Jn this article, select theories of self and cognition from the Indian tradition are exarsined and interpreted in light of comtemporary prychelegy. The affirmation cand demial ofthe slf in rexpectively the Upanisadie and Budethise traditions of India are explained and are critically compared rok her, Mebpng dr no Bit Prion and BF Shinncn i dopund chee praperty undewseand ‘he differing theories, it necesary we carefully amine aa gg that they affiros or deny in the name ‘of elf; on what grounds, and te whar Lemeguences. A theory of cognitian from the Advaita choot & Indian though is outlined and explained to indicate bev it enriches the view of tranicendenaa ‘lf n the Upanisadic radivion. This chery is shonn vo be constructivist im a way similar te Piay theory A meditative technique based om the Adoains theory of cognition is briefly described, an i pointed out how its successful practice leads 10 a deconstruction of the ego and also 10 impor: Grisential benefits. te is shown how the technique ube Provides a means to validate the theory A bricf account of « modern sage who succesfully follawed the Advaita approach to self-realrsation <0en by wy of a cae study to illstate ow i plays ous in real life The article is concluded wish “ tscusion on Indian and Western poychologies and implications for future research, Theories of Self and Cognition: Indian Psychological Perspectives ANAND C. PARANJPE Simon Fraser University Keywords: Atman, identity, ahamkira, €g0, self-realisation, cognitive construction The purpose of this article is to present theoretical perspectives from the Indian tradition on two topics of psychological interest—self and cognition The emphasis here is on illustrating how certain distinctive aspects of The author wishes to thank Prof. Dharm P.§, Bhawuk and an anonym- us reviewer for theit useful comments on earlier drafis of this article. Address correspondence concerning this article 10 Anand C Paranjpe, Department of Psychology, Simon Fraser University, 8888 University Drive, Bumaby B C, CANADA Vs A 156, i ca and Developing Societies 22,1 (2010): 5-48 Los n/New Delhi/Singapore/ Washington DC 133360902200102o ; .d in the Indian tradition. Ab in the heories of self and cognition iy ly accessing the classical wonky theories of self and cogy irect 2 7 . cs barrier for many in GPEGEY 2 jn Sanskait and Pal, cidhisteradiiom pics have been translated into works on # English as well as in many Indian lan; 8. ;rehensive accounts of ig i guages. Compre COR ¢ of schools and sub-schoals of Indian % eB! iporant sues om he ete io context ate meen thought are also widely avai S. Radhakrishnan (1923 : BySIN, Dssgapra (1922/1972) 90 7a ed Geo wokannca to Bring ‘ogether English translations of an . ¥ ede, a will as conceptualised in the Indian tradition. Rin ccukigy ce hilosophical issues, namely € Such literature generally focussed on philosop! contemporary psych- epistemology, axiology and soteriology. By and large, ah Saale dice! ologists tend to focus on empirical studies of psychological oo sei ches phenomena such as cognition and emotion, and are rarely inte W534/1958) philosophical implications. Besides, while Jadunath Sinha’s ( sao anal volume on cognition pulls together detailed references from the classical li erature, the ideas are expressed in traditional language and idiom without interpretation in light of the discourse in contemporary psychology. As a result, such an account remains opaque to the eyes of contemporary psych- ologists. The same is largely true of works by psychologists who have pre- sented Indian perspectives (Kuppuswamy, 1985; Safaya, 1976; Srivastava, 2001). The reason for the limited impact of traditional Indian psychology on contemporary psychology is the unmet need for the interpretation of traditional concepts in light of ideas, constructs and concems dominating mainstream psychology in India, which remains distinctly Western. This article is a modest attempt to remedy this situation. Here I shall try ‘© present traditional concepts in the language and idiom of contemporary Paychology. I shall attempt to focus on issues of relevance for contemporary psychology, and point out both similarities and differences between the Indian and Western approaches. The idea is not to attempt a routine compare-and- contrast exercise, but to try to reveal points of contemporary relevance that remain hidden behind differing styles and expressions of pre-modern and current times. A comparative Perspective is also expected to highlight the distinctive insights of each tradition that are mutually complementary. The complementary insights should help in developing a more inclusive and richer psychology than is offered by either