X is a 16-year old master chess player. But he looks older than his age.

He
won many competitions locally and abroad. TV Channel 5 approached him in one
competition and offered to make a biopic movie about his life. X agreed and he
and the producer signed a contract. After which X accepted the advance payment
of P200,000.00. When the movie came out, X’s parents were shocked to know that
it was about their minor son. They sued TV Channel 5 for annulment of contract
because of X’s minority. TV Channel 5, however, defended that it did not know
that X was still a minor. Should the contract be annulled?

ANS:
No, the contract should not be annulled. As a rule, a minor cannot
enter into contracts because of lack of capacity. However, as an exception,
as held in several decisions (e.g. Suan vs. Alcantara) of the Supreme Court,
when a minor represents his age and the other party is not aware of his
minority, the minor is estopped and the contract is valid and binding. In this
case, X looks older than his age, he did not inform TV Channel 5 that he is a
minor and TV Channel 5 was not aware of his minority. Furthermore, X
even received the advance payment, thereby ratifying the contract. Hence,
the contract cannot be annulled.

X and Y were sweethearts. Y impregnated X but Y immediately broke up

with X. During her pregnancy, X demanded from Y for financial support for their
unborn child. Y refused, claiming that an unborn child has no personality and is
not entitled to support. Is Y correct?

ANS:
No, Y is not correct. Under the Civil Code, personality begins at
conception, provided that the conceived child is born under the conditions
favorable to it. Furthermore, in a case decided by the Supreme Court
(Quimiging vs. Icao), it was held that the unborn child has a right to support
from its progenitors even if the said child is only "en ventre de sa mere”. In
this case, there is no doubt that the unborn child is fathered by Y. Thus, he is
incorrect in refusing the demand for support.

X and Y were married for seven years. Then Y met Z and they married.
When X sued Y for bigamy, Y tried to prove that his marriage to X was void due
to lack of a marriage license. Y presented a negative certification from the Local
Civil Registrar where it was stated that the Office does not have a copy of the
marriage license. Is Y correct that their marriage is void due to lack of a marriage
license?
 ANS:
No, Y is not correct. Under the Family Code, a marriage license is a
formal requisite of marriage. Its absence, however, cannot be presumed. In a
case decided by the Supreme Court (Vitangcol vs. People), it was held that
the Certification that there is no record of a marriage license does not suffice
to establish that there was in fact no marriage license was issued. In this
case, the Office of the Local Civil Registrar simply certified that there is no
copy of the marriage license in its records. This cannot mean that there was
in fact no marriage license during the celebration of the marriage. Thus, Y’s
defense that his marriage to X is untenable.

What is the probative value of the psychological report in a case for nullity
of marriage based on psychological incapacity?

ANS:
In several cases decided by the Supreme Court (e.g. Ngo-Te vs. Yu-
Te), opinions of experts like psychologists are important evidence and
carries weight and may in some cases be decisive in a case. The actual
medical or psychological examination may be dispensed with if the totality
of evidence presented is enough to support a finding of psychological
incapacity.

What is the status of a marriage where one of the spouses “refuses” to have sex?
Void or voidable?

• Under the Family Code, if the failure to have sex is due a physical inability
or disability, the marriage is voidable and can be annulled. However, in a case
decided by the Supreme Court (Chi Ming Tsoi vs. Lao Tsoi), if the failure or
refusal is due to some mental condition or disorder, then the marriage is void due
to psychological incapacity to perform an essential marital obligation.

What is the effect of a make-up sex to a ground for legal separation?

• The “make-up sex” is deemed a condonation which is a defense to a ground
for legal separation. As held in a case decided by the Supreme Court (Bugayong
vs. Ginez), a single voluntary act of marital intercourse between the parties is
sufficient to constitute condonation.

A decree for legal separation was issued, what are the consequences?

• Under the Family Code, the following are the consequences or effects of
legal separation:

o The parties can live separately but the marriage bond remains.
o The property regime shall be dissolved and liquidated.
o The guilty spouse shall not have a right to the net profits of the properties.
o Custody of minor children shall be given to the innocent spouse.
o Guilty spouse shall be disqualified to inherit ab intestato and provisions in
the will made before the legal separation shall be revoked.
o Mutual support shall cease, but the court may award the innocent spouse
alimony.
o Donations and designations as beneficiary in life insurance in favor of the
guilty spouse shall be nullified.

