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An Empirical Test of Stewardship Theory
An Empirical Test of Stewardship Theory
An Empirical Test of Stewardship Theory
Teaching (2005-2012)
Volume 3 Article 6
Number 1 Journal of Business & Leadership
1-1-2007
Steven Frankforter
Winthrop University
David Vollrath
Indiana University South Bend
Vanessa Hill
University of Louisiana , Lafayette
Recommended Citation
Davis, James; Frankforter, Steven; Vollrath, David; and Hill, Vanessa (2007) "An Empirical Test of
Stewardship Theory," Journal of Business & Leadership: Research, Practice, and Teaching (2005-2012):
Vol. 3 : No. 1 , Article 6.
Available at: https://scholars.fhsu.edu/jbl/vol3/iss1/6
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Peer-Reviewed Journals at FHSU Scholars Repository.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Business & Leadership: Research, Practice, and Teaching
(2005-2012) by an authorized editor of FHSU Scholars Repository.
l)al. i'. l'raniJ
I o rtcr. Vo ll ra th and II II Davis et al.: An Empirical
Journ al Test of Stewardship Theory
or Business ~nd L~aclcrs hip : Resea rch. Practi ce
. and Teachi ng
2007 . Vol. 3. No. I . 40-50
argue th at wh en situati ons at a co mpa ny favo r a stewardshi p- ex trin sic moti va tors. agent s w o ul d tend to shirk their
ori ented govern ance stru cture, th en steward-or ient ed execut ive s respons ibi I it ies .
should be employed as CEOs.
Quinn and Jones ( 199 5) and U zz i ( 1996, 1997) argued that, H y p oth es is I : Exec ut ives reportin g higher order need s
with ex peri ence, one can ident ify trustwo rth y age nt s and then motiva t ion w i ll be positi ve l y assoc iated wit h d irec to r
sa fely rely on th ese agent s to behave w ith se l f- r·es
trai nt and to o bser va t ion of steward ship-or iented CEO behav io r .
serve th e good of th e co mpany. Such individu als forge H y poth es is 2: Exec utives repo rtin g low ex tr in sic
relati onships w herein th ey crea te uni qu e co mpetit ive moti va ti on w ill be pos it ive ly ass oc iated w ith direc tor
adva ntages through inves tm ent in relati onship-spec i fi c asse ts obser vat ion of stewa rdship-ori ented CEO behav ior .
(Jones, 1995), pursuit of long-term val ue-bui ldin g strateg ies
( Davi s et al. , 1997), acce ss to propr ietary and/o r fi ne-grain ed I de ntifi ca ti o n : M anage rs id ent i fy w ith an orga ni zati on
inform ation (Uzzi, 1996) , in creased co mmitm ent and w hen th ey de fin e th em se lves in term s o f an orga n iza t ional
in vo l vement in th e affairs of th e fir m (Ya n et al. , 2002), and membershi p w herein th ey accep t it s m iss io n, vi sio n, and
improved access to key reso urce s (Uzz i, 1996). objec ti ve s ( K elm an, 1958; M ae l & A shfo t1h , 1992) . U nder
th ese co ndit ions, th e orga ni za ti on beco mes an ex tensio n o f th e
H y potheses: Testin g Da v is, Sc hoorman, and D onaldso n' s manager' s psycho log ica l stru cture (B row n, 1969) . A n
Heuristic identi fy in g manager inter prets co mm ents abo ut th e
orga ni za ti o n as referrin g also to him se l f or hersel f, all ow in g
We tes t th e mode l that Dav is, et al. ( 1997) proposed to manager s vicar iously ex per ience th e orga ni za ti on's successes
predi ct th e conditio ns fo r a stewa rdshi p-o ri ented co rporate and failu res (e .g. , Katz & K ahn , 1978 ; T urn er, 198 I ) . T his
govern ance to fl ouri sh. We o btained sur ve y responses and th en v iew of orga nizational identi fi ca t ion is co nsistent w ith
ass oc iated CEO- repo rt ed psycho log ical and situa ti onal factors stewa rd ship .
aga in st direc tor-report ed ob se r v:-~ ti o n s o f the stewa rd shi p W hen manage rs ex tern al ize 01·ga tin o iza
na l prob lems to
attribu te s o f th eir CEOs. avo id b lam e or sh ift res po nsib il it y to oth ers (D ' A veni &
MacMi ll an , \ 990) they cl o not id entify w ith th e organi za ti on
Psycholo gical Fa ctor s
nne! he/she w i ll v iew th e orga ni zati on onl y in in strum ent al
M o ti vation : Steward s are prim aril y moti va ted by hi gher term s, foc usin g on how using it may perso na ll y benefit him or
ord er needs, such as opportunity o f growt h, achieve ment . hern (Jenst> & M eck l in g, 1976) . T hu s, an orga ni zati onal foc us
affili ati on , and se l f-ac tu ali za t ion (Dav is, et al. , 1997) . T his required fo r identifi ca ti on is lac k ing. T h is is co nsistent wi th th e
d iffers fro m opp ort uni sts, w ho are mot iva ted by ex tr in sic age ncy theory perspect ive .
