315.
88
some of the public temples sold by the Government
were promptly dismantled by their new owners for the
bricks and gilt.
89
North-China Herald, 22 September, 27 October,
3 November 1923.
90
rbid., 10 November 1923.
 CHAPTER 4

BORODIN'S FIRST MONTH IN CANTON

Shortly before Borodin arrived in Canton, Sun

Yat-sen had gone to the front to assume personal command, 91

but his presence there had not improved the performance

of his troops, and by October 6 he was once more in

92 h owever, may h ave at
resl. d ence ln
. Canton. Boro d ln,
.

first had some difficulty in meeting Sun. In May 1927,

as Borodin's career in China was drawing to a close,

the North-China Herald reported that Sun Yat-sen had

shown no interest in meeting Borodin when he first

93
reached Canton. Louis Fischer's account of Borodin's

arrival makes no mention of this, but his description of

Sun as "a sick and broken man" when Borodin first met
94
him may provide a clue to what happened. Although an

exaggeration, this description shows Sun as a man worn

down by his problems, and perhaps already feeling the

effects of the cancer that would kill him. He had re-

quested that Karakhan send him someone to discuss mutual

relations. Tired and depressed, he may have regarded

Borodin as just one more Soviet nesotiator with nothing

to offer but talk. Such a supposition is in line with

the North-China Herald account, which states that Borodin

only succeeded in securing an interview with Sun after

41
 42

indicating that he could provide Sun with arms and

95
ammunition for his struggle against Ch'en Chiung-ming.

Borodin handled Sun with great astuteness through-

out their relationship. This story, if true, shows that

Borodin displayed this astuteness almost from the moment

he landed in Canton. If Borodin did indeed find himself

unable to obtain an audience with Sun, nothing could have

removed the barriers faster than a promise of military

supplies. Such a promise would have to have been simpl y

a ploy, however, since the Soviets had no way of supplying

such aid. No direct link existed between Canton and the

Soviet Union by which military supplies could have been

sent. The only form of aid that the Soviets could have

provided on short notice was military advisers who could

have been sent from Karakhan's entourage in Peking.

Borodin, of course, would have realized this, but seems

to have chosen the bigger promise as the best way to

gain Sun's attention. Once he had succeeded in obtaining

a meeting with Sun, Borodin apparently dropped all mention

of military aid, and concentrated instead on the political

aspects of his mission. Sun, however, was not to be put

off easily.

When the two men finally met, Borodin convey ed the

96
greetings of Moscow and of Karakhan and then told Sun,

"I have come here to put myself at the disposal of the

97
Chinese National Revolution." He assured Sun that the

Soviets did not consider conditions in China suitable

 43

for Communism and that therefore the Soviet Government•s

policy in China was to promote the National Revolution.

Even the Chinese Communist Party, he told Sun, had been

instructed to concentrate on the National Revolution

rather than Communism. He also told Sun that he strongly

favored Sun•s Three People•s Principles because the y met

the demands of the Chinese Revolution. He also added

that he saw no conflict between the goals of the KMT and

the Comintern since the Third Principle of the People•s

Livelihood expressed opposition to capitalism. But

then he went on to say that

. there are very serious shortcomings with

the Kuo-Min Tang. In the first place, the
Kuo-Min Tang organisation is very incomplete
and there is no discipline worth speaking of.
Secondly, there are many impure elements in
the Kuo-Min Tang, corrupt bureaucrats and ad-
venturers. Then the Kuo-Min Tang lacks a
popular basis in the form of the organisation
of the masses. These things have all to be
rectified before the Kuo-Min Ta~~ can be an
effective revolutionary weapon.

Although these remarks made a favorable impression

on Sun Yat-sen, he preferred to discuss military affairs,

particularly the acquisition of arms, and he turned the

conversation in this direction. He told Borodin that he

had high hopes for the negotiations being conducted at

that moment in Moscow b y Chiang Kai-shek, and he talked

at length about his plans for military operations against

Peking. For the present, however, it was necessary to

hold Kwangtung, and for this, he told Borodin, his army

must be increased and strengthened. Sun suggested that

 44

a direct steamer route from Vladivostok to Canton be

established to bring Soviet military supplies to his

forces. This last comment in particular suggests that

Borodin had won this meeting with a promise of military

supplies, and that Sun was pressing the point to see how

such supplies might be delivered. This supposition is

further strengthened by the fact that Borodin not only

agreed with Sun on this point, but also reported to

Moscow that Canton's need for a direct connection with

99
the Soviet Union was urgent.

This meeting was important because it established

cordial relations between Borodin and Sun Yat-sen from

the very onset of Borodin's mission. A close working

relationship quickly developed between the two men that

lasted for the remainder of Sun's life. Only a few days

after their initial encounter, they were seen strolling

. . 100
toget h er d eep 1n conversat1on, an d on 0 cto b er 26 ,

less than three weeks after meeting Borodin, Sun sent a

telegram to the "friendly Moscow Government and Party"

101
thanking them for sending Borodin to assist the KMT.

Over the succeeding months, Sun's faith in Borodin con-

tinued to grow. Even on his deathbed, according to

Eugene Chen, II
. he was satisfied that his trust in

the ability and loyalty of Borodin . . had not been

102
misplaced."

Borodin took advantage of this rapidly developing

rapport to press Sun on the issue of reorganizing the

 45

KNT. This reorganization, the main objective of his

mission to Canton, was desired by Moscow, the Chinese

Communists, and by Sun Yat-sen himself. The KNT organi-

zation, as Borodin pointed out to Sun at their first

meeting, had several serious weaknesses. Moscow wanted

the KNT party organization strengthened so that the

Chinese Communists would have a viable instrument with

which to attack the foreign imperialists, most notably

the British. The CCP shared this concern. They, however,

believed that they were striving for control of the KNT

principally to promote the spread of Communism in China.

Sun Yat-sen, on the other hand, desired a strengthened

KMT, because after years of failure he had finally become

convinced that only through a strong, well-organized KNT

.
cou ld h e ever h ope to ac h leve .
natlona 1 unl. f lcatlon.
. . 1 03

Since all parties involved were in favor of the

reorganization, the only major obstacle standing in Boro-

din's way was Sun's preoccupation with obtaining Soviet

military aid. Borodin seems to have placated Sun on

this issue by arranging for several military advisers to

,
b e sent lmme d late
, l y f rom Kara kh an I s entourage ln
,
Pe k lng.
• 104

Sun's confidence in Borodin apparently was so high,

however, that discussion of the reorganization was

begun even before the first advisers arrived. On

October ll, five days after he reached Canton, Borodin

presented his reorganization plans to a small group of

local Chinese Communists. The preliminary steps of the

 46

plans called for the creation of two committees--a 21-

man provisional national committee chaired by Sun Yat-sen

and composed of prominent KMT leaders, Communists,

Socialistic Youth members, and labor union representa-

tives, and a smaller 9-man executive and administrative

committee, similarly composed, that would organize

. . 1 KM T commlttees
provlnCla . an d sub -commlttees.
. 105

Although the Chinese Communists favored this plan,

they felt that it would be impossible to implement. On

October 13, only two days later, Borodin informed them

that both Sun and the KMT leadership would probably

accept this proposal. This announcement, however, may

h ave b een a bl't prema t ure. 106 There is some evidence

that the other KMT leaders were not so easily convinced

as Sun that Borodin had their best interests at heart.

Twelve days passed before Sun took any concrete

action to implement Borodin's plan. During that interval

Borodin gave a statement to a Cantonese newspaper. This

action was completely out of character for Borodin, who

shunned all publicity until almost the end of his three-

107
year stay in Canton. Therefore, it is logical to

assume that he sought publicity on this occasion with a

specific purpose in mind.

The bulk of the statement concerned the warm

feelings of brotherhood that the proletariat of Europe

supposedl y had for the oppressed peoples of China and

the Far East. The real message, however, was contained

 47

in his closing remarks .

As concerns the labour movement of China, I

believe that the most important condition for
its development lies in its alliance with the
national struggle for the unification, free-
dom and independence of China. This can be
attained by the success of the national struggle
led by the Kuomintang Party.l08

On October 17, Borodin reassured Cantonese Communist

leaders that these remarks had been meant only as

propaganda. II
. I spoke of the Kuomintang," he told

them, "but to us it means that I was speaking of the

increase, and in the end, of the influence of the Com-

109
munist party." Since Borodin had already established

close personal contact with Sun Yat-sen, the most obvious

target for this propaganda was the prominent KMT leaders,

men like Hu Ha~min, who were extremely conservative and

highly suspicious of all radicals, especially Communist

ones.

Apparently Borodin's diplomacy carried the day,

however, for on October 25, Sun created a nine-man

Provisional Central Executive Committee to draft re-

organization plans. Although the members of this com-

mittee were drawn almost exclusively from the ranks of

the KMT rather than from the diverse groups that Borodin

recommended, the strength of Borodin's influence even

at this early stage is evidenced by the selection of the

Communist T'an P'ing-shan as one of the original nine

members. The following day, the second step of Borodin's

plan was realized with the election of 21 men to form a

 48

Provisional National Committee which began operations

110
only two days later. Thus, by the end of October,

barely three weeks after his arrival, Borodin had

already made amazing progress toward achieving the

principal objective of his mission.

 49

91
North-China Herald, 6 October 1923.
92 . F.lSC h er, Th e S ovlets
. . Wor ld Aff alrs,
. 2n d
Louls ln
ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951; re-
printed., abridged by author, New York: Vintage Books
(division of Random House), 1960), p. 463. Sun Yat -sen's
residence actually was situated on Honam Island, just
across the river from Canton City.
93
North-China Herald, 14 May 1927. The account
reads, in part, "when our correspondent was in Canton,
he was given circumstantially and by persons present
at the time, full and detailed accounts of the first
meetings between Dr. Sun Yat-sen and Comrade Borodin,
how Dr. Sun at first did not care to meet him, but when
he told an intermediary whose name is known to us that
he could provide arms and munitions for the Wuchow
expedition and eventually for the northern expedition
Sun Yat-sen met [Borodin] and was favorably impressed
by him."
94
Fischer, The Soviets in World Affairs, p. 463.
95
North-China Herald, 14 May 1927.
96 .
Mltarevs k y, p. 131 .
97
T'ang Leang-Li, The Inner History of the Chinese
Revolution (London: George Routledge and Sons, Ltd.,
1930)' p. 159.
98 b'd
I l . I p. 160 .
99 .
Mltarevs k y, p. 131 . Boro d ln
' to ld Moscow ln
. h lS
'
first official report that the steamship line "would at
once create what he most needs, viz. a direct connection
with Russia (the U.S.S.R.). Military supplies which are
indispensable and which, owing to the blockade, can not
be received, could be brought from Vladivostok."
100
Spence, p. 186.
101 wilbur and How, p. 148.

