Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Gabriel Marcel, Problematic Man New York: Herder and Herder Inc., 1967), 96. Ibid., 97. Ibid
Gabriel Marcel, Problematic Man New York: Herder and Herder Inc., 1967), 96. Ibid., 97. Ibid
0 INTRODUCTION
In his work, Gabriel Marcel insists on the point of human uneasiness; which seems to have taken
much of his time to reflect upon. But for our part, we observe that Marcel uses the ideas of other
people like Heidegger, Nietzsche, Pascal, and Kierkegaard in elaborating more about the
question of Uneasiness and Anguish, just as we shall discuss below. In short, Marcel explains
Before we tackle this question using other people’s minds, let us first call to find out exactly
Now for him, he relies and actually brings in the meditative prayer of William of Thierry who
seems to be one of the greatest spiritual minds of the twentieth century about this problem. In
this way, he asserts that there is uneasiness even in Christian spirituality; simply because that the
soul prepares to pray to its God, always holding itself in its hands, as if to offer itself to Him; that
it is indeed afraid even before what it knows. 1 And because of that immense desire for God, it
loves to the point of scorning everything which exists or even scorning itself. Hence, making
In the same way, he also cites out St. Bernard’s Treatise on the Love of God; in which Bernard
asserts that the human soul transcends from the inferior stage where loving itself by itself but
loving God, is the finally the only way, in which it will attain to the perfection of love which is
1
Gabriel Marcel, Problematic Man (New York: Herder and Herder Inc., 1967), 96.
2
Ibid., 97.
3
Ibid.
1
Having read all this, Gabriel points out that the nature of uneasiness takes root in the nature of
man. Remember, to Pascal, there is no strict difference between anguish and uneasiness.
However, Marcel further says that emptiness helps to recognize the increase in depth which has
realized in the soul and mind of Pascal. That is to say, therefore, that there are two modalities of
uneasiness; ambition and love; which are clearly expressed in Pascal’s Discours sur les Passions
de l’amour.4
From the above background, we can see that to Pascal, diversion is a fruit of uneasiness. That
mean between nothingness and everything.5 He remarks that we must know that our range is,
that we are something but not everything; because the being we have conceals or hides from us
the knowledge of the first principles which are born from nothingness; and continues to hide
From we notice that Kierkegaard is an existential thinker, and not an abstract thinker like Hegel. 6
He is this kind whose thought is determined by the tasks and the difficulties of his own life, so
This is one who is not interested in the sense. He is passionately, virtually interested in
something which is at the very heart of existence. His subject of thought is an individual in his
4
Ibid., 98.
5
Ibid., 101.
6
Ibid., 102.
7
Ibid.
2
uniqueness. Kierkegaard thus writes that the task of this subjective, or existential thinker consists
Kierkegaard, first acknowledges the fact that one may be tempted to think that this Phenomenon
of anguish is implied for him by the general fact of sin and its consequences (of course, “Death
being the wages of sin, not only physical but also eternal death of the soul” he continues to say).9
But for this Danish Philosopher, especially in his treatise on The Concept of Dread, says that this
phenomenon is situated in the Heart of the domain explored by whoever seeks to understand how
sin is possible; the result of which (this analysis), is innocence taken in itself to involve and
contain the possibility of fault or, if you will, of the fall. Indeed, he regards “Innocence as
Ignorance.”10
In this very regard, because he is not yet determined as mind, but only in his psychism, in unity
with what constitutes his nature, man is not yet at the knowledge between good and evil.11
It is merely still a situation of peace, and quietude although again something not yet either
uneasiness or opposition and this is nothing; because the mind is still but in the dream state in
him. It is still dialectic, and eventually, not yet real. 12 Hence, in the long run, the very effect on
Remember, Anguish is the determination of the dream mind. A mind of adventure for the
mysterious, and the unusual; of reality not yet real but possible still; as essentially, belongs to a
8
Ibid.
9
Ibid., 103.
10
Ibid.
11
Ibid.
12
Ibid.
