In re Judge Manzano

Facts: Judge Manzano filed a petition allowing him to accept the appointment by Ilocos Sur
Governor Rodolfo Farinas as the member of Ilocos Norte provincial Committee on Justice
created pursuant to a Presidential Order. He petitioned that his membership in the Committee
will not in any way amount to an abandonment to his present position as Executive Judge of
Branch XIX, RTC, 1st Judicial region and as a member of judiciary.

Issue: Where does it draw the line insofar as administrative functions are concerned?

Ruling: The petition is denied. The Constitution prohibits the designation of members of the
Judiciary to any agency performing Quasi-Judicial or Administrative functions (Sec.12,
Art.VIII, 1987 Constitution).

13. 17 People v Bravo

Facts: Mario Bravo herein accused-appellant was convicted of murder for killing his mother-
in-law. He appealed the decision of the RTC contending that such does not contain "the facts
of the case for or against and only of selected facts in favor of a party." It is argued that this is
unconstitutional. The relevant constitutional provision is found in Article VIII, Section 14,
which says that "no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly
and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based." 

Issue: WON the trial court violated Art. VIII, Sec. 14 in rendering its decision

Ruling: No. The Court do not find it has been violated in the challenged decision. It is for the
judge to determine from the narration of facts, relevant or irrelevant, and the assertions by the
parties, truthful or not, what actually happened in the case before him. Judge Dizon did this
when he made what the appellant calls a "selective finding of facts." Of course, it had to be
selective. That is how a trial judge separates the chaff from the grain, extracts the truth from
the mass of conflicting claims, and determines the basis of the decision he will have to make.

*main point/s underscored

Hernandez v. CA

FACTS: Danilo was introduced to Remedios de Leon by his aunt, as one engaged in the
business of buying and selling jewelry. Danilo subsequently charged in 9 informations w/ the
ESTAFA and for violations against BP Blg. 22. The CA affirmed 8 convictions and reversed
1 case. The Petitioner elevated the case to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: WON the CA err in not disclosing complete findings of fact, contrary to Sec. 14, Art
VIII

RULING: The facts of the case as summarized in the Appellee's Brief are quoted in full the
statement of facts of the Solicitor General. What the Court of Appeals, in effect, said was that
it found the facts as presented by the Solicitor General as supported by the evidence. The
constitutional mandate only requires that the decision should state the facts on which it is
based. There is no proscription made in the briefs or memoranda of the parties, instead of
rewriting the same in its own words.
Main point: Sec. 14- No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein
clearly and distinctively the facts on the law on which it is based.

Nicos v CA

Facts: The order is assailed by the petitioners on the principal ground that it violates the
aforementioned constitutional requirement of Article 8 Section 14 of the Constitution. The
petitioners claim that it is not a reasoned decision and does not clearly and distinctly explain
how it was reached by the trial court. Petitioners complain that there was no analysis of their
testimonial evidence or of their 21 exhibits, the trial court merely confining itself to the
pronouncement that the sheriff's sale was valid and that it had no jurisdiction over the
derivative suit. There was therefore no adequate factual or legal basis for the decision that
could justify its review and affirmance by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court’s decision is unconstitutional

HELD: The challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE for lack of basis.
This case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, Branch 10, for revision,
within 30 days from notice, of the Order of June 6, 1986, conformably to the requirements of
Article VIII, Section 14, of the Constitution, subject to the appeal thereof, if desired, in
accordance with law.

13.23 Re:Problem of delays before the sandiganbayan

Facts: On August 8, 2000, the Court required Sandiganbayan to comment on the letter of the
IBP and to submit a list of all Sandiganbayan cases pending decision, or with motion for
reconsideration pending resolution, indicating the dates they were deemed submitted for
decision or resolution. On September 27, 2000, complying with the order, submitted a report
(hereafter, the compliance) admitting a number of cases submitted for decision and motion
for reconsideration pending resolution before its divisions. The IBP as an administrative
complaint against Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena for serious delays in the decision
of cases and in the resolution of motions and other pending incidents before the different
divisions of the Sandiganbayan, amounting to incompetence, inefficiency, gross neglect of
duty and misconduct in office.

Issue: WON the reglementary period within which the Sandiganbayan must decide/resolve
cases falling within its jurisdiction?

Ruling: The Court Administrator posits that since in the first class of cases, the
Sandiganbayan acts more as a trial court, then for that classification of cases, the three (3)
month reglementary period applies.

13.24 Edano vs. Asdala, AM No. RTJ-06-2007 (2010)

FACTS: Carmen Edaño (complainant) filed an administrative complaint for violation of the
Code of Judicial Ethics, misconduct, rendering an erroneous decision, and rendering a
decision beyond the 90-day reglementary period against Judge Fatima G. Asdala (respondent
judge). The complainant claimed that the respondent judge made it appear that Civil Case No.
Q-97-30576 was decided on March 22, 2005, although the records show that she (respondent
judge) still ruled on several motions relating to this case even after that date. The complainant
further alleged that the respondent judge erred in denying her notice of appeal. The OCA, in
its report dated April 18, 2006, recommended that the respondent judge be fined in the
amount of P10,000.00 for undue delay in rendering a decision, with a stern warning that a
commission of similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.

ISSUE: Whether or not the act of the judge constitutes a violation of the Code of Judicial
Ethics, misconduct, rendering an erroneous decision, and rendering a decision beyond the 90-
day reglementary period.

HELD: Yes, we agree with the finding of the OCA that the respondent judge is guilty of
undue delay in rendering a decision. Section 15, Article VIII of the Constitution requires
judges to decide all cases within three (3) months from the date of submission. This
Constitutional policy is reiterated in Rule 1.02, Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
which states that a judge should administer justice impartially and without delay; and Rule
3.05, Canon 3 of the same Code provides that a judge shall dispose of the court’s business
promptly and decide cases within the required periods.

