Media As A Political Institution In Democratic Society

At the heart of political philosophy rests a maddening conundrum which has confounded thinkers dating
back to the ancient Greeks. How can political infrastructure serve to unify and govern a body of
independent interests in such way that they retain political independence from both the infrastructure
and one another? (Howard 2010, p71) Thousands of years of history have passed without any
satisfactory resolution to the question because, of course, it is paradoxical. One cannot depend on the
city and/or nation state for independence without losing independence (from the state) in the process.
Equally, unity cannot by definition be the sum of different sets of mutually exclusive principles and/or
politically contradictory ideas.

Some temporary respite from this problem, more than a few might say, has been found in democratic
systems of government (Christman 2002, p87; Gaus 2003, p128), where the state -- in theory at least -- is
regulated by the electorate in much the same way that the electorate is regulated by the state. Indeed, it
is indubitably difficult to argue credibly with the success of democracy in contemporary political cultures
(Roser 2019). A fallacy might well be discovered however, in the somewhat spurious assertion that
democracy is therefore a satisfactory and permanent solution to the paradox, whereby, in fact, its own
history in practice implies otherwise (Howard 2010, p35, p87). Such balances between obligations of
political state and the autonomy of the individual are, by their very nature, precarious and fragile. Their
durability is questionable and the reasons for this are by no means complex, since they cultivate political
conflict between the desires of the individual to manage the state and the desires of the state to manage
the individual. The Greek philosopher Aristotle believed that the various historical classifications of
government operated as a cycle (i.e. kyklos), with a dysfunctional democracy eventually giving way to a
return to monarchy. Indeed, he believed democracy itself is an illegitimate perversion of a system of
Polity, where political power ultimately rests with the middle class (Miller 2017).

Even the separation of powers within the political state has resulted historically in belligerence between
the various institutions responsible for providing the "checks and balances" demanded by democratic
political philosophy (Howard 2010, pp 95-96). If the institutions responsible for balance are to retain
autonomy from the others they must necessarily exercise decisions which function to serve their own
best interests, which of course may very well put them into conflict with one another and the larger
interests of the state -- so we have another paradox. Say, for example, media mobilises resources to
influence the outcome of a political election (Brichacek 2016; Bannister 2020), or perhaps pushes the
arbitrary views of its advertisers onto an audience (Herman and Chomsky 1988). These examples might
be juxtaposed against seemingly more genuine efforts to restrain state power, such as when the same
media decide, contrary to the wishes of the state, that the public deserves to be given the truth about a
particular war in which the state is militarily and/or economically invested. The media might be
motivated by self-interest nonetheless, but at least there is an argument to be had. There is no such
defence of the former examples, because the interests served can be understood to be independent of
both the state and the individual. If media provides for its own interests rather than those relationships
between the state and the individual it is intended to mediate, critics can then reason it has failed in its
duty to balance the existing power structure and instead created a new structure in which it itself is a
player.

If we are to run then, with this idea that political institutions within democratic societies do not always
necessarily mediate existing interests, but rather introduce new interests (and new forms of power), it
stands to reason that to fully understand them we must look at the relationships they form with the
existing social, political and economic order. That is to say, we must examine the dynamics of power
between them. Moreover, we must recognise these dynamics to be fluid and omnidirectional rather than
simple, straightforward and static. We must not however, assume that omnidirectional means the same
thing as fair. For example, in an article for Monthly Review in 1949, writing of the capitalist democracy in
America in which he had nine years earlier acquired citizenship, Albert Einstein charged that:

The representatives of the people do not in fact sufficiently protect the interests of the
underprivileged sections of the population. Moreover, under existing conditions, private
capitalists inevitably control, directly or indirectly, the main sources of information (press, radio,
education). It is thus extremely difficult, and indeed in most cases quite impossible, for the
individual citizen to come to objective conclusions and to make intelligent use of his political
rights.

