I.

EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS

DUMLAO VS. COMELEC (an old politician-valid-RATIONAL CLASSIFICATION OF A CLASS/equating as one class that of an accused and that
of a convicted of a crime-against presumption of innocence of the accused-invalid)

Facts:

Petitioner Dumlao questions the constitutionality of Sec. 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg 52 as discriminatory and contrary
to equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution. Sec. 4 provides that any retired elective provincial or municipal
official who has received payments of retirement benefits and shall have been 65 years of age at the  commencement of the term of
office to which he seeks to be elected, shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired. According
to Dumlao, the provision amounts to class legislation. Petitioners Igot and Salapantan Jr. also assail the validity of Sec. 4 of Batas
Pambansa Blg 52, which states that any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State, including those amounting to
subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or other similar crimes, shall not be qualified for any of the offices covered by the act, or to participate
in any partisan activity therein: provided that a judgment of conviction of those crimes shall be conclusive evidence of such fact and the
filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima
facie evidence of such fact.

Issue: Whether or not the aforementioned statutory provisions violate the Constitution and thus, should be declared null and void

Held: In regards to the unconstitutionality of the provisions, Sec. 4, Par. 1, of BP Blg 52 remains constitutional and valid. The constitutional
guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification, which means, one class can be treated differently from
another class. In this case, employees 65 years of age are classified differently from younger employees. The purpose of the provision is to
satisfy the “need for new blood” in the workplace.

In regards to the second paragraph of Sec. 4, it should be declared null and void for being violative of the constitutional
presumption of innocence guaranteed to an accused. “Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel (Article
IV, section 19, 1973 Constitution). An accusation, according to the fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt. The challenged proviso
contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from running for public office on the
ground alone that charges have been filed against him before a civil or military tribunal. It condemns before one is fully heard. In
ultimate effect, except as to the degree of proof, NO distinction is made between a person convicted of acts of disloyalty and one
against whom charges have been filed for such acts, as both of them would be ineligible to run for public office. A person disqualified to
run for public office on the ground that charges have been filed against him is virtually placed in the same category as a person already
convicted of a crime with the penalty of arresto, which carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension of the right to hold office during
the term of the sentence (Art. 44, Revised Penal Code).”
 And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie evidence, and therefore, may be rebutted, yet. there is "clear and
present danger" that because of the proximity of the elections, time constraints will prevent one charged with acts of disloyalty from
offering contrary proof to overcome the prima facie evidence against him.

Additionally, it is best that evidence pro and con of acts of disloyalty be aired before the Courts rather than before an administrative body
such as the COMELEC. A highly possible conflict of findings between two government bodies, to the extreme detriment of a person
charged, will thereby be avoided. Furthermore, a legislative/administrative determination of guilt should not be allowed to be substituted
for a judicial determination.

Being infected with constitutional infirmity, a partial declaration of nullity of only that objectionable portion is mandated. It is
separable from the first portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Big. 52 which can stand by itself.

Wherefore, the first PORTION of section 4 of Batas pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared valid and that portion of the second
paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared null and void, for being violative of the constitutional
presumption of innocence guaranteed to an accused.

When the portion can stand on its own independent of the invalid part then it shall be implemented separate from that of the latter.
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS v. QUISUMBING (work difference of 25% between foreign and
Filipino hired teachers as discriminatory on the latter’s part)

Fact: Private respondent, the School, hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying
the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires. The School employs four tests to determine whether a faculty
member should be classified as a foreign-hire or a local hire. Should the answer to any of four tests queries point to the
Philippines, the faculty member is classified as a local hire; otherwise, he or she is deemed a foreign-hire. The School
grants foreign-hires salary rate twenty-five percent (25%) more than local-hires. The School justifies the difference
on two “significant economic disadvantages” foreign-hires have to endure, namely: (a) the “dislocation factor” and
(b) limited tenure. When negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement were held on June 1995, petitioner
International School Alliance of Educators, “a legitimate labor union and the collective bargaining representative of
all faculty members” of the School, contested the difference in salary rates between foreign and local-hires. This issue
eventually caused a deadlock between the parties. Petitioner filed a notice of strike. The Union claims that the point-of-hire
classification employed by the School is discriminatory to Filipinos and that the grant of higher salaries to foreign-
hires constitutes racial discrimination. The failure of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board to bring the parties to a
compromise prompted the DOLE to assume jurisdiction over the dispute. DOLE Acting Secretary, issued an Order resolving the
parity and representation issues in favor of the School. Then DOLE Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing subsequently denied
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in an Order dated March 19, 1997. Petitioner now seeks relief to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Union can invoke the equal protection clause to justify its claim.

RULING: Yes. Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor Code. Article 135. And also, Art.
248 declares it an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate in regard to wages in order to encourage or discourage
membership in a labor organization. The same Code and the Constitution’s provisions impregnably institutionalize
in this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of "equal pay for equal work." Persons who work with
substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries.

If an employer accords employees the same position and rank, the presumption is that these employees perform
equal work. If the employer pays one employee less than the rest, it is not for that employee to explain why he receives less or
why the others receive more. That would be adding insult to injury.

The employer in this case has failed to discharge this burden. There is no evidence here that foreign-hires perform 25% more
efficiently or effectively than the local-hires. Both groups have similar functions and responsibilities, which they perform under
similar working conditions.

Hence, the Court finds the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to justify the distinction in the salary
rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification. There is no reasonable distinction between the services
rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires.
Conference of Maritime Agencies, Inc. vs. POEA

Facts:
The Governing Board of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) issued Resolution No. 01, series of 1994, amending
and increasing the compensation and other benefits under Paragraph 2, Section C, Paragraph 1 and Section L, Paragraph 1 and 2 of the
POEA Standard Employment Contract for Seafarers. POEA also issued Memo. Circular No. 05, Series of 1994 informing all Filipino seafarers,
manning agencies, ship owners, managers and principals hiring Filipino seafarers of the said adjustment.

Petitioner Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc., an incorporated association of licensed Filipino manning agencies, and its co-

petitioners, all licensed manning agencies which hire and recruit Filipino seamen for and in behalf of their respective foreign ship-owner-
principals, urge to annul Resolution No. 01, series of 1994, of the Governing Board" of the POEA and POEA Memorandum Circular No. 05.
Petitioners contend that POEA does not have the power and authority to fix and promulgate rates affecting death and workmen's
compensation of Filipino seamen working in ocean-going vessels; only Congress can. Governing Board Resolution No. 1: the POEA
Governing Board resolves to amend and increase the compensation and other benefits as specified under Part II, Section. C, paragraph 1
and Section L, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the POEA Standard Employment Contract for Seafarers.

ISSUE
WON the assailed issuances violated the equal protection clause of the constitution.

HELD:
No. There can be no dispute about the dissimilarities between Land-based and Sea-based Filipino Overseas Workers in terms of, among
other things, work environment, safety, danger and risks to life, and accessibility to social, civic, and spiritual activities.

ISSUE:
WON the POEA can promulgate rules by virtue of delegation of legislative power.

HELD:
Yes. The constitutional challenge of the rule-making power of the POEA-based on impermissible delegation of legislative power had been,
as correctly contented by the public respondents, brushed aside by this Court in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. POEA.
 The governing Board of the Administration (POEA) shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise of
the adjudicatory functions of the Administration (POEA).
 To many of the problems attendant upon present-day undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence to provide the
required direct and efficacious not tosay, specific solutions. These solutions may, however, be expected from itsdelegates, who
are supposed to be experts in the particular fields assigned to them.

While the making of laws is a non-delegable power that pertains exclusively to Congress, nevertheless, the latter may constitutionally
delegate the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies, for the reason that
the legislature finds it impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate situations that may be met in carrying the law into effect. All that is
required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction to
but in conformity with the standards prescribed by the law. (Principle of Subordinate Legislation)

That the challenged resolution and memorandum circular, which merely further amended the previous Memorandum Circular No. 02,

strictly conform to the sufficient and valid standard of "fair and equitable employment practices" prescribed in E.O. No.797 can no  longer
be disputed.
 II. SEARCH AND SEIRUES

STONEHILL VS. DIOKNO (ABSTRACT SEARCH WARRANT)

FACTS:  Upon application of the officers of the government, Respondents-Judges — issued on different dates a total of 42 search warrants
against petitioners herein and/or the corporations of which they were officers, directed to the any peace officer, to search the latter
and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the following personal property to
wit: Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and
other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss
statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers) as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense,"
or "used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense," which is described in the applications adverted to above as
"violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code."

Petitioners allege that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening the Constitution and the Rules of Court —
because, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not
mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the petitioners in deportation cases
filed against them; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized
were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law, the said petitioners filed with the
Supreme Court this original action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction, and prayed that, pending final disposition of the
present case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining Respondents-Prosecutors, their agents and /or representatives from
using the effects seized as aforementioned or any copies thereof, in the deportation cases already adverted to, and that, in due course,
thereafter, decision be rendered quashing the contested search warrants and declaring the same null and void, and commanding the
respondents, their agents or representatives to return to petitioners herein, in accordance with Section 3, Rule 67, of the Rules of Court,
the documents, papers, things and cash moneys seized or confiscated under the search warrants in question.

In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged, (1) that the contested search warrants are valid and have been issued in accordance
with law; (2) that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are
admissible in evidence against herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned searches and seizures.

ISSUE: WON the search warrants issued are valid.

HELD: With regard the search issued in the corporation – valid; with regard the search in the houses – void.
RATIO:
As regards the first group (In the offices), we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested
warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their respective personalities,
separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of
them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be. Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be
contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely
personal and cannot be availed of by third parties . Hence, petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of
the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above, BECAUSE the right to object
to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be
invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity.

Second in their houses: Indeed, the same were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had
committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words,
no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were  abstract.
Hence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes
the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or
committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do
not allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a
"violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code," — as alleged in the
aforementioned applications — without reference to any determinate provision of said laws. The warrants authorized the search for and
seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal.
The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus
openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights — that the things to be seized be  particularly described — as well as
tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants.
Gil V. Manlavi, complainant vs. Judge Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr. (Fish catching through explosives)

Facts:
On January 18, 1991 at Brgy. Mandaragat, Pureto Princesa City, complainant Gil Manlavi alleged that the accused
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously possess illegally caught assorted fish with the use of explosives weighing more
or less (8,000) kilos.  The complainant filed thereafter Criminal Cases No. 9210(Illegal Possession of Explosives
Intended for Fishing) and 9211 (Illegal Possession of Illegally Caught Fish) against the accused. The cases were
consolidated for trial at the sala of the Honorable respondent. The accused then moved to quash Criminal Case No. 9210 on the
ground that the evidence of the prosecution was a product of a warrantless and illegal search and seizure and
also moved to quash Criminal case 9211 on the ground that the information failed to charge the offense of illegal possession of
fish caught by explosives for its failure to allege the element of profit.
The respondent granted both the motion to quash the criminal cases filed. The prosecution moved for the reconsideration
of the order but was denied. The complainant then charged the respondent with partiality, miscarriage of justice and
knowingly rendering an unjust decision in connection with the dismissal of the Criminal Cases Nos. 9210 and 9211.

Issue:  
Whether or not the judge erred in dismissing the case due to warrantless arrest and search and seizure.

Ruling:   
NO. As to the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 9210, complainant himself admitted that the search and seizure was
conducted in the absence of a warrant and that the search warrant was only produced by the complainant after the
search and seizure took place.  The complainant invoked Circular No. 130(s.1967) of the Office of the President to justify
the warrantless search. The said circular pertains to the procedure in the confiscation of fish caught by the use of
explosives. Such confiscation may be exercised only by the Commissioner of Fisheries or his representatives who
can only take a sample of the fish caught (not to exceed one kilo) for testing if the fish were indeed caught
through the use of explosives. It is only upon the determination that the fish were caught through the use of explosives
when the seizure of the entire catch may be authorized. Thereafter, an appraisal of the value of the fish caught shall be made,
which shall be paid to the accused should he be subsequently acquitted in the criminal case filed against him. The arresting
officer failed to show compliance with the procedure prescribed by the very circular they invoked.
As to the dismissal of the Criminal Case 9211, though the respondent erred in holding that the information was defective
that the information was defective in not alleging that the offense was committed “knowingly” because the element of
knowledge was encompassed within the word “willfully”; however, the information failed to allege the element of
profit. Though it is true that Presidential Decree No. 704 prohibits the separate acts of possessing, dealing in, selling or
disposing of illegally caught fish and aquatic products, but said acts must not only be done “knowingly” but also “for profit”,
as essential element of the offense.
Republic of the Philippines vs. Sandiganbayan, Major General Josephus Q. Ramas and Elizabeth Dimaano (MAJOR GENERAL ALLEGED
RICHNESS WAS SEIZED IN HIS ABSENCE - no one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence

FACTS:
Immediately upon her assumption to office following the EDSA Revolution, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No.
1 (EO No. 1) creating the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) to recover all ill-gotten wealth of former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos. Accordingly, the PCGG, through its Chairman Jovito R. Salonga, created an AFP Anti-Graft Board (AFP Board) tasked
to investigate reports of unexplained wealth and corrupt practices by AFP personnel, whether in the active service or retired.
Investigations include the alleged unexplained wealth of respondent Major General Josephus Q. Ramas (Ramas), Commanding General of
the Philippine Army.

Evidence showed that respondent is the owner of a house and lot in Quezon City as well in Cebu City. Moreover, equipment
and communication facilities were found in the premises of Elizabeth Dimaano. Aside from the military equipment, the
raiding team also confiscated P2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars in the house of Elizabeth Dimaano. Affidavits of members of the
Military Security Unit disclosed that Elizabeth Dimaano is the mistress of respondent Ramas. Dimaano had no visible means of income
and is supported by respondent for she was formerly a mere secretary. With these, a prima facie case exists against respondent Ramas for
ill-gotten and unexplained wealth. The PCGG filed a petition for forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379, known as The Act for
the Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Property (RA No. 1379), against Ramas and impleaded Dimaano as co-defendant, in favor of the
State.

However, the Sandiganbayan subsequently dismissed the complaint because there was an illegal search and seizure of the
items confiscated. The first Resolution dismissed petitioners Amended Complaint and ordered the return of the confiscated items
to respondent Elizabeth Dimaano, while the second Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, this appeal to SC.
Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan erred in declaring the properties confiscated from Dimaanos house as illegally seized and
therefore inadmissible in evidence.

Issue:
Whether or not the search of Dimaano’s home was legal.

Held:
NO. The search of Dimaano’s home was NOT legal. It is true that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not
operative during an interregnum (any period during which a state has no ruler or only a temporary executive). However, the protection
accorded to individuals in International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Covenant) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(Declaration) remained in effect during the interregnum.
 When constitution or Bill of Rights existed, directives and orders issued by government officers were valid so long as these
officers did not exceed the authority granted on them. The raiding team seized the items detailed in the seizure receipt together with
other items not included in the search warrant. Dimaano was also not present during the raid (only Dimaano's cousins witnessed the
raid).

Under Article 17(1) of the Covenant, the revolutionary government had the duty to insure that no one shall be subjected to
arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence. The Declaration provides in its Article 17(2) that no
one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property. Thus, the revolutionary government is obligated under international law to
observe the rights of individuals under the Declaration.
Nolasco vs. Cruz Pano (GENERAL WARRANT, NO SPECIFIC DESCRIPTION – MEMBERS OF NPA)
FACTS:
(At 11:30 A.M. on August 6th) Aquilar-Roque and Nolasco were arrested by a Constabulary Security Group (CSG) at the intersection
of Mayon Street, Quezon City. The record does not disclose that a warrant of arrest had previously been issued against NOLASCO.

(At 12:00 N. on August 6th) On the same day, a searched was conducted. Ct. Col. Virgilio Saldajeno; (On August 6th, at around 9:00
A.M) applied for search warrant from the respondent judge Cruz-Pano, to be served at the leased residence of AGUILAR-ROQUE, after
almost a month of "round the clock surveillance" of the premises as a "suspected underground house of the CPP/NPA." AGUILAR-ROQUE
has been long wanted by the military for being a high ranking officer of the Communist Party of the Philippines, particularly connected
with the MV Karagatan/Doña Andrea cases.

The searching party seized 428 documents and written materials, and additionally a portable typewriter and 2 wooden boxes.
The City Fiscal filed the information for violation of PD No. 33, Illegal Possession of Subversive Documents.

Petitioners contend that the Search Warrant is void because it is a general warrant since it does not sufficiently describe with
particularity the things subject of the search and seizure and that probable cause had not been properly established for lack of searching
questions propounded to the applicant’s witness.

ISSUE:
WON the search warrant was valid?

HELD:
NO, the search warrant was not valid. Section 3, Article IV of the Constitution, guarantees the right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose. It also
specifically provides that no Search Warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the Judge or such other
responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized.

It is at once evident that the foregoing Search Warrant authorizes the seizure of personal properties vaguely described and not
particularized. It is an all- embracing description which includes everything conceivable regarding the Communist Party of the Philippines
and the National Democratic Front. It does not specify what the subversive books and instructions are; what the manuals not otherwise
available to the public contain to make them subversive or to enable them to be used for the crime of rebellion. There is absent a definite
guideline to the searching team as to what items might be lawfully seized thus giving the officers of the law discretion regarding what
articles they should seize as, in fact, taken also were a portable typewriter and 2 wooden boxes.
 It is thus in the nature of a general warrant and infringes on the constitutional mandate requiring particular description of the
things to be seized. In the recent rulings of this Court, search warrants of similar description were considered null and void for being too
general.
Umil vs. Ramos (arrest without warrant a justified for it is within the contemplation of Section 5 Rule 113, Dural was committing an
offense, when arrested because he was arrested for being a member of the New People's Army, an outlawed organization, where
membership is penalized and for subversion
 
Facts: The Regional Intelligence Operations Unit of the Capital Command (RIOU-CAPCOM) received confidential information about a
member of the NPA Sparrow Unit (liquidation squad) being treated for a gunshot wound at the St. Agnes Hospital in Roosevelt Avenue,
Quezon City. It was found that the wounded person, was Ronnie Javelon, who is actually Rolando Dural, a member of the NPA liquidation
squad, responsible for the killing of two (2) CAPCOM soldiers the day before, or on 31 January 1988, in Macanining Street, Bagong Barrio,
Caloocan City. In view of this verification, Rolando Dural was transferred to the Regional Medical Services of the CAPCOM, for security
reasons. There, he was positively identified by eyewitnesses as the gunman who went on top of the hood of the CAPCOM mobile patrol
car, and fired at the two (2) CAPCOM soldiers seated inside the car. As a consequence of this positive identification, Rolando Dural was
referred to the Caloocan City Fiscal who conducted an inquest and thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City an
information charging Rolando Dural alias Ronnie Javelon with the crime of “Double Murder with Assault Upon Agents of Persons in
Authority.” The case was docketed therein as Criminal Case No. C-30112 and no bail was recommended. On 15 February 1988, the
information was amended to include, as defendant, Bernardo Itucal, Jr. who, at the filing of the original information, was still unidentified.
As to Rolando Dural, it clearly appears that he was not arrested while in the act of shooting the two (2) CAPCOM soldiers aforementioned.
Nor was he arrested just after the commission of the said offense for his arrest came a day after the said shooting incident. Seemingly, his
arrest without warrant is unjustified. However, Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the New Peoples Army (NPA), an
outlawed subversive organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest of Rolando Dural without warrant is justified as it can
be said that he was committing an offense when arrested. The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such
crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the State and
are in the nature of continuing crimes.

