Human Relations

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SAGE Publications
London, Thousand Oaks CA,
New Delhi

Towards a process model of individual

change in organizations
Jennifer M. George and Gareth R. Jones

ABSTRACT
This article analyses the way the individual change process unfolds
when major. second-order changes are required. Using a
framework that integrates both the cognitive and affective
components of indi vidual sensemaking and interpretation, we
develop a process model that systematically analyses the
psychology of the individual change process, and, in particular. the
sources of resistance to change or inertia. A series of steps in the
change process are identified if second-order change is to come
about, and a series of testable propositions about the forces that
may facilitate or stymie change are developed.

KEYWORDS
affect ■ change ■ emotions ■ mood ■ schemas

Attempts to understand the change process and, particularly, the factors that
prevent or stymie change, have a long history in organizational change
research. Over time, the explanation of the factors that impede or prevent
change has moved from a micro- to a more macro-level of analysis. Thus, for
example, Lewin's (1951) early force-field analysis clearly put the person at
the center of attention, with forces for change battling against individual
resistances to change such as habit and routines, and dislike of insecurity and
the unknown (Coch & French, 1948; French & Bell, 1990). More recently,
however, following the lead of population ecology, researchers have come to
view inability to change or inertia as primarily stemming from forces at
the organizational level such as institutionalized routines and practices
419

from the SAGE Social Science Collections. All Rights Reserved.

42O Human Relations S4(4)

embedded in organizational structure and culture (Hannan & Freeman,

1984). At this more macro level of analysis, the role of the person in the
change process is minimized; inertia is seen as a powerful force because of
the existence of stable routines that allow for the institutionalization of
organizational action and increase an organization's chances of survival in
the short run. Only over the long run do inertia and the inability to change
become a liability as an organization becomes unable to adapt to a changing
environment, and is selected out and replaced by a more appropriate organiz
ational form (Hannan & Freeman, 1984). Of course, important change
research at a more micro level of analysis has continued to take place (e.g.
Armenakis et al., 1993; Ford & Ford, 1994, 1995; Gardner et al., 1987;
Gersick, 1991; Judge et al., 1999; Kabanoff et al., 1995; Parsons et al., 1991)
and some micro-change theorists advocate an evolutionary perspective
(Colarelli, 1998). However, inertia and the inability to change are often
viewed as macro-level phenomena (Hannan & Freeman, 1984).
While important, we believe that macro-level explanations of inertia
and the inability to change have ignored the crucial role of people as the cre
ators and perpetuators of organizations. If an understanding of inertia is
central to understanding change in organizations (Weick & Quinn, 1999),
and change in organizations often stems from the efforts of people, either
individually or collectively, then it would seem useful to explore the psy
chology of the change process and how resistance to change and inertia can
arise at the individual and group levels of analysis, in addition to more macro
levels. Taken to the extreme, an exclusive focus on the macro-level approach
to change embodied in population ecology may result in the reification
(Berger & Luckmann, 1966) of the change process in organizations. If a
phenomenon is reified, actors come to believe that they have no control over
it, and thus at the social level they accept the power of institutions over them.
Recognizing the dangers associated with reifying the change process, in this
paper we propose a micro-model of change and resistance to change in
organizations, which is founded in the way individuals construct and make
sense of the social and organizational world. Our model focuses on change
at the individual level of analysis for several reasons.
First, to avoid the problem of reification we believe it is necessary to
recognize that, first and foremost, change is initiated and carried out by indi
viduals in organizations (Bartunek, 1984; Porras & Robertson, 1992). That
is, organizations only change and act through their members and even the
most collective activities that take place in organizations are the result of
some amalgamation of the activities of individual organizational members.
Second, and related, we believe that examining the process of change at the
organizational or group levels of analysis requires the analysis of the process
George & Jones Towards a process model of individual change4 2 I

of change at the individual level of analysis. That is, models and theories
of change and inertia at higher levels of analysis must be informed by an
under standing of change at the individual level of analysis if the problem
of reifi cation is to be overcome and the process of change is to be seen
for what it is - an individual and group sensemaking process taking place
in a social context that is the product of constant and ongoing human
production and interaction in organizational settings. In particular, our
model focuses on the dynamic interplay between human cognition and
affect in initiating the indi vidual change process and determining its
nature and outcomes.
The paper unfolds as follows. First, we introduce the schema construct,
which is central to many perspectives on sensemaking and change in organiz
ations. Second, we describe how inconsistencies or discrepancies with exist
ing schemas have the potential to trigger an emotional reaction and it is
this emotional reaction that sets the process of individual change in
motion. We then examine the information-processing activities that this
emotional reac tion produces, which can ultimately lead to a change in
existing schemas and, hence, changes in individual perceptions,
interpretations, and behaviors. Whether or not change actually occurs is
the result of the complex interplay of a variety of psychological and social
psychological forces; we examine these forces by considering the sources
of resistance to change at each stage of the process. We conclude by
discussing the implications of our analysis and directions for future
research.

