Page |1

CENTRAL UNIVERSITY OF PUNJAB BATHINDA

DEPARTMENT OF LAW

Term Paper Topic

Sudan conflicts: demanding a transition to civilian rule

Subject : International Humanitarian Law (LLM567)

Submitted by:
Rahul Kumar
20llmlaw09
3rd semester

Submitted to:
Dr. Puneet Pathak
Associate professor of Law
School of law and governance
Central University of Punjab, Bathinda
 Page |2

CONTENTS

Sr. No. Title Page.no.

1. Introduction 3
2. A road map to civilian rule if Sudan’s 3
military putschists retreat
3. As crowds swelled in separate marches in 4
Khartoum, protest organizers said that
security forces had attacked a group of
demonstrators near the parliamentary
headquarters
4. Sudan coup: Military dissolves civilian 6
government and arrests leaders.

5. A coup that was poorly prepared 8

6. Civilian rule as an opportunity for the 10
military
7. How to take on heredity and his rapid 12
support forces
 Page |3

Introduction

Hundreds of thousands of people staged marches in Sudanese cities on 21 October in support of

civilian rule. The demonstrations followed protests backed by rebel groups and some political
parties which support a return to military rule. The latest marches started on the anniversary of
the 1964 October Revolution, which overthrew a military government and led to a period of
parliamentary democracy. They highlight the crisis in the country’s troubled transition from
authoritarian rule. Joseph Siegel explains the background.

Arguably, Sudan is still waiting for a civilian government to be established. Following the
sustained protests that led to the ousting of longtime ruler Omar al-Bashir, the 2019
Constitutional Charter instituted a transitional government. It was composed of a civilian cabinet
(headed by a prime minister), a Sovereignty Council (chaired by the military), and a still non-
existent Legislative Council. Presently, the cabinet and the Sovereignty Council jointly function
as the transitional government.

A road map to civilian rule if Sudan’s military putschists retreat1

U.S. President Joe Biden and his administration’s response to the recent military takeover in
Sudan was unambiguous. State Department Spokesperson Ned Price condemned it
unequivocally and announced a pause in the entire $700 million in emergency assistance
appropriations of U.S. economic support funds for Sudan. He added that other forms of bilateral
aid would be reviewed, and he reiterated that Sudan would remain subject to restrictions that
were imposed following the legal determination that a coup d’état had taken place in 1989 “until
the Secretary [of State] determines that a democratically elected government has taken office.”
The World Bank halted disbursement of $2 billion in financing for projects, the EU threatened to
halt its own financial assistance, and the African Union suspended Sudan’s membership.
Sudanese protesters calling for a restoration of the civilian government added to the pressure
by turning out in large numbers in the capital Khartoum and several other cities on October 30.
Collectively, these responses offer some hope of compelling the coup leader, Lieutenant General
Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, to allow the peaceful restoration of Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok’s
civilian government. If Burhan does so, and assuming his various military and paramilitary allies
concur, then the formation of a new “technocratic” government, as Burhan has proposed, is a
likely outcome. But this kind of compromise would only restore an inherently unstable situation.

1
A road map to civilian rule if sudan’s military putchists retreat, available at: https://carnegie-
mec.org/2021/11/03/road-map-to-civilian-rule-if-sudan-s-military-putschists-retreat-pub-85700 (last visited on
2,january,2022)
 Page |4

Worse, it might merely delay the moment when the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and their
allies see a more favorable opportunity to seize power again.
Yezid Sayigh is a senior fellow at the Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut,
where he leads the program on Civil-Military Relations in Arab States (CMRAS). His work
focuses on the comparative political and economic roles of Arab armed forces and nonstate
actors, the impact of war on states and societies, and the politics of postconflict reconstruction
and security sector transformation in Arab transitions, and authoritarian resurgence.

Supporters of Sudan’s democratic transition, both domestic and foreign, must therefore do more
than ensure a return to the status quo ante. This requires addressing the economic and social
malaise and regional grievances that underlie the country’s political crisis; but most immediately
it means taking bold action to put its civil-military relations on a new path. Leading the way
should be the pro-democracy parties and associations that will have to negotiate an exit for the
coup leaders inside Sudan and the United States on the outside—backed by the African Union,
the EU, and the UN. Wherever possible, regional neighbors like Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the
United Arab Emirates (UAE) should also be engaged and ideally brought on board.

