1449. Lee v. People, Gr137914, Dec.
4, 2002
FACTS
Lee and Sonny Moreno were charged
by Neugene Marketing, Inc. through its
designated trustee, Atty. Roger Z. Reyes, with
the crime of estafa with abuse of confidence
before the Office of the City Prosecutor.
Petitioners filed several motions from 1991
to1995 (reconsider date, reinvestigation,
review/reinvestigation,quash/dismiss, etc)
totaling to 24 motions. Petitioners contend
that the long delay in the resolution of the
proceedings at the DOJ and the trial court
violated their constitutional right to a speedy
disposition of their cases.
ISSUE
Whether or not there is a violation of
the right to a speedy trial
RULING/ MAIN POINT
No. Petitioners filed a series of
motions, both repetitious and dilatory. The
accused also filed several Motions to Inhibit
the Judges who saw through the ploy of the
accused, including City Prosecutors. Behind the
backdrop of the nine (9) motions to quash, as
well as reinvestigations involving the same
issues concerning probable cause are. It was
the petitioners themselves who principally
dragged and hindered the resolution of the
criminal investigation and trial for estafa. They
thus have no reason to complain against the
delay in the disposition of their cases
1450. People v. Monje, GR 146689,
Sept. 27, 2002
People vs Monjey (GR No. 146689)
FACTS
Monje, along with other companions,
were charged with rape with homicide for the
brutal rape and killing of 15-year old Imee.
After initial cross-examination by defense
counsel, witness Cordero failed and refused to
return to court for the continuation of his
cross-examination. Despite the insistence of
the defense counsel to pursue his cross-
examination and the repeated warnings from
the trial court that it would be constrained to
strike out and disregard his testimony should
he fail to appear again, the witness stubbornly
refused to return to court for his cross-
examination. Three of the accused were
acquitted, except for Monje, who was
sentenced to death penalty. Monje appealed
proposing the decision to be remanded on
grounds of new evidence for his acquittal as
well.
ISSUE
Whether the action of remanding this
case to the trial court for further proceedings
apparently to enable the prosecution to prove
again what it failed to prove is constitutional
RULING/MAIN POINT
No. A proposal has been expressed
for the remand of this case to the trial court
for further proceedings, apparently to enable
the prosecution to prove again what it failed to
prove in the first instance. We cannot agree
because it will set a dangerous precedent.
Aside from its being unprocedural, it would
open the floodgates to endless litigations
because whenever an accused is on the brink
of acquittal after trial, and realizing its
inadequacy, the prosecution would insist to be
allowed to augment its evidence which should
have been presented much earlier. This is a
criminal prosecution, and to order the remand
of this case to the court a quo to enable the
prosecution to present additional evidence
would violate the constitutional right of the
accused to due process, and to speedy
determination of his case.
1451. Ty-Dazo v. Sandiganbayan, 374
SCRA 200
FACTS: Petitioner Ty-Dazo is Municipal Mayor
of Salcedo, Easter Samar. Two complaints
were filed against him before the SB: Criminal
case 22021 for violation of RA 3019 and
Criminal Case 23656 for violation of PD No. 705
or the Forestry Code. The Office of the OMB
already received the complaints in Criminal
Cases Nos. 23656 and 22021 some time in
1994. However, it was only on April 28, 1997,
or three (3) years after the receipt of the
complaint, that the corresponding information
in Criminal Case No. 23656 was filed with the
SB. On the other hand, while the information
in Criminal Case No. 22021 was filed with the
SB on January 18, 1995, it took the Office of
the OMB more than four (4) years to resolve
petitioner Ty-Dazo’s motion for
reinvestigation. Hence, contends that the SB
committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying his motions to dismiss in the said
cases.
Legends:
OMB: Ombudsman
SB: Sandiganbayan, not Starbucks (okey,
hanaaap)
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner’s right to
due process and speedy disposition was
violated.
RULING: NO.
A mere mathematical reckoning of the time
involved, would not be sufficient. In the
application of the constitutional guarantee of
the right to speedy disposition of cases,
particular regard must also be taken of the
facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.
