EVIDENCE PROJECT REPORT

ON
ESTOPPEL IN LAW OF EVIDENCE

Submitted To : Dr. Sabina Submitted By: Siddhanth Arora

Roll no. : 204/17
Sem : 7th
Class: Ba LLb
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to express my special thanks of gratitude to my guide Dr. Sabina

Salim , who gave me this golden opportunity to do this project on the topic on
‘DOCTRINE OF LAW OF ESTOPPEL IN LAW OF EVIDENCE’. This helped
me increase my knowledge.

Secondly, I would also like to thank my parents and friends who helped me a lot in
finalising and finishing this project within the limited Kme frame. It is rightly said
that if the teacher is a light then the family is the pathway to that light
1. INTRODUCTION

ESTOPPEL PRINCIPLE

Estoppel may be defined as disability whereby a party is precluded from

alleging or proving in legal proceedings, that a fact is otherwise than it has
been made to appear by the matter giving rise to that disability.

The term "Estoppel," comes from an old-French word- "Estoupail" (or

variation), which means "stopper plug", referring to placing a brake on the
imbalance of the situation. The rationale behind estoppel is to prevent
injustice owing to fraud or inconsistency.

Estoppel is based on the maxim, allegans contraria non est audiendus (a

person alleging contradictory facts (should not be heard) and is that kind of
proesumptio juris et de jure, where the fact presumed is taken to be true not
as against all the world, but as against a particular party, and that only by
reason of some act done, it is in truth a kind of argumentum ad hominern.
Hence it appears that estoppels' must not be understood as synonymous with
"conclusive evidences”—the former being conclusions drawn by law against
parties from particular facts, while by the latter is meant some piece or mass
of evidence, sufficiently strong to generate conviction in the mind of a
tribunal, or rendered conclusive on a party, either by common or statute law.

In its simplest sense, Doctrine of Estoppel, precludes a person from denying

or to negate anything to the contrary of that which has been constituted as
truth, either by his own actions, by his deeds or by his representations or by
the acts of judicial or legislative officers. Estoppel is often described as a
rule of evidence as indeed it may be so described. But the whole concept is
more carefully viewed as a rule of substantive law.
The doctrine of promissory estoppel is an equitable doctrine. Like all
equitable remedies, it is discretionary, in contrast to the common law
absolute right like right to damages for breach of contract.The true principle
of promissory estoppel is where one party has by his words or conduct made
to the other a clear and unequivocal promise which is intended to create
legal relations or effect a legal relationship to arise in the future, knowing or
intending that it would be acted upon by the other party to whom the
promise is made and it is in fact so acted upon by the other party, the
promise would be binding on the party making it and he would not be
entitled to go back upon it. It is not necessary, in order to attract the
applicability of the doctrine of promissory estoppel that the promisee acting
in reliance of the promise, should suffer any detriment. The only thing
necessary is that the promisee should have altered his position in reliance of
the promise.

To invoke the doctrine of estoppels, there are three conditions which must be
satisfied;

1. Representation by a person to another

2. The other should have acted upon the said representation and

3. Such action should have been detrimental to the interests of the person to
whom the representation has been made.
 However in the case, "Gyarsi Bai vs. Dhansukh Lal,"1 it was observed by the
Hon'ble Apex Court that even if the first two conditions are fulfilled, but the
third is not, then there is no scope to invoke the doctrine of estoppel.

2. DEVELOPMENT OF PRINCIPLE OF ESTOPPEL

The Development of Estoppel – U. K. In English law, a promise which has

been made without consideration is generally not enforceable. It is known as
a bare promise. The doctrine of promissory estoppel was first developed in
Hughes v. Metropolitan Railway Co.

FACTS

Thomas Hughes was the owner of the property which was leased to the
Railway Company. Under the lease agreement, Hughes was entitled to
compel the tenant to repair the building within six months of notice. The
Notice was served to leasee on 22 October 1874, from which the tenants had
until 22 April to make those repairs. On 28 November, the tenant had sent an
offer letter to owner for purchasing the same property. Negotiations began

1 AIR 1965 SC 1055 3 (1876-77) LR 2 App Cas 439

and continued until 30 December, but there was no settlement. The time of 6
months had elapsed; the owner sued the tenants for the breach of contract
and also tried to evict the tenant.