ISSUE: WON the warrantless arrest is valid

HELD: YES. The arrest without warrant is justified because it is within the contemplation of Section 5 Rule 113, Dural was committing an
offense, when arrested because he was arrested for being a member of the New People's Army, an outlawed organization, where
membership is penalized and for subversion which, like rebellion is, under the doctrine of Garcia vs. Enrile, a continuing offense.
Given the ideological content of membership in the CPP/NPA which includes armed struggle for the overthrow of organized
government, Dural did not cease to be or became less of a subversive, FOR PURPOSES OF ARREST, simply because he was, at the time of
arrest, confined in the St. Agnes Hospital.
Dural was identified as one of several persons who the day before his arrest, without a warrant, at the St. Agnes Hospital, had shot
two (2) CAPCOM policemen in their patrol car. That Dural had shot the two (2) policemen in Caloocan City as part of his mission as a
"sparrow" (NPA member) did not end there and then.
Dural, given another opportunity, would have shot or would shoot other policemen anywhere as agents or representatives of the
organized government. It is in this sense that subversion like rebellion (or insurrection) is perceived here as a continuing offense. Unlike
other so-called "common" offenses, i.e. adultery, murder, arson, etc., which generally end upon their commission, subversion and rebellion
are anchored on an ideological base which compels the repetition of the same acts of lawlessness and violence until the overriding
objective of overthrowing an organized government is attained.
Nor can it be said that Dural's arrest was grounded on mere suspicion by the arresting officers of his membership in the CPP/NPA.
His arrest was based on "probable cause," as supported by actual facts mentioned in this case.
With all these facts and circumstances existing before, during and after the arrest of the afore-named persons (Dural, Buenaobra,
Roque, Anonuevo, Casiple, and Ocaya), no prudent man can say that it would have been better for the military agents not to have acted at
all and made any arrest. That would have been an unpardonable neglect of official duty and a cause for disciplinary action against the
peace officers involved.
For, one of the duties of law enforcers is to arrest lawbreakers in order to place them in the hands of executive and judicial
authorities upon whom devolves the duty to investigate the acts constituting the alleged violation of the law and to prosecute and secure
the punishment therefor. An arrest is therefore in the nature of an administrative measure. The power to arrest without warrant is
without limitation as long as the THREE requirements of Section 5, Rule 113 are met. This rule is founded on an overwhelming public
interest in peace and order in our communities.
In ascertaining whether the arrest without warrant is conducted in accordance with the conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113,
this Court determines not whether the persons arrested are indeed guilty of committing the crime for which they were arrested. Not
evidence of guilt, but "probable cause" is the reason that can validly compel the peace officers, in the performance of their duties and in
the interest of public order, to conduct an arrest without warrant.
The courts should not expect of law-enforcers more than what the law requires of them. Under the conditions set forth in Section
5, Rule 113, particularly paragraph (b) thereof, even if the arrested persons are later found to be innocent and acquitted, the arresting
officers are not liable. But if they do not strictly comply with the said conditions, the arresting officers can be held liable for the crime of
arbitrary detention, for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code 26 and/or for other administrative sanctions.
PEOPLE VS MARTI (marijuana in the box to be sent in Switzerland – valid search and seizure for the one who discovered is a private
person in his OFFICIAL DUTY)

Facts:
On August 14, 1987, between 10:00 and 11:00 a.m., the appellant and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes, went to the booth of
the "Manila, Packing and Export Forwarders" in the Pistang Pilipino Complex, Ermita, Manila, carrying with them four (4) gift-wrapped
packages.  Anita Reyes (the proprietress and no relation to Shirley Reyes) attended to them. The appellant informed Anita Reyes that he
was sending the packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland.  Appellant filled up the contract necessary for the transaction, writing therein
his name, passport number, the date of shipment and the name and address of the consignee, namely, "WALTER FIERZ, Mattacketr II, 8052
Zurich, Switzerland".
"Anita Reyes then asked the appellant if she could examine and inspect the packages.  Appellant, however, refused, assuring her
that the packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and were gifts to his friend in Zurich.  In view of appellant's representation,...
Anita Reyes no longer insisted on inspecting the packages.  The four (4) packages were then placed inside a brown corrugated box one by
two feet in size (1' x 2').  Styro-foam was placed at the bottom and on top of the packages before the box was sealed with masking... tape,
thus making the box ready for shipment. "Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job
Reyes (propietor and husband of Anita Reyes), following standard operating procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection.  When he
opened appellant's box, a peculiar odor... emitted therefrom.  His curiosity aroused, he squeezed one of the bundles allegedly containing
gloves and felt dried leaves inside. Opening one of the bundles, he pulled out a cellophane wrapper protruding from the opening of one of
the gloves. He made an opening on one of the cellophane wrappers and took several grams of the contents thereof "Job Reyes forthwith
prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI and requesting a laboratory examination of the samples he extracted from the
cellophane wrapper. He brought the letter and a sample of appellant's shipment to the Narcotics Section of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI).
He was interviewed by the Chief of Narcotics Section.  Job Reyes informed the NBI that the rest of the shipment was still in his
office.  Therefore, Job Reyes and three (3) NBI agents, and a photographer, went to the Reyes' office at Ermita, Manila. "Job Reyes brought
out the box in which appellant's packages were placed and, in the presence of the NBI agents, opened the top flaps, removed the styro-
foam and took out the cellophane wrappers from inside the gloves.  Dried marijuana leaves were found to have been... contained inside
the cellophane wrappers.
"The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of the box and of the contents thereof, after signing a "Receipt" acknowledging
custody of the said effects. On August 27, 1987, appellant, while claiming his... mail at the Central Post Office, was invited by the NBI to
shed light on the attempted shipment of the seized dried leaves.  On the same day the Narcotics Section of the NBI submitted the dried
leaves to the Forensic Chemistry Section for laboratory examination.  It... turned out that the dried leaves were marijuana flowering tops as
certified by the forensic chemist.
Issues:
WON the evidence subject of the imputed offense had been obtained in violation of his constitutional rights against unreasonable
search and seizure.
Ruling:
 NO. It must be noted, however, that in all those cases adverted to, the evidence so obtained were invariably procured by the State
acting through the medium of its law enforcers or other authorized government agencies. On the other hand, the case at bar assumes a
peculiar character since the evidence sought to be excluded was primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a
private capacity and without the intervention and participation of State authorities. Under the... circumstances, can accused/appellant
validly claim that his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizure has been violated? Stated otherwise, may an act of a
private individual, allegedly in violation of appellant's constitutional rights, be invoked... against the State?
We hold in the negative. In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be
invoked against the State.
As this Court held in Villanueva v. Querubin (48 SCRA 345 [1972]):
"This constitutional right (against unreasonable search and seizure) refers to the immunity of one's person, whether citizen or alien,
from interference by government, included on which is his residence, his papers, and other possessions.
First, the factual considerations of the case at bar readily foreclose the proposition that NBI agents conducted an illegal search and
seizure of the prohibited merchandise.  Records of the case clearly indicate that it was Mr. Job Reyes, the proprietor of the forwarding...
agency, who made search/inspection of the packages.  Said inspection was reasonable and a standard operating procedure on the part
of Mr. Reyes as a precautionary measure before delivery of packages to the Bureau of Customs or the Bureau of Posts (TSN, October 6 &
7,... 1987, pp. 15-18; pp. 7-8; Original Records, pp. 119-122; 167-168). It will be recalled that after Reyes opened the box containing the
illicit cargo, he took samples of the same to the NBI and later summoned the agents to his place of business.   Thereafter, he opened the
parcels containing the rest of the shipment and entrusted the care and... custody thereof to the NBI agents.  Clearly, the NBI agents made
no search and seizure, much less an illegal one, contrary to the postulate of accused/appellant.
Second, the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by Reyes into a warrantless search and
seizure proscribed by the Constitution.  Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search. Having observed that...
which is open, where no trespass has been committed in aid thereof, is not search.
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the
government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the
restraint... against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.
If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass the test of
constitutionality.  However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and...
private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and
seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved.  In sum, the protection against...
unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of
alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.
The argument is untenable.  For one thing, the constitution, in laying down the principles of the government and fundamental
liberties of the people, does not govern relationships between individuals.  Moreover, it must be emphasized that the modifications
introduced... in the 1987 Constitution (re: Sec. 2, Art. III) relate to the issuance of either a search warrant or warrant of arrest vis-a-vis the
responsibility of the judge in the issuance thereof... alleged violations against unreasonable search and seizure may only be invoked
against the State by an individual unjustly traduced by the exercise of sovereign authority.  To agree with appellant that an act of a
private individual in violation of the Bill of... the Rights should also be construed as an act of the State would result in serious legal
complications and an absurd interpretation of the constitution.

Soliven v. Makasiar

FACTS:
Soliven broadcasted the statement that President Aquino hid under her bed during a coup d' etat. The President sued for libel.
Soliven claimed that he can't be sued because the President was immune from suit.
Pres. Cory Aquino filed a criminal complaint for libel against Beltran. Beltran argues that "the reasons which necessitate
presidential immunity from suit impose a correlative disability to file suit". He contends that if criminal proceedings ensue by virtue of
the President's filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have to be a witness for the prosecution, bringing her under the
trial court's jurisdiction. This would in an indirect way to defeat her privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying on the witness stand,
she would be exposing herself to possible contempt of court or perjury. Beltran also contends that he could not be held liable for libel
because of the privileged character of the publication. He also says that to allow the libel case to proceed would produce a “chilling effect”
on press freedom.

Issues:
(1) whether or not petitioners were denied due process when informations for libel were filed against them although the finding of
the existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the President;
(2) whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest
without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause; and
(3) whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate criminal proceedings against the petitioners
through the filing of a complaint-affidavit.

Held:
(1) The allegation of denial of due process of law in the preliminary investigation is negated by the fact that instead of submitting
his counter-affidavits, he filed a "Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed," in effect waiving his right to refute the complaint by filing
counter-affidavits. Due process of law does not require that the respondent in a criminal case actually file his counter-affidavits before the
preliminary investigation is deemed completed. All that is required is that the respondent be given the opportunity to submit counter-
affidavits if he is so minded.
(2) What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the
existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not
required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally
evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis
thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require
the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. Sound
policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary examination and investigation of criminal
complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts.
(3) The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to  assure the exercise of Presidential duties
and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from
requiring all of the office holder's time, also demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the holder of
the office; not by any other person in the President's behalf. Thus, an accused in a criminal case in which the President is complainant
cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the
President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the court's jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the
privilege or to waive it is solely the President's prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person.
(4) Court reiterates that it is not a trier of facts. Court finds no basis at this stage to rule on the “chilling effect” point. 
Allado vs. Diokno, (DEFINITION AND EXPLANATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE)

Facts:
On September 16, 1993, a Security Guard and a discharged Philippine Constabulary named Escolastico Umbal executed a sworn
statement implicating petitioners Diosdado Jose Allado and Roberto Mendoza who are partners in the Law Firm of Salonga, Hernandez
and Allado. He accused them as the brains behind the alleged kidnapping and slaying of Eugen Alexander Van Twest, a German national.
Based on that confession of Umbal, a search warrant was issued by Judge Roberto Barrios of the RTC of Manila. 
Then, the operatives of the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC), armed with the search warrant issued separately raided
the dwellings of police officers who were also pointed by Umbal as the perpetrators of the crimes. Several firearms and ammunitions
were found in the raid including Van Twest's Cartier sunglasses. So, the two lawyers and their other co-defendants were charged with
illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions, carnapping, kidnapping for ransom with murder, and usurpation of authority. Their case
was referred by the PACC to the DOJ who took over the case. 
After preliminary investigation, the Judge Roberto Diokno found probable cause and issued a warrant of arrest without bail . The
petitioners questioned the issued warrants of arrests. They claim that Judge Diokno acted with grave abuse of discretion and in excess of
his jurisdiction as there is lack of probable cause for him to issue the warrants. They further contend that the judge did not personally
determine the admissibility and sufficiency of the evidence where the investigation was based from.

Issue:
WON the judge erred in finding probable cause issuing the search warrant?

Ruling:
Yes, there is no probable cause in this case. The probable cause test is an objective one, PROBABLE CAUSE is defined as, facts and
circumstances must be such as would warrant a belief  by a reasonably discreet and prudent man that the accused is guilty of the crime
which has just been committed. There is serious doubt on Van Twesta’s reported death since the corpus delicti has not been established,
nor his remains been recovered. We are reminded of the leading case of U.S. v. Samarin, decided ninety-two years ago where this Court
ruled that when the supposed victim is wholly unknown, his body not found, and there is but one witness who testifies to the killing,
the corpus delicti is not sufficiently proved. In People v. Inting, we emphasized the important features of the constitutional mandate: (a)
The determination of probable cause is a function of the judge; it is not for the provincial fiscal or prosecutor to ascertain. Only the judge
and the judge alone makes this determination; (b) The preliminary inquiry made by a prosecutor does not bind
the judge. It merely assists him in making the determination of probable cause. The judge does not have to follow what the prosecutor
presents to him. By itself, the prosecutor’s certification of probable cause is ineffectual. It is the report, the affidavits, the transcript of
stenographic notes (if any), and all other supporting documents behind the prosecutor’s certification which are material in assisting the
judge in his determination of probable cause; and, (c) Judges and prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which
determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the
offender should be held for trial or released. Even if the two inquiries be conducted in the course of one and the same proceeding, there
should be no confusion about their objectives. The determination of probable cause for the warrant is made by the judge. The preliminary
investigation proper - whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and therefore,
whether or not he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial –is a function of the prosecutor.
The extrajudicial statement of Umbal suffers from material inconsistencies.“ In Lim v. Felix, where we reiterated Soliven v.
Makasiar and People v. Inting, we said:
“The Judge does not have to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. The Prosecutor can perform the such
functions as a commissioner for the taking of the evidence. However, there should be a report and necessary documents supporting the
Fiscal’s bare certification. All these should be before the Judge. 
The extent of the Judge’s personal examination of the report and its annexes depends on the circumstances of each case. We
cannot determine beforehand how cursory or exhaustive the Judge’s examination should be. The Judge has to exercise sound discretion
for, after all, the personal determination is vested in the Judge by the Constitution. It can be as brief or as detailed as the circumstances
of each case require. To be sure, the judge must go beyond the Prosecutor’s certification and investigation report whenever necessary. He
should call for the complainant and witnesses.”
SORIANO MATA vs HON. JOSEPHINE K. BAYONA (REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ISSUANCE OF SEARCH WARRANT – SELLING OF ILLEGAL TICKETS)

Facts:
Petitioner is accused under PD 810, as amended by PD 1306, the information against him alleging that Soriano Mata offered, took and arranged
bets on the Jai Alai game by "selling illegal tickets known as 'Masiao tickets' without any authority from the Philippine Jai Alai & Amusement
Corporation or from the government... authorities concerned."
Petitioner claims that during the hearing of the case, he discovered that nowhere from the records of the said case could be found the search
warrant and other pertinent papers connected to the issuance of the same, so that he had to inquire from the City Fiscal its... whereabouts, and to
which inquiry respondent Judge replied, "it is with the court". The Judge then handed the records to the Fiscal who attached them to the records. This
led petitioner to file a motion to quash and annul the search warrant and for the return of the articles seized.
The motion was denied by respondent Judge on March 1, 1979, stating... that the Court has made a thorough investigation and examination
under oath of Bernardo U. Goles and Reynaldo T. Mayote, members of the Intelligence Section of 352nd PC Co./Police District II INP; that in fact the
court made a certification to that effect; and that the fact that... documents relating to the search warrant were not attached immediately to the record
of the criminal case is of no moment, considering that the rule does not specify when these documents are to be attached to the records.

Issues:
WON the search warrant is invalid and all the articles confiscated under such warrant as inadmissible as evidence in the... case

Ruling:
YES, THE SEARCH WARRANT IS INVALID. We hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality for being violative of the Constitution and the
Rules of Court.
Under the Constitution "no search warrant shall issue but upon probable cause to be determined by the Judge or such other responsible officer
as may be authorized by law after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce". More... emphatic and
detailed is the implementing rule of the constitutional injunction, Section 4 of Rule 126 which provides that the judge must before issuing the warrant
personally examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their... depositions in writing, and attach
them to the record, in addition to any affidavits presented to him.
Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce and to attach them to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be
able to properly determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, and to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found
later that his declarations are false.
We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of the Judge to conform with the essential requisites of
taking the depositions in writing and attaching them to the record, rendering the search warrant invalid.
Principles:
"depositions"... is sometimes used in a broad sense to describe any written statement verified by oath; but in its more technical and
appropriate sense the meaning of the word is limited to written testimony of a witness given in the... course of a judicial proceeding advance of the trial
or hearing upon oral examination. A deposition is the testimony of a witness, put or taken in writing, under oath or affirmation before a commissioner,
examiner or other judicial officer.

