P L D 1982 Lahore 785

 
Before Ghazanfar Ali Gondal, J
 
ZAFAR AHMAD-Petitioner
 
.                                                     versus
 
BEGUM AMIR AHMAD KHAN AND 2 others--Respondents
 
Writ Petition No. 3346 of 1981, decided on 26th June, 1982.
 
(a) West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (VI of 1959)-
 
S. 16 read with S. 13 and Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. V, rr. 9 & 17, O. XVI, rr. 1, 7-A, 8,
10, 13 & 16 (2) and O. XVII, r. 3Ejectment proceedings-Summoning and enforcing attendance of wit-
nesses-Powers of Rent Controller same as vest in a Civil Court under C. P. C.-Tenant failing to
submit a list of witnesses to Rent Controller within seven days of settlement of issues but at later stage
making application requesting for permission to deposit expenses and diet money of three named
witnesses-Order of Rent Controller directing issuance of summons on condition that service on
witnesses should be got effected by tenant on his own responsibility-Held, within bounds of his power
and a legally valid order-Nothing on _ record to show that dash summons were served by tenant on
his witnesses and that they failed to comply with in spite of service-Held, Rent Controller could not
bring into action coercive machinery to enforce attendance of such witnesses in circumstances of case.
 
Bashir Bibi v. Amin-ud-Din P L D 1973 S C 45 and Imtiaz Ahmad v. Sarfraz Hussain Writ Petition
No. 7582 of 1980 distinguished.
 
Maula Bakhsh v. Abdul Hamid P L D 1971 Lah. 512 and Ghulam Mustaza v. Muhammad 1lyas and 3
others P L D 1980 Lah. 495 ref.
 
(b) West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (VI of 1959)-
 
---S. 13 (2)-Ejectment proceedings-Tenant, despite three opportunities given to him to effect service
on his witnesses, failing to produce his evidence-Order of Rent Controller directing ejectment of
tenant Held, not hit by provision of S. 13 (2) nor in disregard of principle of natural justice :
Auai alleram partem (no one shall be condemned unheard).-[Maxim].
 
(c) West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (VI of 1959)-
 
--S. 13 read with Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), Os. V, XVI, r. 7-A (1) and O. XVII, r.
3-Ejectment proceedings-Rent Controller, on request of tenant, directing service of summons to be
effected on his witnesses on personal responsibility, of tenant-Tenant, however, omitting to receive
summons from office of Rent Controller for service on his witnesses and thus failing to produce his
evidence despite time having granted to him-Conduct of tenant making it impossible for Rent
Controller to proceed with trial of case and continuance of proceedings appearing to be intended to
cause harassment to landlord Case of tenant in circumstances, held, fell under O. XVII, r. 3, C. P. C.
and decision of case forthwith within bounds of Rent Controller's power in proceeding under O. XVII,
r. 3.
 
Ghulam Jafar v. Muhammad Nawaz and others P L D 1977 Lab. 965 rel.
 
(d) West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (VI of 1959)-
 
--S. 13-Ejectment proceedings-Tenant despite opportunity committing default in producing
evidence-No rebuttal on record against evidence produced by landlord and hence no controversy in
evidence to be resolved in discussion-No argument on tenant's behalf that evidence of landlord did not
support order of eviction-Rent Controller and Appellate Court giving reasons for their decision
showing application of mind resulting in satisfaction in their judicial mind that pleas raised by
landlord for ejectment of tenant stood established-Order of Rent Controller directing ejectment and
that of Addl. District Judge maintaining same-Held, cannot be considered to be suffering from any
jurisdictional defect but unexceptionable on that ground.
 
Khadim Mohy-ud-Din's case P L D 1965 S C 459 ref.
 
Pervez Ahmad Khan Burki for Appellant.
 
Muhammad Hanif Niazi for Respondent No.].
 
Nemo for Respondents Nos. 2 and 3.
 
Dates of hearing :-6th, 7th and 8th March, 1982.
 
JUDGMIINT
 ∂
The facts of the case are that the respondent Begum Amir Ahmad Khan filed on 18-3-1978, an
ejectment application against the petitioner in the ground of personal need, damage to the property
resulting In impairment of the utility and value of the property and conversion of the residential bun -
galow into a commercial-cum-residential premises against wishes and without permission of the
landlady.
 