And so, writing some 40 years before Herman & Chomsky's exhaustive analysis of American media,
Einstein already realises that concentration of ownership is becoming a problem. He identifies a lopsided
paradigm in which state political apparatus represent, through the media, ideological justifications for
free market capitalism, only for the individual ("private capitalist") to frame and consolidate
complimentary narratives as a means to compel state political apparatus (and the individual) to make
precisely those same justifications. It is a vicious circle, leading inevitably to the individual being unable
to make informed political choices, since the very institutions responsible for informing those choices are
entrenched in their own struggle for political power. It can be likened to capitalism falling in love with its
own reflection. Einstein rightly points out that the economic underclass suffers in this paradigm most
deeply, because it lacks sufficient power to protect its own interests and hence is dependent on the
mechanics of the larger structure functioning in a manner which is truly democratic. Only as a collective
body can the underclass compete for the political exercise of power, and often this puts them into direct
conflict with the media, as exemplified by the Occupy Wall Street movement (Stoehr 2012) and/or Antifa
in the United States. Whoever is right in these situations is really besides the point, because their very
existence suggests that the majority politics of grassroots campaigns can be effectively challenged by the
minority politics of media apparatus. Concentration of ownership then ceases to become so much of a
problem as an outright political disaster.

But if these conflicts can truly be speculated to arise from competition for the dominant political
narrative and/or the subsequent formation of state policy, then is media just an inanimate tool to be
weaponised in a struggle for power between public and private interests? Or can it be -- as I first
suggested -- functionally autonomous, in that it represents a unique synthesis of interests which serve as
the basis for its own political ends? Again, we must look to the dynamics of the relationships it holds; to
the charted character of its political interactions with the other participants comprising democratic
society. Just as mixing together various paints will produce different colours, so too will mixing media
with various aspects of a political system. The question then really becomes whether the political
economy of media can be understood to be simply the sum of the interests it inherits or whether that
sum represents something independent from its constitutive parts.

To extrapolate on this question briefly, let us consider the propensity of the media to overload itself with
reports of violent crime and general acts of aggression (Scupin 2012, p46). It is difficult to see how it
serves either the interests of the state or the interests of the individual to be confronted on a daily basis
with a world which is unsafe, since the state wants to legitimise its authority to govern the individual and
the individual wants to live somewhere they can be relatively free of fear. Potentially then, we can
propose this exercise of power to characterise the interests of neither state nor individual in strict
isolation, but rather to be representative of a complexity of factors and dynamics between the two
which, when composited together serve to benefit the larger media apparatus in some way. A third set
of priorities, if you will. Following from this, we might then offer up hypotheses to qualify how these new
priorities have emerged from the traditional struggle for power. Perhaps people prefer reading stories of
a violent nature and the state benefits simultaneously by propagating the idea that, without its
governance, anarchy is only a stone's throw away. Or perhaps media, with nothing to gain from sugar-
coating conflict, simply desensitises us to a reality where struggles for power are not always the subtle,
blood-free affairs we have come to believe are mere diplomatic problems housed within the ostensible
righteousness of modern democratic life.

The point to be had is that, much like gravity in Einstein's space-time, democratic political institutions
tend to warp the very fabric of the structure of which they become a part in ways which change it
inexorably. Getting from A to B suddenly becomes complicated by the conflicts created within the wider
political apparatus and the institutions' own struggle for power. Media might be the contemporary
example (Schudson 2002), but in the institutions of the distant democratic past we see it also, such as
with the bitter infighting between the senate and the tribunes of the old Roman Republic (Howard 2010,
pp 95-100). Whether the media acquiesces to a particular state-driven narrative, persuades an audience
to buy this toothpaste or that, or criticises the general leadership of a major party, these actions can all
be understood and rationalised in terms of this same struggle for political power within a framework of
existing actors. For this to be true, of course, we must necessarily accept the idea that media is capable
of wielding arbitrary political power, not only in terms of influencing individuals (Barnes 1946, p42;
Bernays 1928, p25) in a class-dominant, Marxist frame of reference, but also in terms of influencing state
policy itself, as per the "CNN effect" (Livingston 1997, p1, p8).