Sesbreno vs. CA
G.R. No. 161390

Facts: Petitioner filed the complaint for damages thru breach of contract and attorneys fees
against the province of Cebu with the RTC. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the
petitioner. On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC’s decision and dismissed the complaint. The
appellate court concluded that petitioner failed to sufficiently establish his allegation that the
respondents induced the camineros to violate the agreement for attorneys fees and the
compromise agreement, and that he suffered damage due to respondent’s act of directly
paying the camineros the amounts due them. In response to this, the petitioner raises the issue
that the CA erred in not affirming the trial court decision due to long delay in deciding CA-
G.R. CV No. 43287.
 
Issue: WON the CA should have affirmed the trial court’s decision in view of the delay in
resolving the case, and should have denied the appeal because of the formal defects in the
appellant’s brief.

Ruling: No. Even when there is delay and no decision or resolution is made within the
prescribed period, there is no automatic affirmation of the appealed decision. This is different
from the rule under Article X, Section 11 (2) of the 1973 Constitution which said that, in case
of delay, the decision appealed from was deemed affirmed.

14.1 Macalintal v. COMELEC, GR 157013, July 10, 2003

FACTS: Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo B.

Macalintal, a member of the Philippine Bar, seeking a declaration that certain provisions of
Republic Act No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) suffer from
constitutional infirmity.  Claiming that he has actual and material legal interest in the subject
matter of this case in seeing to it that public funds are properly and lawfully used and
appropriated, petitioner filed the instant petition as a taxpayer and as a lawyer.

ISSUE: Whether or not Congress may, exercise their power without violating the
independence of the COMELEC under Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution.
RULING: No. By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review, amend and revise the
Implementing Rules & Regulations for RA No. 9189, Congress went beyond the scope of its
constitutional authority. Congress trampled upon the constitutional mandate of independence
of the COMELEC. Under such a situation, the Court is left with no option but to withdraw
from its usual silence in declaring a provision of law unconstitutional.

14.2 Ombudsman v. Civil Service Comission

FACTS: A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court seeking
to set aside and nullify Resolution No. 030919 of the Civil Service Commission. Melchor
Arthur H. Carandang, Paul Elmer M. Clemente and Jose Tereso U. de Jesus, Jr. were
appointed Graft Investigation Officers III of petitioner by the Ombudsman. The CSC
approved the appointments on the condition that for the appointees to acquire security of
tenure, they must obtain CES or Civil Service Executive (CSE) eligibility which is governed
by the CESB. Ombudsman requested for the change of status, from temporary to permanent,
of the appointments of Carandang, Clemente and De Jesus.

ISSUE: WON independent offices specifically authorized by the constitution to appoint their
officials is not subject to Civil Service Law and Rules?

RULING: No.All appointments in the government service, particularly the career service,
must be in accordance with the qualification requirements as laid down under existing civil
service rules and regulations.

14.3 CSC v DBM

FACTS: The total funds appropriated by GAA for CSC was P285m plus. CSC complains
that the total funds released by DBM were only P279m plus, thereby leaving an unreleased
balance of P5m plus. CSC contends that the funds were intentionally withheld by DBM on
the ground of their “no report, no release” policy. Hence, CSC filed a petition for mandamus
seeking to compel the DBM to release the balance of its budget for fiscal year 2002.

ISSUE: WON DBM‘s policy, “no report, no release” is constitutional 

HELD: No. The no report, no release policy may not be validly enforced against offices
vested with fiscal autonomy is not disputed. Indeed, such policy cannot be enforced against
offices possessing fiscal autonomy without violating Article IX (A), Section 5 of the
Constitution, which provides that the Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy and that their
approved appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released. 

14.4 Macalintal Vs. COMELEC

FACTS: A petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo B. Macalintal, a
member of the Philippine Bar, seeking a declaration that certain provisions of Republic Act
No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003)1 suffer from constitutional infirmity.
Claiming that he has actual and material legal interest in the subject matter of this case in
seeing to it that public funds are properly and lawfully used and appropriated, petitioner filed
the instant petition as a taxpayer and as a lawyer.
ISSUES: Whether or Not the second sentence in the RA 9189 second paragraph
of Section 25, to wit: "It shall review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules
and Regulations promulgated by the Commission" of the same law is constitutional.

HELD: No, congress went beyond the scope of its constitutional authority. It trampled
upon the constitutional mandate of independence of the Comelec.

14.5 rewrite

14.6 Saligumba vs COA, 117 SCRA 669

Facts: This s a petition to review the decision of the Commission on Audit (COA) in
Administrative Case No. 81-525 for disgraceful and immoral conduct. On the basis of the
sworn complaint of Editha Saligumba, the COA instituted the administrative case against
Leonardo Estella, Auditing Examiner III, in the Auditor's Office of Misamis Occidental. The
charge was that the respondent raped Editha Saligumba on several occasions. On April 12,
1982, the COA rendered a decision with the following judgment: “Wherefore, for
insufficiency of evidence, the instant charge is hereby dropped. Respondent is, however,
warned to comport himself henceforth in such a manner as would forestall the filing of
similar complaints in the future.” Editha Saligumba now wants the CA to review the COA
decision. She insists that the decision of the COA is contrary to the evidence.

Issue: Whether or not the decision of the Commission on Audit may be reviewed and
elevated to the Court of Appeals?

Ruling: No, the Supreme Court ruled that decisions of Constitutional Commissions that may
be elevated to the Supreme Court through Rule 65 are only grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction. The petition was dismissed due to the
following reasons: that the power to review COA decisions refers to money matters and not
to administrative cases involving the discipline of its personnel; and even assuming that the
Supreme Court have jurisdiction to review decisions on administrative matters as mentioned
above, they cannot do so on factual issues; their power to review is limited to legal issues.