On 7-6-1978, issues were framed and the landlady was directed to produce her evidence on
27-6-1978. On 27-6-1978, the landlady did not produce evidence and the case was adjourned to
19-7-1978, after burdening her with Rs. 15 as costs. On 19-7-1978, landlady produced her witnesses
and closed her evidence. An additional issue was framed on that day on the application made by the
petitioner and case was adjourned to 18-9-1978, for evidence of the petitioner-tenant. On 18-9-1978,
no witness of petitioner-tenant was present. Accordingly, the case was adjourned to 1-10-1978, on the
condition of payment of Rs. 20 as costs. On 20-9-1978, an application was filed by the
petitioner-tenant for permission to deposit process-fee and dietmoney of three witnesses named in the
application and for summoning the said witnesses for the next date of hearing, vie. 1-10-1978. The
learned Rent Controller by his order dated 20-9-1978, granted the said permission but directed that
service on the said witnesses shall be got affected by the petitioner tenant, at his own responsibility.
Process-fee and diet money of the said witnesses were deposited with Rent Controller on the same
day vie. 20-9-1978. However, on 1-10-1978, when the case was called for hearing, the evidence of the
petitioner-tenant was not available. An application for adjournment of the case was made on the
ground that the petitioner had left for India and was not available. Accordingly the case was adjourned
to 25-10-1978, on the condition of payment of Rs. 20 as costs. It was, however, clearly stated in the
interlocutory order dated 1-10-1978 that this would be the last opportunity to petitioner tenant to
produce his evidence. On 25-10-1978; the evidence of the petitioner-tenant was again not available
and on the request of the counsel for the petitioner-tenant another adjournment was granted and case
was fixed for production of the evidence of petitioner-tenant for 8-11-1978. It was again made clear in
this order that this would be the last opportunity to the petitioner-tenant to produce his witnesses. On
8-11-1978, both the petitioner-tenant and his counsel were absent and instead the clerk of the said
counsel appeared before the Rent Controller and stated that evidence was not present. The Rent
Controller found that the petitioner-tenant himself was also not present and holding that no reasonable
cause had been shown for failing to produce evidence even on the last opportunity granted to the
petitioner, he after adopting Order XVII, rule 3, C. P. C., proceeded under said provision of law to
close the evidence of the petitioner-tenant. Furthermore, finding that t" evidence of the respondent
landlady had already concluded and no rebutal to the same had been produced, he held that the
application of the respondent-landlady stood proved. He, therefore, accepted the said ejectment
application by his order dated 8-11-1978 and directed the petitioner tenant to vacate the property in
question by 10-12-1978 and hand over its possession to the respondent landlady. An appeal filed by
the petitioner on 4-12-1.978 was dismissed by the Additional District Judge by his order dated
19-3-1981. This petition has been filed to challenge the abovesaid orders of the Rent Controller and
the Additional District Judge.
 
2. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has in support of this writ petition, raised the
following points :-
 
(i) That the order of the Rent Controller putting the responsibility of serving summonses on the
witnesses on the shoulders of petitioner tenant was in excess of jurisdiction of the Rent Controller and
the petitioner-tenant having applied for the process of the court for procuring attendance of his
witnesses and having deposited the diet money and process-fee for their service, the entire
responsibility of procuring attendance of the witnesses lay on the shoulders of the Rent Controller and
coercive machinery of the law under rules 10 and 12 of Order XVI, C. P. C. being available to the
Rent Controller by virtue of section 16 of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance he, (the Rent
Controller) had failed to exercise jurisdiction vesting in him in closing the evidence of
petitioner-tenant without resorting to the said coercive machinery for enforcing the attendance of said
witnesses. Reliance in this connection is placed on the case of Bashir Bib! v. Amirud-Din P L D 1973
S C 45, and unreported decision of Mr. Justice Muhammad Ilyas dated 17th November, 1981, passed
in Writ Petition No. 7582 of 1980.
 
(ii) That since the Rent Controller had ordered ejectment of the petitioner without recording statement
of the petitioner-tenant's witnesses, he had failed to give petitioner reasonable opportunity to defend
the ejectment application instituted against him. His order, therefore, was in disregard of the provision
of subsection (2) of section 13 of the Ordinance and was thus without lawful authority.
 