Either way, one has to remain sceptical of media's critical role in mediating the political freedom of the
individual if it cannot even address the individual, and since media can only ever speak to a body
comprised of individuals (i.e. the readership or viewership), its own existence is predicated on the
fundamental idea that it must find, mine or manufacture commonality between consumers. Merely
scratching the surface of modern democratic politics releases these paradoxical notions into the air and
some of them raise serious environmental concerns. For example, is neutrality in reporting then
cherished because of its respect for the political sovereignty of the individual, or do certain media
providers merely abrogate political bias as a means to maximise consumers? Such questions are cynical,
but that does not necessarily mean they should be ignored. At the very least we should recognise their
common denominator in the suggestion of a set of material priorities which find themselves somewhat
detached from either the benefit of the state or the people.

A particularly fine example illustrating the detachment of these priorities can be found in Adam McKay's
2021 black comedy masterpiece, Don't Look Up. Leonardo DiCaprio and Jennifer Lawrence play two
scientists who, upon discovering a comet large enough to destroy life is on a certain trajectory to impact
Earth, elect to use broadcast media apparatus to warn people of their impending doom. The pair are
cynically laughed off by the anchors, who insouciantly poke fun at the story, while meanwhile studio
airtime is prioritised to a celebrity breakup involving Arianna Grande. The anchors then appear to
demonstrate more enthusiasm toward a show called "Celebrity Dance-Off" than to the apparent fact the
world is about to end. It is an especially satirical representation of the contemporary media cultivation of
viewership and ratings over hard news and a stark reminder that media does not always serve our best
interests.

But it is not only the integrated structure of external forces in which media exists which condition and
incentivise its agenda. Internal struggles for power also play a crucial factor in its broader political
economy. In a story from December 2021, the Guardian reports:-

Martin Clarke, the editor of MailOnline, has announced he is leaving the website amid ongoing
turmoil at the top of parent company DMG Media[...] News of his departure shocked staff at
MailOnline, who only two weeks ago assumed that Clarke had emerged as one of the victors in
an internal power struggle[...] There have been persistent rumours that Clarke had been
 approached by Rupert Murdoch to join his News UK outfit but multiple industry sources strongly
denied this is on the cards[...] In this telling, Clarke decided some time ago to leave the company
in order to seek autonomy and a big financial payday – whether by running his own start-up
media business or as part of a bigger tech company.

This left [Lord] Rothermere believing he needed a strong editorial voice within the company,
prompting him to retain the services of [former Daily Mail editor Paul] Dacre – who then publicly
ruled himself out of the race to become chair of media regulator Ofcom. One source suggested
this cascading chain of events – starting with Clarke’s resignation from MailOnline and the
creation of a new role for Dacre – contributed to the decision to remove [Geordie] Greig as editor
of the print Daily Mail.

Thus, we are here confronted by a complex internal conflict involving numerous actors who no doubt all
have (even if only marginally) differing political opinions. While this is a distinct example involving high
profile figures, the case also holds generally that, far from being a homogenous political force, the media
itself is a landscape on which various ideological battles can be and are fought. It is important for us to
take this in its correct context however, because the framework for acceptable internal political
discourse is still very much under threat of restraint by the burgeoning external concentration of media
ownership. Editors and journalists can still be persuaded and/or outright dragooned by the arbitrary
political convictions of the wealthy barons who employ them. For example, former editor of the Sunday
Times, Sir Harold Evans, infamously informed the Leveson Inquiry in 2012 (Independent 2012) that: "Mr
Murdoch told one journalist his leader columns were too long and insisted he should be attacking the
Russians more." The comic elements of this comment aside, it does imply that corporatized media is
somewhat weak to political tyrannies imposed by those forces atop the pyramid which believe -- indeed,
which can support legally -- that media is their property. What is more, tyranny has evolved past the
history of its earlier failures and in contemporary times can be brilliantly camouflaged by the illusion of
consent to disguise its true identity as a representation of brute force (Herman and Chomsky 1988). And
so, when asked if Murdoch ever interfered in his editorship, former editor of The Sun, Dave Yelland,
answered (Evening Standard 2010):