14.7 Cua v COMELEC

FACTS: The first division of the COMELEC rendered a 2-1 decision in favor of the
petitioner Junie Cua but nevertheless suspended his proclamation as winner due to the lack of
the unanimous vote required by the procedural rules. Petitioner argued that the 2-1 decision
of the voting of the COMELEC both in division and en banc was valid because of Art 9-A
Sec 7 of the Constitution, providing that "each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of
all its members any case or matter brought before it." Furthermore, he claimed that this
applies to the voting of the COMELEC both in division and en banc. The respondents insist
that no valid decision was reached by the COMELEC en banc because only three votes were
cast in favor of the petitioner and these did not constitute a majority of the body.

ISSUES: WON the 2-1 decision of the First Court was valid.

RULING: Yes. The Court held that the 2-1 decision rendered by the first division was a
valid decision under Article 9-A, Section 7 of the Constitution. Furthermore, the three
members who voted to affirm the first division constituted a majority of the five members
who deliberated and voted thereon En Banc and their decision is also valid under the afore
cited constitutional provision. Hence, Cua entitled assume his seat in the House of
Representatives.

MAIN POINT:
This case obviously contradicts Section 7 which says: Each Commission shall decide
by ta majority vote of all its members.

14.8 Estrella v. COMELEC, GR No. 160465, May 27, 2004

FACTS: Romeo M. Estrella (petitioner) and Rolando F. Salvador (respondent) were

mayoralty candidates in Baliuag, Bulacan during the May 14, 2001 Elections. The Municipal
Board of Canvassers proclaimed respondent as winner. Petitioner thereafter filed before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan an election protest. By Decision of April 10, 2002,
the RTC annulled respondent’s proclamation and declared petitioner as the duly elected
mayor of Baliuag.

ISSUE: Whether the vote of majority consists of all the members of the COMELEC En
Banc.

RULING: For the foregoing reasons then, this Court hereby abandons the doctrine laid down
in Cua and holds that the COMELEC En Banc shall decide a case or matter brought before it
by a majority vote of "all its members," and NOT majority of the members who deliberated
and voted thereon. The provision of the Constitution is clear that decisions reached by the
COMELEC En Banc should be the majority vote of all its members and not only those who
participated and took part in the deliberation.

14.9 Missing

14.10[G.R. No. 143398. October 25, 2000]

The case before the Court is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order seeking to nullify the order dated June
15, 2000 of the Commission on Elections (Comelec), First Division, giving notice to the
parties of the promulgation of the resolution on the case entitled Jose T. Ramirez, Protestee,
versus Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr., Election Protest Case No. 98-29, on June 20, 2000, at 2:00 in
the afternoon and to prohibit the respondent Commission on Election from promulgating the
so called Guiani ponencia. The facts are as follows: Petitioner Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr. and
respondent Jose T. Ramirez were candidates for the position of Governor, Eastern Samar,
during the May 11, 1998 elections. On May 16, 1998, the Provincial Board of Canvassers
proclaimed Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr. as the duly elected Governor, Eastern Samar, having
obtained 46,547 votes, the highest number of votes in the election returns. On June 4, 1998,
respondent Ramirez who obtained 45,934 votes, the second highest number of votes, filed
with the Comelec, an election protest challenging the results in a total of 201 precincts. The
case was assigned to the First Division (formerly Second), Commission on Elections. On
January 27, 2000, Commissioner Japal M. Guiani prepared and signed a proposed resolution
in the case. To such proposed ponencia, Commissioner Julio F. Desamito dissented.
Commissioner Luzviminda G. Tancangco at first did not indicate her vote but said that she
would wish to see both positions, if any, to make her final decision.
ISSUE: WON the ponencia has value.

RULING: None. Before that resolution or decision is so signed and promulgated, there is no
valid resolution or decision to speak of. A final decision or resolution becomes binding only
after it is promulgated and not before. Accordingly, one who is no longer a member of the
Commission at the time the final decision or resolution is promulgated cannot validly take
part in that resolution or decision. much less could he be the ponente of the resolution or
decision.

RULING = MAINPOINT

14.11 Mateo v. CA, GR No. 113219, August 14, 1995

FACTS: Petitioners, all Board Members of MOWAD, conducted an investigation on private

respondent Edgar Sta. Maria, then General Manager. Respondent was placed under
preventive suspension and Maximo San Diego was designated in his place as Acting General
Manager. He was later dismissed.
Respondent filed a Special Civil Action for Quo Warranto and Mandamus with Preliminary
Injunction before the RTC of Rizal and was granted.
Petitioners moved to dismiss the case on two (2) grounds: (1) the court had no jurisdiction
over disciplinary actions of government employees which is vested exclusively in the CSC
and (2) quo warranto was not the proper remedy but Court of Appeals dismissed the petition
for lack of merit.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Rizal has jurisdiction involving dismissal
of an employee of Quasi-public Corporation.

RULING: The Court held that the RTC has no jurisdiction. There is no question that
MOWAD is a quasi-public corporation created pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
198, known as the provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973. The established rule is that the
hiring and firing of employees of government-own and controlled corporations are governed
by the provisions of the Civil Service Law and Rules and Regulations. The Civil Service
Commission under the Constitution is the single arbiter of all contests relating to the Civil
service and as such, its judgments are unappealable and subject only to this Court's certiorari
judgment. Whether under the old rule or present rule, Regional Trial Courts have no
jurisdiction to entertain cases involving dismissal of officers and employees covered by the
Civil Service Law.