(iii) That on facts available on the file, the case of the petitioner did not fall under Order XVII, rule 3,
C. P. C. and the Rent Controller had acted illegally in exercise of his jurisdiction in proceeding to
decide the ejectment application immediately without giving further opportunity to petitioner-tenant
to produce evidence in rebuttal.
 
(iv) That at any rate even under Order XVlf, rule 3, C. P. C., Rent Controller was bound to give
decision on merits by a speaking order but the learned Rent Controller had not spoken a single word
on the merits of the case in his impugned decision which, therefore, stood vitiated.
 
3. I have given my anxious thought to the points raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner and
proceed to deal with each as blow;--
 
As for the first contention noted above, the authority cited by the learned counsel is distinguishable.
That case was decided by the Supreme Court with reference to Order XVI, C. P. C. as it stood before
its amendment by Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972. At that time under rule 1 of Order XVI, C. P. C.,
the parties could obtain at any time summons to persons whose attendance was required to give
evidence or to produce documents and under rule 8 of Order XVI every summons was to be served as
a summons to a defendant under Order V, C.. P. C., rules 9 and 17 of which contemplated that service
was to be effected only by an officer appointed by the court for the said purpose. In that
case, Mst. Bashir Bibi had made a request for two witnesses to be summoned through the process of
the Court, but the Civil Judge had on 22-7-1970, directed that she should have them served on her
own responsibility, although one of the witnesses had failed to appear even though he was bound
down on an earlier date to appear in court on next date of hearing and summons issued for service of
the other witness (after process-fee and expenses had been deposited by her) had not been served
upon said witness. Since. rules 10 and 12 of Order XVI made provision for enforcing the attendance
of said witnesses, it was held in the context of the then rules 1 and 8, C. P. C. that court was bound to
enforce attendance of said witnesses through the coercive machinery available to it under rules 10 and
12 of Order XVI, C. P. C. and that under said Order XVI, C. P. C., responsibility could not be put on a
party to produce its evidence on pain of losing 'its right to produce that evidence and that even in a
case where a party undertook to produce its own evidence, but later reported its inability to do so and
applied for the process of the court for attendance of its witnesses, there was no sanction in law for
refusing such a request and court must move its own coercive machinery to procure the attendance of
said witnesses. These observations, however, cannot apply to a case decided after the enforcement
since 21-4-1972 of Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, which made amendments in rules 1 and 8 and
added rule 7-A in Order XVI, C. P. C. The said case of Mst. Bashir Bibi v. Amin-ud-Din and 9
others was a case in which the impugned order of Civil Judge had been passed on 22-7-1970, when
Law Reforms Ordinance had not been promulgated.
 
So far as the decision dated 11-11-1981 of my learned brother Muhammad Ilyas, J. in case of Imtiaz
Ahmad v. Sarfraz Hussain in Writ Petition No. 7582 of 1980 is concerned, the order of the Rent
Controller was no doubt passed under the amended Order XVI, C. P. C. when amendments made by
Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, had already been incorporated in it. However, that case too is
distinguishable on facts. It appears that in that case, order had been passed by the Rent Controller in
the very first instance for summoning the witnesses through an officer of the Court. It is not clear in
the judgment as to why Rent Controller had made that order. It appears that that matter was not in
issue in the High Court. Therefore, consistent with rule 7-A of Order XVI, C. P. C. it has to be
assumed that this had been done by Rent Controller on the ground that he had come to the conclusion
in the very first instance that summons to witnesses in that case should be served in the same manner
as a summons to a defendant i.e. through its own officer. It was in view of this order that it was held
that having taken upon himself the responsibility of procuring the attendance of witnesses, the Rent
Controller could not have proceeded to close the case of tenant, Imtiaz Ahmad and that he should
have resummoned them and in case of their default, taken coercive measures to compel said witnesses
to appear before him. The said observations would not apply to the present case in which an order was
passed by the Rent Controller under rule 7-A of Order XVI, C. P. C. that summons to witnesses
should be served by the petitioner himself on his own responsibility. The question of burdening the
petitioner with personal responsibility for service of summons clearly did not arise in that case. The
dictum in that case too, therefore, cannot be applied to the present case.
 
