Survival

Global Politics and Strategy

ISSN: 0039-6338 (Print) 1468-2699 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/tsur20

Music of the Islamic State

Nelly Lahoud & Jonathan Pieslak

To cite this article: Nelly Lahoud & Jonathan Pieslak (2018) Music of the Islamic State, Survival,
60:1, 153-168, DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2018.1427372

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2018.1427372

Published online: 29 Jan 2018.

Submit your article to this journal

Article views: 212

View related articles

View Crossmark data

Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at

http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=tsur20
Review Essay

Music of the Islamic State

Nelly Lahoud and Jonathan Pieslak

When the animals in George Orwell’s Animal Farm concluded that their
misery could be ‘summed up in a single word’, namely ‘Man’, and became
resolved to ‘Remove Man from the scene’, it was a song that propelled them
to revolution.1 Old Major the boar, the most highly regarded among the
animals, addressed his comrades with a philosophical speech about the
‘tyranny of human beings’, going on to tell them of a dream he had had
about life after the disappearance of Man. In particular, he recalled a song
from the dream, ‘Beasts of England’, the lyrics of which contained ‘joyful
tidings’ of a ‘golden future time’ when ‘tyrant man shall be o’erthrown’ and
the fields ‘shall be trod by beasts alone’.2 The song ‘threw the animals into
the wildest excitement’, much more so than Old Major’s speech had done,
and before long ‘the whole farm burst out into Beasts of England in tremen-
dous unison’.3 In short, the song forged a common bond among the animals,
transcending their differences and imbuing Old Major’s plan to eradicate
Man with a potency and resonance that his rhetoric had clearly lacked.
In December 2013, the Islamic State (also known as ISIS or ISIL) was expe-
riencing its own Orwellian moment and, like Old Major, saw fit to mark the
occasion with a song – specifically an Islamic a cappella song or nashid (plural
anashid). That month, ISIS killed Abu Sa‘d al-Hadrami, the leader of rival
jihadi group Jabhat al-Nusra in Raqqa, and was set to take over the province.
Convinced that divine providence was guiding its leaders and fighters, the

Nelly Lahoud is Senior Fellow for Political Islamism, IISS–Middle East. Jonathan Pieslak is Professor at The City
College of New York and Graduate Center, CUNY.

Survival | vol. 60 no. 1 | February–March 2018 | pp. 153–168DOI 10.1080/ 00396338.2018.1427372

154 | Nelly Lahoud and Jonathan Pieslak

group decided to share its own joyful tidings (bushra) by releasing a nashid
so that the faithful might join in the celebration, and of course in the fighting:

My umma, [a new] dawn is breaking

The victory [that God promised]
Is in sight … awaiting
Islam’s [legitimate] state has risen
Because the faithful their blood they’ve given
…
My umma, rejoice
Victory is near
End your despair [and your fears]
My umma, God is our Lord,
[In His path we must fight]
And the blood of the [faithful] He shall generously reward
For victory could only be achieved
When the blood of our martyrs
[As a libation] to our Lord we pour4

Because the use of musical instruments is not lawful under Islamic law,
anashid melodies are delivered through the rhythmic chanting of lyrics. To
ensure that these rhythms move the listeners’ emotions to the greatest possi-
ble extent, modern Islamic anashid make ample use of sound effects; it seems
that, despite jihadis’ disposition to apply Islamic law according to the nar-
rowest interpretation, they do not quibble with the use of such effects. Thus,
the casual listener would not necessarily discern that the audio recording
of the nashid just cited – ‘Ummati qad Laha Fajrun’ (‘My Umma, [a new]
Dawn Is Breaking’) – did not make use of musical instruments. The lyrics
and the upbeat rhythm produced by the nashid’s sophisticated sound effects
succeed in conveying the glad tidings ISIS wished to share.