102 Sharman, p. 253. Although Sun Yat-sen had a

genuinely high regard for Borodin, the feeling was not
mutual. Borodin's dispatches to Moscow indicate that
his personal opinion of Sun was very unfavorable. He
was highly critical of Sun's political judgement, calling
him "very backward" and "slow-minded." Sun, he told
Moscow, "considers everything from a purely objective
point of view [and] often reasons in a simple way like
 50

a man on the street." In addition, Borodin considered

Sun a self-loving egoist and on one occasion referred
to him as "simply an enlightened little satrap."
(Mitarevsky, p. 134). In view of Borodin's true feelings
towards Sun, his success in winning Sun's confidence
appears to be an even more remarkable feat.
103
T'ang, pp. 151-54.
104
The exact date that the first advisers arrived
in Canton is unclear. Wilbur and How, p. 144, state that
the first adviser was a general named Pavlov who was
killed at Sheklung during Ch'en Chiung-ming's offensive
in November 1923. There is, however, good reason to
doubt the accuracy of this statement. On July 26, 1924,
the North-China Herald printed a Reuters Pacific Service
dispatch datelined Hong Kong, July 23, which read as
follows: "General Pavel Andrevitch Pavlov, while
engaged in Dr. Sun's service, has been drowned at
Sheklung. Dr. Sun has ordered a public funeral."
Regardless of the date, however, the number of advisers
in Canton by the end of 1923 had risen to between 30
and 40. Of these, the most famous was General Vassili
K. Blyukher (also spelled Blucher or Bluecher) . He was
known in China as General Galen. As the chief Soviet
adviser to the Whampoa Military Academy and later as
the main adviser to General Chiang Kai-shek, he played
a role second only in importance to Borodin. Later a
Marshall in the Soviet Army, he died in Stalin's purges
of the late 1930s.
105 .
M~tarevs k y, p. 132 .
106
Ibid.
107
Roots, p. 9.
108
North-China Herald, 17 November 1923.
109 .
M~tarevs k y, p. 133 .
110 w~'lb ur an d How, pp. 144-45.
 CHAPTER 5

CH'EN CHIUNG-MING'S OFFENSIVE

Borodin had only been in Canton for a few days

when, on October 10, Sun Yat-sen declared war on the

Peking Government. This action was prompted by the

machinations of a Northern warlord named Ts'ao K'un.

In June 1923, Ts'ao forced President Li Yuan-hung to

transfer power to him. Then to make the move legal, he

bought the votes of over 500 members of Parliament who

111
in early October elected him President of China.

On October 9 telegrams urging Sun to take some positive

action against Ts'ao K'un began to arrive in Canton

from all over China. Sun responded the following day

by issuing a cornrnuniqu~ denouncing Ts'ao and asking the

Foreign Powers not to recognize him. He also informed

the local press that he would launch a new Northern

Expedition within a few weeks. Ch'en Chiung-ming, he

confidently predicted, was almost finished and would not

pose a serious threat to preparations for the drive on

. 112
Pe k 1ng. On the same day in Peking, Sun's representa-

tive, Wang Ching-wei, announced that he had received

instructions from Canton to officially declare war on

. . 113
t h e Pe k 1ng reg1me.

51
 52

Given the situation in Kwangtung and the limited

means at his disposal, Sun could not possibly back up

this declaration with military action. He was notorious

for such disregard of reality when his most cherished

goals were involved, .but on this occasion his confidence

may have been bolstered by the presence of Borodin.

Although he had only arrived a few days earlier, Borodin

may have already convinced Sun that the Soviet Union

stood solidly behind his cause.

The harsh reality of Sun's predicament in Kwang-

tung, however, rather than his wishful thinking continued

to shape the contours of his actions. The biggest single

problem facing Sun was money--there was never enough.

Closely related was the growing disaffection of the popu-

lace, particularly in Canton. The enormously unpopular

confiscation of private property continued. The Govern-

ment had also reversed its earlier popular stand against

gambling and opium in order to gain additional revenues.

It even had gone so far as to organize its own lottery

and had begun licensing both the opium dealers and the

smokers. Businessmen, still heavily taxed, were showing

an increasing reluctance to pay, and business strikes

114
were becoming commonplace. Late in October, the lead-

ing organizations of Canton even issued a formal pro-

test against "the evils of the day." Along with con-

fiscation of property, reopening of the gambling and

opium trade, and taxation, their list of grievances

 53

included the impressment of men for military service

and the increasingly rampant banditry that was terror-

. .
~z~ng b ot h Canton an d t h e ' d e. 115
countrys~

Ch'en Chiung-ming also proved to be a much greater

problem than Sun had predicted. Less than two weeks

after Sun had dismissed him as finished and no longer a

menace, General Ch'en opened an offensive that nearly

toppled Sun's Government. Since mid-May Ch'en had been

besieged in the stronghold of Waichow where his head-

quarters were located, but he had managed to hold his

attackers at bay. Then on October 26, Ch'en suddenly

went on the offensive. Two days later, probably after

being bribed by Ch'en, most of Sun's small navy deserted

and quietly sailed out of Cantonese waters. The first

days of the fighting, however, produced no decisive

results, but it was clear that Canton was in serious

danger of being taken, and Sun sent every available man

to the front. He even dispatched Canton's armed police.

Sun, nevertheless, remained optimistic and claimed that

he would be in control of the East River area within

116
ten days.

Almost immediately, however, reports reached Canton

that Sun's forces had suffered a serious defeat near

Waichow, and by November 1 the fighting was closer to

Canton than at any time since Ch'en was driven from

the city. Despite a lull in the fighting during the

first days of November, the situation continued to look

 54

so unfavorable for Sun that many Cantonese believed he

would flee momentarily. Sun, instead, went to the front

and took personal command of the troops. Briefl y it

appeared that he had regained the upper hand. Although

he had to proclaim martial law in Canton on November 6,

there were reports that General Ch'en had suffered a

reverse in the fighting, and on November 10 Sun's forces

. 11 y capture d . h 117
f ~na Wa~c ow.

Sun's success, however, was illusory. The capture

of Waichow proved to be an empty victory. The strong-

hold fell because Ch'en had removed most of the defenders.

On November 4, Ch'en had slipped out of Waichow unnoticed

and had begun massing his forces along the Canton-

Kowloon Railway. Sun was caught off guard. Ch'en's

forces advanced rapidly. Panic seized Canton. Between

November 10 and 13, 300 families took out permits to

leave the city, and most of the high Government officials

fled to the shelter of Shameen, the Foreign Concession

in Canton. When General Ch'en outflanked Sun's forces

118
on November 12, the situation became desperate.
119
Borodin expected Canton to fall at an y moment,

but he also saw in the deepening crisis an opportunity

to press for some of the radical reforms that the Comin-

tern had outlined in its directives to the CCP. On

120
November 13, Sun returned from the front and called

a meeting of the KMT executi v e committee. Borodin

attended. "I have come to this meeting," he told them,

 55

"not to criticize the past, but to impart to you the

experience which enabled us [the Soviets] to vanquish

our foes under such conditions." He told them that "the

Kuomintang, in spite of its objective revolutionism,

hung by a thread because it did no [sic] rely on any

class or classes." The peasant masses were apathetic

to the KMT's plight because the K.HT had done nothing

to alleviate the peasants' misery. He urged them to

issue immediately a decree that would clearly state

that the land of the landowner will be confis-

cated for the benefit of the peasants who
actually cultivate it, [and] that the Govern-
ment taxes on this land will be such as to
develop the rural economy and not destroy it,
as is being done at present.

Every effort should then be made to distribute the decree

121
among the peasants and to explain its meaning to them.

Similar action was necessary, he went on, in order

to mobilize the 350,000 organized workers in Canton.

Others had been allowed to organize the unions while

the K.HT remained largely indifferent to the workers'

demands. To rectify this a decree should be drafted

that would grant the Cantonese proletariat an eight-hour

day, a minimum wage, and other minimum requirements, the

exact details to be left to the representatives of the

workmen. Borodin also proposed that a manifesto be

issued to the petty industrial bourgeoisie whose support,

especially in Canton, was vital to the K.HT. The mani-

festo would explain that the two decrees would also

 56

benefit the bourgeoisie because bettering the lot of

. 122
t h e poor wou ld pro d uce muc h new b us1ness.

A crisis atmosphere seems to have prevailed at the

meeting, and in a somewhat panicky mood, the committee

123
unanimously approved Borodin's proposals. Borodin

later reported to Moscow that these decrees were widely

promulgated and produced immediate and drastic results.

The peasants and workers rose in support of the KMT,

and largely through their efforts Ch'en Chiung-ming

Was defeated. l24 c on t emporary press repor t s, h owever,

fail to bear this out. There was a report that the KMT

was organizing a volunteer corps to supplement its

regular military forces and that as of November 17 some

125
500 people had applied for membership, but the press

was mute concerning any large scale popular uprising in

favor of the KMT. Instead, the principal reason for

Ch'en's defeat seems to have been the timely arrival of

General T'an Yen-k'ai.

General T'an had been the Governor of Hunan

province, but had lost the office to a rival general

with a better army. T'an had fled Hunan and sought aid

from Sun Yat-sen. On July 27 he had led his troops back

into Hunan, but once again his army was unequal to the

task, and by November he had retreated into southern

Hunan and northern Kwangtung. It was now Sun's turn to

seek aid, and he asked T'an to hasten to Canton with

. so ld'1ers. 126
h 1s
 57

The threat to Canton continued to grow worse. On

November 15 the fighting moved to within 18 miles of the

city. By November 18 the advanced elements of Ch'en's

army were only three miles from Canton. That same day

T'an Yen - k'ai arrived with a small staff. Within a few

days approximately half of his 15,000 Hunanese troops

also reached Canton. Since the two opposing armies were

roughly equal in size, the addition of T'an's 8,000 troops

could very well have been decisive. The Hunanese arrived

just as Ch'en in a final lunge tried to take Canton from

several directions at once. The attack failed. Ch'en

Chiung-ming began to fall back, and by the end of the

month, the tide of battle had definitely turned in

127
Sun's favor.

As soon as it became apparent that the danger was

passed, a number of KMT leaders who had voted for Bora-

din's proposals began to have second thoughts. They

urged Sun to cancel the decrees. When Borodin heard of

this, he became quite upset and went to see Sun. He

warned Sun that the KMT's stature in the eyes of the

masses would be seriously damaged if it reneged on its

promises. Sun, who did not wish to offend his new

friend and patron, finally agreed to a compromise . Two

new decrees would be issued--one reducing land rent

25% and the other authorizing the establishment of peas -

ant unions. Even these measures were apparently too

radical for the KMT leadership, and the rent reduction

 58

was never implemented. The second decree, however,

did go into effect and led to the widespread organization

. 12 8
o f th e Kwang t ung peasan t ry un d er KMT ausplces. Corn-

pared with the major reforms that Borodin thought he had

secured at the height of the crisis, these peasant

unions were an insignificant concession. This setback

showed Borodin quite clearly that the radicalism of

129
Sun Yat-sen and the KMT stopped far short of Cornrnunisrn.
 59

111
clubb, Twentieth Century China, p. 123.
112
North-China Herald, 20 October 1923.
113
rbid., 13 October 1923.
114
rbid., 27 October, 3, 17 November 1923. On
October 16 the Government was forced to compromise with
the restaurant operators to end a month-long strike in
protest of special war-taxes, but only 12 days later
another strike began, this time by building contractors
protesting licensing fees.
115
rbid., 10 November 1923.
116
rbid., 10 November 1923, 19 January 1924.
117
rbid., 3, 17 November 1923.
118
rbid., 17 November, 1 December 1923, 19 January
1924.
119 .
Mltarevs k y, p. 137 .
120
North-China Herald, 17 November 1923.
121
Mitarevsky, pp. 127-38.
122
Ibid., p. 138.
123
rbid.; Fischer, Soviets in World Affairs, p. 463.
124
Fischer, Soviets in World Affairs, p. 463;
Chang, pp. 325-26.
125
North-China Herald, 1 December 1923.
126
rbid., 19 January 1924.
127
rbid., 17 November, 8, 15 December 1923.
128
Fischer, Soviets in World Affairs, pp. 464-65.
129 Louls
• Flsc
• h er, Russla
• I s Roa d f rom p eace to war
(New York: Harper and Row, 1969), p. 125.
 CHAPTER 6

PREPARATIONS FOR THE FIRST NATIONAL CONGRESS

Although the military threat to Canton had receded,

it had not disappeared. Ch'en Chiung-ming had been

thwarted but not crushed. At first General Ch'en's

forces retreated rapidly. By December 1, Sun was able

to move his headquarters to Sheklung, a strategic town

about halfway between Canton and Waichow, and prepara-

tions for a new offensive against Waichow were begun.