Now coming to first contention itself, rules 1, 7-A and 8 of Order XVI as they stand now after the
promulgation of Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, are quoted as below in extenso :-
 
"1.-(1) Not later than seven days after the settlement of issues, the parties shall present in Court, a list
of witnesses whom they propose to call either to give evidence or to produce documents.
 
(2) A party shall not be permitted to call witnesses other than those contained in the said list, except
with the permission of the court and after showing good cause for the omission of the said witnesses
from the list ; and if the court grants such permission, it shall record reasons for so doing.
 
(3) On application to the Court or such officer as it appoints in this behalf, the parties may obtain
summons for persons whose attendance is required in Court;
 
 Provided that no summons shall be issued for service on a person under rule8 unless an application in
that behalf is made not later than fourteen days prior to the date fixed for the hearing of the suit and
the necessary expenses for the summoning of such person are deposited.
 
7-A.-(1) Except where it appears to the Court that a summons under this Order should be served by
the court in the same manner as a summons to a defendant, the court shall make over for service all
summons under this Order to the party applying therefor.
 
(2) The service shall be effected by or on behalf of such party by delivering or tendering to the
witness in person a copy thereof signed by the Judge or such officer as he appoints in this behalf and
sealed with the seal of the Court.
 
(3) Rules 16 and 18 of Order V shall apply to summons personally served under this rule, as though
the person effecting service were a serving officer.
 
8. Every summons under this Order, not being a summons made over to a party for service under rule
7-A of this Order, shall be served as nearly as may be in the same manner as a summons to a
defendant and the rules in Order V as to proof of-service shall apply thereto."
 
Under section 16 of the Ordinance, the Rent Controller has the same power of summoning and
enforcing the attendance of witnesses and compelling the production of evidence as are vested in a
Civil Court under C. P. C. It i clear from perusal of said section 16 that powers of a Court not only for
A enforcing the attendance of witnesses under rules 10 to 13 and 16 (2) o Order XVI, C. P. C., but
also of summoning the witnesses under rules 1(3), 7-and 8 of Order XVI, C. P. C. and relevant rules
of Order V, C. P. C. are also available to a Rent Controller. However, under the C. P. C. these powers
can be exercised subject to conditions laid down in Orders V and XVI, C. P. C. Since these powers
have been incorporated in the Ordinance by virtue of said section 16 of the said Statute, the condition
for exercise of said powers would also apply, because speedy trials for which said conditions had been
laid are as much needed in eviction matters before the Rent Controllers as in civil matters before civil
Courts. In case of Maula Bakhsh v. Abdul Hamid a Division Bench of this Court held that explanation
to section 15 (4) of the Ordinance which incorporated in the said Statute that part of Schedule of C. P.
C. which related to appeals, made applicable to it the provision of abatement of second appeal
provided for in rule 11 read with other rules of Order XXII, C. P. C. It is, therefore, clear that
conditions for exercise of power to summon or to enforce the attendance of witnesses which had been
incorporated in the Ordinance applied equally to the proceedings before Rent Controller. According to
rule 1 of Order XVI, C. P. C. the petitioner-tenant was to present before Rent Controller, a list of
witnesses whom he proposed to call through process of court to give evidence or produce necessary
documents not later than seven days after the settlement of issues and if he had not done so within the
said period, then he could seek permission from the Rent Controller under Order XVI, rule 1 (2) to
call witnesses, giving good explanation for omission to file the said list. In the present case, as already
shown above, issues were framed on 7-6-1978. It is necessary to point out that section 13 (6) of the
Ordinance clearly contemplates framing of issues by the Rent Controller and order of framing of
issues by him was clearly a legally valid order. As soon as issues had been framed it was incumbent
upon parties to proceed in accordance with Order XVI, C. P. C. but no list of witnesses was submitted
by the petitioner tenant within seven days of the settlement of the issues nor was any application filed
later giving any explanation for omission to file list of witnesses for being summoned
through process of court. Even when the petitioner was asked on 19-7-1978, to produce his evidence
on 18-9-1978, no application was filed for the said purpose. It was only on 20-9-1978, that an
application was filed for permission to deposit the expenses and diet-money of three witnesses named
in the said application and a request was made for summoning of the said witnesses through the
machinery of the court. Here also no explanation was given in the application for not submitting any
list within the prescribed period. It is clear, therefore, that petitioner tenant did not rely at any stage on
sub-rule (2) of rule 1 of Order XVI, C. P. C. Now, therefore, according to Full Bench decision of this
Court reported as Ghulam Murtaza v. Muhammad 1lyas and 3 others P L D 1980 Lah. 495, he could
now only bring his witnesses alongwith him for being examined by the Rent Controller as he had lost
the opportunity to summon them through the process of the Court. Therefore, the order of the Rent
Controller accepting the said application for summoning the said witnesses and directing the issue of
summons for service of said witnesses but placing the responsibility of effecting service on them on
the petitioner was itself a concession granted to the petitioner.
 