PEOPLE VS MOLINA (ILLEGALLY SEIZED MARIJUANA IN THE TRISIKAD)

Overview:
SPO1 Paguidopon received a tip about drug pushers. He previously caught a glimpse of one of them, Mula, so he was able to point to him
and his companion, Molina, to arresting officers when they were aboard a trisikad. Upon accosting them, the police were able to find
marijuana in a bag carried by Molina, leading to their arrest. The court however held that they were illegally arrested because their case
don’t fall under the exception of an in flagrante delicto arrest, there being no outward indication that could justify their arrest.

Statement of the Case:

This is for review of the decision of the RTC finding Nasario Molina alias "Bobong" and Gregorio Mula alias "Boboy" guilty of violation of
Sec. 8 of RA 6245, or the Dangerous Drugs Act, by possessing 946.9 grants of dried marijuana.-Molina and Mula pleaded guilty upon
arraignment.

FACTS:
On June 1996, SPO1 Marino Paguidopon received information about a marijuana pusher in Davao. Paguidopon first saw the pusher in
person on July of the same year, when his informer identified Mula as the driver of a motorcycle who just passed by them. Molina, on the
other hand, was never identified prior arrest. In the morning of August 8, 1996, Paguidopon received information that the drug pushers
will pass by at NHA, Ma-a, Davao City that morning, so he called for assistance from the PNP. A team composed of SPO4 Cloribel, SPO2
Paguidopon (brother of Marino), and SPO1 Pamplona were dispatched to proceed to Marino's house where they'll wait for the drug
pushers will pass by. Two hours later, a "trisikad" identified by Paguidopon as carrying Molina and Mula passed by. So, the team boarded
their vehicle, overtook the trisikad and accosted the two. At that point, Mula was holding a black bag. He handed the same to Molina.
Pamplona, introducing himself as a police officer, asked Molina to open the bag, to which Molina replied "Boss, if possible, we will settle
this." Pamplona insisted on opening the bag, which revealed dried marijuana leaves inside. Thereafter, Mula and Molina were
handcuffed. Mula and Molina filed a Demurrer to  Evidence, saying that the marijuna was illegally seized from them, therefore it is
inadmissible. The trial court denied this. The two waived presentation of evidence, and opted to file a joint memorandum. Later, the trial
court still found them guilty, and sentenced them to suffer the death penalty. Pursuant to Art. 47 of the RPC and Rule 122, Sec. 10 of the
ROC, the case is elevated to the SC on automatic review. The SolGen moved for the acquittal of the two.

Issues:
Whether or not the warrantless arrest, search and seizure in the present case fall within the recognized exceptions to the warrant
requirement. NO!
Principles:
Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following instances:
(1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor... vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence
in plain view; (5) when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures; and (6) stop and frisk situations...
In search incidental to a lawful arrest... the law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be... made --- the process
cannot be reversed. An arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest.
The Rules of Court, however, recognizes permissible warrantless arrests. Thus, a peace officer or a private person may,... without
warrant, arrest a person: (a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense (arrest in flagrante delicto); (b) when an offense has just been committed and he has probable... cause to... believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it (arrest effected in hot pursuit);
and (c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or a place where he is serving final...
judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another
(arrest of escaped prisoners).

Ruling:
SPO1 Marino Paguidopon, then a member of the Philippine National Police detailed at Precinct No. 3, Matina, Davao City, received
an information regarding the presence of an alleged marijuana pusher in Davao City. In holding a bag on board a trisikad, accused-
appellants could not be said to be committing, attempting to commit or have committed a crime. It matters not that... accused-appellant
Molina responded "Boss, if possible we will settle this" to the request of SPO1 Pamplona to open the bag. Such response which allegedly
reinforced the "suspicion" of the arresting officers that accused-appellants were committing a crime, is an equivocal... statement which
standing alone will not constitute probable cause to effect an inflagrante delicto arrest... the Court holds that the arrest of accused-
appellants does not fall under the exceptions allowed by the rules. Hence, the search conducted on their person was likewise illegal.
Consequently, the marijuana seized by the peace officers could not be admitted as evidence... against accused-appellants.
PEOPLE VS SY-CHUA (TE ZEST-O JUICE BOX CASE) (STOP AND FRISK ARREST; AND ARREST INCIDENTAL TO THE SEARCH)
Facts:
SPO2 Nulud and PO2 Nunag received a report from their confidential informant that accused-appellant was about to deliver
drugs that night at the Thunder Inn Hotel in Balibago, Angeles City. So, the PNP Chief formed a team of operatives. The group positioned
themselves across McArthur Highway near Bali Hai Restaurant, fronting the hotel. The other group acted as their back up.
Afterwards, their informer pointed to a car driven by accused-appellant BINAD SY-CHUA which just arrived and parked near the
entrance of the hotel. After accused-appellant alighted from the car carrying a sealed Zest-O juice box, SPO2 Nulud and PO2 Nunag
hurriedly accosted him and introduced themselves as police officers. As accused-appellant pulled out his wallet, a small transparent
plastic bag with a crystalline substance protruded from his right  back pocket. Forthwith, SPO2 Nulud subjected him to a body search
which yielded twenty (20) pieces of live .22 caliber  firearm bullets from his left back pocket. When SPO2 Nunag peeked into the contents
of the Zest-O box, he saw that it contained a crystalline substance. SPO2 Nulud instantly confiscated the small transparent plastic bag, the
Zest-O juice box, the twenty (20) pieces of .22 caliber firearm bullets and the car used by accused-appellant. SPO2 Nulud and the other
police operatives who arrived at the scene brought the confiscated items to the office of Col. Guttierez at the PNP Headquarters in Camp
Pepito, Angeles City.
Accused-appellant vehemently denied the accusation against him and narrated a different version of the incident.
Accused-appellant alleged that he was driving the car of his wife to follow her and his son to Manila. He felt sleepy, so he decided
to take the old route along McArthur Highway. He stopped in front of a small store near Thunder Inn Hotel to buy cigarettes and candies.
While at the store, he noticed a man approaches and examines the inside of his car. When he called the attention of the onlooker, the man
immediately pulled out a .45 caliber gun and made him face his car with raised hands. The man later on identified himself as a policeman.
During the course of the arrest, the policeman took out his wallet and instructed him to open his car. He refused, so the policeman took his
car keys and proceeded to search his car. At this time, the police officer’s companions arrived at the scene in two cars. PO2 Nulud, who just
arrived at the scene, pulled him away from his car in a nearby bank, while the others searched his car.
Thereafter, he was brought to a police station and was held inside a bathroom for about fifteen minutes until Col. Guttierez arrived,
who ordered his men to call the media. In the presence of reporters, Col. Guttierez opened the box and accused-appellant was made to
hold the box while pictures were being taken.
The lower court acquitted Sy Chua for the Illegal Possession of Ammunitions, yet convicted him for Illegal Possession of
1,955.815 grams of shabu. Hence, this appeal to the Court.
Issues:
(1) Whether or Not the arrest of accused-appellant was lawful; (NO)
(2) WON the confiscation of shabu allegedly found on him were conducted in a lawful and valid manner. (NO)
Held:
 The lower court believed that since the police received information that the accused will distribute illegal drugs that evening at the
Thunder Inn Hotel and its vicinities. The police officer had to act quickly and there was no more time to secure a search warrant. The
search is valid being akin to a “stop and frisk”.
The trial court confused the concepts of a “stop-and-frisk” and of a search incidental to a lawful arrest. These two types of
warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search, the legality of
the arrest is questioned, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the law requires
that there first be arrest before a search can be made—the process cannot be reversed. Accordingly, for this exception to apply, two
elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
We find the two aforementioned elements lacking in the case at bar. Accused-appellant did not act in a suspicious manner. For all
intents and purposes, there was no overt manifestation that accused-appellant has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit a crime. “Reliable information” alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within the
view of the arresting officers, is not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest.
With regard to the concept of “stop-and frisk”: mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a “stop-and-frisk”. A genuine reason
must exist, in light of the police officer’s experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has
weapons concealed about him. Finally, a “stop-and-frisk” serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention
and detection for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the interest of safety and self-
preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly
weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.
A stop-and-frisk was defined as the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for
weapon(s) or contraband. It should also be emphasized that a search and seizure should precede the arrest for this principle to apply. The
foregoing circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar. To reiterate, accused-appellant was first arrested before the search and seizure
of the alleged illegal items found in his possession. The apprehending police operative failed to make any initial inquiry into accused-
appellant’s business in the vicinity or the contents of the Zest-O juice box he was carrying. The apprehending police officers only
introduced themselves when they already had custody of accused-appellant.
In the case at bar, neither the in flagrante delicto nor the “stop and frisk” principles is applicable to justify the warrantless arrest
and consequent search and seizure made by the police operatives on accused-appellant.
GO VS CA (BUMPING AND KILLING HE BUMPED)
FACTS:
The incident happen along Wilson Street, San Juan, Metro Manila where the car of Petitioner Rolito Go bumped the car of Eldon Maguan while
the Go was traversing a one-way “wrong direction” road. Petitioner alighted from his car, walked over and shot Maguan inside his car. Petitioner then
boarded his car and left the scene. A security guard at a nearby restaurant was able to take down petitioner's car plate number. The police arrived
shortly thereafter at the scene of the shooting and there retrieved an empty shell and one round of live ammunition for a 9 mm caliber pistol.
Verification at the Land Transportation Office showed that the car was registered to one Elsa Ang Go. The following day, the police returned to
the scene of the shooting to find out where the suspect had come from. The police were informed that petitioner had dined at Cravings Bake Shop
shortly before the shooting. The police obtained a facsimile or impression of the credit card used by petitioner from the cashier of the bake shop. The
security guard of the bake shop was shown a picture of petitioner and he positively identified him as the same person who had shot Maguan. Having
established that the assailant was probably the petitioner, the police launched a manhunt for petitioner.
7 days after the shooting incident, petitioner presented himself before the San Juan Police Station to verify news reports that he was being
hunted by the police; he was accompanied by two (2) lawyers. The police forthwith detained him. An eyewitness to the shooting, who was at the police
station at that time, positively identified petitioner as the gunman. That same day, the police promptly filed a complaint for frustrated homicide
against petitioner with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal.
First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Dennis Villa Ignacio ("Prosecutor") informed petitioner, in the presence of his lawyers, that he could avail
himself of his right to a preliminary investigation but that he must first sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
Petitioner refused to execute any such waiver. 2 days after and before the prosecutor filed the information in court, Eldon Maguan died of gunshot
wounds. Accordingly, instead of filing an information for frustrated homicide,  the prosecutor filed an information for murder  before the RTC. No bail
was recommended. At the bottom of the information, the Prosecutor certified that no preliminary investigation had been conducted because the
accused did not execute and sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
Counsel for petitioner filed with the Prosecutor an omnibus motion for immediate release and proper preliminary investigation, alleging that
the warrantless arrest of petitioner was unlawful and that no preliminary investigation had been conducted before the information was filed .
Petitioner also prayed that he be released on recognizance or on bail. Provincial Prosecutor Mauro Castro, acting on the omnibus motion, wrote on the
last page of the motion itself that he interposed no objection to petitioner being granted provisional liberty on a cash bond of P100,000.00.
Petitioner was released when his cash bond was approved. Prosecutor filed with the RTC a motion for leave to conduct a preliminary
investigation and prayed that in the meantime all proceedings in the court be suspended. The prosecutor stated that petitioner had filed before the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal an omnibus motion for immediate release and preliminary investigation, which motion had been granted by
Provincial Prosecutor Mauro Castro, who also agreed to recommend cash bail of P100,000.00. The trial court issued an Order granting leave to conduct
preliminary investigation and cancelling the arraignment set for 15 August 1991 until after the prosecution shall have concluded its preliminary
investigation. However, the respondent judge issued an order on July 17, 1991, recalling his bail, the leave to conduct P.I, and his omnibus for
immediate release. Likewise, the judge ordered the petitioner to surrender within 48 hours.
 Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before the Supreme Court assailing the 17 July 1991 Order.
Petitioner contends that the information was null and void because no preliminary investigation had been previously conducted , in violation of his
right to due process. Petitioner also moved for suspension of all proceedings in the case pending resolution by the Supreme Court of his petition; this
motion was, however, denied by respondent Judge.
Petitioner argues that he was not lawfully arrested without a warrant because he went to the police station six (6) days after the shooting
which he had allegedly perpetrated. Thus, petitioner argues, the crime had not been “just committed” at the time that he was arrested. Moreover,
none of the police officers who arrested him had been an eyewitness to the shooting of Maguan and accordingly, none had the “personal
knowledge” required for the lawfulness of a warrantless arrest. Since there had been no lawful warrantless arrest, Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court which establishes the only exception to the right to a preliminary investigation, could not apply in respect of petitioner.

ISSUE:
WON the warrantless arrest of petitioner was lawful (NO)
WON petitioner effectively waived his right to preliminary investigation (NO)

HELD:

1. NO. The arrest was invalid.

First, the trial court’s reliance in the case of Umil v. Ramos is incorrect. Herein, appellant was charged with murder while in Umil, the accused
was charged with subversion, a continuing offense. The petitioner’s appearance to the police station did not mean he was arrested at all. Petitioner
neither expressed surrender nor any statement that he was or was not guilty of any crime.
Second, the instant case did not fall within the terms of Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. Petitioner's "arrest" took
place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan. The "arresting" officers obviously were not present, within the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time
petitioner had allegedly shot Maguan. Neither could the "arrest" effected six (6) days after the shooting be reasonably regarded as effected "when [the
shooting had] in fact just been committed" within the meaning of Section 5(b). Moreover, none of the "arresting" officers had any "personal
knowledge" of facts indicating that petitioner was the gunman who had shot Maguan. The information upon which the police acted had been derived
from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting — one stated that petitioner was the gunman; another was able to take down the
alleged gunman's car's plate number which turned out to be registered in petitioner's wife's name. That information did not, however, constitute
"personal knowledge."

2. NO. Petitioner did not waive his right to P.I.

Petitioner had from the very beginning demanded that a preliminary investigation be conducted. As earlier pointed out, on the same day that
the information for murder was filed with the RTC, petitioner filed with the Prosecutor an omnibus motion for immediate release and preliminary
investigation. Moreover, the Court does not believe that by posting bail petitioner had waived his right to preliminary investigation. In People v.
Selfaison, we did hold that appellants there had waived their right to a preliminary investigation because immediately after their arrest, they filed bail
and proceeded to trial "without previously claiming that they did not have the benefit of a preliminary investigation.
In the instant case, petitioner Go asked for release on recognizance or on bail and for preliminary investigation in one omnibus motion. He had
thus claimed his right to preliminary investigation before respondent Judge approved the cash bond posted by petitioner and ordered his release on 12
July 1991.
Accordingly, we cannot reasonably imply waiver of a preliminary investigation on the part of petitioner. In fact, when the Prosecutor filed a motion in
court asking for leave to conduct a preliminary investigation, he clearly implied to have recognize that petitioner's claim to the preliminary
investigation was a legitimate one.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BANSIL (A BULGE IN BANSIL’S STOMACH)

FACTS
Appellant Bansil herein is a twenty-eight (28) year-old construction worker residing in Quiapo, Manila, who was arrested by a team of
policemen, upon an informer's tip that appellant was one of the suspects in the killing of three persons some weeks before in Quiapo, Manila.
Responding to the information, the officers proceeded to the Muslim area. One of said persons had a suspicious bulge in his stomach, and
when frisked, a .45 cal. pistol with an extended magazine and six (6) live bullets was recovered from the center front of his waist line.
That same day, SPO3 Mendoza received the person of the accused and the subject firearm for safekeeping. The defendant categorically denies
ever having in his possession a gun at the time he was arrested.
RTC: “[T]he accused is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of P.D. 1866 as charged and therefore, the accused, Datukon
Bansil y Alog is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua”.

ISSUE:
WON the trial court erred in relying on the testimony of the prosecution witnesses in convicting appellant?

HELD:
Yes, the trial court erred. We find the same insufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt the culpability of the appellant for the crime
charged. We find the testimony of SPO4 Clemente full of inconsistencies on material points. We find that there was no probable cause for the
warrantless arrest of the appellant notwithstanding the putative application of Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure based on
the informant's tip and the "bulging waistline" of the accused. The arresting team was only armed with the knowledge of the suspect's "attire" which
the prosecution witness admitted during trial he cannot even remember. The team did not have a physical description of the suspect nor his name.
They were not even given a specific place within which to target their search of the suspect, only a vicinity of the Muslim Area in Quiapo, near the
Muslim Mosque. Yet the arresting team directly zeroed in on the accused and his companions who were only eating halo-halo at a small restaurant,
surely not a crime in itself. While SPO4 Clemente claims that accused had a "bulging waistline", this alone, in the light of the availing circumstances, is
insufficient to constitute probable cause for the arrest of the accused. Further, the essence of the crime of illegal possession is the possession,
whether actual or constructive, of the subject firearm, without which there can be no conviction for illegal possession. Faced with outright denial of
the accused of the possession of the gun, the prosecution had all the opportunity to cross-examine the accused and his witness in order to ferret out
the truth and expose the falsity of their allegations. This the public prosecution failed to do.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and appellant DATUKON BANSIL is hereby ACQUITTED for insufficiency of
evidence to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Appellant's immediate release is ordered unless he is detained for some other lawful cause.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DAVID SALVATIERRA

FACTS 
Accused-appellant David Salvatierra was found guilty of the crime of murder and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. The facts of the case would show that the victim, Charlie Fernandez was walking along M. de la Fuente Street when suddenly, 3
persons met him including accused-appellant who lunged a pointed instrument at the victim. The latter was able to parry the thrust but
the appellant swung the instrument anew which hit the victim at the left breast. The said assault was witnessed by Milagros Martinez but
due to fear, she did not immediately report the incident to the authorities. As a result of the said assault, the victim died. Three months
later, accused-appellant was arrested for he was causing a commotion along Sampaloc Manila. He was taken into custody by the police
who then later found out that he was one of the suspects in the killing of Charlie Fernandez. Accused-appellant was then turned over to
the WPD wherein the witness Milagrosa identified him in the police line-up as the one who stabbed Charlie. Thereafter, a booking sheet
and arrest order was prepared by the police and signed by the appellant. He was then charged with murder and convicted of the same
crime. Accused-appellant belies all these assertions. On appeal, he faults the trial court for not finding that his arrest, investigation and
detention for the offense charged was violative of his constitutional rights.

