1497. ARVIN R. BALAG v. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al., G.R. No.

234608, 3 July
2018,
EN BANC (Gesmundo, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE: The interests of the Senate and the witnesses appearing in its
legislative inquiry are balanced. The Senate can continuously and effectively exercise its power
of contempt during the legislative inquiry against recalcitrant witnesses, even during recess.
Such power can be exercised by the Senate immediately when the witness performs a
contemptuous act, subject to its own rules and the constitutional rights of the said witness.
However, the Senate will be prevented from effectively conducting legislative hearings during
recess - shall be duly addressed because it is expressly provided herein that the Senate may
still exercise its power of contempt during legislative hearings while on recess provided that the
period of imprisonment shall only last until the termination of the legislative inquiry, specifically,
upon the approval or disapproval of the Committee Report. Thus, the Senate's inherent power
of contempt is still potent and compelling even during its recess. At the same time, the rights of
the persons appearing are respected because their detention shall not be indefinite.

FACTS: This is a case of petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer of an issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction seeking to annul, set aside and
enjoin implementation of the Senate P.S. Resolution No. 504 and October 18, 2017 Order of
Complaint by the Senate Committee on Public Order and Dangerous Drugs filed by Arvin R.
Balag (petitioner) against the Senate of the Philippines, et. al. (respondent). On September 17,
2017, a first-year law student from the University of Santo Tomas named Horacio Castillo III,
allegedly died due to hazing-related activities conducted by the Aegis Juris Fraternity. On
September 20, 2017, the senate released Senate Resolution No. 504 entitled “a Resolution
Directing the Appropriate Senate Committees to Conduct an Inquiry, In Aid of Legislation, into
the Recent Death of Horacio Castillo III Allegedly due to Hazing-Related Activities” filed by Sen.
Paolo Benigno Aquino IV.
When the petitioner attended the hearing dated on October 18, 2017, Sen. Grace Poe
asked the petitioner if he was the president of Aegis Juris Fraternity however, the petitioner
refused to answer and invoked his right to self-incrimination. Sen. Panfilo Lacson reminded that
it was just a “simple question” to invoke self-incrimination and warned the petitioner that he may
be cited in contempt, but the petitioner still refused to answer. According to Sen. Grace Poe, the
petitioner’s signature appeared on the document for the application of the Aegis Juris Fraternity
in the organizational sheet submitted in the school administration and it was indicated therein
that the petitioner was the President, yet he still refuses to answer the simple question asked.
The petitioner was then cited in contempt and was ordered to place in detention under the
Senate Sergeant at Arms’ supervision after the senate hearing. Sen. Panfilo Lacson gave the
petitioner a chance to purge out of contempt, however, the petitioner still refused to answer and
invoked his right to self-incrimination. When the petitioner was asked of the question of whose
decision it was to bring the victim to the hospital, the petitioner submitted a plea to lift his
contempt and stated that he was a member of the Aegis Juris Fraternity, however, he does not
know who the president was because he was enrolled at another university at the time of the
incident. The question asked before his plea was again repeated and the petitioner invoked
again his right to self-incrimination.

ISSUE: Did the Senate Committee acted with grave abuse of discretion in conducting the
legislative inquiry and citing petitioner in contempt?

RULING: YES. However, the court denied the petition for being moot and academic. In the
present case, the Court finds that there is no more justiciable controversy to be decided up
since in its resolution dated December 12, 2017, the Court ordered in the interim the immediate
release of petitioner pending resolution of the instant petition. Thus, petitioner was no longer
detained under the Senate's authority.

However, the court still resolved the case despite being moot and academic. The court
ruled that the period of imprisonment under the inherent power of contempt of the
Senate during inquiries in aid of legislation should only last until the termination of the
legislative inquiry. The court stated that the interests of the Senate and the witnesses
appearing in its legislative inquiry should be balanced. The Senate can continuously and
effectively exercise its power of contempt during the legislative inquiry against recalcitrant
witnesses, even during recess. Such power can be exercised by the Senate immediately when
the witness performs a contemptuous act, subject to its own rules and the constitutional rights of
the said witness. However, during recess, the Senate will be prevented from effectively
conducting legislative hearings. But the Senate may still exercise its power of contempt during
legislative hearings while on recess provided that the period of imprisonment shall only last until
the termination of the legislative inquiry upon the approval or disapproval of the Committee
Report. Thus, the Senate's inherent power of contempt is still potent and compelling even
during its recess. At the same time, the rights of the persons appearing are respected
because their detention shall not be indefinite.

