c115 Airplane Security Procedures

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Airplane Security Procedures Page 1/14
Online Course Rev: 3
Date 21/01/2014
TABLE OF CONTENT
LEGAL CAUTION....................................................................................................................................................................... 2
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................................................................ 2
DEFINITIONS & TERMS.............................................................................................................................................................. 2
CONTROLLING DOCUMENTS .................................................................................................................................................. 3
DIFFERENT LEVEL OF THREATS & ACTIONS ................................................................................................................. 3
THREAT LEVEL 1 ........................................................................................................................................................................ 3
THREAT LEVEL 2 ........................................................................................................................................................................ 4
THREAT LEVEL 3 ........................................................................................................................................................................ 4
THREAT LEVEL 4 ........................................................................................................................................................................ 5
POST – INCIDENT CONCERNS FOR CREW ............................................................................................................................. 6
SABOTAGE (CONSIDERED A LEVEL 3 THREAT) ............................................................................................................. 6
BOMB THREAT (CONSIDERED A LEVEL 3 THREAT) ..................................................................................................... 6
ACTION BY PERSON RECEIVING A BOMB THREAT CALL ................................................................................................. 7
BOMB THREAT ON GROUND .................................................................................................................................................... 7
BOMB THREAT IN FLIGHT ........................................................................................................................................................ 8
DEALING WITH CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WEAPON (CBW) ................................................................................... 9
AEROSOL CBW WITH ACTIVATION........................................................................................................................................ 9
CBW THREATS IN CABIN – WITHOUT ACTIVATION ........................................................................................................... 9
CBW THREATS IN CARGO COMPARTMENT........................................................................................................................ 10
SUSPICIOUS SUBSTANCE & PACKAGES .............................................................................................................................. 10
HIJACK PROCEDURES .......................................................................................................................................................... 10
HIJACKER PROFILE .................................................................................................................................................................. 10
STAGE OF HIJACK..................................................................................................................................................................... 11
AIRCRAFT SECURITY PROCEDURES ............................................................................................................................... 11
AIRPLANE UNDER CREW SUPERVISION ............................................................................................................................. 12
SECURITY BRIEFING ................................................................................................................................................................ 12
CABIN CHECK PRIOR TO FLIGHT .......................................................................................................................................... 12
FLIGHT CREW COMPARTMENT ACCESS PROCEDURES .................................................................................................. 12
FLIGHT CREW COMPARTMENT ACCESS PROCEDURES ................................................................................................................... 13
AIRPLANE NOT UNDER CREW SUPERVISION .................................................................................................................... 13
SUMMARY ................................................................................................................................................................................. 13
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LEGAL CAUTION
The material contained in this training program is based on the information obtained from current state,
local and company regulations and it is to be used for training purposes only. At the time of designing this
program contained then current information. In the event of conflict between data provided herein and that
in publications issued by the authority, the authority shall take precedence.
INTRODUCTION
GENERAL
Terrorist activity has taken yet another terrible turn, since the events of 11 September 2001. Operators,
Airports, Security Officials, Aircrews and the travelling public now share a new and unexpected threat to
flight operations.
Security experts agree that there is no one key to preventing terrorist acts or even unruly passengers
creating challenges aboard our aircraft. Security must consist of many different layers or protection. Some
of these layers are obvious to all of us; questioning, x-ray checks of our baggage, and limiting liquids
brought on board. Other layers of protected go undetected like intelligence of suspicious activity, lists of
names of known terror subjects or secret observation of their activities. All play a part in increasing the
safety margin for our operations. The single best source to detect and stop terrorism and unruly passengers
is you. Each of you possess a God given ability to be able to observe your surrounding and notice when
something or someone does not seem to “fit”. No machine can be developed to sense what you can. It is
vitally important that if you find yourself in a situation in which something or someone does not seem to
fit that you communicate that to the appropriate authorities so others can evaluate the situation and take
action if needed.
This program is intended to discuss some of the security threats to your operation and how each of you can
fulfil your responsibilities to combat these threats. This program is taken from many different sources and
is not intended to override JAA/ICAO/FAA regulations or your own companies’ security operating
manual. t is intended for training purposes only. This course does not cover procedures that are
considered “sensitive to security operations” by specific operators for obvious reasons. Refer to your own
security operations procedure manual for those specific procedures.
• This program will first discuss some definitions and terms you need to know about security
activity.
• We will then discuss the different types and levels of threats that you can face in your operations.
• Next we will discuss ground security operations to include security of the aircraft and then cover
in-flight security procedures and actions.
DEFINITIONS & TERMS
Please click to see explanation on each.
ATTEMPTED HIJACKING: An attempted act to take control of the aircraft by one or more assailants
but the aircrew still has control of the aircraft.
BOMB THREAT: Is generally defined as a verbal threat to detonate an explosive or incendiary device to
cause aircraft damage or injuries, whether or not such a device actually exists.
DISRUPTIVE/UNRULY PASSENGER: Individual passengers or groups of passengers who fail to
respect the rules of conduct on board aircraft or to follow the instructions of crewmembers.