Indian or Western tradition alone * (Paranjpe, 1984; 1998). language poses & of the Upanisadic and Bu virtually all the importantTheories of Seif and Coppition 17 One could raise there was no such ee vaeeee to this very enterprise by suggesting chat terms like Secdiddenn Deyehiaisey in the Indian tradition. Indeed, the fc snipas aceanl be ménasa-Sastra which are currently used to designate janie tii ine constructed from Sanskrit roots but never found alaph hesntce ae pes to such an objection it may be noted that, with founding of ieee pears began in late niineceenth century Ree rand and James, psychological thought was eee ase philasophy—and the same is true about Sree evertheless, it may be granted thac there are no exaet a indian tradition to key terms used here, namely, theory: cognition and even self. Besides, the term self is often used in English with radically differing connotations within the Western tradition ‘The same is true within the Indian tradition of Sanskrit and Pali for terms such as dtman and atta. As such, there is a need for carefully examining what the verms ‘mean in their respective contexts. In Indological literature, ithas been argued that systems of Indian thought called the darianas presented in, compendia such as the famous Sarva- darkana-sarhgraha of Sayana-Madhava (14th cent CE/ 1978) are not systems of philosophy in the Western sense. It hhas been recognised that there is 4 distinctive Indian style of critical reasoning called dnviksik? that is different from that of Western philosophy. The differences in these styles sometimes pose difficulties in communicating across the Indian and Western traditions Civen such difficulties, it would be useful to first briefly explain the sense in “pbich the term “theory” is used in the present contest: The Meaning and Nature of Theory In the present context, what I mean by the term theory is simply a set of con- cepts that together provide a systematic framework within which attempts are framed to understand a given set of phenomena and to effectively deal with them. In my view, elaborate and sophisticated conceptual frameworks for understanding what we now designate as self and cognition ate found in major systems of Indian thought such as che Vedanta, Sarhkhya-Yoga, Nyaya as well as the various schools of Buddhism and Jainism. The roots of the key insights regarding the selfare clearly traced to the ancient Upanisads, reaction to the Upanigadic “orthodoxy” . However, theand other sciences. So A ives, which I would here cat To some extent, traditional ees has called “patadigme,ie, theories, are similar to what ee foundational beliefs or axioms frameworks for thinking involving concepts, Jevant in this context—first, as well as values. There are two types of values —- ciinrdkcnkanc’ oe pee ook Dovecat ee reflecting the such as in spiritual vs. mundane sp! ene ae iia or relative importance of criteria for assessing the validity of coir iat the various elements that constitute paradigms, the criteria o ; such as observation, reason, predictability, evc., are matters of SBneRER: in epistemology, or the philosophy of knowledge. In modern psychology, which tries to closely follow styles of thinking in modern science, theory is primarily viewed as a tool for the prediction of hitherto unknown facts or relations among facts. Arguably, psychology’s enthusiasm for prediction follows from the highly successful prediction in physics of various subatomic particles. Inspired by the continued success of theoretical physics, modern psychology, has committed itself to the hypothetico-deductive model in research, which demands making Predictions—often called hypotheses—and empirically testing them The search for truth in the Indian intellectual tradition has rarely followed this particular model, [n the Indian tradition, by and large, the main thrust has been on the development of conceptual frameworks Primarily as a puide for living a good life thar interested individuals could follow. The test of a “theory” in this context is not so much as discovery of new facts Or pattern of relationships correlations”) among observations, but success in attaining individual human goals of enlightenment and inner peace. This stands in contrast with the goal of “prediction and control” of behaviour which mod- ern psychology followed within the Baconian tradition of Science. It would be made between satyam, meaning something that is universally and eternally or “absolutely” true, and 7am, which means a Tepeated pattern of relationships among observable phenomena, It should be clear that modern psychology, following the natural sciences, focuses on [tam. ot repeatable patterns oftradition looks far w ohcely