fac tors I ike tangible rell'a rds and incenti ves posse ss ing a H y po th esis 3: Exec ut ive s repo rtin g h igh identifi ca ti on
meas urab le market va lue. CEOs pr imar i ly mo ti va ted by hi gher ll' it h the mga ni zatibe
on w ill positi ve ly assoc iat ed w ith
order needs fi nd per fo rm ance o f or·ga tinonal
i za wo rk itse l f to cl irec tm observa ti on of stewa rdshi p-ori ented CEO
be a strong moti va tin g fac tor. Th e basis fo r the ass umpti on behav ior.
lin k ing th e pursuit o f hi gher· order needs to a stewa rdship
ori entati on ca n be fo un d in m ost of th e estab li shed th eo ri es o f Va lu e co mmitm en t: Va lue co mmitm ent is th e be li ef in and
moti va ti on, in pa rti cul ar, hig her Ol'dcr needs as descri bed by :~ccep t a n ce o f orga nization al goa ls and va lu es (Mayer and
M aslow's hi erarc hy ( 1970) , A lder fer' s growth need ( 1972). and Schoo rm an, 1992) . T he se l f- im age o f o rga ni zat ionall y va lue-
th e achi eve ment and affili ati on needs of M cC lelland ( 1975) co m m itt ed managers refl ects t he co m pany ' s im age (Ecc les &
and M cG regor ( 1967). O pportuni sts, look at work No hr ia, l ':t J2) . Va lue co mm itt ed exec uti ve s d c tin e th em selves
in strum entall y, expend in g effo rt s w hen th ere is materi al in term s of th eir mem bership in th eir parti cul ar organi zati ons
compensati on for th eir effo rts (Fa ma & Jense n, 1983) . (Mae l & A shfo rth , 1992) , prod uc ing a sa ti sfy in g re lati onship
A steward w ill tend to be int r insica ll y moti va ted and wi ll (S uss man & V ecc hi o. 1982) . V alue co m m itt ed exec uti ves
form int ern al chall enges th :-~ t lead to hi gher leve ls of possess a psycho log ica l al ignm ent w ith th eir organ izati ons o r
perform ance as w ell as sa t i s f;:~ c ti o n w ith hi s/her wo r" . pri ncipals because th ey shar·e th e sam e v ision. va lues. and
Hac k man and O ld ham ( 197 6) argued th at three psycho ica l log mi ss ion, and exe rt co nsiderab le effort to sec th at th e
states (experi enced mea ni ng fu lness o f wo rk, ex peri ence d o rg ;:~ni z a ti o n succee ds (D::tv is, et al .. 1997). Co nve rse ly,
responsib ility for outcomes. and k no w ledge o f actual result s) opport uni sts tend to p lace import ance on m::tal teri ga in ra th er
media te th e relati onship betwee n task character isti cs and th :1 r1 va lu es . e)ckTh la co m mitm ent o r all egia nce to
int ern al work mot iva ti o n. T his model o f wo r·k moti va t io n i ~ one orgar1i zat io ns. v iew ing th e fi rn1 as an in strum ent 11·ith w hi ch to
o f th e foun dati onal ass umpt ions o f stewil ry rdshi p th eo M:~ n z achi
oI :1in
atc
eve(Fa
r·iper·s
ma ar1 lm :J grt nd Jensen, 1983).
( 1986) argued th at se l f- e fl~ caC). se l f-determinati on. and
H y po tl11:s
is ~: Ex ec uti ves report ing hi gh i ll va lunte
fee lings of purpose are c h :~ rac t c ri zcd as bt> ing n it ica l
co mm itm t> 11 be positi ve !) ass oc iated w ith direc to r
determin ants of intr in sic moti va ti on. Co nve l r ·sc y, th e age ncy
obser va ti on o f stewa rd ship-ori ented CEO behav io r-.
approach emphas ize th e ro le o r ex tr in sic rewa rds in
moti va tin g a CEO, em p inloy
g a tit - lo r- tat perspec tive in w hi ch Pe r so n a l Power : G ibson, l van cev ich ::tnd Donn ell y ( 1991)
rewa rds are conti ngent on effo rt and tang ib le result s. Absent clas sifi ed powe r as eith er perso nal or in stituti
onal . A manage r's
https://scholars.fhsu.edu/jbl/vol3/iss1/6 41 2
Dm is. F ra n ~ lon er. Vo
h. and
llrat Davis et al.: An Empirical Test of Stewardship
II ill Theory
Journal of Business and Leadership: Research, Practi ce. and Teaching
2007 . Vo l. 3. No . I. 40-SO
board s of directors of th ese co mpani es in 1997 . Th e res ult o f co mponent item s indi cated a three -co mponent so lut io n. Th e
th e initi al mailing and fo ll ow- ups is th at 16 1 d irec tors and 135 first co mponent ( identifi cati o n) had si x it em s and ex plai ned
CEOs responded . Stati sti ca l tes ts comparin g th e mea n response 23.4% o f th e va ri ance, th e second ( in vo l vem ent) had three
for th e va ri abl es betwee n w aves o f data co ll ec tion were it ems and ex p lain ed an additi onal 16 .9% of th e vari ance, and
insignifica nt , sugges tin g th at later res pondent s we1·e simil ar to th e third (c ul tu re) had fi ve items and ex pl ained an add iti onal
earli er respondent s. W e y ielded I 02 matched pairs o f CEO and 15.4% o f th e va1·iance. The sca les fo r th e depend ent and
direc tor respon ses. Miss ing data redu ced th e number o f in dependent va ri ab les appear in appendi x A .