Be that as it may, under C. P. C. even when the court decides to summon the witnesses through its
process, under the new rule 7-A of Order XVI, unless it comes to the conclusion that a summons
under this Order should be served by the court in the same manner as a summons to a defendant, it has
to make over for service, all the summons issued under Order XVI to the party applying therefor.
Service on defendant in a suit in a civil court is made' through an officer of the court as shown by
rules 9 and 17 to 20 of Order V, C. P. C. Therefore, unless the court comes to the conclusion that
summons on said witnesses were to be served through its own officer, it is bound under said rule 7 -A
to hand over the said summons to the party applying therefor. The said rule 7-A is couched in
imperative language, expressive of a command of law to the court to make over for service all the
summons to the party applying therefor. Under this mandatory provision of law, as soon as the court
decides to issue summons for service of witnesses, it has to decide in the first instance as to whether
summons on these witnesses should be served in the same manner as a summons to a defendant. The
moment it comes to conclusion that the said summons should not be served in that manner, it becomes
obligatory ,for it to hand over summons to the party applying therefor, who according to rule 7 -A (2)
and (3) will personally effect service on the said witnesses as if he himself was the serving officer. It
is, therefore, clear that putting the responsibility of effecting service on witnesses on the shoulder of
person applying therefor is now contemplated by amended provision of Order XVI and such an order
can validly be passed by a court. It can be passed by a Rent Controller also on account of application
of these provisions to the proceedings before him. Now there is no indication on the record to show
that Rent Controller had come to the conclusion that summons on the said witnesses should be served
in the same manner as summons to a defendant. It rather appears that he came to the positive
conclusion that the said summons should be served on said witnesses personally by the
petitioner-tenant, because he passed order on his application that service be effected by him on said
witnesses on his own responsibility. It is clear therefore, that order of the Rent Controller putting on
shoulder of the petitioner-tenant the responsibility of effecting service on said witnesses was
consistent with rule 7-A of Order XVI, C. P. C. and was a legally valid order.
 
The matter does not end here. The order passed by Rent Controller on 20-9-1978 fixing the
responsibility of service of said witnesses on the petitioner tenant was sustainable even under proviso
to rule 1 (3) read with rule 8 of Order XVI, C. P. C. According to said proviso, no summons was to be
issued for service on a person under rule 8, unless an application in that behalf is made not later than
14 days prior to the date fixed for hearing of the suit and necessary expenses for summoning such
persons are deposited. Under rule 8 of Order XVI summons on a witness is to be served in the same
manner as a summons to a defendant under Order V, C. P. C. i.e. through an officer of the Court. In
the present case, the application for summoning the witnesses for 1-10-1978, the next date of hearing,
had been made by the petitioner-tenant on 20-9-1978. In-between the two dates, there was time lag of
only 10 days and not 14 days as required by the said proviso. Therefore, under the mandatory
provision made in the said proviso, no summons could be issued for service on a witness through an
officer of the Court. Only such summons could be issued as could be served by petitioner-tenant
himself. The Rent Controller had, therefore, no choice but to issue such summons as could be served
by petitioner himself as if he himself was the serving officer. The said order of Rent Controller
impliedly directing issuance of summons on the condition that service of said summons on said
witnesses shall be got effected by petitioner-tenant on his own responsibility was, therefore, within
the bounds of his power and was a legally valid order.
 
I would now deal with next leg of argument relating to the first point raised by learned counsel for the
petitioner. There is no doubt that even after issuance of dash summons, the coercive machinery of law
for enforcing the attendance of witnesses as provided under rules 10 and 12 of Order XVI, C. P. C. is
available to the court but that can be done only if said witnesses had been served and they had refused
to or failed to attend or to produce a document in compliance with such summons. This is made clear
by opening words of rule 10 (1) of Order XVI which prescribe the basic condition for the initiation of
action by the court against the defaulting witnesses under rules 10 (2), 10 (3), 11 and 12 of Order
XVI, C. P. C.
 
