.TOCAO V.

CA
G.R. No. 127405; October 4, 2000
Ponente: J. Ynares-Santiago

FACTS:

Private respondent Nenita A. Anay met petitioner William T. Belo, then the vice-president for operations
of Ultra Clean Water Purifier, through her former employer in Bangkok. Belo introduced Anay to
petitioner Marjorie Tocao, who conveyed her desire to enter into a joint venture with her for the
importation and local distribution of kitchen cookwares

Under the joint venture, Belo acted as capitalist, Tocao as president and general manager, and Anay as
head of the marketing department and later, vice-president for sales

The parties agreed that Belo's name should not appear in any documents relating to their transactions
with West Bend Company. Anay having secured the distributorship of cookware products from the West
Bend Company and organized the administrative staff and the sales force, the cookware business took
off successfully. They operated under the name of Geminesse Enterprise, a sole proprietorship
registered in Marjorie Tocao's name.

The parties agreed further that Anay would be entitled to:

(1) ten percent (10%) of the annual net profits of the business;
(2) overriding commission of six percent (6%) of the overall weekly production;
(3) thirty percent (30%) of the sales she would make; and
(4) two percent (2%) for her demonstration services. The agreement was not reduced to writing on the
strength of Belo's assurances that he was sincere, dependable and honest when it came to financial
commitments.

On October 9, 1987, Anay learned that Marjorie Tocao had signed a letter addressed to the Cubao sales
office to the effect that she was no longer the vice-president of Geminesse Enterprise.

Anay attempted to contact Belo. She wrote him twice to demand her overriding commission for the
period of January 8, 1988 to February 5, 1988 and the audit of the company to determine her share in
the net profits.

Anay still received her five percent (5%) overriding commission up to December 1987. The following
year, 1988, she did not receive the same commission although the company netted a gross sales of P
13,300,360.00.

On April 5, 1988, Nenita A. Anay filed Civil Case No. 88-509, a complaint for sum of money with damages
against Marjorie D. Tocao and William Belo before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 140

The trial court held that there was indeed an "oral partnership agreement between the plaintiff and the
defendants. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision.
ISSUE:
Whether the parties formed a partnership

HELD:

Yes, the parties involved in this case formed a partnership

The Supreme Court held that to be considered a juridical personality, a partnership must fulfill these
requisites:

(1) two or more persons bind themselves to contribute money, property or industry to a common fund;
and

(2) intention on the part of the partners to divide the profits among themselves. It may be constituted in
any form; a public instrument is necessary only where immovable property or real rights are contributed
thereto.

This implies that since a contract of partnership is consensual, an oral contract of partnership is as good
as a written one.

In the case at hand, Belo acted as capitalist while Tocao as president and general manager, and Anay as
head of the marketing department and later, vice-president for sales. Furthermore, Anay was entitled to
a percentage of the net profits of the business.

Therefore, the parties formed a partnership.

Villabert vs. Desierto
GR 166715, February 13, 2000

Facts:

An administrative charge for grave misconduct was filed against Villavert, Sales & Promotion Supervisor
of PCSO Cebu Branch. The Graft Investigation Officer recommended the dismissal of the case. However,
Deputy Ombudsman-Visayas issued a Memorandum finding Villavert guilty of the charge. Hence, this
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Sec. 27 of RA 6770.

Issue:

May decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative cases be appealed to the Supreme Court?

Held:

No. In Fabian vs. Desierto, Sec. 27 of RA 6770, which authorizes an appeal to this Court from decisions of
the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases, was declared violative of the
proscription in Sec. 30, Art. VI, of the Constitution against a law which increases the appellate
jurisdiction of this Court without its advice and consent. In addition, the Court noted that Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure precludes appeals from quasi-judicial agencies, like the Office of the
Ombudsman, to the Supreme Court. Consequently, appeals from decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman in administrative cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43, as
reiterated in the subsequent case of Namuhe v. Ombudsman.
Arturo de Castro vs. JBC
GR 191002, March 17, 2010