companies in o ur analys is to 100 . T hi s stud y mee ts th e
minimum acceptable response rate o f 20% for dsm vey -base C o ntr
oal Va ri bles
resea rch ( H itt . Hosk inso n, Jo hn son. & M oese l, 1996) .
We inc lud ed se ve n co ntro l va ri ab les co mm o nly fo un d in
Unmatched res ponses were used in our fac tor an::l liys s. but
co rp orate govern ance resea rch: Pro fit abilit y, cap ital
we re di scard ed before we tes ted hypoth eses.
ex pend itures, stoc k o w nership , dualit y, fir m size, lo ng-t erm
compensati on. and board tenure. Th ey are co ntro l va ri ab les in
Dependent Variabl e
th e usual, stati sti ca l se nse o f th e ter m . In multi ple regress io n
We mea sured th e dependent va ri able with d irec tor surve ys. analys is, th ey may co mpete wi th our hypoth esized co rrelates to
W e deve loped an eight-item scale as ses sin g th e lea dershi p account fo1· vari ance in th e dependent va ri ab le. A lth o ug h we d o
approach th eir C EO ex hibited . A prin c ipal-co mponents fac tor not frame form al hy potheses in vo l v in g th ese vari ab les, we note
analysis determin ed w heth er a redu ce d se t o f the co m ponent th at each may serve as a mechani sm to co ntro l CEOs.
sca le items co uld be ex tracted. T he th re ho ld estab li shed in
Pro fit ab ilit y: Dav is et al. ( 1997) pred icted th at fir ms wi th
advance for th e se lec ti o n of fac tor it ems were a fac tor load ing
good ali gnm ent betwee n th e CEO phi losop hy and the fi rm 's
of .50 or greater and at least a .20 diffe rence betwee n th e item 's
gove rn ance stru cture wo uld tend to have supe ri or pro fit abi lit y .
loadi ng with its fac tor and eac h o f 1he other fac tors. T he
W e measured pro fi tabil it y as th e diffe rence betwee n fi nn and
analys is o f th e eight co mponenl items in dted ica a tw o -
th e mean in dustry relllrns on equit y, ba se d o n fo ur-d ig it SICs.
component so luti o n th at ex piJin ed 56 .-l 0 o o r th
e T1·ari
he an ce.
D ata we 1·e co ll ec ted fro m Rese:J rch al Insig ht.
first component poss ess ed fi ve items refl ec tin g a stewa rdshi p-
C apit Ex penditures: D av is. et al. ( 1997) argued that
ori entati on. T hese items w ere totaled for th e subseq uent
C EOs w ith a stewa rd ship perspecti ve wi l l possess a lo ng-term
analys is. T he seco nd co mponent co nsisted of th ree items
perspec ti ve fm th e firm and w ill pur ue strateg ies th at suppo rt
unrelated to stewa1·dship and wa s not use d.
long-term perf o, rm
ge anma ce lik kin cap it al in ves tmen ts.
Ind epend ent Vari ables Ca pi tal ex pendes itur we r·e com put ed as a fi rm 's capi tal
experes ndi tu d i v ided by its total asse ts and subt rac t in g th e
T he sured
independ
re m11 ithentC va1·iab les we ea EO equi va lent ind ustr ) mea n, aga in base d on fo u1 cted
·g-di
it SI
from
Cs. Data
surveys. W e empl oyed pre-p ub li shed sc ales to measure e fire co th l ve 11e le Resea rch Insight. p: ner s
of th e in depend ent va ri ab les ( hi gh order needs. ex trin sic t ock Ow hi W here CEO's ho ld gre at er proporti ons
mot iva ti on, va lue co mmitm ent , personal power. ndr p0 :J 11e Of kStOC
i. th ere II ll be grea ter degreeS Of al ig nm ent ll' itiJ th e
d istance) and crea ted new sca les to r th e three remai ning int erests o f th e firm and it s shareho lders (Ei se nhardt . 1988:
ind ependent va ri ab les ( identifi cat ion. i111 o lvemcnt , and culture) Jensen & M eck1.l in g, 976) W e co mp ut ed stoc k ow nerships as
usin g factor analys is. the perce nt age o f th e firm 's co mm o n shares held by th e
First, w e se lected th e fi ve pre-pub li shed scales. For th e first C EO/ nt.