As crowds swelled in separate marches in Khartoum, protest organizers said

that security forces had attacked a group of demonstrators near the
parliamentary headquarters2

Thousands of people rallied in the streets of Sudan’s capital city on October 21, demanding a
fully civilian government as the relationship between military generals and pro-democracy
groups deteriorated over the country’s future.

As crowds swelled in separate marches in Khartoum, protest organizers said that security forces
had attacked a group of demonstrators near the parliamentary headquarters. A police statement,
however, said that some demonstrators had departed from the otherwise peaceful march and
attacked the security forces, leaving policemen with injuries, including two with gunshot
wounds.
2
Available at: https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/thousands-rally-in-sudans-capital-to-demand-
civilian-rule/article37119985.ece (last visited on 2,january,2022)
 Page |5

Dr. Mohamed al-Haj, who works at a nearby hospital in the area of Omdurman, said he knew of
a dozen protesters who were being treated there, two of them with gunshot wounds.

Sudan has been ruled by an interim civilian-military government since 2019. The military ousted
longtime autocrat Omar al-Bashir in April that year, following four months of mass protests
against his rule. With al-Bashir toppled, the ruling generals agreed to share power with civilians
representing the protest movement.

The aftermath has been volatile. The rallies on October 21 come after a rival group rallied in
support of the military leaders.

The Sudanese Professionals’ Association, which had called for the large rallies nationwide, said
in a statement on the evening of October 21 that security forces had attacked protesters near the
country's parliamentary headquarters. They did not elaborate on the nature of the attack. The
statement told protesters to remain peaceful, but not to retreat from the streets until there was a
handover of power.

“Let's mark with our protests a new wave of popular uprising that will pave the way for a fully
civilian and democratic rule,” read an earlier statement by the group, which spearheaded the
uprising that kicked off in December 2018 and culminated in al-Bashir’s ouster.

Thousands of men and women marched in the capital on October 21, waving the Sudanese flag
and chanting: "We are free! We are revolutionaries! We will carry on with our journey!”

Tensions between the civilians and generals in the transitional government have increased since
Sudan’s interim authorities said they foiled a coup attempt within the military last month.
Officials blamed al-Bashir loyalists for the move. The announcement also aroused fears among
civilians that the military may eventually hijack the country's transition to a civilian democratic
rule.

Military leaders have also signaled a change in direction. Gen. Abdel-Fattah Burhan, head of the
ruling Sovereign Council, said that dissolving the government of Prime Minister Abdullah
Hamdok could resolve the ongoing political crisis. Mr. Hamdok responded last week by
addressing the public in a televised speech where he laid out a series of measures that he said
would help speed the handover to a completely elected and civilian government. They included
 Page |6

repeated exhortations for groups of differing opinions to work together, and for the country’s
transitional constitution and judicial bodies to be respected.

In a video released by his office late on October 21, Mr. Hamdok praised the demonstrators'
peaceful movement and thanked the police who had secured the marches.

On October 16, thousands of Sudanese took to the streets of Khartoum to demand the
dismantling of Mr. Hamdok's government and the establishment of military rule. Since then,
hundreds of them have been camping outside the Republican Palace, the seat of the Sovereign
Council.

In a tweet on October 20, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken called on the Sudanese to
exercise their right to assembly peacefully and without violence.

The rallies on October 21 also coincide with the 57th anniversary with the Sudanese uprising that
ended the military rule of Gen. Ibrahim Abboud in 1964 and paved the way for a constitutional
government.

Sudan coup: Military dissolves civilian government and arrests leaders

A coup is under way in Sudan, where the military has dissolved civilian rule, arrested
political leaders and declared a state of emergency.
The coup leader, Gen Abdel Fattah Burhan, blamed political infighting.
Protests have erupted in several cities including the capital Khartoum. Three people are said to
have died after being shot by the armed forces.
Military and civilian leaders have been at odds since long-time ruler Omar al-Bashir was
overthrown two years ago.
Large numbers of protesters are on the streets of the capital demanding the return of civilian rule,
BBC Arabic's Mohamed Osman reports from Khartoum.
More protesters are expected to join the crowds after calls for action by political parties and
professional unions, our correspondent says. Doctors have refused to work at hospitals and
institutions under military rule, except in emergencies, he adds.
One demonstrator, Sawsan Bashir, told AFP news agency: "We will not leave the streets until the
civilian government is back and the transition is back."
 Page |7

"We are ready to give our lives for the democratic transition in Sudan," fellow protester Haitham
Mohamed said.
Army and paramilitary troops have been deployed across Khartoum, the city's airport is closed
and international flights are suspended. The internet is also down.
At least three people have been killed and 80 have been injured, the Sudan Central Doctor's
Committee wrote on its Facebook page. Those who died had been shot by soldiers, it said.
• Sudan coup: What you need to know
Video footage from Khartoum on Monday showed large groups in the streets, including many
women. Barricades of burning tyres can be seen, with plumes of black smoke rising in various
parts of the city.
"There is tension and also violence because people tried to go to the army headquarters… they
were met with gunshots", human rights defender Duaa Tariq told the BBC. She added there was
fear and confusion in the streets, but also solidarity between the protesters.
World leaders have reacted with alarm to the military's move.