HIJACKING: Is an act where an aggressor(s) control of the entire airplane from the cockpit and the cabin
crew while either on the ground or in flight.
ILLEGAL INTERFERENCE: The Tokyo Convention of 1963 definition as: ‘‘acts which, whether or
not they are offences, may or do jeopardize the safety of the aircraft or of persons or property therein or

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which jeopardize good order and discipline on board ‘‘. The three major forms of unlawful interference
are unruly passenger, hijacking and bomb threat.
SABOTAGE: Is any illegal action taken against aircraft, operating systems, airports, or personnel
intended to disrupt civil aviation for reasons that might be unknown.
SECURITY: According to ICAO security is defined as "a combination of measures, human and material
resources intended to safeguard international civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference".
THREAT LEVELS: A broadly understood reference that can be used to describe an ongoing incident in
a way that facilitates the understanding of crew and ground personnel as to what level of seriousness the
on-board situation has reached.
UNRULY PASSENGER: Individual passengers or groups of passengers who fail to respect the rules of
conduct on board aircraft or to follow the instructions of crewmembers.
CONTROLLING DOCUMENTS
Standards and Recommended Practices (SARP) on Security were adopted by the ICAO on 22 March 1974
and designated as ICAO Annex 17 – Security. This Annex sets out the basis for the ICAO civil aviation
security programme and seeks to safeguard civil aviation and its facilities against acts of unlawful
interference. The ICAO Council adopted Amendment 10, to Annex 17 on 7 December 2001 in order to
address challenges posed to civil aviation by the events of 11 September 2001. It became applicable on 1
July 2002. The amendment includes various definitions and new provisions in relation to the applicability
of this Annex to domestic operations; international cooperation relating to threat information; national
quality control; access control; measures related to passengers and their cabin and hold baggage; in-flight
security personnel and protection of the cockpit; code-sharing/collaborative arrangements; human factors;
and management of response to acts of unlawful interference.
The Security Manual for Safeguarding Civil Aviation Against Acts of Unlawful Interference (Doc. 8973 -
Restricted) contains guidance material on the interpretation and implementation of the SARPs found in
Annex 17.
DIFFERENT LEVEL OF THREATS & ACTIONS
Crew familiarity with basic threat levels leads to successful handling of occurrences of unlawful
interference. It is essential that a relationship of realistic trust and credibility and cooperation between all
the parties involved as layers of protection. The crews must know that the Commander will be advised as
necessary of intelligence that directly affects their flights. The Commander must of course communicate
to the rest of the crew all know threats to the flight and set a tone of trust, confidence and cooperation
among the crew. This cooperation is a key element during the determination of the seriousness of many
developing incidents. What starts out as a minor disruption can quickly turn into a major event.
Communication and teamwork are key to safely addressing any situation. All personnel should constantly
be vigilant for any indications of suspicious activity or disruptive behaviour.
Threat Levels/Actions
Threat Levels have been developed to help define and communicate the level of threat between
crewmembers and ground personnel.
• Threat Level 1: Disruptive behaviours (Generally verbal);
• Threat Level 2: Physically abusive behaviours;
• Threat Level 3: Life-threatening behaviours;
• Threat Level 4: Attempted breach or actual breach of the flight crew compartment.
THREAT LEVEL 1
Unruly Behaviour – Verbally Threatening or Abusive; Suspicious
Level 1 Threats are usually attributed to an unruly passenger(s). The behaviour may be disorderly due to
alcohol, drugs, mental or medical problem etc. or abusive language used by passenger that has lost his/her
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temper either in the boarding area or once on board the aircraft. Additionally, any acts, body language or
words that confirm any suspicious or threatening behaviour. A Level 1 threat can occur either on the
ground or while airborne. This is the most common threat faced by airline personnel.
Action:
The cabin crew will inform the Commander and follow procedure provided to handle common disruptive
behavior (conflict management skills). Inform the Commander as soon as possible if the conflict cannot be
diffused and recommend that the passenger be removed from the flight. The cabin crew should consider
warning the unruly passenger of the possible results of their illegal activity.
The flight crew will immediately ensure that the flight deck is properly secured and all admission to flight
deck will be suspended until it is confirmed that the situation is completely resolved. The flight crew
should advise ATC, ground personnel and security if need to resolve the situation. The Commander
should make an appropriate PA. If the aircraft has already taxied, the Commander should consider
stopping the aircraft or returning to the gate to have the person and their baggage removed before
continuing the flight. In-flight the flight crew should keep the Operation Control Center advised of their
situation and request security personnel meet the aircraft upon landing if necessary. Diversion will usually
not be required unless the situation elevates.
THREAT LEVEL 2
Physically Abusive Behavior
The type of behavior involves physical abuse from the assailant for example, grabbing, pushing, slapping,
kicking another passenger or crew or deliberate damage to property. This type of threat can easily elevate
from a verbal exchange into a physical assault and then into a life-threatening situation quickly and should
be handled with great care. Use on conflict management skills are extremely important at this level.
Action:
The cabin crew will inform the Commander and follow procedure as trained to handle combative
passengers. The cabin crew should use separation techniques and self-defense responses as necessary.