14.12 REYES V. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT

Fact: This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus which seeks the annulment
of the decision of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), dismissing petitioner's appeal
from the trial court's decision. Petitioner Aquiles Reyes and private respondent Adolfo
Comia. During the proceedings of the Municipal Board of Canvassers, private respondent
moved for the exclusion of certain election returns, on the ground of serious irregularity in
counting in favor of petitioner. Aquiles Reyes votes cast for "Reyes" only, considering that
there was another candidate (Epitacio Reyes) bearing the same surname. However, without
resolving his petition, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed on the same day
petitioner as the eighth winning candidate. The petitioner took his oath of office. Private
respondent filed an election protest before the trial court. He alleged that "a vital mistake”
had been committed by the Board of Canvassers in the mathematical computation of the total
number of votes garnered by petitioner. The petitioner filed a motion to dismiss private
respondent's petition on the ground that it was filed beyond the reglementary period of ten
days from proclamation. Petitioner filed a notice of appeal to the COMELEC. The Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition because of petitioner's pending appeal in the COMELEC.
Petitioner contends that both the trial court and the COMELEC's First Division committed a
grave abuse of discretion, the first, by assuming jurisdiction over the election contest filed by
private respondent despite the fact that the case was filed more than ten days after petitioner's
proclamation, and the second i.e., the COMELEC's First Division, by dismissing petitioner's
appeal from the decision of the trial court for late payment of the appeal fee.

Issue W/N the petition for certiorari would prosper?

Ruling: No. The filing of the present petition, without petitioner first filing a motion for
reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc, violates Art. IX, A, Sec 7 of the Constitution
because under this provision only decisions of the COMELEC en banc may be brought
to the Supreme Court on certiorari.

14.13 ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION vs. COMELEC

Facts: A Petition for Certiorari raised by ABS-CBN under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
assailing Commission on Elections (Comelec) en banc Resolution No. 98-14191 dated April
21, 1998. In the said Resolution, the poll body RESOLVED to approve the issuance of a
restraining order to stop ABS-CBN or any other groups, its agents or representatives from
conducting such exit survey and to authorize the Honorable Chairman to issue the same. The
electoral body believed that such project might conflict with the official Comelec count, as
well as the unofficial quick count of the National Movement for Free Elections. the Court
issued the Temporary Restraining Order prayed for by petitioner. We directed the Comelec to
cease and desist, until further orders, from implementing the assailed Resolution or the
restraining order issued pursuant thereto, if any. In fact, the exit polls were actually
conducted and reported by media without any difficulty or problem.

Issue: Whether the assailed resolution is valid.

Held : The absolute ban imposed by the Comelec cannot be justified. It does not leave open
any alternative channel of communication to gather the type of information obtained through
exit polling. On the other hand, there are other valid and reasonable ways and means to
achieve the Comelec end of avoiding or minimizing disorder and confusion that may be
brought about by exit surveys. A specific limited area for conducting exit polls may be
designated. Only professional survey groups may be allowed to conduct the same. Pollsters
may be kept at a reasonable distance from the voting center. They may be required to explain
to voters that the latter may refuse interviewed, and that

14.14 Aguilar v. COMELEC

Facts: In this case, petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing his appeal
was not resolved by the COMELEC en banc, but by the COMELEC First Division, in
obvious violation of the provisions of the Constitution and the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure. Stated differently, the division, after dismissing petitioners appeal arrogated unto
itself the en bancs function of resolving petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Issue: Whether the COMELEC First Division gravely abused its discretion in issuing the
order dismissing the petitioner’s appeal.
Ruling: The Court finds that the COMELEC First Division gravely abused its discretion in
issuing he order dismissing petitioner’s appeal. The COMELEC First Division should have
been more cautious in dismissing petitioner’s appeal on the mere technicality of non-payment
of the additional P3,200.00 appeal fee given the public interest involved in election cases.
This is especially true in this case where only one vote separates the contending parties. The
Court stresses once more that election law and rules are to be interpreted and applied in a
liberal manner so as to give effect, not to frustrates, the will of the electorate.

Main Point: Where a division of the COMELEc decides a motion for reconsideration in
violation of Article IX, C, 3 the division’s ruling is a complete nullity and may be brought to
the Court on Certiorari.

14.15 missing

14.16 Dumayas vs COMELEC

Facts: Petitioner Dumayas and respondent Bernal were rival candidates for the position in
Mayor of Carles, Iloilo in the May 1998 synchronized elections. Petitioner sought the
exclusion of election returns for 3 precincts of Barangay Pantalan owing to alleged acts of
terrorism, intimidation and coercion committed in said precincts during the casting and
counting of votes which was denied by MBC. Petitioner appealed to the COMELEC Second
Division which excluded election returns from 3 precincts and directed the MBC to
reconvene and finish the canvass of the remaining or uncontested returns and then, to
proclaim the winning mayoralty candidate. Private respondent Bernal moved for
reconsideration of the decision of the Second Division with the COMELEC en banc. The
MBC proclaim petitioner winner of the election. Private respondent Bernal filed an urgent
motion to declare void petitioner’s proclamation. The COMELEC en banc reversed the
decision of the Second Division, annulled the petitioner Dumayas’ proclamation; and
constituted a new MBC. Respondent Bernal was proclaimed by the newly-constituted MBC
as the duly-elected Mayor of the Municipality. 

Issue: Whether the COMELEC was correct in including in the canvass the election returns of
the contested precincts? 

Held: The Supreme Court held in the affirmative. The only evidence presented by the
petitioner to prove the alleged irregularities were the self-serving contracts of his watchers
and inspectors. Returns cannot be excluded on mere allegations that the returns are
manufactured without any physical signs of tampering. The election irregularities cited by the
petitioner would require the presentation of evidence which cannot be done in a pre-
proclamation controversy which is summary in nature.

14.17 Thelma Gaminde v. COA

Facts: On June 1993, the President appointed petitioner as ad interim Commissioner of the
Civil Service Commission (CSC) for a term expiring on February 2, 1999 as stated in her
appointment paper and the Commission on Appointments confirmed such appointment.
However, the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel in a letter clarified that petitioner’s term of
office would expire on February 2, 2000 not on 1999 thus, petitioner remained in office. On
February 1999, the COA issued an opinion that the term of petitioner has expired thus, the
CSC auditor disallowed the audit of salaries and emoluments of petitioner. Petitioner
appealed the disallowance to the Commission on Audit en banc which affirmed the
disallowance. Petitioner now seen the reversal of such decision.