Music and jihad

Music has long been deployed by states and by non-state actors alike to
gain recruits and motivate action, and even to engender a culture of mili-
 Music of the Islamic State | 155

tancy and incite violence. Its use by actors with such differing aims as racist
skinheads and animal-rights militants demonstrates that the use of music
as a political tool is unrestrained by ideological orientation, culture, reli-
gion or geography.5 Indeed, it would not be an exaggeration to observe that
the strength of a radical organisation is typically reflected by the degree to
which its musical culture thrives.6
The value of music has not escaped the attention of jihadis. Anwar al-
‘Awlaqi, the American Yemeni imam who joined al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula (AQAP) and was killed by a US drone in Yemen in 2011, made
a special case for anashid in his 2009 missive, ‘44 Ways to Support Jihad’.
He contended that a ‘good nasheed can spread so widely it can reach to an
audience that you could not reach through a lecture or a book. Nasheeds
are especially inspiring to the youth, who are the foundation of Jihad in
every age and time. Nasheed are an important element in creating a “Jihad
culture”.’7 ‘Awlaqi was merely articulating what jihadi groups had been
doing for decades in their media propaganda.
To be clear, we are not suggesting a direct causal relationship between
the consumption of anashid and the resort to militancy. However, real-
world examples demonstrate the impact that anashid and video messaging
can have, and there is ample evidence to suggest that such cultural forms
are much more than mere jingles intended to liven up the cause in moments
of leisure.
Anashid figure prominently in the propaganda-consumption habits
of the 17 jihadists who have caused casualties within the US since 2013.
Boston Marathon bombers Tamerlan and Dzhokhar (‘Jahar’) Tsarnaev, for
example, specifically demanded that Dun Meng, who became their captive
after they carjacked him, instruct them on how to connect their iPhone to his
car’s stereo so they could listen to militant anashid during their flight from
law enforcement.8 When they could not connect the device, they actually
drove back to the green Honda they had abandoned in Watertown, MA, to
retrieve a CD.9 If the Tsarnaev brothers’ purpose in listening to the anashid
was to celebrate the bloodbath they had created, their prosecutors later used
the music to establish the brothers’ guilt in court, playing a slideshow for
jurors as part of their closing arguments in which scenes of carnage (pools
156 | Nelly Lahoud and Jonathan Pieslak

of blood, severed limbs, people screaming) were set to the Islamic chanting
of the Tsarnaevs’ CD.10
In another example, Elton Simpson and Nadir Soofi opened fire on the
Curtis Culwell Center, which was hosting the ‘First Annual Muhammad
Art Exhibit and Contest’, in Garland, TX, on 3 May 2015. Both Simpson
and Soofi were killed by law enforcement in an exchange of gunfire. In the
hours leading up to the attack, Simpson not only tweeted his bay‘a (pledge
of allegiance) to the self-styled ‘caliph’ of the Islamic State, Abu Bakr
al-Baghdadi, but also tweeted and hashtagged lyrics from the ISIS nashid
‘Qariban, Qariban’ (‘Soon, Soon’), a well-known track that gained currency
in the world of jihadi propaganda when it was used as the soundtrack to the
immolation video of Jordanian pilot Muaz al-Kasasbeh. Further evidence
drawn from the investigations into attacks by Abdul Arkan, Omar Mateen,
Faisal Mohammad, Alton Nolan, Ahmad Rahami and Zale Thompson
supports the assertion that anashid constitute a significant proportion of the
media consumed by attackers who have embraced the cause of jihadism,
and especially that of the Islamic State.11 Among these predominantly home-
grown perpetrators, the overwhelming majority were radicalised through
online mechanisms such as social media and propaganda dissemination,
and operated without direct training from ISIS cadres or in-person contact
from the organisation that most of them died for. This route to terrorist
violence is becoming increasingly familiar in Western countries.

Why ISIS anashid?

For much of their history, jihadi groups largely relied on existing Islamic
anashid to propagate their message and engender a culture of militancy,
either in the form of on-the-ground recitations or chanting, or for use in
recordings. This is not surprising given that there exists a large corpus of
Islamic anashid expressing themes that range from the deeply spiritual to the
explicitly militant, all composed to display Muslims’ devotion to and love of
God. Many of these have been recorded by unaffiliated munshidun (reciters
or performers of anashid, munshid in the singular), some of whom oppose
jihadism. Thus, it would be inaccurate to equate anashid about jihad with
pro-jihadism, as if to suggest that those who listen to, or even perform, such
 Music of the Islamic State | 157

