Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) vs.

Soriano
A.M. No. MTJ-07-1683, September 11, 2013

Facts:
A judicial audit and inventory of pending cases was conducted by the OCA in two trial courts both
presided by Judge Soriano. Later, it was found out that around 100 cases remained unresolved and were
already beyond the reglementary period to decide. The judge was then directed to dispose of the cases. He
was able to dispose of most of the cases before his retirement. However, 12 of these cases were decided
on the day his compulsory retirement took effect. It was also found out that records of at least 4 cases had
been missing and could no longer be found or reconstituted.

Issue:
Is the judge guilty of gross inefficiency?

Held:
Yes.

[Section 5, Canon 6 of NCJCPJ; Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of Code of Judicial Conduct and; Section 15(1),
Article VIII of the Constitution ]

Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary mandates judges to
"perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with
reasonable promptness." Similarly, Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct exhorts judges to
dispose of the court’s business promptly and to decide cases within the required periods. Section 15(1),
Article VIII of the Constitution provides that all cases and matters must be decided or resolved by the
lower courts within three months from the date of submission of the last pleading.

Judge Soriano has been remiss in the performance of his judicial duties. Judge Soriano’s unreasonable
delay in deciding cases and resolving incidents and motions, and his failure to decide the remaining cases
before his compulsory retirement constitutes gross inefficiency which cannot be tolerated. As held in
numerous cases, inexcusable failure to decide cases within the reglementary period constitutes gross
inefficiency, warranting the imposition of an administrative sanction on the defaulting judge.

Judge Soriano’s inefficiency in managing his caseload was compounded by gross negligence as evinced
by the loss of the records of at least four cases which could no longer be located or reconstituted despite
diligent efforts by his successor. Judge Soriano was responsible for managing his court efficiently to
ensure the prompt delivery of court services, especially the speedy disposition of cases. Under Rule 3.08,
Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, a judge is mandated to diligently discharge administrative
responsibilities and maintain professional competence in court management. Furthermore, a judge should
organize and supervise the court personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch of business, and
require at all times the observance of high standards of public service and fidelity. Judge Soriano failed in
this respect.

Comilang vs. Belen (Finals)

A.M. No. RTJ-10-2216, June 26, 2012

Facts:
Prosecutor Comilang assisted in a certain case. He appeared before Judge Belen and moved for the
deferment of the hearing of a case because he has a schedule for preliminary investigation on that day.
Instead of granting the same, the Judge required him to submit an explanation and to pay a fine. The
Prosecutor complied, but the judge directed him again to explain on why he should not be held for
contempt. The prosecutor again complied, but nevertheless, the judge held him liable for contempt and to
pay a fine. The prosecutor filed with the CA that he be granted TRO to stay the execution of the decision.
Instead of obeying the TRO issued, the judge held the Prosecutor for indirect contempt.

Issue:
Did the judge show grave abuse of authority and gross ignorance of law?

Held:
Yes.

No less than the Code of Judicial conduct mandates that a judge shall be faithful to the laws and maintain
professional competence. Indeed, competence is a mark of a good judge. A judge must be acquainted with
legal norms and precepts as well as with procedural rules. When a judge displays an utter lack of
familiarity with the rules, he erodes the public’s confidence in the competence of our courts. Such is gross
ignorance of the law. One who accepts the exalted position of a judge owes the public and the court the
duty to be proficient in the law. Unfamiliarity with the Rules of Court is a sign of incompetence. Basic
rules of procedure must be at the palm of a judge’s hands.

This Court has consistently held that a judge is presumed to know the law and when the law is so
elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Verily, failure to follow basic
legal commands embodied in the law and the Rules constitutes gross ignorance of the law, from which no
one is excused, and surely not a judge.

Mendoza vs. Deciembre (Finals)

A.C. No. 5338, Feb. 23, 2009

Facts:
Mendoza is a mail sorter at the Central Post Office in Manila. She obtained a loan from a certain
company through Atty. Deciembre. The loan is secured by blank checks. Unfortunately, she was not able
to faithfully pay her obligations on stipulated due dates, nevertheless, she was able to make partial
payments to it. On the other hand, the lawyer claimed that her remittances were not enough to cover the
other charges from the loan and warned her that he will write an amount in the blank checks and have it
deposited in the bank. Subsequently, respondent filled up 2 of the blank checks in his possession claiming
that these were in exchange of subsequent loans granted to Mendoza to which she denied explaining that
such loan will never be granted taking into consideration her measly salary. The lawyer then filed a
complaint for violation of BP 22 against Mendoza for the checks he earlier filled up and then
subsequently bounced when deposited in the bank.

Issue:
Is the lawyer guilty of gross misconduct?

Held:
Yes.

The practice of law is not a right but merely a privilege bestowed by the State upon those who show that
they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such
privilege. A high sense of morality, honesty and fair dealing is expected and required of members of the
bar. They must conduct themselves with great propriety, and their behavior must be beyond reproach
anywhere and at all times.
A lawyer may be disciplined for acts committed even in his private capacity for acts which tend to bring
reproach on the legal profession or to injure it in the favorable opinion of the public. Indeed, there is no
distinction as to whether the transgression is committed in a lawyer's private life or in his professional
capacity, for a lawyer may not divide his personality as an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at
another.