MAIN POINT: The right to a speedy disposition
of cases, like the right to a speedy trial, is
deemed violated only when the proceedings is
attended by vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays; or when unjustified
postponements of the trial are asked for and
secured, or when without cause or
unjustifiable motive, a long period of time is
allowed to elapse without the party having his
case tried.
1452. Guiani v. Sandiganbayan, GR
146897, Aug. 6, 2002 (delay in
preliminary investigation)
FACTS: The COA-ARMM, after an inspection
was conducted during October 15, 1992
instituted a complaint for violation of RA 3019
against the regional officers of DPWH-ARMM
for the alleged anomalous implementation of
infrastructure projects. Preliminary
investigation was conducted by the OMB and a
recommendation for indictment was approved
by Ombudsman Desierto on October 16, 1998,
6 years after the complaint was made by COA.
21 criminal cases were filed against the
petitioners before the SB immediately
thereafter. In a motion to dismiss, petitioners
argued that the delay in the resolution of the
complaints against them by the OMB violated
their right to speedy trial. The motion was
denied by the SB and motion for
reconsideration was denied likewise.
ISSUE: Whether or not the alleged delay of
almost 6 years violated their constitutional
right to speedy trial.
RULING: NO.
Most of the respondents, including some of
petitioners herein, moved for extensions of
time. All the counter-affidavits were received
in August 1995, owing to the number of
respondents. Thereafter, the COA filed reply-
affidavits on February 24, 1996 and May 29,
1996. It was only after the submission of the
last pleading, i.e., the reply-affidavits, that the
preliminary investigation can be said to have
been concluded. The time to resolve the cases
commences from this date.
MAIN POINT: Well-settled is the rule that the
right to a speedy disposition of cases, like the
right to a speedy trial, is deemed violated only
when the proceeding is attended by vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive delay. In the
determination of whether or not that right has
been violated, the factors that may be
considered and balanced are: the length of
delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion
or failure to assert such right by the accused,
and the prejudice caused by the delay.
1453. Avilla v. Reyes 479 SCRA 334
FACTS: In a verified complaint filed before the
Court, herein complainants charged the
respondent Judge of Court of Appeals,
Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes, for allegedly
violating Rule 1.02 of Canon 1 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct for delaying their petition for
writ of preliminary mandatory injuction for one
and a half month despite extreme urgency of
the matter to their prejudice and damage.
ISSUE: Whether or not the delay violated their
right to speedy disposition of the case.
RULING: NO.
The period to study its propriety in the
circumstances was, however, interrupted
when complainants filed their motion for oral
arguments, and by the succeeding incidents
where comments were required and filed.
MAIN POINT: The right to a speedy disposition
of a case, like the right to a speedy trial, is
deemed violated only when the proceeding is
attended by vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays.
1454. Enriquez v. Office of OMB, 545
SCRA 618
FACTS: Herein petitioners, various officers of
Land Registration Authority (LRA), were
charged administratively and criminally in a
complaint before the office of the
Ombudsman. Six (6) years from the filing of
the complaints-affidavits and more than four
(4) years after the parties formally offered
their evidence on January 29, 2002,
petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss all the
cases against them as respondent’s “inordinate
delay” constitutes a violation of their
constitutional right to a speedy disposition of
their cases.
ISSUE: Whether or not the inaction of the
office of the Ombudsman constitutes a
violation of petitioners’ right to speedy
disposition of their cases.
RULING: YES.
Respondent did not resolve the administrative
and criminal cases against petitioners although
the investigation of the said cases had long
been terminated when the latter formally
offered their evidence way back on January 29,
2002. Respondent’s belated excusethat the
prosecutors assigned to these cases are still
reviewing and evaluating them with extreme
care to arrive at a just determination is not
only unreasonable but also an afterthought.
Thus, the complaints against petitioners were
dismissed.
MAIN POINT: The adjudication of cases must
not only be done in an orderly manner that is
in accord with the established rules of
procedure, but must also be promptly decided
to better serve the ends of justice. Excessive
delay in the disposition of cases renders the
rights of the people guaranteed by the
Constitution and by various legislations inutile.