Call for assistance from other crewmembers and passengers as needed to restrain the assailant. Then
check for personnel requiring medical assistance.
The flight crew will immediately ensure that the flight deck is properly secured and all admission to flight
deck will be suspended until it is confirmed that the situation is completely resolved. The flight crew
should inform ATC, Operation Control Center, ground personnel or security personnel as needed. They
should make a PA announcement as necessary. If the aircraft has taxied, stop the aircraft or return to the
gate and have the passenger removed along with their baggage. If in-flight, the crew should consider a
divert to the nearest suitable airport and get help from outside resources.
THREAT LEVEL 3
Life-threatening Behaviour
If the crew determines that the life of one or more members of the crew or passengers is in danger, a Level
3 Threat should be communicated. Generally, this level of threat is generally determined by the presence
of a weapon or dangerous device. If possible, cabin crew should make all possible effort to safely confirm
the presence of some kind of weapon or device. Examples of weapons/devices include guns, explosives,
knifes, chemical, gasses, flammable liquids, wires or cords (normally used for choking), stun- guns etc.;
even duct tape or bare hands and serving knives can be used as weapons for choking or stabbing. The
crew should consider the behaviour of the assailant to determine if they feel the situation is life-
threatening. The action of the assailant can be a premeditated plan to act solely or as a part of another
larger plan to take control of the aircraft; or simply a mental, medical, alcohol or drug induced actions of
one of the passengers.
Action:
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This type of threat should be handled with great care but immediate direct action must be taken
immediately.
On the ground:
The cabin crew will inform the Commander and follow procedure as trained to handle life-threatening
situations. The cabin crewmembers should do the following: use separation techniques or self-defense
responses as necessary to avoid any assailants; attempt to restrain any assailants per proper company
procedures; attempt to escape and get all the passengers out of the aircraft.
If the flight crew has already evacuated the aircraft, the cabin crew should: try to communicate with
ground personnel or the company; use hostage survival techniques to cause delays; evacuate all passengers
and crew; follow the directions of authorities on the ground; and then check to see if anyone needs
medical attention.
The flight crew will immediately establish communication with the cabin crew and ground personnel;
evacuate or escape from the aircraft; and ensure that all relevant system are shutdown or disconnected
prior to leaving.
In-flight:
In-flight, the cabin crew should also notify the Commander of the nature of the threat, number of
assailants, their location, description and types of weapons if applicable. Discontinue cabin service to
monitor the situation in the cabin. If an explosive device or suspicious device is found, coordinate with
the Commander to move the device to the Least Risk Bomb Location.
In-flight, the flight crew will confirm the flight deck is properly secured and all admission to flight deck
will be suspended until it is confirmed that the situation is completely resolved. The flight crew will
inform ATC and Operation Control Center of their situation with details on the nature of the threat,
information on any assailants onboard the aircraft. The Commander should declare an emergency to ATC,
squawk 7700, and request diversion to the nearest suitable airport and request armed intervention from law
enforcement personnel on the ground. The flight crew should expect interception by military aircraft and
monitor 121.5 and follow appropriate intercept procedures
THREAT LEVEL 4
Attempted or Actual Breach of Flight Deck
Threat Level 4 is an attempt or actual breach of the flight deck. This is can be the most serious threat to
the safety of the aircraft, crew and passengers. This threat can either be a plot to take control of the
aircraft or just another level threat that escalates to a Level 4. Several attempted and actual cockpit
breaches have occurred by people with mental or medical problems. In each case these people were
restrained by a combination of flight, cabin crew and passenger assistance. The flight deck lockdown
policy is the primary defense for the cockpit. However, hijackers could use physical force and violence in
the cabin in order to attempt to gain access to the flight deck. This cannot be allowed to succeed.
Any attempt to enter the flight deck is very serious and should be considered as a method of gaining
control of the aircraft and use it as a weapon of mass destruction.
Actions:
On the ground:
The cabin crew should notify the Commander immediately, attempt to escape or evacuate the aircraft, or if
escape is not possible, they should use all available recourses to eliminate the threat and restrain any
assailants.
The flight crew should communicate with ground personnel to get security intervention. If possible,
evacuate or escape the aircraft and shutdown all relevant systems to disable the aircraft. If escape is not
possible, the flight crew should use all available resources to mitigate the threat.
In-Flight:
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Cabin crews should immediately contact the Commander and use all available resources to eliminate the
threat. Cabin crew should communicate by all available means with other crewmembers and passengers
to get help to restrain all assailants.
Flight crews should immediately ensure that the flight deck is properly secured and declare an emergency
with ATC, set the transponder to 7500 and land the nearest suitable airport. Flight crew should use an
emergency or rapid descend to minimize the time of exposure to the threat in flight. The hijackers should
never be given access to the flight deck, no matter what violence or threats are made against personnel in
the cabin.
A hijacker would most probably attempt to immobilize a pilot by attacking him/her on the head, neck and
throat from the blind side. If the assailant has gained access to the flight deck, one of the flight crew
should take all necessary measures to prevent the assailant from taking control of, or causing the flight
crew to loose control of, the aircraft. This is to be carried out while the pilot flying maintains control of
the aircraft. Pilots should discuss how they would handle any intruder once they have breached the flight
deck.
