Asistio vs. Aguirre G.R. No.

191124 April 27, 2010

Nachura, J:
Facts: Private respondent Echiverri filed a Petition for Exclusion of Voter from the permanent list of
voters of Caloocan City before the MeTC presided by Judge Malabaguio. He alleged that Asistio is not a
resident of Caloocan City and was no longer residing in the address stated in his CoC for Mayor in the
2010 Elections. Malabaguio rendered a decision directing the Election Registration Board to remove the
name of Asistion from the list of permanent voters of Caloocan City. Echiverri then filed with the
COMELEC a Petition for Disqualification on the grounds that Asistio is not a resident of Caloocan City and
that he had been previously convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Asistio filed his Notice of
Appeal and paid the required appeal fees through postal money orders on Feb.10,2010. Echiverri filed a
motion to dismiss the appeal, arguing that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the appeal on the
ground of failure to file the required appeal fees. Judge Aguirre granted the motion for failing to pay the
docket fees essential for the RTC to acquire jurisdiction over the appeal. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not Asistio should be excluded from the permanent list of voters of Caloocan City for
failure to comply with the residency required by law.

Held: The Supreme Court ruled that from the provisions of Section 117 of BP 881 and Section 9 of RA
8189, the residency requirement of voter is at least 1 year residence in the Philippines and at least 6
months in the place where the person proposes or intends to vote. “Residence” as used in the law
prescribing the qualifications for suffrage is doctrinally settled to mean “domicile”. Domicile denotes a
fixed permanent residence where, when absent for business or pleasure, one intends to return. To
successfully effect a transfer of domicile one must demonstrate: (1) an actual removal or change of
domicile; (2) a bona fide intention of abandoning the place of residence; (3) acts which correspond with
that purpose. Asistio has always been a resident of Caloocan City since birth and his family is also known
to be among the prominent political families in Caloocan. He even served as a 2nd district representative
in Caloocan and sought also election as City Mayor in 2007. Taking these circumstances into
consideration, it cannot be denied that Asistio has qualified and continues to qualify as a voter of
Caloocan City.
QUINTO and TOLENTINO, JR., vs.
COMELEC G.R. No. 189698 December 1,
2009 Equal Protection Clause, Appointed
Officials
NOVEMBER 23, 2017

NACHURA, J

FACTS:

  Before the Court is a petition for prohibition and certiorari, with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction, assailing Section 4(a) of
Resolution No. 8678 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). They contend that the
COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it issued the assailed Resolution. They aver that
the advance filing of CoCs for the 2010 elections is intended merely for the purpose of early
printing of the official ballots in order to cope with time limitations. Such advance filing does not
automatically make the person who filed the CoC a candidate at the moment of filing. Petitioners
further posit that the provision considering them as ipso facto resigned from office upon the
filing of their CoCs is discriminatory and violates the equal protection clause in the Constitution.

ISSUE:

Are appointed officials considered resigned upon filing of their certificates of candidacy? Is
Section 13 of RA 9369 violative of the equal protection clause?

RULING:

No to the first question and yes to the second. “ANY PERSON WHO FILES HIS
CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY WITHIN THIS PERIOD SHALL ONLY BE
CONSIDERED AS A CANDIDATE AT THE START OF THE CAMPAIGN PERIOD FOR
WHICH HE FILED HIS COC.” The said proviso seems to mitigate the situation of disadvantage
afflicting appointive officials by considering persons who filed their CoCs as candidates only at
the start of the campaign period, thereby, conveying the tacit intent that persons holding
appointive positions will only be considered as resigned at the start of the campaign period when
they are already treated by law as candidates.
In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their posts upon
the filing of their CoCs, but not considering as resigned all other civil servants, specifically the
elective ones, the law unduly discriminates against the first class. The fact alone that there is
substantial distinction between those who hold appointive positions and those occupying elective
posts, does not justify such differential treatment.

Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court finds that the differential treatment of
persons holding appointive offices as opposed to those holding elective ones is not germane to
the purposes of the law. There is thus no valid justification to treat appointive officials differently
from the elective ones. The classification simply fails to meet the test that it should be germane
to the purposes of the law. The measure encapsulated in the second proviso of the third
paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and in Section 66 of the OEC violates the equal
protection clause.

