FFRED (ghost fihter) the condition that they must obtain CES or Civil Service Constitution.
y must obtain CES or Civil Service Constitution. Sec 5 provides “The Commission shall enjoy fiscal
CASE NO. 1
ART IX-A, SEC 1: INDEPENDENT COMMISSIONS (w/o sub)
Macalintal vs. COMELEC
Facts: Romulo B. Macalintal filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition seeking a declaration that certain provisions of
Republic Act No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of
2003) suffer from constitutional infirmity. Petitioner avers that
Sections 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 violate Article IX-A
(Common Provisions) of the Constitution as it allows the
congress through the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee
created in Section 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189 to exercise the
power to review, revise, amend, and approve the IRR that the
COMELEC shall promulgate.
Issue: W/N Section 19 and 25 of RA 9189 violates the
constitution?
Ruling: Yes, Section 19 and 25 of RA 9189 whereby Congress,
in both provisions, arrogates unto itself a function not
specifically vested by the Constitution, should be stricken out
of the subject statute for constitutional infirmity. Both
provisions brazenly violate the mandate on the independence
of the COMELEC. Interpreting Section 1, Article X of the 1935
Constitution providing that there shall be
an independent COMELEC, the Court has held that [w]hatever
may be the nature of the functions of the Commission on
Elections, the fact is that the framers of the Constitution
wanted it to be independent from the other departments of
the Government.
Main Point: The ambit of legislative power under Article VI of
the Constitution is circumscribed by other constitutional
provisions. One such provision is Section 1 of Article IX-A of the
1987 Constitution ordaining that constitutional commissions
such as the COMELEC shall be independent.
FRED (ghost fihter)
CASE NO. 2
ART IX-A, SEC 1: INDEPENDENT COMMISSIONS (w/o sub)
Ombudsman vs. CSC
Facts: Sometime on 2002, Carandang, Clemente and. de Jesus,
Jr. were appointed Graft Investigation Officers III of petitioner
by the Ombudsman. The CSC approved the appointments on
Executive (CSE) eligibility which is governed by the CESB.
Petitioner argued by invoking a jurisprudence of CA which
states that the letter and intent of the law is to circumscribe
the Career Executive Service (CES) to CES positions in the
Executive Branch of Government, and that the Judiciary, the
Con Com, the Office of the Ombudsman and the CHR
are not covered by the CES governed by the CESB.
Subsequently, the CSC changed the status of Carandangs and
Clementes appointments to permanent, but not with respect
to De Jesus on the ground that he has not met the eligibility
requirements.
Issue: W/N the general power of CSC to administer the civil
service can curtail the specific discretionary power of
appointment, including the grant of security of tenure, by the
ombudsman?
Ruling: No, CSC’s authority is limited only to [determine]
whether or not the appointees possess the legal qualifications
and the appropriate eligibility, nothing else. The CSC has the
ministerial duty to grant the request of the Ombudsman that
appointment be made permanent. To refuse to heed the
request is a clear encroachment on the discretion vested
solely on the Ombudsman as appointing authority.
(Main Point in Bold)
FRED (ghost fihter)
CASE NO. 3
ART IX-A, SEC 1: INDEPENDENT COMMISSIONS (w/o sub)
CSC vs. DBM
Facts: The CSC via the present petition for mandamus seeks to
compel the DBM to release the balance of its budget for fiscal
year 2002. Respondent withheld the balance to petitioners on
the basis of its no report, no release policy whereby allocations
for agencies are withheld pending their submission of the
documents. Petitioner contends that the application of the
policy upon independent constitutional bodies is a violation of
the principle of fiscal autonomy and, therefore,
unconstitutional.
Issue: W/N the no report, no release policy may not be validly
enforced against offices vested with fiscal autonomy?
Ruling: Yes, Enforcing such policy against offices possessing
fiscal autonomy violates Article IX (A), Section 5 of the
autonomy. Their approved appropriations shall be
automatically and regularly released”. By parity of
construction, automatic release of approved annual
appropriations to petitioner, a constitutional commission which
is vested with fiscal autonomy, should thus be construed to
mean that no condition to fund releases to it may be imposed.
Main Point: The agencies which the Constitution has vested
with fiscal autonomy should thus be given priority in the
release of their approved appropriations over all other
agencies not similarly vested when there is a revenue shortfall.
FRED (ghost fihter)
CASE NO. 4
ART IX-A, SEC 1: INDEPENDENT COMMISSIONS (w/o sub)
Macalintal vs. COMELEC
Facts: Petitioner assails the creation of Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee with the power to review, revise, amend
and approve the IRR promulgated by the COMELEC, that R.A.
No. 9189 intrudes into the independence of the COMELEC in
which the same should not be subject under the control of
either the executive or legislative departments of government.
COMELEC joins the petitioner in asserting that as an
independent constitutional body, it may not be subject to
interference by any government instrumentality and that only
this Court may review COMELEC rules and only in cases of
grave abuse of discretion.
Issue: W/N the creation of Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee under RA 9189 intrudes the COMLEC’s rule making
power?
Ruling: Yes. The Commission on Elections is a constitutional
body. It is intended to play a distinct and important part in
our scheme of government. In the discharge of its functions, it
should not be hampered with restrictions that would be fully
warranted in the case of a less responsible organization. It is
not correct to hold that because of its recognized extensive
legislative power to enact election laws, Congress may intrude
into the independence of the COMELEC by exercising
supervisory powers over its rule-making authority.
MAINPOINT: BOLD
5FRED (ghost fihter)
CASE NO. 5
 ART IX-A, SEC 1: INDEPENDENT COMMISSIONS (w/o sub)
Sabili vs. COMELEC
Facts: COMELEC upon a petition of a private respondent,
disqualified the petitioner from running as Mayor of Lipa City,
and cancelled his COC for not being a resident of Lipa City and
for his failure to meet the 1year residency requirement under
the law. In its Resolution the COMELEC en banc denied the
Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner. Although he was able
to receive his copy of the Resolution, no prior notice setting the
date of promulgation of the said Resolution was received by
him. Meanwhile, Section 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8696
requires the parties to be notified in advance of the date of the
promulgation of the Resolution. Hence, petitioner filed with
this Court a seeking the annulment of the Resolutions of the
COMELEC
Issue: Whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of
discretion when it failed to promulgate its Resolution in
accordance with its own Rules of Procedure
Ruling: NO, the COMELEC validly exercised its constitutionally
granted power to make its own rules of procedure when it
issued the Order suspending Section 6 of COMELEC Resolution
No. 8696. Consequently, the second assailed Resolution of the
COMELEC cannot be set aside on the ground of COMELECs
failure to issue to petitioner a notice setting the date of the
promulgation thereof. The additional rule requiring notice to
the parties prior to promulgation of a decision is not part of
the process of promulgation. Since lack of such notice does
not prejudice the rights of the parties, noncompliance with
this rule is a procedural lapse that does not vitiate the validity
of the decision.
(MAIN POINT IN BOLD)
FRED (ghost fihter)
CASE NO. 6
ART IX-A, SEC 7: DECISIONS OF THE COMMISSIONS
REVIEW OF FINAL ORDERS, RESOLUTION, & DECISIONS (w/
sub)
FILIPINAS ENGINEERING vs. FERRER
FACTS: Respondent issued an invitation to bid for the
manufacture and delivery of 11,000 units of voting booths for
the coming 1969 elections in which bidders are required to
submit finished sample. Petitioner, Filipinas Engineering and
Machine Shop, (Filipinas) and the private respondent, Acme
Steel Manufacturing Company, (Acme) are among the 17
bidders who responded. COMELEC rejected Acme's bid
because its sample was poorly made and recommended that
Filipinas be awarded the contract to manufacture and supply
the voting booths, but that an ocular inspection be made by
the Commission on all the samples before the final award be
made.
After conducting ocular inspection, the COMELEC issued
a Resolution awarding the contract to Acme provided that it
improves its samples i.e. rust proof or rust resistant. COMELEC
then issued purchase for the manufacture and supply of the
11,000 Units of voting booths in favour of Acme. Filipinas filed
an Injunction suit with the then Manila RTC against COMELEC
and private respondent Acme. Thereafter the public
respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss. Acting on the motion (to
dismiss), the respondent Judge denied Filipinas' motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court has jurisdiction to take
cognizance of a suit involving an order of the COMELEC dealing
with an award of contract arising from its invitation to bid?
RULING: Yes.  What is contemplated by the term "final orders,
rulings and decisions" of the COMELEC reviewable
by certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by law are
those rendered in actions or proceedings before the COMELEC
and taken cognizance of by the said body in the exercise of its
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.
MAINPOINT: The COMELEC resolution awarding the contract in
favor of Acme was not issued
pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions but merely as an
incident of its inherent administrative functions over the
conduct of elections, and hence, the said resolution may not be
deemed as a "final order" reviewable by certiorari by the
Supreme Court.  Any question arising from said order may be
well taken in an ordinary civil action before the trial courts.
FRED (ghost fihter)
CASE NO. 7
ART IX-A, SEC 7: DECISIONS OF THE COMMISSIONS
REVIEW OF FINAL ORDERS, RESOLUTION, & DECISIONS (w/
sub)
SALIGUMBA vs. COA
FACTS: Editha Saligumba, the COA instituted the administrative
case against Leonardo Estella, Auditing Examiner III, in the
Auditor's Office of Misamis Occidental. The charge was that the
respondent raped petitioner on several occasions. COA
dismissed the complaint for being devoid of merit. Petitioner
now wants to review the COA decision. She insists that the
decision of the COA is contrary to the evidence.
ISSUE: W/N the case would prosper?
RULING & MAINPOINT:
No. SC power to review COA decisions refers to money matters
and not to administrative cases involving the discipline of its
personnel. . Even assuming that SC have jurisdiction to review
decisions on administrative matters as mentioned above, SC
cannot do so on factual issues; SC’s power to review is limited
to legal issues.
FRED (ghost fihter)
CASE NO. 8
ART IX-A, SEC 7: DECISIONS OF THE COMMISSIONS
REVIEW OF FINAL ORDERS, RESOLUTION, & DECISIONS (w/
sub)
PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE CORPORATION vs.
COA
FACTS: Petitioner was granted under RA 4161, a franchise "to
establish and operate telecommunication systems throughout
the Philippines which require petitioner to pay a franchise tax
of 1½% on all gross receipts from business transacted
thereunder.
Later, Domestic Satellite Philippines, Inc. (DOMSAT for
short) was granted by PD 947 a franchise to operate "as a
carrier's carrier, any and all types of telecommunications
services available through the use of space relay and repeater.
Under its franchise, DOMSAT is required to pay a franchise tax
of only one-half percent (½%) on all gross receipts from
business transacted thereunder.
Subsequently, respondent found that PT & T had a
franchise tax deficiency of P387, 370.50 in 1979. This amount
was computed at ½% of petitioner's gross receipts from
business transacted under its franchise. The Commission
informed petitioner of its liability for said amount. Petitioner
took exception to the Commission's finding on the ground that
under RA 4161 it has clearly fully settled its franchise tax
liability.
In a reply Commission reiterated its previous stand that
petitioner's franchise tax should be computed at the rate of 1½
% finding petitioners contention meritless. Hence, the instant
petition which seeks the review of the letter dated June 4,1980
and the letter dated August 26,1980 of respondent
Commission.
ISSUE: W/N the letters of respondent Commission are
proper subjects of appeal and/or review by this Court?
RULING: No. A cursory examination of the two (2) letters in
question shows that the same are not a "final award, order or
decision". Respondent Commission in the said letters did not
decide the issue. It did not render a decision, order or final
award. It merely expressed an opinion. Then too, respondent
Commission cannot render a "final order, decision or award"
on the question of whether petitioner should pay 1½% or ½
% of franchise tax. This is not a matter falling under its
jurisdiction. Rather, it is a matter for resolution by the Bureau
of Internal Revenue whose decision may be appealed to the
Court of Tax Appeals.
MAINPOINT:BOLD
FRED (ghost fihter)
CASE NO. 9
ART IX-A, SEC 7: DECISIONS OF THE COMMISSIONS
REVIEW OF FINAL ORDERS, RESOLUTION, & DECISIONS (w/
sub)
CUA vs. COMELEC
FACTS: The petitioner won the election but COMELEC
suspended his proclamation as winner in the lone
congressional district of Quirino due to the lack of the
unanimous vote required by the procedural rules of COMELEC.
Private respondent Puzon filed a "motion for reconsiderationof
the said decision with the COMELEC en banc, where three
members voted to sustain the First Division, with two
dissenting and one abstaining.
On the strength of 3-2 vote, Cua moved for his
proclamation by the board of canvassers and granted his
motion. Cua took his oath the same day, but the next day
Puzon filed with the COMELEC an urgent motion to suspend
Cua's proclamation or to annul or suspend its effect if already
made. COMELEC set the motion for hearing and three days
later it issued a restraining telegram enjoining Cua from
assuming the office of member of the House of
Representatives. The petitioner then came to SC to enjoin the
COMELEC from acting on the said motion and enforcing its
restraining order.
ISSUE: Whether or not the 2-1 vote casted on Cua constituted
the majority vote defined by Article IX-A Sec 7?
RULING: Yes. After considering the issues and the arguments
raised by the parties, the Court holds that the 2-1 decision
rendered by the First Division was a valid decision under Article
IX-A, Section 7 of the Constitution. Furthermore, the three
members who voted to affirm the First Division constituted a
majority of the five members who deliberated and voted
thereon en banc and their decision is also valid under the
aforecited constitutional provision. Hence, the proclamation
of Cua on the basis of the two aforecited decisions was a valid
act that entitles him now to assume his seat in the House of
Representatives
MAINPOINT:BOLD
FRED (ghost fihter)
CASE NO. 10
ART IX-A, SEC 7: DECISIONS OF THE COMMISSIONS
REVIEW OF FINAL ORDERS, RESOLUTION, & DECISIONS (w/
sub)
ESTRELLA vs. COMELEC
FACTS: Petitioner Romeo M. Estrella sought the nullification
Status Quo Ante Order issued by (COMELEC) En Banc in .
Estrella v. Salvador, directing the parties to maintain the status
quo ante  order. In the issuance of the questioned COMELEC En
Banc Status Quo Ante Order, five (5) of the then
incumbent seven (7) members of the COMELEC participated
Later, Commissioner Lantion stated in his handwriting
that he will not participate in the Division deliberations but will
vote when the case is elevated to en banc. Commissioner
Lantions voluntary piecemeal inhibition was not accepted.
Since Commissioner Lantion could not participate and vote,
thus leaving three (3) members concurring, the necessary votes
of four (4) or majority of the members of the COMELEC was not
attained. The order thus failed to comply with the number of
votes necessary for the pronouncement of a decision or order,
as required under Rule 3, Section 5(a) of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure. In seeking a reconsideration of the above-quoted
Resolution, private respondent cites Cua v. Commission on
Elections.
ISSUE: W/N the Court follows precisely the phrase “shall
decide a case or matter brought before it by a majority vote
of all its members?
RULING: No. Had the framers intended that it should be the
majority of the members who participated or deliberated, it
would have clearly phrased it that way as it did with respect to
the Supreme Court in Section 4(2), Article VIII of the
Constitution: SECTION 4(2) x x x all other cases which under the
Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc, x x x shall be
decided with the concurrence of a majority of the members
who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in
the case and voted thereon. 
SC abandons the doctrine laid down in Cua and holds
that the COMELEC En Banc  shall decide a case or matter
brought before it by a majority vote of all its members, and
NOT majority of the members who deliberated and
voted thereon.
MAINPOINT: IN BOLD RULING 2ND PARAGRAPH
CASE NO. 11
ART IX-A, SEC 7: DECISIONS OF THE COMMISSIONS
REVIEW OF FINAL ORDERS, RESOLUTION, & DECISIONS (w/
sub)
MISON vs. COA
FACTS: Commissioner of Customs rendered a decision
declaring illegal the seizure by elements of the Philippine Navy
of the M/V "Hyojin Maru" a vessel of Japanese registry, and
ordered the release of the vessel, but failed because it sank
while in the custody of the BOC. Chan Chiu On and Cheung I
then filed a claim with the COA for the payment of the value of
the vessel but denied by COA acting chariman Espiritu and later
the chairman of COA.
In a 4th Indorsement addressed "to the Auditor,
Bureau of Customs," Chairman Eufemio C. Domingo, acting "for
the commission," reconsidered decision and declared that the
Commission will interpose no objection to the instant claim,
subject to the usual auditing and accounting requirements.
Petitioner Mison sought clarification of "the legal
implication of the 4th Indorsement in two (2) letters. The
response entitled "COA Decision No. 992," signed by "the full
complement of three (3) members of the Commission on
Audit."  Said COA Decision No. 992 pointed out that the earlier
decision, No. 77-142, was "open to question and cannot be
recognized by the present Commission" because signed merely
by the then Manager of the Technical Service Office," who
evidently "was not acting for the Commission but only for the
then Acting Chairman." It therefore held that the 4th
Indorsement should be "deemed for all legal intents and
purposes as the final decision on the matter.
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but
was denied by letter signed by the Chairman and the two (2)
Members of the Commission. Petitioner seasonably filed a
petition for certiorari to nullify said COA Decisions pursuant to
Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution.  a member of any political party.
ISSUE: W/N COA’s 1st decision, although signed only by the
Manager, Technical Service Office of the COA, was valid
because it "was adopted in toto as a decision of the COA?
RULING: No. Espiritu decision” was void ab initio. As manager
of the COA Technical Service Office, Mr. Espiritu obviously had
no power whatever to render and promulgate a decision of or
for the Commission. Indeed, even the Chairman, alone, had not
that power. As clearly set out in the Constitution then in force,
the power was lodged in the Commission on Audit,
“composed of a Chairman and two Commissioners.” It was
the Commission, as a collegial body, which then as now, had
the jurisdiction to decide any case brought before it within
sixty days from the date of its submission for resolution,”
subject to review by the Supreme Court on certiorari.
MAINPOINT: BOLD
Martin
CASE NO. 12
ART IX SEC 7: DECISIONS OF THE COMMISSIONS
Paredes v. COMELEC
Facts: On Jan. 25, 1980, a petition (petitioner is the Provincial
Chairman of the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan - KBL) was raised to
disqualify — on the ground of turncoatism (prohibited) which is
a change of party affiliations by an elective official during his
term of office and by a candidate for such office within six
months immediately preceding or following an election —
several candidates (private respondents) for the positions of
Mayor, Vice-Mayor and Members of Sangguniang Bayan in the
Municipality of Kiangan, Province of Ifugao. But before the
resolution thereof by COMELEC, the local election was held and
the respondents were proclaimed without prejudice to hearing
and ruling thereafter. The petition for review was filed because
petitioner contends that the fact finding by the Commission
was arbitrary in character. The fact finding says that private
respondents (members of Nacionalista Party) testified that,
although they admittedly attended certain meetings of the KBL,
they did so on the belief that these were intended for the
organization of civic committees that would disseminate
information regarding future plebiscites and elections. The
COMELEC found the fact finding as decisive such as the
respondents did not take an oath of affiliation as members of
the KBL; they have been long standing NP members prior to
said meetings, except respondent Guyguyon who was not then
Issue: Whether or not the Supreme Court may review the
findings of fact by the COMELEC.
Ruling: No. The decision certainly was not tainted by
arbitrariness. To that extent, it is free from the infirmity of lack
of due process. It was supported by substantial evidence,
hence its finding is entitled to be accorded full respect.
Main Point: Generally, the Court may not review the rulings or
findings of fact by the COMELEC; their rulings or findings are
conclusive. The exception is when the facts would show
arbitrariness.
Martin
CASE NO. 13
ART IX SEC 7: DECISIONS OF THE COMMISSIONS
Ambil v. COMELEC
Facts: The case at bar is an election protest (challenging the
results in a total of 201 precincts) filed by Ramirez (with second
highest number of votes) involving the position of Governor
(Eastern Samar) for which Ambil was proclaimed the winner.
On Jan. 27, 2000, Commissioner Japal M. Guiani prepared and
signed a proposed resolution in the case. Then on Feb. 15,
2000, Guiani retired from service. A resolution promulgated on
February 14, 2000, signed by Commissioner Guiani, revealed
the result which was in favor of respondent Ramirez who was
declared winner. On June 15, 2000, the Comelec, First Division,
through Commissioner Julio F. Desamito, issued an order
setting the promulgation of the resolution in the case on June
20, 2000. On June 19, 2000, petitioner Ambil filed the instant
petition that seeks to annul the order dated June 15, 2000 and
prohibiting the Comelec, First Division, from promulgating the
purported Guiani resolution. Respondent Ramirez admitted
that the proposed resolution of Commissioner Guiani was no
longer valid after his retirement on February 15, 2000.
Issue: Whether or not the Guiani resolution is considered a
final decision.
Ruling: No. The so-called Guiani resolution is void. The
Constitution provides that, “any decision, order, or ruling of
each commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on
certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt
of a copy thereof.” A final decision or resolution becomes
binding only after it is promulgated and not before. Guiani
might have signed a draft ponencia prior to his retirement from
office, but when he vacated his office without the final decision
or resolution having been promulgated, his vote was
automatically invalidated.
Main Point: There is no decision until the draft is signed and
promulgated. If a Commissioner signs a decision but retires
before the decision is promulgated, his vote does not count
even if it was he who penned the decision.
Martin
CASE NO. 14
ART IX SEC 7: DECISIONS OF THE COMMISSIONS
Mateo v. CA
Facts: Petitioners, all Board Members of Morong Water District
(quasi-public corporation), conducted an investigation on
private respondent Edgar Sta Maria (then General Manager).
He was placed under preventive suspension and Maximo San
Diego was designated in his place as Acting General Manager.
Later on, he was dismissed. Hence, private respondent filed a
Special Civil Action for Quo Warranto and Mandamus with
Preliminary Injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Rizal,
challenging his dismissal by petitioners. The petitioners moved
to dismiss the case as the RTC had no jurisdiction over
disciplinary actions of government employees which is vested
exclusively in the Civil Service Commission.
Issue: Whether or not CSC has jurisdiction over the case; and
whether or not decisions of CSC are reviewable only by the SC
by certiorari under Rule 65.
Ruling: Yes. RTC have no jurisdiction to entertain cases
involving dismissal of officers and employees covered by the
Civil Service Law. The established rule is that the hiring and
firing of employees of government-own and controlled
corporations are governed by the provisions of the Civil Service
Law and Rules and Regulations.
No. In Mancita v. Barcinas (old rule), the CSC, is the
single arbiter of all contests relating to the civil service and as
such, its judgments are unappealable and subject only to the
SC's certiorari judgment (pursuant to Sec. 7, Art. IX). However,
this rule no longer governs for under the present rule (“Unless
otherwise provided... by law”), Revised Circular No. 1-91 as
amended by Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 which
took effect on June 1, 1995, final resolutions of the Civil Service
Commission shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals.
Main Point: Prior to June 1, 1995, decisions could be reviewed
only by the Supreme Court by certiorari under Rule 65. Now,
however, judgments or final orders of quasi-judicial agencies
may be appealed to the Court of Appeals within fifteen days
from notice thereof.
Martin
CASE NO. 15
ART IX SEC 7: DECISIONS OF THE COMMISSIONS
Reyes v. Regional Trial Court
Facts: Petitioner Aquiles Reyes and private respondent Adolfo
Comia were candidates for the position of member of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro in the
synchronized elections. Private respondent moved for the
exclusion of certain election returns, on the ground of serious
irregularity in counting in favor of petitioner Aquiles Reyes
votes cast for "Reyes" only, considering that there was another
candidate bearing the same surname. Petition for certiorari
was filed seeking the annulment of the decision of the
COMELEC, dismissing the petitioner’s appeal (on the ground
that he had failed to pay the appeal fee within the prescribed
period) from the trial court's decision. The Solicitor General, in
behalf of the COMELEC, contends that the filing of the present
petition, without petitioner first filing a motion for
reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc, violates Art. IX,
Sec. 7 of the Constitution because under this provision only
decisions of the COMELEC en banc may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not a motion for reconsideration before the
COMELEC en banc is necessary before filing a petition before
the SC for certiorari.
Ruling: Yes. The petitioner's failure to file a motion for
reconsideration of the decision of the First Division of the
COMELEC is fatal to his present action. It is now settled that in
providing that the decisions, orders and rulings of COMELEC
"may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari" as
provided by Sec. 7, Art. IX of the Constitution. And Rule 65 (1)
says that certiorari may be resorted to when there is no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Hence, a case may be
brought to the Supreme Court only after reconsideration (a
speedy and adequate remedy).
Main Point: In the case of the COMELEC, only decisions en
banc may be brought to the Supreme Court by certiorari since
motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by
the Commission en banc.
Martin
CASE NO. 16
ART IX SEC 7: DECISIONS OF THE COMMISSIONS
ABS-CBN v. COMELEC
Facts: In the May 11, 1998 elections, the COMELEC en banc
issued a resolution, 20 days before the said election, to stop
ABS-CBN or any other groups, its agents or representatives
from conducting exit survey/poll; an exit poll is an electoral
survey that gives an advance overview of how the electorate
voted to the public. Herein petitioner argues that the holding
of exit polls and the nationwide reporting of their results are
valid exercises of the freedoms of speech and of the press
hence the petition for certiorari. On the other hand, the
solicitor general contends that the petition should be dismissed
for petitioner's failure to exhaust available remedies before the
issuing forum, specifically the filing of a motion for
reconsideration.
Issue: Whether or not a motion for reconsideration should
have been the adequate remedy resorted to by ABS-CBN and
not petition for certiorari.
Ruling: No. The instant petition assails a resolution issued by
the Comelec only twenty (20) days before the election itself.
Besides, the petitioner got hold of a copy thereof only on May
4, 1998. Under the circumstances, there was hardly enough
opportunity to move for a reconsideration and to obtain a swift
resolution in time for the May 11, 1998 elections. Moreover,
not only is time of the essence; the Petition involves
transcendental constitutional issues. Direct resort to this Court
through a special civil action for certiorari is therefore justified.
The SC has ruled in the past that procedural requirement may
be glossed over to prevent a miscarriage of justice, when the
issue involves the principle of social justice or the protection of
labor, when the decision or resolution sought to be set aside is
a nullity, or when the need for relief is extremely urgent and
certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy available.
Main Point: The general rule, a COMELEC case may be brought
to the SC (through certiorari) only after reconsideration. An
exception is when the elections are already very close (urgent)
and that there is no more time for another speedy remedy.
Sheena
Case 17
Art IX A Section 7 Decisions of the Commissions
Salva v. Makalintal
FACTS: Petitioners, as officials and residents of barangay San
Rafael, Calaca, Batangas, filed with the RTC a class suit against
the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Batangas, Sangguniang
Pambayan of Calaca, Batangas, and the COMELEC for
annulment of Ordinance No. 05 and Resolution No. 345 both
enacted by the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Batangas, and
COMELEC Resolution No. 2987. Ordinance No. 05 declared the
abolition of Barangay San Rafael and its merger with Barangay
Dacanlao, Municipality of Calaca, Batangas and accordingly
instructed the COMELEC to conduct the required plebiscite.
Resolution No. 345 affirmed the effectivity of Ordinance No.
05, thereby overriding the veto exercised by the governor of
Batangas. Ordinance No. 05 was vetoed by the Governor of
Batangas for being ultra vires, particularly, as it was not shown
that the essential requirements regarding the attestations or
certifications of several government agencies were obtained.
The COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2987, providing for
the rules and regulations governing the conduct of the required
plebiscite scheduled on February 28, 1998, to decide the issue
of the abolition of barangay San Rafael and its merger with
barangay Dacanlao, Calaca, Batangas. The trial court denied the
petition saying that any petition or action questioning an act,
resolution or decision of the COMELEC must be brought before
SC. The petitioners contend that when the COMELEC exercises
its quasi-judicial functions under Section 52 of the Omnibus
Election Code, its acts are subject to the exclusive review by
this Court; but when the COMELEC performs a purely
ministerial duty, such act is subject to scrutiny by the RTC.
Petitioners submit that the conduct of a plebiscite, pursuant to
Ordinance No. 05 and Resolution No. 345, is not adjudicatory
or quasi-judicial in nature but simply ministerial or
administrative in nature and only in obedience to the aforesaid
Ordinance and Resolution.
ISSUE: W/N the respondent court has jurisdiction to enjoin the
COMELEC from implementing its Resolution No. 2987 which
provided for the rules and regulations for the conduct of the
plebiscite to decide on the abolition of Brgy. San Rafael and its
merger with Brgy. Dacanlao, Calaca, Batangas, pending the
determination of civil case no. 3442 for the annulment of
ordinance no. 05, resolution no. 345 and COMELEC Resolution
No. 2987.
RULING: YES. Section 7, Article IX A of the 1987 Constitution
provides in part that: SEC. 7. xxx. Unless otherwise provided
by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of
each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on
certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt
of a copy thereof. The Court ruled that “…What is
contemplated by the term final orders, rulings and decisions of
the COMELEC reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court as
provided by law are those rendered in actions or proceedings
before the COMELEC and taken cognizance of by the said body
in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.
Briefly, COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 which provides for the
rules and regulations governing the conduct of the required
plebiscite, was not issued pursuant to the COMELECs quasi-
judicial functions but merely as an incident of its inherent
administrative functions over the conduct of plebiscites, thus,
the said resolution may not be deemed as a final order
reviewable by certiorari by this Court. Any question
pertaining to the validity of said resolution may be well taken
in an ordinary civil action before the trial courts.
MAIN POINT: What is contemplated by the term “final orders,
rulings and decisions” of the COMELEC reviewable by certiorari
by the Supreme Court as provided by law are those rendered in
actions or proceedings before the COMELEC and taken
cognizance of by the said body in the exercise of its
adjudicatory (or quasi-judicial) powers.
Sheena
Case 18
Art IX A Section 7 Decisions of the Commissions
Garces v. CA
Facts: Lucita Garces was appointed Election Registrar of
Gutalac, Zamboanga del Norte on July 27, 1986. She was to
replace respondent Election Registrar Claudio Concepcion,
who, in turn, was transferred to Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte.
Both appointments were to take effect upon assumption of
office. Concepcion, however, refused to transfer post as he did
not request for it. Garces was directed by the Office of
Assistant Director for Operations to assume the Gutalac post.
But she was not able to do so because of a Memorandum
issued by respondent Provincial Election Supervisor Salvador
Empeynado that prohibited her from assuming office as the
same is not vacant. Meanwhile, since Concepcion continued
occupying the Gutalac office, the COMELEC en banc cancelled
his appointment to Liloy.
Garces filed before the RTC a petition for mandamus with
preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction and damages
against Empeynado and Concepcion. The COMELEC en banc
resolved to recognize respondent Concepcion as the Election
Registrar of Gutalac and ordered that the appointments of
Garces be cancelled. Empeynado moved to dismiss the petition
for mandamus alleging that the same was rendered moot and
academic by the said COMELEC Resolution, and that the case is
cognizable only by the COMELEC under Sec. 7 Art. IX-A of the
1987 Constitution. Empeynado argues that the matter should
be raised only on certiorari before the Supreme Court and not
before the RTC, else the latter court becomes a reviewer of an
en banc COMELEC resolution contrary to Sec. 7, Art. IX-A.
Issue: W/N the case is cognizable by the Supreme Court.
Ruling: No. The settled rule is that decision, rulings, order of
the COMELEC that may be brought to the Supreme Court on
certiorari under Sec. 7 Art. IX-A are those that relate to the
COMELECs exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers
involving elective regional, provincial and city officials. In this
case, what is being assailed is the COMELECs choice of an
appointee to occupy the Gutalac Post which is an
administrative duty done for the operational set-up of an
agency. The controversy involves an appointive, not an
elective, official. Hardly can this matter call for the certiorari
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. To rule otherwise would
surely burden the Court with trivial administrative questions
that are best ventilated before the RTC, a court which the law
vests with the power to exercise original jurisdiction over all
cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court,
tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions.
Main Point: The “case” or “matter” referred to by the
Constitution must be something within the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC, i.e., it must pertain to an election dispute. The
settled rule is that “decision, rulings, order” of the COMELEC
that may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari under
Sec. 7, Art. IX-A are those that relate to the COMELEC’s
exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers involving
“elective regional, provincial, and city officials.” In this case,
what is being assailed is the COMELEC’s choice of an appointee
to occupy the Gutalac Post which is an administrative duty
done for the operational set-up of an agency.
Sheena
Case 19
 Art IX A Section 7 Decisions of the Commissions
Dumayas vs COMELEC
FACTS: Petitioner Dumayas and respondent Bernal were
candidates for the position in Mayor of Iloilo. During the
canvassing by the Municipal Board of Canvassers, petitioner
sought the exclusion of election returns for 3 precincts for
alleged acts of terrorism, intimidation and coercion committed
in said precincts during the casting and counting of votes. The
MBC denied petitioner’s objections. Petitioner appealed to the
COMELEC Second Division which excluded election returns
from 3 precincts and directed the MBC to reconvene and finish
the canvass of the remaining or uncontested returns and then,
to proclaim the winning mayoralty candidate. Private
respondent Bernal moved for reconsideration of the decision
of the Second Division with the COMELEC en banc. The MBC
proclaimed petitioner winner of the election. Private
respondent Bernal filed an urgent motion to declare void
petitioner’s proclamation. The duly proclaimed Vice-Mayor
Betita, and private respondent Bernal filed an action for quo
warranto against petitioner before the RTC of Iloilo.
Petitioner filed with COMELEC en banc a motion to cancel
Bernal’s motion for reconsideration and motion to declare void
petitioner’s proclamation on the ground that respondent
Bernal should be deemed to have abandoned said motion
when he filed quo warranto action. The COMELEC en banc
reversed the decision of the Second Division, annulled the
petitioner Dumayas’ proclamation; and constituted a new
MBC. 2 commissioners who participated in the consideration
of the case retired before the promulgation of the COMELEC
decision but after they cast their vote. 4 commissioners were
left. Respondent Bernal was proclaimed by the newly-
constituted MBC as the duly-elected Mayor of the Municipality.
Petitioner Dumayas asked the Supreme Court to set aside the
COMELEC en banc resolution.
ISSUE: (1) W/N the votes of the retirees be counted.
(2) W/N the 3-1 vote of the remaining Commissioners a valid
decision en banc.
RULING: (1) No. Their vote should be automatically
withdrawn. There is no decision until it is promulgated. (2)
The remaining 4 commissioners constituted the total
membership and constituted a quorum. The vote of 3 is a
majority vote of all.
MAIN POINT: IN BOLD – from Bernas book.
Sheena
Case 20
Art IX A Section 7 Decisions of the Commissions
Aguilar v. COMELEC
FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari assailing COMELEC
issuances. In 2007 barangay elections, petitioner Aguilar (264
votes) won the chairmanship of a barangay in Lanao del Norte,
over private respondent Insoy (265 votes) by a margin of one
vote. Insoy instituted a protest MTC. MTC decided Insoy as the
duly elected punong barangay. The TC nullified the
proclamation of Aguilar. Aguilar filed his notice of appeal and
paid to the trial court the appeal fee of P1,000.00 in
accordance with Rule 14, Sections 8 and 9 of the recently
promulgated A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC or the Rules of Procedure in
Election Contests Before the Courts Involving Elective
Municipal and Barangay Officials. When the COMELEC received
the records elevated by the trial court, its First Division issued
first assailed Order dismissing the instant appeal for Aguilar’s
failure to pay the appeal fee of P3,000.00 as prescribed by the
Comelec Rules of Procedure within the five-(5)-day
reglementary period. Aguilar moved for reconsideration, that
the newly promulgated A.M. only requires the payment of
P1,000.00 as appeal fee. First Division denied. Aguilar filed
another motion for reconsideration, contending, among
others, that the order was null and void because it was issued
in violation of the rule that motions for reconsideration should
be resolved by the COMELEC en banc. Division denied as its
final order.
ISSUE: W/N COMELEC First Division gravely abused its
discretion in issuing the order dismissing petitioners appeal.
RULING: YES. In this case, petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration of the order dismissing his appeal was not
resolved by the COMELEC en banc, but by the COMELEC First
Division, in obvious violation of the provisions of the
Constitution and the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. The
division, after dismissing petitioners appeal, arrogated unto
itself the en bancs function of resolving petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration. The rule that a motion to reconsider a
decision, resolution, order or ruling of a COMELEC division,
except with regard to interlocutory orders, shall be elevated
to the COMELEC en banc. Here, there is no doubt that the
order dismissing the appeal is not merely an interlocutory, but
a final order. It was, therefore, incumbent upon the Presiding
Commissioner of the COMELEC First Division to certify the case
to the COMELEC en banc within two days from notification of
the filing of the motion.
MAIN POINT: Where a division of the COMELEC decides a
motion for reconsideration in violation of Art IX C 3, the
division’s ruling is a complete nullity and may be brought to
the Court on certiorari. (Bernas)
Sheena
Case 21
Art IX A Section 7 Decisions of the Commissions
Cayetano v. COMELEC
FACT: In 2010, petitioner Maria Laarni Cayetano and private
respondent Dante O. Tinga were candidates for the position of
Mayor of Taguig City. Petitioner was proclaimed the winner,
95,865 votes as against 93,445 votes received by private
respondent. Private respondent filed an Election Protest
against petitioner before the COMELEC on the ground of frauds
and irregularities allegedly committed by petitioner. Petitioner
raised the affirmative defense of insufficiency in form and
content of the Election Protest and prayed for dismissal.
COMELEC denied. Motion for reconsideration was filed but also
denied. Private respondent refutes the allegations of petitioner
and raises the procedural infirmity in the instant petition, i.e.,
the power of this Court to review decisions of the COMELEC
under Section 3, Article IX-C, pursuant to the leading case of
Repol v. COMELEC. Private respondent likewise counters that
the petition fails to demonstrate grave abuse of discretion.
Petitioner insists that the case at bar differs from Repol since
the herein assailed Orders constituted a final order of the
COMELEC (Second Division) on that particular issue. Moreover,
petitioner maintains that the COMELEC patently committed
grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUE: W/N the final order of the COMELEC (Second Division)
denying the affirmative defenses of petitioner can be
questioned before this Court even via a petition for certiorari.
RULING: No. The Court has no jurisdiction to review an order,
whether final or interlocutory, even a final resolution of a
division of the COMELEC. Stated otherwise, the Court can only
review via certiorari a decision, order, or ruling of the
COMELEC en banc in accordance with Section 7, Article IX-A of
the Constitution. Petitioners assertion that circumstances
prevailing herein are different from the factual milieu
attendant in Repol has no merit. As stated in Soriano, the
general rule is that a decision or an order of a COMELEC
Division cannot be elevated directly to this Court through a
special civil action for certiorari. True, the aforestated rule
admits of exceptions as when the issuance of the assailed
interlocutory order is a patent nullity because of the absence of
jurisdiction to issue the same. Unfortunately for petitioner,
none of the circumstances permitting an exception to the rule
occurs in this instance.
MAIN POINT: IN BOLD
Additional Notes: The issuance of a special writ of certiorari has
two prerequisites: (1) a tribunal, board, or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (2)
there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law.
Case No. 22
Art IX: Section 7. Decisions of the Commissions
A. Common Provisions
Dela Llana v. The Chairperson, COA
Facts: Petitioner Dela Llana, as a taxpayer wrote to COA
regarding the recommendation of the Senate Committee on
agriculture and food that the Dept of agriculture (DA) set-up an
internal pre-audit service. The COA replied to Dela LLana
informing him of the prior issuance of Circular 82-29 which
provides whenever the circumstances warrant, COA may
reinstitute pre-audit or adopt such other control measures as
necessary and appropriate to protect the funds and property of
an agency.
Dela Llana filed a petition for alleging that the pre-
audit duty onthe part of the COA cannot be lifted by a mere
circular, considering that the pre-audit is a constitutional
mandate enshrined in Section 2 of Article IX-D of the 1987
Constitution
Issue: W/N the petitioner the petition for certiorari file by Dela
Llana proper
Ruling: No. However the Petitioner is correct in that decisions
and orders of the COA are reviewable by the court via a
petition for certiorari. However, these refer to decisions and
orders which were rendered by the COA in its quasi-judicial
capacity. Circular No. 89-299 was promulgated by the COA
under its quasi-legislative or rule-making powers. Hence,
Circular No. 89-299 is not reviewable by certiorari. Neither is a
petition for prohibition appropriate in this case. A petition for
prohibition is filed against any tribunal, corporation, board, or
person—whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or
ministerial functions—who has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, and the
petitioner prays that judgment be rendered, commanding the
respondent to desist from further proceeding in the action or
matter specified in the petition. However, prohibition only lies
against judicial or ministerial functions, but not against
legislative or quasi-legislative functions.
Main Point: Decisions and orders of the Commission on Audit
(COA) rendered in its quasi-judicial capacity are reviewable by
the court via a petition for certiorari and not those
promulgated under its quasi-legislative or rule-making powers.
Case No. 23
Art IX: Section 7. Decisions of the Commissions
A. Common Provisions
Cagas v. COMELEC
Facts: The petitioner Cagas and respondent Bautista contested
the position of Governor of the Province of Davao del Sur in the
2010 automated national and local elections, wherein the
petitioner won against the respondent. Alleging fraud,
anomalies, irregularities, vote-buying and violations of election
laws, rules and resolutions, Bautista filed an electoral protest.
The petitioner moved to reconsider on the ground
that the order did not discuss whether the protest specified the
alleged irregularities in the conduct of the elections. He prayed
that the matter be certified to the COMELEC en banc pursuant
to Section 1, Section 5, and Section 6, all of Rule 20 of
COMELEC Resolution No. 8804.
Issue: W/N COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN REFUSING TO DISMISS THE PROTEST FOR
INSUFFICIENCY IN FORM AND CONTENT
Ruling: No. The governing provision is Section 7, Article IX of
the 1987 Constitution, which provides: Section 7. Each
Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members
any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the
date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or
matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the
filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by
the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless
otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision,
order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within
thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof. This provision,
although it confers on the Court the power to review any
decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC, limits such power to
a final decision or resolution of the COMELEC en banc, and
does not extend to an interlocutory order issued by a Division
of the COMELEC. Otherwise stated, the Court has no power to
review on certiorari an interlocutory order or even a final
resolution issued by a Division of the COMELEC.
Main Point: The Court has no power to review on certiorari an
interlocutory order or even a final resolution issued by a
Division of the COMELEC.
LJ
Case No. 24
Art IX: Section 8. Other Functions
B. Civil Service Commission
Section 1. Composition; Qualifications; Term
Gaminde v. COA
FACTS: On June 11, 1993, the President of the Philippines
appointed petitioner Thelma P. Gaminde, ad interim,
Commissioner, Civil Service Commission. She assumed office on
June 22, 1993, after taking an oath of office. On September 07,
1993, the Commission on Appointment, Congress of the
Philippines confirmed the appointment. In her appointment
paper the end of her term will be on Feb 2, 1999. However in
1998, petitioner sought clarification from the Office of the
President as to the expiry date of her term of office, In reply to
her request, the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel, in a letter
opined that petitioner’s term of office would expire on
February 02, 2000, not on February 02, 1999. She continued to
remain in office, 1998, petitioner sought clarification from the
Office of the President as to the expiry date of her term of
office. In reply to her request, the Chief Presidential Legal
Counsel, in a letter dated April 07, 19982 opined that
petitioner’s term of office would expire on February 02, 2000,
not on February 02, 1999. ISSUE: W/N the common starting
point of the appointees of the commission February 2, 1987
RULING: Yes. This is true even if Art XVIII, Sec 15 provided an
extension of tenure of the incumbents when the Constitution
took effect, the said extension doesn’t affect the term. The
starting point shall be February 2 despite the appointee took
office after February 2, through this rotational system the
staggering system is preserved hence Gaminde’s expired on
February 02, 1999. However, she served as de facto officer in
good faith until February 02, 2000, and thus entitled to receive
her salary and other emoluments for actual service rendered.  Presidential Decree 51 creating the CSU never became law, it
MAIN POINT: There is no need to expressly state the beginning
of the term of office as this is understood to coincide with the
effectivity of the Constitution upon its ratification.
LJ
Case No. 25
Art IX: Section 8. Other Functions
B. Civil Service Commission
Section 1. Composition; Qualifications; Term
Mathay Jr. v. CA
FACTS: During his term as Mayor of Quezon City, Mr. Brigido R.
Simon appointed private respondents to positions in the Civil
Service Unit (“CSU”) of the local government of Quezon City.
Civil Service Units were created pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 51 which was allegedly signed into law on
November 15 or 16, 1972. PD 51 created certain offices and
they were promptly filled. However in 1991, PD 51 was
declared never published hence it never became a law. On
June 4, 1990, the Civil Service Commission issued
Memorandum Circular No. 30, directing all Civil Service
Regional or Field Offices to recall, revoke and disapprove within
one year from issuance of the said Memorandum, all
appointments in CSUs created pursuant to Presidential Decree
No. 51 on the ground that the same never became law. Among
those affected by the revocation of appointments are private
respondents in these three petitions. The sanggunian passed
an ordinance declaring the “personnel” the private
respondents absorbed in the department of order and public
safety. Due to the lack of vacancies Simon made them
contractual employees, When Matthay became mayor he
renew all contract but refused to renew the private
respondents. The Civil Service Commission then ordered to
reinstate them in the ground that their appointment is
automatic.
ISSUE: W/N the Civil Service Commission erred in their decision
in ordering the reinstatement of the respondents based on the
ground that the city had passed an ordinance that provide for
the “absorption” of specific persons to certain positions.
RULING: Yes. the ordinance is invalid. The act of ordering the
absorption is an act of appointment, in which the city council
has no power to appoint. It is axiomatic that the right to hold
public office is not a natural right. The right exists only by virtue
of a law expressly or impliedly creating and conferring it. Since
could not be a source of rights. Neither could it impose duties.