In this case, the petition presents a critical and decisive issue that must be addressed by Court:
what is the duration of the detention for a contempt ordered by the Senate?

This issue must be threshed out as the Senate's exercise of its power of contempt without a
definite period is capable of repetition. Moreover, the indefinite detention of persons cited in
contempt impairs their constitutional right to liberty. Thus, paramount public interest requires the
Court to determine such issue to ensure that the constitutional rights of the persons appearing
before a legislative inquiry of the Senate are protected.

The contempt order issued against petitioner simply stated that he would be arrested and
detained until such time that he gives his true testimony, or otherwise purges himself of the
contempt. It does not provide any definite and concrete period of detention. Neither does the
Senate Rules specify a precise period of detention when a person is cited in contempt.

Thus, a review of the Constitution and relevant laws and jurisprudence must be conducted to
determine whether there is a limitation to the period of detention when the Senate exercises its
power of contempt during inquiries in aid of legislation.

IN RELATION TO SECTION 19, ARTICLE III (Cruel, Degrading or Inhuman Punishment;

Excessive Fines)

An indefinite and unspecified period of detention will amount to excessive restriction and
will certainly violate any person’s right to liberty. Thus, the court must strike a balance
between the interest of the senate and the rights of persons cited in contempt during
legislative inquiries. The balancing of interest requires that the court take a conscious
and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation or
type of situation. These interests usually consist in the exercise by an individual of his
basic freedoms on the one hand, and the government’s promotion of fundamental public
interest or policy objectives on the other.
The court finds that the period of imprisonment under the inherent power of contempt by
the senate during inquiries in aid of legislation should only last until the termination of
the legislative inquiry under which the said power is invoked. As legislative inquiry ends,
the basis for the detention of the recalcitrant witness likewise ends.
1498. IN RE: CORRECTION/ADJUSTMENT OF PENALTY PURSUANT TO REPUBLIC ACT
NO. 10951, IN RELATION TO HERNAN V. SANDIGANBAYAN - ROLANDO ELBANBUENA
Y MARFIL, Petitioner G.R. No. 237721

Facts: Petitioner Elbanbuena worked as a Disbursing Officer of Alingilan National High School
in Alingilan, Bacolod. He was charged with four counts of malversation of public funds through
falsification of a public document under Articles 217 and 171 in relation to Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC). After trial, Elbanbuena was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crimes charged in the Information. Since Elbanbuena did not appeal the ruling, it became
final and executory on August 10, 2000. On January 9, 2003, Elbanbuena started serving his
sentence at the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa City.On August 29, 2017, RA No. 10951 was
promulgated. It amended Act No. 3815, otherwise known as the Revised Penal Code, and
reduced the penalties for certain crimes.
Issue: Whether the case of Petitioner (Elbanbuena) should be reopened for the purpose of re-
computing his penalty pursuant to RA No. 10951
Ruling: As held by this Court in Hernan v. Sandiganbayan, the passage of RA No. 10951 is an
exceptional circumstance which warrants not only the reopening of an already terminated case,
but also the recall of an Entry of Judgment for purposes of modifying the penalty to be served.
Thus, in Hernan, this Court re-opened the case for the sole purpose of re-computing the proper
sentence to be imposed in accordance with RA No. 10951. In contrast, petitioner Elbanbuena
here seeks not only a modification of his sentence in accordance with RA No. 10951; he also
seeks immediate release from confinement on account of his alleged full service of the
recomputed sentence. The determination of whether he is entitled to immediate release,
however, would necessarily involve ascertaining, among others, the actual length of time
Elbanbuena has actually been in confinement and whether time allowance for good conduct
should be allowed. Such an exercise would, at the first instance, be better undertaken by a trial
court, which is relatively more equipped to make findings of both fact and law.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated July 5,
2000 in Criminal Cases Nos. 95-17263, 95-17264, 95-17265, and 95-17266 is
hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court in Muntinlupa City for the determination of: (1)
the proper penalty/penalties in accordance with RA No. 10951; and (2) whether
petitioner ROLANDO ELBANBUENA y MARFIL is entitled to immediate release on account of
full service of his sentences, as modified.