Although successes by Sun's troops were reported in

early December, no decisive victories were won, and

soon a lack of money brought the fighting to a stand-

still.130

Sun's Government, always in financial straits, now

found itself particularly hard pressed for funds because

of the large military expenditures it had been forced

to make during the intensive fighting of November.

Borodin seems to have taken advantage of this situation

to prompt Sun into renewed action on the customs surplus

issue. Sun had made his initial request for the surplus

a month before Borodin arrived, but had not pressed the

issue when it became obvious that the Foreign Powers

would not comply. Now, he not only renewed his request

but threatened the use of force as well. On December 5,

he told an interviewer that within a few days he would

60
 61

seize the Kwangtung customs to support his war effort,

and he hinted that he was prepared to make arrangements

through Borodin for an active alliance with the Soviet

Union if the Powers employed their gunboats to block

the seizure. The Powers were not cowed, however, and

immediately began sending warships to Canton. Undaunted,

Sun, on December 19, ordered the Commissioner of Customs

in Canton to surrender the surplus revenues. With a

massive array of foreign warships riding at anchor just

outside his office window, the Commissioner refused to

surrender anything. Sun continued to bluster a while

longer, but he was not really prepared for an armed con-

frontation with the Powers, and finally let the matter

.
qu1et 1 y d 1e.
' 131

Borodin, pf course, had an interest in the fiscal

soundness of Sun's Government, but he probably urged

Sun to press the customs issue for political rather than

financial reasons. As previously mentioned, the Comin-

tern had recommended to the CCP that foreign control of

the customs be used as an issue to stir up anti-imperialist

132
feeling among the Chinese masses. In Canton, the

customs issue was exploited in just this way. By Dec-

ember 15, reports from Canton indicated that the customs

question had taken a definite anti-foreign turn with the

general populace. On the day after Sun issued his order

to the Commissioner of Customs, placards were reported

in Canton calling for an anti-American and anti-British

 62

boycott in retaliation for the Powers' intransigence

.
on re 1 easlng t h e customs surp 1 us. 133 On t h.lS occaslon,
.

however, the anti-foreign sentiment was not allowed to

reach the boiling point because of Sun's refusal to

force an all-out confrontation. Once again, Sun's lack

of radical fire had stymied Borodin's efforts to mani-

pulate the KMT.

* * *

Sun's failure to gain the customs revenues was not

his only disappointment in December. The lingering

menace of General Ch'en made actual preparations for a

Northern Expedition impossible. His confidence in the

prospects for success of such an undertaking, however,

remained undiminished. In a letter to the National

Students' Federation of China, he indicated that he

would attack Peking by way of Kiangsi and Hunan as soon

as the situation in Kwangtung had been stabilized.

Despite a lack of improvement in local conditions,

however, he continued to lay plans for his conquest of

the North. 134

While Sun was devoting much of his attention on

futile military planning, Borodin concentrated on plan-

ning the remodeling of the KMT. No clear-cut account

of the reorganization planning exists, but it is clear

that Borodin did most of the work. Originally, the

nine members of the Provisional Central Executive

 63

Committee, selected in October, were charged with res-

ponsibility for drafting the plans. All nine men,

however, do not seem to have taken part in the actual

planning. Fischer gives a smaller group consisting of

Wang Ching-wei, Hu Han-min, Tai Chi-tao, Liao Chung-k'ai,

and Borodin as those actually involved in the decision

making. 135 Of these four men, Borodin encountered the

strongest opposition from arch-conservative Hu Han-min.

Hu disagreed with all Borodin's proposals and could have

been an insurmountable obstacle had not Sun backed

Borodin on most of the crucial issues. As a result

Hu withdrew from the planning, leaving Borodin with

only slight resistance from Tai Chi-tao, a moderate, and

from Wang Ching-wei and Liao Chung-k'ai, both of whom

136
had strong leftist sympathies. Even these more

amenable colleagues, however, found some of Borodin's

proposals too radical. Two major points for which

Borodin was unable to win approval were the doctrine

of the class struggle and the policy of confiscating

land without compensation. Wang Ching-wei was apparently

so steadfastly opposed to both these stands that Borodin

137
was forced to abandon them.

From these deliberations came two basic documents:

a new Party Constitution and a new Party Platform. The

most important of the two was the Constitution, which

was the blueprint for reorganization. Borodin, at Sun's

request, drafted the original in English for Sun's

 64

approval. Liao Chung-k'ai then translated it into

138
Chinese for presentation to the First Party Congress.

Borodin's influence on this document was over-

whelming and unmistakable. Closely resembling the Soviet

Constitution, it created a tightly organized pyramidal

party structure. Party headquarters were established

at four levels--sub-district, district, hsien, and

provincial--with the National Congress as the highest

Party organ. The National Congress would meet at least

once every two years, but between Congresses control of

the Party would be in the hands of the CEC. The Corn-

rnunist principle of democratic centralism provided the

cement to hold this structure together. Each level in

the structure was required to render unquestioning

obedience to the decisions of all higher Party organs,

although discussion of issues was permitted prior to a

. .
d ec1s1on b e1ng
. reac h e d . 139

Chang Kuo-t'ao, a member of the CCP CEC, objected

to this rigid restructuring, and complained that demo-

cratic centralism was inappropriate for the KMT. He

argued that the revitalized KMT should give the Chinese

Communists greater latitude to pursue their own ends.

Borodin agreed with Chang's reasoning, but countered by

saying that, "people do feel that a revolutionary party

must have a rigid organizational structure if it is to

.
s h ou ld er 1ts h.1stor1ca
. 1 rn1sslon.
. . .. 140 Borodin believed

that, just as in the Soviet Union, "the party must be

 65

the central organ of the political power," and since

many segments of the KMT were lacking in revolutionary

ardor, democratic centralism was absolutely essential

to ac h 1eve co h es1veness. 141

0
0

Despite his insistence on a Soviet style party

structure and a rigid party discipline, however, Borodin

was no doctrinaire. His handling of Sun Yat-sen was

highly pragmatic. A purely Communist restructuring

would have relegated Sun to the role of Party Secretary

and placed decision making in the hands of the CEC.

Borodin, however, realized that Sun clung tenaciously

to the supreme power in the KMT, and would not easily

142
suffer any action that threatened his position.

Therefore, Borodin included in the Constitution a pro-

vision that made Sun chairman of both the National Con-

gress and the CEC with the power to override the de-
143
cisions of either body. Such extraordinary power

in the hands of one man ran completely counter to the

concept of rule by committee embodied in the rest of the

Constitution, but Borodin saw the necessity of flattering

144
Sun's ego. By making the entire Constitution enhance

Sun's power and influence, Borodin ensured Sun's approval

of the Bolshevization of the KMT.

Borodin's hand is equally evident 1n the drafting

of the Manifesto of the 1st National Congress. Sometimes

also referred to as the Charter of National Freedom

and Independence, it gave the KMT a detailed Party

 66

Platform for the first time in its history. The basic

framework of the Manifesto was Sun's Three People's

Principles of Nationalism, Democracy, and the People's

Livelihood. Although the Principles had served as Sun's

platform for many years, they remained little more than

vague generalities. Borodin successfully grafted Soviet

foreign policy objectives onto the skeleton of these

Principles, and produced a KMT political platform both

favorable to Russian interests and acceptable to Sun.

Although Sun's enmity remained directed primaril y

towards the Peking militarists, his hostility towards

the Foreign Powers had been growing due to their lack of

support for his cause. Now, under Borodin's influence,

Sun began to look on the Foreign Powers, not Peking, as

the real source of his problems. The new Party Plat;orm

showed this shift in emphasis quite clearly, particularly

in the section dealing with the Principle of National-

. 145
lSm.

Up until 1911, Nationalism had for the most part

meant opposition to the Manchus. After the collapse

of the Manchu dynasty, it had focused on equality among

the five principal races of Republican China. Although

the Manifesto retained racial equality as one of its

main points, the real emphasis was shifted elsewhere

as the following passage from the document indicates:

To whatever class, the meaning of nationalism

is none other than the elimination of the
imperialist agression. to the majority
 67

of the people, the objective in the struggle

lmperlallsm. 1
~or n~ti~nal ~~beration is none other than anti-

Likewise, the Principle of Democracy was expanded

to include, among other things, a denial of heaven-

bestowed rights, a criticism of Western democracy, and

. . . 1 lsm.
antl-lmperla ' 14 7 Emphasis was placed on training

Party members nationwide so that the Party would be

able to seize political power and suppress its enemies.

In spelling out just who the enemies were, the stress

was again on anti-imperialism.

Only truly anti-imperialist individuals and

organization may enjoy all rights and liberty .
All those, whether individuals or organizations,
who betray the country and the people and who
owe allegiance to imperialists are barred ~3om
the enjoyment of such rights and liberty.
1

In the third Principle, that of the People's Live-

lihood, some anti-imperialism was also included, but

this section was most noteworthy for its recognition

that ultimate victory was possible for the KMT only

with the support of the masses. In order to win this

support, the Manifesto pledged that the KMT would reform

agrarian organization, improve the li v ing conditions

of peasants and workers, enact a labor law, and support

. . 149
an d protect t h e d eve 1 opment o f 1 a b or organlzatlons.

Although the immediate results of these pledges may not

have been much better than those of the November decrees,

Borodin had at least managed to make such objectives

part of official KMT policy .