It could not afford any protection. It did not create an office. It
is as inoperative as though it was never passed. In Debulgado
vs. Civil Service Commission we held that “a void appointment
cannot give rise to security of tenure on the part of the holder
of the appointment.”
MAIN POINT: The right to hold public office is not a natural
right; It exists only by virtue of a law expressly or impliedly
creating and conferring it; A void appointment cannot give rise
to security of tenure on the part of the holder of the
appointment.
LJ
Case No. 26
Art IX: Section 8. Other Functions
B. Civil Service Commission
Section 2: Scope of the System
Cuevas v. Bacal
FACTS: This case involves the appointment and transfer of
career executive service officers (CESOs).  More specifically, it
concerns the “appointment” of respondent Josefina G. Bacal,
who holds the rank of CESO III, to the position of Chief Public
Attorney in the Public Attorney’s Office, which has a Career
Executive Service (CES) Rank Level I, and her subsequent
transfer, made without her consent, to the Office of the
Regional Director of the PAO because of the appointment of
Atty. Carina Demaisip to the position of Chief Public Defender
(formerly Chief Public Attorney). Atty. Bacal filed a petition
for quo warranto ruled in her favor by the Court of Appeals;
Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: W/N the respondent have the right to retain her
position despite her lack of qualification.
RULING: No. As respondent does not have the rank appropriate
for the position of Chief Public Attorney, her appointment to
that position cannot be considered permanent, and she can
claim no security of tenure in respect of that position. As held
in Achacoso v. Macaraig: It is settled that a permanent
appointment can be issued only “to a person who meets all the
requirements for the position to which he is being appointed,
including the appropriate eligibility prescribed.” Achacoso did
not. At best, therefore, his appointment could be regarded only
as temporary. And being so, it could be withdrawn at will by
the appointing authority and “at a moment’s notice,”
conformably to establish jurisprudence . . . The mere fact that a
position belongs to the Career Service does not automatically
confer security of tenure on its occupant even if he does not
possess the required qualifications. Such right will have to
depend on the nature of his appointment, which in turn
depends on his eligibility or lack of it. A person who does not
have the requisite qualifications for the position cannot be
appointed to it in the first place or, only as an exception to the
rule, may be appointed to it merely in an acting capacity in the
absence of appropriate eligibles. The appointment extended to
him cannot be regarded as permanent even if it may be so
designated. . . .
Main Point: Civil Service Commission; Respondent not having
the rank appropriate for the position of Chief Public Attorney,
her appointment to that position cannot be considered
permanent and she can claim no security of tenure in respect
of that position.
Gomez
CASE NO. 27
ART IX B (CSC) SEC 2: SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM
PARAGRAPH 1
MWSS v. Hernandez
FACTS: A decision against the respondent, Metropolitan
Waterworkds and Sewerage System, was held by the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), for failure to pay wage
differentials, allowances and other monetary benefits to its
2500 contractual employees, and that jurisdiction falls over the
NLRC because the employees concerned are “Contractual
Employees” and that Civil Service’ jurisdiction are only over
those regular employees employed by GOCCs . Now a petition
to review such said decision and order, filed by the
respondents, as NLRC has no jurisdiction over this case as
jurisdiction falls within the Civil Service not with NLRC.
ISSUE: Whether or not MWSS is a government owned
corporation (GOCC) that is under the jurisdiction of the civil
service not by the labor code.
RULING: Yes. The Character of the MWSS as a GOCC is not
contested. Regardless of the status of the employment, The
Civil Service covers service and non-service employment, or
regular and contractual employees.
MAIN POINT: Republic Act No. 6234 created it as a
“government corporation to be known as the Metropolitan
Waterworks and Sewerage System.” As in the case of the
National Housing Authority, therefore, employment in the
MWSS is governed not by the Labor Code but by the civil
service law, rules and regulations; and controversies arising
from or connected with that employment are not cognizable by
the National Labor Relations Commission.
Gomez
CASE NO. 28
ART IX B (CSC) SEC 2: SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM
PARAGRAPH 1
NSC v. NLRC
FACTS: Credo, an employee of National Service Commission
(NASECO or NSC), was charge administratively for non-
compliance of certain entry procedures in the company’s billing
adjustment and was being considered for termination. The
case was raised by both parties before the NLRC which then
ruled against the petitioner and ordered for her reinstatement.
Petitioners now contends that such action by the NLRC is
without jurisdiction as they are a government corporation by
virtue of its being a subsidiary of NIDC, that the case at bar is
for the Civil Service Commission to decide.
ISSUE: Whether or not the jurisprudence under NHC v. Juco,
regarding employees of government corporation falling under
the Civil Service jurisdiction, would prevail over the case.
RULING: No. Retroactive effect cannot be given to cases that
arose before the inception of the jurisprudence under NHC v.
Juco which ruled that government corporations are under the
jurisdiction of the Civil Service or before its date of effectivity,
January 17, 1985. Thus, the ruling of NLRC stands.
MAIN POINT: The civil service commission, as promulgated,
governs all employees falling under GOCCs. However,
retroactive effect as to its jurisdiction under the jurisprudence
ruled in NHC v Juco cannot be made before its effectivity. Thus,
this case occurring before such effectivity falls under the Labor
Code.
Gomez
CASE NO. 29
ART IX B (CSC) SEC 2: SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM
PARAGRAPH 1
UP v. Regino
FACTS: Private respondent, Angel Pamplina, a mimeograph
operator of the UP school of economics, was dismissed from
service after having found guilty of dishonesty and grave
misconduct when she leaked examination questions in
Economics 106 under Prof. Salita Monsod. The Merit System
Board (MSB), decided on the case and ruled for the
reinstatement of Private respondent. UP then filed a motion to
dismiss such decision for lack of jurisdiction of MSB on the
matter, that UP under the law, is a GOCC and that the Civil
Service Commission has jurisdiction over administrative
matters involving GOCCs.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Civil Service commission has
jurisdiction over this administrative case against private
respondent.
RULING: Yes. Since private respondent is said to be employed
by UP and acted dishonestly as an employee thereof, then Civil
Service will have appellate jurisdiction over the case.
MAIN POINT: UP is therefore governed by PD 807 and
administrative cases involving the discipline of its employees
come under the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service
Commission.
Gomez
CASE NO. 30
ART IX B (CSC) SEC 2: SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM
PARAGRAPH 1
Mateo v. CA
FACTS: A complaint was initiated by the petitioners against
Edgar Sta. Maria (Private Respondent), then general manager
of Morong Water District (MOWAD). Which then resulted to
his suspension, in a decision made by the Board of Directors of
said institution. Private respondent filed a Special Civil Action
for Quo Warranto and Mandamus with Preliminary
Injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, Branch 78,
challenging his dismissal by petitioners. 
ISSUE: Whether or not the courts had no jurisdiction to decide
over the disciplinary actions of government employees which is
vested exclusively in the Civil Service Commission.
RULING: Yes. the Court en banc ruled that employees of
government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charter fall under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service
Commission.
MAIN POINT: MOWAD is a quasi-public corporation created
pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 198, known as the
Provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973, and as such its officers
and employees are covered by the Civil Service Law.
Gomez
CASE NO. 31
ART IX B (CSC) SEC 2: SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM
PARAGRAPH 1
DOH v. NLRC
FACTS: A petition for Certiorari and Prohibition was filed by the
DOH in behalf of Dr. Jose N. Reodriguez Memorial Hospital
(DJRMH). Seeking to review the resolution of the NLRC NCR CA
No. 002864-92. It started when private respondent, Ceferino
Laur, was employed to DJRMH as a Patient-Assistant Police
Force and was later on charge for violating Code of Ethics of
Policemen and conduct of unbecoming a police officer. Private
respondent then elevated the case to the NLRC and asking for
claims of his illegal dismissal from the said hospital. The NLRC
then ruled in favor of the private respondent. Now the
petitioners are questioning the jurisdiction of NLRC to rule over
this case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the DJRRMH is a government hospital
whose employees falls under the Civil Service Commission.
RULING: Yes. Any controversy concerning the relationship
between the employees on the one hand and the hospital’s
administration on the other, as is the case of private
respondent, comes under the jurisdiction of the Merit Systems
Board and the Civil Service Commission.
MAIN POINT: The DJRMH falls well within the scope and/or
coverage of the Civil Service Law in accordance with paragraph
1, Section 2, Article IX B, 1987 Constitution and the provisions
of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987 and Presidential Decree No. 807,
otherwise known as the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines.
AIRA
CASE NO. 32
ART IX CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION SECTION 2: UNDER CIVIL
SERVICE LAW (Paragraph 1)
Juco v. NLRC
FACTS: Benjamin C. Juco was hired as a project engineer of
respondent National Housing Corporation (NHC). On May 14,
1975, he was separated from the service for having been
implicated in a crime of theft and/or malversation of public
funds. He filed a complaint for illegal dismissal w/ the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) but his case was
dismissed by the labor arbiter on the ground that the NHC is a
government-owned corporation and jurisdiction over its
employees is vested in the Civil Service Commission (CSC). On
January 1989, petitioner filed the case with the CSC but was
again dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, stating that NHC is not a
GOCC with an original charter. On April 1989, petitioner filed
again a complaint with National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) which was finally ruled in favor of petitioner. However,
respondent appealed on the matter, and it was again reversed
in favor of said respondent, NLRC stating that they had no
jurisdiction on the matter.
ISSUE: Whether or not public respondent committed grave
abuse of discretion in holding that petitioner is not governed
by the Labor Code.
RULING: Yes. The NLRC erred in dismissing petitioner’s
complaint for lack of jurisdiction because the rule now is that
the Civil Service covers only government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters. Having been incorporated
under the Corporation Law, its relations with its personnel are
governed by the Labor Code and come under the jurisdiction of
the National Labor Relations Commission.
MAIN POINT: Constitution now provides: “The civil service
embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and
agencies of the Government, including government owned or
controlled corporations with original charter.” Notwithstanding
that the case arose at the time when the 1973 Constitution was
still in effect, the NLRC has jurisdiction over the employees on
the ground that it is the 1987 Constitution that governs
because it is the Constitution in place at the time of the
decision.
AIRA
CASE NO. 33
ART IX CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION SECTION 2: UNDER CIVIL
SERVICE LAW (Paragraph 1)
Feliciano v. Gison
FACTS: The Leyte Metropolitan Water District (LMWD),
through General Manager Ranulfo Feliciano, filed with the
Department of Finance (DOF) a petition requesting that certain
water supply equipment and a motor vehicle, particularly a
Toyota Hi-Lux pick-up truck, be exempted from tax. These
properties were given to LMWD through a grant by the
Japanese Government for the rehabilitation of its typhoon-
damaged water supply system. DOF granted the tax exemption
on the water supply equipment but assessed the
corresponding tax and duty on the Toyota HiLux pick-up truck.
LMWD then moved to reconsider the disallowance of the tax
exemption on the subject vehicle. The DOF, through then
Undersecretary Cornelio C. Gison, denied LMWD’s request for
reconsideration because the tax exemption privileges of
government agencies and government owned and controlled
corporations (GOCCs) had already been withdrawn by
Executive Order No. 93.
ISSUE: Whether or not water districts are, by law, GOCCs with
original charter.
RULING: Yes, water districts are GOCCs. Unlike private
corporations that derive their legal existence and power from
the Corporation Code, water districts derive their legal
existence and power from the Provincial Water Utilities Act
(P.D. No. 198). Water districts would not have corporate
powers without P.D. No. 198.
MAIN POINT: A water district is a government-owned and
controlled corporation with a special charter since it is created
pursuant to a special law, P.D. No. 198.
KALMA, WALANG CASE 34. NAGKAMALI LANG AKO (AREEJ)
SA COUNT. NEXT CASE NA, BES.
AIRA
CASE NO. 35
ART IX CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION SECTION 2: UNDER CIVIL
SERVICE LAW (GOCCs under the Corporation Code)
 Bliss Development Corp. Employees Union v. Hon. Calleja
FACTS: Petitioner, a duly registered labor union, filed with the
Department of Labor, a petition for certification election of
private respondent Bliss Development Corporation (BDC). Med-
Arbiter Napoleon V. Fernando dismissed the petition for lack of
jurisdiction stating that the majority of BDC’s stocks are owned
by the Human Settlement Development Corporation (HSDC), a
wholly-owned government corporation. Therefore, BDC is
subject to Civil Service law, rules, and regulations. Petitioner
then filed an appeal with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR).
At this time, President Corazon Aquino issued EO 180,
extending to government employees the right to organize and
bargain collectively. Director Pura Ferrer-Calleja of BLR issued
an Order dismissing the appeal on the grounds that it is a
government corporation where workers are prohibited from
organizing and joining labor unions. With EO 180 however, BLR
enjoins the petitioner to register in accordance with the
provisions in said executive order.
ISSUE: Whether or not BDC is a GOCC subject to Civil Service
laws, rules, and regulations. Corollary to this issue is whether
or not petitioner is covered by EO 180 and must register as a
precondition for filing a petition for certification election.
RULING: No. BDC is a government-owned corporation created
under the Corporation Law. It is without a charter, governed by
the Labor Code and not by the Civil Service Law; hence,
Executive Order No. 180 does not apply to it. Consequently,
public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in
ordering petitioner to register under EO 180 as a precondition
for filing a petition for certification election.
MAIN POINT: BDC is created under the Corporation Law. It is
without a charter; hence, Executive Order No. 180 will not
apply.
AIRA
CASE NO. 36
ART IX CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION SECTION 2: UNDER CIVIL
SERVICE LAW (GOCCs under the Corporation Code)
Postigo v. Philippine Tuberculosis Society, Inc.
FACTS: Petitioners Dr. Perla A. Postigo, et al., were regular
employees of the respondent Philippine Tuberculosis Society,
Inc. (PTSI). They retired on various dates from 1996 to 1998.
Upon retirement from service, some of the petitioners who
were compulsory members of the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) obtained retirement benefits from the
GSIS. At the time the petitioners retired, Article 287 of the
Labor Code had been amended by Republic Act No. 7641 which
granted retirement pay to qualified employees in the private
sector, in the absence of any retirement plan or agreement
with the company. As the respondent did not have a
retirement plan for its employees, aside from its contribution
to the GSIS, petitioners claimed from the respondent their
retirement benefits under RA 7641. The respondent denied
their claims on the ground that the accommodation extended
by the GSIS to the petitioners removed them from the
coverage of the law.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are employees in the private
sector and are therefore entitled to the benefits of RA 7641.
RULING: Yes, the petitioners are employees in the private
sector; hence, entitled to the benefits of RA 7641. Even
assuming that by virtue of their compulsory inclusion in the
GSIS, the petitioners became employees in the public sector,
they are still entitled to the benefits of RA 7641 since they are
not covered by the Civil Service Law and its regulations.
MAIN POINT: Respondent is a private and not a governmental
corporation. The respondent was incorporated as a non-profit,
benevolent and non-stock corporation under the Corporation
Code. Having been created under the general corporation law
instead of a special charter, we hold that the respondent is a
private and not a governmental corporation.
RYLE
Case No. 37
ART. IX-B (CSC) SEC. 2: SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM
PAR. 1 - UNDER CIVIL SERVICE LAW
LRTA v. Venus
FACTS: LRTA entered into a 10-year Agreement with petitioner
METRO to provide the commuting public with an efficient and
dependable light rail transit system through the construction of
a LRT system from Monumento to Kalookan. Petitioner METRO
hired its own employees, including private respondents.
METRO had a collective bargaining agreement with the Pinag-
isang Lakas ng Manggagawa sa METRO, Inc. – National
Federation of Labor (PIGLAS-METRO, INC. – NFL – KMU).
However, the Union filed a Notice of Strike against METRO on
account of a deadlock in the collective bargaining negotiation.
On the same day, the Union struck, paralyzing the progress of
the rails’ construction. This led to an issuance of an assumption
of jurisdiction order by DOLE Secretary Bienvenido E. Laguesma
directing all the striking employees "to return to work
immediately … and for the Company to accept them back
under the same terms and conditions of employment
prevailing prior to the strike."
Despite the issuance, posting, and publication of the
assumption of jurisdiction and return to work order, private
respondent workers, among others, failed to return to work.
Thus, effective July 27, 2000, private respondents Venus et al.
were considered dismissed from employment, which led them
to file a complaint for illegal dismissal before the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and impleaded both
petitioners LRTA and METRO. This resulted to a decision
favoring the respondents. The decision was later repealed
through an appeal by the petitioners, but was reversed by the
Appellate Court, hence this case.
Petitioner LRTA argues that it has no employer-employee
relationship with private respondent workers as they were
hired by petitioner METRO alone, and that that it is a GOCC,
and thus under the exclusive jurisdiction only of the Civil
Service Commission, not the NLRC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner LRTA is under the
jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.
RULING: Yes. Article IX-B, 1987 Constitution, expressly provides
that “the civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charters.” Corporations with original charters are those which
have been created by special law and not through the general
corporation law. Thus, it was held that “the test in determining
whether a GOCC is subject to the Civil Service Law is the
manner of its creation such that government corporations
created by special charter are subject to its provisions….” There
should be no dispute then that employment in petitioner LRTA
should be governed only by civil service rules, and not the
Labor Code and beyond the reach of the Department of Labor
and Employment, since petitioner LRTA is a government-owned
and controlled corporation with an original charter, Executive
Order No. 603, Series of 1980, as amended.
MAIN POINT: Government-owned and controlled corporations
with original charter fall under the jurisdiction of the Civil
Service Commission.
RYLE
Case No. 38
ART. IX-B (CSC) SEC. 2: SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM
PAR. 2 – CLASSIFICATIONS AND APPOINTMENTS
HIGC v. CSC
FACTS: Daniel Cruz, the Vice President, Finance and
Administrative Group of the Home Financing Corporation, now
known as the Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation
(HIGC), was found to be responsible by an investigating
committee for simple neglect of duty arising from his inefficient
supervision over his subordinates arising from the loss of six (6)
Land Bank checks. He was also one of those not reappointed
when HIGC underwent a reorganization which resulted among
others in the reduction of the number of Vice-President
positions from 6 to 3. Cruz then invoked on appeal his
permanent appointment and insisted that the question of his
eligibility should be left for determination by the CSC. Cruz
attempted to avail his early retirement package but was denied
of the same. CSC issued a Resolution finding Cruz possessing
eligibility to serve as Vice President.
ISSUE: Whether or not CSC is correct in finding Daniel Cruz
eligible for reappointment as Vice President of HIGC.
RULING: No. It is not disputed that Cruz is without any civil
service eligibility as shown by his appointment papers. As such,
he cannot be legally conferred a permanent appointment for
the law is clear that career positions, particularly the first and
second level positions in the service, require civil service
eligibility. Thus the attestation by respondent CSC that
respondent Cruz' appointment is permanent must be struck
down for being contrary to law. It has been observed that "The
permanent appointment of a non-civil service eligible to a
career position is, from a legal viewpoint, a nullity. Not even
the CSC can validate the error, as it cannot rise higher than the
law that created it—the same law that requires civil service
eligibility for a permanent appointment to any of the two
positions subject of the present petition." Consequently, his
appointment being merely temporary in the context of the Civil
Service Law, it follows that Cruz' appointment can be
terminated at the pleasure of the appointing power.
MAIN POINT: Civil Service Commission is not empowered to
determine the kind or nature of the appointment.
RYLE
Case No. 39
ART. IX-B (CSC) SEC. 2: SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM
PAR. 2 – CLASSIFICATIONS AND APPOINTMENTS
Mauna v. Civil Service Commission
FACTS: On November 16, 1987, petitioner Mauna was
appointed as Chief Election Officer of the Precincts and Voting
Centers Division of the Election and Barangay Affairs
Department (EBAD) of the COMELEC. A month later, private
respondent Cristeto J. Limbaco, the incumbent Assistant Chief
Election Officer filed a protest against the petitioner's
appointment before the COMELEC on the grounds that (1) he is
more qualified than petitioner; (2) he is next-in-rank as
Assistant Chief Election Officer; and (3) he is more senior than
petitioner, having been employed by the COMELEC since 1979.
The COMELEC en banc dismissed the private respondent's
protest for lack of merit. Private respondent filed an appeal on
March 15, 1988 before the Merit System Protection Board
(MSPB) of respondent Civil Service Commission reiterating the
grounds earlier raised before the COMELEC, which the latter
found meritorious.
Petitioner tried to challenge the MSPB’s decision but was
denied. Petitioner takes the position that public respondent
has no authority to revoke his appointment as Chief Election
Officer on the ground that another person is more qualified
and to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice.
ISSUE: Whether or not public respondent CSC’s MSPB has the
power to authority to revoke such an appointment on the
aforementioned ground.
RULING: No. It is well-settled that when the appointee is
qualified, as in this case, and all the other legal requirements
are satisfied, the CSC has no alternative but to attest to the
appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Laws. The
Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment on the
ground that another person is more qualified for a particular
position. It also has no authority to direct the appointment of a
substitute of its choice. To do so would be an encroachment on
the discretion vested upon the appointing authority. An
appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of
whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only condition that the
appointee should possess the qualifications required by law.”
MAIN POINT: The right of choice, having been exercised it,
cannot now be faulted on the ground that there is another
better qualified.
RYLE
Case No. 40
ART. IX-B (CSC) SEC. 2: SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM
PAR. 2 – CLASSIFICATIONS AND APPOINTMENTS
Rimonte v. CSC
FACTS: Petitioner was the incumbent Planning Officer III in the
Office of the Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez issued Office
Order No. 90-32 directing the implementation of the
"performance appraisal system" as a basis for evaluation of
providing for the "General Policy and Procedural Guidelines in
the Placement of Personnel for the New Staffing Pattern".
Petitioner applied to different positions including any of the
positions of Records Officer V of the Central Records Division.
Petitioner was appointed to the position of Associate Graft
Investigation Officer III while Henrietta F. Roque was appointed
Records Officer V.
Petitioner filed a protest on Roque's appointment to CSC and
assailed that he has the better qualifications than her.
However, CSC denied his protest, the same with his motion for
reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether the appointment made by the appointing
authority may be disregarded on the ground that someone has
better qualification than the appointed officer.
RULING: No. The power of appointment is essentially
discretionary provided the appointee is qualified. Even though
someone is said to be better or proved to have superior
credentials, the head of the agency who is the appointing
power is the one most knowledgeable to decide who can best
perform the functions of the office.
MAIN POINT: The law limits the Commission's authority only to
whether or not the appointees possess the legal qualifications
and the appropriate civil service eligibility, nothing else. If they
do then the appointments are approved because the
Commission cannot exceed its power by substituting its will for
that of the appointing authority.
RYLE
Case No. 41
ART. IX-B (CSC) SEC. 2: SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM
PAR. 2 – CLASSIFICATIONS AND APPOINTMENTS
Gloria v. De Guzman
FACTS: Private respondents were employees of the Philippine
Air Force College of Aeronautics (PAFCA) through temporary
appointments due to them not being eligible for civil service.
Rosario V. Cerillo, a private respondent, was issued a one-year
temporary appointment to the position of Board Secretary II of
PAFCA but was relieved as Board Secretary of the PAFCA by
reason of loss of confidence. However, she was designated as
“Coordinator for Extension Services.”
Private respondents filed a “Petition for Mandamus and
Reinstatement, with Back Wages and Damages,” when their
appointments expired. This has been done so that then DECS
Secretary Armand Fabella complete the filling up of positions
for Board of Trustees and order the Board of Trustees to
reinstate the respondents in the case at bench to their
respective positions. Respondent Judge De Guzman rendered a
decision ordering the reinstatement of Cerillo as Coordinator
for Extension Services.
ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent Cerillo is entitled to
reinstatement to the position of Coordinator for Extension
Services.
RULING: No. Private respondent Cerillo’s assignment as
“Coordinator for Extension Services” was a mere designation.
Not being a permanent appointment, the designation to the
position cannot be the subject of a case for reinstatement. The
judgment of respondent Judge is patently improper because it
finds no support as to facts and the law. Respondent Cerillo,
although temporarily extended an appointment as Board
Secretary II, was dismissed therefrom because of loss of
confidence. There is no question, therefore, that her dismissal
as Board Secretary II could not have been the subject of the
petition for mandamus and reinstatement filed before
respondent Judge. The fact is that private respondent’s
assignment as “Coordinator for Extension Services” was a mere
designation. Not being a permanent appointment, the
designation to the position cannot be the subject of a case for
reinstatement.
MAIN POINT: Compliance with the legal requirements for an
appointment to a civil service position is essential in order to
make it fully effective, and until an appointment has become a
completed act, it would precipitate to invoke the rule on
security of tenure.
AREEJ
CASE NO. 42
ART IX-B (CSC) SEC 2: SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM
PARA 2. CLASSIFICATION AND APPOINTMENTS
Atty. Elias Omar A. Sana v. Career Executive Service Board
FACTS: Petitioner contends that EO 883, granting the rank of
Career Executive Service Officer (CESO) III or higher, by the
President, to officers and employees occupying legal positions
in the government executive service who have obtained certain
graduate degrees such as in law, and the 13 appointments
made pursuant to it, were void for violating Art VII Sec 15 of
the PH Constitution (the constitutional ban on midnight
appointment). Petitioner also submits that Career Executive
Service Board (CESB) Resolution No. 870, which found no legal
impediment to the vesting by the President of the CESO rank,
circumvents Art VII Sec 15 of the PH Constitution by
distinguishing the terms appoint and appointment.
CESB argues that the issue raised by the petition was rendered
moot by the issuance of President Ninoy Aquino of EO 3, which
expressly revoked of E0 883, as it encroaches upon the power
of the CESB to promulgate rules, standards and procedures on
the selection, classification, compensation and career
development of members of the CES vested by law with it. It
further opined that the appointment to a CESO rank is not
equivalent to an appointment to an office since the latter
entails the conferment of an authority to exercise the
functions of an office whereas the former is merely a
completion of a previous appointment. The CESB also submits
that the grant of CESO rank III is not automatic because this
needs prior guidelines from the CESB. The CESB points out
that President Arroyo did not confer CESO rank to any official
based on EO 883.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 883 and the 13 appointments were
valid as the vesting of the CESO rank does not contemplate any
hiring or appointment since it involves only the conferment of
a rank rather than a selection for a position
RULING: PETITION WAS DISMISSED ON THE GROUND OF
MOOTNESS. At the time this petition was filed, President
Aquino had already issued EO 3 revoking EO 883 expressly and
CESB Resolution No. 870 impliedly.
MAIN POINT: The question whether an appointment to a CESO
rank of an executive official amounts to an appointment for
purposes of the constitutional ban on midnight appointment,
while potentially recurring, holds no certainty of evading
judicial review as the question can be decided even beyond the
appointments-ban period under Section 15, Article VII of the
Constitution. Petitioner has not suffered any violation of a right
vested in him under EO 883.
AREEJ
CASE NO. 43
ART IX-C (CSC) SEC 2: SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM
PARA 2. COMPETITIVE
Samson v. CA
FACTS: Private respondent Feliciano Talens was appointed by
former City Mayor Asistio of Caloocan City as Assistant
Secretary to the Mayor. However, petitioner Mayor Marcial
Samson, who succeeded Mayor Asistio, furnished private
respondent the questioned AO 3, which terminated the
services of the private respondent on the ground of “lack and
loss of confidence”. Private respondent contends Sec. 5(f) of
RA 2260 (Civil Service Law) specifies as non-competitive only
the positions of "secretaries of provincial city and municipal
boards and councils." He submits that in accordance with
Section 32 of the Civil Service Law, he can be removed only
for cause and after due process has been observed.
Petitioners contend that the termination of private
respondent's services is authorized by Section 5(f) of RA 2260
and argued that although the position of assistant secretary to
the city mayor is not among those expressly declared in Section
5 of RA 2260, as amended, to be within the non-competitive
service, petitioners argue that an assistant secretary is a
position inherently and primarily highly confidential in
nature, and is also a secretary, and thus comprised within the
general term "secretaries" as provided for in Section 5(f), and
that the tenure of assistant secretary lasts only as long as the
Mayor's confidence in him remains.
ISSUE: Whether or not the position of Assistant Secretary to
the City Mayor should be considered as in the non-competitive
service.
RULING: NO.  Under a strict construction of R.A. 2260, the
position of Assistant Secretary to the Mayor is deemed to
belong to the competitive service inasmuch only secretaries
to governors and mayors are expressly enumerated as non-
competitive. It is the nature of the position which finally
determines a position to be primarily confidential. While both
Secretary and Assistant Secretary may be called “secretary,”
one is certainly of higher category and rank than the other with
the added distinction that a Secretary must enjoy the
confidence of the Mayor. However, the position of Assistant
Secretary being of a lower rank, need not carry the requisites
attaching to the primarily confidential position of the actual
Secretary to the Mayor. 
MAIN POINT: While duties possibly involving confidential
matters are sometimes handled by the Assistant Secretary to
the Mayor, this does not necessarily transform the nature of
the position itself as one that is primarily and highly
confidential. It is the nature of the position which finally
determines a position to be primarily confidential.
AREEJ
CASE NO. 44
ART IX-C (CSC) SEC 2: SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM
PARA 2. NON-COMPETITIVE
Astraquillo v. Mangalupas
FACTS: Petitioner Astraquillo was appointed by the President
as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary and Chief of
Mission (II) to the United Arab Emirates (UAE). After he had
occupied the post for two years or so, a confidential
memorandum was filed with the Home Office by Atty. Roy
Seneres, the Philippine Labor Attache to the United Arab
Emirates, accusing Astraquillo, his wife and cousin-in-law of
improper interference with his (Seneres') functions. Thereafter,
the Secretary of Foreign Affairs recommended to the President
the termination of Astraquillo's services as ambassador, which
was approved by authority of the President." Petitioner now
argues that under the Foreign Service Code of 1983, his
removal could be predicated only upon good cause duly
established at a hearing of which he was entitled to notice and
an opportunity to defend.
This decision deals with five cases that have been consolidated
and jointly considered, all turning uponthe validity of the
termination, by authority of the President of the Philippines,
of the petitioners' appointments as "political" or "non-career"
members of the country's Foreign Service.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner’s service as Philippine
diplomats was under the circumstances, at the pleasure of the
president, terminable without cause or need of investigation.
RULING & MAIN POINT (IN BOLD): YES. The Civil Service Law,
Presidential Decree No. 807, classifies employment in
Government into "career" and "non-career service." By these
statutory standards, it seems plain that all three (3) petitioners:
Isabelo J. Astraquillo, Alunan C. Glang, and Alejandro Melchor,
Jr., pertained to the Non-Career Service. Their appointments
to the Foreign Service were made on "bases other than those
of the usual test of merit and fitness utilized for the career
service;" their entrance was not 'based on merit and fitness
determined by competitive examinations, or based on highly
technical qualifications." This being so, their "tenure was
coterminous with that of the appointing authority or subject
to his pleasures.” The termination of their connection with the
Foreign Service was not dependent on proof of some legally
recognized cause therefor, after due notice and hearing — as in
the case of career officers and employees — but lay entirely
within the will of the President, in the exercise of her
discretion, and her determination of the wisdom, necessity or
convenience of such a step in the national interest, actually a
political decision.
AREEJ
CASE NO. 45
ART IX-C (CSC) SEC 2: SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM
PARA 2. NON-COMPETITIVE
Office of the President v. Buenaobra
FACTS: The Office of the Ombudsman's Special Prosecution
Officer filed an information against respondent Buenaobra,
Chairman of the Komisyon sa Wikang Pilipino (KWP), with the
Sandiganbayan for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 (anti-
graft and corrupt practices act) for causing undue injury to the
government through gross inexcusable negligence in
connection with the unauthorized reprinting of the
Diksyunaryo ng Wikang Pilipino. Pending reinvestigation, the
Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) conducted a parallel
administrative investigation charging respondent with causing
undue injury to the government and giving unwarranted
benefits to Merylvin Publishing House, Inc., through gross
inexcusable negligence in not taking legal action to collect the
15% royalty fee of P3,366,250.00 approved by the KWF Board
to be levied against the publisher for its unauthorized
reprinting and selling of the dictionary. Respondent moved to
dismiss the administrative case on grounds of litis
pendentia and forum shopping in view of the pending
Sandiganbayan case, which was denied by PAGC, who
recommended respondent's dismissal from the service which
the petitioner subsequently adopted. The case was later
elevated to the SC which denied petitioner’s subsequent
motion for reconsideration. Hence, the instant petition where
the petitioner argues that respondent was a presidential
appointee and a holder of a non-career service position.
Hence, she could be removed from the service at the pleasure
of the President.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent was a presidential
appointee and a holder of a non-career service position, hence,
she could be removed from the service at the pleasure of the
President.
RULING & MAIN POINT (IN BOLD): NO. Respondent who is the
Chairman of the KWP is a non-career service personnel whose
tenure is limited to seven years as provided under R.A. No.
7104 (an act creating the Commission on the Filipino
language). Section 4, Article IV, of Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 807, or the Civil Service Decree, describes “non-career
service personnel” as one whose “tenure which is limited to a
period specified by law”. Since respondent’s tenure is fixed by
law, her removal from office is not at the pleasure of the
appointing authority. It was consistently ruled that non-career
service personnel enjoy security of tenure. They may not be
removed without just cause and non-observance of due
process. An employee who belongs to the non-career service
is protected from removal or suspension without just cause
and non-observance.
AREEJ
CASE NO. 46
ART IX-C (CSC) SEC 2: SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM
PARA 2. PRIMARILY CONFIDENTIAL
Borres v. CA
FACTS: Private respondents German Lumapac and Bartolome
Elizondo were appointed by then Mayor Cuision as Senior
Security and Security Guard respectively, in the Office of the
Vice-Mayor. In the 1967 local elections, it was Sergio Osmena
Jr., and petitioner Eulogio Borres who won as Mayor and Vice-
mayor, respectively, of Cebu City. Upon assuming office,
petitioner Borres terminated the services of private
respondents “due to lack of confidence”. Private respondents
contends that their removal be declared null and void. RTC and
CA ruled in favor of private respondents. It was ruled that an
employee or official in the Civil Service who is holding a
position with a permanent status is within the protection of
Section 4, Article IX of the old Constitution which provides that
no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed
except for cause as provided by law. In the present petition,
petitioners interpose that CA erred in finding the appointments
of the private respondents as permanent and in declaring that
they were illegally dismissed.
ISSUE: Whether or not private respondents may be dismissed,
without cause or hearing, on the mere ground of lack of
confidence.
RULING & MAIN POINT (IN BOLD): YES. There are two (2)
instances when a position may be considered primarily
confidential: (1) when the President, upon recommendation
of the Commissioner of Civil Service, has declared the position
to be primarily confidential; or (2) in the absence of such
declaration, when by the nature of the functions of the office,
there exists close intimacy between the appointee and the
appointing power, which insures freedom of intercourse
without embarrassment or freedom from misgiving of
betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of
state. However, upon the enactment of the 1959 Civil Service
Act (RA 2260), it is the nature of the position which finally
determines whether a position is primarily confidential.
Executive pronouncements can be no more
than initial determinations that are not conclusive in case of
conflict. In the instant case, the positions of Senior Security and
Security Guard in the Office of the Vice-Mayor of Cebu City, are
primarily confidential in nature because of the duties and
functions attached to said positions. The tenure of personnel
holding primarily confidential positions, such as the
respondents, ends upon loss of confidence, because their
term of office lasts only as long as confidence in them
endures, thus, their cessation involves no removal.
ANGELO
Case No. 47
ART IX-B CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION SEC 2: SCOPE OF THE
SYSTEM
PAR 2: PRIMARILY CONFIDENTIAL
Griño v Civil Service Commission
FACTS: On February 2, 1988, petitioner Simplicio Griño
assumed office as the newly elected governor of Iloilo. One
month later, he informed respondent Arandela and all the legal
officers at the Provincial Attorney’s Office about his decision to
terminate their services. In his letter, petitioner made mention
of an article pertaining to the Iloilo office of the Provincial
Attorney which appeared in the Panay News and which
“undermined that trust and confidence” that he reposed on
them. Petitioner Demaisip was reappointed by Governor Griño
as the Provincial Attorney. The latter, on the other hand,
arranged the replacements of the other legal officers. On
March 15, 1988, petitioner Governor Griño formally
terminated the services of the respondents herein on the
ground of loss of trust and confidence. This action taken by
the governor was appealed by respondents to the Merit
Systems Protection Board of the Civil Service Commission. On
March 9, 1989, the Merit Systems Board issued an Order
declaring the respondents’ termination illegal and ordering
that they be immediately restored to their positions with back
salaries and other emoluments due them. This was appealed
by petitioner Griño to the Civil Service Commission.
ISSUE: Whether or not the position of a provincial attorney and
those of his legal subordinates are primarily confidential in
nature so that the services of those holding the said items can
be terminated upon loss of confidence.
RULING: YES. The Court find as an undeniable fact that the
position of a provincial attorney and those of his legal
subordinates are ‘primarily confidential.’ The phrase ‘primarily
confidential’ denotes not only confidence in the aptitude of
the appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close
intimacy which insures freedom of intercourse, without
embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of
personal trust on confidential matters of state.
ANGELO
Case No. 48
ART IX-B CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION SEC 2: SCOPE OF THE
SYSTEM
PAR 2: PRIMARILY CONFIDENTIAL
Santos v Macaraig
FACTS: Petitioner Rosalinda de Perio-Santos was appointed by
President Corazon C. Aquino, to the position of Permanent
Representative of the Philippines to the Philippine Mission to
the United Nations and other International Organizations with
station in Geneva, Switzerland. Petitioner sought a leave of
absence from the DFA to spend the Easter Holidays in New
York with her mother, brothers and sisters at no expense to the
Government. She bought two (2) non-transferable, non-
refundable discounted tickets costing SFr.1,597 for herself and
her adopted daughter Pia. Before they could leave Geneva,
petitioner received instructions from the home office directing
her to proceed to Havana for a Preparatory Conference. For
the official trip outside her station, she was entitled, under the
“Foreign Service Personnel Manual on Travel, Per Diems, and
Daily Allowance Abroad,” to SFr.2,996 for the cost of economy
roundtrip fare from Geneva-New York-Geneva portion of her
Geneva-New York-Havana-New York-Geneva trip. Instead of
buying an economy roundtrip ticket, she used for the Geneva-
New York-Geneva portion of her trip the two (2) discounted
tickets costing only SFr.1,597 for herself and her daughter Pia.
The DFA sent her a cable requesting clarification on “why
Mission paid for plane ticket of infant Pia de Perio-Santos
(petitioner’s daughter) when she was not authorized to
accompany her adoptive mother at government expense.” The
DFA required her to refund the amount representing her
daughter’s round-trip ticket.
President Aquino issued Administrative Order No. 122 finding
petitioner guilty of dishonesty instead of misconduct and
imposed upon her the penalty of reprimand, with recall to the
home office.
ISSUE: Whether or not the loss of confidence entails removal
or dismissal from office.
RULING: NO. The tenure of officials holding primarily
confidential positions ends upon loss of confidence, because
their term of office lasts only as long as confidence in them
endures. When that confidence is lost and the officer holding
the position is separated from the service, such cessation is
not removal from office but merely an expiration of his/her
term. As holder of a primarily confidential position,
petitioner’s foreign assignment was at the pleasure of the
President. The recall order terminating her tour of duty in
Geneva and returning her to the home office was merely a
change of post or transfer of location of work. Petitioner may
not justifiably assail the appointment of Narcisa Escaler as her
replacement in Geneva because the power to appoint is
essentially discretionary. The appointing power, the President,
has the right of choice which she may exercise freely, according
to her best lights
MAIN POINT: An incumbent of a primarily confidential position
holds office at the pleasure of the appointing power. When the
pleasure turns into displeasure, the incumbent is not removed
or dismissed from office—his term merely expires
ANGELO
Case No. 49
ART IX-B CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION SEC 2: SCOPE OF THE
SYSTEM
PAR 2: PRIMARILY CONFIDENTIAL
Hilario v Civil Service Commission
FACTS: Respondent Vice Mayor Charito L. Planas of Quezon
City filed a complaint with the CSC against petitioner and a
certain Jose L. Pecson praying that respondents be found
administratively liable for usurpation, grave misconduct, being
notoriously undesirable, gross insubordination, and conduct
grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The CSC
issued Resolution No. 93-4067, the dispositive portion of which
states the Commission resolves to hold in abeyance any
administrative disciplinary action against Atty. Nescito C.
Hilario. However, Atty. Hilario should not be allowed to
continue holding the position of the Legal Officer (City
Attorney) of Quezon City. The Commission hereby orders the
Cashier of the Quezon City government to stop payment of
salaries to Atty. Hilario, otherwise the former shall be
personally liable for its refund. Petitioner alleges that when he
was appointed City Attorney, the applicable law governing his
appointment was Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 and, therefore, his
position should not be considered confidential. He argues that
although the said position was considered confidential under
Republic Act No. 5185, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 impliedly
repealed the confidential nature of the position when it
expanded the duties of City Attorney.
ISSUE: Whether or not BP 337 impliedly repealed the
confidential nature of a city attorney when it expanded its
duties.
RULING: NO. An examination of the provisions of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 337 reveals no intention by the legislature to
remove the confidential nature of the position of city legal
officer. What it does, is to merely specify the various
qualifications, powers and duties of a city legal officer which
were not enumerated under Republic Act No. 5185. By virtue
of Republic Act No. 5185, both the provincial attorney and city
legal officer serve as the legal adviser and legal officer for the
civil cases of the province and the city that they work for. Their
services are precisely categorized by law to be ‘trusted
services’
ANGELO
Case No. 50
ART IX-B CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION SEC 2: SCOPE OF THE
SYSTEM
PAR 2: PRIMARILY CONFIDENTIAL
Rosete v CA
FACTS: Respondent Richard Gordon, then Olongapo City
Mayor, filed a formal charge against petitioner for grave
misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best interests of service,
dishonesty, grave abuse of authority, violation of Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, neglect of duty and gross
negligence. Invoking Sec. 40 of P.D. No. 807, the Mayor, found
petitioner guilty as charged and summarily dismissed him for
being “notoriously undesirable.” Petitioner questioned his
dismissal for being allegedly made without due process.
However, the case was overtaken by the Edsa Revolution of
February 1986 which saw respondent Mayor ousted from
office following a revamp of the entire government. In a
Memorandum, Atty. Teddy C. Macapagal, Olongapo OIC
Mayor vice Gordon, reversed the summary dismissal of
petitioner and ordered him to resume the performance of his
duties as Chief of Hospital. Macapagal was succeeded by Mr.
Ildefonso Arriola as OIC of Olongapo City. Arriola forthwith
issued a directive to the petitioner to cease and desist from
further executing the duties and functions of Chief of Hospital.
ISSUE: Whether or not a government official that had been
illegally dismissed, and his reinstatement had later been
ordered, is considered as not having left his office.
RULING: YES. Petitioner’s dismissal prior to 1988 could not be
invoked to justify his second dismissal. First, respondent
Mayor’s successor in office after the EDSA Revolution, OIC
Macapagal, reversed the first dismissal and manifested before
us that the charges against petitioner were unworthy of
credence. Petitioner resumed all the duties and responsibilities
of the said office, as well as the rights and privileges pertaining
thereto. The Court dismissed the first petition for being moot
and academic. For all legal intents and purposes therefore,
the first summary dismissal had no legal force and effect:
petitioner’s tenure of office was never interrupted by
respondent Mayor’s first order of dismissal.
MAIN POINT: When a government official or employee in the
classified civil service had been illegally suspended or illegally
dismissed, and his reinstatement had later been ordered, for all
legal purposes he is considered as not having left his office, so
that he is entitled to all the rights and privileges that accrue to
him by virtue of the office that he held.
ANGELO
Case No. 51
ART IX-B CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION SEC 2: SCOPE OF THE
SYSTEM
PAR 2: PRIMARILY CONFIDENTIAL
Civil Service Commission v Salas
FACTS: Respondent Salas was appointed by the PAGCOR
Chairman as Internal Security Staff member and assigned to
the casino at the Manila Pavilion Hotel. However, his
employment was terminated by the Board of Directors of
PAGCOR, allegedly for loss of confidence. The summary of
intelligence information claimed that respondent was allegedly
engaged in proxy betting as detailed in the affidavits
purportedly executed by two customers of PAGCOR who
claimed that they were used as gunners on different occasions
by respondent. He appealed to the Merit Systems Protection
Board (MSPB) which denied the appeal on the ground that, as a
confidential employee, respondent was not dismissed from
the service but his term of office merely expired. On appeal,
the CSC issued Resolution No. 92-1283 which affirmed the
decision of the MSPB. Respondent Salas initially went to this
Court on a petition for certiorari assailing the propriety of the
questioned CSC resolution. However, the case was referred to
the CA. The CA rendered its questioned decision with the
finding that herein respondent Salas is not a confidential
employee, hence he may not be dismissed on the ground of
loss of confidence. In so ruling, the appellate court applied the
“proximity rule”
According to petitioners, respondent Salas was not dismissed
from the service but, instead, his term of office had expired.
They additionally contend that the Court of Appeals erred in
applying the “proximity rule” because even if Salas occupied
one of the lowest rungs in the organizational ladder of
PAGCOR, he performed the functions of one of the most
sensitive positions in the corporation. On the other hand,
respondent Salas argues that it is the actual nature of an
employee’s functions, and not his designation or title, which
determines whether or not a position is primarily confidential.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Salas is a confidential
employee.
RULING: NO. Prior to the passage of the aforestated Civil
Service Act of 1959, there were two recognized instances when
a position may be considered primarily confidential: Firstly,
when the President, upon recommendation of the
Commissioner of Civil Service, has declared the position to be
primarily confidential; and, secondly, in the absence of such
declaration, when by the nature of the functions of the office
there exists “close intimacy” between the appointee and
appointing power which insures freedom of intercourse
without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of
betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state.