1499. Inmates of the New Bilibid Prison vs. De Lima, G.R No. 212719, June 25, 2019
Facts: On May 29, 2013, President Benigno Aquin III signed Republic Act No. 10592 amending
certain provisions in the Revised Penal Code. Pursuant to the amendatory law, an IRR was
jointly issue by DOJ Secretary Leila De Lima and DILG Secretary Mauel Roxas. Petitioners
assailed the validity of Rule 1, Section of the IRR where it directs the prospective application of
the grant of good conduct time allowance, time allowance for study, teaching and mentoring and
special time allowance for loyalty mainly on the ground that it violates Article 22 of the Revised
Penal Code or the Retroactive effect of Penal Laws.
A Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition was file by the convicted prisoners of the New
Bilibid Prisoner through their acting attorney-in-fact contending that the provisions of R.A 10592
are penal in nature and beneficial to the inmates; hence it should be given a retroactive effect
under Art. 22 of the RPC. For them, the IRR contradicts the law it implements. Petitioner submit
that the simple standards added by the new law should not override the constitutional guarantee
of the rights to liberty and due process of law aside from the principle that penal laws beneficial
to the accused are given retroactive effect.
A petition in intervention was filed by Atty. Rene Saguisag where he implead the same
respondents and added that nowhere from the legislative history of R.A 10592 that it intends to
be prospective in character. Another petition-in-intervention was filed by the Free Legal
Assistance Group who served as counsel for inmates of NBP arguing that Section 4, Rule I of
the IRR is facially void for being contrary to the equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution;
it discriminates, without any reasonable basis, against those who would have been benefited
from the retroactive application of the law; and is also ultra vires, as it was issued beyond the
authority of respondents to promulgate.
A petition for Certiorari and Prohibition by Edago et.al. who are all inmates of the
Maximum Security of NBP on the ground that (1) Rule 1, Section 4 of the IRR was issued with
GADALEJ because R.A 10952 did not state that it shall have prospective application, it is
contrary to Article 22 of the RPC and contravenes public policy; (2) Rule 1,Section 4 of the IRR
is unconstitutional because it violated the Equal Protection Clause and Substantive Due
Process.
Issue: Whether the Section 4, Rule 1 of the IRR of Republic Act No. 10952 is constitutional
Ruling: NO. Every new law has a prospective effect. Under Article 22 of the RPC, however, a
penal law that is favorable or advantageous to the accused shall be given retroactive effect if he
is not a habitual criminal. These are the rules, the exception, and the exception to the exception
on the effectivity of laws.
In criminal law, the principle favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda (penal laws
which are favorable to the accused are given retroactive effect) is well entrenched.
According to. Chief Justice Manuel Araullo, the principle is "not as a right" of the offender, "but
founded on the very principles on which the right of the State to punish and the commination of
the penalty are based, and regards it not as an exception based on political considerations, but
as a rule founded on principles of strict justice. The "penal laws" mentioned in Article 22 of the
RPC refer to substantive laws, not procedural rules. Moreover, the mere fact that a law contains
penal provisions does not make it penal in nature.
The "penal laws" mentioned in Article 22 of the RPC refer to substantive laws, not procedural
rules. Moreover, the mere fact that a law contains penal provisions does not make it penal in
nature. 66
In the case at bar, petitioners assert that Article 22 of the RPC applies because R.A. No. 10592
is a penal law. They claim that said law has become an integral part of the RPC as Articles 29,
94, 97, 98 and 99 thereof. Edago et al. further argue that if an amendment to the RPC that
makes the penalties more onerous or prejudicial to the accused cannot be applied retroactively
for being an ex post facto law, a law that makes the penalties lighter should be considered penal
laws in accordance with Article 22 of the RPC.
The Court concurs.
While R.A. No. 10592 does provide/prescribe/establish a penalty67 component of our
correctional system, not define a crime/offense or as it addresses the rehabilitation its provisions
have the purpose and effect of diminishing the punishment attached to the crime. The further