Panganiban vs. Guerrero

A.M. No. RTJ-94-1200 March 1, 1995

Facts:
A legal researcher and staff of a Judge has been castigated by the latter in front of several people in his
chambers. The judge also demanded the staff to resign several times because of her shortcomings with
regard to work. This is also followed by abusive remarks and/or language thrown at his staff.

Issue:
Was the conduct of the judge proper?

Held:
No.

A judge's official conduct should be free from and be untainted by the appearance of impropriety, and his
or her personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his
or her everyday life, should be beyond reproach. Respondent judge has not been exactly scrupulous in
exemplifying such high ideals, as earlier narrated. One improvident act committed in an unguarded
moment could have been understandable, but not a regrettable series thereof.

Lim vs. Domagas

A.M. Nos. RTJ-92-899, October 15, 1993

Facts:
An order requiring the appearance of the minor children of the Lim spouses was issued by Judge
Domagas. However, this was not complied with and so the judge held the spouses in contempt. The
spouses challenged the decision on the ground that no notice and hearing was conducted. On the other
hand, the judge averred that his action was proper as the matter involved was urgent.

Issue:
Is the judge guilty of gross ignorance of law?

Held:
Yes.

Respondent Judge Domagas owes it to the public to know the law to be applied in a particular
controversy. In so doing, he is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes
and procedural rules. Notwithstanding respondent Judge's opinion regarding the urgency of the case, the
law and settled jurisprudence should not be sacrificed for the sake of expediency.

In declaring the complainant and Daniel Que Lim guilty of indirect contempt and ordering their arrest
without complying with the rule, the judge acted not only without or in excess of his jurisdiction but with
gross ignorance of the law.
Medina vs. De Guia
A.M. No. RTJ-88-216, March 1, 1993

Facts:
1. Three cases were due for raffling by the clerk of court but Judge De Guia ordered its publishing
immediately without giving copies of the case to the former. Thus, no raffle was conducted.
2. Judge de Guia was not observing the required office hours during Fridays contrary to the mandate
that a judge must render at least 8 hours of service a day.
Issue:
1. Was the conduct of the judge proper?
2. Was the judge inefficient?
Held:

1. No. Emphasizing the indispensability of the raffle system, not only because it is the mandate of
the law, but in order to avoid favoritism — a rung away from the ladder of graft and corruption
— by judges. This Court will not countenance any deviation or disregard of the system, devised
as it is to shield judges from any suspicion of impropriety.
2. Yes. Canon 5 of the Code of Judicial Conduct explicitly states that "[a] judge should regulate
extrajudicial activities to minimize the risk of conflict with judicial duties. Judges are duty bound
to comply with the[service requirement] to insure the maximum efficiency of the trial courts for a
speedy administration of justice. Daily trials at a minimum of five hours per working day of the
week will enable the judge to calendar as many cases as possible and to dispose with regular
dispatch the increasing number of litigations pending with the court. All other matters needing the
attention of the judge are to be attended to outside of this five-hour schedule of trial.

Panis, Jr. vs. Dinopol

A.M. OCA-IPI No. 07-2618-RTJ, February 12, 2013

Facts:
Cabel, a nephew of the wife of Judge Dinopol, was an employee and one of the plaintiffs in a civil case
filed against Koronadal Water District in his court.

Issue:
Is the judge required to inhibit from the case?

Held:
Yes.

Section 1. Disqualification of judges. — No judge or judicial officers shall sit in any case in which he, or
his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related
to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree,
computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator,
guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision
is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered
upon the record.

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or
valid reasons other than those mentioned above.

Considering that Cabel is a relative by affinity within the sixth degree, respondent should have inhibited
himself from taking cognizance of the case.
Anonymous vs. Achas
A.M. No. MTJ-11-1801, February 27, 2013

Facts:
An anonymous letter complaint was filed with the Court alleging the immorality and conduct unbecoming
of a judge against Judge Achas. in the letter, it alleges that the Judge is having an affair with a woman
who is not his wife and he is involved in cockfighting and gambling, among others. The judge denied the
allegations but he admitted that he has been separated de facto with his wife, that he has an affair with a
young woman and that he joins in the said gambling scheme.

Issue:
Did Judge Achas uphold the Integrity and Propriety that NCJCPJ mandates?

Held:
No.

No position demands greater moral righteousness and uprightness from its occupant than does the judicial
office. Judges in particular must be individuals of competence, honesty and probity, charged as they are
with safeguarding the integrity of the court and its proceedings. He should behave at all times so as to
promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, and avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all his activities. His personal behaviour outside the court, and not only
while in the performance of his official duties, must be beyond reproach, for he is perceived to be the
personification of law and justice. Thus, any demeaning act of a judge degrades the institution he
represents.

It was revealed that the respondent judge found "for himself a suitable young lass whom he occasionally
goes out with in public and such a fact is not a secret around town." Notwithstanding his admission, the
fact remains that he is still legally married to his wife. The Court agrees in finding that it is not
commendable, proper or moral for a judge to be perceived as going out with a woman not his wife. Such
is a blemish to his integrity and propriety, as well as to that of the Judiciary.