Although appointed by the Chairman, ISS members do not
directly report to the Office of the Chairman in the
performance of their official duties. An ISS member is subject
to the control and supervision of an Area Supervisor who, in
turn, only implements the directives of the Branch Chief
Security Officer. The latter is himself answerable to the
Chairman and the Board of Directors. Obviously, as the lowest
in the chain of command, private respondent does not enjoy
that “primarily close intimacy” which characterizes a
confidential employee
MAIN POINT: It may be said that honesty and integrity are
primary considerations in his appointment as a member of the
ISS, his position does not involve “such close intimacy”
between him and the appointing authority, that is, the
Chairman of PAGCOR, as would insure “freedom from
misgivings of betrayals of personal trust.”
Ayeh CASE NO. 52
ART. IX-B (CSC) SEC 2: SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM
PAR. 2: CLASSIFICATION AND APPOINTMENTS
NON-COMPETITIVE - PRIMARILY CONFIDENTIAL
Acahaso v. Macaraig
FACTS: Tomas D. Achacoso was appointed Administrator of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration. In compliance
with a request addressed by the President of the Philippines to
"all Department Heads, Undersecretaries, Assistant Secretaries,
Bureau Heads," and other government officials, he filed a
courtesy resignation which was accepted by the President.
Secretary of Labor requested him to turn over his office to the
Deputy Administrator as officer in-charge. He protested his
replacement and declared he was not surrendering his office
because his resignation was not voluntary but filed only in
obedience to the President's directive.
Acahacoso contends that he is a member of the Career Service
of the Civil Service and so enjoys security of tenure. Claiming to
have the rank of undersecretary, he says he comes under
Article IV, Section 5 of P.D. 807, otherwise known as the Civil
Service Decree which includes Career Service Executives.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner who is a member of the
Career Service of the Civil Service is accorded security of
tenure.
RULING: No. The appointment extended to him cannot be
regarded as permanent even if it may be so designated
therefore not covered by the security of tenure protection. The
purpose of an acting or temporary appointment is to prevent a
hiatus in the discharge of official functions by authorizing a
person to discharge the same pending the selection of a
permanent or another appointee.4 The person named in an
acting capacity accepts the position under the condition that
he shall surrender the office once he is called upon to do so by
the appointing authority.
MAINPOINT: The mere fact that a position belongs to the
Career Service does not automatically confer security of tenure
on its occupant even if he does not possess the required
qualifications. Such right must depend on the nature of his
appointment, which in turn depends on his eligibility or lack of
it. In these circumstances, the acting appointee is separated by
a method of terminating official relations known in the law of
public officers as expiration of the term. His term is understood
at the outset as without any fixity and enduring at the pleasure
of the appointing authority making the nature of the position
primarily confidential.
Ayeh CASE NO. 53
ART. IX-B (CSC) SEC 2: SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM
PAR. 2: CLASSIFICATION AND APPOINTMENTS
NON-COMPETITIVE - PRIMARILY CONFIDENTIAL
Felix v. Buenaseda
FACTS: Petitioner Dr. Alfredo B. Felix passed the Physician's
Licensure Examinations and joined the National Center for
Mental Health (NCMH) as a Resident Physician. He got
promoted to the position of Medical Specialist I (Temporary
Status). Then DOH issued Department Order No. 347 which
required board certification as a prerequisite for renewal of
specialist positions in various medical centers, hospitals and
agencies of the said department. After reviewing petitioner's
service record and performance, the Medical Credentials
Committee of the NCMH recommended non-renewal of his
appointment as Medical Specialist I.
Petitioner assails his dismissal as Medical Specialist I of the
NCMH contending that he has security of tenure. He filed a
petition with the Merit System Protection Board who later
dismissed the case for lack of merit. Such decision was
appealed to the CSC who then affirmed the decision of MSPB.
Hence, this petition to the Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the right of the petitioner to the
constitutional provision on security of tenure was violated by
his removal.
RULING: NO. No security of tenure was violated as a residency
or resident physician position in a medical specialty is never a
permanent one. Residency connotes training and temporary
status.
MAINPOINT: Every appointment implies confidence. The
nature of the contracts of resident physicians meet traditional
tests for determining employer-employee relationships, but
because the focus of residency is training, they are neither here
nor there, and primarily confidential denotes not only
confidence in aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the
office but primarily close intimacy between employee and the
employer.
Ayeh CASE NO. 54
ART. IX-B (CSC) SEC 2: SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM
PAR. 2: CLASSIFICATION AND APPOINTMENTS
NON-COMPETITIVE - PRIMARILY CONFIDENTIAL
Pamantasan ng Maynila v. CSC
FACTS: This petition stemmed from a complaint for illegal
dismissal and unfair labor practice filed with public respondent
Civil Service Commission (CSC) by private respondents, through
Pamantasan Ng Lungsod Ng Maynila Faculty Organization
(PLMFO), against petitioner Pamantasan Ng Lungsod Ng
Maynila (PLM) and its officers. Private respondents through
PLMFO, alleged in its complaint that their actions and
determination to see changes in the management of PLM
angered PLM which prompted its decision to terminate the
services of the complainants.
ISSUE: Whether or not PLM illegally dismissed the private
respondents to stop its involvement in in the organization and
its attempts to raise issues in the institution.
RULING: YES. There is sufficient evidence to show that the
management of PLM is not particularly enthusiastic about
faculty participation in the formulation of policies concerning
the University and the Faculty itself, as shown from the very
nature of most the complaints of the faculty against the
administration and the response/reaction of the management
to earlier attempts by the faculty to bring about changes. The
facts on record show that management did not respond to any
of the faculty issues.
Had complainants not been among those active officers and/or
members of the PLMFO, and had their qualifications, training,
experience and performance rating not been impressive, the
Commission would have agreed that the termination or non-
renewal of the contracts of complainants does not constitute
unfair labor practice. But the records reveal otherwise. Hence,
there is indeed no reason for PLM Management to terminate
the services of these employees except to bust their
organization. The Commission finds no reason to disagree with
the findings of facts by the PSLMC that PLM Management
committed an unfair labor practice.
MAINPOINT: Paragraph 5, Section 2 of Art. IX-B mandates
that the right to self-organization shall not be denied to gov’t
employees. This constitutional right of employees is superior
to the right of management not to renew the temporary
appointment of its employees. When the exercise of
discretion by the management is calculated to bust the union
as what PLM Management had done, the Commission has no
choice but to declare it as a grave abuse of discretion. (this
isn’t under the non-competitive positions but still under the
par. 2 of Sec. 2 of the article)
Ayeh CASE NO. 55
ART. IX-B (CSC) SEC 2: SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM
PAR. 2: CLASSIFICATION AND APPOINTMENTS
NON-COMPETITIVE - PRIMARILY CONFIDENTIAL
Province of Camarines Sur v. CA
FACTS: Private respondent Tito Dato was a temporary
employee of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Camarines Sur.
Later on, Governor Alfelor approved the change in Dato's
employment status from temporary to permanent upon the
latter's representation that he passed the civil service
examination for supervising security guards. Said change of
status however, was not favorably acted upon by the Civil
Service Commission (CSC) reasoning that Tito Dato did not
possess the necessary civil service eligibility for the office he
was appointed to. His appointment therefore remained
temporary to which it reversed 2 years later making Dato now
a permanent employee.
ISSUE: Whether or not Tito Dado is now having a status of a
permanent employee.
RULING: NO. passing the civil service exam does not ipso facto
convert a temporary appointment into a permanent one. In
cases, such as in the case at bar, what is required is a new
appointment and not a continuation of the temporary
appointment. Furthermore, the CSC does not have the power
to make the appointment itself or to direct the appointing
authority to change the employment status of the employee—
it can only inquire into the eligibility of the person chosen to fill
a position.
MAINPOINT: Lack of civil service eligibility makes an
appointment temporary without a fixed and definite term and
dependent entirely upon the pleasure of the appointing power.
Appointments are always made with confidence and in non-
competitive positions, merit and fitness is highly required.
Primarily confidential positions denotes aptitude of the
appointee for the duties of the office.
Ayeh CASE NO. 56
ART. IX-B (CSC) SEC 2: SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM
PAR. 2: CLASSIFICATION AND APPOINTMENTS
NON-COMPETITIVE - PRIMARILY CONFIDENTIAL
PEZA v. Mercado
FACTS: Respondent was appointed as Group Manager for
Policy and Planning of PEZA on September 16, 1998. Her
appointment was temporary in nature but was promoted to
the position of Deputy Director General for Policy and Planning.
Her appointment indicated the same as on permanent basis,
but with the following annotation: NO SECURITY OF TENURE
UNLESS HE/SHE OBTAINS CESO OR CSEE ELIGIBILITY. On June
2000, respondent was advised of the termination of her
appointment effective on the closing hours of the day.
Respondent filed for a case and alleged in her complaint that
her degree in Master in National Security Administration
(MNSA) automatically conferred upon her Career Executive
Service (CES) eligibility; that Republic Act No. R.A. 8748 (PEZA
Charter), did away with the CES eligibility requirement for the
position of Deputy Director General; and that the termination
of her appointment was actuated with bad faith to entitle her
to moral and exemplary damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner should’ve been accorded
permanent appointment after having her degree in Master in
National Security Administration which automatically conferred
her CES eligibility under the PEZA Charter.
RULING: NO. Firstly, not being a CES eligible, she had no
security of tenure, hence, the termination by the PEZA Board
on June 2000 of her appointment, as well as the appointment
in her stead of CES eligible by another were not illegal.
Respondents subsequent passing on December 2000 of the
CES examinations did not retroact to consider her a CESO at
the time her appointment was terminated on June 2000.
MAINPOINT: The mere fact that a position belongs to the
Career Service does not automatically confer security of tenure
on its occupant especially if he does not possess the required
qualifications. Furthermore, appointment to a CES rank is
made by the President upon the Board’s recommendation as
classified under non-competitive position under the Civil
Service Act of 1959. As every appointment requires
confidence, the position having the nature of non-permanence
gives the appointing authority to exercise his discretion on the
tenure of the appointee.
RAIZA
CASE NO. 57
ART IX-B SEC 2: SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM
NON-COMPETITIVE (Primarily Confidential)
Civil Service Commission vs. Court of Appeals
FACTS: This is a consolidated case seeking reconsideration of
CSCFO-OP’s disapproval on the temporary appointment of
Ortega and Sarsonas as Assistant Department II of the
Planning and Production Department and Internal Audit
Department (IAD), respectively, by the PCSO Board of
Directors. The CSC Field Office-Office of the President
disapproved the temporary appointment of Ortega and
Sarsonas on the ground of failure to meet the eligibility
requirement for the position. CSCFO-OP certified that there
were qualified individuals who signified their interest and
further reasoned out that there were other qualified third-level
eligibles working in PCSO who were willing and available to be
appointed to the subject position. PCSO appealed to the CSC
contending that Section 7(3), Title I, Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987 provides an exclusive
enumeration of the specific positions covered by the Career
Executive Service (CES), all of whom are appointed by the
President and are required to have Career Service Executive
(CSE) eligibility.
ISSUE: Whether or not the position of Assistant Department
Manager II falls
under the Career Executive Service and requires third level
eligibility pursuant to the Civil Service Law, rules and
regulations.
RULING: NO. The Court is of the position that the CES covers
presidential appointees only. Corollarily, as the position of
Assistant Department Manager II does not require
appointment by the President of the Philippines, it does not fall
under the CES. Therefore, the temporary appointments of
Sarsonas and Ortega as Assistant Department Manager II do
not require third level eligibility pursuant to the Civil Service
Law, rules and regulations.
MAIN POINT: In order for a position to be covered by the CES,
two elements must concur. First, the position must either be
(1) a position enumerated under Book V, Title I, Subsection A,
Chapter 2, Section 7(3) of the Administrative Code of 1987, i.e.
Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant
Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director,
Chief of Department Service, or (2) a position of equal rank as
those enumerated, and identified by the Career Executive
Service Board to be such position of equal rank. Second, the
holder of the position must be a presidential appointee.
Failing in any of these requirements, a position cannot be
considered as one covered by the third-level or CES.
RAIZA
CASE NO. 58
ART IX-B SEC 2: SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM
PERMANENT
Luego vs. CSC
FACTS: The petitioner was appointed Administrative Officer II,
Office of the City Mayor, Cebu City, by Mayor Florentino Solon.
The appointment was described as “permanent” but the Civil
Service Commission approved it as “temporary,” subject to the
final action taken in the protest filed by the private respondent
and another employee. The Civil Service Commission found the
private respondent better qualified than the petitioner for the
contested position and, appointed Felicula Tuozo be appointed
as Administrative Officer II in the Administrative Division, in
place of Felimon Luego whose appointment as Administrative
Officer II was revoked. The petitioner, invoking his earlier
permanent appointment, questioned the order.
ISSUE: W/N the Civil Service Commission is authorized to
disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that
another person is better qualified than the appointee and, on
the basis of this finding, order his replacement by the latter
RULING: No. The SC ruled that the Civil Service Commission is
not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the
appointment extended by the appointing officer, its authority
being limited to approving or reviewing the appointment in the
light of the requirements of the Civil Service Law. When the
appointee is qualified and all the other legal requirements are
satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to attest to the
appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Laws. The
appointing authority has discretion who to appoint even in the
career service of the Civil Service, where the appointee
possesses the minimum qualification requirements prescribed
by law for the position.
MAIN POINT: A permanent appointment is protected by the
Constitution. The appointment of the petitioner was not
temporary but permanent and was therefore protected by
Constitution. The appointing authority indicated that it was
permanent, as he had the right to do so, and it was not for the
respondent Civil Service Commission to reverse him and call it
temporary.
Raiza
CASE NO. 59
ART IX-B SEC 2: SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM
PERMANENT
Pangilinan vs. Maglaya
FACTS: Teodoro B. Pangilinan was appointed as agent in the
National Bureau of Investigation, a position for which he had
the appropriate civil service eligibility. He had risen to
Supervising Agent when he resigned to accept appointment as
Executive Director of the Land Transportation Office. He was
detailed to the Manila International Airport Authority, where
he served as Assistant General Manager in charge of finance
and administrative and also of security and general services.
Upon his return to the LTO, he was designated as Resident
Ombudsman in addition to his regular duties where he
discovered the irregularities in the purchase of motor vehicle
license plates. He says he brought this matter to the attention
of Asst. Secretary Manuel Sabalza of the Department of
Transportation and Communications and later of Secretary
Pete Prado. Neither of them took any action. Then he called a
press conference to expose what the media later described as
“the license plate mess.” The following day, he was relieved as
Exec. Dir. and was replaced with Maglaya. In this petition,
Pangilinan prays for reinstatement on the ground that no
charge has been filed or proved against him to justify his
removal, citing different jurisprudence in which the security of
tenure of the dismissed employees was upheld.
ISSUE: W/N the appointment of the petitioner as the Executive
Director of the LTO is permanent and thus covered by the
security of tenure
RULING: No. Pangilinan was only an acting appointee because
he did not have the requisite qualifications; as such, he could
not claim security of tenure. This Court has repeatedly held
that this guaranty is available only to permanent appointees.
The fact that Pangilinan was qualified for his initial
appointment as agent in the NBI does not mean he was
qualified for all other positions he might later occupy in the
civil service. The law does not prescribe uniform qualifications
for all public positions regardless of nature or degree.
MAIN POINT: A permanent appointment shall be issued to a
person who meets all the requirements for the position to
which he is being appointed, including the appropriate
eligibility prescribed, in accordance with the provisions of law,
rules and standards promulgated in pursuance thereof.
Raiza
CASE NO. 60
ART IX-B SEC 2: SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM
REORGANIZATION
Santiago vs SCS
FACTS: Santiago was appointed by Commissioner Tanada from
Collector of Customs I to Collector of Customs III. Jose petitions
that he should be the next in rank because he was Collector of
Customs II. Respondent Commission ruled that although both
SANTIAGO and JOSE are qualified for the position of Customs
Collector III, respondent JOSE has far better qualifications. It
added that the Commission is empowered to administer and
enforce the merit system as mandated by the 1973 and 1987
Constitutions and to approve all appointments,
whether original or promotional, to positions in the civil
service, subject to specified exceptions, pursuant to paragraphs
(a) and (h), Section 9 of the Civil Service Law.
ISSUE: W/N Commission is empowered to administer and
enforce the merit system as mandated by the 1973 and 1987
Constitutions and to approve all appointments, whether
original or promotional, to positions in the civil service
RULING: YES, the SC held that the Commission is empowered
to approve all appointments, whether original or promotional,
to positions in the civil service and disapprove those where the
appointees do not possess the appropriate eligibility or
required qualification. HOWEVER, consistent with the ruling in
Luego vs. CSC, “all the commission is actually allowed to do is
check whether or not the appointee possesses the appropriate
civil service eligibility or the required qualifications. If he does,
his appointment is approved; if not, it is disapproved. No other
criterion is permitted by law to be employed by the Commission
when it acts on, or as the decree says, “approves” or
“disapproves” an appointment made by the proper authorities.
x x x To be sure, it has no authority to revoke the said
appointment simply because it believed that the private
respondent was better qualified for that would have
constituted an encroachment on the discretion vested solely
(in the appointing authority).”
MAIN POINT: Commission has no authority to revoke the said
appointment simply because it believed that the private
respondent was better qualified for that would have
constituted an encroachment on the discretion vested solely
(in the appointing authority)
Raiza
CASE NO. 60
ART IX-B SEC 2: SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM
REORGANIZATION
Montecillo vs SCS
FACTS: During the modification of the personnel structure of
the Metropolitan Cebu Water District (MCWD) to conform with
position descriptions and corresponding salary grades in the
civil service, three of its employees, the petitioners, applied for
promotional appointment to the position of “Private
Secretary”. At the time of their application, petitioners had
been occupying the position of “Department Secretary” and
were employed in the MCWD for six to seven years. When
their appointments were forwarded to the Civil Service
Commission Field Office, the latter refused to approve their
appointments as “permanent” on the ground that the position
applied for was a “primarily confidential” and “co-terminous”
position. The CSC then issued Resolution No. 972512 based on
the CSC Memorandum Circular No. 22, Series of 1991 which
classified the Private Secretary position as primarily
confidential in nature. Petitioners contend that respondent
abused its power to promulgate rules and regulations by
issuing the challenged circular, because the grant of rule-
making power to respondent did not authorize it to amend the
law by adding to the statutory enumeration. Petitioners
conclude that since said memorandum circular was issued in
excess of the powers granted to respondent, it is null and void
and consequently, the assailed CSC resolution has no leg to
stand on.
ISSUE: W/N the CSC has gravely abused its discretion in issuing
the Memorandum Circular
RULING: No. The Supreme Court held that under the
Administrative Code of 1987, the Civil Service Commission is
expressly empowered to declare positions in the Civil Service as
primarily confidential. This signifies that the enumeration in the
Civil Service decree, is not an exclusive list. The Commission
can supplement this enumeration, as it did when it issued
Memorandum Circular No. 22, s. 1991, specifying positions in
the Civil Service which are considered primarily confidential
and, therefore, their occupants hold tenure co-terminus with
the officials they serve.

MAIN POINT: CSC was expressly empowered to declare
positions in the Civil Service as may properly be classified as
primarily confidential under Section 12, Chapter 3, Book V of
the Administrative Code of 1987.
Who digested: COELI
Case no. 62
Article IX, COMELEC, Sec. 2, REORGANIZATION
Rudigario C. Gatmaitan v. Dr. Ricardo B. Gonzales| 492 SCRA
591
FACTS:
Petitioner Rudigario C. Gatmaitan avers that his reassignment
to Operating Room-Delivery Room (OR-DR) Complex changed
his duties which violated his constitutional rights to property
protection, security of job tenure and the demotion while
there might had been no demotion in his salaries, it could not
be denied that there was a demotion in his status pointing to a
clear case of illegal reassignment which constitute grave
misconduct or conduct unbecoming of an officer.
Citing several cases, petitioner insists that his demotion is
tantamount to a constructive dismissal and it is only just and
proper that he be given reparation by reinstating him to his
previous position as Head of the Hospital Housekeeping Unit.
ISSUE: Whether or not the reassignment from the lobby to the
OR-DR ordered by respondent was valid.
RULING: YES. There was no demotion involved in the transfer
of petitioners workstation since what transpired was merely a
reassignment brought about by the exigencies of the service.
The law is clear on this point – a demotion would entail the
issuance of another appointment that would have given
petitioner diminution in duties, responsibilities, status or rank –
yet no appointment to this effect was ever issued.
MAIN POINT: An employee may be re-assigned from one
organizational unit to another in the same agency, provided,
that such re-assignment shall not involve a reduction in rank,
status and salary; and does not require the issuance of an
appointment.
Reassignment is defined as the movement of an employee
from one organizational unit in the same department or agency
which does not involve a reduction in rank, status, or salary
and does not require the issuance of an appointment.
Demotion is a movement from one position to another
involving the issuance of an appointment with diminution in
duties, responsibilities, status or rank which may or may not
involve reduction in salary.
Who digested: COELI
Case no. 63
Article IX, COMELEC, Sec. 2, REORGANIZATION
RUSSEL ULYSSES I. NIEVES v. JOCELYN LB. BLANCO | G.R. No.
190422, 19
FACTS: Russel Ulysses I. Nieves is a Trade and Industry
Development Specialist of the Department of Trade and
Industry (DTI). Nieves was formerly assigned to the DTI-
Sorsogon but was reassigned by to DTI-Albay. A year after his
reassignment to DTI-Albay, Nieves requested DTI Regional
Director Jocelyn Blanco for his reassignment back to DTI-
Sorsogon but this was denied. Nieves appealed his
reassignment to the CSC asserting he is a station-specific
employee and is allowed only to be reassigned for a maximum
period of one year. CSC however pointed out that Nieves’
appointment is not station-specific but this does not mean that
Nieves could be reassigned to DTI-Albay indefinitely. The CSC
ruled that under the Revised Rules on Reassignment, a
reassignment outside the geographical location, if without the
consent of the employee concerned should not exceed the
maximum period of one year.
ISSUE: Whether or not the reassignment of Nieves is station-
specific and subject to the one-year period limitation.
RULING: No, Nieves’ appointment is not station-specific. Thus,
the period of his reassignment to DTI-Albay is indefinite, unless
otherwise revoked or recalled by the Head of the Agency, the
CSC or a competent court. Further, since the reassignment of
Nieves was within the same regional office, i.e. from DTI-
Sorsogon to DTI-Albay, the one-year period limitation does not
apply.
MAIN POINT: The reassignment of an employee with a station-
specific place of work indicated in their respective
appointments is allowed provided that it would not exceed a
maximum period of one year. On the other hand, the
reassignment of an employee whose appointment is not
station-specific has no definite period unless otherwise
revoked or recalled by the Head of the Agency, the CSC or a
competent court.
Who digested: COELI
Case no. 64
Article IX, COMELEC, Sec. 2, APPOINTMENT VS. DESIGNATION
BINAMIRA V. GARUCHO
FACTS: A memorandum designating Ramon Binamira as
General Manager of Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) was
addressed and signed by the then Minister of Tourism and the
Ex-officio Chairman of PTA. The Minister sought the approval of
the delegation to the president and was granted. Since then
Binamira discharged duties as the PTA general manager and ex-
officio vice chairman. Peter Garrucho, as the newly appointed
secretary of tourism demanded for Binamira's resignation as he
was not appointed by the president. When Binamira was
ousted, Garrucho took over his place as general manager.
Binamira filed a petition for quo warranto to question
Garrucho's post and prayed for reinstatement claiming unjust
dismissal.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Binamira acquired the
position by appointment and shall be entitled to security of
tenure.
RULING: NO. Petitioner Binamira never acquired a valid title to
the disputed position so he has no right to be reinstated; he
shall hold the office only in a temporary capacity and may be
replaced at will by the appointing authority. In this sense, the
designation is considered only an acting or temporary
appointment, which does not confer security of tenure on the
person named.
MAIN POINT: Where the person is merely designated and not
appointed, the implication is that he shall hold the office only
in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the
appointing authority.
Appointment is defined as the selection, by the authority
vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the
functions of a given office. When completed, the appointment
results in security of tenure.
It is said that appointment is essentially executive.
Designation connotes merely the imposition by law of
additional duties on an incumbent official and is legislative in
nature.
Who digested: COELI
Case no. 65
Article IX, COMELEC, Sec. 2, LOSS CONFIDENCE
HERNANDEZ V. VILLEGAS
FACTS: Epifanio Villegas, a lawyer and civil service eligible, was
appointed Director for Security of the Bureau of Customs. He
was sent to the United States to study enforcement techniques
and customs practices under the technical assistance program
of the National Economic Council and the International
Cooperation Administration. Villegas returned to the
Philippines. Thereafter, he was temporarily detailed to the
Arrastre Service and, in his stead, James Keefe was designated
Acting Director for Security. Keefe was promoted to the
position of Director for Security and Villegas was demoted to
the rank of Arrastre Superintendent. Villegas filed this action
for quo warranto in the Court of First Instance of Manila,
denied by both the CFI and Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: Whether or not Villegas' termination of official relation
was without cause and illegal.
RULING: NO, officers occupying primarily confidential positions
may not be removed or suspended without cause. The
termination of their official relation can be justified on the
ground of loss of confidence because in that case their
cessation from office involves no removal but merely the
expiration of the term of office. But the point is that as long as
confidence in them endures — and it has been shown that it
has been lost in this case — the incumbent is entitled to
continue in office.
MAIN POINT: It is to be understood of course that officials and
employees holding primarily confidential positions continue
only for so long as confidence in them endures.
Who digested: COELI
Case no. 66
Article IX, COMELEC, Sec. 2, ABOLITION OF OFFICE
BRIONES V. OSMEÑA
FACTS:
Petitioners have served in the office of the Mayor of Cebu,
since Commonwealth days, before the war. Petitioner
Concepcion G. Briones is a first grade civil service eligible,
appointed Clerk-Stenographer in the Office of the City
Treasurer of Cebu and she was transferred to the Office of the
City Mayor with permanent status. Petitioner Faustino O.
Rosagaran, on the other hand, is a second grade civil service
eligible. He was employed in the Office of the City Mayor of
Cebu and promoted to Administrative Officer. Municipal Board
approved Ordinance No. 192, abolishing 32 positions in both
offices. Among the positions abolished in the Office of the City
Mayor were those occupied by petitioners. Petitioners filed the
instant petition for reinstatement, back salaries, moral
damages and attorney’s fees.
ISSUE: Whether or not the abolition of positions of the
petitioners was invalid.
RULING: YES. A decent respect for the Civil Service provisions
of our Constitution dictates that civil service eligibles, like
petitioners herein who have rendered long and honorable
service, should not be sacrificed in favor of non-eligibles given
positions of recent creation, nor should they be left at the
mercy of political changes.
MAIN POINT: No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall
be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law.
KARLY
CASE NO. 67
ART IX SEC 2, PAR. 2: APPOINTMENT V. DESIGNATION
2. ABOLISH OF OFFICE
EUGENIO V. CSC, 243 SCRA 196 (1995)
FACTS: Petitioner is the Deputy Director of the Philippine
Nuclear Research Institute. She applied for Career Executive
Service (CES) Eligibility and a CESO rank on August 2, 1993, she
was given a CES eligibility. On September 15, 1993, she was
recommended to the President for a CESO rank by the Career
Executive Service Board.
On October 1, 1993, respondent Civil Service
Commission passed Resolution No. 93-4359, which became an
impediment to the appointment of petitioner as Civil Service
Officer, Rank IV.
Finding herself bereft of further administrative relief as the
Career Executive Service Board which recommended her CESO
Rank IV has been abolished; petitioner filed the petition at
bench to annul, among others, resolution No. 93-4359. 
ISSUE: WON CSC given the authority to abolish the office of the
CESB
RULING: NO, the Career Executive Service Board was created in
PD No. 1 on September 1, 1974;  it cannot be disputed that as
the CESB was created by law, it can only be abolished by the
legislature. This follows an unbroken stream of rulings that the
creation and abolition of public offices is primarily a legislative
function. The essential autonomous character of the CESB is
not negated by its attachment to respondent Commission. By
said attachment, CESB was not made to fall within the control
of respondent Commission.
Main Point: As read together, the inescapable conclusion is
that respondent Commission’s power to reorganize is limited
to offices under its control as enumerated in Section 16.
CASE NO. 68
ART IX SEC 2, PAR. 2: APPOINTMENT V. DESIGNATION
3. REORGANIZATION
Romualdez-Yap v. CSC, 225 SCRA 285 (1993)
FACTS: Petitioner Conchita Romualdez-Yap started working
with the Philippine National Bank (PNB) on September 20,
1972. After several promotions, she was appointed in 1983 as a
Senior Vice President assigned to the Fund Transfer
Department. The case at bar is a special civil action for
certiorari assailing Res. No. 92-201 of the respondent which
upheld the petitioner’s separation from PNB in light of EO 80 or
the Revised Charter of PNB. Petitioner contends that there is
an existence of bad faith in its reorganization and that there is
an erroneous application of the one year prescriptive period
for quo warranto proceedings in her case.
ISSUE: Is the reorganization of PNB, a government-owned or
controlled corporation performing ministrant functions, valid?
RULING: YES, Ministrant functions are those undertaken by
way of advancing the general interests of society and are
merely optional. Commercial or universal banking is, ideally,
not a governmental but a private sector endeavor, an optional
function of the government. There are functions of the
government which it may exercise to promote merely the
welfare, progress, and prosperity of the people. Thus,
reorganization of such corporations like PNB is valid so long as
they are done in good faith as prescribed in the Dario v. Mison
doctrine. Accordingly, the reorganization of PNB is found to be
done in good faith by the Court.
CASE NO. 69
ART IX SEC 2, PAR. 2: APPOINTMENT V. DESIGNATION
3. REORGANIZATION
FERNANDEZ V. STO. TOMAS 242 SCRA 192 1995
FACTS: Petitioners Salvador C. Fernandez and Anicia M. de
Lima assail the validity of Resolution No. 94-3710 to the extent
it merged the OCSS [Office of Career Systems and Standards],
the OPIA [Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit] and the
OPR [Office of Personnel Relations], to form the RDO [Research
and Development Office] of the Civil Service Commission and
the authority of the Commission to issue the same.
Petitioner Fernandez was serving as Director of the Office of
Personnel Inspection and Audit ("OPIA") while petitioner de
Lima was serving as Director of the Office of the Personnel
Relations ("OPR"), both at the Central Office of the Civil Service
Commission in Quezon City, Metropolitan Manila.
Examination of Resolution No. 94-3710 shows that thereby the
Commission re-arranged  some of the administrative units (i.e.,
Offices) within the Commission and re-allocated certain
functions moving some functions from one Office to
another; e.g., the information technology function of OPM
(Office of Planning and Management) was transferred to the
newly named Management Information Office (MIO). This re-
allocation or re-assignment of some functions carried with it
the transfer of the budget earmarked for such function to the
Office where the function was transferred.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Civil Service Commission had legal
authority to issue Resolution No. 94-3710.
RULING: YES, it did not constitute a violation of their
constitutional right to security of tenure.It follows that the
reassignment of petitioners Fernandez and de Lima from their
previous positions in OPIA and OPR, respectively, to the
Research and Development Office (RDO) in the Central Office
of the Commission in Metropolitan Manila and their
subsequent assignment from the RDO to the Commission's
Regional Offices in Regions V and III had been effected with
express statutory authority and did not constitute removals
without lawful cause.
MAIN POINT: The above conclusion is compelled not only by
the statutory provisions relevant in the instant case, but also by
a long line of cases decided by this Court in respect of different
agencies or offices of government.
CASE NO. 70
ART IX SEC 2, PAR. 2: APPOINTMENT V. DESIGNATION
3. REORGANIZATION
CHATO V. NATIVIDAD 244 SCRA 787 (1995)
FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari  to annul the order dated
February 7, 1994 of respondent judge of the Regional Trial
Court of San Fernando, Pampanga in Civil Case No. 10066,
enjoining petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue from
transferring respondent Nori B. Blas, as revenue district officer
from San Fernando, Pampanga to Tuguegarao, Cagayan.
Among those affected by the reassignment was private
respondent Salvador Nori Blas, who was ordered to report to
Revenue District No. 14 in Tuguegarao, Cagayan. In turn,
petitioner Solon B. Alcantara was ordered to report to Blas'
former post in San Fernando, Pampanga, now known as
Revenue District No. 21.
Petitioner argues, firstly, that private respondent did not have
any vested right to his station in San Fernando, Pampanga since
he was only designated to the post and not appointed thereto.
Neither did private respondent show any right to be exempted
from the reorganization.
ISSUE: WON the reassignment is valid.
RULING: NO, Private respondent failed to show patent illegality
in the action of the Commissioner constituting violation of his
right to security of tenure. To sustain his contention that his
transfer constitutes a demotion simply because the new
assignment is not to his liking would be to subordinate
government projects, along with the great resources and
efforts they entail, to the individual preferences and opinions
of civil service employees. Such contention would negate the
principle5 that a public office is a public trust and that it is not
the private preserve of any person. In granting an injunction
despite the absence of any legal right to be protected,
respondent committed a grave abuse of its discretion.
MAIN POINT: Any employee who questions the validity of his
transfer should appeal to the Civil Service Commission.
Respondent judge should have dismissed the action below for
failure of private respondent to exhaust administrative
remedies.
CASE NO. 71
ART IX SEC 2, PAR. 2: APPOINTMENT V. DESIGNATION
3. REORGANIZATION
Divinagracia v. Sto. Tomas 244 SCRA 595 (1995)
FACTS: On 1 January 1985 the Joint Commission on Local
Government Personnel Administration approved the
reorganization plan and staffing pattern of the Municipality of
Pili Private respondent Prescilla B. Nacario who was then the
Municipal Budget Officer was appointed MPDC on 10 June
1985 to take effect on 1 July 1985. Nacario was replaced by
Digna Isidro as Municipal Budget Officer.  Isidro was succeeded
a year later by Eleanor Villarico who served until 1990.
On 15 March 1993 Mayor Divinagracia wrote to CSC
Chairperson Patricia A. Sto. Tomas seeking a reconsideration of
her opinion of 8 December 1992.  Mayor Divinagracia
explained the factual circumstances behind the ouster of
Mancita and the resulting appointment of Nacario to the
position of MPDC, arguing that San Luis was validly appointed
by the Secretary of the Budget and confirmed by the CSC,
hence, entitled to security of tenure.
Petitioners contend that Sec. 13, Rule VI, of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Revised Administrative Code (E.O. 292) does
not apply to the present case because the rule covers only
appointments in a chain of promotions and not where a public
officer was merely transferred to another position of the same
rank, grade and level.
ISSUE: WON the transfer is valid
RULING: NO, Clearly then, the unconsented lateral transfer of
Nacario from the Budget Office to the Office of MPDC was
arbitrary for it amounted to removal without cause, hence,
invalid as it is anathema to security of tenure.  When Nacario
was extended a permanent appointment on 1 August 1980 and
she assumed the position, she acquired a legal, not merely an
equitable, right to the position.  Such right to security of tenure
is protected not only by statute, but also by the
Constitution and cannot be taken away from her either by
removal, transfer or by revocation of appointment, except for
cause, and after prior notice.
MAIN POINT: A transfer requires a prior appointment and
acceptance in order to complete the appointment. No
permanent transfer can take place unless the officer or
employee is first removed from the position held, and then
appointed to another position.
ARZHY
CASE NO. 72
ART IX SEC 2: CIVIL SERVICE; SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM
SECURITY OF TENURE/CAUSE FOR REMOVAL: PAR 3;
REORGANIZATION
Vinzons-Chato v. Zenarosa
FACTS: Private respondent, Estrella V. Martinez, was
reassigned to Assistant Division Chief, Collection Programs
Division, National Office in Quezon City from her previous
position of Assistant Revenue District Officer of Revenue
District Office (RDO) No. 34 pursuant to the Revenue Travel
Assignment Order (RTAO) No. 8-95 issued by Petitioner
Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Private respondent alleged
that her reassignment was tantamount to a demotion and
dislocation (i.e. reassignment to a position totally alien to her
proven area of expertise in assessment) and that the act of the
petitioner in issuing the travel order was made in bad faith
intended to harass her. A writ of preliminary injunction
enjoining implementation of RTAO 8-95 was filed by private
respondent and granted by respondent Judge Zenarosa. Private
respondent was suspended for one month on the ground of
gross insubordination in accordance with Sec 23, Rule XIV of
the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulation for her failure
to comply with the travel order. Petitioner contended that such
reassignment will not alter the appointment of private
respondent as Chief Revenue Officer II. Futhermore,
reassignment was made for the prevention of familiarity and
patronage between BIR officers and taxpayers.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance of RTO No. 8-95 is violative
of the security of tenure granted by the Constitution as it
constitutes a demotion on the part of respondent
RULING: No, the reassignment of public respondent is not a
demotion for there is no diminution of rank, salary, status, and
responsibility. Moreover, she is not the only one assigned to a
new post. Petitioner, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, is
authorized to assign or re-assign officers and employees of BIR
as the exigencies of the service may require, without demotion
in rank and salary in accordance with Civil Service Rules and
Regulation.
MAIN POINT: Reassignment in good faith and in the interest of
the government service is permissible and valid. Mere
reorganization of the agency does not constitute removal from
office nor demotion when such will not result to diminution of
rank, salary, status, and responsibility (in case of demotion).
ARZHY
CASE NO. 73
ART IX SEC 2: CIVIL SERVICE; SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM
SECURITY OF TENURE/CAUSE FOR REMOVAL: PAR 3;
REORGANIZATION De Guzman v. Comelec
FACTS: Petitioners assailed the validity of the provision found
in Section 44 of the The Voter’s Registration Act of 1996’ which
provides for the prohibition on election officers to hold office in
a particular city or municipality for more than four years and
for the automatic reassignment of election officers who have
served for at least four years in a particular city or municipality
to a new station outside the original congressional district.
Pursuant to this provision, COMELEC issued several directives
reassigning petitioners, who are either City or Municipal
Officers, to different stations.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 44 of Republic Act No. 8189
violates the constitutional guarantee on security of tenure of
Civil Servants
RULING: No, the rule that outlaws unconsented transfers as
anathema (something that one vehemently dislikes) to security
of tenure applies only to an officer who is appointed-not
merely assigned-to a particular station. Such rule does not
proscribe a transfer carried out under a specific statute that
empowers the head of an agency to periodically reassign the
employees and officers in order to improve the service of the
agency. Furthermore, the guarantee of security of tenure
under the Constitution is not a guarantee of perpetual
employment. It only means that an employee cannot be
dismissed (or transferred) from the service for causes other
than those provided by law and only after due process has
been accorded to the employee. What it seeks to prevent is
capricious exercise of the power to dismiss. Where the law-
making authority itself which furnishes the ground for the
transfer of a class of employees, no such capriciousness can be
raised as long as the remedy proposed to cure a perceived evil
is germane to the purposes of the law.
MAIN POINT: Reassignment of employees assigned to a
particular station is not violative of the Constitutional grant of
security of tenure when such act is based on pronouncements
made by the law-making authority for purposes of curing a
perceived evil and for improvement of the service of the
agency.
ARZHY
CASE NO. 74
ART IX SEC 2: CIVIL SERVICE; SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM
SECURITY OF TENURE/CAUSE FOR REMOVAL: PAR 3;
REORGANIZATION Cuevas v. Bacal
FACTS: Respondent, Josefina G. Bacal, who holds the rank of
Career Executive Service Officer (CESO) III was appointed to the
position of Chief Public Attorney in the Public Attorney’s Office
(PAO) which has a Career Executive Service (CES) Rank Level I.
She was subsequently transferred, without her consent, to the
Office of the Regional Director of the PAO while petitioner
Carina Demaisip was appointed Chief Public Defender
(formerly Chief Public Attorney) by Pres. Estrada in her stead.
Respondent filed a quo warranto before the CA questioning her
replacement for which the court ruled in her favor and held
that such transfer amounted to removal without cause.
Petitioners contended that such reassignment or transfer of
respondent Bacal from Chief Public Attorney to Regional
Director is appropriate and did not result in her losing her rank
as CESO III and her right to receive the salary corresponding to
her present rank.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent’s reassignment from
Chief Public Attorney to Regional Director constitutes a
violation of security of tenure
RULING: No, respondent, not having the rank appropriate for
the position of Chief Public Attorney, her appointment to that
position cannot be considered permanent and cannot claim
security of tenure in respect to such position. The guarantee of
security of tenure to members of the Career Executive Service
(CES) does not extend to the particular positions to which they
may be appointed but to the rank to which they are appointed
by the President.
MAIN POINT: Appointment to a lower position does not violate
the Constitutional grant of security of tenure when such
reassignment does not result in diminution of rank and the
right to receive salary corresponding to such rank.
ARZHY
CASE NO. 75
ART IX SEC 2: CIVIL SERVICE; SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM
SECURITY OF TENURE/CAUSE FOR REMOVAL: PAR 3;
QUALIFICATION FOR ELIGIBILITY
Mayor v. Macaraig
FACTS: Five special civil actions are jointly decided which
assailed the constitutionality of Section 35 of Republic Act No.
6715 which declares vacant all positions of the Commissioners,
Executive Labor Arbiters, and Labor Arbiters of the National
Labor Relations Commission and operates to remove the
incumbents upon the appointment and qualification of their
successors. Additional qualification requirement for Executive
Labor Arbiters and Labor Arbiters was added under RA 6715
which includes: a) must have been in the practice of law in the
Philippines for at least 7 years, with at least 3 years of
experience or exposure in the field of labor-management
relations; b) must have been engaged in the practice of law for
at least 5 years for purposes of reappointment for those
incumbent Executive Labor Arbiters and Labor Arbiters.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 35 of Republic Act No. 6715 is
violative of the security of tenure granted by the Constitution
RULING: Yes, abolition by law as a result of reorganization is a
recognized cause for termination of a Government employee
but abolition of an office is not the same as the declaration that
the office is vacant. There is no express or implied abolition of
the petitioners’ positions effected by RA 6715 (Bernas p. 381).
While it is undoubtedly a prerogative of the legislature to
abolish certain offices, it cannot be conceded the power to
simply pronounce those offices vacant and thereby effectively
remove the occupants or holders thereof from the civil service.
Their incumbents constitutionally granted security of tenure
cannot be defeated by the provision for higher or other
qualifications than were prescribed under the old law. Said
provision can only operate prospectively and as to new
appointees to positions regularly vacated. There is also no
showing that the petitioners do not qualify under the new law.
MAIN POINT: Declaration of office as vacant is not the kind of
abolition by law contemplated in the Constitution as a valid
termination of government employee.
ARZHY
CASE NO. 76
ART IX SEC 2: CIVIL SERVICE; SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM
SECURITY OF TENURE/CAUSE FOR REMOVAL: PAR 3;
ABANDONMENT: ACCEPTANCE OF INCOMPATIBLE/OTHER
EMPLOYMENT
Canonizado v. Aguirre
FACTS: Petitioner was removed from his office as NAPOLCOM
Commissioner by the enactment of RA 8551, otherwise known
as the Philippine National Police Reform and Reorganization
Act of 1998, and was subsequently appointed as Inspector
General of Internal Affairs Services (IAS), pending appeal on his
removal as Commissioner. The Court ruled RA 8551 to be
unconstitutional and ordered for the reinstatement of
petitioner and the payment of full backwages to be computed
from the date he was removed from office. Respondents
claimed that his acceptance of the position of Inspector
General is deemed abandonment of his claim for reinstatement
to the NAPOLCOM since the offices of NAPOLCOM
Commissioner and Inspector General of IAS are incompatible.
ISSUE: Whether or not Canonizado’s appointment to and
acceptance of the position of Inspector General of IAS would
result in the abandonment of his claim for reinstatement to the
NAPOLCOM due to incompatibility of duties
RULING: No, the rule on incompatibility of duties does not
apply to the case at bar. Canonizado did not discharge the
functions of two offices simultaneously. While he was
appointed as Inspector General of IAS, which he sought during
the pendency of his appeal on his removal as Commissioner, he
had ceased to discharge his function as NAPOLCOM
Commissioner. General rule: one, while occupying one office,
accepts another incompatible with the first, ipso facto vacates
the first and his title is thereby terminated without any other
act or proceeding.
MAIN POINT: While desiring and intending to hold the office,
and with no willful desire or intention to abandon it, the public
officer vacates it in deference to the requirements of a statute
which is afterwards declared unconstitutional, such a surrender
will not be deemed an abandonment and the officer may
recover the office.
R. Rizon
CASE NO. 77
Article IX CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
Abandonment, Acceptance of Incompatible/Other
Employment
 Salvador vs. CA
FACTS: Petitioner Conrado C. Salvador had been a permanent
employee of DENR since 1964. Petitioner, who prior
to the reorganization of DENR had held the position
of Forestry Supervisor II for almost eight (8) years.
Because of the reorganization he accepted a
coterminous position and thereafter terminated.
When petitioner applied for a vacant position
equivalent to his former position as Forestry
Supervisor II under the 1986 plantilla. Petitioner’s
application was ignored and instead one Sofio B.
Quintana was appointed to the position. Respondent
court (CA) contented that the appointing power of
the DENR is discretionary and that petitioner was not
entitled to the position he applied for considering
that he had no vested right thereto.
ISSUES: Whether or not petitioner has a vested right to the
position considering he was already terminated from
the service.
RULING: Yes, petitioner must be reinstated to his former or
equivalent positions in the DENR without loss of
seniority and other benefits, and be issued regular
and permanent appointments to the positions in the
new 1986 plantilla. Petitioners application for and
acceptance of a lower position in the DENR, under
the circumstances, was the practical and responsible
thing to do, and cannot be construed against him.
MAIN POINT: The bare fact of accepting a position which was
not only lower but of a coterminous status due to
reorganization does not affect his right to
reinstatement.
R. Rizon
CASE NO. 78
Article IX CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
Due Process in Removal
Enrique vs. CA
FACTS: Petitioners were charged with dishonesty, grave
misconduct, being notoriously undesirable, receiving
for personal use for a fee, gift or other valuable
things in the course of official duties for having
assisted examinees in answering examination
questions for a consideration of P500 to P1,000. CSC
ordered for their preventive suspension and denied
petitioner's request for a formal hearing as well as
the lifting of the suspension.