Schemas, sensemaking, and change

Schemas are abstract cognitive structures that contain knowledge about a

kind of stimulus or concept, its features or attributes, and the interconnec
tions between its attributes (Fiske & Linville, 1980; Fiske & Taylor,
1991; Taylor & Crocker, 1981). People develop schemas for stimuli or
concepts that they come across repeatedly. Once a schema has been
developed for a concept, whenever stimuli that are encountered fit or
are related to the concept, the schema is activated and used to interpret
information. Infor mation tends to be interpreted in ways that are
consistent with the schema and confirm it (Fiske & Taylor, 1984).
Hence, people construct or enact reality in a way that is consistent with
their prior expectations (Schutz, 1976; Weick, 1979).
Schemas result in top-down or theory-driven processing in that new
information is processed based on pre-existing organized knowledge rather
than in a bottom-up fashion or based on consideration of the actual facts
or data (Abelson, 1981; Bobrow & Norman, 1975; Fiske & Taylor,
1991;
422 H11man Relations 54( 4)

Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977). People's schemas are really their simplified
theories about different concepts or stimuli that can be used to make sense
of many different specific instances that match or fit the schema (Fiske &
Taylor, 1991). In the organizational literature, it has been widely recognized
that organizational members rely on schemas to guide perceptions, infor
mation processing, sensemaking, decision making and behavior in organiz
ations (e.g. Walsh, 1995). Particularly relevant to our paper is the role of
schemas in understanding individual change in organizations (e.g. Bartunek,
1984; Bartunek & Moch, 1987; Bartunek et al., 1992). This is because at the
heart of change is change in organizational members' beliefs, interpretative
schemes, and behaviors (Bartunek, 1984; Porras & Robertson, 1992).
Our model of the individual change process in organizations takes as
a starting point the fact that organizational members use their schemas to
process information and make sense of what is going on in their organiz
ations and also the fact that change is an affectively laden process. However,
as indicated in Figure 1, our model proposes that affect, and, in particular,
emotions, play a central role in initiating the change process and directing
organizational members' sensemaking activities to pressing concerns, oppor
tunities, and problems. In our model, emotion is not just a by-product of, or
influence on, the change process but also the initial trigger for change. Thus,
our model complements existing treatments and models of change by aug
menting a focus on cognitive processes (e.g. Porras & Robertson, 1992) with
the explicit consideration of the highly interdependent nature of affect and
cognition. Additionally, our model extends the work of change theorists who
explicitly incorporate affect in their models. For example, Bartunek (1984)
proposed that emotional reactions partially mediate the relationship between
change in interpretative schemas and organizational restructuring. As
another example, Bartunek (1988) suggested that feelings influence multiple
stages of reframing in organizations.
The model of the change process described below is cyclical, but, for
exposition purposes, it is useful to start at Step 1 where an individual encoun
ters some noticeable discrepancy or inconsistency with his or her pre-existing
schemas. If this discrepancy triggers an emotional reaction, the change
process is set in motion. At each stage in the process, including the stage in
which the emotional reaction occurs, there are potential sources of resistance
to change. Resistance to change can stem both from the individual as well as
from the social and organizational context. Hence, the well-documented
observation that, while people are often presented with information that is
inconsistent with their schemas or world views, they often cling to past
interpretations rather than change their perspectives or schemas. Having
briefly introduced the model as well as the schema construct, below we
describe each of the steps
 r------------------------,
I I r-------------------------,
Step2 I I

Resistance:
I
1 1
Emotional reaction : Resistance:
Discrepancy
I rationalized; � I ',, _______:
: Learned I
I ' to discrepancy helplessness
I resilient schemas I I I
I_________________________I
_____________

Step 1 Step 3
G'l
Discrepancy or inconsistency Moderation of emotion; 3
with pre-existing schemas o<l
attention directed to
is encountered Ra
r-------------------------,
I I g
I I Ill
-------------1 Resistance:
I Denial

,,"'
Step 7 Step4 I
I
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_____________
Ill

r-----------------------------
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Schema
Information processing
of pressing concern, problem,
I I i
change or opportunity
_ r--------------------------------1
!
: Resistance: I ---�--__-_ -----=-----� ----- : Resistance: I ii
i
1 result of an is the
Challenge
uncontrollable or
1
r Step 5
Challenge to : concerns; I 111,
i"
Step 6 : complacency
I I unpredictable event :
Substantive information
I pre-existing !.,_ _____________ 1
I
processing of challenge I schemas :r
Ill
I
,-------1--------,
I
: Resistance:
: Challenge is
I �w ...
L___
I 1
ansubtyped as
excepti.on JI
_
Figure I A process model of individual change in organizations
 George & Jones Towards a process model of Individual 4

in the process of change as well as the sources of resistance to change at each

step. For each of the steps in the process we provide two numbered proposi
tions; the first pertains to the nature of the change process at the particular
step and the second pertains to resistance to change at the step.

Step I : Discrepancy or inconsistency with pre-existing schemas

is encountered

When people are able to successfully use their pre-existing schemas to per
ceive, interpret, and make sense of organizational life, and no discrepancies
or inconsistencies with these schemas are encountered, they are more or less
in a steady-state equilibrium condition (Lewin, 1951). While they may make
incremental adjustments to their schemas along the lines of what is com
monly referred to as first-order changes (Porras & Robertson, 1992) in
response to incoming information, there is really no impetus for any kind of
major change in perspective.
When an inconsistency or discrepancy with a pre-existing schema is
encountered, however, one's established expectations are challenged. Con
sistent with cognitive dissonance theory, discrepancies produce dissonance
and a concomitant desire to reduce the discrepancy (Festinger et al., 1956).
The discrepancy can come from the wider environment such as when com
petitors or customers behave in ways that are inconsistent with one's schemas
or expectations; from within the organization such as when employees
respond to events in a manner opposite to what was anticipated; or even from
within an individual such as when a person comes to the realization that a
cherished personal striving or goal is not worth working towards or no longer
valued.

Proposition 1: Encountered discrepancies with pre-existing schemas are the

initial impetus for individual change in organizations.