There is, however, nothing on the record of the present case to show that the dasti summons were
served by the petitioner-tenant on said three witnesses and they had failed to comply with them in
spite of service or had deliberately avoided service on the dash summons made available to the
petitioner. I have scrutinized the file of the Rent Controller. No returned summonses are available on
his file showing that said witnesses had been served. personally by petitioner-tenant and they had
failed to attend in spite of service. There is not even an application on the file of the Rent Controller
by the petitioner tenant saying that he had tried to serve summons on the said witnesses but they had
avoided or refused service deliberately or that they had been served but had in spite of the service
failed to appear before him to give evidence in this case. It is, therefore, clear that the Rent Con troller
could not bring into action coercive machinery available to him under rules 10 and 12 of Order XVI,
C. P. C. to enforce the attendance of said witnesses. The case did not fulfil the basic conditions for
initiation of such B action. There was, therefore, no refusal or failure by the Rent Controller to
exercise jurisdiction vested in him. The point raised by the learned counsel has no force and the same
is repelled.
 
As for the second contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, the facts of the case recited
above show that the Rent Controller had given to the petitioner tenant a number of opportunities to
produce his evidence. He was given opportunity first on 19-7-1978 for producing evidence on
18-9-1978 which he did not avail on 18-9-1978 and case had to be adjourned to 1-10-1978. On
20-9-1,978, he filed an application before Rent Controller for procuring attendance of his witnesses
through process of court. The Rent Controller accepted the said application and had directed that
service on said witnesses would be effected on the personal responsibility of petitioner. The
petitioner-tenant was given three opportunities to effect service on the said witnesses but he failed to
do so. It is, therefore, clear that the learned Rent Controller had given reasonable opportunity to the
petitioner-tenant to defend the ejectment petition instituted against him. The order of the Rent
Controller is, therefore, not hit by the provision made in subsection (2) of section 13 of the Punjab
Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, nor it is in disregard of the well-known principles of natural
justice, `audi alteram partem'.
 
The third contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner has also no substance in it. As shown in
preceding paragraphs petitioner-tenant had been granted at first, time to produce his witnesses and
later time to cause the attendance of his witnesses but he had failed either to produce witnesses  of to
cause the attendance of his witnesses. On accepting petitioner' application on 20-9-1979 for issuing of
process of court for summoning his witnesses, the Rent Controller had directed service to be effected
on said witnesses on personal responsibility of petitioner-tenant. Under this order, the petitioner was
bound to receive the summons duly signed by the Rent Controller from the office of the Rent
Controller and was to serve the said summons on said witnesses himself as if he himself was the
serving officer. As already shown, this order was wholly consistent with rule 7-A (1) of Order XVI,
C. P. C. according to which it was imperative for the Rent Controller to make over summons for
service to party applying therefor unless the Rent Controller by a specific order directed that
summons. on said witnesses should be served by him in the same manner as a summons to a
defendant under Order V, C. P. C. However, there was no order in this case to the effect that service
on said witnesses should be effected in the said manner. Therefore, even in view of provision made in
rule 7-A (1) of Order XVI, C. P. C., it was incumbent upon petitioner-tenant to receive summons from
the office of Rent Controller and serve them himself on said witnesses as if he himself was the serving
officer.
 