ISSUES AND HOLDING 

W/N the arrest was valid?
Accused-appellant invokes his right against warrantless arrests on the ground that there nothing on record show that his arrest
for the minor offense of malicious mischief was effected by virtue of a warrant. He also points out to the fact that he was arrested for the
crime of killing the victim 3 months after the said commission of the crime, which according to him is sufficient time for the police
authorities to secure a warrant of arrest. In the present case, the arguments presented are plausible, however the appellant is now
estopped from questioning the legality of his arrest considering that he never raised this before entering his plea. Any objection involving
a warrant of arrest or the procedure in the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he enters his
plea, otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. Voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court by active participation
in the trial would cure any defect in the arrest made against him.
People v. Chua Ho San 308 SCRA 432 (1999) G.R. No. 128222, June 17, 1999 (caught with shabu in the coastline-sign language)
Fact:
In response to reports of rampant smuggling of firearms and other contraband, CID began patrolling the Bacnotan coastline with his
officers. While monitoring the coastal area he intercepted a radio call from ALMOITE requesting police assistance regarding an unfamiliar
speedboat. CID and six of his men. When the speedboat landed, the male passenger alighted, and using both hands, carried what
appeared a multicolored strawbag. He then walked towards the road. By this time, ALMOITE, CID and BADUA, the latter two conspicuous
in their uniform and issued side-arms, became suspicious of the man as he suddenly changed direction and broke into a run upon seeing
the approaching officers. BADUA, however, prevented the man from fleeing by holding on to his right arm. Although CID introduced
themselves as police officers, the man appeared impassive. Speaking in English, CID then requested the man to open his bag, but he seem
not to understand. CID thus tried speaking Tagalog, then Ilocano, but still to no avail. CID then resorted to what he termed “sign
language;” he motioned with his hands for the man to open the bag. This time, the man apparently understood and acceded to the
request. A search of the bag yielded several transparent plastic packets containing yellowish crystalline substances, which was later
found out that it was Shabu. CID then gestured to the man to close the bag, which he did. As CID wished to proceed to the police station,
he signaled the man to follow, but the latter did not comprehend. Hence, CID placed his arm around the shoulders of the man and
escorted the latter to the police headquarters. CHUA was initially charged with illegal possession of methaphetamine hydrochloride
before the RTC. The RTC convicted Chua Ho San guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Chua Ho San prays for his acquitttal and the reversal of
the judgment of the RTC.

Issue:
Whether the accused who was acting suspiciously constitute Probable Cause effecting an in flagrante delicto arrest.

Held:
No, the Court, finds that these do not constitute “probable cause.” None of the telltale clues, e.g., bag or package emanating the
pungent odor of marijuana or other prohibited drug, confidential report and/or positive identification by informers of courier(s) of
prohibited drug and/or the time and place where they will transport/deliver the same, suspicious demeanor or behavior and suspicious
bulge in the waist — accepted by this Court as sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest exists in this case. The term PROBABLE CAUSE had
been understood to mean a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a
cautious man’s belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. Specifically with respect to arrests, it is
such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonable discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed
by the person sought to be arrested. In in fragrante delicto arrests, a peace officer or a private person may without a warrant, arrest a
person, when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. The
arresting officer, therefore, must have personal knowledge of such facts or as recent case law adverts to, personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances convincingly indicative or constitutive of probable cause.
The search cannot therefore be denominated as incidental to an arrest. While a contemporaneous search of a person arrested
may be effected to deliver dangerous weapons or proofs or implements used in the commission of the crime and which search may extend
to the area within his immediate control where he might gain possession of a weapon or evidence he can destroy, a valid arrest must
precede the search. The process cannot be reversed. In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the
validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was
merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can
be made — the process cannot be reversed. (LAWFUL ARREST FIRST THEN SEARCH).
PEOPLE v. HINDOY (partner and the accused in a buy bust operation for marijuana with marked money of 500 pesos)
SUMMARY:
An informant came to the police station and reported that accused Hindoy and Bella would be receiving a shipment of illegal drugs . The
policemen conducted a buy-bust operation at the address given. When the sale was completed, the men identified themselves as police. They entered
the house and found bags of marijuana. NBI confirmed that the drugs were marijuana. Trial court convicted the accused and Bella of illegal sale and
possession of prohibited drugs. SC affirmed.

DOCTRINE:
Evidence for the prosecution fully proved beyond reasonable doubt the elements necessary to successfully prosecute a case for the illegal sale
of a prohibited drug, namely, (a) identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the things sold and the
payment therefor. Possession of marijuana is absorbed in the sale thereof, except where the seller is further apprehended in possession of another
quantity of the prohibited drugs not covered by or included in the sale and which are probably intended for some future dealings or use by the seller.

FACTS: 
At around 2 a.m., a woman informant came to the station and reported that a certain Bella of Mandaluyong, would be receiving a shipment of
illegal drugs that day. On the strength of that information, SPO4 Antiojo organized a team that would conduct a buy-bust operation
  At around 3 a.m., the Criminal Investigation Team, headed by Antiojo himself and guided by the woman informant, went to said address. Two
men acted as poseur-buyers, while the others served as backup. They knocked on the door and BELLA’s live-in partner Accused Hindoy opened it.
  Eugenio (police) said, May bagong dating, kukuha kami (If there is new stuff, well get some), referring to marijuana. Accused Hindoy
answered, Meron (Yes, there is) so Eugenio gave him one P500.00 and five P100.00 marked bills. 
After counting the money, Accused asked BELLA to get the stuff. She complied and brought a brick of marijuana, with an estimated weight of
one kilogram, which was wrapped in newspaper.
Accused, in turn, handed it over to Eugenio (police). That was when they identified themselves as police officers. After giving the prearranged
signal to the backup operatives, he and Cariaga entered the house then announced that they were going to conduct a search . Under a table, they found
a bag made of abaca containing twelve more bricks of marijuana. The evidence was marked then turned over to Prianes, who transmitted the same to
the NBI for chemical analysis.
NBI: Specimens submitted is marijuana. The accused where charged with two violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act of1972.
RTC: Guilty for violating Sections 4 and 8, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Section 13 of Republic Act No. 7659.
RULING:
Whether Accused Hindoy and Bella guilty of illegal sale. YES.
The evidence for the prosecution fully proved beyond reasonable doubt the elements necessary to successfully prosecute a case for the illegal
sale of a prohibited drug, namely, (a) identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the things sold and
the payment therefor.
Identity of object: After chemical analysis by an NBI forensics expert, the thirteen (13) blocks of suspected marijuana, with a combined weight
of 13.05 kilograms, which were found in and seized from the residence of BELLA, were determined to be genuine marijuana.
Identity of sellers: The identity of ENRIQUE and BELLA as the sellers and possessors of the seized marijuana cannot be doubted, for they were
caught in flagrante delicto in a standard police buy-bust operation . Such positive identification prevails over their feeble denial and declaration that
the abaca bag which contained twelve blocks of marijuana was only left to their custody by a certain Marlyn

Whether Accused guilty of illegal possession of prohibited drugs. YES.

Likewise, the trial court did not err when it convicted ENRIQUE and BELLA of illegal possession of prohibited drugs punishable under Section 8
of R.A. No. 6425, as amended. In People v. Lacerna, possession of marijuana is absorbed in the sale thereof, except where the seller is further
apprehended in possession of another quantity of the prohibited drugs not covered by or included in the sale and which are probably intended for
some future dealings or use by the seller.
The records, indeed, reveal that aside from selling one block of marijuana to the arresting officers, accused-appellants were also caught in
possession of another12.04 kilograms of marijuana in twelve individually wrapped blocks, hidden in a bag under a table in their house.
Their possession thereof gives rise to a disputable presumption under Section 3[j], Rule 131 of the Rules of Court.
ESPANO V. CA (Caught in flagrante for selling a marijuana to the buyer, thereby searched in his house)
FACTS:
The accused was caught in flagrante by herein police officers selling Marijuana near Zamora and Pandacan Streets, where they are
conducting an investigation in the area reported being rampant of drug pushing. The agents frisked the accused after he completed his
transaction to a buyer and there found with him 2 tea bags of Marijuana.
Accused was asked by the police officers whether he has some more of the marijuana and told them he got more at his house. They
went to the accused house and found 10 more teabags of Marijuana. Petitioner was charged with possession of prohibited drugs.
During the trial, accused denied all the allegations against him and made an alibi that he was in his house sleeping when the police
officer went to his house looking for his brother in law and instead handcuffed him to take his part for allegedly having in his possession 10
teabags of Marijuana.
The trial court did not believe his alibi and found him guilty of violation of Article II, Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.
Accused appealed and said that the arrest was illegally done and the search of his house is deemed a violation of his
constitutional right.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the pieces of evidence seized were admissible as evidence against the accused?

HELD:
YES. The marijuana seized from Espano when he was frisked is admissible as evidence even if the search was done without
a warrant.
Rule 113 Section 5(a) of the Rules of  Court provides that a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
Petitioner's arrest falls squarely under the aforecited rule. He was caught in flagranti as a result of a buy-bust operation
conducted by police officers on the basis of information received regarding the illegal trade of drugs within the area of Zamora and
Pandacan Streets, Manila. The police officer saw petitioner handing over something to an alleged buyer. After the buyer left, they
searched him and discovered two cellophanes of marijuana. His arrest was, therefore, lawful and the two cellophane bags of marijuana
seized were admissible in evidence, being the fruits of the crime.
As for the marijuana found at petitioner's residence, however, the same are inadmissible in evidence.
The 1987 Constitution guarantees freedom against  unreasonable searches and seizures under Article III, Section 2 which provides
that the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
An exception to the said rule is a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest for dangerous weapons or anything which may be
used as proof of the commission of an offense.
PEOPLE VS. AMINUDIN (caught and searched for marijuana in his bag, but denied for having been set up and maltreated just to admit
that he did such act) (HIS NAME WAS KNOWN, THE VEHICLE WAS IDENTIFIED. THE DATE OF ITS ARRIVAL WAS CERTAIN BUT NO EFFORT
WAS EVEN MADE TO SECURE A WARRANT)
FACTS:
Idel Aminnudin was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 at about 8:30 in the evening, in
Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him simply accosted him, inspected his bag and finding what looked liked
marijuana leaves took him to their headquarters for investigation. Later on, the information was amended to include Farida Ali y Hassen
and both were charged for Illegal Transportation of Prohibited Drugs. The fiscal absolved Ali after a thorough investigation. Then trial
proceeded only against the accused-appellant, who was eventually convicted.
AMINNUDIN’S defense:
 Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana, averring that all he had in his bag was his clothing consisting of a jacket, two shirts and two
pairs of pants.
 He alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested and immediately handcuffed. His bag was confiscated without a search warrant.
 At the PC headquarters, he was manhandled to force him to admit he was carrying the marijuana, the investigator hitting him
with a piece of wood in the chest and arms even as he parried the blows while he was still handcuffed.  
 He insisted he did not even know what marijuana looked like and that his business was selling watches and sometimes
cigarettes.
 He also argued that the marijuana he was alleged to have been carrying was not properly Identified and could have been any of
several bundles kept in the stock room of the PC headquarters.
The trial court was unconvinced, noting from its own examination of the accused that he claimed to have come to Iloilo City to sell
watches but carried only two watches at the time, traveling from Jolo for that purpose and spending P107.00 for fare, not to mention his
other expenses.
Aminnudin testified that he kept the two watches in a secret pocket below his belt but, strangely, they were not discovered when
he was bodily searched by the arresting officers nor were they damaged as a result of his manhandling. He also said he sold one of the
watches for P400.00 and gave away the other, although the watches belonged not to him but to his cousin, to a friend whose full name he
said did not even know.
 The trial court also rejected his allegations of maltreatment, observing that he had not sufficiently proved the injuries sustained by
him.
On appeal, the Court finds it necessary to answer the legality of his arrest without warrant.

Issue:
Whether the accused was caught in flagrante delicto hence justifies the warrantless arrest

Held:
No, the accused-appellant was not caught in flagrante nor was a crime about to be committed or had just been committed to
justify the warrantless arrest allowed under the Rules of Court. The present case presented no such urgency. It is clear that they had at
least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V
Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was Identified. The date of its arrival was certain. And from the information they had
received, they could have persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, sufficient enough to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet
they did nothing. No effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who
was the head of the arresting team, had determined on his own authority that a “search warrant was not necessary.” In the case at bar,
the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he
had just done so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called
for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the
informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension. It was the
furtive finger that triggered his arrest. The Identification by the informer was the probable cause as determined by the officers (and not a
judge) that authorized them to pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him. While this is not to say that the accused-appellant is
innocent, for indeed his very own words suggest that he is lying, that fact alone does not justify a finding that he is guilty. The
constitutional presumption is that he is innocent, and he will be so declared even if his defense is weak as long as the prosecution is not
strong enough to convict him.
The Checkpoints Case: Valmonte v. De Villa (Atty. opposing the installation of checkpoints as a violation of the constitution as a blanket
to make search warrants; it is not sufficient to enable the Court to determine whether there was a violation of Valmonte's right against
unlawful search and seizure.

……………………………………………………….FACTS
On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of
the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and
peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an
atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development of the National Capital Region. As part of its duty to maintain
peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. 
Petitioners Atty. Ricardo Valmonte, who is a resident of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and the Union of Lawyers and Advocates For
People’s Rights (ULAP) sought the declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and elsewhere as unconstitutional. In the
alternative, they prayed that respondents Renato De Villa and the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) be directed to
formulate guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints for the protection of the people. Petitioners contended that the checkpoints
gave the respondents blanket authority to make searches and seizures without search warrant or court order in violation of the
Constitution.

ISSUE:
WON the installations of the checkpoints violated their constitutional right against illegal search and seizures.

HELD:
NO. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be
determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case.
In the case at bar, the setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may be considered as a
security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing an effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and
order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the government, in the
interest of public security. In this connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the shift to urban centers and their suburbs of the
insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in the increased killings in cities of police and military men by NPA "sparrow units," not to
mention the abundance of unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such urban centers , not all of which are
reported in media, most likely brought about by deteriorating economic conditions — which all sum up to what one can rightly consider, at
the very least, as abnormal times. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an
individual's right against a warrantless search which is however reasonably conducted , the former should prevail.
True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform, in the same manner, that all
governmental power is susceptible to abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the
checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and
a peaceful community.
Furthermore, the Court stressed that the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right
invocable only by those whose rights have been infringed, or threatened to be infringed. What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable
search and seizure in any particular case is purely a judicial question, determinable from a consideration of the circumstances involved.
Petitioner Valmonte's general allegation to the effect that he had been stopped and searched without a search warrant by the
military manning the checkpoints, without more, i.e., without stating the details of the incidents which amount to a violation of his right
against unlawful search and seizure, is not sufficient to enable the Court to determine whether there was a violation of Valmonte's right
against unlawful search and seizure. Hence, petition dismissed.
PEOPLE v. ROBERTO SALANGUIT Y KO (SHABU SELLING INSIDE HIS ROOM AND TAKE OUT FROM HIS CABINET)

Facts:
On December 26, 1995, Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied for a warrant[5] in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, Dasmariñas, Cavite, to
search the residence of accused-appellant Robert Salanguit y Ko on Binhagan St., Novaliches, Quezon City.  He presented as... his witness
SPO1 Edmund Badua, who testified that as a poseur-buyer, he was able to purchase 2.12 grams of shabu from accused-appellant.  The
sale took place in accused-appellant's room, and Badua saw that the shabu was taken by accused-appellant from a... cabinet inside his
room.  The application was granted, and a search warrant was later issued by Presiding Judge Dolores L. Español.
At about 10:30 p.m. of December 26, 1995, a group of about 10 policemen, along with one civilian informer, went to the residence
of accused-appellant to serve the warrant. The police operatives knocked on accused-appellant's door, but nobody opened it.  They heard
people inside the house, apparently panicking. The police operatives then forced the door open and entered the house.
After showing the search warrant to the occupants of the house, Lt. Cortes and his group started searching the house. They found
12 small heat-sealed transparent plastic bags containing a white crystalline substance, a paper clip box also containing a... white crystalline
substance, and two bricks of dried leaves which appeared to be marijuana wrapped in newsprint[9] having a total weight of approximately
1,255 grams. A receipt of the items seized was prepared, but the... accused-appellant refused to sign it.
After the search, the police operatives took accused-appellant with them to Station 10, EDSA, Kamuning, Quezon City, along with
the items they had seized. PO3 Duazo requested a laboratory examination of the confiscated evidence. The white crystalline substance
with a total weight of 2.77 grams and those contained in a small box with a total weight of 8.37 grams were found to be positive for
methamphetamine... hydrochloride. On the other hand, the two bricks of dried leaves, one weighing 425 grams and the other 850 grams,
were found to be marijuana.
Accused-appellant testified that on the night of December 26, 1995, as they were about to leave their house, they heard a
commotion at the gate and on the roof of their house. Suddenly, about 20 men in civilian attire, brandishing long firearms, climbed over
the gate and... descended through an opening in the roof.
When accused-appellant demanded to be shown a search warrant, a piece of paper inside a folder was waved in front of him.  As
accused-appellant fumbled for his glasses, however, the paper was withdrawn and he had no chance to read it.
 Accused-appellant claimed that he was ordered to stay in one place of the house while the policemen conducted a search, forcibly
opening cabinets and taking his bag containing money, a licensed .45 caliber firearm, jewelry, and canned goods.
The policemen left at around 12:30 a.m. of December 27, 1995, and, after putting handcuffs on accused-appellant, took him with
them to the NARCOM on EDSA, Quezon City, where accused-appellant was detained.
Accused-appellant's mother-in law, Soledad Arcano, corroborated his testimony. Arcano testified that the policemen ransacked their
house, ate their food, and took aw... ay canned goods and other valuables.

ISSUES:
1. W/N the warrant used to seize the shabu was valid and admissible in evidence against him. YES.
2. W/N the marijuana seized was admissible in evidence against Salanguit pursuant to plain view doctrine. NO.

HELD:
1. Yes, all the requisites for the issuance of a search warrant were satisfied.
2. No, the marijuana was not one of the drugs indicated in the warrant and it was not in plain view when it was seized.