The House of Lords ruled that with the initiation of the negotiations there
was an implied promise by the landlord not to enforce their strict legal rights
with respect to the time limit on the repairs and the tenant acted on this
promise to their detriment, thus allowing the tenants more time to repair.
Hence, the owner is estopped from claiming to the contrary.

However, the doctrine of estoppel had lost its value for some time after this
case and it was resurrected by Lord Denning in the case "Central London
Property Trust Ltd v High Trees House Ltd”

FACTS-

In 1937, High Trees House Ltd leased a block of flats in Clapham, London,
for a rate £2500/year from Central London Property Trust Ltd. Due to the
prevailing conditions during the beginning of the World War II occupancy
rates were drastically lower than normal. In January 1940, to ameliorate the
situation the parties made an agreement in writing to reduce rent by half.
However, neither party stipulated the period for which this reduced rental
was to apply. Over the next five years, High Trees paid the reduced rate
while the flats began to fill, and by 1945, the flats were back at full
occupancy. Central London sued for payment of the full rental costs from
June 1945 onwards.

Based on previous judgments as Hughes v Metropolitan Railway Co,

Denning J held that the full rent was payable from the time that the flats
became fully occupied in mid-1945. However, he continued in an obiter
statement that if Central London had tried to claim for the full rent from
1940 onwards, they would not have been able to. This was reasoned on the
basis that if a party leads another party to believe that he will not enforce his
 strict legal rights, then the Courts will prevent him from doing so at a later
stage. This obiter remark was not actually a binding precedent, yet it
essentially created the doctrine of promissory estoppels .

In the formative period the doctrine of promissory estoppel could not be

invoked by the promisee unless he had suffered 'detriment' or 'prejudice'. All
that is required is that the party asserting the estoppel must have acted upon
the assurance given by him. The alteration of position by the party Is the
only indispensable requirement of the doctrine.

3. THE INDIAN DEVELOPMENT OF ESTOPPEL

In context of India also, this concept of Estoppel was prevalent from the
origin of its civilization. Indian civilization projects the concept of truth and
righteousness (Sathyam and Dharma) as the basic virtue in all thoughts and
acts.

Chapter VIII of the INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT deals with the ESTOPPEL

Section 115 - "When one person has, by his declaration, act or omission, intentionally
caused or permitted another person to believe a thing to be true and to act upon such
belief, neither he nor his representative shall be allowed, in any suit or proceeding
between himself and such person or his representative, to deny the truth of that thing".

The illustration to this section reads as follows: A intentionally and falsely

leads B to believe that certain land belongs to A and thereby induced B to
buy and pay for it. The land afterward becomes the property of A and A
seeks to set aside the sale on the ground that at the time of the sale, he had
no title. He must not be allowed to prove his want of title. Thus as a rule of
evidence the same is codified in India.
 The doctrine embodied under this section is not a rule of equity, but is a rule
of evidence formulated and applied in courts of law2

The rule is invoked and applied even in cases where there is no pre-existing
legal relationship between the parties to a cause either in the form of a
contract or otherwise. The principle is applied even to a mere promise to
perform an act in future even if the promise is not supported with
consideration. All that is required to be established is that the promise made
was intended to be acted upon and on that belief someone did act and altered
his position.

The History of doctrine of promissory estoppel in India can be traced to the case
of In the case of R.S. Madanappa and ors. v.. Chandramma and Anr3, the court
made the following observation with regards to the principle of estoppel
concerning Section 115 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872-“We doubt whether the
court while determining whether the conduct of a particular party amounts to an
estoppel, could travel beyond the provisions of Section 115 of the Evidence
Act.”The court denied to accept the contention that the law of estoppel by
representation is not confined to the provisions of Section 115 of the Evidence Act.