Under arrest
Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok and his wife are among those reported to have been detained
and put under house arrest, along with members of his cabinet and other civilian leaders. Their
whereabouts are unknown.
They are part of a transitional government designed to steer Sudan towards democracy after the
rule of former president, Omar al-Bashir.
Mr Hamdok was reportedly being pressed to support the coup but was refusing to do so, and
instead he urged people to continue with peaceful protests to "defend the revolution".
Gen Burhan had been leading the power-sharing arrangement between military and civilian
leaders, known as the Sovereign Council.
In a televised address, he said infighting between politicians, ambition and incitement to violence
had forced him to act to protect the safety of the nation and to "rectify the revolution's course".
He said Sudan was still committed to "international accords" and the transition to civilian rule,
with elections planned for July 2023.
• Sounding the alarm for Sudan’s democracy
• Why Omar al-Bashir was overthrown
 Page |8

• Are military takeovers on the rise in Africa?

But a senior official from the prime minister's office, Adam Elhiraika, told the BBC the coup
could lead Sudan back into a civil war, adding the risk was "extremely high".
Although Sudan remains in a deep economic crisis, it had been receiving more international
support. A military takeover will put that at risk.

A coup that was poorly prepared3

Swift action in line with a strategic vision will be crucial. Burhan and his fellow coup leaders
may be better prepared politically next time. Not only did they badly handle discussions with
U.S. Special Envoy Jeffrey Feltman on the eve of their coup, deceiving him about their
intentions, but nothing they have done or said since then shows that they anticipated such a
hostile international backlash or were prepared to preempt or mitigate it.
It is equally obvious that the coup leaders also failed to realize that they would need to build an
effective civilian coalition in advance, so as to legitimize and consolidate the coup in its
immediate aftermath. There were obvious potential allies in the political parties that were already
opposed to the Hamdok government, or ones that had recently broken away from the main
government alliance, the Forces of Freedom and Change. However, the coup leaders seem to
have relied exclusively on their own patronage networks so far, falling back on former
supporters of ousted dictator Omar al-Bashir and assorted Islamists.
The very different course of the coup d’état–cum–popular revolution in Egypt in 2013 offers a
striking contrast. There, the armed forces worked closely with civilian grassroots activists and
allied parties over several months to be able to take power at the crest of the 2013
demonstrations by millions of Egyptians against then president Mohamed Morsi. That is why
they had an interim president and a new government—all civilians—waiting in the wings. The
SAF and its paramilitary and security allies behaved less carefully, doing little more than bussing
supporters into the capital Khartoum a week ahead of the coup to call for a military intervention,
where they were dwarfed by the much larger numbers of demonstrators who came out to support
civilian rule.

3
A coup that was poorly prepared available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep07759.5.pdf (last visited
on 2,january,2022)
 Page |9

Considerable obstacles stand in the way of a democratic transition. Most important of these are
disunity within the pro-democracy camp and the presence of significant civilian constituencies
that support the military. Various SAF factions have exploited these factors to mount seventeen
coup attempts since 1956 by one count, of which five have been successful, and by some
accounts Burhan may have been forced to act by military hardliners who might still push him
aside if he compromises. Deep communal divisions across the country will impede every course
of action, and not only for a civilian government. After all, the successive civil wars and
internecine conflicts that are estimated to have left well upward of 2 million dead and led to the
independence of South Sudan in July 2011 took place entirely on the watch of one military-
backed regime in Khartoum or another. This alone should be a powerful argument for resetting
civil-military relations.
The visible lack of preparedness of the coup leaders reveals their political ineptitude and
suggests a sense of panic. More importantly, they have inadvertently provided the pro-
democracy camp with an opportunity to retake the initiative and deepen the transition. The senior
generals have demonstrated that they are very much a remnant of the Bashir regime, hence their
fear of prosecution for war crimes committed during his time in power. The fact that one of
Burhan’s first steps on taking power was to suspend the clause of the 2019 interim constitutional
declaration establishing the so-called Nabil Adeeb Commission to investigate the violent
disbanding of the civilian sit-in at the Army High Command in June 2019 directly speaks to this.
It is likely that Burhan and his deputy as chair of the Transitional Sovereign Council, Lieutenant
General Mohamed Hamdan “Hemedti” Dagalo, seek to protect themselves from prosecution
after they leave office at the end of the transition in 2024. This fear is something that the civilian
camp must address, and perhaps negotiate on, by (for example) leveraging an offer of protection
to extract significant concessions on the transfer of military-owned businesses to civilian control
and on the future status of the paramilitary group known as the Rapid Support Forces (RSF),
which are commanded by Hemedti.4