FACTS: These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming
compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the presidential
election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that “vacancy shall be filled within
ninety days from the occurrence thereof” from a “list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial
and Bar Council for every vacancy.” Also considering that Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department)
of the Constitution prohibits the President or Acting President from making appointments within two
months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except
temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public
service or endanger public safety. The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously
agreed to start the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice. Conformably with its existing
practice, the JBC “automatically considered” for the position of Chief Justice the five most senior of the
Associate Justices of the Court, namely: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C.
Corona; Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and
Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last two declined their nomination through
letters dated January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010, respectively. The OSG contends that the incumbent
President may appoint the next Chief Justice, because the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the
Constitution does not apply to appointments in the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the incumbent President can appoint the next Chief Justice

DECISION: Denied

RATIO DECIDENDI: Prohibition under section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a
vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the judiciary. The records of the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the framers devoted time to meticulously
drafting, styling, and arranging the Constitution. Such meticulousness indicates that the organization and
arrangement of the provisions of the Constitution were not arbitrarily or whimsically done by the
framers, but purposely made to reflect their intention and manifest their vision of what the Constitution
should contain. As can be seen, Article VII is devoted to the Executive Department, and, among others, it
lists the powers vested by the Constitution in the President. The presidential power of appointment is
dealt with in Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Article. Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition
contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could
have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They
would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being
equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely
in Section 4 (1), Article VIII.
Garcia vs. Board of Investments (BOI)
191 SCRA 288, November 9, 1990

FACTS:

Former Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC), now Luzon Petrochemical Corporation, formed by a
group of Taiwanese investors, was granted by the BOI for the transfer of its proposed plant site from
Bataan to Batangas and the shift of the plant’s feedstock or fuel for its petrochemical plant from
“naphta only” to “naptha and/or liquefied petroleum gas. In February 1989, one year after the BPC
began its production in Bataan, the corporation applied to the BOI to have its plant site transferred from
Bataan to Batangas. Despite vigorous opposition from petitioner Cong. Enrique Garcia and others,the
BOI granted private respondent BPC’s application, stating that the investors have the final choice as to
where to have their plant site because they are the ones who risk capital for the project.

ISSUE: Whether or not the BOI committed a grave abuse of discretion in yielding to the application of
the investors without considering the national interest

COURT RULING: The Supreme Court found the BOI to have committed grave abuse of discretion in this
case, and ordered the original application of the BPC to have its plant site in Bataan and the product
naphta as feedstock maintained. The ponente, Justice Gutierrez, Jr., first stated the Court’s judicial
power to settle actual controversies as provided for by Section 1 of Article VIII in our 1987 Constitution
before he wrote the reasons as to how the Court arrived to its conclusion. He mentioned that nothing is
shown to justify the BOI’s action in letting the investors decide on an issue which, if handled by our own
government, could have been very beneficial to the State, as he remembered the word of a great
Filipino leader, to wit: “.. he would not mind having a government run like hell by Filipinos than one
subservient to foreign dictation”. Justice Griño Aquino, in her dissenting opinion, argued that the
petition was not well-taken because the1987 Investment Code does not prohibit the registration of a
certain project, as well as any decision of the BOI regarding the amended application. She stated that
the fact that petitioner disagrees with BOI does not make the BOI wrong in its decision, and that
petitioner should have appealed to the President of the country and not to the Court, as provided for by
Section 36 of the 1987 Investment Code. Justice Melencio-Herrera, in another dissenting opinion, stated
that the Constitution does not vest in the Court the power to enter the realm of policy considerations,
such as in this case.
SANTIAGO VS BAUTISTA
Posted by kaye lee on 10:22 PM
G.R. No. L-25024 March 30, 1970 [Judicial Power]

FACTS:
Teodoro Santiago, a grade 6 pupil, was adjudged 3rd honor. 2 days before his graduation, Ted and his
parents sought the invalidation of the ranking of the honor students. They filed a Certiorari case against
the principal and teachers who composed the committee on rating honors.. Respondents filed a MTD
claiming that the action was improper, and even assuming it was proper, the question has become
academic (bc the graduation already proceeded. They also argue that there was no GADALEJ on the part
of the teachers since the Committee on Ratings is not a tribunal, nor board, exercising judicial functions,
under Rule 65, certiorari is a remedy against judicial function

ISSUE: WoN judicial function be exercised in this case.