Then in the landmark case of “Ganges Mfg Co. v. Sourajmu”l4 whereby the
Calcutta High Court had held that the doctrine of estoppel was not only limited to
the law of evidence, but that a person may be estopped from doing acts or relying
on particular arguments or contentions.

2 M. MORIR, TEXTBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 373 (2011)

3 1965 AIR 1812

4 (1880) ILR 5 Cal 669

 NO ESTOPPEL AGAINST STATUTE OR LAW-

The doctrine of estoppel does not apply to statutes. In other words, a person
who makes a statement as to the existence of the provisions of a statute is
not estopped, subsequently, from contending that the statutory provision is
different from what he has previously stated. A person may not represent the
true status of a statute or law, but the other person who relies on such a
representation is at liberty to find out the position of law on the matter and as
the maxim says, ignorance of law is no excuse. So a person can not take
recourse to the defence of estoppel to plead that a false representation has
been made regarding the provisions of a statute or law. The principles of
estoppel can not override the provisions of a statute. Where a statute imposes
a duty by positive action, estoppel can not prevent it. The doctrine cannot
also be invoked to prevent the legislative and executive organs of the
Government from performing their duties.

In Jit Ram Shiv Kumar v. State of Haryana5, a municipality granted

exemption from octroi for developing a mandi, but subsequently is revoked
the exemption. Later it again granted the exemption in keeping with the
terms of the original sale of plots, but levied taxes again. Even so, a claim of
estoppel against its legislative power was not allowed.

So is the case with the tax laws. If the law requires that a certain tax be
collected, it cannot be given up, and any assurances by the Government that
the taxes would not be collected would not bind the Government, when it
chooses to collect the taxes. Thus it was held that when there was a clear and
unambiguous provision of law that entitles the plaintiff to a relief, no
question of estoppel arises.

5 AIR 1980 SC 1285

 The following conditions have been laid down as necessary to invoke the
principle of 'No estoppel against a statute':

• The parties must bilaterally agree to contract irrespective of statutory

provisions of the applicable Act.

• The agreement entered into by the parties must be expressly prohibited by

the Act.

• The provision of law must be made for public interest and not pertain to a
particular class of persons.

• The agreement of the parties should not have been merged into an order of
the court which by the conduct of the parties had been dissuaded from
performing its statutory obligations.

In Jatindra Prasad Das Vs. State of Orissa & others6, Orissa High Court,
held that:

"There can be no estoppel against statutes and the Statutory Provisions and
therefore, the said statutory provisions cannot be ignored on the grounds of
an earlier administrative decision or precedent."

State of Bihar and others v. Project Uchcha Vidya, Sikshak Sangh and
others7, in which it was laid that "We do not find any merit in the contention

6 MANU/OR/0225/2011

7 MANU/SC/0054/2006 : (2006) 2 SCC 545

 raised by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents that the
principle of equitable estoppel would apply against the State of Bihar. It is
now well known, the rule of estoppels has no application where contention
as regards a constitutional provision or a statute is raised."

Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation (1985.07.10) (Right to Life

and Livelihood for Homeless8), that there can be no estoppels against the
constitution of India or against the fundamental rights.

4. NATURE OF ESTOPPEL IN INDIA

The nature of Estoppel in India has three aspects-

(A) As a Rule of Evidence

There is high authority for the view that estoppel is only a rule of evidence.
831 Estoppel has some similarity to an irrefutable presumption of law, and
has been so treated for one of its effects is to prevent the rebuttal of facts
alleged by the other party. But an estoppel has two characteristics of
evidence to distinguish it from such a presumption which is a rule of
substantive law. An estoppel may be waived by the party who would
otherwise benefit by it; and frequently operates only between the parties to
an action

8 986 AIR 180, 1985 SCR Supl. (2) 51

 (B) As a Matter of Pleading

As per the jurist Stephen fitzjames, estoppels belong rather to the law of
pleading than to that of evidence.Subject to minor exceptions, a party who
proposes to rely on an estoppel must raise this point and state the relevant
facts in his pleading. This requirement involves an exception to the rule that
evidence should not be pleaded, but it does not show that estoppel is not a
rule of evidence.9 Failure to plead an estoppel may amount to a waiver, and

Thus may result in making admissible facts which would otherwise be

excluded.