But in all cases, Burhan should be required to step down as chairperson of the Transitional
Sovereign Council. The planned rotation of his post to a civilian, originally scheduled to take
44
A road map to civilian rule if sudan’s military putchists retreat, available at: https://carnegie-
mec.org/2021/11/03/road-map-to-civilian-rule-if-sudan-s-military-putschists-retreat-pub-85700 (last visited on
2,january,2022)
 P a g e | 10

place in May 2021 and since delayed to an unconfirmed date between April and July 2022,
should happen immediately. External actors should place this demand squarely on their agenda.
Just as importantly, Burhan should also step down as the SAF’s commander-in-chief, alongside a
clean sweep of the SAF command, bringing in fresh blood. There is a real risk, however, that
removal of the military’s old guard might simply pave the way for an ambitious younger general
to take power, much like what happened with Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in Egypt. The dismissal of the
entire leadership of the Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF) and the appointment of Sisi as defense
minister by Morsi in August 2012 positioned him to take power as the head of the EAF less than
a year later. For this reason, Sudan should break with tradition and appoint a civilian as defense
minister. Indeed, it might also revive the proposal made by an SAF general in the 1990s to
eliminate the position of commander-in-chief—whose concentrated powers, he argued, facilitate
coup attempts—in favor of a U.S.-style joint chiefs of staff.1
Civilian rule as an opportunity for the military5
Submitting to a civilian defense minister would go against the grain for the SAF. Indeed, the
notion goes against the norm in many Arab countries, neighboring Egypt especially, where the
constitution has gone so far as to reserve the post exclusively for EAF officers. To defuse
opposition within the SAF, it is crucial to create different incentive structures to encourage a new
generation of commanders—and the mid-level and junior officers below them—to see the
benefits of working with, rather than against, civilian control. These may be summed up as
increased professionalization, modernization, and addressing capability gaps. The goal is not to
penalize the armed forces for the October 25 coup, as much as it is to show that the assertion of
civilian control presents an opportunity for them as well and to give them a stake in the success
of a democratic transition.

Replacement of the SAF command therefore needs to be accompanied by structural reforms

designed to depoliticize the military, enhance its professionalism and esprit de corps, and address
its capability gaps. Designing and implementing these broad aims will take time, and so an initial
step could be to launch a defense white paper process that maps out policy options and specific
measures. For some months, Hamdok’s office had been drafting a policy framework for security
sector reform, and this process should be reinstated and expanded in scope and detail.
5
Civilian rule as an opportunity for the military available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/165470 (last visited on
2,January,2022)
 P a g e | 11

In the interim, preliminary reviews could be undertaken of select paths through which the SAF’s
depoliticization, professionalization, and cohesion might be enhanced. These include entry to
officer school (with an eye toward making the selection process more representative of Sudan’s
demographics and geography), the composition of the ground forces’ brigades and their
deployment rotations (with the purpose of diluting communitarian tensions among their
personnel), the enlistment and training of noncommissioned officers (to encourage leadership),
and pay and pensions as well as other conditions of service (to address equity issues and
grievances, both internally and toward civilians). Together, these key ingredients of improved
morale and motivation may help secure buy-in from the SAF officer corps and rank and file
alike.

Demonstrating the benefits for the SAF of a different kind of civil-military relationship than
Sudan has had without interruption since independence in 1956 will be slow and difficult. These
efforts may be helped by dangling the extra carrot of forming a donor coordination body for
international security assistance to help the SAF formulate and implement a multiyear
capabilities development plan. This would also be an entry point to conducting a comprehensive
review of defense spending, improving defense budget planning methodologies, and socializing
the SAF into working with relevant government agencies such as the Ministry of Finance and
Economic Planning and the Cabinet Office.