1455. OMB v. Jurado, 561 SCRA 135
FACTS: In an original complaint, various
officers of Maglei Enterprises Co., were
charged for violations of the Tariff Code. Also,
after a report by the Fact-finding board (FFB)
of OMB, a subsequent complaint and
investigation against Atty. Ben Jurado, Chief of
the Warehouse Inspection Division of Maglei
Enterprises Co., was recommended. But the
Court of Appeals, in absolving Jurado, provided
that in the case at bench, the incident which
gave rise to the complaint against the
petitioner happened on March 16, 1992. And
yet it was only on November 20, 1997 or a
lapse of more than five (5) years after the
original complaint that the case relative to the
said incident was filed against him. Records
also show that it took the Ombudsman almost
six (6) years to decide that a case be filed
against the petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not the aforementioned
acts constitute a violation of respondent’s right
to speedy disposition of the case.
RULING: NO.
Prior to the report and recommendation by
the FFB that respondent be criminally and
administratively charged, respondent was
neither investigated nor charged. That
respondent was charged only in 1997 while the
subject incident occurred in 1992, is not
necessarily a violation of his right to the
speedy disposition of his case. The record is
clear that prior to 1997, respondent had no
case to speak of—he was not made the subject
of any complaint or made to undergo any
investigation.
MAIN POINT: With respect to respondent,
there were no vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays because he was not made to
undergo any investigative proceeding prior to
the report and findings of the FFB of OMB.
1456. Perez v. People, 544 SCRA 532
FACTS: Perez is the Municipal Treasurer of
Tubigon, Bohol. In an audit made on his office,
it was found that the public funds that he was
entrusted to is short of Php72,784.57. He was
found guilty of Malversation of Funds by the
SB. Upon appeal, Peitioner claims that he was
violated the right to a speedy trial and due
process, as over 13 years had passed, before
the case had been filed against him.
ISSUE: WON Perez ‘ rights to a speedy trial and
to a speedy disposition of the case was
violated
RULING: No. Petitioner cannot complain that
his right to due process has been violated. He
was given all the chances in the world to
present his case, and the Sandiganbayan
rendered its decision only after considering all
the pieces of evidence presented before it.
Petitioner has clearly slept on his right. The
matter could have taken a different dimension
if during all those twelve years, petitioner had
shown signs of asserting his right to a speedy
disposition of his case or at least made some
overt acts, like filing a motion for early
resolution, to show that he was not waiving
that right .  1458. Roquera v. Chancellor – 614
1457. Gaas v. Mitmug, 553 SCRA 335
FACTS: Gaas was the bookkeeper of the Office
of the Municipal Treasurer, Municipality of
Bacolod, Lanao del Norte. Because of a cash
shortage in his office, the OMB rendered a
Decision finding Gaas guilty of gross neglect of
duty and ordered his dismissal. The Complaint
was filed on November 18, 1991 and
petitioners received an Order directing them
to submit their counter-affidavits only three
years after. The Court of Appeals, affirmed the
decision of the Deputy Ombudsman.
ISSUE: WON Gaas’ rights to a speedy trial and
to a speedy disposition of the case was
violated
RULING: No. Within the three year period,
they failed to raise the issue of speedy
disposition of the case. It was only when they
lost and pursued their appeal that they first
raised the issue. It cannot therefore be said
that the proceedings are attended by
vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays.
Petitioners cannot now seek the protection of
the law to benefit from the adverse effects of
their failure to raise the issue at the first
instance. In effect, they are deemed to have
waived their rights when they filed their
counter-affidavits after they received the
Order without immediately questioning the
alleged violations of their rights to a speedy
trial and to a speedy disposition of the case
SCRA 723
FACTS: Petitioner Capt. Roquero., an employee
of UP Manila was placed under preventive
suspension for ninety (90) days due to a
complaint of Grave Misconduct filed against
him. The prosecution agreed to submit its
Formal Offer of Evidence on or before 16 July
1999 but failed. So Roquero filed a Motion
through counsel praying that complainant be
declared to have waived her rights to formally
offer her exhibits. The ADT was not able to act
on the said Motion for almost five (5) years.
Due to the unreasonable delay, Roquero filed
another Motion asking for the dismissal of the
administrative case against him but was
denied on the ground that “Section 27 of the
Uniform Rules states that the failure to file a
formal offer of evidence amounts to a mere
waiver thereof, and not a dismissal of the
action.” As such, petitioner cannot claim a
vested right to a dismissal of his case below
just because a formal offer was not filed within
the agreed period.