(C) As Substantive Law

The doctrine of estoppel belongs rather to substantive than to adjective

law.Yet it has been shown that estoppels are not on the same footing as the
rules of Substantive law embodied in irrefutable presumptions, and estoppels
will not generally found a cause of action at common law, for they involve
no claim. However, it is said thatthey may support claims to equitable relief
and they may amount to a defense when they prevent a plaintiff

proving some facts, essential to his case. Accordingly, estoppels have some
characteristics of substantive law

5. NO ESTOPPEL IN CRIMINAL CASES

Estoppel is a rule of civil actions. It has no application to criminal

proceedings, though in such proceedings matters which in civil actions

9 STEPHEN JAMES FITZJAMES, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 200 (2008)

 create an estoppel are usually so cogent that it would be almost useless to
setup a different story.10

A petition was filed for quashing the proceedings under sections 498A and
304 of IPC and under the Dowry Prohibition Act because of an agreement
between the parties. The petition was dismissed as the party to theagreement
was not bound by an unlawful compromise and hence there was no question
of estoppel either.11

Estoppel should be pleaded: Onus of proving the Plea –

The rule of estoppel depends for its application on certain of fact.12 It should,
therefore, be specifically, pleaded unless there is no opportunity of doing so,
e.g., in cases where there are no pleadings, in which case the party relying
on estoppel must raise it by an objection in other form at the earliest possible
stage of the proceeding. Where estoppel is not specifically pleaded, a party
will not permitted to rely it at a subsequent stage.

A person is entitled to plead estoppel in his own individual character and not
as a representative of his assignees.13

10 E. v. Maha Ram, 19 Cr LJ 615

11 Madhumiri surya Narayan v. state, 2003 Cr LJ NOC 75 (Kant)

12 Sheo Tahal Ram v. Bmaek Shukul, 53 A 747: 1931 A 689 (693)

13 C.K. Mehta v. Patel Narandas Haribhai, AIR 1983 (9) SC 119

 6. ESTOPPEL AND RES JUDICATA

Sometimes, the doctrine of "res judicata" is considered as a branch of law of

estoppel. There is distinction between doctrine of "res judicata" principle of
'issue estoppel' and 'rule estoppel' under section 115 Of the Evidence Act.
Doctrine Of res judicata creates legal embargo on hands of the court to a
judicial determination of deciding the same question over again even though
earlier determination may be demonstratedly erroneous. When the
proceedings between the same parties have attained finality, they are bound
by the judgment and cannot be permitted to re-agitate the same lis. The
determination of the issue in the same set of facts in the previous lis

between the parties would give rise to an issue of estoppel. It operates in any
subsequent proceedings between the same parties.

The doctrine of res judicata is based on rule of procedure. However, doctrine

of mere estoppel under section 115 of the Evidence Act, there is embargo on
the party to plead or prove a particular facts whereas in case of res

judicata, the prohibition is operative against the court to deal with the same
kind of issue again and again.

7. ESTOPPEL AND ADMISSION

Though in both admissions and estoppels there are statements, an admission

does not ripen into an estoppel unless the person to whom the representation
is made believes it and acts upon such belief, whereas in the case of mere
admission evidence can be given to show that the admission was wrongly
made.14

Admission made in earlier suit as to the nature of property if proved valid in

subsequent proceedings are binding

14 5 Badri v. Gulbi, AIR 1962 Pat 281

 as estoppels.15

8. GENERAL CONDITIONS OF ESTOPPEL

A. Estoppels must be reciprocal or mutual

This statement seems to mean that an estoppel must bind both parties to the
litigation.

B. Estoppels cannot circumvent the Law.

Hence the contractual incapacity of a minor cannot be evaded by any

estoppel against asserting his Infancy, even though he has obtained a loan by
a false representation that he was an adult. And a tenant, who fails to raise a
defense that his rent is in excess Of the standard rent permitted by statute, is
not estopped from making a

subsequent application to determine the lawful rent.