ISSUES: Whether or not petitioners were denied due process of
law when they were dismissed from the service
through a summary proceeding conducted by the
CSC.
RULING: No, petitioners were informed of the charges levelled
against them and were given reasonable opportunity
to present their defenses. As a matter of fact,
petitioners admitted that they filed their answer to
the formal charges against them and submitted
additional evidence when asked to do so.
MAIN POINT: Summary proceedings in the removal or
dismissal of employees are allowed so long as the
respondents in the administrative case are duly
informed of the charges against them and given the
opportunity to present their side.
Rizon
CASE NO. 79
Article IX CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
Due Process in Removal
CSC vs. Magnaye
FACTS: Magnaye was appointed as Utility Worker I and
detailed at the Municipal Planning and Development
Office. Less than a month from his appointment, the
new mayor (Bendaa) served him a notice of
termination for unsatisfactory conduct or want of
capacity. Petitioner argued that his termination was
without basis and was politically motivated.
ISSUES: Whether or not petitioner was denied due process.
RULING: Yes, petitioner acquires a legal, not merely equitable
right (to the position), which is protected not only by
statute, but also by the Constitution and cannot be
taken away from him except for cause, and with
previous notice and hearing, regardless of whether
he is regular or probationary employee.
MAIN POINT: No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall
be suspended or dismissed except for cause as
provided by law is a guaranty of both procedural and
substantive due process, regardless if he is a
probationary employee. Procedural due process
requires that the dismissal comes only after notice
and hearing, while substantive due process requires
that the dismissal be for cause.
R. Rizon
CASE NO. 80
Article IX CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
Due Process in Removal
Rubenecia vs CA
FACTS: Teachers of Catarman National High School in
Catarman, Northern Samar, filed before the MSPB an
administrative complaint against petitioner
Rubenecia, the School Principal, for dishonesty,
nepotism, oppression and violation of Civil Service
Rules. CSC found him guilty and ordered his dismissal
from the government service.
ISSUES: Whether or not petitioner was denied due process.
RULING: No, the formal charge prepared by the MSPB and
given to petitioner constituted sufficient notice
which, in fact, had enabled him to prepare his
defense. Finally, the motion for reconsideration filed
by Rubenecia before the Commission cured whatever
defect might have existed in respect of alleged denial
of procedural due process.
MAIN POINT: Motion for reconsideration filed before the
Commission cured whatever defect might have
existed in respect of alleged denial of procedural due
process. Denial of due process cannot be successfully
invoked by a party who has had the opportunity to
be heard on his motion for reconsideration.

R. Rizon
CASE NO. 81
Article IX CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
Due Process in Removal
PCSO Directors vs. Marie Lapid
FACTS: Marie Jean C. Lapid, Casual Clerk (Acting Teller) of PCSO
was found her guilty by PCSO of Discourtesy in the
Course of Official Duties and Grave Misconduct and
imposed on her the penalty of Dismissal from the
Service for confronting, badmouthing and shouting
invectives at Mr. Guemo, PCSO Chief Lottery
Operations Officer of Bataan Provincial District in the
presence of other employees and clients. Lapid
claimed that the CSC erred in denying her appeal on
the ground that she was a casual employee who was
without any security of tenure and may be separated
from service at any time.
ISSUES: Whether or not petitioner was denied due process.
RULING: Yes, casuals are entitled to due process especially if
they are to be removed for more serious causes or
for causes other than (1) when their services are no
longer needed; (2) funds are no longer available; (3)
the project has already been completed/finished; or
(4) their performance are below par. Petitioner was
not formally charged and the charges were not
substantiated.
MAIN RULING: No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall
be suspended or dismissed except for cause as
provided by law after due process. Even a casual or
temporary employee enjoys security of tenure and
cannot be dismissed except for cause.
Digested by: FRANZ
CASE NO. 82
Article IX-B, Section 2(3): The Civil Service Commission: Security
of Tenure
Chua v. CSC
FACTS: Petitioner believing that she is qualified to avail of the
benefits of the Early Retirement Law (RA 6683), filed an
application on 30 January 1989 with respondent National
Irrigation Administration (NIA) which, however, denied the
same; instead, she was offered separation benefits equivalent
to one half (1/2) month basic pay for every year of three (3)
years period prior to retirement are continuous and fulfill the
service requirement for retirement.’ What substantial
differences exist, if any, between casual, emergency, seasonal,
project, co-terminus or contractual personnel? All are tenurial
employees with no fixed term, non-career, and temporary. CSC
characterized that her employment with NIA is contractual in
nature, thus she is not benefited by the Early Retirement Law.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to the benefits of
the Early Retirement Law.
RULING: Yes. Co-terminus or project personnel, who have
rendered years of continuous service, should be included in the
coverage of the Early Retirement Law, as long as they file their
application prior to the expiration of their term, and as long as
they comply with CSC regulations promulgated for such
purpose. In this connection, Memorandum Circular No. 14,
Series of 1990 (5 March 1990) implementing Rep. Act No. 6850,
requires, as a condition to qualify for the grant of eligibility, an
aggregate or total of seven (7) years of government service
which need not be continuous, in the career or non-career
service, whether benefits authorized under this Act shall apply
to all regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees,
regardless of age, who have rendered at least a total of two (2)
consecutive years of government service as of the date of
separation. Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines including those of the PC-INP are excluded from the
coverage of this Act.
MAIN POINT: Although no proof of the existence of a work
pool can be assumed, her service record cannot be
disregarded.
CASE NO. 83
Article IX-B, Section 2(3): The Civil Service Commission: Security
of Tenure
NLTD v. CSC
FACTS: Petitioner Garcia, a Bachelor of Laws graduate and a
first grade civil service eligible was appointed Deputy Register
of Deeds VII under permanent status. Said position was later
reclassified to Deputy Register of Deeds III pursuant to PD
1529, to which position, petitioner was also appointed under
permanent status up to September 1984. By virtue of Executive
Order No. 649 which authorized the restructuring of the Land
Registration Commission to National Land Titles and Deeds
Registration Administration and regionalizing the Offices of the
Registers therein, petitioner Garcia was issued an appointment
as Deputy Register of Deeds II on October 1, 1984, under
temporary status, for not being a member of the Philippine
Bar. Resolution 2 dated June 30, 1988, the Civil Service
Commission directed that private respondent Garcia be
restored to her position as Deputy Register of Deeds II or its
equivalent in the NALTDRA. It held that "under the vested right
theory the new requirement of BAR membership to qualify for
permanent appointment as Deputy Register of Deeds II or
higher as mandated under said Executive Order, would not
apply to her (private respondent Garcia) but only to the filling
up of vacant lawyer positions on or after February 9, 1981, the
date said Executive Order took effect." Petitioner NALTDRA
filed the present petition to assail the validity of the above
Resolution of the Civil Service Commission. It contends that
Sections 8 and 10 of Executive Order No. 649 abolished all
existing positions in the LRC and transferred their functions to
the appropriate new offices created by said Executive Order,
which newly created offices required the issuance of new
appointments to qualified office holders. Verily, Executive
Order No. 649 applies to private respondent Garcia, and not
being a member of the Bar, she cannot be reinstated to her
former position as Deputy Register of Deeds II.
ISSUE: Whether or Not membership in the bar, which is the
qualification requirement prescribed for appointment to the
position of Deputy Register of Deeds under Section 4 of
Executive Order No. 649 (LRC into NALTDRA) should be
required of and/or applied only to new applicants and not to
those who were already in the service of the LRC as deputy
register of deeds at the time of the issuance and
implementation of the above said Executive Order.
RULING: Yes, however, does not mean removal. Abolition of a
position does not involve or mean removal for the reason that
removal implies that the post subsists and that one is merely
separated there from. After abolition, there is in law no
occupant. Thus, there can be no tenure to speak of. It is in this
sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of
any impairment of security of tenure does not arise.

MAIN POINT: IN BOLD
CASE NO. 84
Article IX-B, Section 2(3): The Civil Service Commission: Security
of Tenure
Cabagnot v. CSC
FACTS: CSC found petitioner to have violated the rule on
preference for appointment of permanent employees based on
Sec. 4 of Rep. Act No3. . 6656, Sec. 7 of Rules on Organization
and Memorandum Circular No. 5, s. 1988 of the CSC, the rule
means that “old employees should be considered first” on the
assumption, though not absolutely true, that they have gained
“not only superior skills but also greater dedication to the
public service.” This is not to say, however, that they should be
automatically appointed because “the law does not preclude
the infusion of new blood, younger dynamism, or necessary
talents into the government service” provided that the acts of
the appointing power are “bonafide for the best interest of the
public service and the person chosen has the needed
qualifications.”
ISSUE: Whether or Not the security of tenure of the employees
was impaired.
RULING: Yes. The CSC found that sixteen (16) of the seventeen
(17) private respondents were demoted because of the wide
disparity between the former positions held by them and the
positions to which they were proposed by petitioner.
MAIN POINT: Demotion of a government employee is an act of
impairment of security of tenure.
CASE NO. 85
Article IX-B, Section 2(3): The Civil Service Commission: Security
of Tenure
Marohombsar v. CA
FACTS: Private respondent was first appointed as Technical
Assistant. The position was subsequently reclassified and
retitled to Executive Assistant II. Since the private respondent
did not possess the appropriate civil service eligibility required
of the position, she was extended a temporary appointment
only. She was later extended a permanent appointment when
she acquired a Career Service Professional Eligibility. When
petitioner became the President of MSU, private respondent
was later dismissed. Petitioner argues that the dismissal was
legal since the private respondent’s appointment lacks the
requisite confirmation by the Board of Regents.
ISSUE: Whether or Not private respondent is entitled to back
wages from the time of illegal dismissal up to the time of
reinstatement.
RULING: Yes. Private respondent could not be removed or
dismissed from the service without just cause and without
observing the requirements of due process as what happened
in the present case. Inescapable then is the conclusion that
private respondent was illegally dismissed when she was
summarily terminated from the service by mere letter on the
alleged ground of "urgent need to establish a new order and
maintain the trust and confidence reposed upon the Office of
the President.
MAIN POINT: An illegally terminated civil service employee is
entitled to back salaries limited only to a maximum period of
five (5) years and not full back salaries from her illegal
termination up to her reinstatement.
CASE NO. 86
Article IX-B, Section 2(3): The Civil Service Commission: Security
of Tenure
Ong v. OP
FACTS: On February 22, 2005, Ong filed before the CA a
petition for quo warranto. He sought for the declaration as null
and void of (a) his removal from the position of NBI Director III;
and (b) his replacement by respondent Victor Bessat (Bessat).
Ong likewise prayed for reinstatement and back wages. In the
career executive service, the acquisition of security of tenure
presupposes a permanent appointment. It is further alleged
that it was erroneous for the CA to equate an appointment co-
terminus with the tenure of the appointing authority with one
that is at the pleasure of such appointing authority. The OSG
points out that the replacement of Ong by Bessat was fair and
just in accordance to with Sections 13 and 14 Rule V, Civil
Service Commission (CSC) Resolution No. 91-1631 issued on
December 27, 1991. Further, the OSG claims that when Ong
accepted promotional appointments in the Career Executive
Service (CES) for which he did not have the required eligibility,
he became a temporary employee and had impliedly
abandoned his right to security of tenure.
ISSUE: Whether or Not petitioner has the right for security of
tenure.
RULING: No, it is undisputed that the petitioner is a non-CESO
eligible. At best, therefore, his appointment could be regarded
only as temporary and, hence, he has no security of tenure.
Such being the case, his appointment can be withdrawn at will
by the President, who is the appointing authority in this case,
and at a moment's notice.
MAIN POINT: Security of tenure in the career executive service,
which presupposes a permanent appointment, takes place
upon passing the CES examinations administered by the CES
Board.
Rechine CASE NO. 87
ARTICLE IX-B (CSC), SEC. 2: SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM
ELECTIONEERING OR PARTISAN POLITICAL ACTIVITY
SANTOS v. YATCO
FACTS: Respondent Alejo Santos is a Secretary of National
Defense and head of the Department of National Defense,
with power of control and supervision over the armed forces.
The position of Secretary of National Defense is not embraced
and included within the term "officers and employees in the
civil service" (as disclosed in the proceedings in the
Constitutional Convention wherein the attempt of Delegate
Mumar to include the heads of executive departments within
the civil service was rejected). Respondent is campaigning for
Governor Tomas Martin, candidate of the Nacionalista Party
in the Province of Bulacan, was acting as member of the
Cabinet in discussing the issues before the electorate and
defending the actuations of the Administration to which he
belongs.
ISSUE: Whether or not cabinet members may engage in
partisan political activities.
RULING: Yes. Cabinet Members are not covered by the
Constitutional prohibition against electioneering or partisan
political activity because they hold political offices.  Cabinet
Members serve at the behest and pleasure of the President.  As
such, their positions are essentially political. The same
proscription relating to civil servants does not also extend to
members of the Cabinet as their positions are essentially
political.

MAIN POINT: The Supreme Court is plain that “elective
officials” are not covered by the prohibition against engaging in
electioneering or partisan political activities for practical
reasons and in view of the nature of positions and
responsibility.
Rechine CASE NO. 88
ARTICLE IX-B (CSC), SEC. 2: SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM
ELECTIONEERING OR PARTISAN POLITICAL ACTIVITY
PEOPLE v. DE VENECIA
FACTS: Braulio de Venecia was prosecuted for electioneering,
because according to the information: “he did x x x wilfully x x x
induce, influence, sway and make the electors vote in favor of
candidates for public office namely, Felipe Oda, NP candidate
for Municipal Mayor of Binalonan x x x by, then and there,
distributing and or causing to be distributed election handbills,
a sample of which is attached hereto as Annex “A” and made
integral part hereof, which leaflets were distributed and/or
caused to be distributed by the accused to win votes for NP
candidates Felipe Oda x x x.” Upon a motion to quash, the
court dismissed the case, holding that sec. 54 of the Revised
Election Code (upon which the prosecution rested) had been
repealed by sec. 29 of Republic Act 2260.
ISSUE: Whether or not the classified civil service employee of
handbills urging election of a particular candidate is a
solicitation of the electors’ vote
RULING: Yes. The distribution by a classified civil service
employee of handbills urging election of a particular candidate
is a solicitation of the electors’ vote punishable by Section 54 of
the Revised Election Code because he “aided a candidate” and
may not invoke the privilege reserved to him by sec. 29.
Distributing handbills is undoubtedly “aiding”. It is not merely
mentioning the candidate whom De Venecia supported, nor
mere expression of his opinion on current political problems. It
is solicitation of the elector’s vote in favor of Oda. It is an
indorsement of the request for his support by gubernatorial
candidate Conrado F. Estrella.
MAIN POINT: Partisan political activity, which is the phrase
used in previous Constitutions, includes “every form of
solicitation of the elector’s vote in favor of” a specific
candidate. It includes contribution of money for election
purposes and distribution of handbills. However, the provision
does not “prevent any officer or employee from expressing his
views on current political problems or issues, or from
mentioning the names of candidates for public office whom he
supports.” Section 29, RA 2260.
Rechine CASE NO. 89
ARTICLE IX-B (CSC), SEC. 2: SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM
RIGHT TO SELF-ORGANIZATION AND RIGHT TO STRIKE
SSS EMPLOYEE v. CA
FACTS: SSS filed a complaint alleging that the officers and
members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and barricaded the
entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-striking
employees from reporting for work and SSS members from
transacting business with the SSS; the Public Sector Labor-
Management Council, the strikers to return to work; that the
strikers refused to return to work; and that the SSS suffered
damages as a result of the strike. It appears that the Social
Security System Employees Association (SSSEA) went on strike
after the SSS failed to act on the union’s demands. The CA held
that since the employees of the SSS, are government
employees, they are not allowed to strike, and may be
enjoined by the Regional Trial Court, which had jurisdiction
over the SSS’ complaint for damages, from continuing with
their strike.
ISSUE: Whether or not employees of the Security System have
the right to strike?
RULING: No. Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic
law becomes helpful in understanding the meaning of these
provisions. A reading of the proceedings of the Constitutional
Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution would show
that in recognizing the right of government employees to
organize, the commissioners intended to limit the right to the
formation of unions or associations only, without including the
right to strike.
MAIN POINT: Resort to the intent of the framers point to the
understanding that the right to organize does not include the
right to strike.
Rechine CASE NO. 90
ARTICLE IX-B (CSC), SEC. 2: SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM
RIGHT TO SELF-ORGANIZATION AND RIGHT TO STRIKE
BALINGASAN v. CA
FACTS: Petitioners, except Rodolfo Mariano, were among the
800 public school teachers who staged “mass actions” to
dramatize their grievances concerning, in the main, the alleged
failure of the public authorities to implement in a just and
correct manner certain laws and measures intended for their
material benefit.
The Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports (DECS) issued a Return-to-Work Order. Petitioners failed
to comply with said order. They were simultaneously placed
under preventive suspension.
ISSUE: Whether or not employees in the public service may
engage in strikes.
RULING: No. It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that
employees in the public service may not engage in strikes.
While the Constitution recognizes the right of government
employees to organize, they are prohibited from staging
strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other
forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage
or disruption of public services.
MAIN POINT: The right of government employees to organize
is limited only to the formation of unions or associations,
without including the right to strike. The ability to strike is not
essential to the right of association. In the absence of statute,
public employees do not have the right to engage in concerted
work stoppages for any purpose.
Rechine CASE NO. 91
ARTICLE IX-B (CSC), SEC. 2: SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM
RIGHT TO SELF-ORGANIZATION AND RIGHT TO STRIKE
JACINTO v. CA
FACTS: Petitioners are public school teachers from various
schools in Metropolitan Manila. They incurred unauthorized
absences in connection with the mass actions then staged;
DECS Secretary Isidro Cariño immediately issued a return-to-
work order. Petitioners initially questioned the CSC resolutions.
Respondent Court found that the “petitioners absented
themselves from their classes in furtherance of or in
connection with the ‘mass action’ for the purpose of pressuring
the government to grant their demands.
ISSUE: Whether or not public school teachers may strike
against the government

RULING: No. The Civil Service Commission found them guilty of
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for having
absented themselves without proper authority, from their
schools during regular school days, in order to participate in
the mass protest, their absence ineluctably resulting in the
non-holding of classes and in the deprivation of students of
education, for which they were responsible. As it was, the
temporary stoppage of classes resulting from their activity
necessarily disrupted public services, the very evil sought to
be forestalled by the prohibition against strikes by
government workers. Their act by its nature was enjoined by
the Civil Service law, rules and regulations, for which they
must, therefore, be made answerable. It is also settled in
jurisprudence that, in general, workers in the public sector do
not enjoy the right to strike.  their free time—recess, after classes, weekends or holidays no
MAIN POINT: IN BOLD
Andalahao
CASE NO. 91
ART IX B: CSC SEC 2: Scope of the System
Right to Self-organization and right to strike
De la Cruz vs CA 305 SCRA 303
FACTS: Public school teachers were simultaneously charged,
preventively suspended, and eventually dismissed then
Department of Education, Culture and Sports Secretary Isidro
D. Cariño based on the report submitted by their respective
school principals wherein it was alleged that the teachers
participated in the mass action/illegal strike and subsequently
defied the return-to-work order which acts constituted grave
misconduct, gross neglect of duty, gross violation of Civil
Service Law, Rules and Regulations and reasonable office
regulations, refusal to perform official duty, gross
insubordination, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service and absence without official leave (AWOL), in violation
of Presidential Decree 807, otherwise known as the Civil
Service Decree of the Philippines.
Appeals were filed with the CSC Merit Systems Protection
Board and CA but all petitions were denied. Hence a petition
for review on certiorari was filed in SC.
ISSUE: WON public school teachers can invoke the right to self-
organization and strike to avoid administrative sanctions.
RULING: NO. The Court stressed that the teachers were
penalized not because they exercised their right to peaceably
assemble but because of the manner by which such right was
exercised i.e. going on unauthorized and unilateral absences
thus disrupting classes in various schools in Metro Manila
which produced adverse effects upon the students for whose
education the teachers were responsible.
MAIN POINT: The teachers were thereby denied their rights to
peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances reasoning that this constitutional liberty to be
upheld, like any other liberty, must be exercised within
reasonable limits so as not to prejudice the public welfare.
The public school teachers’ mass actions were clearly exercised
beyond their constitutional rights. Had the teachers availed of
one could have held them liable for their participation in the
mass actions.
Andalahao
CASE NO. 92
ART IX B: CSC SEC 2: Scope of the System
Right to Self-organization and right to strike
GSIS vs Kapisan 510 SCRA 622
FACTS: A four-day rally was staged by the Kapisanan Ng Mga
Manggagawa sa GSIS (KMG) due to the management style of
GSIS President & GM Garcia. Show cause memorandum was
issued by GSIS Investigating Unit ordering those who joined the
demonstration to show cause why they should not be
administratively charged for the participation in the said rally.
But no explanation was made, instead a reconsideration was
sought contending that employees returned to work in
obedience to the return-to-work order issued. Administrative
cases were filed against those who joined the rally. But CA held
that Garcia's "filing of administrative charges against KMG
members is tantamount to grave abuse of discretion which
may be the proper subject of the writ of prohibition.
Thus the petition is filed for review on certiorari to nullify CA's
decision
ISSUE: WON KMG is within the bounds of exercising their rights
to self-organization and strike.
RULING: NO. The Court ruled that government employees may
organize but shall not engage in strikes, mass leaves, walkouts,
and other forms of mass action that will lead in temporary
stoppage or disruption of public service.
MAIN POINT: The Court ruled that government employees may
organize but shall not engage in strikes, mass leaves, walkouts,
and other forms of mass action that will lead in temporary
stoppage or disruption of public service. The right of
government employees to organize is limited to the
formation of unions or associations only, without including
the right to strike, adding that public employees going on
disruptive unauthorized absences to join concerted mass
actions may be held liable for conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service.
The assailed decision and resolution, if allowed to remain
undisturbed, would likely pave the way to legitimization of
mass actions undertaken by civil servants, regardless of their
deleterious effects on the interest of the public they have
sworn to serve with loyalty and efficiency.
Andalahao
CASE NO. 94
ART IX B: CSC SEC 2: Scope of the System
Temporary Employees
Gloria vs CA GR 119903, August 15 2000
FACTS: Secretary Gloria (DECS), recommended the
reassignment of the appointed Schools Division
Superintendent, Divisions of City Schools, QC to MIST
( Marikina Institute of Science and Technology) to fill up the
vacuum created by a retirement of a Superintendent. The
president approved the recommendation of the Secretary and
was then transmitted to the concerned Regional Director for
implementation which then informed the reassigned employee
of the new assignment. The petitioner requested for a
reconsideration on the reassignment but Secretary Gloria
denied the request.
Court proceedings were sought to prevent the implementation
of the reassignment but the reassignment was implemented
after the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction of CA. Thus
the matter goes to SC.
ISSUE: WON the reassignment violated the employee’s right to
security of tenure
RULING: YES. The Court upholds the finding of the respondent
court that the reassignment of petitioner to MIST “appears to
be indefinite” which then appears to be more than temporary
due to the description specified as to the fitness for the
(reassigned) job, being an expert in the field. The
memorandum has nothing to show that the reassignment is
temporary or would only last until a permanent replacement is
found as no period is specified or fixed which fact evinces an
intention on the part of petitioners to reassign private
respondent with no definite period or duration. Such feature of
the reassignment violates the security of tenure of the private
respondent.
MAIN POINT: Security of tenure is a fundamental and
constitutionally guaranteed feature of our civil service. The
mantle of its protection extends not only to employees
removed without cause but also to cases of unconsented
transfers which are tantamount to illegal removals. While a
temporary transfer or assignment of personnel is permissible
even without the employee’s prior consent, it cannot be done
when the transfer is a preliminary step toward his removal, or
is a scheme to lure him away from his permanent position, or
designed to indirectly terminate his service, or force his
resignation. Such a transfer would in effect circumvent the
provision which safeguards the tenure of office of those who
are in the Civil Service
Andalahao
CASE NO. 95
ART IX B: CSC SEC 2: Scope of the System
Lazo vs CSC 236 SCRA 469
FACTS: CSC received a letter alleging fraud in the acquisition of
the CSC Sub-professional eligibility of petitioner Dennis Lazo.
The Regional Office - Tugeugarao found the complaint fictitious
and recommended the dismissal of the case. But the review of
the examination answer sheets pushed through and disclosed
that the petitioner's actual score was 34.48% and charged the
petitioner with dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct
prejudicial to the best interests of the service, and ordered the
Regional Office to a formal investigation; but recommended
the dismissal of the case for lack of evidence. But CSC revoked
the eligibility for being null and void.
Petitioner asked for a reconsideration, alleging it violated of his
right to due process and that the CSC had found him to have
failed the Civil Service Examinations without evidence being
presented to support the finding.
CSC affirmed its decision, hence the petition for certiorari was
filed alleging that the CSC acted with grave abuse of discretion
and denied petitioner's right to due process
ISSUE: WON CSC can revoke certificate of eligibility to
government service
RULING: YES. The Civil Service Commission is the central
personnel agency of the government charged with the duty of
determining questions of qualifications of merit and fitness of
those appointed to the civil service. Its power to issue a
certificate of eligibility carries with it the power to revoke a
certificate for being null and void.
MAIN POINT: Under the Constitution, the Civil Service
Commission is the central personnel agency of the government
charged with the duty of determining questions of
qualifications of merit and fitness of those appointed to the
civil service. Its power to issue a certificate of eligibility carries
with it the power to revoke a certificate for being null and void.
Andalahao
CASE NO. 96
ART IX B SEC 6: Prohibition of Appointment of "Lame Ducks"
People vs Sandiganbayan GR 164185 July 23 2008
FACTS: During the May 11, 1998 elections, Villapando ran for
Municipal Mayor of San Vicente, Palawan. Orlando M. Tiape
(now deceased), a relative of Villapandos wife, ran for
Municipal Mayor of Kitcharao, Agusan del Norte. Villapando
won while Tiape lost. On July 1, 1998, Villapando designated
Tiape as Municipal Administrator of the Municipality of San
Vicente, Palawan.
Charges were filed against Villapando and Tiape in violation of
Article 244 of the Revised Penal COde before the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon alleging that Mayor Villapando
committed crime in relation to and taking advantage of his
official functions by appointing Tiape as Municipal
Administrator in his town.
The information was docketed as a Criminal case and raffled to
the 4th Division of the Sandiganbayan. Villapando filed a
Demurrer to evidence and was iven merit by the
Sandiganbayan which ruled the prosecution did not allege
much less prove that the appointed Municipal Administrator
lacked any of the qualification imposed by the law and that
temporary prohibition is not synonymous with absence or lack
of legal qualification.
Hence the petition for certiorari was filed by the Ombudsman
through the Office of the Special Prosecutor assails the May 20,
2004 Decision of the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, in
Criminal Case No. 27465, granting private respondent
Alejandro A. Villapandos Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting
him of the crime of unlawful appointment under Article 244 of
the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE: WON the appointment made by Mayor Villapando is
valid
RULING: NO. The Court ruled that legal disqualification cannot
be read as excluding temporary disqualification to exempt
therefrom the legal prohibitions under the 1987 Constitution
and the Local Government Code of 1991. Basic is the rule in
statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish,
the courts should not distinguish. There should be no
distinction in the application of a law where none is indicated.
MAIN POINT: legal disqualification cannot be read as excluding
temporary disqualification to exempt therefrom the legal
prohibitions under the 1987 Constitution and the Local
Government Code of 1991. Hence an appointing officer cannot
appoint any public office any person lacking the legal
qualifications.
Case No. 97
Art 9-B Sec 7: Prohibitions; Appointments; Office;
Employment
Flores v. Drilon
FACTS: Petitioners, who claim to be taxpayers, employees of
the U.S. Facility at the Subic, Zambales, and officers and
members of the Filipino Civilian Employees Association in U.S.
Facilities in the Philippines, questions the constitutionality of
Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227 (Bases Conversion and
Development Act of 1992), under which respondent Mayor
Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman
and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority (SBMA).
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. 13, par. (d) of RA 7227 is
unconstitutional in line with Section 7 of Article 9-B.
RULING: Yes. Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227 is declared
unconstitutional. The phrase "shall be appointed"
unquestionably shows the intent to make the SBMA posts
appointive and not merely adjunct to the post of Mayor of
Olongapo City.
MAIN POINT: Section 7 expresses the policy against the
concentration of several public positions in one person, so that
a public officer or employee may serve full-time with
dedication and thus be efficient in the delivery of public
services. Congress may not create an exception to this rule.
NOTE: Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227 which states, "Provided,
however, that for the first year of its operations from the
effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall
be appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer of the
Subic Authority,"
Case No. 98
Art 9-B Sec 7: Prohibitions; Appointments; Office;
Employment
In re Eduardo Escala
FACTS: Respondent, Eduardo V. Escala, was appointed as SC
Chief Judicial Staff Officer, Security Division, by the Office of
Administrative Services (OAS)having been employed as Chief
Inspector of the PNP Aviation Security Group at the time of his
appointment in the Supreme Court. He was allowed to assume
office and perform his duties, for reasons of exigency in the
service although he has yet to comply with the submission of
all the documentary requirements for his appointment. During
the course of his employment, an anonymous letter reached
the OAS reporting that respondent received salaries and other
benefits from the Court and also from the PNP which was
confirmed by an active member in the PNP Aviation Security
Group.
ISSUE: W/N respondent’s act of holding two positions in the
government is unconstitutional.
RULING: Yes. He admitted his fault and was cognizant of the
consequences. The court ruled that the respondent is guilty of
gross dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service and ordered his dismissal.
MAIN POINT: It is clearly stated in Sec. 7, Art. 9-B that it is
prohibited for an appointive official to hold any other office or
employment in the government, making his act
unconstitutional.
Case No. 99
Art 9-B Sec 7: Prohibitions; Appointments; Office;
Employment
La Carlota City v. Rojo
FACTS: Atty. Rex Rojo resigned as a member of the
Sangguniang Panglungsod preceding the appointment, by Vice
Mayor Jalandoon, as Sangguniang Panglungsod on March 18,
2004. Petitioners alleged that respondent’s resignation as a
Sangguniang Panlungsod member was not accepted when it
was presented on March 17, 2004 during the scheduled regular
session of the SP of La Carlota City, Negros Occidental for lack
of quorum which makes him an incumbent regular SP member
when then he was appointed as SP Secretary, which
contravenes Section 7, Article IX-B of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or notthe appointment of respondent as
sangguniang panlungsod secretary is unconstitutional due to
lack of Quorum.
RULING: No. Seven (7) members (including the presiding
officer) were present on the 17 March 2004 regular session of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod, clearly there was a quorum such
that the irrevocable resignation of respondent was validly
accepted.
MAIN POINT: The appointment of the respondent was not
against Par. 1 of Sec. 7, Art. 9-B because he was not holding
any public office or position anymore when he was appointed.
Case No. 100
Art 9-B Sec 8: Prohibitions; Compensation; Foreign
Gift/Office/Title
Sedusasta v. Municipality of Surigao
FACTS: Pursuant to the provisions of section 1916 of the
Revised Administrative Code, Zacarias D. Sadueste, as district
engineer for the Province of Surigao, created an additional
compensation of not more than P60 a month payable from the
income of the waterworks system under his supervision which
took effect on January 1, 1936. Provincial board of Surigao, by
resolution, approved the designation. From January 1, 1936 to
March 30, 1939, plaintiff rendered services to the defendant
municipality in his capacity as sanitary and waterworks
engineer. The municipal council of the defendant municipality
failed to provide the necessary appropriation for his services in
the sum of P2,338.06, plaintiff instituted an action for its
recovery with claim for damages in the amount of P300. Trial
court dismissed the complaint holding that section 1916 of the
RAC has been repealed by section 17 of Act No. 4187(GAA
1936).
ISSUE: W/N the Sadueste can claim for damages from the
designation made.
RULING: No. There being no law by which the appellant is
specifically authorized to receive additional compensation for
his services as sanitary and waterworks engineer, his claim Article IX Section 8: Prohibitions;Compensations; Foreign
therefor must fail.
gift/office/title
MAIN POINT: The phrase “specifically authorized by law” was Santos vs CA
included in the provision in Sec. 8, Art 9-B because of peculiar
FACTS Upon retirement from the judiciary on 1 April 1992,
or exceptional reasons warranting the payment of extra or
additional compensation. petitioner was fully paid of his retirement gratuity under RA
910, as amended, where he was receiving a monthly pension
Case No. 101
Art 9-B Sec 8: Prohibitions; Compensation; Foreign for five years. He was then appointed Director III of
Gift/Office/Title
MMA(defunct, now called MMDA) under RA 7294
Peralta v. Mathay
ISSUE/S
FACTS: A resolution duly passed, granted the petitioner an
(1)Whether or not petitioner can continue to receive pension
optional retirement gratuity of P40,336.07.  Of that amount, he
was not able to collect the sum of P7,032.26, covering while receiving salary as a director (2) whether or not, upon
P3,982.26 as cost of living allowance, P1,275.00 as incentive
separation from MMA(MMDA), he can include his separation
bonus, and P1,775.00 as Christmas bonus.  Such items were
not passed in audit, the view of respondent Auditor General pay under RA 7294 for his service in the judiciary
being that they should be deducted from his gratuity, although
RULING
during petitioner's incumbency as Trustee, no question was
raised when he was paid such allowance and bonuses.  (1)Yes. The second paragraph of section 8 means he can still
Respondent Auditor General justified his action on the ground
receive pension or gratuity even if he accepts another position
that they "partake of the nature of additional compensation," a
trustee's remuneration being fixed by law in the form of a per where another compensation is attached (2) no. it would entail
diem of P25.00 for every board meeting of the GSIS attended. 
double compensation for the same service where he was
Respondent so ruled on June 28, 1966 and maintained such a
stand on September 1, 1966 when he denied a motion for already paid. RA 7294 does not specifically authorize payment
reconsideration. 
of additional compensation for years of government service
ISSUE: W/N incentive bonus and Christmas bonus are outside of MMA
additional compensation.
MAIN POINT
RULING: Yes. A trustee’s remuneration fixed by law is P25 per In instances when holding another office, he can
day. Incentive bonus and Christmas Bonus are obviously
draw his salary attached, provided that it is specifically
additional compensation.
authorized by the law
MAIN POINT: It is expressly provided in the Constitution:  "No
CHAM
officer or employee of the government shall receive additional
or double compensation unless specifically authorized by law." Case No. 103
He is of course entitled to be rewarded for the performance of
Article IX Section 8: Prohibitions;Compensations; Foreign
the functions entrusted to him, but that should not be the
overriding consideration.  gift/office/title
Cabili vs CSC
CHAM FACTS
Case No. 102
 The facts show that the Local Water Utilities
Administration Employees Association for Progress (LEAP),
represented by its Chairman, Leonardo C. Cruz, filed a
complaint before the CSC against Camilo P. Cabili and Antonio
R. De Vera, Chairman of the Board of Trustees and
Administrator, respectively, of the Local Water Utilities
Administration (LWUA). The complaint prayed for investigation
and opinion on the validity of the multiple directorship of
LWUA Deputy Administrator Rodolfo de Jesus and his
entitlement to per diems, representation and transportation
allowance (RATA), discretionary fund, and other extraordinary
and miscellaneous expenses (EME) from the Olongapo City
Water District where he was designated as member of the
board of directors. He received these monetary benefits in
addition to his compensation as Deputy Administrator of
LWUA.
ISSUE/S
Whether CHRISTMAS BONUS, CASH GIFT AND
PRODUCTIVITY INCENTIVE BONUS are in the nature or
additional compensation, hence should be disallowed
RULING
Yes. The prohibition cannot be any clearer. PD 198
states that each director shall receive a per diem, to be
determined by the board, for each meeting of the board
actually attended by him, but no director shall receive per
diems in any given month in excess of the equivalent of the
total per diems of four meetings in any given month. No
director shall receive other compensation for services to the
district
MAIN POINT
Bonuses given to one whose compensation under the
law is merely per diem violates the rule against additional
compensation
CHAM
Case No. 104
Article IX Section 8: Prohibitions;Compensations; Foreign
gift/office/title
Benguet State University vs Colting
FACTS
Congress passed Republic Act No. 8292 entitled An
Act Providing for the Uniform Composition and Powers of the
Governing Boards, the Manner of Appointment and Term of
Office of the President of Chartered State Universities and
Colleges, and for Other Purposes, granting rice subsidy and
health care allowance to BSUs employees. The grant of this rice
subsidy and health care allowance in the total amount of
P4,350,000.00 was disallowed in audit under Notice of
Disallowance No. 99-001-STF (98), stating that R.A. No. 8292
does not provide for the grant of said allowance to employees
and officials of the university. BSU requested the lifting of the
disallowance with the COA Regional Office, but it was denied, it
held that a non-existent item, project, activity, purpose, or
object of expenditure cannot be funded by augmentation from
savings or by the use of appropriations. It further held that the
grant of said allowances lacked statutory basis, transgressed
the constitutional proscription on additional, double, or
indirect compensation and ran counter to the provisions of the
Salary Standardization Law.
ISSUE/S
(1)Whether or not petitioner is authorized to grant
Health Care Allowance and Rice Subsidy to its employees (2)
Whether or not the recipients should reimburse the amounts
received by them
RULING
(1)Yes. It argues that the said law vests state universities and
colleges with fiscal autonomy, and grants them ample leeway
in the appropriation and disbursement of their funds and it
argues that the Salary Standardization Law does not expressly
prohibit the benefits, because the said allowances are in the
nature of a financial assistance and not an additional income
where the SC agrees. (2) The COA correctly ruled that the other
programs/projects under R.A. No. 8292 and its Implementing
Rules should be of the same nature as instruction, research,
and extension. In BSU's case, the disbursements were for rice
subsidy and health care allowances which are, in no way,
intended for academic programs similar to instruction,
research, or extension. However, no reimbursement was
needed
MAIN POINT
When a law says that money generated by a school
may be used for “other programs/projects of the university or
college”, such law is not an authorization for giving additional
or double compensation
CHAM
Case No. 105
Article IX Section 8: Prohibitions;Compensations; Foreign
gift/office/title
Herrera et.al vs NPC
FACTS On February 28, 2003, all NPC employees, including the
petitioners, were separated from the service. As a result, all the
employees who held permanent positions at the NPC as of
June 26, 2001 opted for and were paid the corresponding
separation pay equivalent to one and a half months salary per
year of service. Nonetheless, in addition to the separation
package mandated by the EPIRA, a number of NPC employees
also claimed retirement benefits under CA No. 186. Under
these laws, government employees who have rendered at least
20 years of service are entitled to a gratuity equivalent to one
month’s salary for every year of service for the first 20 years,
one and a half months salary for every year of service over 20
but below 30 years, and two months’ salary for every year of
service in excess of 30 years. The NPC, on the other hand, took
the position that the grant of retirement benefits to displaced
employees in addition to separation pay was inconsistent with
the constitutional proscription on the grant of a double
gratuity. Respondents argue that the grant of both separation
pay and retirement benefit amounts to double gratuity in
direct contravention of the Constitution and that no law
authorizes the payment of both separation pay and retirement
benefits to petitioners.
ISSUE/S
Whether or not NPC employees who were separated from the
service because of the reorganization of the electric power
industry and who received their separation pay under RA No.
9136 are still entitled to receive retirement benefits under CA
No. 186, as amended.
RULING
No. Section 8 of Article IX(B) of the Constitution
provides that no elective or appointive public officer or
employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect
compensation, unless specifically authorized by law. In prior
decisions, we have ruled that there must be a clear and
unequivocal statutory provision to justify the grant of both
separation pay and retirement benefits to an employee. Here,
absent an express provision of law, the grant of both
separation and retirement benefits would amount to double
compensation from one single act of separation from
employment.
MAIN POINT
Absent clear and unequivocal statutory authority, the
grant of both separation pay and retirement benefits violate
the constitutional proscription on additional compensation.
CHAM
Case No. 106
Article IX Section 8: Prohibitions;Compensations; Foreign
gift/office/title
NEA vs CSC
FACTS On November 16, 1988, public respondent Civil
Service Commission passed Resolution No. 88-830 regarding
the issue raised by its Provincial Extension Office, Naga City, on
whether NEA officials and employees were allowed to collect
additional compensation or allowances from private entities
such as electric cooperatives. On August 10, 1989, the General
Manager of Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. (BENECO)
requested a clarification, since the basic issue raised on
whether the NEA officials and employees were allowed to
collect additional compensation or allowance from private
entities such as electric cooperatives was not squarely resolved
in CSC Resolution No. 88-830.
ISSUE/S
Whether or not NEA officials and employees are
allowed to collect additional compensation or allowances from
private entities such as electric cooperatives
RULING
No. SC agrees with the CA when it affirmed public
respondent's finding that payment to NEA personnel
designated to cooperatives of allowances and other benefits on
top of their regular salaries from petitioner becomes violative
of their own charter which does not provide for such payment
and, thus, inimical to the best interest of public service. It also
violates the first paragraph of Section 8, Article IX-B of the
Constitution.
MAIN POINT
No elective or appointive public officer or employee
shall receive additional, double, or indirect compensation,
unless specifically authorized by law.
Pastor
Case No. 107
Art IX-B Sec 8: Civil Service Commission;
Doctrine of Finality
YAP vs. COA
FACTS:
in the Course of the regular audit, the Corporate
Auditor, MGC issued notices of disallowances against Mr.
Ramon R. Yap which were predicated on the ground that
appellants appointment to Manila Gas Corporation in addition
to his regular position as Department Manager of National
Development Company (NDC) and the subsequent receipt of
the questioned allowances and reimbursements from the
former directly contravened the proscription contained in
Section 7 (2) and Section 8, Article IX-b of the Constitution.

COA denied petitioner’s appeal and upheld the
decision of Corporate Audit Office II (CAO II) that characterized
the disallowed allowances and reimbursements as prohibited
by the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not COA committed grave abuse of
discretion when it used as a basis the public purpose
requirement in affirming the questioned disallowance.
RULING: No. Any disbursement of public funds which
includes payment of salaries and benefits to government
employees and officials must (a) be authorized by law, and (b)
serve a public purpose.
MAIN POINT:
It is, in fact, an oft-repeated rule that findings of
administrative agencies are accorded not only respect but also
finality when the decision and order are not tainted with
unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse
of discretion
Pastor
Note: Case 108 and 109 are related.
Case No. 108
Art IX-B Sec 8: Civil Service Commission;
Doctrine of Finality
Sergio I. Carbonilla, et al vs. Board of Airlines
FACTS: Petitioners Carbonilla, et al. filed an Omnibus Motion
to Intervene [in the Case No. 109] before the Court of Appeals
on the ground that as customs personnel, they would be
directly affected by the outcome of the case.
Court of Appeals denied Carbonilla, et al.’s motion for
intervention in its 26 February 2009 Resolution on the ground
that the case was for collection of unpaid overtime services
and thus should be pursued in a separate proceeding against
the proper respondents.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible
error in denying the intervention of Carbonilla, et al.
RULING: No.
Rules of Court shows the intention to give the courts
the full measure of discretion in allowing or disallowing the
intervention. The permissive tenor of the Rules of Court shows
the intention to give the courts the full measure of discretion in
allowing or disallowing the intervention.
MAIN POINT:
Once the courts have exercised this discretion, it
could not be reviewed by certiorari or controlled by mandamus
unless it could be shown that the discretion was exercised in an
arbitrary or capricious manner.
Motion for intervention - A person who has a legal interest in
the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the
parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be
adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of
property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof
may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action.
The court shall consider whether or not the intervention will
unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the
original parties, and whether or not the intervenor’s rights may
be fully protected in a separate proceeding.”
Pastor
Case No. 109
Art IX-B Sec 8: Civil Service Commission;
Doctrine of Finality
Office of the President vs. Board of Airlines Representatives
FACTS:
The Office of the President, et al. argued that the
Court of Appeals should have denied Board of Airlines
Representatives’ (BAR) petition because it had no jurisdiction
over the issues raised, involving the validity and collection of
money charges (overtime payment of BOC’s employees)
authorized by Customs Law which are under the jurisdiction of
the Court of Tax Appeals.
Also, The Office of the President, et al. alleged that
the Court of Appeals should have dismissed the petition
because of BAR’s failure to comply fully with the requirements
of verification and certification of non-forum shopping.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction
over BAR’s petition.
2. Whether or not the CA should have dismissed
the petition of BAR for failure to comply with
the requirements.
RULING:
1. Yes. CA has jurisdiction based on Section 3, Rule
43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. BAR’s
petition for review to the Court of Appeals from
the decision and resolution of the Office of the
President falls within the jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals.
2. No. As regards the certification of non-forum
shopping, this Court may relax the rigid
application of the rules to afford the parties the
opportunity to fully ventilate their cases on the
merits.
MAIN POINT:
1. Appeals from awards, judgments, final orders or
resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial
agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial
functions, which includes the Office of the
President, may be taken to the Court of Appeals.
2. Cases should be decided only after giving all
parties the chance to argue their causes and
defenses. Technicality and procedural
imperfections should not serve as basis of
decisions and should not be used to defeat the
substantive rights of the other party.
Pastor
Case No. 110
Art IX-B Sec 8: Civil Service Commission;
Doctrine of Finality
PEZA vs. COA
FACTS:
On September 13, 2007, the PEZA Auditor Corazon V.
Españo issued Notice of Disallowances on payments of per
diems to ex officio members of the PEZA Board for the period
2001-2006. She stated that the PEZA Management continued
paying per diems even after they were duly notified through
said NDs that such was in violation of the Constitution as
explained in the Civil Liberties Union case here ex officio
members in several government agencies were prohibited
from receiving additional compensation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not PEZA have legal basis in granting per
diems to the ex officio members of its Board.
RULING: No.
The lack of legal basis to grant per diems to ex officio
members of the PEZA Board, including their representatives,
has already been settled by no less than the Court En Banc in
the case of Bitonio, Jr., that the grant of per diems to PEZA
Board members as it was in conflict with the proscription laid
down in the 1987 Constitution.