RULING:
A judicial function is an act performed by virtue of judicial powers. The exercise of judicial function is the
doing of something in the nature of the action of the court. In order for an action for certiorari to exist,
Test to determine whether a tribunal or board exercises judicial functions:
1) there must be specific controversy involving rights of persons brought before a tribunal for hearing
and determination.
2) that the tribunal must have the power and authority to pronounce judgment and render a decision.
3) the tribunal must pertain to that branch of the sovereign which belongs to the judiciary (or at least
the not the legislative nor the executive)
It may be said that the exercise of judicial function is to determine what the law is, and what the legal
rights of parties are, with respect to a matter in controversy.

Judicial power is defined:

• as authority to determine the rights of persons or property.
• authority vested in some court, officer or persons to hear and determine when the rights of persons or
property or the propriety of doing an act is the subject matter of adjudication.
• The power exercised by courts in hearing and determining cases before them.
• The construction of laws and the adjudication of legal rights.

The so-called Committee for Rating Honor Students are neither judicial nor quasi-judicial bodies in the
performance of its assigned task. It is necessary that there be a LAW that gives rise to some specific
rights of persons or property under which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy
ensuring there from is brought in turn, to the tribunal or board clothed with power and authority to
determine
TROPICAL HOMES v. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY
GR No. L-48672, 1987-07-31

Facts:
 Tropical Homes, Inc. entered into a contract with Cordova (respondent)
 Cordova was informed contract was cancelled due to non-payment of installments for a period
of seven (7) months
 Cordova filed a letter-complaint with the DOT asking for a refund of the total payments he made
amounting to P8,627.86.case was referred to respondent National Housing Authority (NHA)

Issue: whether Presidential Decree No. 1344, in relation to Presidential Decree No. 957, giving the
National Housing Authority exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving the real estate business and
limiting the appeal from such decisions only to the President of the Philippines, is constitutional.

HELD:
Tropical Homes, Inc. be ordered to refund to Arturo Cordova78, P.D. No. 1344 was passed
National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following
nature:
a) Unsound real estate business practices; b ) Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by sub-
division lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or
salesman; The decision of the National Housing Authority shall become final and executory after the
lapse of fifteen (15) days from the date of its receipt. It is appealable only to the President of the
Philippines TH went to Office of the pres, The President failed to act on the appeal.TH petition for
certiorari and prohibition with writ of preliminary injunction ISSUE: The only issue raised in this petition
is the constitutionality of P.D. No. 1344.TH - P.D. No. 1344 is unconstitutional on grounds that a) it
deprives herein petitioner access to courts of law and b) the manner of appeal provided for therein is
violative of due process.HELD: The right to appeal is not a natural right nor a part of due process, except
where it is granted by statute in which case it should be exercised in the manner and in accordance with
the provisions of law. (Bello v. Francisco, 4 SCRA 134; Rodriguez v. Director of Prisons, 47 SCRA 153). In
other words, appeal is a right of statutory and not constitutional origin.There is no question that a
statute may vest exclusive original jurisdiction in an administrative agency over certain disputes and
controversies falling within the agency's special expertise. The very definition of an administrative
agency includes its being vested with quasi-judicial powers. The ever increasing variety of powers and
functions given to administrative agencies recognizes the need for the active intervention of
administrative agencies in matters calling for technical knowledge and speed in countless controversies
which cannot possibly be handled by regular courts.The fact that P.D. No. 1344 does not specifically
provide for judicial review of NHA decisions affirmed or reversed by the President, does not necessarily
preclude judicial review.We, therefore, hold that P.D. No. 1344 in so far as the vesting of exclusive
original jurisdiction over cases involving the sales of lots in commercial subdivisions to NHA and the
mode of appeal provided therein are concerned, is not unconstitutional
LINA vs. PURISIMA (GR No. L-39380)
April 14, 1978

RELATED PROVISION/S:
Art. VIII. Sec. 5 (in relation to the power of the Supreme Court to disregard its own rules)

FACTS:
1. Lina is a bookkeeper at the Philippine Veterans Bank. She is dismissed from work for being
“notoriously undesirable” pursuant to LOI 14 and 19-A.
2. She files a petition for mandamus (to restore her to position in bank) with the CFI Manila, but
her petition is dismissed.
3. Reason for dismissal: General Order No. 3 (1972) removes the issue of the validity or legality of
presidential decrees, orders, or acts from the jurisdiction of the judiciary. Because Lina’s dismissal was
pursuant to an LOI, the validity or legality of said act is beyond the power of the court to review.