C. Estoppels must be certain

The statement that an estoppel must be clear, precise or unambiguous

primarily refers to the representation on which an estoppel by conduct may
be founded.

D. Conflicting Estoppels Cancel each Other

The classical example is Prof. Coke's statement that "estoppel against

estoppel both put the matter at large”.

E.Fulfilling Doctrine of Estoppel – The doctrine of promissory estoppel is

an equitable doctrine and the petitioners cannot ask the Court to apply the

15 Dara Singh v. Jasmir Singh, 2003 (2) RCR (Civil) 361 (P&H).
 same to compel something which is inequitable, one who seeks equity must
do equity. In our society larger public must get precedence over individual
interest or interest of comparatively smaller section of society.

9.ESTOPPEL BY ITSELF DOES NOT CREATE A CAUSE OF

ACTION OR TITLE-

Estoppel, except as a bar to testimony, has no operation or efficacy

whatsoever. Emphatically it is not a cause of action in itself; nor does it
create one, though the application of this, as of any other rule of evidence in
the course of litigation, may result in a total or partial establishment or
disestablishment of the case made by one or other of the parties.

Estoppel merely operates as a bar to the suit; it does not extinguish the
right.16

Estoppel deals with questions of fact and not question of right. In other
words, there is no general rule of law that a man is estopped from asserting a
right which he has said that he will not Estoppel by representation is one of
those rules of evidence which are personal to the parties, and does not
belong to that class of rules which relate to titles or rights against the world.
As between the parties to the representation, therefore, rule of estoppel may
affect or create substantive rights. It may enable a party as against another
party to claim a right of property which in fact he does not possess17, and in
this sense it may more correctly be viewed as a substantive rule of law. Third
parties are not affected by the rule at all.

Waiver, as distinguished from estoppel, is contractual. It is an agreement to

release or not to assert a right, and May, therefore, constitute a cause of
action.

16 Suraj, Prasad v. Oudh Behari, 193 IA 216: 131 IC 681

17 MercanKle Bank of India Ltd. v. Central Bank of India Ltd., 1938 PC 52; Wahidan v. Nasir Khan, 1930 A 434 (2)
436: 124 IC 183
10.Application of Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel to
Government
The doctrine of promissory estoppel has also been applied against the
Government and the defence based on executive necessity has been
categorically negatived. The Government is not exempted from liability to
carry out the representation made by it to its future conduct and it cannot on
some undefined and undisclosed grounds of necessity or expediency fail to
carry out the promise made, solemnly by it. The Supreme Court has refused
to make any distinction between a private individual and public body so far
as the doctrine of promissory estoppel is concerned. But if the promise is on
behalf of the Government is unconstitutional, against any statute or against
public policy the question of promissory estoppel against Government does
not apply. Thus, the Government through its officers is bound by the
doctrine and cannot invoke any defence for their inaction, unless backed by
statutory authority. Statute imposes a public duty while the duties imposed
by a promise are owed by the Government not to the public but to private
individuals. Thus estoppel does not apply to contravention of a statute but
applies to the breach of a promise by the Government.

Where the Government makes a promise knowing or intending that it would

be acted upon by the promisee and, in fact, the promisee acting in reliance of
it, alters his position, the Government will be held bound by the promise and
the promise would be enforceable against the Government at the instance of
the promisee, notwithstanding that there is no consideration for the promise
and the promise is not recorded in the form of a formal contract as required
by Article 299 of the Constitution of India.

It is elementary in a republic, governed by a rule of law, no one howsoever

high or low, is above the law. Everyone is subjected to the law as fully and
completely as any other and the Government is no exception. It is indeed the
pride of constitutional democracy and the rule of law that the Government
stands on the same footing as a private individual so far as obligation under
the law is concerned. The Government cannot claim immunity from the
applicability of the rule of promissory estoppel and repudiate a promise
made by it on the ground that such promise may fetter its future executive
action.

