Banco Filipino v.

Palanca
37 P 92

Street, J.

Facts
EngracioPalanca was indebted to El Banco Español and had his parcels of real property situated in Manila
as security for owing debt to the said bank. His debt grew to P218, 294.10 at 8% per annum. The parcel of
land he owned at that time is P292, 558 which is P75,000.00 more than what he owe. After the
instrument’s execution, Palanca went back to Amoy, China where he died. Due to the failure of the
defendant to make his payments, El Banco Español executed an instrument to mortgage Engracio’s
property and since the latter is a non-resident, said bank had to notify defendant about intent of suing him
by means of a publication in a news paper pursuant to Section 399 of the CC.
Thus publication was made in the newspaper of Manila and at the same time a court order was issued to
be deposited in the post office in a stamped envelope with a copy the summons, complaint directed to the
defendant at his last place of residence, in China. It was not certain if the clerk of court complied with the
mail publication orders.
After which proceeding followed where defendant did not appear thus judgement was made in favor of
plaintiff. In the decision, defendant was enjoined to pay the amount of P249, 355.32 on or before July 6,
1908 and if upon failure within the period prescribed by court, the property in question will be exposed to
public sale. Due to the failure of defendant to pay the mortgage loan, the said property was ordered for
public auction and bought by the bank for P110,200.00.
After seven years, the administrator of the estate, Vicente Palanca appeared and requested court to set
aside the order of default of July 2, 1908 and the judgement rendered on July 3, 1908 and to vacate all the
proceedings subsequent thereto on the grounds that the court had no jurisdiction over the defendant and
the case. However, the court denied the motion hence the appeal.

Issue: whether those proceedings were conducted in such manner as to constitute due process of law.

Held:
Yes. The Court held that the requisites for judicial due process had been met. The requisite that defendant
shall have the opportunity to be heard, as such that in the herein case, the latter is a non-resident, was duly
notified by having the complaint posted in a publication and an order of the court pursuant to the
provision contained in section 399 of Civil Code Procedure wherein the law provided the owner or
defendant to caution him that his property is subject to judicial proceedings thus it is up to him to takes
steps as he sees fit to protect it. However, the mode of notification does not involve absolute assurance
that the absent owner shall receive the actual notice as the possibility of having obtained the notice is
dependent on the correctness of the mailing address and the security of the mail service. However, the
Court held that actual notice to the defendant case as such as this is not under the law considered to be
absolute necessary. The idea upon which the law proceeds in recognizing the efficacy of a means of
notification which may fall short of actual notice is apparently this: Property is always assumed to be in
the possession of its owner, in person or by agent; and he may be safely held, under certain conditions, to
be affected with knowledge that proceedings have been instituted for its condemnation and sale.

As for the alleged failure of the clerk of court to send notice to the defendant’s last known address does
not amount to a denial of due process of law and would not avoid the judgement of the herein case and
that the notice if publication in a newspaper is the only notice unconditionally required by law.
Hence, the judgment of the court rendered on July 3, 1908 was affirmed.

Samartino v. Raon
GR. No. 131482, July 3, 2002

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Facts

Respondents Raon and Agustin Crisostomo filed an ejection case against Regalado P. Samartino.
Respondents are the surviving sisters and spouse of late Filomena Bernardo Crisostomo. The latter leased
her share in the property to petitioner for a period of 5 years starting 1986. The institution of case was due
to refusal of petitioner Samartino to vacate the property despite demands as the period of lease had
already expired. The case was filed with the MTC Noveleta, Cavite. Summons was served to petitioner’s
brother, Roberto who at that time was not at home as he was at confined at NBI TRC for treatment and
rehabilitation for drug dependency. A liason officer from the said institution submitted a certification at
the court stating that the petitioner will not be able to comply with the directive to answer under the
prescribe reglementary period as it will take 6 months for him to complete the rehabilitation and upon
recommendation of the committee. However the said court despite the certification submitted by the NBI-
TRC granted the respondent’s motion to declare petitioner in default and ordered the former to present
evidence ex-parte. Judgement rendered favored the respondent ordering petitioner to surrender and
evacuate the property and to pay the respondents for damages.
Petitoner’s counsel filed a motion to set aside judgement but was denied by the RTC. A writ of execution
was issued by the court giving petitioner one month to vacate the property in question. A petition for
relief from judgement was filed by petitioner with affidavit of merit for support stating that the land to
which he was being orderd to evauate was sold to him by the deceased Filomena as evidenced by the
Deed of Sale but was dismissed by the RTC. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioner but
was likewise denied. A writ of execution was issued by the court ordering the sheriff to remove the
building and other accessories in the said property to be delivered to the respondents. A petition for
certiorari and reconsideration were consecutively filed but were both denied by the CA. Hence this
review.

