JOYCE, APPELLANT

AND
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS, RESPONDENT.

The defendant was an American citizen but held a British passport. After the
outbreak of war between Great Britain and Germany in 1939, he delivered from
German territory broadcast talks in English hostile to Great Britain.

In 1933 the appellant, an American citizen, who had resided in British territory for
about twenty-four years, applied for and obtained a British passport, describing
himself as a British subject by birth and stating that he required it for the purpose
of holiday touring in Belgium, France, Germany, Switzerland, Italy and Austria. On
its expiration, he obtained renewals on September 24, 1938 and on August 24,
1939, each for a period of one year, again describing himself as a British subject.
After the outbreak of war between Great Britain and Germany and before the
expiration of the validity of the renewed passport, he was proved to have been
employed by the German radio company and to have delivered from enemy
territory broadcast talks in English hostile to Great Britain. The passport was not
found in his possession when he was arrested. Having been convicted of high
treason he appealed:—

Held (1.) that an alien abroad holding a British passport enjoys the protection of the
Crown and if he is adherent to the King’s enemies he is guilty of treason, so long as
he has not renounced that protection; (2.) (per Lord Jowitt L.C., Lord Macmillan
Lord Wright and Lord Simonds, Lord Porter dissenting) that the judge at the trial
had given a proper direction to the jury who could not have failed to appreciate
from it that it was for them to consider whether at the material times the appellant
continued to enjoy the protection afforded by the passport.
 
Per Lord Porter: The renewal of the passport did not prove conclusively in law that
the duty of allegiance continued until the passport ceased to be valid, unless some
action on the part of the Crown or of the appellant put an end to that protection;
the onus was not on the appellant to show that the duty had been terminated.

Held: His conviction for treason was confirmed.

Lord Jowitt LC referred to ‘the reciprocal duties of protection and allegiance’

between a citizen and the state, saying: ‘The contention is a different one: it is that
by the holding of a passport he asserts and maintains the relation in which he
formally stood, claiming a continued protection of the Crown and thereby pledging
the continuance of his fidelity. In these circumstances I am clearly of the opinion
that so long as he holds the passport he is within the meaning of the statute a man
who, if he is adherent to the King’s enemies in the realm or elsewhere commits an
act of treason . . Moreover the special value to the enemy of the appellant’s
services as a broadcaster was that he could be represented as speaking as a British
subject and his German workbook showed that it was in this character that he was
employed, for which his passport was doubtless accepted as the voucher’.

Blackmer v. United States

Facts. Blackmer (D), a U.S. (P) citizen who was residing in France, was served
subpoenas to appear in court as a witness in a criminal trial in the U.S. Contempt
proceedings were initiated against Blackmer (D) when he failed to respond to the
subpoenas and he was found guilty and fined. Blackmer (D) appealed on the
ground that the federal statute was unconstitutional.

Issue. Must there be due process for the exercise of judicial jurisdiction in

personam?

Held. (Hughes, C.J). Yes. There must be due process for the exercise of judicial
jurisdiction in personam. The court may adjudge the witness guity of contempt if
the witness fails to comply with the court order. Congress acted pursuant to its
authority in enacting the statute and it could prescribe a penalty to enforce it.
Affirmed.

Facts:

1. A citizen of the United States residing in a foreign country continues to owe

allegiance to the United States and is bound by its laws made applicable to his
situation. P. 284 U. S. 436.

2. The power to require the return of absent citizens in the public interest is
inherent in sovereignty, and what in England was the sovereign prerogative in this
respect pertains, under our constitutional system, to the national authority,
exercisable by Congress, to prescribe the duties of the citizens of the United States.

3. One of the duties of such absent citizens to the United States is that of attending
its courts to give testimony when properly summoned, and Congress may provide
for the performance of this duty and prescribe penalties for disobedience.

