7.1.1. What is an indirect speech act?

Most of the world’s languages have three basic sentence types: (i) declarative, (ii) interrogative, and (iii)
imperative.10 In some languages, the three major sentence types are distinguished morphologically and/or
syntactically.

If there is a direct match between a sentence type and an illocutionary force, we have a direct speech act. In
addition, explicit performatives, which happen to be in the declarative form, are also taken to be direct speech
acts, because they have their illocutionary force explicitly named by the performative verb in the main part (or
‘matrix clause’) of the sentence. On the other hand, if there is no direct relationship between a sentence type and
an illocutionary force, we are faced with an indirect speech act. Thus, when an explicit performative is used to
make a request, as in (4.37), it functions as a direct speech act; the same is the case when an imperative is
employed, as in (4.38). By comparison, when an interrogative is used to make a request, as in (4.39), we have an
indirect speech act.

(4.37) I request you to pass the salt.

(4.38) Pass the salt.
(4.39) Can you pass the salt?

In short, the validity of the distinction between direct and indirect speech act is dependent on whether or not one
subscribes to what Levinson (1983: 264, 274) called the literal force hypothesis—the view that there is a direct
structure–function correlation in speech acts and that sentence forms are by default direct reflexes of their
underlying illocutionary forces. There are, however, problems at the very heart of the literal force hypothesis. One
is that there are cases of speech acts where even the direct link between performative verbs and speech acts breaks
down. Consider (4.40).

(4.40) I promise to sack you if you don’t finish the job by this weekend.

In (4.40), the performative verb is promise, but the illocutionary force that is most naturally ascribed to this speech
act is that of either a threat or a warning. This shows that contrary to the main prediction of the literal force
hypothesis, we cannot always identify speech acts even with sentences that contain a performative verb. Secondly
and more importantly, as pointed out by Levinson (1983: 264), most usages are indirect. The speech act of
requesting, for example, is very rarely performed by means of an imperative in English. Instead, it is standardly
carried out indirectly, and there is probably an infinite variety of sentences that can be used to make a request
indirectly, as shown in (4.41) (adapted from Levinson 1983: 264–5; see also Bertolet 1994, Holdcroft 1994).

(4.41) a. I want you to close the window.

b. Can you close the window?
c. Will you close the window?
d. Would you close the window?
e. Would you mind closing the window?
f. You ought to close the window.
g. May I ask you to close the window?
h. I wonder if you’d mind closing the window.

7.6.2. How is an indirect speech act analysed?

Roughly, there are three main approaches. The first is to assume the existence of a dual illocutionary force (as
proposed by Searle 1975b). On this assumption, indirect speech acts have two illocutionary forces, one literal or
direct, and the other non-literal or indirect. While the literal force is secondary, the non-literal force is primary.
Next, whether an utterance operates as an indirect speech act or not has to do with the relevant felicity
conditions. For example, (4.39) above both infringes the felicity condition for the speech act of questioning and
queries the preparatory condition for that of requesting. This explains why it can function as an indirect speech
act whereas (4.42), for example, cannot.The reason is that in the case of (4.42), felicity conditions are irrelevant.

(4.42) (Searle 1975b)

Salt is made of sodium chloride.

Finally, on Searle’s view, a speaker’s performing and an addressee’s understanding an indirect speech act always
involves some kind of inference. The question that arises next is how this inference can be computed. Searle’s
suggestion is that it can be computed along the general lines of the rational, co-operative model of communication
articulated by Grice. One interesting characteristic of indirect speech acts is that they are frequently
conventionalized (Morgan 1978). This can be illustrated by the fact that of various, apparently synonymous
linguistic expressions, only one may conventionally be used to convey an indirect speech act. Consider (4.43).

(4. 43) a. Are you able to pass the salt?

b. Do you have the ability to pass the salt?

Under Searle’s analysis, both (4.43a) and (4.43b) would be expected to be able to perform the indirect speech act
of requesting, because (i) they are largely synonymous with (4.39), and (ii) they, too, inquire about the satisfaction
of the addressee-based preparatory condition for making a request. But this expectation is not fulfilled. Searle’s
response to this puzzle is that there is also a certain degree of conventionality about indirect speech acts, and this
may be accounted for in terms of convention of use/meaning. Inspired by this insight of Searle’s, Morgan (1978)
developed a notion of short-circuited implicature to cover inference involved in cases like (4.39). In these cases,
while the relevant conversational implicature is in principle calculable, it is not in practice calculated (see also
Horn and Bayer 1984, Horn 1988). From a linguistic point of view, then, the conventionality here is correlated
with the possible occurrence of please. While please can be inserted before the verb pass in

(4.37)–(4.39), it cannot in (4.43), as shown in (4.44).

(4.44) a. I request you to please pass the salt.

b. Please pass the salt.

c. Can you please pass the salt?

d. ?Are you able to please pass the salt?

e. ?Do you have the ability to please pass the salt?