e' ; Pr de D ata we re ectcoedll fro m proxy statements.
two, w e used Frankfort er, Dav is, & V o llr 's
a th 10- (:~00
item 1) Du ali ty: W hen th e CEO also serve s as c hair m thane of
hi gh order needs sca le and th eir 9- it em ex trin sic moti va ti on boa rd (co m rn o nl v refe rred to as the ndu al rn govc :J ce stru cture),
scale. Th e third w as a I 0-i tem sca le deve loped by Sc hec hter he/ she it ma) th e lim boa rd's co ntro l o f mana ge me nt
( 198 5) meas ured va lue co mm itm ent. Th e fourth and firth were ( D onaldso n & Da1·is. 1989 n.
ll iam
1985).
, 199 1: Dual
\.Viit y so
sc ales develo ped by Frost and Stahelski ( 1988) to mea sure is a dic hoto mo us va ri ab le in 11hich 0 represe s 111 out side board
power and po wer di stance . T hese sca les arc b:J scd upon leadership ( kn ow n as the in dependent governan ce stru cture)
French and Raven's ( 19 59) bases o f soc ial powe r and corts rec ande Is rcrr sehere nt i n ~ t a n ce s 11 th e CEO a lso ser ves as th e
se veral sca le form at co n fo unds fo und in prev ious resea rch. chai rm an o f t he boa rd . Data we 1·e co l lec ted f ro m proxy
Referent and ex pert power subsca les we re co mbin ed to fo rm an statement size:s. I'll
11 - item scale represe nting pe1 onal
·s powe r. Coe rc ive. F irm <.: siLc of th e firn1 ma y 1ntlucn cc the fo rm o f
legitim ate, and rewa rd powe r subscak s we re co mbin ed to form po we1· a l-oCt::O
r u ses. exa n1p le. a L'EO in a a) vny large fi rm
a 12-item sca le representi ng po,ver diSie sta11 Ce. 111 ce th es 11 not h:11e as mu ch t veopportunit
) thtoe d i1 ha ·ec co ntac t
scales had p1·ev io usly -estab l ished rel iabil it) (a lpha) 1neas u1·e<>. ncces sa1·) tL) t' Stabli ed
sh. wW
topersonal
e
r fi po wn co lll ll rm
fa ctor analy is wa s not necessa ry to for mul ate th ese ll1 c size by takin ogf the
the ltotn log numbe r of em p loyees
meas ures . ( F1·ank to n er. et <d., 200 I ). 1cd Datafrom
ere
11 co l l ec Rese arc h
Second , we appli ed facto r analys is to til t: CEO surve) S fo r I nsight.
onensa
co
: vc
th e three remainin g ind epend ent va r iab les. empl oy in g th e same ng-
Lu te rm mp ti E:-.ec uti co m pe nsa ti o n th at is
dec ision rul es w ith th e ind epe ndent va ri able s as we did 111 lo ng- term in natudre mi ght be u se to uea te ali g nm ent w hen a
determinin g th e dependent va ri able. T he analys is o f th e 1 -1 CEO is ass um ed to be opportuni sti c, rather th an possess 3
https://scholars.fhsu.edu/jbl/vol3/iss1/6 43 4
D:"kFr:
lon
>S. er.111
. and Vo ll ra th IIIII
Davis et al.: An Empirical Test of Stewardship Theory
.l oun wl or Ousin
css a nd Lc~ ders hip · Research. Practi ce. and Teaching
2007. Vo l. 3. No . I. 40-50
stcwa t·dshi p ori entati on (Jen se n & M eck l ing, 1976) . We Method
ca lcul ated long-term co mpensa ti on as th e percentage o f shon
Th e data for all but one of th e dependent, independent, and
term to total exec uti ve compensati on. T hese data were
control vari ab les were co ntinuous. The other one was
co llec
ted from proxy statement s.
di chotomous. T herefore, w e co ndu cted hypoth es is testin g using
Board tenure: With steward ship's emphas is on deve lopin g
multipl e regress ion analys is.
and maint ainin g long-term relati onships, w e anti cipate th at
C EO's wi th stew ard ship phil oso phies will tend to have serv ed Res ult s
on th e board for a relatilyvelong peri od o f tim e. Board tenure
wa s meas ured as :h e year th e CEO first began ser vice on th e Figure I di spl ays a v isual represe ntati on of the control and
boa rd . Da ta were co llted
ec from proxy statements. ex perim ental vari ab les.
C unlro al lc.
s:x\cs'ariahtc
l'ro llt:~hli>l y
Sloc k ownersl
C ap ll pe nd>tur
11p
D u:~ l >l )'
Fmn \ I ll'
I ll ll g_- l l: llll
'\ illCU
10
C 1llp 11 11
I)O aHJ IC i llll\..'