Issue: Whether the term of office of petitioner expired on February 2, 1999 as stated in her
appointment letter, or on February 2, 2000 as claimed by her

Ruling: Petitioner accepted the appointment and assumed office on June 22, 1993. She
is bound by the term of the appointment she accepted, expiring February 02, 1999. In this
connection, the letter dated April 07, 1998, of Deputy Executive Secretary Renato
Corona clarifying that her term would expire on February 02, 2000, was in error. However,
she served as de facto  officer in good faith until February 02, 2000, and thus entitled to
receive her salary and other emoluments for actual service rendered.

14.18 Mathay Jr. v. Court of Appeals

FACTS: Mayor of Quezon City, Mr. Brigido R. Simon appointed private respondents to
positions in the Civil Service Unit (CSU) of the local government of Quezon City. Civil
Service Units were created pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 51. On February 23, 1990 the
Presidential Decree No. 51 was declared never published in the Official Gazette. The Civil
Service Commission issued Memorandum Circular No. 30, directing all Civil Service
Regional or Field Offices to recall, revoke and disapprove within one year from issuance of
the said Memorandum, all appointments in CSUs created pursuant to Presidential Decree No.
51 on the ground that the same never became law. Mayor Brigido R. Simon remedied the
situation by offering private respondents contractual appointments. On May 11, 1992,
petitioner Ismael A. Mathay, Jr. was elected Mayor of Quezon City. On July 1, 1992, Mayor
Mathay again renewed the contractual appointments of all private respondents effective July
1 to July 31, 1992. Upon their expiry, these appointments, however, were no longer renewed.
The non-renewal by Quezon City Mayor Ismael A. Mathay, Jr. of private respondents
appointments became the seed of discontent from which these three consolidated petitions
grew.The Commision on Civil Service ordered Mathay to take them sayingthat their
reappointment was automatic pursuant to the ordinance.
ISSUE: WON the ordinance is valid.
RULING/Main Point: NO. The ordinance is invalid. Ordering the absorption of the personnel
is an act of appointment. The city council has no power to appointing.
14.19 missing
14.20 Cabrera vs. NLRC
MAINPOINT: the Civil Service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and
agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with
original charters.

FACTS: Dismissed by the National Service Corporation, the petitioners complained to the
Ministry of Labor and Employment on September 17, 1980. After considering the position
papers of the parties, the Labor Arbiter ordered the petitioners' reinstatement without loss of
seniority rights and the payment to them of two years back wages and other benefits. 3 The
decision was appealed to and affirmed by the First Division of the NLRC on December 9,
1985, and in due time, the petitioners moved for the issuance of a writ of execution. This was
opposed by NASECO on the ground that it had not been furnished with a copy of the
decision, but the opposition was rejected and the petition was granted. Reconsideration of the
order having been denied, the NASECO appealed to the NLRC, which, through its Third
Division this time, declared itself without jurisdiction and dismissed the case on August 18,
1987. 4 Citing the NHA case, the public respondent held that the NASECO was not covered
by the Labor Code but by Civil Service rules and regulations, being a government-owned or
controlled corporation applying thereto the 1973 Constitution Article XII-B, Section 1(1)
providing that "the Civil Service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision and
instrumentality of the Government, including every government-owned or controlled
corporation."

ISSUE : Whether or not the Labor Code or the Civil Service rules and regulations shall apply
to the instant case.

RULING: On the premise that it is the 1987 Constitution that governs the instant case
because it is the Constitution in place at the time of decision thereof, the NLRC has
jurisdiction to accord relief to the parties. As an admitted subsidiary of the NIDC, in turn a
subsidiary of the PNB, the NASECO is a government-owned or controlled corporation
without original charter. Our finding is that the respondent NLRC erred in dismissing the
petitioners' complaint for lack of jurisdiction because the rule now is that only government-
owned or controlled corporations with original charters come under the Civil Service. The
NASECO having been organized under the Corporation Law and not by virtue of a special
legislative charter, its relations with its personnel are governed by the Labor Code and come
under the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Commission.

14.21 MWSS v. Hernandez, 143 SCRA 602

Facts: Several contractual employees of the MWSS filed a complaint before the NLRC for
willful failure to pay their wage differentials, allowances, and other monetary benefits. The
defense of MWSS was that it was a government owned or controlled corporation, and
therefore the NLRC had no jurisdiction over the case. Nevertheless, the Labor-Arbiter
rendered a decision against MWSS citing that only regular employees are NOT within the
NLRC jurisdiction. Since the petitioners were contractual employees, they are still within
NLRC jurisdiction. The Labor Arbiter also stated that the Civil Service Decree applies to
employees in government corporation in all matters, except monetary claims, which is a case
governed by the Labor Code. Since this is a money case, the NLRC still had jurisdiction.
MWSS filed an certiorari to the SC

Issue: Are employees of the MWSS covered by the Labor Code or the Civil Service laws?

Ruling: MWSS is a GOCC created under RA 6234. Employment in the MWSS is governed
NOT BY THE LABOR CODE, but by civil service law rules and regulations. Thus,
controversies arising from or connected with that employment are NOT RECOGNIZABLE
BY THE NLRC.
The contention of the L-A that only regular employees are not covered by NLRC, and that
non-regular or contractual employees are still covered by NLRC, is sophistical. There is no
legal or logical justification for such a distinction. Indeed it is ruled out by the fact that
positions in the civil service are classified into career and non-career. (not by regular or
contractual).
The other contention of the L-A that monetary claims are still governed by the NLRC/ Labor
Code, is even more patently illogical, and deserves no confutation. (confutation!?!)