Resistance to change at this first stage of the individual change process occurs
when individuals persevere in the beliefs contained in their schemas and are
able to either rationalize the discrepancy (Miller, 1993) or make sense of it
without changing their schemas (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). It is a well-accepted
finding that established schemas are resistant to change even in light of dis
confirming evidence and it is actually their resistance to change that was
probably responsible for the burgeoning of scholarly interest in schemas
(Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Sometimes discrepancies can be rationalized to the
point where they are actually seen as supporting one's expectations (Fiske &
Taylor, 1991). For example, initial sales of a product championed by a
4 Human Relations

manager are disappointing and fall far short of expectations. Rather than
rethinking the merits of the product, the manager rationalizes the discrep ancy
by thinking that the marketing campaign failed to publicize desired fea tures
of the product and it is actually a testament to the potential of the product that
it sold as well as it did in light of the marketing problems. Ten dencies toward
rationalization may be further augmented by the operation of self-serving
attributional biases whereby people have the tendency to take credit for
successes and blame outside forces for problems (e.g. Knight & Vallacher,
1981; Miller & Ross, 1975; Zuckerman, 1979).
Rationalization of discrepancies also can be a collective
phenomenon. Shared rationalizations of discrepancies are a prominent
feature in Janis's (1982) conceptualization of groupthink. Moreover,
whenever a group or organizational unit has a vested interest in a course
of action that a discrep ancy challenges, there may be pressures for
collective rationalization. Build ing from the previous example, the new
product development team of an initially unsuccessful new product may
collectively try to rationalize the dis crepancy of low sales. Through social
comparison processes (Festinger, 1954), collective rationalization efforts
may lead team members to be more confident in, and even strengthen,
their own rationalizations. That is, any team member who is unsure about
whether or not it is appropriate to rationalize the discrepancy may become
convinced that this is appropriate given the views of other team members.
Additionally, team members' ratio nalizations may actually become
stronger once they learn that others also are inclined to rationalize the
discrepancy.
Even when rationalization does not take place, people may be able to
make sense of the inconsistency without changing their schemas. This is
especially likely to be the case for experts or people who have well-developed
schemas for the relevant concept or type of stimulus. As schemas become
well developed, they become richer in that they incorporate more attributes
and also become more complex and organized (Linville, 1982; Linville &
Jones, 1980). Well-developed schemas both contain more information and are
also more complex, which can result in them being more accommodating of
dis crepancies because the discrepancy itself can be incorporated into the
schema (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Consistent with this reasoning, Fiske and
Taylor (1991: 149) indicate that 'As schemas develop, they become more
resilient to inconsistency. As they become more abstract, complex, organized,
and compact, they more easily incorporate exceptions.'
To the extent that members of a group or team come to share schemas
to organize their knowledge, and interpret and make sense of incoming infor
mation, or develop team mental models (Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994),
these team mental models also may become more resilient to inconsistencies
 George & Jones Towards a process model of individual 42

or discrepancies as they become more complex and organized. More complex

team mental models may enable team members to interpret discrepancies as
actually being consistent with some aspect of the team's mental model.

Proposition 2a: Resistance to change can occur as the result of the rational
ization of discrepancies.
Proposition 2b: Resistance to change can occur as the result of using
schemas that are resilient to discrepancies.

When change is successfully resisted at this step, there is no change in

schemas nor is there any impetus for further consideration of the discrepancy
and the change process is brought to a halt. The discrepancy is dealt with
quite efficiently and ongoing activities take over attention. Sometimes,
however, rather than cognitively processing discrepancies in ways that enable
pre-existing expectations to prevail, discrepancies trigger an emotional reac
tion which leads to Step 2 in our model.

Step 2: Emotional reaction to discrepancy

Emotions are relatively intense affective states that interrupt ongoing thought
processes and behaviors (Simon, 1982). Emotions are adaptive in that they
signal where people need to focus their attention and place people in a state
of action readiness (Frijda, 1988). Emotions are triggered by encountering
what is both unexpected and personally relevant; by personally relevant, we
mean having direct implications for one's personal goals or strivings (Frijda,
1988). Just as discrepancies can be positive or negative, so, too, can emo
tions, consistent with the basic dichotomy of pleasure and pain (Zajonc,
1998). The heightened levels of arousal characteristic of emotions are trig
gered by discrepancies (Mandler, 1984, 1990). This arousal, in turn, triggers
efforts to cognitively interpret or make sense of the discrepancy.
Emotions arise when discrepancies are encountered that are relevant to
one's personal well-being or goals and objectives. In this way, emotions are
functional in that they provide signals that there is a situation that is per
sonally relevant in need of attention (Frijda, 1994). This signaling function
is complemented by the motivational implications of emotions; emotions
motivate cognitive activity and behavior to deal with the emotion-triggering
situation (Frijda, 1994). Hence, emotional reactions play a key role in the
change process. The emotional reaction to a discrepancy is the key signal to
an individual that there is a condition in need of their immediate attention.
The emotion puts them in a state of preparedness to deal with the discrep
ancy and mobilizes cognitive processing and behavior. For example, negative
4 Human Relations

emotions, such as fear and anxiety, that a manager experiences upon learn ing
of an ethical lapse on the part of a subordinate may serve the important
functions of directing the manager's attention to the questionable behavior,
and mobilizing the manager to take actions to minimize current damage and
ensure that the behavior is prevented in the future. As another example, the
emotions of excitement and enthusiasm which accompany learning that
demand has dramatically increased for a once unpopular product may serve
the important function of directing attention to the product, understanding
why demand has so dramatically increased, and finding ways to both meet
the demand and capitalize on the unexpected windfall opportunity.