Tab le 1: D esc er·i ptiv S tati st ics, A lph as, Variation Infl a tion Fa c to r·s (VI F s ),
an d t h e Co n eiolat
n Matr· ix
Co ntinued tabl e I
In vo lve
- Culture Power Pro fi ta- Capital
k S toc Duality S ize Long -term
lll Cill di St (l llC c.! bi lit y Expendi - owners hip Co mpen-
lures sati on
Involvement
Culture . I5
Power di stan ce -. 10 -.24*
l'rotit abilit y 09 2 1* - 05
Ca pit al expenditures .05 . I0 -01 .07
Stock ownership .05 . 16 ()) . 19 - 16
Dualit y I7 . II -.23 * - 08 07 . 12
Finn size ()() 08 10 II 26* -.02 .22.
Long·tern
nsation
l cu mpL: -.06 12 06 I0 I ~ - OJ 2 1*
Board tenure - I t} -. 20 . 0~ - 16 -.06 -.23 * -.28 ** -. 14 -.04
• r < .05
.. p < .0 1
••• r < .oo 1
Tab le 2 shows th e mu ltip le regres sion res ults. Mode l I th e depend ent vari ab le, th e F stati sti c w ill not be stati st ica ll y
eva luates onl y the regress ion result s mea suring th e effect o f th e sionifi ca nt Th e res ults for model I show no exp lanatory power
contro l variables on th e depend ent va ri ab le (s tewa rd ship) . Thi s fo~ any of th e control variab les over th e depende nt va ri ab le.
allows us to di stin gui sh between th e effec t of th e con tro l and Sim il arl y, th e overal l mode l ' s ex p lanatory power over t he
th e experimental vari ab les o n th e depend ent variabl e. In thi s dependent va ri abl e shows an in signifi can t F of 1.5 8 and an
2
model, if th e co ntrol va ri ab les have no exp lanatory power over adju sted R of - .04 .
M odel 2 eva luates o nl y th e regres sio n res ult s meas urin g th e vMiab les do not interac t wi th th e ex perim enta l vJri ab les. th en
ef fec t of th e ex perim ent al va ri ab les on th e depe nd ent va ri ab le. th e res ults fo un d in m ode l 3 w ill be sim i lar to th ose found in
exc ludin g the effe cts of th e contro l va ri ab les. I f th e mode l 2 and mode l I . In thi s m ode l, in vo lve m ent and cu ltu re
ex perim ental va ri ables have ex p lanatory power· o ver th e contin ued to be stati sti ca ll y signifi ca nt , whi le hi gher mde r
dependent va ri ab le. th e F stati sti c wi ll be stati sti call y needs wa sll ystJt isti ca signifi ca nt onl y in th is mod el. Th e
signifi ca nt. We find th at mode l 2 show s good exp tory
lan:1 ove rall model 's ex plan atory powe r over th e depende nt var iabl sJr e
power of th e ex perim ent al va r·iabl es ov er th e dependent was imii to tha t o f model 2 , wi th a stati sti cal ly signifi ca nt F
vari ab le, w ith in vo l vement and cultur-e achiev in g stat isti ca l of 4 .53 and an adj usted R 2 of .36 .
signifi ca nce. The ove rall mode l 's ex plan atory power over th e W e co nducted hy poth es is tes tin g usin g o ne-ta il ed tests
dependent va ri ab le y ielded a stati sti ca ll y signifi ca nt F of 6.29 beca use d irec ti on was predi cted. H ypo th eses 6 and 7 ac hi eved
and an adju sted R 2 of .30 .
cleat· suppon in models 2 and 3, whil e hy po th es is I wa s
Mode l 3 di sp lays t·csult
or s f' th e full model. in clud in g both support ed onl y in model 3. Th us. one of th e fiv e psycho log ica l
groups of contro l and ex perim ent al va ri ab les . I f the co ntro l and two of th e tlll'ee situ at ional w ere stati sti ca ll y significant. Of
https://scholars.fhsu.edu/jbl/vol3/iss1/6 45 6
I )," , " l 1:111k1l o • 1 ~ 1 . VP III. :ilh
alld II III Davis et al.: An Empirical Test of Stewardship
ltHulla ll" " " ~Theory
ss 11d L~ackrs hip : R cs ~arc h . racti ce. "" d Teaching
200 7. Vol. 3 . No I . 40- SO
variab l lli es (' I ~O s ursuil o r higher (isli ypoI )orckr wa s Dav is,an,.1 .,ll oo Sc m1 1:. , & Do naldso n, L. 1997. Tow ard a
11<.:e '> lli es posili ve ly ass oc is
csis
cd
iCnl
ein
ri:11
cand
iab(w SiiU:lli
lc
li ycpo ilh OnaJ Sleward ship theo r y of manage menl. Aca d em y of
i ) pOih ~ l eOwa r rd s h ip . lli V:J s, VO Ve lll Ma na getmRev eu iew, 22: 20-47 lo.. I
es 6) ullur lli 7) we re posil i ve ly
a ~s oc i a l e d w ill!(.1997)
model
ory
sl
expsewael
l rd ship Ove
ycielded
a g r::~ ll , lli Davi l. DeA nge .. 1988 . M nnageri al co mpelili on, info rm ali on cos ts,
liip ood allitl power, ex plai ri nin ancc
canl g leve lsand
in models o l' co rp orate govern ance : T he u e o r acco untin g
hi g hl y sig nifi va 2 ::~ nd 3 . :h
He perfonn<tii Cemeas ures in proxy co nl ests. J ournal of
Acco unting and Eco no mics, 10 :, 3-36.