Issue: Whether or not the right of petitioner to due process is violated.

Held.
Yes. The Court held that for the reason of ineffective service of summons by the sheriff, petitioner was
not duly informed of the action against him. The former failed to show the reason why personal service
could not be made, the reason for the impossibility of the delivery and fall short to show that efforts were
made to find the defendant personally and that said efforts failed hence the resort to substituted service.
The ineffective service of summons prevented the petitioner from answering the claims against him thus
was not given a chance to hear his defense. The fact also that the court had cognizance that petitioner’s
condition for being unable to file his answer and still move on with the proceeding violated his right to
due process.
Also the Court held that the trial court acted rashly in the declaring a default order against the petitioner.
Well-settled is the rule that courts should be liberal in setting aside default orders as the latter is frowned
upon and not looked upon with failure as it results to great injustice if petitioners are not afforded an
opportunity to prove their claims. The issuance of orders of default should be the exception rather than
the rule, to be allowed only in clear cases of obstinate refusal by the defendant to comply with the orders
of the trial court.
In addition,the RTC committed reversible error in dismissing the petition for relief from the judgement
for having filed out of time pursuant to Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Civil Procedures.
Hence, petition for review was granted and the decision of the appellate court was reversed and set aside.

Lim v. CA
GR. No. 111397, August 12, 2002

Carpio, J.

Facts
Bistro filed before the trial court a petition for mandamus and prohibition with prayer for TRO against
Mayor Lim of Manila and the policemen whom he instructed to inspect and investigate Bistro’s license,
work permits and health certificates of its staff causing a stoppage in the business of the latter.

Bistro argued that Mayor Lim refused to issue a business license and permit. The trial acted in favour of
the plaintiff enjoining the other party to refrain from inspecting or interfering the operation of petitioner.
However, despite the said order, respondent mayor and policemen issued a closure order of Bistro’s
operations thus the latter filed an Urgent Motion for Contempt against respondents and during the
hearing, was withdrawn on the condition that Lim would respect court decision. However, on certain
consecutive days, Lim and policemen again disrupted Bistro’s operation and filed a motion to dissolve the
injunctive order and to dismiss the case contending that as a mayor he holds the power to inspect and
investigate commercial establishments and its staff as provided for in the Sec.11 Art. 2 Revised Charter of
the City of Manila and in Sec. 455, par, 3(4) Local Government Code. Lim’s motion was denied by the
court and elevated the case to the Court of appeals for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against
petitioner and Judge Reyes, the latter for committing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in issuing writ of prohibitory preliminary injunction but was also denied. However, Lim
ordered to permanently close Bistro’s establishment on the same day that Manila City Ordinance No.
7783 took effect.

Issue.

Whether or not Lim violated due process on the ground of failing to give Bistro the opportunity to be
heard?

Held.

The Court ruled that Lim has no authority to close down Bistro’s establishment without due process of
law. Lim’s contention was based on the law expressly provided in the Revised Charter of the City of
Manila and the Local Government Code. However, the power of the mayor to suspend, revoke or even
refuse to issue licenses and permits refers to violation of the conditions on which the same were issued or
non-compliance with the prerequisite for the issuance of such licenses and permits. The mayor must
observe due process in exercising these powers, which means that the mayor must give the applicant or
licensee notice and opportunity to be heard. In addition to the laws which Lim took refuge upon, there
were no provisions that expressly or impliedly granting the mayor to close down private commercial
establishments without notice and hearing and even if there is, such provision is void. The due process
clause of the Constitution requires that Lim should have given Bistro an opportunity to rebut the
allegations that it violated the conditions of its licenses and permits.
Thus, petition is denied for lack of merit and the CA decision was affirmed.

Pollution Adjudication Board v. CA

GR. No. 93891, March 11, 1991