S O ME CA R D IN A L P O IN TS IN

KN O WLE DGE

B" S H A DWO RT H H H O DG S O N
.

FE LLO W O F THE A C A DE M"

Rea d J a n ua r
y 1 8 , 1 9 1 1

S UMMAR " OF CONTENTS

I T H E common sense v i ew of the Un i verse which we may call
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experience i n a loose sense i s that expe rience which i t is the first

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business of phi losophy simply to analyse w i thout ma ki ng any ,

assumpt i ons to begin with not e ven that of a Co nscious Be i ng

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or S ubj ect of the Experience ( paragraphs 1—3 i nclusiv e) .

I I The ul t i mate data of ex perien c e are em pi rical percepts w hi ch

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are never peif ectly s i m ple and the first lowest and simplest whi c h
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we have are o bj ec t ified contents of consciousness ( pars 4

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III After analy si ng a supposed insta nce of a short series of su c h

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simplest empiri cal perc epts a po int is i nsisted on wh i ch is pe rhaps

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the most i mportant i n al l philosoph i ca l analysis viz the twofold , .

movement of one and the same present experience i n two opposite

direction s of t i me a t o n c e backwards i nto the past as a kn o wi n g an d
, ,

forwards into the future as an ewisten t ; whi c h latter disti n ction i s

the immediate consequen c e of that twofold mo vement ( pars 10 .

IV Cons c ious n ess as a knowi n g is the sole e vid en c e we have fo r

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a n ything whatever i ncludi n g it self as a n e xisten t The nature or

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kin d of the sp ecific qualities of its ult i mate data is i n ca pab l e of

be i ng accounted for But we cannot avoid i nqu i ri ng i nto the i r genesis
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as ex isten ts ( pars 1 1 .

V Our knowledge of the Reality of M atter i s der i ved from the

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exerc i se of sight a n d tou c h together But o ur knowledge of the

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n at ure of Matter itself i s due to touch ( involving sense of stre ss )

only T ouch is the only sen se which ha s a r eplic a of i t se lf at once
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,

v B 1
2 PROCEE D ING S OF THE B R I TIS H ACADE M"
a s its o bj ec t and ( si n ce the r eplica is separable from the original
erception of it ) as a r ea l c o n di tio n of the occurrence of n ew sensation s
p
of the sam e ki n d Moreover it is ev i dent from the phys i cal sciences
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, ,

that the r eplic a is capable of many analyses quite d i fferent from those
sensat i ons which give us our immediate knowledge of it though ,

a lways i nto co n stituents which der i ve their whole meaning from touch
and stress sensatio n s ( pars 24 "There follow here some remarks
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on Pragmatism a doctri ne very much i n vogue at the present tim e

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( pars 33
.

V I We locate in thought consciousness wi thin the organism becaus e

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it is w i thin the organ i sm that we ca nnot but locate its pr o x im a te rea l

condition s a s an exis t ent ( p ars 39 .

VII The elements wh i ch are i nseparable from one another i n al l

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human empiric al e xper i ence may be group ed under two heads formal ,

and m aterial the fOrm a l b eing th ose o f t i me duration and space

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e xtens i on an d the materi al some mode or modes of feeli n g But

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we cannot avo i d c onceiv i ng the possi b ility of an indefi n ite vari ety
of modes of con sciousness other than our own o f which we can form ,

no po s i tive idea whatever ( par .

VI I I T he Emot i ons are those m o des of feeling the exi stence o f

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whi ch is i mmed i ately conditioned u p on intra cerebral activit i es j ust -

as that of sensations is upon stimul i received by the peripheral termi

n ations o f the neuro cerebral system Their specifi c qualities in p oi n t
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of kin d are as i ncap able of b eing thought to be c aused or con

d it io n ed as those of sensation a re
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They have thus an equal title .

w i th the sensations and w i th the form al c o elements of time and

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s p ace which are common to both to ran k as ultimate sources o f

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man s whole k nowled ge of Be i ng and E xisten c e of the Universe and

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of Reality We cannot avoid understanding the terms Bein g and

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E xi sten ce to mean that which a t the lea st i s knowable by some con , ,

sc io usn e ss or other ( pars 5 1 .

IX . are the m o ti ves ( including in that term the unper

E motions
cei ved activ i ty of their pro x imate real conditions ) of all D es i re ,

Volition Thought and Conscious Actio n When consc i ou sly adopted

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they are k n own as Fi nal Causes ( pars 56 .

X Theology di ffers from Philosophy i n having a special obj ec t

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of inqu i ry viz the P o wer which upholds the Totality of Bei n g

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not that Total ity itsel f I t di ffers from Religion in not being emo
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t io n a l but theoretic a l on l y ( pa rs 60
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 S OME CARDINAL POINTS IN KNOWLEDGE 3

X I . Four so urces of Religion deep ly rooted i n human nature are

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then enumerated with some consequence s which they seem to n ec e s

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sita te ( pars 62 .

X II S peculat i ve knowledge begins with empiri ca l perceptions

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and ends with empirical ideas Plato was the first to grappl e with
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the q uestion of Becoming yiyve a fia t in his dialogue the P a m en id es

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which has somet i mes been sa i d to contain his Epistemology His .

relation to Parmenides the Eleati c ( pars 67 .

X III Mean i ng of the term un d er sta n d in g

. Thought being
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fou n ded on attent i o n which is an a c t of a r r est we see h o w the

, ,

Eleatic proofs of the impossib ility of motion are to be dea l t with .

Yet it is to P armenides the Eleatic that we mu st accord the honour

of be i ng the first to disti n guish Philosophy fr om Sc ience by his ,

doct r i n e of The T wo Roads — that of Truth and that of Opinion

,

( pars 73
.

X IV The a r r est in attent i on with which thought begins is a n

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, ,

arrest of someth i ng bel o n ging to consciousness as a kn o win g by that ,

same consciousness as an ex isten t which itself cont i nues to dea l with

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the arrested idea We c a n no more trans cend the ide a of Reality

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as something knowabl e by c onsciousness than we can limit by thought

,

the Totality of the Real whi ch i s i ts object thought of ( pars 7 8 .

B 1— 2
 S O ME C A R D IN A L P O IN TS IN

KN O W LE D GE

1 When Phi l o so phy beg ins to e x ist there is a vast mass of

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experi ence already acquired including both fac t and fancy into , ,

wh i ch i t has to inqu i re We have in this mass of ex perience the

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c ommon sense v i e w of th i ngs ; langu age h a s grown up pa r i pa ssu

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with the acqui sition of i t and with the ac qu i s i t i on of t he conce ptions

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by mean s of wh i ch i t group s and endeavours to understand i ts phe

n o m en a Bo t h the common sen se v i ew of th i ngs and the in vest igation
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of that v i ew which i s philosophy have the natur e of the Un i verse as

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thei r obj ec t of pursui t though philosophy far more defi ni tely and
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se lf consc i ously than common sense namely to understand the Un i

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verse so far a s poss i ble or i f and where it i s not poss i ble to underst and
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what and where i s the rea son for i ts being w i thdr awn from our
understan d i ng The fact wh ic h I ta k e to be indisputable that
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, ,

lan guage has grown up pa r i pa ss u with the common sen se view of -

th i ngs is s i gnifican t ; it s meaning is that ph i losophy h a s t o deal

,

w i th language p rec i sely a s i t deals with common sense ideas which -

l anguage r epresent s .

2 I t should be noted that common sense i tself warrants its being

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made the obj ec t i nquired i nto by ph i losophy on the pra ct i cal max im ,

of testing beliefs and avo i d i ng i l lusions by examin i ng from all sides ; ,

or i n other words ph i losophy has the warrant of common sense for

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e xi st i ng a nd for di stingui shing i tself a s a mode of thought in some

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way spec i fi c ally d i fferent from common sense I t w ould not b e -

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c ommon se nse but prej ud ic e w hich should refuse to give that warra nt
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to philosophy But c ommon sense does more than this I t also t o

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some extent pres c ribes the method of philosophical inquiry into the
n ature of the Un i v erse and of itsel f as common se n se knowled g e of
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it For i t demands that we should procee d without making any

.

assumpt i ons that i s that we shoul d a s k wha t it is we have got a s

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our o bject of inq uiry v iz our c ommon sense expe ri ence before
, .
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asking h o w i t co m es to be i n our experience how it c omes to be an ,

obj ect hav i ng a whatn ess To inquire fi r st into it s g en esis would be

.
6 PROCEEDINGS OF T HE B R I TI S H ACADEM"
to mak e the a pr io r i assumpt i on that we alread y know what genesis
i s And it is pl ain to c ommon sense that it i s i mposs i bl e to a sk
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what the genesis of anything is w i thout having someth i ng some ,

“

e xperi en c e h owever smal l or c onfu sed concern i ng wh i ch the question

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of genesis can b e put I n ph il osophy therefore the quest i on Wha t is

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always p ri or to the quest i o n H o w com es .

3 Essentially there a re on l y t wo line s p oss ib le for i t that of the

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r io r ist and tha t of the ea i i en t ia li st And i t i s clear I think

‘
e
a
p p .
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from what precedes that the kn o wi n g of obj ect s the sulyec ti ve a spec t
'

, ,

of obj ects o r briefly our c onsciousness or awareness of things is the

, ,

first essential chara cteri stic of the field of ph i losophy ; consciou sness
i s t h e sole ev i dence we have of or for anyth i ng whatever i tself ,

included Con sequently philosophy must p roc eed by analysis of that

.

e v i dence i e of consciousness ; and also all assum p tions no t force d

, . .

u pon us by exp eri ence of them as ul t i mate immed ia te and un a v o id , ,

able d a ta o r g i ven f a c ts of e x per i ence must be av o i ded even such

, , ,

apparently ne c essary ideas as tha t of a c onsc i ous be i ng or agent

Mind S oul S elf or Ego— who ha s the exp er i ence ; an assum pt i on
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wh i ch is m a d e for instance by Pe r r ier in the First Pro po sition of his

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In sti tutes of Meta physic and wh i ch he lays at the basis of his ,

ph i losoph i ca l system Th ere i s a wide di ffere nce be t ween immed i ate

.

an d ulti mate p erceptions which canno t be demonstrated solely because ,

they are i mmed i at e and ultimate or i n other words because they ,

cannot be doubted and o bj ects of bel i ef wh i ch may be held with

,

unwav ering tenac i ty a ltho ug h they a re not and perhaps ca nnot be

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demon strated The former c lass are facts the latter are beliefs only
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, .

Fa cts are not to b e c onfused with beliefs simply becau se they are like
them in be i ng indemonstrable .

4 s The first and least thing in consc i ousness is a con ten t of consc i ous
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ness what we aft erwards c all an o hj ec t of consciousness an empirical

, ,

percept I t i s not at first dist i ngu i shed from the p rocess of perceiving
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it nor perce i ved as the conclusion or accompaniment of that p rocess

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When we call it an o lyec t we must be on our guard a gai n st ta k ing

'

the proc e ss p erce i v i ng i t as what we af terwards call i t s sulyec ti vity or

'

sub j e c t i ve a s ec t
p To do so would be. to make the tacit assumpt i on of
a P erc eiving S ubj ect fo r making which as an in i tial assumpt ion
, , ,

there is no warrant i n experi ence Empirical percepts are the first .

things in know l edge He who in ph i losophy bases him self on the

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psychologica l assumpti on of a con scious S ubj ect a s in drawing the ,

distinction between S ubj ect and Obj ect as an in i t i al di st i n ct ion is ,

like a man who i n astronomy should base h i mself on the geocentri c

theory of the v is i ble universe .
 S OM E CARDINAL POI N TS I N KN OWLE DGE 7

5 . But the process perceiv in g such an em pi ri ca l pe rcep t i s also

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sub se ue ntly dist i nguished from the content perce i ved wh i ch is

q ,

c alled it s obj ect and a s so d i stingu i shed is thereby i tself o bj ec tified

, , , ,

i e m ade an obj ect of a subseq uent perc epti on

. . The original p roce ss .

o f p erceiving a content as dist i ngui shed from the con t ent of wh i ch i t

,

is ori ginally an undistingu i shed part is now perce i ved a s itself a n ,

obj ect and in tha t c ha r a c ter is con sciou snes s not as a knowing of
, ,

c ontents or of obj ects but simply as an emisten t an e xi st i ng proce ss of

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knowing At the same time wha t i t is as an ex isten t what i t i s as

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a r o cess c an b e known only from the contents it s own contents

p , , ,

wh i ch it o bj e c t ifies Among these obj ects is i tself a s an ex is tent

.

process ; i t a l so i s knowable only by being o bj ec t ifi e d j ust a s all ,

other c ontents of consciousness are The process as well a s i ts .

c ontent s the contents of the process

, i s o bj e c t ifie d in being k nown ,

a s a p roce ss — a p rocess hav ing and obj ectify i ng co ntents .

6 Henceforwar d i e when in phi l osophy we ta k e conscio usnes s

.
, . .

w i th both its con st i tuent s— process and c ontents- i n c lud ed though ,

distingu i shed from one another we are pre cluded fro m tak i ng ,

t h e p rocess as the su bj ect i vity of the o bj ec t ifi ed contents i f we were ,

e ver tem p ted to do so ; fo r it is itself o bj ec t ifie d along with and

equally w i th i ts contents Cons c iousness with its process a nd con tents
.

included i s our so le eviden c e for everything we can poss ibly t hin k of ,

a lthough it is itself of ne c essity thought of as an ex i sten t proces s , ,

and that too a self obj ect i fying process Henceforward therefore in
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,

philosophy the o bj e c t ifie d contents of consc i ousnes s ( p r ocess and

,

contents in cluded ) become for us the subj ect i ve aspect or subj ec ti vity , ,

of whatever we ca n think of or imagin e a s Bein g or E x isting inde ,

pendently of or not i ncl ud ed in our own e x istent consciousnes s

, , .

And the question is ra i sed Is there su ch a th i ng a sBein g or E x istin g

,

which is n on c o n scio usn ess " Is not such an i dea a mere fut i lity a n d
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\vill o the w i sp
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7 The reply wh ich I shou l d make to this question re lying solel y

“

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on what h a s been al ready said i n this paper a reply whi ch leaves t he ,

c ompl ete an swe r open to furt he r eviden c e but at the sa me time ,

p re cl udes the a pr i or i a doption either of Ideal ism or T r a n sc en

d entalism is a s follows ,
Our notio n of Be in g or Exi sting the very
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,

meani n g of those words is de r ived from the o bj ec t ifi e d content of

,

c onsciousness— the subj e c tivity or subj ec tive aspect o r evidence of

, , ,

everything whatever We cannot perceive think of or imagine

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, ,

Be ing or E xistence e xc ept by pe rc eiv in g th i nking of or i magi n i ng , ,

them . Consequently the f a c t of being p erceived imag i ned o r , ,

thought of is our ult i m ate mea n i n g and indis pensable meani n g of

, , ,
8 PROCEEDINGS OF THE B RIT I S H AC ADE M"
the words Bein g and E x isten ce But th i s does not i mply that what.

is our sole evidenc e of bei n g existence or i n one word r ea li ty is com

, , ,

me n s urate with the re al i ty whi ch it informs us of The whol e nature .

of perceived contents or obj ects i s not exhausted by o ur perce i ving

o r obj ect i fy i ng those contents Whether it i s or is not i s open t o
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evidence wh i ch our own consc i ousness which raises the question , ,

must afford I t is only i n the case of consciou sness i tself as a pro cess
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disti n guished b ut not sep a rated from its own immediate o bj ects that ,

pe r ceivi ng an d being perc eived are identi c al I t i s here that my .

d i stinctio n between consc i o usness as an e x istent and c onscious n ess as

a kno wi n g is of service e n abl i ng us to a void the puzzles so freque n tl y
,

inv ol ved in premature assert i on There i s no reason why we sho uld .

attribute con sciousness as an e x istent and therefore also a s a kno w in g , ,

to all objects wh i ch we perc eive or thin k o f sim p ly bec ause o ur con ,

sc io usn e ss o b ec t ifi e s them
j j ust as in existi
, n g it o b ec t ifi e s itse l f
j .

From the fact that all con sciousness i s obj ect i fi c at i on it d o es not
follow that ev erything o bj ec t ified is consc iousness Con sciousness is .

the only evid en ce of fa ct t r ue — b ut this does not mean that the

,

e vidence alone and not the fact ex ists Co n sciousness (as we shall
, , .

see ) is no t all that e x ists ; i t is the si n e u a n on of our idea of

q
e xi sten c e In short consciousness is r evela tio n Proof of wha t it is
.
, .

there is none ; proof tha t i t ex ists is gi ven only by its existing At .

the same t i me the relativity of Being or E x is t ing to consciousness ,

the m ea n i n g of those terms for us is preser ved We st il l find that , .

obj ec ti vi ty or pe r cei va bi li ty is the i r mea ning in general terms n o t ,

another sor t of Be i ng or E xi stence a t the bac k o f o r underlyi n g , , ,

or ca using the phenomenal sort to which we are restricted— a trans

c e n d e n t a l sort We ca n not thin k of Be i ng or E xiste n ce except a s
.

relative or phenomenal that is by thi n king of i t Si milarly our o wn

, , .

S ubj ect i vit y wh i ch must be and i n fa c t is o bj ec t ified i n think in g

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of i t m ust be t aken and understood as the ge n eralized character o f

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perceiv i ng thi nk i ng of or imagini n g obj ect s ; that is as an attri bute

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common t o all S ubj ec t s ( supp osing the notion of S ubj ects est ablished ) ,

not as a tran sc ende n tal a ttri bute of a n on phe n ome nal so rt -

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8 S u c h notions a s these — a non phenomenal Be in g or Existe n ce

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and a n on phenomenal S ubj ect or S ubj ect i vity— are themsel ves derived
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solely from certain i nterpretations wh i ch we put upon the p henomen a

of ou r own consc i ousness our own ex peri ence and which are fall ac iousl y
, ,

derived therefrom The true i n terpr etatio n to be put on those phe

.

n o m e n a i s not that Be ing or e xistence is er se or a a r te r ei either

, p p , ,

con sc iousness or else u n knowable ( w hich latter is a con tra dictio n in

t erms ) but that our huma n modes of knowing are lim i ted
, But ho w .
 S OME CARD I NAL POINTS I N KN O IVLE DG E 9

and why th i s is the true interp r etati o n ca n b e see n on l y from further

e xam in at i on of the phe n omena themselves The r e is someth i ng in .

our experien c e whi ch compe l s us to l oo k for an explanation of every

fa ct and yet of this fac t— o f experie n cing itself— no e xpl an ation ca n
,

be gi ven which does n ot itself c ontain another i nstance of the fa ct to

b e ex plained .

9 Aga i n in knowing the di screte presup p oses the continuous ;

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the contin uous does n ot presuppose the d iscrete The abstract pre .

supposes the concrete ; the concrete does not p resuppose the abstract .

P ar t presupposes whol e ; whole does not p resuppose p art S u bj ect pre .

supposes obj ect obj e ct does n ot pr esuppose S ubj ect Yet i n ea ch of .

these pairs and mo re might be added each member of them a ppea r s

, ,

to presuppose the other being alike i n this respect How and why
, .

is th i s " The a ppe aran c e c omes from the fact that we understand
the given on l y when w e have to some exte n t analysed i t and made ,

each member throw l ight by contrast upon the other ; we un d er sta n d

, ,

the c ontinuous only by c ontrast w i th the discrete the conc rete only ,

by c ontrast with the abst ract wholes on l y by cont rast with their
,

parts obj ects on ly by co n trast with their S u bj e c ts N o w if abstract

, .

th i nki n g ab stract thought alone was the g i ver of our ultimate data
, ,

of cons c iousness oppositio n s of th i s sort would be our ultimate data

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i n exp er i ence and the appearance of ea c h member of a pa ir being

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a li ke in presupposing the other would be the truth a true appe a rance

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a fact ; the Not being the Nothing of Hegel s first pair of opposites
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wou l d be as much the presupposition of Being as Being is of Not

be i ng But then this idea that abstract thought is the g i ver of the
.
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ult i mate data of cons ci ousness is a pure assumption and one which
, ,

is re futed by al l actual an d unavo i dable e xpe ri ence H o w is this " .

The ul tim ate dat a of conscious n ess a re all emp i ri cal Take the .

simplest a nd lowest momen t of co n s c iousness you can imagine or

th in k o f— a simple feeling of plea su r e for instan c e or of pa i n or , , ,

of any sensation or of a n y so called in n er feel i ng or a ffec tio n or

,
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of any thought or judgeme n t — it i s what we c a ll empir ica l i t is n ot ,

er ec t ly simple i t has at any rate dis t inguish a ble but non separab l e
p f
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elements it has some durat i on as well a s some specific quality ; its

,

felt spe c ific quality has some duration w ithout wh i ch it would not
exist either as a feel in g or as a thought To im agine i t ex i sting fo r .

n o d u r a tio n is to imagine i t n o t m i sti n n o n ex i sten t The fact to

g
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wh i ch I may give the general name the distin c tio n of i n sepa r a ble s in ,

all experience is I believe the most i mportant and fundamenta l fac t

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i n p h i losophy and ins i sten c e on it the most character i stic feat ure of
,

me taphysi ca l method pre c luding the understa nd i ng of s i ngle names

,
10 PROCEEDINGS OF THE B RITIS H A CA DE MY

as expressi v e of si n gl e s i mpl e and separable c ontents of consci ous

, ,

ness The two oppos i te time d i rect i ons in cons c iousness p resently to
.
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be spoke n of are an instance of this distinction I may add that the

, .

fundamenta l chara cter of the di stinction in philo so phy because found ,

as a fa ct in al l per c ept ion was clearly enunciated in my Ti m e a n d

,

S pa ce 186 5 ( e g P ar t I ch ii
, . . 1 1 pp 4 5 , and all my subse
.
, , .

quent w ork in philosophy h a s I t h ink tended unequ i vocally to , ,

support the validity of that j udgement There are in fac t n o su ch .

things as a to m s in co n sc i ousness .

