THE CONCEPT OF THE PUBLIC OFFICE cases

Binamira v. Garrucho G.R. No. 92008 July 30, 1990

Appointment v. Designation

FACTS: The petitioner received the following communication addressed to him by the Minister of
Tourism on April 7, 1986:

MEMORANDUM TO: MR. RAMON P. BINAMIRA

You are hereby designated General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority, effective immediately.

By virtue hereof, you may qualify and enter upon the performance of the duties of the office.

(Sgd.) JOSE ANTONIO GONZALES Minister of Tourism and Chairman, P.T.A. Board

Pursuant thereto, the petitioner assumed office on the same date.

On April 10, 1986, the President approved the composition of the Board of Directors of the PTA, which
included Binamira as Vice-Chairman in his capacity as General Manager.

On January 2, 1990, Garrucho, the new Secretary of Tourism, demanded his resignation.

On January 4, 1990, President Aquino sent respondent Garrucho the following memorandum, copy
furnished Binamira:

MEMORANDUM TO: Hon. Peter D. Garrucho, Jr.. Secretary of Tourism

It appearing from the records you have submitted to this Office that the present General Manager of the
Philippine Tourism Authority was designated not by the President, as required by P.D. No. 564, as
amended, but only by the Secretary of Tourism, such designation is invalid. Accordingly, you are hereby
designated concurrently as General Manager, effective immediately, until I can appoint a person to
serve in the said office in a permanent capacity.

Please be guided accordingly.

(Sgd.) CORAZON C. AQUINO

Garrucho took over as General Manager of the PTA in accordance with this memorandum.

In this petition for quo warranto, Ramon P. Binamira seeks reinstatement to the office of General
Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority from which he claims to have been removed without just
cause in violation of his security of tenure.

ISSUE: Whether or not the removal of the petitioner from office was valid.
RULING: YES.

Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual
who is to exercise the functions of a given office. When completed, usually with its confirmation, the
appointment results in security of tenure for the person chosen unless he is replaceable at pleasure
because of the nature of his office.

Designation, on the other hand, connotes merely the imposition by law of additional duties on an
incumbent official, as where, in the case before us, the Secretary of Tourism is designated Chairman of
the Board of Directors of the Philippine Tourism Authority, or where, under the Constitution, three
Justices of the Supreme Court are designated by the Chief Justice to sit in the Electoral Tribunal of the
Senate or the House of Representatives.

It is said that appointment is essentially executive while designation is legislative in nature.

Designation may also be loosely defined as an appointment because it likewise involves the naming of a
particular person to a specified public office.

However, where the person is merely designated and not appointed, the implication is that he shall hold
the office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing authority. In this
sense, the designation is considered only an acting or temporary appointment, which does not confer
security of tenure on the person named.

Appointment involves the exercise of discretion, which because of its nature cannot be delegated.
Legally speaking, it was not possible for Minister Gonzales to assume the exercise of that discretion as
an alter ego of the President. The appointment (or designation) of the petitioner was not a merely
mechanical or ministerial act that could be validly performed by a subordinate even if he happened as in
this case to be a member of the Cabinet.

The petitioner’s claim of security of tenure must perforce fall to the ground. His designation being an
unlawful encroachment on a presidential prerogative, he did not acquire valid title thereunder to the
position in question. Even if it be assumed that it could be and was authorized, the designation signified
merely a temporary or acting appointment that could be legally withdrawn at pleasure, as in fact it was
(albeit for a different reason).

We must rule therefore that the petitioner never acquired valid title to the disputed position and so has
no right to be reinstated as General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority.
Tapispisan v. Court of Appeals (459 SCRA 695, 2005)
G.R. NO. 157950 : June 8, 2005
Designations

Facts: Petitioner Tapispisan is a public school teacher and has been occupying the position of Teacher III
since September 1, 1992. She has been teaching for the last thirty (30) years and is currently assigned at
the Villamor Air Base Elementary School in Pasay City.