All Murdoch editors, what they do is this: they go on a journey where they end up agreeing with
everything Rupert says. But you don't admit to yourself that you're being influenced. Most
Murdoch editors wake up in the morning, switch on the radio, hear that something has
happened and think, What would Rupert think about this?' It's like a mantra inside your head. It's
like a prism. You look at the world through Rupert's eyes.
Exaggeration or not, it is not a herculean leap to propose that perhaps the political sentiments of the
owners of media enjoy a disproportionate and unbalanced depiction within their own apparatus. Again,
concentration of ownership graduates from problem into disaster if that concentration yields an inverse
relationship with the political diversity upon which democracy is fundamentally predicated. Moreover, if
the owners of media are able to enervate dissent by bending journalists and/or editors to their own will
it bestows upon them a chilling wealth of political capital. According to research from the Hacked Off
media campaign, formed in the wake of the 2011 phone-hacking revelations, Rupert Murdoch's
employees met with the UK government 206 times between 2018 and 2019, while Murdoch himself had
5 private meetings with ministers during this same period.

Much like media's external environment then, internally there are a multiplicity of conflicts and
relationships to quantify when exploring how political identity is shaped. Some, however, are more
relevant and pressurising than others. It might be foolish to assume that the personal opinions of
journalists are always repressed by some grand Murdochian narrative, but it would be equally foolish to
dismiss hegemony as if it were not a significant factor in the political economy of the media. If "Some
[journalists] claim(ed) that objectivity in writing is impossible, as all journalists are somehow swayed by
their own personal histories" (Understanding Media and Culture 2016, p146), it could well be the case
that a savvy media magnate might therefore show preference for those journalists with comparable
"personal histories" during the hiring process. In a 2006 study, the Sutton Trust found that of the top 100
journalists, 54 percent had been privately educated, compared to only 7 percent of people nationally, so
perhaps there is at least some circumstantial support for this line of inquiry.

One thing evolving technologies have illustrated in recent years is that both the media and the terrain it
functions in are in a perpetual state of development, so the belief that we can ever fully decipher the
political topography of media is belied by the simple fact that the landscape is always changing, and
frequently in ways which are difficult to predict. For example, there were great hopes in the early days of
the internet that "citizen journalism" might lead us from temptation into a new democratic utopia and
away from the aforementioned monopolisation of the existing platforms. Quoting Benasayag and
Sztulwark (2002), Nico Carpentier (2011, p100) refers to, "the development of the multiplicity as the only
road to attempt to conquer the capitalist centrality." In real terms however, the multitude of new
participants, many of whom possessed little or no journalism training, merely diluted and undermined
traditional discourse to such an extent that people were reminded why we have journalists in the first
place! Better one prima facie authority than a thousand different opinions all braying for a consumer's
attention. Even the wisest new voices can and do get lost in the cacophony of digital media, and this
should only serve to remind us of the paradoxical complexion of any ideology in which equal freedom to
contribute can simultaneously be considered both a strength and weakness. If each view, each
chronology, each narrative, are afforded equal political weight, then are we saying there is no truth or
falsity? That political decisions should always be made on the basis of popularity and not merit?
Correspondingly, should we then throw away diversity and commit to being fed truth by gatekeeper
journalists nursing their own partisanships? Who, in the most cynical of views, are little more than
symbols of economic power? Quandaries of this nature throw us face forward into a firm understanding
that democracy is at its fundamental core a delicate balancing act between competing absurdities.