Proposition 3: The initial response to a discrepancy that is personally relevant

to important goals or objectives is an emotional reaction.

While emotional reactions to discrepancies are the prompts to action and the
initial impetus for change, even when these emotional reactions are experi
enced, the change process may still be halted. Such a situation can be likened
to the phenomenon of learned helplessness. Learned helplessness was first
demonstrated in avoidance-learning experiments in which animals who were
exposed to unavoidable aversive consequences 'learned to be helpless'; when
exposed to aversive consequences that could be avoided by learning a simple
behavior, these animals didn't try to avoid the consequence but rather pas
sively acquiesced to it (Seligman, 1975; Seligman & Maier, 1967). It appears
that humans also can learn to be helpless when exposed to uncontrollable
negative consequences, although initial reactions to such conditions often
result in increased attempts to assert control (Abrahamson et al., 1978;
Weiss, 1990; Wortman & Brehm, 1975). However, when these attempts fail,
learned helplessness may set in, resulting in decreased effort in the future
(Pittman, 1998).
In organizational settings, it is likely that organizational members
might encounter situations in which learned helplessness actually does set in,
especially in situations where people lack control (Weiss, 1990). For example,
a lower-level manager may encounter repeated negative discrepancies that
trigger emotional reactions. However, each time the manager tries to
attend to the situation responsible for the discrepancy, they realize that
they do not have the authority or control to make any changes and
suggestions to superiors fall on deaf ears. Eventually, the manager learns to
accept these dis crepancies and negative emotions without responding to
them as they are viewed as beyond personal control (Miller, 1993).
Hence, as a source of resistance to change at this step, learned help
lessness can arise not only because of individual level factors, but also
42 Human Relations

because of conditions at the group or organizational level of analysis. For

example, highly routinized work, a very centralized and mechanistic
organizational structure (Burns & Stalker, 1961), autocratic leadership and
a lack of autonomy may all lead to individuals responding to emotional
reactions to discrepancies with learned helplessness, and bring the change
process to a halt.

Proposition 4: Learned helplessness is a source of resistance to change.

While learned helplessness most commonly occurs in response to negative

outcomes (Weiss, 1990), one can also envision scenarios in which positive
discrepancies and emotions also result in little or no redirection of activity
or change. Essentially, if the positive discrepancy and subsequent emotion
are externally attributed to some uncontrollable and unpredictable cause, then
individuals may enjoy it while it lasts with no change or reorientation taking
place.

Step 3: Attention directed to pressing concern, problem, or

opportunity
When emotional reactions to discrepancies occur, and do not result in a
passive, accepting response or learned helplessness, the change process con
tinues to Step 3. At this step, the individual tries to identify the cause of the
discrepancy and its resulting emotional reaction. An important aspect of this
step is the control and moderation of the original emotional response. Frijda
(1988) suggests that emotional reactions trigger a corresponding secondary
response aimed at regulation and moderation of the emotion. Essentially,
people are aware of the fact that there may be adverse consequences to unin
hibited emotions and emotion control or moderation is in response to these
potential adverse consequences (Frijda, 1988; Gray, 1982).
Along with moderation or control of the emotional reaction comes the
tendency to initially direct one's attention to relevant pressing concerns, prob
lems, or opportunities in ways that minimize the negative and maximize the
positive (Frijda, 1988, 1992). That is, in trying to identify and make sense of
the pressing issue underlying the discrepancy, organizational members strive
to put a positive spin on the identification process and lessen the negative
spin - to the extent that this is possible. For example, a manager who receives
a report indicating that revenues for a new product are well below budgeted
projections experiences anxiety. The emotional reaction of anxiety usefully
directs the manager's attention to the product's sales. The initial anxiety
triggers a secondary emotionally oriented impulse to control the emotion
 George & Jones Towards a process model of individual 42

while at the same time the manager is focused towards interpretations that
minimize the negative fallout from the poor sales.

Proposition Sa: Positive and negative emotional reactions to discrepancies

trigger efforts to moderate the emotion and direct attention to the pressing
concern, problem, or opportunity.
Proposition Sb: When directing attention to pressing concerns, problems,
and opportunities, people have an initial tendency towards sensemaking
and interpretation that minimize the negative and maximize the positive.

Resistance to change at this step is unlikely in the case of positive discrep

ancies and emotional reactions and much more likely in the case of negative
discrepancies and emotional reactions. When negative discrepancies and
emotional reactions occur, the change process may come to a halt through
the process of denial (Breznitz, 1983; Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1995; Lazarus
& Folkman, 1984). As a person seeks to control the initial emotional reac
tion, the process of denial may set in whereby the existence of the initial dis
crepancy and concomitant emotion is minimized or defensively denied.
Sometimes a person may psychologically distance themselves from the
phenomenon, may become preoccupied with other things, or deny the fact
that there is anything to be concerned about (Lazarus, 1995). When denial
takes place, consideration of the discrepancy is avoided and the process of
change halted.
Denial may also take place on a collective level. Members of a group
or team or even of an organization may repeatedly put off consideration of
a discrepancy and focus their attention on other concerns until the discrep
ancy fades from the collective consciousness. Strong, impartial leaders who
engage in denial may encourage the collective denial of discrepancies, which
prevents members of a group or organization from responding to contradic
tory information.

Proposition 6: Negative emotional reactions will fail to direct attention to

pressing concerns and problems when denial takes place.