On May 30, 1995, respondent Atty. Ricardo T. Sibug (Schools Division Superintendent, Pasay City) issued
Division Memorandum No. 33 designating respondent Rumbaoa as OIC-Head Teacher of P. Villanueva
Elementary School and respondent Teves as OIC-Principal of Don Carlos Elementary School, both schools
are in Pasay City. Feeling that she had been unduly by-passed, petitioner Tapispisan filed with
respondent Sibug a protest contesting such designation. The latter, however, denied the protest. The
petitioner then brought the matter to respondent Dr. Nilo L. Rosas, Regional Director of the Department
of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) for National Capital Region (NCR) who, likewise, denied the
protest.

Issue: Respondent Court of Appeals committed serious error when it upheld the findings of the Civil
Service Commission that protest will not lie in absence of appointment/promotion.

Ruling: Yes. Indeed, there is a marked difference between an appointment and a designation. The Court
had the occasion to expound the distinction in this wise:

Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual
who is to exercise the functions of a given office. When completed, usually with its confirmation, the
appointment results in security of tenure for the person chosen unless he is replaceable at pleasure
because of the nature of his office. Designation, on the other hand, connotes merely the imposition by
law of additional duties of an incumbent official - . It is said that appointment is essentially executive
while designation is legislative in nature.

Designation may also be loosely defined as an appointment because it, likewise, involves the naming of
a particular person to a specified public office. That is the common understanding of the term. However,
where the person is merely designated and not appointed, the implication is that he shall hold the office
only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing authority. In this sense, the
designation is considered only an acting or temporary appointment, which does not confer security of
tenure on the person named.
Monsanto vs. Factoran, G.R. No. 78239, February 9, 1989

DOCTRINE: Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President
may grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by
final judgment.

He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of
the Congress. (Sec. 19, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution)

Facts: In 1983, Monsanto (then assistant city treasurer of Calbayog City) was convicted by the
Sandiganbayan of estafa thru falsification of public documents. She was sentenced to jail and to
indemnify the government in the sum of P4,892.50. The SC affirmed the decision. She then filed a
motion for reconsideration but while said motion was pending, she was extended by President Marcos
absolute pardon which she accepted (at that time, clemency could be given even before conviction).

On the strength of such pardon, she wrote the City Treasurer of Calbayog asking for automatic
reinstatement to her position without need of a new appointment since it was still vacant. The letter
was referred to the Ministry of Finance (MF) which at that time had control over the City Treasuries. The
Ministry of Finance ruled in favor of Monsanto but said that appointment was only to retroact from the
date of she was given pardon. Monsanto asked for reconsideration saying that the full pardon wiped out
the crime and thus her service in the government should not be considered to have interrupted. Thus,
the date of her reinstatement should correspond to the date of her preventive suspension; that she is
entitled to backpay for the entire period of her suspension; and that she should not be required to pay
the proportionate share of the amount of P4,892.50.

The motion for reconsideration was referred to the Office of the President. Executive Secretary Factoran
reversed the ruling of MF, ruling that acquittal and not pardon is the only ground for reinstatement in
the public service and entitlement to payment of his salaries, benefits and emoluments due to him
during the period of his suspension pendente lite.

Monsanto thus filed a petition before the SC. She contends that since the pardon was given when her
case was still pending on appeal before the SC, no final verdict has yet been handed and consequently
the accessory penalty attached to the crime which is forfeiture from public office did not attached. Also
she contends that the pardon given before the final verdict is tantamount to acquittal.

Issues:

1. What is the effect of absolute pardon?

2. Is Monsanto entitled to backpay?

3. Is a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, entitled to
reinstatement to her former position without need of a new appointment?

4. May petitioner be exempt from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon her by the
sentence?
RULING:

1. Pardon is defined as "an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the
laws, which exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a
crime he has committed. It is the private, though official act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the
individual for whose benefit it is intended, and not communicated officially to the Court.

While a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the existence of guilt so that in the eye of
the law the offender is as innocent as though he never committed the offense, it does not operate for all
purposes. The very essence of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt. Pardon implies guilt. It does
not erase the fact of the commission of the crime and the conviction thereof. It does not wash out the
moral stain. It involves forgiveness and not forgetfulness.