MAIN POINT:
1. The MWSS is a GOCC and employment is governed by the CSL, not the Labor Code
2. Both regular and contractual employees are covered. There is no distinction.
3. NLRC has no jurisdiction over money claims of contractual employees of GOCCs. They
are still governed by the CSL, not the Labor Code.

14.22 Philippine Fisheries Development Authority v. NLRC and Odin Security Agency,
GR No. 94825, September 4, 1992

Facts: Philippine Fisheries Development Authority entered into a contract with Odin
Security Agency for the security services of its Iloilo Fishing Port which was renewable
unless terminated by either party. Wage order number 6 was enforced, increasing the wages
for security, janitorial and similar service contracts prompting the respondents asked for an
adjustment of the contract, which was ignored by the petitioners. Thus, Odin filed a
complaint for unpaid amounts of re-adjustment rate under Wage Order No. 6. LA dismissed
case claiming that the petitioner is a government owned corporation and should be under the
Civil Service Commission and not the NLRC. NLRC reversed. This court agrees because the
guards are not employees of the petitioner but are contractual employees of Odin working for
PFD therefore under the scope of the NLRC.

Issue: WON an indirect employer is bound by the rulings of the National Labor Relations
Commission

Held: Therefore, the petitioner and the private respondent jointly and severally liable to the
security guards for the unpaid wage differentials under Wage Order No. 6. As held in the
Eagle case, the security guards’ immediate recourse is with their direct employer, private
respondent Odin Security Agency. The solidary liability is, however, without prejudice to a
claim for reimbursement by the private respondent against the petitioner for only one-half of
the amount due considering that the private respondent is also at fault for entering into the
contract without taking into consideration the minimum wage rates under Wage Order No. 6.

Mainpoint: Under the labor Code, the liabilities for wages are joint and solidary with
contractor. The law on wages in the Labor code specifically provides that “employer’
includes any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to
employees. (Bernas)

G.R. No. 93396 September 30, 1991

PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ELIODORO B. GUINTO, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge, Br. LVIII, RTC of Angeles City and JOEL MONTOYA, respondents.

Facts: On May 3, 1988, the Philippine Amusement & Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR)
terminated the services of private respondent Joel Montoya as Table Supervisor at Casino
Filipino on the ground of loss of confidence. He was formally notified of this action on May
5, 1988.Alleging that he had been dismissed without due process of law, Montoya lodged
with the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City on June 7, 1988, a complaint for damages and
attorney's fees against PAGCOR. PAGCOR filed a motion to dismiss challenging the
jurisdiction of the court.
The movant contended that, being a money claim arising from the plaintiffs alleged illegal
dismissal, the complaint was cognizable only by the labor arbiter and the National Labor
Relations Commission. Montoya insisted, however, that PAGCOR was a government-
controlled corporation created under PD 1869 and therefore not covered by the Labor Code.
The order was affirmed on appeal in the decision of the respondent court dated February 16,
1990. 3 It was there held that the issue raised in the lower court did not involve a labor
dispute because the allegations of the plaintiff were "not grounded on the dismissal per se but
on the manner by which he was dismissed." Hence, it did not come under the jurisdiction of
the labor authorities but of the courts of justice.
In the present petition, the Solicitor General argues that the respondent court erred in
affirming the order of the trial court. He does not maintain the original stand of PAGCOR
that the complaint should be resolved by the labor arbiters. Instead, he now asserts that: (a)
PAGCOR is a part of the Civil Service and not a private corporation governed by the Labor
Code; (b) the complaint filed by Montoya is cognizable by the Merit System Protection
Board and not the Regional Trial Court; (c) the plaintiff has not exhausted administrative
remedies; and (d) in any case, the termination of the plaintiff s service was not unlawful.

Issue: WHETHER OR NOT THE PAGCOR IS UNDER THE CIVIL SERVICE

COMMISSION
Ruling: PAGCOR belongs to the Civil Service because it was created directly by PD 1869 on
July 11, 1983. Consequently, controversies concerning the relations of the employees with
the management of PAGCOR should come under the jurisdiction of the Merit System
Protection Board and the Civil Service Commission, conformably to the Administrative Code
of 1987.
Main point: PAGCOR belongs to the Civil Service because it was created directly by PD
1869 on July 11, 1983.

14.24 Agyao v. CSC, 639 SCRA 781

FACTS: Petitioner was re-appointed, following the expiration of his previous temporary
appointment, to PEZA Director II by the PEZA Director-General de Lima. The appointment
was submitted to the Civil Service Commission. The re-appointment was invalidated by the
CSC as petitioner lacked the prescribed Career Executive Service Office/Career Service
Executive Examination (CESO/CSEE) qualifications. The CSC ruled that the position of
PEZA Director II is above the Division Chief level, which falls properly under level 3, or
Career Executive Service. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, which sustained the
ruling of the CSC.

ISSUE: Whether or not PEZA Director II falls under level 3 or Career Executive Service, of
the Administrative Code.

HELD: Petition is impressed with merit. It has been held in a long line of Jurisprudence that
for a position to fall under Career Executive Service, the appointing authority must be the
President of the Philippines. The Administrative code makes this classification based on the
Constitutional powers granted to the President. As such, any deviation of interpretation would
not only be against the prevailing law (i.e. Administrative Code), but also be unconstitutional.
The position of PEZA Director II is appointed by the PEZA Director-General, not by the
President of the Philippines. Hence, the CESO/CSEE requirements are not needed by the
appointee.

14.25 De Los Santos vs. Mallare

87 PHIL 289

Facts: Eduardo De Los Santos was appointed City Engineer of Baguio City on July 16, 1946
by the president and was confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. On June 1, 1950,
Gil R. Mallare was extended an ad interim appointment by the president to the same position,
after which, on June 3, the undersecretary of the Department of Public Works and
Communications directed Santos to report to the Bureau of Public Works for another
assignment. Santos refused to vacate the office; the city mayor and the other officials named
as Mallare's co-defendants ignored the petitioner and paid Mallare the salary corresponding
to the position.