ISSUE: WON Roquero’s rights to a speedy trial
and to a speedy disposition of the case was
violated
RULING: Yes. the delay was prejudicial to
petitioner's cause as he was under preventive
suspension for ninety (90) days, and during the
interregnum of almost five years, the trial of
the accusation against him remained stagnant
at the prosecution stage. While it is true that
administrative investigations should not be
bound by strict adherence to the technical
rules of procedure and evidence applicable to
judicial proceedings, the same however should
not violate the constitutional right of
respondents to a speedy disposition of cases.
The constitutional right to a "speedy
disposition of cases" is not limited to the
accused in criminal proceedings but extends to
all parties in all cases, including civil and
administrative cases, and in all proceedings,
including judicial and quasi-judicial hearings.
Hence, under the Constitution, any party to a
case may demand expeditious action by all
officials who are tasked with the
administration of justice.
1459. Lumanog v. People – 630 SCRA
42
FACTS: Appellants were the accused
perpetrators of the ambush-slay of former
Chief of the Metropolitan Command
Intelligence and Security Group of the
Philippine Constabulary Colonel Rolando N.
Abadilla. The trial court convicted them and
the CA upheld the conviction of the accused-
appellants based on the credible eyewitness
testimony of Alejo who vividly recounted
before the trial court their respective positions
and participation in the fatal shooting of
Abadilla having been able to witness closely
how they committed the crime. This case
remained pending with the CA for four years.
ISSUE: WON Accused-appellants’ rights to a
speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of the
case was violated
RULING: No. It must be stressed that in the
determination of whether the right to speedy
disposition of cases has been violated,
particular regard must be taken of the facts
and circumstances peculiar to each case. A
mere mathematical reckoning of the time
involved would not be sufficient. 158 Under
the circumstances, we hold that the delay of
(4) four years during which the case remained
pending with the CA and this Court was not
unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive. In this
case appellants are not entitled to the “radical
relief” in the absence of clear and convincing
showing that the delay in the resolution of
their appeal was unreasonable or arbitrary.
XVII. Section 17. No person shall be
compelled to be a witness against
himself.
A. Right Against Self-
Incrimination
Cases
1460. United States v. Navarro - 3
PHIL. 143 (rationale)
FACTS: The defendants, Baldomero Navarro et
al are charged with the crime of illegal
detention. During the trial, the prosecution
presented 3 witnesses, along with these are
one of the defendants. Marcelo De Leon
testified that along his 2 other co-accused, did
kidnap Punsalan. Flaviano Punsalan (Felix’s
brother) testified that Navarro stated that he
was the leader of the band that kidnapped
Felix Punsalan and that his companions were
Marcelo de Leon, Fidel Feliciano, Remigio
Delupio, and one Luis; that the said Felix
Punsalan died within a week from the time he
was kidnapped. The witness testified that
Navarro made the statement freely and
spontaneously, without threats or compulsion.
The lower court rendered judgement
condemning each one of the defendants to life
imprisonment
ISSUE: WON the law can compel accused to
testify against himself
RULING: No. The right against self-
incrimination was established on the grounds
of public policy and humanity of policy,
because if the party were required to testify,
it would place the witness under the
strongest temptation to commit the crime of
perjury, and of humanity, because it would
prevent the extorting of confessions by
duress. In other words, the very object of
adopting this provision of law was to wipe out
such practices as formerly prevailed in the
Philippines under the Spanish rule
that requires the accused to submit to judicial
examinations, and to get testimony regarding
the offense with which they were charged or if
they refuse face stricter punishment. The
prosecution has the duty to convict one of a
crime and produce evidence. The accused
cannot be called to assist in the production of
such evidence nor his silence be proof against
him.
1461. United States v. Tan Teng - 23
PHIL.145
FACTS: Tan teng raped Oliva Pacomio, a 7 year
old girl. Upon investigation, Olivia identified
the accused, thus was arrested. During trial,
the victim through medical examination show
that she was suffering from Gonorrhea disease
and that it is acquired through contact. Later,
the defendant testified that he rest his private
parts upon hers and that he was found
suffering from gonorrhea based on medical
examination. Tan Teng contended, that the
result of the scientific examination made by
the Bureau of Science of the substance taken
from his body was not admissible in evidence
as proof he was suffering from gonorrhea; as
that to admit such evidence was to compel the
defendant to testify against himself.