OCA vs. Fuentes III

A.M. No. 11-8-152-RTC

Facts:
In a judicial audit conducted in a Trial Court, it was revealed that around 300 cases remained pending for
disposal and were already beyond the reglementary period of deciding cases. Judge Fuentes III was
ordered to dispose of the cases who substantially complied with the same. His reason for not being able to
decide the cases expeditiously was because his home is far from his assigned office and that he had to
regularly visit his family which also affected his health.

Issue:
Is the judge guilty of gross inefficiency?

Held:
Yes.

A judge cannot choose his deadline for deciding cases pending before him. Without an extension granted
by the Court, the failure to decide even a single case within the required period constitutes gross
inefficiency that merits administrative sanction. If a judge is unable to comply with the period for
deciding cases or matters, he can, for good reasons, ask for an extension.

OCA vs. Tormis

A.M. No. MTJ-12-1817, March 12, 2013

Facts:
A judicial audit was conducted in a court presided by Judge Tormis. It was found out that around 5,000
cases remained pending beyond the reglementary period of deciding cases. Also, her court did not
maintain a general docket book. In one case, she issued warrant of arrest to an accused despite not being
required under those which fall on summary procedures. Later, she was directed to explain these findings.
She explained that the irregularities committed were due to her being suspended from work for more than
six months. The reason of her suspension was due to previously instituted administrative cases filed
against her. The OCA, however, stated that most of the cases remained pending even before her
suspension was effected.

Issue:
Did the judge commit undue delay in the disposition of cases?

Held:
Yes.

The Court has consistently impressed upon judges the need to decide cases promptly and expeditiously
under the time-honored precept that justice delayed is justice denied. Every judge should decide cases
with dispatch and should be careful, punctual, and observant in the performance of his functions for delay
in the disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of our people in the judiciary, lowers its
standards and brings it into disrepute. Failure to decide a case within the reglementary period is not
excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency warranting the imposition of administrative sanctions on the
defaulting judge.

Judge Tormis had been remiss in her duty to dispose of cases within the mandatory period to do so. Judge
Tormis was repeatedly suspended in cases wherein she committed a breach of her duty as a member of
the Bench. She cannot, therefore, be allowed to use the same to justify another violation of her solemn
oath to dispense justice. Even if we allow her to use such an excuse, as aptly observed by the OCA,
several of the cases that she failed to dispose of had been overdue for decision or resolution even prior to
her suspension. Hence, she cannot be absolved from liability for her inaction. This notwithstanding her
later compliance with the Court’s resolution thereby making the appropriate action on said cases.

Decena vs. Malanyaon

A.M. No. RTJ-10-2217, April 8, 2013

Facts:
The wife of Judge Malanyaon was charged with an Administrative complaint to which his daughter, who
just passed the bar, was the counsel. During the hearing, the Judge sat beside her and coached her on what
to do. The opposing side questioned his presence but he negated it stating that there is no rule that
prohibits such. He also averred that it is his filial duty to lend his family moral and legal support.

Issue:
1. Was the conduct of Judge Malanyaon considered as private practice of law?
2. Are Judges prohibited from private practice of law?
Held:
1. Yes.

The term practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court or to participation in court
proceedings, but extends to the preparation of pleadings or papers in anticipation of a litigation, the
giving of legal advice to clients or persons needing the same, the preparation of legal instruments and
contracts by which legal rights are secured, and the preparation of papers incident to actions and
special proceedings.

2. Yes.

Section 35 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court expressly prohibits sitting judges like Judge Malanyaon
from engaging in the private practice of law or giving professional advice to clients. Section 11,
Canon 4 (Propriety), of the New Code of Judicial Conduct and Rule 5.07 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct reiterate the prohibition from engaging in the private practice of law or giving professional
advice to clients. The prohibition is based on sound reasons of public policy, considering that the
rights, duties, privileges and functions of the office of an attorney are inherently incompatible with
the high official functions, duties, powers, discretion and privileges of a sitting judge. It also aims to
ensure that judges give their full time and attention to their judicial duties, prevent them from
extending favors to their own private interests, and assure the public of their impartiality in the
performance of their functions. These objectives are dictated by a sense of moral decency and desire
to promote the public interest.

An attorney who accepts an appointment to the Bench must accept that his right to practice law as a
member of the Philippine Bar is thereby suspended, and it shall continue to be so suspended for the
entire period of his incumbency as a judge.

Garado vs. Gutierrez-Torres

A.M. No. MTJ-11-1778, June 5, 2013

Facts:
A civil case filed by Garado which requires Summary Procedure remained pending for more than 20
months. The OCA issued several directives to Judge Torres, however, he ignored those despite receipt.

Issue:
Is Judge torres guilty of undue delay in rendering decisions?

Held:
Yes.

Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct directs judges to "dispose of the court’s business
promptly and decide cases within the required periods.

Prompt disposition of cases is attained basically through the efficiency and dedication to duty of judges. If
judges do not possess those traits, delay in the disposition of cases is inevitable to the prejudice of
litigants. Accordingly, judges should be imbued with a high sense of duty and responsibility in the
discharge of their obligation to administer justice promptly.

In this case, respondent judge failed to live up to the exacting standards of duty and responsibility that her
position required. Upon the failure of the defendant Estor to file her Answer in Civil Case No. 20129,
respondent was then required under Section 6 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure to render
judgment in Civil Case No. 20129 within 30 days. She failed to do so contrary to the rationale behind the
said Rule, which was precisely adopted to promote a more expeditious and inexpensive determination of
cases, and to enforce the constitutional rights of litigants to the speedy disposition of cases.