Issue: WON the president may remove a city engineer, a position that is neither confidential,
policy determining, nor technical at pleasure.

Ruling: No. It is the nature and not just the label of the position which makes it non-
competitive. More than ordinary confidence is reposed in the occupant of a position that is
primarily confidential; not only confidence in the aptitude of the appointee for the duties of
the office but primarily close intimacy which insures freedom of intercourse without
embarrassment or freedom from misgivings or betrayals of personal trust on confidential
matters of the state. A position is highly technical if the occupant is required to possess a
technical skill or training in the supreme or superior degree.

15.1 Santiago Jr. v. CSC, GR No. 81467, October 27, 1989

FACTS: CSC revoked the promotional appointment of petitioner fromCollector of Customs I
to Collector of Customs III and directing instead the appointment of private respondent to
the same position. When petitioner was promoted, respondent filed a protest with the
MSPB.MSPB upheld petitioner’s promotional appointment on the grounds,
amongothers, that: (1) the next-in-rank rule is no longer mandatory; (2) theprotestee is
competent and qualified for the position and such fact was not questioned by the protestant;
and (3) existing law and jurisprudence give wide latitude of discretion to the appointing
authority provided there is no clear showing of grave abuse of discretion or fraud.
Respondent appealed to the Board then overturned its earlier decision. The Commission ruled
that although both SANTIAGO and JOSE are qualified for the position of Customs Collector
III, JOSE has far better qualifications in terms of educational attainment,
civil service eligibilities, relevant seminars
and training courses taken, and holding as he does by permanent appointment a position
which is higher in rank and salary range.

ISSUE: Whether the revocation of petitioner’s appointment was valid.

HELD: No. There is "no mandatory nor peremptory requirement in the

(CivilService Law) that persons next-in-rank are entitled to preference in appointment. What
it does provide is that they would be among the first to be considered for the vacancy, if
qualified, and if the vacancy is not filled by
promotion, the same shall be filled by transfer or other modes of appointment." One who is
next-in-rank is entitled to preferential consideration for promotion to the higher vacancy but
it does not necessarily follow that he and no one else can be appointed. The rule neither
grants a vested right to the holder nor imposes a ministerial duty on the appointing authority
to promote such person to the next higher position. The power to appoint is a matter of
discretion. The appointing power has a wide latitude of choice as to who is best qualified for
the position. To apply the next-in rank rule peremptorily would impose a rigid formula on the
appointing power contrary to the policy of the law that among those qualified and eligible,
the appointing authority is granted discretion and prerogative of choice of the one he deems
fit for appointment

15.2 Central Bank v. CSC

FACTS: Petitioners Dr. Angela 0. Jordan and Central Bank of the Philippines ,petitioned for
certiorari. They are questioning the Civil Service Commission resolutions directed the
immediate revocation of the appointment of Dr. Angela P. Jordan to the position of Assistant
Bank Physician of the Central Bank of the Philippines and the issuance of an appointment in
favor of herein private respondent, Dr. Basilio E. Borja to the said position.

ISSUE: Whether Civil Service Commission may disapprove appointment and require the
appointment oa another person whom it believes is more qualified for the position?

RULING: No. Unser Presidential Decree No. 807, 13 otherwise known as the Civil Service
Decree, the Commission is not authorized to curtail the discretion of the appointing official
on the nature or kind of appointment to be extended.The authority of the Commission is
limited to approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of the requirements of the law
governing the Civil Service.

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION V. SALAS

TOPIC: APPOINTMENT TO CIVIL SERVICE

DOCTRINE: The nature of the position, as may be ascertained by the court in case of
conflict, which finally determines whether a position is primarily confidential, policy-
determining or highly technical.

FACTS: Respondent Salas was appointed by PAGCOR Chairman as Internal Security Staff
[ISS] member and assigned to the casino at Manila Pavilion Hotel. His employment was
terminated for loss of confidence after a covert investigation of the Intelligence division of
PAGCOR. Salas submitted a letter of appeal to the Chairman and the Board of Directors of
PAGCOR requesting for reinvestigation since he was not given an opportunity to be heard. It
was DENIED. The appeal with the Merit Systems Protection Board was denied on the ground
that as a confidential employee, respondent was not dismissed from service but his term of
office expired. CSC affirmed the decision of MSPB. CA ruled that Salas is not a confidential
employee; hence he may not be dismissed on the ground of loss of confidence.
a. Sec. 16 of PD 1869 has been superseded and repealed by Section 2(1), Article
IX-B of the Constitution.

ISSUE/S: WON respondent Salas is a confidential employee

RULING: NOT CONFIDENTIAL.

There are 2 instances when a position may be considered primarily confidential: When the
President, upon CSC recommendation, declares a position to be such When the position, by
its nature, is primary confidential. In other words, the classification made by the executive,
while to be accorded the weight it deserves, is not definitively determinative of the nature of
the position.

Since the enactment of the Civil Service Law of 1959, it is the nature of the position which
Thus, it is apparent that the purpose of declaring a position to be policy determining,
primarily confidential, or highly technical, is to EXEMPT THESE CATEGORIES from
COMPETITIVE EXAM as a means for determining fitness and merit. These positions are
still covered by security of tenure, although they are considered NON-COMPETITIVE only
in the sense that the appointees do NOT HAVE TO UNDERGO COMPETITIVE EXAM for
purposes of determining merit and fitness.

Thus, the contention that Pagcor employees are declared confidential appointees by operation
of law must be rejected.