MAIN POINT:
Findings of administrative agencies, such as COA, are
accorded not only respect but also finality when the decision
and order are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that
would amount to grave abuse of discretion
Pastor
Case No. 111
Art IX-B Sec 8: Civil Service Commission;
Doctrine of Finality
Dimagiba vs. Espartero
FACTS:
Ombudsman found respondents guilty of the charges
(Gross Neglect of Duty, Oppression, Conduct Prejudicial to the
Best Interest of Service, Inefficiency and Incompetence, and
Violation of Section 5 (a), Republic Act No. 6713) filed against
them and imposed upon them the penalty of dismissal from
the service. Court of Appeals, however, reversed the decision
of the Ombudsman.
Petitioners contended that the CA erred in acting on
the petition which was filed beyond the 10-day reglementary
period for filing the same as provided under Section 27 of RA
6770.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the honorable court of appeals erred
when it gave due course to respondents’ petition for review
despite being filed beyond the reglementary period of ten (10)
days set by section 27 of republic act 6770.
RULING: No.
If only to assure the judicial mind that no injustice is
allowed to take place due to a blind adherence to rules of
procedure, the dismissal on technicality of respondents’
petition, which is aimed at establishing not just their innocence
but the truth, cannot stand.
MAIN POINT:
Dismissal of appeals on purely technical ground is
frowned upon especially if it will result to unfairness as in this
case. Reasons or justifications to resist the strict adherence to
procedure, to wit:
(1) matters of life, liberty, honor and property;
(2) counsel’s negligence without the participatory
negligence on the part of the client;
(3) the existence of special or compelling
circumstances;
(4) the merits of the case;
(5) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or
negligence of the party favored by the suspension of
the rules; (6) a lack of any showing that the review
sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; and
(7) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced
thereby.
CASE NO. 112
ART IX-C (COE) SEC 1: COMPOSITION; QUALIFICATION;TERM
QUALIICATION
Cayetano vs. Monsod
FACTS: Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon
C. Aquino to the position of chairman of the COMELEC.
Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod
does not possess required qualification of having been engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten years. Under his resume,
he has been engaged in business and finance, in which areas he
has distinguished himself, but as an executive and economist
and not as a practicing lawyer.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent does not possess the
required qualification.
RULING: NO. Atty. Monsod’s past work experience as a lawyer-
economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of
industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-
legislator of both rich and the poor – verily more than satisfy
the constitutional requirement for the position of COMELEC
chairman.
MAIN POINT: Practice of law means any activity, in or out of
court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience.
AIMAR
CASE NO. 113
ART IX-C (COE) SEC 1: COMPOSITION; QUALIFICATION;TERM
INDEPENDENCE
Brillantes vs. Yorac
FACTS: Hilario Davide, who had been named chairman of the
fact-finding commission to investigate the December 1989
coup d' etat attempt, has to vacate his chairmanship over the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) . Haydee Yorac, an
associate commissioner in the COMELEC, was appointed by
then President Corazon Aquino as a temporary substitute, in
short, she was appointed in an acting capacity. Sixto Brillantes,
Jr. then questioned such appointment urging that under Art 10-
C of the Constitution “in no case shall any member of the
COMELEC be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting
capacity”.
ISSUE: Whether or not the designation made by the president
was unconstitutional.
RULING: YES. The Supreme Court ruled that although all
constitutional commissions are essentially executive in nature,
they are not under the control of the president in the discharge
of their functions. The choice of a temporary Chairman is an
internal matter which comes under the discretion of the
Commission as a body and that such discretion cannot be
exercised for the Commission by anybody else. This is to
guarantee constitutional independence.
MAIN POINT: It is expressly in sec 1 (2) that no member can be
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
Which is a safeguard insuring the independence of the
Commissions

AIMAR
CASE NO. 114
ART IX-C (COE) SEC 1: COMPOSITION; QUALIFICATION;TERM
INDEPENDENCE
Matibag vs. Benipayo
FACTS: Matibag was appointed Acting Director IV of the
Comelec’sEID by then Comelec Chairperson Harriet Demetriou
in a temporary capacity. Benipayo was appointed Comelec
Chairman in an ad interim appointment, and in his capacity as
Chairman issued a Memorandum address transferring
petitioner to the Law Department. Petitioner filed the instant
petition questioning the appointment and the right to remain
in office of Benipayo as Chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner
claims that the ad interim appointment of Benipayo violates
the constitutional provisions on the independence of the
COMELEC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo on
the basis of the ad interim appointments issued by the
President amounts to a temporary appointment prohibited by
Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution.
RULING: NO. An ad interim appointment is a permanent
appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no
longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has
qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its
permanent character.
MAIN POINT: While the Constitution mandates that the
COMELEC “shall be independent,” this provision should be
harmonized with the President’s power to extend ad interim
appointments.
AIMAR
CASE NO. 115
ART IX-C (COE) SEC 1: COMPOSITION; QUALIFICATION;TERM
QUALIICATION
Hayudini vs. COMELEC
FACTS: Hayudini filed his Certifcate of Candidacy for the
position of Municipal Mayor of South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi. Omar
filed a petition to Cancel Hayudini’s CoC, he asserted that
Hayudini should be disqualified for making false representation
when Hayudini declared in his CoC that he is a resident of the
Municipality of South Ubian when, in fact, he resides in
Zamboanga City, but COMELEC 1 st Division dismissed the case
for lack of substantial evidence. When the RTC decided in favor
of Omar, Omar filed again before the COMELEC by Virtue of a
Supervening Event. Hayudini however, won the mayoralty race.
Later on, the COMELEC’s 2nd Division issued a resolution
granting Omar’s second petition, thus, Hayudini filed a Motion
for reconsideration with the COMELEC En Banc, arguing that its
Second Division committed grave error when it gave due
course to a slowly filed petition and treated TC Decision as a
supervening event. The COMELEC En Banc denied Hayudini’s
Motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. But the COMELEC
later on declared Omar as mayor.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse
of discretion in its decision and proclaiming Omar as mayor.
RULING: NO. Generally the statutes providing for election
contests are to be freely interpreted in order that the will of
the people in the choice of public officers may not be defeated
by mere technical objections. It is imperative that his claim be
immediately cleared, not only for the benefit of the winner but
for the sake of public interest, which can only be achieved by
brushing aside technicalities of procedure that protract and
delay the trial of
MAIN POINT: In exercising its powers and jurisdiction, as
defined by its mandate to protect the integrity of elections, the
COMELEC must not be hindered by procedural rules in
resolving election disputes.
AIMAR
CASE NO. 116
ART IX-C (COE) SEC 1: COMPOSITION; QUALIFICATION;TERM
TERM
Naval vs. COMELEC
FACTS: From 2004 to 2007 and 2007 to 2010, Naval had been
elected and had served as a member of the Sanggunian,
Second District, Province of Camarines Sur. On October 12,
2009, the President approved Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9716,
which reapportioned the legislative districts in Camarines Sur
leaving the 2nd District two towns, Gainza and Milaor, merged
with five towns from the old First District. In the 2010
elections, Naval once again won as among the members of the
Sanggunian, Third District. In the 2013 elections, Naval ran
anew and was re-elected. Julia a candidate in the 2013
elections filed before the COMELEC a Verified Petition to Deny
Due Course or to Cancel COC of Naval because he had fully
served for three consecutive and allowing Naval to run as a
Sanggunian member for the fourth time is violative of the
inflexible three-term limit rule enshrined in the Constitution
and the LGC, which must be strictly construed. COMELEC
cancelled Naval's COC. Hence the petition, he contends that
the 3rd District is a new constituent, consisting of new voters,
residents and jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether or not Naval has the right to be elected as a
member a Sandiganbayan.
RULING: NO. The conditions for the application of the three-
term limit rule are present in the instant case as the records
clearly establish that Naval is running for the 4th time for the
same government post. Under RA no. 9176 the Third District is
just renamed, and not a new set of constituents.
MAIN POINT: Provincial board member’s election to the same
position for the third and fourth time, but now in
representation of the renamed district, is a violation of the
three-term limit rule.
Macy
CASE NO. 117
ART IX-C SEC I: Composition:Qualification:Term
Timbol v. COMELEC
FACTS: Timbol was declared a nuisance candidate and ordering
the removal of his name from the certified list of candidates for
the position of Member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Caloocan City. He received a Subpoena from COMELEC Election
Officer Valencia, together with his counsel, to appear During
the clarificatory hearing, Timbol argued that he was not a
nuisance candidate. Election Officer Valencia recommended
that Timbol's Certificate of Candidacy be given due course.
Despite favorable recommendation, Timbol's name was not
removed from the list of nuisance candidates posted in the
COMELEC's website. With the printing of ballots for the
automated elections Timbol filed a Petition praying that his
name be included in the certified list of candidates. Comelec
denied the petition for being moot, considering that the
printing of ballots had already begun.
ISSUE: WON COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in denying
petitioner Timbol’s Petition for inclusion in the certified list of
candidates.
RULING: Yes. Respondent declared petitioner a nuisance
candidate without giving him a chance to explain his bona fide
intention to run for office, when petitioner appeared in a
clarificatory hearing, it was an ineffective opportunity to be
heard. First, he would not have to file the Petition had been
given an opportunity to be heard in the first place. Second, in
the Minute Resolution, respondent denied petitioner's Petition
on the sole ground that the printing of ballots had already
begun
"to ensure that the electoral process is clean, honest, orderly,
and peaceful" the right to be heard of a candidate to explain
his or her bona fide intention to run for public office before he
or she is declared a nuisance candidate.
MAIN POINT: The power of the COMELEC to restrict a citizen's
right of suffrage should not be arbitrarily exercised. The
COMELEC cannot motu proprio deny due course to or cancel
an alleged nuisance candidate's certificate of candidacy
without providing the candidate his opportunity to be heard.
Macy
CASE NO. 118
ART IX-C SEC I: Composition:Qualification:Term
Jalover v. Osmena
FACTS: Osmeña filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the
position of mayor, Toledo City, Cebu. Soon thereafter, the
petitioners filed before the COMELEC a "Petition to Deny Due
Course and to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and to Disqualify
a Candidate for Possessing Some Grounds for Disqualification,"
because he allegedly failed to comply with the residency
requirement. In support of his allegations, Osmeña submitted
pieces of evidence such as a certification from the HOR that
Osmeña was the duly elected representative of the 3rd District
of Cebu, Tax Declarations, Absolute Sale concerning the Ibo,
Toledo City property, photographs of the exterior and interior
of the Ibo, Toledo City property, several affidavits attesting to
the fact that Osmeña resides and has profound socio-civic and
political linkages in Toledo City and many more.
ISSUE: WON COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
RULING: No. petitioners have not presented a convincing case
sufficient to show that the COMELEC committed an error of
jurisdiction in upholding the residency of Osmena and the
validity of his representation on this point in his COC. Osmeña’s
actual physical presence in Toledo City is established not only
by the presence of a place (Ibo, Toledo City, house and lot) he
can actually live in, but also the affidavits of various persons in
Toledo City. Osmeña’s substantial and real interest in
establishing his domicile of choice in Toledo City is also
sufficiently shown not only by the acquisition of additional
property in the area and the transfer of his voter registration
and headquarters, but also his participation in the community’s
socio-civic and political activities.
MAIN POINT: The minimum requirement under our
Constitution and election laws for the candidates' residency in
the political unit they seek to represent carries with it a very
specific purpose: to prevent "stranger[s] or newcomer[s]
unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community"
from seeking elective offices in that community
CASE NO. 119
ART IX-C SEC II: Powers and Functions
Administrative Power
Alfiado v. COMELEC
FACTS: Joel Miranda became the substitute candidate for his
father, Jose "Pempe" Miranda, for the position of Mayor. When
the ballots were counted, Joel emerged as the winner over his
opponent Antonio Abaya and he was later proclaimed. Amelita
S. Navarro also won and was proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of
Santiago City. Abaya filed a Petition to Declare Null and Void
Substitution which was later amended. The amended petition
sought the declaration of the certificate of candidacy of Jose
Miranda, the father of Joel, as null and void. The amended
petition’s decision ruled that since the certificate of candidacy
of Jose Miranda was not valid, he could not be validly
substituted by his son, Joel Miranda, as a mayoralty candidate
in Santiago City. Hence, Vice-Mayor Amelita S. Navarro thus
became the new Mayor of Santiago City by virtue of the law on
succession, but she was brought forth the loss of confidence in
her capacity and fitness to discharge the duties and to perform
the functions of her public office
ISSUE: WON an elective official who became City Mayor by
legal succession can be the subject of a recall election by virtue
of a Preparatory Recall Assembly Resolution which was passed
or adopted when the said elective official was still The Vice-
Mayor
RULING: No, it is already moot and academic. The assumption
by legal succession of the petitioner as the new Mayor of
Santiago City is a supervening event which rendered the recall
proceeding against her moot and academic.
A scrutiny of the said Resolution reveals that the person
subject of the recall process is a specific elective official in
relation to her specific office. The said resolution is supplied
with statements, which leave no doubt that the purpose of the
assembly was to recall petitioner as Vice Mayor for her official
acts as Vice Mayor. The intent of the PRA as expressed in the
said Resolution is to remove the petitioner as Vice Mayor for
they already lost their confidence in her by reason of her
official acts. To recall, then, the petitioner when she’s already
the incumbent City Mayor is to deviate from the expressed will
of the PRA.
MAIN POINT: The specific purpose of the preparatory recall
assembly was to revive the vice-mayor. However, the
resolution does not apply to the vice-mayor anymore, since she
gave up the office of vice-mayor when she assumed the
position of mayor.

Macy
CASE NO. 120
ART IX-C SEC II: Powers and Functions
Administrative Power
Columbres v. COMELEC
FACTS: Petitioner Rolando Columbres and private respondent
de Guzman, Jr. were candidates for the position of Mayor of
San Jacinto, Pangasinan. The Municipal Board of Canvassers
proclaimed De Guzman the winner. Petitioner filed an election
protest with the RTC contesting the 42 precincts and prayed for
the revision of ballots in the said precincts. Petitioner alleges
that there were 124 ballots which were written by two (2)
persons, and they should all be annulled. Instead, the
Commission (2nd division) annulled only 13 ballots while
validating 111 ballots in favor of respondent Hilario de
Guzman, Jr. Movant contends that the 13 ballots commonly
invalidated by both the COMELEC (Second Division) and the
trial court as having been written by two persons were no
different from the 111 ballots validated by the Commission
(Second Division) but invalidated by the trial court.
ISSUE: WON the findings of fact of the COMELEC Division
(especially in matters of appreciation of ballots) is absolute and
cannot be the subject to a Motion for Reconsideration before
the COMELEC En Banc;
RULING: No. The grounds of motion for reconsideration should
consist of insufficiency of evidence to justify the decision, order
or ruling; or that the said decision, order or ruling is contrary to
law. Nowhere in the provision can finding of fact be the subject
of motion for reconsideration. The finding by the Commission
(Second Division) that the 111 questioned ballots were written
by the same person is a finding of fact that may not be the
subject of a motion for reconsideration. Movant protestant-
appellee is not challenging the sufficiency of the evidence in
this instance but the appreciation by the Commission
MAIN POINT: To determine the winning candidate, the
application of election law and jurisprudence in appreciating
the contested ballots, is essential. Any question on the
appreciation of the ballots would directly affect the sufficiency
of the evidence supporting the declared winner. Any question
on the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the assailed
decision, order or ruling of a COMELEC Division is also a proper
subject of a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC
en banc. The legal presumption in validating ballots is that the
sanctity of the ballot has been protected and preserved. A
ballot appearing to have been written by two persons is
presumed to have been cast "as is" during the voting, and this
presumption can only be overcome by showing that the ballot
was tampered with after it was deposited in the ballot box.
Macy
CASE NO. 121
ART IX-C SEC II: Powers and Functions
Administrative Power
Sahali v. COMELEC
FACTS: During the 2010 elections, Sahali and Matba were two
of the four candidates who ran for the position of governor in
the Province of Tawi-Tawi while Ruby and Usman ran for the
position of Vice-Governor, The Provincial Board of Canvassers
proclaimed petitioners Sadikul and Ruby as the duly elected
governor and vice-governor respectively. Matba and Usman
filed a Manifestation and Ex-Parte Motion requesting that they
be allowed to secure photocopies of the contested ballots.
Further, they moved for a technical examination and the Book
of voters by comparing signatures and thumbmarks. Sadikul
and Ruby jointly filed the COMELEC 1 st division a strong
manifestation of grave concern and motion for
reconsideration. The COMELEC first division issued the assailed
order which denied the said motion for reconsideration filed by
Sadikul and Ruby. They filed instant petition asserting that the
COMELEC first division committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
ISSUE: WON Sadikul and Ruby were denied due process when
COMELEC granted the motion for technical examination to
Matba and Usman without giving them opportunity to oppose
the motion?
RULING: No. COMELEC in election disputes, is not duty-bound
to notify and direct a party to file an opposition to a Motion
filed by the other party. It is incumbent upon the party
concerned, if he or she deems it necessary, to file an
opposition to a Motion within five days from receipt of a copy
of the same without waiting for the COMELEC’s directive to do
so.
Further, this Court cannot see how due process was denied to
the petitioners in the issuance of the COMELEC First Division’s
Order. The petitioners were able to present their opposition to
the said motion for technical examination in their
manifestation and motion for reconsideration which they filed
with the COMELEC First Division. Indeed, the petitioners’
objections to the technical examination of the said election
paraphernalia were exhaustively discussed by the COMELEC
First Division in its May 3, 2012 Resolution. Having filed a
motion for reconsideration of the COMELEC First Division
Order, the petitioners’ claim of denial of due process is clearly
unfounded.
MAIN POINT: An election contest, unlike an ordinary civil
action, is clothed with a public interest. The purpose of an
election protest is to ascertain whether the candidate
proclaimed by the board of canvassers is the lawful choice of
the people.
CASE NO. 122
ART IX SEC 2 COMMISSION ON ELECTION
ADMINISTRATIVE POWER
Claudio vs Comelec
Facts: Jovito O. Claudio, was the duly elected mayor of Pasay
City who assumed his office on July 1, 1998. On May 29, 1999,
PRA adopted a resolution entitled RESOLUTION TO INITIATE
THE RECALL OF JOVITO O. CLAUDIO AS MAYOR OF PASAY CITY
FOR LOSS OF CONFIDENCE and made a formal submission to
the Office of the Election Officer on July 2, 1999 of the petition
for recall. Claudio contend that the convening of the PRA took
place within the one-year prohibited period which is violative
of Sec 74 of the Local Government Code (LCG) which provides:
xxxx (b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the
date of the official's assumption to office or one (1) year
immediately preceding a regular local election.
Issue: Whether the exercise of the power of recall was
prohibitive of the rule on the limitations on recall.
Ruling: No. The SC ruled that "recall" refers to the election
itself by means of which voters decide whether they should
retain their local official or elect his replacement. Thus, there
may be several PRAs held or petitions for recall filed with the
COMELEC - there is no legal limit on the number of times such
processes may be resorted to. These are merely preliminary
steps for the purpose of initiating a recall.
Main point: The limitations in 74 apply only to the exercise of
the power of recall which is vested in the registered voters. It is
this - and not merely, the preliminary steps required to be
taken to initiate a recall - which paragraph (b) of 74 seeks to
limit by providing that no recall shall take place within one year
from the date of assumption of office of an elective local
official.
Who digested: FRENCH
CASE NO. 123
ART IX-C SEC 2. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
ADMINISTRATIVE POWER
De Guzman v Comelec
FACTS: Petitioner is assailed the validity of Sec 44(4) of RA 8189
or the voters registration act of 1996 for it undermines the
constitutional independence of the COMELEC and their
authority to name, designate and appoint and then reassign
and transfer its very own officials and employees.
ISSUE: W/N Sec 44 of RA 8189 is valid and constitutional?
RULING: YES. As stressed by the Sol Gen, sec 44 establishes a
guideline for the comelec to follow. Said section provides the
criterion or basis for the arraignment or transfer of an election
officer and does not deprive the COMELEC of its power to
appoint and maintain its authority over its officials and
employees.
MAIN POINT: It is the power of the COMELEC to reassign and
transfer its officials and employees, but still bound to comply
with the laws passed by Congress.
Who digested: FRENCH
CASE NO. 124
ART IX-C SEC 2. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
ADMINISTRATIVE POWER
Social Weather Station v COMELEC
FACTS: Petitioner et.al wishes to conduct an election survey
throughout the period of the elections and release to the
media the results of such survey as well as publish them
directly. Petitioners argue that the restriction of the publication
of election survey by the COMELEC constitutes a prior restraint
on the exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and
present danger to justify such restraint.
ISSUE: W/N the COMELEC resolutions prohibiting the holding of
pre-polls and exit polls and the dissemination of their results
through mass media constitutional?
RULING: NO. The Court held that Sec. 5(4) is unconstitutional
because it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of
expression, a direct and total suppression of a category of
expression even though such suppression is only for a limited
period, and the governmental interest sought to be promoted
can be achieved by means other than suppression of freedom
of expression.
MAIN POINT: It is not an exercise by the COMELEC of its
adjudicatory power to settle the claims of parties.
Who digested: FRENCH
CASE NO. 125
ART IX-C SEC 2 COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
ADMINISTRATIVE POWER
Information Technology Foundation v COMELEC
FACTS: The COMELEC awarded the Contract for the automation
of the counting and canvassing of the ballots in the 2004
elections to Mega Pacific Consortium, an entity that had not
participated in the bidding and the poll body signed the actual
automation contract with MP eSolutions, Inc., a bidder but had
not met eligibility requirements which the Petitioners sought to
declare null and void the aforementioned resolution of the
COMELEC.
ISSUE: W/N the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion?
RULING: YES. The Court declared the assailed Resolution No.
6074 and subject Contract void for illegal, imprudent and hasty
actions of the Commission have not desecrated legal and
jurisprudential norms, but have also cast serious doubt upon
the poll body’s ability and capacity to conduct automated
elections.
MAIN POINT: The COMELEC placed the pith and soul of
democracy which is a credible, orderly, and peaceful elections
in jeopardy by the illegal and gravely abusive acts of the
respondents.
Who digested: FRENCH
CASE NO. 126
ART IX-C SEC 2. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
ADMINISTRATIVE POWER
Buac v COMELEC
FACTS: Petitioner is assailing the COMELEC’s resolution which is
the regularization of the conduct of the conversion of the
municipality of Taguig into a highly urbanized city in the
plebiscite conducted for the purpose stating that it has no
jurisdiction over plebiscite controversies. COMELEC contends
that the rules and regulations it has only covers election
protests. The quasi-judicial jurisdiction of the commission
extends those enumerated in Sec 2(2) of Art 9-C.
ISSUE: W/N the COMELEC has jurisdiction over controversies
involving the conduct of plebiscite and the annulment of its
result
RULING: YES. The COMELEC has jurisdiction over controversies
involving the conduct of plebiscites and not of regular courts.
The case at bar does not fit the kind of a case calling for the
exercise of judicial power and does not involve the violation of
any legally demandable right and its enforcement.
MAIN POINT: There is no plaintiff or defendant for it merely
involves the ascertainment of the vote of the electorate of
Taguig whether they approve or disapprove the conversion.
Art 9-C Sec 2(2) “COMELEC shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns,
and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city
officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving
elective municipal officials decided by the trial courts of
general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials
decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction”
CASE NO. 127
ART IX-C (COMELEC) SEC 2: POWERS AND FUNCTIONS
PAR.1: ADMINISTRATIVE POWER
Capalla v. Comelec
FACTS: The Comelec and Smartmatic-TIM entered into a
Contract for the Provision of an Automated Election System for
the May 10, 2010 Synchronized National and Local Elections
(AES Contract) which is a Contract of Lease with Option to
Purchase (OTP) the goods listed therein consisting of the
Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS), both software and
hardware. COMELEC issued a Resolution resolving to accept
Smartmatic-TIM’s offer to extend the period to exercise the
OTP. The agreement on the Extension of the OTP under the
AES Contract (Extension Agreement) was eventually signed.
Finally, respondent COMELEC issued a Resolution resolving to
approve the Deed of Sale with Smartmatic-TIM to purchase the
latter’s PCOS machines to be used in the upcoming 2013
elections. The Deed of Sale was forthwith executed. Petitioners
claim that the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in contracting for
the purchase of AES goods and services from Smartmatic-TIM
in spite of the below par performance of the latter’s PCOS
machines, CCS and other software and hardware in the May
2010 elections and non-compliance with the minimum
functional capabilities required by law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the deed of sale entered into by the
COMELEC was constitutional.
RULING: Yes. As the Comelec is confronted with time and
budget constraints, and in view of the Comelecs mandate to
ensure free, honest, and credible elections, the acceptance of
the extension of the option period, the exercise of the option,
and the execution of the Deed of Sale, are the more prudent
choices available to the Comelec for a successful 2013
automated elections. The alleged defects in the subject goods
have been determined and may be corrected as in fact fixes
and enhancements had been undertaken by Smartmatic-TIM.
Petitioners could not even give a plausible alternative to
ensure the conduct of a successful 2013 automated elections,
in the event that the Court nullifies the Deed of Sale.
MAIN POINT IN BOLD.
PEREZ, E.C.
CASE NO. 128
ART IX-C (COMELEC) SEC 2: POWERS AND FUNCTIONS
PAR.2: ELECTION CONTESTS
Flores v. Comelec
FACTS: Facts: Petitioner Roque Flores was declared by the
board of canvassers as having the highest number of votes for
kagawad in Barangay Poblacion, Abra, and thus proclaimed
punong barangay in accordance with Section 5 of R.A. 6679.
However, his election was protested by private respondent
Rapisora, who placed second. The Municipal Circuit Trial Court
of Tayum sustained Rapisora and installed him as punong
barangay in place of the petitioner. Flores appealed to the RTC,
which affirmed the challenged decision in totality. The
petitioner went to the COMELEC, which dismissed his appeal
on the ground that it had no power to review the decision of
the RTC, based on Section 9 of R.A. 6679, that decisions of the
RTC in a protest appealed to it from the municipal trial court in
barangay elections “on questions of fact shall be final and non-
appealable”. In his petition for certiorari, the COMELEC is
faulted for not taking cognizance of the petitioners appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 9 of R.A. No. 6679 is valid
insofar as it makes decisions of a municipal or metropolitan
court in a barangay election appealable to the trial court.
HELD: No, the decision rendered by the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, should have been appealed directly to the COMELEC and
not to the RTC. Accordingly, Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 6679,
insofar as it provides that the decision of the municipal or
metropolitan court in a barangay election case should be
appealed to the RTC, must be declared unconstitutional. Article
IX-C, Section 2(2) of the Constitution, providing that the
COMELEC shall “Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all
contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of
all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate
jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal
officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or
involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of
limited jurisdiction”. Municipal or Metropolitan Courts being
courts of limited jurisdiction, their decisions in barangay
election contests are subject to the exclusive appellate
jurisdiction of the COMELEC under the afore-quoted section.
MAIN POINT IN BOLD.
PEREZ, E.C.
CASE NO. 129
ART IX-C (COMELEC) SEC 2: POWERS AND FUNCTIONS
PAR.2: ELECTION CONTESTS
Galido v. Comelec
FACTS: Petitioner Galido and private respondent Galeon were
candidates during the local elections for mayor of Garcia-
Hernandez, Bohol. Petitioner was proclaimed the duly-elected
Mayor. Private respondent filed an election protest before the
RTC. After hearing, the said court upheld the proclamation of
petitioner. Private respondent appealed the RTC decision to
the COMELEC. Its First Division reversed the RTC decision and
declared private respondent the duly-elected mayor. After the
COMELEC en banc denied the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration and affirmed the decision of its First Division.
Undaunted by his previous failed actions, the petitioner filed
the present petition for certiorari and injunction before the
Supreme Court and succeeded in getting a temporary
restraining order. In his comment to the petition, private
respondent moved for dismissal, citing Article IX (C), Section
2(2), paragraph 2 of the 1987 Constitution, that “Final
decisions, orders or rulings of the COMELEC in election
contests involving elective municipal offices are final and
executory, and not appealable.
ISSUE: Whether or not a COMELEC decision may, if it sets aside
the trial court’s decision involving marked ballots, be brought
to the Supreme Court by a petition for certiorari by the
aggrieved party.
RULING: Yes. The fact that decisions, final orders or rulings of
the COMELEC in contests involving elective municipal and
barangay offices are final, executory and not appealable, does
not preclude a recourse to the Court by way of a special civil
action of certiorari. The court however believes that the
respondent COMELEC has not committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
rendering the questioned decision. The COMELEC has the
inherent power to decide an election contest on physical
evidence, equity, law and justice, and apply established
jurisprudence, in support of its findings and conclusions; and
that the extent to which such precedents apply rests on its
discretion, the exercise of which should not be controlled
unless such discretion has been abused to the prejudice of
either party. ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DIMISSSED.
MAIN POINT IN BOLD.
PEREZ, E.C.
CASE NO. 130
ART IX-C (COMELEC) SEC 2: POWERS AND FUNCTIONS
PAR.2: ELECTION CONTESTS
Mercado v. BES
FACTS: Petitioner Jose M. Mercado was proclaimed winner in
the election for chairman of the SK of Barangay Mabalor,
Ibaan, Batangas over his rival, private respondent Crisanto P.
Pangilinan. Immediately after proclamation as the winner by
the BET (Board of Election Tellers), Pangilinan filed a formal
protest with the BES (Board of Election Supervisors)
questioning the results of the election. The BES ordered the
reopening of the ballot box and the recount of the votes for SK
Chairman. The recount reversed in favor of Pangilinan.
Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Section 24,
Resolution No. 2499 of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) creating, for purposes of the elections in the
Sangguniang Kabataan (SK), the BES and making it the final
arbiter of all election protests.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. 24 of COMELEC Resolution No.
2499 contravene Par. 2, Sec. 2 of Art. IX-C insofar as it
mandates that the COMELEC shall have the power to enforce
and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct
of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall.
RULING: No. Sec. 24 of COMELEC Resolution 2499 placed the
SK elections under the direct control of the DILG (Department
of Interior and Local Government). Elections for SK officers are
not subject to the supervision of the COMELEC in the same
way that contests involving elections of SK officials do not fall
within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC.
MAIN POINT IN BOLD.
PEREZ, E.C.
CASE NO. 131
ART IX-C (COMELEC) SEC 2: POWERS AND FUNCTIONS
PAR.2: ELECTION CONTESTS
Relampagos v. Cumba
FACTS: Petitioner Relampagos and private respondent Cumba
were candidates for Mayor of Magallanes, Agusan del Norte.
Cumba was proclaimed the winning candidate. Unwilling to
accept defeat, the petitioner filed an election protest with the
RTC which found the petitioner to have won with a margin of
six votes over the private respondent and rendered judgment
in favor of the petitioner. Private respondent then appealed
the decision to the COMELEC. The petitioner filed with the trial
court a motion for execution pending appeal, which the trial
court granted. The private respondent then filed with the
respondent COMELEC a petition for certiorari to annul the
aforesaid order of the trial court granting the motion for
execution pending appeal and the writ of execution. The
COMELEC granted the petition ordering Cumba as restored to
her position as Municipality Mayor, upholding its exclusive
authority to decide petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus where the COMELEC maintains that there is a
special law granting it such jurisdiction Section 50 of B.P. Blg.
697, which remains in full force as it was not expressly
repealed by the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881).
ISSUE: Whether or not the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) has jurisdiction over petitions for, certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus in election cases where it has
exclusive appellate jurisdiction.
RULING: Yes. The Court holds that the last paragraph of
Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697 providing as follows: “The
Commission is hereby vested with exclusive authority to hear
and decide petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
involving election cases” remains in full force and effect but
only in such cases where, under paragraph (2), Section 1,
Article IX-C of the Constitution, it has exclusive appellate
jurisdiction. Simply put, the COMELEC has the authority to
issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
MAIN POINT: Since the COMELEC, in discharging its appellate
jurisdiction pursuant to Sec. 2 (2), Art. IX-C, acts as a court of
justice performing judicial power and said power includes the
determination of whether or not there has been grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, it
necessarily follows that the COMELEC, by constitutional
mandate, is vested with jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari
in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
AR
CASE NO. 132
ART IX-C (COMELEC) SEC 2: POWERS AND FUNCTIONS
ELECTION CONTESTS
People v. Delgado
FACTS: The authority of the RTC to review actions of the
COMELEC in the investigation and prosecution of election
offenses filed in said court is being questioned. Atty. Quilatan,
Election Registrar, filed a complaint to COMELEC against Hon.
Delgado, RTC presiding Judge, and other private respondents,
for alleged violation of the Omnibus Election Code [Sec 261 (2) makes
any false or untruthful statements in application for registration of voters, and (5) registers anew without
application for cancellation of previous registration].
The Regional Election Director of
R VII was designated by the COMELEC to handle the
prosecution, who eventually recommended the filing of
information against each private respondent. COMELEC en
banc resolved it against the respondents.

Private respondents assailed that no preliminary investigation
was conducted. Respondent court issued an order directing
COMELEC to conduct reinvestigation of said cases. COMELEC
prosecutor opposed the order alleging that only the Supreme
Court may review the decisions, orders, rulings and resolutions
of the COMELEC. This was denied by the court. contending that
since the cases were filed in court by the COMELEC as a public
prosecutor, and not in the exercise of its power to decide
election contests, the trial court has authority to order a
reinvestigation.
ISSUE: W/N in as much as the COMELEC is an independent
constitutional body, its actions on election matters may be
reviewed only on certiorari by the SC.
RULING: NO! The refusal of COMELEC to comply is untenable.
True that the decisions of the COMELEC on election contests or
administrative questions brought before it are subject to
judicial review only by SC. However, aside from the
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC to decide
election contests and administrative questions, it is also vested
the power of a public prosecutor with the exclusive authority
to conduct the preliminary investigation and the prosecution
of election offenses punishable under the Code before the
competent court.
MAIN POINT: When the COMELEC, through its duly authorized
law officer, conducts the preliminary investigation of an
election offense and upon a prima facie finding of a probable
cause, files the information in the proper court, said court
thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case. Consequently, all
the subsequent disposition of said case must be subject to the
approval of the court. The COMELEC cannot conduct a
reinvestigation of the case without the authority of the court or
unless so ordered by the court.
AR
CASE NO. 133
ART IX-C (COMELEC) SEC 2: POWERS AND FUNCTIONS
ELECTION CONTESTS
Garces v. CA
FACTS: Garces was appointed Election Registrar of Gutalac,
ZDN. She was to replace respondent Election Registrar
Concepcion who was transferred to Liloy, ZDN. Concepcion
refused to transfer post as he did not request for it. Garces was
prevented from assuming office by the order of the Provincial
Election Supervisor. Meanwhile, since Concepcion continued
occupying the Gutalac office, the COMELEC en banc cancelled
his appointment to Liloy.
Garces filed before the RTC a petition of mandamus.
Meanwhile, COMELEC en banc issued a resolution recognizing
Concepcion as Election Registrar of Gutalac, and at the same
time, cancelling the appointment of Garces. CA affirmed the
RTC’s dismissal of the case. Respondent questioned jurisdiction
of RTC contending that the COMELEC resolution should be
raised only on certiorari before the Supreme Court, and not
before the RTC, else the latter court becomes a reviewer of an
en banc COMELEC resolution contrary to Sec. 7, Art. IX-A.
ISSUE: W/N the case is cognizable by the SC.
RULING: NO! Sec 7 Art IX-A which states that any decision or
ruling of the commission may be brought to the SC on
certiorari is NOT applicable as there was no case or matter filed
before the COMELEC. The decisions, rulings, and orders pertain
to the COMELEC’s exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial
powers involving elective official. In the case at bar, what is
being assailed is the COMELEC's choice of an appointee to
occupy the Gutalac Post which is an administrative duty done
for the operational set-up of an agency. The controversy
involves an appointive, not an elective, official. Hence, the case
is cognizable by the RTC.
MAIN POINT: In the exercise of its functions over Election
Contests, the decisions, rulings and orders of the COMELEC
must pertain only in its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers
involving elective official, NOT appointive official.
CASE NO. 134
ART IX-C (COMELEC) SEC 2: POWERS AND FUNCTIONS
ELECTION CONTESTS
Zarate v. COMELEC and Lallave
FACTS: This is a case of certiorari ascribing grave abuse of
discretion to COMELEC for annulling the decision of MTC and
declaring respondent Lallave as SK Chairman of Brgy. Ican,
Pangasinan.
Petitioner Zarate lost to Lallave in the 1996 SK Elections of Brgy
Ican, Malasiqui, Pangasinan. Zarate garnered 45 votes as
against to Lallave who got 46 votes. Zarate then filed an
election protest before the Municipal Trial Court stating that
three or more votes that read “JL” should not have been
credited in favor of Lallave and must be considered as stray
votes. The MTC rendered its decision in favor of petitioner
Zarate, declaring 8 of the original 46 votes invalid.
Lallave appealed to the Commission on Elections theorizing
that the votes reading “JL” should be credited in his favor
considering that such initials sufficiently identify him as the
candidate. The appeal by Lallave was not referred to a division
of the Commission but was, instead, submitted to COMELEC en
banc. The COMELEC en banc annulled the decision of the
Municipal Trial Court and declared Lallave as the elected SK
chairman.
ISSUE: W/N COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of
discretion for rendering a decision even if the election case was
not heard and decided by a division.
RULING: YES! Election cases include pre-proclamation
controversies, and all such cases must first be heard and
decided by a Division of the Commission. The Commission,
sitting en banc, does not have the authority to hear and decide
the same at the first instance. The Court ruled that COMELEC
en banc transgressed the requirement that all election cases
shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions
for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the
Commission en banc. The Court ordered COMELEC to assign
the case to a Division to resolve the same.
MAIN POINT: Election cases must first be heard and decided
by a division of the Commission on Elections—the Commission,
sitting en banc, does not have the authority to hear and decide
the same at the first instance.
CASE NO. 135
ART IX-C (COMELEC) SEC 2: POWERS AND FUNCTIONS
ELECTION CONTESTS
Regalado v. CA
FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari on the decision
of CA affirming the ruling of RTC which found petitioner
Regalado guilty of violating Section 261(h)Prohibition on transfer of officers
and employees in the civil service
of the Omnibus Election Code.
Barba was appointed nursing attendant in the Rural Health
Office of Tanjay, Negros Oriental by then OIC Mayor Rodolfo
Navarro. As Navarro decided to run for mayor, petitioner
Regalado was appointed substitute OIC Mayor. While sitting as
OIC Mayor, he issued a memorandum to Barba transferring her
work assignment to a remote barangay without prior approval
from COMELEC. She then filed a complaint against petitioner
for violation of the Omnibus Election Code. The RTC rendered a
decision against the petitioner. CA affirmed the decision.
ISSUE: W/N the lower courts erred in their decision against
petitioner for violation of the requirement under Omnibus
Code that there should be no movement of personnel during
elections, without prior approval of COMELEC.
RULING: NO! The Court ruled that petitioner violated the
Omnibus Election Code, and that his justification of that the
appointment is in the exigency of public service, is not tenable.
Still, the petitioner should have acquired prior approval from
COMELEC before the transfer of the personnel.
MAIN POINT: Appointing authorities can transfer or detail
personnel as the exigencies of public service require. However,
during election period, as such personnel movement could be
used for electioneering or even to harass subordinates who are
of different political persuasion, such is prohibited unless
approved by the COMELEC
ART IX-C (COMELEC) SEC 2: POWERS AND FUNCTIONS
ELECTION CONTESTS
Faelnar v. People
FACTS: Petitioner Faelnar filed a certificate of candidacy for the
position of Brgy. Chairman of Brgy. Guadalupe, Cebu City in the
1997 barangay elections. A basketball tournament, dubbed the
"2nd JING-JING FAELNAR'S CUP," opened at the Guadalupe
Sports Complex. This gave rise to a complaint for electioneering
filed against petitioner by Antonio Luy. Complainant alleged
that the basketball tournament was actually a campaign
gimmick staged outside the campaign period in violation of the
Omnibus Election Code. The complaint was investigated by
Atty. Edwin Cadungog, election officer of Cebu City, who later
recommended the dismissal of the charges against petitioner.
On the other hand, the Law Department of the COMELEC
recommended the filing of a case against petitioner, which was
later dismissed by the COMELEC en banc. However, on motion
of Luy, the COMELEC reconsidered its action and ordered the
filing of the necessary Information against petitioner. They
were formally charged in the RTC.
Petitioner moved to quash the information contending that the
first resolution which dismissed the complaint against him, was
immediately executory and could no longer be reconsidered.
He avers that the MR is a prohibited pleading since the
resolution in question was immediately final and executory,
hence, no longer within the power of the COMELEC to
reconsider.
ISSUE: W/N the COMELEC’s first resolution dismissing the case
against petitioner is final and executory and cannot be
reconsidered.
RULING: NO! The Court ruled that under the 1993 Rules of
Procedure (which amended 1988’s), motion for
reconsideration of an en banc ruling, resolution or decision is
not allowed (except for election offenses). In the case at bar,
what is involved is a resolution of the COMELEC en banc in an
election offense. Therefore, the COMELEC may reconsider the
case against the petitioner.
MAIN POINT: The COMELEC has the power and functions over
Election Contests. Under the 1993 Rules of Procedure,
pleadings are allowed for cases decided by COMELEC en banc,
only if it involves an election offense.
ART IX-C, SEC 2: POWERS AND FUNCTION;
(2) ELECTION CONTESTS
Tan v. COMELEC
FACTS: In GR No. 148575-76, petitioners filed with the
COMELEC petition to declare failure of elections, one after
another. However, private respondents were already
proclaimed as the winning candidates. The petitioners therein
filed their Amended Petitions impleading for the first time the
winning candidates. Respondents filed their respective answers
to the petitions questioning in the main the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC to act on the said amended petitions. The COMELEC
issued an order declaring that it had jurisdiction over the
amended petitions conformably with Section 4 of Republic Act
No. 7166; and denying the omnibus motion of the respondents.
In GR No. 152882-83, private respondents are now herein
petitioners, filed with the Court a prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction, praying for the nullification of the public
respondents Orders. Petitioners have already assumed and are
already exercising their duties and functions as elective
provincial officials. Hence, the remedy of the losing candidates
is an election protest.
ISSUE: Whether or the COMELEC En Banc, now public
respondent, is vested with jurisdiction to take cognizance of
and resolve the amended petitions before it?
RULING: YES. The amended petitions filed by the respondents
herein are election protest cases over which the public
respondent has original exclusive jurisdiction under Section
2(2), Article IX-C of the Constitution. The public respondent
assumed jurisdiction over the amended petitions in the
exercise of its quasi-judicial powers. In resolving the amended
petitions, the public respondent will have to rule on the validity
of the proclamation of the petitioners and their right to hold
office and perform the duties appurtenant thereto. The alleged
fraud and irregularities, granting arguendo that they indeed
marred the elections, did not prevent or suspend the holding of
the elections in the aforementioned municipalities including
the preparation and transmission of the election returns.
MAIN POINT: In connection with Section 2(2) of Article IX-C,
where, as in this case, elections had been held and winners had
been duly proclaimed, the proper recourse should have been
to file regular election protest cases to ventilate the veracity of
the alleged election fraud and irregularities of the election in
the subject precincts with the consequent determination and
declaration of the real winners in the elections.
CASE N0. 138
ART IX-C, SEC 2: POWERS AND FUNCTION;
(2) ELECTION CONTESTS
Alauya v. COMELEC
FACTS: There was a petition to declare a failure of election in
Lumbatan and in the 5 municipalities of the province of Lanao
del Sur because of massive substitute voting. Private
respondent Tamano prayed for the suspension of proclamation
of the winning candidates. Alauya filed his Answer with Motion
to Dismiss. Sarangani filed his Answer and Opposition to the
Suspension of Proclamation. A special elections in Lumbatan
proceeded and the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBC)
canvassed the election returns. The results of the canvass of
Lumbatan and of the other 20 municipalities showed [The 2nd
District of the province of Lanao del Sur is composed of 21
municipalities] Menor as the No. 1 winning candidate, followed
by Sarangani (No. 2 spot) and Alauya (No. 3); the COMELEC en
banc issued the order directing the (PBC) NOT to proclaim the
alleged or supposed winners and to continue and complete the
canvass of election results in the 2nd District of Lanao del Sur.
Alauya filed a Motion to Lift Suspension of Proclamation with
the COMELEC and subsequently filed a Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC commit grave abuse of
discretion in assuming jurisdiction over said petitions, the pre-
proclamation controversy?
RULING: NO. Petitioner erroneously considered the petitions
as pre-proclamation controversies when, in fact, these were
filed under Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code for failure
of election. These petitions clearly state their nature XXX of the
widespread, massive and rampant substitute voting and other
electoral fraud, anomalies and irregularities which prevented
duly registered voters from actually voting in the regional
elections. As distinguished in the case of Loong v. COMELEC,
while, however, the COMELEC, is restricted in pre-proclamation
cases, to an examination of the election returns on their face
and is without jurisdiction to go beyond or behind them and
investigate election irregularities, the COMELEC is duty bound
to investigate allegations of fraud, terrorism, violence and
other analogous causes in actions for annulment of election
results or for declaration of failure of elections, as the Omnibus
Election Code denominates the same. XXX Needless to say, a
pre-proclamation controversy is not the same as an action for
annulment of election results or declaration of failure of
elections.”
MAIN POINT: The COMELEC has the constitutional authority to
declare a failure of election pursuant to Article IX-C, Section 2
of the 1987 Constitution and in accordance with Section 6 of
the Omnibus Election Code and Section 4 of R.A. 7166.