 68

* * *

Much of Sun's attention right up to the eve of the

National Congress was devoted to military matters. Con-

versations with four northern generals hostile to Ts'ao

K'un who had arrived in Canton on Christmas day were

continued well into January. A large meeting, held in

Canton on January 4 and attended by more than 40 promin-

ent people, seems to have been called primarily to dis-

cuss the proposed Northern expedition. Negotiations

were also begun with Ch'en Chiung-ming in the hope that

he would agree to join forces with Sun and lead the

attack against the North. General Ch'en, however,

refused the offer, and lack of funds continued to hamper

efforts to launch the proposed expedition. Despite these

setbacks, Sun's position in Kwangtung had improved

slightly by the time the National Congress opened, as

his foes, also short of funds, were unable to go on the

.
o ff ens1ve . h er. 150
e1t

The National Congress opened at the Canton Teachers'

College on January 20. Originally, it had been sched-

uled to start on the 15th, but many of the 199 delegates

failed to arrive on time, and the opening had to be

151
postponed. Sun delivered the opening address. He

told the delegates that it was too earl y to speak of a

Party government, that the KMT's first duty as a revolu-

tionary part y was to rebuild t h e nation. So far, the

 69

KMT had failed because it lacked disciplined strength.

The reorganization, he told them, was designed to give

. nee d e d to b e Vlctorlous.
t h e KMT t h e strengt h lt . . 152

The Congress subsequently sanctioned the party reforms,

153
reportedly at a session directed personally by Borodin.

It is not known whether or not Borodin encountered any

resistance to the reforms from the Congress, but it is

known that some of the delegates strongly objected to

the participation of Chinese Communists in the KMT.

Despite this opposition, however, Communists were

elected to three of the 24 seats on the first permanent

CEC and to six of the 17 seats on the reserve CEC. In

addition, control of the most powerful single department,

the KMT Organization Department, went to the Communist

T I an p 1 lng-s
• h an. 154

On January 26, word of Lenin's death reached Can-

ton. After hearing an address by Borodin, the Congress

went into recess for three days. By this time, however,

the work of the Congress was nearly finished, and on

155
January 30, it held its 17th and final session.

Borodin's success had been remarkable. In less than

four months, he had won the trust and confidence of

Sun Yat-sen, and had accomplished the primary objective

of his mission, the reorganization of the KMT.

 70

130 .
North-China Herald, 8, 22 December 1923.
131
rbid., 8 , 29 December 1923.
132
See Chapter I, p. 12.
133
North-China Herald, 29 December 1923 . Some
observers felt that the inclusion of the Americans in
the placard campaign was due to the ignorance of the sign
makers who did not understand the difference between
Americans and the British. The real target of the
campaign, however, was felt to be Great Britain alone.
134
rbid., 29 December 1923, 12 January 1924.
135
Fischer, Soviets in World Affairs, p. 466.
136
rbid.
137T, ang, p. 166n.
138
Brandt, Schwartz, and Fa i rban k , Documentary
History , p . 7 2 .
139 olb
Wl ur an d How, p. 145 .
140
Chang Kuo-t'ao, The Rise of the Chinese Com-
munist Party 1921-1927: Volume One of the Autobiography
of Chang Kuo-t'ao (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press
of Kansas , 19 71 ) , p p . 3 2 9- 3 0 .
141
Flsc h er,
0

s ovlets
0 0

~n Wor ld Aff alrs, pp. 465 - 66 .

0

142
Sharman, p. 267.
143 olb
Wl ur an d How, p. 145 .
144
Sharman , p . 2 6 7 .
145
wilbur and How, p. 146.
146
rbid.
147
Chang , p. 3 2 9 .
148
wilbur and How, p. 147.
149
Ibid., p. 148.
150
North-China Herald, 12, 19 January 1924.
 71

151
rbid., 26 January, 2 February 1924; Sharman,
p. 257.
152
wilbur and How, p. 145.
153
Kotenev, p. 181.
154 '1b
w~ ur an d How, p. 149 .
155
North-China Herald, 16 February 1924; Sharman,
p. 257.
 CHAPTER 7

THE MERCHANT VOLUNTEERS' REVOLT

Soon after the close of the National Congress,

Boro d ln returne d to Pe k lng. 156

0 0

At the time of his

departure from Canton the military situation in Kwang-

tung was still relatively calm as a result of the finan-

cial exhaustion of both Sun Yat-sen and his opponents.

Although rumors persisted that a major military clash

was imminent, neither side, at the moment, was in a

posltlon to mount an o ff enslve. 157

0 0 0

Efforts were underway in Canton, however, to

strengthen Sun's army by providing it with a cadre of

well-trained, highly disciplined officers. Organization

of the Whampoa Military Academy, originally discussed

by Liao Chung-k'ai and Adolph Joffe the previous sum-

mer, was officially begun on January 24, 1924, when Sun

appointed Chiang Kai-shek to head a seven-man KMT pre-

paratory committee. Although Chiang's diary, which

mentions 32 meetings of this committee, makes no mention

of Soviet involvement, both Soviet money and expertise

were h eavl 1 y commltte d to t h e proJect. 158 Karakhan

0
° 0

himself told Louis Fischer that the Soviet Union supplied

three million gold rubles ($1.5 million) to get the

159
school started, and such largess was definitely not

72
 73

given without some measure of direct Soviet supervision.

Hollington K. Tong asserts that Borodin played an impor-

o t h e sc h oo l I s f oun do1ng, 160 b ut s1nce
tant ro 1 e 1n o Boro do1n

was absent during most of the planning period and was,

moreover, completely lacking in military background,

Soviet interests were more likely to have been repre-

161
sented by General Galen instead. Borodin's importance

in the founding probably stemmed primarily from his con-

trol of the purse strings.

The activity of Borodin during this period, how-

ever, is something of a mystery. Although little docu-

mentation exists of his visit to Peking, it seems that

the trip was a combination of political consultation and

family reunion. Borodin had kept Karakhan informed of

events in Kwangtung with detailed weekly reports written

0 0 162
1n t h e f orm o f a d 1ary. Contact h a d a l so b een ma1n-
0

tained between the two by Vointinskii, the Soviets's

old China hand, who had shuttled between Canton and

163
Peking giving advice to his new team members. Now,

however, events in Canton were entering a new phase.

Borodin almost certainly had expected his assign-

ment in Canton to be temporary, but by the time he re-

turned to Peking, there were already indications that

his mission might be a lengthy one. On December 13,

Sun had officially appointed Borodin adviser to the

164
KMT. The timing of this appointment strongly suggests

that it was made to assuage Borodin's disappointment

 74

over the dismal results of the November decrees and to

show him that he still had Sun's trust. The appoint-

ment may also have been made, at least in part, to

legitimize Borodin's hitherto unofficial role on the

reorganization committee and thereby strengthen his

hand in his confrontations with Hu Han-min. Immediately

following the National Congress, Sun went a step further

by appointing Borodin High Adviser to the CEC of the

KMT, the organ that controlled both the Party and the
16 S Th lS
. appoln
. t men t was o f grea t slgnl
. . f.l-
Government.

cance. According to Eugene Chen, who was present when

Sun decided to make Borodin a high adviser, "The appoint-

ment was correctly understood as definitely completing

Dr. Sun's Soviet orientation. It was not lightly

rna d e.
.. 166
Since Borodin's status had thus been altered

drastically, direct discussion with him over future

Soviet policy in South China was probably considered

imperative.

* * *

The lack of success of Karakhan's mission up to

this point contrasted sharply with the achievements of

Borodin's diplomacy. Upon arriving in Peking, Karakhan

had moved with caution in an effort to avoid the blunders

of his predecessors. His mission, however, was in

trouble from the very start because of his demand that

 75

Peking grant the Soviets de jure recognition prior to

the start of any negotiations. Talks remained stalled

for months over this issue, but finally, in March 1924,

the Peking regime, weakened by domestic conflicts, could

wait no longer. Negotiations began in earnest, and on

March 14, Karakhan and C. T. Wang signed a treaty. The

agreement, however, was more favorable to Russia than

to China, and the Peking regime refused to ratify it,

saying that Wang had exceeded his authority. Karakhan

sent Wang an ultimatum, then tried to appeal to public

opinion by releasing the text of the signed treaty, but

a 11 to no aval'1 . 167

Meanwhile, Borodin was given the task of negotia-

ting with Chang Tso-lin, the powerful Manchurian warlord

168
who actually controlled the CER. Borodin negotiated

for ten weeks, and Louis Fischer would have us believe

that he persuaded Chang to accept the Karakhan-Wang

169
agreement. This, however, was one occasion when

Borodin's diplomatic skills failed to carry the day.

Even after Borodin's return to Canton, Karakhan was

complaining to the Peking Government about Chang's

intransigent refusal to recognize the treaty which Peking

had finally ratified in May.

17 ° Following Borodin's

departure, Karakhan sent Nikolai Konznetsoff to Man-

171
churia to conduct secret negotiations with Chang,

but the warlord still did not sign an agreement until

September 20, when the pressures of the Second

 76

Chihli-Mukden War and Karakhan's threats to use force

172
finally convinced him to do so.

* * *

Kwangtung was once again enjoying a period of

relative calm when Borodin returned on June 19. 173

The progress that had been made in his absence must

have given him ample reason for satisfaction, even

optimism. Ever since the close of the National Congress,

Communist workers had been busy organizing both labor

and peasant unions under the auspices of the Labor and

Peasant Workers Department of the KMT's CEc. 174 At

Whampoa, just east of Canton, the Soviet backed Military

Academy was already training its first class of cadets. 175

And even in the protracted struggle with Ch'en Chiung-

ming, the outlook seemed encouraging. After a brief

period of active belligerence in March and April, Ch'en

was once again trying to settle the dispute through

. .
negotlatlon. 176 Appearances, h owever, were d ecelVlng,
. .

for within two months of Borodin's return, Canton would

be in the throes of still another major crisis. This

time the confrontation would be with the merchants of

Canton.

The Canton Merchant Volunteers were organized in

1912 in the unstable times following the overthrow of

the Manchus, and like similar groups throughout Kwang-

tung, their original purpose had been self-protection

 77
'
f rom b r~gan d s. 177 . In recent years, h owever, t h e menace

of bandits had often been overshadowed by the threat

posed by the deprecations of Sun's mercenary troops over

whom he had little real control. This was particularly

true in Canton during times of military crisis. During

such periods, the Merchant Volunteers attempted to main-

tain some semblance of civil order. These attempts had

met with considerable success and had greatly increased

the Volunteers's influence with the general populace,

but at the same time had often brought them into direct

conflict with some of Sun's troops and, hence, indirectly

178
into conflict with Sun himself. This challenge to

Sun's authority, however, remained only a minor problem

so long as the Volunteers remained poorly organized and

179
poorly armed.

The Merchant Volunteers viewed with suspicion

and alarm the increasing Bolshevization of Sun's Govern-

ment and the ~~T. Aware of their own weakness, however,

they had already taken steps to achieve greater military

effectiveness. On May 26 at a meeting of Volunteers

from throughout the province, a reorganization was

adopted that wed approximately 140 separate groups with

an estimated combined membership of 50,000 into a

single organization called the United Volunteer Corps.