POST – INCIDENT CONCERNS FOR CREW
Cooperate with the authorities.
If in a foreign country, contact the airline representative, follow company procedures.
Do not discuss the situation with the media or other witness.
All crewmembers that have been involved or witnessed the incident involving passenger disturbance
(Level 1-4) must forward a written statement to the authorities and company as required.
Collect all necessary information from the witnesses including contact information.
Treat all security information confidentially and provide information only to those who operationally
require it.
Expect that the whole crew might have to remain at the airport until all required coordination has been
completed with the authorities and the airline.
SABOTAGE (CONSIDERED A LEVEL 3 THREAT)
Sabotage can be committed by personnel inside or outside of the company for a number of reasons.
Internal threats
Internal threats may come from employees that have a grievance against the company or supervisory
personnel. They may attempt to get revenge by damaging aircraft systems or taking other actions, which
might damage the aircraft or support equipment/systems to get back at the company. It is important that
all personnel be vigilant for this type of illegal activity and report it immediately.
External threats
External threats may come from many different sources. As discussed earlier, there are many different
layers of protection to stop illegal activity from damaging airports, aircraft, operating systems, ground
equipment, fuel storage etc. Each of us must remain vigilant to identify suspicious activity immediately.
BOMB THREAT (CONSIDERED A LEVEL 3 THREAT)
Over 99% of bomb threat calls against civil aviation targets are hoaxes, perpetrated by people who wish to
cause a nuisance and/or disruption to normal activity at airports or air carrier operations. In some cases
passengers running late for flights have actually called in bomb threat to delay takeoff so they can make
their flight. The level of disruption caused will vary according to the severity of the threat and the scale of
reaction to it. Disruption may cause significant delay to services and inconvenience and probably
discomfort and unease to airport, air carrier and customers. The costs of such disruption can be significant.
Bomb threats are normally anonymous telephone calls, which may provide information indicating the
intention to commit an act of terrorism or sabotage against an air carrier, aircraft or airport installation.
Written warnings are rare but should be assessed using the same techniques as applied to a telephoned
warning.
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Telephoned bomb warnings may be received by airports or air carriers either directly from the people
using the warnings or from intermediaries, for example, press agencies or the media.
Because it is practically impossible to determine if a really dangerous situation exists or if it is only an
empty threat, EVERY BOMB THREAT MUST BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY.
ACTION BY PERSON RECEIVING A BOMB THREAT CALL
The recipient of a bomb warning should attempt to obtain as much information as possible in order to
facilitate assessment of the threat and identification of the person issuing it. Keep in mind that even
minimum information might be useful for further analysis of the situation and the threat.
When answering a bomb threat call:
First, listen without interrupting the caller and without giving usable information.
Then, employ all possible tactics to prolong the conversation notably by asking questions if possible, such
as;
• What sort of device is it?
• Where is the device located?
• When will it detonate?
• What type of explosive is being used?
• Where are you calling from?
• What is your name and telephone number?
• Why do you expect me to believe you?
• What do you hope to accomplish by doing this?
• Are you aware that there are many innocent people involved?
• What do you hope to gain?
Try to learn the Flight Number, airport, time.
Record or write down the exact words the caller uses during the conversation or immediately afterwards.
Make notes of any accent or peculiarities of speech, together with other obvious factors such as sex,
approximate age of the caller.
Make notes of characteristics of the voice, and attitude and accuracy of the language of the caller and note
also background noise.
Notify the proper authorities as soon as possible!
As a minimum contact:
• Airport/airline security,
• Operational Control Centres
• Airport/airline management,
• Flight/Ground Operations Managers and
• Flight/Ground Safety Officials.
BOMB THREAT ON GROUND
When a bomb threat or warning is associated with an aircraft that is on the ground:
Before boarding:
Have the passengers leave the gate area to a safe location (generally outside the terminal) with their cabin
baggage. Leave the airplane.
During boarding: Stop the boarding process, disembark passengers with all cabin baggage via stairs or jet
bridges. Then, evacuate them to a safe location and isolate the airplane. Leave the airplane.
During taxi: Taxi to a designated parking position if such a position is available or taxi to a remote and
isolated location, which is apart from buildings or other airplane movement areas. Then, disembark the
passengers via stairs. Escape slides should only be used in extreme conditions and have the passengers
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moved to a safe location. Leave the airplane. Then, isolate the airplane until proper security personnel
arrive.
After the aircraft is isolated, the airport and security authorities will take over the situation. The Fire
brigade and emergency services should be ready to service the airplane as it stops. The airport and the
security authority will cordon off and guard the airplane. Hold baggage, cargo, catering and supplies will
be unloaded.
Whole airplane will be searched. Once the airplane has been considered sterile, it could be towed to a
normal parking position.
The passengers and crew should be transported to and gathered to a secure room.
The passengers, crew and their cabin baggage should be screened before re-boarding. Hold baggage
should be screened and then reloaded subject to identification during re-boarding of the passengers. The
cargo may be screened before reloading or, if not possible, held over at least 24 hours.