KIND OF CASE/PETITION: Petition to for certiorari and mandamus to annul the orders of dismissal issued
by respondent judge and to command the said respondent to decide the case on the merits

ISSUES:

1. W/N the orders of dismissal are valid

2. W/N the SC can decide on the merits of the case (note: not an express issue in the case, but
might be the relevant issue for recits)

HELD/RATIO:
1. NO
- The SC has always deemed General Order No. 3 and its amendments to be inoperative. It is for
the Court to decide whether or not they may take cognizance of any case involving the validity of
executive acts.

2. YES
- Ordinarily, the Court would direct the petitioner’s case to be tried and decided by respondent
judge on the merits.
- But all the facts are available for the Court itself to decide on the merits.
- When a case is elevated to the Court for the correction of a procedural error and it has been
found that there was indeed a mistake, and all the facts are available for the Court to decide on the
merits, in the interests of justice, the Court may at its option dispense with the usual procedure and
resolve the issue on its own. Otherwise, expenses would only increase and justice would be uselessly
delayed.

RULING:
During the pendency of the case, respondents reinstated petitioner and paid her backwages plus costs
of the suit (but Lina still didn’t report for work). Respondent judge’s order set aside and Lina ordered to
go back to work on pain of losing her job.
PACU vs. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION
G.R. No. L-5279 | October 31, 1955

Constitutional Law | Judicial Department | Judicial Power

Bona fide suit — cases and controversies where one actually sustains [or is in danger of sustaining]
injury … mere apprehension [of an injury] is not enough.

FACTS:
Petitioner Philippine Assoc of Colleges and Universities (PACU) assails the constitutionality of Act No.
2706 as amended and RA 139. Act No. 2706 provides that before a private school may be opened to the
public, it must first obtain a permit from the Sec. of Education, which they aver restrains the right of a
citizen to own and operate a school. Said Act also confers on the Sec. of Education the duty to maintain
a general standard of efficiency in all private schools xxx. PACU contends this confers unlimited power
constituting unlawful delegation of legislative power. On the other hand, RA 139 confers upon the Board
of Textbooks power to review all textbooks to be used in private schools and prohibit the use of those
deemed, in sum, unsuitable. PACU avers this is censorship in “its baldest form”.

ISSUE:
May PACU validly assail the constitutionality of foregoing statutes?

HELD:
No. The action is premature. There is no justiciable controversy as petitioners have suffered no wrong
and therefore no actual and positive relief may be had in striking down the assailed statutes.* Petitioner
private schools are operating under the permits issued to them pursuant to the assailed Act, and there is
no threat, as they do not assert, that the Sec. of Education will revoke their permits. Mere apprehension
that the Secretary might, under the law, withdraw the permit does not constitute a justiciable
controversy. Petitioners also do not show how the “general standard of efficiency” set by the Secretary
has injured any of them or interfered with their operation. It has not been shown that the Board of
Textbooks has prohibited certain texts to which petitioners are averse and are thereby in danger of
losing substantial privileges or rights.

Bona fide suit — cases and controversies where one actually sustains injury from the operation of the
law. The authority of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of a law is legitimate only in the last
resort, and as necessity in the determination of real, vital controversy between litigants (PACU v.
Secretary of Education, 97 Phil 806, 810)
People vs Vera
G.R. No. L-45685 – November 16, 1937

Mario Cu-Unjieng was convicted in a criminal case. He applied for PROBATION under the provisions of
ACT # 4221. He insists that he is innocent of the crime for which he has been convicted and that he has
no prior criminal record and he would observe good conduct in the future.

The matter was referred to the Insular Probation Office, but the Office DENIED THE PROBATION.
Nevertheless, Judge Vera heard the petition. The City Fiscal obviously opposed the grant of probation.