Since the doctrine of promissory estoppel is an equitable doctrine it must

yield when the equity so requires. If it can be shown by the Government that
having regard to the facts as they have subsequently transpired, it would be
inequitable to the Government to abide by the promise made by it, the court
would not raise an equity in favor of the promise and enforce the it against
the Government. The doctrine of promissory estoppel will be displaced is
such a case because equity would not require the Government to be bound
by the promise. When the Government is able to show that due to the facts
which have transpired subsequent to the promise being made, public interest
would be prejudiced if the Government were required to carry out the
promise made, the court would have to balance the public interest in the
Government carrying out the promise made to a citizen which has induced
the citizen to alter his position to his prejudice and the public interest likely
to suffer if the Government were to carry out the promise, and determine
which way the equity lies.

The doctrine of estoppel cannot be invoked for preventing the Government

from acting in discharge of its duties under the law. The doctrine of cannot
be applied in teeth of an obligation or liability imposed by the law. It cannot
be used to compel the Government or even a private party to do an act
prohibited by law. There can be no promissory estoppel against the exercise
of legislative power. The legislature can never be precluded from exercising
its legislative functions by resort to the doctrine of promissory estoppel.

An insight into judicial behaviour further indicates that estoppel cannot be

applied against the Government if it jeopardizes the constitutional powers of
 Government. In the case of C. Sankaranarayanan v. State of Kerala,18 the
court rejected the contention of estoppel and held that the power conferred
by the Constitution cannot be curtailed by any agreement.

The court also did not allow the plea of estoppel against the Government if it
had the effect of repealing any provision of the Constitution. In Mulamchand
v. State of Madhya Pradesh,19 the Supreme Court did not apply estoppel
against the Government in cases of contracts not entered into in accordance
with the form prescribed in Article 299 of the Constitution. The court held
that if the estoppel is allowed it would mean the repeal of an important
constitutional provision, intended for the protection of the general public.

The case of Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills v. State of U.P20. is a trendsetter

regarding the application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel against the
Government. In this case the Chief Secretary of the Government gave a
categorical assurance that total exemption from sales tax would be given for
three years to all new industrial units in order them to establish themselves
firmly. Acting on this assurance the appellant sugar mills set up a
hydrogenation plant by raising a huge loan. Subsequently, the Government
changed its policy and announced that sales tax exemption will be given at
varying rates over three years. The appellant contended that they set up the
plant and raised huge loans only due to the assurance given by the
Government. The Supreme Court held that the Government was bound by its

18 1971 AIR 1997

19 1968 AIR 1218

20 1979 AIR 621

 promise and was liable to exempt the appellants from sales tax for a period
of three years commencing from the date of production.

In State of Rajasthan v. Mahavir Oil Mills,21 a new industry was set up on

the basis of an incentive scheme from the Government wherein it promised
some benefits. The Supreme Court held that the State Government was
bound by its promise held out in such situation. However, it does not
preclude the State Government from withdrawing the scheme prospectively.
It could withdraw the scheme even during its continuance, if public interest
so requires. Even if the party has altered his position, if due to supervening
circumstances public interest requires the withdrawal of benefits, the
benefits can be withdrawn or modified. The supervening public interest
would prevail over promissory estoppel.

Further, in Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. v. Ulhasnagar

Municipality22, the municipality agreed to exempt certain existent industrial
concerns in the area from octroi duty for a period of seven years. However,
later on it sought to impose duty. This was challenged and the Supreme
Court, while remanding the case to the High Court, held that where the
private party had acted upon the representation of a public authority, it could
be enforced against the authority on the grounds of equity in appropriate
cases even though the representation did not result in a contract owing to the
lack of proper form.

21 1999 115 STC 25 SC

22 1971 AIR 1021

 However, the case of Jit Ram Shiv Kumar v. State of Haryana23, cast a
shadow on the Motilal case where it was held that the doctrine of promissory
estoppel is not available against the exercise of executive functions of the
State.

The Supreme Court in Union of India v. Godfrey Phillips India Ltd.24 soon
removed this doubt. The court held that the law laid down in Motilal case
represents the correct law on promissory estoppel.