WEE
CASE N0. 139
ART IX-C, SEC 2: POWERS AND FUNCTION;
(4) DEPUTIZING LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES
People v. Basilla
FACTS: As an aftermath of the May 1987 congressional
elections in Masbate, complaints for violations of Section 261
of the Omnibus Election Code (BP Blg. 881) were filed with the
Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Masbate against the private
respondents (violation for: vote-buying [2] and carrying of
deadly weapon [1]). After preliminary investigation of the
foregoing complaints, the Provincial Fiscal of Masbate filed in
the Regional Trial Court, Cataingan, Masbate. However,
respondent, Judge Basilla, dismissed motu proprio the
information filed by the Provincial Fiscal giving the following
justification that the record shows that the complainant filed
the complaint with the fiscal and not with the COMELEC and
the COMELEC did not investigate the case. Petitioner moved
for reconsideration of respondent Judge's orders, without
success. The instant Petition for Review assails that the
dismissal of the criminal information filed against the private
respondents, as constituting grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The Petition argues
principally that the COMELEC has authority to deputize the
chief state prosecutors, provincial and city fiscals and their
assistants, under Sections 2 (4) and (8), Article IX-C of the 1987
Constitution, and that the COMELEC did deputize such
prosecution officers to conduct preliminary investigation of
complaints for alleged violation of election laws and to institute
criminal information therefor.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge erred in dismissing
the information filed on the ground that prosecuting election
offenses is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission
on Elections?
RULING: YES. There is no dispute that the COMELEC is vested
with power and authority to conduct preliminary investigation
of all election offenses punishable under the Omnibus Election
Code and to prosecute such offenses in court. This Code
(Section 265) vests “exclusive power” XXX upon the
COMELEC, it at the same time authorizes the COMELEC to
avail itself of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the
Government. Section 2 of Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution
clearly envisage that the COMELEC would not be compelled to
carry out all its functions directly and by itself alone. Section
2(4) of Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution likewise
authorizes the COMELEC to deputize, with the consent of the
President, other law enforcement agencies. This the COMELEC
has done and the consent of the President was given in E.O.
134 [27 February 1987]. The acts of the delegated officers are
in legal contemplation acts of the COMELEC.
MAIN POINT: IN BOLD.
WEE
 CASE N0. 140
ART IX-C, SEC 2: POWERS AND FUNCTION;
(5) REGISTRATION OF PARTIES AND ORGANIZATIONS
LDP v. COMELEC
FACTS: Prior to the May 2004 elections, the Laban ng
Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) has been divided because of the
struggle of authority between Party Chair Edgardo Angara and
Party Secretary General Agapito Aquino, both having endorsed
two different sets of candidates under the same party, LDP.
The matter was brought to the COMELEC. The COMELEC
recognized that it has the authority to act on matters
pertaining to the ascertainment of the identity of [a] political
party and its legitimate officers. In the same breath, however,
it held that internal party matters and wranglings [sic] are
purely for the party members to settle among themselves and
any unsettled controversy should be brought to the proper
forum with jurisdiction. The Commission in its resolution, has
recognized the factions creating two sub-parties: LDP Angara
wing and LDP Aquino. Sen. Angara thus filed the present
petition for Certiorari assailing the COMELEC Resolution for
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC did commit grave abuse
of discretion when it issued the resolution diving the LDP into
wings, each of which nominate candidates for every elective
position and be entitled to representation?
RULING: YES. The COMELEC, by dividing a political party into
“wings,” effectively diffused the party’s strength and
undeniably emasculated its chance of obtaining the
Commission’s nod as the dominant minority party, and by
allowing each wing to nominate different candidates, the
COMELEC planted the seeds of confusion among the
electorate, who are apt to be confounded by two candidates
from a single political party. As in the case of Recabo, Jr. v.
Commission on Elections, the Court declared that the electoral
process envisions one candidate from a political party for each
position, and disunity and discord amongst members of a
political party should not be allowed to create a mockery
thereof. The admonition against mocking the electoral process
not only applies to political parties but with greater force to the
COMELEC. By according both wings representatives in the
election committees, the COMELEC has eroded the significance
of political parties and effectively divided the opposition.
MAIN POINT: In line with Section 2(5) of Article IX-C,
registration, aside from conferring juridical personality, serves
other purposes as well. It informs the people of the party's or
organization's existence and of its ideals, and it identifies the
parties and its officers for purposes of regulation by the
Commission on Elections. Because of this last purpose, and as a
corollary to the right to form associations, every political party
or organization should be allowed to register.
WEE
CASE N0. 141
ART IX-C, SEC 2: POWERS AND FUNCTION;
(5) REGISTRATION OF PARTIES AND ORGANIZATIONS
Atienza v. COMELEC
FACTS: Drilon, the former president of the Liberal Party (LP)
announced that his party withdrew support for the
administration of former PGMA. However, Atienza, LP
Chairman, alleged that Drilon made the announcement
without consulting first the party. Atienza, then, hosted a party
conference which resulted to the election of new officers, with
Atienza as LP president. Drilon immediately filed a petition with
the COMELEC to nullify the said election claiming that it was
illegal considering that the party’s electing bodies, National
Executive Council (NECO) and National Political Council
(NAPOLCO),were not properly convened. Moreover, Drilon
claimed that under the LP Constitution, there is a three-year
term, meaning, his term has not yet ended. However, Atienza
contested that the election of new officers could be likened to
people power removing Drilon as president by direct action.
Also, Atienza alleged that the amendment to the LP
Constitution providing the three-term had not been properly
ratified. The COMELEC held that the election of Atienza and
others was invalid since the electing assembly did not convene
in accordance with the LP Constitution. Subsequently, the LP
held a NECO meeting to elect new party leaders before
respondent Drilon’s term expired which resulted to the
election of Roxas as the new LP president. Now, petitioner,
Atienza et al., sought to enjoin Roxas from assuming the
presidency of the LP questioning the validity of the quorum.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction over the
intra-party disputes?
RULING: YES. The COMELEC’s jurisdiction over intra-party
disputes is limited. It does not have blanket authority to
resolve any and all controversies involving political parties.
Political parties are generally free to conduct their activities
without interference from the state. The COMELEC may
intervene in disputes internal to a party only when necessary
to the discharge of its constitutional functions. The COMELEC’s
jurisdiction over intra-party leadership disputes has already
been settled by the Court. The Court ruled in Kalaw v.
Commission on Elections, that the COMELEC’s powers and
functions under Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution,
“include the ascertainment of the identity of the political
party and its legitimate officers responsible for its acts.” The
Court also declared in another case that the COMELEC’s
power to register political parties necessarily involved the
determination of the persons who must act on its behalf .
Thus, the COMELEC may resolve an intra-party leadership
dispute, in a proper case brought before it, as an incident of its
power to register political parties.
MAIN POINT: IN BOLD.
Ahmad
CASE NO. 142
ART-IX-C (COE) SEC. 2: Powers and Functions
 Par 5: Registration of Parties and Organization
Lokin v. COMELEC
Facts: CIBAC party-list is a multi-sectoral party registered under
Republic Act No. (R.A.) 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List
System Act. Herein the petitioners assail the COMELEC’s
resolution in favor of the private respondents of their “Petition
to Expunge from the Records and/or Disqualification” nullifying
their certificate “Manifestation of Intent to Participate in the
Party-list system of representation in the May 10, 2010
elections” filed by a certain Derla.. In the same resolution the
respondent’s faction was also declared by the COMELEC as the
true nominees of CIBAC. In a per curiam resolution it also
reiterated that Derla was unable to prove her identity to file
the said certificate, whereas respondents presented
overwhelming evidence that they were the deputized to
submit the certificate of nomination pursuant to CIBAC’s
constitution and bylaws.
Issue: WON the COMELEC erred in granting the Petition for
Disqualification and recognizing respondents as the properly
authorized nominees of CIBAC party-list.
Ruling: NO, they submitted their Certificate of Nomination and
Manifestation of Intent to participate in the party-list elections.
Precisely, petitioners were seeking the COMELEC’s approval of
their eligibility to participate in the upcoming party-list
elections. In effect, they invoke its authority under the Party-
List System Act. Contrary to their stance that the present
dispute stemmed from an intra-corporate matter, their
submissions even recognize the COMELEC’s constitutional
power to enforce and administer all laws relative to the
conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and
recall. More specifically, as one of its constitutional functions,
the COMELEC is also tasked to “register, after sufficient
publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions which,
in addition to other requirements, must present their platform
or program of government.”
Main point: It is within the COMELEC’s power to register
political parties necessarily involved in the determination of
the persons who must act on its behalf. Thus, the COMELEC
may resolve an intra-party leadership dispute, in a proper case
brought before it as an incident of its power to register political
parties.
Ahmad
CASE NO. 143
ART-IX-C (COE) SEC. 2: Powers and Functions
Par 6: Prosecution of Election Offenses
People v. Inting
Facts: Acting on the complaint of Editha Barbara against OIC-
Mayor Dominador Regalado for transferring her from the office
of the Municipal Mayor to a very remote Brgy. without
obtaining the permission or clearance of the COMELEC as
required by law. COMELEC directed Atty. Gerardo Lituanas,
Provincial Election Supervisor of Dumaguete City: (1) to
conduct the preliminary investigation of the case; (2) to
prepare and file the necessary information in court; (3) to
handle the prosecution if the evidence submitted shows
a prima facie case and (4) to issue a resolution of prosecution
or dismissal as the case may be. After finding a prima facie case
a criminal case was filed against the OIC-Mayor and his arrest
was ordered, however before he could even be arrested the
trial court set aside its order on the ground that Atty. Lituanas
is not authorized to determined probable cause, the court
stated that it “will give due course to the information filed in
this case if the same has the written approval of the Provincial
Fiscal after which the prosecution of the case shall be under
the supervision and control of the latter.”
Issue: WON a preliminary investigation conducted by a
Provincial Election Supervisor involving election offenses have
to be coursed through the Provincial Fiscal now Provincial
Prosecutor, before the Regional Trial Court may take
cognizance of the investigation and determine whether or not
probable cause exists?
Ruling: No. Comelec is empowered to conduct preliminary
investigations in cases involving election offenses for the
purpose of helping the Judge determine probable cause and for
filing an information in Court. In effect the 1987 Constitution
mandates the COMELEC not only to investigate but also to
prosecute cases of violation of election laws. This means that
the COMELEC is empowered to conduct preliminary
investigations in cases involving election offenses for the
purpose of helping the Judge determine probable cause and for
filing an information in court. This power is exclusive with
COMELEC.
Main point: The Provincial Fiscal, as such, assumes no role in
the prosecution of election offenses. If the Fiscal or Prosecutor
files an information charging an election offense or prosecutes
a violation of election law, it is because he has been deputized
by the COMELEC. He does not do so under the sole authority of
his office.
Ahmad
CASE NO. 144
ART-IX-C (COE) SEC. 2: Powers and Functions
Par 6: Prosecution of Election Offenses
Corpus v. Tanodbayan
Facts: Corpus et.al were members of the Citizens Election
Committee of Caba La Union Esteban Mangaser, an
independent candidate for vice-mayor of the municipality of
sent a letter to Pres. Marcos charging the petitioners with
violation of the 1978 Election Code, specifically for
electioneering and/or campaigning inside the voting centers
during the election. On instruction from the COMELEC the
Regional Election Director conducted a formal investigation
and submitted his report recommending to the COMELEC the
dismissal of the complaint, it did dismissed the complaint for
insufficiency of evidence. However, it was refiled in the
Tanodbayan. Subsequently the assistant provincial fiscal
started a preliminary investigation of the same complaint filed
by Mangaser with the Tanodbayan against the same parties
previously dismissed by the COMELEC, the same moved for
dismissal of the complaint but the motion was denied. The
Tanodbayan asserting exclusive authority to prosecute the
case, stated in a letter to the COMELEC Chairman that a lawyer
of the COMELEC if not properly deputized as a Tanodbayan
prosecutor has no authority to conduct preliminary
investigations and prosecute offenses committed by COMELEC
officials in relation to their office.
Issue: WON the Tanodbayan have the power to investigate,
prosecute and try election offenses committed by a public
officer in relation to his office.
Ruling: No. An examination of the provisions of the
Constitution and the Election Code of 1978 reveals the clear
intention to place in the COMELEC exclusive jurisdiction to
investigate and prosecute election offenses committed by any
person, whether private individual or public officer or
employee, and in the latter instance, irrespective of whether
the offense is committed in relation to his official duties or not.
Main point: It is the nature of the offense and not the
personality of the offender that matters. As long as the offense
is an election offense jurisdiction over the same rests
exclusively with the COMELEC, in view of its all- embracing
power over the conduct of elections. The Tanodbayan cannot
on its own prosecute election offenses.
Note: Tanodbayan = Ombudsman
Ahmad
CASE NO. 145
ART-IX-C (COE) SEC. 2: Powers and Functions
Par 6: Prosecution of Election Offenses
Comelec v. Silva
Facts: Pursuant to its power under Art. IX-C (6) of the
Constitution, the COMELEC charged private respondents with
violations R.A. No. 6646, in twelve separate information filed
with the RTC-Bataan. Tanciongco, who is provincial prosecutor
of Bataan, was vice chairman, while Castillo, who is division
superintendent of schools, was secretary of the Provincial
Board of Canvassers. Uy, who is assistant regional director of
elections, was chairman of the board, the three were accused
of having tampered, in conspiracy with one another, with the
CO canvass by increasing the votes received by then senatorial
candidate Juan Ponce Enrile in certain municipalities of Bataan
in the 1995 elections. The cases were raffled to three branches
of the court presided over by respondent judges, Hon. Silva
and Hon. Vianzon. In orders Judges Silva and Vianzon
summarily dismissed the cases against private respondents.
The COMELEC sought to appeal the dismissal of the cases to
the Court of Appeals by filing notices but the judges denied due
course to its appeal. The sole basis for the denials was the fact
that the prosecutor, whom the COMELEC had deputized to
prosecute the cases, had earlier taken a contrary stand against
the COMELEC. Hence this petition seeking the nullification of
the orders of the two judges, denying due course to their
Notices of Appeal.
Issue: WON The authority to the dismissal of a criminal
prosecution for an election offense belongs to the COMELEC,
not the designated prosecutor.
Ruling: Yes. Prosecutors designated by the COMELEC to
prosecute the cases act as its deputies. Consequently, it was
beyond the power of Chief State Prosecutor Zuño to oppose
the appeal of the COMELEC. For that matter, it was beyond his
power, as COMELEC-designated prosecutor, to leave to the
trial courts the determination of whether there was probable
cause for the filing of the cases and, if it found none, whether
the cases should be dismissed. Those cases were filed by the
COMELEC after appropriate preliminary investigation. If the
Chief State Prosecutor thought there was no probable cause
for proceeding against private respondents, he should have
discussed the matter with the COMELEC and awaited its
instruction. If he disagreed with the COMELEC’s findings, he
should have sought permission to withdraw from the cases.
But he could not leave the determination of probable cause to
the courts and agree in advance to the dismissal of the cases
should the courts find no probable cause for proceeding with
the trial of the accused.
Main point: The Prosecutors designated by the COMELEC
derive their authority from it and not from their offices. The
authority to decide on the appeal the dismissal belongs to the
COMELEC. Art. IX-C, §2(6) of the Constitution expressly vests in
it the power and function to “investigate and, where
appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws,
including acts or omissions constituting election frauds,
offenses, and malpractices.”
Ahmad
CASE NO. 146
ART-IX-C (COE) SEC. 2: Powers and Functions
Par 6: Prosecution of Election Offenses
Comelec v. Hon. Espanol
Facts: May 11, 1998, Florentino A. Bautista, Lakas candidate for
Mayor of Kawit, Cavite executed an Affidavit-Complaint
charging the incumbent Municipal Mayor Atty. Federico
Poblete and other candidate of violation of the Omnibus
Election Code under paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 261 (vote
buying) and filed the same with the Law Department of the
COMELEC. The commission’s Law Department filed an
Information against the respondents with the RTC-Cavite. In
the meantime, Gerardo Macapagal and Inocencio Rodelas filed
a criminal complaint for violation of Section 261(a) of the
Omnibus Election Code (vote selling) against Bautista. An
information was filed before the RTC. COMELEC now claims
that it has the “exclusive power” to review, motu proprio or
through an appeal, the “recommendation or resolution of
investigating officers” in the preliminary investigation since it
has “exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all
election offenses and to prosecute the same” and to review the
recommendation or resolution of investigating officers.
Issue: WON the review of the Provincial Prosecutor's resolution
by COMELEC and the subsequent request for its nullification
was proper.
Ruling: Yes. Under Article IX, Section 2(b) of the Constitution,
the petitioner is empowered to investigate and, when
appropriate, prosecute election offenses. The grant by the
Constitution to the petitioner of the express power to
investigate and prosecute election offenses is intended to
enable the petitioner to assure the people of a fine, orderly,
honest, peaceful and credible election. Under Section 265 of
the Omnibus Election Code, the petitioner, through its duly
authorized legal officers, has the exclusive power to conduct
preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable
under the Omnibus Election Code, and to prosecute the same.
Main point: The petitioner may avail of the assistance of the
prosecuting arms of the government but as held in a previous
case the continuing authority of the Provincial or City
Prosecutors stays until revoked or withdrawn any time by the
petitioner, either expressly or impliedly, when in its judgment
such revocation or withdrawal is necessary to protect the
integrity of the process to promote the common good, or
where it believes that successful prosecution of the case can be
done by the petitioner.
FRED (ghost fihter)
CASE NO. 147
ART IX-C, SEC 2: POWERS AND FUNCTIONS
PROSECUTION OF ELECTION OFFENSES (w/ sub)
Arroyo vs. Department of Justice
FACTS: Upon the discovery of 2004 and 2007 election fraud,
the COMELEC issued a resolution approving a committee joint
with the (DOJ), to conduct investigation on alleged offenses
committed during 2004 and 2007 elections. Several persons
were recommended to be charged administratively, while
others including petitioner Arroyo, were recommended to be
subjected to further investigation.
Thereafter, petitioners filed before the Court
prayer for issuance of TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction assailing the creation of the Joint Panel.
ISSUE: W/N the creation of the joint committee, which
fuses the commission on elections - a constitutionally
independent body - with the department of justice – a political
agent of the executive – demolishes the independence of the
commission on elections as provided in article ix(a), sections 1
and 2
RULING: No. The DOJ now conducts preliminary investigation
of election offenses concurrently with the Comelec and no
longer as mere deputies.—The grant of exclusive power to
investigate and prosecute cases of election offenses to the
Comelec was not by virtue of the Constitution but by the
Omnibus Election Code which was eventually amended by
Section 43 of R.A. 9369. Thus, the DOJ now conducts
preliminary investigation of election offenses concurrently
with the Comelec and no longer as mere deputies.
(MAIN POINT in BOLD)
FRED (ghost fihter)
CASE NO. 148
ART IX-C, SEC 3: DECISIONS (w/o sub)
Pangilinan vs. COMELEC
FACTS: The petitioner Pangilinan and private respondent
Belmonte, Jr. were both candidates for congressman in the 4th
legislative district of Quezon City in the 1992 elections. A
petition for disqualification against the private respondent was
filed with the COMELEC for violation of Section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (B. P. Blg. 881) for
alleged anomalous acts which were later scrutinized. During
the canvassing, the petitioner objected to over 120 election
returns being canvassed on the ground that they were
tampered, altered or spurious. The canvassers, retorted that
under Section 15 of R.A. No. 7166 and Section 23 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 2413, entitled "General Instructions for the
Provincial/City/District and Municipal Board of Canvassers
(BoC)" pre-proclamation controversies are not allowed in the
election of members of the HoR
Canvassing committees for canvassing of returns
were created. The petitioner objected to the creation of such
because he was not given the opportunity to appoint watchers
and/or counsel to such. The BoC proceeded to canvass the
returns. The petitioner, therefore, filed a petition, claiming that
public respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and
argues that Section 15 of R.A. 7166 is unconstitutional, for it
disallows pre-proclamation controversies in the election of
members of the HoR. The petitioner claims that COMELEC has
the power to hear and decide pre-proclamation controversies
without distinction as to whether the pre-proclamation
controversy involves the election of Members of the
HoR/provincial/local elective officials.
ISSUE: W/N Section 15 of R.A. No. 7166 and
Section 23 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2413 disallowing pre-
proclamation controversies in the election of members of the
House of Representatives are unconstitutional.
RULING: No. The Constitution vests in the COMELEC “exclusive
original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections,
returns, and qualifications of all elective regional
provincial and city officials.” It has no jurisdiction over contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of Members
of the House of Representatives.. Consequently, the phrase
“including pre-proclamation controversies” used in Sec 3,
Article IX-C of the Constitution should be construed as
referring only to “pre-proclamation controversies” in election
cases that fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
COMELEC, i.e., election cases pertaining to the election of
regional, provincial and city officials.
(MAIN POINT in BOLD)
FRED (ghost fihter)
CASE NO. 149
ART IX-C, SEC 3: DECISIONS (w/o sub)
Sarmiento v. COMELEC
FACTS: The special civil actions for certiorari  filed under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seek to set aside the Resolutions
of respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in granting
the appeal from the ruling of the Municipal Board of
Canvassers of Virac, Catanduanes which ordered the exclusion
from the canvass of one (1) election return;
Petitioners impugn the challenged resolutions
above specified as having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion in that, inter alia, the Commission, sitting en banc,
took cognizance of and decided the appeals without first
referring them to any of its Divisions.
ISSUE: W/N the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion, when it resolved the appeals of
petitioners in the abovementioned Special Cases without first
referring them to any of its Divisions?
RULING: Yes. It is clear from the provision of the 1987
Constitution that election cases include pre-proclamation
controversies, and all such cases must first be heard and
decided by a Division of the Commission.
Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en
banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of
procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases,
including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election
cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that
motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the
Commission en banc.
The Commission, sitting en banc, does not have the authority
to hear and decide the same at the first instance. In the
COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE, pre-proclamation cases are
classified as Special Cases 1 and, in compliance with the above
provision of the Constitution, the two (2) Divisions of the
Commission are vested with the authority to hear and decide
these Special Cases.
(MAIN POINT in BOLD)
FRED (ghost fihter)
CASE NO. 150
ART IX-C, SEC 3: DECISIONS (w/o sub)
Canicosa v. COMELEC
FACTS: DO "BOY" CANICOSA and SEVERINO LAJARA were
candidates for mayor in Calamba, Laguna, during the 1995
elections. After obtaining a majority votes Lajara was
proclaimed winner by the Municipal Board of Canvassers. Later
Canicosa filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Declare Failure
of Election and to Declare Null and Void the Canvass and
Proclamation  because of alleged widespread frauds and
anomalies in casting and counting of votes, preparation of
election returns, violence, threats, intimidation, vote buying,
unregistered voters voting, and delay in the delivery of election
documents and paraphernalia from the precincts to the Office
of the Municipal Treasurer. The COMELEC en banc  dismissed
the petition on the ground that the allegations therein did not
justify a declaration of failure of election.
Canicosa finally insists that the COMELEC sitting en
banc erred  in ruling on his petition. He maintains that his
petition should have first been heard by a division of COMELEC
and later by the COMELEC en banc upon motion for
reconsideration, pursuant to Sec. 3, Art. IX-C, of the
Constitution.
ISSUE: W/N his petition should have first been heard by a
division of COMELEC and later by the COMELEC en banc upon
motion for reconsideration, pursuant to Sec. 3, Art. IX-C, of the
Constitution.?
RULING: NO. The provision applies only when the COMELEC
acts in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial
functions and not when it merely exercises purely
administrative functions.
The grounds cited by Canicosa in his petition require the
exercise by the COMELEC of its administrative
functions. Section 2, Art. IX-C, of the 1987 Constitution grants
extensive administrative powers to the COMELEC with regard
to the enforcement and administration of all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of elections.  and city officials, which fall within the exclusive original
Main Point: Quite obviously, it is only in the exercise of its
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers that the COMELEC is
mandated to hear and decide cases first by Division and then,
upon motion for reconsideration, by the COMELEC en
banc. This is when it is jurisdictional. In the instant case, as
aforestated, the issues presented demand only the exercise by
the COMELEC of its administrative functions.
FRED (ghost fihter)
CASE NO. 151
ART IX-C, SEC 3: DECISIONS (w/o sub)
RAMAS v. COMELEC
FACTS: The petitioners and the private respondents were the
official candidates of rival party lists, for the elective municipal
positions of Guipos, Zamboanga del Sur, in the elections of 8
May 1995. After the canvassing of returns, the Municipal Board
of Canvassers of Guipos proclaimed the petitioners as the duly
elected officials.
Private respondents, the losing candidates for mayor
and vice mayor, respectively, as well as, the 9 th, 10th, 11th, and
12th placers, respectively, for members of the SB, filed separate
election protests with the Pagadian RTC which ruled on their
favour.
Private respondents subsequently filed a Motion for
Immediate Execution of Decision Pending Appeal. On the
contrary, the petitioners filed their Opposition to the Motion
but the trial court ruled again on the favour of private
respondents.
The petitioners assailed the trial courts order
contending that trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion
and filed a petition with the COMELEC. But respondent
COMELEC after scrutiny denied the petition on the ground that
the ruling of the RTC considers the near expiration of the term
of office, public interest, the pendency of the election contest
for more than 3 years which, for them is justified
. Division. Moreover, only motions to reconsider decisions,
ISSUE: W/N COMELEC seriously erred in holding that
petitioners failed to establish a case of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial court.
RULING: NO, as to election cases involving regional, provincial,
jurisdiction of the COMELEC, Section 3 of Article IX-C of the
Constitution vests the COMELEC with the authority to
promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite
disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation
controversies.
MAIN POINT: To deprive trial courts of their discretion to grant
execution pending appeal would, bring back the ghost of the
grab-the-proclamation-prolong the protest techniques so often
resorted to by devious politicians in the past in their efforts to
perpetuate their hold to an elective office. This would, as a
consequence, lay to waste the will of the electorate.
Martin
CASE NO. 152
ART IX SEC 3: DECISIONS
Garvida v. Sales
Facts: Petitioner Lynette G. Garvida seeks to annul and set
aside the order dated May 2, 1996 of respondent Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) en banc suspending her proclamation
as the duly elected Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan of
Barangay San Lorenzo, Municipality of Bangui, Ilocos Norte.
The reason for the suspension of her proclamation was her
alleged illegibility on the ground that she had exceeded the age
limit for membership in the Katipunan ng Kabataan as laid
down in Section 3 [b] of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824.
Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC en banc has the
jurisdiction to act on the petition to deny or cancel the
petitioner’s certificate of candidacy.
Ruling: No. In the instant case, the COMELEC en banc did not
refer the case to any of its Divisions upon receipt of the
petition. The jurisdiction over a petition to cancel a certificate
of candidacy lies with the COMELEC sitting in Division, not en
banc. Cases before a Division may only be entertained by the
COMELEC en banc when the required number of votes to reach
a decision, resolution, order or ruling is not obtained in the
resolutions, orders or rulings of the COMELEC in Division are
resolved by the COMELEC en banc. The COMELEC en banc
therefore acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion

Main Point: It is the COMELEC sitting in Divisions that can hear
and decide election cases.
Martin
CASE NO. 153
ART IX SEC 3: DECISIONS
Velayo v. COMELEC
Facts: Petitioner Arthur V. Velayo and private respondent
Ernesto Natividad were among the candidates for mayor of
Gapan, Nueva Ecija. Private respondent filed with the
COMELEC a petition seeking the exclusion of certain election
returns on the ground of incomplete and material defects, and
for which the COMELEC en banc issued (in favor of respondent)
a resolution excluding such election returns and annulling the
proclamation of petitioner Velayo. Thus, the petitioner (and
SolGen) contends that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion when it did not dismiss said pre-proclamation case
for the reason that the grounds relied upon by respondent
Natividad are proper grounds for election protests.
Issue: Whether or not COMELEC should have dismissed the
alleged pre-proclamation case.
Ruling: Yes. RA No. 7166 provides for summary proceedings in
pre-proclamation cases and does not require a trial type
hearing. Nevertheless, (1) summary proceedings cannot be
stretched to mean ex parte proceedings (an ex parte hearing is
one in which the court or tribunal hears only one side of the
controversy), and (2) pre-proclamation controversies on
election returns or certificates of canvass must be disposed of
summarily on the basis of the records and evidence adduced in
the Board of Canvassers. In the case at bar, petitioner’s
proclamation as mayor was summarily annulled ex parte and
there was no showing that the official records of the Board of
Canvassers were forwarded to the respondent COMELEC and
were used to cancel Velayos proclamation.
Main Point: All pre-proclamation controversies shall be heard
summarily after due notice provided that pre-proclamation
controversies on election returns or certificates of canvass
shall, on the basis of the records and evidence to it by the
board of canvassers, be disposed of summarily by the
Commission en banc within seven (7) days from receipt
thereof.
Martin
CASE NO. 154
ART IX SEC 3: DECISIONS
Sebastian v. COMELEC
Facts: Petitioners were electoral candidates of the Reporma
Party in Sto. Tomas, Davao del Norte. On election day, as the
Municipal Board of Canvassers was preparing to canvass the
election returns, petitioners sought the exclusion from the
canvass of several election returns from certain precincts.
Petitioners claimed that the election returns from these areas
were prepared under "extreme duress, threat, intimidation and
political pressure and influence." Petitioners also manifested
that four election returns were missing. The COMELEC pointed
out that it could not justifiably exclude from the canvass of
votes, in a pre-proclamation controversy, election returns that
on their face appear regular. Where the issues raised would
require the COMELEC to look beyond the face of the return,
the proper remedy is a regular election protest. Nevertheless,
the petitioners do not claim that the returns themselves are
not regular, genuine or authentic.
Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC should go beyond the face
of the return and investigate election irregularities in a pre-
proclamation controversy.
Ruling: No. The petition stemmed from a pre-proclamation
controversy. In a long line of cases, the Court have consistently
held that a pre-proclamation controversy is limited to an
examination of the election returns on their face. The
COMELEC as a general rule need not go beyond the face of the
returns and investigate alleged election irregularities. However,
where the resolution of the issues raised would require the
COMELEC to "pierce the veil" of election returns that appear
prima facie regular, the remedy is a regular election protest.
Main Point: A pre-proclamation controversy should be
summarily decided.
Martin
CASE NO. 155
ART IX SEC 3: DECISIONS
Soller v. COMELEC
Facts: Petitioner and private respondent were both electoral
candidates for mayor of the municipality of Bansud, Oriental
Mindoro. The municipal board of canvassers proclaimed
petitioner Ferdinand Thomas Soller duly elected mayor. Thus,
private respondent filed with the RTC election protest against
petitioner. Petitioner then moved to dismiss private
respondent's protest on the ground of lack of jurisdiction,
forum-shopping, and failure to state cause of action.
Thereafter, the trial court denied petitioner's motion to
dismiss. Hence, the petitioner filed with the COMELEC a
petition for certiorari contending that respondent RTC acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion in not dismissing private respondent's election
protest. Consequently, the COMELEC en banc dismissed
petitioner's suit.
Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC en banc acted within its
jurisdiction in taking cognizance of petitioner’s petition in the
first instance.
Ruling: No. Under Sec. 3, Art. IX of the Constitution,
respondent COMELEC en banc had no jurisdiction to affirm the
refusal of respondent trial court to dismiss private
respondent's election protest. The COMELEC, sitting en banc,
does not have the requisite authority to hear and decide
election cases including pre-proclamation controversies in the
first instance. This power pertains to the divisions of the
Commission. Any decision by the Commission en banc as
regards election cases decided by it in the first instance is null
and void. As can be gleaned from the proceedings aforestated,
petitioner's petition with the COMELEC was not referred to a
division of that Commission but was, instead, submitted
directly to the Commission en banc. The authority to resolve
petition for certiorari involving incidental issues of election
protest, like the questioned order of the trial court, falls within
the division of the COMELEC and not on the COMELEC en banc.
Clearly, the COMELEC en banc  acted without jurisdiction in
taking cognizance of petitioner's petition in the first instance
Main Point: See ruling, IN BOLD.
Martin
CASE NO. 156
ART IX SEC 3: DECISIONS
Barroso v. Ampig et al
Facts: Petitioner Claudius G. Barroso and private respondent
Emerico V. Escobillo were candidates for mayor of the
municipality of Tampakan, Cotabato in the May 11, 1998
elections. Petitioner won the election. Private respondent filed
several pre-proclamation protests with the COMELEC and he
likewise filed several election offense cases before the trial
courts. When SPC 98-009 (pre-proclamation case) was
dismissed, private respondent forthwith moved for
reconsideration (later on denied by COMELEC en banc). It was
during the pendency of this motion that private respondent
filed E.C. Case No. 15-24 before the RTC contesting petitioner’s
election. The petitioner then filed a case to dismiss the election
protest filed against him by private respondents on the ground
of the violation of the non-forum shopping rule because the
respondent failed to mention (in its certification against forum
shopping) the pendency of the above pre-proclamation case.
Thus, this instant petition questioning the non-dismissal of the
election protest by respondent trial court on such basis.
Issue: Whether or not the election contest should be dismissed
for the strict application of the non-forum shopping rule.
Ruling: No. The strict application of the non-forum shopping
rule in the case at bar would not work to the best interest of
the parties and the electorate. An election contest, unlike an
ordinary civil action, is clothed with a public interest. The
purpose of an election protest is to ascertain whether the
candidate proclaimed by the board of canvassers is the lawful
choice of the people. Moreover, the Comelec Rules of
Procedure are subject to a liberal construction (election
contests are subject to the Comelec Rules of Procedure). This
liberality is for the purpose of promoting the effective and
efficient implementation of the objectives of ensuring the
holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections
and for achieving just, expeditious and inexpensive
determination and disposition of every action and proceeding
brought before the Comelec.
Main Point: See ruling, IN BOLD.  challenged COMELEC Resolution may not have been entirely
Sheena
Case 157
Article IX C
Recommendatory Powers Section 3. Decisions
Maruhom v. Comelec
FACTS: A petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary
injunction challenging the Resolution of the COMELEC dated
July 6, 1999 dismissing Comelec Case SPR No. 52-98.
Petitioner and private respondent were both candidates for
Mayor in the Municipality of Marogong, Lanao del Sur and
voted as such in 1998. Petitioner is a re-electionist and a
veteran politician. Private respondent, knowing that he was
cheated and the true winner for Mayor, filed before this
Honorable Commission a petition to annul the proclamation of
petitioner Abdulmadid Maruhom as the duly elected Mayor of
Marogong, Lanao del Sur docketed as SPC No. 98-226.
Petitioner alleges that in dismissing the petition, the COMELEC
acted in excess of, or with grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in holding that a motion to
dismiss an election protest case filed in the RTC is a prohibited
pleading, holding that the motion to dismiss filed after the
answer is not allowed and failing to resolve the issues raised in
SPR No. 52-98 which are sufficient legal bases to dismiss
Election Case No. 11-127. The COMELEC according to the
petitioner "abdicated its duty under its own rules of procedure
and under the Constitution and the election laws." Such
abdication of duty, according to petitioner, amounts to grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE: W/N a motion to dismiss, filed after an answer has been
filed, is a prohibited pleading in an election protest pending
before the Regional Trial Court.
RULING: NO. It must be noted that nowhere in Part VI of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure is it provided that motions to
dismiss and bill of particulars are not allowed in election
protests or quo warranto cases pending before regular courts.
Constitutionally speaking, the COMELEC cannot adopt a rule
prohibiting the filing of a certain pleading in the regular
courts. The power to promulgate rules concerning pleadings,
practice and procedure in all courts is vested in the Supreme
Court. The foregoing pronouncement, however, will not
extricate petitioner from his predicament because the denial
of petitioner's motion to dismiss was based on the fact that
the other grounds relied therein was considered
unmeritorious and not because the said motion is a
prohibited pleading in electoral protest cases. While the
correct in dismissing the petition in this regard, the soundness
of its discretion to accord unto the trial court the competence
to resolve the factual issues raised in the controversy cannot
be doubted. Indeed, as reasoned by the COMELEC, the
Commission assumes the competence of the trial court to
handle electoral protest and cannot encroach on its original
and exclusive jurisdiction on electoral protest cases involving
the contested mayoralty seat. To our mind, the trial court
should be allowed to resolve the case on the merits to be able
to rule on the factual and legal grounds raised by the petitioner
as his defenses in his Answer. Should the petitioner be
dissatisfied with the outcome of the case in the lower court, he
can still appeal, as his relief, to this Commission within the
reglementary period provided by law.
MAIN POINT: IN BOLD.
Sheena
Case 158
Article IX C
Recommendatory Powers Section 3. Decisions
Balindong v. Comelec
FACTS:
This is a petition where the petitioner, Anwar Balindong
(Anwar), a candidate for Mayor of Malabang, Lanao del Sur,
seeks to set aside the Resolution of the COMELEC en banc
ordering the Municipal Board of Canvassers to immediately
reconvene, totally exclude from canvass the election return for
a certain precinct and count 88 votes in the election return for
another precinct, not in favor of Anwar but another mayoralty
candidate by the name of Amir-Oden Balindong. Petitioner,
private respondent Aklima Jaafar Balindong, and Amir-Oden
Balindong are half brothers. They were 3 of the 9 candidates
for the position of Mayor.
Aklima filed an objection to the inclusion of the election return
for Precinct 127A/128A due to fraud and irregularity in the
conduct of election, being voted upon by those who are not
registered thereof and violence, threat and intimidation against
watchers of their party and the registered voters thereof. MBC
denied.
When the MBC reconvened, Aklima, filed an objection to the
inclusion of all the election returns, invoking as grounds the
illegal proceedings of the Board of Canvassers and violation of
Section 25(l) of COMELEC Resolution No. 3848. MBC denied
and proceeded with the canvassing of returns. Aklima filed
before the COMELEC an Appeal, urging that the proceedings of
the MBC be declared illegal and a new board of canvassers
constituted to canvass the election returns for the various
precincts of Malabang. This was docketed as SPC No. 01-063.
MBC proclaimed the winning municipal candidates, with Anwar
winning as Mayor by a margin of 52 votes over Aklima.
Aklima filed another Petition, praying that the MBC be ordered
to reconvene and re-canvass, this time, the election returns in
38 precincts only. The petition was docketed as SPC No. 01-
175. COMELEC ordered the MBC to reconvene, take into
account its directives with respect to the two (2) returns and
thereafter proclaim the winning mayoralty candidate.

Anwar filed the present petition. He faults the COMELEC for
having acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction, in taking cognizance of the
consolidated cases in the first instance without referring them
to either one of its divisions, in violation of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
W/N the COMELEC en banc had jurisdiction over pre-
proclamation controversies at the first instance.
RULING:
No. This Court has consistently ruled that the requirement
mandating the hearing and decision of election cases, including
pre-proclamation controversies, at the first instance by a
division of the COMELEC, and not by the poll body as a whole,
is mandatory and jurisdictional. It is imperative for this Court to
enforce its indelible import and spirit to the fullest, any
decision, resolution or proceeding of the COMELEC which runs
counter to it notwithstanding. In the definitive case of
Sarmiento v. COMELEC, this Court explicitly held that the
COMELEC en banc does not have the requisite authority to
hear and decide pre-proclamation controversies at the first
instance. SPC No. 01-063 and 01-175 are pre-proclamation
controversies, involving as they do the alleged illegality of the
canvassing proceedings and the purported tampering of certain
election returns. This is clear from the OEC.
MAIN POINT:
It is only in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial
powers that the COMELEC is mandated to hear and decide
cases first by division and then, upon motion for
reconsideration by the COMELEC en banc. The conduct of a
preliminary investigation before the filing of an information in
court does not involve the exercise of adjudicatory function.
(Bernas)
Sheena
Case 159
Article IX C
Recommendatory Powers Section 3. Decisions
Jaramilla v. Comelec
FACTS:
Respondent Antonio Suyat and petitioner Alberto J. Jaramilla
both ran for the position of Member of the Sangguniang Bayan
in the Municipality of Sta. Cruz, Ilocos Sur in 2001 elections.
MBC proclaimed the winning candidates for the offices of
Mayor, Vice-Mayor and 8 members of the Sangguniang Bayan.
Suyat ranked 9. Upon review, he discovered that Jaramilla was
credited with only 23 votes per Election Return. However,
when the figures were forwarded to the Statement of Votes by
Precinct, Jaramilla was credited with 73 votes or 50 votes more
than what he actually obtained. Suyat filed before the
COMELEC en banc an Urgent Motion for Issuance of Order to
Reconvene, which the latter treated as a Petition for Correction
of Manifest Error. Petitioner countered in his Answer that said
petition should be dismissed for having been filed out of time
and for lack of the required certification of non-forum
shopping.
ISSUE:
W/N COMELEC en banc properly assumed original jurisdiction
over a petition for Correction of Manifest Errors.
RULING: YES. As stated in Sec 3 Art 9 C, election cases including
pre-proclamation controversies should first be heard and
decided by a division of the COMELEC, and then by the
commission en banc if a motion for reconsideration of the
division is filed.
It must be noted however that this provision applies only in
cases where the COMELEC exercises its adjudicatory or quasi-
judicial powers, and not when it merely exercises purely
administrative functions. Accordingly, when the case
demands only the exercise by the COMELEC of its
administrative functions, such as the correction of a manifest
mistake in the addition of votes or an erroneous tabulation in
the statement of votes, the COMELEC en banc can directly act
on it in the exercise of its constitutional function to decide
questions affecting elections.
The Petition for Correction of Manifest Errors in the case at bar
alleges an erroneous copying of figures from the election
return to the Statement of Votes by Precinct. Such an error in
the tabulation of the results, which merely requires a clerical
correction without the necessity of opening ballot boxes or
examining ballots, demands only the exercise of the
administrative power of the COMELEC. Hence, the Commission
en banc properly assumed original jurisdiction over the
aforesaid petition.
MAIN POINT: IN BOLD
Sheena
Case 160
Article IX C
Recommendatory Powers Section 3. Decisions
Bautista v. Comelec
FACTS:
Bautista filed his COC for Punong Barangay in Lumbangan for
the 2002 barangay elections. Election Officer Josefina P. Jareo
refused to accept Bautistas COC because he was not a
registered voter in Lumbangan. Bautista filed an action for
mandamus against Election Officer Jareo with the RTC of
Batangas. RTC ordered Election Officer Jareo to accept
Bautistas COC and to include his name in the certified list of
candidates for Punong Barangay. The trial court ruled that
Section 7 (g) of COMELEC Resolution No. 4801 mandates
Election Officer Jareo to include the name of Bautista in the
certified list of candidates until the COMELEC directs
otherwise. In compliance with the trial courts order, Election
Officer Jareo included Bautista in the certified list of candidates
for Punong Barangay. At the same time, Election Officer Jareo
referred the matter of Bautistas inclusion in the certified list of
candidates with the COMELEC Law Department. COMELEC Law
Department recommended the cancellation of Bautistas
certificate of candidacy since he was not registered as a voter
in Lumbangan. The COMELEC en banc failed to act on the
COMELEC Law Departments recommendation before the
barangay elections.
Bautista and private respondent Divina Alcoreza were
candidates for the position of Punong Barangay in Lumbangan.
Bautista obtained the highest number of votes (719) while
Alcoreza came in second with 522 votes, or a margin of 197
votes. Bautista was proclaimed as the elected Punong Barangay
then took his oath.
COMELEC issued Resolution Nos. 5404 and 5584, canceling
Bautista’s COC. The COMELEC en banc directed the Election
Officer to delete Bautistas name from the official list of
candidates. Bautista filed for reconsideration. While pending
with the COMELEC, Bautista filed this petition for certiorari and
prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order.
ISSUE:
W/N COMELEC en banc can act on the case without a prior
action by a division.
RULING: NO. The COMELECs exercise of its quasi-judicial
powers is subject to Section 3 of Article IX-C which expressly
requires that all election cases, including pre-proclamation
controversies, shall be decided by the COMELEC in division, and
the motion for reconsideration shall be decided by the
COMELEC en banc. COMELEC is mandated to decide cases first
in division, and then upon motion for reconsideration en banc,
only when the COMELEC exercises its quasi-judicial powers.
Under Section 3, Rule 23 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, a petition for the denial or cancellation of a
certificate of candidacy must be heard summarily after due
notice. It is thus clear that cancellation proceedings involve
the exercise of the quasi-judicial functions of the COMELEC
which the COMELEC in division should first decide. More so in
this case where the cancellation proceedings originated not
from a petition but from a report of the election officer
regarding the lack of qualification of the candidate in the
barangay election. The COMELEC en banc cannot short cut the
proceedings by acting on the case without a prior action by a
division because it denies due process to the candidate.
MAIN POINT: IN BOLD
Sheena
Case 161
Article IX C
Recommendatory Powers Section 3. Decisions
De Llana v. Comelec
FACTS:
In 2001 elections, petitioner Loretta Dela Llana and respondent
Rizalino Pablo, Jr. were among the candidates for Provincial
Board Member, First District of Zambales. The First District,
which comprised the municipalities of Subic, Castillejos and San
Marcelino, is allotted three (3) seats in the Provincial Board.
Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed the three (3)
winning candidates. Included was herein petitioner, being the
third duly elected member of the Provincial Board. Respondent
ranked fourth obtaining 24 votes less than that obtained by
petitioner. Contesting the election and proclamation of
petitioner, respondent filed an election protest with the
Electoral Contest Adjudication Department of the COMELEC.
Respondent alleged that there was an error in the Statement of
Votes cast in Precinct No. 92-A-1 at Castillejos, Zambales.
Petitioner, in her answer, filed a counter-protest.
The COMELEC First Division a) granted respondents petition for
the correction of manifest errors; b) directed the Municipal
Board of Canvassers of Subic, Zambales to reconvene and
effect the necessary corrections in the Statement of Votes by
Precinct to reflect therein the actual number of votes obtained
by respondent in Precinct No. 29-A-1; c) annulled petitioners
proclamation, being based on an erroneous and/or incomplete
canvass of election returns; and d) ordered petitioner to
immediately vacate her post as the third member of the
Provincial Board, First District of Zambales, and to cease and
desist from discharging the duties and functions of that office.
In the same Resolution, the First Division denied, for being
premature.