music necessarily sympathise with jihadis. What is distinct about the use
of Islamic anashid by jihadists is that they disproportionately rely on those
with militant themes in their propaganda.12 Jihadi groups have freely bor-
rowed anashid deemed to be sonically emblematic of their cause, especially
as video soundtracks or as anthems chanted by fighters on the battlefield.
The Islamic State’s parent group, the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), was no
exception. When the ISI founded its own media outlet – al-Furqan, which
broadcast its first video on 21 November 2006 – the group relied on borrowed
anashid. It continued to do so for more than six years. Recurring selections
were titles such as ‘Qum’ (‘Rise Up’), ‘al-Qawl, Qawl’ (‘The Word Is the
Word’), ‘Madin ka-al-Sayf’ (‘Sharp Like the Sword’), ‘bi-Jihadina’ (‘Through
our Jihad’) and ‘Jaljalat’ (‘Thunderclouds’). Among the group’s preferred
munshidun were the Saudi performers Abu ‘Ali and Abu ‘Abd al-Malik, and
the Yemeni Abu Hajar al-Hadrami.13 Among these three, only al-Hadrami is
associated with a jihadi group; he appears as the subject of an interview in a
pamphlet released in 2014 by AQAP’s al-Malahim media.
The ISI did not begin to produce its own original anashid until it started
to achieve some military momentum. Indeed, the recording of the group’s
first official nashid – al-Furqan’s ‘Ya Allah al-Jannah’ (‘O Allah [we seek]
Paradise’), released in July 2013 – followed its decision to rebrand itself as
the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) on 8 April 2013, at a time when
it was making territorial advances. Although this was the first ‘official’
release, it is possible that the ISI had been producing original anashid even
earlier. The previous year, one of the anashid featuring in the first instalment
of the ISI’s momentous four-part series, ‘Salil al-Sawarim’ (‘Clanging of the
Swords’), released on 30 June 2012, included the nashid ‘Qama li-al-Islami
Sarhun’ (‘A State for Islam Has Arisen’),14 which specifically references the
‘Islamic State’, and has been attributed to the well-known Islamic State
munshid ‘Abu Yaser’. There may have been several group-specific recordings
in circulation before the ISI began making official releases.
When ISIS founded Ajnad, the group’s dedicated Arabic anashid- and
sura-recitation media branch, on 20 August 2013, the group began to produce
anashid in earnest, rarely allowing more than two weeks to elapse between
official releases. By the time ISIS delivered the fourth instalment of ‘Salil
 158 | Nelly Lahoud and Jonathan Pieslak

al-Sawarim’ on 17 May 2014, its library of group-specific anashid had grown

to such an extent that the soundtrack to this 62-minute video is dominated
by them. ‘Salil al-Sawarim 4’ is by far the most musical video of the series,
and more than half of it (approximately 35 minutes)
features scenes overdubbed with ISIS anashid. The
title-track nashid, ‘Salil al-Sawarim’, which made its
debut in this programme, appears four times and con-
sumes more than 13 minutes of soundtrack time. If one
were looking to identify pivotal moments in Islamic
Ajnad logo State media history and a landmark production char-
acterising the group’s militant soundtrack style, ‘Salil
al-Sawarim 4’ would rank among the better choices.
Shortly after its release, and before the month was over, ISIS announced
the founding of al-Hayat media, which assumed the task of producing all
non-Arabic propaganda, including anashid. This surge of activity coincided
with what was perhaps the peak of the Islamic State’s territorial conquests,
the capture of Mosul between 4 and 10 June, when an estimated 1,500 com-
batants overcame 60,000 Iraqi soldiers and police. A caliphate would be
declared a few weeks later on 29 June, at which time the group dropped
‘Iraq and the Levant’ from its name.
Since July 2013, ISIS has produced no fewer than 160 group-specific
anashid through Ajnad and al-Hayat. The group has progressively come to
rely almost exclusively upon its own anashid as sonically emblematic of its
cause, especially within video messaging. Given that ISIS has devoted more
resources to anashid production and dissemination than any other contem-
porary jihadi group, why did it break with the tradition of borrowing extant
militant-themed anashid?
It would appear from its broader state-building project that the Islamic
State believes itself to be ushering in a new era distinguished by ideological
purity. In this sense, ISIS anashid do not merely serve as propaganda tools,
but also reflect the group’s distinct political identity as a state. The new
era, one surmises, demands the purging of all cultural items contaminated
by anything that is not the product of the Islamic State. Nothing should
remain of the ancien régime. Just as mainstream Muslim theology establishes
 Music of the Islamic State | 159

a binary between Islam and jahiliyya – the pre-Islamic period that symbol-
ises a primordial ignorance of God – the Islamic State strives to distinguish
itself from anything outside it.
The new rupture promoted by ISIS does not just separate Muslims and
non-Muslims, or jihadis and mainstream Muslims; perhaps more importantly,
it demarcates the Islamic State from other jihadi groups that have refused to
pledge allegiance to al-Baghdadi. Accordingly, the group’s production of its
own anashid as an element of its state-building enterprise marks the start of a
new chapter for the role of such music in jihadi culture. In this new chapter,
anashid serve not just to extol militancy, but to heighten the divide between
the Islamic State and its enemies, particularly its jihadi rivals.