ISSUE: WON the substance found is violate his
right against self- incrimination
RULING: No. The prohibition that a person
shall not be compelled to be a witness against
himself, is simply a prohibition against legal
process to extract from the defendant's own
lips, against his will, an admission of his
guilt. The main purpose is to prohibit
compulsory oral examination of prisoners
before trial, or upon trial, for the purpose of
extorting unwilling confessions or
declarations implicating them in the
commission of a crime. Judge Lobingier said, if
Tang Teng was found with a stolen object or a
bloody shirt, the same could constitute
evidence of the commission of the crime if
used for the same purpose. So, an inspection
of the bodily features by competent authority
was not violative because he was not
compelled to make any admission, what was
obtained was his body itself.
1462. United States v. Ong Siu Hong -
36 PHIL. 73 (discharge)
FACTS: Ong Siu Hong was forced to discharge
the morphine from his mouth. Ong Siu Hong
appears to have been convicted by the lower
court, based on the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses, who were members of the Secret
Service. Ong Siu Hong's counsel raised the
constitutional question that the accused was
compelled to be a witness against himself.
ISSUE: Whether Ong Siu Hong was compelled
to be a witness against himself when the
morphine was forced from his mouth.
RULING: Yes. To force a prohibited drug from
the person of an accused is along the same
line as requiring him to exhibit himself before
the court; or putting in evidence papers and
other articles taken from the room of an
accused in his absence; or, as in the Tan Teng
case, taking a substance from the body of the
accused to be used in proving his guilt. It
would be a forced construction of the
paragraph of the Philippine Bill of Rights in
question to hold that any article, substance, or
thing taken from a person accused of crime
could not be given in evidence. The main
purpose of this constitutional provision is to
prohibit testimonial compulsion by oral
examination in order to extort unwilling
confessions from prisoners implicating them
in the commission of a crime.
1463. Villaflor v. Summers - 41 PHIL.
62 (pregnancy test)
FACTS: Emeteria Villaflor and Florentino
Souingco were charged with the crime of
adultery. On trial before the Judge of First
Instance, the court ordered Villaflor to submit
her body to the examination of one or two
competent doctors to determine if she was
pregnant or not. Villaflor refused to obey the
order on the ground that such examination of
her person was a violation of the constitutional
provision in contempt of court and was
ordered to be committed to Bilibid Prison until
she should permit the medical examination
required by the court. Villaflor filed a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus.
ISSUE: WON the compelling of a woman to
permit her body to be examined by physicians
to determine if she is pregnant, violates her
right against self incrimination
RULING: No. Every person has a natural and
inherent right to the possession and control of
his own body. To compel any one, and
especially a woman, to lay bare the body, or to
submit to the touch of a stranger, without
lawful authority, is an indignity, an assault, and
a trespass. However, between a sacrifice of the
ascertainment of truth to personal
considerations, between a disregard of the
public welfare for refined notions of delicacy,
law and justice cannot hesitate. The rule that
no person shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself, is limited
to a prohibition against compulsory
testimonial self incrimination. The corollary to
the proposition is that, on a proper showing
and under an order of the trial court, an ocular
inspection of the body of the accused is
permissible. The proviso is that torture or
force shall be avoided. It is a reasonable
presumption that in an examination by
reputable and disinterested physicians due
care will be taken not to use violence and not
to embarrass the patient any more than is
absolutely necessary. And, the accused made
no objection to the physical examination.
1464. Beltran v. Samson - 53 PHIL.
570 (writing)
Facts: Petitioner Beltran, a municipal treasurer
charged with the crime of Falsification, refused
to write a sample of his handwriting as ordered
by the respondent Judge. Beltran in this case
contended that such order would be a
violation of his constitutional right against self-
incrimination because such examination would
give the prosecution evidence against him,
which the latter should have gotten in the first
place. He further argued that the same will
make him furnish evidence against himself.
Issue: Whether or not the writing sought in
this case for the purpose of determining
whether Beltran wrote certain documents
supposed to be falsified constitutes evidence
against himself within the scope and meaning
of the constitutional provision under
examination.