Petitioner filed a motion for contending that the First Division
has no authority/jurisdiction to convert motu proprio
respondents petition into one for correction of manifest errors.
She claimed that the First Division acted with grave abuse of
discretion.
Petitioner maintains that the COMELEC is without
authority/jurisdiction to treat respondent’s petition for
election protest as a case for correction of manifest errors and
justify such act by suspending its own Rules of Procedure.
ISSUE: W/N COMELEC First Division committed grave abuse of
discretion when it entertained respondent’s petition by
suspending its own Rules of Procedure.
RULING: No. This is clearly allowed under Section 4, Rule 1 of
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which provides:
Section 4. Suspension of the Rules. In the interest of justice and
in order to obtain speedy disposition of all matters pending
before the Commission, these rules or any portion thereof may
be suspended by the Commission.
Certainly, such rule of suspension is in accordance with the
spirit of Section 6, Article IX-A and Section 3 of Article IX-C of
the Constitution which bestows upon the COMELEC the power
to promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings and practice
before it or before any of its offices to attain justice and the
noble purpose of determining the true will of the electorate.
It is significant to note that petitioner does not assail the
factual findings of the COMELEC that there was indeed
manifest error in the copying of the figures from the election
returns to the Statement of Votes by Precinct. Clearly, the
assailed Resolution of the COMELEC ordering the necessary
correction of the Statement of Votes of Castillejos, Zambales,
to reflect the true will of the people of that municipality, is in
order.
MAIN POINT:
The Constitution has vested to the COMELEC broad powers,
involving not only the enforcement and administration of all
laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections, but
also the resolution and determination of election
controversies. It also granted the COMELEC the power and
authority to promulgate its rules of procedure, with the
primary objective of ensuring the expeditious disposition of
election cases.
LJ
Case No.162
Art IX, C. COMELEC Section 3. Decisions
Repol v. Comelec
Facts: Repol and private respondent Violeto Ceracas
(“Ceracas”) were candidates for Municipal Mayor of
Pagsanghan, Samar in the 14 May 2001 elections. On 16 May
2001, Ceracas was proclaimed as the duly elected mayor with
66 votes more than Repol. Repol filed an election protest
before the Regional Trial Court of Tarangnan, Samar. Claiming
that fraud and other irregularities marred the elections in
Precincts 3A, 5A and 71, Repol prayed for revision of the ballots
in these precincts. This election protest was then dismissed and
a petition for certiorari is filed in here the decision was
reversed and reinstated the protest.
On 30 December 2003, the trial court declared
Ceracas’s proclamation void and proclaimed Repol the duly
elected mayor of Pagsanghan, Samar. Due to some anomalies
found such as the same writing of the some ballots and the
offering of free rides to the voting precincts. He took on Jan. 6,
2004. Ceracas appealed the trial court’s judgment to the
COMELEC. During the pendency of Ceracas’s appeal with the
COMELEC and without waiting for the trial court to resolve his
omnibus motion, Ceracas filed with the COMELEC a Petition for
Certiorari (with prayer for temporary restraining order, writ of
preliminary injunction and/or sCAYETANOtatus quo ante)
assailing the writ of execution.
Issue: W/N this Commission can resolve on the Application for
a Writ of Preliminary Injunction 1 despite the pendency of the
said petition.
Ruling: NO. the issue of quo ante should be first be solved.Only
final orders of the COMELEC in Division may be raised before
the COMELEC en banc. Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987
Constitution mandates that only motions for reconsideration of
final decisions shall be decided by the COMELEC en banc.
Main Point: Commission on Elections (COMELEC); Only final
orders of the COMELEC in Division may be raised before the
COMELEC en banc.
\ correct simple errors of judgment but capricious and whimsical
LJ
Case No.163
Art IX, C. COMELEC Section 3. Decisions
Pedragoza v. COMELEC
Facts: Artemio Pedragoza (“petitioner”) and Francisco
Sumulong, Jr. (“respondent”) were among the candidates for
Punong Barangay of De La Paz, Antipolo City in the Barangay
elections. Petitioner was proclaimed winner by a margin of 39
votes. Claiming that irregularities marred the elections,
respondent filed an election protest in the MTC (“trial court”).
Respondent sought a recount of ballots from 25 out of De La
Paz’s 103 precincts.
In his Answer, petitioner denied respondent’s claim
and filed a counter-protest, contending that he was the one
prejudiced by election irregularities.
Issue: Whether the COMELEC En Banc committed grave abuse
of discretion in affirming the First Division’s findings.
Ruling: No. we find no merit to this claim. In his petition,
petitioner contented himself with making the sweeping charge
1 who may grant. (a) A preliminary injunction is an order
granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to
the judgment or final order, requiring a party to an
administrative case or any third person to refrain from a
particular act or acts.
that the COMELEC En Banc’s ruling is contrary to “law, x x x
evidence and existing jurisprudence” without substantiating his
claim. Perhaps realizing this, petitioner, in his Reply to
respondent’s Comment, reproduced the grounds he raised in
his motion for reconsideration with the COMELEC En Banc. This
does not suffice to sustain his claim of grave abuse of
discretion. The office of a petition for certiorari is not to correct
simple errors of judgment but “capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction arbitrary
and despotic exercise of power because of passion or personal
hostility.” We have gone over the grounds petitioner raised in
his motion for reconsideration with the COMELEC En Banc and
we find no such grave error tainting the Resolution of 30
September 2005.
Main Point: The office of a petition for certiorari is not to
exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction, or
arbitrary and despotic exercise of power because of passion or
personal hostility.
LJ
Case No.164
Art IX, C. COMELEC Section 3. Decisions
Cayetano v. COMELEC
Facts: On April 25, 1998, the COMELEC conducted a plebiscite
in Taguig, Metro Manila on the conversion of this municipality
into a highly urbanized city as mandated by Republic Act No.
8487.2 The residents of Taguig were asked this question: “Do
you approve the conversion of the Municipality of Taguig,
Metro Manila into a highly urbanized city to be known as the
City of Taguig. On April 26, 1998, the Plebiscite Board of
Canvassers (PBOC), without completing the canvass of sixty-
four (64) other election returns, declared that the “No” votes
won, indicating that the people rejected the conversion of
Taguig into a city.
However, upon order of the COMELEC en banc, the
PBOC reconvened and completed the canvass of the plebiscite
returns, eventually proclaiming that the negative votes still
prevailed. Alleging that fraud and irregularities attended the
casting and counting of votes, private respondents, filed with
the COMELEC a petition seeking the annulment of the
announced results of the plebiscite with a prayer for revision
and recount of the ballots. Petitioner intervened in the case.
He then filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground
that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction over an action involving
the conduct of a plebi-scite. He alleged that a plebiscite cannot
be the subject of an election protest.
Issue: W/N the COMELEC has the authority to enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election
Ruling: Yes. The above factual findings of the COMELEC
supported by evidence, are accorded, not only respect, but
finality. This is so because “the conduct of plebiscite and
determination of its result have always been the business of
the COMELEC and not the regular courts. Such a case involves
the appreciation of ballots which is best left to the COMELEC.
As an independent constitutional body exclusively charged with
the power of enforcement and administration of all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum and recall, the COMELEC has the
indisputable expertise in the field of election and related laws.”
Its acts, therefore, enjoy the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties.
Main Point: Commission on Elections (COMELEC); As an
independent constitutional body exclusively charged with the
power of enforcement and administration of all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum and recall, the COMELEC has the
indisputable expertise in the field of election and related laws;
Its acts, therefore, enjoy the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties.
LJ
Case No.165
Art IX, C. COMELEC Section 3. Decisions
Munoz v. COMELEC
Facts: Petitioner and private respondent were candidates for
mayor of Camalig, Albay in the May 10, 2004 election.3 At 6:00
o’clock in the evening of May 10, 2004, the Municipal Board of
Canvassers (MBC) convened and canvassed the election returns
(ER). On May 11, 2004, the lawyers of private respondent
objected to the inclusion of the 26 ERs from various precincts
on various grounds. The MBC denied the objections and ruled
to include the objected ERs in the canvass. Despite the
pendency of the appeal, petitioner was proclaimed on May 19,
2004 by the MBC as the winning candidate for mayor of
Camalig, Albay. Private respondent filed with the COMELEC a
petition to annul the proclamation of the petitioner for being
premature and illegal. First Division rendered a Resolution
granting the petition to annul the proclamation.
Issue: W/N THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT ISSUED THE ASSAILED RESOLUTION
DIRECTING THE NEW MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF
CAMALIG, ALBAY, TO RECONVENE AND RE-CANVASS ALL
ELECTION RESULTS OF CAMALIG, ALBAY, FOR BEING CONTRARY
TO LAW .
Ruling: Yes. we find that it exceeded its authority and thus
gravely abused its discretion when it ordered the new MBC to
re-canvass all ERs even before its First Division could decide on
SPC No. 04-087 filed by private respondent assailing the ruling
of the MBC to include the 26 contested ERs in the canvass. In
Sarmiento v. Commission on Elections, 212 SCRA 307 (1992),
and Zarate v. Commission on Elections, 318 SCRA 608, 612
(1999), the Court similarly held that “election cases must first
be heard and decided by a Division of the Commission,” and
that the “Commission, sitting en banc, does not have the
authority to hear and decide the same at the first instance.”
Thus, in Acosta v. Commission on Elections, 293 SCRA 578, 580
(1998), the Court held that the COMELEC En Banc violated the
foregoing Constitutional mandate when it affirmed the trial
court’s decision that was not the subject of the special civil
action before it, but of the appeal filed by therein petitioner,
which was still undocketed at the time and the parties have not
yet submitted any evidence in relation thereto.
Main Point: election cases must first be heard and decided by a
Division of the COMELEC—the Commission, sitting en banc,
does not have the authority to hear and decide the same at the
first instance.
LJ
Case No.166
Art IX, C. COMELEC Section 3. Decisions
Tan v. COMELEC
Facts: Petitioners Abdusakur M. Tan and Basaron Burahan
were the gubernatorial and vice-gubernatorial candidates,
respectively, of Sulu Province in the May 10, 2004 national and
local elections. On May 17, 2004, petitioners, together with
other local candidates for congressman, mayor, and vice-
mayor, filed with the COMELEC four (4) Petitions for
Declaration of Failure of Elections in the towns of Maim-bung,
Luuk, Tongkil, and Panamao, all of Sulu Province.
Petitioners Tan and Burahan alleged systematic
fraud, terrorism, illegal schemes, and machinations allegedly
perpetrated by private respondents and their supporters
resulting in massive disenfranchisement of voters.
Meanwhile, the COMELEC Second Division, acting on
the Petitions for Declaration of Failure of Elections, issued its
May 17, 2004 Order suspending the proclamation of the
winning gubernatorial candidate of Sulu,23 but lifted the
suspension three (3) days later. In the May 20, 2004 lifting
Order, the COMELEC Second Division directed the Sulu PBOC to
complete the canvass of votes and “to bring all canvass
documents to Manila, and to proclaim the winning candidates
for Governor in Manila. Despite the suspension Benjamin
Loong was proclaimed winner of the election.
On October 18, 2004, the COMELEC en banc, through a Joint
Resolution,29 dismissed the five (5) Petitions to Declare Failure
of Elections in the towns of Maimbung, Luuk, Tongkil, and
Panamao, for lack of merit. The COMELEC en banc ruled that
there was no failure of election in the subject municipalities of
Sulu.
Issue: W/N COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in dismissing the
consolidated petitions despite the evident massive
disenfranchisement of the voters.
Ruling: No. it may be considered that the dissenting opinion
duly noted “to follow” in the joint resolution is an extended
reserved opinion. But such won’t serve to help petitioners’
position. While we are sympathetic to the predicament of
petitioners, we however declare that Sections 3 and 4 of Rule
18, COMELEC Rules of Procedure are unconstitutional and must
perforce be struck down. The 1987 Constitution, under Article
IX-A, Section 6 and Article IX-C, Section 3, grants and authorizes
the COMELEC to promulgate its own rules of procedures as
long as such rules concerning pleadings and practice do not
diminish, increase or modify substantive rights; on the other
hand, this Court has a rulemaking power provided in Article
VIII, Section 5, paragraph (5)—the constitutional prerogative
and authority to strike down and disapprove rules of procedure
of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies.
Main Point: Court declares that Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 18
COMELEC Rules of Procedure are unconstitutional and must
perforce be struck down.
Gomez
CASE NO. 167
ART IX-C (Comelec) SEC 3: Decision
Enriguel v. COMELEC
FACTS: Petitioner Sandra Enriguel and private respondent Ma.
Theresa Dumpit were mayoralty candidates of Agoo, La Union
during the May 14, 2007 elections. When the results came out,
Enriguel was proclaimed to have received the highest number
of votes and therefore was elected as mayor. Later, the losing
candidate, Dumpit, filed an election protest before the RTC of
Agoo, La Union. She alleges that there were anomalies in the
canvassing of votes. Which was then dismissed by the court on
the basis of failure to present how many votes were
erroneously applied to Enriguel. Now a motion for
reconsideration was instituted by the same. The case was later
on directed to the special second division of COMELEC where
such division decided to inhibit a decision, which then
instituted the elevation of the case to the Commission
(COMELEC) en banc.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a grave abuse of discretion on
the part of COMELEC for failing to decide on the case in
division.
RULING: Yes. Automatic elevation of the appeal to the
Commission en banc is invalid.
MAIN POINT: When the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) is
exercising its quasi-judicial powers, the Commission is
constitutionally mandated to decide the case first in division,
and en banc only upon motion for reconsideration.
Gomez
CASE NO. 168
ART IX-C (Comelec) SEC 3: Decision
Mendoza v. COMELEC
FACTS: In 2007, petitioner Joselito Mendoza was proclaimed
the winning candidate for the position of Governor in the
Province of Bulacan. Besting his opponent Roberto Pagdangan,
Private respondent. An election protest was then filed by
Pagdangan against petitioner, that the later has perpetrated
electoral fraud which led to his proclamation as governor. This
case was then raffled to the second division of the Commission
on Election. A decision by division was reached in favor of
Pagdangan, which subsequently resulted to an action for a
motion for reconsideration by the petitioner. Comelec, sitting
en banc, failed to reach the required number of votes to
conclude the case at bar.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC sitting en banc and failing
to reach the required number of votes, as provided by Section
6, rule 18 of COMELEC rules of procedure, would invalidate
such petition by the private respondent, Pagdangan.
RULING: Yes. Section 6, rule 18 of COMELEC rules of procedure
provides that if it fails to do so “the action or proceeding shall
be dismissed if originally commenced in the Commission.”
Thus, the respondent’s petition cannot proceed in this case.
MAIN POINT: When the Commission En Banc is equally divided
in opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be had, the case
shall be re-heard, and if on re-hearing, no decision is reached,
the action or proceeding shall be dismissed if originally
commenced in the Commission.
Gomez
CASE NO. 169
ART IX-C (Comelec) SEC 3: Decision
Maria Laarni L. Cayetano v. COMELEC
FACTS: Petitioner, Maria Laarni Cayetano, and private
respondent, were running for the mayoral position of Taguig
City. Private respondent, after the proclamation of Cayetano,
filed a case against her for election fraud and irregularities
before the COMELEC, this was held in division. COMELEC in
division, did not extinguish the protest filed by the private
respondent thus a petition for certiorari, before the Supreme
Court, was filed by petitioner-Cayetano against COMELEC for
grave abuse of discretion for its refusal to dismiss private
respondents protest.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme court can act on the
petition for certiorari in relation to the decision made by the
decision in division of COMELEC.
RULING: No. The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to review
an order, whether final or interlocutory, even a final resolution
of a division of the COMELEC, the Court can only review via
certiorari a decision, order, or ruling of the COMELEC en banc.
MAIN POINT: The decision must be a final decision or
resolution of the COMELEC en banc. The Supreme Court has no
power to review via certiorari an interlocutory order or even a
final resolution of a Division of the COMELEC. Failure to abide
by this procedural requirement constitutes a ground for
dismissal of the petition.
Gomez
CASE NO. 170
ART IX-C (Comelec) SEC 4: SUPERVISION/REGULATION OF
PUBLIC UTILITIES, MEDIA GRANTS, PRIVILEGES
Unido v. COMELEC
FACTS: Petitioner UNIDO, United Democratic Opposition, is
invoking the resolutions no. 1467, 1468, and 1469 issued by
COMELEC regarding the equal opportunity and equal time in on
the use of broadcasting media on public discussion and
debates on the plebiscite. That the “YES” votes for the
constitution amendment, as announced by President Maros
and will be broadcasted in the media, should be given such
equal opportunity, spearheaded by the Peititioners, to
broadcast the “NO” votes for such amendment. COMELEC
denied petitioners request as it is not applicable in the case at
bar.
ISSUE: Whether or not the constitutional mandate provided in
Sec 4 of Art IX-C of the 1987 constitution, the fair and equal
usage provision of media during election, applies to plebiscite.
RULING: Yes. The Court views the provision as applicable also
to plebiscites, particularly one relative to constitutional
amendments.
MAIN POINT: Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution, the
Court views the provision as applicable also to plebiscites,
particularly one relative to constitutional amendments. Be it
borne in mind that it has been one of the most steadfast
rulings of this Court in connection with such plebiscites that it
is indispensable that they be properly characterized to be “fair
submission”—by which is meant that the voters must of
necessity have had adequate opportunity, in the light of
conventional wisdom, to cast their votes with sufficient
understanding of what they are voting on.
Gomez
CASE NO. 171
ART IX-C (Comelec) SEC 4: SUPERVISION/REGULATION OF
PUBLIC UTILITIES, MEDIA GRANTS, PRIVILEGES
Sanidad v. COMELEC
FACTS: Petitioner, Pablito Sanidad, assails the constitutionality
of Resolution no. 2167, prohibiting the media from
broadcasting or writing on the plebiscite day, plebiscite for the
“Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region”, their
opinion in favor or against the plebiscite issue. It is alleged by
petitioner that said provision is void and unconstitutional
because it violates the constitutional guarantees of the
freedom of expression and of the press enshrined in the
Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC Resolution no. 2167 is void
and unconstitutional.
RULING: Yes. Sec. 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167
prohibiting columnists, commentators or announcers from
using their columns to campaign for or against the plebiscite
issues is a restriction of freedom of expression.
MAIN POINT: Sanidad is not a candidate and in fact in a
plebiscite, there are no candidates. Plebiscite issues are
matters of public concern and the people’s right to be informed
must be preserve. Moreover, the people’s choice of forum for
discussion should not be restricted.
AIRA
CASE NO. 172
ART IX COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS SECTION 4:
SUPERVISION/REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES, MEDIA
GRANTS, PRIVILEGES
Osmena v. COMELEC
FACTS: On 1991, RA 7056, “An Act Providing for the National
and Local Elections in 1992, Pave the Way for Synchronized and
Simultaneous Elections Beginning 1995, and Authorizing
Appropriations Therefor.” Governor Osmena of Cebu filed a
petition against the COMELEC for the nullity of the said RA on
the reason that the said law was unconstitutional. Some
provisions that were deemed by the petitioners
unconstitutional were that it violates the mandate of the
Constitution for the holding of synchronized national and local
elections on the second Monday of May 1992; that par. 2 of
section 3 of the said RA provided that all incumbent provincial,
city and municipal officials shall hold over beyond June 30,
1992 and shall serve until their successors shall have been duly
elected and qualified violates Section 2, Article XVIII (Transitory
Provision) of the Constitution; the same paragraph of Section 3
of Republic Act 7056, which in effect, shortens the term or
tenure of office of local officials to be elected on the 2nd
Monday of November, 1992.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7056 is constitutional. Corollary to
this is whether or not COMELEC may still supervise or regulate
public utilities, media grants, and privileges with regard the
upcoming elections.
RULING: No, RA 7056 is unconstitutional; hence, null and void.
Further, with this declaration, COMELEC may not supervise and
regulate public utilities, media grants, and privileges.
MAIN POINT: COMELEC may, during the election period,
supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all
franchises or permits for the operation of transportation and
other public utilities, media of communication or information,
all grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by the
Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
thereof, including any GOCCs.
AIRA
CASE NO. 173
ART IX COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS SECTION 4:
SUPERVISION/REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES, MEDIA
GRANTS, PRIVILEGES
Philippine Press Institute v. COMELEC
FACTS: Respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
issued Resolution No. 2772 which read in part that COMELEC
shall procure free print space of not less than one half (1/2)
page in at least one newspaper of general circulation in every
province or city for use as ‘COMELEC Space’ from March 6,
1995 in the case of candidates for senator and from March 21,
1995 until May 12, 1995. In the absence of said newspaper,
‘COMELEC Space’ shall be obtained from any magazine or
periodical of said province or city. Petitioner, a non-profit
organization of newspaper and magazine publishers,
questioned the constitutionality of said resolution on the
ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the
Constitution upon the government against the taking of private
property for public use without just compensation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC may require print media
to allocate free space for candidates.
RULING: No. SC ruled that print media may not be compelled
to allocate free space to the Commission. Such would amount
to a prohibited taking of property without just compensation.
MAIN POINT: To compel print media companies to donate
“COMELEC space” of the dimensions specified in Section 2 of
Resolution No. 2772, amounts to “taking” of private personal
property for public use or purposes. The taking of private
property for public use is authorized by the Constitution, but
not without payment of “just compensation.”
CASE NO. 174
ART IX COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS SECTION 4:
SUPERVISION/REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES, MEDIA
GRANTS, PRIVILEGES
Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the
Philippines, Inc., et. al. v. COMELEC
FACTS: Petitioners are challenging the validity of Sec. 92 of B.P.
Blg. No. 881which requires that radio and television time be
given for free. Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast
Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. is an organization of lawyers
of radio and television broadcasting companies. They are suing
as citizens, taxpayers, and registered voters. The other
petitioner, GMA Network, Inc., operates radio and television
broadcasting stations throughout the Philippines under a
franchise granted by Congress. Petitioners challenge the
validity of §92 on the ground that it is in excess of the power
given to the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the operation of
media of communication or information during the period of
election.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. 92 of B.P. Blg. No. 881 is
unconstitutional on the ground that it gives excess power to
COMELEC.
RULING: No, it is constitutional. §92 of B.P. Blg. 881 is part and
parcel of a regulatory scheme designed to equalize the
opportunity of candidates in an election in regard to the use of
mass media for political campaigns. COMELEC Time should “be
considered as part of the public service time said stations are
required to furnish the Government for the dissemination of
public information and education under their respective
franchises or permits.” There is no reason to suppose that §92
of B.P. Blg. 881 considers the COMELEC Time therein provided
to be otherwise than as a public service which petitioner is
required to render under §4 of its charter (R.A. No. 7252). In
sum, B.P. Blg. 881, §92 is not an invalid amendment of
petitioner’s franchise but the enforcement of a duty voluntarily
assumed by petitioner in accepting a public grant of privilege.
MAIN POINT: B.P. Blg. 881, §92 is not an invalid amendment of
petitioner’s franchise but the enforcement of a duty voluntarily
assumed by petitioner in accepting a public grant of privilege.
Broadcast media can find their just and highest reward in the
fact that whatever altruistic service they may render in
connection with the holding of elections is for that common
good.
CASE NO. 175
ART IX COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS SECTION 4:
SUPERVISION/REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES, MEDIA
GRANTS, PRIVILEGES
ABS-CBN v. COMELEC
FACTS: A petition for certiorari was raised by ABS-CBN under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which assailed the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) en banc Resolution No. 98-14191. In the
said Resolution, the poll body resolved to approve the issuance
of a restraining order to stop ABS-CBN or any other groups, its
agents or representatives from conducting such exit survey and
to authorize the Honorable Chairman to issue the same. The
electoral body believed that such project might conflict with
the official COMELEC count, as well as the unofficial quick
count of the National Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL).
It also noted that it had not authorized or deputized petitioner
ABS-CBN to undertake the exit survey.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent COMELEC acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction
when it approved the issuance of a restraining order enjoining
the petitioner or any other group, its agents or representatives
from conducting exit polls during the elections.
RULING: Yes. The absolute ban imposed by the COMELEC
cannot be justified. It does not leave open any alternative
channel of communication to gather the type of information
obtained through exit polling.
MAIN POINT: An exit poll is a species of electoral survey
conducted by qualified individuals or groups of individuals for
the purpose of determining the probable result of an election
by confidentially asking randomly selected voters whom they
have voted for, immediately after they have officially cast their
ballots. The results of the survey are announced to the public,
usually through the mass media, to give an advance overview
of how, in the opinion of the polling individuals or
organizations, the electorate voted. The freedom of expression
is a means of assuring individual self-fulfillment, of attaining
the truth, of securing participation by the people in social and
political decision-making, and of maintaining the balance
between stability and change.
CASE NO. 176
ART IX COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS SECTION 4:
SUPERVISION/REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES, MEDIA
GRANTS, PRIVILEGES
SWS v. COMELEC
FACTS: Social Weather Stations (SWS) is an institution
conducting surveys
in various fields. Kamahalan Publishing Corp., on the
other hand, publishes the Manila Standard which is a
newspaper of general circulation and features items
of information including election surveys. Both SWS
and Kamahalan are contesting the validity and enforcement of
RA 9006 (Fair Election Act), especially section 5(4) which
provides that surveys affecting national candidates shall not be
published 15 days before an election and surveys affecting local
candidates shall not be published 7 days before election.
Petitioner states that it wishes to conduct an election survey
throughout the period of the elections and release to the
media the results of such survey as well as publish them
directly. Petitioner argues that the restriction on the
publication of election survey results constitutes a prior
restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech without any
clear and present danger to justify such restraint.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC Resolutions prohibiting
the holding of pre-polls and exit polls and the dissemination of
their results through mass media, valid and constitutional.
RULING: No. The Court held that Section (5)4 is invalid because
(1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression,
(2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of
expression even though such suppression is only for a limited
period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to be
promoted can be achieved by means other than suppression of
freedom of expression.  betrayed its raison d’être of ensuring “free, orderly, honest,
It has been held that "[mere] legislative preferences or beliefs
respecting matters of public convenience may well support
regulation directed at other personal activities, but be
insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights
so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions.”
MAIN POINT: The prohibition against surveys within the
specified period is a prior and unreasonable restraint upon the
freedom of expression which is not reasonably necessary to
achieve the purpose of clean, honest, orderly and peaceful
elections.
RYLE
Case No. 177
ART. IX-C (COMELEC) SEC. 6: FREE AND OPEN PARTY SYSTEM
Liberal Party vs. COMELEC
FACTS: On July 14, 2009, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution
No. 8646 setting August 17, 2009 as the last day for the filing of
petitions for registration of political parties. On January 21,
2010, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 8752 setting
the deadline for filing of petitions for accreditation on February
12, 2010 and required that accreditation applicants be
registered political parties, organizations or coalitions. On
February 12, 2010, petitioner Liberal Party filed its petition for
accreditation as a dominant minority party. On the same date,
the Nacionalista Party and the Nationalist People’s Coalition
filed a petition for registration as a coalition and asked that it
be recognized as the dominant minority party for purposes of
the May 10, 2010 elections. The case was docketed as an
accreditation case. On April 12, 2010, the en banc granted the
NP-NPC’s petition for registration as a coalition through the
Resolution assailed in the present case.
ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC’s grant of NP-NPC’s petition
for registration as a coalition correct.
RULING: No. The constitutional mandate that the COMELEC
“register, after sufficient publication, political parties,
organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to other
requirements, must present their platform or program of
government….” is meant to insure free, orderly, honest,
peaceful and credible elections. Worse still, the COMELEC
peaceful, and credible elections” by undermining the
constitutional policy of fostering stable, party-based, program-
driven electoral system. The early screening of party or
coalition registrants implements this policy. Because the
COMELEC ignored its self-imposed deadline, a dubious, hastily
patched coalition has now belatedly entered the electoral
system, flouting a constitutionally rooted policy.
MAIN POINT: The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) should
be at its most strict in implementing and complying with the
standards and procedures the Constitution and our laws
impose.
RYLE
Case No. 178
ART. IX-D (COA) SEC. 1: QUALIFICATIONS, TERMS
Mison v. COA
FACTS: The seizure of M/V "Hyojin Maru" was deemed illegal
and that the vessel and its cargo be returned to the claimants.
Return of the cargo was effected. Release of the vessel,
however, was never effected; it sank while yet in the custody of
the Bureau of Customs, and requests by the Bureau to the
Philippine Navy and the CADA to refloat or salvage the ship
could not be complied with for lack of funds. Chan Chiu On and
Cheung I, the owners of the vessel, through their counsel, filed
a claim with the Commission on Audit for the payment of the
value of the vessel. Their attempts to claim were denied on
numerous occasions, with the first two attempts being denied
by Mr. Rogelio B. Espiritu, Manager, Technical Service Office of
the COA and Acting COA Chairman Francisco S. Tantuico,
before being decided upon by the COA Chairperson and
Commissioners.
ISSUE: Whether or not Mr. Espiritu had the power to
promulgate a decision concerning the claims made by the
owners of the M/V Hyojin Maru, given that he acted “by
authority of the Acting Chairman."
RULING: No. As Manager of the COA Technical Service Office,
Mr. Espiritu obviously had no power whatever to render and
promulgate a decision of or for the commission. In the first
place the “Espiritu decision” was void ab initio. As manager of
the COA Technical Service Office, Mr. Espiritu obviously had no
power whatever to render and promulgate a decision of or for
the Commission. Indeed, even the Chairman, alone, had not
that power.
MAIN POINT: As clearly set out in the Constitution then in
force, the power was lodged in the Commission on Audit,
“composed of a Chairman and two Commissioners.” It was the
Commission, as a collegial body, which then as now, had the
jurisdiction to “decide any case brought before it within sixty
days from the date of its submission for resolution,” subject to
review by the Supreme Court on certiorari.
RYLE
Case No. 179
ART. IX-D (COA) SEC. 2: GENERAL FUNCTION, POWERS
EXAMINE AND AUDIT: GOV’T REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES
Blue Bar Coconut v. Tantuico, Jr.
FACTS: On January 8, 1975, the Governing Board of the PCA
issued Resolution No. 01-75 which reduced the rate of levy
from P70.00 to P40.00 per 100 kilograms of copra and P110.00
to P70.00 per metric ton of husked nuts. The resolution was
effective January 11, 1975. On January 29, 1975, the same
Governing Board of the PCA which issued the January 8, 1975
Resolution No. 01-75 issued Resolution No. 018-75 which
deferred collection of the CCSF levies from the desiccated
coconut industry for a period not exceeding six (6) months.
Sometime in 1976, respondent Tantuico, Jr. initiated a special
audit of coconut end-user companies. He directed high-ranking
officials within the PCA to collect the short levies and overpaid
subsidies, and to apply subsidy claims to the settlement of
short levies should the petitioners fail to remit the amount
due. Petitioners wrote on March 8, 1977 a letter to the said
Chairman requesting reconsideration of his action, alleging that
the supposed overpayments and/or deficiencies in their
remittances were due to the Chairman’s refusal to recognize
the validity of the resolution passed in January 1975 by the
then Governing Board of the PCA. On September 5, 1977, the
COA Chairman wrote the PCA Administrator. In his letter, the
COA Chairman enumerated several conditions under which the
bonds to be posted by the coconut end-users companies would
be accepted, hence this case. The petitioners also question the
respondents’ authority to audit them. They contend that they
are outside the ambit of respondents’ "audit" power which is
confined to government-owned or controlled corporations.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners Blue Bar Coconut
Philippines, et al, being all end-users and as such, are levy-
collectors and remitters, subject to the jurisdiction of the
Commission on Audit.
RULING: Yes. Section 2 (1) of Article IX-D of the Constitution
provides that "The Commission on Audit shall have the power,
authority and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts
pertaining to the revenues and receipts of, and expenditures or
uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by or
pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions,
agencies or instrumentalities, including government-owned or
controlled corporation with original charters, and on a post-
audit basis . . . (d) such non-governmental entities receiving
subsidy or equity directly or indirectly from or through the
Government which are required by law or the granting
institution to submit to such audit as a condition of subsidy or
equity."
MAIN POINT: The Constitution formally embodies the long
established rule that private entities who handle government
funds or subsidies in trust may be examined or audited in their
handling of said funds by government auditors.
Case No. 180
ART. IX-D (COA) SEC. 2: GENERAL FUNCTION, POWERS
EXAMINE AND AUDIT: GOV’T REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES
DBP vs. COA
FACTS: DBP conducted a public bidding for one unit of
uninterruptible power supply (UPS). Thereafter, DBP issued
Purchase Order No. 0137 to Voltronics for P1,436,539.25
inclusive of customs duties and taxes. COA sent a notice to the
chairman of DBP notifying him of the disallowance of the
amount of P246,539.25 representing customs duties and taxes
and at the same time holding him, along with other petitioners,
jointly and severally liable for the aforementioned sum.
ISSUE: Whether or not COA is allowed to conduct post audit.
RULING: Yes. DBP is no doubt a government corporation and
the question of whether COA Circular 86-299 was retroactively
applied to the subject transaction is thus of no moment. To
begin with, there was never any retroactive application of post-
audit. Regardless of the result of the pre-audit, it cannot be
denied that respondent COA is so empowered to conduct a
post-audit.
MAIN POINT: Article IX-D, Section 2(1) of the Constitution
expressly grants the commission the power to conduct a post
audit.
RYLE
Case No. 181
ART. IX-D (COA) SEC. 2: GENERAL FUNCTION, POWERS
EXAMINE AND AUDIT: GOV’T REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES
Eslao v. COA
FACTS: On 9 December 1988, PSU entered into a MOA with the
DENR for the evaluation of 11 government reforestation
operations in Pangasinan. On 16 January 1989, PSU Vice
President for Research and Extension and Assistant Project
Director Victorino P. Espero requested the Office of the
President, PSU, to have the University's Board of Regents
confirm the appointments or designations of involved PSU
personnel including the rates of honoraria and per diems
corresponding to their specific roles and functions. The BOR
approved the MOA on 30 January 1989 and on 1 February
1989, PSU issued Voucher No. 8902007 representing the
amount of P70,375 for payment of honoraria to PSU personnel
engaged in the project. Later, however, the approved
honoraria rates were found to be somewhat higher than the
rates provided for in the guidelines of National Compensation
Circular No. 53. Accordingly, the amounts were adjusted
downwards to conform to NCC No. 53. On 6 July 1989,
Bonifacio Icu, COA resident auditor at PSU, issued a "Notice of
Disallowance" disallowing P64,925 from the amount of P70,375
stated in Voucher No. 8902007. The resident auditor based his
action on the premise that Compensation Policy Guidelines No.
80-4, dated 7 August 1980, issued by the DBM which provided
for lower rates than NCC No. 53 dated 21 June 1988, also
issued by the Department of Budget and Management, was the
schedule for honoraria and per diems applicable to work done
under the MOA of 9 December 1988 between the PSU and the
DENR.
ISSUE: Whether or not the evaluation project is in fact a
"special project" and that there were excess of payments of
honoraria.
RULING: The instant evaluation project being a Foreign-
Assisted Project, the PSU personnels involved in the project
shall be paid according to the Budget Estimate schedule of the
MOA. COA, under its constitutional mandate, is not authorized
to substitute its own judgment for any applicable law or
administrative regulation with the wisdom or propriety of
which, however, it does not agree, at least not before such law
or regulation is set aside by the authorized agency of
government – i.e., the courts – as unconstitutional or illegal
and void.
MAIN POINT: The COA, like all other government agencies,
must respect the presumption of legality and constitutionality
to which statutes and administrative regulations are entitled
until such statute or regulation is repealed or amended, or until
set aside in appropriate case by a competent court and
ultimately the Supreme Court.
AREEJ
CASE NO. 182
ART IX-D (COA) SEC 2: GENERAL FUNCTIONS; POWERS
EXAMINE AND AUDIT: GOVT REVENUES AND GOVT
EXPENDITURES
J.F.F. Manacop v. CA
FACTS: Petitioner constructed a perimeter fence along the MIA
road, even though the Notice to Proceed was not yet signed by
the general manager of private respondent, in order to prevent
would be squatters from entering the area. However, after the
February 1986 revolution, the new general manager of private
respondent stopped the construction of the said fence. By that
time 95% was finished. For two years, petitioner made
repeated demands for the payment of what it has completed
but private respondent ignored said demands. Petitioner then
brought the matter to court which ruled that for the services
rendered by the petitioner, it should be paid P238,501.48
based upon a quantum meruit since there is an absence of a
written contract between the parties. Said amount is the latest
evaluation of the work done which evaluation was made by
private respondent itself. On appeal, the private respondent
assigned the error that the trial court should have referred the
computation of what should be paid to petitioner to the COA.
The petitioner refuted this assigned error by pointing out that
it is not one of the issues raised before the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the computation of the payment, based
upon a quantum meruit, due the petitioner should be referred
to COA.
RULING & MAIN POINT (IN BOLD): NO. Quantum meruit allows
recovery of the reasonable value regardless of any agreement
as to value. It entitles the party to “as much as he
reasonably deserves,” as distinguished from quantum
valebant or to “as much as what is reasonably worth.”
Unliquidated claims present a justiciable question ripe for
judicial determination which is beyond the powers of the COA
to adjudicate. Recovery based on quantum meruit is in the
nature of such claim because its settlement requires the
application of judgment and discretion and cannot be
adjusted by simple arithmetical processes. As our courts are
both courts of law and equity, they are not powerless to
determine a factual matter in accordance with both standards.
Quantum meruit: It entitles the party to “as much as he
reasonably deserves,” as distinguished from quantum
valebant or to “as much as what is reasonably worth.”
AREEJ
CASE NO. 183
ART IX-D (COA) SEC 2: GENERAL FUNCTIONS; POWERS
EXAMINE AND AUDIT: GOVT REVENUES AND GOVT
EXPENDITURES
Polloso v. Gangan
FACTS: The National Power Corporation (NPC) entered into a
service contract with Atty. Benemerito A. Sattore. Under said
contract, Satorre was to provide services on administrative and
legal matters. Unit Auditor Tan issued a Notice of Disallowance
for the payment of the services rendered by Sattore for the
reason that the contract for services did not have the written
conformity and acquiescence of the Solicitor General or the
Corporate Counsel and concurrence of the Commission on
Audit as required under COA Circular No. 86-255. Upon
appeal, petitioner contends that the said Circular is
unconstitutional for being an invalid restriction to the law
profession.
ISSUE: Whether or not COA Circular No. 86-255 operates to
restrict the practice of the law profession.
RULING and MAIN POINT (IN BOLD): NO. The questioned COA
circular simply sets forth the prerequisites for a government
agency instrumentality in hiring a private lawyer, which are
reasonable safeguards to prevent irregular, unnecessary,
excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures or
uses of government funds and properties.
CASE NO. 184
ART IX-D (COA) SEC 2: GENERAL FUNCTIONS; POWERS
EXAMINE AND AUDIT: GOVT REVENUES AND GOVT
EXPENDITURES
Uy et. al. v. COA
FACTS: Petitioners were among the more than 60 permanent
employees of the Provincial Engineering Office, Province of
Agusan del Sur, who were dismissed from the service by then
Governor Paredes when the latter assumed office to scale
down the operations of the said office. Petitioners sought for
reinstatement before the Merit Systems Protection Board
(MSPB) which ruled that the reduction in work force was not
done in accordance with civil service rules and regulations and
directed the Provincial Government of Agusan del Sur pay
petitioners their back salaries and other money benefits for the
period that they had been out of the service until their
reinstatement. The Provincial Administrator, for and in behalf
of Governor Plaza, then wrote a letter to respondent COA,
which saw no further legal impediment to the payment of the
claims of petitioners, which has become the personal liability of
former Governor Paredes, it appearing that the illegal dismissal
was done in bad faith as clearly shown in the herein records.
The Provincial Government of Agusan del Sur refused to
release petitioners’ remaining back salaries and other
monetary benefits. A motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioners was denied by respondent COA. Hence, the instant
petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent COA, in the exercise of its
power to audit, can disallow the payment of back wages of
illegally dismissed employees by the Provincial Government of
Agusan del Sur.
RULING: NO. In the case at bar, the action taken by COA in
disallowing the further payment by the Provincial Government
of Agusan del Sur of backwages due the petitioners amended
the final decision of the MSPB. The jurisdiction of the MSPB to
render said decision is unquestionable. This decision cannot be
categorized as void. Thus, we cannot allow the COA to set it
aside in the exercise of its broad powers of audit. The audit
authority of COA is intended to prevent irregular,
unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable
expenditures, or uses of government funds and properties.
Payment of backwages to illegally dismissed government
employees can hardly be described as irregular, unnecessary,
excessive, extravagant or unconscionable.
MAIN POINT: COA cannot say that the responsibility belongs to
the official who made the illegal dismissal when such official
has not been heard. Besides, payment of backwages is not an
irregular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagant expense.
AREEJ
CASE NO. 185
ART IX-D (COA) SEC 2: GENERAL FUNCTIONS; POWERS
EXAMINE AND AUDIT: GOVT REVENUES AND GOVT
EXPENDITURES
Aguinaldo v. Sandiganbayan
FACTS: Two cases of malversation of public funds were filed
against herein petitioner Provincial Governor of Cagayan, with
regard to the his claims for intelligence operations charged to
the 20% Development Fund and which were covered by
disbursement vouchers with only reimbursement receipts to
support them. Petitioner failed to submit receipts evidencing
disbursement for intelligence activities required by COA
Circular No. 77-17D. The Office of the Ombudsman
reinvestigated the case, and petitioner was allowed to submit
documents to prove his claim. The COA Special and Technical
Audit Division, through Provincial Auditor Teresita Rios, stated
that the documents may be a convincing proof that the
questioned disbursements were disbursed according to the
intended purpose and not for private consumption.
Sandiganbayan deemed the COA statements to be lacking in
definiteness and proceeded with the trial of the petitioner. In
the instant case, petitioner alleges that the Sandiganbayan
gravely abused its discretion by completely disregarding the
COA findings and post-audit clearances.
ISSUE: Whether or not COA’s finding, pursuant to its
constitutional authority to examine, audit and settle accounts
pertaining to the expenditures of the funds in question, is
conclusive and mandatory and not reviewable except on
certiorari and only by the SC
RULING: NO. COA's approval of petitioner's disbursements only
relates to the administrative aspect of the matter of his
accountability but it does not foreclose the Ombudsman's
authority to investigate and determine whether there is a
crime to be prosecuted for which petitioner is answerable.
While the COA may assist in gathering evidence to substantiate
a charge of malversation, any determination made by it will not
be conclusive as to whether adequate cause exists to prosecute
a case. This is so because the Ombudsman is given the power
to investigate on its own an illegal act or omission of a public
official.
MAIN POINT: The conclusive effect of the finality of the COA's
decision on the executive branch of the government relates
solely to the administrative aspect of the matter.
AREEJ
CASE NO. 186
ART IX-D (COA) SEC 2: GENERAL FUNCTIONS; POWERS
EXAMINE AND AUDIT: GOVT REVENUES AND GOVT
EXPENDITURES
DBP v. COA
FACTS: The DBP Gratuity Plan authorized the setting up of
a retirement fund to cover the benefits due to DBP retiring
officials and employees. The Bank later established a Special
Loan Program, pursuant to which, the DBP Trust Services
Department (DBP-TSD) paid to the investor-members  net
earnings of the investments for the years 1991 and 1992 but
the payments were disallowed by the Auditor under Audit
Observation Memorandum No. 93-2, on the ground that the
distribution of income of the Gratuity Plan Fund (GPF) to
future retirees of DBP is irregular and constituted the use of
public funds for private purposes which is specifically
proscribed under Section 4 of P.D. 1445. Former DBP
Chairman requested then COA Chairman to reconsider AOM
No. 93-2, and alleged that the express trust created under the
Trust Agreement gave the Fund a separate legal personality,
and all earnings of the Fund accrue only to the Fund. COA
affirmed AOM No. 93-2. Hence, the instant petition. The DBP
reiterates that the income of the Fund should be treated and
recorded as separate from the income of DBP itself.
The OSG argued, citing Section 2, Article IX-D of the
Constitution, that petitioner may ask the lifting of the
disallowance by COA, since COA had not yet made a definitive
and final ruling on the matter in issue. But after COA denied
with finality the motion for reconsideration of petitioner,
petitioner, being a government instrumentality, should accept
COAs ruling and leave the matter of questioning COAs decision
with the concerned investor-members.
ISSUE: Whether or not Article IX-D of the Constitution bar
government instrumentalities from questioning decisions of
the Commission on Audit.
RULING & MAIN POINT (IN BOLD): NO. Section 2, Article IX-D
of the Constitution does not bar government
instrumentalities from questioning decisions of the
COA. Government agencies and government-owned and
controlled corporations have long resorted to petitions
for certiorari to question rulings of the COA. These
government entities filed their petitions with this Court
pursuant to Section 7, Article IX of the Constitution, which
mandates that aggrieved parties may bring decisions of the
COA to the Court on certiorari. Likewise, the Government
Auditing Code expressly provides that a government agency
aggrieved by a COA decision, order or ruling may raise the
controversy to the Supreme Court on certiorari  in the manner
provided by law and the Rules of Court. 
ANGELO
Case No. 187
ART IX-D COMMISSION OF AUDIT SEC 2: GENERAL FUNCTION,
POWERS
Examine and Audit: Government revenues and Government
expenditures
Home Development Mutual Fund v COA
FACTS: Sec 3 of Republic Act No. 6971 (An Act to Encourage
Productivity and Maintain Industrial Peace by Providing
Incentives to Both Labor and Capital) states its coverage that it
shall apply ”to all business enterprises with or without existing
and duly recognized or certified labor organizations, including
government-owned and controlled corporations performing
proprietary functions. It shall cover all employees and workers
including casual, regular, supervisory and managerial
employees.” Petitioner HDMF granted Productivity Incentive
Bonus equivalent to one month salary plus allowance to all its
personnel despite the advice of Undersecretary of DBM to all
GOCCs and government financial institutions with original
charters performing proprietary functions to defer payment of
the productivity incentive bonus to their employees, pending
the issuance of a definite ruling by the Office of the President
on the matter. The grant of productivity incentive bonus to the
HDMF personnel was disallowed in audit. The disallowance was
based on COA Decision No. 96-288, stating that Republic Act
No. 6971 does not apply to government-owned or controlled
corporations or to government financial institutions with
original charters performing proprietary functions, such as the
HDMF. Petitioner contends that when it granted the
productivity incentive bonus to its personnel, no other rule but
the Implementing Rules of Republic Act No. 6971 dated was in
existence.