SILVERIO R. TAGOLINO v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

AND LUCY MARIE TORRES-GOMEZ

[G.R. No. 202202. March 19, 2013.]

TOPIC: Substitution of Candidates

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

 FACTS:

On November 30, 2009, Richard Gomez filed his CoC as Representative for the Fourth
Legislative District of Leyte under the ticket of the Liberal Party.

One of the opposing candidates, Buenaventura Juntilla filed a Verified Petition alleging that
Richard, who was actually a resident of Colgate Street, East Greenhills, San Juan City,
Metro Manila, misrepresented in his CoC that he resided in 910 Carlota Hills, Can-
adieng, Ormoc City. In this regard, Juntilla asserted that Richard failed to meet the one (1)
year residency requirement under Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
and thus should be declared disqualified/ineligible to run for the said office. In addition,
Juntilla prayed that Richard's CoC be denied due course and/or cancelled.

COMELEC 1ST DIVISION: Disqualified Richard Gomez

COMELEC EN BANC: motion for reconsideration was denied

On May 5, 2010, Lucy Marie Torres-Gomez (private respondent) filed her CoC together
with a Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance from the Liberal Party endorsing her as
the party's official substitute candidate of her husband, Richard.

COMELEC EN BANC: approved the substitution.

During the elections, Richard, whose name remained on the ballots, garnered 101,250
votes while his opponents, namely, Eufrocino Codilla, Jr. and herein petitioner Silverio
Tagolino, obtained 76,549 and 493 votes, respectively.

In view of the aforementioned substitution, Lucy Torres was proclaimed the duly-elected

Representative of the Fourth District of Leyte.

On May 24, 2010, petitioner filed a Petition for quo warranto before the HRET in order to
oust private respondent from her congressional seat, claiming that she did not validly
substitute Richard as his CoC was void ab initio; and

HRET: declared Lucy Torres as a qualified candidate

ISSUE: W/N Lucy Torres validly substituted Richard Gomez.

 RULING:

No, Lucy Torres did not validly substitute Richard Gomez.

Misrepresentation warrants cancellation of COC, not disqualification. When cancelled, there

is no valid CoC. As such, there is no candidate. Ergo, there cannot be substitution.
Substitution is proper only when the substituted is disqualified, because he or she was
considered a candidate until ordered discontinued.

Disqualification v. Cancellation of COC 

The Omnibus Election Code (OEC) provides for certain remedies to assail a candidate's bid
for public office. Among these which obtain particular significance to this case are: (1) a
petition for disqualification under Section 68; and (2) a petition to deny due course to and/or
cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78. The distinctions between the two are
well-perceived.

SEC 68 SEC 78

Primarily, a disqualification A denial of due course to and/or cancellation of

case under Section 68 of the a CoC proceeding under Section 78 of the OEC
OEC is hinged on either: (a) a
candidate's possession of a
permanent resident status in a
foreign country; or (b) his or her
commission of certain acts of
disqualification.
is premised on a person's misrepresentation of any
of the material qualifications required for the
elective office aspired for. It is not enough that a
person lacks the relevant qualification; he or she
must have also made a false representation of the
same in the CoC.

Tajanan v COMELEC G.R. No. 104443 April 13, 1992

Facts In line with the 2004 and 2010 elections COMELEC issued a resolution adopting the
recommendation of it’s law department regarding the limiting of the number of candidates to ensure
the dignity and manageability of the election for the Offices of the President, Vice-President and
Senators. This is in line with the ruling in Tajanan v COMELEC

Held “xxx This does not mean that this Court is declaring national politics as the sole preserve of the so-
called ‘traditional politicians’. However, given the complexity of the present political exercise, which
involves the election of government officials from the President down to city and municipal officials. We
recognize the need to keep the number of candidates to a manageable level, and this means keeping
those who are not serious in running for office out of the race.” Considering the dignity that must be
accorded the Offices of the President, Vice-President and Senators, the magnitude of the responsibility
of those officers, the following criteria was observed in the determination of the candidates who have
bona fide intention to run for the office for which they seek to be elected:

1. Candidates who, on the face of their certificate of candidacy, do not possess the constitutional and
legal qualifications of the office to which they aspire to be elected;