But if the somewhat anticlimactic impact of citizen journalism failed to agitate the existing power
structure in terms equal to its own hype, then perhaps more can be said for the suddenly explosive
significance of social media in contemporary daily life. Platforms like Twitter and Facebook have
complimented media's descent into the celebrity journalism of the post-modern era in ways paramount
to how media is today presented and consumed (Campbell, Martin and Fabos 2012, p9; Understanding
Media and Culture 2016, p475). Why even send a journalist out to capture a semi-vacuous verbalism
from a pop star when you can simply remain in the office all day writing about their hour long quarrel
about politics on Twitter? Indeed, analysis of celebrity social media gossip is arguably imperative for
traditional entertainment media in this new paradigm of direct communication between celebrity and
fans merely so journalism doesn't become extraneous to it! True also, that journalists themselves can
make use of the very same social media platforms to market their own relevance to the public, though
always at risk of being interpreted a celebrity first and journalist second, since the scoring system of
social media (i.e. followers, views, likes etc.) makes it a somewhat instinctual affair to dichotomise
activity along celebrity/non-celebrity lines.

However, possibly the most fascinating aspect of these modern developments is that social media
platforms have expedited a culture where celebrity is substitutive to a currency of direct political capital
for the individual. As Lawrence and Boydstun (2017) put it:

The growing pervasiveness of entertainment media—and the many hybrids of entertainment and
news—creates opportunities for nontraditional media formats and nontraditional political actors
to wield considerable political influence.

The influence of celebrity can be understood to differ in substantial respects from that catalysed by more
traditional, non-celebrity political actors who might push leaflets through doors or organise a petition
(Carpentier 2011, p182). Firstly, it is not constrained by intent, so that an innocuous remark by one
socially powerful figure could in theory lead to spontaneous deliberation among millions of different
people all over the planet. Secondly, it is not constrained by distance or time, so that a Tweet from the
United States can be under discussion within seconds in India, Brazil, Russia and Japan. But most
importantly, it is not constrained by (political) identity, so that anybody prequalified by media as a
celebrity possesses the theoretical means necessary to bring a political discussion to the table. It is this
last factor which has cardinal impact upon the dynamics of power because it throws open a door
through which individuals can use fame to pressure and/or influence the state. It would be wise not to
overplay social media as some sort of jurisdictional magic wand of course. After all, the sceptic can
reason that the power of celebrity as political capital is protocol by which capitalism qualifies itself with
its own success stories, and therefore is ineffectual as a galvanising force by which to enact any type of
radical political change. Even the most hardened sceptic however, would probably have to agree that the
production of dissent -- at least in theory -- is a more straightforward matter now than it was 30 years
ago.

Perhaps though, the sceptic has a point, because just as political orthodoxy can be challenged through
the tools of new media technology, so too can it be buttressed by dominating interests in a multiplicity of
different ways. Power is still power, and if the (mostly) successful online transition of the former major
print providers taught us any lesson, it was that, although the internet has been revolutionary in many
ways, it probably isn't going to threaten the wider general structure of media power in western
democracies. If, as Christman (2002, p193) puts it, "There is much prima facie evidence that ideas reflect
the interests of the powerful in capitalist societies", then one would be wise to remain mistrustful of the
possibility that new media is going to be the shining knight galloping us away from this imbalance. What
of the failure of the previous media revolutions of print, broadcast and entertainment to do just that?
Certainly, wealth inequality and poverty are still comparatively high in both the UK and the US (Guardian
2019; Francis-Devine 2021; World Population Review 2021) so the most egregious political problems are
either not being raised in the right circles on social media, being drowned out somehow or simply not
being solved. Conversely, social media has been used to great effect in major political campaigns and
corporate marketing strategies (Anderson and Taylor 2013, p48; Understanding Media and Culture 2016,
pp 461-462; Campbell, Martin and Fabos 2012, p336), supporting the idea that it functions more
effectively as a component of the larger media paradigm than it represents a tangible threat to the
existing structure of political authority.

Christman's pessimism of capitalist democracy is hardly new (or historically inaccurate) either. In 1918
the American sociologist Franklin Giddings argued (Barnes 1946, p54):

Invariably the few rule, more or less arbitrarily, more or less drastically, more or less extensively.
Democracy, even the most radical democracy, is only that state of politically organized mankind
in which the rule of the few is least arbitrary and most responsible, least drastic and most
considerate.