llbcu ss iou am i F uture v se is an
Donaldso11 L ., & Da v is, J. 1989 . CEO governance and
l)a el al. ( 1997 cuscd
s-o) nsli
rand
argued
rc I hal slewa rdship ::~ ge n cy shareholder return s: Agc ucy th eo r y o r stewardship
(l la1i ip cs ull as a ma ier c ho ol' ice bel wec n theory. l)apcr esenl cdpr al llic ann uii l meetin g of lh e
ag<:nl: s and nc ipals.pri O ur slud y find s 11i c C oc
ed
EO dlh-repon
c10r .:: a A ca, dem
c ge y o r Ma11a rn n1 W ashin gton, D .C. mtl. c
a nl cc~.: d c n! s
ror ~ 1 -:: ward s liip ss ia1 wi dirc
p c rcc pli o n ~ of' C I:O I) pe, cw u n s i ~ l c nl i11i c.:: II 4 o r I li e Dav is cl l)u hon L .. & Dav is. J. 199 1. Sl eward ship lheor y or ;~ ge n cy
;II ( 199nna 7)
rin·o
cll(li
cpr
ipalcc- mode 1n ge l. 1-'1 1n our rcse.!1 u
ig
wee
card
lh
lil
konal
co alll
cl,sli
:nc
ip<
nwoip-ori
:1
ds
caadd
lu ode
sl lli
r thi
enl co
sed<1-y: aliCgn1
I ~ O gove rna nce 8nd shareho lder rclurns.
ha we C811 il l'li c ew 11 111 A uslrali an Journal of Manage m ent , 16 : 49-64 .
.:: prin :1 1d C I ~ O s 11 c!\ i ~ l.
l ·cc k s, IC , & No llri:. , N . 1')92. Beyo nd th e hy pe. Boslon:
l lndin g~ llll 1r -, nillc i1 1l i1i
ll ;u·1ill·d<11 l l u hoo
-, <:: ss Sc l.
ilr<:: '> 1-'ir ~ l . i11 l csnl !in
eccd
lcw;
al
sc,g!h
ocd
c i'!li
ose e 1:1111
: 1cl<1rs .:: <, Jr bliip we
nllnn lli 11 dll 11d be pl· e ~c lll w hen ;1
lew;
ll!hal
e
ll dlrl·C
mW!li
lI'dleIO
Wc'>1:0 I
l : i ~c i J h ; lrdl , K . 19 8X I-Ih
.nryo n
and
A ge cy-
in s tiluli :J eo
ei ve '> '> hil i< mo ( 1')~ 5 )
<trg 11 OI
ed
01:1ekn
11!cal
11 lll own u urc w hirsall ch cd,
yiacl
e ca
igcrs
bc
slso
lll(lll
yi olsl'ra1
agc n1k
w:t sho ill
cxp l ; u ~;JI I O II S or
Th se rcl ail
a, cnsal
I sales
. cnt
ion
, 31\'lanagt:
.co
1: mp
Ac:td<:n1y of rn .lournal 488 -5 11
nuni c;ill am cy CO illr uld un vc 1:a
ppli ( 1 9~X) . () ui1111 :111d Junes ( 1995) . ami i IJ ;; 111 '. & .I ' ~'>e n , M . I 'JS J. p:traliSc on o f' ownershi p and
( 1996 u1
p/o
ail
nc
) rspro
nh
ary
a!
cv idcncc
vd
:. ide
irec
O urar:.-
l urs
10 Ipercc
li e i vc u1dsl cll':l rd s C\l lllr or
CO il lru l. .l our nal Law & Eco nomic s, 2 6 : 30 1-325 . s
findin gs ow Ili lii !r i11 !li eclwiDlioen
snali I lipsyc
av e Cho I:Olog ical
C I:O 11li 1c1ors co nsisl rc p o n ~ am illlali 1:1·ank . 1{ . 1 9~X . l'a ss iou within reason: T he strat eg ic r ole of
<.: lll i11J s' al. ( 1997) dd
y ssn10dcl. emotions. New York : Norlo 11.r. o n
Seco nd , 1hi ~ llld :1 lo prccc arch
vvai
ly
1n)
d
iuus
oy
III
)orc
ld:
.vi1sc:1
by
idcd
1g
C
rese
orpo
rch
C by andral
eIS boc l<trgo111pl
vc m :
'> UI vcy- sc 11:1 p1 il! dirc c l o r~ C I : O ~ al lli l: rankl .:: S., Da v is, J ., & Vo ll .-a tli , 1cc')
) . _()0
ement
s 1. W hy impl
s: CQ J1:1 tn !li e du ._:e;tl gove rnan ce lru lm Mu ch :td o aboo.ul so melhin
<t :thilil <1 1d is lli crerm c li111il cd i11 Ce il ~ nlral Busin ess Review XX : Ll -9 .
lil'cdi ctisve l il y.<thi Thi is I ru e u i" prev ious 1rcnc hliplliorcsc:
agucd
as
i' a b ge cy
Frencl1
. J., & l{avc n, 13 . I 959eses
suc
. Thial ba or power . In D.
lli eo hi ce 11 hy in consislc
l e.