1 0 Now what is it that we do in ac t ually e xp eriencing in bei n g

.
,

cons c ious or aware of a c ontent or contents i n b eing aware of i t or ,

them apart or abstra cting from any particul ar quali ty or prope rty
,

which may be theirs ; for some su c h qual i ty or p roperty all

alike possess " D o we find a nythi ng i n them whi ch i s common to
all co n tents alike and in v olved i n all al i ke whatever their specific ,

di fferen ces may be " S o taken what we find is this that we ha ve in , ,

co n scious n ess a s equence of em pi rical moments of c onsciousness a ,

sequen c e of what p erhaps may best be called pr esen ta tio ns no matter ,

what other characteristics they may contain quite apart from any ,

idea or knowledge of their being pr esen ted to us from outside obj ects
a nd c oming i n the gu i se of sensations or from with in the m i nd or ,

from within the brain and so com i ng in the gu i se of representations

, ,

ideas o r thoughts or desires or feeli n gs of an y ki n d Whatever

, , , .

their specific nature they a re actu a lly pr esen t moments of conscious

,

n ess Let us ta k e them as a sequence of si n gl e se n sations abs t ract i ng

.
,

from their c o e x isti n g context if any and call the m a b c d O f

-

, , , , .

these a is a presentation whi c h be c omes vivid then becomes l ess

, ,

vivid an d before it has c eased being i n c ons c iousness is followed by b

, ,

whi c h in its turn becomes vivid then be c omes less vi v id a n d agai n is , ,

fol lowed befo re ceasi n g to exist by c and c again in l ike manner by d , .

I take a short se r ies in order to be ab l e to trea t the whole the four ,

pr ese n tations it c on sists of a s one prese n t atio n notwithstanding that

, ,

each of its three earl ie r members h a s chan ged its character i n respe ct ,

of vividness whe n d is prese n t and d itself is also undergoi n g the

, ,

s a me chan ge The member ca lled d i n fact r et a i n s in what we may

.
,

call rete n tive ( n ot recalli ng) memory itself bei n g still vi v id an , ,

a wareness of the th ree earlier present ations a b a nd 0 having ri se n , , , ,

i n to vividness and the n ceased to be vivid whereby it i n c l udes a ,

memo ry of them as part an d parcel of its own a wareness so long as it

'

c o n tinues to be an actual l y present membe r of the series .

1 1 In the next pla c e l et it be observed that this who l e presen tation

.

as it is in the supposed last member of it d is entirely i ndependent of , ,

 S OME CARDINAL POINTS IN KNOWLEDGE 11

y act of though t We here and now are using thought to an a lyse

.

it and we a r e using terms ac qu i red by means of thought t o describe

,

it but the presentation itse l f shows no trace of thought or of having

, ,

been produced by thinki n g N o e ffort no pur po se no act of c o n .

, ,

c e i vi n or j udgi n g is i nc luded in it If su c h a c ts were to oc c ur in

g , .

a presentation they wou l d be a specifi c m o d ifi cation of any su c h

sim p le presentation a s that whi c h we hav e figu red and woul d pre ,

suppose some su ch presentation as their o wn m ater ial and field of

operation .

1 2 In the ne x t plac e be i t noted — and th i s perhaps is the most

.

important feature of a ll— that a sequence such as that now des c ri bed .

seems in its changes to move a t o n c e in two oppo si t e directions of time ,

from present to past a n d from past to present For the presentation .

which we hav e ca lled d is a n awareness a t o n c e of the c the b and the , ,

a, as memories which r eced e from itself as a v i vid p resentation c ,

standi n g nearest and a farthest from itself while at the same time it
, ,

is awa re of these s a me members havi n g occurred that i s of having , ,

be en vivid presentations i n the oppos i te order of sequence the c on

, ,
‘
t r a r y dire c tio n of ti me t he a having oc c urred bg b r e the b the b before
, ,

the c and the 0 befo re itself the d In d i tsel f also the same two
, .

co n trary m ovements c o exi sti n g w i th e a ch other are experie n ced by

,
-

it as it rece des so that they must be thought of ( subsequently ) as

,

c o e x isting i n every st r ictly present portion of c on sciousness

-
I n bri ef .
,

d is an a wareness of the whole c on ten t of the series as a chang e from

present to past and of the o ccur r en ce of the seri es as a change from
,

past to present .

1 3 Be it noted also that there is in su ch simple prese n ta t i ons a s

.
,

the one j ust figured no idea or suggestion whatever of t i me fu tur e

, .

Time is not ori g i nall y experienced as divided i n t o p a st presen t a n d , ,

future The idea of future time o r of the future as co n ti n uous with

.
,

the present a n d the past requires some fur ther mod i fication of ex pe
,

r ie n c e not inc l uded in the simplest cases of it But time p ast and .

time present bo th of them bei n g found by analysis as c ontai n ed

, , ,

in the simp l est empirical members of cons c iousness are found a s ,

essential el ements of those members which are the ultimate chi ta of

our experi en c e .

1 4 How the n a re we to figu r e to ourselves how u n d er sta n d the

.
,

experience whi c h seems at fi rst sight so parad oxica l " I mea n the
c h ange th a t is the movement i n point of time of on e an d the same
, , ,

presenta tion one and the s a me empirical member of c on sciousness i n

, ,

two opposite time di rections at once I th i nk we must dea l with it a s

-
.

fol lows — we must dist i nguish between the b are f a c t of being cons c ious
12 PROCEEDINGS OF THE B R I TI S H ACA D E M "
or aware of a n yt h i ng that i s of the occurrence of empi rical members
, ,

of consciousness a n d the wha t of those mem bers or the co n ten t apart

, ,

from the fa ct of the i r occurrence or of t he i r be i ng perce i v ed T he i r .

c onten t is in fact the sole ev i dence we hav e for anything whatever ,

i n cluding t he occ urrence of the mem bers of consc i ous n ess them selves .

S o that the term c o n ten t of consciousness is c o e x tens i ve with the

, ,
-

term con scio usn ess i tself while at the same t ime it characterizes
,

con sc i ousness a s a kn o win g in c ontrad i s ti nct i on from the occurrence of

,

those mem b ers of i t of which occurrence as a fac t it is the e v idence

, .

The bare fac t of the occ urrence of such members on the other hand , ,

i s the bare fact that some content or o ther i s p erc ei v ed that they ,

come i nto be i ng a s consc i o usness ; that is they are c on sciousness as ,

a n ex i sten t . In th i s latter chara c t er they must be held to have

some real conditions of e xi sten c e c ond i tions wh i ch the ultimate ,

elemen t s of c onsciousness as a kn o win g cannot be conce i v e d as

even c apable of having s i nce they are themselves the source of o ur
,

not i on of c on d i t io n s as of all other noti ons or i dea s whatever There

, .

are thus two orders of sequence i n consc i o usness the order of knowledge ,

( by which is not meant the log i cal order of unders tanding things ) and ,

the order of e xi s tence Consc i ousness m ust be thought of as existi n g

.
,

in depende n ce upon some real cond i tion or cond it ions of i ts ex iste n ce ,

before it can be thought of as a kn owi n g and must exist as a knowi n g ,

before it can c onta i n the thought of itself as an existent The two .

contrary time directions in co n s ci ousness belong not to consciousness

-
,

i mag i ned a s an unchan ging entity a cons c ious age n t or faculty but to
.
, ,

consc i ous n ess experi enced as a process con tent— all process i n time -

i nvolv in g some change and di fferentiation of its proceed in g co n te n t ,

and thereby i n the case of cons c iousness admi tting its di fferent iation
, ,

into opposite aspects obj ective and subj ective and into O pposite
, ,

directions of its seq uen c es without los i ng its own cont in u i ty both
, ,

aspects and b oth sequences be i ng ali k e obj ects of consc i ousness as

a kn o wi n g wh i ch is o ur sole e vid en ce fo r the e x isten c e as well as for
, ,

the content or whatness of a nything whate ver real co n dit i ons of

, ,

e x istence included Observe moreover that the change of an i mme

.
, ,

diate pr esentat i on into a memory whi c h is it s representation is

essent i al to every em p irical present moment of cons c io usness or
expe rie n ce and that ever y such moment i s both a proces s itself
,

and must be thought of as part of a larg er process whether this ,

l atter is a p rocess of consciousness only or of obj e cts of conscious n ess

also w ith which it is cont i nuous
, But the t wo opp os ite time .

dir e ction s spoken of are c c ex i s t ent in every emp i ri cal present moment
-

of c onsc i ousness and this ve ry c o ex istence it i s wh i ch since they

,
-
,
 S OM E CARDINAL POINTS IN KNOWLEDGE 13

cc - exist and do not div i de it enabl es us to understand i ts s pec i al and

,

unique natu r e as cons c iousness a n ature whi c h d i ffere nti ates it from ,

everything else that the Un i ve rse may c ontain This spe c ial natu re .

i s if we may so speak a c ertain do uble n ess whereby it h as i ts own

, , ,

c ontent i ts own spec ifi c fee l ings or qualities as its own immed iate
, ,

obj ects I t is awa reness of its own c ontents a s repr esentations while
.
,

those c ontents a re themsel v es a n a warene ss as p resentat i ons ; though

if ( per i m po ssi bile) it were not a process we should never be able to ,

perceive this its spe cial a n d unique nature by distinguish i ng as we ,

n o w do its c ontents from i ts awareness of them But as it is the

, .
,

rece ding time direct i on of contents whi c h we are aware of occupies of

-

necess i ty the same portion of time a s the a d vancing t ime direc ti on of -

our awareness of them occupies and that in every empirica l present ,

moment of consc i ousness .

15 To reali ze the d i fference be t ween the orders of e x istence and of

.

k nowledge and of the opp os i te direct i ons i n wh i ch one and the same
,

c on sc i ousness one and the same e xperi ence seems to be mo v i ng take

, , ,

any moment a p o i nt of t i me i n any ord i nary ex perience as we have

, ,

it at the p resent day w i th our i deas of future a s well a s p ast and

,

present time already famil i ar ; a dop t that p o i nt as your po i nt of

v i ew an d a sk what that e xperi ence is as seen from it "o u w i l l
, , .

then I th i nk find s i nce i t is a presen t moment of that exp erience

, , ,

from whi ch yo u s uppo se yourself to be loo k ing that on one s i de you ,

hav e an unknown and at present non exi sten t f u ture i nto wh i ch -

your e xperien c e seems to be ad vanc i ng wh i le on the other si de your ,

e xp er i ence has ta k en the form of memory a more or less corre c t ,

rep re sentat i on of a pa st wh i ch t houg h i t has once ex i sted i s exi stent

, , ,

no longer Your e xperi ence a s i t a d vances into the future is ex

.

e r i e n c e a s an ex isten t a n d as i t i n so ad van c ing cha n ges i nto

p , , ,

memory becomes rep re sentation of a past a lengthening and receding

, ,

chain of representati on wh i ch i s experience a s a kn o wing , .

1 6 Returning now w ith th i s analyt i cal key in o ur hand s to the

.

ca se of presen t ation with which we began w e can see that what we ,

ca lled the em pi ri cal mem ber d of c onsciousness in the sequen c e ,

'

a, b c d i s an emp i ri cal p resent member i n wh i ch the two orders o f

, , , ,

knowled ge and of ex istence co i ncide ; but this is now though t of

a s p art of an ever chang i ng process content -
adm i tt i ng whatever -
,

d i fferentiat i o n s may have the warrant of ex peri ence which process ,

c ontent is no longer thought of a s an unchangi ng ent i ty obv i ously ,

c hargeable w i th self cont ra d i ct i on if thought of as mo vi ng i n t wo

-

contrary t i me d i rect i ons at once For ob serve what i s of the g r eatest

-
.
,

im port ance the ti me durati on wh i ch i s common to both the orders

,
-
,
14 PROCEEDINGS OF THE B RITIS H ACAD EMY
or i n whi c h they c oincide is not itself perceived a s moving or ,

changing Havi n g of itself no content whatever but be i ng me rely

.
,

a n esse n tial c o element in the empirical members of consciousness

-

it must be thought of a s time duration simply not as chang i ng or -

fl owing at all "however equ a bly ; not a s sta t ic or at rest nor as

, ,

dynam i c o r in motion ; not as distingu i shed i nto past present and

'

, ,

fut ure or even into past and prese n t only All thes e d i st i nctions
, .

belong not to time duration per se or i n the abstract b u t only as

,
-
,

it is found in the empirical data i nto whi ch i t enters as an essential

and insep arable c onstituent or element empiri cal data which though , ,

an alysable into d i st ingu i shable elements a r e t he ul t imate data of

.
,
.

e x perien c e T he di fferent spec i fic feeling s or sensations wh i ch are

.
,

its c o element in the ult i mate em pi rical data are the element wh i ch
-
-
,

i n troduces or wh ic h originally enables the i ntroduction of any dis

,

tin c tion whatever into ti m e durati on per se I n a least empiric a l -

.

present member s ay for instance any one of our a b c d ser ies

, , , , ,

imagining it for th at purpo se as reduced to a m i n im um no change or ,

motion would be perce i v ab le by our sens i t i vity ; d uration ( but no

change ) would be sensibly perceived in it But this does not mean .

th a t i t is perce i ved as s tat i c or at rest I t i s gi ven to percep tion b ut .

,

of course not though t of a s what we su b seq ue n tly call a c on tin uum , .

But then no single empir i cal least member of e x perience ( supposi ng i t

possi ble) would be enough of i tself tak en singly or i n isolat ion , ,

to constit ut e any experience that we can th i n k of I n expe ri en c e .

,

such lea s t empiri cal members always occur i n seq ue n ces such as
com p o se our a b c d ser i es and in some context of si multaneously
, , , ,

oc c urr i ng members We distinguish the i r m in im a l character only by

.
.

thought and a s so d i stinguished they stand to the experi ences which

”

, ,

they then seem to compose i n a relat i on very si mi lar to th at i n which ,

their own cons t ituent elements the formal and the material stand , ,

towards them .

1 7 I t i s the stream of em p ir i ca l e xp er i ence alone wh i ch when

. ,

mathem at i ca ll y di vided or held t o be divisible by thought ,

;

, ,

divis i ons the thought of whi c h i s originally made poss i ble by

di fferences percei v ed in the material or sensation c o eleme n t of -

consciousness c a n be held to flow equ a bly ; whi c h it does by virtue

,
-

of i ts mathematical di v i sibility into ideally equal port i ons I n that .

sense Time duration i n Newton s phrase a egua bi liter j lui t And in

,
-

,
’
, .

fac t we hav e — in the d i stin c tion between the two or ders of knowledge
and of existen c e— the j ustification the origin in e xperi e n ce of t he , ,

great disti nc tion of Method the dis t inction between the N a tur e and ,

the Gen esis of e verything a d i st i nction i nsi st ed on by Plato in se vera l

,
 S OME CARDI N AL PO I NTS IN KN OWLEDGE 15

places I t i s t he n a t ur e of co n s c iousness to be a kn o wi n g ; it is the

.
‘

en esis of consciousness that in M an a t a n y rate i s known be ca use

g , , ,

d i sco vered to be dependent on real c onditions of e x istence And it

,
.

is the analys i s of the n a tur e of consciousness which enables and

compels us to dra w this distinction as well a s th a t between the two ,

orders of knowledge a nd of e xi stence themselves M a n s c onscious

, , .
’

ness h as no t to provide for its o wn genesis ; it is not known a pr io r i

a screa t i v e ; it has only to provide in its metaphysi c al dep a rtment , ,

for und erstanding so far as it can it s own n ature and genesis these
, , ,

conceptions having been arr i ved a t by experience In its nature .

,

philosophy i s a k nowing That k nowing and existing should fo l low

.

opposite time direction s is no contradi c tion even if they coincide

-

i n occupying the same empirical portions of time d uration in which -

no time direction and therefore no difference of time dire c tions is

-
,
-

perc eivabl e We now see that when we think of a n empiri c al present

.
,

member of the stream of consciousness as mov in g from p a st to present ,

we a re thi n ki ng of it as an ex isten t and when we think of it a s ,

moving from p rese n t to past we a r e thinki ng of it as a kn o win g .

The pe rc eption or thought of it as an e x istent is the s ubj ective a spect

of it as an exi stent ; the percept i on or thought of i t as a knowing
i s the percept i on or thought of it as the ev i dence and the sole ,

ev i dence that is the su bject i ve as pect of anything and everything

, , ,

wh atever .

18 Moreover we must thin k of any empirical and act ual present

.
,

member as belonging to consciou s ness as an e x istent a n d therefore to ,

the o rder of existen c e of consciousness ; it is actual only as so

b elonging But then also bein g thereby generalized it ha s n o special
.
, ,

content a ttached to it or incl uded in it except its a ctual ity any , ,

more than the b a re general i zed fact of the e x istence of c onscious n es s

has I t is so to speak a mo vable and mo v ing pr esen t It moves
.
, , .

forwards in time over all the conten t s which i t leaves behind i t as it

were c on te n ts which hav e once been prese nt members themsel ves as
,
.
,

the a b a nd c of our instance when they have become memories to d

, , , .

A n d t o thin k of the actually present member as moving forwards is ,

c o ipso to th in k of those memories as moving ba ckwards from it

, ,

th at is a s receding fa rther an d farther i nto the pa st I s ay c c ipso

‘

, .

because it is on l y the receding order of k n owledge which e na bles us

to thi n k of a forward mov i ng con sc i ousness at al l The memory
-
.

order is pri or to the e xi stence order in order of knowl e dge As an -

, .

existent consciousness o bj ec t ifie s its own c ontent as a k n ow in g and

, ,

the content of one actually presen t member bec omes as it recedes ,

into memory the obj ect of the ne xt actually present mem ber as i t
,
.
16 PROCEEDINGS OF TH E B RITIS H ACA D EM "
advances i n to what at a l ater stage of experie nc e th a n that whi ch we
,

have now bee n e x amining we call the Future , .

1 9 But when we say that c ons c iousness o bj e c t i fi e s i ts o wn con t ent

.
,

as the ru l es of g ra mmar c ompel us to do we must remem ber that the ,

whole agency e ffecti veness or power the do i n g i n vol v ed or intended

, , ,

in the use of the v erb active belongs to the real cond i tion of the ,

p rocess to that which ( whatever i t m ay turn ou t to be ) brings

,

c on sciousness as a k now i ng into ex i stence and makes an e xi sten t of it , .

And it is the fact of the o cc ur r e n ce the a r isin g of feelings sensat i ons , , , ,

o r ideas as conscious state s that we have n o w to cons i der a s for

, , ,

instan c e of the a b c d of the seri es we have alrea d y h a d before us

, , , , .

The occurren c e of p arti c ular con sc i ous states in such ser i es as we

have descri bed is someth i ng that plainly requires accounting for and ,

accordingly we look fo r someth i ng wh i ch we cal l the real cond i tion or

c onditions on wh ic h i t dep end s I t i s not the nature or whatness .

of the s p ecific qual i t i es of the simplest data of cons c iousnes s or of ,

cons c iousness i tself abstracting from the p articular i n stances of i t ,

i nto which we are then i nqu i ring The se are incapable of be i ng .

thought of as cond i t i on e d ; no e ffic i ent agent or agency w i thout

speci fic qualities of it s own which must be thought of either a s , ,

or as obj ects of modes of consc i ousness being conce i vable Bu t

, , .

what the rea l cond i t i oning of the occurrence of consc i ous state s that ,

is of the i r ex i sten c e whi c h i s also ind i rec tly ( owing to the nat ure of
, ,

consciousness ) the real condit i on i ng of consciousne ss a s a k nowing ,

accounts for o r would account for supposing it to b e a sc ertained , ,

i s i ts arising i ts genesis its continuance but not pri mari ly or

, , ,

d i rectly i ts nat ure a s a k now i ng When i t ari ses or comes into .

ex i stence it comes i n shape of emp i rical perceptual mem bers of

,

a p rocess members whi c h a r e our ultimate data of knowledge and

, ,

the nature of whi ch and even the nature of the i r c onnex ion with
,

their real cond i tions of existence must i f poss i ble be learn t from the i r
,

analys i s or by way of i nference therefrom s i nce the i r a ctual ar i si n g

, ,

a s perceiv i ngs or p r oduct i on as states of cons c iousness by what we

,

a fterwards call their pr o x im a te rea l condition cannot be it self ,

o b ec t ifi ed as a c ontent of consc i ousnes s at the v ery i n stant of it s

j
producing them We cannot perce i ve a p er ce i v i ng ti ll the p rocess
.
,

is pe rcei ved to whi ch i t be longs .

20 What then do we k now what are we com pelled to i n fer

.
, ,

concerning the arising of consc i ousne ss a s an exi stent i n dependence ,

upon it s real c onditions from the o bj ec t ified content of con sciousness

,

as a kno wi ng which i s the sole e v i dence we have for anyt hing

,

whatev er " Consc i ousness i s plai nly a very d i fferen t thing for us ,
 S OME CARDINAL POINTS I N KNOWLEDGE 17

according as i t is thought of a s a knowing or as an existent As a n .

exi stent it is a more o r l ess permanent obj e c t amon g other obj ects ,

intermittent in i ts objectific ation as for i n stan c e when i n terrupted by

,

sleep but capable of c ontents in imme n se v ariety among whi ch are

, ,

the premisses from whi ch its own identity notwithstan di n g its inter ,

m it t en c e as an existent is i n ferr ed
,
As a knowing it is that st ream
.

of contents whi c h c omes before us portion by port i on in a way which ,

we may c all it s own sel f o bj e c t ifi c a t io n a s a stream ; i n to wh i ch

-

stream atte n tion thought desi re and indeed a vast variety of other
, , ,

modes of conscious n ess m a y enter quite di fferent from su ch simple

,

members as those c o n templ ated i n our selected i n stance Now what .

is it that guarantees the greater or l es s permanen c e a s an existent

of this strea m of knowi n g every portion of which is transitory arising
, ,

once and then passing away app arently never to return, Whatever
it may be it is this whi ch is mean t when we speak of the real
,

c ondition or c ondition s of conscious n ess .

21 And here the i n ferential character of our k n owledge of the

.

real condition s and conditioni n g of con sciousness should be explicitly

recog n ized We can percei v e c ons c iousness per se th at is without at
.
, ,

the same time perceivi n g that it is consciousness which we perc eive ;

we are then simply objectifyi n g a c ontent but we can not pe rceive the
percei vi ng pro cess apart from a c on tent or the perceiver apart from ,

his percei v ing process with its c ontent ; that is we cannot perceive ,

either the perceiver or his perc ei v ing per se because perceiving is ,

obj e ctifyi n g and to perceive either the pure S ubject or the pu re

, ,

p rocess of pe r ceiving wou l d be to m ake objects of them i n the very

,

a c t of perceivi n g them so th a t the idea of doi n g so i n volves a con

,

t r a d ic t io n in terms I mean th at it is sel f contradi cto ry to disti n gu i sh

.
-

a perc e i ver or a pe rceivi n g from their contents or obj ects and to ,

imagi n e them perceivabl e in that abstrac t shape or as so distinguished , .

It woul d be a c ase of what is commonly called mak in g entities of

abstra ctions .

22 Conseque n t l y whe n we think or speak of the pure S ubject

.
,

or of pure S ubj ectivity we must not imagi n e that we are thinking of

, ,

or expressing in those terms a ny immediate perceptio n or knowl edge

,

of a S e lf or an Ego a S oul or a Mind and so on ; what w e a r e

, , , ,

obj ectifyi n g when so thi n ki n g is our own thought of cons ci ousness

, ,

in the abstract or as c ont radisting uished fr om obj ects and obj ectivity
, .