Thus, any serious analysis of the political economy of the media must recognise that, although
technological progress can alter the ways in which media exercises (and reacts to) power, it does not
necessarily make the world any fairer a place. Like a sheet laid across old furniture, new technologies fit
over the world we have already built for ourselves. Media can, as a political institution, mediate this
world, but in so doing oft becomes a reflection of the various paradoxes and imbalances which antecede
it; for example, in its cultivation of the idea of majority democracy while its own control is concentrated
into the hands of minority interests (Thompson 2019). As such, plutocratic reality can in fact hide itself
behind rhetoric, technology and political infrastructure. Paraphrasing Leonard Hobhouse, Harry Barnes
(1946, pp 54-55) makes this point well:

Merely giving a name to a form of state means little or nothing. For example, to call a form of
state democracy is a mere sham unless we bring into being those conditions which make
democracy possible.

And here indeed is the rebarbative problem for those interested in how political institutions function in
democratic society, for already we must absorb the language of power in agreeing society is democratic
in the first place! The view which Barnes, Giddings and Hobhouse all seem to commission is that
democracy is a mere buzzword used to rationalise societies in which rulership of the few has become a
more liberal affair. Does media -- or indeed any other part of the state infrastructure -- "bring into being"
democratic conditions, or does it rather join the existing struggle for power within present conditions?
The pressures of economic survival surely stipulate the latter, as does the very notion that media and
other institutions act contrary to the limitations of their own political utility. Capitalism is at its core an
economic -- rather than political -- system, so the objection that its ostensibly democratic political
apparatus will be monopolised along economic lines is hardly a surprising -- or original -- one. The
historical symbiosis between media and advertising is one way this manifests itself for the present case,
but there are certainly others, such as disparities in access to both state and corporate power. Indeed,
the fundamental question we should be asking ourselves is: how can institutions which are not run
democratically provide value to a society which (supposedly) is?

Nihilistic as it might be, it is perhaps the case that media has given up on democracy as a tentatively
balanced solution to the paradox of how the free can be governed, choosing instead to fixate on how
best to mythologise the concept to a market audience. Quite brilliantly, nobody wants to be the one to
put up a hand and cry, "But the emperor has no clothes!" It's all so much easier to keep playing along; to
keep framing political questions with the syntax of power (Campbell, Martin and Fabos 2012, p469). That
is not to draw any conclusions about whether democracy is more just than any other form of political
organisation, but intended simply toward the fundamental interests of calling a spade a spade. Of
course, it is surely unequivocal that western democracies have successfully established many
fundamental individual political rights, but what is not explained so well in (traditional) historical
literature is the extent to which these have been counterbalanced by other economic, political and/or
social forces. Noting Einstein's prior reference to "intelligent use" of political rights, we can be reminded
that there is no obligation to ever educate the individual as to what is truthfully the best course of
political action for them to take, or who is the best candidate to vote for. Duplicity is not simply
permitted, but some would argue paramount to the way modern politics works. Thus, political rights
exist alongside opposing forces which can work to undermine their true value to the individual.

The philosopher Karl Popper believed that, integral to the success of political organisation in open
society, is its coherence with the empirical scientific method of self-correction (Anthony 2007, p287).
Applied to media, this principle illuminates an interesting contrast between the micro level, where a
newspaper or an internet site might publish a retraction or correct a detail, and the macro level, where
media nevertheless exists within the context of a dominant political paradigm. Importantly, it is the
deeper constructs of the political state which refuse to be held accountable to critical analysis, not the
commonplace hustle of daily life. It is a little like being permitted to question form but not structure.
Politicians can be criticised publicly only within the parameters of the unspoken agreement that the
general political system is the best possible method of organisation which society could be using; if the
actors are wrong, then at least the play is correct. But can a democracy really exist if these discussions
are off the table? Is political power truly equal among individuals? Can it indeed ever be equal? The
absence of such sobering questions from public discourse implies that we don't appear to be democratic
about whether or not we can legitimately label ourselves democracies in the first place.

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