The delegates also elected Ch'eng Lien-po, comprador

of the Hongkong-Shanghai Banking Corporation, as their

 78

commander-in-chief, and gave him instructions to purchase

180
arms for the new Corps.

Ch'eng obtained the arms from a British firm, and

they were shipped to Canton aboard the Norwegian steamer

Hav. The arms purchase remained a secret until August 6,

four days before the shipment arrived, when Ch'eng re-

quested a permit to receive the weapons from the Military

Department of Sun's Government. The permit was granted,

but when the Hav reached port, Sun ordered the arms
. d . 181
se1ze He h a d no ot h er c h o1ce.
. T h e s h'1pment con-

tained 4850 rifles with 1,150,000 rounds of ammunition,

4,331 Mauser pistols with 2,060,000 rounds of ammuni-

tion, and 660 revolvers with 164,000 rounds of ammuni-

. 182
t 1on. Given the poverty of his own forces, Sun could

not possibly have allowed such a large quantity of

.
weapons to f a 11 1nto t h e h an d s o f a potent1a . 1 . 183
. 1 r1va

The Merchant Volunteers, however, were furious.

On the night of August 11, they declared martial

law in Canton, and the Government responded by disarming

some of them. The situation quickly became tense. On

August 13, the Hav was taken to Whampoa, and troops re-

moved all the arms and ammunition. The merchants,

angered not only by the arms seizure but also by the

Government's attempts to force unsecured paper money

on them, retaliated on August 23 with a general strike.

By August 24, 90 % of all Canton businesses were closed.

Sun tried to end the strike by offering to sell the

 79

Volunteers their arms at the original price plus $60

per rifle, but the merchants refused. The situation

worsened. By August 28, Sun was contemplating bombarding

the city. Any such action, however, would have involved

firing shells over Shameen, the Foreign Concession, thus

endangering the lives of the foreign nationals living

there. When the British Consul learned of the proposed

attack, he immediately informed Sun that he would order

the intervention of the British Navy if necessary to

. 184
prevent sue h a s h e 11 lng.

This ultimatum stayed Sun's hand, but on Septem-

ber 1, he issued a manifesto in which he declared that

the Merchant Volunteers had risen in open rebellion

with British support. Even though the imperialist

powers had consistently aided the forces of counter-

revolution in China, he said, he was dismayed nonetheless

that the British Labor Government would threaten armed

intervention at a time when his Government faced possible

overthrow. He declared that a new era had begun in

which the Chinese must give top priority to the elimin-

ation of imperialist intervention. Ten days later, he

wired London accusing the British Consul in Canton of

.
p 1 ottlng to d estray h lS
. Government. 185

The vehemence of Sun's attacks could easily have

provoked a devastating confrontation with the British

had his attention not been diverted by a new outbreak

of fighting in North China. On September 5, Sun told

 80

an interviewer that he would personally lead his army

north to join the fight against General Wu Pei-fu,

President Ts'ao K'un's chief military supporter. Sun's

health was failing, and perhaps he realized that he did

not have the luxury of time, for he moved with unaccus-

tomed speed to launch the expedition. Only eight days

after the interview, he was headed north with his wife

and over 1,000 troops aboard an armored train. Their

destination was Shaokuan, the terminus of the Kwangtung

section of the Canton-Hankow Railway. Located 140 miles

north of Canton, it was to be the staging point for

the new Northern Expedition. On September 16, the

fighting in North China expanded to become the Second

Chihli-Mikden War, and two days later, Sun officially

186
declared his alliance with the Mukden faction. The

British, however, were still on his mind. He announced

that the object of the war was ~not only the overthrow

of militarists but also, and more particularly, the

overthrow of imperialism upon which the existence of

ml' 1 ltarlsts
' . d epen d s. ,187

Throughout September, efforts to end the merchants'

strike were hampered by Sun's insistence that the mer-

chants contribute funds for his Northern Expedition as

the quid pro quo to the release of their arms. The

merchants steadfastly refused, and their hostility

towards Sun grew alarmingl y . On September 24, the

United Commercial Guilds of Kwangtung province publicly

 81

denounced Sun in extremely strong terms and recommended

that the overseas Chinese cease their financial support

of him. A few days later, the Committee of the Kwang-

tung Gentry, representing 96 districts in the province,

repudiated Sun's Government calling it "irregularly

constituted without even the support of the sentiment

and goodwill of the local people." And on September 30,

the Kwangtung Provincial Assembly, in a message to the

League of Nations, called Sun "a rebel disturbing local

peace and also disturbing international goodwill by his

. .
mlsrepresentatlons. .. 188

Early in October, Sun promised to return the arms.

Tensions eased somewhat, and the merchants ended their

strike. The Government, however, took no immediate

action to make good Sun's promise, and the tension

quickly mounted once more. There was talk of a new

strike, and in the western suburb of Saikwan, the Vol-

.
unteers b egan erectlng b arrlca
. d es. 189

Sun, engrossed in preparations at Shaokuan, showed

little interest in events in Canton. Certain that the

Northern Expedition would be a success, he was determined

not to return to Canton to deal with the Volunteers.

The timely arrival, on October 7, of the first shipment

190
of Soviet military supplies must have bolstered Sun's

confidence even further. He ordered the entire shipment

to be sent to him at once. Two days later, he ordered

 82

Chiang Kai-shek to abandon Whampoa and to send the

191
students and all their arms to Shaokuan.

Sun apparently felt that with the Soviet arms and

the Whampoa cadets to support his Expedition, he could

afford to make some real concessions to the Volunteers,

for on October 9, the Canton Government announced that

it would return a portion of the arms and ammunition

seized in August. 192 On the same day, Sun, at Borodin's

. 193 1
suggest1on, a so or d ere d a Revo 1 ut1onary
. Committee
194
to be formed to deal with the Volunteers. What action,

if any, he intended the Committee to take, however, is

not clear.

The return of the Hav arms began on October 10.

Just as a group of Volunteers were unloading the weapons

onto the bund, the Labor Unions and the Students Corps

marched by in a parade celebrating Republican Anniver-

sary Day. Words were exchanged, then fighting erupted.

The Volunteers, using their newly regained weapons,

fired into the crowd, killing and wounding many of the

195
marchers. The crisis was at hand.

Borodin, who had remained behind in Canton when

Sun moved his headquarters to Shaokuan, wanted to take

strong action against the Volunteers, but he appears to

have been apprehensive that little would be done . Sun

was over 100 miles away and clearly disinterested, and

Borodin well knew that the KMT's conservative Right Wing

still exerted a powerful influence on Party policy .

 83

On October 9, the day Sun ordered the formation of the

Revolutionary Committee, Borodin visited Chiang in his

office at Whampoa. He had come, he told Chiang, to

express his opposition to the inclusion of either Hu

. or Wang Ch 1ng-we1
Han-m1n . . on t h e Comm1ttee.
. 19 6 Borodin

distrusted them both and probably felt that their

presence on the Committee would kill any chance for a

firm stand against the Volunteers. Chiang informed

Sun of the conversation, but recommended that both men

be placed on the Committee. Sun compromised by naming

Wang but not Hu as a committee member. The exclusion of

Hu Han-min gives clear indication of Borodin's continued

influence with Sun, for Hu was Deputy Generalissimo

,
an d , 1n s un I s a b sence, t h e sen1or
, KMT 1 ea d er 1n
, Canton. 19 7

Despite the clash on the bund, Sun still failed to

comprehend the gravity of the situation. On October 11,

he ordered Chiang to join him immediately at Shaokuan.

Chiang, however, chose to ignore this order as he had

the previous ones concerning the Soviet arms and the

Hhampoa cadets, and continued instead to argue with Sun

to return. In the meantime, the Volunteers, disregarding

orders to disarm, were concentrating their forces in

Saikwan. Gradually Sun began to accept Chiang's eval-

uation of the situation. On October 12, he sent his

bodyguard under General Wu Tieh-ch'eng back to Canton,

198
and he himself followed on the 14th.
 84

According to Borodin's report, the Revolutionary

Committee met for the first time on the same day. They

agreed that drastic measures were necessary. Chiang was

placed in charge of the military operations and given

command of an odd assortment of troops that ranged from

the aviation squadron to the peasants' self-defense corps.

In addition, several other military commanders were

ordered to coordinate their troops with those of Chiang.

Borodin expressed in his report a concern that the

generals other than Chiang were unreliable and that

Chiang alone could be trusted to crush the Volunteers.

These fears, however, were unrealized, for all the units

carr1e d out t h e1r ass1gnments as or d ere d . 199

0 0 0

The attack opened on the night of October 14.

For two days the battle raged in the narrow streets and

alleyways of Saikwan. Heavy artillery was used. Fires

broke out, and government troops engaged in wholesale

pillaging. The Volunteers fought fiercely, but were

badly outnumbered, and never really had a chance. By

the evening of the 16th, it was all over. The death

toll ran into the thousands, the property damage into

the millions. The surviving Volunteers in Canton were

fined $100 each, and the Volunteers throughout the

prov1nce were d 1sarme d . 200

0 0

With fire and sword, the

threat of the Volunteers had been eliminated.

 85

156 Boro d'1n I s exact d eparture d ate was uncertaln.

'
His last known appearance in Canton was at a meeting on
Feburary 2 (North-China Herald, 14 February 1924), and
he appears to have already reached Peking by March 14
when the Karakhan-Wang agreement was signed.
157
North-China Herald, 2, 16 February, 8 March,
5 April, and 3 May 1924. Although fighting did break
out in late March and early April, the results were
inconclusive. The following item from the North-China
Herald of May 10 highlights the poverty of Sun's military
establishment. "Dr. Sun Yat-sen's aviators are so badly
in need of ammunition and bombs says the Chinese press,
that of late they have been dropping big stones over
Waichow. !"
158 'lb
Wl ur an d How, p. 150 .
159 Fischer, Russia's Road, p. 120. The Soviet
investment in Whampoa, however, may very well have been
greater than these figures indicate. A letter dated
March 17, 1925, from Moscow to Soustchefsky, the Soviet
Military Attache in Peking states that Galen had just
been given 100,000 rubles for the upkeep of Whampoa for
two months. The letter goes on to state that, "For
the further subsidizing of Whampoa a definite estimate
must be submitted." (Mitarevsky, pp. 39-40.)
160 'lb
Wl ur an d How, p. 150 .
161
See note #104, Chapter VI. According to Hol-
lington K. Tong, Chiang had met Galen on his recent
visit to Russia and had personally selected him to be
his chief of staff at the proposed academy. (Wilbur
and How, p. 150.)
162 .
M1tarevs k y, p. 181 .
163
Chang, p. 341.
164
wilbur and How, p. 148.
165
George E. Sokolsky, The Tinder Box of Asia
(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Doran & Co., Inc., 1932),
p. 329.
166 Sharman, p. 252.