RATIO:
1. The warrant authorized the seizure of undetermined quantity of shabu and drug paraphernalia.
 Salanguit contends that it should be void as it did not indicate the existence of drug paraphernalias. The warrant was valid
as to the seizure of shabu and void as to the seizure of drug paraphernalia. It is to be noted that no drug paraphernalia was
seized.
 Salanguit further contends that the warrant was issued for more than one specific offense because possession or uses are
punished under two different provisions in the Dangerous Drugs Act. This Court has decided in the case of People v Dichoso
that a warrant that does not specify what provisions of the law were violated, it is valid as to the authority to search and
seize marijuana, shabu and drug paraphernalias.
 Lastly, Salanguit argues that the search warrant failed to indicate the place to be searched with sufficient particularity .
The rule is that a description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable
effort, ascertain and identify the place to be searched. The location of Salanguit’s house being indicated by the evidence on
record, there can be no doubt that the warrant described the place to be searched with sufficient particularity.

2. Because the location of the shabu was indicated in the warrant and thus known to the police operatives, it is reasonable to assume
that the police found the packets and shabu first. Once the valid portion of the search warrant has been executed, the plain view doctrine
can no longer provide basis for admitting the other items subsequently found. The marijuana bricks were wrapped in newsprint. There was
no apparent illegality to justify their seizure. Not being in a transparent container, the contents wrapped in newsprint could not have been
readily discernible as marijuana. That being said, we hold that the marijuana is inadmissible in evidence against Salanguit.
 III. PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION AND CORRESPONDENCE

Socorro Ramirez vs Court of Appeals (secretly recording the hostile and furious confrontation)

Facts:
A civil case for damages was filed by petitioner Socorro Ramirez in the RTC of Quezon City alleging that the private respondent,
Ester Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter’s office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a “hostile and furious mood” and in a
manner offensive to petitioner’s dignity and personality, “contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.”
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event. The transcript on which the civil case was based was
culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner.
As a result of petitioner’s recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal,
private respondent filed a criminal case before the RTC of Pasay City for violation of RA 4200, entitled “An Act to Prohibit and Penalize
Wiretapping and Other Related Violations of Private Communication, and Other Purposes.”
Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the ground that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense particularly a violation of RA 4200. The trial court granted the Motion to Quash, agreeing with petitioner.
From the trial court’s Order, the private respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court, which forthwith
referred the case to the CA.
Respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed Decision declaring the trial court’s order null and void.

Issue:
Whether the act of recording through a tape constitutes an offense?

Held:
YES. The Court ruled that the language of the law is clear and unambiguous. The provision clearly makes it illegal for ANY person,
NOT AUTHORIZED BY ALL PARTIES to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder.
 The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or
different from those involved in the private communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such
recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any".
The nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of the conversations need not be
specifically alleged in the information. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private communication by
means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200.
Petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include "private
conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the word "communication" to a point of absurdity. In its ordinary signification,
communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a
conversation, or signifies the "process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system of
symbols (as language signs or gestures)."
These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive communications of "meanings or
thoughts" which are likely to include the emotionally-charged exchange between petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the
latter's office.
In Gaanan v. Intermediate Appellate Court , a case which dealt with the issue of telephone wiretapping, we held that the use of a
telephone extension for the purpose of overhearing a private conversation without authorization did not violate R.A. 4200 because a
telephone extension devise was neither among those "device(s) or arrangement(s)" enumerated, following the principle that "penal
statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused."
In this case, the use of tape recorder falls under the devices enumerated in the law (Dictaphone,
Dictagraph, Detectaphone, Walkie-talkie, and Tape recorder). Therefore, the act of recording through the tape constitutes an offense.
The instant case turns on a different note, because the applicable facts and circumstances pointing to a violation of R.A. 4200 suffer
from no ambiguity, and the statute itself explicitly mentions the unauthorized "recording" of private communications with the use of tape-
recorders as among the acts punishable.
FELIPE NAVARRO v. CA (away ng press at police sa prisinto)
Facts:
Around 8:40 in the evening of February 4, 1990, Stanley Jalbuena and Enrique "Ike" Lingan, who were reporters of the radio station
DWTI in Lucena City, together with one Mario Ilagan, went to the Entertainment City following reports that it was... showing nude
dancers. After the three had seated themselves at a table and ordered beer, a scantily clad dancer appeared on stage and began to
perform a strip act. As she removed her brassieres, Jalbuena brought out his camera and took a picture.
At that point, the floor manager, Dante Liquin, with a security guard, Alex Sioco, approached Jalbuena and demanded to know
why he took a picture. Jalbuena replied: "Wala kang pakialam, because this is my job." Sioco... pushed Jalbuena towards the table as he
warned the latter that he would kill him. When Jalbuena saw that Sioco was about to pull out his gun, he ran out of the joint followed by
his companions.
Jalbuena and his companions went to the police station to report the matter. Three of the policemen on duty, including petitioner
Navarro, were having drinks in front of the police station, and they asked Jalbuena and his companions to join them. Jalbuena declined and
went to... the desk officer, Sgt. Añonuevo, to report the incident. In a while, Liquin and Sioco arrived on a motorcycle.
Sioco and Liquin were met by petitioner Navarro who talked with them in a corner for around fifteen minutes. Afterwards,
petitioner Navarro turned to Jalbuena and, pushing him to the wall, said to him: "Putang ina, kinakalaban mo si Kabo Liquin, anak... yan ni
Kabo Liquin, hindi mo ba kilala?" Petitioner Navarro then pulled out his firearm and cocked it, and, pressing it on the face of Jalbuena ,
said, "Ano, uutasin na kita?"
At this point, Lingan intervened and said to petitioner Navarro: "Huwag namang ganyan, pumarito kami para magpa-blotter, I am
here to mediate.
Petitioner Navarro replied: "Walang press, press, mag-sampu pa kayo."
He then turned to Sgt. Añonuevo and told him to make of record the behavior of Jalbuena and Lingan.
This angered Lingan, who said: "O, di ilagay mo diyan." Petitioner Navarro retorted: "Talagang ilalagay ko."[15] The two then had a
heated exchange. Finally, Lingan said: "Masyado kang... abusado, alisin mo yang baril mo at magsuntukan na lang tayo." Petitioner Navarro
replied: "Ah, ganoon?"
As Lingan was about to turn away, petitioner Navarro hit him with the handle of his pistol above the left eyebrow. Lingan fell on the
floor, blood flowing down his face. He tried to get up, but petitioner Navarro gave him a fist blow on the forehead which floored him.
 Capt. Coronado, the station commander, called petitioner Navarro to his office, while a policeman took Lingan to the Quezon
Memorial Hospital. The station manager of DWTI, Boy Casañada, arrived and, learning that Lingan had been taken to the hospital,
proceeded there. But Lingan... died from his injuries.
Unknown to petitioner Navarro, Jalbuena was able to record on tape the exchange between petitioner and the deceased.

Issues:
Whether the tape is admissible in view of R.A. No. 4200, which prohibits wire tapping.
Ruling:
YES. The answer is in the affirmative. The law provides:
The law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private communications. Since the exchange between petitioner
Navarro and Lingan was not private, its tape recording is not prohibited. Nor is there any question that it was duly authenticated. A voice
recording is authenticated by the testimony of a witness , (1) that he personally recorded the conversation ; (2) that the tape played in
court was the one he recorded; and (3) that the voices on the tape are those... of the persons such are claimed to belong. In the instant
case, Jalbuena testified that he personally made the voice recording; that the tape played in court was the one he recorded; and that the...
speakers on the tape were petitioner Navarro and Lingan. A sufficient foundation was thus laid for the authentication of the tape
presented by the prosecution.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the modification that petitioner Felipe Navarro is hereby
SENTENCED to suffer a prison term of 8 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14 years and 8 months of reclusion temporal, as...
maximum.
SO ORDERED

SECTION 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken
word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication... or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or
tape-recorder, or however otherwise described:
It shall also be unlawful for any person, he be a participant or not in the act or acts penalized in the next preceding sentence, to
knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other such record, or copies thereof, of any communication or
spoken word... secured either before or after the effective date of this Act in the manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for
any other person or persons; or to communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof ,
whether... complete or partial, to any other person: Provided, That the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil,
criminal investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this prohibition.

SEC. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of the same or any
part thereof, or any information therein contained obtained or secured by any person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall
not be... admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.
Cecilia Zulueta vs. CA, and Dr. Alfredo Martin (wife forcibly getting private things of her husband as an evidence against him) Privacy of
Communication. 

Doctrine in Nachura: The right to privacy of communication may be invoked against the wife who went to the clinic of her husband and
there took documents consisting of private communications between her husband and his alleged paramour.

Facts:
Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of Dr. Alfredo Martin. One day, she went to the clinic of her husband, together with her mom, her driver
and Dr. Martin’s secretary and forcibly opened the drawer of her husband’s clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private
correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martins passport, and
photographs without Dr. Martin’s knowledge and consent. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal
separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.
Dr. Martin brought an action for the recovery of documents and papers, as well as damages against her wife before the RTC. The
RTC ruled in his favor, declaring him to be the exclusive owner of such documents. The writ of preliminary injunction was made final and
petitioner Cecilia Zulueta and her attorneys and representatives were enjoined from using or submitting/admitting as evidence the
documents and papers in question. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Hence this petition.
Cecilia’s side: She contends that the case of Alfredo Martin vs Alfonso Felix, Jr. (NOTE: the case is between her husband, Dr.
Martin and a lawyer, atty. alfonso) where the court ruled that the documents and papers were admissible in evidence and that the use of
those documents by Atty. Alfonso did not constitute gross malpractice and gross misconduct. 

Issue:
WON the documents in question are admissible in evidence.
Privacy and correspondence is inviolable thus applicable even to husbands and wives.

Held:
 NO. Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. Cecilia’s contention, using the case of Alfredo
Martin vs Alfonso Felix, Jr., the case is between her husband, Dr. Martin and a lawyer, atty. alfonso is of no merit because such is for a
disbarment case.
The constitutional injunction declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable is no less applicable
simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husbands infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional
provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a lawful order [from a] court or when
public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law. Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding.
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and
in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or
his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify
for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists.  Neither may be examined without the
consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified
exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the
other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.
BLAS F. OPLE v. RUBEN D. TORRES, GR No. 127685, 1998-07-23

Facts:
Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification
Reference System" on two important constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to... legislate, and two, it
impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy. We grant the petition for the rights sought to be vindicated by the
petitioner need stronger barriers against further erosion.
A.O. No. 308 was issued by President Fidel V. Ramos on December 12, 1996
A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation on January 22, 1997 and January 23, 1997. On January 24,
1997, petitioner filed the instant petition against respondents, then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads of the government
agencies, who as... members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee, are charged with the implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April
8, 1997, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining its implementation.

Petitioner contends:
"A.     THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM REQUIRES A LEGISLATIVE ACT. THE
ISSUANCE OF A.O. NO. 308 BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES IS, THEREFORE, AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL
USURPATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.
B.      THE APPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS BY THE PRESIDENT FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL
USURPATION OF THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT OF CONGRESS TO APPROPRIATE PUBLIC FUNDS FOR EXPENDITURE.
C.      THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 INSIDIOUSLY LAYS THE GROUNDWORK FOR A SYSTEM WHICH WILL VIOLATE THE BILL OF
RIGHTS ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION."

Respondents counter-argue:
A.      THE INSTANT PETITION IS NOT A JUSTICIABLE CASE AS WOULD WARRANT A JUDICIAL REVIEW;
B.      A.O. NO. 308 [1996] WAS ISSUED WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT
ENCROACHING ON THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF CONGRESS;
C.      THE FUNDS NECESSARY FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM MAY BE SOURCED FROM THE
BUDGETS OF THE CONCERNED AGENCIES;
D.      A.O. NO. 308 [1996] PROTECTS AN INDIVIDUAL'S INTEREST IN PRIVACY.[3]

Issue:
Whether or not AO No. 308 is violative of the right to privacy

Held:
Yes. The court prescinds from the premise that the right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution , hence,
it is the burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn.  A.O.
No. 308 is predicated on two considerations: (1) the need to provide our citizens and foreigners with the facility to conveniently transact
business with basic service and social security providers and other government instrumentalities and (2) the need to reduce, if not totally
eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations by persons seeking basic services.  It is debatable whether these interests are
compelling enough to warrant the issuance of A.O. No. 308.  But what is not arguable is the broadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth of
A.O. No. 308 which if implemented will put our people’s right to privacy in clear and present danger.
The potential for misuse of the data to be gathered under A.O. No. 308 cannot be underplayed as the dissenters do.  Pursuant to
said administrative order, an individual must present his PRN every time he deals with a government agency to avail of basic services and
security. His transactions with the government agency will necessarily be recorded – whether it be in the computer or in the documentary
file of the agency.  The individual’s file may include his transactions for loan availments, income tax returns, statement of assets and
liabilities, reimbursements for medication, hospitalization, etc.  The more frequent the use of the PRN, the better the chance of building a
huge and formidable information base through the electronic linkage of the files. The data may be gathered for gainful and useful
government purposes; but the existence of this vast reservoir of personal information constitutes a covert invitation to misuse, a
temptation that may be too great for some of our authorities to resist.
The right to privacy is one of the most threatened rights of man living in a mass society.   The threats emanate from various
sources– governments, journalists, employers, social scientists, etc. In the case at bar, the threat comes from the executive branch of
government which by issuing A.O. No. 308 pressures the people to surrender their privacy by giving information about themselves on
the pretext that it will facilitate delivery of basic services.  Given the record-keeping power of the computer, only the indifferent will fail
to perceive the danger that A.O. No. 308 gives the government the power to compile a devastating dossier against unsuspecting citizens.
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

NATIONAL PRESS CLUB VS. COMELEC [201 SCRA 1; G.R. NO. 1026653; 5 MAR 1992]

Facts:
Petitioners in these cases consist of representatives of the mass media which are prevented from selling or donating space and time for
political advertisements; two (2) individuals who are candidates for office (one for national and the other for provincial office) in the
coming May 1992 elections; and taxpayers and voters who claim that their right to be informed of election Issue and of credentials of
the candidates is being curtailed. It is principally argued by petitioners that Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 66461, known as the
Electoral Reforms Law of 1987:
"Sec. 11. Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda. - In addition to the forms of election propaganda prohibited under Section 85 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881, it shall be unlawful: b) for any newspapers, radio broadcasting or television station, other mass media, or any person
making use of the mass media to sell or to give free of charge print space or... air time for campaign or other political purposes except to
the Commission as provided under Section 90 and 92 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. Any mass media columnist, commentator, announcer or
personality who is a candidate for any elective... public office shall take a leave of absence from his work as such during the campaign
period."

PETITIONER’S CLAIM:
Invades and violates the constitutional guarantees comprising freedom of expression. Petitioners maintain that the prohibition imposed
by Section 11 (b) amounts to censorship, because it selects and singles out for suppression and repression with criminal sanctions, only
publications of a particular content, namely, media-based election or political propaganda during the election period of 1992. It is
asserted that the prohibition is in derogation of media's role, function and duty to provide adequate channels of public information and
public opinion relevant to election Issue. Further, petitioners contend that Section 11 (b) abridges the freedom of speech of candidates,
and that the suppression of media-based campaign or political propaganda except those appearing in the Comelec space of the
newspapers and on Comelec time of radio and television broadcasts, would bring about a substantial reduction in the quantity or volume
of information concerning candidates and Issue in the election thereby curtailing and limiting the right of voters to information and
opinion.

Issues:
Whether or not Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 66461 constitute unconstitutional repression of freedom of speech and freedom of the
press.

Ruling:
The Court considers that Section 11 (b) has not gone outside the permissible bounds of supervision or regulation of media operations
during... election periods.

"Sec. 90. Comelec space. The Commission shall procure space in at least one newspaper of general circulation in every province or city:
Provided, however. That in the absence of said newspaper, publication shall be done in... any other magazine or periodical in said province
or city, which shall be known as 'Comelec Space' wherein candidates can announce their candidacy. Said space shall be allocated, free of
charge, equally, and impartially by the Commission among all candidates within the area in which the newspaper is circulated.

Sec. 92. Comelec time. The Commission shall procure radio and television time to be known as 'Comelec Time' which shall be allocated
equally and impartially among the candidates within the area of coverage of all radio and... television stations. For this purpose, the
franchises of all radio broadcasting and television stations are hereby amended so as to provide radio or television time, free of charge,
during the period of the campaign."

Article IX(C)(4) of the 1987 Constitution

"Sec. 4. The Commission (on Elections) may, during the election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises
or permits for the operation of transportation and other public utilities, media of... communication or information, all grants, special
privileges, or concessions granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-
owned or controlled corporation or its subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal opportunity, time, and space,
and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information... campaigns and forums among candidates in
connection with the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections."

It is important to note that the restrictive impact upon freedom of speech and freedom of the Press of Section 11 (b) is circumscribed by
certain important limitations:

Firstly, Section 11 (b) is limited in the duration of its applicability and enforceability. By its Resolution No. 2328... dated 2 January 1992, the
Comelec, acting under another specific grant of authority by the Constitution (Article IX(C)(9)), has defined the period from 12 January
1992 until 10 June 1992 as the relevant election period.
Secondly, and more importantly, Section 11 (b) is limited in its scope of application, apply only to the purchase and sale, including purchase
and sale disguised as a... donation,[4] of print space and air time for "campaign or other political purposes."

Section 11 (b) does not purport in any way to... restrict the reporting by newspapers or radio or television stations of news or news-worthy
events relating to candidates, their qualifications, political parties and programs of government.
Section 11 (b) exempts from its prohibition the purchase by or donation to the Comelec of print space or air time, which space and time
Comelec is then affirmatively required to... allocate on a fair and equal basis, free of charge, among the individual candidates for elective
public offices Section 11 (b) does, of course, limit the right of free speech and of access to mass media of the candidates themselves. The
limitation, however, bears a clear and reasonable connection with the constitutional objective set out in Article IX(C)(4) and Article II (26) of
the Constitution. For it is precisely in the unlimited purchase of print space and radio and television time that the resources of the
financially affluent candidates are likely to make a crucial difference. Here lies the core problem of equalization of the situations of the...
candidates with deep pockets and the candidates with shallow or empty pockets that Article IX(C)(4) of the Constitution and Section 11
(b) seek to address.