The United States, the EU, the UK, and the UN could lead this effort in much the way they have
done since 2013, with considerable success, for the Lebanese Armed Forces. Aside from holding
out the promise of Western security assistance, this framework could be a vehicle for integrating
the regional powers with the greatest stakes in Sudan’s stability—Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the
UAE. All three countries are already invested in the Sudanese military, so inviting them to
contribute training and funding through the proposed framework would not involve a major shift.
Crucially, creating a tent and bringing them inside it may increase the chances that these
countries will lend their weight to persuading the SAF to engage constructively.
Lastly, the March 2021 agreement between the SAF and the government
on divesting the military’s numerous business interests in the civilian domain should be
expedited. Military involvement in business is inimical to professionalism, so reinvigorating the
divestment agreement benefits the SAF. Although the agreement was a positive first step, little
 P a g e | 12

progress has been made since then in terms of government access to data, let alone the actual
transfer of military-owned commercial companies to its control. This process can be assisted, in
part, by giving the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning and the Ministry of Trade and
Industry immediate access to company books to assist their managers and accountants in
inventorying, auditing, and market evaluation. Overcoming military resistance on this issue may
also pave the way for the transitional government to assert control over the hundreds of civilian
parastatals that do not submit their income to the state treasury, accounting for a large part of the
82 percent shortfall in government revenue.

How to take on heredity and his rapid support forces6

A considerably thornier challenge consists of dealing with Hemedti, Burhan’s deputy as chair of
the Transitional Sovereign Council. The RSF he commands has been accused of
perpetrating atrocities against civilians in Darfur in 2015 and of spearheading the massacre of
civilian protesters in June 2019, and Hemedti clearly colluded with Burhan in organizing the
October 2021 coup. But the political reality of Hemedti’s tribal power base in Darfur, coupled
with the constitutional fact that the RSF is a formally established state agency—having been
elevated from a state-sponsored Janjaweed militia by Bashir, effectively putting it on par with
the SAF—will complicate attempts to make him step down or neutralize his forces.
A start can be made, nonetheless, by having a restored civilian government repeal the order
issued by Hemedti in June 2021 that designated the RSF as part of a joint force tasked with
maintaining public order in Khartoum. Instead, the transitional government should invest in
standing up the law enforcement capability of the police and other agencies reporting to the
Ministry of Interior.
Like the SAF, the RSF has also developed significant commercial interests. These differ
somewhat from the SAF’s holdings in that they are partly legal, albeit taking the form of private
front companies owned by relatives of Hemedti or other RSF commanders, but they also include
extensive black market activities. Hemedti and his officers should be presented with a choice: the
RSF can be an official military force or a commercial enterprise, and they can be commanders or
businessmen, but not both. In all cases, dubious commercial exploitation licenses awarded to
6
How to take on heredity and his rapid support forces available at:
https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/conflict-minerals/exposing-rsfs-secret-financial-network/ (last
visited on 2,January,2022)
 P a g e | 13

RSF-affiliated companies should be reviewed, and revoked wherever appropriate, not least in the
extraction and marketing of gold and other natural resources and principal exports such as
sesame and gum Arabic.

More strategically, a review should be initiated with the aim of bringing the RSF in line with
standard policies and regulations regarding enlistment, officer training, pay and pensions, and
service conditions in the SAF. Its budgeting structure and financial management procedures
should also be reviewed for alignment with those of the Ministry of Defense. Ideally, the process
would start by revoking the RSF’s autonomous status under the Bashir-era constitution and
placing it under the Ministry of Defense. This may have the added advantage of being regarded
favorably by the SAF, which views the RSF as a rival.

In the longer term, other options can be considered for the RSF’s future, foremost among them
the force’s integration into the SAF and other security services. This is what the transitional
government promised to do with fighters of the various rebel groups with which it signed
the Juba Peace Agreement (JPA) in October 2020, and this is what will presumably also be
offered to members of the other groups with which it has negotiated since then.
However, wholesale integration may cause more problems than it resolves. It is likely to result in
a severely bloated military and security payroll in a country that can ill afford it, and such a
move could undermine cohesion and generate political tensions within Sudan’s defense and
security agencies. An alternative approach might be to accommodate paramilitary and rebel
forces within a new, countrywide national or provincial guard structure established for this
purpose, approximating the U.S. National Guard. Every option comes with political and financial
costs, but the UAE’s special relationship with the RSF may offer a crucial entry point. This is an
added reason for getting the UAE on board and giving it a stake in the success of the entire
effort.