Step 4: Information processing of pressing concern, problem, or

opportunity

Once Step 4 has been reached, the emotion has subsided into a less intense
mood and substantive information processing (Forgas, 1995) takes place to
interpret the concern, problem, or opportunity identified in Step 3. Because
of their intensity, emotions tend to be short-lived. However, emotions often
43 Human Relations

lead to less intense affective states called moods. Moods are pervasive and
generalized feelings or affective states people experience, which influence
behaviors and thought processes in more subtle ways without interrupting
them (Brady, 1970; Clark & Isen, 1982; Morris & Reilly, 1987; Nowlis,
1970; Thayer, 1989). Hence, negative emotions elicited by discrepancies are
likely to lead into negative moods during subsequent information processing
and positive emotions elicited by discrepancies are likely to lead into positive
moods.
At this stage, given the fact that the original discrepancy is at odds with
pre-existing schemas, rather than processing information based on schemas,
information processing proceeds in a more data-driven manner (Fiske &
Taylor, 1991). In data-driven processing, rather then relying on schemas to
simplify information, people are inclined to pay attention to the data or infor
mation at hand including its specific nuances; attention is paid to detail and
people care about accurately assessing and incorporating information at
hand to form judgments (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Higgins & Bargh, 1987).
The kind of information processing that occurs at Step 4 has been
referred to as substantive information processing. Substantive information
processing is characterized by the need to selectively attend to, learn, and
judge new information under conditions of complexity and novelty with a
desire to be accurate (Forgas, 1995). There are several reasons for expect ing
substantive processing to take place at Step 4 in the change process. The fact
that a discrepancy with pre-existing schemas has been encountered sug gests
that novel information has been encountered which is in need of pro cessing.
The discrepancy must have been perceived as important and personally
relevant given that an emotional reaction has occurred (Frijda, 1986), and
complexity is likely to be high given the fact that an important discrepancy
from expectations has been encountered in an organizational context. Given
the perceived personal relevance and importance of the dis crepancy, there is
likely also to be strong motivation to be accurate in infor mation processing.
A counterintuitive finding from research on the interplay between
mood and information processing is that judgments made during substantive
information processing are especially likely to be influenced by people's con
current affective states or their moods (Fiedler, 1991; Forgas, 1992, 1993,
1994, 1995). Mood influences substantive information processing through
affect priming. Affect priming results in people selectively attending to,
encoding, and retrieving information from memory, and making connections
and judgments that are consistent with their current mood state (e.g. Bower,
1981, 1991; Forgas, 1995; Forgas & Bower, 1987, 1988; Isen, 1984, 1987;
Singer & Salovey, 1988).
 George & Jones Towards a process model of individual 4

Being in a positive mood has several implications for substantive infor

mation processing at Step 4. Specifically, when organizational members are
in positive moods, their judgments will be more positive, they will be more
prone to recall relevant positive material from memory, they will feel more
self-efficacious, and they will be more likely to make self-serving attributions
for successes and failures (e.g. Bower, 1981; Forgas et al., 1984, 1990).
Organizational members in positive moods will also be more likely to be
creative in their information processing, relying on inductive reasoning and
flexibly making connections among different kinds of stimuli (Isen et al.,
1985, 1987). Tracking through an example consistent with this scenario may
help to clarify the evolution of the change process up until Step 4. Take the
case of a manager who has just learned that sales of a product historically
unpopular with consumers have sky-rocketed. This positive discrepancy with
the manager's pre-existing schema for the product causes a positive emotional
reaction such as excitement and enthusiasm. The positive emotion directs the
manager's attention to the product and the circumstances of its recent
success. Owing to efforts to control the positive emotion as well as the short
lived nature of emotions per se, the positive emotion subsides into a less
intense positive mood which colors the manager's information processing.
Now, at Step 4, the manager is trying to interpret and understand why sales
of the product have recently taken off as well as plan for the future. Positive
moods during substantive information processing result in the manager being
especially attuned to positive information as well as being more expansive in
his or her processing, thinking of new related opportunities to pursue for
increased benefits in the future.
Alternatively, consider the case of a manager who has just learned that
sales for a best-selling product have dramatically dropped. This negative dis
crepancy triggers a negative emotional reaction of anxiety and distress, which
signals the need to focus attention on the product and its recent problems.
The negative emotion subsides into a negative mood, which colors the
manager's substantive information processing of the current problem. In
what ways will the manager's negative mood influence information process
ing? Research suggests that negative moods will not only negatively color
perceptions and interpretations through the process of affect priming, but
may also foster deductive reasoning, systematic and careful information pro
cessing, critical thinking, and comprehensive evaluations (Salovey et al.,
1993; Sinclair, 1988; Sinclair & Mark, 1992). Hence, the manager's negative
mood may prompt him or her not only to focus on potential problems and
recall more negative material from memory, but also to be very systematic
and comprehensive in his or her efforts to understand and make sense of the
shortfall in sales.
43 Human Relations

Additionally, moods experienced during substantive information pro

cessing will be used by organizational members as input into information
processing (Martin & Stoner, 1996). Positive moods provide input that the
scenario under consideration is something that is good and a potential oppor
tunity. Negative moods provide input that one cannot be satisfied with the
status quo; careful and detailed consideration of the scenario is necessary,
and change and improvement called for.

Proposition 7a: Once the emotional reaction to a discrepancy has subsided

into a less intense mood state (congruent in valence to the original emotion),
substantive information processing takes place of the pressing concern,
problem, or opportunity.
Proposition 7b: Positive moods result in more consideration, recall from
memory, and use of positive information during substantive information pro
cessing of the pressing concern or opportunity as well as creative and expan
sive thinking to uncover opportunities for gain.
Proposition 7c: Negative moods result in more consideration, recall from
memory, and use of negative information during substantive information
processing of the pressing concern or problem as well as systematic and
careful information processing to uncover sources of difficulties.