3
child who cannot do without it, even if it disturbs him, but enchants him. 13 He adds that it is even
found in all peoples where childhood has been reserved as a reverie of the mind; that is to say,
that the less the mind there is, the less the anguish; as is evidenced in children and absorbed
people.14
Gabriel Marcel sets off by asserting that no one, not even Pascal has profoundly analyzed the
conditions which must be or ought to be met by him who dares to call himself a Christian; and
also, to what extent he has met such conditions. 15 And that indeed, between the Christian
condition and this condition itself, therein, subsists or exists an interval which can only be
crossed by what the Danish Philosopher- Pascal called, the a leap; which to the eyes of
reflection, will always appear risky or illegitimate to the Christian; to whom it is.16
This division is brought about by Christ Himself. And on this, Marcel points out that there is
truly a disturbing ambiguity in Kierkegaard’s thought of anguish. In short, it is divided into two
on the way, hence, leading to the development of the recent theological doctrines of the reformed
Church; mostly, that of Karl Barth, which opposes the liberal Protestantism of Immanuel Kant,
and Schleiermacher.17
He emphasizes above all, the Absolute transcendence of a God; who is above the believer as the
“Absolutely Other.” And this led to a radical humbling of reason before the word of God-sole
13
Ibid., 104.
14
Ibid.
15
Ibid., 107.
16
Ibid.
17
Ibid.
4
bearer of salvation (Barthism). Hence, Marcel noted that some Catholic theologians like
traced back to Nietzsche in his Zarathustra. Marcel, therefore, asserts that we ought to ask
ourselves questions like; “To what extent Nietzsche is concerned as philosopher of anguish: First
by accepting the fact Nietzsche’s thought has been highly influenced by anguish, more so, that
the problem of solitude personally experienced as trial, is at the heart of Nietzchean tragedy (the
affirmation of the death of God, is ascribed to the tragic consciousness- from the fact that to
Nietzsche, we have actually killed God, you and I; and we are all His murderers).19
Marcel puts out Jaspers who writes about Nietzsche that: The Atheism of Nietzsche is due to the
progressive uneasiness of search for a God which perhaps, no longer understands itself,
revealed in the unspoken suffering portrayed in the statements of necessity of renouncing God,
such as: “You will no longer pray,” “You will no longer rest in infinite confidence.” And as
such, the death of God should not be taken as a historical fact but rather, as a question of a
certain decision which one has to make in order to assume: thus, doing violence to a nostalgia
for childhood which remains deep down inside a great many of us.20
18
Ibid.
19
Ibid.
20
Ibid., 109.
5
Heidegger in his analysis of human condition of Man’s situation in the world, develops the
Kierkegaardian thought of anguish in a category of existence that is, one exists in so far as he is
in relation with the exterior world. The world of his experience, he does not exist in this world as
certain content in a container. Rather this existence is that of preoccupation which defines every
object in the external world and in turn it is through these objects that the world addresses itself
to man. And that man in turn, is defined by the many possibilities of actions which are in him.
This confers a meaning upon things, and places them in a totality which is the world. This world
therefore, is a global sense which my possibilities project upon the background which has no
meaning.21
This answers the traditional problems of the realities of the external world, Marcel therefore,
says that Heidegger has shown that it is absurd to isolate the existent subject and to ask oneself
basing on the isolated subject, whether the world exists or not. For in fact, this existence subject
Heidegger, like Kierkegaard, differentiates anguish from fear. Fear always has a given object
Heidegger, wrote that in anguish all the objects of the world and our environment itself, appear
devoid of all importance; they become nonsensical and collapsed into an absolute nullity.23
“Even I feel myself disappearing from the scene in as much as I refer to my habitual self, made
up of preoccupations, ambitions and day today desires,” de Weahlens continues to say. This
anguish that disturbs us is not located anywhere but in the very things which occupy us-
omnipresent it envelops us with the felling of radical strangeness of being lost without support.
21
Ibid., 111.
22
Ibid., 112.
23
Ibid.
6
This anguish shows us the world as the world and not as particular object in the world. And at
the same time, anguish bring us to question who we are and we rediscover here the identity of
In a word, basing on the minds of other Philosophers, we have basically discovered how Marcel
demonstrates uneasiness: whereby, he portrays this topic in Pascal; who asserted that uneasiness
indeed, is found in Christian Spirituality; while for Kierkegaard, it is especially found in fixated
people in whom there is a desire and admiration as we have seen as it is common even in the
children. And for Heidegger, he insists that we become uneasy after God has deserted us; when
24
Ibid., 112.
25
Ibid.