ISSUE: Whether or not HDMF is excluded from the coverage of
RA 6971.
RULING: YES. Petitioner is a government-owned and controlled
corporation performing proprietary functions with original
charter or created by special law, specifically Presidential
Decree No. 1752, amending PD No. 1530. As such, petitioner
HDMF is covered by the Civil Service, and, therefore, excluded
from the coverage of Republic Act No. 6971. Even if petitioner
HDMF granted the Productivity Incentive Bonus before the
Supplemental Rules were issued clarifying that petitioner was
excluded from the coverage of Republic Act No. 6971, the
employees of HDMF did not acquire a vested right over said
bonus because they were not entitled to it under Republic Act
No. 6971
MAIN POINT: Since Republic Act No. 6971 intended to cover
only government-owned and controlled corporations
incorporated under the general corporation law, the power of
administrative officials to promulgate rules in the
implementation of the statute is necessarily limited to what is
intended and provided for in the legislative
enactment. Hence, the Supplemental Rules clarified that
government-owned and controlled corporations performing
proprietary functions which are “created, maintained or
acquired in pursuance of a policy of the state, enunciated in
the constitution or by law, and those whose officers and
employees are covered by the Civil Service” are excluded from
the coverage of Republic Act No. 6971.
ANGELO
Case No. 188
ART IX-D COMMISSION OF AUDIT SEC 2: GENERAL FUNCTION,
POWERS
Examine and Audit: Government revenues and Government
expenditures
DBP v COA
FACTS: The petitioner purchased 5 Mitsubishi L-300 vans and
14 Mitsubishi Lancer cars which amounted to P5,525,000.00
for its 5 regional offices and 14 branches pursuant to its
modernization program. In its Annual Audit Report, the
respondent COA included these transactions among its adverse
audit findings alleging non-compliance by the petitioner with
Letter of Instruction No. 667 and Letter of Implementation No.
29 which require Presidential approval for purchase of
transport. While the auditor at the time did not issue a Notice
of Disallowance on this audit finding, she, nonetheless,
recommended the filing of administrative charges against the
responsible officers. The incumbent COA Auditor issued a
Notice of Disallowance. This impelled the petitioner to move
for the lifting of the disallowance of P5,525,000.00. According
to her, petitioner’s branches were in dire need of additional
vehicles for improved mobility to support its thrust of providing
financial assistance to small and medium enterprises. The
incumbent COA Auditor issued a 4th indorsement letter which
disclosed that the COA suspended in audit the purchase of 2
Mitsubishi Lancer cars amounting to P525,000.00 made by the
DBP-Baguio Branch. Respondent issued the assailed COA
Decision No. 2001-151, which denied petitioner’s motion for
the lifting of the disallowance The Motion for Reconsideration
was denied in a Resolution of the COA. It was received, through
a certain Lolet Toledo. Upon verification, the petitioner learned
that the said Lolet Toledo is a personnel of its Resident
Corporate Auditor and that no copy of the resolution was
served upon any of its departments.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not judgments, final orders, and
resolution be delivered personally; and (2) Whether or not the
corporate auditor does come within the definition of “clerk or
person having charge” of the office who may be validly served
with a copy of the resolution of the Commission on Audit.
RULING: (1) YES. Judgments, final orders and resolutions are
appealable. It is necessary that they be served personally or, if
not possible, by registered mail accompanied by a written
explanation why the service was not done personally, in order
that the period for taking an appeal may be computed. As a
rule, personal service of judgments is done by delivering them
personally to the party or his counsel, or when they are left in
his office, with his clerk or with a person having charge thereof.
In case this is not possible, the copy of the judgment may be
left at the party’s or his counsel’s residence with a person of
sufficient age or discretion residing therein.
(2) NO. The Court agree with the petitioner that the resident
corporate auditor of the DBP is neither an official nor an
employee of the DBP. He does not come within the definition
of “clerk or person having charge” of the office who may be
validly served with a copy of the resolution of the respondent
as contemplated by the Rules. In fact, the resident corporate
auditor is an extension of the respondent COA and no
department of the petitioner was actually served with a copy of
the resolution. 
ANGELO
Case No. 189
ART IX-D COMMISSION OF AUDIT SEC 2: GENERAL FUNCTION,
POWERS
Examine and Audit: Government revenues and Government
expenditures
Nava v Pallatao
FACTS: The complaint involving the herein accused was
initiated by the COA, Region XI, Davao City, which resulted
from an audit conducted by a team of the 9.36 million
allotment which was released by the DECS to its Division
Offices. In the Audit Report, the amount of P603,265 was
shown to have been released to the DECS Division of Davao del
Sur for distribution to the newly nationalized high schools
located within the region. The accused Venancio Nava, instead
of referring the allotment to the 155 heads of the nationalized
high schools for the improvement of their facilities, he
succeeded in persuading only his 7 schools division
superintendents to use the allotment for the purchase of
science education facilities. Evidence shows that accused Nava
persuaded his 7 schools division superintendents to ignore the
circular that the purchase of the school materials shall be
done through public bidding. The provision on the conduct of
a public bidding was not followed. Instead the purchase was
done through negotiation. The report concluded that the
government lost P380,013.60. After due trial, only petitioner
was convicted, while all the other accused were acquitted.
Petitioner was found guilty of entering on behalf of the
government any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the latter, whether or not the public officer
profited or would profit thereby.
ISSUE: Whether or not COA’s findings are accorded finality.
RULING: YES. The principal evidence presented during trial was
the COA Special Audit Report. The COA is the agency
specifically given the power, authority and duty to examine,
audit and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and
receipts of, and expenditures or uses of fond and property
owned by or pertaining to the government. It has the
exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and
examination and to establish the required techniques and
methods. Thus, COA’s findings are accorded not only respect
but also finality, when they are not tainted with grave abuse
of discretion.
An audit is conducted to determine whether the amounts
allotted for certain expenditures were spent wisely, in keeping
with official guidelines and regulations—it is not a witch hunt
to terrorize accountable public officials.
ANGELO
Case No. 190
ART IX-D COMMISSION OF AUDIT SEC 2: GENERAL FUNCTION,
POWERS
Examine and Audit: Government revenues and Government
expenditures
Gualberto De Llana v COA
FACTS: The COA issued a circular, lifting the system of pre-
audit of government financial transactions, albeit with certain
exceptions. The circular affirmed the state policy that all
resources of the government shall be managed, expended or
utilized in accordance with law and regulations. After the
change in administration due to the February 1986 revolution,
grave irregularities and anomalies in the government’s financial
transactions were uncovered. Hence, the COA issued a
circular, which reinstated the pre-audit of selected
government transactions. With the normalization of the
political system and the stabilization of government
operations, the COA saw it fit to issue a circular, which again
lifted the pre-audit of government transactions of national
government agencies and government-owned or controlled
corporations. Concomitant to the lifting of the pre-audit of
government transactions of NGAs and GOCCs, the circular
mandated the installation, implementation and monitoring of
an adequate internal control system, which would be the
direct responsibility of the government agency head. It further
provided that the pre-audit activities retained by the COA as
therein outlined shall no longer be a pre-requisite to the
implementation or prosecution of projects and the payment
of claims. However, the circular did not include the financial
transactions of local government units in its coverage.
Petitioner alleges that the pre-audit duty on the part of the
COA cannot be lifted by a mere circular, considering that pre-
audit is a constitutional mandate enshrined in Section 2 of
Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the conduct of pre-audit is mandatory.
RULING: NO. The conduct of a pre-audit is not a mandatory
duty that the Court may compel the COA to perform. This
discretion on its part is in line with the constitutional
pronouncement that the COA has the exclusive authority to
define the scope of its audit and examination. When the
language of the law is clear and explicit, there is no room for
interpretation, only application. Neither can the scope of the
provision be unduly enlarged by the Court.
MAIN POINT: The 1987 Constitution has made the COA the
guardian of public funds, vesting it with broad powers over all
accounts pertaining to government revenues and expenditures
and the use of public funds and property, including the
exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and
examination; to establish the techniques and methods for the
review.
ANGELO
Case No. 191
ART IX-D COMMISSION OF AUDIT SEC 2: GENERAL FUNCTION,
POWERS
Examine and Audit: Government revenues and Government
expenditures
Candelario Versoza Jr v Guillermo Carague
FACTS: The petitioner, in his former capacity as Executive
Director of the Cooperative Development Authority purchased
from Tetra Corporation a total of 46 units of computer
equipment and peripherals in the total amount of
P2,285,279.00. Tetra was chosen from among three qualified
bidders. In the technical evaluation of the units to be supplied
by the qualified bidders, CDA engaged the services of the
Development Academy of the Philippines-Technical Evaluation
Committee. The bidding was conducted in accordance with the
Approved Guidelines and Procedures of Public Bidding for
Information Technology Resources. The Resident Auditor
sought the assistance of the Technical Services Office, COA in
the determination of the reasonableness of the prices of the
purchased computers. In its reply-letter, the TSO found that
the purchased computers were overpriced/excessive by a
total of P881,819.00. The Resident Auditor issued Notice of
Disallowance for the amount of P881,819.00. Respondent COA
issued the assailed decision affirming the disallowance. It held
that whether or not the product is branded is irrelevant in the
determination of the reasonableness of the price since the
brand was not stated in the Call for Bids nor in the Purchase
Order. Further, COA declared that CDA should not have
awarded the contract to Tetra but to the other competing
bidders, whose bid is more advantageous to the government.
ISSUE: Whether or not COA’s affirmation on the disallowance
affected the same rules it imposes on all public officer
regarding the manner of conducting canvasses.
RULING: YES. The COA cannot violate the same rules it imposes
on all public offices regarding the manner of conducting
canvasses. These rules essentially require that written
canvasses be made of the same item from at least three
suppliers, using the proper canvass forms. The COA itself
cannot violate these rules by disallowing purchases merely on
the basis of an alleged overpricing. What is more apparent is
that petitioner was merely exercising ministerial functions with
regard to the whole process. Thus, absent any evidence
showing that petitioner had any direct participation in the
alleged fixing of the price, or that he exerted undue influence
over the PBAC and BOA, he should not have been made liable
under the circumstances. The conduct of public bidding in this
case was not made objectively with the end in view of
purchasing quality equipment at the least cost to the
government.
MAIN POINT: COA is endowed with enough latitude to
determine, prevent and disallow irregular, unnecessary,
excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of
government funds.
Ayeh CASE NO. 192
ART. IX-C (COA) SEC 2: GENERAL FUNCTIONS; POWERS
EXAMINE AND AUDIT: GOV’T REVENUE AND GOV’T
EXPENDITURES
PH Coconut v. Republic
FACTS: During martial law in 1972, there had been issuances of
several presidential decrees purportedly designed to improve
the coconut industry through the collection and use of the
coconut levy fund. This is a consolidated case of allegations
about the alleged misuse of the coconut levy funds to buy out
the majority of the outstanding shares of stock of San Miguel
Corporation.
ISSUE: Whether or not COA has jurisdiction over the said
matter.
RULING: YES. Any property purchased by means of the coconut
levy funds should likewise be treated as public funds or public
property, subject to the burdens and restrictions attached by
law to such property.
MAINPOINT: By the decision of the Court, it is fairly established
that the coconut levy funds are special public funds and subject
to the burdens and restrictions attached by law to such
property. The Constitution by express provision, vests the COA
with the responsibility for State Audit. therefore, coconut levy
funds being public funds, falls under the jurisdiction of the
COA.
“The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and
duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to
the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds
and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to the
Government xxx”
Ayeh CASE NO. 193
ART. IX-C (COA) SEC 2: GENERAL FUNCTIONS; POWERS
AUDIT JURISDICTION
Caltex v. COA
FACTS: Commission on Audit directed Caltex Philippines Inc. to
remit its collection to the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF),
not including the additional taxes on petroleum products
authorized under the PD 1956 (imposing ad valorem tax on
certain manufactured oils xxx) for the specified years of 1986
and 1988. Caltex submitted a proposal to COA for the payment
and the recovery of claims of which COA received and
approved but prohibited the company from offsetting
remittances and reimbursements for the present and
succeeding years. Caltex filed for a reconsideration but was
denied, hence, this petition to the Court.
ISSUE: WON COA acted with GAD and completely without
jurisdiction in declaring that petitioner cannot avail of the right
to offset any amount that it may be required under the law to
remit to the OPSF against any amount that it may receive by
way of reimbursement therefrom.
RULING: NO. COA acted within the scope of its jurisdiction.
Section 2, Subdivision D, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution
expressly provides: Sec. 2(l). The Commission on Audit shall
have the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and
settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of,
and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held
in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its
subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including
government-owned and controlled corporations with original
charters, and on a post-audit basis those enumerated under
this provision.
MAINPOINT: The audit power of the Auditor General under the
1935 Constitution and the Commission on Audit under the
1973 Constitution authorized them to disallow illegal
expenditures of funds or uses of funds and property. Our
present Constitution retains that same power and authority,
further strengthened by the definition of the COA’s general
jurisdiction in Section 26 of the Government Auditing Code of
the Philippines and Administrative Code of 1987.
Ayeh CASE NO. 194
ART. IX-C (COA) SEC 2: GENERAL FUNCTIONS; POWERS
AUDIT JURISDICTION
Mamaril v. Domingo
FACTS: Petitioner was formerly an Evaluator/Computer of the
Land Transportation Office (LTO) at its San Pablo City Branch. In
the course of the performance of his duties, he committed
errors in his evaluation and computation, resulting in the under
collection of registration, license and other miscellaneous fees
and penalties. As a result of the decision of the COA, the
amount of P44,515.90 be withheld from petitioner’s terminal
leave pay other than his retirement gratuity he has not
received in full the benefits due him from his retirement.
Petitioner contended that he could not be held liable on the
audit disallowances because he was not an accountable officer
within the meaning of Section 101 of P.D. No. 1445 (1978)
since: (a) his work was purely clerical; (b) he did not come into
possession of any money or property for which he is now asked
to pay; and (c) he did not act in bad faith or with gross
negligence.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is not an accountable
officer and is therefore not within the scope of the auditing
power of COA.
RULING: No. The Commission has authority not just over
accountable officers but also over other officers who perform
functions related to accounting such verification of
evaluations and computations of fees collectible, and the
adoption of internal rules of control. In the case at bar, the
Solicitor General and the petitioner overlooked that
petitioner's duties as an Evaluator/Computer constituted an
indispensable part of the process of the assessment and
collection of motor vehicle registration fees and such nature
falls within the scope of the Commission’s jurisdiction.
MAINPOINT: State audit is not limited to the auditing of the
accountable officers and the settlement of accounts, but
includes accounting functions and the adoption in the audited
agencies of internal controls to see to it, among other matters,
that the correct fees and penalties due the government are
collected.
Ayeh CASE NO. 195
ART. IX-C (COA) SEC 2: GENERAL FUNCTIONS; POWERS
AUDIT JURISDICTION
Philippine Airlines v. COA
FACTS: Commission on Audit wrote PAL a letter advising it to
desist from bidding the company's fuel supply contracts,
considering that existing regulations require government-
owned or controlled corporations and other agencies of
government to procure their petroleum product requirements
from PETRON Corporation. PAL sought reconsideration of such
advise by the COA two times but was not heeded. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not COA exceeded its jurisdiction in
extending the application of said department order to
petitioner.
RULING: YES. As a business operation heavily dependent on
fuel supply, for PAL to rely solely on a single supplier would
indeed be impracticable. To compel it to do so would amount
to a grave abuse of discretion on its part as this might well lead
to irregular, excessive or unconscionable expenditures, the
very evil sought to be avoided in the creation of the COA.
This, however, is so much water under the bridge. PAL's
corporate complexion having changed during the pendency of
the instant petition from government-controlled to private
ownership, the Court dismissed the petition for being moot
and academic.
MAINPOINT: The authority granted under the constitution
enables COA to adopt as its own, simply by reiteration or by
reference, without the necessity of promulgation, already
existing rules and regulations. It may also expand the coverage
thereof to agencies or instrumentalities under its audit
jurisdiction. In the case at bar, although COA was correct in
ruling that Department Order No. 19 applied to PAL as a
government agency at the time, it nonetheless gravely abused
its discretion in not exempting PAL therefrom.
However, PAL, having ceased to be a government-owned or
controlled corporation, is no longer under the audit jurisdiction
of the COA. Accordingly, the question raised in this petition has
clearly become moot and academic.
Ayeh CASE NO. 196
ART. IX-C (COA) SEC 2: GENERAL FUNCTIONS; POWERS
AUDIT JURISDICTION
CIR v. COA
FACTS: Then BIR Commissioner recommended to the Minister
of Finance payment to private petitioner Savellano of an
informer's reward for information denouncing tax liabilities of
several entities. Said recommendation having been favorably
passed upon by the Committee on Rewards of the Department
of Finance, the same was approved by then Deputy Minister of
Finance Alfredo Pio de Roda, Jr.; and Savellano was in due time
paid the aforesaid amount when COA disallowed it through a
decision that lead the filing of this petition by the CIR.
Public petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue argues
that: the approval by the Department of Finance of the claim
for informer's reward of petitioner Savellano is conclusive upon
the executive agencies concerned, respondent COA included,
as it constitutes the final determination of the proper
administrative authority under Section 90 of the Government
Auditing Code of the Philippines.
ISSUE: Whether or not the approval of DOF of the informer’s
reward is conclusive upon COA.
RULING: No. The final determination by the Department of
Finance, through the recommendation of the BIR of Savellano's
entitlement to the informer's reward under Section 90 is
conclusive only upon the executive agencies concerned.
Respondent COA is not an executive agency but is one of the
three (3) independent constitutional commissions. Specifically,
it is the constitutional agency vested with the "power,
authority and duty to examine, audit and settle all accounts
pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or
uses of funds and property owned or held in trust by . . . the
government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies or
instrumentalities".
MAINPOINT: The final determination made by the Finance
Department cannot bind respondent COA or foreclose its
review thereof in the exercise of its constitutional function and
duty to ensure that public funds are expended and used in
conformity with law. To hold otherwise would be to ignore the
clear mandate and the equally clear implications of Section 3,
Article IX (D)of the 1987 Constitution providing that:
No law shall be passed exempting any entity of the government
of its subsidiary in any guise whatever, or any investment of
public funds, from the jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit.
RAIZA
CASE NO. 197
ART IX-D SEC 2: General Functions; Powers
Audit Jurisdiction
CSC vs. Pobre
FACTS: Respondent Hermogenes P. Pobre is a former
government official who retired from the government service
three times. The first two times he retired, respondent Pobre
received his terminal leave pay amounting to P310,522.60 and
P55,000, respectively. On his third retirement, respondent
Pobre claimed payment of his terminal leave based on his
highest monthly salary as PRC chairman but to be reckoned
from the date he first entered the government service as
budget examiner in the defunct Budget Commission in 1958. He
invoked Section 13 of Commonwealth Act 186 which provides
that the amount of annuity shall be computed from the date of
original employment. Petitioner CSC promulgated a Resolution
stating that all respondent Pobre was entitled to were his
terminal leave benefits based only on his accrued leave credits
from the date of his assumption to office as PRC chairman and
not his total terminal leave credits, including those earned in
other government agencies from the beginning of his
government service. The Court of Appeals set aside the
resolutions of petitioner CSC and declared that it was the COA,
not petitioner CSC, which had jurisdiction to adjudicate
respondent Pobre’s claim for terminal leave benefits. Thus this
petition.
ISSUE: W/N the petitioner CSC has an exclusive jurisdiction to
pass upon the validity of respondent’s claim for terminal leave
RULING: NO. The SC held that while the determination of leave
benefits is within the functions of the CSC as the central
personnel agency of the government, the duty to examine
accounts and expenditures relating to such benefits properly
pertains to the COA. Where government expenditures or use of
funds is involved, the CSC cannot claim exclusive jurisdiction
simply because leave matters are involved. Thus, even as we
recognize CSC’s jurisdiction in this case, its power is not
exclusive as it is shared with the COA.
MAIN POINT: While the determination of leave benefits is
within the functions of the CSC as the central personnel agency
of the government, the duty to examine accounts and
expenditures relating to such benefits properly pertains to the
COA; Even as the Court recognizes CSC’s jurisdiction in this
case, its power is not exclusive as it is shared with the COA.
RAIZA
CASE NO. 198
ART IX-D SEC 2: General Functions; Powers
Audit Jurisdiction
Luciano Veloso (velos) vs COA
FACTS: On December 7, 2000, the City Council of Manila
enacted Ordinance No. 8040 entitled An Ordinance Authorizing
the Conferment of Exemplary Public Service Award to Elective
Local Officials of Manila Who Have Been Elected for Three (3)
Consecutive Terms in the Same Position.
SEC. 2. The EPSA shall consist of a Plaque of
Appreciation, retirement and gratuity pay remuneration
equivalent to the actual time served in the position for three
(3) consecutive terms, subject to the availability of funds as
certified by the City Treasurer. ….xxx…..
Pursuant to the ordinance, the City made partial payments to
some former city councilors including herein petitioners the
total amount of P9,923,257.00.
The Director, Legal and Adjudication Office (LAO)-Local of the
COA issued a Notice of Disallowance. They opined that the
monetary reward under the EPSA is covered by the term
“compensation.” Though it recognizes the local autonomy of
LGUs, it emphasized the limitations thereof set forth in the
Salary Standardization Law (SSL). It explained that the SSL does
not authorize the grant of such monetary reward or gratuity.
Petitioners insist that the power and authority of the COA to
audit government funds and accounts does not carry with it in
all instances the power to disallow a particular disbursement.
ISSUE: W/N the power and authority of the COA to audit
government funds and accounts does not carry with it in all
instances the power to disallow a particular disbursement
RULING: No. The SC held that under the 1987 Constitution, the
COA is vested with the authority to determine whether
government entities, including LGUs, comply with laws and
regulations in disbursing government funds, and to disallow
illegal or irregular disbursements of these funds.
MAIN POINT: COA has exclusive authority, subject to the
limitations in this Article, to define the scope of its audit and
examination, establish the techniques and methods required
therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and
regulations, including those for the prevention and
disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or uses of
government funds and properties.”
Raiza
CASE NO. 199
ART IX-D SEC 2: General Functions; Powers
Audit Jurisdiction
Boy Scout of the Phil vs. COA
FACTS: COA issued a Resolution, with the subject “Defining the
Commission’s Policy with respect to the audit of the Boy Scout
of the Philippines.” Contending that the BSP was created as a
public corporation, and that in BSP vs. NLRC, the Supreme
Court ruled that the BSP, as constituted under its charter, was a
Government Owned and Controlled Corporation within the
meaning of Art. IX (B) (2) (1) of the Constitution, and that the
BSP is regarded as a government instrumentality under the
Administrative Code. For the purposes of audit supervision, the
BSP shall be classified among the government corporations to
be audited by employing the team audit approach. The BSP
sought reconsideration of the COA Resolution in a letter signed
by then BSP National President Jejomar C. Binay, saying that it
is not subject to the COA’s jurisdiction.
ISSUE: W/N the BSP is a public corporation and thus subject to
the audit jurisdiction of COA.
RULING: YES. The SC held that after looking at the legislative
history of its amended charter and carefully studying the
applicable laws and the arguments of both parties, they find
that the BSP is a public corporation and its funds are subject to
the COA’s audit jurisdiction. The BSP Charter (Commonwealth
Act No. 111), entitled “An Act to Create a Public Corporation to
be Known as the Boy Scouts of the Philippines, and to Define its
Powers and Purposes” created the BSP as a “public
corporation”. Several provisions of the all are also cited,
asserting that the BSP is a public instrumentalities and thus
subject to the jurisdiction of the COA.
MAIN POINT: Section 2 of Art IX-C provides that the
Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty
to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the
revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and
property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the
Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or
instrumentalities, including government-owned and controlled
corporations with original charters….x
Raiza
CASE NO. 200
ART IX-D SEC 2: General Functions; Powers
Audit Jurisdiction
Dela Lana vs COA
FACTS: Petitioner dela Llana (a taxpayer) wrote to the
Commission on Audit (COA) regarding the recommendation of
the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Food that the
Department of Agriculture set up an internal pre-audit service.
The COA replied informing him of the prior issuance of Circular
No. 89-299, which provides that whenever the circumstances
permits it, the COA may reinstitute pre-audit or adopt such
other control measures as necessary and appropriate to
protect the funds and property of an agency. The petitioner
filed the petition for Certiorari. He alleges that the pre-audit is
a constitutional mandate enshrined in Section 2 of Article IX-D
of the 1987 Constitution. He claimed that the lack of pre-audit
by COA, serious irregularities in government transactions have
been committed. Respondents, filed their Comment on the
petition and argued that the petition must be dismissed
because it is not proper for a petition for certiorari because: 1.
there is no allegation showing that COA exercised judicial or
quasi- judicial functions when it promulgated Circular No. 89-
299 2. there is no convincing explanation showing the
promulgation of the circular was done with grave abuse of
discretion. Respondents claim that the circular is valid, as COA
has the power under the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE: W/N the duty to conduct pre-audit is included in the
constitutional duty of COA
RULING: NO. The SC held that there is nothing in Par 1. Section
2 of Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution that requires the COA
to conduct a pre-audit of all government transactions and for
all government agencies. The only clear reference to a pre-
audit requirement is found in Section 2, paragraph 1, which
provides that a post-audit is mandated for certain government
or private entities with state subsidy or equity and only when
the internal control system of an audited entity is inadequate.
In such a situation, the COA may adopt measures, including a
temporary or special pre-audit, to correct the deficiencies.
MAIN POINT: The conduct of a pre-audit is not a mandatory
duty that this Court may compel the COA to perform. This
discretion on its part is in line with the constitutional
pronouncement that the COA has the exclusive authority to
define the scope of its audit and examination.
Raiza
CASE NO. 201
ART IX-D SEC 2: General Functions; Powers
Audit Jurisdiction
Philippine Operations Inc., vs Auditor-General
FACTS: POI entered into a barter agreement with the Bureau
of Prisons whereby it agreed to deliver to the Bureau a sawmill,
complete, with a diesel fuel engine, a stop saw edge and log
turner, etc., and two LCMs in good turning condition, in
exchange for 350,000 board feet of sawed lumber. The receipt
that an employee of the Bureau of Prisons issued for the
sawmill and its accessories discloses following unsatisfactory
conditions. The Attorney of POI claim with the Auditor General
demanding cash payment plus damaged incurred. The Auditor
denied the claim because the agreement entered into was one
of barter and no money consideration came to mind and that
the Bureau of Prisons was willing to perform its part of the
obligation. The respondents contend that Commonwealth Act
No. 327, which imposes upon the Auditor General the duty of
acting upon and deciding "all cases involving the settlement of
accounts or claims…” does not authorize or empower the
Auditor General to pass upon the petitioner's claim, because
the term "claims" used in the said Act can refer to no other
than liquidated claims. Petitioner argues that under
Commonwealth Act No. 3038, Sections 1 and 2, the Auditor
General has been granted the additional power upon "any
moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, express
or implied, which could serve as a basis for civil action between
private parties,".
ISSUE: W/N the Auditor General has jurisdiction over
unliquidated claim
RULING: No. the SC held that he Auditor General has no
jurisdiction or power to take cognizance of claims for
unliquidated damages. An examination of the provisions of the
Constitution fails to disclose any power vested in or granted to
the Auditor General to consider claims. All that is vested in the
Auditor General is the settlement of accounts. "Accounts,"
because of the absence of any reasons to the contrary, must be
deemed to have the same meaning as accounts under the laws
in force before the approval of the Constitution. The
Constitution does not grant the Auditor General the right to
consider claims. After the promulgation of the Constitution, the
power was granted under the provisions of Commonwealth Act
No. 327.
MAIN POINT: All that is vested in the Auditor General is the
settlement of accounts. "Accounts," because of the absence of
any reasons to the contrary, must be deemed to have the same
meaning as accounts under the laws in force before the
approval of the Constitution. The Constitution does not grant
the Auditor General the right to consider claims.
Who digested: COELI
Case no. 202
Article IX, COA, Sec. 3, AUDIT JURISDICTION
INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA (ICNA)
vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, BUREAU OF CUSTOMS,
UNITED STATES LINES COMPANY and/or LUZON
STEVEDORING CORPORATION
FACTS: ICNA filed, in the Court of First Instance of Manila, an
action for the recovery of P86,081.30, the insured value of a
shipment of eighty-two (82) cartons of goods, allegedly lost in
the custody of the carrier, defendant United States Lines, Co.,
or of the lighter operator, defendant Luzon Stevedoring
Corporation, or of the arrastre operator, defendant Bureau of
Customs, an agency of defendant Republic of the Philippines.
The Republic of the Philippines and the Bureau of Customs,
moved to dismiss the complaint, claiming State immunity from
suit.
The court denied the Republic's and Bureau of Customs'
motion to dismiss. Subsequently, however, said court, taking
notice of SC’s decision in Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc. vs.
Bureau of Customs dismissed the case with respect to the
Republic of the Philippines and the Bureau of Customs.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner should have filed through
the Auditor General, it being for money claims.
RULING: YES. In this case, the existence of a specific and fixed
debt is the issue, the Auditor General has power to act on the
claim
However, when the existence and also the amount of an
unfixed and undetermined debt is involved, said official has no
competence to consider such a claim.
MAIN POINT: Auditor General is competent to consider money
claims, but not competent to decide money claims for
damages.
Who digested: COELI
Case no. 203
Article IX, COA, Sec. 3, AUDIT JURISDICTION
DINGCONG vs GUINGONA
FACTS: Petitioner, Atty. Praxedio P. Dingcong, was the former
Acting Regional Director of Regional Office No. VI of the Bureau
of Treasury in Iloilo City, until his retirement. He contracted on
an "emergency labor basis " the services of one Rameses
Layson, a private carpenter and electrician on "pakyao" basis
for the renovation and improvement of the Bureau of Treasury
Office.
When petitioner retired, among the items disallowed by the
Resident Auditor was the amount of P6,574.00 from the labor
contracts with Layson, by reducing the latter's daily rate from
P40.00 per day to P18.00 daily.
Petitioner appealed to the Chairman of the Commission on
Audit, who affirmed the disallowance as being "excessive and
disadvantageous to the government," but increased Layson's
daily rate to P25.00 thereby reducing the total amount
disallowed to P4,276.00. Despite petitioner's request for
reconsideration, respondent Commission remained unmoved,
hence, the instant appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the disallowance made by COA was
invalid for being a usurpation of a management function and
an impairment of contract.
RULING: NO. The disallowance made by COA is neither illegal
nor a usurpation of a management function. The authority of
the petitioner, as agency head, to enter into a contract is not
being curtailed. What COA maintains is that the "pakyao"
contract has proved disadvantageous to the government.
MAIN POINT: COA determines whether or not: (a) the fiscal
responsibility that rests directly with the head of the
government agency has been properly and effectively
discharged; and (b) there has been loss or wastage of
government resources.
Case no. 204
Article IX, COA, Sec. 3, AUDIT JURISDICTION
NHC vs. COA
FACTS: There are no uncertainties on the facts of the case. Our
government forged an agreement on financial cooperation
with the Republic of Germany. The agreement empowered the
NHA (National Housing Authority) and the KFW (Kreditanstalt
Fur Weideraufbau) to be the lender or the project sponsor of
the Urban Housing Dagat Dagatan Project II.
However, despite all the negotiations and contracts, the
project was not completed as scheduled. Thus, an extension of
the contracts was made since the NHA did not appear to have
much choice. Several extensions were made which triggered
the difficulties experienced by the NHA.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COA has the authority to disallow a
duly entered contract and substitute its own judgment or
disposition in lieu of the decision of the management or
governing body of the government entities.
RULING: YES. Since the COA is responsible for the enforcement
of the rules and regulations, it goes without saying that failure
to comply with them is a ground for disapproving the payment
of the proposed expenditure.
MAIN POINT: Court recognized the authority of COA to
disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or
unconscionable (IUEEU) expenditures.
Case no. 205
Article IX, COA, Sec. 3, AUDIT JURISDICTION
Euro-Med v. Province of Batangas, 495 SCRA 30 [2006]
FACTS: Petitioner Euro-Med Laboratories, Phil., Inc. filed a
complaint against Province of Batangas for unpaid balance still
due to the petitioner. Respondent alleged that some payments
it had already made were not reflected in the computation set
forth in the complaint and that it was continuously exerting
genuine and earnest efforts "to find out the true and actual
amount owed."  failure of bidding.
At the conclusion of petitioner's presentation of evidence,
respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the
ground that the primary jurisdiction over petitioner's money
claim was lodged with the COA. Respondent pointed out that
petitioner's claim, arising as it did from a series of procurement
transactions with the province, was governed by the Local
Government Code provisions and COA rules and regulations on
supply and property management in local governments.
Respondent argued that the case called for a determination of
whether these provisions and rules were complied with, and
that was within the exclusive domain of COA to make.
ISSUE: Whether or not COA which has primary jurisdiction to
pass upon petitioner's money claim against the Province of
Batangas.
RULING: YES. COA has the primary jurisdiction, and not the
RTC. The circumstances surrounding petitioner's claim brought
it clearly within the ambit of the COA's jurisdiction.
MAIN POINT: The doctrine of primary jurisdiction holds that if
a case is such that its determination requires the expertise,
specialized training and knowledge of an administrative body,
relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding
before resort to the courts is had even if the matter may well
be within their proper jurisdiction.
Case no. 206
Article IX, COA, Sec. 3, DEFINE SCOPE AND TECHNIQUES OF
AUDITING PROCEDURES
Danville Maritime v. COA, 175 SCRA 701 [1989]
FACTS: Petitioner seeks to set aside the letter-directive of
respondent COA for disapproving the result of the public
bidding held by the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC ) of
the sale of its tanker-vessel "T/T Andres Bonifacio" on the
ground that only one bidder submitted a bid and to direct COA
to approve the said sale.
ISSUE: Whether or not COA committed a grave abuse of
discretion when it ruled that there was a failure of bidding
when only one bid was submitted and subsequently ordered a
rebidding.
RULING: NO. It is provided in COA Circular No. 88-264 that
there should at least be two (2) bidders, otherwise there is a
Negotiated sale may only be undertaken under the failure of
the second bidding. Only the SC can review the decisions made
by COA.
MAIN POINT: No less than the Constitution has ordained that
the COA shall have exclusive authority to define the scope of its
audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods
required therefore, and promulgate accounting and auditing
rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and
disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant,
or unconscionable expenditures, or use of government funds
and properties.
KARLY
CASE NO. 207
ART IX SEC 2: GENERAL FUNCTIONS; POWERS
AUDIT JURISDICTION: PROMULGATE ACCOUNTING AND
AUDITING RULES
 Leycano v. COA
FACTS: The Commission on Audit (COA) Decision No. 2002-129
which denied petitioner’s appeal of the Notices of Disallowance
is being challenged in the present Petition for Certiorari.
Petitioner Manuel Leycano, Jr. was the Provincial Treasurer of
Oriental Mindoro and at the same time a member of the
Provincial School Board (PSB) of that province. During his
tenure, he was appointed by the PSB as a member of its
Inspectorate Team which, according to him, had the function of
"monitoring the progress of PSB projects.”
In the year 1995, several checks were issued to various private
contractors in connection with the repair, rehabilitation, and
construction projects covered by the Special Education Fund
(SEF) of Oriental Mindoro in the several public schools.
The Special Audit Team found deficiencies in the projects,
hence, it issued the questioned Notices of Disallowance holding
petitioner, along with Sangguniang Panlalawigan Member
Remedios Marasigan and Schools Division Superintendent
Benjamin Cruz, liable for signing the Certificates of Inspection
(the dates of which have not been alleged by either party)
relative to the projects and thereby falsely attesting to their
100% completion.
ISSUE: WON petitioner is held accountable for the said project
RULING: YES, In this case, there was such irregularity when
petitioner and other members of the Team attested to the
100% completion of the projects notwithstanding their
undisputed deficiencies. Petitioner should have perceived the
anomaly in the existence of Acceptance Reports executed by
DECS officials prior to the Inspectorate Team’s assessment of
the projects and its issuance of a certificate of inspection.
Strangely, rather than being alerted by this circumstance,
petitioner even claims that these Acceptance Reports were
among his bases for signing the Certificate of Inspection.
MAIN POINT: “In addition, the authority of the COA to hold
petitioner liable is also implied in its duty to "promulgate
accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those
for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary,
excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or
uses of government funds and properties."
CASE NO. 208
ART IX SEC 2: GENERAL FUNCTIONS; POWERS
AUDIT JURISDICTION: DECIDE ADMIN CASES INVOLVING
EXPENDITURES OF PUBLIC FUNDS
National Center for Mental Health Mngt v. COA, 265 SCRA
390
FACTS: An increase in its budgetary allocation of from P145
million in 1987 to P191 million in 1988 enabled petitioner
NCMH, headed by Dr. Brigida Buenaseda, to finally undertake
the rehabilitation, apparently long overdue, of various facilities
in the NCMHM.
Soon after most of the work was accomplished, the NCMHM
Nurses Association lodged with the Office of the Ombudsman a
complaint against petitioners for alleged mismanagement of
funds. At the same time, the group asked the COA to undertake
an audit of the NCMHM. Acting on the request, the COA
directed an audit, covering the transactions made in 1988 and
the first four (4) months of 1989, to be conducted by a Special
Audit Team ("SAT"). On 27 July 1992, the SAT submitted its SAO
(Special Audit Office) report that states that a use of  bulk of
the budget was unnecessary, extravagant and/or excessive.
While the incurrence of these expenditures made the physical
surroundings pleasant, it left some basic hospital needs
unattended to or given minimal attention.
The SAO report and the evaluation report were brought to COA
en banc for review and were denied for alleging that there was
an overpricing, splitting, violation of rues of public bidding, and
unlawful alterations of dates”. Hence, this petition alleged that
COA to have committed Grave Abuse of Discretion, that they
denied due process and that the findings found in the SAO
report was not substantiated evidence but by suspicion.
Issue: WON the expenditures were considered to be was
unnecessary, extravagant and/or excessive.
RULING: NO, Although NCMH management has the absolute
and/or sole discretion on matters affecting the use of its funds
for a particular purpose, i.e., MOOE, as specifically stated in its
budget, this must yield to the constitutionally mandated power
of the Commission to prevent the incurrence of irregular,
unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable use of
public funds. In the light of the operational definition of these
expenses and the standard or list of situational cases indicated
in COA Circular No. 85-55A.
MAIN POINT: The term extravagant expenditures signifies
those incurred without restraint, judiciousness and
economy. Extravagant expenditures exceed the bounds of
propriety. These expenditures are immoderate, prodigal,
lavish, luxurious, wasteful, grossly excessive, and injudicious
(COA Cir. 88-55A, supra),
CASE NO. 209
ART IX SEC 2: GENERAL FUNCTIONS; POWERS
AUDIT JURISDICTION: DECIDE ADMIN CASES INVOLVING
EXPENDITURES OF PUBLIC FUNDS
Ramos v. Aquino, 39 SCRA 256 [1971]
Facts: Appellants, assailed the jurisdiction of respondent
Benjamin Aquino, then Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, to conduct the
preliminary investigation of the alleged commission of
malversation through falsification of Public, official and
commercial documents imputed to them by the other
respondent, then the Commanding General, Philippine Army,
Fort Bonifacio, Rizal, Romeo Espino.
The basis for such a petition was that under the Constitution,
the Auditor General is not only vested with the duty to
examine or audit all expenditures of funds of the Government,
but also to audit or investigate and "bring to the attention of
the proper administrative officer expenditures of funds or
property which in this opinion are irregular, unnecessary,
excessive, or extravagant." It is their contention that under the
above, it is incumbent on the Auditor General to determine
whether criminal responsibility for the anomaly discovered in
the course of his audit or examination of the accounts lies.
Issue: Won the investigation of the cases by the Provincial
Fiscal encroached upon the powers of the Auditor General.
RULING: NO, There is the explicit requirement then that there
be no expenditure of public funds except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law. Though the power of the purse
belongs to the legislative, they are not in a position to oversee
and supervise the actual release of each and every
appropriation. That is where the Auditor General comes in. He
serves as the necessary check to make certain that no
department of the government exceeds the statutory limits of
the appropriation to which it is entitled.

MAIN POINT: The exclusive jurisdiction of the Auditor General
refer to auditor requirements and approval but not to the
criminal liability, if any, of the persons involved in an alleged
irregular or anomalous disbursement of public funds. The
authority of the Fiscal to investigate whether a criminal act has
been committed or not in the disbursement of public funds is
not included in the administrative findings of the Auditor
General.
nCASE NO. 210
ART IX SEC 2: GENERAL FUNCTIONS; POWERS
AUDIT JURISDICTION: DECIDE ADMIN CASES INVOLVING
EXPENDITURES OF PUBLIC FUNDS
Salva v. Carague, 511 SCRA 258
Facts: Petitioner Dr. Teresita L. Salva, President of the Palawan
State University(formerly Palawan State College [PSC]), is being
held personally liable by the Commission on Audit (COA) for
the disallowance made on the construction of Phase II, Multi-
Purpose Building of the PSC in the amount of P274,726.38
In 1992, the PSC and the Integrand Development Construction,
Inc. (IDCI)entered into a Construction Agreement for the
construction of the PSC Multi-Purpose Building (Phase II) for
the price of P1,685,883.45.
When the COA-Technical Audit Specialist (COA-TAS) reviewed
the contract, it found excess amounts attributed to the costs of
items of mobilization/demobilization and earth fill and
compaction.
In COA Decision No. 95-211 dated March 28, 1995, petitioner,
together with PSCVice-President Francisco M. Romantico and
PSC Accountant Carolina S. Baloran, were held jointly and
severally liable for the amount of P274,726.38 which was the
excess amount. The COA further affirmed said disallowance in
COA Decision No. 2000-273dated September 26, 2000, with the
modification that Romantico and Baloran were excused from
any liability, while Engineers Norberto S. Dela Cruz and Lucy
JanetPasion, and the IDCI Manager, were included as persons
liable for the amount.
Issue:
WON petitioner should be held personally liable for the
disallowed amount?
RULING: NO, the court found that her only participation is to
approve the Approved Agency Estimates (AAE) prepared by
PSU Engineers Norberto S. dela Cruz and Lucy Janet R. Pasion.
She cannot be held personally liable for the disallowance
simply because she was the final approving authority of the
transaction in question. Also, being the president of PSU does
not automatically make her the party ultimately liable in case
of disallowance of expenses for questionable transactions of
her agency.
MAIN POINT: An official or employee shall be personally liable
for unauthorized expenditures if the following requisites are
present, to wit: (a) there must be an expenditure of
government funds or use of government property; (b) the
expenditure is in violation of law or regulation; and(c) the
official is found directly responsible.
CASE NO. 211
ART IX SEC 2: GENERAL FUNCTIONS; POWERS
AUDIT JURISDICTION: DECIDE ADMIN CASES INVOLVING
EXPENDITURES OF PUBLIC FUNDS
City of Basilan v. Hechanova, 58 SCRA 711 [1974]
Facts: The City of Basilan, by ordinance created the position of
Assistant City Auditor in1954. Private respondent Miguel
Antonio was appointed to this position. In 1964, the city
abolished the position by through another ordinance, deleting
the position from the plantilla and specifying no compensation
for the office. Respondents contested the authority of the City
of Basilan to abolish the position, hence Antonio continued to
discharge the functions of his office.
Issue: WON the City of Basilan can dissolve the office of
Assistant City Auditor by ordinance
RULING: NO. The office of Assistant City Auditor is dissimilar
from that of a city employee. It comes within the purview of
the Auditor General, a constitutionally created position. It is a
position primarily under the General Auditing Office. Therefore,
the City of Basilan does not have sole jurisdiction over the
position, much less the power to abolish it.
MAIN POINT: "As well-settled as the rule that the abolition of
an office does not amount to an illegal removal of its
incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the
abolition must be made in good faith. Where the abolition is
made in bad faith, for political or personal reasons, or in order
to circumvent the constitutional security of tenure of civil
service employees, it is null and void ..."
ARZHY
CASE NO. 212
ART IX SEC 3: COMMISSION ON AUDIT
COA JURISDICTION
Luciano Veloso v. Commisssion on Audit
FACTS: COA disallowed the monetary reward as part of the
Exemplary Public Service Award (EPSA) to former three-term
councilors of the City of Manila authorized by City Ordinance
No. 8040. Petitioners claimed that the power and authority of
COA to audit government funds and accounts does not carry
with it all instances the power to disallow a particular
disbursement. COA’s remedy, according to petitioner, is to
bring to the attention of the proper administrative officer such
expenditures that, in its opinion, are irregular, unnecessary,
excessive or extravagant.
ISSUE: Whether or not COA has the authority to disallow the
disbursement of local government funds
RULING: Yes, COA is vested with the authority to determine
whether government entities, including Local Government
Units (LGUs), comply with laws and regulations in disbursing
government funds, and to disallow illegal or irregular
disbursements of these funds. Previous ruling of the Court re
bringing to the attention of the proper administrative body any
irregular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagant expenditure of
public funds as COA’s remedy has already been overturned.
MAIN POINT: Pursuant to its mandate as the guardian of public
funds, the COA is vested with broad powers over all accounts
pertaining to government revenue and expenditures and the
uses of public funds and property. It is endowed with enough
latitude to determine, prevent, disallow irregular, unnecessary,
excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of
government funds.