15.4 CSC v. Javier, 546 SCRA 485

FACTS: A Petition for Review on Certiorari invalidating the appointment of respondent Nita
Javier, as Corporate Secretary of GSIS. Respondent was employed in the GSIS since 1960,
and in 2001 in her 64th Birthday she opted for early retirement and received the
corresponding monetary benefits. On 2002, GSIS President with the approval of the Board
of Trustees, reappointed respondent as Corporate Secretary, the same position she left and
retired from barely a year earlier. Her appointment was classified as "confidential in nature
and the tenure of office is at the pleasure of the Board." Petitioner alleges that the position
of Corporate Secretary is a permanent (career) position, and not primarily confidential (non-
career); thus, it was wrong to appoint respondent to this position since she no longer
complies with eligibility requirements for a permanent career status. More importantly, as
respondent by then has reached compulsory retirement at age 65, respondent was no
longer qualified for a permanent career position.

Issue: Whether or not the appointment of the respondent as Corporate Secretary of GSIS
was “primarily confidential” in nature.

Held: Yes. In determining whether a position is primarily confidential or otherwise, the

nature of its functions, duties and responsibilities must be looked into, and not just its
formal classification. Examining the functions, duties and responsibilities of the GSIS
Corporate Secretary, indeed, such a position is primarily confidential in nature. The court
denied the petition, and affirm with CA ruling.

15.5 Grino v. CSC, 194 SCRA 458

Facts:
Sixto Demaisip was the provincial attorney of Iloilo. He resigned and recommended
Arandela as his replacement. This was approved by the governor. Grino was elected as the
new governor. When he took over, he terminated Arandela, and re-appointed Demaisip as
provincial attorney. Apparently, there was loss of trust and confidence. Also terminated
were other subordinates of the provincial attorney. Arandela appealed the action taken by
Governor Grino to the Merit Systems Protection Board of the CSC. The MSPB declared the termination
illegal, and ordered they Arandela be immediately restored to their positions, with back
wages. This was affirmed by the CSC. Gov. Grino now filed a petition for review assailing the
decision of the MSPB and CSC. He relied on the case of Cadiente, which ruled that a city
legal officer was a primarily confidential position. He argued that since a provincial atty and
a city legal officer has similar functions, then a provincial atty is also a primarily confidential
position, one requiring utmost confidence on the part of the mayor to be extended to said
officer. Arandela on the other hand contends that the CSC has already classified the position
of Provincial Attorney as a career position, and that the same is permanent, and can be removed only
for a cause.

Issue: Whether or not the position of a provincial attorney and those of his legal
subordinates are primarily confidential in nature so that the services of those holding the
said items can be terminated upon loss of confidence.

Ruling: Yes. The fact that the position of Arandela as provincial attorney has already been
classified as under career service, and certified as permanent by the CSC cannot conceal or
alter its highly confidential nature. Since in the Cadiente case the city legal officer was
declared by this Court to be primarily confidential, the Court must also hold that the
position of provincial attorney is also primarily confidential. To rule otherwise would be
tantamount to classifying 2positions with the same nature and functions in to incompatible
categories. Arandela’s termination valid. The tenure of an official holding a primarily
confidential position ends upon loss of confidence. He was not dismissed or removed from
office, his term merely expired.
There is no need to extend the professional relationship to the legal staff and
subordinates which assist the confidential employer. Since the positions occupied by
these subordinates are REMOTE from that of the appointing authority, the element of
trust between them is no longer predominant. The importance of these subordinates now
lies in the contribution of their legal skills to facilitate the work of the confidential
employee.

Main point: The position of a provincial attorney is primarily confidential, where the
position of city legal officer was held to be primarily confidential. However, the positions of
the legal staff are not.

15.6 Briones vs Osmena, 104 Phil 588

Facts: Petitioner Concepcion G. Briones is a first grade civil service eligible. On March 4,
1937, she was appointed Clerk-Stenographer in the Office of the City Treasurer of Cebu and
on August 5, 1937, she was transferred to the Office of the City Mayor. Petitioner Faustino
O. Rosagaran, on the other hand, is a second grade civil service eligible. He was employed in
the Office of the City Mayor of Cebu since July, 1940, and promoted to Administrative
Officer.
Briones and Rosagaran were employees in the Office of the City Mayor since 1937 and 1940,
respectively, In 1956, the City created 35 new positions and abolished 32, of which the
positions of Briones and Rosagaran were included. Consequently, the two were terminated.

Issue: Whether the termination of petitioners were valid.

Ruling:   SC held that the termination was not valid. While abolition does not imply removal
of the incumbent, this rule is true only where the abolition is made in good faith. In other
words, the right to abolish cannot be used to discharge employees in violation of the Civil
Service law nor can it be exercised for personal or political reasons.

Main point: While abolition of the office does not imply removal of the incumbent, the rule is
true only where the abolition is made in good faith; the right to abolish can not be used to
cover the discharge of employees in violation of the civil service law nor can it be exercised
for personal or political reasons.

Abakada Group Party List v. Purisima (BOCEA v TEVES)

562 SCRA 251

FACTS: Former President Arroyo signed into law R.A. No. 9335 to optimize the revenue-
generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau
of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to
exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the
creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation
Board (Board). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six
months of service, regardless of employment status. BUREAU OF CUSTOMS
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (BOCEA) argued that its members and other BOC
employees are in great danger of losing their jobs should they fail to meet the required quota
provided under the law, in clear violation of their constitutional right to security of tenure,
and at their and their respective families prejudice.

ISSUES: Whether R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR violate the rights of BOCEA’s members to
security of tenure.

RULING: NO way had it violated the security of tenure of officials and employees of the
BIR and the BOC. In this case it lays down a reasonable measure for removal (when the
revenue collection falls short of the target by at least 7.5%) with due consideration of all
relevant factors affecting the level of collection. This standard is analogous to inefficiency
and incompetence in the performance of official duties, a ground for disciplinary action under
civil service laws. The action for removal is also subject to civil service laws, rules and
regulations and compliance with substantive and procedural dueprocess.

MAIN POINT: The guarantee of security of tenure only means that an employee cannot be
dismissed from the service for causes other than those provided by law and only after due
process is accorded the employee.