This of c our se does not mea n th at the contents of such terms are
unreal ; but they ar e real o nl y i n the c o n crete and as disti n guished ,

in the concrete by ou r thought of what the concrete involves as

its essential eleme n ts o r characters As so involved they depen d for.

v B 2
18 PROCEEDINGS OF THE B RITIS H ACAD EMY
their e x isten c e as c onsciousness i tself does upon some real condition
, ,

or conditio n s of existen c e I f amon g these c ondition s any shoul d

.

be fou n d whi c h can o nly or p r efe rab ly be denoted by su ch ter ms a s

, ,

S el f Ego S oul Mind a nd so on it ca n only be so because some

, , , , ,

positive knowledge of those c onditions will have been ac quired ,

a positive know l edge ve ry di fferent fr om the know l edge of them as

pure abstractions which those ter ms m ay as we have j ust seen be
, , ,

al so empl oyed to exp ress They must in c onsequen c e of any positive

.
,

knowledge of them be treated a s con c rete real ities and not as

, ,

abstractions As real conditions they must be known as con crete

.

realities and not as abstract elements of that whi c h they are held
,

to c ondition And this I think explains and j ustifies the reason

.
, ,

why we have to dism i ss as noted above that first distin ction whi ch
, , ,

at the outset of phi l osophizi n g we might be incl ined to draw between , ,

the o bj e c t ifi ed content of conscious n ess a s the obj e ctivity and the ,

mere pro c ess of pe rc eivi n g a s the subj e c tivity of expe r ien ce and have ,

to rep l ace it as was al so noted by disti n guishi n g also within c on

, , ,

sc i o u sn e ss itse l f the c ontent of consciousness as a know i ng wh i ch is

, ,

its subj e ctivity from its own obj ective aspe ct a s a known that i s to say
, , ,

from the perceived fact of its c omi n g i n to existence as consciousne ss .

2 3 Co n scious n ess as an existe n t then i s a re a l condit i onate of

.
, ,

some rea l co n ditio n o r c o n ditio n s which we must think of as not

cons c iousnes s whatever it o r they may turn out to be But we k now

, .

conscious n ess a s a n exi stent that is we k n ow the fac t of its e xistence

, , ,

sol ely through its o wn content as a knowi n g And we do not in the .

first instan c e perc ei v e its existential chara cter or disti n guish it a s an ,

ex i stent fr om itself as a knowi n g It gives us the refore no k nowledge .

of loc ality or of its own location within the body whi ch i s aft erwards
, ,

perceived as the constan t c ent ral obj ect of its own panorama Neither .

the ab stract fact of bei n g conscious nor any of the simplest and ,

lowest empiri cal perceptions give us an y knowledge of spatial ,

tens i o n or even of pla c e i n a time series of experiences though i t may

,
-

possibly and I think truly be argued that the merely abstra c t fact
, , ,

of be i ng c onscious that is cons c iousness being t a ken wi thout any

, ,

specific c o n tent being thought of invo l ves some time duration without , ,

whi ch this ab stract fact itsel f would be impossible However this .

may be it is clear that the d i stinct p e rcept i o n both of t i me d ur at i on

, ,
-

and of place in any time series of experien ces belongs to the content
-

of c onsciousness as a knowi n g j ust as much as our perc eption of ,

the body and of spatial ex tension does The time durat i on in vo l ved .
-

in the abstract fact of c onsciousness is common to it with that

invol ved in the speci al c o n tent of an y and ev ery particu lar actua l
 S OME CARDINAL POINTS IN KNOWLEDGE 19

a wareness or mome n t of c on crete c o n s c iousness ; they both o cc upy

o n e an d the same portio n of time du ratio n ; an d this fac t c on stitute s -

the immediacy of that spe c ial an d parti cu lar c o n ten t of c o n s c iousness ,

or i n other wo r ds is o ur k n owl edge of it as an existe n t perc ept .

2 4 Now it is on l y fr o m the two senses of sight an d tou ch ( the

.

l atter i n te n sified it may be by the mus c u l ar se n s ation s c ombined

, ,

with it) th at we obtai n the first rudiments the fi rst basis of ou r , ,

k n owl edge of the worl d of S pace A n d that they are e xercised .

togethe r is a pl ai n fact of experie nc e r esti ng on no assumptio n , ,

a n d requi ri ng n o previous knowl edge of wh at the terms sen ses , ,

e x e r cisi n,g a n d t o e ther

g mean Befo r e an alysing any se n satio n o r
, .
,

an y immedi ate exper ien c e whateve r I ha ve of n ec essity to use the , , ,

n ame for it as d esig n a ti ve o nl y that is a s mer el y i n dicati n g what

, ,

it is th at I am i n te n di n g to anal yse G rammati cal langu age whi ch .

,

is formed subseque n t ly to the first fo rmatio n of some theory o r othe r

co nc er ni n g su ch immedi ate exper ie nc es a s those n o w in question ,

l e a v es no othe r cou rse ope n to me ; si nc e the name take n by itsel f , ,

c o n tai n s n o disti nction bet ween the experien c e per se an d the

theoreti cal c on st ruction to whi c h it bel on gs and to the for mation ,

of whi ch it h a s c on tributed I n short l anguage r eprese n ts a n d

.
,

exp resses that c ommo n sen se vie w of thi n gs which I t ake to be the
-

a n a l sa n d um of phi l osophy ; an d these rem ar ks m a y se r ve to elucidate

y
the method which I fol low th roughout this i n qui ry as well a s i n ,

the c ase of those se n satio n s the visual an d the t act ual which a re
, ,

j ust n ow u n der co n sideratio n But to proceed — Organ i c sensation s

.

o f all ki n ds with their p l ea su r es an d p a i n s do n ot of themse l ves al o n e

, ,

imp ar t an y k n owl edge of the o rgan i c body or of a spatial worl d , .

The s a me is t rue of emotio n al fee l i ngs of all kinds with their ,

pl easu res an d pai n s A n d the s ame is also t rue of the sen ses of taste
.
,

smell an d sound with the i r spec ific p leasu res an d pai n s But visu al
, , .

se n satio n s give us the perc eptio n of space exte n sion in two dimen sio n s -

of spac e na me l y l en gth an d b readth ; an d tactual se n sations ( especi all y

, ,

whe n i n ten sified by muscul ar) give us the perceptio n of sp ac e exte n sion -

i n three dimensio n s l ength breadth a n d depth that is of what

, , , , ,

we call sol id bodies i n the cases whe n these one o r more c ome i nto
, , ,

co ntact with that one of them o ur ow n o rgan ism whi ch is the , ,

c o n stant c en tral obj ect of ou r ow n p a noram a and whi ch is itsel f ,

perceived a s a solid body sol el y by mea ns of these same tactu al an d

mus cular sensations .

25 Now the perc eption an d the idea of Matter as a re al exis t ent

. ,

of our own o rganism as a mater ial body of the location of our ,

c onsc i ousness withi n that body and of the condi t ioni n g of our con
,

B 2 —2
20 PROCEEDINGS OF THE B RITIS H ACA D EMY

sc io usn e ss by material obj ects the existence of whi ch is independent

,

of the existence of the cons c iousness whi ch they condition — these a re ,

perceptions and ideas which ( though of c ourse not original ly capable

of bei n g stated in su ch terms as I have used in describi n g them )
are formed very early in the life both of i n dividual s and of the rac e .

They are in fact part and p arcel of that common sense know l edge -

which as noted at the outset is the a n a lysa n d um of phi l osophy

, , .

They are part an d p arce l of th at common sense knowledge of adults -

at the prese n t day j ust as much as in the earliest stages of human

,

history When we begin to analyse them philosophically at the

.

presen t day th at is to say i n reliance upon the results reached by

, ,

previous philosoph i cal investigations we find ourselves met by c ertai n ,

time honoured probl ems first and foremost of which i s the Real ity of
-

M atter an d then co nn ected with it the Location of Consc i ousness

,

within the o rganism an d the Real Conditioning of consciousness by the

,

interaction of material obj ects organic and inorganic O n these three .

questions I propose with your permission to o ffer some brief remarks

, , ,

from my own point of vie w a s alrea d y set forth in the present

paper .

2 6 And first as to the Reality of Matter

. When we di st i nguish .

consc i ousness from its own par ticular contents or obj e cts that is from , ,

those c ontents or obj ects whi ch constitute it a k nowing as wel l

a s an existent then it seems to us since we are then objectifyi n g
, ,

our own thought of it to b e perceiving it s own b ody from outside

, ,

j us t as it perc eives other solid bodies which are outside its own body .

I t i s in fact by inference that we subsequently to the simplest ,

perceptions lo cat e our co n sciou sness wi thin and not w i thout its o wn
, , ,

body the central obj ect of i ts own panorama Tactual sensations

, .
,

inte n sified i t may be by muscular are the o n ly sensatio n s —tou ch , , ,

w i th the sense of e ffort which comes from muscular tension is the ,

only sen se —to which we owe our po sit i ve k n owledge of a reality

,

which is not consciousness and which possesses an e ffi c iency of its

-

own i ndependent of that consciousne ss whi c h i s a knowledge of it ,

and of the existence of whi ch it is a real condition I t is on l y .

thr ough the sense of tou ch and mus c ular e ffort that we know the
nature and are aware of the existence of solid material obj e cts .

Why " Because these are the on l y sensations or feeli n gs of an y ,

k ind which have a r eplic a of them selves as thei r immediately per

,

c e i v e d object and that a r eplica whi c h h a s what they have not

, , ,

e fficiency as a real condition or real c onditions inasmu ch as they

, ,

ar e at once the obj e c t an d the real condit i on of those se n sations

o f whi c h they are the r e lica
p How is this " .
 S OME CARDINAL POINTS I N KN OWLEDGE 21

27 . Briefly stated the answer is as fol l ows These sensations a s

, .
,

experie n ced for inst an ce i n grasping an d feel ing o n e hand with the
other or in gra sping and feel i n g any sm al l solid obj ect occupy
, ,

the same portion of spac e at and for the same portion of t ime ,

du ration as their r eplic a the solid object occupies ; whi l e this same
, , ,

obj ect the r eplica is known as di fferen t fr om a nd not wholly

, , ,

identical with but i n depende n t of those sensations of which it is the

, ,

r e lic a
p by ,
two fa c ts — fi r st of its being cap a ble of an entirely di fferent

a nalysis from theirs an d seco n dly of i ts producing their occurrence

,

a s sensations in co n sciousness The identity of the r eplica i n point .

,

of quality and contour w ith the sensat i ons which a r e the i mmediate
,

perception of i t is shown by the sameness of the space and the t i me

occupied by both I mean during the time of their actual presen
, ,

t a t io n ; its d i fference fr om those sen sat i ons i s shown by its operat i on

in c o n ditioning the i r o c currence and its analy sis i n to physical parts ,

and forces or modes of motion in addition to its analysi s as a perc ept

, ,

into modes of consciousness These latter of course are consc i ousnes s ;

.

the r eplica is n on consciousness ; but both ali k e occupy one and the
-

same portio n of three dimensional spac e for one and the same port i on
-

of time namely the time of their actual presentati on in experience

, , .

( The term r eplica a p plied as here to tangible obj ects w i ll be found

, ,

i n my Meta physic of E xper i en ce book i chap viii 4: An a lytica l , , .

,

d iscr i m i n a tio n of r ea l Co n d i tio n s f r o m r ea l E x isten ts near the end , ,

at p 405 of v o l i )
. . .

28 This presentation therefore the presentation in actual e x

.
,

er ie n c e of solid obj ects by the sense of Tou ch i ncluding musc ul a r

p ,

se n satio n or sen se of e ff o rt which we may c al l stress is the poin t

, ,

at whi ch we have immedi ate evidence of the reality of an external

wo rld a world of n on conscious n ess si n ce it is the po in t at which th at
,
-

worl d and our cons c iousness coincide the point at whi ch a portion ,

of that wo rl d is experi enced as actually operative an d efficient by its ,

produ ci n g o r co n ditioni n g the actual occu rren c e of those sensations

of whi ch it is a lso the obj e ct I t is as thei r obj ect th at we can .

c haracterize it as their r eplic a As sen s ations they are themselves .

obj e c tive to con sciousness which is a sel f obj e ctifyi n g pro c ess But
,
-
.

i n that same conscious process of wh i ch they a re a part they a r e , ,

al so themselves perceived as h a vi n g an obje c t whi ch is a r eplic a of

themselves in poi n t of qu al ity whi l e it is al so i n depe n den t of them , ,

and prior to them in point of existe nc e i na smuch as it is upon

, ,

its existen c e that their oc c u rre nc e i n c o n s c ious n ess depen ds For let .

one solid obj e c t come i n to visu a lly perc eived co n t act with our
organ ism whi ch is an other solid obj e ct an d n ew ta ctual sen sations
, , ,
22 PROCEEDINGS OF THE B RITIS H ACA D EMY
n ot before existi n g c ome i n to c o n s c ious n ess a s actu ally presented
,

exp erienc es .

2 9 Observe moreover that it is from these se n sation s of tou c h

.
, ,

and st ress that al l the ideas ter ms and hypotheses of physical s c ie nc e , ,

der ive their mean i n g ( S ee on this poi n t P rofessor S tout s pape r

.
’
,

P r im a ry a n d S eco n d a r y "u a li t i es in the P ro c eedings of the Aris ,

t o t el ia n S ociety vo l iv N S ,
for 1 9 03 . Howeve r di ffere n t m ay
, . .
,

be the analysis of their r eplic a as a solid physical obj e ct from that

of the sensations whi ch are our k n owledge of it we c ann ot but ,

imagine the obj ects arrived at by th at an al ysis for the purpose of ,

underst andi n g them as obj ects of tactual an d mus c ular sen sitivity
, ,

though of a sensitivity i n defi n itely ex c eedi n g ours in range deli cac y , ,

and acuteness The whol e m ea n in g of the terms denoti n g an d

.

describing them is derived from our own tac tu al an d mus c u l ar

sensiti v ity Atoms (and their c ompon en ts if an y ) or molecules of
. ,

Matte r a nd the forces or modes of motion c ombi n i n g or sep arati n g

,

them me chanica l ly fusi n g or di ssolving thei r fusio n chemi cally o r

, ,

organizi n g them v i tal l y as fo r i n stanc e i n protoplasm or i n the

, ,

germ plasm ids biophors and determi n a n ts of P rofessor Weismann s

-

, , ,
’

theory ; air a nd the w aves of a i r tran smitti n g sound ; ether an d the

waves of ether transmitti n g light ; electrons and the elect ri c a n d
m agneti c forces which gover n their stru c ture a n d thei r motions a n d , ,

so to speak orga n ize th at con t i n uous somethi n g which is o ft e n hel d

,

to make space itself a plen u"m ; all these alike as obj ects are c on -

, ,

c e i v ed as obj ects of possible se n sations of touch a n d stress a n d n ot

,

of a n y other sense The sense of heari n g does not he ar the a i r or

.

the w a ves of air t ransmitti n g sou n d ; what it b e a r s is so un d S eei n g .

does n ot see the ether or the waves of ether tran smitti n g light or its
variously coloured modes ; what i t sees is lig ht and c o lo ur The .

sen sation of touch w i th its combined stress alone h a s a s its immedi ate
obj e c t a r eplica of itsel f whi ch is a t once its obj ect and the real
,

condit i on p roduci n g or c ontri but in g to produce the sensation of it

, , .

30 Nevertheless it may well be doubted whethe r the sense of tou c h

.

with st ress wou l d a l one su ffi c e or have su ffi c ed to give us a perceptio n, ,

of solid bodies o r of an extended mater ial world of spac e without the

, ,

c o ope ration
-
so to speak of the se n se of sight These two se n ses
, .
,

are normally as a fact exercised together We experie n ce the sen

, , .

sa t io n s of the two senses sim ul taneously I n many cases we see and .

we touch one and the same obj ect at one and the s a me time tha t is
to s ay the obj e ct of both k i n ds of se n sation i n tho se cases o ccupies
, , ,

o n e an d the same portion of time the time of its presentation its , ,

solidity being given us by touch with stress i ts contour by the dis ,

 S OME CARDINAL POINTS I N KNOWLEDGE 23

t in c t iv ecolou r i n g due to sight This it is whi ch e n ables us to identify .

i t — say a sm all object of tou ch with itsel f after its removal from -

, , ,

immediate contact with our own body ; o r as in o n e of the cases ,

i n stanc ed above to ide n tify our ow n hands grasping one another

, ,

e ach with itsel f an d both a s parts of our own body which is thus
, ,

perce i ved as the ce n tral obje ct of ou r own pan orama And the same .

is t r ue of obj ects an d even ts o n a larger scale ; we c a n touch and see

a ball oon or ae roplan e befo r e it r ises from the earth we can follow it ,

by sight throughout its whol e ae ri al voyage and finally see and touch ,

it agai n on its return to its starting poi n t The ide n tity of the obj e c t -
.

of the two experienc es of tou ch is assured sol ely by the continuity of

the interveni n g visual experie n ce .

3 1 But now as to the reality of the Matter thus perceived

. T he .

meaning of the term Reali ty in its ful lest se n se is originall y or i n the ,

first instance given to human bei n gs by th at e xperien c e of Matter and

,

of an external material world which is most probably due t o the ,

sim ul tan eous exercise of their two senses of sight and tou c h with
stress in the man ner which has j ust been sketched I t means the
, .
,

term r ea li ty in i ts ful lest sense means the combination of obj ectivity ,

to consciousness that is of perceivab i lity with effi c i ency or agen cy

, , , ,

the power of bei n g what we may properly cal l a real condition of the
genesis of someth i ng or other or of a change in something or other , ,

that i s of an event The latter part of this definition is P lato s I t

, .
’
.

is p ut into the mouth of the Eleatic Stran ger in his S ophist 2 4 7D E ,

-

and 24 8 P erceivability alone or by itself is reality in a very true

.
, ,

sense ; a state of conscious n ess is an object of c ons c ious n ess and i s rea l ,

wh ile i t is being perceived But it is on l y whe n a perc eived or per .

c e i va ble obj ect is also endowed with effi c iency or age n cy that it ,

becomes real in the full sense and that the fullest sen se in which w e ,

c an understand the term The etymology of the term from the .

Latin r es a thing seems to bear this out Whatever ideas or

, , .
,

feel ings or hypotheses whatever obj ects of cons ci ousness we may

, , ,

see reaso n to i n cl ude under t h e term r ea l and to c o n side r as r ea lities ,

in the ful l sense the meaning of the ter m r em ains the same a nd is i n
, ,

n o wi se altered or a dded to the r eby It sti l l mean s perc eiv ability .

c ombi n ed with effi c iency It cann ot in clude an Absol ute o r a T ran

.
,

sc e n d en t or a Thi n g in itself or an ything thought of a s in its own

,
- -

nature non perceiv ab l e Nor have we a ny a pr io r i idea or c ognition

-
.

or catego ry of what Re al ity in its own n ature is or must be or ought ,

to be if it i s tr ue real ity o r of wh at an ythi n g must be if it is tr uly

, ,

real Our idea of it our whole knowl edge of it is der ived from
.
, ,

exper i en c e i n the way al ready sket ched .

24 PROCEEDINGS OF THE B RIT I S H ACAD EMY

32 . True we distinguish the being o r the existenc e of a n obj e c t

, ,

the Ens o r the Existent pe rc eived from the c onscious n ess actu a ll y ,

perc eivi n g it which is its subj e ctive aspe ct a nd regard it when so

, ,

disti n guished as non consciousness ; for even a st ate of co n s c ious n ess

-

when on c e o bj e c t ifie d and forgotten is a n experienc e bel on gi n g to ,

the past wholl y unalterabl e and remains a living state of conscious

, ,

ness n o mo r e But the fact that we so disti n guish the Ens o r the
.

Existe n t perce i ved from the c ons c iousness actuall y perceivi n g it and ,

regard it in that respect as non co n sciousness does not show either -

, ,

that it is no n obj e ctive to conscious n ess or that a state of co n scious

-

ness when o bj ec t ifi e d h a s not formed part of a livi n g c o n ciousness in

, ,

a nd during the p ro c ess of its obj ectifi c atio n or th at the gene ral terms ,

Bei n g and E x isten ce do n ot cover an d i n c l ude c ou n t l ess Beings and

Existe n ts of which we a s huma n bei n gs can fo r m no positive idea
, ,

whate ver Those ge n eral te r ms and al l that they cover bel ong to
.
,

human cons c iousness but they cove r vast r egio n s of Bei n g a nd of

,

Existe n ce whi ch are utterl y inacc essible to an y positive im ag i n at i o n

or thought of ours They c ov er whatever the terms Infi n i ty an d
.

E ter n i ty cove r with al l their possible though to us unknowabl e

, , ,

kinds an d modes of being and existence And i n fact we may come .

to know much both of those u n alte r abl e states of con s c ious n ess
,

w h i ch after obj e c tification h a ve be c ome portions and parc els of the

, ,

dreadful past an d of those independent obj ects real in the fu ll ,

sense whi ch we at any given time set dow n simply as real existents
, ,

the n ature of which we have at that time perforce to l eave un , ,

explored .

33 And here perhaps some remarks will be in p l a c e c oncerning

.

that n e w Philosophy j ust now in vogue call ed P ragm atism sin c e ,

it seem s partly if not pri nc ipally to rest on a c o n fusion between the

, ,

two thi n gs j ust disti n guished which are ver y di ffere n t from one ,

an other I mean the r eality of our perceptio n or cog n itio n of an y

.

obj ect an d the exhaustive c haracter of that per c eptio n or c og n itio n ,

its adequacy or inadequacy to give us a c omplete or perfe c t know

l edge o f the obj ec t pe rceived or c og n ized When I per c eiv e or .

cognize any obj ect the t r u th of that perceptio n o r cogn itio n c o n sists
,

in its bei n g a corr e ct kn o win g of its obj e ct as a real bei n g o r existen t , ,

or fact o r eve n t As for i n stan c e i n my pe rc eption of a sm all

, .
, ,

sol id obj e c t whi ch I g rasp an d pe rc eive a s o c cupyi n g the s a me sp ace

, ,

at the s ame time as my perception of it In this case I c an an d do

,
.

c ompare i n r ep rese n tatio n immedi ately subseque n t to the expe r ienc e

, ,

the pe rc eptio n with the thi n g perceived ; I disti n guish the t wo an d ,

yet I perc eive their ide n tity i n space an d time and owing to tha t ,
 S OME CARDINAL POINTS IN K N OWLEDGE 25

identity I know th at the o n e is a c o rrect knowi n g of the other or i n ,

other words th at it is a t rue k n ow l edge of fact Tr uth is a wo r d of

,
.