may tum once api, Tegpinl vo theses 2 27 ae modern science to provid again to an insight from the recent history of the distinctive pane lea Context in which to understand and appreciate is that, as noted ne ke ies ou as self and cognition. The point patt of a broader y Kuhn (1970), theories or conceptual frameworks are eter he calls a paradigm, which in turn is ensconced in seas, ture of knowledge seekers in specialised fields of study. There coghinne ey (or axioms) unquestionably accepted by members of a = y of scholars, and these provide the foundations for the inquiry. urther, the consensually supported values of the knowledge seekers provide overarching goals for the inquiry as well as uphold and rank criteria for the validation of truth claims. To put it in other words, theories and paradigms are ensconced in, and supported by, larger cultures in a manner that Berger (1966), a sociologist of knowledge, calls the “sacred canopy”. Given that the Indian and the Western psychologies developed in cultures that were centuries and continents apart, there is a wide cultural gap thar stands between them. Therefore, for an effective communication between them, there is a need to examine the wider cultural context in which their insights emerged. As such, in the remainder of this article I shall first present the highlights of selected Indian contributions to the psychology of self and cognition, and then discuss them in light of understanding of the same issues in Western psychology in their respective cultural contexts. Self in Indian Traditions In India, mutually opposing theories of self developed in two rival traditions—the Upanisadic tradition affirming the self, and the Buddhist tradition strongly denying it. A closer look at these theories indicates crucial differences in what they affirmed or denied in the name of self (d#man in Sanskrit and asta in Pali), on what grounds, leading to what consequences. The mutually opposing views of the self stem from a basic human di- lemma, which is that, while most of us and for most of the time tend to experience an unfailing sense of continuing to be one and the same person, rsoms CON i multi i that under-10/ ANAND C. PARANJPE. “problem of identity” (Paranjpe. 1998). Some of the speakabout a changcless oman, he emphas scholarship. So, instead of talking z ised the cl in selfhood as th ae ee eee eae before startin, ei ark Le i ' ares oneself in ‘anv ethical-mspeey eee z 2 search for an elusive inner sof. For such persons, asking, 1 ach for an intangible self woud be distracting, I chere was someting presen ae unchangeable, one could say, why should one bother self-improvement? Against this background, focusing on the changing aspects of the self would seem to be much better than emphasising, that which remains unchanged. In fact, the denial of an unchanging self is an integral part of the Buddhist teaching. r Nevertheless, the overall thrust of these teachings is to overcome the nega- tive effects of an ego that identifies itself with the changing images of the self, and in this regard the Buddhist denial of the self is essentially consistent with the basic teachings of the Upanisadic tradition. To help understand how this is so, it is necessary to understand what the Buddha denied as the self, and why. As the famous story of Buddha's life suggests, as a young prince, Siddhartha, he was deeply affected by the sight of old age, sickness and death and thereby led to the conclusion that pleasures of life are ephemeral. When people take good things in life such as health, wealth and life itself as if they were everlasting, it often results in frustration and suffering. In this regard, he was no different from Naciketas of theUpanisads, who yearned for a ra- dical and permanent removal of suffering. However, unlike the Upanisadic seers who presumed an abstract and unseen reality underlying what one en- counters in daily life, Gautama Buddha believed in the reality in the changing world of ordinary experience. He concluded that the main cause of suffering was attachment to the desire for pleasures of life. Frustration: result when individuals develop an ego identified with those things they sh and hope—or rather presume—that they would continue to exist in. perpetuity. Stronger the ego-i volvement in. objects of pleasure, greater is the misery resulting from their loss. A basic conclusion in Buddha's thinking was that impermanence is sorrow, and framing an image of the self on the assumption of its permanence is dangerous.147 ANAND C. PARANJPE Buddha’s teachings, which were recorded by his disciples after his death, : are voluminous and complex, They are open to differing SATE BO and scholars are not