Furthermore, the conventionality indicated by please in (4.44a) and (4.44b) is one of meaning, hence the speech
act of requesting is performed directly. By contrast, the conventionality signalled by please in (4.44c) is one of
usage, and thus we have an indirect speech act. A second, rather similar, approach is due to Gordon and Lakoff
(1975). In their analysis, there are inference rules called conversational postulates that reduce the amount of
inference needed to interpret an indirect speech act. Thus in the case of (4.39), if the interpretation as a question
cannot be intended by the speaker, then the utterance will be read as being equivalent to his or her having said
(4.37), thus resulting in the performance of the indirect speech act of requesting. Stated this way, the
conversational postulates proposed by Gordon and Lakoff can be seen as another reflection of the conventionality
of indirect speech acts. As to the similarities and differences between Searle’s and Gordon and Lakoff’s analyses,
the major similarity is that both accounts assume that the interpretation of indirect speech acts involves both
inference and conventionality; the major difference concerns the question of balance, namely, how much of the
work involved in computing an indirect speech act is inferential and how much is conventional.

Finally, in contrast to the inferential model we have just discussed, there is the idiom model. In this model,
sentences like (4.39) are semantically ambiguous, and the request interpretation constitutes a speech act idiom
that involves no inference at all. On this view, (4.39) is simply recognized as a request with no question being
perceived. This is the position taken by Sadock (1974). There are, however, problems with this analysis, too. One
is that it fails to capture the fact that the meaning of an indirect speech act can frequently (at least in part) be
derived from the meaning of its components. The technical term for this is compositionality (see Chapter 3). In
addition, these would-be idioms turn out to be quite comparable cross-linguistically. For example, like their
English equivalent in (4.45), (4.46)–(4.49) can all be used to indirectly request the addressee to turn on the central
heating system, depending on context.

(4.45) It’s cold in here.

(4.46) (Arabic)

?na-hu barid huma.

it’s-3-M-S cold in here

‘It’s cold in here.’

(4.47) (Chinese)

zher zhen leng.

here really cold

‘It’s really cold in here.’

(4.48) (German)

Es ist sehr kalt hier drin.

it is very cold here in

‘It’s very cold in here.’

(4.49) (Modern Greek)

Kani krio edo mesa.

it is doing cold here in

‘It’s cold in here.’

A further problem is that in the idiom model, an interpretation that takes into account the literal meaning or the
direct illocutionary force of an indirect speech act is not allowed. This, however, leaves examples like (4.50)
unexplained.

(4.50) A: Can you pass the salt?

B: Yes, I can. (Here it is.)

7.6.3. Why is an indirect speech act used?

Some remarks on politeness Why, then, do people use indirect speech acts? One answer is that the use of indirect
speech acts is in general associated with politeness. Indirect speech acts are usually considered to be more polite
than their direct counterparts. Furthermore, the more indirect a speech act, the more polite. There is an extensive
literature on politeness (see, e.g., DuFon et al. 1994 for a bibliography on politeness covering publications up to
the early 1990s), and this is not the place for me to give a full review of it. Currently, there are four main theoretical
models of politeness: (i) the ‘social norm’ model, (ii) the ‘conversational maxim’ model (e.g., Leech 1983, 2003),
(iii) the ‘face-saving’ model (Brown and Levinson 1978, 1987), and (iv) the ‘conversational contract’ model (e.g.,
Fraser 1990). (See also Watts 2003 for a ‘social practice’ model.17) Of these four models, the most influential
and comprehensive is Brown and Levinson’s now classic ‘face-saving’ model. At the heart of Brown and
Levinson’s theory of politeness lies Goffman’s (1967) sociological notion of face. Simply put, face is ‘the public
self-image that every member wants to claim for himself’ (Brown and Levinson 1987: 61). Stated in another way,
face means roughly an individual’s self-esteem. Furthermore, there are two aspects to face. First, positive face,
which represents an individual’s desire to be accepted and liked by others. Positive politeness orients to preserving
the positive face of others. When one uses positive politeness, one tends to choose the speech strategies that
emphasize one’s solidarity with the addressee. These strategies include claiming ‘common ground’ with the
addressee, conveying that the speaker and the addressee are co-operators, and satisfying the addressee’s wants
(Brown and Levinson 1987: 101–29). Second, there is negative face, which refers to an individual’s right to
freedom of action and his or her need not to be imposed on by others. Negative politeness orients to maintaining
the negative face of others. When one employs negative politeness, one tends to opt for the speech strategies that
emphasize one’s deference to the addressee. Typical linguistic realizations of the strategies of negative politeness
involve, for example, the use of conventional indirectness, hedges on illocutionary force, and apologies (Brown
and Levinson 1987: 130). Defined thus, face is considered to be a universal notion in any human society. As
rational agents, conversational participants will ideally try to preserve both their own face and their interlocutors’
face in a verbal interaction.