Kn o win g ; Fa c t is a wo r d of Bei n g But it is obvious that this .

k n owl edge though true does n ot tell me a ll about the obj e c t k n own
, , ,

a ll that is to be k n ow n eithe r of its n ature or its genesis Al l I ca n .

say a nd must say about it is th at wh ateve r el se it may some d ay be,

k n own to be wha te ver else may bel ong to its r eal natu r e or genesis
, ,

the know l edge of that n ature or genesis will only be t r ue knowl edge
i n virtue of its bei n g a c or rect presentation or repr esentation of the
f a c ts of that n ature or gen esis I ts truth wi ll consist in that .

c orrectness .

34 But s ay the P ragmatist s a complete a nd perfe c t knowled ge

.
, ,

of real ity is whol l y and for ever unattai n abl e by man in every case
that we can thi n k of the real being or fac t is know n and knowabl e
,

only by and through what it appear s to him to be ; as his k n owl edge

of it i n c reases his conception of it c hanges one c on c eption of it
, ,

disappeari n g and an other t a ki ng i ts plac e on l y to be itself in its ,

turn disproved an d replaced by anothe r A compl ete and perfect .

knowledge of reality bei ng thu s impossible for man tr u th must mean ,

for him o r a s they put it must p r a c tic a lly mean whatever concept i on
, ,

or idea s atisfies his mind at a g i ven time or is found ser viceab l e as ,

a worki n g hypothesis leadi n g to further k n o wledge or is a basis on ,

whi ch p racticall y he is prepared to act A ccor di n g to this do c tri n e .

,

the n if tr u th is a know l edge of reality truth is a knowledge of the

, ,

unknowable si n ce only the unknowable is r ea l But the do ctri n e is

, .

fall acious an d for this reason namely because it tac itly substitutes
, , ,

fo r the idea of Reality as the object k n ow n by t r uth the idea of

, ,

Total ity or Compl eteness of the Real It t a kes a perfe c t and com .

p le t e k n owledge of the Real Unive r se to be the me a ni n g of the word

t r u th i n ste a d of taki n g that wo r d to mea n a pa r ticu lar attribute

,

without whi ch no knowledge woul d be a true k n ow l edge or as we ,

c ommonly say a truth (S ee Mr F C S S chil l er s H um a n ism ;

, . . . . .
’

M acmill an 1 9 03 pp 45—5 4 in the third Ess ay of th at vol e n titled

, , .
, .
,

Tr u th ) O r aga i n to take the m atter from an other side it ho l ds

.
, ,

that be cause it is impossibl e to ve r ify the su lyec ti ve a spec t a s a

'

whole it is therefore impossibl e to give a c ogn itive as disti n ct from

, ,

a practical mean i n g o r defi n itio n of Truth w i th in the tot al ity of the

, ,

subj e ctive aspect Un l ess and u n ti l we arrive at a k n ow l edge of the

.

To t a lit y of the U n iverse it holds t h at we h a ve n o true k n ow l edge of

,

the Real Co n sequently it abandons the usuall y acc epted defi n ition
.

‘
of truth a correct rep resentation of fa ct a nd substitutes for it
, ,
’

a defin i tion mean in g the powe r an idea has of bei n g servi c eabl e or ,
26 PROCEEDINGS OF THE BRITI S H ACAD EMY
s atisfyi n g at any given time our desire for knowledge — But granting
that a c o rr ect representation of fa ct will do th i s also it does not fo r ,

all that e n ter into the definitio n of truth Total ity is by no mean s .

esse n tial to Truth I t belon gs as an idea n ot to k n owledge simpl y

.
, ,

but to some department or system of knowledge su ch a s phi l osophy ,

or mathematics For instan c e s ay I a m walki n g with a friend an d

.
, ,

we see at a distan c e somethi n g whi c h he t a kes for a mi l estone a nd

I t ake for a pump On going nearer it turns out to be a pump My

. .

idea of it as a pump was therefore a true idea an d it is not mad e ,

un t rue by o ur ignorance whether matter after a ll is not matter but

mind stu ff Nor c an it be shown to be untrue i n the sense we both
-
.
,

meant it except by showing that i ts obj ect whether a mi l estone or

, ,

not was something else which was not a pump Thus in a dopti n g
, .

the usually accepted definition of truth philosophy stands on the

same gr ound as commo n sense whi ch in my opin ion if commo n -

, ,

sense is its a n a lysa n d u m is a poi n t of the greatest import anc e But

, .

it must be remembered that in j udging whether a proposed idea of a ,

doubtful matter is or is not to be ac cepted as true c r i ter i a distinguish ,

abl e from th a t idea are required criteria drawn from a ct ual experie nc e ,

or from previously ascert a ined truths based on experien c e and not ,

from any a pr io r i idea of wh at the Totality of the Universe must

ne c essarily be .

35 The theo ry is mischievous also as well a s fall aciou s; mischievous

.

because being put forward a s a philosophy it wou l d shift phi losophy

, ,

from a cognitive to a practical b a sis w ould make practi cal co n sidera ,

tions decisive of theoreti c al questions True all thinking is practi cal .

,

action ; we think for the pur pose of satisfying some des ire i n theoreti cal
matters th at purp ose is knowledge of reality be th at real ity of wh at
, ,

nature it may whether phy sical psychi cal or logical —the l aws by
, , , ,

which thought itself moves Whatever con c lusion we come to sup .

,

posing we come to any satisfies for the time our desire for knowledge
, ,

the mot i ve of our thinki ng activity But thi s satisfaction is not what .

the truth of the conclusio n co n sists in S o far as it s atisfies us it .

,

satisfies us because it is true o r an a ppro x imation to t r uth it is not

true or an approximatio n to truth becau se it satisfies us No ; it .

satisfies us practi cal ly so far as it is what we desire to attain by

thought namely a knowledge of reality
, , .

3 6 If i t is argued on the other ha n d that the motive the end i n

.
, ,
’
view the r e Ao s of all conscious volunt ary actio n is the satisfaction of
, ,

desire a n d therefore that thought being a mode of c o n scious volunt ary

, ,

actio n must be mere l y i n strumental o r subsidiary a me an s to the

, ,

attai n me n t of that end the answer is that it is so only when we

, ,
 S OME CARDINAL POINTS IN KNOWLEDGE 27

regard thought as pr actic al a ction o nl y and dis regard its nature a s ,

that mode of pra ctica l action the d ifier en tia of whi c h is to aim at
’

ac quiring a true knowl edge of re al ity o r fact The e n d or motive of .

th a t spe c i a l ki n d of action th at e n d which is its spec ifi c diff e re n ce a s

,

thought is not s atisfaction but truth and the v arious co ncl usions o r
, ,

stages a t whi ch w e arrive i n pu r suit of th at end are subsidi a ry a s means

, ,

to the attainment not of a greate r s atisfactio n but of a greate r degr ee

, ,

of t ruth as a knowledge of reality The s atisfaction whi ch accompan ies.

this pursuit m akes n o part of its d if er en tia as the pursuit of truth

’

And moreove r the con c l usions at whi c h we may arrive from time to
, ,

time in pursui n g it m ay be themselves eithe r satisfacto ry or un sa t is

factory without maki n g the smal l est di fferen ce l n the val idity of the
,

thi nki n g process by whi ch they are arrived at The spe c i al satisfaction .

which accompanies it is due entirely to its being a pro c ess the special
purpose of whi ch is to attain a true know l edge of reality o r fact .

Thinking aims not at satisfa ctio n but at truth The c ontrary opinio n .

is a n e x e m pli fi c a t io n of the remar k — B o lus la tet in g en er a li bus S atis .

faction is general to the special satisfaction accompanyi n g the endeavour

to att ain a corr ect knowledge of fact .

37 S in c e writing the four foregoing paragraphs ( b arri n g a sentence

.

or two) I have read the preface to P rofessor Wi l liam J

, a mes s recently ’

publ ished volume The Mea n in g of Tr uth a S eq ue l to P r a g m a tism

, , ,

1 9 09 Professor J
, ames bei n g o n e of the originators and ar ch ch a mpion s -

of the new theory of Pragmatism He begins th at prefa c e by a .

quotation fr om his ow n fo rmer work P r a g m a tism whi c h shows him ,

absolutely blind to the di fference which I have j ust endeavoured to

signalize He sees no di ffere n ce bet ween defini n g truth as the agree
.
‘

ment of certa i n of our idea s w ith reality a defin i tion which he s avs ’
,

both pragmat i st s and intellectualists accept as a matter of course

and defi n i n g it as v erification T ruth he says ha ppen s t o an
.
‘ ’

, ,

idea I t bec om es true is m a d e true b y events I ts ver ity is in fact an

.
, .

event a process the proce ss namely of i ts verifying itsel f its ve r i ca

, , , , ,

tio n ( i talics in the original ) He must therefore since he also

.
,

accepts the older defi n ition see no differen c e betwee n the agreeme n t
,

of certain of our ideas with real ity and the ascertai n ment of that
agreement by subsequent verification And this m a kes it easy for .

him in defin i ng truth ei ther to substitute the as c ertai n ment of the

, ,

agreement for the agreement itself the v erification of a t r ue idea fo r ,

the truth of th at ide a to fact a s he does in saying that it is all that

,

truth is k nown as o r to fal l back on the older defin i tion as he must

’
, ,

“
be doing when he says again quoting from himself But ver ifia bi li ty
,
‘
,

I add is as good as verification For how otherwi se than by re l i anc e

, .
’
28 PROCEEDINGS OF THE BRITI S H ACA D EMY
on the ol de r defi n itio n c an a n ide a be a s good a s t rue previous ly to that ,

ve rificatio n i n whi ch as he al leges its t ruth c o n sists " Before you can
, ,

ve rify an idea o r a st ateme n t the idea or the st atement must ex ist Its
, .

ver ifi cation al o n e therefo r e is n o t al l th at t r uth is known as ; there is

‘
, ,
’

the idea or the statement itself p r ior to its veri ficatio n My quotations
, .

a re al l take n from the two fi rst pages of P rofessor J a mes s prefac e I ’

.

have had of necessity to abridge and c ondense his argument very c on

sid er a bl but I believe I have i n no w a y mis r epresented its me an ing
y , .

Those pages seem to me to p l ac e the l ogi c of the n e w P ragmatism in

a strong a nd by no means favourable l ight though Professor J ames ,

n ever writes without instructing a s well as charming his readers .

38 P erhaps as a n adh erent of the o l der defi n ition of truth after

.
,

cr iti c izing however briefly the idea that truth c onsists in verifi c ation
, ,

I ought to give some brief statement fr om the o lder point of v iew of , ,

what I c on c eive to be the r eal rel ation between them To me then .

, ,

it seems that the idea of verifi cation depends upon the idea of truth
( i e the agreement of an idea with fact) and n ot vic e ver sa the idea
. .
,

of truth upon that of verificat i o n Verific ation of a perc eptio n or of .

an ide a is ne c essar i ly subsequent to the pe rc eption or idea verified .

It is a r e flection upon them whi ch re c ognizes their truth an d c lassifies ,

them as true But to do this the re must be some m arks some

.
, ,

features in the pe rc eptions or ide a s refle cted on by which the

, ,

ve rifying re fle ctio n is g uided in recognizing and classifyi n g them as

t rue Verification being a refle c tive j udgeme n t on perceptions o r
.
,

idea s an d n o t bei n g omnipotent om n is c ie n ce c an not m a ke it can only

, , ,

fi n d truth i n them A n d to do this there must be some fe atures i n

, .

the pe rceptions or ideas j udged which are the crite r ia fo r its j udge ,

ments the found atio n on which its own truth stands Now there a re
, .

c ert ai n u ltim ate d ata i n experie n ce whi ch ar e the b asis of verification ,

d ata which are t r ue previous to verifi cation pr evious to an y gen e ral ,

idea of truth S u c h data are fou n d i n co n s c iousness o n ly They ar e

. .

aw are n esses whi ch t aken singly are each of them a k n owing a s w ell , ,

a s a know n that is to say are a process which is a k n owledge of fact

, ,
.

The ofte n repeated perceptions of sameness a nd di fferen c e of qu al ity

i n the c ontents of al l empi r ic al pe rc epts of c omp atibi l ities a nd in ,

c ompatibi l ities between them an d of the u n iversal ity a nd co n stancy

,

of the time an d space relations whether of sequenc e o r c c ex istenc e ,

-

within them an d between them compe l us to regar d the u n iver se as ,

a syste m atic whol e existi n g an d wo rking in u n ifo r m ways whi c h we

,

cal l l a ws ; an d this conception i t is a c o n ceptio n founded on repeated ,

perc eption s of fact whi ch enabl es us to verify ( or other wise) the t ruth
,

to fact of an y given per c eptio n o r idea i n all cases where the supposed ,
 S OME CARDINAL POINTS IN KN OWLEDGE 29

verifi catio n is anythi n g more th an a me r e repetition of the perc eptio n

or ide a to be v erified Experience me ans positivel y k n own fact If
. .

it is tryi n g to an experie n tialist to hear the r ig ht identified with the

e xpedien t as it is by uti l itarians in m atters of prac ti c e it is doub ly
, ,

tryi n g to hear the tr ue ide n tified with it as exp l icitl y it is by Pr ofessor ,

J ames at the third page of the Prefac e already c ited i n m atters of

, ,

1
knowl edge .

3 9 I fear I may have dwelt far too lon g o n this c o n troversi al topi c
.

of P ragmatism I return to the m a i n c urre n t of my paper —W e

. .

have see n or a t l east I hope I have m ade it evide n t that tangibl e

, ,

obje cts alo n e amon g al l th at are know n to us by the se n ses give us

, ,

our first idea of Real ity in the full sen se though of course n ot know n ,

or imagi n ed to be the o n ly obje cts which m ay be covered by the

general te r m r ea l in the same full se n se an d for the same or similar
re ason s These tangible obje c t s i n clude fo r each one of us his ow n
.
, ,

t an gibl e body a nd limbs on o n e side an d tangib l e obj e cts e xtern al to ,

his body an d limbs on the other this b r oad disti n ction bein g due to
,

the fact that the obj ect which an individual call s his own body is a
c onstan t obj ect in his waking c onsciousness and the only particular ,

obj e ct whi ch is strict l y constant i n the same sen se i n his who l e spati al
panoram a The di ffe rence is e x emplified by the two i n stances t a ken
.

above the graspi n g of o n e hand by the other an d the gra sping of

, ,

some sm al l solid object which may be seen as separate when no longer

,

actuall y grasped .

40 We have seen al so that all these t angible obj ects bear a double
.

c haracte r— as kn o wn they c onsist of perceptio n s of tou ch an d stress ,

w hich a re states of c ons c ious n ess ; as k n ow n to ex ist even whe n they ,

are not a ctuall y perc eived they a re real c o n ditions of the o ccurren c e
,

or arising of n e w perceptio n s of touch and stress from which fact i n ,

often repeated expe r ien c es w e infer that obj ect s whi ch ar e a r eplic a ,

of perceptions of tou ch and stress were also the real c o n dition a s well
as the object of the states of conscious n ess o r iginally perc eivi n g them .

We thus in dr a wi n g this i n fere nc e sep a r a te in thought the real object

, ,

whi c h is re al in the fu ll sense i e as r ea l c o n dition as well a s obj e c t

, . .
,

from the tac tual sens atio n s which gave us our fi rst k n owl edge of it ,

from which it was i n its fi rst origin u n distinguished and whi ch a s , ,

sen satio n s simply are real existents n ot in the fu l l sense but on l y

, , ,

as being o bj e c t ifi ed i n c ons c iousness a nd m a ki n g pa rt of its stream of

,

process contents We have also seen th at these obje cts re a l i n the

-
.
,

fu ll sen se are obj e cts of surfac e perceptio n s en cl osi n g portio n s of

,

l
Th e fo r eg o i n g c r iti c i sm wa s pe n n e d l o n g be fo r e t h e l a m e n te d d e a th o f t h e
g en i a l a c c o m pli sh e d a n d m uc h b e l o ve d Pr o fe sso W illi a m J
, ,
a m es r .
30 PROCEEDINGS OF THE BRITI S H ACA D EMY
spac e of th ree dime n sio n s the i n side c ore of whi ch is not perc eived in
,

perceivi n g them ; but that they are always perceived a s it were fr om , ,

the outside ; and this is true eve n in the case of our ow n body the ,

c on st an t obj ect of our whole panorama a s for instance in gra sping ,

o n e h an d with the other .

41 Yet we do u n doubtedly locate in thought our own con s c ious

.

n ess withi n a nd not without our ow n body n otwithstanding th at w e

, , ,

n ever seem to perc eive the body immedi ate ly from within eithe r by ,

tou ch o r sight or a ny other sen se though it is true we may appear ,

to do so in the case of o rganic sens ations when once we have fo r med ,

the idea of ou r body and have al so by thought located ou r c on

, , ,

sc io usn e ss within it The twofo l d question is the refore unavoidabl y

.

suggested how this loc ation of c o n scious n ess withi n the body is
,

b rought about what is the pro c ess an d wh at the val idity of the
, ,

i n feren c e whe reby first we attribute an y l ocation a t al l to our own

, ,

c onsciousness a n d then second ly determi n e the seat of it withi n a nd

, , , ,

not somewhe re outside our own body , .

42 And fi r st a s to the first question Both questio n s it must be

. .
,

obser ved c once rn actu al c o n s c iousness as an existen t Ex c ept a s an

, .

existent it is n ot perc eived as l oca ted an ywhe r e o r as havi ng any ,

n eed o r c arryi n g with it an y suggestion of lo cation S ight a n d tou ch .

,

exerc ised togethe r give us our first idea of a spatial worl d an d

, ,

l ocatio n is an ide a belongi n g to space an ide a presupposing th at of ,

space Even pla ce in o rde r of time the o rder i n which perc eption s
.
,

a rise and p ass aw ay i n time is only u n d er sto o d a s a real ity by me ans

,

of ideas derived from spac e But co n s c iousness whi ch a s an e x iste n t

.
,

c onsists of a se ries of states o r pro c ess c ontents arising and passi n g -

away in time du ration and the ex isten ce of whi ch is therefore know n

-

o nl y as the fac t of its obje ctifyi n g its own pro c ess c o n tent— this -

simpl y existe n t c o n scious n ess must also as a n existe n t so soon as we , ,

inc l ude sp atial perception s in its pro c es s content ( and of c ourse their -

ex c lusio n is supposed so l e l y for the pu r pose of our p r esent a nal ys i s ) ,

h a ve some p lace amon g those perc eptio n s or as we commonl y say i n ,

the sp ati al wo rl d — a worl d perceived o nly in an d by the c ontent of

,

c ons c iousness a s a kn o wi n g The reaso n plainl y i s that S pac e bein g

. ,

thought of a s all emb ra c i n g Extension all distin c tions within it whe n

-

, ,

it is t aken as extensio n simply however these distin c tion s m a y be ,

introduced ar e distin ctions of location givi n g rise to di ffe ren ces of

, ,

position o r di re c tio n as exempli fi ed for i n st ance in the three sides

,

of a t ri an gle whi ch have location in rel ation to o n e an other What

,
.

eve r parti cu lar obje ct therefore we think of as belongin g to a s p atial

, ,

worl d we think of as one obj e ct among others or a s a n obj ect

, ,
 S OME CARDINAL POI N TS IN KNOWLEDGE 31

havi n g an environment of other obj ects in space ; eve n though l ike ,

a mathem atica l poi n t or l ike our own series of st ates of c ons c ious n ess
, ,

whe n t aken not a s a kn o win g but as an ex isten t ( whi ch i s the c ase we

are n ow c onsideri n g) n eithe r these states n or the series they compose
,

are thought of a s themse l ves o cc upyi ng any exte n sion wh atever A n d .

this I think is the an swer to the fi rst of our two questio n s how we
, , ,

c ome to as cr ibe l o cation at all to c o n s c iousness .

43 As to the se c o n d questio n na mel y how we come to determi n e

.
, ,

the se at of con scious n ess within an d not somewhere outside our own
, ,

body the an swe r b r iefly stated is this We plac e it by i n fere n ce

,
.
, ,

withi n that obj ect which c o n t a ins what we a fte r wards c all the
r o x i m a te r ea l co n ditio n s of its ar isi n g that is withi n the body
p , ,

which is the on l y co n st a nt parti c ul a r obj e c t of its p a no rama But .

le t us see more definite l y how this l ocation by i n fe re nc e is e ffected .

In the first place con scious n ess is c on c eived as a si ngl e thing si n ce

, ,

the fact of being c o n scious is c ontinuous i n time when ever there is

an y objectifi cation of a c onten t its c ontinuity bei n g i n volved in that
,

obje c tifi c ation but itsel f being d i sti n guished fro m al l its particular
,

c on te n ts save on l y that of its time duration and thought of a s

,
-

independe n t of a n y and every such particu l ar content From al l .

particular co n ten ts save that of time du ration we abstrac t and

,
-

d i sti n guish the simple fact of consciousness or of bei n g c o n scious ,

of some c ontent or other a s an existent , Its n a me as su c h an .

existen t is the Ego In short the fa c t of consciousness bei n g a n

.
,

obj e ctifying process is the c ontent whi ch it o bj ec t ifi e s a nd na mes

Ego ap art from any other content which may be c ome its obj ect
, .

It is the content of an abstract but ve ry real perception the a bst r a c ,

tion bei n g per formed by an alysis And when we thi n k or speak .

of the S el f o r Ego as the immediately k n ow n perc ipient an d age n t

i n ex perience— which we all alike do and must do in c ommo n sense -

thought a nd speech— w e do so on l y by t ac itly as cribing to it as

c o n s c iousness the agency which in fact belo ngs to its immediate
or p roximate real condition or conditions an ascriptio n which is ,

rendered possible a nd facile only by the circumstan c e that we never

immedi ately perceive the conditioni n g p ro c ess in a ny m ode of con
sc io u sn e ss or consciou s a ction .