Resistance to change at Step 4 occurs when other pressing concerns or issues

take precedence over consideration of the source of the original discrepancy.
Now that the intensity of the emotion has subsided, other more immediate
or pressing concerns may demand attention, and the original discrepancy is
shelved for the time being and the change process is halted. The original dis
crepancy may resurface at a later date or it may never be addressed again.
Information-processing demands on organizational members and the nature
and quantity of job tasks and requirements are likely to be contributing
factors to this source of resistance to change.
At a collective level, heavy workloads and demands in organizations
may make individuals more likely to cease consideration of the scenario and
the need for change. Ironically, the spate of downsizings and restructurings
that have taken place to give organizations more flexibility may inadvertently
lead to more resistance to change and less responsiveness as overstretched
employees are unable to attend to discrepancies and scenarios signaling the
need for change because of their heavy ongoing workloads.
For positive discrepancies, another source of resistance to change is
likely at Step 4. In the case of positive discrepancies, positive emotions
feeding into positive moods are experienced and things are better than one
expected. One reaction to such a scenario may be simply to sit back, bask in
 George & Jones Towards a process model of individual 4

the glory of success, and essentially do nothing (Frijda, 1986). Given things
are going so well, rather than viewing the scenario as representing an oppor
tunity for further improvements, organizational members may feel little need
for closer consideration. Moreover, the success may cause organizational
members to become over-confident (Miller, 1993), which again can result in
them failing to carefully consider and take advantage of potential oppor
tunities that may lie behind positive discrepancies.

Proposition 8a: Once emotions have subsided into less intense moods, further
information processing of the scenario (and the change process) may be
halted by other pressing demands.
Proposition 8b: Positive discrepancies, emotional reactions, and resultant
moods may result in complacency and no further information processing.

Step 5: Challenge to pre-existing schemas

In order for the change process to proceed, the result of substantive infor
mation processing at Step 4 must lead to some challenges to pre-existing
schemas or expectations. That is, it is not sufficient for organizational
members to solely consider the issue or concern underlying the initial dis
crepancy but they must also consider the implications of the results of their
information processing for their current world views or schemas. At Step 5,
organizational members essentially confront a challenge to their pre-existing
schemas, which can either lead to a continuation of the change process or
bring change to a halt.
We propose that the extensiveness of the challenge (and not necessarily
its severity) is a key determining factor of whether the change process con
tinues past this step or is brought to a halt. By extensiveness, we mean the
extent to which the challenge to pre-existing schemas is widespread or
encompasses multiple aspects of the schema or is more narrowly focused on
particular aspects of the schema. When an important challenge to a schema
is widespread or extensive, it is difficult to try to assimilate the challenge into
the schema because the challenge speaks to the overall nature of the schema
itself. Challenges that are widespread or extensive may lead to what has been
called a conversion model of change in cognitive structures such as schemas
or stereotypes (Hilton & von Hippel, 1996; Rothbart, 1981). Under a con
version model of schema change, which has received support in the literature
(Hewstone et al., 1992), change in schemas can be significant or second-order
in nature when an individual is confronted with salient and important chal
lenges or disconfirmations of the schema. A key feature of significant chal
lenges to existing schemas is that they are widespread or relevant to multiple
43 Human Relations

aspects of the schema and, thus, cannot be easily dismissed as isolated excep
tions. As Rothbart (1981: 177) indicates, 'disconfirming instances may be
particularly potent when people are aware of a powerful discrepancy
between what they expect and what they obtain'.
Challenges that are more narrowly focused and relevant to only one or
a few aspects of the schema, even if extreme, may fail to result in significant
challenges to the schema itself because of the tendency people have to
subtype challenges as exceptions to the more general schema (Brewer et al.,
1981; Hilton & von Hippel, 1996; Kunda & Oleson, 1995, 1997). Hence, if
an individual can make sense of the challenge in terms of being an
exception, the schema will remain unchanged and the change process is
brought to a halt. When the challenge is widespread or extensive, it is much
more difficult to subtype the challenge as an exception.

Proposition 9: Challenges to pre-existing schemas that are widespread or

extensive are more likely to lead to change than are challenges that are more
narrowly focused.
Proposition 10: Narrowly focused challenges to pre-existing schemas will be
subtyped as exceptions leading to no fundamental change in the schema
itself.

To the extent that members of a group or team share cognitive structures or

schemas, or have shared team mental models (Klimoski & Mohammed,
1994), analogous processes may take place at a collective level. That is, chal
lenges to team mental models that are widespread or extensive may be more
likely to lead to change than those that are narrowly focused. Narrowly
focused challenges may be labeled as exceptions leading to no fundamental
change in the team mental model.