Ruling: Yes. In the case at bar writing means
that Beltran is to furnish means to determine
whether or not he is the falsifier, as the
petition of the respondent fiscal clearly states.
The Court believes the present case is similar
to that of producing documents or chattels in
one's possession. For the purposes of the
constitutional privilege, there is a similarity
between one who is compelled to produce a
document, and one who is compelled to
furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in
both cases, the witness is required to furnish
evidence against himself. Writing is something
more than moving the body, or the hands, or
the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical
act, because it requires the application of
intelligence and attention. Considering the
circumstance that Beltran is a municipal
treasurer, it should not be a difficult matter for
the fiscal to obtain genuine specimens of his
handwriting. But even supposing it is
impossible to obtain specimen or specimens
without resorting to the means complained
herein, that is no reason for trampling upon a
personal right guaranteed by the constitution.
1465. Bermudez v. Castillo - 64 PHIL.
483
Facts: An investigation was filed against the
respondent in connection with an
administrative case. Respondent filed 6 letters
as additional evidence in support of his
defense. He claimed that the said letters were
of the complainant but the complainant
admitted that only 3 of the letters were hers.
Respondent, in determination to prove that
the other 3 letters were of the complainant, he
required her to copy the letters in her own
handwriting in the presence of the
investigator; the complainant refused, invoking
her right against self-incrimination.
Issue: Whether or not the complainant is
entitled to the right against self-incrimination
by refusing to copy the letters in her own
handwriting as the respondent was impelling
her to do.
Ruling: Yes. Complainant has made a no
disclosure and her testimony may be attacked
by means of other evidence in the possession
of the respondent, which is not precisely that
coming from the complainant herself.
The purpose of Section 17, Article III is
positively to avoid and prohibit the repetition
and recurrence of the certainly inhuman
procedure of compelling a person, in a criminal
or any other case, to furnish the missing
evidence necessary for his conviction. If such is
its purpose, then the evidence must be sought
elsewhere; and if it is desired to discover
evidence in the person himself, then he must
be promised and assured at least absolute
immunity by one authorized to do so legally, or
he should be asked once for all, to furnish such
evidence voluntarily without any condition.
Main Point: The privilege against self-
crimination is a personal one. But the privilege
is an option of refusal, not a prohibition of
inquiry. Hence, when an ordinary witness is on
the stand, and a self-criminating act relevant to
the issue is desired to be shown by him, the
question may be asked, and then it is for the
witness to say whether he will answer it or
claim its privilege.
1466. Chavez v. CA – L- 29169,
Aug.19, 1968
acts: An information was filed against all the
accused for stealing a thunderbird car together
with accessories. During the trial, the
prosecution asked herein petitioner Roger
Chavez, one of the accused, to be the first
witness. Counsel of the accused opposed.
Prosecution contends that the accused Chavez
will only be an ordinary witness not a state
witness. Counsel of accused answered that it
will only incriminate his client. Prosecution
averred that he has waived his constitutional
right to remain silent. The Judge ruled in favor
of the prosecution. Petitioner was convicted.
Judgment of conviction was rendered for
qualified theft of a motor vehicle.
Issue: Whether or not constitutional right of
Chavez against self–incrimination had been
violated so as to warrant a grant of writ of
Habeas Corpus.
Ruling: Yes. Under our own Rules of Court, to
grant the remedy to the accused Roger
Chavez whose case presents a clear picture of
disregard of a constitutional right is
absolutely proper. Section 1 of Rule 102
extends the writ, unless otherwise expressly
provided by law, to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any
person is deprived of his liberty, or by which
the rightful custody of any person is withheld
from the person entitled thereto. Petitioner
was forced to testify to incriminate himself, in
full breach of his constitutional right to remain
silent. It cannot be said that he has waived his
right. He did not volunteer to take the stand
and in his own defense; he did not offer
himself as a witness.