Realistically, the only limitation upon the free speech of candidates imposed is on the right of candidates to bombard the... helpless
electorate with paid advertisements commonly repeated in the mass media ad nauseam. Frequently, such repetitive political
commercials when fed into the electronic media themselves constitute invasions of the privacy of the general electorate.
Adiong v Comelec 207 SCRA 712 (1992)

Facts:
The COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347 pursuant to its powers granted by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code,
Republic Acts Nos. 6646 and 7166 and other election laws.

Section 15(a) of the resolution provides: Sec. 15. Lawful Election Propaganda. — The following are lawful election propaganda: (a)
Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals, stickers, handwritten or printed letters, or other written or printed materials not more than eight and
one-half (8-1/2) inches in width and fourteen (14) inches in length. Provided, that decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the
authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof: Sec. 21(f). Prohibited forms of election propaganda. — It is
unlawful:
(f) To draw, paint, inscribe, post, display or publicly exhibit any election propaganda in any place, whether public or private, mobile or
stationary, except in the COMELEC common posted areas and/or billboards, at the campaign headquarters of the candidate or political
party, organization or coalition, or at the candidate's own residential house or one of his residential houses, if he has more than one:
Provided, that such posters or election propaganda shall not exceed two (2) feet by three (3) feet in size.

Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections now assails the COMELEC's Resolution insofar
as it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in "mobile" places like cars and other moving vehicles . According to him such prohibition
is violative of Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 11(a) of Republic Act No. 6646 . In addition, the petitioner believes that
with the ban on radio, television and print political advertisements, he, being a neophyte in the field of politics stands to suffer grave and
irreparable injury with this prohibition. The posting of decals and stickers on cars and other moving vehicles would be his last medium
to inform the electorate that he is a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections. Finally, the petitioner states that as of February
22, 1992 (the date of the petition) he has not received any notice from any of the Election Registrars in the entire country as to the
location of the supposed "Comelec Poster Areas."

Issue:
Whether or not the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) may prohibit the posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places,
public or private, and limit their location or publication to the authorized posting areas that it fixes.

Ratio:
No. The prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on “mobile”places whether public or private except in the authorized areas
designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship which cannot be justified by the Constitution:

The concept of the Constitution as the fundamental law, setting forth the criterion for the validity of any public act whether
proceeding from the highest official or the lowest functionary, is a postulate of our system of government. That is to manifest fealty to the
rule of law, with priority accorded to that which occupies the topmost rung in the legal hierarchy. The three departments of government in
the discharge of the functions with which it is entrusted have no choice but to yield obedience to its commands. Whatever limits the
Constitution imposes must be observed. Congress in the enactment of statutes must ever be on guard lest the restrictions on its authority,
either substantive or formal, be transcended. The Presidency in the execution of the laws cannot ignore or disregard what it ordains. In its
task of applying the law to the facts as found in deciding cases, the judiciary is called upon to maintain inviolate what is decreed by the
fundamental law. Even its power of judicial review to pass upon the validity of the acts of the coordinate branches in the course of
adjudication is a logical. Corollary of this basic principle that the Constitution is paramount. It overrides any governmental measure that
fails to live up to its mandates. Thereby there is a recognition of its being the supreme law. (Mutuc v. Commission on Elections, supra)

The unusual circumstances of this year's national and local elections call for a more liberal interpretation of the freedom to speak
and the right to know. It is not alone the widest possible dissemination of information on platforms and programs which concern us. Nor
are we limiting ourselves to protecting the unfettered interchange of ideas to bring about political change. (Cf. New York Times v.
Sullivan, supra) The big number of candidates and elective positions involved has resulted in the peculiar situation where almost all voters
cannot name half or even two-thirds of the candidates running for Senator. The public does not know who are aspiring to be elected to
public office.

There are many candidates whose names alone evoke qualifications, platforms, programs and ideologies which the voter may
accept or reject. When a person attaches a sticker with such a candidate's name on his car bumper, he is expressing more than the
name; he is espousing ideas. Our review of the validity of the challenged regulation includes its effects in today's particular
circumstances. We are constrained to rule against the COMELEC prohibition.
IGLESIA NI CRISTO VS. COURT OF APPEALS [259 SCRA 529; G.R. NO. 119673; 26 JUL 1996]

Facts:
Petitioner has a television program entitled "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" aired on Channel 2 every Saturday and on Channel 13 every
Sunday. The program presents and propagates petitioner's religious beliefs, doctrines and practices often times in comparative studies
with other religions. Petitioner submitted to the respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and Television the VTR tapes of its TV
program Series Nos. 116, 119, 121 and 128. The Board classified the series as "X" or not for public viewing on the ground that they
"offend and constitute an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law." On November 28, 1992, petitioner appealed
to the Office of the President the classification of its TV Series No. 128 which allowed it through a letter of former Executive Secretary
Edelmiro A. Amante, Sr., addressed for Henrietta S. Mendez reversing the decision of the respondent Board. Accordingly the episode is
protected by the constitutional guarantee of free speech and expression and no indication that the episode poses any clear and
present danger. Petitioner also filed Civil Case. Petitioner alleged that the respondent Board acted without jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion in requiring petitioner to submit the VTR tapes of its TV program and in x-rating them. It cited its TV Program Series
Nos. 115, 119, 121 and 128. In their Answer, respondent Board invoked its power under PD No. 19861 in relation to Article 201 of the
Revised Penal Code. The Iglesia ni Cristo insists on the literal translation of the bible and says that our (Catholic) veneration of the Virgin
Mary is not to be condoned because nowhere it is found in the bible. The board contended that it outrages Catholic and
Protestant's beliefs. RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. CA however reversed it hence this petition.

THE ISSUES
1. Does respondent Board have the power to review petitioner’s TV program?
 2. Assuming it has the power, did respondent Board gravely abuse its discretion when it prohibited the airing of petitioner’s
religious program?

THE RULING

[The Court voted 13-1 to REVERSE the CA insofar as the CA sustained the action of the respondent Board’s X-rating petitioner’s TV Program
Series Nos. 115, 119, and 121. It also voted 10-4 to AFFIRM the CA insofar as the CA it sustained the jurisdiction of the respondent MTRCB
to review petitioner’s TV program entitled “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo.”]

1. YES, respondent Board has the power to review petitioner’s TV program.

Petitioner contends that the term “television program” [in Sec. 3 of PD No. 1986 that the respondent Board has the power to
review and classify] should not include religious programs like its program “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo.” A contrary interpretation, it is urged, will
contravene section 5, Article III of the Constitution which guarantees that “no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or
preference, shall forever be allowed.”

[The Court however] reject petitioner’s postulate. Petitioner’s public broadcast on TV of its religious program brings it out of the
bosom of internal belief. Television is a medium that reaches even the eyes and ears of children. The Court iterates the rule that the
exercise of religious freedom can be regulated by the State when it will bring about the clear and present danger of some substantive
evil which the State is duty bound to prevent, i.e., serious detriment to the more overriding interest of public health, public morals, or
public welfare. A laissez faire policy on the exercise of religion can be seductive to the liberal mind but history counsels the Court against its
blind adoption as religion is and continues to be a volatile area of concern in our country today. . . [T]he Court] shall continue to subject
any act pinching the space for the free exercise of religion to a heightened scrutiny but we shall not leave its rational exercise to the
irrationality of man. For when religion divides and its exercise destroys, the State should not stand still.

2. YES, respondent Board gravely abuse its discretion when it prohibited the airing of petitioner’s religious program.
[A]ny act that restrains speech is hobbled by the presumption of invalidity and should be greeted with furrowed brows. It is the
burden of the respondent Board to overthrow this presumption. If it fails to discharge this burden, its act of censorship will be struck down.
It failed in the case at bar.

The evidence shows that the respondent Board x-rated petitioners TV series for “attacking” either religions, especially the Catholic
Church. An examination of the evidence . . . will show that the so-called “attacks” are mere criticisms of some of the deeply held dogmas
and tenets of other religions. The videotapes were not viewed by the respondent court as they were not presented as evidence. Yet the
videotapes were considered by the respondent court as indecent, contrary to law and good customs, hence, can be prohibited from public
viewing under section 3(c) of PD 1986. This ruling clearly suppresses petitioner's freedom of speech and interferes with its right to free
exercise of religion. xxx.
 The respondent Board may disagree with the criticisms of other religions by petitioner but that gives it no excuse to interdict such
criticisms, however, unclean they may be. Under our constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the State to favor any religion by
protecting it against an attack by another religion. . . In fine, respondent board cannot squelch the speech of petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo
simply because it attacks other religions, even if said religion happens to be the most numerous church in our country. In a State where
there ought to be no difference between the appearance and the reality of freedom of religion, the remedy against bad theology is better
theology. The bedrock of freedom of religion is freedom of thought and it is best served by encouraging the marketplace of duelling ideas.
When the luxury of time permits, the marketplace of ideas demands that speech should be met by more speech for it is the spark of
opposite speech, the heat of colliding ideas that can fan the embers of truth.

In x-rating the TV program of the petitioner, the respondents failed to apply the clear and present danger rule. In American Bible
Society v. City of Manila, this Court held: “The constitutional guaranty of free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship
carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any restraint of such right can be justified like other restraints on freedom
of expression on the ground that there is a clear and present danger of any substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent.”
In Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, we further ruled that “. . . it is only where it is unavoidably necessary to prevent
an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community that infringement of religious freedom may be
justified, and only to the smallest extent necessary to avoid the danger.”

The records show that the decision of the respondent Board, affirmed by the respondent appellate court, is completely bereft of
findings of facts to justify the conclusion that the subject video tapes constitute impermissible attacks against another religion. There is no
showing whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring about especially the gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior
restraint on speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and
imminent evil which has taken the life of a reality already on ground.
MIRIAM COLLEGE FOUNDATION, INC. V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 127930, [DECEMBER 15, 2000] ALSO

FACTS:
The members of the editorial board of the Miriam College Foundation’s school paper were subjected to disciplinary sanction by the
College Discipline Committee after letters of complaint were filed before the Board following the publication of the school paper that
contains obscene, vulgar, and sexually explicit contents. Prior to the disciplinary sanction to the defendants they were required to submit a
written statement to answer the complaints against them to the Discipline Committee but the defendants, instead of doing so wrote to
the Committee to transfer the case to the DECS which they alleged to have the jurisdiction over the issue. Pushing through with the
investigation ex parte the Committee found the defendants guilty and imposed upon them disciplinary sanctions. Defendants filed before
the court for prohibition with preliminary injunction on said decision of the Committee questioning the jurisdiction of said Discipline Board
over the defendants.
  
ISSUE:
WON the petitioner has the power to discipline and dismiss the students. 

HELD:
YES. Section 5 (2), Article XIV of the Constitution guarantees all institutions of higher learning academic freedom. This
institutional academic freedom includes the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to
attain them free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint . The
essential freedoms subsumed in the term “academic freedom” encompasses the freedom to determine for itself on academic grounds: (1)
Who may teach, (2) What may be taught, (3) How it shall be taught, and (4) Who may be admitted to study. The right of the school to
discipline its students is at once apparent in the third freedom , i. e., “how it shall be taught.” A school certainly cannot function in an
atmosphere of anarchy. Thus, there can be no doubt that the establishment of an educational institution requires rules and regulations
necessary for the maintenance of an orderly educational program and the creation of an educational environment conducive to learning.
Such rules and regulations are equally necessary for the protection of the students, faculty, and property. Moreover, the school has an
interest in teaching the student discipline, a necessary, if not indispensable, value in any field of learning. By instilling discipline, the
school teaches discipline. Accordingly, the right to discipline the student likewise finds basis in the freedom “what to teach.” Incidentally,
the school not only has the right but the duty to develop discipline in its students. The Constitution no less imposes such duty. [All
educational institutions] shall inculcate patriotism and nationalism, foster love of humanity, respect for human rights, appreciation of the
role of national heroes in the historical development of the country, teach the rights and duties of citizenship, strengthen ethical and
spiritual values, develop moral character and personal discipline, encourage critical and creative thinking, broaden scientific and
technological knowledge, and promote vocational efficiency.

Section 4 (1), Article XIV of the Constitution recognizes the State’s power to regulate educational institution: The State recognizes
the complementary roles of public and private institutions in the educational system and shall exercise reasonable supervision and
regulation of all educational institutions. As may be gleaned from the above provision, such power to regulate is subject to the
requirement of reasonableness. Moreover, the Constitution allows merely the regulation and supervision of educational institutions, not
the deprivation of their rights.

Campus journalism act (republic act no. 7079); section 7 thereof construed to mean that the school cannot suspend or expel a
student solely on the basis of the articles he or she has written, except when such articles materially disrupts class work or involve
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others. 

The power of the school to investigate is an adjunct of its power to suspend or expel. It is a necessary corollary to the
enforcement of rules and regulations and the maintenance of a safe and orderly educational environment conducive to learning. That
power, like the power to suspend or expel, is an inherent part of the academic freedom of institutions of higher learning guaranteed
by the Constitution. We therefore rule that Miriam College has the authority to hear and decide the cases filed against respondent
students.
U.S. v Bustos G.R. No. L-12592 March 8, 1918

Facts:
In 1915, 34 Pampanga residents signed a petition to the Executive Secretary regarding charges against Roman Punsalan, the justice
of the peace of Macabebe. They wanted to oust him from his office.
Specific allegations against him included bribery charges, involuntary servitude, and theft.
The justice denied the charges. In the CFI, not all the charges were proved. But, the judge still found him guilty.
Punsalan filed charges alleging that he was the victim of prosecution and one Jaime, an auxiliary justice, instigated the charges
against him for personal reasons. He was acquitted.
The complainants filed an appeal to the Governor General but it wasn’t acted upon.
Criminal action was instituted aganst the residents by Punsalan.
The CFI found almost all of the 34 defendants guilty and sentenced them to pay 10 pesos or suffer imprisonment in case of
insolvency.
The defendants filed a motion for a retrial to retire the objection made by Punsalan. The trial court denied the motion. All except 2
of the defendants appealed. Making assignments of error.
1. The court erred in overruling motion for retrial.
2. Error in not holding that the libelous statement was not privileged
3. Error in not acquitting defendants
4. Evidence failed to show gult of defendants beyond reasonable doubt.
5. Erred in making defendants prove that the libelous statements were true.
 6. Error in sustaining the prosecution’s objection to the introduction in evidence by the accused of the  affidavits upon which the
petition forming the basis of the libelous charge was based.
7. Erred in refusing to permit the defendants to retire the objection in advertently interposed by their counsel to the  admission in
evidence of the expediente administrativo out of which the accusation in this case arose.

Issue:
Whether or not the defendants and appellants are guilty of a libel of Roman Punsalan, justice of the peace in Pampanga.

Held: Yes. Defendants acquitted.

Ratio:
Freedom of speech was non existent in the country before 1900. There were small efforts at reform made by the La Solidaridad.
The Malolos Constitution, on  the other hand, guaranteed freedom of speech.
During the U.S. period, President McKinley himself laid down the tenet Magna Charta of Philippine Liberty when he wrote, “that no
law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or of the rights of the people to peaceably assemble and petition the
Government for a redress of grievances." This was in the Philippine Bill.
In the Amrican cases it was held, there were references to “public opinion should be the constant source of liberty and democracy.”
It also said “the guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to criticize judicial conduct. The administration of the law is a
matter of vital public concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced is, therefore, a fit subject for proper comment. If the people
cannot criticize a justice of the peace or a judge the same as any other public officer, public opinion will be  effectively muzzled. Attempted
terrorization of public opinion on the part of the judiciary would be tyranny of the basest sort.”
“It is a duty which everyone owes to society or to the State to assist in the investigation of any alleged misconduct. It is further the
duty of all who know of any official dereliction on the part of a magistrate or the wrongful act of any public officer to bring the facts to the
notice of those whose duty it is to inquire into and punish them.”
The right to assemble and petition is the necessary consequence of republican institutions and the complement of the part of free
speech. Assembly means a right on the part of citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs. Petition means
that any person or group of persons can apply, without fear of penalty, to the appropriate branch or office of the government for a
redress of grievances. The persons assembling and petitioning must, of course, assume responsibility for the charges made.
Public policy has demanded protection for public opinion. The doctrine of privilege has been the result of this. Privileged
communications may in some instances afford an immunity to the slanderer. Public policy is the “unfettered administration of justice.”
Privilege is either absolute or qualified. Qualified privilege is prima facie which may be lost by proof of malice. This is apparent in
complaints made in good faith against a public official’s conduct having a duty in the matter. Even if the statements were found to be false,
the protection of privilege may cover the individual given that it was in good faith. There must be a sense of duty and not a self-seeking
motive.
A communication made bona fide upon any subject-matter in which the party communicating has an interest, or in reference to
which has a duty, is privileged, if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, although it contained criminatory matter
which without this privilege would be slanderous and actionable. In the usual case malice can be presumed from defamatory words.
Privilege destroys that presumption. The onus of proving malice then lies on the plaintiff. The plaintiff must bring home to the defendant
the existence of malice as the true motive of his conduct. Falsehood and the absence of probable cause will amount to proof of malice.
It is true that the particular words set out in the information, if said of a private  person, might well be considered libelous per se.
The charges might also under certain conceivable conditions convict one of a libel of a government official. As a general rule words
imputing to a judge or a justice of the peace dishonesty or corruption or incapacity or misconduct touching him in his office are actionable.
But as suggested in the beginning we do not have present a simple case of direct and vicious accusations published in the press, but of
charges predicated on affidavits made to the proper official and thus qualifiedly privileged. Express malice has not been proved by the
prosecution. Further, although the charges are probably not true as to the justice of the peace, they were believed to be true by the
petitioners. Good faith surrounded their action. Probable cause for them to think that malfeasance or misfeasance in office existed is
apparent. The ends and the motives of these citizens— to secure the removal from office of a  person thought to be venal — were
justifiable. In no way did they abuse the privilege. These respectable citizens did not eagerly seize on a frivolous matter but on instances
which not only seemed to them of a grave character, but which were sufficient in an investigation by a judge of first instance to convince
him of their seriousness. No undue publicity was given to the petition. The manner of commenting on the conduct of the justice of the
peace was proper.