Step 6: Substantive information processing of challenge

If organizational members are not able to dismiss a challenge as an excep

tion at Step 5, we propose that they engage in detailed substantive infor
mation processing to reconcile the challenge with their pre-existing
schemas. At Step 6, organizational members are engaged in the process of
altering their expectations and views of the world or reframing (Bartunek,
1988). They have realized that their existing schemas are no longer viable
for explaining the challenge they face and they strive to change their
schemas to be consistent with the schema-disconfirming evidence con
fronting them.
As discussed above, careful information processing under conditions of
uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity with a desire to be accurate are the
 George & Jones Towards a process model of Individual 4

hallmarks of substantive information processing. And, current mood state is

especially likely to infuse judgments and sensemaking when substantive
information processing takes place (Forgas, 1995). Positive discrepancies are
likely to initially result in positive emotions, which will then feed into a more
generalized and less intense positive mood state. At Step 6, positive moods
are likely to lead organizational members to be expansive in their thinking
as well as to see ambiguous information in a positive light, focusing on upside
potential. Inductive reasoning is especially likely to be prevalent as an indi
vidual seeks to develop the broader implications of their change in perspec
tive (lsen et al., 1985, 1987).
When change is initiated by negative discrepancies, negative moods
during Step 6 are likely to result in systematic and detailed information pro
cessing. Rather than expansively considering how to generate and seize
opportunities for gain, organizational members will be more focused on
making sure their current understandings are accurate and they have taken
into account all mitigating circumstances. Deductive reasoning and a critical
and comprehensive analysis of the circumstances is likely to predominate
(Salovey et al., 1993; Sinclair, 1988; Sinclair & Mark, 1992) as this sense
making process unfolds.

Proposition 11a: When an initial pos1t1ve discrepancy has triggered the

change process, substantive information processing of challenges to pre
existing schemas will be characterized by expansive thinking and inductive
reasoning.
Proposition 11b: When an initial negative discrepancy has triggered the
change process, substantive information processing of challenges to pre
existing schemas will be characterized by systematic and detailed information
processing and deductive reasoning.

Resistance to change at Step 6 can come from organizational members

viewing the challenge to their schemas as being beyond their ability to
address (Miller, 1993). They may continue to view their schemas as being
accurate or reasonable views of the world as long as uncontrollable events
don't take place. The uncontrollable events are not seen as necessitating a re-
evaluation of current frames of reference or schemas but rather signaling that
things can happen which are beyond anyone's ability to predict or anticipate in
advance. In this case, the challenge is not viewed as indicating the need for a
new per spective but rather results in the adoption of a more sobering and
pessimistic outlook whereby current understandings and sensemaking
activities are seen as impotent in the face of uncontrollable and unpredictable
events. When organizational members view challenges to their schemas as
signaling the
43 Human Relations S4(

presence of an uncontrollable or unpredictable event, the change process is

brought to a halt.
The wider organizational context may lead members of an organization
to view challenges to pre-existing schemas as being beyond their control. For
example, strongly held values and norms and organizational cultures may
cause organizational members to interpret incoming stimuli and challenges
to schemas in certain ways (Jelinek & Schoonhoven, 1990; Trice, 1985;
Trice & Beyer, 1993). For example, challenges may be viewed as outside of
the control of the organization and as essentially unpredictable occurrences
that the organization may need to passively accept.

Proposition 12: Processing of challenges to schemas is halted when the chal

lenge is perceived to be the result of an uncontrollable or unpredictable
event.

Step 7: Schema change

At the final step in the change process, there is actual change in

organizational members' schemas. Importantly, these schemas are likely not
only to contain organized knowledge that results from information processing
during Step 6 but also to include the affect associated with the change
process. More specifically, schema-triggered affect theory suggests that, as
schemas develop, the affect experienced at the time the schema develops is
often associated with the schema and stored in memory with it (Fiske, 1982;
Fiske & Taylor, 1991). When the schema is activated in the future, the affect
associated with it will also be activated, influencing perceptions,
interpretations, and judgments guided by the schema. The affect is stored at
the top or the category level of the schema and is likely to be quite salient
because 'a perceiver first compre hends an input by assimilating it to an
existing knowledge structure, and then evaluates the instances on the basis of
the affect linked to the schema' (Fiske, 1982: 60).
Hence, when a particular change cycle is complete, not only are
organizational members' schemas altered but so too are the affective associ
ations linked to these schemas. When the changed schemas are invoked to
perceive, interpret, and make sense of new situations or events, the affect
associated with the schemas will influence interpretations, judgments, and
information processing. Take a simple example of a manager who has cycled
through the change process and changed his or her schema for a once suc
cessful product that experienced a dramatic downturn in sales. The schema
will contain not only new organized knowledge about the product and its
potential (or lack of) but also the negative affect that was experienced during
the process of schema change. When the schema is invoked to guide future
 George & Jones Towards a process model of individual 4

decision making about this and related products, the negative affect associ
ated with the schema also will be invoked causing the manager to be especi
ally attuned to negative information, carefully and systematically processing
information, and critically evaluating alternatives (Forgas, 1995; Salovey et
al., 1993; Sinclair, 1988; Sinclair & Mark, 1992).

Proposition 13: The affect experienced during the change process is linked
to the changed schemas and influences subsequent schema-based information
processmg.

At a collective level, George (1990, 1996) has proposed that groups may
come to possess group affective tones, or consistent and homogeneous affec
tive reactions within the group. To the extent that groups have affective tones
and shared mental models, at the group level of analysis, affect experienced
by group members during the change process may be linked to their shared
mental models and influence subsequent information processing (George,
1996).