167
whiting, pp. 209-12, 221, 223-24; Cheng, pp.
114-15. Two draft agreements were signed calling for
immediate diplomatic relations to begin and for a
conference to be held within a month to:
 86

1) annul all previous agreements between Russia and

China and replace them with new ones based on the spirit
of the decrees of 1919 and 1920;
2) set time limits for the withdrawal of Soviet troops
from Mongolia and adopt measures for the safety of the
frontiers;
3) demarcate the national boundaries; and
4) conclude a trade and tariff agreement.
In addition, both the governments agreed not to shelter
groups harmful to the other and not to engage in propa-
ganda against each other. Russia agreed to give up the
Boxer indemnity, rights of extra-territoriality, and
consular jurisdiction, and to renounce all special rights
and privileges granted tsarist Russia anywhere in China.
Russia recognized Outer Mongolia as part of China and
promised to respect China's sovereignty there. Russia
also declared that all treaties between tsarist Russia
and any third parties over rights in China were void.
A conference on the CER was to be called. Meanwhile
all parts of the 1896 agreement not in conflict with
the present agreement would remain in effect.
168
william L. Tung, China and the Foreign Powers
(Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1970),
p. 221.
169 Flsc
. h er, Sovlets
. .
ln Wor ld Aff alrs,
. p. 401.
170 Jane Degras, e d . , Sovlet
· Documents on F orelgn
·
Policy: volume II 1925-1932 (London: Oxford University
Press, 1952), p. 459.
171
Cheng, p. 116.
172
clubb, Twentieth Century China, p. 125.
173
North-China Herald, 28 June 1925. Borodin
sailed from Shanghai aboard the passenger steamer Linan
on June 15, accompanied by his wife, Fanny, and their
youngest son, Norman. (North-China Herald, 21 June
1924). It is unknown just when Borodin's family arrived
in Peking, but it is entirely likely that they made the
trip to China with him in the fall of 1923 and had re-
mained with the Karakhan mission during his absence in
Canton. It is known, for instance, that Karakhan's
wife accompanied him to China.
174
sokolsky, Tinder Box, p. 330. This department
was directed by Liao Chung-k'ai, the man who had helped
plan the Whampoa Military Academy with Joffe and until
recently the Civil Governor of Kwangtung.
 87

175 The Academy began operations in Hay 1924.

Official opening ceremonies took place on June 16.
176 North-China Herald, 14 June 1924.

177 volunteer groups in the bigger cities were

called Shant'uan or Merchant Volunteers, while similar
groups in the small towns and villages were called
Hsiangt'uan or Rural Volunteers.
178 North-China Herald, 1 March, 28 June 1924;
China Year Book 1924-25, p. 1135.
179 North-China Herald, 15 December 1923, 1 March,
28 June 1924. Estimates of the strength of the Canton
Merchant Volunteers varied from 3,200 to 13,000. All
observers seem to agree, however, that the Volunteers
were poorly armed. As few as one-fourth of them owned
a rifle.
180 china Year Book 1925-26, pp. 849, 1135-36;
Wilbur and How, p. 154.
181 china Year Book 1925-26, p. 1136; Wilbur and
How, p. 154.
182
North-China Herald, 23 August 1924.
183 Sun 1 s prlmary
•
source o f weapons was t h e Canton
arsenal. The following entry on the arsenal appears,
word for word, in every edition of the China Year Book
from 1923 to 1928. "The present capacity is about
700,000 cartridges per month, 25 rifles per day, 8
machine guns (Vickers model) per month and an unknown
number of automatic pistols. Smokeless powder is also
manufactured." Based on these figures, the Volunteers
had purchased as much ammunition as the arsenal could
produce in five months and as many rifles as it could
produce in six and a half months. Even without the
threat of armed Volunteers on his doorstep, Sun found
the arsenal inadequate for his needs. In December 1923,
he had unsuccessfully tried to buy a shipment of arms
that was aboard the White Russian vessel Mongovgay.
The shipment contained 2,000 rifles and 2,000,000 rounds
of ammunition which Sun needed badly for the Northern
Expedition that he was then trying to launch. The ship,
however, was anchored in the roadstead at Woosung near
Shanghai, and the transaction was never completed, per-
haps due to pressure from influential people in Shanghai
hostile to Sun.
 88

184
North-China Herald, 16, 23, 30 August 1924;
China Year Book 1925-26, p. 850.
185
North China Herald, 20 September 1924; Wilbur
and How, p. 154.
186
North-China Herald, 13, 20 September 1924;
Clubb, Twentieth Century China, p. 125.
187
wilbur and How, p. 155. Ironically, Sun had
chosen as his partner in this crusade against militarists
and imperialists, Marshal Chang Tso-lin, head of the
Mukden forces. Chang, who was virtual dictator over the
Three Autonomous Provinces (i.e., Manchuria), was one
of the most powerful and reactionary militarists in
China. Chang's imperialist backers were the Japanese.
188 china Year Book 1925-26, p. 850.

189
Ibid.; North-China Herald, 4 October 1924,
14 February 1925.
190
A full year passed between Borodin's reported
promise of Soviet military supplies and the arrival of
the first shipment. The lengthy delay resulted from
the lack of coordinationofSoviet activity in China
prior to the establishment of a permanent Soviet embassy
staff in Peking. First the reluctance of the Chinese to
grant the Soviets diplomatic recognition, then the
reluctance of the Dutch to surrender custody of the
old Imperial Russian Embassy compound prevented Karakhan
from making full use of Peking as the focal point of
Soviet activity throughout China. Consequently, it was
not until late in the summer of 1924 that the necessary
mechanism existed for providing supplies to Canton.
191 'lb
Wl ur an d How, pp. 154 - 55 .
192
china Year Book 1925-26, p. 850.
193 . h s ovlets
. .
Flsc er, ln Wor ld Aff alrs,
. p. 467 .
194
wilbur and How, p. 155.
195 china Year Book 1925-26, pp. 850, 1136.

196 Although Western news dispatches from South

China frequently labled both Hu Han-min and Wang Ching-
wei as "Red," Hu was an ultra-conservative and Wang was
a half-hearted liberal at best. Hu was one of the prin-
cipal leaders of the KMT's Right Wing. Wang later
became the head of the Party's Left Wing, but in 1927,
 89

he joined forces with Chiang Kai-shek in the bloody

suppression of the Communists that marked the end of
Borodin's career in China.
197
wilbur and How, p. 156. The committee consisted
of Wang Ching-wei, Chiang Kai-shek, Hsu Ch'ung-shih,
Eugene Chen, Liao Chung-k'ai, and T'an P'ing-shan.
Borodin should have been well pleased with this selection.
Hsu was necessary because he was one of the most power-
ful generals in Canton and his participation was probably
thought essential. Eugene Chen was Sun's private sec-
retary. Liao was strongly Leftist in his thinking.
And T'an was a Communist. Borodin, although not offic-
ially named to the committee, was an integral part of
the group and its deliberations.
198
rbid., p. 155; China Year Book 1925-26, p. 1136;
North-China Herald, 18 October 1924.
199
wilbur and How, pp. 155, 171-73. Borodin's
report lists the following units as being placed under
Chiang's command:
1) the Whampoa Academy,
2) the aviation squadron,
3) the armor car battalion,
4) General Wu T'ieh-ch'eng's school for gendarmes,
5) the gendarmes,
6) the Yunnan Army's School,
7) General Ch'en Ch'i-mei's Hunan School,
8) the workers' police,
9) the peasant self-defense corps, and
10) the arsenal.
In addition, the report gives the following lists of
units as participating in the operation but not under
the direct control of the Revolutionary Committee:
1) the Kwangtung First Division under General Li
Chi-shen,
2) the Kwangtung Second Division under General Chang
Min-ta,
3) the Yunnan troops under General Fan Shih-sheng,
4) the Yunnan troops under General Liao Hsing-ch'ao,
and
5) other Kwangtung troops under General Hsu Ch'ung-
chih.
200
china Year Book 1925-26, pp. 851, 1136; North-
China Herald, 18 October 1924, 14 February 1925. Many
people charged that the fires were deliberately set by
the Government troops. On October 25, 1924, the North-
China Herald gave the estimated property damage as $10
million. On January 10, 1925, the Herald stated that
during the fighting "more than 1,364 shops and houses
were burnt in Canton. "
 CHAPTER 8

SUN YAT-SEN'S LAST DAYS

Borodin's power rested solely on his influence

with Sun Yat-sen. In the months following his return

to Canton in June 1924, his power had increased. On

July 11, Sun created a new political body, the KMT

Political Council, for which no provision had been made

in the new KMT Constitution. The Council consisted of

12 members appointed by Sun, who held the post of Council

Chairman. Its purpose was to carry out all diplomatic

and political policies decided on by Sun, but it did not

need to obtain the consent of the KMT's 24-man CEC,

201
thus usurping the CEC's authority. Borodin was

name d t h e Councl'1' s s enlor

. Ad vlser.
. 202 It was even

reported, perhaps with some exaggeration, that during

this period, Borodin virtually became Sun's alter ego,

screening all Sun's visitors and then sitting in on his

203
audiences with them.

Sun's preoccupation with the Northern Expedition

and his resultant absence from Canton in the fall of

1924 had weakened Borodin's control over him as the

incident concerning Wang Ching-wei's appointment to

the Revolutionary Committee clearly showed. Although

the Volunteer Revolt had brought Sun back to Canton,

90
 91

the situation had barely returned to normal when news of

General Feng's treachery reached South China. On October

23, Feng Yu-hsiang, one of Ts'ao K'un's chief lieuten-

ants, marched on Peking and with the collaboration of

Sun Yueh, the Peking Garrison Commander, ousted Ts'ao

K I un f rom th e p res1' d ency. 2 0 4

The ouster abruptly ended the Second Chihli-Mukden

War. A post-war conference of the victors, held at

Tientsin in November, installed Tuan Ch' i-jui as Pro-

visional President of China. Sun, as one of the anti-

Chihli leaders, received an invitation to the conference.

He accepted and left Canton on November 13 with his wife

and a large entourage. He had no intention, however, of

attending the Tientsin Conference, for he knew that it

could only produce a temporary political settlement and,

more importantly, that it would only serve to legitimize

the arrangements previously agreed upon by the victorious

militarists anyway. He viewed the invitation, instead,

as a chance to be present in Peking when a permanent

political solution was worked out. He thus hoped to

have a voice in the formulation of a trul y national

. 205
governmen t f or Ch 1na.

Sun made known his views on China's future in a

circular telegram issued just before he sailed for the

North. He called for a preliminary conference attended

by representati v es from industrial, educational, agri-

cultural, labor, and student organizations as well as

 92

from the armies and political parties that had fought

Ts'ao K'un. This group would, in turn, arrange for the

convocation of a larger People's Conference that would

206
creat a new democratic political order for China.

In order to avoid the Tientsin Conference, Sun

proceeded northward at a leisurely pace. He spent

four days in Shanghai and then made a side trip to Kobe,

207
Japan before finally reaching Tientsin on December 4.

Sun's health had been poor when he left the South, and

during the trip his condition had steadily worsened.