PEOPLE v. SALVADOR ALARCON ET AL., GR No. 46551, 1939-12-12

Facts:
The decision rendered by the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in criminal case No. 5733, The People of the Philippines vs.
Salvador Alarcon, et al., convicting the accused therein except one of the crime of robbery committed in... band, a denunciatory letter,
signed by one Luis M. Taruc, was addressed to His Excellency, the President of the Philippines. A copy of said letter found its way to the
herein respondent, Federico Mangahas who, as columnist of the Tribune, a newspaper of general... circulation in the Philippines, quoted
the letter in an article published by him in the issue of that paper of September 23, 1937. The objectionable portion is inserted in the
following petition of the provincial fiscal of Pampanga, filed with the Court of First Instance of that... province... tenants in Floridablanca,
Pampanga, have been charged and convicted on a trumped up charge of robbery in band because they took each a few cavans of palay for
which they issued the corresponding receipts, from the bodega in the hacienda where they are working.

These tenants contend that they have the right to take the palay for their food as the hacienda owner has the obligation to give
them rations of palay for their maintenance and their families to be paid later with their share of their crop. But this is not all. When the...
convicted tenants appealed the case and were released on bail pending their appeal, court and public officials exerted pressure upon one
of their bondsmen, as this bondsman informed the tenants, to withdraw his bail for them, and the fifty-two tenants were arrested again
and put... in jail... he lower court ordered the respondent to appear and show cause. The respondent appeared and filed an answer,
alleging:
 That he did not draft and write the paragraph above quoted in the petition of the Provincial Fiscal, but the same is merely a part of
a letter addressed to the President of the Philippines, certified copy of which is hereto attached, and marked Exhibit '1.
That he caused the said letter to be copied without comments or remarks as may been seen from the attached issue of the The
Tribune' on September 23, 1937,... That in having the said letter copied it was not the intention, much less the purpose and design of the
respondent to attack the honor, virtue and reputation of this Honorable Court but merely cited it as an instance of the popular tendency to
resort to the President in... everything.
That the publication of the letter in question did not and does not embarrass, impede, intimidate or influence this Honorable Court
in the exercise of its judicial functions, or prevent an impartial trial in this case, inasmuch as the case has already been decided.
That the respondent alleges that this case is no longer pending before this Hon. Court and therefore the Court has lost its
jurisdiction over it.
The general rule is that to constitute any publication a contempt it must have reference to a matter then pending in court, and be
of a character tending to the injury of pending proceeding before it and of the subsequent proceeding. It is accordingly held that libelous...
comments upon a sentence already passed in a criminal proceeding is not a contempt.'
That the publication of the letter in question is in line with the constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press."
Respondent Mañgahas appealed from this order to the Court of Appeals

Issues:
The lower court erred in finding the respondent guilty of contempt of court.

Ruling:
It must, however, clearly appear that such publications... do impede, interfere with, and embarrass the administration of justice
before the author of the publications should be held for contempt. (Nixon v. State 207 Ind., 426, 193 N. E., 591, 97 A. L. R., 894.)   What is
thus sought to be shielded against the influence of... newspaper comments is the all-important duty of the court to administer justice in
the decision of a pending case. There is no pending case to speak of when and once the court has come upon a decision and has lost
control either to reconsider or amend it.  That, we believe,... is the case at bar, for here we have a concession that the letter complained of
was published after the Court of First Instance of Pampanga had decided the aforesaid criminal case for robbery in band, and after that
decision had been appealed to the Court of Appeals.  The... fact that a motion to reconsider its order confiscating the bond of the accused
therein was subsequently filed may be admitted; but, the important consideration is that it was then without power to reopen or modify
the decision which it had rendered upon the merits of the case,... and could not have been influenced by the questioned publication. The
weight of authority, however, is clearly to the effect that comment upon concluded cases is unrestricted under our... constitutional
guaranty of the liberty of the press."... and where a reasonable doubt in fact or in law exists as to the guilt of one of constructive contempt
for interfering... with the due administration of justice the doubt must be resolved in his favor, and he must be acquitted.
Ayer Vs Capulong

Facts:
Petitioner McElroy an Australian film maker, and his movie production company, Ayer Productions, envisioned, sometime in 1987,
for commercial viewing and for Philippine and international release, the historic peaceful struggle of the Filipinos at EDSA. The proposed
motion picture entitled "The Four Day Revolution" was endorsed by the MTRCB as and other government agencies consulted. Ramos also
signified his approval of the intended film production. It is designed to be viewed in a six-hour mini-series television play, presented in a
"docu-drama" style, creating four fictional characters interwoven with real events, and utilizing actual documentary footage as
background. David Williamson is Australia's leading playwright and Professor McCoy (University of New South Wales) is an American
historian have developed a script. Enrile declared that he will not approve the use, appropriation, reproduction and/or exhibition of his
name, or picture, or that of any member of his family in any cinema or television production, film or other medium for advertising or
commercial exploitation. petitioners acceded to this demand and the name of Enrile was deleted from the movie script, and petitioners
proceeded to film the projected motion picture. However, a complaint was filed by Enrile invoking his right to privacy. RTC ordered for the
desistance of the movie production and making of any reference to plaintiff or his family and from creating any fictitious character in lieu of
plaintiff which nevertheless is based on, or bears substantial or marked resemblance to Enrile. Hence the appeal.
Issue:
Whether or Not freedom of expression was violated

HELD :
The Court would once more stress that this freedom includes the freedom to film and produce motion pictures and to exhibit such
motion pictures in theaters or to diffuse them through television The respondent Judge should have stayed his hand, instead of issuing an
ex-parte Temporary Restraining Order one day after filing of a complaint by the private respondent and issuing a Preliminary Injunction
twenty (20) days later; for the projected motion picture was as yet uncompleted and hence not exhibited to any audience. Neither private
respondent nor the respondent trial Judge knew what the completed film would precisely look like. There was, in other words, no "clear
and present danger" of any violation of any right to privacy that private respondent could lawfully assert. The subject matter, as set out in
the synopsis provided by the petitioners and quoted above, does not relate to the individual life and certainly not to the private life of
private respondent Ponce Enrile The extent of that intrusion, as this Court understands the synopsis of the proposed film, may be generally
described as such intrusion as is reasonably necessary to keep that film a truthful historical account. Private respondent does not claim
that petitioners threatened to depict in "The Four Day Revolution" any part of the private life of private respondent or that of any member
of his family. His participation therein was major in character, a film reenactment of the peaceful revolution that fails to make reference to
the role played by private respondent would be grossly unhistorical. The right of privacy of a "public figure" is necessarily narrower than
that of an ordinary citizen. Private respondent has not retired into the seclusion of simple private citizenship. he continues to be a "public
figure." After a successful political campaign during which his participation in the EDSA Revolution was directly or indirectly referred to in
the press, radio and television, he sits in a very public place, the Senate of the Philippines. The line of equilibrium in the specific context of
the instant case between the constitutional freedom of speech and of expression and the right of privacy, may be marked out in terms of a
requirement that the proposed motion picture must be fairly truthful and historical in its presentation of events

ARTURO BORJAL a.k.a. ART BORJAL and

MAXIMO SOLIVEN, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and FRANCISCO WENCESLAO,
respondents.
[G.R. No. 126466. January 14, 1999]
BELLOSILLO, J.:
FACTS: Petitioners Arturo Borjal and Maximo Soliven
are among the incorporators of Philippines Today,
Inc. (PTI), now PhilSTAR Daily, Inc., owner of The
Philippine Star, a daily newspaper. At the time the
complaint was filed, petitioner Borjal was its
President while Soliven was (and still is) Publisher
and
Chairman of its Editorial Board. Private respondent
Francisco Wenceslao, on the other hand, is a civil
engineer, businessman, business consultant and
journalist by profession. In 1988 he served as a
technical adviser of Congressman Fabian Sison, then
Chairman of the House of Representatives Sub-
Committee on Industrial Policy.
A series of articles written by petitioner Borjal was
published in his column Jaywalker. The articles
dealt with the alleged anomalous activities of an
"organizer of a conference" without naming or
identifying
private respondent. Neither did it refer to the FNCLT as
the conference.
Thereafter, private respondent filed a complaint
with the National Press Club (NPC) against
petitioner Borjal for unethical conduct. He accused
petitioner Borjal of using his column as a form of
leverage to obtain contracts for his public relations firm,
AA Borjal Associates.In turn, petitioner Borjal
published a rejoinder to the challenge of private
respondent not only to protect his name and honor but
also to refute the claim that he was using his column for
character assassination.
Borjal v. CA

Facts:
Arturo Borjal was the president of PhilSTAR Daily, Inc., and Maximo Soliven was the publisher and chairman of its editorial board.
Borjal was among the regular writers of The Philippien Star who runs the column Jaywalker. The case stems from the articles written
in Jaywalker, which called a certain organizer of a conference a self-proclaimed hero.

Around that time, the First National Conference on Land Transportation (FNCLT) was organized. Its objective was to draft an
omnibus bill that would embody a long-term land transportation policy for presentation to Congress. The conference was estimated to cost
around Php1,815,000, which would be funded through solicitations from various sponsors. Private respondent Francisco Wenceslao was
elected as Executive Director of the FNCLT. As such, he wrote numerous solicitation letters to the business committee to support the
conference.

The Jaywalkercontained articles allegedly referring to these solicitation letters and other defamatory statements. However, none of
these articles named the organizer nor the conference referred to. Wenceslao, thinking he was the one talked about in the article, filed a
case of libel against Borjal, Soliven, and others. The trial court as well as the appellate court found the accused guilty of libel.

A petition for review was filed before the SC contending that private respondent was not sufficiently identified to be the subject of
the published articles.

Issue:
Whether or not there are sufficient grounds to constitute guilt of petitioners for libel.

Held:
 In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be identifiable although it is not necessary that he be named. It is
also not sufficient that the offended party recognized himself as the person attacked or defamed, but it must be shown that at least a
third person could identify him as the object of the libelous publication. These requisites have not been complied with in the case at
bar. The element of identifiability was not met since it was Wenceslaso who revealed he was the organizer of said conference and had he
not done so the public would not have known.

The concept of privileged communications is implicit in the freedom of the press and that privileged communications must be
protective of public opinion. Fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action
for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair comment means that while in general every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed
false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious,
nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable.
In order that such discreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a
comment based on a false supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on established facts, then it is immaterial that
the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred from the facts.

The questioned article dealt with matters of public interest as the declared objective of the conference, the composition of its
members and participants, and the manner by which it was intended to be funded no doubt lend to its activities as being genuinely imbued
with public interest. Respondent is also deemed to be a public figure and even otherwise is involved in a public issue. The court held that
freedom of expression is constitutionally guaranteed and protected with the reminder among media members to practice highest ethical
standards in the exercise thereof.

A privileged communication may be either:

1. Absolutely privileged communication - those which are not actionable even if the author has acted in bad faith. An example is found in
Sec. 11, Art.VI, of the 1987 Constitution which exempts a member of Congress from liability for any speech or debate in the Congress or in
any Committee thereof.

2. Qualifiedly privileged communications - those containing defamatory imputations are not actionable unless found to have been made
without good intention justifiable motive. To this genre belong "private communications" and "fair and true report without any comments
or remarks."
Reyes Vs. Bagatsing 125 SCRA 553

Facts:
Petitioner Justice Reyes sought a permit from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on October 26, 1983 from 2:00
to 5:00 in the afternoon, starting from the Luneta to the gates of the United States Embassy. Once there, and in an open space of public
property, a short program would be held. The march would be attended by the local and foreign participants of such conference. That
would be followed by the handing over of a petition based on the resolution adopted at the closing session of the Anti-Bases Coalition.
There was likewise an assurance in the petition that in the exercise of the constitutional rights to free speech and assembly, all the
necessary steps would be taken by it "to ensure a peaceful march and rally. However the request was denied. Reference was made to
persistent intelligence reports affirming the plans of subversive/criminal elements to infiltrate or disrupt any assembly or congregations
where a large number of people is expected to attend. Respondent suggested that a permit may be issued if it is to be held at the Rizal
Coliseum or any other enclosed area where the safety of the participants themselves and the general public may been sured. An oral
argument was heard and the mandatory injunction was granted on the ground that there was no showing of the existence of a clear and
present danger of a substantive evil that
could justify the denial of a permit. However Justice Aquino dissented that the rally is violative of Ordinance No. 7295 of the City of Manila
prohibiting the holding of rallies within a radius of five hundred (500) feet from any foreign mission or chancery and for other purposes.
Hence the Court resolves.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the denial of permit for the conduct peaceable assembly to the gates of U.S. Embassy may be validly enforced.

HELD:
NO. Mandatory injunction prayed was granted.

RATIO:
[T]he Court is called upon to protect the exercise of the cognate rights to free speech and peaceful assembly, arising from the
denial of a permit. The Constitution is quite explicit: “No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right
of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances.”. There can be no legal objection, absent the
existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil, on the choice of Luneta as the place where the peace rally would
start. Neither can there be any valid objection to the use of the streets, to the gates of the US Embassy, hardly two block-away at the Roxas
Boulevard.
 There is merit to the observation that except as to the novel aspects of a litigation, the judgment must be confined within the limits
of previous decisions. The law declared on past occasions is, on the whole, a safe guide, So it has been here. While the General rule is that
a permit should recognize the right of the applicants to hold their assembly at a public place of their choice, another place may be
designated by the licensing authority if it be shown that there is a clear and present danger of a substantive evil if no such change were
made.
By way of a summary The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the date, the public
place where and the time when it will take place. If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal
possession is required. Such application should be filed well ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to appraise whether
there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place.
SEPARATE OPINIONS:
TEEHANKEE, concurring
The salutary desire on the part of respondent to prevent disorder cannot be pursued by the unjustified denial and suppression of the
people’s basic rights, which would thereby turn out to be mere paper rights.;

MAKASIAR, concurring
With the justification that in case of conflict, the Philippine Constitution — particularly the Bill of Rights — should prevail over the Vienna
Convention;

ABAD SANTOS, concurring

To add anything to the learned opinion of the Chief Justice is like bringing coal to Newcastle, I just want to state for the record that I voted
for the issuance ex-parte of a preliminary mandatory injunction;

PLANA, concurring
In my view, without saying that the Ordinance is obnoxious per se to the constitution, it cannot be validly invoked whenever its application
would collide with a constitutionally guaranteed right such as freedom of assembly and/or expression, as in the case at bar, regardless of
whether the chancery of any foreign embassy is beyond or within 500 feet from the situs of the rally or demonstration.

AQUINO, dissenting
Voted to dismiss the petition on the ground that the holding of the rally in front of the US Embassy violates Ordinance No. 7295 of the City
of Manila.
PITA VS. COURT OF APPEALS [178 SCRA 362; G.R. NO.80806; 5 OCT 1989]

Facts:
On December 1 and 3, 1983, pursuing an Anti-Smut Campaign initiated by the Mayor of the City of Manila, Ramon D. Bagatsing,
elements of the Special Anti-Narcotics Group, Auxilliary Services Bureau, Western Police District, INP of the Metropolitan Police Force of
Manila, seized and confiscated from dealers, distributors, newsstand owners and peddlers along Manila sidewalks, magazines, publications
and other reading materials believed to be obscene, pornographic and indecent and later burned the seized materials in public at the
University belt along C.M. Recto Avenue, Manila, in the presence of Mayor Bagatsing and several officers and members of
various student organizations.

Among the publications seized, and later burned, was "Pinoy Playboy" magazines published and co-edited by plaintiff Leo Pita.

Plaintiff filed a case for injunction with prayer for issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction against Mayor Bagatsing and
Narcisco Cabrera, as superintendent of Western Police District of the City of Manila, seeking to enjoin said defendants and their agents
from confiscating plaintiff’s magazines or from preventing the sale or circulation thereof claiming that the magazine is a decent, artistic and
educational magazine which is not per se obscene, and that the publication is protected by the Constitutional guarantees of freedom of
speech and of the press. Plaintiff also filed an Urgent Motion for issuance of a temporary restraining order against indiscriminate
seizure, confiscation and burning of plaintiff's "Pinoy Playboy" Magazines, pending hearing on the petition for preliminary injunction. The
Court granted the temporary restraining order. The case was set for trial upon the lapse of the TRO. RTC ruled that the seizure was valid.
This was affirmed by the CA.

In the SC, the petitioner claimed that:

1. The CA erred in holding that the police officers could without any court warrant or order seize and confiscate petitioner's
magazines on the basis simply of their determination that they are obscene.
2. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court and, in effect, holding that the trial court could dismiss the
case on its merits without any hearing thereon when what was submitted to it for resolution was merely the application of petitioner for
the writ of preliminary injunction.
Issue: Whether or Not the seizure violative of the freedom of expression of the petitioner.