Key themes
In making a case for the political legitimacy of their self-proclaimed cali-
phate, the leaders of the Islamic State have asserted that its founding was
preordained by God. Indeed, when in June 2014 Abu Muhammad al-Adnani
proclaimed the establishment of a global state, the title of his public state-
ment was ‘This Is God’s Promise’ (‘Hadha Wa‘du Allah’).15 The title echoes a
Koranic verse (Q. 24:55) that speaks of God’s promise to believers who fight
in His path against unbelievers that they will be rewarded with tamkin (ter-
ritorial strength). In other words, the faithful will take political sovereignty
away from the infidel and will establish God’s religion:

God promised those of you who believe and do good works that He will
cause them to be successors in the earth, as He had caused the believers
who were before them to succeed the infidels of their time; and that He will
establish for them their religion, so that security will replace their fears.16

The themes of promise and tamkin in this verse are key to the Islamic State’s
core ideology, and to its claim to legitimate statehood.17 This verse is used
to identify the group’s followers and fighters as the true believers who are
worthy of God’s promise (wa‘du Allah). Given that ISIS is the first jihadi
group to achieve territorial governance, tamkin is understandably absent in
the anashid used by other jihadi groups.
160 | Nelly Lahoud and Jonathan Pieslak

Islamic State anashid seek to convey such key ideological messages,

starting with bushra (glad tidings).18 The nashid ‘My Umma, [a new] Dawn
Is Breaking’ cited earlier speaks to the good news about God’s promise
unfolding. Likewise, the nashid ‘This Is Indeed the Path [to glory]’ (‘Hadha
al-Tariqu’), makes an even more compelling case that all the signs (a‘lam)
point to the promise’s fulfilment:

This is indeed the path [to glory]

And these are the signs
[Foretold in Scripture is our imminent victory]
Execute then God’s command
Veritably, this is Islam
Towering it has returned
Illuminating the right path
[For the faithful to be guided]
[God’s promise is unfolding]
[Behold] Baghdad [to glory] is marching
[And from its deep sleep] the Levant is waking

The proof that the Islamic State represents the fulfilment of God’s promise,
ISIS has argued, can be found in its ability to establish tamkin, and in its
administration of God’s law within that territory. Thus, the theme of bushra
is intertwined both with the significance of God’s promise and with the ter-
ritorial proof that this promise is being fulfilled.
In view of ISIS’s territorial victories between 2014 and early 2015, its
sympathisers and followers likely believed that divine providence was
guiding the group. It then seemed invincible: it captured large cities in
Iraq and Syria, and in June 2014, to borrow from the title of the video it
produced that month, it ‘erased the borders’ – a reference to the borders
drawn almost a century earlier by the British and the French with the
signing of the Sykes–Picot Agreement in 1916. Islamic State publica-
tions featured articles framing the group’s victories in tamkin parlance to
assert that these were a sign from God that He was fulfilling His promise
to His faithful.
 Music of the Islamic State | 161

The Islamic State’s territorial gains were also commemorated in its

anashid. Shortly before the group’s proclamation of a global state following
successive territorial victories in Iraq and Syria, the popular nashid ‘Saraya
Dawlati Hayya’ (‘Rise up, Companies of My State’) conveyed the sense that
a state, not a group, was on the march by employing the term saraya, or mili-
tary company, as an assertion of statehood. The nashid refers to Iraq, past
and present, to compare the contemporary victories of the group (still called
ISIL in May 2014) in Iraq to the early seventh-century conquests that saw the
capture of Iraq by the early generations of Muslims. Thus:

Rise up, companies of my state

Our glorious [past] reclaim
The crown of our umma restore
The bravery of [our righteous predecessors emulate]
Every taghut [tyrant] obliterate
Let your fire [their bodies] set ablaze
When their soldiers [in battle] you face
Their breath be sure to end
No, upon none of the [religiously] impure show mercy
…
[Chivalrous] were the men of our [past Islamic] state
In their shadows [today] we fight
God salutes His knights
Whose lives to the first Baghdad [they sacrificed]
[Today] God salutes the courageous
Around the walls of our Damascus [they fight]
For this is the era of the champions
[Their heroism] our meekness buried