By the time he arrived at Tientsin, he was so weak that

he was confined to bed for several weeks. Determined to

reach Peking despite his enfeebled condition, he finally

left Tientsin on December 30. The following day, a

large group of sup~orters greeted his train in Peking,

208
but he was so weak that he could not address the crowd.

Without fanfare, he was hurried to a waiting car and

taken to the Hotel de Pekin where he was immediately

209
confined to bed once more.

Ill health, however, was not Sun ' s only problem.

Prior to his arrival, Tuan Ch'i-jui had responded to his

circular telegram by announcing that he would soon con-

vene a Reorganization Conference to decide China's

political future. The delegates to this conference, in

direct conflict with Sun's proposal, would be neither

freely elected, nor widely representative of the Chinese

 93

people. Clearly, Sun was still at odds with the rulers

. 210
o f Pe k 1.ng.

Feng Yu-hsiang, the man most responsible for the

fall of Ts'ao K'un and the resurrection of Tuan Ch'i-

jui,211 was also finding himself at odds with his erst-

while allies, Tuan and Marshal Chang Tso-lin. As Tuan's

hostility toward Sun became more apparent, many of the

KMT leaders who had accompanied Sun to Peking began to

feel a need for closer ties with Feng and his newly
212
formed Kuominchun (People's Army). Although Feng

was feuding with Tuan and had a reputation as something

of a radical and a patriot as well, the KMT was mainly

interested in him because his army was one of the

strongest in China.
. s un 213
Boro d 1.n, wh o h a d precee d e d to Pe k 1.ng,
. was

selected to be the KMT's emissary. Wang Ching-wei wrote

Feng suggesting a meeting with Borodin, but Feng at

214
first refused to see him. According to Chang Kuo-

t'ao, Borodin was especially enthusiastic about this

venture. At this time Feng was living in the Western

Hills just outside of Peking, but in the first days of

1925, he moved his headquarters to Kalgan about 100

miles northwest of the capital. Borodin continued to

press for a meeting, and with the help of the Soviet

embassy, one was finally arranged. In late January or

early February, Borodin traveled to Kalgan and had a

215
long and fairly successful talk with Feng. At a
 94

meeting of the KMT Political Council in February he

reported that Feng was prepared to cooperate with the

216
KMT, but was reluctant to do so openly. He did agree,

however, to permit KMT propagandists to agitate among

.
h lS so ld 1ers
. f or t h e new nat1ona
. 1 1sm.
. 217 In addition,

there is evidence which strongly suggests that during his

visit to Kalgan Borodin also signed a preliminary agree-

ment with Feng that provided Soviet military supplies

. h''
f or t h e Kuom1nc un. 218

Despite his illness, Sun attempted to remain an

active participant in Peking politics. Soon after his

arrival he voiced his approval of the ouster of the

Emperor Hsuan Tung from the Forbidden City, and on

January 17, he again requested that Tuan allow admission

of elected representatives of the various Provincial

. t 1ons
A ssoc1a . to t h e Reorgan1zat1on
. . Con f erence. 219

Sun, however, was deteriorating rapidly. On January 26,

he entered the hospital. Exploratory surgery by foreign

doctors revealed cancer of the liver. The case was

terminal. Sun remained hospitalized until February 18.

He was then moved to a private home that was serving

220
as KMT headquarters.

Sun was by now too weak to be an effective leader,

and as a result the Political Council temporarily took

on greater significance. Borodin, as Senior Adviser to

the Council, participated in their meetings. By re-

maining detached from the disputes that often arose

 95

during Council sessions and by proposing only those

measures that had Sun's prior approval and were sure to

be passed, he gradually created the impression with the

Council members that he was the only man who could settle
221
issues. Despite his cultivation of Feng and the

Political Council, obviously moves made with an eye to

the future, Borodin did not neglect Sun Yat-sen. He

222
had been Sun's first visitor at the Hotel de Pekin,

and he remained at Sun's bedside almost constantly

during Sun's final weeks. After his release from the

hospital, Sun lingered on for 24 more days. Finally,

on March 12, 1925, surrounded by members of his family,

his personal followers, and Borodin and his wife Fanny,

223
Dr. Sun Yat-sen passed away.
 96

201
wilbur and How, pp. 152-53.
202
Spence, p. 188. At about this same time,
Borodin was also named as adviser to the agricultural
section of the KMT. Although this assignment did not
significantly increase Borodin's power, it is indicative
of his spreading influence.
203
North-China Herald, 3 October 1925.
204
clubb, Twentieth Century China, p. 125; Wilbur
and How, p. 157.
205
Sharman, p. 303; China Year Book 1925-1926,
p. 849.
206
china Year Book 1925-1926, p. 851.
207
Sharman, pp. 303-04.
208
His only public statement upon arriving at the
train station was "I have come especially to save the
country in cooperation with y ou gentlemen." (Clubb,
Twentieth Century China, p. 128.)
209
china Year Book 1925-1926, pp. 851-52.
210
I b'd
]. . I p. 851 .
211
Tuan Ch'i-jui had previously held the post of
Premier of the Peking Government on several occasions.
212
Chang, p. 394.
213 rt is uncertain exactly when Borodin arrived
in Peking. He brought his wife and youngest son with
him, but there is no indication that they made any part
of the trip North in the company of Sun and his wife.
214 FJ.sc
. h er, SovJ.ets
. . Wor ld Aff aJ.rs,
J.n . p. 474 .
215
Ibid. I pp. 474-75.
216
Chang, p. 394.
217
Fischer, Soviets in World Affairs, p. 475.
Fischer gives a rather detailed account of this meeting
with Feng.
218
James E. Sheridan, Chinese Warlord (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1966), p. 339n.
 97

219
china Year Book 1925-1926, p. 852.
220
North-China Herald, 31 January, 21 February 1925.
221
Chang, pp. 391-92.
222
Nort h -c h'lna Hera ld , 10 January 1925 .
223
Kotenev, p. 204.
 CHAPTER 9

AFTERMATH AND CONCLUSION

Sun Yat-sen had died a failure. Against his wishes,

Tuan Ch'i-jui had opened the Reorganization Conference

on February 1. In death, however, Sun achieved instant

sainthood. Borodin was largely responsible for this.

In life Sun had been synonymous with the KMT; in death

Borodin hoped that Sun would become the embodiment of

. 1 . . 224
nat1ona asp1rat1ons. The campaign quickly became

a tremendous success. In an editorial on Sun's funeral,

the "Central China Post" reported with considerable

distaste that "The Kuomintang now promotes Sun Yat-sen

.
to an equa 1 1ty . h Jesus Ch r1st.
Wlt . ,.225

This veneration of Sun served to keep alive Boro-

din's most important link to the KMT, especially during

the difficult period of transition to a new leadership.

Sun, like many other leaders who have completely dom-

inated their Party, left no designated successor. The

most logical candidate was Hu Han-min or perhaps Wang

Ching-wei, both long-time followers of Sun. Borodin dis-

trusted both men. But in the days immediately follow-

ing Sun's death, his own position was in considerable

doubt. Two factors combined to preserve Borodin's

influence. First, only he and Liao Chung-k'ai really

98
 99

understood the operation of either the Bolshevized KMT

or the Canton Government. The second factor was the

chain of events started by the shooting of twelve student

demonstrators by the Shanghai International Settlement

Police on May 30. This incident triggered demonstrations

throughout China. One such demonstration in Canton on

June 23 was fired on by foreign troops as it passed the

Shakee Bridge leading to Shameen, the Foreign Concession.

Scores of Chinese were killed or wounded. The Chinese

were outraged and clamped a boycott on Hong Kong that

strangled the Crown Colony economically for well over a

year. The Shakee-Shameen Incident and the subsequent

boycott radicalized Kwangtung politics overnight. The

KMT leaders were ill-equipped to handle such a situation,

and Borodin's advice and council were, with some reluc-

tance, deemed indispensible.

The first step in reorganizing the KMT hierarchy

came on July 1. The Canton Military Government formally

became the Nationalist Government of China with Hu Han-

min as Chairman, Wang Ching-wei as Minister of Communi-

cations, Liao Chung-k'ai as Minister of Finance, and

226
Hsu Ch'ung-chih as Minister of War. This arrangement

was definitely not pleasing to Borodin, and he soon got

his chance to change it . On August 19, Liao Chung-k'ai

227
was assassinated. Hu's younger brother was implicated,

and Borodin pressured Hu into leaving the country. A

corr~ittee consisting of Wang Ching-wei, Hsu Ch'ung-chih,

 100

and Chiang Kai-shek now took control. Soon, however,

.
Hsu was also forced from offlce an d 1 e f t . 228
f or S h ang h al.

Borodin was once more firmly in power by this time,

but he could not exercise his authority too openly. His

success had been as the power behind the throne. Now

he needed someone to replace Sun on that throne, and he

chose Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang had proven reliable during

the Volunteers Revolt. He had since proved to be an able

military leader as well. While Sun had been dying in

Peking, he had launched a campaign that had finally

eliminated the threat from General Ch'en Chiung-ming

once and for all. Then in June 1925, he had confronted

the Yunnanese mercenaries that had held Canton hostage

for so long and had completely routed them. Through

Borodin's influence, Chiang whose highest post previously

had been as head of Whampoa, was suddenly propelled

into the position of co-leader of the Nationalist Govern-

ment. Throughout 1925, Borodin continued to favor Chiang

over Wang.

In the spring of 1926, Borodin was again visiting

North China when Chiang, charging that the Communists

were about to overthrow him, launched a counter-coup.

Borodin rushed back to Canton, and he and Chiang reached

an uneasy truce. Borodin gave his reluctant blessing

to a new Northern Expedition, and Chiang relented some-

what on his anti-communist repression.

 101

Much to the amazement of the world, Chiang's army

swept out of Kwangtung in July 1926, and by Christmas

had driven all the way to the Yangtze River . In Decem-

ber, Borodin and the Nationalist Government moved to

Wuhan on the middle Yangtze. As the campaign moved

northward, Chiang had resumed his crack down on the Corn-

rnunists. Borodin finally broke with Chiang completely

and threw his support behind Wang Ching-wei, who was now,

ironically, head of the KMT's Left Wing. The end carne

quickly when Wang and Chiang reconciled their differences

long enough to launch a bloody massacre of the Chinese

Communists. On July 27, 1927, Borodin left Wuhan in

229
defeat, lucky to escape from China with his life.