Held:
Freedom of the press is not without restraint as the state has the right to protect society from pornographic literature that is
offensive to public morals, as indeed we have laws punishing the author, publishers and sellers of obscene publications. However, It is
easier said than done to say, that if the pictures here in question were used not exactly for art's sake but rather for commercial purposes,
the pictures are not entitled to any constitutional protection. Using the Kottinger rule: Test for obscenity: "whether the tendency of the
matter charged as obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into whose hands a
publication or other article charged as being obscene may fall.
Also, "whether a picture is obscene or indecent must depend upon the circumstances of the case, and that ultimately, the question
is to be decided by the "judgment of the aggregate sense of the community reached by it." (Kottinger)
When does a publication have a corrupting tendency, or when can it be said to be offensive to human sensibilities?
The issue is a complicated one, in which the fine lines have neither been drawn nor divided.
Katigbak- "Whether to the average person, applying contemporary standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a
whole appeals to prurient interest."
Kalaw-Katigbak represented a marked departure from Kottinger in the sense that it measured obscenity in terms of the "dominant
theme" of the work, rather than isolated passages, which were central to Kottinger (although both cases are agreed that "contemporary
community standards" are the final arbiters of what is "obscene"). Kalaw-Katigbak undertook moreover to make the determination of
obscenity essentially a judicial question and as a consequence, to temper the wide discretion Kottinger had given unto law enforcers.
The latest say on American jurisprudence was Miller v. California, which expressly abandoned Massachusettes, and established
"basic guidelines," to wit: "(a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary standards' would find the work, taken as a
whole, appeals to the prurient interest . . .; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value.
The lack of uniformity in American jurisprudence as to what constitutes "obscenity" has been attributed to the reluctance of the courts to
recognize the constitutional dimension of the problem.
Apparently, the courts have assumed that "obscenity" is not included in the guaranty of free speech, an assumption that, as we
averred, has allowed a climate of opinions among magistrates predicated upon arbitrary, if vague theories of what is acceptable to society.
In the case at bar, there is no challenge on the right of the State, in the legitimate exercise of police power, to suppress smut provided it is
smut. For obvious reasons, smut is not smut simply because one insists it is smut. So is it equally evident that individual tastes
develop, adapt to wide-ranging influences, and keep in step with the rapid advance of civilization. What shocked our forebears, say, five
decades ago, is not necessarily repulsive to the present generation.
But neither should we say that "obscenity" is a bare (no pun intended) matter of opinion. As we said earlier, it is the divergent
perceptions of men and women that have probably compounded the problem rather than resolved it.
Undoubtedly, "immoral" lore or literature comes within the ambit of free expression, although not its protection. In free expression
cases, this Court has consistently been on the side of the exercise of the right, barring a "clear and present danger" that would warrant
State interference and action. But the burden to show this lies with the authorities.
 "There must be objective and convincing, not subjective or conjectural, proof of the existence of such clear and present danger."
As we so strongly stressed in Bagatsing, a case involving the delivery of a political speech, the presumption is that the speech may validly
be said. The burden is on the State to demonstrate the existence of a danger, a danger that must not only be: (1) clear but also, (2) present,
to justify State action to stop the speech.
The Court is not convinced that the private respondents have shown the required proof to justify a ban and to warrant confiscation
of the literature for which mandatory injunction had been sought below. First of all, they were not possessed of a lawful court order: (1)
finding the said materials to be pornography, and (2) authorizing them to carry out a search and seizure, by way of a search warrant.
Has petitioner been found guilty for publishing obscene works under Presidential Decrees Nos. 960 and 969? This not answered, one can
conclude that the fact that the former respondent Mayor's act was sanctioned by "police power" is no license to seize property in disregard
of due process. The PD’s don’t give the authorities the permission to execute high-handed acts.
It is basic that searches and seizures may be done only through a judicial warrant, otherwise, they become unreasonable and
subject to challenge.
There is of course provision for warrantless searches under the Rules of Court but as the provision itself suggests, the search must
have been an incident to a lawful arrest and it must be on account to a crime committed.
The Court rejected the argument that "[t]here is no constitutional nor legal provision which would free the accused of all criminal
responsibility because there had been no warrant, and there is no "accused" here to speak of, who ought to be "punished".
 Second, to say that the respondent Mayor could have validly ordered the raid (as a result of an anti-smut campaign) without a lawful
search warrant because, in his opinion, "violation of penal laws" has been committed, is to make the respondent Mayor judge, jury, and
executioner rolled into one.
ZALDIVAR VS. SANDIGANBAYAN [170 SCRA 1; G.R. NO. 79690-707; 1 FEB 1989]

Facts: 
The case stemmed from the resolution of the Supreme Court stopping the respondent from investigating graft cases involving
Antique Gov. Enrique Zaldivar. The Court ruled that since the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, respondent’s powers as Tanodbayan have
been superseded by the creation of the Office of the Ombudsman, he however becomes the Special Prosecutor of the State, and can only
conduct an investigation and file cases only when so authorized by the Ombudsman. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the
respondent wherein he included statements which were unrelated in the Issue raised in the Court. This include: (a)That he had been
approached twice by a leading member of the court and he was asked to 'go slow on Zaldivar and 'not to be too hard on him; (b) That he
"was approached and asked to refrain from investigating the COA report on illegal disbursements in the Supreme Court because 'it will
embarass the Court;" and (c) that in several instances, the undersigned respondent was called over the  phone by a leading member of the
Court and was asked to dismiss the cases against two Members of the Court." Statements of the respondent saying that the SC’s order
'"heightens the people's apprehension over the justice system in this country, especially because the people have been thinking that only
the small fly can get it while big fishes go scot-free” was publicized in leading newspapers.

Now, the Court Resolved to require respondent to explain in writing why he should not be punished for contempt of court for
making such public statements reported in the media. Respondent then sought to get some members of the Court to inhibit themselves in
the resolution of the Zaldivar case for alleged bias and prejudice against him. A little later, he in effect asked the whole Court to inhibit
itself from passing upon the Issue involved in proceeding and to pass on responsibility for this matter to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, upon the ground that respondent cannot expect due process from this Court, that the Court has become incapable of judging
him impartially and fairly. The Court found respondent guilty of contempt of court and indefinitely suspended from the practice of law.
Now, he assails said conviction, invoking his freedom of speech. Counsel for respondent urges that it is error "for this Court to apply the
"visible tendency" rule rather than the "clear and present danger" rule in disciplinary and contempt charges."

Issue: Whether or Not there was a violation of the freedom of speech/expression.

Held:
 There was no violation. The Court did not purport to announce a new doctrine of "visible tendency," it was simply
paraphrasing Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court which penalizes a variety of contumacious conduct including: "any
improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice."

Under either the "clear and present danger" test or the "balancing-of-interest test," the Court held that the statements made by
respondent Gonzalez are of such a nature and were made in such a manner and under such circumstances, as to transcend the permissible
limits of free speech. What is here at stake is the authority of the Supreme Court to confront and prevent a "substantive evil" consisting
not only of the obstruction of a free and fair hearing of a particular case but also the avoidance of the broader evil of the degradation of
the judicial system of a country and the destruction of the standards of professional conduct required from members of the bar and
officers of the courts, which has some implications to the society.
FRANCISCO CHAVEZ, petitioner, vs. RAUL M. GONZALES, in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Justice; and NATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (NTC), respondents. [G.R. No. 168338. February 15, 2008.]

FACTS:
The case is about the “Hello Garci” wire-tapping scandal. A year after the 2004 national and local elections. Press Secretary Ignacio
Bunye told reporters that the opposition was planning to destabilize the administration by releasing an audiotape of a mobile phone
conversation allegedly between the President of the Philippines, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, and a high-ranking official of the COMELEC
(Garcillano). The conversation was audiotaped allegedly through wire-tapping. Later, in a Malacañang press briefing, Secretary Bunye
produced two versions of the tape, one supposedly the complete version, and the other, a spliced, “doctored” or altered version, which
would suggest that the President had instructed the COMELEC official to manipulate the election results in the President’s favor. Former
counsel of deposed President Joseph Estrada, Atty. Alan Paguia, subsequently released an alleged authentic tape recording of the wiretap.
Included in the tapes were purported conversations of the President, the First Gentleman Jose Miguel Arroyo, COMELEC Commissioner
Garcillano, and the late Senator Barbers. Afterwards, DOJ Secretary Raul Gonzales warned reporters that those who had copies of the
compact disc and those broadcasting or publishing its contents could be held liable under the Anti-Wiretapping Act. He also stated that
persons possessing or airing said tapes were committing a continuing offense, subject to arrest by anybody who had personal knowledge if
the crime was committed or was being committed in their presence. He then ordered the NBI to go after media organizations “found to
have caused the spread, the playing and the printing of the contents of a tape” of an alleged wiretapped conversation involving the
President about fixing votes in the 2004 national elections. Gonzales said that he was going to start with Inq7.net, a joint venture between
the Philippine Daily Inquirer and GMA7 television network, because by the very nature of the Internet medium, it was able to disseminate
the contents of the tape more widely. He then expressed his intention of inviting the editors and managers of Inq7.net and GMA7 to a
probe, and supposedly declared, “I have asked the NBI to conduct a tactical interrogation of all concerned.” The NTC then issued in a press
briefing: Taking into consideration the country’s unusual situation, and in order not to unnecessarily aggravate the same, the NTC warns all
radio stations and television network owners/operators that the conditions of the authorization and permits issued to them by
Government like the Provisional Authority and/or Certificate of Authority explicitly provides that said companies shall not use their stations
for the broadcasting or telecasting of false information or willful misrepresentation. Relative thereto, it has come to the attention of the
[NTC] that certain personalities are in possession of alleged taped conversations which they claim involve the President of the Philippines
and a Commissioner of the COMELEC regarding supposed violation of election laws. It is the position of the [NTC] that the continuous airing
or broadcast of the said taped conversations by radio and television stations is a continuing violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law and the
conditions of the Provisional Authority and/or Certificate of Authority issued to these radio and television stations. It has been
subsequently established that the said tapes are false and/or fraudulent and after a prosecution or appropriate investigation, the
concerned radio and television companies are hereby warned that their broadcast/airing of such false information and/or willful
misrepresentation shall be just cause for the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or authorizations issued to the said
companies. The NTC will not hesitate, after observing the requirements of due process, to apply with full force the provisions of said
Circulars and their accompanying sanctions on erring radio and television stations and their owners/operators.

Petitioner’s Claim:
Alleging that the acts of respondents are violations of the freedom of expression and of the press, and the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern. That the acts complained constitutes a form of impermissible prior restraint.

Respondent’s Claim:
Denied that the acts transgress the Constitution. That the “fair warning” issued by respondent NTC is valid because broadcast media enjoy
lesser constitutional guarantees compared to print media, and the warning was issued pursuant to the NTC’s mandate to regulate the
telecommunications industry. It was also stressed that “most of the television and radio stations continue, even to this date, to air the
tapes, but of late within the parameters agreed upon between the NTC and KBP.”

ISSUE:
1.    Whether or not the acts complained of violates the constitutional right to freedom of speech, of expression and of the press and right
to information?
2.    Whether or not the acts complained of constitutes impermissible prior restraint?

HELD:
1.    YES. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably
to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. In the Philippines, the primacy and high esteem accorded freedom of
expression is a fundamental postulate of our constitutional system. This right was elevated to constitutional status in the 1935, the 1973
and the 1987 Constitutions, reflecting our own lesson of history, both political and legal, that freedom of speech is an indispensable
condition for nearly every other form of freedom. Freedom of speech and of the press means something more than the right to approve
existing political beliefs or economic arrangements, to lend support to official measures, and to take refuge in the existing climate of
opinion on any matter of public consequence. When atrophied, the right becomes meaningless. The right belongs as well — if not more
— to those who question, who do not conform, and who differs. The ideas that may be expressed under this freedom are confined not
only to those that are conventional or acceptable to the majority. To be truly meaningful, freedom of speech and of the press should allow
and even encourage the articulation of the unorthodox view, though it be hostile to or derided by others; or though such view “induces a
condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger.” To paraphrase Justice Holmes, it is
freedom for the thought that we hate, no less than for the thought that agrees with us. The scope of freedom of expression is so broad
that it extends protection to nearly all forms of communication. It protects speech, print and assembly regarding secular as well as political
causes, and is not confined to any particular field of human interest.
Freedom of expression is not an absolute, nor is it an “unbridled license that gives immunity for every possible use of language and
prevents the punishment of those who abuse this freedom.” Some types of speech may be subjected to some regulation by the State
under its pervasive police power, in order that it may not be injurious to the equal right of others or those of the community or society.
The difference in treatment is expected because the relevant interests of one type of speech, e.g., political speech, may vary from those of
another, e.g., obscene speech. Distinctions have therefore been made in the treatment, analysis, and evaluation of the permissible scope
of restrictions on various categories of speech. We have ruled, for example, that in our jurisdiction slander or libel, lewd and obscene
speech, as well as “fighting words” are not entitled to constitutional protection and may be penalized. Generally, restraints on freedom of
speech and expression are evaluated by either or a combination of three tests: (a) the dangerous tendency doctrine which permits
limitations on speech once a rational connection has been established between the speech restrained and the danger contemplated; (b)
the balancing of interests tests, used as a standard when courts need to balance conflicting social values and individual interests, and
requires a conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation of type of situation; and (c) the
clear and present danger rule which rests on the premise that speech may be restrained because there is substantial danger that the
speech will likely lead to an evil the government has a right to prevent. This rule requires that the evil consequences sought to be
prevented must be substantive, “extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.”

2. YES. Philippine jurisprudence, even as early as the period under the 1935 Constitution, has recognized four aspects of freedom of
the press. These are (1) freedom from prior restraint; (2) freedom from punishment subsequent to publication; (3) freedom of access to
information; and (4) freedom of circulation. The determination in every case of whether there is an impermissible restraint on the freedom
of speech has always been based on the circumstances of each case, including the nature of the restraint. Prior restraint refers to official
governmental restrictions on the press or other forms of expression in advance of actual publication or dissemination. Freedom from prior
restraint is largely freedom from government censorship of publications, whatever the form of censorship, and regardless of whether it is
wielded by the executive, legislative or judicial branch of the government. It is important to stress not all prior restraints on speech are
invalid. Certain previous restraints may be permitted by the Constitution, but determined only upon a careful evaluation of the challenged
act as against the appropriate test by which it should be measured against. There are two types of restraint to freedom of speech. 2 TESTS:
(1) A content-neutral regulation, i.e., merely concerned with the incidents of the speech, or one that merely controls the time, place or
manner, and under well-defined standards; or (2) a content-based restraint or censorship, i.e., the restriction is based on the subject
matter of the utterance or speech. When the speech restraints take the form of a content-neutral regulation, only a substantial
governmental interest is required for its validity. On the other hand, a governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the press
based on content is given the strictest scrutiny in light of its inherent and invasive impact. Only when the challenged act has overcome the
clear and present danger rule will it pass constitutional muster, with the government having the burden of overcoming the presumed
unconstitutionality. Unless the government can overthrow this presumption and is able to show the type of harm the speech sought to be
restrained would bring about — especially the gravity and the imminence of the threatened harm — the content-based restraint will be
struck down. On the basis of the records of the case at bar, respondents who have the burden to show that these acts do not abridge
freedom of speech and of the press failed to hurdle the clear and present danger test. It appears that the great evil which government
wants to prevent is the airing of a tape recording in alleged violation of the anti-wiretapping law. The records of the case at bar, however,
are confused and confusing, and respondents’ evidence falls short of satisfying the clear and present danger test. That not every violation
of a law will justify straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press. Our laws are of different kinds and doubtless, some
of them provide norms of conduct which even if violated have only an adverse effect on a person’s private comfort but does not endanger
national security. There are laws of great significance but their violation, by itself and without more, cannot support suppression of free
speech and free press. Any act done, such as a speech uttered, for and on behalf of the government in an official capacity is covered by the
rule on prior restraint. The concept of an “act” does not limit itself to acts already converted to a formal order or official circular.
Otherwise, the non-formalization of an act into an official order or circular will result in the easy circumvention of the prohibition on prior
restraint. It is sufficient that the press statements were made by respondents while in the exercise of their official functions.

PEOPLE OFTHE PHI

LIPPINES vs. DATUKON BANSIL y ALOG
G.R. No. 120163 March 10, 199
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#"$
 !&

'$#

(
!
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"

#
$
&*+&
,#-
,./"
/
$#$$
&
 # 0)1!-
/$
"2
3#$$&

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//

#
 '4567
"$"
 "  "  $ 
8  $  0&9&  :..

$ 
9;
"<
$reclusion perpetua”
=>?
4@A

#$
/
B
C?D9
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DATUKON BANSIL y
ALOG
G.R. No. 120163 March 10, 199





 !
"
#$#
$#
%
$
$

#"$
 !&

'$#

(
!
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"

#
$
&*+&
,#-
,./"
/
$#$$
&
 # 0)1!-
/$
"2
3#$$&

$
//

#
 '4567
"$"
 "  "  $ 
8  $  0&9&  :..

$ 
9;
"<
$reclusion perpetua”
=>?
4@A

#$
/
B
C?D9

Epu
blic of the Philippines vs. Sandiganbayan, Major
General Josephus Q. Ramas and Elizabeth
Dimaano, G.R. No. 104768. July 21, 2003
FACTS:
Immediately upon her assumption to office
following the EDSA Revolution, President
Corazon
C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 1 (EO No.
1) creating the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) to recover all ill-gotten
wealth of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos.
Accordingly, the PCGG, through its Chairman
Jovito R. Salonga, created an AFP Anti-Graft
Board (AFP Board) tasked to investigate reports of
unexplained wealth and corrupt practices by AFP
personnel, whether in the active service or retired.
Investigations include the alleged unexplained
wealth
of respondent Major General Josephus Q. Ramas
(Ramas), Commanding General of the Philippine
Army.
Evidences showed that respondent is the owner of
a house and lot in Quezon City as well in Cebu
City. Moreover, equipment and communication
facilities were found in the premises of
Elizabeth
Dimaano. Aside from the military
equipment, the raiding team also confiscated
P2,870,000.00 and
$50,000 US Dollars in the house of Elizabeth
Dimaano. Affidavits of members of the Military
Security
Unit disclosed that Elizabeth Dimaano is the
mistress of respondent Ramas. Dimaano had no
visible
means of income and is supported by respondent
for she was formerly a mere secretary.
With these, a prima facie case exists against
respondent Ramas for ill-gotten and unexplained
wealth.
The PCGG filed a petition for forfeiture under
Republic Act No. 1379, known as The Act
for the
Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Property (RA
No. 1379), against Ramas and impleaded
Dimaano as
co-defendant, in favor of the State.
However, the Sandiganbayan subsequently
dismissed the complaint because there was an
illegal
search and seizure of the items confiscated.
The first Resolution dismissed petitioners
Amended
Complaint and ordered the return of the
confiscated items to respondent Elizabeth
Dimaano, while the
second Resolution denied petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.
Hence, this appeal to SC. Petitioner claims that the
Sandiganbayan erred in declaring the properties
confiscated from Dimaanos house as illegally
seized and therefore inadmissible in evidence.
Issue:
Whether or not the search of Dimaano’s home was
legal.
Held:
NO. It is true that the Bill of Rights under the
1973 Constitution was not operative during an
interregnum (any period during which a state has
no ruler or only a temporary executive). However,
the
protection accorded to individuals in International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Covenant)
and
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(Declaration) remained in effect during the
interregnum.
Wheno constitution or Bill of Rights existed,
directives and orders issued by government
officers
were valid so long as these officers did not exceed
the authority granted on them. The raiding team
seized
the items detailed in the seizure receipt together
with other items not included in the search warrant.
Dimaano was also not present during the raid (only
Dimaano's cousins witnessed the raid).
Under Article 17(1) of the Covenant, the
revolutionary government had the duty to insure
that no one
shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful
interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence.
The Declaration provides in its Article 17(2) that
no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.
Thus, the revolutionary government is
obligated under international law to observe
the rights of
individuals under the Declaratio