BOMB THREAT IN FLIGHT
If a bomb threat is received in flight:
Operation Control Center and the Commander must evaluate the threat and take action accordingly. An
in-flight bomb search takes about 60-90 minutes to accomplish. If a diversion airport is available, the
crew should consider landing as soon as practicable to have the aircraft and personnel searched rather than
continue flight. If a diversion airport is not readily available, the crew should consider using the In-Flight
Bomb Search Procedure, which includes searching the cabin of the aircraft and all cabin
baggage/wardrobe.
Cabin and Flight Crew should apply Bomb Warning procedure printed in their QRH or In-flight manuals.
If a device is found in-flight that is suspicious or has been identified as a bomb comply with the following:
CONTINUE WITH THE NEXT 8 SLIDES.
If the aircraft can land with 20-30 minutes it is recommended that the device remain where it was found
and passengers/crew be moved away from the device.
If landing cannot be made within about 30 minutes then it is strongly recommended to relocate the
bomb/suspicious device to the Least Risk Bomb Location. Remember greatest danger occurs when the
explosion occurs directly adjacent to a critical structural part of the airframe or in the vicinity of fuel tanks,
fuel lines, control runs, hydraulic and electronic compartments and components.
The cabin crew should build a pallet for the device at the Least Risk Bomb Location to direct any possible
blast out the door rather into more critical portions of the aircraft. Follow the procedure published in In-
Flight Manual Emergency Procedures Section. Commander gives the last decision whether it is necessary
to move the bomb to LRBL or not.
Disconnecting or cutting electrical circuits in the suspect item should not be attempted. Also, a suspicious
package or article should not be jettisoned from the airplane.
A descent should be made to 10,000 feet, if fuel and terrain allow, to reduce differential pressure to a
minimum without changing cabin pressure. This is to minimize the chance of an explosive decompression
and avoid triggering a possible pressure initiated device. If possible, a landing site should be selected with
a pressure altitude “lower” than the present cabin altitude. Whenever possible, especially on short haul
flights, the scheduled airport should be approached; otherwise the principle of “nearest suitable airport”
applies according to commander’s decision.
Tests have shown that an in-flight explosion need not necessarily cause an airplane to crash. Several
aircraft that have sustained an in-flight explosion and have survived the explosion to land safely. However,
it may cause serious injury particularly to those persons in the close proximity to the point of detonation.
After landing, passengers should depart the aircraft via stairs. If the Pilot in Command finds that
disembarkation via stairs is not possible because, for example, stairs are not available within an acceptable
period of time, a “Controlled Disembarkation via Slides” should take place.
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In case a bomb has been found and treated according to the bomb handling procedure, a “Controlled
Disembarkation via Escape Slides” should take place principally.
REMEMBER AN UNSUCCESSFUL BOMB SEARCH DOES NOT INDICATE END OF DANGER!
DEALING WITH CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WEAPON (CBW)
Chemical/Bilogical Weapons should be handled with the same care and dillagence as the the
bomb/suspicous device procedures above.
AEROSOL CBW WITH ACTIVATION
A primary method of releaseing chemical and biologic agents inside the aircraft is aerosol dispersion. The
action of leaking, exploding, or manually pouring the substance into the cabin interior will move the agent
through simple airborne transmission onto the skin or into the eyes, lungs and nasal passages. It will be the
goal of crew members to contain the weapon’s aeresol potential before it spreads through the cabin
atmosphere or, if unable, to minimize its effect on passengers and crew.
With the exception of slow-acting biological agents, such as anthrax, airborne exposure to toxic agents
may rapidly generate sudden passenger sickness in an epidemic outbreak.. Generally, many biological
agents will generate symptoms less rapidly then will chemical agents, many of which cause immediate
symptoms. Depending on the agent, passenger and cabin crew may exhibit choking, discoloration and
fainting, blistering or convulsions that are beyond the means of of crew members to effectively deal with
while airborne.
Action:
Flight crew members must don mask and goggles before any other action. Turn on the passenger oxygen
switch. Secure the cabin door and deny any entry from the cabin. Next, decrease cabin pressure by raising
the the cabin altitude as quickly as possible, to evacuate and dilute the aeresol chemical agent.
Recurcilation fans should be turned off and the coldest possible temperature should be selected to aid in
minimizing agent aeresol dispersion. Cabin crew and passengers should go on oxygen. A rapid descent
and an immediate landing is paramount to ensure flight crew are phisically able to land the aircraft and
gain time-critical medical treatment for exposed individuals.
CBW THREATS IN CABIN – WITHOUT ACTIVATION
If a CBW is reported to be on aircraft but without apparent activation due to lack of physical symtoms or
exposure-it should be noted that exposure to biological agents will not likely result in an immediate
presence of symptoms; nor will the dispersal of a biological or chemical agent necessarily be immediately
detectable.
Action:
The crew must take immediate steps to deal with the situation and attempt to minimize aeresol dispersion
immediately. Flight and cabin crew have different duties that should be started simultaneously.