unanimous on the issue of whether or not he admitted something enduring underlying the self Serious disagreement — followers is surely not unique to the Buddhist tradition; ie-was.crue o| most traditions of the world, including the Upanigadic and Sankara’s Advaita traditions. Indeed, with regard to many issues that lead to either/or type of answers, and people become involved in endless debates, Buddha preferred to remain silent. One such issue was whether there is something permanent underlying the changing, images of the self. Silence was golden in his approach; it avoided getting onto the horns of a dilemma. He was of course aware that the Upanisads had declared that true self was permanent and blissful (ananda). According to Dasgupta (1922/1975), “We could suppose that early Buddhism tacitly presupposed some such idea. It was probably thought thar if there was the self (atta), it must be bliss” ({p. 109). However, as Dasgupta points out, Buddha's conclusion was the converse of this idea: “that which is changing is sorrow, and whatever is sorrow is not self” (p. 110). Notwithstanding their doctrinal opposition to the Upanisads, Buddhist thinkers shared a dominant belief widely shared through the history of Indian culture, namely, the belief that human desires are insatiable, and that it is necessary to curb one’s desires, Indeed, that is the moral of the famous story in Buddha's life: that as a young prince he found no happiness despite the availability of all kinds of pleasures through wealth and power. The belief thar suffering often exceeds pleasures has found repeated expression in various sources such as Adiparva (75.49) section of the epic Mahabharata and the influential text Manusmrti (2.94; Manu, n.d./1971) where it is articulated in the following way: desires are never fully satisfied by supplying them with articles of pleasure; rather they keep intensifying like fire fed by a constant supply of fuel, The Buddhist Perspective is consistent with this pervasive theme of the Indian culture; it is an integral part of a “sacred canopy” (Berger, 1966) under which both the Advaitic and Buddhist theories evolved. Buddha emphasised that clinging to desires embedded in one’s ego is the root cause of suffering. He, therefore, presctibed a life of austetities to curb one’s desires, and a way of contemplation for realising the impermanence of the ego. Regardless of their irreconcilable doctrinal opposition, the Buddhist and Upanisadic theories lead to a common goal: | the dissipation of ego as a means to overcoming suffe ing, and the resulting |”continually thang open to di a Buddhis, desire: irect saaeneste ee aie that is claimed to be inden sr ae ae of consciousness. By contrast, what s—desires that the Poe eae ae aes iene ae eR unfulfilled ot are replaced with, other sige oe ic a ; - In either case, satisfaction remains relative 5 no limit to an increase in how much wealth or power one would wish, no matter how large the actual gain. In essence, the common. Indian teaching, whether in the Upanisadic tradition or in that of the Buddhist and Jain rebels, is for people to recognise that the chase of more and more of the good things in life leave an excess of wants over gains. While the >) Buddhists prefer to convey this by emphasising the despair associated with | the changing images of the self and the consequent frustration, the Advaita / 1. perspective tries to convey just the same teaching by trying to show that inexhaustible bliss is attainable by discovering the unchanging self behind the changing images. The foregoing discussion of the conflicting Indian theories of the self should make it clear that a meaningful comparison of theories demands a clear understanding of what is affirmed or denied, on what grounds and leading to what consequences. Given that Western psychology has also witnessed dia- metrically opposing views on the nature of self, we would remember the need of a similar critical examination of the prominent Western theories of the self. Hopefully, this cross-cultural framework for comparison would provide an opportunity for a deeper understanding of the underlying principles, a clearer picture on a wider canvas. Western Parallels in the Denial and Affirmation of the Self Turning now to Western psychology, the opposition between Skinner and Erikson in theories of self would appear to be the parallels of respectively the Buddhist denial and the Advaitic affirmation of the self. Here, a closer examination of the views of Skinner and Erikson in light of their historical roots and cultural contexts would help understand the nuances hidden behind the superficial similarities. Neither Skinner nor Erikson explicitly recognises