Live in or common law spouses, with legal impediment, one is already married,
what is their property regime?

• Under the Family Code, where the parties are living together as common law
spouses with legal impediment, only the properties acquired by both of the parties
through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be
owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions.
Furthermore, if one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in
the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership
existing in such valid marriage.

A lessee installs a machinery needed for his business in the leased premises. In the
lease contract, it was provided that upon the expiration of the lease, all
improvements introduced by the lessee shall belong to the lessor. What is the
nature of the machinery installed by the lessee? Immovable or movable?

• The machinery installed by the lessee is immovable property. Under the

Civil Code, for a machinery, a movable by nature, to be deemed immovable, it
must be attached to an immovable by the owner of the immovable property. This
rule generally does not apply if the one who attached it is a mere lessee. The
exception, however, is when the lease contract provides that the machinery
installed by the lessee shall belong to the lessor upon the expiration of the lease
because in that case the lessee acts as an agent of the lessor. Thus, in the problem
given, the machinery installed is an immovable. Because of the Covid-19
Pandemic lockdowns, online business, work from home, became popular. X made
a production plant at home which emitted odorous and bad smells. When
complained, X claimed that she has all the right to do as she wishes because it is
within her property. Is she correct?

• No, X is not correct. The right to property, while Constitutionally protected,

is not absolute. One of the limitations is that arising from conflict with other rights.
Particularly, the Civil Code states that the owner of a thing cannot make use
thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person. Sic utere tuo ut
alienum non laedas.

Daniela bought a property that was surrounded by other properties. She demanded
a right of way through Samantha’s property. The right of way demanded will cut
through half of the house of Samantha. Samantha claimed that Daniela can actually
use the other side of his property which is next to an irrigation canal by building a
bridge over the irrigation canal. Daniela refused because that would not be the
shortest route and it would be costly to her. Is Daniela entitled to have a right of
way through Samantha’s property through the route that she demanded?

• No, Daniela cannot demand the route that she wants. Applying the Civil
Code, in easement of right of way, when there is a conflict between convenience to
the requesting property, also called the dominant estate, and the prejudice caused
to the requested property, also called the servient estate, the criterion of least
prejudice prevails over the criterion of convenience. In this case, the route
demanded will seriously prejudice Samantha because it will cut through half of her
house. On the other hand, the way through the irrigation canal is very much
possible albeit it will be costly to Daniela.

To pay or to deliver the finished products using the raw materials from the creditor,
that was the alternative obligation of the debtor. Without the knowledge of the
creditor, the debtor entered into an agreement with a third person regarding the
finished products and that this third person would pay the creditor. Can the creditor
still demand payment from the debtor?

• Yes, the debtor can still demand the payment of cash from the debtor. First,
there was no novation. Under the Civil Code, for novation to apply, there must be
consent of the creditor. Here, there was no such consent for a third person to pay
the creditor. Also, the obligation being an alternative one, under the Civil Code, the
choice of what prestation is to be performed shall be made by the debtor. A choice
is also made when the debtor renders the other alternative obligation no longer
feasible. In this case, the debtor had delivered the raw materials to a third person,
thus the choice of delivery of the finished products to the creditor is no longer
feasible. The sole obligation is therefore to pay the creditor for the raw materials.
X and Y were to be married in April 2020. They hired a wedding planner, booked
the hotel, the caterer, makeup artists and singers. Then the Covid-19 pandemic
came. The government locked down the whole country, preventing mass
gatherings, including the weddings. X and Y demanded that the wedding push
through. While everyone agreed, the hotel refused. The Hotel claimed that its
obligation is made impossible by due to a fortuitous event. X and Y objected,
claiming that no one from the side of the couple, from the hotel or from the
suppliers has been afflicted with Covid-19. Is the Hotel correct in refusing to hold
the wedding?

• Yes, the Hotel is correct. Under the Civil Code, an obligor is excused from
performing an obligation to do when the obligation cannot be performed due to
impossibility or fortuitous event. A fortuitous event is an event or happening that is
unexpected, or even if expected cannot be avoided, without fault on the part of the
obligor. In this case, the reason for the Hotel’s inability to perform its obligation is
the strict government response to the Covid-19 pandemic, not simply the disease.
The lockdown and order preventing or prohibiting mass gatherings is an event
beyond the control of the Hotel.