Many types of speech acts such as complaints, disagreements (e.g., Locher 2004), and requests intrinsically
threaten face. Hence they are called face-threatening acts (FTAs). In the first place, FTAs can threaten positive
face, negative face, or both. Acts that threaten positive face include expressions of disapproval, accusations,
criticism, disagreements, and insults; those that threaten negative face include advice, orders, requests,
suggestions, and warnings; those that threaten both positive and negative face include complaints, interruptions,
and threats. Furthermore, a second distinction can be made between acts that primarily threaten the speaker’s face
and those that primarily threaten the addressee’s face. The speaker can threaten his or her own face by performing,
for example, the acts of accepting compliments, expressing thanks, and making confessions. On the other hand,
acts such as advice, reminding, and strong expression of emotions threaten primarily the addressee’s face wants
(Brown and Levinson 1987: 67–8).

Brown and Levinson (1987: 74) posited three independent and culturally sensitive social variables according to
which the strength or weightiness of an FTA can be measured. First, there is the social distance (D) between the
speaker and the addressee. Second is the relative power (P) of the addressee over the speaker. Finally, the third
variable is the absolute ranking (R) of imposition in a particular culture (see also Scollon and Scollon 1995). The
strength of an FTA is measured by adding together the three variables D, P, and R, on the basis of which the
amount of face work needed or the degree of politeness required can be worked out. On Brown and Levinson’s
model, there is a set of five strategies one can choose from to avoid or weaken an FTA.

Let me now explore these strategies in somewhat greater detail. In the first place, one can perform an FTA on
record, that is, directly; or off record, that is, indirectly, for example, by dropping a verbal hint. Secondly, an FTA
on record can be performed either baldly, i.e. without redress; or with redress. In the latter case, there are two
further choices: an FTA can be performed with a face-saving act using either positive politeness redress (such as
emphasizing solidarity with the addressee) or negative politeness redress (such as giving deference to the
addressee). Finally, there is also the option for one not to perform the FTA at all, for instance, by dropping a non-
verbal hint. These five strategies can be illustrated in (4.52).

(4.52) Situation: John, a student asks Mary, another student to lend him her lecture notes

1. On record, without redress, baldly: Lend me your lecture notes.

2. On record, with positive politeness redress: How about letting me have a look at your lecture notes?

3. On record, with negative politeness redress: Could you please lend me your lecture notes?

4. Off record: I didn’t take any notes for the last lecture.

5. Don’t perform the FTA: [John silently looks at Mary’s lecture notes.]

It will be apparent that the use of indirect speech acts serves to diminish FTAs and thereby to satisfy face needs.

Since its publication in 1978, Brown and Levinson’s ‘face-saving’ theory has generated an enormous amount of
research on politeness (see Brown and Levinson 1987 for a survey of the literature up to the mid-1980s). From an
empirical point of view, while Brown and Levinson’s model is based on an in-depth study of three unrelated
languages/cultures, namely, Tamil, Tzeltal, and English (both British and American), politeness phenomena in a
much wider array of languages/cultures ranging from Catalan through Japanese to Turkish have in the meantime
been carefully studied. Conceptually, many of the recent studies have focused on the universality of the Brown
and Levinson theory, in particular the notion of face, the social variables, and the set of five politeness strategies.
Sifianou (1992), for example, in a cross-cultural comparison between the politeness systems in England and
Greece, argued that the politeness system in Greek is more positive-face oriented, whereas in British English it is
more negative-face oriented. While arguing for such differences, her study nevertheless showed that Brown and
Levinson’s theory provides a very good general theoretical and descriptive framework for the study of politeness.
On the other hand, a number of scholars have found it difficult to apply Brown and Levinson’s model directly to
the politeness systems in Eastern, collective cultures (see, e.g., Gu 1990, Mao 1994, and Lee-Wong 2000 on
Chinese; Matsumoto 1988, 1989, and Ide 1989 on Japanese; Hwang 1990 on Korean; Bayraktaroglu 2001 and
Zeyrek 2001 on Turkish; Koutlaki 2002 on Persian). The same can be said of some African languages/cultures.
Nwoye (1989, 1992), for example, carried out a study of the notion of face in Igbo. According to this study, Igbo
society is more concerned with the collective self-image of a group than the individualistic self-image of any one
member of the group. The ‘group face’ is defined as ‘[t]he avoidance of behavior capable of lowering the public
self-image or self-worth[iness] (iru) of one’s group, dictated by the fear of imecu iru (to darken face)’ (Nwoye
1992: 314) (see also Agyekum 2004 on the concept of face in Akan). Strecker (1993) also argued that the
politeness system of the Hamer in south Ethiopia presents a challenge to Brown and Levinson’s theory. All this
seems to indicate that while politeness itself is a universal phenomenon, politeness strategies and individual speech
acts may to some extent vary from one language/culture to another.