, l icW1ce ll ollndin gs vu
Ca rl wn : dghl
.), , (l Studies in Social Power. Ann Arbor:
1111 be 111 11 o ur sl ud
y oy ' sscr vc s rprim 1r dal<~
: ' "'..: as
ll ni vc rsi1 y oi" Mi c hi gan
, ln
es lilul for Soc ial Resea
rch.
dll iucsry
govc
e:-.a
l:lcusin
, rmplc
C\l g pri or
rurlllill')'
lli c d:ll
hc nc lll or :l
sec da da prov idin :1 ~ liiiiU:Ird lli lll lill o r Frusl . 1) ., & Sl:th c lsk i, t\ . 19XX
:tli
surclnenl
e. cTh
sysl
nl c
lll c:J
l'11111r
c:l
Ic l·cli
l'llilll
gm
c corc. rp OI' :I <.: Cc '> ui' l:rcnclil :tm Ra ve n '~ ha <;cs
or soc i:d powe r in
11ork g r o up ~ .l ourual of A pplied
y, IPsyc
Socho
ial log 8:
ES REFEltE NC 17~ - 1 X t) .
Yan , A , Ze"
McG regor, D . 1960 . The hum a n s ide of the e nt erprise. hu ( I , & 11 <1 11 . D . 200 2. Int erna
ents
oass
ti ignal nm
Yo rk: McG raw- ll ill . lo r ca ree r bui ldin g : A mod nships
el
at o f agen c: rel io and
psycho log ica I co ntractAc s. ad c my o f M a nagc mcn I
McGregor, D. 196 7. The profess io na l manager.
· Ne" Yorh. Rev'"iL , 27. '73-39 1
James Dllv is is an assoc iate pro fessor o l' rn anagc t ment <l No tre Dame ehe
cy
poll'her
teac
Univers
hes itbus
), ·e in s' li and
int ern ati onal bu s in ess . l ie is th e Jam es r . O'S· haughnChaeSS) ir of Fami l) Ent erpri es a nd scl'lee' as th direc to r of the Gigo t
Cent er for Entre :tuJie
preneuri
li e r tl s. (!CC il ed hi s lagc
il'h r.D.
merin ll ll ll fro rn th e Ll nil
1. Icrs ity' or 011'<1 lis rese:-Jrc h int erests
in clu de ste>va
ship
r eo
cl r·y th and tru st.
https://scholars.fhsu.edu/jbl/vol3/iss1/6 47 8
IJ.11 " · FrnnkliI>nh.
cr.; Vo llrat
Davis et al.: An Empirical Test of Stewardship
mel till ce.Theory
Journa l o rnus incss an d Leaders hip : Research . Prac ti and Teaching
200 7. Vo l. J. No . I . 40-50
Va ness;
• Hill is an nss istant professor o f management at Uni versit y of L oui siana, Lafaye tt e, w here she teac hes orga ni zati onal
behav ior and human resource management. he recei ved her Ph .D. in business from Carn egie M ell on U niversit y. Her research
int eres ts in c lu de stakeho lder th eory and bu inc ss ethi cs.
Appendix A
Sc ales
Depe
e (An
Varia
ndent
s\\ ercd bl b) directo"
)
Extrinsic Motivation
I. Recogniti on fo r yo ur success
2. Your status within the co mpan y
3. Your j ob securit y
4. Wages whi ch co mpare favo rabl y wi th others doin g sim i1M or same j ob
5. R~ s pec t and re cogniti on fromesout id the co mpa ur
ny
k lo r yo "or
nt of yo ur salar)
7. Opportunit y lo r yo ur advanng
omprai
cementse
Rece i vi fr th e b o:~rcl lo r ah.i we
<' ll cl one
9. Yo ur pcrso
I nCJ eco nomic gr~ in
s ~trongl~ Strong!)