Implications and conclusions

As noted earlier, many discussions of inertia in organizations point to how

institutional forces, and the emergence of stable organizational structures,
cultures, and other forms of social influence such as prescribed roles and
rules, provide powerful deterrents to change (Hannan & Freeman, 1984).
While we acknowledge that these effects are both likely and important, in
this paper, we propose that the psychology of the change process may also
be key to understanding inertia and the inability to change in organizations.
Important sources of inertia may be rooted in individual and group cogni
tive and affective sensemaking and interpretation processes. The analysis in
this paper reveals that macro-level explanations may be enriched by con
sideration of the individual change process. The analysis in this paper both
suggests how individual change can come about in organizations as well as
how and why it may be resisted. While change in organizations is rooted in
change in individuals' schemas and behaviors, social influence and the wider
organizational context can either serve to encourage or discourage the change
process and the sources of resistance to change described in this paper.
At the micro-level, the analysis in this paper illuminates the psychol ogy
of the individual change process. While psychological factors such as traits,
habits, and routines have always been seen as important sources of resistance
to change, the analysis in this paper reveals how these factors are
43 Human Relations S4(

just one subset of factors that can facilitate or stymie change. Because the
model systematically analyses the way cognitive and affective processes
jointly operate in the sensemaking process, it reveals the key role affective
processes play in the change process and the way emotional reactions to dis
crepancies set the whole change process in motion. Indeed, while traditional
management thought has tended to ignore or downplay the role of emotions,
or to view emotions as impediments to rationality, our model proposes that
emotional reactions are the forces that can keep managers in tune with the
changing circumstances they face. Emotional reactions to discrepancies are
the important signals that managers and all members of an organization
receive indicating the need to direct one's attention to a pressing concern,
problem, or opportunity and change one's perspective or schemas.
Of course, sometimes discrepancies might be encountered that require
no change or can be rectified by a minor modification to current views (first
order changes). We acknowledge this but our concern in this paper is to
understand how the individual change process unfolds when major, second
order changes are required. Suppose the discrepancy is due to some random
occurrence that is unlikely to be repeated; then the change process would
appropriately be halted at Step 1. Similarly, suppose a major re-orientation
is not called for but rather change more along the lines of first-order change.
First-order changes can occur at Step 6 and can be the result of either minor
modifications of schemas or the creation of subtypes to account for an excep
tion to the schema; in both cases, the schema remains fundamentally intact
with no reorienting of meaning.
One might ask, at this point, how do organizational members know if
a discrepancy is a random occurrence unlikely to be repeated or something
that is best viewed more as an exception (and no major change in schemas
called for)? Our answer would be that these kinds of responses are actually
the most likely; people's general tendencies would lead them in these direc
tions (as would the sources of resistance to change at each step in the process)
as they are less cognitively and affectively effortful. Our model outlines the
conditions that must exist for major re-orientations in schemas or second
order changes to take place. Having said this, we would also like to point
out that sometimes change in schemas is not called for, such as when a dis
crepancy is the result of an unpredictable event that is rare and unlikely to
occur again. Moreover, even when change is called for, individuals may
'rationally' try to resist it when the change is personally or collectively threat
enmg.
Given the role of affect in the change process, both when intense emo
tions alert people to the need for change and when less intense moods more
subtly influence the information processing leading up to change and come
 George & Jones Towards a process model of Individual 4

to be associated with the changed schemas themselves, it may be informative

to explore how individual differences may result in people being more or less
likely to complete the cycle of change. In particular, the construct of
emotional intelligence may be particularly relevant as people who are higher
on emotional intelligence are more attuned to their emotions and moods,
more responsive to them, and have more knowledge about why certain feel
ings are being experienced (e.g. Huy, 1999; Mayer & Salovey, 1993, 1995,
1997; Salovey & Mayer, 1989-90). Hence, one might conjecture that people
who are high on emotional intelligence will be more likely to be attuned to
emotional reactions to discrepancies that signal the need for change and will
be more responsive to them. Of course, this is an empirical question.
Indeed, empirical research is needed to test the relationships we
propose and the overall model in both laboratory and field settings using
quantitative and qualitative methodologies. Quantitative laboratory studies
could be conducted to test, under highly controlled conditions, some of the
specific postulates of the model such as Propositions 9 and 10 which focus
on the differential effects of extensive vs. focused challenges to pre-existing
schemas. A combination of quantitative and qualitative methodologies could
be used to test the viability of the model in explaining actual changes that
organizational members experience in their world views or schemas in field
settings. We believe that our model, offering as it does detailed refutable
propositions, has the potential to enhance our understanding of individual
change in organizations and the important roles of affect and cognition in
the change process.

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444 Human Relations

Jennifer M. George is the Mary Gibbs Jones Professor of Management

and Professor of Psychology in the Jesse H. Jones Graduate School of
Management at Rice University, Houston, Texas, USA. She received her
PhD in management and organizational behavior from New York Uni
versity. She has published many articles in leading journals such as the
Journalof Applied Psychology, Psychological Bulletin, Academy of Management
Journal, Academy of Management Review, and the Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology. She is, or has been, on the editorial review boards
of the Journal of Applied Psychology, Academy of Management Journal,
theJournal of
Management, and the Journal of Managerial Issues and has been a Con
sulting Editor for theJournal of Organizational Behavior. Her research
inter ests include affect, mood, and emotion in the workplace;
creativity;
personality influences; groups and teams; prosocial behavior and cus
tomer service; values and work-life linkages; and stress and well-
being. [E-mail: jgeorge@rice.edu]

Gareth R. Jones is a Professor in the Lowry Mays College and Gradu

ate School of Business at Texas A&M University, USA. He received his
PhD from the University of Lancaster, UK. He has published many articles
in leading journals such as the Academy of Management Review, the
Academy of Management Journal, and Administrative Science Quarterly. He
has served on the editorial review boards of the Academy of
Management Review, the Journal of Management, and Management
Inquiry. His research interests include meso-organizational analysis;
organizational design for
performance; specialization and entrepreneurship; evolution of business
and corporate-level strategy; transaction cost analysis; organizational-
level implications of cognitive-affective relationships; organizational
structure and control at the inter- and intra-organizational levels;
organizational learning; organizational socialization and culture.
[E-mail: gjones@cgsb.tamu.edu]