4. Questions of authority in such cases are not questions of international law, but of
municipal law. P. 284 U.S. 437.

5. The Act of July 3, 1926, provides that, when the testimony of a citizen of the
United States residing in a foreign country is needed by the Government in a
criminal case, the court in which the case is pending may issue a subpoena to be
served upon him personally by an American consul with a tender of money to cover
his necessary expenses of travel to and from, and attendance upon, the court; that,
if he refuse or neglect to appear as directed by the subpoena, the same court, upon
proof of service and default, may issue its order directing him to appear before it at
a designated time to show cause why he should not be adjudged guilty of contempt
and be punished; that this order may direct that property of the witness in the
United States be seized and held to satisfy any judgment that may be rendered in
the contempt proceeding; that, after such seizure, the order to show cause and for
sequestration shall be served on the witness personally by such consul and shall be
published in some newspaper of general circulation in the district where the court
sits, and that, on the return day of the order, or later, proof shall be taken, and if
the charge of recusancy shall be sustained, the court shall adjudge the witness
guilty of contempt and impose upon him a fine not exceeding $100,000, which,
with the costs, may be satisfied by sale of the property levied upon, to be
conducted upon notice and in the manner provided for sales upon execution. In
contempt proceedings for failure to obey subpoenas, held:

(1) The absent witness is bound with notice of the statute. P. 284 U. S. 438.

(2) The method provided by the Act for acquiring judicial jurisdiction to render a
personal judgment includes due notice and opportunity to be heard, and satisfies
the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. Pp. 284 U. S. 438-439.

(3) Service of the subpoena in a foreign country invades no right of the foreign
government, and the citizen has no standing to invoke such supposed right.

(4) The function of a consul in serving the subpoena and the order to show cause is
merely that of an agent of the government for conveying actual notice to one of its
citizens; it need not be sanctioned by a treaty. Pp. 284 U. S. 439-440.

(5) In criminal contempt proceedings, due process does not require that the
respondent be present at the hearing and adjudication if he was duly notified and
had adequate opportunity to appear and be heard. P. 284 U. S. 440.

(6) The contempt proceeding being valid, the provisional remedy of seizing and
applying property to secure payment of the penalty is also constitutional.

(7) The fact that enforcement of the penalty may depend on seizure of property
does not imply unconstitutional discrimination between those contumacious
absentee witnesses who have property in this country and those who have not. Id.

(8) A provisional or final levy on property, as provided in the statute, to satisfy

liability of the owner is not an unreasonable search and seizure. Id.

(9) The question whether the statute grants the right to subpoena foreign residents
in criminal cases to the government only, and thereby violates the provision of the
Sixth Amendment guaranteeing accused persons compulsory process for witnesses,
will not be considered at the instance of a recalcitrant witness. P. 284 U. S. 442.

(10) Where the subpoena served was issued at the request of the government upon
a statement as to the materiality and importance of the expected testimony
sufficient to give the court jurisdiction to issue it, it binds the witness unless set
aside upon proper petition, and the question whether the showing was otherwise
sufficient cannot be raised in defense against proceedings to punish his
disobedience as contempt. Id.
(11) It is not necessary that the subpoena issued under the statute show on its face
that it was so issued. Id.

(12) Where a witness has been served with subpoena under the statute, and has
defaulted, service of an order directing him to show cause, at a time and place
stated, why he should not be adjudged guilty of contempt, and providing for seizure
of his property to be held to satisfy any judgment that may be rendered against
him in the proceeding, affords notice sufficient to inform him of the character of the
charge and of the hearing at which he will have opportunity to present his defense.
P. 284 U. S. 443.

(13) Where two subpoenas are issued for appearances at different times, a seizure
of property in connection with the first is not vacated by the seizure of the same
property in connection with the second. Id.

(14) A witness subpoenaed to attend on a day named, and not to depart the court
without leave of the court or the district attorney, cannot excuse his refusal to
come upon the ground that the trial did not begin on the day specified in the writ,
but on a later day to which the case was continued. Id.

Certiorari to review decrees sustaining fines imposed on the petitioner Blackmer as

punishment for contemptuous disobedience of two subpoenas in a criminal case.
The judgments provided that the fines be satisfied out of property seized after the
subpoenas were served.
The Case of the S.S. Lotus (France
v. Turkey)
Brief Fact Summary. Turkey’s (D) assertion of jurisdiction over a French citizen who had
been the first officer of a ship that collided with a Turkish ship on the high seas was
challenged by France (P) as a violation of international law.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. A rule of international law, which prohibits a state from
exercising criminal jurisdiction over a foreign national who commits acts outside of the
state’s national jurisdiction, does not exist.

Facts. A collision occurred shortly before midnight on the 2nd of August 1926 between
the French (P) mail steamer Lotus and the Turkish (D) collier Boz-Kourt. The French mail
steamer was captained by a French citizen by the name Demons while the Turkish
collier Boz-Kourt was captained by Hassan Bey. The Turks lost eight men after their ship
cut into two and sank as a result of the collision.