Lubaton vs. Lazaro

A.M. No. RTJ-12-2320, September 2, 2013

Facts:
Judge Lazaro was adjudged to be liable for undue delay in resolution of Motion to Dismiss. The judge
moved for its reconsideriation averring that there was no undue delay on her part. She stated that the
delay was due to having a docket-heavy judicial station where she receives more new cases everyday than
what she can dispose.

Issue:
Is the judge guilty of undue delay in resolution of cases?

Held:
No.

The 90-day period within which a sitting trial Judge should decide a case or resolve a pending matter is
mandatory. If the Judge cannot decide or resolve within the period, she can be allowed additional time to
do so, provided she files a written request for the extension of her time to decide the case or resolve the
pending matter. Only a valid reason may excuse a delay. The period is reckoned from the date of the
filing of the last pleading. The rule, albeit mandatory, is to be implemented with an awareness of the
limitations that may prevent a Judge from being efficient.

In this case, it would be unkind and inconsiderate on the part of the Court to disregard respondent Judge's
limitations and exact a rigid and literal compliance with the rule. With her undeniably heavy inherited
docket and the large volume of her official workload, she most probably failed to note the need for her to
apply for the extension of the 90-day period to resolve the Motion to Dismiss.

This failure does happen frequently when one is too preoccupied with too much work and is faced with
more deadlines that can be humanly met. Most men call this failure inadvertence. A few characterize it as
oversight. In either case, it is excusable except if it emanated from indolence, neglect, or bad faith.

Cayetano vs. Monsod

G.R. No. 100113, September 3, 1991

Facts:
The Constitution requires that majority of the members of the COMELEC must be members of the
Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Issue:
Define practice of law.

Held:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation
of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions
and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all
advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services,
assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the
foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings,
and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done
involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions.

Manangan vs. CFI

G.R. No. 82760, August 30, 1990

Facts:
Filemon Manangan represented himself as a lawyer and even acquired a position in the Bureau of Lands
as Legal Officer I. It was later found out that his real name was Andres M. Calunag and that he assumed
credentials of the real Filemon Manangan who is now dead.

Issue:
Is Filemon Manangan guilty of fraudulent misrepresentation?

Held:
Yes.

The evidence on hand, without need for more, and with petitioner having been sufficiently heard, amply
establishes that petitioner Filemon Manangan, is an impostor. He is guilty of continued fraudulent
misrepresentation and highly improper conduct tending directly to impede, obstruct, degrade, and make a
mockery of the administration of justice.

While it may be that some pronouncements in the pertinent decisions allude to Filemon Manangan and
that Andres Culanag is just an alias of Filemon Manangan, those statements actually refer to the person of
Andres Culanag and not to the real Filemon Manangan, long since dead.

Cordova vs. Cordova

A.M. No. 3249, November 29, 1989

Facts:
Salvacion filed a complaint against his husband for immorality and acts unbecoming a member of the
Bar. It was found out that Atty. Laurence has cohabited with at least 2 mistresses and also neglected his
legitimate family.

Issue:
Is immorality a ground for disbarment?

Held:
Yes.

An applicant for admission to membership in the bar is required to show that he is possessed of good
moral character. That requirement is not exhausted and dispensed with upon admission to membership of
the bar. On the contrary, that requirement persists as a continuing condition for membership in the Bar in
good standing.

"The continued possession ... of a good moral character is a requisite condition for the rightful
continuance in the practice of the law ... and its loss requires suspension or disbarment, even though the
statutes do not specify that as a ground for disbarment.” It is important to note that the lack of moral
character that we here refer to as essential is not limited to good moral character relating to the discharge
of the duties and responsibilities of an attorney at law. The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a
member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral
standards of the community, conduct for instance, which makes "a mockery of the inviolable social
institution or marriage."

In the instant case, respondent Cordova maintained for about two (2) years an adulterous relationship with
a married woman not his wife, in full view of the general public, to the humiliation and detriment of his
legitimate family which he, rubbing salt on the wound, failed or refused to support. After a brief period of
"reform" respondent took up again with another woman not his wife, cohabiting with her and bringing
along his young daughter to live with them. Clearly, respondent flaunted his disregard of the fundamental
institution of marriage and its elementary obligations before his own daughter and the community at
large.

Maglasang vs. People

G.R. No. 90083, October 4, 1990

Facts:
Maglasang was the client of Atty. Castellano in a criminal case. Their appeal was dismissed since they
did not comply with the requirements of a certain circular. Later, the lawyer filed a complaint with the
President of the Philippines accusing the Justices of the Supreme Court with biases, ignorance of law and
rendering unjust judgments. The Court directed the lawyer to explain why he should not be punished for
contempt for improper filing of the complaint and using intemperate language against the former. Atty.
Castellano opposed such stating that his complaint was that of a constructive criticism intended to correct
the practices of the Justices. He also averred that the Justices, being respondents of the does not have
jurisdiction over the case.

Issue:
Should Atty. Castellano be held liable for contempt?

Held:
Yes.

Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts.

CANON 11-A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE
COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY
OTHERS.