1467. Cabal v. Kapunan, Jr. - L-19052
Facts: Petitioner Manuel Cabal, then Chief of
Staff of the AFP, was charged with "graft,
corrupt practices, unexplained wealth, and
other equally reprehensible acts". Then
President of the Philippines created a
committee to investigate the charge of
unexplained wealth. The Committee ordered
petitioner Cabal to take the witness stand in
the administrative proceeding and be sworn to
as witness in support of his aforementioned
charge of unexplained wealth. Petitioner
objected to the order of the Committee,
invoking his constitutional right against self-
incrimination. The Committee insisted that
petitioner take the witness stand and be sworn
to, subject to his right to refuse to answer such
questions as may be incriminatory. This
notwithstanding, petitioner respectfully
refused to be sworn to as a witness to take the
witness stand. The Committee referred the
matter to the Fiscal of Manila. The City Fiscal
filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila
a "charge" of contempt for failing to obey the
order of the Committee to take the witness
stand.
Issue: Whether or not the Committee's order
requiring petitioner to take the witness stand
violates his constitutional right against self-
incrimination.
Ruling: Yes. Although the said Committee was
created to investigate the administrative
charge of unexplained wealth, the purpose of
the charge against petitioner is to apply the
provisions of the Anti-Graft Law, which
authorizes the forfeiture to the State of
property of a public officer or employee which
is manifestly out of proportion to his salary.
However, such forfeiture has been held to
partake of the nature of a penalty. As a
consequence, proceedings for forfeiture of
property are deemed criminal or penal, and,
hence, the exemption of defendants in
criminal case from the obligation to be
witnesses against themselves are applicable
thereto. No person shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself.
This prohibition against compelling a person to
take the stand as a witness against himself
applies to criminal, quasi-criminal, and penal
proceedings, including a proceeding civil in
form for forfeiture of property by reason of the
commission of an offense, but not a
proceeding in which the penalty recoverable is
civil or remedial in nature.
Main Point: The possibility that the
examination of the witness will be pursued to
the extent of requiring self-incrimination will
not justify the refusal to answer questions.
However, where the position of the witness is
virtually that of an accused on trial, it would
appear that he may invoke the privilege in
support of a blanket refusal to answer any and
all questions. It is not disputed that the
accused in a criminal case may refuse, not only
to answer incriminatory questions, but, also, to
take the witness stand.
1468. Pascual, Jr. v. Board of Medical
Examiners - L-25018
Facts: An administrative case against Arsenio
Pascual Jr. for alleged immorality. At the initial
hearing thereof, opposing counsel announced
that he would present Pascual as his first
witness. Pascual objected, relying on the
constitutional right from being a witness
against himself. The Board of Examiners took
note of such a plea but scheduled Pascual to
testify in the next hearing unless in the
meantime he could secure a restraining order
from a competent authority. Pascual filed with
the Court of First Instance of Manila an action
for prohibition with prayer for preliminary
injunction against the Board of Medical
Examiners. The lower court ordered that a writ
of preliminary injunction issue against the
Board commanding it to refrain from hearing
or further proceeding with such an
administrative case and to await the judicial
disposition of the matter. Subsequently, a
decision was rendered by the lower court
finding the claim of Pascual to be well-founded
and prohibiting the Board "from compelling
the petitioner to act and testify as a witness for
the complainant in said investigation without
his consent and against himself." Hence, the
Board appealed.
Issue: Whether a medical practitioner charged
with malpractice in administrative case can
avail of the constitutional guarantee not to be
a witness against himself.
Ruling: Yes. The case for malpractice and
cancellation of the license to practice medicine
while administrative in character possesses a
criminal or penal aspect. An unfavorable
decision would result in the revocation of the
license of the respondent to practice medicine.
Consequently, he can refuse to take the
witness stand. The right against self-
incrimination extends not only to right to
refuse to answer questions put to the accused
while on witness stand, but also to forgo
testimony, to remain silent and refuse to take
the witness stand when called by as a witness
by the prosecution. The reason is that the right
against self- incrimination, along with the
other rights granted to the accused, stands for
a belief that while a crime should not go
unpunished and that the truth must be
revealed, such desirable objective should not
be accomplished according to means and
methods offensive to the high sense of
respect accorded to the human personality.
1469. People v. Gamboa - 194 SCRA
372 (paraffin test)
FACTS: Common-law spouses Soledad and
Impas were conversing in their house when
suddenly someone kicked open the door.