reduction on the length of the penalty of imprisonment is, in the ultimate analysis, beneficial to
the detention and convicted prisoners alike; hence, calls for the application of Article 22 of the
RPC.
The prospective application of the beneficial provisions of R.A. No. 10592 actually works
to the disadvantage of petitioners and those who are similarly situated. It precludes the
decrease in the penalty attached to their respective crimes and lengthens their prison
stay; thus, making more onerous the punishment for the crimes they committed.
Depriving them of time off to which they are justly entitled as a practical matter results in
extending their sentence and increasing their punishment. 69 Evidently, this
transgresses the clear mandate of Article 22 of the RPC.
In support of the prospective application of the grant of GCTA, TASTM, and STAL, respondents
aver that a careful scrutiny of R.A. No. 10592 would indicate the need for "new procedures and
standards of behavior" to fully implement the law by the BUCOR (as to persons serving their
sentences after conviction) and the BJMP (as to accused who are under preventive detention).
It is alleged that the amendments introduced are substantial and of utmost importance that they
may not be implemented without a thorough revision of the BUCOR and the BJMP operating
manuals on jail management. In particular, the establishment of the MSEC is said to be an
administrative mechanism to address the policy and necessity that the BUCOR superintendents
and the BJMP jail wardens must follow uniform guidelines in managing, screening and
evaluating the behavior or conduct of prisoners prior to their recommendation to the heads of
the two bureaus on who may be granted time allowances.
Respondents fail to persuade the court.
Except for the benefits of TASTM and the STAL granted to a prisoner who chose to stay in the
place of his confinement despite the existence of a calamity or catastrophe enumerated in
Article 158 of the RPC, the provisions of R.A. No. 10592 are mere modifications of the RPC that
have been implemented by the BUCOR prior to the issuance of the challenged IRR. In view of
this, the claim of "new procedures and standards of behavior" for the grant of time allowances is
untenable.
Under the IRR of R.A. No. 10592, the MSECs (Management, Screening and Evaluation
Committee) are established to act as the recommending body for the grant of OCTA and
TASTM. 78 They are tasked to manage, screen and evaluate the behavior and conduct of a
detention or convicted prisoner and to monitor and certify whether said prisoner has actually
studied, taught or performed mentoring activities.79 The creation of the MSEC, however, does
not justify the prospective application of R.A. No. 10592. Nowhere in the amendatory law was its
formation set as a precondition before its beneficial provisions are applied. What R.A. No.
10592 only provides is that the Secretaries of the DOJ and the DILG are authorized to
promulgate rules and regulations on the classification·system for good conduct and time
allowances, as may be necessary to implement its provisions. 8° Clearly, respondents went
outside the bounds of their legal mandate when they provided for rules beyond what was
contemplated by the law to be enforced.
Main Point in relation to Sec. 19, Art III (Cruel, Degrading or Inhuman Punishment;
Excessive Fines)
The prospective application of the beneficial provisions of R.A. No. 10592 actually works
to the disadvantage of petitioners and those who are similarly situated. It precludes the
decrease in the penalty attached to their respective crimes and lengthens their prison
stay; thus, making more onerous the punishment for the crimes they committed.
Depriving them of time off to which they are justly entitled as a practical matter results in
extending their sentence and increasing their punishment. 69 Evidently, this
transgresses the clear mandate of Article 22 of the RPC.
Main point in relation to Sec. 22, Art III (Ex post Facto Law; Bill of Attainder)
While R.A. No. 10592 does provide/prescribe/establish a penalty component of our
correctional system, not define a crime/offense or as it addresses the rehabilitation its
provisions have the purpose and effect of diminishing the punishment attached to the
crime. The further reduction on the length of the penalty of imprisonment is, in the
ultimate analysis, beneficial to the detention and convicted prisoners alike; hence, calls
for the application of Article 22 of the RPC.

1644. IN RE: CORRECTION/ADJUSTMENT OF PENALTY PURSUANT TO REPUBLIC ACT

NO. 10951, IN RELATION TO HERNAN V. SANDIGANBAYAN - ROLANDO ELBANBUENA
Y MARFIL, Petitioner G.R. No. 237721- NOTHING ABOUT SECTION 22, ARTICLE 3 of the
BILL OF RIGHTS.