Facts
Petitioners challenged the provisions of the Probation Act (Act No. 4221) saying that the said Act is
unconstitutional as it is an invalid delegation of legislative powers to provincial boards.

The challenged provision thereof reads, “This act shall apply ONLY in those provinces in which the
respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than
those now provided for provincial fiscals.”.

Issue
Whether or not the Probation Act constitutes an invalid delegation of legislative powers.

Ruling
Yes.

The effectivity of the Act was made to depend upon an act to be done by the provincial boards, that is,
the appropriating of funds for the salary of the probation officer.

But the act does not fix and impose upon the provincial boards any standard or guide in the exercise of
this discretionary power. What is granted is a roving commission.

LAW INVALID. UNDUE DELEGATION.

Sotto v. Commission on Elections
76 Phil. 516, G.R. No. L-329 April 16, 1946

Facts:
V. Sotto filed for a review for the decision of COMELEC declaring E. Javier as the true and legitimate Pres.
of the Popular Front(Sumulong) Party. Sotto contends that he is the President.

Issue:
W/N the Supreme Court(S.C) can review Sotto’s petition under sec.9 of the Commonwealth Act 657 w/c
states that any decision, order or ruling of COMELEC may be reviewed by the SC by writ of certiorari in
accordance with the Rules of Court or w/ such rules as may be promulgated by the SC

Held:
No. The words “may be reviewed by writ of certiorari” does not refer to the special civil action of
certiorari. Sotto filed a special civil action of review of decision w/c means that the SC can only review
the acts of the inferior court, board or officer exercising judicial functions when it acted in excess of
his/its jurisdiction (not the review of the actual decision of the lower court w/c should be filed as an
appeal)
TAÑADA vs. CUENCO, et al
G.R. No. L-10520 | 103 Phil 1051 | February 28, 1957 |

FACTS:
Pending before the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) was an election protest filed by members of the
Citizens Party (CP) who lost to members of the Nacionalista Party (NP). The Senate was at the time
composed of 23 members of the NP and one of the CP — petitioner Sen. Tañada. When the SET was
being organized, Sen. Tañada, in behalf of the CP, nominated himself alone. Sen. Primicias, a member of
the NP, then nominated “not on behalf of the [NP] but on behalf of the Committee on Rules of the
Senate” Sens. Delgado and respondent Cuenco “to complete the membership of the Tribunal”. This he
claims is the mandate of the Constitution which reads: “xxx Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of
nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court xxx and the remaining six shall be
Members of the [House] who shall be chosen by each House, three upon nomination of the party having
the largest number of votes and three of the party having the second largest number of votes therein.
xxx.” Over the objection of Sen. Tañada, Sens. Delgado and Cuenco were chosen to sit in the SET. Sen.
Tañada now contests them in Court. Respondents aver, among others, that the SC has no jurisdiction on
the matter as the issue is a political question and not judicial.

ISSUE:
Is the issue a political question beyond the ambit of judicial inquiry?

RULING:
No. The issue at bar is not a political question for the Senate is not clothed with “full discretionary
authority” in the choice of members of the SET.¹ The exercise of its power thereon is subject to
constitutional limitations. It is clearly within the legitimate prove of the judicial department to pass upon
the validity the proceedings in connection therewith. We have not only jurisdiction, but also the duty to
consider and determine the principal issue² raised by the parties herein.

The question is said to be political when it is a matter which is to be exercised by the people in their
primary political capacity. It is judicial when it is a matter that has been specifically delegated to some
other department or particular officer of the government, with discretionary power to act. In short, the
term “political question” connotes a question of policy; that is, it refers to “those questions which, under
the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or Executive branch of the Government.” It
is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure. (Tañada v.
Cuenco, 103 Phil 1051)