44 Consciousness as a known existent consists therefore of two

.

a spects i n separa b le from each other obj ecti v e an d subj ective its
, ,

ow n conten t as the fact of perce i ving be in g the obj ect perce i ved
, ,

by it in ret rospection al l c on sc i ous n ess being retrospe ctive i n orde r

,

of time We do n ot perc eive the fact of percei v ing ( as d i sti nc t from

.

the c ontent which in percei ving it o bj ec t ifie s) i n the moment of

, ,
32 PROCEEDINGS OF THE BR IT IS H ACA D EMY
perceivi n g ; in th at moment we are objectifyi n g a c o n te n t but we ,

are n ot a lso perceivi n g that we are obj e c t ifyin g it This percept i on .

c omes subsequently in co n sequence of the arisi ng c onti n ui n g a nd

, , ,

passing a way of c ontents of c on sciousness having bee n experien c ed

in retrospe c tion by mea ns of what we properly call rete n tive memory
, ,

as for i n stance in the case of the successive percept s a b c d spoken , , , ,

of above This notion of the retrospect i v e nature of al l consciousness

.
,

in the simplest cases as well as in the more compl ex c ase of a ppe r

c e t io n
p is if I m ay be all owed the rem ark the key notion of my
, , ,

Metaphysic of E xper ien ce the notion which seems to myself to render

,

that work a very de c ided advance upon my previous work The ,

P h i lo sophy of Refl ec t io n though i n that wor k and works still earlier

,

I had seen the retrospe c ti ve c haracter of consciousness as when in , ,

my Tim e a n d S pa ce I compared consciousness to a ma n walki n g

,

bac k wards who sees only the grou n d he h a s j ust passed over not
, ,

the ground he is pass i n g over whi l e seeing the former (Part I .

,

chap iii 21 pp 1 9 0 2 of wor k cited )

.
, , .
-
.

45 The two inseparable aspects obj ective and subj e c ti ve of

.
, ,

consciousness as a known e x istent have an analogue in the case

of sol id material bodies which as I have tried to show above are
, , ,

originally perceived without being distinguished from the sensations

of touch w ith stress of which t hey are the r ep lic a this la t ter dis
, ,
~

tinction becomi n g possi ble only by v i rtue of thei r being perceived

as separable in space and time from the sensations of which o rigin ally
they are the r eplic a an d in this separable char acter bei ng real
,

condit i ons as we l l as obj ects of tho se sensations S olid materi a l .

bodies ha ve in fact a double asp ect obj ective a n d subj e c tive ; ,

sen sations of touch with stres s b e i ng their subj e c tive a spe c t while ,

their obj ective aspect cons i sts in their existential c haracter as solid
material bodies capable i n action and reaction upo n o n e another
, ,

of being real co n ditions not only of chan ges in o n e another as

,

material obj ects but also of the o ccurre n ce or gen esis of states or
,

process conte n ts of cons c iousness as ex i ste n ts in the order of existence

-
,

or hi story It i s this double character of real mate r ial obj ects first
.
,

as separably existi n g obj ects secondly as real conditio n s of the ,

ge n esis of other existents or of ch anges in them that seems to ,

m e a nalogous to the double a spect of consciousness itself as a known

existent though of course not to be co n fused with it The in sepa r a

,
.

bilit y of two comp l ementary characters is the ci rc umstance which

is c ommon to both and in which their an alogy consists
,
.

46 Now the facts i nc luded a nd described by the term r eten ti ve

.

m em o ry a re the experien c e whi c h in the l a st resort guaran tees or

 S OME CARDINAL POINTS IN KN OWLEDGE 33

i s the evidence of the stream of cons c iousness a s an existent And .

this experien c e must have some rea l condition o r condition s of

ist in g ov er an d above and other than those r e a l c onditions
, ,

perce i ved as su rface perception s of m aterial bodies whi ch bring about ,

the aris in g or o ccurren c e of new se n sat io n s or perc eptions new ,

experiences whi ch a risi n g as prese n tations are immedi atel y t aken up

, ,

i n to and make pa rt of the st rea m of c ons c io usness an d begin from ,

the first moment of the i r arising or presen tat ion to form part a s ,

representations of the expe r ien c e known as retentive memory The

, .

re a so n for this statement is th at they do not account for the reten

,

t i ve n e ss
. Moreove r the o rgani c b ody itself is per c eived as a single
,

perm an ent stru c ture an d a s the one co n stant object in a panorama

,

of obj ects solely by v i rtue of presentat i ons be c oming representati ons

,

in retentive memo ry and thereby enteri ng as parts i n to the con

,

t in uo us stream of c onsc i ousness .

47 Consequently the real condition or conditi on s of this continuity

.

of the st r eam of conscious n ess or in other words of this re t ent i veness

,

of presentations i n the form of represe n tations by memory a s dis ,

t i n g uish e d from the presentations of mater i al obj ects which a r e

surface perc eptions and the obj ects of which appear also (o wi ng to a
,

temporary continuity or co n tact) as real conditions of the a r i sing of

new se n s ations m ust themselves be thought of a s forming a c ont i nu i ty
,

in whatever material obj ect i s thou g ht of as the real c ondition of the

continu i ty of the dependent stream But this conti n uity of the real .

c ond i tion of the stream can be c o n ceived on ly a s ex i sting w i th i n and ,

fo r ming part of that single c onstant obj e c t whi ch each individu a l

,

names his own body For to conce i ve it el sewhere than exclusivel y

.

within that single c onstant obj ect i s to conce i ve it non co n tinuous -

.

To this r eal agent and agency then w i thin his own body he attributes
, ,

the immediate or as we may better call it the pr o x i m a te conditioning

, ,

of his own consciousness both of its co n ti n u i ty as a st re a m and of the

,

occurrenc e o r gen esis of new states of con scious n ess whi ch a s they oc cur ,

are taken up into the c o n tinuous stream I t is somewhere within the .

body somewhere w i thi n the unseen core of it that the immediate co n

, ,

d it io n s and c onditioning of cons c iousness as a co n tinuous stream must

be p l aced ; and we conseque n tly lo c ate that st ream locate the Ego , ,

l ocate co n sciousness as an existent whe re by in ference we locate ,

those real conditions upon wh ic h we c once i ve it as immediatel y or

p r ox imately dependent And this is the answer whi c h I should give
.

to the second of the two questions proposed above .

4 8 It now only remains to remark that co n ceiv in g the neuro

.
,

cerebral system as the proxi mate real cond i tion of consciousness as an

V B 3
34 PROCEEDINGS OF THE BRITI S H ACA D EMY
e x iste n t throws back some additional light upon a car di nal fac t
previously dwelt o n I mean the movements in two c ontrary time
,

dire c tion s observable in a ctu a l prese n t ative expe ri ences moveme n ts

, ,

oc c upyi n g o n e and the same portio n of time duration For it it the -

.

series of c h a nges i n the comparat i vely permanent n euro cerebral -

system w h ic h moves for wards into the future and c arr ies with it a s ,

its conditionate not only every present moment of co n sciousn ess as

,

it arises but also those portions of it whi ch ar e retain ed as r e pr e se n

,

t a t io n s an d are revo cable as memor i es in a series moving b a c kwards

, ,

from the ever n e w present moment a nd that without restricti n g t h e

,

c o n te n t of c ons c iousness as a kn o win g to be a knowledge of tan gible

obj ects only although it is only as a r eplic a of per ceptions of tou c h
,

with stress that ch an ges in the neuro cerebral system can themselves -

b e conceived It is thus the co n ten t of consciousness that moves

.

backwa rds its ex isten c e that moves forwards in time Every em

, , .

i i c a l moment of c o n s c iousness both conj oins and separates these

p r

opposite a spe cts of it .

49 The neuro c erebral system which by its peripheral termina

.
-

t i on s is in c ontac t both with the organism an d with the world

e xte rnal to the organism would I be l ieve completel y s ati sfy the
, , ,

requireme n ts above stated for being the real condition or c ondi tion s
of the genesis of hum an c onscious n ess as an existen t an d for its co n ,

t in ui t y as a stream Whethe r over and above this we should intro

.

duce the conception of an immate rial agent some ,

Ani m ula v agula blandula

, ,

H o spe s c o m e sq ue corporis
’
,

as the true proximate real condition of consc i ousness a s an existent ,

is a question I do not feel called upon to discuss I ndeed I thi n k .

,

that i t wou l d b e futi l e to do so unt i l some defin i te and positi v e idea

,

of such an agent should have been put forward In any case the .

neuro cerebral syste m withi n the organi c body must be taken as

-

a reality by an y scientifi c system of P sy chology which I ta ke to be ,

the positive scien c e treati n g of the genesis history development an d , , ,

combin ation of parts and p rocesses of consciousness as an existe n t ,

the n a tu r e of the s p ecifi c qual i ties of i ts states or p rocess con tents -

being taken as ultim ate d a ta wholly incapabl e of being accou n ted for
by an y real condition or conditio n s whatever and p resupposed i n ,

forming the conc eption either of c ause or real co n dition a fact whi c h ,

I have r epe a t e d ly p o in t e d out elsewhe re as well as i n the present ,

p aper And I thi n k it is a fac t of c ardinal importance in phi l osophy

. .

5 0 The var iety of specific qualities of consciousness whi c h are

.
 S OME CARDINAL POINTS I N KNOWLEDG E 35

ultimate d ata i n human experience fa r exceeds m an s powe r of dis ’

t in g u i sh in g naming or e n umerati n g them

, , They m ay be grouped .

under the two heads of formal and m aterial c o e leme n ts of experie n ce -

the formal bei n g those of time duratio n and spatial extension an d the
-

materi al bei n g again cla ssifi ab l e under the heads of se n sation ( whether
organic or spe c ific ) emotio n passion con scious ac tio n o r sense of
, , ,

effort an d modes of pl ea sur e or of p a i n which c ombine with e l ements

,

belongi n g to an y of the for egoi ng groups But besides this v a st an d

.

innumerab l e v ariety of specifi c qu alities for mal and m ateri al of , ,

human c onscious n ess we can im a gine the possibi l ity of there being
,

indefi n itely m a ny and great varieties of spec i fi c qual ities of con s c ious
ness belon g i n g to cons c ious bei n gs other than hum a n of whose ,

nature o r of the spe c ifi c qualities of whose c ons c iousness we can form

, ,

no positi ve ide a wh ateve r no su c h positive idea fo r instance as we

, , ,

can form of the cons ci ous n ess of kno wn members of the animal king
dom A n d we n ot only can but must im agi n e this possibility For
. .

whi l e to us it is n ot more than a possibility i n asmuch a s we c an ,

form no positive idea of those c ons c ious bei n gs or of their specifi c ,

modes of cons c ious n ess we are equally in capable of con ceivi n g th at

,

the existe nc e of some su c h c on s c ious bei n gs is impossible There is .

in fa ct nothi n g in hum an c o n s c iousness which e n ab l es us to co n ceive

modes of c ons c ious n ess or kinds of c on s c ious bei ngs as l imited in
, ,

number but o n the co n trary the ideas of i n fi n ity an d etern ity are
,

essen ti al ly a n d inseparab ly i n vol ved in hum a n cons c iousness while ,

the specific material qual ities of feeling belo n gi n g to it we c onceive

to be those which the nature of its proximate real c o n ditio n or co n di
tio n s pe r mits to arise or c o n ti n ue a s p a rts of its stre a m The real .

existe nce of worl ds beyo n d worl ds of co n scious bei n gs an d modes of ,

con s c ious n ess other than human is therefore a belief which is al most
,

forced upo n us whe n we refle c t o n the n ature of our own exper ience
of this worl d of ou rs notwithstan di n g that i n e n deavouring to fra me
, ,

a c o n ception of su ch a world or worlds we ca nn ot go beyond the ,

ge n eral c onc eptio n of existenc e a s whatever is obj e ctive to co n scious

,

n ess a n d c on seque n t ly that n o su c h spe c ifi cally imagi n ed world ca n

,

be con c eived as other th an a possibi l ity by us Neither its real i ty .

nor its u n reality c an by us be a sserted as a positivel y k n own fa ct .

II .

51 It woul d be a muti l atio n even of so professedly imperfect

.

a paper as the presen t if I were to bri n g it to a c on c lusion without

,

m a king some remarks on the emotional nature of man the g reat ,

B 3— 2
36 PROCEEDIN GS OF THE BR I TI S H ACAD EMY
comparat i ve development of which i n com b in atio n with that of his ,

c ognitive powers gives him h i s spec i fic title to rank abo v e the other
,

tribes of co n s c ious beings who are denizens al ong with him of the
planet Earth The Emotions are those modes of feeling the e x istence
.
,

of wh i ch is immed iately conditioned upon in tra c erebral activi t ies and -

c omb i n at i ons of ac tivity j us t as the existen c e of sensations i s con

,

d it io n ed upon stim ul i rece i ved by the pe r iphe ral te r minations of the

neuro c e rebral system Their spec i fic qualit i es a s modes o r a s forms
-
.

of feeli n g meani n g thereby their abst ract n a tu r e o r wha tn ess are

, ,

ultimate data of experience whi c h are as i n capabl e of being thought

to be caused or condit i o n ed as the spe ci fic qual ities of sensat i on are .

But w he r eas the specific qualities of sen sation have some mode or
modes of time duration a nd in certai n cases some mode or modes of
-

spati al e xten sio n also as their form al c c e l eme n t the spe c ific qual i t i es
,
-

o f emotion have a s their fo r mal c o element some ideas thoughts or -

, ,

con c eption s wh i ch i n the last resort are themselves formed by i ntra

, ,

cerebral ac tion from time and space relations Briefly they may b e
, .

described as the material or feeling c o element in idea s But the

"
, ,
-
.

nature of their spe c ifi c qua lities does not depend upon the ideas ,

c o n ceptions or thoughts which are their formal c o elements any

,
-

more than that of the specific qualities of sensation depends upon

the time du r ation or space extension which they occupy or include
- -

as their formal c o el eme n t I n both cases ali k e it is the materi a l

-
.

c o element
-
the feeling c o element that is the u l timate basis the
,
-

, ,

primal given source of whatever k nowledge we possess of whatev er

, ,

belief we can entertain concerning what this Universe is in which ,

we l i ve and concern i ng what we oursel ve s are who seem to hav e our

,

portio n therein .

52 The emotions as the feeling element i n i deas have an equa l

.

title with the sen sat i o n s and with the formal c o elements of time ,
-

and spac e which are common to both to ran k as ul timate and ,

originat in g sources of man s whole kno wl edge of Bei n g and Existence ’

,

of the Un i verse and Real ity I t is to the p rocess content of his .

-

consciousness th at his notion of there being a Uni v erse at all that ,

anything whatever Exists that Anything is contrasted with N othing , ,

is due His notion of his ow n S elf of himsel f as a conscious S ubj ect

.
, ,

o r as a cons c ious Agent is derived fr om the same process content ,

-
.

This notio n is not l ike those data which have been me n tioned an
, ,

u l tim ate d atum or originating source of his know l edge He doe s .

not beg in his knowledge with the perc eption or idea of himself a s
perceiver or re c ipie n t of feelings or included as a n essential const i tuent
, ,

i n them as he begi ns it w i th some specifi c mode or modes of feeling

, ,
 S OME CARDINAL POINTS IN KNOWLEDGE 37

whether pl easu rable or painful heat o r cold j o y or gri ef and so on , , ,

i n sayi n g which it may be noted that j oy seems to be the proper

name for emotional pl easure g r i g for emotio n al pa i n The d i sti n o
f
, .

tion between S ubj ect an d Obj ect is not an u ltimate datum in

consciousness .

5 3 True we cannot but think that the r e is or has been a c o n ten t

.
,

of c onscious n ess before th at content is o bj e c t ifie d this conception ,

being forced upo n us by the fact that : all eve n the lea st states of , ,

actual consciousness are empirical that is involve at the least a , ,

r o cess in time the i nchoate stages of which can be thought of on l y

p ,

as content not yet o bj ec t ifie d An d we thi n k of this as a content of.

co n scio usn ess though previou s to o bjectification because it is o nl y by

, ,

experience of empirical data already obj ec t ifi ed that we arriv e at the

c o n ception of it w hile there is nothi n g i n that experien ce when
, ,

tested subsequently by analysis wh i ch enables us to conceive it as ,

different in kind ( though di fferent in degree ) either from the emp i rical
data analysed or from those el ement s of it whi c h the an alysis dis
covers The dur ation the extension the intensity of a feeli n g in an
.
, , ,

empirical per c ept may severall y or in coal ition be too small or s l ight
,

to be perceptible by human sensitivity S t i ll we thi n k and c annot .

,

but think of every su ch part or element as sharing in the nature of

,

the whole to whi c h they b elong the empiri cal percept itself n o t wit h , ,

standing that severall y o r a s less than the whole they are imper
, ,

c e t ible And in the proces s of e x periencing the moment at which

p .
, ,

the degree at which they become perc eptible by huma n sensit i vity is
rea ched that moment i s the moment of their obj ectifi ca tion also
, ,

called the moment of the i r crossing the threshold of consciousness ,

below or previous to whi ch degree or moment we perfor c e think of

them as conte n t i n proce ss of becomi n g cons c iousness i n dependen c e ,

of course on the operation of the real c o n ditions of its genesis By .

this I do not me an that we must have formed the notion of c ause or

real condition pr eviousl y to thinki n g of a n o n o bj e c t ifie d content a s -

bei n g neverthel ess a c ontent of con sc io usn ess I im agi n e its history .

di fferentl y I thi n k th at it is on l y whe n we ha ve arr ived at the stage

.

of ant ic ipating in thought the o c currence of an expe r ien c e that is

, , , ,

of an obj ectific ation and findi n g our anticip atio n ful fi l led by its
,

o c curren c e that we can draw the disti nction between a n o bj ec t ifi ed

,

and a non o bj ec t ifie d c o n ten t and yet thi n k of this latter content as
-

a content of c o n scio usn ess although or while it is not o bj e c t ified

, ,

but o nly i n choate or in process of be c oming an obj ect i ficat i on This

, .

thought of it however i n application to any or all perceptions si mply

,

in their empiri c a l character i s p robably suggested and is certa i nly

, ,
38 PROCEEDINGS OF THE BRITI S H ACAD EMY
supported by its anal ogy to the phe n omen a of fu l fi ll ed a nti c ipatio n
,

in ordi nary exper ie nc e .

5 4 But to suppose th a t we beg in our con s c ious l ife by cl a ssifying

.

the o bj e c t ifi e d conte n t o r conte n ts of an empirical perception u n der

the hea d either of wh at is subj ectively or wh at i s obj e ctively given ,

or the fa ct of perceivi n g them under the h e a d e it h er of its bei n g .

or of its c omi n g to be is to make the p ure assumptio n that we hav e

,

the ide a s of Bei n g or of Existence p reviously to an d independently ,

of those empi ri cally given perceptions a n a ssumption i n fac t essen

,
-

t ia lly the same as Kant s that we are noumen al Entities endowed with
’

a r io r i fo r ms a n d catego r ies of c o n sciousness — a n assumption after

p
wards deve l oped by Hegel into that of Thought bei n g the C reator of
Bei n g and of Nothi n g a t a l] by its ow n inhere n t powe r of D isti n
- -

g u i sh i n
g the truth bei n g ( a s I at l eas t cannot but thi n k ) th a t these
ideas like al l others ar e de r ived from empirically given perc ept i ons
, , ,

and are n ot the o r igi nato rs of the c l assific ation .

55 Ou r who l e k n owledge the n of Bei n g o r of Existe nc e both of

.
, , ,

wha t it is an d tha t it is h a s its source i n the nature of those u l timate

,

spe c ific qual ities of c o n sciousness formal and m ate r i al w hi ch have, ,

been enumer ated A n d this I hold to be one of the most fund ame n ta l
.

and import ant truths in the whol e domain of knowled ge It m ay be .

said to be the spe c i al basis upo n whi c h a n y system of Experiential ism

must re st Man s whole thought and conscious n ess are acc ordi n gl y
.
’

anthropomorphi c and c annot possib ly be othe r wise though of c ourse

, ,

he can and does frame the i de a that there may be othe r thoughts ,

other modes of c on s c iousness not anthropomorphi c othe r c o n scious

, ,

bei n g s than man ; th at idea itsel f bei n g a n anth r opomorphi c idea .

Human c onscious n ess gives us our sol e i ntim ation that there is su ch
a thi n g as Being without l imiti n g or rathe r while showi ng its utte r
, ,

i nc apacity to l imit the Be i ngs or modes or att r ibutes of the Bei n gs

, , , ,

w hi c h the genera l ter m Bein g of n ecessity c overs Our idea of it is .

anthropomorphi c because we can not even conceive it except a s co n

forming to whateve r we may hold to be it s essential ch aracteristic or
characteristics si nc e othe rwise the term Bein g woul d be wholly
,

meaningless to us I n short we can ge n eral ize the ide a of human

.
,

c onscious n ess but we do not ther eby escape nor ca n we es ca pe from

, , ,

the idea of Bein g as th at whi c h at the l ea st is k n owabl e by some, ,

c o n s c ious n ess o r othe r The term E xper ien c e on the othe r h an d is

.
, ,

a term of subj e cti v ity of knowl edge of c o n scious n ess Immediate

, ,
.

c ertainty is wh at it is emp l oyed to exp ress But in al l experie n ce in .

,

all c o n s c ious n ess whi ch is thus immediate an d c ert ai n the r e is implicit ly ,

co n tained the disti n ctio n betwee n subj ect i vity an d obj ectiv i ty between ,
 S OME CARDINAL POINTS I N KNOWLEDGE 39

the knowi n g an d the k now n between the subj ective an d obj ective
,

aspects of expe rienc e itself— disti n ctio n s very di fferent from that
betwee n S ubje ct an d Object whi ch is a disti nctio n invol vi ng the
,

isolatio n of S ubje cts from thei r own Obj e cts a n d from o n e another , ,

an isolation whi ch bei n g i n troduced as it is by pure assumption as

,

the first step i n philosophy it wi ll be fou n d di fficu l t if not impossibl e

,

to remove by re asoni ng— reaso n ing whi ch may then be itsel f no more
than the i ll usory im agination of a si n gl e S ubj ect .

5 6 Re c urri n g now ( aft er these somewhat I fear too le n gt hy

.
, ,

remarks ) to the emotio nal c o e l ement i n ideas it is I think to be

-

, , ,

accepted as a fact th at these emot i o n al modes of feel i ng give us as

,

d eep and true a n i n sight i n to the n ature of Re al Being a s is given by

the sen s a t ion a l c o el emen t in sensation s or the for ma l c o el ements
-

,
-

time and spa ce which a r e common to both This of cour se does not
, .

mean that the emotion a l c o e l eme n t in ideas guara n tees the truth or
-

validity of the idea s in whi c h they are fr om time to time c o elements -

.

The cogn itive c o el ement i n ideas is subj ect to perpetual chan ge an d

-

de ve l opment as we know from the fact that n e w knowledge is per

,

p e t ua ll
y bei n g gained that ide a
,
s once he l d to be true are being
perpetu ally dis carded a s partly or e v en who ll y erroneous I t is .

doubt l ess al so t rue that with the cha nges in ideas their emotiona l
c o element in some measure cha n ges a l so ; but th i s does not alter the
-

fact that the specific quality of al l emotions as distinguished from ,

their occurrence is i n capab l e of be in g conceived as caused or con di

,

t io n e d by anything The variety of ki n ds of emotion of their sub

.
,

ki n ds and of the combi n ations of these with one an other is e n ormous

,
.