RULE 11.03 — A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menancing language or behavior
before the courts.

RULE 11.04 — A lawyer should not attribute to a judge motives not supported by the record or have
materiality to the case.

The arrogance displayed by counsel in insisting that the Court has no jurisdiction to question his act of
having complained before the Office of the President, and in claiming that a contempt order is used as a
weapon by judges and justices against practicing lawyers, however, reveals all too plainly that he was not
honestly motivated in his criticism. Rather, Atty. Castellano's complaint is a vilification of the honor and
integrity of the Justices of the Second Division of the Court and an impeachment of their capacity to
render justice according to law.
In Re: 1989 Elections of the IBP
A.M. No. 491, October 6, 1989

Facts:
During the IBP elections in 1989, several candidates allegedly used intensive electioneering and
overspending, namely Drilon, Paculdo and Nisce. Upon investigation, it was found out that the said
candidates have spent more than 200,000.00 php in their campaign.

Issue:
Did the candidates violate the code of ethics for lawyers?

Held:
Yes.

The By-Laws of the IBP and the ethics of the legal profession imposes on all lawyers, as a corollary of
their obligation to obey and uphold the constitution and the laws, the duty to "promote respect for law and
legal processes" and to abstain from 'activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in
the legal system. Respect for law is gravely eroded when lawyers themselves, who are supposed to be
millions of the law, engage in unlawful practices and cavalierly brush aside the very rules that the IBP
formulated for their observance.

The unseemly ardor with which the candidates pursued the presidency of the association detracted from
the dignity of the legal profession. The spectacle of lawyers bribing or being bribed to vote one way or
another, certainly did not uphold the honor of the profession nor elevate it in the public's esteem.

Bautista vs. Gonzales

A.M. No. 1625, February 12, 1990

Facts:
A complaint for disbarment was filed against Atty. Gonzales alleging that he accepted a case wherein his
clients agreed that they pay for the litigation expenses and to transfer 50% of the property in dispute. He
also failed to inform Bautista, her former client of the fact that the property in litigation was already sold
at a public auction. And lastly, he submitted falsified documents with the court concerning a criminal
case. In reply, Atty. Gonzales averred that the New Code of Professional Responsibility no longer have
the provision which prohibits the purchase of any interest in the subject matter of the litigation he is part
of.

Issue:
Is the purchase of interest still prohibited by the CPR?

Held:
Yes.

The new Code states that "a lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and legal process.” Moreover, Rule 138, Sec. 3 of the Revised Rules of Court requires
every lawyer to take an oath to obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities
therein.” And for any violation of this oath, a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred by the Supreme
Court. All of these underscore the role of the lawyer as the vanguard of our legal system. The
transgression of any provision of law by a lawyer is a repulsive and reprehensible act which the Court
will not countenance. In the instant case, respondent, having violated Art. 1491 of the Civil Code, must be
held accountable both to his client and to society.
People vs. Rio
G.R. No. 90294, September 24, 1991

Facts:
Ricardo Rio appealed his conviction for the crime of rape but later, manifested his intention to withdraw
such due to his poverty. He stated that he can no longer afford the services of a lawyer.

Issue:
Should poverty preclude one from pursuing his case?

Held:
No.

Pursuant to Section 13 of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court and the constitutional mandate provided in
Section 11 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution which reads as follows:

Sec. 11. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be
denied to any person by reason of poverty.

This right to a counsel de oficio does not cease upon the conviction of an accused by a trial court. It
continues, even during appeal, such that the duty of the court to assign a counsel de oficio persists where
an accused interposes an intent to appeal. Even in a case, such as the one at bar, where the accused had
signified his intent to withdraw his appeal, the court is required to inquire into the reason for the
withdrawal. Where it finds the sole reason for the withdrawal to be poverty, as in this case, the court must
assign a counsel de oficio, for despite such withdrawal, the duty to protect the rights of the accused
subsists and perhaps, with greater reason. After all, "those who have less in life must have more in law."9
Justice should never be limited to those who have the means. It is for everyone, whether rich or poor. Its
scales should always be balanced and should never equivocate or cogitate in order to favor one party over
another.

Tiania vs. Ocampo

A.C. No. 2285, August 12, 1991

Facts:
Atty. Ocampo was the retaining counsel of Tiania. Later, she was sued by Blaylock for ejection where the
lawyer appeared for both of them. Atty. Ocampo assured Tiania that he will take care of everything and
that she has nothing to worry about. After some time, she received an order to vacate the disputed
property.

Issue:
Is Atty. Ocampo guilty of representing conflicting interests?

Held:
Yes.

A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interest except by written consent of all concerned given after a
full disclosure of the facts.
The representation of conflicting interests is prohibited not only because the relation of attorney and client
is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree, but also because of the principles of public policy and
good taste. An attorney has the duty to deserve the fullest confidence of his client and represent him with
undivided loyalty. Once this confidence is abused, the entire profession suffers.

The test of the conflict of interest in disciplinary cases against a lawyer is whether or not the acceptance
of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and
loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance thereof.

Garcia vs. Francisco

A.C. No. 3923, March 30, 1993

Facts:
Garcia leased her property to Lee. At the expiration of the lease, the latter refused to vacate even after
repeated demands. To prevent Garcia from regaining her property, Lee’s counsel, Atty Francisco,
instituted various suits against Garcia. Thus a disbarment case filed against the lawyer. In his defense he
stated that he only availed those remedies as authorized by law.