There is another landmark judgment given by the Supreme Court in Express

Newspaper Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India,25 wherein the doctrine was used to
preclude the Government from quashing the action of a minister for approval
of a lease as it was within the scope of his authority to grant such
permission. Thus the fraud on power was checked. But if there is
misrepresentation by the party itself to obtain the promise then the State is
not bound by the promissory estoppel as held in Central Airmen Selection
Board v. Surender Kumar.26 The court said that a person, who has himself
misled the authority by making a fake statement, couldn't invoke this
principle, if his misrepresentation misled the authority into taking a decision,
which on discovery of the misinterpretation is sought to be cancelled.

Today we are living in a world where a promise of Government to any

citizen or non citizen matters a lot especially if it is done in a contractual or
business transaction. When a person relies on the Government's promise and
invests hard earned money and the Government afterwards does not abide by
its promise then it creates a position where the person's investment is in
danger and he becomes helpless and paralyzed. The judiciary in India has
played a very significant role in making the State responsible and
accountable and made it abide by its promise.

23 1980 AIR 1285

24 1986 AIR 806

25 1986 AIR 872

26 2003 SCC 152

 11.Estoppel of tenant; and of licensee of person in possession:
Section 116 of Indian Evidence Act deal with it.
No tenant of immovable property or person claiming through such tenant,
shall, during the continuance of the tenancy, be permitted to deny that the
landlord of such tenant had, at the beginning of the tenancy, a title to such
immovable property; and no person who came upon any immovable
property by the license of the person in possession thereof, shall be
permitted to deny that such person had a title to such possession at the time
when such license was given.

The doctrine is generally recognized that a tenant is estopped, while the

tenancy continues, to deny the title of his landlord.27

This section deals with estoppel arising out of relationship between

(i) a tenant and landlord;

(ii) (ii) between licensee and licensor.

The basic principle of Section 116 is that when a person comes into
possession of any immovable properly as a tenant from other person
whom he accepts as the owner he will be estopped from questioning
the title of the owner. Same principle is also applicable to existing
relationship between licensee and licensor. A person who is ia
possession of any immovable property as a licensee cannot be

27 Schwartze v. Mahoney, (1893) 97 Cal. 131

 permitted afterwards to say that his licensor had no right to the
property. It is one of the first principles of the law of estoppel from
denying the title of the former.

Even before passing of the Evidence Act the Bombay High Court recognized
this principle. After the Act came into force the Privy Council in Kumar Rai
Krishna Prosad Lai v Baraboni Coal Concern Ltd. declared that “the section
does not deal with all kinds of estoppel which might arise between the
landlord and tenant.” But it is enough to determine the applicability of an
estoppel against a tenant or against a licensee, because, “the law is that the
estoppel of a tenant under section 116 of the Evidence Act was a recognition
and a statutory assimilation of the equitable principles underlying the
estoppel in relation to tenants.

“The principle emerging from Section 116 can be individual case. Rule of
estoppel which governs an owner of an immovable property and his tenant
would also mutates mutandis govern a tenant and his sub-tenant in their
relationship inter se.”

(A)ESTOPPEL OF TENANT

Under Section 116 a tenant is estoppel to deny the title of the owner so long
the tenancy continues. So long the relation of landlord and tenant stands and
by which the tenant remains in possession of tenancy the principle of
estoppel is applicable against the tenant. The rule applies “during the
continuance of the tenancy.” After the expiry of the period of tenancy or the
tenancy is surrendered by the tenant there is no application of estoppel. But
the tenancy is obtained by fraud etc. the tenant cannot be estopped. The
estoppel of the tenant is natural consequence, on proof of relationship of
landlord and tenant remains bound by it irrespective of any change in the
line of succession in the landlord’s family.
The rule of estoppel does not apply to a tenant who subsequently purchases a
share of the co-sharer. The equitable right of a person who has purchased
certain premises cannot be questioned by the tenant even if the purchaser has
not yet become the registered owner. After the tenancy has ceased the tenant
is free to deny the title of the landlord.

