As explained in Bonilla: “x x x Article 777 of the Civil Code provides ‘that the rights to

the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent.’ From the
moment of the death of the decedent, the heirs become the absolute owners of his
property, subject to the rights and obligations of the decedent, and they cannot be
deprived of their rights thereto except by the methods provided for by law” (G.R. No.
173292, September 1, 2010 citing Bonilla).

In the case of Cruz v. Cruz, Memoracion Cruz claimed that during her union with her
common-law husband (deceased) Architect Guido M. Cruz, she acquired a parcel of
land located in Tondo Manila; that the said lot was registered in her name; and that
sometime in July 1992, she discovered that the title to the said property was transferred
by Guido and the latter’s wife to their names in 1991 by virtue of a Deed of Sale dated
February 12, 1973 (G.R. No. 173292, September 1, 2010).

Memoracion claimed that the said deed was executed through fraud, forgery,
misrepresentation and simulation, and hence, was null and void.  After presenting her
evidence in chief, she died on October 30, 1996.  Through a Manifestation,
Memoracion’s counsel, Atty. Roberto T. Neri, notified the trial court on January 13, 1997
of the fact of her death, evidenced by a certificate thereof (G.R. No. 173292, September
1, 2010).

For his part, Guido filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that (1) the plaintiff’s
reconveyance action is a personal action which does not survive a party’s death,
pursuant to Section 21, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court, and (2) allowing the case
to continue would result in a legal absurdity whereby one heir is representing the
defendant, who is a co-plaintiff in this case (G.R. No. 173292, September 1, 2010).

ҬThe trial court ordered and the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the case
without prejudice to the prosecution thereof in the proper estate proceedings. However,
the Supreme Court ruled that the RTC erred in dismissing the case. The petition for the
annulment of a deed of sale involves property and property rights, and hence, survives
the death of petitioner Memoracion (G.R. No. 173292, September 1, 2010).

The period to inform or give notice to the court of the party’s death and the legal
representative/s is as important as determining whether the action survives. Section 16,
Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that “it shall be the duty of his
counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof,
and to give the name and address of his legal representative or representatives”.

The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without
requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator. The court shall forthwith order
the said legal representative or representatives to appear and be substituted within a
period of thirty (30) days from notice (Section 16, Rule 3).

The selection of the legal representative is not an easy task, because the lawyer would
have to discuss with the heirs the reasons for his or her selection and the extent of the
liability, if any. The selection is not the personal choice of the counsel. The heirs may
even need to wait for the court’s appointment of an administrator or its confirmation of
the executor named in the will; but in all cases the notice must be made within thirty
days from the death.

In simpler words, the counsel of the deceased party must inform the court of the fact of
death of the party and give the name and address of the legal representative/s. The
court also has the duty to order the legal representative to appear and be substituted or
to take the place of the deceased party. Both the counsel and court must comply with
the requirements of the Rule.

Non-compliance with the rule on substitution of a deceased party renders the

proceedings and judgment of the trial court infirm, because the court acquired no
jurisdiction over the legal representatives or the heirs on whom the trial and the
judgment would be binding (Brioso v. Mariano, G.R. No. 132765, January 31, 2003).

As we explained in Vda. de Salazar v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 121510, November

23, 1995):

“We should not lose sight of the principle underlying the general rule that formal
substitution of heirs must be effectuated for them to be bound by a subsequent
judgment, x x x… the general rule established not because the rule on substitution of
heirs and that on appointment of a legal representative are jurisdictional requirements
per se but because non-compliance therewith results in the undeniable violation of the
right to due process.”

In the case of de la Cruz v. Joaquin, the petitioners asserted that the RTC’s Decision
was invalid for lack of jurisdiction. They claim that the respondent died during the
pendency of the case. There being no substitution by the heirs, the trial court allegedly
lacked jurisdiction over the litigation – “the Rule on the substitution by heirs is not a
matter of jurisdiction, but a requirement of due process” (G.R. No. 162788, July 28,
2005).

Thus, when due process is not violated, as when the right of the representative or heir is
recognized and protected, noncompliance or belated formal compliance with the Rules
cannot affect the validity of a promulgated decision. Mere failure to substitute for a
deceased plaintiff is not a sufficient reason to nullify a trial court’s decision. The alleging
party must prove that there was an undeniable violation of due process (G.R. No.
162788, July 28, 2005).

Formal substitution by heirs is not necessary when they themselves voluntarily appear,
participate in the case, and present evidence in defense of the deceased. In the case of
Napere v. Barbarona, there is really no violation of the right to due process; the
proceedings cannot be nullified because the petitioner, who was in fact a co-defendant
of the deceased, actively participated in the case (G.R. No. 160426, January 31, 2008).
The records show that the counsel of Juan Napere and petitioner continued to represent
them even after Juan’s death. Hence, through counsel, the petitioner was able to
adequately defend herself and the deceased in the proceedings below. Due process
simply demands an opportunity to be heard and this opportunity was not denied the
petitioner (G.R. No. 160426, January 31, 2008).

However, not all cases of death of a party in civil case will fall under Section 16, Rule 3
of the Rules of Civil Procedure. For example, if the action is for the recovery of money
arising from a contract, and the defendant dies before the final judgment, it shall not be
dismissed but shall be allowed to continue against the estate until the entry of judgment.
Since the action is for the recovery of money and the deceased party is the defendant,
Section 20 and not 16 of Rule 3 will apply.

The essence of due process is the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any
evidence available in support of one’s defense. When due process is not violated, as when the
right of the representative or heir is recognized and protected, noncompliance or belated formal
compliance with the Rules cannot affect the validity of a promulgated decision (G.R. No.
160426, January 31, 2008).