2. Candidates who, on the face of said certificate, filed their certificate of candidacy to put the election
process in mockery or disrepute;

3. Candidates whose certificate of candidacy would cause confusion among the voters by the similarity
of names and surnames with other candidates; and

4. Candidates who have no intention to run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy has been
filed as shown by circumstances or acts that clearly demonstrate the lack of such bona fide intention,
such as:

a) candidate who cannot wage a nationwide campaign;

b) candidates who do not have a platform of government;

c) candidates who are not nominated by a political party or are not supported by a registered political
party with national constituency; and
d) candidates for president or vice-president who do not present running mates for president or vice-
president, respectively, nor senatorial candidates.

VICTORINO SALCEDO II, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ERMELITA CACAO SALCEDO,
respondents.

Gonzaga-Reyes, J:

FACTS: On February 18, 1968, Neptali Salcedo is married to Agnez Celiz. Without his first 
marriage being dissolved, Neptali married Ermelita Cacao in a civil ceremony in 1986. 
Two days later, Ermelita Cacao contracted another marriage with a certain Jesus Aguirre.
During the May 11, 1998 Elections, petitioner Victorino Salcedo II and private 
respondent Ermelita Cacao Salcedo both ran for the position of mayor in Sara, Iloilo. 
Petitioner then filed with the COMELEC a petition for the cancellation of respondent’s 
certificate of candidacy on the ground that she made a false representation in the use of 
her surname Salcedo. He alleges that she had no right to use said surname because she 
was not legally married to Neptali Salcedo.

ISSUE: Whether or not misrepresentation in the use of surname may serve as a ground for the 
cancellation of her certificate of candidacy.

RULING: No. In case there is a material  misrepresentation  in the certificate of candidacy,  the

Comelec is authorized to deny due course to or cancel such certificate upon the filing of a
petition by any person pursuant to section 78 of the Code.
As stated in the law, in order to justify the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy
under section 78, it is essential that the false representation mentioned therein pertain to a
material matter for the sanction imposed by this provision would affect the respondents rights
of a candidate - the right to run for the elective post for which he filed the certificate of candidacy.
Petitioner has made no allegations concerning private respondents qualifications to
run for the office of mayor. Aside from his contention that she made a misrepresentation
in the use of the surname Salcedo, petitioner does not claim that private respondent lacks
the requisite residency, age, citizenship or any other legal qualification necessary to run for   a   local  
elective   office   as   provided   for   in   the   Local   Government   Code. Thus, petitioner   has   failed   to
discharge   the   burden   of   proving   that   the   misrepresentation
allegedly made by private respondent in her certificate of candidacy pertains to a material matter.
Aside from the requirement of materiality, a false representation under section 78
must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise  
render  a   candidate  ineligible.[25] In  other   words,  it   must  be  made  with   an
intention to deceive the electorate as to ones qualifications for public office. The use of a
surname, when not intended to mislead or deceive the public as to ones identity, is not
within the scope of the provision.
There is absolutely no showing that the inhabitants of Sara, Iloilo were deceived by
the use of such surname by private respondent.

Ejercito vs Comelec

Peralta J:

Facts: Three days prior to the May 13, 2013 Elections, a petition for disqualification was filed by Edgar
“Egay”San Luis before the COMELEC against Emilio Ramon “E.R.” P. Ejercito, who was a fellow candidate
and, at the time, the incumbent Governor of the Province of Laguna. Causes of action: (1) Ejercito,
during the campaign period for 2013 local election, distributed to the electorates of the province of
Laguna the “Orange Card” which could be used in any public hospital within the Province of Laguna for
their medical needs = a material consideration in convincing the voters to cast their votes for Ejercito’s
favor in violation of Sec 68 of the Omnibus Election Code; (2) Under Sec 5 of COMELEC Resolution No.
9615, the aggregate amount that a candidate may spend for election campaign shall be “P3.00 for every
voter currently registered in the constituency where the candidate filed his certificate of candidacy” The
Province of Laguna has a total of 1,525,522 registered electorate. Accordingly, a candidate for the
position of Provincial Governor of Laguna is only authorized to incur an election expense amounting to
P4,576,566.00. However, for television campaign commercials alone, Ejercito already spent
P23,730,784. Even assuming that Ejercito was given 30%discount as prescribed under the Fair Election
Act, he still paid the sum of P16,611,549. Hence, Ejercito committed an election offense under Sec 35 of
COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, in relation to Sec 68 of the OEC.