D1 ag.rc:L· t\ greL'
ldcntilication
I. The longer I sta y with thi s orga ni zati on. th e harlk r it is to b n c SD I) u !\ SA
2. It wou ld be dirti cult
lo r me to adapt to a nc·wor on ga ni za ti SD I) u !\ SA
3. I wo uld give up a lot by lea ving thi s orgaon z1ti ati SD D u !\ SA
4. I would be wil lin g to stay wit h thi s orgaonnni until
ti I retire so I) u ;\ SA
5. If I dec ided to leave thi s organi zati on. it would be dirti n cultt
o C\p l ai to Ill ) so 0 ll A SA
fri ends and famil y
6. Man y chan ges wo uld have to occur in 111 ) present c ircumstan ces to ca use so I) ll !\ s,,
me to leave thi s orga
non
i u ni
Value Co mmitment
I. My va lues and th e organi zati on's va lu es arc very s imil ar SD I) u A SA
2. I am willin g to put in a great deal or c11 rt
obeyo nd th at norm all ) ex pected SD I) u !\ SA
in order to help thi s organi on
zati be succe>s ful
3. Thi s orga ni zati on inspires my hcstj ob pcr lo nn ance SD I) ll A SA
4. I usuall y agree with thi s orga ni zati on's p o l i c i ~s on important
el
crs perso nn mn tt so 0 u A SA
,,,,
5. I c ar~ about the fat e of thi s orgaon zni ati SD I) ll A SA
6. I tell my fri end s that thi s orga ni zati on i> a good pl ace to '""' SD I) u SA
7. Thi s is one o f th e bes t o f all orga nizatio ns lo r" hich to 11 0rl- so I) Ll ';/\
8. I am glad I chose th is organi za onti to "or!- fo r ove r otkr ss I wa co nsideri ng so D Ll S.·\
at the tim e I j o ined
9. I am proud to tell o
ers
on
>th
orga
I amnir.
th
part
at o f thi Hi SD I) ll A :0, •\
10. I el l> not intend to k <tvc th is o rga n tni ;_..1 io in th e fo re ~e \!abk: future SD I) ll !\ St\
https://scholars.fhsu.edu/jbl/vol3/iss1/6 49 10
Davi
er.
. and
s. Vollra
Frank fo rt th Hill Davis et al.: An Empirical Test of Stewardship Theory
Journal of Business and Leadership : Research, Practice. and Teaching
2007. VoL 3. No . I. 40-SO
Se ldom Otien
P ~rsona l Po wer
Pro mote
em th or reco1nmend
lore th 1n pro motion
2. Re comm
sem
e nd
fOr th
l\wa rd or co mmendati on
Give
emth hi gh I"K::i iOnn ancc ril tin gs
4. Prai em
se th
Give th em extra time off
('- Adv ise and ass ist them
7. Give them good ass signm e nt 4
8. Rel y on his/her good relations with th em to get the job done 4
9. Rel y on his/her people gettin g the job done because they do beca use they don' t
want to let him/ her down
I0. Set the exa mple and rel y upon hi s/her peo ple to lo ll ow hi s/her example
II . Rely on them thinking that it's to their advant age as much as it is to his/her to r
th
em to cooperate with him/her
Power Distan ce
I. Demote them or reco mmend th em lo r demoti on
2. Reco mm endsciplin th em loaryr di acti on or repr im ands
J. G i ve m th
eman lo w pe rfor ce ratin gs
4. Chewem tl1 out
5. Give th em ex a tr wo rk as puni shmc111
(, Let em
tl1ow kn th at I have th e ri ght to ex pec t to have my orders fo llowe d
7. Expect th at my orders and requ ests will be carri ed out becausee I am th
boss and th ey will not ques tiom ter
on
o or
an
a s rd fr upai
ec them to fo llo w my orders beca use th ey rea liobab ze I thlyat pr ha ve
inform at ion they don't have ander
re
th efO a good reaso n for iss uin g (lil Y order
9. Ge t them to accoeish
mpl th wo rk by demonstrating th at I know how to
perlilrm th e task
I0 Impressem th with my overall
w mpcten
y cc And ab ilit
on th e sp0t
ectco rr lOllS
12. Gi ve em
th had assignm
se nt
Pleas«.: indi
e cat yo ur re~1 c t io n to each i.) r the 1t1 ll owin
g s t ~lt ~; IJ l e nt s .
Stron gly Strongly .
Di sagree Agree
111\'0 I' VC IIIl rtl
Within a year. the hoard will
co me be more in volve
d in how the co mp any SD D u A SA
spends money (R)
2. Within a ycQr. the iJOQrd
d wil more
llbeco me in vo ve wi th my deci sions. (R) SD D u A SA
J. Wit hin a yea r. the boa rd will act to promote
skier ri strateg ic dec isions. (R) SD D u A SA
SA
C ulture SA
I The board sees myvesble
initi
attra
QSaticre
c di Qnd ti ve SD D u A SA
2. The boa rd generall
y acce pts or complies with my initiati ves SD D u A SA
J. Th e hoard reli
cs on tru st more than on mechani sms to co ntrol me SD I) u A
The hoa rd wk es ea long-t rm more th an a short -term view of its relati
onship SD D u A
wi lh rn c
Within a year. th e boa rd willnot
cr
d Qchange
em y my pc >w an utl lOr it SD D u A SA
It is reve rse-scaled