There is however no indication on record that the said summons were taken by the petitioner-tenant
for service on his witnesses. If the petitioner bad taken those summons but the said witnesses could
not be served by him for one reason or other, he should have established the same before the Rent
Controller. There is no description in interlocutory orders by virtue of which he was granted further
adjournments that he had made any such statement before the Rent Controller. Further, there is no
application by petitioner on record alleging that he bad taken summons but had failed to effect service
due to any valid cause. It is, therefore, clear that petitioner had not received and taken the summonses
from the office of Rent Controller for service on said witnesses. He could not rely on mere deposit of
process fee and diet money of said witnesses, as, be failed to go forward and ask the Rent Controller
to band - over the summons to him. The petitioner had, therefore, clearly failed to produce evidence
and cause the attendance of his witnesses in the case in spite of time having been granted to him and,
therefore, the case stood covered by Order XVII, rule 3, C. P. C. I am fortified in this view of mine by
the decision of Mr. Justice Aftab Hussain of this Court (now Chief Justice, Federal Shariat Court,
Islamabad) in case of Ghulam Jafar v. Muhammad Nawaz and others P L D 1977 Lab. 965. The
conduct of petitioner tenant in failing to produce his witnesses on the first occasion and failing on
three subsequent occasions to cause attendance of his witnesses had clearly made it impossible for the
Rent Controller to proceed with the trial of the case and continuance of proceedings appeared only to
be intended to cause harassment to respondent landlady. For this reason too, the case of petitioner
clearly' fell under Order XVII, rule 3, C. P. C. and Rent Controller was within the bounds of his
power in proceeding under that provision and deciding the case forthwith.
 
There is no force in the fourth contention of the learned counsel for petitioner either. The decision by
the Rent Controller is not based on an p technical rule of law. He has not passed the order
of  acceptance of ejectment petition merely on the ground that petitioner-tenant had committed default
in producing evidence. On the other hand, he has said that since there is no rebuttal on record against
the evidence produced by respondent landlady, her case stands established and her application is
consequently accepted. This is clearly a decision on merits based on evidence produced by landlady.
 
There is no doubt that there is no discussion of the evidence in the impugned order, but no discussion
was called for in the circumstances of this case, as, there was no evidence in rebuttal of evidence of
respondent-landlady. It was not the written statement but the actual evidence on the pleas raised in
written statement which mattered. There being no evidence of petitioner tenant in support of his
written statement, there was no controversy in evidence to be resolved in discussion. Obviously the
order of eviction has been shown by the Rent Controller to be based on evidence produced by
respondent-landlady. It is not the case of learned counsel for the petitioner that said evidence does not
support the order of eviction. Certified copies of evidence adduced by landlady before Rent Controller
have not been provided alongwith this writ petition nor any argument has been advanced by the
learned counsel for the petitioner alleging that eviction order was not supported by said evidence. It
must therefore be assumed that the evidence produced by the landlady adequately supported the
eviction order. No fault can, therefore, be found with the order of Rent Controller or Additional
District Judge.
 
Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, further submits that no reasons have been given by the
Rent Controller and the Additional District Judge for their decisions and, therefore, the said
judgments stand vitiated and are without lawful authority.
 
Learned counsel for the respondent has submitted in reply that rule 5, Order XX, C. P. C. which
makes it incumbent on the court to state its finding or decision with reasons thereof for each separate
issue does not apply in terms to eviction cases before Rent Controller under section 13 of the
Ordinance and under the said section it is only the satisfaction of the Rent Controller on the pleas
raised in the ejectment application which is to result in ejectment order. He submits on the basis of the
said language of section 13 of the Ordinance that the orders of the Rent Controller and the appellate
Court are legally valid orders.
 
                                       I have considered this plea too. In my opinion the question cannot be resolved
by referring to these provisions alone. As held by the Supreme Court in Khadim Mohy-ud-Din's
case, the Rent Controller is a quasi-judicial authority. Since he deals with valuable civil rights of the
parties recognized under the Ordinance, it is in the public interest that it should be assured that there is
no arbitrariness of thought in his decision. It is, therefore, necessary that the Rent Controller and the
appellate Court should give reasons for their decisions showing application of their mind. In the
circumstances of the present case, however, in my opinion both the Rent Controller and the
Additional District Judge had given reasons for their decision showing the application of mind by
them resulting in satisfaction in their judicial mind that the pleas raised by the landlady for ejectment
of the petitioner stood established. One of those reasons was that there was no rebuttal to the evidence
produced by the landlady. Another reason which is implied one, is that the evidence produced by the
landlady was believable and did not suffer from any improbability or any other flaw and established
the pleas raised by the landlady in her ejectment application. In this state of affairs the orders of the
Rent Controller and the Additional District Judge cannot be considered to be suffering from any
jurisdictional defect and have to be held as unexceptionable on that ground.
 
In view of the above, there is no substance in this writ petition and the same is dismissed with-costs.
 
g, Q,                                                                              Petition dismissed.
(1) P L D 1965 S C 459