They have to a great e xtent bee n disti ngui shed n amed and c lassified , ,
.

I ca nn ot here attempt their enume ration Far more sti ll r emains to

.

be done Their modifi c atio n s appar en tl y far ex c eed o ur powe r s of

.

defi n ite disti nctio n in thought an d still more of naming and des cribi ng
, .

They di ffe r al so a s between di ffer ent individuals and it is p r obabl e ,

that the i mmense var iety of charac ters and types of characte r amon g
men depen ds chiefly on the great di ffe rences in the str en gth with
which the di fferent emotions an d g roups of emotio n preponderate i n
di fferen t i n dividual s an d on the var iety of the modes i n which thei r
,

emotions i n teract and combi n e with one anothe r — o f course always

i n depende nc e on the bra in st ructu re a n d the b rain activity whi c h ,

are thei r real condition as states of co n sciousness .

5 7 Another poi n t relati n g to the i n te n sity of feel i n g is remarkab l e

. .

The intensity of emotion al ( as well as sens ational) feel i n g its various ,

degrees and the v arious degr ees of compa rative v al ue good n ess an d
, ,

bad n ess pl easur e and pai n a nd the i r modes of which it i s capab le

, , ,
40 PROCEEDI N GS OF THE BRITI S H ACAD EMY
all th i s entirel y es c apes the power of definite dist i nction and expres ,

sio n by names or words of language alone We disti nguish two great .

divisions of i nten sity i n emotions by c lassing high degrees of them

a s p a ssions just as we have n a mes for certain emotions ; but this is
,

a d escr ipti ve process ; the n ames describe bu t do not e x press for the
speaker or convey to the hearer t he i ntens i ty of the feeling n a med
, , .

To do th i s even part i ally and inadequately the aid of S on g or of

, , ,

Rhetori c or of P oetry must b e sought The secret of Music its

, .
,

charm as a Fine Ar t i s that i t awak ens the emotional element in

,

c onsciousness withou t any other im agery than that of the retained

comb i n ation and succession of it s sounds ; i n doing which it makes
g r eat use of i mitation of the inart i culat e cri es wh i ch are the in v o lun
tary utterances prompted by various in tens i t i es both of sensations
and of various emotions and pa ssion s The secret and char m of .

P oe t ry a s a Fi n e Art is that by mean s of the rhythm the stresses

, , ,

and the cadences wh i ch it i n troduces into the art icul ate la nguage
,

which it uses i t comb i nes musical tone which awakens emotio n with
,

trains of images ideas and thoughts which have an intellectual

, ,

sign i ficance .

5 8 I t is in emotional feeling that the connex i on b et ween knowing

.

an d c ons c iously acting is to be tra c ed Emotions and P assion s are .

the moti ves of cho i ce and volition But of course in cal ling these .
,

st ates of c onsciousness m o ti ves we must remember that we are i n ,

cluding i n them the agency whi ch in real ity belongs to the unperc ei v ed
activ i t y of their immediate rea l con di tions of which activity t hey are ,

the only ev i dence and the di fferent m odes of which ( at least at the
,

present stage f physiological knowledge) we can di stinguish and

specify only b y means of them j ust as in the case of the S elf or Ego
spok en of above in which the agency i n volved in the genesis of
,

c ons c iou sness itself i s combi n ed with cons c iousness in the idea of
a singl e unanalysed Consci ous Be i ng Th i s must be remembered .

whenever conscious motives purposes or act s are spoken of as for

, , ,

instan c e when it was said above ( par 5 6) that di fferen c es in character .

depend chiefly upon di fferen c es i n the strength of emotions or of t h e ,

groups into which they may be distributed Emotions taken simply .

,

a s modes of cons c iousness a r e themselves included in any meaning we

,

can give to the t erm c ha r a c ter Consciously entertained D esires then

.
, ,

a n t i c ipati n g a fu t ure state of c on s c iousness whi c h at the present is

o nly imagined whether it be to escape fr om some evil or to attain to
,

s o me good are the ev idence for that kind of action in the c onscious
,

being which when determined either by a j udgement of c omparative

,

v al ues or by a preponderati n g intensity of one feel i ng over another

, ,
 S OM E CARDINAL POINTS IN KNOWLEDGE 41

is characteri z ed as an act of Will If it is determined by a judgeme n t . ,

‘
we chara cterize it also a s teleol ogi cal The anticipated E n d or r eAo s .

is then the determi n i n g motive of the choi c e or act of volition is ,

what we c al l i ts Fin a l Cause No other ki n d of e ffic iency or age ncy

.

in the c ons c ious bei n g is requi red to account for a cts of choi c e than is
required for other i ntra c erebral ope ration s whi ch are n ot tel eol ogi cal
-
.

The di ffe ren c e is simp ly this that t wo disti nc t st ages are i ncluded i n
,

teleologica l acts ; there is first the present an ti c ipatio n of a n u n certai n

future state of c ons c ious n ess and the n se c o n dl y there is the j udgement
,

of the c omparative val ues of the possible altern atives to that st ate .

There is no n eed to suppose an y other ki n d of e fli c ie n c y i n the c o n s c ious

being peculiar to his tel eologi c al a cts or due to the operatio n of Fi n al
, ,

Causes upo n him There is n o need for i n stan ce to suppose the

.
, ,

existe n ce of an agent or age n cy whi ch though consisting of nothing ,

but c onsciousness m ay yet be imagined cap abl e of i n fluenci n g an d

, ,

being in fluenced by its ow n ideas We need not hypostasize con

, .

sc io usn e ss nor need we hypost a size any fac ulty of co n sciousness a s a n

, ,

entity ca l li n g it say the Wi ll in order to ac cou n t for the special

, , , ,

n ature of teleological acts The very meaning of the determi nat i on

.

of choice by j udgement is that the an ticipated al ternative whi ch is

,

j udged to be best thereby becomes ipso f a c to the st r on gest motive .

59 J ust as Pl ato s disti n ction between Being and Becoming o i cr ta

’
.
,

an d ye ve m s sweeps exhaustivel y the whole region of Being i n the

’

largest sense of the t erm so Aristotle s luminous distinction of the

,
’

Four Causes — the Material the Fo r mal the E fficient an d the Final
, , ,

sweeps exh aust i vely the whole regi on of Genesis or Be c oming But .

we must remember th at i n modern positive and s c ientific thought it

, ,

is the effi cient cause on l y that is the obj ect of dis c overy i n c l udi n g i n ,

the search for it all inquiri es i n to the form and the matter of pheno
m ena , consideri n g t hese also as possible c o operati v e causes a n d -
,

thereby enlarging Arist otle s efi cien t ca use at the expense of two ’

others of his four The obj ect of discovery is n ow described usual ly

.

by the figu r ative phra se Law or Laws of Nature mea n i n g the reby ,

Un ifo r m i ty whether stati c or ki n etic that is whether of structure or

, , ,

of p ro c ess The figur ative ter m la w has do n e i ncalc ulable mis chief
.

i n maki n g f r eed om an almost insoluble p rob l em ; so far from bei n g

governed by previously fixed edicts all natural age nc ies are more ,

strictly i n ac t i ng m akers of the l a ws by whi c h they are said to be

, ,

governed The uniform i ty i s inseparabl e fr om the a ctio n But i n

. .

all Ge n esis chan ge i s the fu n dame n tal fact ; in Ge n esis structure

, ,

presuppo ses pro c ess the stati c presupposes the ki n eti c Moreover
, .
,

U n iform i ty itself whether stat i c or ki n etic presupposes D i ffere n ce ;

, ,
42 PROCEEDINGS OF THE BRITI S H ACA D EMY
the te r m has mean ing o nl y as u n iformity i n some respects of obj ects
whi ch are di ff ere n t i n other respe cts ; an d that whi c h is Var iety i n the
stati c o r i n st ructure is Vari ation i n the ki n etic o r i n proc ess This
, , , .

I take to be the me a ni n g a nd the justifi cation of the flux the n c vr a ,

i
-

s et, of H e r a c le i t u s ; to al l p r o c ess it is essential p ro c ess ca n n ot be ,

thought of without it Variation the r efore m ay rightly be assumed

.

as a fa ct univers ally fou n d by al l experience in al l ph ysi cal substanc es

, , ,

an d in that ge n eral character may be made o n e of the data or pre

misses i n a n y i n qui ry i n to their histo ry a s fo r i n stance was done by ,

D arwi n i n his theory of natural selectio n of favourable vari ations as

the chief age n cy i n deter mi n ing the origi natio n of n ew species of
organic bei ngs The ge n eral fac t of variation i n the c ase of an y par
.
,

t ic u la r physi cal subst an c e becomes and is ide n tical with the va r ia bi li ty

,

of that p articular substance We kno w that it w il l v ary without .

,

ne c ess ari l y k n owing wha t an y of its vari ations wi l l be Every o n e of .

these wi ll h a ve its o wn dete r mi n ing causes o r c onditio n s i n tern a l or ,

exte rnal and to dis c over these at al l the stages in the genesis of a
,

spe c ies fr om the fi rst to the l ast would be n ot the fi r st but the last
, ,

step in fa ct the c ompletion of our k n ow l edge of the origi n ation of

,

that species of physic a l substan c e I f then by the ter m ca usa tio n at .

, ,

the prese n t day it is effic ient caus ation o nl y i n the a bove en l arged ,

sense that is intended we see that no one can now speak w i thout
, ,

confusion of Fin a l Causes u n less he is prepared to show th at some

,

states of cons c iousness as distinguished from thei r own immediate

,

r eal co n ditio n or c onditions react upo n and ar e p roductive of ch ange

,

i n the act i vity of those real conditions and mediately the reby i n ,

other parts of the o rgan ism to whi ch they bel o n g .

6 0 Co n scious choice whe n dete r mined by j udgement which is the

.
, ,

no r m al case is al ways upward an d onward l ooki n g ; the desi re chosen

,

is th a t which at the time is j udged to be best Among these desi r es . ,

the desi r e for know l edge of fact whateve r the fac t m ay be whethe r , ,

welc ome o r unwe lc ome to ou rsel ves o n othe r groun ds is a c onst antly ,

p resent des ir e a nd o n e whi ch is c apabl e al so of the greatest stre n gth

,
.

It is not the s a me thi n g as the desi r e for usefu l know l edge or know ,

l edge o f mean s of a tt a i n ing other pu rposes than that of i ncreasing the

knowledge itsel f It may be s aid to be the spe c ial motive of Philosophy
.
,

the desi r e fo r k n owi n g al l that c an possibly be known of the Unive r se

o r Total ity of Bein g Nothi n g short of this totality however its
.
,

natu r e may be c onc eived o r imagined or whereve r its limits may be ,

d raw n from time to time a s k n owledge advan ces fr om gen eration to

, ,

gene ratio n is an obj e c t c apabl e of s atisfying this desire The desi r e

,
.

is deeply r ooted i n the n ature of man and will doubtless c on tinue to ,

 S OME CARDINAL POINTS IN KNOWLE D GE 43

O perate in him as a motive so l on g a s he con ti n ues to be an upward

an d on ward l ooki n g con s c ious bei ng It is he re th at is in taki n g this
.
, ,

view of the U n ive rse o r Tot al ity of Bei n g that Phi l osophy coi n cides ,

w ith Theo l ogy The P ower i n the U n iverse uphol di n g govern i n g

.
, , ,

an d a c cou n ti n g for the existen c e of al l things A l mighty Po we r —the ,

é

idea of po wer bei n g an idea un analysabl e by us— this is what is meant

by D i vin i ty in the l east a nd l owest sense whi ch is essen tial to that
idea Now phi l osophy and theol ogy doubt less do coi n cide at this
.

point an d in t h is idea But though the ide a itsel f is thus common

, .

to both pursuits it is not reached by b oth in the s ame way n or does

, ,

it hol d the same position o r perform the s am e functio n i n both al ike .

S o that it wou l d be a fatal mistake fat al to both pursuits to identify , ,

them completel y on th at ac c ount as m an y person s do a nd to co n sider

, ,

that they are but one pursuit though c al l ed by di ffe re n t names and
, ,

c o n sequent ly that you ca n lay the found atio n s of your philosophy i n

theol ogi c al ideas To do this wou l d be in fact to base phi l osophy on
.

assumptio n s the one thi n g which is destructive fr om the fi rst of its

,

n ature and val ue as phi losophy Theol ogy in fac t t reats the grea t
.

Obj ect of its pursuit the D ivine Bei n g as a particular obj ect and
, , ,

thereby becomes itself a pa rti cular s c ience ; it is n ot an inquiry into

the n ature an d validity of k n owledge in gene ral And a s to what
‘
.

philosophy is it must I th in k be admitted that no method of pur

, , ,

sui n g k n owledge can possibly override i t since n on e c an be con cei ved ,

m o r e comprehensive or al l embracing tha n that whi c h is based on

pu r e an a lysis without a ssumptions of the subj e ctive side or aspect of

, ,

phenome n a th at is of the c ontent of k n owi n g as disti n guished from

, ,

being i nc ludi n g even the exi stence of the c ontent that is of the
, , ,

knowing itsel f .

6 1 But while for these reasons Theology di ffe r s so widely from

.
, ,

P hi l osophy it di ff ers stil l mo r e widely from Religio n notwithsta n ding

, ,

that here also the ide n tifi cation of the two i s very far from un c ommon .

Theology is some system of ideas or c on c eptions in which the state

of our const antl y changing phi l osophi c al k n ow l edge enables us from
time to time to clothe a s it were an d fix by investi n g with a c ertain
, ,

d e fi n it e n e ss th at par ticu l ar group of needs desi res an d emotio n s

, , , ,

deep l y rooted in the nature of m an which ar e the essen ti al and ,

perm anent c o n stitue n t of Religio n It is of the esse n ce of Re l igion

.

to be emotio na l No system of ideas or c onception s whi c h does not

.

serve as the embodiment or vehi cle of emotion s whi ch a re fe lt and ,

j udged to be of the highest worth in fact of supreme mora l ex c ell ence

,

an d val ue deser ves the titl e of Theology For the whol e moral n ature
, .

of man i ncludi n g all i ts j udgeme n ts of the rel ative v alue of feelings

, ,
44 PROCEEDIN GS OF THE B RITIS H ACA D EMY
its appro vals and di sapprovals of them and of the v olitional acts of ,

choice whi ch they prompt— to which whole nature the religious

emotions and acts prompted by them b elong— must be presupposed
in any i nquiry i nto the sp ecial character i s t ics which ent i tl e any
emot ion o r group of emotions to be d i stingu i shed as religi ous an d ,

make the m the o rig in ators and foundat i on of Rel i gion .

62 What then must we conce i ve of the nature of the religious

.
, ,

emot i ons an d what are those i deas wh i ch without b eing a systematic

, ,

theology are essent i al to their enterta i nment and consc i ous realization
,

by i ndiv i duals " I can do no more than barely enumerate them

b arely enumerate what appear to me to be the sources of religion all ,

of them deeply rooted in huma n nature I t is i mpossible a nd indeed .

,

would be undesirable in a paper like the present to attempt more , .

I state them therefore not as ascerta i ned fac t but only as the result ,

of my own speculation on this int r i c ate t opic And of course here .

also as throughout this paper I must be underst ood t o be speaking

, ,

an alytically of the matters dealt with as we k now them i n our own ,

e xperience and phi l osophi c al thought at the present day and not as ,

attempting to gi ve an account of the stages whereby that e xp eri ence

and that thought have b een attai n ed either i n the history of man ,

kind in adv an c i ng from prim i tive perhap s e ven p re human to

, ,
-
,

modern times or in that of the indi v i dual in advanc i ng from birth

,

t o death The sources I spea k of seem t o me to b e four z

.

1 The distinct i o n of Being and D oing on the one hand fr om

.

Feeli n g and J udg i ng on the other i n consciousness ,

alone .

2 T he idea of the I nfin i ty and Etern i ty of the Un iv erse and

.
,

of the vast regions i nac cessible to human pos i ti ve know

ledge .

3 Man s need of S ympathy moral and intellect ual and his

’
.
, ,

desire for i t This is the specially emot i onal sou rc e

.

of religion t h is the moral emotion which is specially

,

religi ous .

4 The felt i n adequacy of all human sympathy to satisfy this

.

desire owing to the total i ncommu n icabil ity of every

,

indi vidual s consciousness a s it is in hi m to e very other

’

individual .

63 Consequent l y spri ng i ng from t hese sources the P ostulate of an

.
, ,

Omnis ci ent Being who knows every inmost thought feel ing desire , , ,

and choice — this Postulate is the first art i cle of a religious Faith It .

is a Postulate in the stri ct sense of the term a practi c al and fu n da ,

me n tal demand no t li k e the so c alled Postulates of Logi c the

,
-
,
 S OME CARDINAL POINTS IN KNOWLE D GE 45
fundamental l aw of Thought I dentity Cont radi c tion and Excluded , ,

Middl e — which are more properly to be c all ed Ax i oms th an Postul ates ,

since the te r m Ax i o m has c ome to signify somethi n g not demanded

but found a s an ultimate and universal fact i n the thi n ki n g pro c ess 1
.

And we a r e enabled t o make the postu l ate of Omnis c ien c e givi n g ,

it a rational mean ing by con c e i ving it as the c ons c ious n ess tha t
,

inseparably accompanies ete rn al and infi n ite P ower the e fficien t ,

age n cy i n the etern al and infin i te Universe throughout a ll it s ,

regions seen and un seen and reaching to its minutest pr oc es se s

,

and changes as well as to it s largest so as to sh are ( so to speak ) ,

the eternity and infin i ty of that P ower Not that we the reby ga in .

any insight i nto the nature of po wer wh i ch st i ll rem a ins as before , , ,

the general term under whi ch we gather up the f a c ts of existence

and cont i nuance of change a n d process as realities or fac ts simply
, , .

But we can and we do conceive the poss i b i l i ty that every one of these
fa c ts should have a consc i ousness of itself attach i ng to i t i n such ,

a way that in it b eing and k now i ng though distin ct are i nseparable

, , , ,

and co eternal Yet i n whatever way we may con c eive Omn i sc i ence
~
.

as poss ible the real i ty of i t which we p os tul at e is still a matter of

,

Fa i th not of Knowledge The fact that we concei v e it as infini t e

, .

and eternal that is a s shar i ng the i nfin ity and etern i ty of the d i v i ne
, ,

power and of the un i verse which i t susta i ns shows that we conceive ,

it equally w i th them as far exceeding any p os i t i ve k nowledge which

, ,

i s poss i ble to us as human beings Whatever is thought of a s i nfi n ite

.

or eternal is thought of a s someth i ng the to ta li ty of whi ch thereb y

e scapes c i rcum scrip ti on or l i m i tat i on by conceptual thought .

6 4 At the same t i me we conce i ve the Omniscien c e wh i ch we

.

postulate a s sympathet i c w ith o ur own moral nature That symp a thy .

with our own otherw i se incommunicable feeli ngs is i n fact our spe c ial , ,

moti v e i n postulating i t And i n this it is postulated as sympathet i c

.

with our own mora l j udgements as wel l as feel ings with o ur j udge ,

ments of the relat i ve v alue of our own feeli n gs a n d with our own ,

ap provals and disappro va ls of our own acts No r is it possible to .

desire such sympathy from any Being who se nature we should conceive
as morally lower than our own Moreover owing to it s inseparability
.
,

from the i nfinite and eternal Un i verse and the P ower wh i ch sustains
it no j udgemen t s of the relat i v e value of feelings or approval s a nd
, ,

dis approvals of act s of choice ca n be c on ce i ved as poss i bl e whi c h can

,

override in p oint of validity and truth those wh ich we c once i ve

, , ,

from o ur human poi nt of v i ew as pas sed and entertained by ,

1
I h a ve n o t a l wa y s ta k en thi s v i ew o f t h e r i g ht n a m e fo r t h e Po st ul a te s o f
Lo gi c
’
.
46 PROCEEDINGS OF THE B RITIS H ACA D EMY
Omniscie nc e They have i n our co n ception a morall y bi n di n g
.
, ,

powe r whi c h is the same in ki n d as that of our ow n Co n s c ienc e ,

whi l e we a ttribute to them as passed a nd e n tertai n ed by Om n iscie n ce

, ,

an u l tim ate an d irreversible val idity an d truth The ultim ate val idity .
,

t ruth and morally bi n ding power of the j udgeme n ts of our own

,

Co n s c ie n ce ar e thus c o n ceived as based upon their h armony w ith

the laws of n ature which are the laws of Omniscien t P ower Our
, .

ow n fel t and wel comed r el atio n to this Om n iscie n t P owe r a relation ,

postulated by us because it alone gives us the symp athy whi c h we

need this al one is r el igious Faith ; n othing else h a s a ny clai m to be
,

entitled Rel igion .

6 5 Now we c an n ot c onst r uct a theory of that which is show n by

.
,

the an alysis of our c ons c ious n ess to be conce i vable o n ly as es caping

,

co n ception be cause i n fi n ite an d ete rnal ; to say nothi n g of the fac t

,

that we c an an d do co n ceive the possibi l ity of there bei n g in real ity , ,

other modes of cons c iousness th a n ou r s an d other worl ds besides th at,

material wo rl d of su n and stars and planets whi ch is revealed to our

senses a worl d which we must then thi n k of as but a part of a far
,

greater and more comp r ehensive totality But while this totality .

thus of ne c essity escapes our pos i tive k n owledge it is not beyond the ,

purview of religious Faith whi c h is based upon a desi r e ineradicabl e

,

in human natu re and ( prompted by this desi re) upon the postul ate
,

of an omnis c ient and al mighty power We have no knowledge as .

,

distinguished from faith of the nature of the D ivi n e Bei n g At the

, .

same time we h ave no ideas or conception s but su ch as are derived

from human expe rien c e by which to represe n t a n d think of that
,

natu re an d of the rel ation of the D ivi n e Bei n g to ou rsel ves ; so that
,

we h a ve to recog n ize th at the D ivine Being is far more an d ( i n that

m o r e) fa r other tha n it is possible for us as human bei n gs to c o n ce i ve , ,

or i magi n e .