Flight crew should immediately don masks, goggles, select 100% oxygen, minimize skin coverage with
shirt sleeves down or uniform jackets worn. Some CBW agents are odourless and will not be sensed until
it is too late, so this step should not be delayed. Although an emergency declaration and turn towards an
alternate aerodrome is appropriate, an immediate change in cabin pressure should not be initiated until the
unactivated device is secured to the maximum extent possible. Immediately reducing cabin temperature to
the lowest practical setting and turning off recirculation fans will decrease most aeresol dispersion
characteristics.
Once the suspected Chemical/Biological container is covered and sealed from the cabin atmosphere, a
gradual descent of the aircraft can be initiated using a descent that minimizes the rate of cabin change.
The slower the descent and increase in cabin pressure, the lower the risk of agent dispersal during the final
phase of flight

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CBW THREATS IN CARGO COMPARTMENT

A reported CBW threat in cargo compartment should be dealt with much as one would deal with a cargo
fire: isolate the cargo bay by removing all sources of ventilation and turn off recirculation fans. In-flight
activation of a CBW may be sensed by smoke detectors in the cargo hold. Normal fire fighting techniques
will provide optimal protection. During descent, a positive outflow of pressure from the airconditioning
packs will decrease the risk of chemical agents migrating from the cargo bays and into the cabin. Setting
the landing elevation lower than the actual destination will keep the cabin relatively over-pressurized
throughout the landing phase. Manually keeping outflow valves from fully opening upon landing could
keep the cabin over-presurized and protected from cargo area contamination until ready for emergency
evacuation through upwind exits.
SUSPICIOUS SUBSTANCE & PACKAGES
Identification: A suspicious package may have oily stains, discoloration or odour. A suspicious substance
may be a white, tan or beige colored powder and have the consistency and texture of talcum powder.
Discovery of a Suspicious Spilled Substance:
Important; do not try to clean up the substance. Advice the Pilot in Command. Turn ventilation down to
minimum. Breath oxygen and have the passengers breath oxygen. If contact has been made with the
substance, immediately wash hands and forearms repeatedly. Don protective equipment; gloves and mask.
Cover the substance immediately with anything suitable at hand, then create as many barrier layers as
possible between the agent and the cabin atmosphere by covering the item with multiple layers of plastic
trash bags, dry blankets, more plastic, wet blankets, then more dry blankets to minimize leakage and
spreading. Isolate the area. Do not allow anyone to approach the substance in a radius of 3 meters. Have
any inidividuals exposed to the substance wash their hands and forearms. Change clothing that may have
been contaminated and place it in a sealed bag.
Discovery of a Suspicious Package/Envelope:
Important; do not shake or empty contents of envelope and package. Advice the Pilot in Command. Crew
to consider going on oxygen. Don protective equipment; gloves and mask. Cover all exposed skin. Isolate
the area. Do not move the item. Cover the substance as mentioned in the above paragraph. Consider
passengers to go on oxygen.
Reporting Procedure
The Commander must be notified by cabin crewmembers of any possible CBW threat. The will assure
that an accurate report of the incident is made and reported to proper authorities. Refer to your company’s
procedure manual for the correct reporting procedure for your company.
HIJACK PROCEDURES
It is a very important to distinguish between an “attempted hijacking’’ and a “confirmed hijacking’’. An
“attempted hijacking’’ means some illegal action is taking place but the flight crew still in control of the
aircraft. A “Confirmed Hijacking’’ means, that one or more assailants are in control of the aircraft. It is
absolutely essential that the flight crew clarifies this distinction with air traffic control or ground
personnel, due to the potential difference in response and resultant risk variables to all on board the
aircraft. An aircraft that has clearly diverted from its planned route of flight, is proceeding toward a major
population center and whether or not it is in communication with ground entities may well be treated as a
hijacking with intended use as a weapon of mass destruction. If communication is possible, it is
paramount that the crew communicates the actual status of control of the aircraft.
HIJACKER PROFILE
The profile of a hijacker can be classified into broad categories based on their objectives:
Asylum Seekers: are looking to escape a country or groups to reach safety or a better life style.
Criminals: are trying to avoid arrest or detention for illegal acts
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Political motivated: persons trying to make a “statement” about some apparent wrong or injustice as they
see the situation.
Terrorists: politically or religiously motivated individuals or groups attempting to make a “statement”
through the use of illegal acts or inflicting mass casualties.
Various motivations can drive this psychological phenomena. These characteristics are common to all
extremist groups regardless of their target. The goals, methods, demands, messages and statements of
terrorists are clearly communicated to potential terrorists, who are often inspired by the associated
notoriety and publicity to emulate the behavior. Crewmembers need to be aware that terrorists will
manipulate their victims, the public, the authorities and the press. Trained terrorists are very
knowledgeable in these areas. They will use, if possible, unwitting crewmembers ‘’mouthpieces’’ of their
cause or situation. Terrorist’s action is normally aimed far more at the outside audience than at their
victims.
Mentally disturbed persons suffering from anyone of many emotional or medical imbalances, which cause
erratic behaviour.