If ‘Saraya Dawlati Hayya’ illustrated the theoretical dimension of tamkin,

the nashid ‘al-Maliki Ghada Maqhura’ (‘Maliki Has Been Vanquished’) cel-
ebrated its empirical component. The nashid commemorates not just the
Islamic State’s territorial victories, but also the fall of Iraqi prime minister
Nuri al-Maliki, who resigned his post following the failure of the Iraqi army
162 | Nelly Lahoud and Jonathan Pieslak

to defend Mosul. The nashid is thus Iraq-specific; any listener who is famil-
iar with the names of Iraqi cities can hear the musical note of victory in the
nashid, which sounds as though the cities captured by ISIS are dancing to the
beats of a broken Maliki and an impotent America:

Falluja, [the birthplace of] dignity we acquired

And Zwei‘ and Dolib [their centres] we crossed
All of Ramadi we captured
…
Tikrit and al-Dor we liberated
And Beiji and Kirkuk we raided
…
In half America we divided
And the dogs of Europe we humiliated
…
Sykes–Picot’s [borders] we abolished
And the sharia we established

The music of terror

It should come as no surprise that militant music contains a strong dose of
terror designed both to incite listeners to action and to intimidate enemies.19
The ISIS nashid ‘Salil al-Sawarim’, for example, celebrates the virtue of tarhib
(terrorising) as if it were a form of worship:

The clashing of the swords

Is the anthem of the proud
[For whom] fighting is their lives’ path
[We serve Him as we shift between every] invasion
[To] obliterate the tyrants
[We serve Him]
[Through the] echo [of blood splashing with every trigger of] a silent pistol
[Through fighting]
The dignity of my religion I elevate
 Music of the Islamic State | 163

And the oppressors I humiliate

O my people rise
And on the path of the brave embark
For either a life on the path of huda [true religion] we shall lead
Or a death that will enrage [God’s] enemies we [should] meet

The video series in which this nashid first appeared (the aforementioned
‘Salil al-Sawarim’ series) has actually received the credit for the Islamic
State’s victories in early 2014: it was reported that the series was widely
distributed in Iraq, which led to the Iraqi army fleeing Mosul.
Similarly, the nashid ‘Dawlatu al-Islami Suli wa-Idhari’ (‘Islam’s
[legitimate] State [with your] Attack[s proceed]’) is designed to highlight that
the legitimacy of the Islamic State goes hand in hand with the righteousness
of terrorising its enemies, a message it conveys in graphic detail:

Islam’s [legitimate] state [with your] attack[s proceed]

[Upon] the religion[s] of kufr [unbelief] and their armies bring defeat
…
The bodies [of infidels] set ablaze
Smoke them
As a sight like no other [paint them]
…
Calamities upon them inflict
Let the news of the shock their hearts rip
…
Let the corpses be a warning
[Of those] the sharp spears had a tasting

Likewise, the nashid ‘Sawfa Namdi li-al-Ma‘ali’ (‘Towards Lofty

Principles We Shall Proceed’) seeks to establish a connection between lofty
principles and pride, and the crushing of the enemies’ heads:

Towards lofty principles we shall proceed

[The obstacles in our path] we shall not heed
164 | Nelly Lahoud and Jonathan Pieslak

…
This is the age of epic battles
With fighting it radiates
Do not relent, do not soften
Like the mountains [raise your head] high
Shatter the [infidels], destroy them
The heads of error crush
…
[Behold]
Upon the corpses of men
Islam’s [legitimate] state we shall raise

Of all the Islamic State’s terror-focused music, the nashid ‘Qariban,

Qariban, Tarawna al-‘Ajiba’ (‘Soon, Soon, You Shall See Something
Wondrous’) arguably elaborates on the theme of tarhib most potently. It
speaks of ‘bearing slaughter and death’ to the enemy, and of ‘beheading’
to ‘break the disgrace [you caused us] … so that you may taste humilia-
tion’. The nashid was first heard on the video depicting the execution of
Muaz al-Kasasbeh, released in February 2015. In the video, the lyrics appear
to synchronise with the silent rhythm of the flames that consumed the
Jordanian pilot:

