CBRN(E): With or Without the

(E)xplosive

George Javier McKerrow,

Director of MAC7 Training
USA
Debates around whether CBRN teams are also responsible for devices containing
explosives have gone on for years, hence some groups being CBRN while others are
CBRNE. Certain groups will even refer to it as CBRNe, with the lowercase “e”
minimizing their association with explosives.

In some cases, hazardous CBRN devices containing explosives often require

cooperation between the CBRN team and an EOD team. However, there is the
opportunity for a stalemate when it comes to handling or defeating a device if neither
team can agree on the correct approach. For example, the EOD team may have
protocols limiting their approach on devices that contain radiological elements, and the
CBRN team’s protocols may restrict their procedures for IEDs, regardless of whether a
radiological threat is also suspected. It is crucial that training between these two groups
take place in a safe, controlled environment so the teams can develop cooperative
standard operating procedures.

These requirements led me to the development of several training scenarios that took
place recently at the NCT (Non-Conventional Threat) event in the Netherlands. The
National Training Center offered various settings such as metro stations, airplanes, and
theaters where we were able to implement realistic training events. The scenarios, while
varied, all included inert CBRN devices that sometimes added explosive elements.
Teams involved in these exercises ranged from military and civilian first responders,
with joint groups often featuring a mixture from both fields. Additionally, these teams
were typically a combination of personnel with CBRN and/or EOD backgrounds.

As mentioned, the Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) could be set up as CBRN or

CBRNE. Now this is where it gets interesting. When we talk about IEDs, we have
categorized them as containing five major components:

1. Main Charge (Explosive)

2. Container (Steel Pipe, Pressure Cooker, etc.)
3. Switch (Anti-lift, Remote, etc.)
4. Detonator (Blasting Cap, E-Match, etc.)
5. Power Source (Battery)

George McKerrow pictured while briefing

the teams at NCT Pro Trainings.
If we were not to include the Main Charge in a CBRN device, then it would be classified
as a improvised chemical dispersion device (ICDD). This would then more than likely
require the following:
1. Chemical
2. Container
3. Switch
4. Power Source

It is worth explaining here that the switch plays a hugely significant role in the set up.
When we talk about the switch in an IED then we place it within three main categories of
activation: Command, Victim, and Time. These three main categories then split down
further into many subcategories, such as pressure release or light sensors for victim
activated switches. Command activated could be key fobs or cell phones, while time
activated could be digital, chemical or mechanical. There are many more, but that gives
you an idea of how the switch may function.

A container.
All the scenarios we ran through at NCT incorporated agents from Hot Zone Solutions
that would indicate on detection equipment that a CBRN threat was viable within our
training devices. After the teams would confirm the presence of that threat, the EOD
and CBRN teams would jointly develop a plan to inspect the devices further (either
visually or with an X-ray system provided by Teledyne).

While most of these teams had never worked together, either because they were from
different countries or had limited protocols, these events offered the chance to
cooperate and share ideas in a setting very similar to how a real threat would evolve.
EOD teams provided intelligence of x-ray interpretation to determine the devices
components and how they may be triggered. CBRN teams were able to share intel on
how they would contain the specific threat in ways that included setting safe perimeters,
ensuring the proper protective equipment was available, as well as diagnose any
medical issues that may arise in case of device activation.

Each event played out differently, and the procedures for approach in some cases had
been drastically different for each country and department involved. The ability to share
these ideas between CBRN and EOD teams, however, highlighted the necessity to
ensure realistic, joint training for both groups. Perhaps the “E” in CBRNE should be
viewed as a bridge between CBRN and EOD, as the NCT event proved these
departments cooperation is crucial in training and in response to real events.

Trainees pictured at NCT Pro Trainings

using Hot Zone Solution's detection
equipment.
George McKerrow is a certified counter terrorism practitioner who continues to conduct
training, develop equipment, organize international training events. He has been a
guest speaker at numerous global counter terrorism conferences and workshops all
around and has conducted training in US, Canada, UK, SE Asia, Europe & the Middle
East. He enlisted into the British Army in 1984 and attended training to be a
Paratrooper, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Officer and a High-Risk Search Advisor. He
attended extensive training at the UK Defense Explosive Ordnance Disposal School
(DEODS) and the UK National Search Academy. George has been deployed
operationally on EOD and HRS missions in Northern Ireland, Bosnia, Kosovo,
Afghanistan & Iraq.