(B) ESTOPPEL OF LICENSEE

A licensee who has obtained possession through licence cannot be heard

to deny the title of licensor. The doctrine of estoppel will continue so
long the relations between the licensor and licensee continues. Even a
person who has got possession of licensed premises from father by
succession was not permitted to question the title of the licensor.

12. Estoppel of acceptor of bill of exchange, Bailee or

licensee:
Section 117 of the Indian Evidence Act deals with it.

No acceptor of a bill of exchange shall be permitted to deny that the

drawer had authority to draw such bill or to endorse it; nor shall any
Bailee or licensee be permitted to deny that his bailor or licensor had, at
the time with the bailment or licence commenced, authority to make such
bailment or grant such license.

Explanation 1.-The acceptor of a bill of exchange may deny that the bill
was really drawn by the person by whom

it purports to have been drawn.

Explanation 2.-If a Bailee delivers the goods bailed to a person other than
the bailor, the may prove that such person had a right to them as against
the bailor.
 As per the stand taken by Supreme Court in the case of Mohan v. State28,
the rule of issue estoppel does notprohibit that evidence given at one trial
against the accused cannot be given in another trial for another offence.

Section 117 deals with estoppel in respect of movable property. An

estoppel under this section is based on agreement

a. Acceptor of a bill of exchange:

An acceptor of a bill of exchange is not permitted to deny that the drawer

had authority to draw or to endorse it. But there is an exception laid
down in Explanation-I which provides that the acceptor of a bill of
exchange may deny that the bill was really drawn by the person by whom
it purports to have been drawn.

b. Bailment

A bailee of goods cannot be permitted to say that at the time of

commencement of the bailment, the bailor has no authority to bail or to
take them back. Under the Explanation-II, if a bailee delivers the goods
bailed to a person other than the bailer, he may prove that such person
had a right to them as against the bailor. A garage owner receiving a car
for repairs is estopped from challenging the title of the person from when
the car was received.

c. License:

Same rule is applicable here as applied in bailment.

28 AIR 1968 SC 1281

13.CONCLUSION-

Doctrine of Estoppel, precludes a person from denying or to negate anything

to the contrary of that which has been constituted as truth, either by his own
actions, by his deeds or by his representations or by the acts of judicial or
legislative officers.

Estoppels have also been likened to solemn admissions and conclusive

evidence. Formal admissions, conclusive evidence and estoppels have the
common feature of affecting the admissibility, of evidence. Hence it appears
that estoppels' must not be understood as synonymous with "conclusive
evidences”—the former being conclusions drawn by law against parties
from particular facts, while by the latter is meant some piece or mass of
evidence, sufficiently strong to generate conviction in the mind of a tribunal,
or rendered conclusive on a party, either by common or statute law.

Estoppel was once regarded as a rule or branch of the law of evidence, but
the better opinion, and that which now prevails, is that it is more properly a
branch of the substantive law. Although in some respects it might be
regarded as within the field of procedure. In any event, however, it is
customary to treat the subject to some extent in works on evidence, and it is
clearly within the scope of our plan to treat it so far as questions of evidence
are concerned when estoppel is involved as a particular issue in a case.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

ACT/STATUTE

INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT,1872

BOOKS REFERRED

1. Ratanlal & Dhirajlal, Law of Evidence, (27th ed, Lexis Nexis, New Delhi, 2019)

2. Batuklal, The Law of Evidence, (21st ed, Central Law Publication, Allahabad, 2018)

3. Dr. Avtar Singh, Law of Evidence (23rd ed, Central Law Publication, Allahabad,

2016)

WEBLIOGRAPHY

1. heps://crlreview.in/secKon-115-indian-evidence-act/#_inref1

2. heps://www.legalbites.in/estoppel-under-secKon-115-indian-evidence-act1872/#_in69

3. hep://www.legalserviceindia.com/arKcle/l249-Promissory-Estoppel.html

4. heps://www.mondaq.com/india/landlord-tenant--leases/262648/doctrine-of-estoppel-
overview

5. heps://www.jstor.org/stable/43953334?seq=1