In the midst of your abode, battles we shall wage

To demolish you, our swords we shall sharpen [and arrange]
…
Slaughter and death upon you we shall inflict
Your scared naked body quietly we shall split
…
Into death [fearless] we plunge, our ranks [closely] we bind
Standing we shall die, just as the [statant] lions in the mountains [roam]

* * *
 Music of the Islamic State | 165

The territory of the Islamic State peaked before the group celebrated its one-
year anniversary, though it continued to win some areas and lose others for
another year or so, especially in Syria. By September 2016, it became clear
that the group’s territorial losses were also having an impact on its online
presence. The group began to produce all its non-Arabic magazines under
the title Rumiyah, which consisted mainly of translations of articles that
had already appeared in its weekly Arabic magazine al-Naba’. The group’s
production of anashid also took a hit. Whereas in 2015, Ajnad produced 15
anashid, in 2016 it produced only five. One of them, ‘Mawkibu al-Nur’ (‘The
Process of [divine] Light’), is worth noting. Released in October, the first few
lines exhort the faithful to join the battle:

The process of [divine] light called upon us

Come forth, the wind of change is blowing20
The [true] religion is [calling you]
In battle O brother, O brother [join us]
Go forth, rise up, all of you
On us only can our religion count
…

In subsequent verses, however, the nashid seems to refer to the Islamic

State’s achievements in the past tense, as if reminding those who may have
forgotten them of the group’s victories, however short-lived:

Here and now, behold the victory [we achieved]

[Can’t you see] how history [has recorded] our ascent
Rise up then with all your might
And proudly raise our flag

The nashid’s desperate tone appears to suggest that the composer knew
there was little to offer other than tarhib, promising that:

The [beheading of the] executioners

The infidels shall have to meet
166 | Nelly Lahoud and Jonathan Pieslak

It concludes with further reflection in the past tense:

To the [believers], we showed mercy

To our enemies, we [wreaked] agony

Does this nashid signal that the Islamic State saw that the end was near,
and wished to make a Sinatra-style, ‘we did it our way’ exit? While this
may be a plausible reading, those charged with prosecuting the group for
its crimes will find it impossible to prepare the kind of slideshow used in
the Tsarnaev trial. For notwithstanding the Islamic State’s prolific produc-
tion of anashid, its output of violence and blood has far exceeded its cultural
production.

Acknowledgements
The authors are grateful for the assistance they received from Muhammad al-‘Ubaydi
and Mohamed al-Shamlan in compiling and coding Arabic anashid lyrics. They are
also grateful for thoughtful conversations with colleagues, including linguistic sugges-
tions. Research for this article was supported by a Minerva Research Initiative, Grant
FA9550-15-1-0373.

Notes
1 George Orwell, Animal Farm CT: Wesleyan University Press, 2015).
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 6 Ibid., p. 3.
1968), p. 9. 7 Anwar al-‘Awlaqi, ‘44 Ways to

2 Ibid., p. 13. Support Jihad’.

3 Ibid., p. 14. 8 Michael McLaughlin, ‘Carjacking

4 Unless otherwise stated, the transla- Victim Describes Encounter with

tion of anashid throughout this essay
is by Nelly Lahoud. The translation
is purposely not literal; it is meant to
bring out themes that are implicit in
the nashid, and where possible to pre-
serve their poetic quality.
Tsarnaev Brothers’, Huffington
Post, 12 March 2015, http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/2015/03/12/car-
jacking-tsarnaev-brothers_n_6857372.
html.
9 Adrienne Gaffney, ‘Tsarnaev

5 See Jonathan Pieslak, Radicalism & Carjacking Victim Recalls Harrowing

Music: An Introduction to the Music Ride, Making the “Most Difficult
Cultures of al-Qa’ida, Racist Skinheads, Decision” of His Life’, New York, 12
Christian-Affiliated Radicals, and Eco- March 2015, http://nymag.com/daily/
Animal Rights Militants (Middletown, intelligencer/2015/03/tsarnaev-carjack-