66 Wh en we come in speculatio n to the end of our positivel y

.
, ,

conceivabl e ideas as e g in the ca se of our t ryi n g to c o n ceive a

, , . .

begi nn i n g or an e n di n g of the Uni v erse we tend to m ark that stop ,

to our ideas by some self contradictory and on th at a cc ou n t st r i ct ly

-

incon c eivab l e idea as for i n st a nce the idea of Ch an ce o r Ch aos or

, , ,

spo n tan eous ge n er ation of somethi n g ex n ihi lo or of a C reator whose ,

own Bei n g we e n deavour to c o n ceive by the sel f contradictory idea of -

Ca usa S u i Ideas su c h as these are nugatory not bec ause they are
.
,

ideals whi ch are take n to be re al izabl e on l y a t i nfi n i ty but because ,

they are sel f c ontradictory Chan ce and C haos for instan c e being
-

, , ,

terms predi cated of a real u n iverse notwithsta n ding th at the idea of

,

all real bei n g of all existence and be c oming invo l ves the idea of some
, ,
 S OME CARDINAL POINTS IN KNOWLE D GE 47
c orresponde nc e of p a rts of some o rder some regul arity essenti ally
, , ,

atta chi n g to it S u c h suppos e d ideas as these bei n g stri ctly i n c o n

.
,

c e i va ble bec a use se l f co n tra di ctory give us n o positive know l edge wh a t

,
-

e ver o f the Universe though appear i n g a s if they might possib l y do so

, .

They simpl y i n di ca te that we have re ac hed a l imit i n tha t positive

knowledge True this l atter c haracte risti c of m arki n g a limit is one
.
,

which they shar e wi t h such general ideas as those of Fo rc e E n ergy , ,

P ower Age n cy E ffi c iency which of themselves tell us n othi n g of how

, , ,

or why existe n ts exist events o ccur They are n ot ideas of abstract

, .

but hypost asized e n tities ; they a re ideas of the abstrac t but very real
f a c t i n c o ncrete experienc es th at existe n ts d o exist eve n ts d o o cc ur , ,

whatever m ay be the kind of their bei n g or the mode of their o cc ur

re n ce Conseque n tl y these ideas al so ( though not self co n tra dictory )
.
-

mark limits in our k n owl edge ; but these l imits are limits in our
anal ysis of positively know n existents and eve n ts ; whi ch l imiti n g
ideas we the refore h ave to accept as fi n al resu l ts of philosophi ca l as
well as scie n tifi c i n qui ry .

67 S pe c u lative k n ow l edge begi n s with empiric a l perceptio n s and

.

ends with empirical ideas The Universe is the obj ect of an empiri cal
.

idea We c an n ot c on struct that obj e c t i n thought be cause we c a n not

.
,

l imi t o r c irc ums cr ibe in thought th at which we must think of as

infi n ite and ete rnal S omethi n g has bee n already s a id in this paper
.

of the term em pi r ic a l but it will perhaps n o t be out of p lac e to add

,

some few rem ar ks on it i n co n c l usion It was des c ribed above a s the .

o b ec t ifi e d co n tent of a process and a c ert a in comp l exity w a s pointed

j ,

out as esse n tial to it This description may now be ch aracte r ized

.

somewh a t more mi n utely by sayi n g th at the te r m em pi r i ca l expresses ,

the fac t that the perceptio n s a n d ret ai n ed ide a s representi n g pe rcep

tio n s w hich are the d ata of experience oc c upy some duration of time
, ,

(though it m ay be b rief) or some duration of time a n d some exte n sio n

,

of spa c e together ( though it m a y be s m all ) so that some specifi c ,

feel ing c ombi n ed with some duration or du ratio n and extension ,

togethe r c o n stitute a perc eptual d atum of experie nc e

,
I t is its .

c omposite c haracte r th at is its empi r i c al ch arac ter Now in the ca se .

,

of the supposed m i n i m a of pe rceptio n — the l east possibl e empiri cal

perc eptions — n o di ffe re n ce within them of fo rmer a n d latter in time
is perc eived and likewise no di ffere nc e i n position of p a rts of spa ce
,

withi n them The di ffere nc e h a s to be i n ferred be cause it es capes

.
,

the ac uten ess of ou r perc eptive po w ers ; but i n ferred it must be .

For no other fac t is c ompatible with the fac t of empi r ical perception
on the large r s cale th at is as a ctuall y given in the varied p rocess
, ,

c onte n t of exper ience whi c h is the a n a lysa n dum of philosophy

, .
4
8 PROCEEDINGS OF THE B RITIS H ACA D EMY
What we find as belonging to these fa cts we h a ve to think of as
bel onging to them th roughout al l their p ar ts even when these are ,

though t of as so minute a s to esc ape the distinguishing ca pacity of

perc eption ; an d it must be noted that it i s only by thought that the
m i n i m a per cep ti bi lia themselves are disti n gu i shed ; as m in i m a they are

not da ta of experien c e ; co n sciousness is not g i ven to us in m in im a

ready marked out a s such in percep tion nor yet is experience g i ven
i n ori ginally separate emp i ri c al un i ts i n such units as we have ,

selected by anal ysis out of our a n a lysa n d um e g the a b c d of the , . .

, , ,

present paper as the s i mplest kind of fac t s emp iri c ally known to us
, ,

and therefore the best to take first i n pro c eeding to analyse it ; but
wherever there i s extension or durat i on there also i s div i sib i lity by
, ,

t houg h t. These per c eption s we may divide i n tho ug h t by in trodu ci ng , ,

mathem atical points and may p icture these points by so called

,
-

m in im a e r cepti bi lia ; but mathematic al points being div i di n gs only

p , ,

are not perceptible b y sense Nor are those m i n im a per cepti bi lia by
.

which we picture them e g the dots on pape r pictu ring mathe

, . .

m a t ic a l points per c eiv a b l e separately as ultimate percepts b u t only

, ,

a s part s of larger percepts ; the dot s are not per c eivable withou t a

back g rou n d or context of some sort or other on wh i ch and a s parts ,

of whi ch they appear and are dist i nguished .

68 Now mathem atical d i vis i ons points i n d uration poi n ts l i nes

.
, , , ,

and surfaces in extension are no percei vable bre a k or solution i n the

,

cont i nuity of the abstrac t but insep arable perceptual c ontinua

durat i on and e xtension — i n to wh i ch they are i n t roduced by thought .

S till less are they solutions of the c ontinuity of any stri ctly homo
en e o us c ontent of those co n tinua These homogeneous co n ti n ua are
g .

data of per ceptio n or of representat ion s i m a gined as perc eptual

, ,

not data of tho ug ht .Change or motion in an y su c h c ont in uous

homoge n eou s content of du r at i on o r extension which is the lowest ,

and si mplest shape either c hange or motion can assume and therefore ,

that whi ch is most essential to them an d al so that in which they may ,

escape the h ighest deg ree of acuteness of human perceptivity shar es ,

the c onti n uity of that homogeneous c ontent into whi ch di visions may
be i n t r odu c ed by tho ug ht without an y break i n its c ontinu i ty be in g
,

introdu c ed thereby . D ivisions i ntroduced by thought p resuppose

continua given in perception ; to think of a c on ti n uum i s to think of
somethi n g which is divisible by thought without solution of i ts ,

continuity as a perc ept Ch an ge and Mot i on therefo re whe n thought

.
,

of in their lowest and therefore most essential s hape let us say fo r , ,

argume n t s sake a s a passing from a this to a tha t over a m athemat i cal

’
,

divis i on introduced by thought m ust b e though t of a s co n t in uous

,
 S OME CARDINAL POINTS IN KNOWLE D GE 49
transitions unbroken by the mathem a tical division which th i nking ,

i n troduces into perc eptual continua for the purpose of understa nding
perceptual d ata continuity among them Tra nsition or pa ssi n g per se
, .
,

or in the abstrac t is no more pe rceptible than is a mathematica l p oint

,

or divis i on i n duration or exte n sion the number 1 for instan c e in , , ,

arithmeti c When c han ges or motio n s or un i ts are empi rica l ly gi ven

.

in perceptio n it is because there is some heteroge n eity some di ffere n ce

, ,

in kind i n the content to whi c h they belo n g en abli n g the this and
, ,

the tha t of the transit i on ( or the unit a nd i ts context ) to be dis

t in g ui sh ed as di ffe rent i n dependent l y of an y mathemati c al d i vision
,

( or a c t of counti n g in arithmetic ) P ure l y m athematical div i sions .

make no di ffe ren c e to the co ntinuity of the c onte n t i n to which they

are introdu c ed by thought n or do they effe c t any arrest or stop page ,

of continuous t ransitions ( changes or motions ) i n perceptu al continua .

69 P lato was the first so far as I am aware to signal ize this

.
, ,

nature of change and motion calling it éfa lcpvn s in his wonderful, ,

d ial ogue the P a r m en id es w here he not on ly re v eals to us the laws

, ,

of pure that is purely l ogi c al thought apart from any particular

, , ,

mode of it su ch for instance as the mathemati c al but also by

, , , , ,

d istinguishing the logical concept un i ty from ex isten t unity as its

obj ect thought of l ays the l ogical basis for a consistent theory of
,

a World of Chan gi n g Realities at on c e phenomen a l and real w i thout ,

i dentifying a s P armenides the Eleatic philosopher had done the

, ,

concept un i ty with the ex isten t permanent and eternal Universe or ,

contrasting the two taken together and undiscri minated w i th ever

, ,

cha nging phenomena which the Eleatic p hilosopher held to be illu ,

sory and unreal because transitory a nd not r ea l like the one ete rnal
, ,

Universe S ee for 7 0 i fa tpvn s the concluding port i on of the se c ond

.

di vi sion of the argument of the S econd Part of the P a r m en ides ,

pp 1 5 5 E to 1 5 7 B and perhaps more particularly the words 6M

’
.
,

n o t s d r on o s n s é x d enr a t usr a fb r fis x wfio e a s r e Ka i

éfa ict vns a br n (I
’ f ’ i
‘ -

y
to ewe, Ev xpo vcp o bbevi o ii o a , Ka i si s r a t rn v bi; Ka i 8x m u m s r d Te
-
’ ’ i “
o n
'

m vo uue vo v n er a BdAh ec i n t 7 6 éo r dva r « a t 7 5 éo r bs i n t 7 6 m usi c Oa t ( P a r m ,

‘ -
. .

p . D E)
15 6 , .

7 0 P lato in this S e c ond P ar t of the di alogue P a r m en ides aga i n

.

makes P ar menides himself the chief speaker expoundi n g an d develop ,

’
i ng his o wn strictly philosophica l theo ry the Road of T ruth ( the
‘
,

signifi c ance of which expressions wi ll be tou ched on p resently ) ,

expan di n g it i n fact i nto a theory j ustifyi n g the applicat i on of

logica l thought to the whol e phen omenal Universe It deals only .

with the pu rel y logica l part of the P lato n i c Theo ry of K n owledge ;

i t i s Pl ato s development of the Eleatic phi l osophy I t i s Parmenides
’
.

V B 4
50 PROCEEDINGS OF THE B RITIS H ACAD EMY
that gave P lato the most powerful mental stimulus P armenides .

rather than S ocrates was Pl a to s chief Father in philosophy though ’ ’

,

the S ocrat i c influence was also of cardinal im p ortance T he whole .

argument of thi s expans i on turn s upon the d i stinct i on betwee n the

wh a tn ess or mean i ng expressed by si n gle terms and the tha t" n ess or

e x istence of those whatnesses Plato nev er accounts for the ex istence .

of that distinction n or yet for di fference or genesi s or change or

, , , ,

motion or any of their deri vat i ves ( though in the c a se of one

,

deri v ative wh i ch I shall presently notice he seems to me to ma k e

a strenuou s attempt to do so ) all he says i s — i t is only by dra wi ng -

these primary d i stinctions a nd those which are deducible from them

th at we can un der sta n d the phe n omenal un i v erse ( Perhaps I may be .

allowed to say here that a l l serious students of the P a rm en id es w ill

find Professor Henry J ackson s articles on the P hilebus and the ’

P a r m en id es in vols x a n d xi of the J
, o ur n a l of P hi lo log y London
.
,

and Cambridge 1882 most valuable aids in understanding it These

, , .

a rt icles are the two first of a series entitled P la to s La ter Theo ry o f

’

Id ea s con t r i buted by hi m to th a t J ournal But in saying this I by .

no means i ntend to i mply complete agreement with Prof J ack son s .

’

i nterpretation of the Second Part of the P a r m en ides To the t wo .

arti cles j ust mentioned should be added the third article in the seri es ,

t hat on the Tim a eus i n vol xiii and the fifth on the S ophist in
, .
, , ,

v o l x iv of the J
.
, ournal ) .

7 1 Thu s the S econd Part of the P a r m en id es is Plato s chief ’

.

attempt to grapple w i th the ambigu i ties invol ved in the apparently

simple term s m n n a ( Iv a t ou a n (iv and m i x dv — ambigui t ies the full
’ ’ ’ ’

, , , , ,

s i gnificance a n d decepti veness of which it may be S aid to have

d i scovered in and by the ac t of grappling with the m in this a n d
other D ialogue s as for i n stance i n the S ophist For along w i th
, .
,

all their apparent simplicity and real ambiguity they are the term s ,

wh i ch we employ and cannot avoid employing t acitly or openly , ,

i n e v ery act of thought We have the is of the copula connecting .

subj ect with pred i cate i n an act of j udgement as in red is a colour ’

, ,

and w e ha ve the is of existence where it i s predicate also as in ,

‘ ‘ ’
red exists i e red is existent
, .
S i milarly with o bcn a which
’ ’
. .
,

i ncludes both bei ng a s a fact and the wha tn ess of an y being whi ch , , ,

i f defined or defin a ble we call i ts essen ce that is the c haracteristi c s

, , ,

which a r e e ssenti a l to its be i ng what it is I t is moreover quite .

, ,

possibl e that there shou l d be some whatnesses whi ch are perfe ct l y

well known to us and the names of which con vey a well known
,
-

meani n g and yet are wholly un d e fin a ble bei n g u ltimates in thought

, , ,

and therefore a s su c h whatnesses have no predicate s not even that

, , ,
 S OME CARDINAL POINTS IN KNOWLE D GE 51

of the i r own meaning as dis t inguished from the whatne sses them ~

selves Such an ultimate i n thought is the whatness ( or meaning) of

.

the term O n e as handl ed by Parmenides in the D ial ogue I n the

, .

first part of the eight divisions into which the Se c ond Part of
the D i a l ogue falls ( pp 137 C 1 4 2 B ) he shows that the term One
.
-

, ,

so understood has literally no predi cates not even that of o bm a

, ,
’
.

It is like the subj ect A of the first so called P ostulate of Logic ,

-
,

A is A but wi tho u t its predicated A I t is rather a n act of counting

, .

than of t hought In the second division ( pp 1 42 B 1 5 7 B ) he

. .
-

mak es the supposition that t h e One of the fi rst div i sion h a s Being in
,

the sense of Existence or becomes ( for our thoug ht) Exi stent That , .

compos i te Unit so to speak both exists and is one Although

.

,
.

, .

it is One it yet con tains d i fference w i thin itself ; its components are
,

di fferent ér epa fr om each other And this is true of all i ts part s

,
’

, .
,

r hMa supposing such parts to ex ist

'
7 06 E va s as par ts of a whole
“
, , ,

since every one of t hem must contain the same d ifi er en ce of com

'

p o n en t s that the One contains I t is by th i s line of though t that .

the Parmen i dean Unit Universe is argued to contain plurality an d ,

to hav e pred i cates which are not only di fferent from one another ,

but also in many cases contrari e s of one another contraries which ,

become as we should now sa y contradict ories if predi c ated of one

, , ,

and the same unit at one and the same t i me and i n one and the
, ,

same respec t H is defin i t i on of cum — pea s; o bo ia s n er d xpo vo v

.
'

7 0 6 n a pdvr o s — w i ll b e found at p
,
1 5 1 E a nd that of yiyveo fla i .
,

A i — at p 1 56 A in this second divi sion

’
It
q w s
-

a e r a a v e o o i a , .
,
.

should be not ed that he bri n gs i n time Xpo vo s into h i s defin i tion o f ,

’

d ua l and consequently has to assume it a s necessary to the under

,

stand i ng of yiyveo fla t which he shows to be a process i n t i me ,

The .

one case spoken of in the preced i n g paragraph in wh i ch he seems to

, ,

make a strenuous attempt to account for the e xi stence of one of his

derivative facts is that of the existence of r hAAa r o fi évés which at
, ,

the begi n ni n g of d i vision 3 at p 1 5 7 C sqq he seek s to show is , . .

,

deducibl e from the fact of di fference betwee n its c ompo n ents év a n d ’

(i v
, these l atter of course being inseparabl e by hypo thesis The .

p l ur ality of part s r hM a r o fi évo s all severa lly containing the same

,
’

d i fl er e n c e of components as the 21; (i v is anothe r matter Yet this is , .

what he attempts to deduce from that hypothesis And this attempt .

it is i n which I cannot think he is successful s i nce it bri n gs him into

, ,

contradict i on with his own argum en t in division 2 where r hM a 7 06 ,

évo s were frankly ac c epted as parts n o pi a belo n ging to the % v ou

’ ’ '

, , .

But now in division 3 p 1 5 7 C we are tol d that r hAAa r o fi épa r are

, , .
,
’

di fferent from it solely in v irtue of their having p arts po pi a w i tho ut ,

’

B 4 2 -
52 PROCEEDINGS OF THE B RITIS H ACAD EMY
wh i ch d ifi er en tia they wou l d not be ci M a but identical with gv The ’

, .

3p which is ti p o r whi ch exists is perfectly simple incapabl e of hav i ng

, , ,

parts As we should now say i ts simp l icity i s it s nature its o bo la i n

.
, ,

the sense of essen c e a nd this simpli city i t c a rries w i th it i n t o the

,

exi s tenc e wh i ch the hypothesis a fli r m s of it Plato m ust therefore .

,

in my opin i on look elsewhere than to the mere mean i ng of 311 for the
,

existence of r ciM a or that plural i ty of exi stent p arts which ex perien c e

‘

shows that the $ 1 61 contains though supposing the genesi s of the

; : , ,

part s to be given i t i s very true that they w i ll one and all co ntai n
,

that di fference of components which the t v 63 itself conta i n s : .

72 I t woul d be out of place in a pap er li k e the present to follo w

.

the argument through al l the eight divisions of wh i ch i t consists the ,

four last of which are based on the hypotheses e i ther of the non
mean ing or of the non exi stence of On e that i s upon the contra
-

d ic t o r ie s of the hypotheses either of it s meani n g or of i ts e xi stence ,

wh i ch are the bases of the argument i n the four first di v is i ons .

I will confine myself to saying that the conclus i ons reached both on
the affirmat i v e hypotheses and on the negatives which are the ir con ,

t r a d ic t o r ie s are in perfect harmony with each other namely that i f

, , ,

One does not in any sense ex i st nothing whatever e xi s ts whi le i t , ,

would al so seem that whether One e x ist or not both One itself and
, , ,

all other th in gs whatever in all possible relat i ons both e xi st and do

, ,

not ex i st b oth are and are not man i fe sted a s phenomena (t a fver a i r e
, ,

m i o f: (t a lusr a t p 1 66 C which is the concluding sentence of the

-
.
, .
,

D ialogue It seems therefore that the real e x istence of a p ermanent

.
, ,

Uni v erse cons i st i ng of parts wh i ch though tran si tory are also real i s
, ,

rendered intelligi ble by the affirmat i ve hypotheses Nor is there any .

suggest i on of a transcendent real i ty i n contrast with the phenomenal ,

as in Kant And the apparently open c ontra di ctions whi ch this last
.

sentence contai ns must be thought of as resolved by the br a n ds n s

( t ri m s r "
, f pn
) é a lc v s spoken of in the concluding part of the second
,

d i v i s i on ( pp 1 55 E—1 5 7 B ) which is the conception by mea ns of

. ,

wh i ch Becoming or Genesis is rendered intelligible I n fact we seem .

,

to hav e i n this c oncluding sentence Plato s mode of saying that afte r ’

all there are sense opinion thought &c &c the phenomena of
, , , .
, .
,

c o n sc io usn ess whatever their n a ture may be

, .

I vent ure w i th great d ifli d en c e cons i dering the di fficulty of this ,

much controverted subject to app end here a summary ( involving ,

paraphrase ) of the princ i pal argument of the S econd P art of the

P a r m e n id es as I apprehend it I take that S econd Part to begin w i th
.

some introdu ctory remarks T l o bv r ui no u s duh o o o qn a s ,

MA
’
.

at p 1 35 C down to p 1 37 C the pri ncipal argument o c cupyi n g the

. .
,
 S OME CARDINAL POINTS I N KNOWLE D GE 53

rest of the D ialogue This argumen t falls i n to two Di vis i ons the .
,

first positive the second negat i ve end i ng with the word

, ,

at p 1 66 C . .

Fi r st D i visio n , po si ti ve .

137 C
to If unity is u n ity It h a s no predi ca tes .

14 2 B
II 14 2 B
.

If u n ity has bei n g I t has all ( and contrary) p redi

to
1 57 B
Co n cludi ng pass age of II c learly discriminated from
what precedes by the words én bi) r b r pi r o v Aeywue v ’ ’ ’

1 5 5 E to 1 5 7 B H o w Chan ge i n the wides t sense ,

i ncluding genesis an d predicatio n is possibl e ,

éfa i cpvn s the instant of Ch a nge in tim e duration 1

’
-
, .

I f unity has bei ng Other thi ngs have all ( and con
t r a r y) pred i cates .

I f uni ty is un i ty Other th i ng s h a ve no p redicates .

S econ d D i vi sio n , ne
g a ti ve .

I f unity is not unity It has all ( and contrary) predi

cates .

I f un i ty has not being It has no predicates .

I f u n ity is not u n ity Other thi ngs are i l lusory

Phe n ome n a a ppear i n g to possess all ( and c o n t rary )
,

predi cates .

If u n ity h a s n ot bei n g — Othe r thi ngs have no pre

d ic a t e s a nd do n ot appear as Phe n ome n a at all
, .