Issue:
Did Atty. Francisco violate the lawyer’s oath?

Held:
Yes.

A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client but not at the expense of truth and the administration of
justice.

By grossly abusing his right of recourse to the courts for the purpose of arguing a cause that had been
repeatedly rebuffed, he was disdaining the obligation of the lawyer to maintain only such actions or
proceedings as appear to him to be just and such defense only as he believes to be honestly debatable
under the law. By violating his oath not to delay any man for money or malice, he has besmirched the
name of an honorable profession and has proved himself unworthy of trust reposed in him by law as an
officer of the Court.

Tan vs. CA
G.R. No. 97238, July 15, 1991

Facts:
A certain school refused to admit the children of some parents who are members of the Parent Teacher
Association. The Association then filed two cases of the same issues to two different courts. Thus, Two
conflicting decisions were issued by the courts, one in favor of the school and one in favor of the Parent
Teacher Association.

Issue:
What is the duty of a lawyer with regard to forum shopping?

Held:
Pending any amendment of the Rules or a circular remedying forum Shopping, lawyers and litigants alike
are warned to be more candid with courts of justice and not engage in forum shopping through deliberate
splitting of actions or appeals in the hope that even as one case is dismissed, another would still be open.
Libit vs. Oliva
A.C. No. 2837, October 7, 1994

Facts:
Atty. Oliva offered in evidence a falsified Sheriff’s Return of Summons during the hearing of a certain
civil case effectively hindering the administration of justice.

Issue:
Did Atty. Oliva violate the lawyer’s oath?

Held:
Yes.

Courts are entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading
before them. A lawyer, on the other hand, has the fundamental duty to satisfy the expectation. It is
essential that lawyers bear in mind at all times that their first duty is not to their clients but rather to the
courts, that they are above all court officers sworn to assist the courts in rendering justice to all and
sundry, and only secondarily are they advocates of the exclusive interests of their clients. For this reason,
he is required to swear to do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court

The facts in this case reveal respondent's failure to live up to his duties as a lawyer in consonance with the
strictures of the lawyer's oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional
Ethics. A lawyer's responsibility to protect and advance the interests of his client does not warrant a
course of action propelled by ill motives and malicious intentions against the other party.

Mariveles vs. Mallari

A.C. No. 3294, February 17, 1993

Facts:
Mariveles was convicted for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law. After which, he instructed Atty.
Mallari, his counsel, to file an appeal. However, after numerous extensions of time, he failed to file the
same, resulting in the dismissal of the appeal, thus rendering the decision final.

Issue:
Did Atty. Mallari violate the Code of Professional Responsibility?

Held:
Yes.

Rule 12.03 — A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or
briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so.

Rule 18.03 — A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.

The respondent demonstrated not only appalling indifference and lack of responsibility to the courts and
his client but also a shameless disregard for his duties as a lawyer. He is unfit for membership in this
noble profession.
Vill Transport Service, Inc. vs. CA
G.R. No. 76232, January 18, 1991

Facts:
A copy of a decision for an indemnity for damages against Vill Transport was sent via registered mail to
of Atty. Pimentel,its counsel, but was marked returned due to him moving out of his address. The courts
were not informed of such fact, thus, the period of appeal has elapsed rendering the decision final and
executory. However, the counsel contended that no valid service was made since the “first” notice was
never served to him.

Issue:
Was there a valid service of the notice made to the counsel?

Held:
Yes.

The requirement of conclusive proof of receipt of the registry notice "presupposes that the notice is sent to
the correct address as indicated in the records of the court. It does not apply where, as in the case at bar,
the notice was sent to the lawyer's given address but did not reach him because he had moved therefrom
without informing the court of his new location. The service at the old address should be considered valid.
Otherwise, no process can be served on the client through his lawyer if the latter has simply disappeared
without leaving a forwarding address.

Chavez vs. Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 91391, January 24, 1991

Facts:
Francisco Chavez was a solicitor general. He acted as counsel of the Republic through the PCGG when
they filed a civil case against Juan Ponce Enrile. The latter then filed a counterclaim against them for it
being a harassment suit and also moved for the inclusion of Chavez as one of the party defendants.
Chavez opposed such averring that he is only acting as counsel for the Republic.

Issue:
May the Solicitor General be included as party defendant in this case?

Held:
No.

A lawyer owes his client entire devotion to his genuine interest, warm zeal in the maintenance and
defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability. A lawyer cannot properly attend
to his duties towards his client if, in the same case, he is kept busy defending himself.

As counsel of the Republic, the Solicitor General has to appear in controversial and politically charged
cases. It is not unusual for high officials of the Government to unwittingly use shortcuts in the zealous
desire to expedite executive programs or reforms. The Solicitor General cannot look at these cases with
indifferent neutrality. His perception of national interest and obedience to instructions from above may
compel him to take a stance which to a respondent may appear too personal and biased. It is likewise
unreasonable to require Government Prosecutors to defend themselves against counterclaims in the very
same cases they are prosecuting.
Buted vs. Hernando
A.C. 1359, October 17, 1991

Facts:
In a cadastral proceeding, Atty. Hernando represented both Buted and Bolisay, where he defended the
right of ownership of the latter but also sought the cancellation of the transfer certificate of title of the
disputed land. No consent to either party was made regarding his representation to them.