2. No. A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the past. It affords no
relief for what has been suffered by the offender. It does not impose upon the government any
obligation to make reparation for what has been suffered. “Since the offense has been established by
judicial proceedings, that which has been done or suffered while they were in force is presumed to have
been rightfully done and justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be required.”

3. No. Pardon granted after conviction frees the individual from all the penalties and legal disabilities
and restores him to all his civil rights. But unless expressly grounded on the person's innocence (which is
rare), it cannot bring back lost reputation for honesty, integrity and fair dealing. A pardon, albeit full and
plenary, cannot preclude the appointing power from refusing appointment to anyone deemed to be of
bad character, a poor moral risk, or who is unsuitable by reason of the pardoned conviction.

The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding public
employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she
must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment.

4. No. Civil liability arising from crime is governed by the Revised Penal Code. It subsists notwithstanding
service of sentence, or for any reason the sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty or commutation of
sentence. Petitioner's civil liability may only be extinguished by the same causes recognized in the Civil
Code, namely: payment, loss of the thing due, remission of the debt, merger of the rights of creditor and
debtor, compensation and novation. (Monsanto vs. Factoran, G.R. No. 78239 February 9, 1989)
Petitioners: Doctors Jose Cuyegkeng, Pedro N. Mayuga, Benjamin Roa, Timoteo Alday, Dominador
Jacinto, Alejandro Gaerlan and Rosita Rivera-Ramirez
Respondent: Dr. Pedro M. Cruz

Summary:
The petitioners’ cause of action is predicated upon the fact that their names appear in a list of qualified
physicians, approved and submitted, to the President of the Philippines, by the Executive Council of the
Philippine Medical Association of the Philippines pursuant to the provisions of section 13 of Republic Act
No. 2382, for appointment as members of the Board of Medical Examiners, and that respondent Dr.
Pedro
M. Cruz, whom the President appointed to said board, was not named in said list. Section 13 provides
that the six members composing the Board of Medical Examiners shall be appointed by the President
from a confidential list of not more than 12 names submitted by the council of Philippine Medical
Association.

However, the President appointed Dr Pedro Cruz, a previous member of the Board, despite not being in
the list, by virtue of Section 15 of RA 2382 stating that any member may be reappointed for not more
than one year. The Court upheld the validity of the appointment of Dr Pedro Cruz considering the
statcon doctrine (see below). Section 15 prevails over Section 13 of RA 2382.

Doctrine:
In case of conflict between two (2) provisions of the same statute, the last in order of position is
frequently held to prevail, unless it clearly appears that the intent of Congress is otherwise, and no such
intent is patent

FACTS:
 A Quo Warranto Proceeding was initiated by the petitioners on November 25, 1959 against herein
respondent, Dr. Cruz for being appointed by the President as a member of the Board of Medical
Examiners.

The Council of the Philippine Medical Association submitted a letter to the Office of the President in
compliance with the President’s request containing twelve (12) names for recommendation as members
of the Board of Medical Examiners including the names of the petitioners but excluding the name of the
respondent (Dr Pedro Cruz).

 By a letter of the Assistant Executive Secretary, said Council was advised that the President had
decided to appoint, as member of said Board, Dr. Cesar Filoteo, Dr. Oscar Chacon, Dr. Edgardo Caparas,
Dr. Jose Cocjin, Dr. Antonio Guytingco and Dr. Pedro M. Cruz.

 The President has decided to appoint in the board two graduates from the University of the
Philippines, two from the University of Santo Tomas and two government physicians irrespective of alma
mater.

 Of the twelve (12) names submitted in the letter of October 16, 1959, Dr. Antonio Guytingco and Dr.
Alejandro Gaerlan, government physicians, happen to be both personal physicians of the President. For
this reason, the President decided on renewing the appointment of Dr. Pedro M. Cruz, also a
government physician, whose term under the old law would not have expired until August 7, 1960, were
it not for the enactment of Republic Act No. 2382.

 Petitioners herein, as well as the intervenors, maintain that, pursuant to section 13 of Republic Act No.
2382, the President cannot appoint to the Board of Medical Examiners any person not named in the list
submitted by the Executive Council of the Philippine Medical Association, and that, accordingly, the
aforementioned appointment of respondent is null and void.