In Dr Th o m . as Ma g ui r e ’
s e d iti o n of t h e P a r m e n i d es, 1 882 , I am spo k e n of

as fo ll o w s i a o t t p 88 o thi s whi c h I h ve ll d t h e c o c l ud i g
, n n e a .
, n a ca e
‘
n n

a ssa g e o f I I S h d w r t h H o dgs a se e m s t o su po se th t P l t o h e l d th t t h e
o on
p p a a a

i t " w h i h t ti o ] po sse sse d d u ti o N o e fe e e i s gi ve n t o

’
c u s m e i t w n ra r r
p o n c n . n c

a y w iti g o f m i e th o ug h t h e w it e
n r n n ,
w s c e r ta i l y q u i n t e d Wi th m y Tim e
r r a n ac a

a d Sp e as
n ac o th e
,
n o te i
an h i s vo l um e sh o ws
r I c e r ta i n l y n ve e n t e r ta i n e d
n . e r

s uc h o pi n i o
an e ith e s t o t he f ct
n , r o s t o Pl t o
a Tru e t h e t hi ki g o f
a ,
r a a .
, n n

a d i v i si o o f ti m e h s d u
n ti o n but t h e d i i si o th ught o f per se i s th o ught
a ra ,
v n o

o f a s du ti o n l e ss
ra d wh y " S i m pl y b e c use i n th i n k in g o f it per se w e
,
an a , ,

a bst a c t f o m t h e c o n ti uo us d u ti o whi c h it d i vi d s Thi s wa s m y o pi n i o n

r r n ra n e .
54 PROCEEDINGS OF THE B RITIS H ACAD EMY
There the dial ogue ends Now by accepti n g the four affi rmat i ve
.

hypotheses an d denying their contra dictories the four negative

, ,

hypotheses — which four in eac h c ase are only two sin c e two are
, ,

merel y repetitions — that is by affi rming that ,

( 1 ) unity is unity i e m ea n s un i ty and noth i ng else and

, . .
, ,

( 2) un i ty is combined with bein g ,

we get a c lear and con sistent view of the World of i v Ka t n o h k d ,

w i thout anything per se or a pa r te r ei unknowable in i t or an y

, , ,

wholly non existent illus i ons ; indeed if anything could be wholly

-
,

illusory it would be the év the unity which was un i ty only In

,
’
, .

short we are here pre sented with a World of Cha n g ing Rea li ties
, ,

some more durable than others but the whole of whi ch that is the , , ,

World which they compose is everlasting P lato must me an to deny , .

the four negative hypotheses because i f they were accepted in stead , , ,

of the four correspondi n g affirmat i ves the result so fa r from being , ,

a method leading to knowledge would be a wholl y unthinkable ,

Chaos This then is i n my opin i on what Plato intended to estab

.
, ,

lish by the argument in the S e c ond Part of the D ialogue in subst it u ,

tion for the incomplete doctrine of the real Parmen i des the Elea tic .
,

philo sopher who had left his statement of the case open to many
,

unsolved obj ections At the s a me t i me it cannot be ca l led a n

.
,

Ep i stemology i t is not complete as a theory of knowledge

, It .

is noth i ng more th a n j ust the ba sis of a Methodology showing the ,

v al i dity and the unive rsal applic abi l ity of logical thought to any an d
every kind of subj ect matter ; but this or so m e equivalent basis of
-

the same kind is one of the most indispensable requirements of

P hilosophy And for my part I have litt l e doubt that Plato him
.

sel f finds thi s basis i n the d r o n o s n s(t rim s 7 0 efa cct vn s of p 1 5 6 D E

’
,
’ ’
, .
-

an d that w h at he des cr ibes i n those terms is the logical or mathe ,

m t i l di isi of time dur a tion in the a c t of thinki n — Sti l l less

a c a v o n g
-

does thi s S econd Part deal w i th any particu l ar theo ry such a s P lato s ,
’

own theory of the part played by I deas in N ature o r in Philosophy , ,

but the earlier form of that theory h a ving been fr ankly su r r e n dered
, ,

though not without suggesting another i n the First Part of the ,

D i alogue as I think P rof J

,
ac kson has very clearly shown i t l e a ves
. ,

the theo ry of I deas to be developed i f at all in subsequent or possibly , ,

c ontemporaneously written D i alogues The unapproachab l e m erit .

,

the p re emine n ce of P la to i n P hilosophy seems to me to c onsist by

-

, ,

no means in his theo ry of Ideas bu t i n his power of bringing to ,

wh en I wr o te th a t fo r m e r wo r k j ust a s it is n o w in wr iti n g t h e pr e sen t pa pe r

,
.

S e e m y Ti m e a n d S pa ce Pa r t 1 c h ii
,
16 a n d Pa r t 11 c h v ii d iv 1
,
.
,
41 t o , , .
,
.
,

44 i n c l usive .
 S OME CARDINAL POINTS I N KNOWLED GE 55

l ight the subtlest facts of expe r ien c e owi n g to his c onstant l y sp eak i ng
,

fr om cl ose observatio n of the operations of his own cons c iousness .

73 What then is the e ffect of the introduction of p urely mathe

.

m a t ic a l divisions by thought into per c eptually given continua " How

do they c onduce to u n derstanding the fa cts to f chan ge or of motion

in their lowest and most esse n tial sh ape P la i nl y we must ask what
is meant by un d er sta n d in g understan d ing anythi n g whatever Under
, .

standing I take to be a process of thought a thinki n g whi c h in its, ,

l owest an d most esse n tial shape a ssimilates its obj e c t matter to some -

perceptually given obj ect tak en as al ready known And we say that .

w e u n derstan d anything into whi ch we are i n q u ir i ng when and j ust ,

so far as we e ither perceive i ts l i k eness to some ultimat e empirically

,

gi ven datum of perception or deduce it i nferentially from such

,

u ltimate data Now i n the c ase before us — the facts of change and
.
,

motion in their lowest and most esse n tial shape — thi s a ssimi l ation ,

( to be foll owed by inference) is e ffected by in t rodu c ing into the ,

du ratio n and extension of homogeneous contents distinctions simi l ar ,

to those which are empirically given i n the heterogeneous content s

of u l timate perceptual data We u n derstand the this and the tha t on
.

oppos i te sides of a mathem atical division sol ely by a ssimilati n g them ,

though int r oduced by thought to the c onte n ts di ffe r e n t i n ki n d from

,

one another which are simu ltaneously perceived i n an empirica l

heterogeneous perceptual obj ect In short the thin ki n g of the real
.
,

n ature of Chan ge or of Motion bears witness to the u l t i mate charact er

of perceptual and em pi ri cal data in k nowledge .

7 4 But we are n ot yet at the end of our embarr assments

. We .

have sti l l to conside r how the fo regoing remarks apply to the c ase
of m i n i m a per cepti bi lia themselves ( in that character) a produ ct of
,

thought an d to the idea of Changing or Becoming in its simpl est

,

shape that is of a real form er and latter i n time duration in cases

, ,
-

where no su ch di fference is empirical ly perceived It is he r e that .

"e n o s famous paradoxes aimed against the possibi l ity of Motio n

’

have thei r st ron ghold ; the reason bei n g that while m in im a per cepti
,

bilia seem both to be indisput abl y real a n d to owe that re al ity sol e l y
to thought they yet h av e no change o r motio n perc eptible w i thi n
,

them Of these two c hange is the simplest an d most fu n d a me n tal

.
, ,

motion the more c ompl ex being ch ange i n time an d space together

, .

Change may be fou n d i n time al o n e a nd it is he re that the real cr ux

,

of the c o n trove rsy lies The questio n is this Are m i n im a per cepti bi lia
.
, ,

a r e m athem atica l i n fi n i t e si m a l s the produ c ts so l ely of thought " It

,

seems to me i n disputabl e that they are n o t Both of them are p ro

.

d ucts of diviso ry acts of thought but in both c ases c ontinua must

,
56 PROCEEDINGS OF THE B RITIS H ACA D EMY
be given in perception or p erceptual i dea s b efore div i s i on of them in ,

thought can take place A d i v i sion presupposes a c ont i nuum to be

.

divided ; a cont i nu um does not presuppose a divis i on I t is on ly .

by hyposta siz i ng div i sory acts of thought that you can change them ,

in imagi nation either i n t o m in im a per cepti bi lia themselves or into

, ,

mathemati ca l in fin it e sim a ls which a ga i n are them selves continua ;

,

unless i ndeed by a still further stret c h of i maginat i ve fict i on you

, , ,

suppose them to c r ea te the con ti nua wh ich they then p roceed to di v ide .

In short there are i n ab stract T i me no t i me atoms b ut only thought

, , ,
-

d i v i si on s of Time Now si nce thought b eg i n s with an act of attent i on

.
,

that is an a r r estin g i n thought of the con tent to wh i ch i t attends

, , , ,

i f you hypost asi ze tho se ac t s whether as creative or as div i si ve of ,

cont i nua whatev er they gi ve you as their product is necessari ly some

,

thing i n a state of Rest not of change or of motion S o that if , . ,

thought alone gives you R eal i ty all that i s real is at rest ; whi l e ,

change and motion are an i llusory appearan ce S uch at least I a ppr e .

hend to be the ori g i nal Eleatic doctr i ne and it i s p la i nly in c apable of ,

furnish i ng any scientific or phi losoph ic al theory of a world which it

regards as cons i st i ng of i llusory phenomena .

75 Profe ssor Burn et in his valuable and mo st i nstructi v e wor k

.

E a r ly Gr eek P hi lo sophy maintains along w i th other wri ters whom he ,

names that "eno s argument s agai nst the p oss ib ility of mot i on we r e
,
’

directed aga i nst the P ythagoreans The system of Parmen i des ( he .

says ) made all mot i on imposs ib le a n d his successors had been driven ,

to abandon the mon i st i c hypothesis in order t o avo i d this v ery couse

q ue n c e . "eno does not b r i ng any fresh proofs of the impossibility of
motion ; all he does is to show that a pluralist theory such as t h e ,

Pythagorean i s j ust as unab le to explai n it a s w a s that of P armenides

’

, .

( Wor k cited p 3 66 and

, see. a l so pp 3 5
, 7 3 62 3 69 & c of the s a me .
, , , .
,

secon d edi tion Th i s I th in k may very well be the case At

, , , .

lea st i t would harmonize v ery well w i th my own view of the Ele atic
doctri ne But I would remark that if Pythagoreanism as wel l as the
.
,

doctrin e of Parmenides was precluded from a cc ou n t i ng for the app a

,

rent change and motion of the world a s actually experien c ed that is , ,

for the H er a c lit e a n j lux of all things there in it would be for p re ci sely ,

the same reason namely that b oth do ctr in es alike set up certa in
, ,

thought concepts supposed to be products of p ure thought as riv al

-
, ,

realities to perceptual data conceptualized by thought thus mak i n g -

realities of the concepts and illusio n s of the data Moreover both .

,

doctri n es b elon g to the same k i n d of thought namely the mathe , ,

m a t ica l Unity and units are mathemati cal i deas "eno s arguments
. .
’

agai n st the possi b il i ty of motion show that no thought un i t of sp atial -

 S OME CARDINAL POINTS IN KNOWLE D GE 57

l ength however small i f taken as a reality can ever be traversed an d

, ,

le ft behind by another thought uni t of it taken as a reality bec ause -

the process ta k en as a r eal i ty would require an i nfinitely long t i me

d ur at i on for i ts p erform a nce space continua be in g d i vi sible a d i nfin i
,
-

tu m ; t hat i s to say t he traversi ng could n e ver be reall y p erformed

, ,

and even i f per impo ssibile we should suppose it p er formed i t would

, , ,

there by hav e destroyed the cont i nuum which wa s its own pre
suppos i t i on and co n dition of e xi s tence Conseq uently phenomenal .

motion becomes an i llus i on if purely mathematical units are realities .

7 6 What we find of the utmo st value i n P armenides is somethi ng

.

wh ich i n my opinio n marks him as the origi n ator of the stri ctly
philosophi cal li ne of thought a s disti ng uished from the scientifi c .

I mean his insisten c e on the dist inction between the two roads of ,

truth and of op i n i on the former leadi n g to a real knowledge of Being

, ,

the l atter to an apparent knowledge of Not Being But why and -

.

how is thi s important " Because it embodies the first clear perceptio n
of the subj ecti ve aspect or our kn o wledg e of thi n gs as the S pecial
, ,

field of ph i losophy A ll consc i ousness he says ha s a pos i t i ve cont ent

.
, , ,

has Bei n g of some sort or other as its obj e ct ; and pure Nothing if ,

(per i mpo ssibi le) we could th i nk i t per se would be Not being ,

-

a contra di ct i on in t erm s
O iir e ydp a v yvo in s d ye a "
) e bv ( b ydp
’ ’

)
’
r
d m r ov
‘
o e

mi r e (t pci o a cs .
(W . 39

( I quot e from the Fr a g m en ta P hi lo sopho r um e co r um Ed F G . . . .

A Mulla c hius P ar i siis A Firmin D idot Vol I 1860 pp 1 14

. . . . . . . . .

1 30 P a r m en ides ) We ha ve here the first da w n of the phi lo sophic a l

. .

di stinction between the subj e ctive and the obj ect i v e aspects of e X per i
ence whi ch is a fact otherw i se e xpressible by saying that all Bei ng
,

is relat i ve to Kn owi n g or again that c o n sciousness i s the o n ly evidence

, ,

we have or can have of anythi ng whatever I hold Parmenides there . ,

fore to be the first founder of Philosophy as dist i nct from Sc ien c e

, .

I understand hi s two roa ds the roa d of Truth and the road of ,

Op i n i on to mean — the former phi lo sophic a l the latter scie n tific

, ,

Thought the former lead ing to un i versal and necessary ideas of the
,

O n e etern al and unchanging Universe includ ing all its phenomenal ,

vari eties the latter to theori es of these same phenomenal vari eties
,

whi ch are one and al l impermanent a nd tra ns i tory No one at the .

present day c an endorse prec i sely this distinct i on between philosophy

a nd s c ience Neverthel ess the fact that it was drawn at all based as
.
,

it wa s upon the ob serv ed un i versal and i rrefragable fact t hat con

sc io usn e ss i s our sole e vide n c e for any th in g wha t e ver i s the most ,
58 PROCEEDINGS OF T HE B RITIS H A CA D EM "

important be cause the originating fact in the histo ry of Philosophy

, , .

This is very fa r from bei n g Professor Burn et s v ie w Yet Parmenides ’

.

was no Ideal ist His doctrine as P rofessor Burnet has shown launched
.
, ,

scien tific thought upon the trac k of strictly physical speculati on H i s .

ow n thought of the One Real Un i verse is materi alistic I n the first .

p a rt o f his poem the Road of Truth he argues for it as being an

,

immense but sti ll limited S phere ( v v 102 that is as we should .

,

s ay fi n i te i n poi n t of S pace while at the same time it is unlimited i n

, ,

point of Time duration endless both a pa r te a n te and a pa r te po st

-

, ,

o r as we should say eter n a l having no genesis no destruc t ion

, , ,

én ei yeve o cs Ka i dAeOpo s
'

udh yxdn o a v, d m i o e 63 n io n s dlt n dris

’

fiAe (
’
en h d 83
’

r . v v.

But this eternity he also concei v es as embracing al l part i cular things ,

which are conce i ved as belonging all of them to an eternal N o w , ,

En e i vii v 30 e '
Spo il
( 17 v

21; fvvexe s ( v v 61
'
. .

S uch however imperfect is the first strictly speaking philosophical

, , , ,

c onception of the Un i verse ever framed by man at least in the ,

Western world And it i s this subj ect i v e and stri ctly philosophica l
.

l i n e of thought whi ch Plato follows in his D ialogue P a r m en ide s in ,

the S econd P art of which he represents Parmenides as himsel f enforc i ng

a n d dialectically developing his own Eleatic doctri n e .

7 7 The only logically valid way of deali n g with m i n im a per cepti

.

bilia wi thin which no c han g e o r motio n is per c eptib l e and whi c h ,

therefore are not perceiv ed as a process or a becomi n g wh at they are ,

o r as havi n g a former an d a latter within them while they are sti ll ,

i n the inchoate stage of be c omi n g what they are as m in im a per cept ibili a ,

is i n my opi n ion the foll owi ng We must anal yse them as we fi n d .

them namely as pr odu cts of thought in its en dea vou r to u n de rstand

, ,

the given stream of empirical perc eptio n s We shal l then find if .

,

what I have said above of the mean i ng of u n d er sta n d in g ho l ds good ,

th at it is only by a ssimi l ati ng them i n thought to process co n te n ts of the -

var ied empiri c ally given strea m of co n sciousness that we can u n der
stand them as parts of th at varied stream ( without fal li n g i n to sel f
c o n tradi ctory ideas i n doi n g so) a n d therefore by attributi n g to them
,

c o n ti n uous change an d tran sitio n even though those changes a nd tran ,

sit io n s are not pe r cei v able by huma n sensiti v ity They are n ot made .

i n to u n changi ng atoms by bei n g thought of as m in im a per ceptibilia .

It is merely the limit of human sensitivity that is m arked by thi n kin g

of them as m in im a They could only be conceived as i n di v i sible u n its
.
 S OME CARDINAL POINTS I N KNOWLE D GE 59

excl uding change if they were con c eived as ult i m ate data given by
,

thought and not as products of thought appl ied t o interpret per

,

c e t ua ll
p y given data .

7 8 Wh at then supp o si ng this to be so are we to think of that

.
, , ,

arre st or stoppage whi ch though introduced by thought is yet , ,

apparently introduced as an essential attribute of the obj e c ts thought

of " Here again I think that my distinct i on betwee n cons ci ousness
as an ex istent and the same c ons c iou sne ss a s a knowi n g wil l be found
capabl e of throwi n g light and c l earin g up much c onfusion Thought .

a s an ex istent is itsel f a pro cess Neither the perc eption nor the idea .

of Rest is a datum of consciousness at once u ltimate and universal .

But the very first step in all thinking a s disti n guished from perceiving , ,

is an act of a r r est ; it is a n arrest by attention of the ever changi n g -

p r ocess given in perception Th i s however is no rea l arrest of the .

, ,

str eam of c ons c iousness no arrest of cons c iousness as an e xistent I t

,
.

is an arrest of some member of the consciou sness a s a knowi n g of ,

some obje c t in that apparently backward fl o w in g stream of con scious -

n ess by a member arising in the same stream as an existent flowing

, ,

a ppa rently forwards into the future I t is the retent i on in retentive .

,

memory of the representation of a percep t i on or idea so as sti l l to

, ,

make p a rt of the present and futur e stream of consciou sness although ,

that perception or idea h a s or may have ceased to exi st as it w a s

when it first oc curred It is only as so retained that it appears to be
.

static at rest or unchanging We arre st it by atten t ion fo r the

, , .

purpose of k n owing more about it than the first perception tel ls us ;

and this is the first step in our endeavouring to understand a s well as
pe rceive it We then endeavour to gi ve it some p l ace in a numerical
.

series an d some definition in a logi cal series But consciousness i s

, .

not m ade what i t is by these purposive acts of thought Nor have .

we to say wha t it is in its in c hoate st age whe n we con cei ve it as n o t ,

y et bei n g b ut only a s beco m in

, g cons c iousness si n ce we have nothi ng ,

but empiri c al perceptions from which to derive an idea of wh at i t is ,

whi l e its genesis as an existent is bei n g c o n ditioned .

7 9 It is as an ex isten t that cons c iousness arises beco m es ycyve r a i

’
.
.
, ,

But since it is c o n sciousness that is spoke n of this arisi n g becoming , , ,

genesis can on l y be inferred from wh at it is when it ha s bec o m e that

, ,

is from its o bj e c t ifi e d c onten t as a kn o win g The Laws of Nature

, .

al so so to call them i ncludi n g the most gene ral of all the Unifo rmity
, , ,

of Natur e both static and ki n etic belong to c ons c ious n ess as a kn o win g , ,

and ar e applied to the explanation or understan di n g of N atu re

the Nature of everything co n s c iousness in c luded— as existent There
, .

are just two facts or sets of facts which escape all poss ib ility of
, ,
60 PR O CEEDING S OF THE B RITIS H ACA D EMY
human explanation or understand i ng namely the fact of Ex i stence , ,

i tself the effi ciency whi ch makes the Laws by which it is said to be
,

governed and the specific natures or qualit i es of the feel i ngs and
,
’
forms wh i ch constitute man s consc i ousness as a k no wing .

80 All we can say then of any inchoate state of consciousne ss

.
, ,

pri or to the moment of it s obj ect i ficat ion or crossing the t hreshold ,

of c onsciousness is that i t i s either something that takes place in the

,

pro xi mat e real condi t i ons of that obj ect i ficat i on or else if we take , ,

it by abstraction a s belonging to the obj ect i fication but therein

, , ,

sep arately and apart from i ts conte xt and thus below the m i nimum
of perce i vabil i ty it i s some increase in the i ntens i ty or the di st i nct
,

ness or both of the em pi rical s tat e of consc i ousness o bj e c t ified

, , .

Though t of i n this latt er way m i n im a per cepti bilia may p oss i bly ,

seem to b ear a relat ion to the process of perce i v i ng analogous to

that wh i ch i ts inseparab le elements formal and material bear to an , ,

empiri cal p ercept when formed namely i n b e i ng i mpe rcept ib le in , ,

separat i on from the whole which they form ; thoug h in their case
the imperceptibility is due solely to t heir m i nuteness a s sep arable
parts not elements of the p erceptive p roces s The p arts of a con
, , .

t in uum even when not sep arately perce i vable mu st be conce i ved
, , ,

when thought of a s p art s to b e essen ti al t o it s con ti nu i ty with

, ,

which they cannot be thought of as i nterferi ng .

81 I t seems then t hat there is noth i ng i n e xp eri ence to sho w

.
, ,

e i ther the impossibi li ty of Change or of Mot i on or the pri ori ty of ,

Rest t o either of them in the real Universe I f we attempt to .

chara cteri ze the Universe of Being or Exi stence a s the content or

obj ect of Omn i sc i ence and regard i t i n that respect as const ituting
,

for Omn i science an eternal N o w an idea originating I b elieve with , , ,

Parmen i des — this i s not to retain the i dea of ti m e pr esen t as e x

,

p l a n a tor
y ; i t is to reta i n the i dea of t i m e d u r a tio n as a cont i nuum -

when thought of i n abstrac t ion from i ts content and so t ak ing it to ,

abolish the d i stinct i on s of past present and future with i n it We , , .

are then simply th i nking of time durat i on as shari ng the etern i ty of -

Omniscience the eternity of the Uni verse and using the idea of tim e
, ,

p r ese n t ,or a N o w to chara c ter,i ze the i mmediacy and cer t ainty of

Om n iscien c e that i s to sa y the identity of truth ( subj ect i ve aspect)
, ,

and fac t ( obj ective aspect) both of which aspects we then think of as
,

the inseparable attributes of a Being at once omn i scient and omni

potent We as human beings must conceive or endeavour to con
.

c e iv e that omni sc i ent c onsciousness as a single empi ri cal idea of

infinite c omple xi ty embrac in g contents of i nfinite v ari ety and among

, ,

them the distinction s of past present and future t i me as contained , , ,

 S OME CARDINAL POINTS IN KNOWLE D GE 61

wi t hi n what is to us the i nfi n ite and eternal Universe O ur human

.

c ons c iou sness begins with empirical perceptions and we ca n to some

,

exte n t analyse the knowledge whi ch we de r ive by thought from

empirica l data It is from those data that our idea of Reality is
.

derived Co n seque n tly the idea of Real ity or Real Bei n g as the
.
,

object of an empirical idea is an idea whi ch being what we are we

, , ,

find it as impossible to transcend as we find it impossible to limit or

,

circum scribe by thought the Totality of it s obj ect .