STAGE OF HIJACK
Intimidation Phase:
The hijackers use violence, aggression and intimidation to establish control over the crew, passengers and
the aircraft. They attempt to stop any action to recover control. Passengers and crew generally react in
disbelief and fear that “this is happening to them”. Since 11 September, passengers and crew are much
more likely to react with aggression and violence toward the assailants.
Custodial Phase:
The hijacker attempt to de-humanize the hostages with continued violence and aggression. They attempt
to use the hostages as “bargaining chips” to communicate with outside authorities and the crew to support
their cause. The passengers begin to feel despair, boredom and a collective spirit. The hostages are
susceptible to three different syndromes in this phase:
• Stockholm syndrome
• London Syndrome
• John Wayne Syndrome
Stockholm syndrome:
An unconscious natural technique whereby, hostage and hostage taker establish a degree of empathy with
each other as a result of positive contact over a period of time. The hostage can develop a feeling of
distrust of all authorities, emotional feeling in support of assailants. At this point minimal use of force is
needed to keep the hostages in line.
London Syndrome:
Is the opposite of the Stockholm syndrome and the hostage can become a Target of the hijacker. Heated
political or religious discussions can occur that can a return of aggression and intimidation. This
syndrome has been called ‘Suicide by terrorist’.
John Wayne Syndrome:
The feeling of helplessness often experienced by predominantly male hostages causes them to wish to be a
hero but are actually unable to respond. This can lead to depression or despair.
Resolution Phase: either negotiations that lead to liberation or release of the hostages or armed
intervention leading to liberation defines this phase. If armed intervention is needed, passenger and crew
should remain on the floor, face down and follow the directions of security personnel.
AIRCRAFT SECURITY PROCEDURES
All operators need to take proper procedures to protect aircraft, crews and passengers from any illegal
activity. Each operator should have published procedures to secure aircraft when not in use by the flight
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crews and procedures for the crews to follow at assure the aircraft is safe from the presence of explosives
or other threats.
AIRPLANE UNDER CREW SUPERVISION
A minimum of one flight crewmember and one cabin crewmember has to be on board or near the airplane
at all times. They should authorize entry of other personnel on to the airplane. All personnel boarding the
aircraft should have their identity checked. Identification by approved ID-Cards is regarded as sufficient
or with working groups, the identification of the group leader is regarded to be sufficient. Objects taken
into the cockpit or cabin have to be checked by the cabin crew.
Passenger belongings, which have been security, checked do not require are-check;
Transit passengers
Transit passengers leaving the airplane have to take all their personal belongings with them, and a cabin
check, which includes galleys, lavatories, head racks and compartments with quick release latches, must
be performed. Transit passengers who remain on board must identify their personal belongings during the
cabin check.
Security authorities must be informed immediately any suspicious act is identified. If any person attempts
to enter the aircraft without proper identification, refuses to produce identification when asked or there is
some doubt as to the actual identification of the individual.
The crew shall support security authorities, when required.
SECURITY BRIEFING
The security briefing should be seen as an opportunity to develop the security team on board the aircraft.
The Commander should set the tone for the flight by relaying any specific security information or
concerns about the flight. They should review crew communication procedures for threat levels and
cockpit access procedures for the flight. The crew should also discuss any special attention passengers
such as deportation etc.
CABIN CHECK PRIOR TO FLIGHT
Security Check must be accomplished by Cabin Crew after all ground staff (cleaning, catering, duty free
etc.) has left the aircraft. All Cabin Crewmembers are responsible checking their related area as published
in company procedures manual. Purser should start of Cabin Security Check prior to boarding to cabin
crew via PA. Cabin Crew must look for anything which or out of place. Cabin Crew must report any
irregularities to Purser immediately.
Cabin Crewmembers should visually check seats cushions, the area under the seats, and the seat pockets
for any unknown objects. They should inspect the overhead lockers for any material left behind, including
under blankets, pillows and crew baggage. Also emergency equipment areas need to be inspected to look
for unauthorized material.
FLIGHT CREW COMPARTMENT ACCESS PROCEDURES
The specific coded signals established during the pre-flight briefing should be required for entry.
The flight deck door must be kept closed and locked during flight except for essential needs.
The flight deck door must be closed and locked during boarding.
The flight deck door will be unlocked after de-boarding.
All persons must be positively identified before flight deck access is permitted.
Any person entering or leaving the flight deck must visually check the entry area outside the flight deck
before the flight deck door is opened. Verify with the cabin crew that the galley and adjacent lavatory is
not passenger-occupied.
During boarding and de-boarding the flight deck door must be closed and locked. (CDLS – Cockpit Door
Locking System in progress)
Until the last passenger leaving the aircraft by de-boarding, nobody is allowed to enter the flight deck
except at the Commander’s request.
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The flight deck door must stay locked during all threat levels. Information and coordination will be made
only via interphone.
Entering time to cockpit shall be kept minimum.
The ultimate goal is to minimize the time when the flight deck door is open.
Flight Crew Compartment Access Procedures
• The specific coded signals established during the pre-flight briefing should be required for entry.
• The flight deck door must be kept closed and locked during flight except for essential needs.