ing-victim-on-harrowing-ride.html.
10 Tovia Smith, ‘In Closing Argument,
Prosecutor Says Tsarnaev
Wanted to “Punish America”’,
NPR, 6 April 2015, http://www.
npr.org/2015/04/06/397891184/
in-closing-argument-prosecutor-says-
tsarnaev-wanted-to-punish-america.
11 See Mark Hosenball and Kim
Palmer, ‘Ohio State Attacker May
Have Self-Radicalized, Officials
Say’, Reuters, 29 November 2016,
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
ohio-university-idUSKBN13O20M;
Andrew Buncombe, ‘Orlando
Gunman Omar Mateen “Searched
for Videos of Isis Beheadings”’,
Independent, 14 June 2016, http://
www.independent.co.uk/news/
world/americas/orlando-gunman-
omar-mateen-searched-for-videos-of-
isis-beheadings-a7081686.html; FBI
Sacramento, ‘Update on Investigation
at University of California, Merced’,
17 March 2016, https://www.fbi.
gov/contact-us/field-offices/sac-
ramento/news/press-releases/
update-on-investigation-at-univer-
sity-of-california-merced; ‘Facebook
Profile of Alton Nolen and the
Signs of Radicalization’, Insite
Blog on Terrorism and Extremism,
29 September 2014, https://news.
siteintelgroup.com/blog/index.php/
entry/291-facebook-profile-of-alton-
nolen-and-the-signs-of-radicalization;
Kim Barker et al., ‘Journey from
Class Clown to Suspect in Chelsea
Bombing’, New York Times, 24
September 2016, https://www.
nytimes.com/2016/09/25/nyregion/
journey-from-class-clown-to-suspect-
in-chelsea-bombing.html; Michael
Music of the Islamic State | 167
Schwirtz and William K. Rashbaum,
‘Attacker with Hatchet Is Said to Have
Grown Radical on His Own’, New York
Times, 24 October 2014, https://www.
nytimes.com/2014/10/25/nyregion/
man-who-attacked-police-with-
hatchet-ranted-about-us-officials-say.
html?_r=0.
12 Nelly Lahoud, ‘A Cappella Songs
(Anashid) in Jihadi Culture’, in Thomas
Hegghammer (ed.), Jihadi Culture:
The Art and Social Practices of Militant
Islamists (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2017), pp. 42–62.
13 It bears mentioning that ascribing
authorship to anashid can be quite
challenging. For instance, the oft-used
rendition of ‘Bi jihadina’ (‘Through
Our Jihad’) by Abu Ali is in fact a re-
make of a nashid recited by the Syrian
munshid Abu Mazen decades earlier.
Likewise, a popular nashid in Islamic
State videos, ‘Qad Azamna’ (‘We Are
Resolved [to fight]’), is a remake of
an Abu al-Joud original. Moreover,
munshidun often repurpose the same
melodies with different texts. For
example, Abu Ali’s anthemic ‘Qom’
(‘Rise Up’) uses the same melody as
his earlier nashid, ‘Aqd al-‘Azm’ (‘He
Was Determined [to fight]’), while the
Islamic State nashid ‘Qariban, Qariban’
recycles the melody from a previous
official release, ‘Lana al-Murhafatu’
(‘We Are Bearers of the Swords’).
14 The term sarhun is literally rendered
as ‘edifice’ to designate a solid struc-
ture. In the context of this nashid, it
signifies a ‘state’.
15 Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, ‘Hadha
Wa‘du Allah’, 29 June 2014.
16 This translation combines and amends
translations by George Sale, The
168 | Nelly Lahoud and Jonathan Pieslak
Koran: Translated into English from the
Original Arabic, with an Introduction
by Sir Edward Denison Ross (London
and New York: Frederick Warne,
n.d.), p. 351; and Edward William
Lane, Arabic–English Lexicon (London:
Williams & Norgate, 1863), p. 793.
17 Of 122 Islamic State anashid analysed
for this study, eight have tamkin as
their key theme, while many others
also touch on it.
18 Of 122 anashid analysed, 19 have
bushra and wa‘du Allah as key themes.
Such themes are largely absent from
our dataset of 636 anashid used by
other jihadi groups.
19 In the anashid used by jihadi groups
other than ISIS, the themes of tarhib
(causing people to be fearful/terror-
ised) and tahrid (inciting them to take
up jihad) are usually found in combi-
nation. Although the same might be
said of Islamic State anashid, the theme
of tarhib is treated somewhat differ-
ently in these songs, and is therefore
worth considering separately. As the
anashid cited here show, tarhib does
not simply emerge as a method to
terrorise the enemy in Islamic State
propaganda, but is seen as inter-
twined with the group’s philosophy,
as a means intrinsic to its ends. Tarhib
is the focus of 31 out of 122 Islamic
State anashid, while tahrid in the
conventional sense is the focus of 30
anashid.
20 The literal rendering of darat rahana is
‘the blade of our mill is turning’.