 Section 13 of Republic Act No. 2382 (The Medical Act of 1959):

o The Board of Medical Examiners, its composition and duties. — The Board of Medical Examiners shall
be composed of six members to be appointed by the President of the Philippines from a confidential list
of not more than twelve names approved and submitted by the executive council of the Philippine
Medical Association, after due consultation with other medical associations, during the months of April
and October of each year. The chairman of the Board shall be elected from among themselves by the
members at a meeting called for the purpose. The President of the Philippines shall fill any vacancy that
may occur during any examination from the list of names submitted by the Philippine Medical
Association in accordance with the provisions of this Act.

ISSUE:  WoN the appointment of Dr Pedro Cruz is valid pursuant to the provisions of The Medical Act of
1959 – YES

RULING
 The members of this Court are split into three (3) groups in their views on the issues thus raised by the
pleadings.

 One group of members of this Court is of the opinion that the provisions of this section are mandatory
in character; that, although Congress may, by law, prescribe the qualifications for appointment to a
public office created by statute, inclusion in the list submitted by the Executive Council of the Philippine
Medical Association, in compliance with section 13 of the same Act, is not one of the qualifications
enumerated in said section 14. Consequently, the pertinent portion of section 13 of Republic Act No.
2382 is unconstitutional and the appointment of respondent herein lawful and valid.

 Another group adheres to the view that said portion of section 13 of Republic Act No. 2382 is merely
directory in nature. the function of the former under said section 13 is purely recommendatory.
Needless to say, a "recommendation", as such, implies merely an advice, exhortation or indorsement,
which is essentially persuasive in character, not binding upon the party to whom it is made. The
members of the Court constituting this group feel, therefore, that, although section 13 of Republic Act
No. 2382 is constitutional, respondent herein has a valid title to his office as member of the Board of
Medical Examiners.

 The third group, which is bigger than any of the two (2) groups already adverted to, deems it
unnecessary, either to inquire into the constitutionality of said section 13, or to determine whether the
same is mandatory or directory, for the reasons presently to be stated.

 The list submitted by the Executive Council of the Philippine Medical Association included two (2)
government physicians, namely, Dr. Antonio Guytingco and Dr. Alejandro Gaerlan, both of whom were
"personal physicians of the President".
 Believing, perhaps, that their appointment to the Board may either deprive him completely of the
benefits of their professional services, or impair the quality or usefulness thereof, or that a choice in
favor of his two (2) personal doctors, as representatives of the government physicians in said Board,
may smack of, or be misconstrued as, an act of nepotism, it was deemed best to appoint to the Board
only one of them so that the other could continue giving his undivided attention to the health of the
President.
 Hence, the latter had to look for another government physician for appointment to the Board. In this
connection, it should be noted that respondent's professional competency for the post he now holds is
not disputed.

 When the questioned appointment was extended to him, on November 18, 1959, respondent was a
member of said Board, and his term as such would have expired on August 7, 1960, had it not been for
the approval of Republic Act No. 2382 on June 20, 1959. The President appointed him by virtue of
Section 15 of RA 2382: o "Tenure of office and compensation of members. - The members of the Board
of Medical Examiners shall hold office for one year: Provided, That any member may be reappointed for
not more than one year.

 (STATCON DOCTRINE) The members of said group opine that it is not absolutely necessary that the
person reappointed under this provision be included in the list mentioned in section 13 of Republic Act
No. 2382, for, in case of conflict between two (2) provisions of the same statute, the last in order of
position is frequently held to prevail, unless it clearly appears that the intent of Congress is otherwise,
and no such intent is patent in the case at bar.

 Furthermore, the purpose of section 13, in requiring the favorable indorsement of the Philippine
Medical Association, evidently, to reasonably assure that the members of the Board of Medical
Examiners are among the best in their profession, and one who has already held, or who still holds a
position in said Board, is presumed to belong to such class, in the absence of proof to the contrary.
There is not even the slightest suggestion that respondent does not live up to the standard required for
membership in said Board.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
Wherefore, the writ prayed for should be, as it is hereby, denied, with costs against the petitioners. It is
so ordered.