On the issue on whether the election of Sens. Delgado and Cuenco is valid, the Court ruled in the
negative. It was held that the clear intention of the framers of the Constitution in prescribing the
manner for organizing the Electoral Tribunals is to prevent the majority party from ever controlling the
Electoral Tribunals, and that the structure thereof be founded upon the equilibrium between the
majority and the minority parties with the Justices of the SC to insure greater political justice in the
determination of election contests. Thus, the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate
may nominate not more than three members thereof to the SET, and the party having the second
largest number of votes in the Senate has the exclusive right to nominate the other three Senators. The
Senate may not elect, as members of the SET, those who have not been nominated by the political
parties specified in the Constitution; hence, the Committee on Rules for the Senate has no standing to
validly make such nomination.
Agbayani vs PNB
G.R. No. L-23127 April 29, 1971

FACTS: Plaintiff obtained a loan from PNB dated July 19, 1939, maturing on July 19, 1944, secured by real
estate mortgage. On July 13 1959 or 15 years after maturity of the loan, defendant instituted extra-
judicial foreclosure proceedings for the recovery of the balance of the loan remaining unpaid. Plaintiff
countered with his suit against both alleging that the mortgage sought to be foreclosed had long
prescribed, fifteen years having elapsed from the date of maturity. PNB on the other hand claims that
the defense of prescription would not be available if the period from March 10, 1945, when Executive
Order No. 32 1 was issued, to July 26, 1948, when the subsequent legislative act 2 extending the period
of moratorium was declared invalid, were to be deducted from the computation of the time during
which the bank took no legal steps for the recovery of the loan. The lower court did not find such
contention persuasive and decided the suit in favor of plaintiff.

ISSUE: W/N the period of the effectivity of EO 32 and the Act extending the Moratorium Law before the
same were declared invalid tolled the period of prescription (Effect of the declaration of
Unconstitutionality of a law)

HELD: YES. In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: «The actual existence of a statute,
prior to such a determination [of unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have consequences
which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The
effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects, with
respect to particular relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official.» 4

The now prevailing principle is that the existence of a statute or executive order prior to its being
adjudged void is an operative fact to which legal consequences are attached. Precisely because of the
judicial recognition that moratorium was a valid governmental response to the plight of the debtors who
were war sufferers, this Court has made clear its view in a series of cases impressive in their number and
unanimity that during the eight-year period that Executive Order No. 32 and Republic Act No. 342 were
in force, prescription did not run.

The error of the lower court in sustaining plaintiff’s suit is thus manifest. From July 19, 1944, when her
loan matured, to July 13, 1959, when extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings were started by appellant
Bank, the time consumed is six days short of fifteen years. The prescriptive period was tolled however,
from March 10, 1945, the effectivity of Executive Order No. 32, to May 18, 1953, when the decision of
Rutter v. Esteban was promulgated, covering eight years, two months and eight days. Obviously then,
when resort was had extra-judicially to the foreclosure of the mortgage obligation, there was time to
spare before prescription could be availed of as a defense.
De La Llana v. Alba
March 12, 1982 |G.R. No. L-57883

FACTS:

Batasang Pambansa Blg. 129 entitled, “An act reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor
and for Other Purposes” was passed, providing for the separation of Justices and judges of inferior
courts from the Court of Appeals to municipal circuit courts (except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan
and the Court of Tax appeals). The honorable petitioner sought to prohibit the respondents from
implementing BP 129, alleging that the security of tenure provision of the Constitution has been ignored
and disregarded. Furthermore, they assert that the reorganization was done in lack of good faith.
However, the Solicitor General denies his claim and maintains that the allegation of lack of good faith is
unwarranted and devoid of any support in law, and that BP 129 was a legitimate exercise of the power
vested in the Batasang Pambansa to reorganize the judiciary.

ISSUE:

Was there lack of good faith in reorganizing the judiciary?

HELD:

No. The Court held that there was good faith in reorganizing the judiciary. Citing the separate opinion of
Justice Laurel in the case of Zandueta v. De La Costa, the Court similarly maintains that the passage of BP
129 was in good faith seeing as its purpose was for the fulfillment of what was considered a great public
need by the legislative department, not intended to adversely affect the tenure of judges or any
particular judge. While it is possible that the legislature could deliberately abuse the power to
reorganize the judiciary, thus lacking good faith, the Court is unconvinced that such was the case in this
situation. Thus, where the Court holds that the reorganization of the judiciary by virtue of BP 129 was
done in good faith, the “separation” of the petitioner due to the abolition of his office is valid and
constitutional.