Issue:
1. Is there a conflict of interest in this case?
2. Is actual revelation of confidential information required for one to be in conflict of interest?

Held:
1. Yes.

Adverse influence and conflicting interests.—

It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent of all concerned given
after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting
interests when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client
requires him to oppose.

The obligation to represent the client with undivided fidelity and not to divulge his secrets or
confidence forbids also the subsequent acceptance of retainers or employment from others in matters
adversely affecting any interest of the client with respect to which confidence has been reposed.

In cases where a conflict of interests may exist, full disclosure of the facts and express consent of all
the parties concerned are necessary. The present Code of Professional Responsibility is stricter on this
matter considering that consent of the parties is now required to be in written form. In the case at bar,
such consent was wanting.

2. No.

The mere fact that respondent had acted as counsel for Benito Bolisay in the action for specific
performance should have precluded respondent from acting or appearing as counsel for the other side
in the subsequent petition for cancellation of the Transfer Certificate of Title of the spouses Generosa
and Benito Bolisay. There is no necessity for proving the actual transmission of confidential
information to an attorney in the course of his employment by his first client in order that he may be
precluded from accepting employment by the second or subsequent client where there are conflicting
interests between the first and the subsequent clients.

Lee vs. Abastillas

A.M. No. RTJ-92-863, July 11, 1994

Facts:
Judge Abastillas was the presiding judge of two criminal cases, where Lee and Moreno are defendants.
The judge solicited a certain amount from Atty. Chua to secure a favorable decision on the said criminal
cases, which he communicated to his clients. Lee furnished the money to Atty. Chua as down payment
and was delivered by him to the judge.

Issue:
1. Did Judge Abastillas violate the Code of Judicial Conduct?
2. Did Atty. Chua violate the Code of Professional Responsibility?

Held:
1. Yes.

The Code of Judicial Conduct requires that a judge should be the embodiment of competence,
integrity and independence. He should administer justice impartially and without delay. He should so
behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.

It is peculiarly essential that the system for establishing and dispensing justice be developed to a high
degree of proficiency, to gain the absolute confidence of the public in the integrity and impartiality of
its administration, because appearance is as important as reality, so much so that a judge, like Cesar’s
wife, must not only be pure but beyond suspicion. The actuations of Judge Abastillas transgressed
against the high standard of moral ethics required of judges.

2. Yes.

Rule 1.01 provides that "A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct."

Atty. Chua is guilty of the above provision for allowing himself to be used as a conduit for an illegal
and immoral act.

Municipality of Pililla, Rizal vs. CA

G.R. No. 105909, June 28, 1994

Facts:
The Municipality of Pililla, Rizal won a civil case concerning collection of tax deficiencies against
Philippine Petroleum Corporation. In connection to this, Atty. Mendiola, a private practitioner employed
by the town, moved for the examination of the gross sales of the said Corporation.

Issue:
Is Atty. Mendiola allowed to represent the said municipality?

Held:
No.

Under the law, only the provincial fiscal and the municipal attorney can represent a province or
municipality in their lawsuits. The provision is mandatory. The municipality's authority to employ a
private lawyer is expressly limited only to situations where the provincial fiscal is disqualified to
represent it.

For the exception to apply, the fact that the provincial fiscal was disqualified to handle the municipality's
case must appear on record. In the instant case, there is nothing in the records to show that the provincial
fiscal is disqualified to act as counsel for the Municipality of Pililla on appeal, hence the appearance of
herein private counsel is without authority of law.
People vs. Dacudao
G.R. No. 81389, February 21, 1989

Facts:
Atty. Monteclar, a private prosecutor, protested on the grant of bail to Dacudao stating that no hearing
was conducted, thus denying the prosecution procedural due process.

Issue:
Do private prosecutors have authority to act in criminal cases?

Held:
No.

A private prosecutor in a criminal case has no authority to act for the People of the Philippines before the
Court. It is the Government's counsel, the Solicitor General who appears in criminal cases or their
incidents before the Supreme Court. At the very least, the Provincial Fiscal himself, with the conformity
of the Solicitor General, should raise the issue, with the conformity of one of the Assistant Provincial
Fiscals.

Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank vs. CA

G.R. No. 95625, October 4, 1991

Facts:
Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank won a civil case for annulment of a mortgage contract. In the decision,
Attorney’s fees were awarded for 10% of the “amount due”. However it was not clear whether the basis
of computation should only be for the principal or together with the interest payable. The decision has
already become final and executory.

Issue:
Can a decision which has become final and executory be amended?

Held:
Yes.

A court may still amend a final and executory judgment to clarify an ambiguity caused by an omission or
mistake in the disposition of the decision.

In the case at bar, there is an ambiguity as regards the amount of attorney's fees awarded. It is clear that
the final and executory decision of the Regional Trial Court awarded ten percent (10%) of the amount due
as attorney's fees. Since there was no qualification that the ten percent attorney's fees shall be taken only
from the principal, the ordinary and literal meaning of the words should prevail, that is, from the amount
due which is the total amount due on the loan obligation.