On May 17, 2013, Ejercito and Ramil L. Hernandez were proclaimed by the Provincial Board of
Canvassers as duly-elected Governor and Vice-Governor of Laguna. The COMELEC First Division issued
a Summons with Notice of Conference. Ejercito prayed for the dismissal of the petition. The COMELEC
First Division resolved to grant the disqualification of Ejercito. Ejercito had accepted donations of PhP
20,197,170.25 and PhP 3,366,195.05 from Scenema Concept International, Inc. (SCI) in the form of
television advertisements to be aired on ABS-CBN’s Channel 2. Even assuming that the actual cost of
both advertising contracts only amounted to PhP12,818,470.56, Ejercito exceeded his authorized
expenditure limit

Issue: W/n Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
disqualifying Ejercito.

Held: No. The COMELEC First Division and COMELEC En Banc correctly ruled that the petition filed by
San Luis against Ejercito is not just for prosecution of election offense but for disqualification as well.
Ejercito cannot feign ignorance of the true nature and intent of San Luis’ petition. The title of San Luis’
petition shows that the case was brought under Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which is
the specific rule governing the disqualification of candidates. Moreover, the averments of San Luis’
petition rely on Sec 68 (a) and (c) of the OEC as grounds for its causes of action which enumerates the
grounds for the disqualification of a candidate for elective position.

Ejercito should be disqualified for spending in his election campaign an amount in excess of what is
allowed by the OEC. The Court refused to believe Ejercito's assertion that the advertising contracts
between ABS-CBN Corporation and Scenema Concept International, Inc. were executed without his
(Ejercito) knowledge and consent. His express conformity to the advertising contracts is actually a must
because non-compliance is considered as an election offense. Notably, R.A. No. 9006 explicitly directs
that broadcast advertisements donated to the candidate shall not be broadcasted without the written
acceptance of the candidate, which shall be attached to the advertising contract and shall be submitted
to the COMELEC, and that, in every case, advertising contracts shall be signed by the donor, the
candidate concerned or by the dulyauthorized representative of the political party.

Penera vs Comelec

Carpio J:

Facts: Penera and Andanar are mayoralty candidates for the May 2007 elections in Sta. Monica Surigao
del Norte . Andanar filed a disqualification case against Penera and the other members of her political
party for there were witnesses that allege that Penera engaged in premature campaigning. She was seen
in a motorcade prior to the official campaign period in certain baranggays of Sta. Monica. She admitted
that she was in the motorcade but she should not be disqualified because she and her party did not
make any speech and that they only played a marching background music and waved to the crowd. So
technically according to her, they did not ask the people to vote for them. COMELEC ruled in favor of the
disqualification case. Hence, this petition

Issue: Whether Penera should be disqualified for rengaging in premature campaigning

Held: Yes. The prohibited act of premature campaigning is defined under Section 80 of the Omnibus
Election Code.

In the case at bar, it had been sufficiently established, not just by Andanars evidence, but also those of
Penera herself, that Penera and her partymates, after filing their COCs on 29 March 2007, participated in
a motorcade which passed through the different barangays of Sta. Monica, waived their hands to the
public, and threw candies to the onlookers. More importantly, the conduct of a motorcade is a form of
election campaign or partisan political activity, falling squarely within the ambit of Section 79(b)(2) of
the Omnibus Election Code, on [h]olding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or
other similar assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or
propaganda for or against a candidate[.] A motorcade is a procession or parade of automobiles or other
motor vehicles.[31] The conduct thereof during election periods by the candidates and their supporters
is a fact that need not be belabored due to its widespread and pervasive practice. The obvious purpose
of the conduct of motorcades is to introduce the candidates and the positions, to which they seek to be
elected, to the voting public; or to make them more visible so as to facilitate the recognition and
recollection of their names in the minds of the voters come election time. Unmistakably, motorcades are
undertaken for no other purpose than to promote the election of a particular candidate or candidates.