Although the Lotus did all it could do within its power to help the ship wrecked persons,
it continued on its course to Constantinople, where it arrived on August 3. On the 5th of
August, Lieutenant Demons was asked by the Turkish (D) authority to go ashore to give
evidence. After Demons was examined, he was placed under arrest without informing
the French (P) Consul-General and Hassan Bey. Demons were convicted by the Turkish
(D) courts for negligence conduct in allowing the accident to occur.
This basis was contended by Demons on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction
over him. With this, both countries agreed to submit to the Permanent Court of
International Justice, the question of whether the exercise of Turkish (D) criminal
jurisdiction over Demons for an incident that occurred on the high seas contravened
international law.

Issue. Issue: Does a rule of international law which prohibits a state from exercising
criminal jurisdiction over a foreign national who commits acts outside of the state’s
national jurisdiction exist?

Held. (Per curiam) No. A rule of international law, which prohibits a state from
exercising criminal jurisdiction over a foreign national who commits acts outside of the
state’s national jurisdiction, does not exist. Failing the existence of a permissive rule to
the contrary is the first and foremost restriction imposed by international law on a state
and it may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another state.

This does not imply that international law prohibits a state from exercising jurisdiction
in its own territory, in respect of any case that relates to acts that have taken place
abroad which it cannot rely on some permissive rule of international law. In this
situation, it is impossible to hold that there is a rule of international law that prohibits
Turkey (D) from prosecuting Demons because he was aboard a French ship. This stems
from the fact that the effects of the alleged offense occurred on a Turkish vessel.
Hence, both states here may exercise concurrent jurisdiction over this matter because
there is no rule of international law in regards to collision cases to the effect that
criminal proceedings are exclusively within the jurisdiction of the state whose flag is
flown.

Discussion. In 1975, France enacted a law regarding its criminal jurisdiction over aliens
because of this the situation surrounding this case. The law stipulates that aliens who
commit a crime outside the territory of the Republic may be prosecuted and judged
pursuant to French law, when the victim is of French nationality. This is contained in 102
Journal Du Droit International 962 (Clunet 1975). Several eminent scholars have
criticized the holding in this case for seeming to imply that international law permits all
that it does not forbid.

The first principle of the Lotus Case: A State cannot exercise its

jurisdiction outside its territory unless an international treaty or
customary law permits it to do so. This is what we called the first principle of
the Lotus Case. The Court held that:

“Now the first and foremost  restriction imposed by international law upon a State is that – failing the existence of  a permissive rule to the contrary – it may not exercise its power
in any form in the territory of another State. In this sense jurisdiction is certainly territorial; it cannot be exercised by a State outside its territory except by virtue of a permissive
rule derived from international custom or from a convention.” (para 45)

The second principle of the Lotus Case: Within its territory, a State may

exercise its jurisdiction, in any matter, even if there is no specific rule of
international law permitting it to do so. In these instances, States have a wide
measure of discretion, which is only limited by the prohibitive rules of
international law.The Court held that:

“It does not, however, follow that international law prohibits a State from exercising jurisdiction in its own territory, in respect of any case which relates to acts which have taken
place abroad, and in which it cannot rely on some permissive rule of international law. Such a view would only be tenable if international law contained a general prohibition to
States to extend the application of  their laws and the jurisdiction of  their courts to persons, property and acts outside their territory, and if, as an exception to this general
prohibition, it allowed States to do so in certain specific cases. But this is certainly not the case under international law as it stands at present. Far from laying down a general
prohibition to the effect that States may not extend the application of  their laws and the jurisdiction of  their courts to persons, property and acts outside their territory, it leaves
them in this respect a wide measure of discretion, which is only limited in certain cases by prohibitive rules; as regards other cases, every State remains free to adopt the principles
which it regards as best and most suitable. This discretion left to States by international law explains the great variety of rules which they have been able to adopt without
objections or complaints on the part of  other States …In these circumstances all that can be required of a State is that it should not overstep the limits which international law
places upon its jurisdiction; within these limits, its title to exercise jurisdiction rests in its sovereignty.” (paras 46 and 47)

This applied to civil and criminal cases. If the existence of a specific rule was a
pre-requisite to exercise jurisdiction, the Court argued, then “it would…in
many cases result in paralysing the action of the courts, owing to the
impossibility of citing a universally accepted rule on which to support the
exercise of their [States’] jurisdiction” (para 48).