X and Y entered into a share purchase agreement. X will acquire P1 Million worth
of shares in Y. X paid P1 Million, but Y failed to deliver. So, X demanded
rescission. Y refused, claiming that the shares purchased were properly valued,
thus, there was no lesion. Is X entitled to rescission?

• Yes, X is entitled to rescission. Under the Civil Code, the power to rescind is
implied in reciprocal ones. Here, X is seeking rescission and restitution what it had
paid on the ground that the Share Purchase Agreement did not materialize. This
case does not involve lesion. Hence, rescission is proper.

In 2010, X sued Y for sum of money, arising from a loan contract. The court
decided in favor of X. The decision became final in December 2012. To this day,
Y has not paid the money judgment. What legal interest rate shall be imposed on
the unpaid monetary judgment?

• The legal rate of interest on judgments based on money obligations is 6%

provided for under the Monetary Board Circular (No, 799) as applied by the
Supreme Court in several cases (e.g. Nacar vs. Gallery Frames). However, this rate
of 6% will only be applied prospectively or from July 1, 2013. Before July 1, 2013,
the rate is 12%. Thus, in this case, from December 2012 to June 30, 2013, the rate
shall be 12%. From July 1, 2013 onwards, the rate shall be 6%.

X borrowed P2 Million from Y. As security, X offered his house and lot. Y drafted
a Deed of Sale with right of repurchase. X failed to pay the loan within the
stipulated period. Y filed an Affidavit of Consolidation to attest that the seller has
not repurchased the property. Is Y correct?

• No, Y is not correct. The contract entered by X and Y was an equitable

mortgage because the property was not intended to be sold but only to be used as
security for the payment of the loan. Under the Civil Code, the creditor cannot
appropriate the property given as security because that would violate the rule on
pactum commissorium. Thus, Y’s Affidavit of Consolidation should not be
accepted. X, a bestselling online seller of lip tints, found her sales going down
because her customers were having lip rashes. X even had to refund some of the
buyers. When X had her stocks examined by a chemist, it was found that it had a
high alcohol content. Due to this, X demanded damages against her supplier on the
basis of Art. 2176 of the Civil Code. Her supplier defended that X is not entitled to
damages on the basis of Art. 2176 because they have a pre-existing contract. Is the
supplier correct?

• No, the supplier is not correct. Jurisprudence (e.g. Loadmasters vs. Glodel
Brokerage) postulates that a liability for tort may arise even under a contract,
where tort is that which breaches the contract. In this case, the negligence or fault
of the supplier broke the contract because the object of the sale between them was
toxic and not suitable for public consumption. Hence, the action for damages can
proceed.

X an online seller of rubbing alcohol delivered 1,000 1 gallon bottles to a

distributor, hiring J and K express to transport the same. Upon arrival at the
distributor, 50 gallon bottles worth P10,000.00 were destroyed. When X demanded
indemnity, J and K express argued that X should first establish that it was
negligent. Is J and K correct?

• No, J and K is not correct. Jurisprudence (e.g. Bascos vs. Court of Appeals)
postulates that common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently if the goods are lost, destroyed or deteriorated. The plaintiff need only
show that the goods were delivered to and received in good condition and they
were damaged upon arrival. The burden is on the common carrier to show that it
exercised the due diligence required in the transport of goods. Hence, X’s action
for damages can proceed.

X, a Grab driver, was bumped by a speeding Toyota Innova owned and driven by
Y. X was hospitalized and was not able to earn a living for a month. In the trial for
damages against Y, X claimed actual damages in the form of hospital expenses,
therapy expenses, medicines, and lost of regular income. All except the regular
income was substantiated with receipts. The trial court still awarded actual
damages for regular income, estimating it at P4,000.00 per week based on the
average sales of X. Is the trial court correct?

• No, the trial court is not correct. Jurisprudence (e.g. Sui Yong vs. IAC)
postulates that actual or compensatory damages cannot be presumed and that they
must be duly proved. Here, the trial court simply based its award on X’s testimony.
This is wrong because the question of income could have been duly established
through receipts or financial documents from the company. Hence, the award of
P4,000 per week as lost regular income should be deleted.