• The flight deck door must be closed and locked during boarding.
• The flight deck door will be unlocked after de-boarding.
• All persons must be positively identified before flight deck access is permitted.
• Any person entering or leaving the flight deck must visually check the entry area outside the flight
deck before the flight deck door is opened. Verify with the cabin crew that the galley and adjacent
lavatory is not passenger-occupied.
• During boarding and de-boarding the flight deck door must be closed and locked. (CDLS –
Cockpit Door Locking System in progress)
• Until the last passenger leaving the aircraft by de-boarding, nobody is allowed to enter the flight
deck except at the Commander’s request.
• The flight deck door must stay locked during all threat levels. Information and coordination will
be made only via interphone.
• Entering time to cockpit shall be kept minimum.
• No passenger must be able to see the Cockpit door-opening phase.
• The ultimate goal is to minimize the time when the flight deck door is open.
AIRPLANE NOT UNDER CREW SUPERVISION
If Company Maintenance or its maintenance contract agents are available the responsibility for security of
the airplane is automatically transferred to that respective organization.
If company personnel are not available and the aircraft will be not be under crew supervision for more
than 2 hours, the Commander will make sure that all cabin doors are closed and that tamper evidence is
applied to all aircraft doors either by himself or by the contracted service provider.
Company or contract procedures must be complied with to assure all entry, cargo and service doors are
closed and all access to the aircraft from stairs, platforms and jet brides have been removed. All access
points that can be reached from the ground must be sealed to determine if access has been made.
Before entering an airplane that has not been under crew supervision and using the security seal procedure
a check must be accomplished for integrity (exterior safety check).
If any seal is found to be missing or damaged, the respective compartment, cockpit and cabin, which
include galleys, lavatories, head racks, and compartments with quick release latches, must be checked for
foreign objects before boarding of passengers. If any foreign object is detected, do not remove it, but
inform the PIC or security authorities immediately. Follow Company or contract procedures to notify the
company and authorities. Early recognition of a threat, intervention and removal while at the gate can
preclude a serious on-board incident.
SUMMARY
This program was intended to review important challenges and procedures for security procedures on the
ground and while airborne. This program does not address all possible contingencies that can occur
during your operation. See your AFM and Operator’s Security Procedural Manual for exact procedures
and forms to be completed for your type aircraft or operations.
You are one layer of protection among many that makeup a very larger multi-level barrier to stop the
threat of terrorism or operational disruptions. Remember if something just doesn’t look right to you, it
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probably isn’t. It is always better to check out 100 false alarms than it is to let one threat get through the
system
Questions for Security Program
The single best layer of protection in all security programs is the people working in the aviation industry?
Sensitive information on security procedures is discussed in this program?
Three forms of illegal interference are unruly passengers, hijacking and bomb threat?
Individuals or groups that fail to follow the instructions of crewmembers would be called unruly
passengers?
There are five different Levels of Threats?
Threat Level 1 refers to verbal abuse of passengers or crew or suspicious activity?
Threat Level 2 refers to life threatening acts by a passenger?
Threat Level 3 refers to physical abuse by passengers that do not rise to the level of life threatening?
Threat Level 4 is a breach or attempted breach of the flight deck?
An unruly passenger would probably cause a Threat Level 1 situation?
During any threat level the cabin crew should notify the Commander as soon as possible and the cockpit
should be locked down until the situation is resolved?
The cabin crew should use conflict management skills to deal with unruly passengers?
The cabin crew should use all available resources to stop assailants from getting access to the flight deck?
The cockpit crew does not need to brief the rest of the crew on security issues since they should know the
procedures?
Sabotage is only caused by external personnel trying to make a statement?
A bomb threat is usually give via an anonymous phone call?
The person taking the call for a bomb threat should try to determine the flight number, airport and time the
bomb is set to explode?
A bomb search in-flight can take 60-90 minutes to complete?
Even if a landing can me made in 20-30 minutes, a bomb search must be completed?
If an aerosol CBW is activated in the cabin, the flight crew needs to go on oxygen, use goggles and make
an emergency descent?
In-flight activation of CBW in the cargo compartment can be indicated by smoke detectors in the cargo
hold?
Only terrorists attempt to hijack aircraft?
The intimidation phase of a hijacking include the assailants being aggressive and physically abusive?
During the security briefing, the Commanders sets the tone for the flight and informs all crewmembers of
possible threats?
Cabin crew should check the lavatories, galley, seats and overhead compartments during the Cabin
Check?
End of the Course


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c115 Airplane Security Procedures

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Copyrights © 2007 by Flyco Bilgisayar Programcılığı ve Eğitim Hizmetleri Ltd. Şti.

Copyrights © 2007 by Flyco Bilgisayar Programcılığı ve Eğitim Hizmetleri Ltd. Şti.

Copyrights © 2007 by Flyco Bilgisayar Programcılığı ve Eğitim Hizmetleri Ltd. Şti.

CBW THREATS IN CARGO COMPARTMENT

Copyrights © 2007 by Flyco Bilgisayar Programcılığı ve Eğitim Hizmetleri Ltd. Şti.

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