The Court based this finding on the sovereign will of States. It held that:

“International law governs relations between independent States. The rules of law binding upon States therefor  emanate from their own free will as expressed in conventions or by
usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law and established in order to  regulate the relations between these co-existing independent communities or with a view
to  the achievement of  common aims. Restrictions upon the independence of  States cannot therefore be presumed”
Mighell v. Sultan of Johore

Fact: The Sultan’ s sovereign status was an issue in a court case in England.

When Miss Mighell sued a certain Albert Baker (Sultan of Johor), travelling
incognito in the United Kingdom) for breach of promise of marriage, the Court
granted the Sultan as an “independent sovereign” immunity from jurisdiction.
The decision was based on a letter from the Secretary of State for the
Colonies stating that “generally speaking, [the Sultan] exercises without
question the usual attributes of a sovereign ruler.” This further demonstrates
the British recognition of the Sultanate of Johor as an independent State.

Issue: whether sultan Johor will get diplomatic immunity or not?

Decision: Sultan Johor will get the diplomatic immunity as an “independent

sovereign

Reasoning: The Court granted the Sultan as an “independent sovereign”

immunity from jurisdiction

Principle: Foreign sovereign shall be treated as independent sovereign and

therefore have immunity form local jurisdiction.
WHO vs. AQUINO
Facts:

It is undisputed in the record that petitioner Dr. Leonce Verstuyft, who was assigned on December 6,
1971 by the WHO from his last station in Taipei to the Regional Office in Manila as Acting Assistant
Director of Health Services, is entitled to diplomatic immunity, pursuant to the Host Agreement
executed on July 22, 1951 between the Philippine Government and the World Health Organization.

Such diplomatic immunity carries with it, among other diplomatic privileges and immunities, personal
inviolability, inviolability of the official's properties, exemption from local jurisdiction, and exemption
from taxation and customs duties.

When petitioner Verstuyft's personal effects contained in twelve (12) crates entered the Philippines
as unaccompanied baggage on January 10, 1972, they were accordingly allowed free entry from
duties and taxes. The crates were directly stored at the Eternit Corporation's warehouse at
Mandaluyong, Rizal, "pending his relocation into permanent quarters upon the offer of Mr. Berg, Vice
President of Eternit who was once a patient of Dr. Verstuyft in the Congo.

Dr. Leonce Verstuyft was assigned by WHO to its regional office in Manila as Acting
Assistant Director of Health Services. His personal effects, contained in twelve
(12) crates, were allowed free entry from duties and taxes. Constabulary Offshore
Action Center (COSAC) suspected that the crates “contain large quantities of
highly dutiable goods” beyond the official needs of Verstuyft. Upon application of
the COSAC officers, Judge Aquino issued a search warrant for the search and seizure of
the personal effects of Verstuyft. 

Secretary of Foreign Affairs Carlos P. Romulo advised Judge Aquino that Dr. Verstuyft is
entitled to immunity from search in respect for his personal baggage as accorded to
members of diplomatic missions pursuant to the Host Agreement and requested that
the search warrant be suspended. The Solicitor General accordingly joined Verstuyft for
the quashal of the search warrant but respondent judge nevertheless summarily denied
the quashal. Verstuyft, thus, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the
SC. WHO joined Verstuyft in asserting diplomatic immunity.

Issue:

Whether or not personal effect of Verstuyft can be exempted from search and seizure
under the diplomatic immunity.

Held:

Yes. The executive branch of the Phils has expressly recognized that Verstuyft is
entitled to diplomatic immunity, pursuant to the provisions of the Host
Agreement. The DFA formally advised respondent judge of the Philippine
Government's official position. The Solicitor General, as principal law officer of the
gorvernment, likewise expressly affirmed said petitioner's right to diplomatic immunity
and asked for the quashal of the search warrant. 
It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of
powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should
refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of the government,
and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive
branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to
accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of
the government, the Solicitor General in this case, or other officer acting under his
discretion. Courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction by seizure and detention of
property, as to embarass the executive arm of the government in conducting foreign
relations. 

The Court, therefore, holds the respondent judge acted without jurisdiction and with
grave abuse of discretion in not ordering the quashal of the search warrant issued by
him in disregard of the diplomatic immunity of petitioner Verstuyft. (World Health
Organization vs. Aquino,  G.R. No. L-35131, November 29, 1972, 48 SCRA 243)