His final months in China had taken a tremendous

toll on him. Physically, he had not been well. In

addition to nursing a broken arm, he had frequently

been bedridden with recurring bouts of malaria which he

had contracted during his years in Canton. 230 Mentally,

the toll was even greater. The attempt to obey the

dictates of Moscow while imminent d i s a ste r stared him

in the face had placed enormous pressure on him and had

.
stralne d h lS
' nerves to t h e b rea k lng
' .
polnt. 231

Back in Moscow once more, he received an icy recep-

tion. At first he was made director of the Paper Manu-

facturing Trust, then director of a paper factory--both

jobs for which he was ill-suited by either ternperrnent

or training and at which he did poorl y . Finally in

 102

1932, he was made editor of the Moscow Daily News, an

.
un1mportant Eng 1'1s h - 1 anguage newspaper. 232 K1 aus

Mehnert, who saw Borodin frequently between 1934 and

1936, described him as "a sad-faced man" who "gave one

the impression of a disused locomotive rusting away on

a s1'd 1ng.
' .. 233 Eugene Lyons, a United Press correspon-

dent who spent an uncomfortable 18 months living in the

same building that housed the Moscow Daily News, found

•
Boro d 1n • hb or. 2 3 4
a nervous an d unmanner 1 y ne1g II 0 nee

he led a Chinese revolution; now he quarreled with office

235
boys--an embittered and broken giant." Lyons found

it "preposterous and incredible" that this could be

the same man that had helped shape Chinese history.

"I could only assume," he wrote, "that the Borodin of

1932 was an empty shell of the Borodin of 1927, broken

236
down, bitter, and petty."

Borodin remained in limbo in his editorial post

for 17 years. Finally in February 1949, he was arrested

along with most of his staff and sent to Siberia. There,

237
in 1953, he died.

* * *

This was indeed a tragic end for a man of whom

Mark Gayn wrote,

He knew no Chinese, and very little of Chinese

history and mores. Yet for four years he jug-
gled China's destinies, made and unmade policies
and leaders, molded the minds of millions,
battled the greatest empire the world had ever
 103

known, directed war and revolution. He was a

man with a keen sense of timing and drama;
patient and completely fearless, shrewd and
hard. He could be relied upon to do his work
without regard for his own safety, and yet
238
think twice before embarking on a venture.

George Sokolsky put it more simply. "No foreigner," he

wrote, "had ever so thoroughly succeeded in influencing

Chinese thought and action as Borodin. .. 239

Although it is true that Borodin achieved his

greatest power only after the death of Sun Yat-sen, his

period of service as Sun's confidant and adviser was an

essential prerequisite to his later successes. His

close relationship with Sun made him privy to the inner

workings of the KMT and the Canton Government, gave him

access to the highest political councils, and allowed

him to become an intimate part of the Chinese political

community. Because of these advantages, he was able to

remodel the KMT along Soviet lines, to win approval for

full KMT membership for the Chinese Communists, and to

make significant progress towards making KMT policy

primarily anti-British instead of anti-Peking. Without

these achievements, Mikhail Borodin could never have

gone on to become the uncrowned ruler of South China.

 104

224
Sokolsky, Tinder Box, p. 332.
225 North-China Herald, 4 April 1925.

226
Clu b b, Twent1et
. h Century Ch 1na,
. p. 13 0 .
227
North-China Herald, 22 August 1925.
228 clubb, Twentieth Century China, p. 130.

229 Anna Lou1se

. Strong, Ch 1na
' s M1' 11 1ons
I ' (P e k'1ng:
New World Press, 1965), p. 180; Kotenev, p. 280;
Sokolsky, Tinder Box, p. 340.
2 3° . h . . Wor ld Aff a1rs,
.
F1sc er, Sov1ets 1n p. 491 .
231
North-China Herald, 6 August 1927.
232 Fischer, Russia's Road, pp. 119-20.

233
Mehnert, pp. 262-63.
234
Eugene Lyons, Assignment in Utopia (New York:
Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1937), p. 511.
235
rbid. I p. 331.
236
rbid. I P· 511.
237
victor Serge, Memoirs of a Revolutionary 1901-
1941, trans. and ed. Peter Sedgewick (London: Oxford
University Press, 1963; Oxford University Press paper-
back, 1967), p. l46n. Serge gives the time of Borodin's
death as early 1953 as does Borodin's New York Times
obituary. Louis Fischer, however, states that he died
in 1951. Serge includes the interesting statement
that Chinese intervention is said to have prevented
Borodin from being executed after his arrest.
238
Gayn, p. 122.
239
Sokolsky, Tinder Box, p. 35.
 APPENDIX A

(Map of South China)

105
 106

g
ul ~
"'"' "'0
'-'C:
z-
> -
0
T
"
0
0!
06
ft. a:; c::z
g~ I
I
i I
.!.- I
j i
~
VI
0 I J
VI
g

~
en (6 (,!)
2
0 ,II
0 X"
z ~
~
<(
~

~
( ~ 0
w

~
~
r- 0
c..
<

(
~
0
a::
C)
ez
z<{ :s
2 z
0
~
- 0
w
o/1
<
Ill
 BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES

Brandt, Conrad; Schwartz, Benjamin; and Fairbank, John K.

A Documentary History of Chinese Communism. Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1952; reprint
ed., New York: Atheneum, 1966.

Chang Kuo-t'ao. The Rise of the Chinese Communist Party

1921-1927: Volume One of the Autobiography of
Chang Kuo-t'ao. Lawrence, Kansas: University
Press of Kansas, 1971.

Degras, Jane, ed. Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy:

volume II 1925-1932. London: Oxford University
Press, 1952.

, ed. The Communist International 1919-1943:

------~-
Documents, volume II 1923-1928. London: Oxford
University Press, 1960.

Gallacer, William. The Rolling of the Thunder. London:

Lawrence and Wishart, 1947; reprint ed., Ann
Arbor, Michigan: University Microfilms, 1967.

Gayn, Mark J. Journey From the East: An Autobiography.

New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1944.

Lyons, Eugene. Assignment in Utopia. New York: Har-

court, Brace and Co., 1937.

Mitarevsky, N. World Wide Soviet Plots: As disclosed

by hitherto unpublished documents seized at the
U.S.S.R. Embassy in Peking. Tientsin, China:
Tientsin Press, Ltd., n.d.

Murphy, J. T. New Horizons. London: John Lane

The Bodley Head, 1941.

Serge, Victor. Memoirs of a Revolutionary 1901-1941,

trans. and ed. Peter Sedgwick. London: Oxford
University Press, 1963; Oxford University Press
paperback, 1967.

107
 108

Strong, Anna Louise. I Changed Worlds: The Remaking of

an American. New York: Garden City Publishing
Co., Inc., 1937.

China's Millions: Revolution in Central

China, 1927. Peking: New World Press, 1965.

Vishnyakova-Akimova, Vera Vladimirovna. Two Years in

Revolutionary China 1925-1927. Translated by
Steven I. Levine. Cambridge: East Asian Research
Center, Harvard University, 1971.

Wilbur, C. Martin, and How, Julie Lien-ying, eds.

Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet
Advisers in China 1918-1927: Papers Seized in the
1927 Peking Raid. Introductory essays by eds.
New York: Octagon Books (division of Farrar,
Straus and Giroux), 1972.

SECONDARY SOURCES

Brandt, Conrad. Stalin's Failure in China 1924-1927.

Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958.

Carr, Edward Hallett. The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-

1923, vol. 3. New York: Macmillan Co., 1961.

Cheng Tien-fong. A History of Sino-Russian Relations.

Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1957.

Chiang, Yung-chin. Pao-lo-ting yu Wu-han cheng chuan.

Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1963.

The China Year Book 1923. H. G. W. Woodhead, ed. Tien-

tsin, China: Tientsin Press, Ltd., n.d.

The China Year Book 1924-1925. H. G. W. Woodhead, ed.

Tientsin, China: Tientsin Press, Ltd., n.d.

The China Year Book 1925-1926. H. G. W. Woodhead, ed.

Tientsin, China: Tientsin Press, Ltd., n.d.

The China Year Book 1928. H. G. W. Woodhead, ed. Tien-

tsin, China: Tientsin Press, Ltd., n.d.

Clubb, 0. Edmund. Twentieth Century China. New York:

Columbia University Press, 1964.

China and Russia: The "Great Game". New

York: Columbia University Press, 1971.
 109

Eudin, Xenia Joukoff, and North, Robert C. Soviet

Russia and the East 1920-1927: A Documentary
Survey. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957.

Fischer, Louis. The Soviets in World Affairs: A History

of the Relations between the Soviet Union and the
Rest of the World 1917-1929, 2nd ed. Princeton:
University Press, 1951; reprinted., abridged by
the author, New York: Vintage Books (division of
Random House), 1960.

Russia's Road from Peace to War: Soviet For-

eign Relations 1917-1941. New York: Harper and
Row, 1969.

Gruber, Helmut. Soviet Russia Masters the Comintern:

International Communism in the Era of Stalin's
Ascendancy. Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Press/
Doubleday, 1974.

Isaacs, Harold R. The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution

2nd rev. ed. Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1961.

Kotenev, Anatol M. New Lamps for Old: An Interpreta-

tion of Events in Modern China and Whither They
Lead. Shanghai: North China Daily News and Her-
ald Ltd., 1931; reprint ed., New York: AMS Press
Inc. , 1971.

Lazitch, Branko, and Drachkovitch, Milorad M. Lenin and

the Comintern, vol. l. Stanford: Hoover Institu-
tion Press, 1972.

Biographical Dictionary of the Comintern.

Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1973.

Mehnert, Klaus. Peking and Moscow, trans. Leila Venne-

witz. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1963; New
American Library, 1964.

North, Robert C. Moscow and Chinese Communists, 2nd ed.

Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963.

North, Robert C., and Eudin, Xenia J. M. N. Roy's

Mission to China: The Communist-Kuomintang Split
of 1927. Documents translated by Helen I. Powers.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963.

Poppino, Rollie E. International Communism in Latin

America: A History of the Movement 1917-1963.
Glencoe, California: Free Press of Glencoe (div-
ision of Macmillan Co.), 1964.
 110

Sharman, Lyon. Sun Yat-sen, His Life and Its Meaning:

A Critical Biography. New York: John Day Co.,
1934.

Sheridan, James E. Chinese Warlord: The Career of Feng

Yu-hsiang. Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1966.

Sokolsky, George E. "The Kuomintang," The China Year

Book 1928, ed. H. G. W. Woodhead, Tientsin, China:
Tientsin Press, Ltd., n.d.

The Tinder Box of Asia. Garden City, N.Y.:

Doubleday, Doran & Co., 1932.

Spence, Jonathan. To Change China: Western Advisers in

China 1620-1960. Boston: Little, Brown & Co.,
1969.

T'ang Leang-Li. The Inner History of the Chinese Revolu-

tion. London: George Routledge & Sons, Ltd.,
1930.

Tung, William L. China and the Foreign Powers: The

Impact of and Reaction to Unequal Treaties. Dobbs
Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1970.

Ulam, Adam B. The Bolsheviks: The Intellectual and

Political History of the Triump of Communism in
Russia. New York: Macmillan Co., 1965.

Whiting, Allen S. Soviet Policies in China 1917-1924.

New York: Columbia University Press, 1953.

NEWSPAPERS

New York Times, 3 September 1953.

North-China Herald, 1923-1927.

Roots, John McCook. "Mysterious Borodin Sways South

China," New York Times Magazine, 26 December 1926,
PP • 9 1 21.

Times (London), 30 August 1922.