Herein appellant fired his shotgun to the
husband. He fired a second shot hitting the
victim on the abdomen, causing his eventual
death. He was charged of murder, and was
found guilty as charged. In his appeal,
appellant raises, among others, the question
that the paraffin test was not conducted in the
presence of his lawyer. This right is afforded to
any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense whose confession or
admission may not be taken unless he is
informed of his right to remain silent and to
have competent and independent counsel of
his own choice.
ISSUE: W/N the accused’s right against self-
incrimination is violated by the taking of the
paraffin test.
HELD: NO. The accused’s right against self-
incrimination is not violated by the taking of
the paraffin test of his hands. This
constitutional right extends only to
testimonial compulsion and not when the
body of the accused is proposed to be
examined as in this case. Indeed, the paraffin
test proved positively that he just recently
fired a gun.
1470. People v. Canceran - 229 SCRA
581 (paraffin test)
FACTS: A group, including the accused and the
victim, were having a drinking session, called
“tagayan.” Bautista was the person who
refilled the glass so the other persons present
could take their turn in drinking. When the
victim Doroja was about to take his second
drink from the glass, a bullet struck him on the
left side of the head. Bautista alleged that it
was Canceran who shot the victim. Canceran
and Bautista voluntarily submitted to a paraffin
test to determine who had fired a gun. Results
showed negative for Bautista, but not for
Canceran. The accused alleges that the results
of the nitrate tests should be disregarded due
to the possibility that the results of the tests
conducted on the accused-appellant and
prosecution witness Bautista may have been
interchanged.
ISSUE: W/N the paraffin tests conducted
violates the right against self-incrimination,
and the results from the test must be
disregarded due to the extreme likelihood that
the casts of accused Canceran and prosecution
witness Bautista have been interchanged.
HELD: NO. The paraffin tests conducted
without the presence of counsel did not
violate the right against self-incrimination nor
the right to counsel. The defense failed to
show even the slight possibility that the
paraffin casts were interchanged. The Solicitor
General correctly points out that "there is no
possibility of interchange since the casts, when
submitted to the NBI Manila for examination,
were embedded or glued to the paper with
proper identification."  
1471. People v. Tranca - 235 SCRA
455 (x-ray, not a violation)
FACTS: Appellant was charge with the violation
of the Dangerous Drugs Act. After he was
arrested in a buy-bust operation, he was made
to undergo ultraviolet radiation to determine
the presence of fluorescent powder dusted on
the money used. The defense contends that
the right of the accused against self-
incrimination was violated when he was made
to undergo an ultraviolet ray examination. The
defense also argues that the Chief Chemist
1472. Almonte v. Vasquez – 244
SCRA 286
FACTS: Ombudsman Vasquez required Rogado
and Rivera of Economic Intelligence and
Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to produce all
documents relating to Personal Service Funds
yr. 1988 and all evidence for the whole
plantilla of EIIB for 1988. The subpoena duces
tecum was issued in connection with the
investigation of funds representing savings
from unfilled positions in the EIIB which were
legally disbursed. Almonte and Perez  denied
the anomalous activities that circulate around
the EIIB office.  They moved to quash the
subpoena duces tecum. They claim privilege of
an agency of the Government.
ISSUE: W/N the issuance of the subpoena
duces tecum would violate petitioner’s right
against self-incrimination.
HELD: NO. It is enough to state that the
documents required to be produced in this
failed to inform the accused of his right to incrimination is the use of physical or moral
counsel before subjecting him to the compulsion to export communication from
examination.  the witness, not an inclusion of his body in
evidence, when it may be material. Stated
ISSUE: W/N the accused was denied his right otherwise, it is simply a prohibition against
against self-incrimination when he was made legal process to extract from the defendant's
to undergo the ultra-violet ray examination to own lips, against his will, an admission of guilt.
determine the presence of fluorescent powder Nor can the subjection of the accused's body
dusted on the money used in a buy-bust to ultraviolet radiation, in order to determine
operation. the presence of ultraviolet powder, be
considered a custodial investigation so as to
HELD: NO. What is prohibited by the warrant the presence of counsel.
constitutional guarantee against self-
case are public records and those to whom the
subpoena duces tecum is directed are
government officials in whose possession or
custody the documents are. Where the
subpoena duces tecum is directed to
government officials required to produce
official documents/public records which are in
their possession or custody, then there is no
violation of the right against self-
incrimination.