Del Rosario vs. CA

G.R. No. 98149, September 26, 1994

Facts:
Del Rosario suffered physical injuries from an accident caused by a bus operated by De Dios Marikina
Transportation. Damages were awarded in favor of him but later, on appeal, the attorney’s fees were
reduced from 33,641.59 PHP to 5,000.00 PHP.
Issue:
What are the criteria for determining the reasonableness of attorney’s fees to be awarded?

Held:
The following are the criteria for determining the reasonableness of attorney’s fees to be awarded:

a. the quantity and character of the services rendered;

b. the labor, time and trouble involved;
c. the nature and importance of the litigation;
d. the amount of money or the value of the property affected by the controversy;
e. the novelty and difficulty of questions involved;
f. the responsibility imposed on counsel;
g. the skill and experience called for in the performance of the service;
h. the professional character and social standing of the lawyer;
i. the customary charges of the bar for similar services;
j. the character of employment, whether casual or for establishment client;
k. whether the fee is absolute or contingent (it being the rule that an attorney may properly charge a
higher fee when it is contingent than when it is absolute); and
l. the results that were secured.

Solid Homes, Inc. vs. CA

G.R. No. 97255, August 12, 1994

Facts:
Investco, Inc., Staley and Perez sold to Solid Homes certain parcels of land payable in installments.
However, the latter failed to pay one installment and had rendered the entire obligation demandable at
once (as per stipulation). This was brought to court when Solid homes refused to pay the balance. The
former were awarded, among others, attorneys fees. Solid Homes questioned such award, averring that
there was no special finding of fact to justify such award.

Issue:
When can attorney’s fees be awarded?

Held:
Article 2208 of the Civil Code allows attorney's fees to be awarded by a court when its claimant is
compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest by reason of an
unjustified act or omission of the party from whom it is sought. While judicial discretion is here extant, an
award thereof demands, nevertheless, a factual, legal or equitable justification. The matter cannot and
should not be left to speculation and conjecture.

Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company vs. CA

G.R. No. 86100-03, January 23, 1990

Facts:
Arturo Alafriz and Associates were the counsel for Metrobank in a civil case for declaration of nullity of
deeds of sale. They have won the case through its dismissal initiated by one Alejandro, the opposing
party, and subsequently, the Transfer Certificates of Title were cancelled. The court also granted the law
firm attorney’s lien as a result which is based on quantum meruit. However, Metrobank opposed such on
the ground that it cannot be enforced because the dismissal of the complaint were not judgements for the
payment of money or executions issued in pursuance of such judgments.
Issue:
May the law firm be awarded an attorney's lien?

Held:
No.

A charging lien, to be enforceable as security for the payment of attorney's fees, requires as a condition
sine qua non a judgment for money and execution in pursuance of such judgment secured in the main
action by the attorney in favor of his client.

In the case at bar, the civil cases below were dismissed upon the initiative of the plaintiffs "in view of the
frill satisfaction of their claims." The dismissal order neither provided for any money judgment nor made
any monetary award to any litigant, much less in favor of petitioner who was a defendant therein. This
being so, private respondent's supposed charging lien is, under our rule, without any legal basis. It is
flawed by the fact that there is nothing to generate it and to which it can attach in the same manner as an
ordinary lien arises and attaches to real or personal property.

Law Firm of Raymundo A. Armovit vs. CA

G.R. No. 90983, September 27, 1991

Facts:
Atty. Armovit was the counsel for the Bengsons in the declaration as null and void an extrajudicial
foreclosure of their property by the GSIS. He succeeded in defending the case and their loan was
restructured. As part of the agreement, the lawyer is to be paid contingent fees for 20% of the value of the
favorable judgment. However, the Bengsons did not pay the full amount, but they made assurances that
the balance will be paid. Later, Armovit received an order stating that the amount received constitutes full
payment already due to his withdrawal of the charging lien. Atty. Armovit protested on the ground that
the withdrawal was made because he and the Bengsons are having a compromise agreement and that the
mere fact of his receipt of the initial payment does not constitute full payment.

Issue:
Can Atty. Armovit claim the balance sought after?

Held:
Yes.

Contingent fees are valid in this jurisdiction. It is true that attorney's fees must at all times be reasonable;
however, we do not find Atty. Armovit's claim for "twenty percent of all recoveries" to be unreasonable.
In the case of Aro v. Nañawa, decided in 1969, this Court awarded the agreed fees amid the efforts of the
client to deny him fees by terminating his services. In parallel vein, we are upholding Atty. Armovit's
claim for P252,000.00 more — pursuant to the contingent fee agreement — amid the private respondent's
own endeavours to evade its obligations.

Cadalin vs. POEA Administrator

G.R. No. L-104776, December 5, 1994

Facts:
Atty. Del Mundo filed with NLRC a notice of claim for charging lien. The case involving money claims
of overseas contract workers as against their recruiter originated and was promulgated by the POEA.
Issue:
Where should a claim for a charging lien be filed?

Held:
A statement of a claim for a charging lien shall be filed with the court or administrative agency which
renders and executes the money judgment secured by the lawyer for his clients. The lawyer shall cause
written notice thereof to be delivered to his clients and to the adverse party. The statement of the claim for
the charging lien of Atty. Del Mundo should have been filed with the administrative agency that rendered
and executed the judgment.

Facts:

Issue:

Held: