Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces

RUSSIAN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES
EDITED BY PAVEl PODVIG I FOREWORD BY FRANK VON HIPPEL
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Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces
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Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces
Oleg Bukharin, Timur Kadyshev, Eugene Miasnikov, Pavel Podvig,

Igor Sutyagin, Maxim Tarasenko, and Boris Zhelezov
Edited by Pavel Podvig
A book by
The Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies
at the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology
The English-language edition supported by
The Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
The MIT Press

Cambridge, Massachusetts
London, England
© 2001 Massachusetts Institute of Tedmology
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic
or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and
retrieval) without permission in writing from the publisher.
This book was set in Sabon by Best-set Typesetter Ltd., Hong Kong.
Printed and bOlllld in the United States of America.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Russian strategic nuclear forces I edited by Pavel Podving with contributions from Oleg
Bukharin ... let al.].
p. cm.
Includes index.
ISBN 0-262-16202-4 (he. , alk. paper)
1. Soviet Union. Raketnye voxska strategicheskogo naznacheniei. 2. Russia
(Federation). Raketnye voxska strategicheskogo naznacheniei. 3. Strategic
forces-Soviet Union. 4. Strategic forces-Russia (Federation) 5. Nuclear
weapons-Soviet Union 6. Nuclear weapons-Russia (Federation) I. Podvig, P. L.
(Pavel Leonardovich) II. Bukharin, Oleg.
UA776.R37 R87 2001

355.02'l7'0947-de21
2001030576
Contents
List of Major Weapons Systems IX
Foreword Xl
Preface xv
About the Authors XIX
1 Soviet and Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces 1

Making the First Nuclear Weapons 1
The First Strategic Weapons 4
Achieving Quantitative Parity 6
The SALT I and ABM Treaties 8
Strategic Modernization in the 1970s 10
The SALT II Treaty 12
The Modernization Program at the End of the 1970s 16
The START I Treaty 19
The Breakup of the Soviet Union 23
The START II Treaty 25
The Current State and Future of Russian Strategic Forces 27
2 The Structure and Operations of Strategic Nuclear Forces 33
The Structure of the Armed Forces 33
The Decision-Making Mechanism 38
The Defense Industry 43
Operations of Stragetic Forces 49
3 The Nuclear Weapons Production Complex 67
The History of Nuclear Weapons Development 67
The Nuclear-Industrial Complex 74
The Nuclear Fuel Cycle 78
VI Contents
Production of Fissile Materials for Weapons 88

Nuclear Weapons Development 102
Nuclear Warhead Assembly 106
The Nuclear Weapons Life Cycle 109
Nuclear Warhead Design 111
Warhead Management in the Ministry of Defense 113
Warhead Dismantlement 115
4 The Strategic Rocket Forces 117

The History of the Strategic Rocket Forces 117
The Organizational Structure of the Strategic Rocket Forces 142
Missile Systems 153
The Missile Industry 155
Missile Life Cycle 168
Combat Operations of the Strategic Rocket Forces 172
Appendix 4A Land-Based Missile Systems 177
5 Naval Strategic Nuclear Forces 235
The History of the Creation of the Ballistic-Missile Submarine Fleet 235
The Structure of Naval Strategic Nuclear Forces 245
Strategic Missile Submarines and Sea-Launched Ballistic Missiles 259
Development of Missile Submarines and Their Weapons 259
Strategic Submarine Design 262
Strategic Submarine Production 263
Sea-Launched Ballistic Missiles 266
Naval Reactors 267
Combat Patrol 273
Appendix 5A Ballistic-Missile Submarines 283
Appendix 5B Sea-Launched Ballistic Missiles 309
6 Strategic Aviation 339
The History of the Development of Strategic Aviation 339
The Structure of Strategic Aviation 349
Bomber Development and Production 355
The Development of Bombers 355
The Production of Bombers 357
The Development of Aircraft Engines 360
The Development of Cruise Missiles 362
Contents Vll
Strategic Aviation Operations 363

Appendix 6A Strategic Bombers 366
7 Strategic Defense 399
Air Defense Forces 399
Radio-Technical Troops 400
Surface-to-Air Missile Troops 402
Fighter Aviation of the Air Defense Forces 408
Missile and Space Defense Forces 412
The Early-Warning System 420
Antisatellite and Space Surveillance Systems 432
The Present Structure of Russian Air Defense Forces 435
Combat Duty 436
8 Nuclear Tests 439
The Main Stages of the Soviet Nuclear Test Program 440
The Organization of Soviet Nuclear Tests 457
Test Ranges 461
Industrial Nuclear Explosions 471
Summary List of Nuclear Explosions 480
Afterword: Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces in Transition 567
Structural Reform 568
The Arms Control Agenda 571
Strategic Modernization 574
Conclusion 579
Appendix: Designations of Soviet and Russian Strategic Systems 581
Notes 587
Index 657
The Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies and
The Security Studies Program 693
Major Weapons Systems
Land-Based Missile Systems

R-5M (SS-3 Shyster) 177
R-7 (SS-6 Sapwood) 179
R-12 (SS-4 Sandal) 182
R-14 (SS-5 Skean) 186
R-16 (SS-7 Saddler) 189
R-9A (SS-8 Sasin) 192
R-26 195
R-36 (SS-9 Scarp) 196
GR-1 199
UR-200 (SS-X-10) 200
UR-100 (SS-l1 Sego) 201
RT-2 (SS-13 Savage) 205
RT-15 (SS-X-14 Scamp) 209
RT-25 209
RT-20P (SS-X-15 Scrooge) 209
Temp-2S (SS-X-16 Sinner) 210
MR UR-100 (SS-17 Spanker) 212
R-36M (SS-18 Satan) 215
UR-100N (SS-19 Stiletto) 220
Pioneer (SS-20 Saber) 224
RT-23UTTH (SS-24 Scalpel) 226
RT-2PM Topol (SS-25 Sickle) 230
Topol-M (SS-27) 234
x Major Weapons Systems
Ballistic-Missile Submarines
Project V-611 (Zulu IV 1/2) and Project AV-611 (Zulu V) 283
Project 629 (Golf I), Project 629B (Golf I), Project 629A (Golf 11) 286
Project 658 (Hotel I), Project 658M (Hotel 11) 290
Project 667 A (Yankee I) and Project 667AM (Yankee 11) 294
Project 667B (Delta I) and Project 667BD (Delta 11) 298
Project 667BDR (Delta lll) 302
Project 941 (Typhoon) 304
Project 667BDRM (Delta IV) 306
Sea-Launched Ballistic Missiles

R-llFM 309
R-13 (SS-N-4) 312
R-15 315
R-21 (SS-N-5) 315
R-27 (SS-N-6) 319
0-6 Missile System 322
RT-15M 323
R-29 (SS-N-8) 324
R-31 (SS-N-17) 327
R-29R (SS-N-18) 330
R-39 (SS-N-20) 330
R-29RM (SS-N-23) 335
Strategic Bombers
Tu-4 (Bull) 366
Tu-16 (Badger) 370
3M (Bison) 375
Tu-95 (Bear) 379
M-50 (Bounder) 386
Tu-22 (Blinder) 386
T-4 389
Tu-22M (Backfire) 390
Tu-160 (Blackjack) 394
Foreword
Frank von Hippel, Professor of Public and International Affairs, Princeton
University and Chairman, Federation of American Scientists
I first traveled to Moscow in 1983 to brainstorm with a group of senior Russian

scientists interested in nuclear disarmament. After Mikhail Gorbachev came
to power in the Soviet Union in 1985, I began also to visit the Soviet Foreign
Ministry to brainstorm with a young group of activists who were advising the
Soviet Foreign Minister on nuclear disarmament issues. I found that both
the scientists and the Foreign Ministry officials were starving for information. The
Soviet Ministry of Defense considered all information about Russia's nuclear
forces to be top secret, thereby stifling any informed public debate and making
it very difficult for the Foreign Ministry to negotiate on an equal basis with the
Americans.
Several other Western scientists and I therefore began to bring to Moscow the
best reports and books that we could find summarizing information available in
the West about the Soviet Union's nuclear weapons. One of these sources was the
annual Soviet Military Power put out during the Reagan administration by the
U.S. Department of Defense. Although its purpose was propagandistic and it greatly
exaggerated the Soviet Union's missile defense program, it revealed an enormous
amount of hard U.S. intelligence information, including stunningly detailed "artists'
depictions" of Soviet nuclear weapons systems.
In 1984, Thomas Cochran and collaborators at the Natural Resources Defense
Council, a U.S. environmental group, had published the first volume of their Nuclear
Weapons Databook series, U.S. Forces and Capabilities. It immediately became the
standard compendium of public information about U.S. nuclear weapons inside as
well as outside the U.S. government. Cochran and others brought this publication
to Moscow. It was enormously useful to the developing Soviet arms control
community and also helped dramatize the limited availability of Soviet information
about Soviet nuclear weapons. In 1989, Cochran and his collaborators published
xu Foreword
the fourth volume of their data book series, Soviet Nuclear Weapons, which pulled
together, cross-checked, and summarized the information on the subject that the
u.s. government had released over the years through various channels.
The summer of 1989 also marked the launching of the first international summer
school on arms control physics, hosted by the Moscow Institute of Physics and Tech-
nology (MIPT) and organized on the Soviet side by MIPT Physics Professor Anatoli
Diakov. This and a follow-up meeting in Princeton the following summer inspired
Diakov to establish at MIPT a Center for Arms Control, Energy, and Environmen-
tal Studies staffed with MIPT graduates Oleg Bukharin, Timur Kadyshev, Eugene
Miasnikov, Pavel Podvig, and Maxim Tarasenko. One of the new center's first
projects was to translate into Russian Cochran et al.'s Soviet Nuclear Weapons.
The translation was the first open source of information on Soviet nuclear forces
published in the Soviet Union. It was an instant success inside as well as outside
the government.
Inspired by this success, Podvig and his collaborators decided to write a data-
book based on Russian sources. The result is this remarkable book, which was
published in Russia in 1998.
The value of Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces derives not only from the specific
information that it contains but from the fact that this information has been studied
and organized by a talented group of young Russian analysts into a coherent
account of the evolution of Soviet and then Russian nuclear forces. The u.S. and
Russian militaries almost certainly have all this information and more, but
probably not in such a compact and accessible form. As a result, the Russian
edition has raised the level of the arms control debate inside as well as outside the
Russian government.
Now that it has been translated into English, arms control analysts in the United
States will have it as well. Once again, this book will be invaluable inside as well
as outside the U.S. government. I learned during my 16-month stint as a national
security official in the White House during 1993-1994 that although governments
may be the ultimate source of much of the national security information in the public
domain, secrecy greatly impedes its use inside the government. As a result, a sur-
prisingly large fraction of the information and ideas that influence U.S. government
arms control policy come from a relatively small community of independent
security analysts.
This book is a testimony to the maturation of an even smaller but equally
important community of independent security analysts in Moscow. Much of my
hope for the future of Russian-U .S. nuclear disarmament stems from the continual
Foreword Xlll
brainstorming that now goes on every day bye-mail and during reciprocal visits
between these two communities.
Unfortunately, the penchant of the Russian nuclear bureaucracy for secrecy has
been revived during the past few years. Although the book was very well received
by Russian experts, including those in the military and Minatom, in October 1999
the Russian Security Service (FSB) seized all the remaining unsold Russian copies of
Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, along with the hard disks of the computers on
which the book had been edited. The FSB seems to believe that the volume contains
classified information and launched an investigation into its sources. The fact that
none of the authors had access to classified information does not appear to be an
adequate protection-even though it would be in the United States.
The battle over the availability of information relevant to nuclear weapons policy
in Russia therefore continues. Much hangs on the result, and we owe much to the
authors of this volume for being willing to put themselves at risk to ensure that the
international policy debate is grounded on solid facts and analysis.
Preface
The end of the cold war and the breakup of the Soviet Union ended the con-
frontation of two nuclear superpowers that shaped the international relationships
after the World War II and led the Soviet Union and the United States to amass huge
nuclear arsenals. The process of nuclear disarmament that the Soviet Union and the
United States started in the late 1980s and early 1990s seems irreversible. However
difficult the progress might look, it is now impossible to imagine that Russia and
the United States could return to a cold war confrontation. At the same time, deep
reductions in nuclear weapons will require consistent efforts to resolve very diffi-
cult technical and political problems that will inevitably arise.
Russia, the state that inherited the nuclear status of the Soviet Union and the
largest part of the Soviet nuclear weapon production complex and strategic forces,
is currently one of the two largest nuclear powers. Therefore, the progress in nuclear
disarmament will to a large extent depend on whether Russia is able to handle its
nuclear complex effectively and whether its partners understand the problems that
Russia is facing in restructuring the nuclear complex and scaling it back. These tasks
are complicated by the fact that the decision-making mechanism that existed in the
Soviet Union during the time the nuclear complex was built was very different from
the one that exists in Russia now. In fact, Russia is still working on determining the
role of nuclear weapons in its national security and creating an effective mechanism
for making and implementing decisions related to strategic weapons. In these
circumstances the role of availability of accurate information about the Russian
nuclear complex cannot be overestimated.
This book appeared as part of our ongoing efforts to bring information about
Russian nuclear forces to Russian society. These efforts began in 1991, when a group
of scientists from the Center for Arms Control Studies at the Moscow Institute
of Physics and Technology, some of whom are authors of this book, undertook
XVl Preface
translation into Russian of one of the best u.s. publications on the subject, the
Soviet Nuclear Weapons volume of the Nuclear Weapons Databook series, pub-
lished by the Natural Resources Defense Council. The Russian edition of that book,
which appeared in 1992, was the first source of information about the Soviet nuclear
arsenal publicly available in Russia.
The efforts to make information available about Russian nuclear forces continued
after the 1992 publication. Encouraged by the success of the translation of Soviet
Nuclear Weapons, we began a research project that aimed at publication of this
book, Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, a completely new publication that appeared
in Russia in 1998 and was widely recognized as a unique source of information on
the Russian nuclear arsenal.
We believe that several factors contributed to the success of this book in Russia.
First, the book deals with all aspects of the nuclear complex togethe~ paying atten-
tion to the political and bureaucratic structure of the military and the military indus-
try as well as to technical characteristics of weapon systems and history of their
development. Second, we tried to present the data in a format that allows the book
to be used as a reference. And of course, we did our best to ensure that the book
gives a correct picture of the history and the current state of the Russian nuclear
complex and strategic forces. We had never had access to classified information and
have never worked inside the nuclear complex or the government. All of us have a
technical background, however, which, along with our knowledge of the Soviet and
Russian political and bureaucratic system, allowed us to make the most from the
information that is publicly available. We hope that all these factors distinguish this
book from other publications about the Russian nuclear complex in the Russian
and English language alike.
Chapter 1 of the book is devoted to the history of nuclear weapons and strate-
gic forces development in the Soviet Union and Russia. This chapter pays special
attention to U.S.-Soviet arms control efforts, which had a significant impact on the
structure of strategic forces in both countries.
Chapter 2 is devoted to a description of the mechanism by which Soviet political
leadership exercised its control over the strategic forces and military industry. It also
attempts to describe the main features of the Russian nuclear command and control
system.
Chapter 3 deals with issues of development, production, and handling of nuclear
weapons. Special attention is paid to the nuclear complex that produces fissile
materials used in nuclear weapons.
Preface XVll
The next three chapters are devoted to the individual services that constitute the
so-called strategic triad: the Strategic Rocket Forces (chapter 4), the Navy (chapter
5), and Long-Range Aviation (chapter 6). Each chapter contains a short description
of the history of the development of strategic systems for the individual service
reviewed in the chapter, an overview of evolution of the organizational structure of
that service, and procedures for combat duty and employing the service's weapons.
In addition, each chapter includes information about main design bureaus and pro-
duction facilities involved in development and production of strategic systems, as
well as descriptions of individual systems and their technical characteristics.
Chapter 7 describes the units and systems that were part of the Soviet strategic
defense, such as the early warning system and the Moscow missile defense. These
units formed the core of the Air Defense Forces. Although this service was disbanded
in 1997-1998 as part of a reorganization of the Russian military, we decided to
keep this chapter intact, mainly because the distinction given to strategic defense,
which was kept as a separate service throughout most of the postwar period,
was a very important factor that shaped the Soviet and therefore Russian military
thinking.
Chapter 8 describes the Soviet nuclear testing program and peaceful nuclear
explosions program.
We should emphasize here that all information contained in the book has been
drawn from open sources, primarily Russian. When it is possible, we include
detailed reference to the sources we used. In some cases, however, the information
about the military and industrial complex that could be found in Russian literature
is either incomplete or contradictory. In these cases we had to resort to Western
publications or to filling the void with our own estimates, derived from our knowl-
edge of general principles of military operations, analysis of the little information
that was openly available, and comparison of operations of the u.S. and Soviet
strategic forces. Although this approach inevitably leads to certain inaccuracies, we
believe that the general picture of the history of Soviet and Russian strategic forces
development as well as that of their current state is fairly correct. Of course, the
authors will be very grateful for any comments on the accuracy of the data pre-
sented in the book.
This book would have been impossible to complete without help from many
people and organizations. First of all, the authors would like to thank the
Ploughshares Fund and the W. Alton Jones Foundation, who generously supported
the research project that resulted in publication of the original Russian edition of
XVlll Preface
this book. The work on the project was carried out at the Center for Arms Control
Studies in Moscow. The authors would like to thank Anatoli Diakov, the director
of the center, for his continuous support and help. The authors also express their
gratitude to all the people who helped us locate and find various publications and
books, discussed the results of our research work with us, reviewed the manuscript,
and helped prepare it for publication. Our special thanks go to German Malkin,
who helped publish the book in Russia. We are also very grateful to Alexander
Shlyadinski and Steven Zaloga, who provided the drawings that we have used in
this book: Shlyadinski gave us drawings of ballistic missiles, and Zaloga provided
the drawings of strategic submarines.
The English edition of this book became possible due to the support of the
Security Studies Program of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Harvey
Sapolsky, the director of the program. We are also indebted to George Lewis, the
associate director of the Security Studies Program, for his invaluable help in making
the English edition of the book possible. The financial support for the publication
was provided by the W. Alton Jones Foundation. We are also grateful to the John
Merck Fund and the Ploughshares Fund for their support of the research project
that allowed us to keep this book up-to-date.
In conclusion, we would like to express our hope that this book will help provide
better understanding of the history of the Soviet and Russian nuclear forces and
their current status and problems. We hope that the information in this book will
facilitate more open and informed debate on the role of nuclear weapons in national
security, a debate that we believe will eventually lead to a world in which nuclear
weapons will belong to history.
About the Authors
Pavel Podvig graduated from the General and Applied Physics Department of
the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology (MIPT) in 1988. Since 1991, he
has worked as a Researcher at the Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environ-
mental Studies at MIPT. In 1991-1992, he organized the translation and Russian
publication of Soviet Nuclear Weapons. Pavel Podvig has written for Russian and
u.s presses on matters of missile defense, early warning, and U.S.-Russian arms
control negotiations. Pavel Podvig wrote the first and eighth chapters of this book,
and also parts of the second chapter that deal with political leadership and prin-
ciples of political control over the military forces. In addition to this, he co-authored
other parts of chapter 2 and parts of chapter 7 devoted to strategic defense. As
the editor of the book, Pavel Podvig was also directly involved in work on all
chapters.
Oleg Bukharin received his Ph.D. in physics from the Moscow Institute of Physics
and Technology in 1992. He has also received training in international relations
from the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton
University, and was a researcher at the Center for Arms Control, Energy and
Environmental Studies at MIPT from 1991 to 1992. Currently Dr. Bukharin is a
researcher at the Center for Energy and Environmental Studies at Princeton Uni-
versity. His research work is centered around safeguards for and the security of
nuclear material and the disposition of fissile materials from weapons. In 1995 Oleg
Bukharin was a co-author (with T. Cochran and S. Norris) of the book Making the
Russian Bomb: From Stalin to Yeltsin. Oleg Bukharin wrote parts of chapter 3 that
deal with the history of nuclear weapons development and describe the weapons
material production complex. He was also directly involved in work on other parts
of chapter 3.
xx About the Authors
Timur Kadyshev received his Ph.D. in mathematical modeling from the Moscow
Institute of Physics and Technology in 1991. The subject of his thesis was mathe-
matical models of strategic stability. His research focuses on the history and the
current status of the strategic aviation and arms-control and security issues raised
by ballistic missile proliferation. Since 1991 Timur Kadyshev has worked at the
Center for Arms Control Studies. He wrote chapter 6, which is devoted to
strategic aviation.
Eugene Miasnikov received his Ph.D. in physics (oceanography) from the Moscow
Institute of Physics and Technology in 1989. In 1991 he joined the Center for Arms
Control Studies and started working on the history and role of a strategic naval
fleet and implications of submarine survivability for arms control. He has written
extensively on issues of submarine vulnerability, problems of submarine dismantle-
ment, and other arms control problems. Eugene Miasnikov wrote chapter 5, which
is devoted to the strategic fleet. The part of the chapter that deals with sea-launched
ballistic missiles was co-written with Maxim Tarasenko.
Igor Sutyagin graduated from the Moscow State University (Physics Department) in
1988 and since then has worked at the Institute of U.S. and Canada Studies of the
Russian Academy of Sciences. In 1995 he received his Ph.D. in history from the U.S.
and Canada Institute. The areas of his research activity include the structure and
operations of the Russian and u.s. strategic forces, strategic command and control,
and nuclear weapons development and production. Igor Sutyagin is the author of
numerous publications on these subjects. He co-wrote with Pavel Podvig chapter 7
of the book, which deals with issues of strategic defense, and parts of chapter 3 that
deal with nuclear weapons development and handling. Igor Sutyagin was also
directly involved in work on other parts of chapter 3 and parts of chapter 2 that
are devoted to strategic command and control.
Maxim Tarasenko received his Ph.D. in physics from the Moscow Institute of
Physics and Technology in 1988. Beginning in 1991 he worked at the Center for
Arms Control Studies. Maxim Tarasenko was widely recognized as a leading expert
on the Soviet civilian and military space program, about which he wrote extensively.
Among his publications is the book Military Dimension of the Soviet Space Program
(in Russian). Maxim Tarasenko wrote chapter 4, which is devoted to strategic
land-based missile forces and parts of chapter 5 that deal with sea-launched ballis-
tic missiles. In May 1999 Maxim Tarasenko died in a car accident.
About the Authors XXl
Boris Zhelezov graduated from the Moscow Institute of Communications in

1985. Since 1989 he has worked at the U.S. and Canada Institute of the Russian
Academy of Sciences, where he received his Ph.D. in political science in 1994. Boris
Zhelezov works on problems of civil-military relations and various political and
legal aspects of arms control. His publications include the book Civilian Control
Over Russia's Military Budget (in Russian). Boris Zhelezov worked on the part of
chapter 2 that deals with the structure of the strategic forces.
1
Soviet and Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces
Making the First Nuclear Weapons
The Soviet program of nuclear weapons development was based on the scientific
and technical capability that existed in the Soviet Union before the World War II.
Soviet physicists began working in the field of nuclear physics in the 1920s. In the
1930s, several Soviet research institutes were working in this field. In 1940, shortly
after the discovery of fission of the uranium nucleus, the Soviet Academy of Sci-
ences formed a so-called Commission on the Uranium Problem, which was respon-
sible for coordination of research on uranium fission and self-sustaining fission
reactions, as well as for exploring possible methods of uranium isotope separation. 1
Although the military applications of uranium fission were well understood at that
time, the research program initiated in 1940 was purely a research effort and did
not have development of a nuclear explosive device as its goal. Virtually all research
in this area was suspended after the beginning of World War 11.2
A practical program aimed at investigating the possibility of developing a Soviet
nuclear weapon began in 1943. The program began as a result of the information
about the British and U.S. nuclear programs that the Soviet leadership had had at
that time.' The State Defense Committee issued a decree on 11 February 1943
calling for establishment of Laboratory No.2, which became the main organiza-
tion responsible for the nuclear weapons development. Initially Laboratory No.2
concentrated its efforts on studying plutonium production in graphite and heavy-
water reactors and conducting research on various techniques of uranium isotope
separation. Development of a nuclear weapon was not among the laboratory's goals.
Wartime conditions did not allow the Soviet Union to allocate to the laboratory suf-
ficient resources for a large-scale nuclear weapons development program. Besides,
at that time the feasibility of building a nuclear weapon had not been demonstrated.
2 Chapter 1
The situation changed dramatically after the United States carried out its first
nuclear explosion on 16 July 1945 and dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki on 6 and 9 August 1945. These events led to substantial acceleration of
the Soviet nuclear program, which was reorganized to produce the nuclear bomb
as soon as possible. On 20 August 1945 the Soviet Union established the Special
Committee, which was given the responsibility of supervising the nuclear weapon
development program and reported directly to the Politburo. Practical implemen-
tation of the nuclear program was assigned to a new governmental structure: the
First Main Directorate of the Council of Ministers.4
From that point Oil, work on the nuclear weapons program was carried out at a
very fast pace. The first Soviet experimental graphite reactor went critical on 25
October 1946. Operations of the first plutonium production reactor began in June
1948. By February 1949 the Soviet Union had obtained enough plutonium to build
a nuclear weapon. The KB-ll Design Bureau had by that time completed its work
on the design of the first Soviet nuclear weapon which was essentially a copy of
the U.S. Fat Man device. The first Soviet nuclear weapon, designated RDS-1, was
detonated on 29 August 1949 at a test site near Semipalatinsk. The weapon yield
was 22 kilotons, as predicted. 5
Almost immediately after this first detonation the Soviet Union started serial
production of nuclear weapons. Assembly of a pilot series of five RDS-1 weapons
was completed by March 1950. In December 1951 the Soviet Union began serial
production of nuclear weapons of the RDS-1 type.
While the First Main Directorate was setting up the serial production of RDS-1
weapons, the KB-ll Design Bureau concentrated its efforts on the development of
more effective weapon designs and working out methods of weapon delivery. In
1951 the Soviet Union tested its first indigenously developed weapon, designated
RDS-2, and carried out its first airdrop from a bomber. To work out troop tactics
during a nuclear conflict, in September 1954 the Soviet Union held a military exer-
cise that involved a real nuclear explosion. In 1954 the Soviet army commissioned
the RDS-3 weapon, versions of which seem to have been the first Soviet nuclear
weapons deployed in large numbers.6
Parallel to the work on new nuclear weapon designs, the Soviet Union began
working on thermonuclear devices. The first Soviet thermonuclear device was the
RDS-6, which was tested on 12 August 1953.' After this test, work concentrated
on developing a deliverable weapon based on the RDS-6 design and new two-stage
thermonuclear devices that allowed the production of weapons of yields of a
megaton or more. The deliverable version of the RDS-6 and the first two-stage ther-
Soviet and Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces 3
monuclear device, designated RDS-37, were tested in October-November 1955. The

yield of the RDS-37 thermonuclear weapon, detonated on 22 November 1955, was
1.5 megatons. 8
By the end of the 1950s the main elements of the infrastructure necessary for
the mass production of fissile materials and nuclear weapons were in place.
Two weapons laboratories, Arzamas-16 (KB-ll Design Bureau) and Chelyabinsk-
70, were responsible for weapon design. Tests of nuclear devices and weapons
were being conducted at the test sites at Semipalatinsk and Novaya Zemlya.
In 1957, the pilot centrifuge uranium enrichment plant began operation at
Sverdlovsk-44. In 1958 the Soviet Union completed the construction of a plu-
tonium production complex, which included production reactors and reprocessing
plants, at the sites at Chelyabinsk-40, Tomsk-7, and Krasnoyarsk-26. In 1958-
1960 two new nuclear weapon assembly plants began operation in Penza-19 and
Sverdlovsk -45.
Work on the development of new weapons during the 1950s progressed in
tandem with modification of existing delivery systems for carrying nuclear weapons
as well as development of new ones. Although bombers remained the primary deliv-
ery platform, ballistic missiles were a very serious contender for a nuclear role.
Efforts were also being concentrated on deploying nuclear weapons on naval
platforms.
The first Soviet ballistic missile that carried a nuclear warhead was the R-5M
(SS-3) medium-range missile. In February 1956 the Soviet Union carried out a full-
scale test of the R-5M missile with a real nuclear warhead. 9 After the first R-5M
regiments were deployed in May 1956, development of nuclear-capable ballistic
missiles continued. At the end of the 1950s the Soviet Union began deployment
of a new medium-range missile, the R-12 (SS-4). This missile was followed by the
intermediate-range R-14 (SS-5) missile, which entered service in the early 1960s.
These two missiles later replaced R-5M and for a long time remained the core of
the Soviet theater missile force.
Development of naval platforms, capable of carrying nuclear weapons, progressed
in three main directions: nuclear-armed torpedoes and submarine-launched cruise
and ballistic missiles, which eventually were to be deployed with nuclear warheads.
The first nuclear torpedoes were commissioned in 1955. Later that year the Navy
carried out the first successful launch of an R-llFM ballistic missile from a sub-
marine. In 1957 the Navy received the first Project AV-611 (Zulu V) submarines,
which carried R-IIFM missiles. Submarine-launched nuclear cruise missiles also
entered service before the end of the 1950s.1O
4 Chapter 1
The First Strategic Weapons
By the end of the 1950s the Soviet Union had had a substantial number of nuclear
weapons and nuclear-capable delivery systems for tactical and theater missions. At
the same time, it was concentrating its efforts on the development of interconti-
nental delivery systems, capable of reaching the territory of the United States.
These intercontinental delivery systems were especially important for the Soviet
Union because of the confrontational turn the U.S.-Soviet relationship took during
the postwar years. Although the United States lost its nuclear monopoly with the
Soviets' detonation of the RDS-1 in 1949, the Soviet Union had to take into account
that the United States was capable of delivering nuclear weapons to the Soviet ter-
ritory. By the middle of the 1950s the U.S. strategic forces included more than 1,200
bombers capable of delivering about 2,000 weapons to targets in Soviet territory.l1
Since the Soviet Union, unlike the United States, could not deploy its bombers close
to the adversary's borders, delivering nuclear weapons to u.s. territory required
development of intercontinental platforms.
The first Soviet delivery systems capable of reaching U.S. territory were the inter-
continental bombers created in the second half of the 1950s. The Soviet Union had
begun development of bombers with a 12,000 km range in the late 1940s, shortly
after it attained nuclear capability. In 1949-1951 some of the Tu-4 bombers, which
were at that time deployed with Long-Range Aviation, were given aerial refueling
capability to extend their range. 12 In 1951 the Tupolev Design Bureau developed a
prototype of an intercontinental-range piston engine bomber. These projects were
soon terminated, however, for it became clear that piston engine bombers are
vulnerable to air defense and jet interceptors. As a result, in 1951 the Soviet Union
began development of the 3M (Bison) and Tu-95 (Bear) bombers, which became the
first Soviet intercontinental delivery systems. These aircraft, which entered service
in 1956, remained until the early 1960s the only Soviet means of reaching the ter-
ritory of the United States with nuclear weapons.13 Nevertheless, the scale of their
deployment remained limited. By the end of 1962 Long-Range Aviation had about
100 Tu-95 and 60 3M bombers, which could deliver about 270 nuclear weapons
to U.S. territory.14
The scale of bomber deployment was limited for several reasons. One of the most
important was the success of the Soviet ballistic missile development program. The
Soviet program for development of ballistic and cruise missiles of intercontinental
range began in 1954. One of its results was the R-7 (SS-6) intercontinental ballis-
tic missile (ICBM), flight tests of which started in May 1957. On 3 October and 4
November 1957, during the flight tests, modified versions of the R-7 missile were
used to launch the Earth's first artificial satellites. The Soviet leadership considered
these launches a clear demonstration of the superiority that the Soviet Union had
achieved in the field of ballistic missile development. The propaganda effect of the
launches seemed to have played a very important role in the attention that the Soviet
leadership paid to the missile development program.
The role of ballistic missiles in the Soviet military plans was underscored by
the establishment of the Strategic Rocket Forces as a separate service of the Soviet
armed forces in December 1959. The new service included the first R-7 missiles as
well as the medium-range-missile units, which had been previously subordinated
either to Long-Range Aviation or directly to the Supreme High Command." The
organization of the new military service was accompanied by the restructuring
of the military industry, during which many design bureaus and manufacturing
plants involved in aircraft production were transferred to the new missile pro-
duction sector.
Although the introduction of ICBMs took the effectiveness of the Soviet strate-
gic nuclear forces to a higher level, the Strategic Rocket Forces had rather limited
capabilities, and the ICBMs could not carry out a strategic attack on their own. The
level of readiness of R-7 missiles was extremely low. Besides, the high cost of launch
complexes predetermined the very limited scale of their deployment.16 In 1961 the
Strategic Rocket Forces received a new missile system, the R-16 (SS-7), which had
better readiness and was easier to operate. However, this missile, like the R-7, was
not suitable for mass deployment on a scale that would allow the Soviet Union to
attain parity with the United States.
By 1962 the number of nuclear weapons that the Soviet Union could deliver to
the U.S. territory still did not exceed 300, which was in sharp contrast with the
capabilities of the U.S. strategic forces. The United States had more than 1,300
strategic bombers, capable of delivering more than 3,000 weapons to targets in the
Soviet Union. In addition, the U.S. forces included 183 Atlas and Titan ICBMs and
144 missiles on nine Polaris submarines. In October 1962 the United States began
deployment of Minuteman-a very effective new solid-propellant ICBM.17
The strategic superiority that the United States had in the beginning of the
1960s was clearly demonstrated during the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962.
The formal cause of the crisis was the Soviet decision to deploy medium- and
intermediate-range R-12 (SS-4) and R-14 (SS-5) ballistic missiles in Cuba, from
which these missiles could threaten a large part of the U.S. territory. When the
deployment was discovered, the United States demanded removal of the missiles and
6 Chapter 1
established a naval blockade of the island. The Soviet Union eventually had to give
in to the U.S. demand and withdrew its missiles in exchange for the U.S. pledge not
to invade Cuba and to remove its medium-range missiles from Turkey.1s
The peaceful outcome of the Cuban crisis, which was one of the most serious
confrontation of the cold wa~ became possible mainly because the leaders of the
two countries tried to avoid escalation of the conflict by all possible means and were
determined to avoid military confrontation. At the same time, the u.s. superiority
in capabilities and number of strategic nuclear weapons was one of the most deci-
sive factors that shaped the evolution of the conflict and the positions taken by both
countries during the crisis.
Achieving Quantitative Parity
The Soviet leadership traditionally paid serious attention to achieving a strategic

parity with the United States. Although it was the Cuban crisis that most clearly
demonstrated that the cold war confrontation required building effective strategic
forces that would be comparable to those of the United States, the Soviet Union had
begun its efforts aimed at achieving strategic parity with the United States long
before 1962.
In 1959 the Korolev Design Bureau began development of the R-9A (55-8) inter-
continental missile, which had a much higher level of combat readiness than the
R-7 or R-16. The flight tests of this missile began in April 1961. In addition, in
January 1962 the Yangel Design Bureau began tests of the R-16U missile, a silo-
based version of the R-16. This version also had higher combat readiness than
its predecessor. Although introduction of the new missiles substantially raised the
overall effectiveness of the Soviet ICBM force, neither of these missiles was suit-
able for large-scale deployment.19 Besides, the missiles were deployed in closely
located silos and therefore were highly vulnerable.
The missile systems that finally allowed the Soviet Union to achieve strategic
parity with the United States in the 1960s were the "heavy" R-36 (55-9) missile and
the "lightweight" UR-100 (55-11) ICBM. Development of these missiles began in
April 1962 and March 1963, respectively. The missiles were deployed in individual
silos that were set far enough apart that they could not be destroyed by a single
weapon. Besides, the missiles were filled with fuel after being installed into their
silos, which allowed them to be kept in constant launch readiness. The large throw
weight of the R-36 missile allowed it to be deployed with a high-yield warhead that
could pose a threat to hardened targets. 20
The first flight tests of the R-36 missile took place in September 1963, with the
tests of the UR-100 following in April 1965. Deployment of the missiles, which
began in November 1966, proceeded at a very high rate. By the end of 1969 the
Soviet Union had deployed 170 R-36 and about 860 UR-100 missiles. By 1971
the number of deployed R-36 missiles had increased to 260 and the number of
UR-100s to 990. 21 In addition to these two systems, in 1968 the Strategic Rocket
Forces commissioned the RT-2 (SS-13) missile, the first Soviet solid-propellant
ICBM. Although this missile was accepted for service, the scale of its deployment
was limited to 60 missiles.
In addition to the ICBM development program, during the 1960s the Soviet Union
was working on the development of a strategic submarine that would be compar-
able to the U.S. Polaris system. Work in this area, which began in 1958, by 1962
led to the development of a preliminary technical design of the Project 667 A (Yankee
I) missile submarine, which carried 16 R-27 (SS-N-6) ballistic missiles. Construc-
tion of the first 667A submarine began in 1964, and in 1967 the first ship of this
class entered service." Soon after that the 667A submarines began regular patrols
close to the U.S. coast. By the end of 1969 the Soviet Union had deployed 12 sub-
marines of the Project 667A type. The construction program continued, and the
total number of 667A submarines eventually reached 34.
Another program that attracted the special attention of the Soviet leadership was
the construction of a ballistic missile defense that was thought to be capable of coun-
tering a strategic missile attack. Practical work in this direction began in the mid-
1950s. In 1962 the Soviet Union deployed a prototype of the Moscow antiballistic
missile (ABM) system at a test site and began construction of its first installations
around Moscow.23 Several institutes were also working on a nationwide ballistic
missile defense. Since the United States was working on ballistic missile defense
as well, the Soviet Union also concentrated on development of systems that could
effectively penetrate such defenses. Work in this area resulted in development of
the orbital version of the R-36 missile, which was deployed in 1968.24 In 1969
another version of the R-36 missile was tested with multiple warheads, three instead
of one. The warheads were not independently targeted but allowed the missile to
penetrate the defenses more effectively than the same missile equipped with a single
warhead. 25
The Soviet modernization program of the 1960s occurred simultaneously with a
modernization of U.S. strategic forces. By 1965 the United States had completed
deployment of 800 Minuteman I ballistic missiles. In addition to these missiles, in
1966 the United States began deployment of 200 Minuteman II ICBMs, more
8 Chapter 1
accurate than their predecessors. The u.s. ICBM force also included 54 older Atlas
missiles. The Polaris submarine production program was completed in 1967, and
the total number of deployed Polaris submarines reached 41. (The first Poseidon
submarine, carrying C-3 missiles with 10 independently targeted warheads each,
was planned to enter service in 1971.) By the end of the 1960s the u.s. Air Force
had 360 B-52 bombers. In addition, F-ll1A medium-range bombers deployed
in Europe were also assigned targets in the Soviet Union. As noted above, like
the Soviet Union, the United States was working on development of ballistic missile
defense systems. 26
The scale of the strategic modernization programs of the 1960s and the poten-
tially destabilizing effect of ABM deployment forced the Soviet Union and the United
States in 1969 to begin negotiations on limitations of defensive and offensive strate-
gic forces. These negotiations resulted in two arms control agreements in 1972: the
ABM Treaty and the agreement known as SALT I.
The SALT I and ABM Treaties
The United States and the Soviet Union first began consultations on arms control
in 1967 and in July 1968 agreed to open formal negotiations." After a delay caused
by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the 1968 U.S. presidential elections,
the negotiations finally began in November 1969. The initial intention was that the
negotiations would cover limitations of offensive and defensive weapons. The talks
revealed fundamental differences, however, between the U.S. and Soviet positions
on offensive weapons. The Soviet Union insisted that the scope of the negotiations
should include U.S. forward-based systems in Europe. 2s Because the United States
refused to include these systems in the strategic balance, the two sides decided to
limit the scope of the agreement on offensive weapons and concentrate their efforts
on reaching a full-scale agreement on missile defenses.
Progress in limiting missile defenses was made possible by the fact that the Soviet
Union as well as the United States understood that effective missile defenses are
impossible. At one stage during the negotiations the sides were ready to discuss a
comprehensive ban on defense systems. 29 This idea was not pursued, however, partly
because it was decided that completion of the missile systems already under devel-
opment would be allowed.
The approach accepted at the negotiations assumed limits on the number of
land- and sea-based ballistic missile launchers. The number of warheads deployed
on missiles as well as the number of bombers and their weapons were not limited
by the agreement. During the negotiations, the two sides discussed the possibility
of a ban on multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs) but failed to
find mutually acceptable terms of agreement on this issue, among other reasons
because the U.S. proposals were aimed at denying the Soviet Union this capability
and freezing the advantage the United States had in this area."
The documents that resulted from the negotiations-the Treaty on the Limitation
of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, known as the ABM Treaty, and the Interim Agree-
ment on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive
Arms, which became known as the SALT I agreement-were signed on 26 May
1972 and entered into force on 3 October 1972. The SALT I agreement had the
duration of five years; the ABM Treaty was of unlimited duration.
The most significant provision of the SALT I agreement was its ban on con-
struction of new sea-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers and submarines
and ICBM silos. The agreement also banned construction of new heavy-ICBM silos
and conversion of existing silos for heavy missile deployment. In effect, the SALT I
agreement froze the structure of the Soviet strategic forces, in particular their land-
based component. When the agreement was signed, the Soviet Union had 1,416
ICBM silos deployed or under construction. R-36 (SS-9) and R-36M (SS-18) heavy
missiles were deployed in 308 of these silos. In addition to that, 18 silo launchers
of the orbital version of the R-36 missile at the Baykonur test site were also counted
as heavy missile silos.
The limit on the number of deployed missile submarines applied only to sub-
marines built after 1964. As a result, ships of the older Project 629 (Golf), 658
(Hotel), and 701 (Hotel III) types, which carried two or three ballistic missiles, were
not counted against the ceiling of 62 "modern" missile submarines set in the agree-
ment. These 62 submarines were allowed to carry 740 SLBMs. The Soviet Union
could increase the number of deployed SLBMs to 950 by dismantling 210 launch-
ers of the R-16U and R-9A land-based missiles. This condition in effect allowed the
Soviet Union to deploy 950 SLBMs, since the land-based launchers in question were
of the "group-start" type and had to be dismantled in any event. In general, the
SALT I agreement did not limit the Soviet program of SLBM development in any
substantial way.
The most significant provision of the ABM Treaty was its ban on deployment of
missile defense of national territories or of any region. The treaty also banned
deployment of a base for such defenses. As an exception, each side was allowed
to build two missile defense systems, one of which would defend a national
capital and the other land-based missile bases. The treaty limited the number of
10 Chapter 1
interceptors in each of the missile defense systems to 100. It also imposed certain
limits on the number and areas of deployment of battle management radars. In 1974
the Soviet Union and the United States signed a protocol to the ABM Treaty
that reduced from two to one the number of defense systems each side was allowed
to deploy.
Strategic Modernization in the 1970s
The U.S.-Soviet arms control agreements signed in 1972 were the first real steps
toward limiting the scale of the two countries' strategic nuclear arms buildup. The
ABM Treaty, which banned deployment of missile defenses, allowed the Soviet
Union and the United States to limit the scale of their modernization programs
during the 1970s. At the same time, since the SALT I agreement did not restrain the
number of warheads each side could deploy, it could not prevent nuclear states from
increasing the size of their arsenals by deploying MIRVs on land- and sea-based
missiles.
The modernization program of the 1960s had allowed the Soviet Union to attain
quantitative parity in nuclear weapons with the Unites States. At the same time,
however, it was clear that the as far as the effectiveness of the strategic forces was
concerned, the Soviet forces were inferior to those of the United States. In 1970 the
United States began deployment in highly protected silos of Minuteman III ICBMs,
each carrying three very accurate independently targeted warheads. The Minuteman
program called for deployment of 550 ICBMs of that type and was completed in
1975. As noted above, the first Poseidon submarine with the C-3 missile, which
carried ten independently targeted warheads, entered service in 1971. By 1973 the
number of these submarines deployed had reached 20, and in 1978, when the
program was completed, the total was 31. In early 1971 the United States began
the B-1 supersonic strategic bomber development program. By the time the SALT I
agreement was signed, therefore, the United States, had already initiated a large-
scale strategic modernization.
The Soviet Union also began its modernization program before the SALT I nego-
tiations were completed. The most important element of this program was deploy-
ment of MIRVed land-based missiles. Another significant component was the
measures aimed at obtaining launch-on-warning capability as well as capability to
act under a nuclear attack. The launch-on-warning capability required construction
of a network of early-warning radars and satellites. The Soviet Union had also
started development of a command and control system that would allow it to
transmit launch orders under very tight time conditions or under a nuclear attack.
Significant efforts were also directed at improving radiation hardness of all com-
ponents of missiles and other systems. Special attention was paid to improving the
hardness of missile silos against blast effects and further improvement of missile
combat readiness. 31
The main systems deployed by the 50viet Union during the 1970s were the heavy
R-36M (55-18) missile, replacing the R-36, and two lightweight missiles: the
UR-100N (55-19) and MR UR-100 (55-17) land-based missiles, developed to
replace the UR-100 (55-11). The decisions to develop these missiles had been
made in 1969-1970. All of these new ICBMs carried multiple warheads.
The two "lightweight" missiles to replace the UR-100 initially were developed on
a competitive basis, and it was assumed that only one of them would be chosen for
deployment. The competition was extended, however, to the flight testing stage,
which began in 1972, and eventually both systems were accepted for deployment.32
The first UR-100N and MR UR-100 missiles entered service in 1975.
The UR-100 missile had in the meantime undergone modernization in the early
1970s. The modernized versions, the UR-100K (55-11 Mod 2) and UR-100U
(55-11 Mod 3), had larger throw weights, better accuracy, and shorter response
time than the UR-100. The UR-100K missile carried penetration aids, and the
UR-100U had three warheads, though these were not independently targeted.
The decision to start the R-36M development program was made in 5eptember
1969. The large throw weight of the missile (8.8 tons) allowed to it to carry eight
independently targeted reentry vehicles. Flight testing of the missile began in
February 1973, and in December 1974 the missile entered service. 50 me of the
R-36M missiles were deployed with a single high-yield warhead instead of multiple
warheads.
During the 1970s, in addition to the development of the new silo-based missiles,
the 50viet design bureaus were working on ground-mobile missile development. The
first of these operational mobile systems, the Temp-25 (55-X-16), entered service in
February 1976. Deployment of this system was very limited, and it was not offi-
cially commissioned. The Temp-25 was later used as a prototype for the Pioneer
(55-20) intermediate-range missile.
In the first half of the 1970s, the naval strategic forces received the 667B (Delta
I) ballistic missile submarine, work on which had begun in 1965. The single-
warhead R-29 (55-N-8) missiles, which were deployed on the 667B, had a range of
7,800 km. This meant that the submarines could patrol in the seas close to the 50viet
coast and, unlike the 667A (Yankee) submarines, did not have to cross the
12 Chapter 1
antisubmarine warfare (ASW) lines. As a result, the Soviet submarines became much
less vulnerable to the u.s. ASWoperations.
The first Project 667B submarine entered service in 1972. By 1977 there were 18
nuclear submarines carrying ballistic missiles of this class in the Soviet Navy. In
addition to that, in 1975 the Navy received four submarines of the 667BD (Delta
II) class, which carried 16 R-29D (SS-N-8 Mod 2) missiles each. The missiles were
a version of the R-29 modified to give them a somewhat greater range. Some of the
667B submarines were also fitted with R-29D missiles.
In 1971 the Soviet Union began its solid-propellant SLBM development program.
Flight tests of the R-31 (SS-N-17) missile, the result of this program, began in 1976.
The missile system, which included 12 missiles, was deployed on the lone 667AM
(Yankee II) submarine, converted from one of the 667 A (Yankee I) ships. The
667AM entered service in 1980 but was not officially accepted for service and
remained the only ship of this class. The experience of operating this submarine,
however, convinced the Navy to move toward deployment of solid-propellant
SLBMs.
Another important development of the 1970s was the appearance of a MIRVed
sea-based missile. The work on this missile, designated R-29R (SS-N-18), began in
1973. The first submarine equipped with the R-29R (16 of them), the Project
667BDR (Delta III) class, entered sea trials in 1976. By the time the system was
commissioned in 1979, the number of 667BDR submarines had reached nine.
In the late 1960s or early 1970s, the Soviet Union initiated a program to develop
a supersonic strategic bomber as a direct response to the B-1 bomber program,
which began in the United States at about that time. This project, which eventually
led to development of the Tu-160 Blackjack bomber, was not completed, however,
until the 1980s. The main Soviet bomber project of the 1970s was the development
of the Tu-22M Backfire intermediate-range bomber aircraft. The first prototypes of
the Tu-22M aircraft were built in 1969-1972, and in 1976 the bomber was accepted
for service. The capabilities of this aircraft became one of the most contentious issues
at U.S.-Soviet disarmament negotiations during the 1970s. Although the Tu-22M
bomber did not have intercontinental range, the United States insisted that the
aircraft in some cases could reach u.s. territory and therefore should be counted
as a strategic bomber.33
The SALT II Treaty
Arms control negotiations continued after the United States and the Soviet Union
signed the SALT I agreement in 1972. These negotiations, howeve~ proved to be
more difficult than those for SALT I. Since the new agreement, unlike SALT I,
was to be a comprehensive treaty, the Soviet Union insisted that it should account
for the U.S. forward-based systems located in Europe in the overall strategic
balance. 34 The United States, in turn, concentrated its efforts on limiting the number
and capabilities of Soviet land-based missiles, paying particular attention to the
heavy missiles and MIRVs. Limiting Soviet heavy-missile capabilities became a
pressing problem for the United States after the Soviet Union carried out its first
flight test of an R-36M missile with multiple independently targeted warheads in
1973. The advantage that the Soviet Union had in the overall throw weight of
its missiles, together with the SALT I ban on new missile deployment, had the
potential to translate into a significant Soviet advantage in the number of
deployed warheads. 35
In 1974, during a summit meeting in Vladivostok, the United States and the Soviet
Union reached an agreement that was designed as an outline of the future treaty.
The Vladivostok agreement called for limiting the total number of strategic
launchers in each country to 2,400, only 1,320 of which could carry MIRVs.
The Vladivostok agreement involved serious concessions from the Soviet
Union, which withdrew its requirement that the forward-based U.S. systems be
included in the overall strategic balance. In addition, the Soviet Union agreed
on equal limits for both sides, changing its long-standing position that an arms
control agreement should result in equal capabilities of strategic forces rather than
merely equal numbers. The United States, on the other hand, agreed that the future
treaty would include strategic bombers and stopped its attempts to reduce the
number of Soviet heavy missiles or redefine heavy missiles to include the UR-100N
(SS-19).36
Although the Vladivostok agreement outlined the main features of the proposed
treaty, almost immediately after the summit, the two sides found out that they dif-
fered in their interpretation of certain points of the agreement. Among the prob-
lems that appeared after the Vladivostok summit were questions about the strategic
capabilities of the Tu-22M Backfire bomber and problems with accounting for long-
range air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs). For reasons noted above, the United
States insisted that the Tu-22M Backfire was a strategic aircraft and therefore should
be limited by the future treaty. The Soviet Union insisted on counting every ALCM
as a separate strategic launcherY
In 1976, in an attempt to overcome the problems, the United States and the Soviet
Union reached a preliminary agreement according to which every ALCM-carrying
bomber was counted as a MIRVed launcher. In addition, the United States suggested
setting a separate limit on the number of deployed Tu-22M aircraft. 38 Although these
14 Chapter 1
proposals did not help the sides reach accord on the treaty in 1976, they eventually
became a part of the final agreement.
These negotiations, which eventually led to the SALT II Treaty, continued until
1979. As during the early stages of the talks, the United States continued to seek
limits on the number of warheads that the Soviet Union could deploy on its land-
based missiles. The Soviet efforts in the negotiations were concentrated on estab-
lishing a limit on deployment of air-based cruise missiles. In addition, the Soviet
Union sought a ban on deployment of sea- and land-based cruise missiles. Among
other issues that slowed the progress at the negotiations were the aforementioned
debates over the strategic capabilities of the Tu-22M bomber and the problems with
verification of the agreement.
Since the new treaty was not ready by October 1977, when the term of the SALT
I agreement came to an end, the United States and the Soviet Union declared that
they would continue to observe the SALT I limits. By the end of 1978, however, the
two sides had agreed on the main points of the treaty, and SALT II was eventually
signed on 18 July 1979 during the summit meeting in Vienna.
The SALT II Treaty was based on the main provisions agreed on in Vladivostok,
supplemented by a number of additional conditions. Among the additional require-
ments of SALT II were the obligation to reduce the number of strategic launchers
over the two years subsequent to the signing, limits on the number of warheads on
launchers, and certain restrictions on modernization programs. The treaty was to
be in force until 31 December 1985 and was accompanied by a three-year proto-
col that restricted deployment of land-mobile ICBMs and sea- and land-based cruise
missiles. 39
The main provision of the SALT II Treaty was the limit it imposed on each country
of 2,400 deployed strategic launchers. The sides further agreed to reduce the number
of strategic launchers to 2,150 by 1 January 1981. Of these launchers, only 1,320
were allowed to carry MIRVs; this number included land- and sea-based ballistic
missiles, as well as bombers that carried ALCMs. Excluding bombers, the number
of MIRVed launchers could not exceed 1,200. A separate ceiling limited the number
of MIRVed land-based ballistic missiles, which could not exceed 820.
To limit the total number of warheads, the SALT II Treaty set limits on the number
of warheads on any single delivery platform. In particula~ the treaty banned increas-
ing the number of warheads on land-based ICBMs and prohibited deployment of
more than 14 warheads on SLBMs. Existing types of heavy bombers were limited
to carrying 20 cruise missiles. In addition, any new bombers introduced could carry
no more than an average of 28 cruise missiles per bomber. As a result, the SALT II
Treaty, unlike the SALT I agreement, set a definite limit, although a relatively high
one, on the total number of deployed strategic warheads.
The treaty confirmed the ban on new ICBM silo construction initiated in SALT I
as well as the ban on converting existing light-missile silos into heavy missile silos.
It also prohibited deployment of ICBMs that would be heavier (in terms of launch
weight and throw weight) than existing heavy missiles. As an additional measure,
the treaty banned orbital missiles (the fractional orbital bombardment system, or
FOBS), which also counted as heavy missiles. The Soviet Union agreed to dis-
mantle 18 silos of the orbital version of the R-36 missile deployed in Baykonur
or to convert them to use for test purposes only.
The SALT II Treaty had provisions that aimed at slowing down the weapons mod-
ernization programs of the two countries. Each side could deploy only one ICBM
of a new type during the treaty's duration, and that new type could carry no more
than 10 warheads. This provision was included in the treaty mainly to allow the
United States to complete development of its MX Peacekeeper missile, begun in
1971.40 The United States thought that the new missile on the Soviet side would be
the single-warhead Topol (SS-25); the Soviet Union later announced, however, that
the Topol was a modification of the RT-2P (SS-13) missile and that its new missile
under the treaty would be the RT-23 (SS-24), which carried 10 warheads. It should
be noted that the Topol missile did not fit the definition of a new missile, since its
throw weight (1,000 kilograms) exceeded that of the RT-2P (600 kilograms) by
more than the 5% allowed by the treaty.41
An additional provision concerning land-based missiles was included into the pro-
tocol to the treaty. This provision prohibited deployment of land-mobile missiles
and testing of ICBMs from mobile launchers. In addition, the Soviet Union agreed
to dismantle its land-mobile Temp-2S ICBMs, which by that time had been deployed
only in limited numbers.
Certain provisions of the SALT II Treaty and its protocol limited sea-based
components of the strategic forces, but they were insignificant compared to those
provisions concerning ICBMs and strategic aviation. The treaty changed the rules
for counting SLBM launchers to include old diesel submarines that were used as
test beds for modern missiles. In addition, it prohibited deployment of SLBMs that
carried more than 14 independently targeted warheads. The protocol to the SALT
II Treaty included, in addition to the ban on land-mobile ICBM deployment, a ban
on deployment of sea- and land-based cruise missiles, as well as on tests of such
cruise missiles with multiple warheads. The sides also agreed for the duration of the
protocol neither to test nor to deploy air-based ballistic missiles.
16 Chapter 1
In general, although the SALT II Treaty set certain limits on quantitative devel-
opment of each country's strategic forces, it could not seriously limit their strategic
modernization programs. By the time the treaty was signed, the Soviet Union and
the United States had completed deployment of MIRVed missiles. Besides, at the
negotiations leading up to the treaty, the sides did everything they could to protect
their future strategic modernization programs. By imposing certain agreed-upon
limits on these programs, however, the treaty made the development of strategic
forces more predictable, a significant achievement given the deterioration of
U.S.-Soviet relationships in the late 1970s.
This deterioration in U.S.-Soviet relationships prevented the SALT II Treaty from
ever entering force. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, the
Carter administration withdrew the treaty from Congress and suspended its ratifi-
cation. Since neither side expressed its intention not to ratify the treaty, however,
the United States and the Soviet Union complied with most of its provisions. As an
exception, the Soviet Union did not reduce the number of strategic launchers to
2,400, as the treaty required. In addition, the Soviet Union broke the treaty con-
ditions by announcing the Topol (SS-25) missile as a modification of the RT-2P
(SS-13) rather than as a new missile.
The Modernization Program at the End of the 1970s
The main features of the modernization programs that were carried out by the
United States and the Soviet Union in the late 1970s were improvements in the
counterforce capabilities of each country's strategic systems and efforts at the same
time to reduce the vulnerability of their missile launchers.
In 1977 the United States made a decision to equip 300 of its Minuteman III mis-
siles with a new high-yield warhead. The deployment of these new warheads, which
began in 1979, significantly increased the counterforce capabilities of the Minute-
man III missiles. At the same time, the United States concentrated its efforts on
finding invulnerable basing for its new MX Peacekeeper missile.
Among the new programs initiated by the United States in the second half of the
1970s was the development of a new sea-based missile, the C-4, which it began
deploying on its Poseidon submarines in 1979. The missile was also to be deployed
on new submarines of the Trident class, first of which, the Ohio, entered service in
1982. In 1992 the United States terminated its B-1 strategic bomber development
program and concentrated its efforts on deployment of cruise missiles on B-52
bombers.
Among the modernization programs that the Soviet Union carried out during
the second half of the 1970s were the development of UR-100NUTIH and MR
UR-100UTIH versions of the SS-19 and SS-17 missiles. These missiles entered
service in 1978-1979. In September 1979 the Strategic Rocket Forces received the
R-36MUTTH (SS-18 Mod 4) missile, which carried 10 warheads. Although provi-
sions of the SALT II Treaty limited the scale of deployment of these systems, the
Soviet Union was able to finish its replacement of old ICBMs with new MIRVed
missiles. The systems that had to be dismantled under the SALT II Treaty provi-
sions-the Temp-2S (SS-X-16) and the orbital version of the R-36 (SS-9)-were to
be withdrawn from service in any event. The treaty did not limit development of
new Topol (SS-25) and RT-23 (SS-24) mobile missiles, which began in 1976-1977.
In 1976 the Soviet Navy received its first missile submarine of the Project 667BDR
(Delta III) type. This submarine carried MIRVed R-29R (SS-N-18) missile.
In 1977, the Soviet Union laid the keel of a submarine of the Project 941
(Typhoon) type, which carried 20 solid-propellant R-39 (SS-N-20) missiles. Another
program, initiated in 1979, developed the new liquid-propellant R-29RM (SS-
N-23) missile, which was later deployed on Project 667BDRM (Delta IV)
submarines.
In the late 1970s the Soviet Union began deploying cruise missiles on Tu-95 strate-
gic bombers. The first test launches of Kh-55 (AS-15) long-range cruise missiles from
a Tu-95 bomber were carried out in 1978. In 1979 the Soviet Union began pro-
duction of the Tu-95MS bomber, which could carry six cruise missiles (a later
version of the Tu-95MS bomber, still in service, can carry up to 16 ALCMs). The
Soviet Union also continued development of a new supersonic strategic bomber.
In general, the early 1980s were marked by a significant deterioration in U.S.-
Soviet relations. Among the events that had a significant impact on these relations
was the decision by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1979 to
deploy 108 Pershing II intermediate-range ballistic missiles and 464 land-based
cruise missiles in European territory. Because the U.S. missiles deployed in Europe
could reach targets on a significant part of Soviet territory, the Soviet Union
considered this deployment an attempt to circumvent the SALT II Treaty. The
United States, however, insisted that this decision was a direct response to the Soviet
deployment of Pioneer (SS-20) intermediate-range missiles begun in 1976 and that
any measures that would reverse the decision would have to be conditioned on
liquidation of Soviet SS-20 missiles.42
As a result of the deterioration in U.S.-Soviet relations in the 1980s, arms control
negotiations were essentially brought to a halt, and the United States and the Soviet
18 Chapter 1
Union intensified their strategic modernization. In 1981 the Reagan administration

announced that it would not seek ratification of the SALT II Treaty. In October
1981, the administration resumed the B-1B strategic bomber development program
and announced plans to deploy the MX Peacekeeper missile in silos and to begin
deployment of long-range sea-based cruise missiles on submarines.
This renewed u.s. modernization program caused serious concern among the
Soviet leadership, in part because it could undermine Soviet efforts to achieve parity
with the United States and provide the United States with the capability of launch-
ing a disarming strike. The Soviet Union had just completed building an early
warning network, which provided it with launch-on-warning capability. In 1982 the
Soviet Union pledged itself to a policy of no-first-use of nuclear weapons, which
indicated that it was ready to rely on the early warning network and ability of its
forces to ride out an attack.43
The Soviet Union considered the U.S. program an attempt to acquire first-strike
capability and devalue much of the recent Soviet efforts. The deployment of higher-
yield warheads on the Minuteman III missiles beginning in 1979 as well as the
development of the very accurate MX Peacekeeper ICBM had given the United
States the capability to target hardened Soviet missile silos. U.S. development of
the Trident II (0-5) sea-based missile, which was to have accuracy comparable to
that of the MX, potentially made the Soviet silos vulnerable to an SLBM attack as
well. The counterforce capabilities of sea-based ballistic missiles were potentially
a very serious problem, because the Soviet Union lacked adequate early-warning
capability against SLBM launches.44 Another potential problem was the capability
of sea-based cruise missiles to avoid detection. The flight time of the ballistic and
cruise missiles deployed in Europe was very short, and they could therefore pose a
very serious threat to time-urgent targets, such as command and communication
centers.
Another u.s. program that caused serious concern to the Soviet leadership was
the Strategic Defense Initiative (SOl), undertaken in 1983. This program aimed at
development and deployment of a large-scale missile defense of the U.S. territory.
The Soviet Union considered this program to be yet another attempt by the United
States to alter the strategic balance of the late 1970s.
In response, the Soviet Union continued the modernization programs it had begun
in the late 1970s. The only new program initiated by the Soviet Union in the 1980s
was that for development of the R-36M2 (SS-18) missile, the latest version of the
R-36M heavy ICBM. All the other programs in which the Soviets engaged in the
1980s-the Project 667BDRM (Delta IV) and Project 941 (Typhoon) missile sub-
marines and the deployment of the Kh-55 (AS-15) cruise missile on the Tu-95MS
(Bear H) and Tu-160 (Blackjack) strategic bombers, as well as the development of
the Topol (SS-25) land-mobile ICBM and the RT-23IRT-23UTTH (SS-24) railroad-
mobile and silo-based missile system-had begun in the late 1970s.
The START I Treaty
The negotiation process that had led to the conclusion of the SALT II Treaty was
suspended in 1981 when the Reagan administration announced that it would not
seek ratification of the treaty. At the same time, the United States suggested opening
new talks that would be aimed at reduction of the nuclear arsenals of both nations.
These talks were formally opened in June 1982, but the state of U.S.-Soviet rela-
tionships at the time made any substantial progress virtually impossible. The United
States and the Soviet Union were carrying out at the time the modernization pro-
grams each had initiated in the late 1970s, which fit into the framework of the SALT
II Treaty. In this situation a new agreement would require significant modifications
of the current development plans, which neither side was ready for.
During the early 1980s the main efforts of the negotiations were directed toward
solving the problem of the intermediate-range forces in Europe. As noted above, the
Soviet Union considered NATO's planned deployment of U.S. ballistic and cruise
missiles in Europe as an attempt to circumvent the SALT II Treaty restrictions. Nego-
tiations concerning nuclear weapons in Europe began in October 1980 and resumed
in 1981, after a pause caused by the change in presidential administrations in the
United States. Among the most contentious points at the talks was the question of
the British and French nuclear forces. The Soviet position was that the U.S. NATO
allies should be taken into account in determining the balance achieved, and the
Soviet Union was not ready to reduce the number of its intermediate-range ballis-
tic missiles (IRBMs) below the NATO aggregate level, which would include the
British and French missiles. The United States insisted on accounting for the U.S.
and Soviet forces only and agreed to forgo its plans for deployment of Pershing II
IRBMs and ground-based missiles only in exchange for liquidation of all Soviet
IRBMs.45
On 23 October 1983 the Soviet delegation left the negotiations on nuclear forces
in Europe, after a deep crisis developed in U.S.-Soviet relations in the wake of the
incident with the downed Korean airliner on 1 September 1983. The formal reason
20 Chapter 1
given for the breakup of the negotiations was the final u.s. decision to begin deploy-
ment of its nuclear forces in Europe, which began soon afterward. On 8 December
1983, the Soviet Union also left the strategic arms reduction talks.
After an interruption of more than a yea~ the Soviet Union and the United
States agreed to open new negotiations, which were to cover nuclear weapons in
Europe and space weapons in addition to the traditional questions of strategic
arms control. The final agreement about the date of opening the new talks was
reached in January 1985, and the first round of the negotiations opened on 12
March 1985. The opening of the negotiations coincided with the changes in the
Soviet leadership, which later proved to be the main factor that affected the
direction of the negotiations and their outcome and led to profound changes in the
U.S.-Soviet relations. On 11 March 1985 Mikhail Gorbachev assumed the post of
General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union (CPSU).
One of the first steps the new Soviet leadership took was organizing a U.S.-Soviet
summit meeting, which took place in November 1985. Although the meeting did
not yield any concrete results, it provided the United States and the Soviet Union
with a chance to outline the problems that needed to be solved. One of the ques-
tions the United States and the Soviet Union failed to agree on was SOl. The
Soviet Union insisted on setting strict limits on the scale of the missile defense
development efforts. The Reagan administration considered the SOl program
one of its highest priorities and wanted to continue the program without any
restrictions.
In January 1986, in an attempt to change the direction of the U.S.-Soviet dia-
logue, the Soviet leadership published an ambitious disarmament proposal that
called for complete elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000. Although the
proposal was clearly unrealistic, some of its elements-the proposals for the elimi-
nation of intermediate-range missiles and a 50-percent reduction in the number of
strategic launchers-later formed the basis of the Soviet position at the arms control
negotiations.
The formal Soviet position that incorporated these proposals was revealed to the
United States at the summit meeting in Reykjavik held in October 1986.46 During
the meeting the United States and the Soviet Union agreed on a 50-percent reduc-
tion in all segments of their strategic forces, including the reduction of the number
of Soviet heavy missiles. In addition, the Soviet Union again agreed to exclude the
U.S. forward-based forces in Europe from the strategic balance and also agreed to
exclude the British and French weapons from the balance of intermediate-range
forces and to consider total elimination of the Soviet IRBMs in Europe. The Soviet
concessions were conditioned, however, on restriction of the SDI missile defense
program. In particular, the Soviet Union suggested an agreement by which the sides
would agree not to exercise their right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for
10 years. Since the United States did not accept this restriction of its missile
defense development plans, the Soviet Union withdrew all its proposals.47
In March 1987 the Soviet Union decided to separate the question of
intermediate-range forces in Europe from the SOl problem. As a result, the sides
quickly reached an agreement on complete elimination of intermediate-range mis-
siles. Moreover, during the negotiations the scope of the agreement was broadened
to include all missiles with a range from 500 to 5,000 kilometers. On 8 December
1987, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear
Forces (INF) Treaty, which entered into force on 1 June 1988. During implemen-
tation of the treaty, the Soviet Union eliminated all its Pioneer (SS-20) missile
systems, its old R-12 (SS-4) and R-14 (SS-5) IRBMs, and its Oka (SS-23) tactical
missiles that had a range less than 500 kilometers. 4s
Since the questions of strategic arms reductions were still linked to the u.S. posi-
tion on missile defense, negotiations on that issue went on much more slowly. By
June 1988 the sides reached an agreement on basic elements of the future treaty.
According to this agreement, each side would reduce the number of its strategic
launchers to 1,600 and the number of its warheads to 6,000. The number of
warheads on land- and sea-based ballistic missiles would not exceed 4,900 for each
side. The Soviet Union confirmed its readiness to halve its heavy missile force. The
sides agreed to limit aggregate throw weight of ballistic missiles and formulated the
counting rules that would apply to ALCM-carrying bombers.
In September 1989 the Soviet Union announced that it was ready to separate the
ABM Treaty compliance issue from negotiations on the strategic arms reduction
treaty. In another important decision, the Soviet Union agreed that the arms reduc-
tion treaty would not cover sea-launched cruise missiles. Although these decisions
eventually opened the way to reaching the agreement, it took almost two more years
to finalize the treaty and solve the remaining technical problems. Eventually, the
U.S.-Soviet strategic arms reduction agreement, known as the START I Treaty, was
signed on 31 July 1991. 49
The START I Treaty required the United States and the Soviet Union to reduce
the number of deployed strategic launchers to 1,600. These launchers were allowed
to carry in total no more than 6,000 warheads on each side. Since the treaty includes
complicated rules for counting the warheads, however, the actual number of
22 Chapter 1
deployed warheads could be higher than the treaty limit. An additional ceiling
provided by the treaty limited the number of warheads deployed on land- and sea-
based ballistic missiles to 4,900 on each side. The treaty also limited the number
of warheads deployed on land-mobile missiles, which were allowed to carry no
more than 1,100 warheads. The number of heavy missiles was to be reduced by
half, so that the Soviet Union would have no more than 154 deployed missiles of
this class. The aggregate throw weight of ICBMs and SLBMs was limited to 3,600
metric tons.
According to the treaty's accounting rules, each missile was counted as deployed
with the maximum number of warheads it was able to carry. The rules for count-
ing the number of warheads deployed on strategic bombers were more complex. A
bomber equipped for gravity bombs was counted as carrying one warhead regard-
less of the actual number of bombs it could carry. The rules for counting air-
launched cruise missiles were different for the United States and the Soviet Union.
For the Unites States, within the quota of 150 ALCM-carrying bombers, each such
bomber was counted as carrying 10 cruise missiles. Other strategic bombers
equipped for ALCMs were counted as carrying the maximum number of cruise
missiles they could. For the Soviet Union, all ALCM-equipped bombers within the
quota of 180 aircraft were counted as carrying eight warheads. Another provision
prohibited deployment of more than 20 and 16 long-range air-launched cruise mis-
siles on u.s. and Soviet bombers, respectively.
The treaty allowed the number of warheads associated with a particular type of
missile to be reduced, but with only two existing missile types, and the total number
of warheads "downloaded" from a certain type could not exceed 500. The United
States also had the option of reducing the number of warheads on Minuteman III
missiles, but it could not exercise this option until after the seven-year period during
which the other reductions under the treaty were to be implemented. To minimize
a possible effect of the downloaded warheads' being returned to their launchers, the
treaty limited the total number of downloaded warheads to 1,250 on each side. The
number of warheads taken off a missile of any particular type could not exceed
four. In addition, if this number exceeded two, the warhead platforms had to be
destroyed. This requirement also applied to platforms of the Minuteman III
missiles.
The treaty devoted considerable attention to land-mobile ICBMs. Along with the
limit on the number of warheads on these missiles, the treaty put certain restriction
on their patrol procedures. At the same time, these restrictions seem to have taken
into account the established practice of land-based mobile missile patrol. The treaty
included another provision that detailed a stricter liquidation procedure for land-
based missiles than that for silo-based missiles. Whereas liquidation of a silo-based
missile or SLBM was considered completed after destruction of its silo, liquidation
of a mobile missile required the destruction of both the launcher and the missile
itself.
Among the most substantial drawbacks of the START I Treaty was the lack of
restrictions on sea-launched cruise missiles. When the treaty was signed, the United
States and the Soviet Union made political statements in which they agreed to limit
the number of deployed SLCMs to 880 on each side and inform each other about
their deployment.
At the time the treaty was signed, the Soviet strategic forces included 1,398
ICBMs, 940 sea-based missiles on 62 submarines, and 162 strategic bombers, 62
of which carried long-range cruise missiles. According to the treaty's counting rules,
these 2,500 launchers carried 10,271 nuclear warheads. The United States had
2,246 strategic platforms that were counted as carrying 10,563 warheads. The U.S.
strategic forces included 1,000 land-based missiles, 672 SLBMs, and 574 bombers,
of which 189 were equipped for long-range cruise missiles. The aggregate throw
weight of Soviet missiles was 6,626.3 metric tons; that of U.S. missiles was 2,361.3
metric tons.
Soon after the START I Treaty was signed, the United States and the Soviet Union
undertook unilateral measures that decreased the readiness of their strategic forces.
These measures, announced in September-October 1991, were aimed at reducing
the danger of accidental or unauthorized launch. Among the measures, taken at that
time, was early deactivation of missiles that were to be eliminated under the treaty
and taking strategic bombers off alert. The most important step taken at that time
was withdrawal of all nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles and other nonstrategic
nuclear weapons from submarines and surface ships. Some of these weapons were
dismantled; others were put in storage. In addition, it was announced that all army
tactical nuclear weapons were to be dismantled. 50 The Soviet Union also agreed to
end its program of rail-mobile missile deployment, and the existing rail-mobile
missile systems were confined at their bases.
The Breakup of the Soviet Union
The most important development of 1991, and the one that had the greatest impact
on START I Treaty ratification and implementation process, was the breakup of
the Soviet Union. Its successor, the Commonwealth of Independent States, was
24 Chapter 1
established on 8 December 1991. On 25 December 1991, the president of the Soviet

Union resigned and passed the command over the strategic forces to the president
of Russia.
A major part of the nuclear weapons production complex and infrastructure
of the strategic forces remained on Russian territory. At the time of the breakup
Ukraine had 130 silos of UR-100NUTIH (SS-19) missiles and 46 silos of RT-
23UTIH missiles. In addition to that, 19 Tu-160 bombers as well as 25 Tu-95MS
and 2 Tu-95 bombers also remained on Ukrainian territory. Belarus hosted 81 land-
mobile RT-2PM Topol (SS-25) missile systems, and Kazakhstan had 104 R-36M
(SS-18) missile silos and 40 Tu-95MS bombers.
The problem of succession of the START I Treaty obligations of the Soviet Union
was solved in May 1992, when four former Soviet republics that had nuclear
weapons in their territory-Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus-and the
United States signed a protocol to the treaty, known as the Lisbon Protocol. 51
According to the protocol, the former Soviet republics assumed the obligation to
carry out the START I Treaty reductions. Another provision of the protocol required
Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan to join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
as nonnuclear states. These states therefore had either to eliminate all the nuclear
weapons on their territories or to transfer them to Russia. Kazakhstan and
Belarus later agreed that all the nuclear weapons in their territory were Russian
property, and therefore Russia assumed the responsibility for dismantling those
weapons. Ukraine, in contrast, declared the strategic launchers in its territory
Ukrainian property, and it is responsible for their dismantlement. Nuclear warheads
on Ukrainian territory remained under Russian jurisdiction and were later trans-
ferred to Russia.
Transfer of nuclear warheads from Kazakhstan to Russia was completed in April
1994. All missile silos on Kazakhstan's territory have been dismantled, and all mis-
siles and bombers have been transferred to Russia. All nuclear weapons in Ukraine
had been moved to Russia by June 1996.52 Currently Ukraine is carrying out dis-
mantlement and liquidation of missile silos and ballistic missiles that remained on
its territory. Eight Tu-160 and three Tu-95 bombers located in Ukraine were trans-
ferred to Russia in 2000. In November 1996, Russia completed the transfer of the
Belarussian Topol (SS-25) missile systems to Russia. As a result, by the end of 1996
all Soviet nuclear weapons had been moved to Russia. 53
The START I Treaty had been ratified by all five of its current parties by the end
of 1994 and entered into force on 5 December 1994. The treaty requires that all
the reductions delineated in the treaty be completed by 2001-seven years after the
treaty entered into force. After that, the Treaty will remain in force for eight more
years, until 2009.
The START II Treaty
Work on a new treaty that would call for reductions of strategic weapons even
deeper than those in START I began almost immediately after the breakup of
the Soviet Union. A framework agreement between Russia and the United States
that contained the most important elements of the new treaty was reached in June
1992. The main elements of this agreement were reduction of strategic forces to
3,000-3,500 warheads total on each side and complete elimination of MIRVed land-
based ballistic missiles, including the heavy missiles. 54 The United States and Russia
also agreed to change the counting rules for bomber warheads.
The START II Treaty was signed on 3 January 1993.55 The treaty was con-
cluded quickly because it was based on the procedures and provisions outlined in
START I and in fact just set up new numerical limits and outlined some additional
procedures.
The main element of the START II Treaty is the obligation it places on the parties
to reduce the number of their strategic warheads to 3,000-3,500 on each side by
2003. An additional ceiling, not included in START I, requires that each side's sea-
based ballistic missiles carry no more than 1,750 warheads. Another key require-
ment of the treaty is the elimination of all MIRVed land-based missiles and all heavy
missiles. Silos of MIRVed missile are to be either eliminated or converted for deploy-
ment of single-warhead ICBMs. All heavy missiles and their silos are to be elimi-
nated according to special procedures set forth in the treaty. As an exception, Russia
is allowed to convert 90 R-36MUTTHIR-36M2 (SS-18) silos for deployment of
single-warhead missiles.
The START II Treaty accelerates the dismantlement schedule enacted in START
I. Under the provisions of START II, by the end of the START I Treaty term, Decem-
ber 2001, each side would have only 4,250 deployed warheads, not the 6,000
permitted by START I. The heavy missile dismantlement schedule in START I
would also have to be accelerated under the terms of START II, so by December
2001 Russia would have only 65 deployed SS-18 missiles. All reductions required
by the START II Treaty will have to be completed by 1 January 2003.
Because both the United States and Russia planned to carry out at least some of
the START II reductions by changing the declared number of warheads on deployed
missiles, the treaty removed almost all START I restrictions on reduction of the
26 Chapter 1
number of declared warheads. In particular, START II has no requirement that in

changing the declared number of warheads, the total number of warheads on any
given type of missile cannot be reduced by more than 500, as START I requires. In
addition, under the START II Treaty the total number of downloaded warheads can
exceed 1,250 on missiles of all types. The START II Treaty still does not allow the
declared number of warheads on any given missile to be changed by more than fou~
however, with one exception, which permits Russia to remove five warheads from
105 UR-100NUTTH (SS-19) missiles. Along with removing the restriction on total
number of downloaded warheads, the START II Treaty eliminates the START I
requirement that warhead platforms be destroyed if the number of warheads they
are carrying is decreased by more than two. Unlike the START I, the START II
Treaty does not require the United States to destroy warhead platforms of Minute-
man III missiles if they are converted to single-warhead missiles.
The START II rules for counting warheads on strategic bombers significantly
differ from those of the START I Treaty. According to START II, a bomber with
long-range cruise missiles is counted as carrying the maximum number of cruise
missiles for which it is equipped. The START II Treaty also allows conversion of
100 bombers (not equipped for ALCMs) for nonnuclear missions. Under the terms
of START II, these aircraft could later be converted back to nuclear missions.
In general, during the START II negotiations Russia made serious concessions
that later complicated the treaty's ratification by the Russian Duma. The treaty was
submitted to the Duma on 20 June 1995 but was not approved until 14 April 2000
(the U.S. Senate approved the treaty for ratification on 26 January 1996).
Among the problems that complicate the treaty's ratification by the Duma were
its implementation schedule and the asymmetry in the capabilities of the United
States and Russia to increase the number of deployed warheads should they decide
to pull out of the treaty (so-called breakout potential). This asymmetry was a result
of many factors, the most significant of which were the treaty's lifting restriction
on downloading and the fact that Russia had most of its warheads deployed
on MIRVed land-based ICBMs, which will have to be eliminated and therefore
could not contribute to the breakout potential. Another problem was that to bring
its forces to the START II levels of 3,000-3,500 warheads, Russia would have to
deploy a large number of single-warhead missiles. In 1997 Russia and the United
States reached an agreement that was supposed to help solve at least some of these
problems and to facilitate the Duma's ratification of the treaty. In September of
that year, they signed a protocol to the Treaty that extended its implementation
deadline by five years to 31 December 2007. All the systems scheduled for
dismantlement under the 5TART II Treaty, however, will still have to be deactivated
by the original deadline, 1 January 2003. This protocol was ratified by the Russian
Duma in April 2000 as part of the 5TART II Treaty but has yet to be approved by
the U .5. 5enate.
Among other provisions of the agreements reached in 1997 was an understand-
ing that after the 5TART II enters into force the United 5tates and Russia will start
negotiations on the next treaty, 5TART III, which would reduce the strategic forces
to the level of 2,000-2,500 warheads on each side. According to the agreement, the
new treaty will include measures on elimination of warheads removed from strate-
gic launchers, which could alleviate the problem of asymmetry in the breakout
potentials of the two countries.
The Current State and Future of Russian Strategic Forces
By 2001 Russia had almost completed the decommissioning of strategic systems that
were scheduled for elimination under the 5TART I Treaty.
By the beginning of 2001, Russia had eliminated all land-based UR-100K/UR-
100U (55-11), RT-2P (55-13), MR UR-100UTTH (55-17), and silo-based RT-
23UTTH (55-24) missiles and their silos. In addition, Russia had begun
dismantlement of UR-100NUTTH (55-19) missiles and heavy R-36MUTTH/R-
36M2 (55-18) ICBMs. In January 2001 Russia had 174 R-36MUTTHIR-36M2 (55-
18) and 150 UR-100NUTTH (55-19) missiles, 36 railroad-basedRT-23/RT-23UTTH
(55-24) ICBM systems, and 360 RT-2PM Topol (55-25) road-mobile ICBMs.
While it was dismantling these old missile systems, Russia continued development
of a new Topol-M (55-27) missile system. The Topol-M missile completed the first
series of flight tests in 1997, and in December 1997 the first two missiles of
this type entered service, deployed in UR-100NUTTH (55-19) missile silos. 5ilos
of RT-23UTTH (55-24) missiles, as well as those of the R-36MUTTH/R-36M2
(55-18), could also be used for Topol-M deployment. By the beginning of 200124
Topol-M silo-based missiles were deployed. 56 A road-mobile version of the Topol-
M system is currently undergoing testing and will later be deployed along with the
silo version of the system.
The Russian Navy by the beginning of 2000 had almost completed the decom-
missioning of missile submarines of old types: Project 667 A (Yankee I), Project 667B
(Delta I), and Project 667BD (Delta II). Four remaining submarines of the Project
667B (Delta I) type will be decommissioned in the nearest future. The Navy
has also begun the decommissioning of Project 667BDR (Delta III) submarines. In
28 Chapter 1
addition to the submarines of old types, which are scheduled for elimination under
the START treaties, the Navy has deactivated two relatively new Project 941
(Typhoon) submarines.
As a result, at the beginning of 2001, the Navy had four submarines of the Project
667BDR (Delta III) class, seven Project 667BDRM (Delta IV) submarines, and four
heavy submarines of the Project 941 (Typhoon) class in active service. In 1996
Russia laid the keel of the new missile submarine, which is the first ship of the
new Project 955 class, also known as Yuri Dolgorukii. Submarines of this class will
carry a missile system with solid-propellant missiles, which is currently under
development.
As of early 2001, Russia had practically completed elimination of old Tu-95 Bear
strategic bombers and their modifications that carried gravity bombs and short-
range cruise missiles. In 1999 Russia reached an agreement with Ukraine under
which Ukraine transferred to Russia eight Tu-160 and three Tu-95MS bombers.57
These bombers were transferred to Russia in 2000. In addition, one new bomber,
the Tu-160, entered the Russian Air Force in 2000. As a result, the core of the
Russian strategic aviation currently consists of 62 Tu-95MS Bear Hand 15 Tu-160
Blackjack bombers equipped to carry about 550 Kh-55 (AS-15) long-range cruise
missiles. Russia is developing a new long-range cruise missile that will replace the
Kh-55 on strategic and other bombers.
In July 1998 the Security Council of the Russian Federation approved a program
that will largely determine the future of the Russian strategic forces. The program
assumed that the START II Treaty will eventually enter into force and therefore puts
emphasis on development of START II-compliant systems.
Under the Security Council's program, the main strategic system that will be pro-
duced in Russia is the SS-27 Topol-M single-warhead ICBM. According to the plan,
the production rate will gradually increase from the current 10 missiles a year to
the level of 40-50 missiles annually, so that Russia will be able to deploy about 300
Topol-M missiles by the end of 2008.
Another strategic system under development is a new missile submarine, the
Project 955 class. As noted above, the keel of the lead ship of this new class, the
Yuri Dolgorukii, was laid at the end of 1996. According to the initial plan, the sub-
marines of this class would accommodate the R-39UTTH missile, which was devel-
oped as a follow-on to the R-39 (SS-N-20) SLBM. The same missile was to be
deployed on Typhoon submarines. The Security Council's program canceled the
development of the R-39UTTH missile, however, because of a series of test failures
and decided to begin development of a new SLBM that is to be deployed on the
Yuri Dolgorukii and other submarines of the Project 955 class. Construction of the
submarine has thus been suspended, since it has to be designed to accommodate the
new missile.
The Security Council's program also calls for continuing development of strate-
gic aviation. It is likely that the 1999-2000 purchase of Tu-160 and Tu-95MS
bombers from Ukraine was based on a decision made as part of the 1998 Security
Council plan.
To complete the START I reductions, Russia will dismantle its remaining Project
667B (Delta I) submarines and Tu-95 bombers. In addition to that, Russia will have
to eliminate 20 heavy missile silos to reduce their number to the 154 permitted by
the START I Treaty. Then, since the treaty requires that the number of warheads
deployed on ballistic missiles not exceed 4,900, Russia will have to decommission
additional sea- or land-based missiles. This could be done by eliminating RT-23 and
some of the RT-23UTTH railroad-mobile systems, which reached the end of their
original operational lives in 1998-2000.
After the START I reductions are completed, the future of the Russian strategic
forces will be determined primarily by the retirement schedule of deployed systems
and rate of production of new strategic systems. (It will also depend, to a large
extent, on whether the START II Treaty, which as noted above the Duma ratified
in April 2000, actually enters into force.) In assessing Russia's maintenance and
production capabilities we should take into account that part of the ICBM devel-
opment and production infrastructure remains outside of Russia. As long as this
is the case, Russia cannot resume production of R-36M (55-18) and RT-23 (55-24)
missiles and will experience certain difficulties with servicing deployed missiles
of these types. Production of the Topol-M (55-27) missile systems, on the other
hand, was transferred to Russia after the breakup of the Soviet Union, and this
system will most likely be the only land-based missile produced in Russia in the
next decade.
In contrast to the situation with land-based ICBMs, the development base of sea-
launched missiles, submarines, and strategic bombers is concentrated in Russia. As
noted above, Russia had to suspend construction of the first missile submarine of
the Project 955 class, begun in 1996, until a new solid-propellant ballistic missile
to be deployed on these submarines is developed. Russia's production of strategic
bombers would most likely be limited to completion of construction of Tu-160
Blackjack bombers, which was suspended in 1992 but resumed in 1998.
If the START II Treaty enters into force, Russia will have to eliminate all of its
remaining R-36MUTTHIR-36M2 (55-18) heavy missiles as well as its silo- and
30 Chapter 1
railroad-based RT-23IRT-23UTIH (SS-24) missile systems. Russia could retain 105

UR-100NUTIH (SS-19) missiles by converting them to carry a single warhead. The
UR-100NUTIH missiles in excess of these 105 will have to be eliminated. Silos of
the eliminated MIRVed missiles could be converted, under the terms of START II,
for deployment of the single-warhead Topol-M (SS-27) missiles. The only exception
to this would be the silos of R-36MUTTHIR-36M2 (SS-18) missiles, only 90 of
which could be converted under the treaty.
After the START II reductions Russia would have 105 UR-100NUTIH (SS-19)
missiles, converted to carry a single warhead, and about 360 Topol (SS-25) road-
mobile systems. To deploy the new Topol-M (SS-27) missile in the existing silos,
Russia would have to convert 155 of those silos. After they reach the end of their
operational life, UR-100NUTTH missiles could also be replaced by Topol-M
silo-based systems. Decommissioning of Topol missiles as they reach end of their
operational life and replacing them with Topol-M missiles would result in Russia's
having about 300 Topol-M (SS-27) missiles deployed by the year 2008.
Since the START II Treaty does not place any additional restrictions on the
Russian sea-based strategic forces beyond those enacted in START I, their future
will be determined primarily by the existing capability to maintain the current strate-
gic fleet and the success of the new submarine production program. Russia will most
likely keep in service submarines of the 667BDR (Delta III), 667BDRM (Delta IV),
and 941 (Typhoon) class. Production of the new Project 955 class submarine is
scheduled to be completed in 2002 but will almost certainly be delayed, for the
reasons noted above. After the first submarine is completed, the plan is to com-
mission one new submarine annually. Submarines of the 667BDR class will be
decommissioned by 2003, when these ships reach the end of their operational life.
Project 941 (Typhoon) submarines will be decommissioned even soone~ for the
production of R-39 (SS-N-20) missiles for them has been discontinued. As a result,
the Russian sea-based strategic force in 2008 would probably consist of seven
submarines carrying about 450 warheads.
Russian strategic aviation currently consists of Tu-95MS Bear Hand Tu-160
Blackjack cruise missile-carrying bombers. Since these bombers were produced in
the second half of the 1980s, they could stay in service until 201 0-2015. As a result,
in 2007 Russia could have 62 Tu-95MS and 15 Tu-160 bombers, which could carry
about 550 long-range cruise missiles.
If the START II Treaty is implemented, Russia could have about 1,400 warheads
by the year 2008. The United States, after the implementation of the START II
Treaty, could maintain its forces at the level of 3,500 warheads and would have a
capability to increase the number of deployed warheads quickly to about 5,500 (the
so-called breakout potential).
If the START II Treaty does not enter into force, Russia could keep R-36M2
(55-18) MIRVed missiles, which could stay in service until 2007-2010. In addition
to that, Russia could retain the UR-100NUTTH (55-19) missiles in a multiple-
warhead configuration. These missiles could also stay in service until 2007. These
measures would allow Russia to keep its strategic forces at the level of about
3,000-3,500 warheads in the next decade. However, after R-36M2 and UR-
100NUTTH (55-19) missiles reach the end of their operational life in 2008-2010,
the number of warheads in the Russian strategic forces will be reduced to or even
below the START II levels. The United States in this case could maintain its forces
at the level of 6,000 warheads permitted by the START I Treaty. A more attractive
alternative to Russia is a new strategic arms reduction agreement, START III, that
would bring the strategic forces to the level of about 1,500 warheads on each side.
The current plan for development of the Russian strategic forces is based on the
presumption that Russia and the United States will reach such an agreement before
2003.
2
The Structure and Operations of Strategic
Nuclear Forces
The Structure of the Armed Forces
The Supreme High Command

The Communist Party and its top-level leaders-the Politburo of the CPSU Central
Committee-played the central role in making decisions on all matters of state in
the power structure that existed in the Soviet Union. The Politburo was directly
involved in decisions on all aspects of the country's defensive capabilities and exer-
cised immediate supervision of the armed forces, which, along with other major
government agencies, were effectively under the direct jurisdiction of the Politburo.
The Defense Council, founded in the Soviet Union in the postwar years, appears to
have been the state agency securing the subordination of the armed forces to the
party leadership.'
The Defense Council was made up of members of the Politburo and Secretariat
of the Central Committee, as well as the minister of defense, the chief of General
Staff, and other representatives of the Ministry of Defense and General Staff. The
post of chairman of the Defense Council was always occupied by the general sec-
retary of the Central Committee, who consequently was the supreme high com-
mander of the armed forces of the Soviet Union in title and in fact. 2 The existence
of the Defense Council, therefore, was supposed to secure the mechanism by which
the party leadership exercised control of the armed forces. The Defense Council was
also the agency responsible for defining the basic guidelines of the state's military
policy, thereby giving the party leadership and the top military leaders a chance for
detailed and collective discussion of matters connected with the country's defensive
capabilities.
In wartime the Defense Council was supposed to be converted into the head-
quarters of the Supreme High Command and supervise all operations of the armed
34 Chapter 2
forces. The General Staff of the armed forces, which was the main working organ
of the Defense Council in peacetime, was supposed to be converted into the
Supreme High Command Headquarters Staff in wartime. The Defense Council
apparently was empowered to make decisions on the use of nuclear weapons. We
can also assume that the chairman of the Defense Council-the general secretary of
the Central Committee-had the necessary authority to make the decision to use
nuclear weapons in the event of a surprise nuclear strike.
The existence of the Defense Council was finally recorded in the USSR Constitu-
tion adopted in 1977. The Defense Council was supposed to have been formed by
the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, which was also assigned the function
of making decisions on such matters as declaration of war, mobilization, and
appointment and removal of the high military command. The composition and
functions of the Defense Council were not defined specifically in the Constitution,
but constitutional provisions implied that the Defense Council was an organ of
the Supreme Soviet Presidium and was empowered to define military policy options.
Changes in the top leadership shortly before the adoption of the 1977 constitution
combined the offices of the chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium and the
general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. This was an official confirma-
tion of the common practice by which the general secretary of the Central Com-
mittee headed the Defense Council and was the supreme high commander of the
armed forces of the Soviet Union. 3
Amendments to the Constitution of the Soviet Union in 1990 envisaged the
creation of the office of president of the USSR and assigned to him the duties of
the supreme high commander of the armed forces. 4 After the Soviet Union had
ceased to exist and the president of the Soviet Union had resigned, the strategic
forces of the Soviet Union were formally under the combined command of the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) for a short time,' although the actual
control of the strategic forces was exercised by the president of Russia. In 1992 all
of the nuclear forces and weapons of the armed forces of the Soviet Union and a
large part of the infrastructure of the strategic forces became part of the armed
forces of the Russian Federation under the direct jurisdiction of the president of
Russia.
According to the Constitution of the Russian Federation, adopted in December
1993, the supreme high commander of the armed forces of the Russian Federation
is the president of Russia. 6 The constitution empowers the president to approve mil-
itary doctrine and appoint and dismiss the minister of defense and members of the
high military command. In peacetime the president exercises his powers through the
The Structure and Operations of Strategic Nuclear Forces 35
minister of defense, who supervises the armed forces under the direct jurisdiction
of the president. Besides this, the General Staff of the armed forces is under direct
presidential jurisdiction and is expected to secure the president's constant control
of the strategic forces in peacetime. In the event of war, the General Staff is
supposed to be converted into the Supreme High Command Headquarters Staff,
headed by the president. As the supreme high commander, the president of Russia
is empowered to make the decision to use nuclear weapons.
The Armed Forces

The Ministry of Defense The main governmental structure responsible for the
maintenance of the combat readiness of the armed forces and the support of their
activities in peacetime is the Ministry of Defense. In the performance of these duties,
the Ministry of Defense arranges for acquisition of armaments, military training,
and the accommodation and supply of all military units. Besides this, the Ministry
of Defense is assigned an important role in the development, testing, and produc-
tion of new weapons systems and military equipment.
The minister of defense, under the direct jurisdiction of the supreme high com-
mander, has direct responsibility for the activities of the Ministry of Defense and
the commanding officers of the armed forces'? The minister of defense is also a
member of the government and is responsible for the day-to-day activities of the
armed forces.
The daily activities of the armed forces are supervised by the Ministry of Defense
Collegium, the members of which, in addition to the minister of defense, are
the chief of General Staff and the chief of rear services, both of whom are also
first deputy ministers of defense, the first deputy minister for ministry operations,
the commanders of each service of the armed forces, and the chiefs of the prin-
cipal main directorates. In the armed forces of the Soviet Union, one of the first
deputy ministers of defense was also the commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact
forces.
The main directorates of the Ministry of Defense are responsible for various
aspects of the activities of the armed forces. The ministry's main directorates include
the Main Armaments Directorate, overseeing the development and creation of new
weapons systems and military equipment, the Main Armaments Servicing and Main-
tenance Directorate, the main directorates for international treaties, armored troops,
and military medicine, the main directorates for international military cooperation,
personnel and military training, and budget and finance, and other directorates. A
special role has been assigned to the 12th Main Directorate, which exercises control
36 Chapter 2
of nuclear weapons during the entire period they are under the jurisdiction of the
military.
The General Staff of the Anned Forces The organization of all activities connected
with the use of the armed forces-the drafting of principles and specific plans for
the use of the armed forces and the elaboration of requirements to their composi-
tion and combat readiness-is the job of the General Staff of the armed forces.
The General Staff is the executive agency by means of which the country's polit-
icalleadership exercises supreme high command of the armed forces. In particula~
in peacetime all of the strategic forces units on combat duty are under the direct
jurisdiction of the General Staff and, consequently, at the disposal of the country's
political leadership. The main functions of the General Staff, in addition to secur-
ing the operational command and control of troops, are the analysis of the country's
military-political situation, the determination of trends in the development of
weaponry and the methods of warfare, and the compilation of plans for the use of
the armed forces, which then serve as a basis for the determination of requirements
pertaining to their composition and level of combat readiness and requirements for
weapons systems under development.
The General Staff of the armed forces is headed by the chief of General Staff.
This is the highest military post after that of the minister of defense. The leadership
of the General Staff consists of the chief of General Staff, his first deputy, his deputy,
and the chiefs of the key main directorates of the General Staff. The Main Opera-
tions Directorate, which is in charge of plans for the use of the armed forces, plays
a special role among the directorates making up the General Staff. It drafts the
specific plans for the use of strategic nuclear forces, including targeting strategy. In
addition to the Main Operations Directorate, there are General Staff directorates
responsible for intelligence (the Main Intelligence Directorate, GRU), the develop-
ment of military science, and other areas of General Staff operations.
The Seroices of the Anned Forces The services of the armed forces are the basic
element of the armed forces' structure. Until the armed forces were reorganized in
1997-1998, there were five branches of the armed forces of Russia, just as there
were in the former USSR:S
• The Strategic Rocket Forces (RVSN), which represent one of the main elements
of the strategic nuclear forces. They are armed with land-based intercontinental bal-
listic missiles designed to inflict strategic strikes on enemy territory. Until the end
of the 1980s the RVSN were also armed with intermediate-range ballistic missiles
capable of carrying out strategic missions in a theater of war or theater of military

operations.
• The Naval Forces, which include strategic missile-armed submarines. The naval
strategic nuclear forces are expected to inflict strikes against targets related
to enemy military or military-industrial potential and the administrative centers of
the enemy. One of the Navy's fundamental duties is guaranteeing the ability
of missile-armed submarines to resist the enemy. In addition, the Navy is expected
to fight enemy naval forces and support ground force operations in coastal
areas.
• The Air Forces, which include strategic aviation for the destruction of adminis-
trative, industrial, and military targets of strategic importance on enemy territory.
In addition, the functions of the Air Forces include the destruction of groups of
enemy troops, the achievement of air superiority, aerial reconnaissance, and the
support of landing and transport operations.
• The Air Defense Forces, which were expected to defend the country's
main administrative and industrial centers, groups of armed forces, and critical mil-
itary targets against air strikes. The functions of the Air Defense Forces included
the detection of air attacks, the destruction of enemy strike forces and systems, and
the resistance of air reconnaissance systems. The Air Defense Forces were also
expected to detect and repulse missile attacks and defend against enemy space
systems.
• The Ground Forces, which are expected to repulse strikes in continental theaters
of military operations, fight groups of enemy ground forces, and seize and hold
territory.
The armed forces also include various branches that are not part of any service
(nuclear equipment troops, signal troops, radio-electronic warfare troops, engineer
troops, military construction troops, and others) and the rear services of the armed
forces.
A move to a four-service structure presupposing the dissolution of the Air Defense
Forces began in the armed forces in July 1997. The space missile defense troops that
were part of the Air Defense Forces were turned over to the Strategic Rocket Forces.
In addition, the military space forces, which had existed as a separate combat branch
and had not been part of any service since 1982, were turned over to the RVSN.
By December 1998 the remaining units of the Air Defense Forces, which included
fighter aviation, air defense forces, and radio-technical troops, were turned over to
the Air Forces. The current military reform plan calls for a subsequent move to a
three-service structure of the armed forces. This reorganization has already begun
in 2000 with the decision to make the space missile defense troops and the military
space forces separate branches of the armed forces, reversing the decision made in
38 Chapter 2
1997. After 2005, the Strategic Rocket Forces will be demoted to a status of a
branch of the armed forces and later will probably be joined with the Air Forces,
concluding the transition to the three-service structure. 9
The structure of each service is comparable to the structure of the armed forces
as a whole. In addition to a main staff, responsible for planning the operations
of the branch and supervising the operations of military units, each service includes
branches, rear services, special troops, and special services. The services have
main weapons directorates, main weapons servicing and maintenance directorates,
scientific research institutes, and other subdivisions. The Sixth Directorate of
each of the services exercises control over the nuclear weapons that the service main-
tains. Each service of the armed forces has its own organizational structure, pre-
supposing the existence of army-level units, which consist of the forces and weapons
of the different combat branches making up the service and serve as the basis
for combat units in military operations. The main structural elements of the
Strategic Rocket Forces are the missile armies, and the main structural elements of
the Navy are the fleets and flotillas. The Air Forces are subdivided into air armies,
air corps, and divisions. The Air Defense Forces were divided into air defense
districts and separate armies, corps, divisions, and brigades. The basis of the orga-
nizational structure of the Ground Forces consists of armies, army corps, divisions,
and brigades.
Part of the units of the Ground Forces, Air Forces, and other services are
assigned to military districts and territorial groups of forces. Each military district,
with the units assigned to it, is expected to serve as the basis for a front or a larger
operational-strategic group in the strategic sector.
The units of the strategic nuclear forces of the Strategic Rocket Forces, Navy, and
Air Forces (and, up until their dissolution, the Air Defense Forces) are not assigned
to territorial military districts, however. These units are under the direct jurisdic-
tion of the commanders of services of the armed forces and the General Staff. In
the event of war, the strategic nuclear forces are supposed to be wholly at the dis-
posal of the Supreme High Command.
The Decision-Making Mechanism
Decisions regarding the creation of strategic nuclear forces and their development,
and improvement as well as decisions affecting the role of strategic forces in safe-
guarding the security of the state and its defensive capabilities were usually made
in the Soviet Union during the course of interaction between various state and party
organs. The fundamental features of the mechanism securing interaction by all of

the participants in this process took shape in the 1960s.
The main organ supervising the activities of the party and state was the Politburo
of the CPSU Central Committee,iO which was made up of the general secretary of
the Central Committee, some secretaries of the CPSU Central Committee, the
leaders of some republic party organizations, and the chairman of the Council of
Ministers. The members of the Politburo as a rule included the heads of the main
state agencies: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, and the
State Security Committee (KGB). The structure of the Politburo did not include a
chairman; the actual head of the Politburo was the General Secretary of the CPSU
Central Committee, who was elected to this office at a Central Committee plenum.
All of the most important matters connected with party and state affairs in the
Soviet Union were discussed by the Politburo. The implementation of Politburo
decisions was secured by the Soviet political system, which envisaged compulsory
compliance with party decisions by all governmental bodies. In particula~ the main
government ministries and state committees, such as the Ministry of Defense, the
Ministries of Foreign and Internal Affairs, and the State Security Committee (KGB),
were effectively under the direct jurisdiction of the Politburo. The government of
the USSR, representing the highest executive authority, was also effectively account-
able to the Politburo.
The Ministry of Defense and General Staff played a critical role in the decision-
making mechanism in matters pertaining to national defensive capabilities. Although
the Communist Party and Politburo played the key role in defining the general prin-
ciples of defense policy and the fundamental guidelines for the development of the
armed forces, all of the work of elaborating specific elements of military doctrine
within the confines of party policy and setting requirements for the composition,
combat readiness, and support of the armed forces was done by the Ministry of
Defense and General Staff. The political leadership of the Soviet Union, in turn, relied
almost completely on the recommendations and evaluations of officials of the armed
forces in decision making in the sphere of defense policy.
Politburo activities were supported largely by the Central Committee Secretariat,
which took charge of all matters connected with party affairs, ideological issues,
and personnel appointments in the party and government. The Secretariat's role in
defense decision making, however, was extremely limited. One of the members of
the Central Committee Secretariat was a secretary for defense, but his influence
extended mainly to matters connected with the defense industry.ll In addition, the
Central Committee Secretariat had departments in charge of various areas of state
40 Chapter 2
activity, particularly the Defense Industry Department and the International Depart-
ment. The Defense Industry Department was involved in the preparatory work
for decisions pertaining to the development of weapons, but its participation in
the process of decision making on military issues was rather limited. The Interna-
tional Department was almost always excluded from foreign policy decision making
in connection with military issues or strategic forces, with the exception of a
brief period in 1986-1988 during which it exerted some influence in foreign
po licymaking. 12
Government agencies generally played the main role in decisions not connected
with party activities. The planning of the general guidelines of national economic
development and the implementation of specific measures in this sphere were the
responsibility of the Council of Ministers and its key agencies. The activities of the
government were overseen at all times by the Politburo. In view of the particular
importance of the office of chairman of the Council of Ministers, the position was
usually occupied by an influential member of the top-level politicalleadership.13
The supervision of the state's foreign policy activity and the preparatory work for
all Politburo decisions on foreign policy matters were traditionally reserved for the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 14 In its own activity, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was
guided, as the military agencies were, by the general political aims of the party lead-
ership. The planning of specific foreign policy moves and initiatives, however, was
usually the ministry's exclusive prerogative. Even when the International Depart-
ment had some influence in foreign policymaking for a short time in 1986-1988,
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs kept its leading role in defining the foreign policy
of the Soviet Union.
Another important state agency directly involved in policymaking in the sphere
of defense in the Soviet Union was the Commission on Military-Industrial Affairs
of the Presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers, more commonly referred to as
the "Military-Industrial Commission. "15 The commission coordinated the activities
of the Defense Ministry and defense industry during the definition of the basic guide-
lines of technical development for the armed forces and the development and
creation of new military equipment and weapons.
The interests of various agencies involved in the elaboration of the state's defense
policy and in planning specific measures for the pursuit of this policy were balanced
with the aid of a decision-making procedure presupposing the consideration of
various opinions and interests. The Defense Council apparently was the most impor-
tant body in charge of the definition of the fundamental guidelines of military policy.
The minister of defense and chief of General Staff were supposed to be members of
the Defense Council along with Politburo officials, and the council was always
headed by the general secretary of the Central Committee. In addition, the heads
of the principal main directorates of the Defense Ministry and General Staff
(primarily the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff) and the deputy
ministers of defense (including the commanders-in-chief of services of the armed
forces) apparently participated in the work of the Defense Council. Some additional
representatives of the Ministry of Defense and General Staff may have been full
members of the council as well. Representatives of the government and the defense
industry could also participate in the council's work.
One of the functions of the Defense Council, which acted in the capacity of a
state agency, was the maintenance of the official mechanism by which the top party
leadership could command and control the armed forces. The council's other,
equally important functions were the elaboration and confirmation of the funda-
mental provisions of military doctrine, the definition of the fundamental guidelines
of military and military-technical policy, and the evaluation of the state of national
defensive capabilities. Despite its high formal status, the Defense Council generally
acted only as a working organ of the Politburo, establishing a forum for thorough
discussion of general aspects of the development of the armed forces. The Politburo
had to approve the most important Defense Council decisions. In addition, in
some cases important decisions could be introduced for discussion directly to the
Politburo, bypassing the Defense Council. 16 The Defense Council did not seem to
have its own staff and relied wholly on the recommendations and assessments of
the General Staff.
The development and creation of weapons played a critical role in the decision-
making process in the area of military and military-technical policy. Most of the
key decisions pertaining to specific measures to secure the country's defensive capa-
bilities and the general principles of military doctrine were made in connection with
decisions on the development, production, or adoption of various weapon systems.
Besides this, most of the work of coordinating the interests of various agencies and
organizations was carried on while decisions were being made on those matters.
In view of the special role the creation of new weapons played in the military
decision-making process, it is described in a separate section ("Weapons Develop-
ment and Production").
Another important channel for the coordination of the interests of various
agencies was the Politburo commission monitoring arms limitation talks, which
was formed in 1969. The commission was made up of the minister of defense,
the minister of foreign affairs, the Central Committee secretary of defense, the
42 Chapter 2
chairman of the Military-Industrial Commission, and the chairman of the State

Security Committee (KGB) and thus commonly known as the "Big Five."17 It was
created to ensure consideration of the positions of various agencies during the delib-
eration of proposals discussed at the Soviet-American strategic arms limitation talks
that began in November 1969. A working group made up of experts from the agen-
cies represented on the commission (known as the "Little Five") was set up later to
discuss technical matters arising during the talks. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and the General Staff played the most active role in the main commission and in
the working group, doing most of the work of elaborating the Soviet position at
the talks and solving pro blems arising during the talksY
The commission monitoring the talks played an exceptionally important role
during the preparation of Soviet-American arms limitation and disarmament agree-
ments. In November 1990 the commission, which had grown considerably by that
time, was converted into the USSR Presidential Negotiation Monitoring Commis-
sion and continued to exist in that capacity virtually up to the very moment of the
breakup of the Soviet Union.19
The breakup of the Soviet Union brought about cardinal changes in the mecha-
nism for decisions pertaining to defensive capabilities, mainly because the new polit-
ical structure in Russia differed fundamentally from the state structure of the Soviet
Union. The Constitution of the Russian Federation that was adopted in 1993
assigned the key role in decisions on virtually all aspects of political affairs to the
president of Russia, elected in direct and general elections. In particular, the presi-
dent was empowered to make decisions on all aspects of military policy.
The Russian constitution envisages the existence of the Security Council, the main
presidential working body in charge of preparatory work for decisions in the sphere
of military policy. The role that the Security Council played in making decisions on
political and military matters varied. In 1997-1998 the Security Council was directly
involved in drawing plans for the military reform. The role of the Security Council
in decision making seems to have increased further after the March 2000 presiden-
tial elections. In particular, all major decisions about restructuring of the armed
forces were considered and approved by the Security Council. Council members
include-in addition to the president, who acts as its chairman-the Secretary of
the Council, the prime minister, the minister of defense, the minister of foreign
affairs, the director of the Federal Security Service (FSB), and others.
The responsibility for the state of the armed forces and their support and for
the implementation of specific measures in the sphere of military policy has been
assigned mainly to the government of Russia and the Ministry of Defense. The gov-
ernment as a whole is responsible for the state of the armed forces and supplies
them with weapons and military equipment. The Ministry of Defense drafts the
fundamental guidelines of military organizational development and draws up arms
programs, and it is also responsible for the coordination and funding of defense-
related projects, including scientific research and experimental design projects. The
General Staff plays the main role in the elaboration of military doctrine and the
choice of the fundamental guidelines of military organizational development.
The Defense Industry
The system for the development and production of new weapons systems in the
Soviet Union was based on the existence of a number of defense ministries, each of
which was responsible for the creation of specific types of weapons and military
equipment, as follows:
• the Ministry of Medium Machine Building, which was responsible for the whole
cycle of development and production of nuclear weapons;
• the Ministry of General Machine Building, which was in charge of the creation
of land- and sea-based strategic ballistic missiles, space delivery vehicles, and
military and civilian satellites;
• the Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry, which was responsible for the creation of
ships for the Navy and the civilian fleet and for naval armaments;
• the Ministry of Aviation Industry, which was in charge of the development and
production of military and civilian aviation equipment, airborne weapons, and
cruise and antiaircraft missiles;
• the Ministry of Defense Industry, which was responsible for the production of
solid-propellant missiles (mostly nonstrategic), conventional arms for ground
troops, elements of military equipment, and ammunition;
• the Ministry of Radio Industry, which was responsible for the creation of radar
stations, air defense and ballistic missile defense systems, space monitoring systems,
aircraft navigation systems, and powerful computers;
• the Ministry of Electronics Industry, the responsibilities of which included the
creation of semiconductor electronic equipment, microwave and microelectronic
components, and computers;
• the Ministry of Communication Equipment Industry, which secured the produc-
tion of various types of communication equipment;
• the Ministry of Machine Building, which participated in the production of explo-
sives, propellants, rocket fuel, and ammunition.
In addition to the defense industry ministries, other ministries were also involved
in the creation of weapons and military equipment, particularly the Ministry of
44 Chapter 2
Heavy and Transport Machine Building, the Ministry of Electrical Equipment

Industry, the Ministry of Automotive Industry, and the Ministry of Chemical
Industry.
Each of the ministries had scientific research institutes, design bureaus, test ranges,
and experimental and serial-production plants securing the full cycle of arms devel-
opment and production. The activities of all the ministries in fulfilling defense orders
were coordinated by the Military-Industrial Commission.
The Ministry of Defense acted in the capacity of a customer ordering new
weapons for the country and was involved in all stages of the development process,
from scientific research to serial production. In scientific research and in experi-
mental design projects, the scientific research institutes of the Ministry of Defense
and the branches of the armed forces played the main role. These institutes were
directly involved in defining the preliminary specifications for new weapons systems.
In addition, the Ministry of Defense played the key role in overseeing the tests of
new systems and in ruling on the expediency of adopting any particular class mili-
tary equipment developed.
The military acquisition and official acceptance procedure was another mecha-
nism by which the Ministry of Defense exercised constant oversight of the whole
process of arms development and production. Military representatives worked in
the scientific research institutes of the defense industry and in design bureaus, over-
seeing the scientific research and experimental design projects conducted there. In
addition, these representatives were completely in control of the serial production
of weapons. This system was fairly effective in terms of quality control, because the
military representatives were not staff members of the defense industry ministries
and were under the direct jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defense.
The structure of the defense industry changed significantly after the breakup of
the Soviet Union in December 1991. Almost all of the defense industry ministries
were dissolved. Enterprises of the defense complex that ended up outside Russia
were transferred to the jurisdiction of the republics where they were located. All of
the remaining defense enterprises were transferred to the jurisdiction of the new
Russian Federation Ministry of Industry. The only exceptions were the enterprises
of the Ministry of Medium Machine Building (known by that time as the USSR
Ministry of Atomic Energy and Industry), which became part of the Russia's Min-
istry of Atomic Energy. Additionally, more than 30 enterprises that were once part
of the Ministry of General Machine Building were transferred to the jurisdiction of
the Russian Space Agency in 1994.
The Ministry of Industry was dissolved at the end of 1992 and the defense indus-
try enterprises were turned over to the jurisdiction of the new Committee of the
Russian Federation for Defense Industries (Roskomoboronprom). It was later
renamed a State Committee (Goskomoboronprom), and in May 1996 it was reor-
ganized as the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense Industry. By the beginning
of 1997, therefore, all of the enterprises of the defense complex in Russia were
concentrated in three agencies: the Ministry of Atomic Energy, the Russian Space
Agency, and the Ministry of Defense Industry. In March 1997 the Ministry of
Defense Industry was dissolved and its subdivisions became part of the Ministry of
Economics.
Weapons Development and Production

Military and military-technical policymaking is related directly to the process of
developing and creating new weapon systems. In the decision-making mechanism
in this sphere in the Soviet Union, key decisions pertaining to the fundamental guide-
lines for the development of strategic forces and the strategy of their use were usually
made during the determination of requirements for new systems and the discussion
of matters connected with the expediency of developing specific weapons systems
and arranging for their serial production.
The process of creating new weapons systems usually consists of several basic
stages: scientific research projects, the preliminary design process, development of
the system, adoption of the system, and serial production and operation of the
system. In the Soviet Union the scientific research projects (NIR) and system devel-
opment (OKR) were conducted in accordance with a special plan: the Armament
Development Program. This program was revised once every five years and included
the plan for scientific research, exploratory and experimental design projects for the
subsequent five years, and the fundamental guidelines of the work for the period of
10 years. The program was drawn up by the Military-Industrial Commission, which
consolidated the proposals of ministries and all of their institutes and design bureaus
for research projects and earlier decisions on NIR and OKR.
The decision to include a specific field of research in the Armament Development
Program was usually made by the Military-Industrial Commission, which formed a
special commission, if necessary, to study the proposals of the research institutes
and design bureaus. In some cases, during the discussion of key questions of weapon
development strategy, the Politburo itself made the decision to create such a com-
mission and the final decision on research and design projects.
46 Chapter 2
During the research stage, the fundamental specifications of the future system
were defined and one or several technical sketches were drafted. The performance
specifications for the preliminary design were usually drawn up during this stage by
the customer: one of the scientific research institutes of the service of the armed
forces for which the system was intended. The specifications for separate compo-
nents of the systems were drawn up by specialized institutes of the services of the
armed forces. In some cases, when the preliminary specifications were being set for
nuclear munitions and when military command, control, and communications
systems were being developed, the institutes of Defense Ministry directorates acted
as the customer.
While the technical assignment was being drawn up, the developers and repre-
sentatives of the military clarified the proposed specifications for the system and
defined the objectives to be attained during the preliminary design stage. Sometimes
the developers submitted their proposals regarding preliminary design without per-
formance specifications from the Ministry of Defense.
The developers' requests to start work on preliminary design were submitted
to the Military-Industrial Commission, which made the decision to begin this stage
of the work; it did not require the publication of a special government decree.
During the work on a weapon system's preliminary design, all project planning work
was completed, the subcontractors who would work on the production of the system
were chosen, and proposals were drafted on the organization of projects for the cre-
ation of the system. The system's tactical specifications were also defined during this
stage and then elaborated by institutes of the Ministry of Defense, which provided
developers with suggestions and comments during this stage of the work.
After the work on the preliminary design had been completed, the decision to
begin the development stage had to be made. The plans developed during prelimi-
nary design were submitted to the Military-Industrial Commission along with the
conclusions and recommendations of the head institutes of the appropriate Defense
Ministry directorates. During deliberations on the expediency of starting work on
the creation of the system, the Military-Industrial Commission could form a special
commission, enlisting the help of industry and military institutes and the Academy
of Sciences. After the actual decision to start the development had been made, the
Military-Industrial Commission and the Defense Industry Department of the CPSU
Central Committee drafted the joint Central Committee and Council of Ministers
decree required for the start of work on the project itself. This special decree stip-
ulated the dates of the project, named the primary contractor, and issued instruc-
tions to secure the completion of the necessary work. 20 If system requirements and
the deadlines for the completion of certain stages changed during the work on
major projects, a new decree had to be issued to make the necessary changes in the
original plans.
The development stage consisted of the following substages: preparation of a draft
design, preparation of engineering plans and design documents, creation and exper-
imental testing of system components, combined tests, production of models, and
use of the system by troops. The draft design substage included the preliminary
determination of the system's configuration, the clarification of its composition,
the development, analysis, and choice of design options, and the preliminary choice
of technological support options. The engineering and design documentation sub-
stage included the final determination of the system's configuration, the thorough
testing of all components, and the preparation of a complete set of blueprints and
manuals. Experimental models and components of the system were then produced
according to the specifications in the blueprints, and several tests were conducted
if necessary.
The results of these tests of system components served as the basis for a decision
that the system was ready to be tested. This decision, as well as the monitoring of
tests and the evaluation of test results, was under the exclusive jurisdiction of a state
commission established expressly for this purpose. The testing commission was
formed by the Military-Industrial Commission pursuant to the decree on the devel-
opment of the system (or the commencement of experimental design projects). Addi-
tional state commissions could be set up to test separate components of the system
in some cases. During the creation of strategic missile-armed submarines with new
missile systems, for example, a separate commission was formed to conduct the tests
of the submarines.
The state testing commission was usually headed by a representative of the head
institute of the Ministry of Defense. In some cases the chairman of the commission
would be the chief of the armaments directorate of the specific service of the armed
forces for which the system was being developed. Some commission members
represented the developers and the military, but most represented the Ministry of
Defense. When commissions were formed to test and accept updated models of
existing systems, the commission members usually included servicemen with expe-
rience in using those systems.
The number of tests was specified in the decree that permitted the development
of the system. The tests could be conducted in two stages, and during the first of
these-the designer tests-the accuracy of design decisions was verified in field
experiments with full-scale models. The results of these designer tests could lead to
48 Chapter 2
a decision on the need for changes and improvements in the system's design. The
second stage of the tests-the so-called combined tests-was conducted to verify
the correspondence of the system to the assigned tactical specifications and to decide
whether the system should be adopted. In the 1970s virtually all tests of strategic
systems were conducted exclusively within the combined-test framework (bypass-
ing the designer tests entirely), in which developers solved design problems and
servicemen evaluated the features of the system.
After the program of tests had been completed, the state testing commission
compiled its report, including recommendations with regard to the expediency of
adopting the system. The completion of the tests did not mark the official end
of the experimental design projects, however. Theoretically, at least, before the new
system could be adopted, it had to go through the stage of operation in the field.
In spite of this, however, the decision to adopt the system was made right after the
end of the tests in most cases and generally took the form of a special government
decree.
Preparations for the serial production of the new system began during the devel-
opment stage. The approximate date of the start of series production was specified
in the decree authorizing the development of the system, and for this reason the
necessary preparations for series production usually had been made by the time the
tests were completed. The levels of production were based on a Ministry of Defense
acquisition request, which was drawn up as part of the five-year plan-that is, long
before the end of the development stage. The system could be included in the acqui-
sition request even if it had not been officially adopted.
The main distinguishing feature of the system for the development, adoption, and
production of military equipment in the Soviet Union was its distribution of the
necessary funds directly to the defense industry, bypassing the Ministry of Defense.
In spite of this, the Ministry of Defense could effectively influence the process
of the creation of new equipment because it drew up the tactical specifications
and exercised oversight of the industry during all stages of arms development and
production.
The current method of financing the defense industry and research and design
projects in Russia differs considerably from the accepted practice in the Soviet
Union. Funds for the development of military equipment and for purchases of
equipment are disbursed by the Ministry of Defense, which acts as the customer.
One of the problems arising in this funding procedure is the lack of money for basic
research, the maintenance of experimental facilities in the defense industry, and
the organization of serial production. The situation is complicated by the almost
constant underfinancing of the Ministry of Defense. Under these conditions, the

ministry cannot afford to allocate the necessary funds for arms purchases and for
research and design projects.
The reorganization of the defense industry in the evolution from the Soviet Union
into Russia also led to the elimination of the Military-Industrial Commission, the
Soviet body that conducted most of the work involved in formulating a common
policy on the development and production of new weapons. The commission's func-
tions were effectively transferred to the Ministry of Defense, which has encountered
certain difficulties in the organization and planning of production.
In general, projects for the creation of new strategic weapons systems in Russia
are the continuation of development projects that began before 1991. Russia there-
fore lacks experience in the complete cycle of work involved in the creation of strate-
gic systems, and it is too early to discuss the established procedures in this area.
Operations of Strategic Forces
The principles governing the use of the armed forces are recorded in the most general
terms in military doctrine, which represents the accepted views of the state on the
methods, purpose, and nature of war, the methods of its prevention, and the prin-
ciples of warfare. The fundamental provisions of military doctrine are reflected in
state policy in the sphere of military organizational development.
The principles serving as the basis for policy on the use of strategic nuclear
forces represent a very important part of military doctrine. These principles are
reflected specifically in the role assigned to strategic forces in safeguarding the secu-
rity of the state, in the manner of planning the use of strategic forces, in the choice
of options, and in the definition of the conditions under which the state would
be prepared to use its strategic forces. The general principles governing the use of
strategic forces are reflected in the requirements imposed on their composition, in
the technical specifications of weapons and delivery vehicles, and also in the
practice of combat duty.
General Principles
The decisive characteristic of the strategic forces is their ability to attain strategic
goals-that is, to conduct military operations with results leading to fundamental
changes in the military-political and strategic situation. Because of the tremendous
scale of the damage strategic nuclear forces can inflict in the event of their use,
these forces are assigned a special role in the state's military doctrine. In addition
50 Chapter 2
to inflicting damage during the course of military operations, strategic forces are
expected to prevent the onset of an armed conflict or to keep a limited conflict (non-
nuclear or involving the use of tactical nuclear weapons) from reaching the stage of
the use of strategic nuclear weapons.
The prevention of armed conflicts by means of a threat to use nuclear weapons
is the basis of the policy of nuclear deterrence. Such a policy implies the ability to
use strategic nuclear forces to reach strategic goals in the conflict. Possession of this
ability means that any conflict involving a state with nuclear weapons, irrespective
of its initial scale, can reach the stage of the use of strategic nuclear forces under
certain conditions. Because strategic nuclear forces are capable of inflicting damage
on an exceptionally large scale, the threat of their use can prevent aggressive actions
against a state that possesses them.
The effectiveness of a policy of nuclear deterrence depends on the nature of
the threat being deterred and the ability of strategic forces to counter this
threat. Requirements are placed on strategic forces based on the principle that
their primary function is the prevention of a strategic nuclear attack. Strategic
forces must therefore be able to perform this function under any conditions,
even if they have suffered losses as a result of the use of strategic nuclear
systems by an enemy. Effective deterrence is secured only when strategic nuclear
forces are able to inflict unacceptable damage on an enemy even under those
conditions.
What level of damage an enemy deems unacceptable depends on the specific
conditions of the conflict, its scale, and on how the expected damage corresponds
to the strategic goals of the conflict. The ambiguous nature of the definition
of unacceptable damage means that strategic forces have to be built up and orga-
nized to be able to inflict a certain "assigned" damage, the level of which would be
perceived as unacceptable by the enemy under any circumstances.
The ability to deter the threat of strategic nuclear attack is an important, but not
the only, requirement of the strategic forces. The effective deterrence of conflicts at
different levels requires the ability to use nuclear force under the most diverse con-
ditions and in accordance with an extensive array of scenarios. In particular, this
means that the leadership should be able to exercise control over the strategic forces
during all stages of the conflict and that the possibility of the flexible use of the
strategic forces must be secured.
Scenarios involving the use of strategic nuclear forces can be subdivided into three
main categories: the preemptive strike (or first strike), the counterstrike (or launch-
on-warning strike), and the retaliatory strike. When strategic forces are used to
deliver a preemptive strike, the strategic delivery vehicles are launched before the
enemy inflicts its own strategic strike. In a counterstrike, the vehicles are launched
after the start of the enemy attack, but before the enemy strike reaches its targets
(missile launch sites, strategic missile-armed submarines, bombers, and command
centers). A retaliatory strike is delivered after the enemy warheads have reached
their targets.
Because the retaliatory option imposes the strictest requirements on strategic
forces-they must respond after the enemy's strategic strike has in some degree
accomplished its mission and disabled certain elements of the strategic forces-their
structural features and the features of strategic weapon systems and battle man-
agement systems are usually planned in anticipation of precisely this option. This
approach corresponds entirely to the performance of the main function of strategic
forces: effective deterrence. Because the choice of the scenario for the use of strate-
gic forces depends so much on the specific circumstances under which the decision
to use them will be made, however, the possibility of using strategic forces in the
preemptive strike and counterstrike options can provide more extensive opportuni-
ties to influence the course of a conflict or crisis.
It is significant that virtually all of the possible options for the use of strategic
nuclear forces imply a serious international crisis or a military conflict involving the
possible use of conventional arms and tactical nuclear weapons. The probability of
a "bolt-out-of-the-blue" strategic strike is extremely low, although the possibility of
this kind of strike was evidently taken into account during the cold war when the
requirements of strategic forces were defined. When the various scenarios involving
the use of strategic forces are discussed, therefore, it is important to remember that
the choice of a particular option will be made in the context of the specific situa-
tion and with a view to the actual sources of tensions that have led to a particular
crisis or an armed conflict.
The decision to deliver a preemptive strike requires knowledge that an enemy
strategic attack is imminent, even though the enemy delivery vehicles have yet not
been launched (so-called strategic warning). Under these conditions, the delivery of
a strike against the strategic systems of the enemy can minimize the damage the
enemy strategic forces will be able to inflict in the planned strike. The existence of
reports of a planned attack theoretically distinguishes the scenario of the preemp-
tive strike from the option of a first counterforce strike, which is delivered not for
the purpose of minimizing the damage from the planned attack but to deprive the
enemy of the ability to deliver the planned attack at all. The line between the
preemptive strike and the first counterforce strike, however, is highly conditional.
52 Chapter 2
An enemy's preparations for an attack can be judged only by indirect signs, which
means that any report of an imminent attack on the part of an enemy has at best
only a tenuous reliability.
Because the fundamental purpose of the first strike is the destruction of enemy
strategic forces, the systems used in this strike must have high counterforce poten-
tial, that is, the capability of effectively destroying highly hardened targets, such as
silo launchers and command centers. This capability is achieved with the aid of
highly accurate delivery systems and high-yield warheads.
Although the delivery of a first strike allows the capabilities of strategic forces to
be used more fully, the choice to launch the first strike means the deliberate esca-
lation of the conflict or crisis to the level of the exchange of strategic nuclear strikes.
In addition to the obvious problems associated with the irreversibility of this deci-
sion and its disastrous consequences, there is also the possibility that the attacked
side could deliver a retaliatory strike powerful enough to inflict considerable damage
on the attacking side. The delivery of a first counterforce strike is feasible only if
the destruction of the strategic targets of this strike will justify the damage the
attacked side will inflict in a retaliatory strike. If the strategic forces of both sides
are capable of inflicting obviously unacceptable damage in a retaliatory strike, the
choice to deliver a first disarming strike would be indefensible under virtually any
conditions.
In contrast to the first counterforce (disarming) strike, the preemptive strike,
which is intended not to prevent but to minimize the damage from an imminent
attack, could appear to be justified under certain conditions. In particular, a pre-
emptive strike could be justified if there is reason to believe that an enemy is plan-
ning a disarming strike capable of minimizing or neutralizing one's own capability
of inflicting unacceptable damage on that enemy in a retaliatory strike. The main
problem arising during the discussion of the feasibility of a preemptive strike con-
sists in the extremely unreliable nature of reports of preparations for a strategic
strike and the high probability of the inaccurate interpretation of the actions and
intentions of the other side. Nevertheless, under certain conditions there can be some
indications of the enemy's intention to launch a strategic attack. The decision to
deliver a preemptive strike may reasonably be made, for example, if there is a
genuine threat that the command structure of strategic forces may be destroyed
or that considerable numbers of strategic systems (offensive and defensive) may be
lost during the course of a local military conflict (involving nonnuclear forces or
tactical nuclear systems). In this kind of situation, actions intended to destroy the
command structure and strategic delivery vehicles could be viewed as evidence of

enemy preparations for a first disarming strike.
The counterstrike (launch-on-warning) enables the defensive side to avert the
destruction of its strategic forces and thereby deprive the attacking side of the advan-
tages it hopes to gain through a first strike. Virtually all strategic forces can be
committed to action in a counterstrike, because the strategic delivery vehicles are
launched before the enemy strike reaches its targets. The decision to use nuclear
force in a counterstrike, in contrast to a preemptive strike, is based on the actual
fact of a nuclear attack, detected by early-warning systems (so-called tactical
warning), rather than on much less reliable, indirect signs that an enemy is making
preparations for an attack.
The delivery of a counterstrike makes extremely high demands on the system for
the command and control of the strategic forces. A permanently operating early-
warning system, capable of reliably recording the start of a nuclear strike, is required
to detect the enemy's attack. After the attack has been detected, the credibility of
the information must be assessed, and the scale of the attack must be determined.
Then the decision to deliver a counterstrike must be made on the level of the polit-
ical leadership, and the decision must then be transmitted to troops, which are to
launch strategic delivery vehicles. The vehicles themselves must then take off and
leave the blast zone in launch areas. The interval of time during which the
side facing attack must perform all of these actions is quite limited. If land-based
ICBMs are used to deliver the first strike, the other side will have no more than
30 minutes to complete all the above actions and launch its counterstrike. After
the amount of time required for the detection of the attack and transmission of
the order to launch the strategic delivery systems has been subtracted from the
total, the political leadership has no more than 8-10 minutes to make the decision
to deliver a counterstrike.
The limited amount of time for decision making obviously complicates the deliv-
ery of a counterstrike. In addition, the attacking side can take various measures to
complicate or partially exclude the use of strategic forces in a counterstrike, such
as the preliminary destruction of command posts, lines of communication, and the
main components of strategic forces with the aid of systems that either cannot be
detected by the early-warning system or leave no time for the performance of the
necessary actions because of their short flight time. These systems include sea-
launched ballistic and cruise missiles and air-launched cruise missiles. Nonnuclear
weapons could also be used for a preliminary strike at key targets.
54 Chapter 2
The ability to deliver a counterstrike, therefore, cannot be considered certain even

in the presence of the technical capabilities for it. In the event that delivering a coun-
terstrike proves impossible, strategic forces would be used in a retaliatory strike:
that is, strategic delivery vehicles would be launched after delivery systems and battle
management systems have been attacked by enemy nuclear systems. A retaliatory
strike is the least favorable option for the attacked side, which is why the require-
ments concerning the quantitative composition of strategic forces, the basing
methods and survivability of strategic delivery systems, and the stability of battle
management systems are based on the assumption of the need to secure retaliatory
capability.
The capability of inflicting a retaliatory strike is achieved primarily by securing
the invulnerability of strategic delivery systems and enhancing their hardness to the
destructive factors of a nuclear blast. The creation of an invulnerable system of
communications and battle management for strategic forces, capable of functioning
during a nuclear attack, plays a special role in securing retaliatory strike potential.
The invulnerability of delivery systems can be secured by means of their inde-
tectability and mobility, complicating or precluding the enemy's determination of
their locations. The indetectability of missile-armed submarines on combat patrol
at sea, for example, virtually precludes their destruction. The unknown locations of
land-based mobile missile systems on combat patrol also complicates their destruc-
tion considerably. On the other hand, since silo-based ballistic missiles are essen-
tially immobile, their invulnerability is secured by enhancing the hardness of the
systems to the destructive factors of a nuclear blast.
The warheads of strategic systems used in a retaliatory strike or counterstrike
have lower accuracy and yield requirements than those used in a first strike. By the
time an attack is detected, a considerable portion of potential strategic military
targets in the enemy's territory will have been activated, and their destruction would
therefore not affect the level of losses inflicted by the enemy in its first strike. The
main purpose of the retaliatory strike or counterstrike is thus the infliction of
assigned damage on the enemy. In this context, the main strike should be delivered
against so-called value targets: military-industrial and political-administrative
centers. It is important to remember, however, that only part of the strategic forces
of the enemy might be deployed in the first strike, and the destruction of military
facilities consequently should be included in the retaliatory mission. The yield of
warheads and the accuracy of delivery systems used in a retaliatory strike, there-
fore, can play an important role, even if the yield and accuracy of such systems in
not as crucial a factor as in a preemptive or counterstrike attack.
Planning
Plans for operations of strategic forces must include descriptions of specific options
for the use of strategic forces, the list of targets to be destroyed in each option, and
the forces and systems to be used in the attack. The plan of operations is based on
the principles of the state's military doctrine, embodied in the instructions issued to
strategic forces. When the plan of operations is being drawn up, however, the actual
capabilities of strategic forces are taken into account, and these can have a signifi-
cant impact on the methods selected for use of strategic forces and on the provi-
sions of military doctrine.
The choice of targets to be destroyed in a strategic strike depends on the goals
the strategic forces are expected to attain in each of the possible scenarios of their
use. As a result, the options for the use of strategic forces-the preemptive strike,
counterstrike, and retaliatory strike-differ in terms of the nature of the targets to
be destroyed and of the composition of systems to be used. Some options could
envisage the delivery of a limited strike, involving only part of the existing strate-
gic systems.
The strategic systems to be used in the delivery of a strike differ in terms of a
whole series of indicators, including the level of combat readiness, vulnerability,
retargeting capability, and counterforce potential (the ability to destroy hardened
point targets). All of these factors must be taken into account when the possibility
of using strategic delivery systems to destroy chosen targets is being assessed.
When the list of targets that can be destroyed within the confines of various
options for the use of strategic forces is being compiled, all possible targets are
subdivided into several categories: nuclear forces (including facilities for the pro-
duction of nuclear weapons), other military installations, political-administrative
centers, and military-industrial facilities. Within these categories, priority is assigned
to certain targets, which probably would include the silo missile launchers, key
command centers, and elements of the adversary's command, control, and commu-
nications system.
The destruction of a specific target necessitates the guaranteed delivery of a certain
number of warheads to the target with a yield and accuracy securing the assigned kill
probability. This kill probability depends on numerous factors, among which are the
characteristics of the target (its dimensions, the existence of information about its
location, and its hardness), the number of warheads delivered to the target, and the
yield of the warheads and accuracy of their delivery play the determining role.
The degree of a target's hardening is usually measured with the aid of the over-
pressure that must be created to destroy the target or disable it. 21 For the majority
56 Chapter 2
of urban structures the required overpressure is approximately 0.3 atmospheres,

and the overpressure required to destroy hardened silo launchers and command
centers can exceed 100 atmospheres. The determination of the effects of a nuclear
explosion on a target usually includes the calculation of the kill radius, which is
the maximum distance between the target and the nuclear explosion at which target
can be destroyed by the blast and which depends on the hardening of the target and
on the yield of the warhead."
The probability that the warhead's impact point will not deviate from the aiming
point by more than the target kill radius is measured by means of the accuracy of
the delivery system. The deviation of the warhead from the aiming point is gov-
erned by the pattern of normal circular distribution, which is generally described
by probable circular error (CEP): the radius of the circle within which the warhead
would land with a probability of 50 percent. The accuracy is sometimes measured
in terms of maximum error (ME), which is 2.3 times as great as CEP. A warhead
will land within a circle with a radius equal to maximum deviation with 99 percent
probability.23
The number of warheads required to destroy a hardened target depends on the
relationship between the kill radius and the maximum deviation that corresponds
to the accuracy of the delivery system. The number of warheads required to destroy
a hardened target rises quickly as delivery system accuracy declines. 24 Increasing
the yield of warheads can compensate for the lack of accuracy to some extent, but
this approach requires the use of extremely powerful weapons in the absence of
sufficient numbers of accurate delivery systemsP
The delivery accuracy rate is much less important in the destruction of soft area
targets. In this case the area within which enough excess pressure is generated to
destroy targets, can serve as the indicator of the warhead's kill capabilities. The use
of several lower-yield warheads instead of a single high-yield weapon can increase
the size of this area, as is desirable, for example, in an attack on the patrol zones
of mobile land-based missiles.
During the planning of a strategic strike, several circumstances must be taken into
account in addition to the list of targets and the number and yield of weapons
needed for their destruction. It is necessary, for example, to coordinate the target
destruction times with the amount of time required to deliver warheads by various
means. In addition, there could be a need for special weapons to penetrate enemy
defenses.
Specifically with respect to Russian military doctrine, the plan drawn up with a
view to all of the requirements made of strategic forces is reduced to a single doc-
ument: the "Plan of Operations of Strategic Nuclear Forces," which serves as the
basis for the objectives set for various elements of strategic forces and, eventually,
for the flight plans for specific delivery vehicles. The Plan of Operations lists the
specific targets of nuclear strikes and their possible combinations, corresponding to
different scenarios in the use of strategic forces. The Main Operations Directorate
of the General Staff plays the main role in drawing up the plan, enlisting the ser-
vices of specialized institutes of the Ministry of Defense and the operations direc-
torates of the main staffs of services of the armed forces.
Within the confines of each of the strategic strike options, the Plan of Operations
assigns to each service of the armed forces taking part in the strategic strike a list
of missions for the destruction of a specific set of targets. The operations direc-
torates of the main staffs of the services, working in conjunction with the General
Staff, then use this plan as a basis to determine the combination of forces, in terms
of the types and numbers of delivery systems, required to attain the objectives of
each of the approved options.
The services of the armed forces draw up assignments for their armies and fleets
with a view to the requirements of the Plan of Operations. The functions of the
operations directorates of the main staffs also include the coordination of the plans
for delivery vehicles of nuclear weapons. The units of the strategic nuclear forces-
rocket armies, fleets, and strategic air armies-are then responsible for maintaining
the assigned number of delivery vehicles in a state of combat readiness to secure the
attainment of their assigned objectives. The army-level units of strategic forces sub-
sequently use the requirements of the assigned level of combat readiness as the basis
for planning the combat duty of their subunits and for scheduling routine inspec-
tions and repairs.
Combat Duty
Combat duty is a means of maintaining the combat readiness of the troops expected
to attain the objectives specified in the Plan of Operations. The primary function
of the forces on combat duty consists in securing the possibility of inflicting the
assigned damage on the enemy under any conditions. The attainment of this objec-
tive requires keeping a significant portion of strategic delivery vehicles on alert,
securing the continuous operation of the early-warning system for the timely detec-
tion of an attack, and keeping the battle management system in a state capable of
guaranteeing compliance with the order for a strategic strike.
Silo-based missile systems constitute the basis of the strategic forces in a per-
manent state of alert. Mobile missile systems are also kept in a permanent state of
58 Chapter 2
readiness, some on combat patrol routes and others on alert in garrisons. Rail-based
systems are now on combat duty in garrisons, with periodic changes in their loca-
tions. Land- and rail-based mobile systems can be dispersed over a large area when
troops are placed on high alert.
Strategic missile-armed submarines can be on combat duty either on combat
patrol or in port, fully ready to launch missiles. All submarines not on combat patrol
or undergoing maintenance are on alert at naval stations. The Plan of Operations
stipulates that all missile-armed submarines must move from naval stations to
combat patrol routes at sea during a crisis.
Strategic bombers have the lowest level of combat readiness among all the
forces under normal conditions. Bombers on combat duty are not ready for takeoff
when there is no indication of imminent danger. Nuclear weapons are mounted
on bombers only when troops' alert status rises at a time of a crisis. In the event of
hostilities, the bombers do not fly combat patrol missions; at the maximum level
of their combat readiness, the bombers are fully armed and on the runway. To
raise their readiness further, the bombers can be scattered among several reserve
airfields.
In addition to strategic offensive systems, the units securing the detection of air
and missile attacks-the personnel of radar stations and satellites of the early-
warning system, as well as the ballistic missile defense corps and the radiotechnical
and antiaircraft missile troops-are also on permanent combat duty.
The distinctive features of the combat duty procedures of strategic forces and their
actions in response to orders are described in the chapters on the various elements
of the strategic forces, and the discussion in this chapter is therefore confined pri-
marily to the system for communications and battle management, which is intended
to secure the command and control of strategic forces and the transmission of the
order for the use of nuclear weapons.
In addition to securing the guaranteed transmission of an authorized order to use
nuclear weapons, the command and control system must perform the equally impor-
tant function of preventing the accidental or unauthorized use of strategic delivery
vehicles. Requirements for the controllability of strategic forces and for elimination
of the possibility of unauthorized launches are satisfied with the aid of the special
design of the command and control system. Under normal conditions, the opera-
tional features of the system preclude an order to use nuclear forces. In this mode,
the links of the chain of command for the transmission of the order and authoriz-
ing codes for the launching of delivery vehicles and the activation of missile warhead
detonation systems are disengaged. This structure of the command and control
system precludes the accidental transmission of the launch command or the deliv-
ery of an unauthorized command. The use of the command and control system to
transmit an authorized order for launch of nuclear weapons is discussed in the next
section.
Use of Strategic Nuclear Forces

Virtually any scenario involving the use of strategic nuclear forces implies that
the decision to use them will be preceded by a serious international crisis that
could reach the stage of an armed conflict involving conventional arms or tactical
nuclear weapons. Therefore, plans for the use of strategic forces and the procedures
for the delivery of a strategic strike are based on the assumption that each side
will be able to put strategic forces and battle management systems on high
alert. 26
The only scenario that does not include exercising this capability is a surprise
strategic nuclear strike. The probability of an unprovoked nuclear strike was
minimal even when relations between the Soviet Union and the United States were
characterized by extreme tension. Nevertheless, the structure of strategic forces,
their operations, and the structure of the battle management system were designed
to secure the capability for a strategic strike even under the most unfavorable case
of a surprise nuclear attack.
If the development of a particular crisis situation suggests that a strategic nuclear
strike might be delivered by any side in the conflict, strategic forces can be put on
high alert. High-alert status can increase the survivability of strategic systems
and the stability of command and control systems considerably. In particula~
after this higher state of readiness has been declared, land- and rail-based mobile
missile systems can be dispersed, missile-armed submarines in port can be sent out
to sea, and bombers can be loaded with nuclear weapons. Measures to enhance
the stability of command and control systems may include the activation of
reserve command centers and reserve communication channels and the deployment
of mobile relay stations for the transmission of commands to submarines and
bombers.
The establishment of communications between the military leadership and the
national leadership and the engagement of the Supreme High Command mechanism
would be essential in the enhancement of the capability of the command and control
system to withstand an attack. This would entail, among other measures, the arrival
60 Chapter 2
of the supreme commander at the central or reserve command center and his offi-
cial assumption of the command of the armed forces. In this case the General Staff
would be the executive body of the Supreme High Command. Putting the troops
on high alert probably would be accompanied by the transfer of the battle man-
agement system from regular combat duty to combat mode. The supreme com-
mander could then use the command and control system to give the necessary orders
for a nuclear strike.
The determination of the necessary level of readiness of the troops and the choice
of the specific steps to raise this level should be based on an analysis of the current
situation and the plans drawn up in advance. The declaration of the high-alert status
is a potentially destabilizing move because it can be interpreted as a signal of the
willingness to use strategic force and could escalate a crisis or conflict, and this is
an important consideration in making the decision to move to high alert. For this
reason, the institution of these measures probably would require an order from
the supreme commander and should be preceded by a thorough analysis of the
possible consequences of this move. Some of the steps required to raise the level of
readiness could also be taken on orders from the General StaffP
A surprise strategic strike would eliminate any opportunity to raise the level of
readiness of the armed forces. Consequently, if a strategic strike should become
necessary under those conditions, all missions would have to be undertaken by the
forces that were already on alert at the time of the attack. Nevertheless, even this
would entail efforts to disperse the troops, so that they could serve as the basis for
a reserve force in the delivery of a retaliatory strike. In addition, measures to enhance
the stability of the command, control, and communications system following a
surprise attack would increase the feasibility of a retaliatory strike.
After the strategic forces have been put on high alert in response to a crisis
situation, the need to deliver a strategic strike must be addressed with a view to that
situation and the development of the crisis or conflict. The main strategic option
envisaged in Soviet military doctrine was the delivery of the counterstrike or launch-
on-warning strike. The decision to use nuclear weapons would thus be made
only in response to the delivery of a nuclear strike against the USSR.2S The
counterstrike is also the main option envisaged in Russian military doctrine.
The provisions of Russian military doctrine, however, specifically envisage the
possibility of delivering a first strike. In particular, the delivery of a first strike can
be considered, under Russian military doctrine, in the case of an attack on key ele-
ments of the early warning system or the command, control, and communications
system. 29
The principal event determining the need to deliver a strategic nuclear strike,
therefore, is the start of an attack by an enemy. The determination that an enemy
has initiated a is made based on the detection of launches of ballistic missiles aimed
at national territory. The Russian missile attack early-warning system can record
launches of ICBMs from u.s. territory and launches of SLBMs from certain parts
of the world's oceans. The "missile attack" signal is transmitted from the command
center of the early-warning system to the central air defense command post and the
central command post of the General Staff.
The "missile attack" signal generated by the space-based early-warning system
probably would have to be confirmed at the central command post of the Air
Defense Forces and the central command post of the General Staff. If the number
of indications of an attack were to exceed a certain minimum, confirmation of the
signal might not be required, and it might be transmitted automatically to the
highest levels of the command and control system. The duty officers of the corre-
sponding command posts would then use all available information, including early-
warning satellite imagery, to assess the signal's credibility. In addition, a report of
the detected event would be sent to the Krokus terminals of the highest military
officers, which would display information about the scale of the possible attack and
the projected impact area of the warheads. The military command would then use
this information to assess the credibility of the signal and the scale of the possible
threat.
The "missile attack" signal generated by the space-based early-warning system
probably would playa more important role in a surprise attack. In that case, this
signal would activate the Kazbek communications system, with terminals in the
offices of the supreme commande~ the minister of defense, and the chief of General
Staff, and would facilitate the transfer of the battle management system from regular
combat duty to combat mode. (If this status change has been effected in advance,
for example, in response to a crisis, the satellite signal may not play such a signifi-
cant role.) In any of the possible scenarios, the supreme commander would have to
make decisions about further action on the recommendations of the minister of
defense and chief of General Staff after the warning of the possible attack has been
transmitted. In the event of a surprise attack, the equipment of the Kazbek system
would be used to establish direct communications between the supreme comman-
der and the military leadership and to transmit all of the supreme commander's
orders and commands.
It is precisely during this stage that the decision would be made to put strategic
forces in a full state of readiness. If this decision were made, the supreme
62 Chapter 2
commander would issue a so-called preliminary command, which is necessary for

further actions that could lead to the delivery of a strategic strike. During the exe-
cution of the preliminary command, all of the links of the battle management system
would be connected, so that the system would be ready to transmit the main
launch command and the launch authorization codes, if necessary. As noted in the
last section, because of safeguards built into the system, the command to launch
delivery vehicles for a nuclear attack probably could not be issued without the
execution of the preliminary command.
If the troops were transferred to the high-alert status, the preliminary command
could be issued even in the absence of a signal from the early-warning system.
In this case, the preliminary command, which still could be issued only by the
supreme commander, could be carried out at the same time as the measures to
raise the level of readiness. The decision to issue the preliminary command
before an actual incoming attack probably would be made on the basis of an
analysis of the situation. As noted earlier, when the preliminary command was
executed by the personnel on alert and all of the duty crews, measures would be
taken to guarantee the execution of a main launch command if one were to be
issued.
One of the distinctive features of the system for the command and control
of strategic forces in the Soviet Union was that the supreme commander could
issue the order to launch strategic vehicles and the authorizing codes only after
the transmission of a "missile attack" signal from the early-warning system.
In the absence of this signal, the order to launch strategic vehicles could not
be given. The system was set up in this way probably to eliminate the possibility
of an erroneous decision to launch a strategic strike. This arrangement, however,
did not and does not exclude the possibility of a first strike, as described
below.
The "missile attack" signal is transmitted after the space-based early-warning
system has detected ballistic missile launches by the enemy and the early-warning
radars have confirmed those launches. Radar detection and tracking of targets is
required to confirm the attack. Because the space-based early warning system does
not register missile launches from all possible launch sites, a "missile attack" signal
can be transmitted even if it is based only on data reported by radars. In that case,
the criteria for the reliable identification of targets could be somewhat stricter
and the tracking time somewhat longer than for missile launches detected directly
by the satellite system.
After receiving the "missile attack" signal, the supreme commander would make
decisions, relying on the recommendations of the minister of defense and chief of
General Staff, on whether to deliver a strategic strike and, if so, on the specific type
of strike to be delivered. Information transmitted by the early-warning system on
the probable number of attacking missiles and the main regions to be attacked
would be used to assess the potential scale of the attack. If the supreme com-
mander were not in one of the command posts of the highest command and control
link the decision to deliver a strategic strike had to be made, he would have to use
his Kazbek terminal to transmit the preliminary command and the launch order.
The supreme commander's order would be transmitted to the central command
post of the General Staff, which would then issue the launch order to be transmit-
ted through the chain of command to the strategic delivery vehicles. The launch
order, which would include a unique code to confirm its authenticity, as well as the
code of the chosen mode of operations and the release codes, would be sent through
the chain of command of the battle management system and numerous backup
communication channels to the missile launchers and to the relay stations trans-
mitting the order and the authorizing codes to missile-armed submarines and
bombers.
As discussed above, the command and control system is set up so that a "missile
attack" signal is required to enable the order for a strategic launch to be given
and the authorization codes to be transmitted. Since in the case of a first strike,
the early-warning system would not register an enemy attack (because one was
not occurring) and would not transmit such a signal, the "missile attack" signal
required for the issuance of the launch command would have to be generated man-
ually at the central command post. In the event of a decision to deliver a first strike,
the supreme commander and the minister of defense would order this signal to be
generated. This arrangement enables the military leadership to prevent a situation
in which the decision to deliver a first strike is made by the supreme commander
alone.
A launch-on-warning counterstrike puts exceptionally high demands on the
readiness of troops and on the stability and reliability of the command and
control system. As noted above, in the event of a surprise attack, the country's top
leaders will have only a few minutes to assess the situation and choose a response.
The possibility of delivering a launch-on-warning or retaliatory strike could
be threatened if key elements of the command, control, and communications
system are attacked during the early stages of a conflict. The highly centralized
64 Chapter 2
decision-making mechanism that was a distinctive feature of the command and

control system in the Soviet Union could also preclude a launch-on-warning or retal-
iatory strike if the central command post and the top leadership are eliminated.
To guarantee the capability of delivering a retaliatory strike, the battle manage-
ment system envisages the possibility of issuing an order to use nuclear weapons
and the authorization codes in the absence of a direct command from the supreme
commander. This requires the fulfillment of several conditions, however. First of all,
the equipment of the battle management system must confirm the absence of com-
munications with the supreme commander. Second, the nuclear attack identification
system, which apparently includes various detectors recording seismic signals and
other effects of nuclear explosions, must record nuclear explosions within national
territory. Third, the supreme commander must have given preliminary authoriza-
tion to deliver this type of retaliatory strike to the central or reserve command center.
This authorization probably would be issued at a fairly early stage of the conflict,
most probably at the same time as the preliminary command put strategic forces in
a state of maximum readiness. If all of these conditions are fulfilled, the central
command center or the reserve command center can launch strategic vehicles using
its own authorizing codes.
The problem of the vulnerability of the central command center and the top lead-
ership is also solved by deploying a network of reserve command centers, which
could deliver a retaliatory strike if necessary. In particula~ airborne and rail-based
mobile command centers could be deployed in times of crisis. If there is enough
time, members of the top leadership could also move to a hardened central
command station in the Moscow region.
In addition, the Soviet Union began contruction of a reserve command station of
the General Staff, a superhardened command center in the Yamantau Mountain.
Located underground, this command center is intended to secure the control of the
strategic forces after the destruction of the main command centers. 30 It is quite pos-
sible that this command center is supposed to take the necessary steps to deliver a
retaliatory strike if the top leadership is eliminated.
In addition to securing the possibility of issuing the order to use strategic force,
the battle management system must provide the possibility of transmitting the
order to the delivery systems of the nuclear weapons. The possibility of delivering
a retaliatory strike is highly dependent on the existence of reliable communications,
because the central command center of the command and control system and
the lines of communication must continue to be operable even under the effects
of enemy nuclear weapons. It is highly probable, however, that the destruction of
elements of the command and control system, which would be among the first
targets of the attack, could also complicate the delivery of a launch-on-warning
strike.
The stability of the communications system is secured with the aid of numerous
backup channels and the use of a variety of devices and frequencies to transmit
orders. The stability of this system can also be enhanced considerably by using satel-
lite communication channels and by deploying mobile relay stations, including
airborne stations, that can escape destruction during an attack and secure the trans-
mission of the use signal and the authorization codes to ICBM launchers,
submarines, and strategic bombers.
One of the reserve communication channels created in the Soviet Union is the
Perimeter system, which has been integrated into the battle management system. 31
The Perimeter system includes command rockets for the transmission of commands
directly to strategic missile launchers. After the appropriate command has been
received by the Perimeter system command post, the command rockets would take
off and transmit the launch order and authorization codes continuously in flight
over the missile position areas for a period ranging from 20 to 50 minutes. This
signal would make the launch of delivery vehicles possible even if all other lines of
communication between the launcher and the outside world have been damaged.
Silo missiles could be launched automatically, without any participation by the
combat duty personnel of the regimental command station. The relay stations trans-
mitting commands to submarines and bombers probably can also receive the signal
from the command rockets of the Perimeter system, and the submarines and
bombers probably can receive the signal directly as well.
A distinctive feature of the Perimeter system is the possibility of activating it
before a nuclear attack is detected. When the system was being designed, it was
assumed that the supreme commander might issue the command to activate it after
a warning of the first signs of a nuclear attack. According to the original plan, later
rejected, if the command station of the Perimeter system was activated in advance
and did not receive an order to stop the combat algorithm within a certain period
of time, the launch of the command rockets and the transmission of the order to
deliver a retaliatory strike would be automatic. This was supposed to guarantee the
delivery of a retaliatory strike in the event of the elimination of the top leadership
while reserving the possibility of the cancellation of the order in the event of a false
signal.
By all indications, the Perimeter system was never deployed in the configuration
that allowed such an automatic launch of the command rockets. The decision to
66 Chapter 2
deploy the system took into account the chance that the work of the combat algo-
rithm could not be stopped and that the operation of the system in the automatic
mode would therefore be potentially dangerous. At this time the Perimeter system
is supposed to serve as a reserve communication channel, and the command rockets
can be launched by a human order either from the central command center or from
one of the reserve command centers, in accordance with the regular procedure for
a retaliatory strike. The guaranteed launch feature of the Perimeter system may have
been one of the functions reserved for the super hardened command center.
3
The Nuclear Weapons Production Complex
The History of Nuclear Weapons Development
Early Developments in Nuclear Physics

The first studies of radioactive materials in Russia were organized by Academician
V. I. Vernadsky in the early 1900s.' At the time, the main effort was to explore
deposits of radioactive materials in Central Asia and Siberia. After the October 1917
revolution, a dozen or so scientific centers continued research of radioactive mate-
rials and their properties. The State Institute of Roentgenology and Radiology in
Petrograd (now SI. Petersburg) became the principal research center in the area of
radioactivity. The institute was split in November 1921. The Department of Physics
and Technology, established in 1918 on A. F. Ioffe's initiative, became the Institute
of Physics and Technology (later renamed the Leningrad Institute of Physics and
Technology, or LPTI). Ioffe was the first director of the new institute. In January
1922, the remainder of the Institute of Roentgenology became the Radium Institute
of the Academy of Science (RIAN).
In 1932, with Ioffe's support, a special research group was established in the LPTI
to conduct research in nuclear physics. By 1934, four LPTI departments (directed
by I. V. Kurchatov, A. I. Alikhanov, L. A. Artsimovich, and D. V. Skobeltsin)
were conducting research in nuclear physics. At the same time, Academicians V. I.
Vernadsky and V. G. Khlopin were establishing a national school of radiochemistry
and analytical chemistry in the Radium Institute.
In 1934, as the Academy of Sciences was being relocated from Leningrad to
Moscow, the Lebedev Institute of Physics was established and became a primary
center of nuclear physics in Moscow. Another large nuclear research center, the
Ukrainian (later Kharkov) Institute of Physics and Technology (UPTI/KhPTI), was
established by K. D. Sinelnikov in Kharkov early in 1931.
68 Chapter 3
The expansion of the nuclear research base allowed Soviet scientists to follow
major international discoveries in nuclear physics. In the 1930s, Soviet scientists
were active in such areas as nuclear fission, physics of the atomic nucleus, and inter-
actions of neutrons with matter. In 1932, scientists in the Ukrainian Institute of
Physics and Technology repeated the Cockroft-Walton experiment in which a
nucleus of lithium was fissioned by charged particles accelerated in a high-voltage
linear accelerator. In 1939, Ya. I. Frenkel, the head of the LPTI's theoretical depart-
ment, proposed the droplet model of an atomic nucleus and formulated funda-
mentals of the theory of fission of heavy nuclei. In 1940, N. N. Semenov, Ya. B.
Zeldovich, and Yu. B. Khariton, who were working in the Institute of Chemical
Physics in Moscow, developed a theory of a chain reaction in uranium. In the LPTI,
which had become the coordinating center for research in nuclear fission, G. N.
Flerov and L. I. Rusinov, independently of Western researchers, discovered that a
fission of uranium releases from two to four neutrons. In 1940, G. N. Flerov and
K. A. Petrzhak discovered spontaneous fission of uranium.
In July 1940, the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences established the Commis-
sion on the Uranium Problem, headed by academician V. G. Khlopin. 2 The com-
mission was tasked with developing a program and organizing research in the areas
of fission, separation of uranium isotopes, and self-sustaining nuclear reactions.
The presidium also resolved to construct new and modernize the existing Soviet
cyclotron facilities and to conduct a geological survey of uranium deposits in Central
Asia.
The Beginning of the Nuclear Program

By the end of 1940 the Department of Scientific and Technical Intelligence of NKVD
(the Soviet security and intelligence service) had begun to target nuclear develop-
ments in Great Britain, France, and Germany. By October 1941, NKVD had
obtained a copy of at least one of the two reports prepared by the Maud Commit-
tee of Great Britain analyzing the feasibility of military use of nuclear energy and
providing recommendations on initiating a nuclear weapons program. 3
When the Soviet Union entered World War II in 1941, however, nuclear research
stopped, and scientists were redirected to work in support of the war effort. This
situation did not change until late 1942 or early 1943, when the flow of foreign
intelligence forced the issue of an atomic project back on the agenda. In a March
1942 letter to I. V. Stalin, L. P. Beria, chief of the secret service, recommended
showing the intelligence data to Soviet scientists and starting a nuclear weapons
project in the Soviet Union. 4 On February 11, 1943, after consultations with
The Nuclear Weapons Production Complex 69
scientists, the State Defense Committee made a decision to initiate a nuclear energy
R&D program and to establish Laboratory No. 2 for this purpose. Kurchatov
became the program's science director and director of Laboratory No. 2.5 V. M.
Molotov was given oversight responsibility for the program at the Politburo level.
According to the initial plans, Laboratory No.2 was to design a nuclear reactor
to demonstrate the feasibility of a nuclear chain reaction and to develop techniques
of uranium isotope separation. In the spring of 1943, following Kurchatov's analy-
sis of intelligence data revealing the importance of plutonium as a nuclear weapons
arsenal, the research agenda was expanded to include the production of plutonium
and the study of its properties. 6 Laboratory No.2 began a study of plutonium
production in graphite-moderated and heavy-water-moderated reactors. Simultane-
ously, the Radium Institute began research on the physical and chemical properties
of plutonium, which was produced in microgram quantities in a cyclotron.
Despite these efforts, the scale of the program remained limited because of insuf-
ficient resources, bureaucratic and interagency obstacles, and the assumption that
the development of a practical nuclear explosive device was not feasible in the
foreseeable future. As of April 1944, Laboratory No.2 employed only 83 people,
and of those, only 25 were scientists.
The Beginning of the Nuclear Weapons Program

The 16 July 1945 nuclear test in the United States and the atomic bombings of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki on 6 and 9 August 1945 gave a new impetus to the Soviet
nuclear program. On 20 August 1945 the State Defense Committee passed a reso-
lution to establish a Special Committee on the Atomic Problem. Beria, who became
the chairman of the special committee, was given overall oversight responsibility for
the Soviet nuclear program. Decree No. 2227-567 of the Sovnarkom (the Council
of People's Commissars), dated 29 August 1945, established the First Main
Directorate (Pervoye Glavnoye Upravleniye, or PGU) of the Council of People's
Commissars to administer and manage the program. The PGU was to report directly
to the Politburo. The People's Commissar of Munitions, B. L. Vannikov, became the
PGU's first chairman. The organization spent its first six months developing the
PGU's organizational structure and selecting personnel. On 9 April 1946 the Council
of Ministers formally approved its structure. Simultaneously, the PGU received
unlimited access to materiel and personnel resources.
Many research institutes and design bureaus were involved in the nuclear weapons
development project. Laboratory No.2 was the leading institute in the area of
fissile material production. On 25 December 1946 the first experimental graphite-
70 Chapter 3
moderated reactor, designated F-1 (Physics-1) and called a "boiler," was brought
into operation in the laboratory. Kurchatov and V. S. Fursov supervised the design
work on and construction of the reactor. The F-l reactor allowed Soviet scientists
to research the issues of purity of graphite and uranium, to optimize the location
of fuel channels within the reactor, and to work on instrumentation and control
systems. The results were directly applicable to the design and construction of the
first industrial-scale plutonium production reactor, the design work on which began
as early as the summer of 1945.
In parallel with the work on the plutonium production reactor, Khlopin's group
in the Radium Institute was conducting theoretical and experimental research in
plutonium radiochemistry. The results of these efforts were presented in a technical
report at the PGU's Scientific and Technical Council on 20 May 1946. The report,
known as the "Blue Book," described the fundamentals of the processes of separa-
tion of plutonium from irradiated uranium fuel. It made it possible to start in 1947
the construction of an industrial radiochemical complex to produce plutonium:
Combine 817 in Chelyabinsk-40 (usually referred to as Chelyabinsk-65, the name
it received around 1990).7
In 1943, research on uranium-processing technologies began in the State Institute
of Rare Metals (Giredmet) under the guidance of Z. V. Ershova. In 1944, the insti-
tute produced the USSR's first slug of uranium metal. In 1945, howeve~ uranium
research was transferred to the newly formed Institute of Special Metals (NII-9).8
Under the guidance of V. B. Shevchenko, the NII-9 immediately began research on
uranium deposits, uranium extraction, and production of uranium metal. The tech-
nologies of uranium production and fabrication of uranium metal fuel elements for
the F-1 reactor were also developed at Machine-Building Plant 12 in Electrostal near
Moscow.
The NII-9 was also developing an industrial-scale technology to separate pluto-
nium and residual uranium from irradiated uranium fuel elements. The separation
technology was subsequently applied at Combine 817. The NII-9's Department V,
headed by A. A. Bochvar, was researching physical and chemical properties of
plutonium and developing technologies of plutonium metallurgy and machining.
Soviet scientists were working in parallel on plutonium production and uranium
enrichment technologies. 9 The production of highly enriched uranium, however, was
slowed by technical difficulties, and the USSR's first nuclear explosive device was
therefore based on a plutonium core.
Plutonium for the first device was produced at Combine 817. The Chelyabinsk-
40 complex, consisting of a production reactor (Reactor A), a radiochemical
facility (Plant B), and a chemical and metallurgical facility (Plant V), provided for
a complete cycle of plutonium production and processing. E. P. Slavsky and I. V.
Kurchatov were Chelyabinsk-40's first director and science directo~ respectively. Its
first plutonium production reactor went on line in June 1948. By 22 December 1948
the first batch of irradiated uranium elements was being loaded into the dissolver
of the radiochemical plant. On 26 February 1949, the first batch of plutonium was
produced. This plutonium was transferred to the chemical and metallurgical plant,
where it was converted to plutonium metal and shaped into weapons components:
two nickel-plated plutonium hemispheres. From Chelyabinsk-40, the plutonium
components were shipped to Design Bureau 11 (KB-11) for assembly into the first
Soviet nuclear bomb.
The First Soviet Nuclear Explosion

The design and engineering work on the first Soviet nuclear bomb took place in
Design Bureau 11 (KB-11),lO established in April 1946 specifically for this purpose
(though actual work in the KB-11 did not begin until the spring of 1947 when the
construction of the initial research facilities was completed).ll P. M. Zernov and Yu.
B. Khariton were the KB-11 's first director and chief designer, respectively. Initially,
Soviet scientists pursued both implosion- and gun-type designs. By mid-1948,
however, the latter project was dropped because gun-type devices were found to
have a relatively low efficiency,12
The KB-11 was working in the following two principal areas: (1) research in
physical processes taking place in a nuclear explosive device, as well as design of
an explosive device and fusing and firing systems, and (2) design of a gravity bomb
casing to accommodate the explosive device. The research was carried out in the
KB-11's Scientific Research Sector (NIS), and all design activities were initially con-
centrated in the Scientific Design Sector (NKS), headed by V. A. Turbiner. The prin-
cipal R&D work in the KB-11 included research on detonation of high explosives
and development of explosive lenses, development of diagnostic techniques for high-
speed processes, research on mechanical properties of plutonium and uranium,
research on and calculation of nuclear parameters and critical masses, design
of a neutron initiator, and design of a nuclear explosive device and a bomb.13
In October 1948, the Scientific Design Sector was divided into two sectors. The
NKS-1 (headed by N. L. Dukhov) was given responsibility for designing a nuclear
explosive device and a bomb. The NKS-2 (headed by V. I. Alferov) became respon-
sible for automation and fusing and firing systems. Khariton retained overall
oversight responsibility for the bomb development project.
72 Chapter 3
Research institutes and design bureaus of other ministries and agencies partici-
pated in the nuclear bomb development project as well. For example, the Institute
of Chemical Physics of the Academy of Sciences was conducting theoretical and
computational research to optimize the metallic core of the warhead, to determine
properties of spherically converging detonation waves, and to study the physics of
a nuclear explosion. The institute also was developing techniques and equipment to
measure detonation waves. Design bureaus and institutes of other ministries were
working on various automatic components and control equipment. 14 The bomb
development project relied heavily on foreign intelligence information about the U.S.
nuclear weapons programY
By the summer of 1949, all physics and engineering problems with respect to the
Soviet nuclear bomb had been resolved, the weapon design was finalized, and the
development of manufacturing technologies was completed. The KB-11 had finished
nonnuclear testing of the warhead and the bomb and their components. In April
1949, a group headed by Khariton and K. I. Shchelkin, was established in the
KB-l1 to prepare and carry out a nuclear test. A special government commission
selected a test site in the Semipalatinsk area in Kazakhstan, and on 10 August 1949
the site was accepted for use. After three trial runs on 14, 18, and 22 August, on
29 August 1949 the first Soviet nuclear explosive device RDS-1 was successfully
tested at a yield of 22 kilotons.16
Advances in Nuclear Warhead Development

The RDS-1 was essentially a carbon copy of the U.S. bomb Fat ManY One year
before the August 1949 test, howeve~ in parallel with the RDS-1 project, designers
in Arzamas-16 had already begun to work on advanced designs of nuclear weapons.
Their effort was focused on increasing the bomb's efficiency (decreasing the amount
of fissile materials) and yield and reducing its weight and size. A fully indigenous
device, RDS-2, was tested on 24 September 1951. An improved system of explo-
sive lenses allowed the designers to double the yield of the RDS-2 relative to the
RDS-1 and simultaneously to reduce its size and weightY Within an interval of less
than a month, on 18 October 1951, the RDS-3, the first Soviet bomb to be dropped
from an aircraft, was tested, producing a yield of 41.2 kilotons,19 The RDS-3 design
incorporated a composite uranium-plutonium pit. 20 The RDS-3T, a modernized
version of the RDS-3, became the USSR's first mass-produced atomic bomb. In
1953, it was assigned to Long-Range Aviation.
On 23 August 1953 the Soviet Union tested the RDS-4 device, also known as
Tatyana. Compared to the RDS-3, its size and weight were reduced by one third
and a factor of three, respectively. The USSR's first tactical bomb, which had a yield
of 30 kilotons and was based on the RDS-4, became available for deployment with
the tactical aviation in 1954 and remained in service until 1966. Late~ the device
also was used in warheads of strategic missile systems.21
In 1952 the KB-ll took an important step in improving the performance of
nuclear weapons when it developed an external impulse tube neutron initiator.22
The design for this initiator eliminated the need for frequent replacement typical of
internally located, polonium-210-beryllium initiators. It also made it possible to
optimize the timing of the initiation of the chain reaction, thereby increasing the
yield by a factor of 1.5-1.7. For example, the RDS-3I, which was an RDS-3 with
an external neutron initiator, was tested on 23 October 1953 with a yield of
62 kilotons.
Tactical (including low-yield) designs were another area of rapid advances. In
1955, at the newly established Navy's test site at Novaya Zemlya, a compact
RDS-9 type device was tested at a yield of five kilotons.23 Subsequently the RDS-9
device was mated with the T-5 torpedo that was assigned to the Navy. In 1956,
Soviet designers completed the development of a concept for a nuclear artillery
shell.24 The first tactical missile warhead, with a yield of up to 10 kilotons, entered
the stockpile in 1960 and remained in service until 1967.25 The implementation of
a tactical weapons program adopted by the Soviet government in 1954 provided
the Soviet military with a range of theater systems, including nuclear-armed land-
based tactical missiles, air defense systems, and cruise missiles.26
The Development of Thermonuclear Weapons

The idea of thermonuclear weapons was initially proposed in the Soviet Union
in 1946 by Ya. B. Zeldovich, I. Yu. Pomeranchuk, and Yu. B. Khariton in "The
Use of Atomic Energy of Light Elements." Council of Ministers Resolution No.
1989-773cc/op of 10 June 1948 established a working group in the Institute of
Physics of the Academy of Sciences to conduct a feasibility study regarding a hydro-
gen bomb. The group, headed by I. E. Tamm, included A. D. Sakharov, S. Z.
Belen'kiy, V. L. Ginzburg, and Yu. A. Romanov. Another group, headed by Ya. B.
Zeldovich, was established in the KB-11.
Tamm's group proposed a thermonuclear device in which a fission bomb would
detonate a cylindrical configuration of liquid deuterium-tritium fuel. The Zeldovich
group proposed a spherical design in which a spherical layer of liquid deuterium
would be placed between fissile materials and high explosives of an implosion
nuclear bomb. Subsequent calculations, however, demonstrated that in neither
74 Chapter 3
design would a nuclear explosion generate sufficient deuterium densities and tem-
peratures to initiate a thermonuclear reaction. Sakharov and Ginzburg proposed
two important modifications that alleviated the problem somewhat.27 Sakharov pro-
posed surrounding thermonuclear fuel with uranium-238. Heavy nuclei of uranium-
238 would slow down the disassembly of the light-nucleus fuel, thereby facilitating
the thermonuclear reaction. Such a design would also increase the total yield of
the device through fission of uranium-238 by fast neutrons generated by the ther-
monuclear reaction. Ginzburg suggested using lithium-6 deuteride instead of liquid
deuterium,'8 which simplified the design. Also, because the temperature threshold
for the tritium-deuterium reaction is considerably lower than that for the deuterium-
deuterium reaction, the breeding of tritium in a reaction of lithium-6 with neutrons
made it easier to initiate the thermonuclear reaction.
The formal decision to undertake a full-scale project to develop thermonuclear
weapons was made on 26 February 1951. The first Soviet thermonuclear device was
based on the ideas of Sakharov and Ginzburg. Its weaponized version, "Device 6c,"
was tower tested, with a yield of 400 kilotons, on 12 August 1953. Thermonuclear
reactions accounted for approximately 15-20 percent of the yield. 29
In 1954, the KB-ll's theoretical scientists," including A. D. Sakharov and Yu. A.
Trutnev, proposed a new thermonuclear design based on the "third idea," which
was similar to the Ulam-Teller idea. 31 In the new design, a thermonuclear secondary
(thermonuclear fuel) and a nuclear primary (fission bomb) were separated from each
other physically in the device. Heating and compression of the secondary were
achieved by X-ray radiation produced in the primary nuclear explosion. The first
thermonuclear bomb, designated RDS-37 and based on the "third idea," was suc-
cessfully tested on 22 November 1955. It was dropped from a Tu-16 bomber and
produced a yield of 1.7 megatons. 32 In the late 1950s, the Soviet Union developed
a family of new thermonuclear weapons based on the RDS-37 design that had a
vastly improved yield-to-weight ratio."
The Nuclear-Industrial Complex
The increasing complexity and magnitude of the tasks faced by the Soviet nuclear
program soon made its original organizational structure inadequate for handling
them. The accelerated production of nuclear warheads required scaling up the pro-
duction of fissile materials. Under Council of Ministers Resolution No. 5744-2162
(27 December 1949), the uranium production industry was transferred from the
PGU to the newly established Second Main Directorate. To manage civilian nuclear
activities, the Third Main Directorate was also established at this time.
The death of Stalin in March 1953 caused major changes in the life of the
nation and directly affected the nuclear program. On 26 June 1953 the Ministry of
Medium Machine Building (Minsredmash) was formed from the Second Main
Directorate," and in July 1953, it absorbed the First and Third Main Directorates
of the Council of Ministers. On 24 July 1957, after multiple changes in the
ministry's leadership, the title of the Minister of Medium Machine Building was
given to E. P. Slavsky, who continued to manage the Soviet nuclear complex until
November 1986. 35
On 13 March 1963 Minsredmash was renamed the State Industrial Committee
for Medium Machine Building, but on 2 March 1965 the name "Ministry" was
restored. On 11 September 1989, in the course of the restructuring conducted in
the aftermath of the Chernobyl disaster with the purpose of consolidating controls
over various branches of the nuclear industry, Minsredmash and the Ministry
of Atomic Energy, which was created in 1986 to manage civilian nuclear power
plants, were merged to create the Ministry of Atomic Energy and Industry of
the USSR. On 29 January 1992, following the dissolution of the USSR, the
ministry was restructured to become the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the
Russian Federation (Minatom). As of April 2001, the ministry was headed by
A. Yu. Rumyantsev.
At the time of its creation Minatom comprised approximately 150 production
facilities and research institutes and employed one million people. It is responsible
for Russia's defense nuclear programs, its program of commercial nuclear power,
and fundamental and applied research. The nuclear programs are supported by the
construction, machine-building, and device-building industries. The ministry has its
own education and training institutes, export organizations and banks, and social
infrastructure.
Minatom's headquarters are organized to form a number of main directorates
(currently departments), concerns, and committees. Three main directorates manage
the warhead production complex. The production and processing of fissile materi-
als for weapons take place at facilities of the Fourth Main Directorate (production
reactors, radiochemical and isotope enrichment facilities, currently the Fuel Cycle
Department). Weapons R&D and stockpile surveillance is the responsibility of
institutes of the Fifth Main Directorate (now the Department of Nuclear Weapons
Development and Testing). Facilities of the Sixth Main Directorate (now the
76 Chapter 3
Department of Nuclear Weapons Production) are responsible for the mass produc-
tion and dismantlement of nuclear warheads. AO TVEL (formerly the Third Main
Directorate, which had the responsibility for manufacturing reactor fuel), the 16th
Main Directorate (nuclear reactor development), the Main Scientific and Technical
Directorate (which includes the Institute of Inorganic Materials, Institute of Physics
and Power Engineering, and others) and other Minatom units also playa signifi-
cant role in the defense programs. The Science and Technology Council and the
Ministerial Collegium (Council) develop Minatom's policy in the area of science and
technology.
At its prime in the early 1980s, the Soviet nuclear weapons production complex
had an extensive research and production infrastructure, the most important ele-
ments of which were located in 10 closed cities (closed administrative-territorial
units, or ZATOs) listed in table 3.1. The institutes in Arzamas-16 and Chelyabinsk-
70 were the principal nuclear weapons design centers responsible for weapons
R&D and life cycle science support of nuclear weapons. The Institute of Automat-
ics also was involved in designing weapons and nonnuclear components of nuclear
warheads. Fissile materials for weapons were produced by five facilities (combines).
Table 3.1
Minatom's closed cities
Traditional name New name Nuclear weapons activities
Arzamas-16 Sarov nuclear weapons R&D, serial production of

nuclear weapons
Chelyabinsk-70 Snezrunsk nuclear weapons R&D
Sverdlovsk-45 Lesnoy serial production of nuclear weapons
Penza-19 Zaredmy serial production of nuclear weapons
Zlatoust-36 Trekhgorny serial production of nuclear weapons
Chelyabinsk-65 Ozersk plutonium production, production of HEU,
plutonium, and tritium components of nuclear
warheads
Tomsk-7 Seversk plutonium production, HEU production,
production of HEU and plutoniwn components of
nuclear warheads
Krasnoyarsk-26 Zheleznogorsk plutonium production
Krasnoyarsk-45 Zelenogorsk HEU production
Sverdlovsk-44 Novouralsk HEU production
Source: T. Cochran, S. Norris, and o. Bukharin, Making the Russian Bomb: From Stalin to
Yeltsin (Westview, 1995), p. 94.
The production combines in Chelyabinsk-65, Tomsk-7, and Krasnoyarsk-26

produced weapons-grade plutonium. The enrichment plants in Sverdlovsk-44,
Krasnoyarsk-45, and Tomsk-7 produced highly enriched uranium (HEU). (The
fourth enrichment plant in Angarsk, although a part of the integrated enrichment
complex, was producing low-enriched uranium, or LEU.) Two other nuclear mate-
rials for weapons, tritium and lithium-6, were produced in Chelyabinsk-65 and
Novosibirsk, respectively. The chemical and metallurgical plants in Chelyabinsk-65
and Tomsk-7 were manufacturing the fissile-material components of nuclear war-
heads. Components and subassemblies of nuclear warheads were being produced
in Arzamas-16, Sverdlovsk-45, Zlatoust-36, and Penza-19. (Only Arzamas-16 and
Sverdlovsk-45 were involved in assembling "physics packages": subassemblies con-
taining high explosives and fissile materials.) From the assembly plants, warheads
were transferred to the 12th Main Directorate of the Ministry of Defense,
which, in turn, distributed them to the appropriate branches of the armed forces.
Periodically, deployed warheads were returned to the assembly plants in Arzamas-
16 and Sverdlovsk-45 for maintenance, and, at the end of their life cycle, for
dismantlement. 36
The political and economic changes in the country in the 1990s have dramati-
cally changed the warhead production complex. In 1989, the USSR announced the
end of HEU production for weapons. 37 In 1987, the first production reactor was
shut down in Chelyabinsk-65. 38 In October 1989, the Soviet leadership made public
its plans to shut down all plutonium production reactors. 39 The production of
plutonium for weapons ceased in Russia in October 1994.
As a result of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the nuclear complex has lost
the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site located in now independent Kazakhstan. All other
principal components of the complex remain in Russia. 40 Cuts in defense orders have
forced the complex to scale down its weapons work and to start looking for defense
conversion opportunities.
In the summer of 1998, the Russian government adopted the Nuclear Complex
Reconfiguration Program. According to this program, nuclear warhead assembly
operations in Arzamas-16 and Penza-19 are scheduled to phase out warhead dis-
assembly work by 2003. These operations have been moved to the remaining two
facilities, Sverdlovsk-45 and Zlatoust-36. All fissile material processing is to be con-
solidated at one facility (Chelyabinsk-65) by 2003. Defense program personnel is
to be reduced from 75,000 to 40,000 by 2005. 41
Changes are also ongoing in the mechanism of management of the nuclear
complex. At the highest executive level, the supreme leadership is exercised by the
78 Chapter 3
president of the Russian Federation. At the cabinet level, problems concerning

the nuclear complex are addressed by the State Commission on Nuclear
Weapons, which is chaired by the prime minister. 42 Minatom, in coordination
with the Ministry of Defense and other agencies, manages the complex on a day-
to-day basis. In 1991, the president of the Russian Federation established a
federal regulatory agency, the State Committee for Oversight of Radiation
Safety (Gosatomnadzor). As of 1997, Gosatomnadzor was regulating civilian
nuclear activities at the facilities of Minatom and other agencies.4 3 The Ministry of
Defense was responsible for the regulatory oversight of nuclear activities in the
defense complex.
The Nuclear Fuel Cycle

Overview The Soviet Union would not be able to build and maintain its
nuclear arsenal without an extensive infrastructure capable of a full range of
fuel cycle activities, from the mining of natural uranium to production and
processing of highly enriched uranium and plutonium. The fuel cycle complex
was at its peak in the early 1980s. At that time, uranium was produced by a network
of large mining complexes in the USSR and Eastern Europe. Most uranium
was used to make fuel for the plutonium production reactors. (Some uranium
was also sent to the enrichment facilities, stockpiled, and, starting in 1988, ex-
ported to the West.)44 From the mining facilities uranium (as U,Os) was sent to
the Chepetsk Mechanical Plant for additional purification and conversion to
metal. Uranium metal was sent to the Chemical Concentrates Plant in Novosibirsk
for fabrication of uranium metal fuel elements for plutonium production
reactors.
Irradiated fuel was reprocessed by the radiochemical plants in Chelyabinsk-65,
Tomsk-7, and Krasnoyarsk-26. Extracted plutonium was manufactured into nuclear
warhead components. Reprocessed uranium, that is, uranium recovered from irra-
diated fuel and containing approximately 0.67 percent uranium-235, was enriched
by facilities in Sverdlovsk-44, Tomsk-7, Krasnoyarsk-26, and Angarsk. Reprocessed
uranium was a feedstock for the production of virtually all HEU for weapons.45
Table 3.2 lists the fuel cycle facilities in the Soviet Union.
The enrichment plants presumably used both reprocessed and natural uranium
to produce LEU for civilian power reactors. From the enrichment plants, LEU hexa-
fluoride was sent to the Machine-Building Plant in Electrostal (fuel for VVER-440
reactors) and the Ulbinsky Metallurgical Plant in Ust' -Kamenogorsk, Kazakhstan
(fuel for VVER-1000 and RBMK reactors) for conversion to uranium dioxide and
Table 32
Fuel cycle facilities
Facility Location Established Principal activities
Siberian Chemical Tomsk-7 1951 Production reactors

Combine Radiochemical plant
Chemical and
metallurgical plant
Conversion plant
Enrichment plant
Mayak Production Chelyabinsk-65 1948 Production reactors
Association Radiochemical plant
Chemical and
metallurgical plant
Isotope plant
Mining and Chemical Krasnoyarsk-26 1958 Production reactors
Combine Radiochemical plant
Angarsk Electrolysis Angarsk 1954 Conversion plant
and Chemical Plant Enrichment plant
Urals Electrochemical Sverdlovsk-44 1945 Enrichment plant
Combine
Electrochemical Plant Krasnoyarsk-45 1955 Enrichment plant
Kirovo-Chepetsk Kirovo-Chepetsk 1949 UF 4 production plant
Chemical Plant
Novosibirsk Chemical Novosibirsk 1949 Fuel fabrication plant
Concentrates Plant Lithium isotopes plant
Macrune- Building Plant Electrostal 1945 Fuel fabrication plant
Chepetsk Mechanical Glazov 1951 Chemical and
Plant metallurgical plant
Ulbinsky Metallurgical Ust' -Kamenogorsk, 1949 Chemical and
Plant Kazakhstan metallurgical plant
Fuel fabrication
plant
Note: Data are taken from Otchet 0 deyatelnosti federalnogo nadzora Rossii po yadernoi i
radiatsionnoi bezopasnosti v 1993 godu (Report on Activities of the Federal Oversight Com-
mittee on Nuclear and Radiation Safety in 1993), RD-03-02-93 (Moscow: Gosatomnadzor),
1993. According to the report, there are also chemical and metallurgical plants in Krasno-
yarsk and Sverdlovsk-44.
80 Chapter 3
fabrication of ceramic fuel pellets. At the fuel fabrication plants in Electrostal and
Novosibirsk, fuel pellets were used to manufacture fuel rods and assemblies.
Irradiated fuel was placed in interim storage at the reactor sites. The plan was to
consolidate spent RBMK fuel in regional repositories. This plan has not been imple-
mented because of insufficient funding, and fuel continues to accumulate at the
reactor sites. Spent fuel from VVER-1000 reactors has been shipped for storage to
the centralized storage facility in Krasnoyarsk-26. The plan was to reprocess this
fuel at the RT-2 facility, a very large radiochemical plant that was being built in
Krasnoyarsk-26 but has never been finished. Spent VVER-440 reactor fuel was
shipped for reprocessing to the RT-1 radiochemical plant in Chelyabinsk-65.
Reactor-grade plutonium, extracted from spent fuel, was placed in storage, and
reprocessed uranium was sent to the Ulbinsky Metallurgical Plant for fabrication
into RBMK reactor fuel.
The HEU fuel cycle also included several steps. 90-percent enriched HEU was
used in nuclear-material production, naval-propulsion, and research reactors. Spent
HEU fuel was reprocessed at the RT-1 radiochemical plant in Chelyabinsk-65.
Residual reprocessed uranium was used to produce naval-reactor fuel (enriched to
20-45 percent uranium-235).
The large-scale recycling of reprocessed uranium recovered from irradiated fuel
of the plutonium production and some power reactors was an essential feature of
the Soviet nuclear fuel cycle. During the initial period of the Soviet nuclear program,
uranium recycling was important to cover the existing deficit of natural uranium.
Later on, the closed nuclear fuel cycle concept, based on reprocessing of spent
reactor fuel and recycling of plutonium and other elements, was adopted as a fun-
damental strategy for the nuclear power program in the future. The closed nuclear
fuel cycle assumes the large-scale implementation of fast-breeder reactors that use
plutonium fuel and produce new plutonium in reactor blankets. The closed nuclear
fuel cycle concept has not been implemented, however, and it is unlikely that it will
be implemented in the foreseeable future for economic reasons.
Reductions in military orders after the cold war have caused major changes in
the Russian nuclear fuel cycle. Imports of natural uranium from Eastern Europe
and former Soviet republics have largely stopped. The natural uranium and HEU
requirements of the plutonium production reactors have decreased. The production
of enriched uranium and plutonium for weapons ceased in 1989 and 1994 respec-
tively. Currently, the principal mission of the fuel cycle complex is the production
of fuel for Soviet-designed reactors, as well as management and disposition of the
existing stocks of nuclear materials, spent fuel, and radioactive waste. Figure 3.1
shows the flows of fissile materials inside the nuclear complex.
0
I
E><port 01
natural
uranium 0
NlltUral
uranuim
production
Stllla reserves
of narural
uranium x
-"01
..
""'' ' '
'''''',
to
....-
x
Operational
of narural
uranium
x
~
Uranium
enrichment
_~~o)-
plutonium
,.
production
X
x Tx
0
Transport reactor HEU and Pu
PaNer reactor
fuo' fuo'
(20-45% U-235) 0
HEU
"'0"""
-
we""",
"""', -
t
!
Tx 0
..... Chemical
reprocessing
(WER-440.
HEUfuel)
--------<01---
,
,
,
..f""",,uo'
HEU transport
. """"'"
mota 0
.
,
i
,
!
HEU production
...,..."k",
HEU and Pu
storage and
disposal
-
c ---------------<1--
To
Reactor-grade
plutonium
""- -------------------<01--
Natural and low-enrlched (LEU) uranium

HEU research
reactor
c:::::::J X
'"of .
Operation dlal;:ontlnued
LEU SKpOrt
and nalural
uranium Import
...
Highly enriched Ul1lnlum
."...
c:::::::J 0 Operation Introduosd In late 805-early 901
Figure 3.1
Production and use of fissile materials during the 1980s and today
82 Chapter 3
Production of Natural Uranium Uranium is relatively abundant in nature.

Deposits with high levels of uranium content, however, are rare, and finding them
requires geological exploration. An approximate location of a uranium deposit is
established through an analysis of geological models, airborne radiometry, water
and soil sampling and analysis, and other techniques. More detailed prospecting of
uranium deposits requires drilling and sample analysis.
A geological survey also serves as a basis for selecting an appropriate mining tech-
nique. Near-surface deposits are mined using open-pit techniques. Underground
mining is used to extract uranium ore from deposits deep underground. 46 In both
cases, mined ores are sorted using radiometric equipment, crushed, and processed
chemically to extract the uranium. Typically, to leach uranium into a solution
(eluent), uranium ores are treated, for example, with sulfuric acid at elevated pres-
sures and temperatures.
In the 1960s, the Soviet Union started to use the in situ leaching (ISL) technique,
which is considerably more efficient for certain types of deposits.47 The use of
ISL expanded rapidly after its introduction, and, in the 1980s, in situ leaching
operations accounted for 32 percent of the total uranium production in the USSR.
Correspondingly, approximately 52 and 16 percent of the country's uranium came
from underground and open-pit mines.
After extraction of the uranium in the form of a uranium-containing solution,
the next step of the technological process is to concentrate uranium from the
solution, for example, by using ion exchange resins. The resultant slurry is sub-
sequently treated in a uranium mill, with uranium concentrate, U3 0 S powder, as
the final product of the mining and milling process.4S To increase its natural uranium
content to 90 percent or higher, uranium concentrate is purified by solvent
extraction.
In the Soviet Union, the production of uranium began in 1945 at the Taboshar
deposit in Tajikistan and adjacent deposits in Uzbekistan and Kyrgystan. 49 In par-
allel, the Ministry of Geology initiated a large-scale exploration effort to find new
uranium deposits. The discovery of uranium deposits in Central Asia, the North
Caucasus, and the Ukraine in the 1940s enabled the Soviet Union to increase
uranium production noticeably. Czechoslovakia and East Germany, however,
remained the principal sources of uranium for the Soviet nuclear program,so
imported under agreements signed with Czechoslovakia and East Germany in 1945
and 1946, respectively.
During the 1950s, the use of airborne radiometry resulted in discoveries of major
deposits of uranium in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. In the 1960s, the development
of theoretical models for uranium deposit geology allowed Soviet geologists to dis-
cover the Streltsovsk uranium ore area in the Southeastern Siberia as well as
additional deposits in the Kyzylkum and Krivorozh uranium ore areas.
During the 1960s and 1970s, based on these geological discoveries, the Soviet
Union constructed very large uranium production centers, such as the Tselinny
(Stepnogorsk) and Pricaspiisky (Aktau, formerly Shevchenko) combines in Kaza-
khstan, the Navoi combine in Uzbekistan, and the Priargunsky combine in Russia.
In addition, the Soviet Union continued importing significant quantities of uranium
from East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Hungary. During the 1970s and
1980s, the combined level of domestic production and imports was more than
30,000 tons of uranium per year. 51 The deficit of uranium, which had been slowing
the progress of the Soviet nuclear program, was thereby eliminated.
After decades of insufficient supplies of uranium, cuts in defense orders in the late
1980s and a near stagnation of the Soviet nuclear power program following the
Chernobyl accident actually resulted in excesses of natural uranium and reductions
in its level of production. Shortly thereafte~ the breakup of the Soviet Union changed
the structure of the Soviet uranium production complex, which had split into
individual producers marketing uranium on the world markets.
By the early 1990s, the Soviet Union had produced and imported from Eastern
Europe a total of approximately 660,000 tons uranium.52 Of this, approximately
460,000 tons had been used to produce fissile materials for weapons.
At present, known uranium resources in the former Soviet Union are located in
nine uranium ore areas, which have been developed, and five undeveloped uranium-
bearing areas. 53 The largest shares of the uranium resources are located in Russia
(approximately 300,000 tons), Kazakhstan (576,700 tons), and Uzbekistan
(230,000 tons).54
The Priargunsky Mining and Chemical Combine in Krasnokamensk, Chita
oblast, is Russia's only currently operating large complex that produces natural
uranium. Uranium is mined from the Antei and Streltsovskoye deposits of the
Streltsovsk district. The combine, which has a capacity of 4,000 tons of uranium
per year, produced approximately 2,000 tons of uranium in 1996: 1,400 tons by
conventional mining (deep underground mining at the Antei deposit and under-
ground and open-pit mining at the Streltsovskoye deposit), 500 tons by surface
heap-leaching, and 100 tons by underground block-leaching." Production was
maintained at the same level in 1997 as well. In the early 1990s, the Russian
government has announced that all newly produced uranium is available for
export.
84 Chapter 3
Uranium Conversion Production of uranium hexafluoride (UF 6 ), a feed material

for uranium enrichment facilities, is an important step in the nuclear fuel cycle. 56
The People's Commissariat of Chemical Industries organized the Soviet research
program on uranium conversion (UF6 production) in the early 1940s, and the first
gram-quantities of UF 6 were produced in 1943.'7 An industrial facility was
established in 1947 at the Rulon plant (Plant 906) in Dzerzhinsk. In particular, the
plant was producing uranium hexafluoride, which was subsequently converted to
uranium metal fuel for the F-l experimental reactor in the Kurchatov Institute. In
the 1950s, a more effective uranium conversion technology, based on the production
of uranium tetrafluoride as an interim product, was implemented at the chemical
combine in Kirovo-Chepetsk (Plant 752; prior to 1958, the plant was managed by
the Ministry of Chemical Industry).
At present, uranium hexafluoride is produced in Russia in a one-step flame
reactor. Various uranium compounds, including tetrafluoride and oxides, are used
as feed materials. 58 The technology was developed in the 1960s and implemented
in the 1970s at the conversion plants in Tomsk-7 and Angarsk. (The Kirovo-
Chepetsk plant was subsequently redirected to process uranium tetrafluoride.) Both
plants are capable of working with both natural and reprocessed uranium. At
present, the Angarsk facility, which has an estimated capacity of 18,700 tons per
year, works primarily with natural uranium. 59
Fuel Fabrication The primary task of the fuel plants in the early period of the
Soviet nuclear program was to make uranium metal fuel for the plutonium
production reactors. 60 Plant 12 in Electrostal, near Moscow, pioneered a technology
to produce uranium metal and to fabricate fuel for the F-1 reactor. Subsequently,
the Electrostal facility was augmented by the Chepetsk Mechanical Plant in Glazov
and the Novosibirsk Chemical Concentrates Plant. In the late 1950s and in the
1960s, the fuel fabrication complex began to make fuel for naval propulsion and
commercial nuclear power reactors. The formation of the complex, which is
presently organized in the Concern TVEL (Fuel Element), was completed by the
mid-1970s. Its principal facilities include the Electrostal Machine-Building Plant,
the Novosibirsk Chemical Concentrates Plant, the Ulbinsky Metallurgical Plant, and
the Chepetsk Mechanical Plant. 61
The Electrostal Machine-Building Plant The Machine-Building Plant 12 in
Electrostal (MSZ) was transferred to the PGU in 1945 and became the lead facility
for the production of uranium metal fuel. The MSZ continued manufacturing
fuels for production reactors until 1968. In addition, the plant participated in
a number of other key defense activities, including the production of magnets
(1960-1967) and filters (1948-1960) for gaseous-diffusion enrichment plants,
development of technologies to process HEU metal,62 production of neutron
generators (1956-1967), and production of lithium-6 and lithium hydrides
(1956-1962).
In the mid-1960s, the MSZ plant was redirected to develop and manufacture
fuels for newly developed power reactors as well as naval-propulsion and research
reactors. At present, the plant performs functions encompassing a complete tech-
nological cycle to produce VVER-440 reactor fuel, including such operations as the
conversion of UF6 to uranium oxide, pressing and sintering of fuel pellets, filling
zirconium-niobium tubes of fuel rods (TVELs) with pellets, and assembly of fuel
rods into fuel assemblies. In addition, the plant produces fuel rods and assemblies
for RBMK reactors using UO, pellets supplied by the Ulbinsky Metallurgical Plant.
The MSZ also manufactures fuel for naval reactors, fuel for the BN-350 and BN-
600 fast-neutron reactors (with enrichments of 17, 21, and 26 percent), and various
experimental fuels.
The Novosibirsk Chemical Concentrates Plant The Novosibirsk Chemical Con-
centrates Plant was established in 1949 and, by the early 1960s, had become the
principal Soviet manufacturer of fuels for production reactors. At present, the plant
manufactures natural-uranium metal fuel for the plutonium production reactors,
HEU ceramic-metal fuel 63 for the plutonium and tritium production reactors, and
research reactor fuel. In addition, the plant produces fuel rods and assemblies
for VVER-1000 reactors, using uranium oxide pellets supplied by the Ulbinsky
Metallurgical Plant. The plant makes lithium compounds 64 used to produce tritium
for nuclear weapons as well as in thermonuclear secondaries. 65 It is home to a
central storage facility for lithium-6 deuteride components of dismantled nuclear
warheads. 66
The U1binsky Metallurgical Plant The Ulbinsky Metallurgical Plant (UMZ) in
Ust'-Kamenogorsk (Kazakhstan) is the only large fuel cycle facility (aside from
uranium production centers) in the former Soviet Union located outside of Russia.
The UMZ plant was established in 1949 for metallurgical processing of uranium
and other special metals. In particular, the plant was producing uranium-beryllium
fuel for liquid-metal-cooled naval reactors. 67
The production of naval reactor fuel at the UMZ plant was halted in the 1970s. 68
At present, the UMZ plant manufactures a range of beryllium products for nuclear
86 Chapter 3
and aerospace applications and processes tantalum and some rare-earth materials.
Its principal product is uranium oxide pellets for VVER-440, VVER-1000, and
RBMK reactors. The plant supplies pellets to Electrostal and Novosibirsk, where
they are used in manufacturing fuel rods and assemblies.
The Chepetsk Mechanical Plant The Chepetsk Mechanical Plant (ChMZ; formerly
Plant 514) was established in 1951 in Glazov, Udmurtia. Its principal functions
included purification of natural uranium, production of uranium metal, and fabri-
cation of natural uranium fuel for production reactors. Since 1953, the plant has
been a major source of zirconium, and the production of reactor fuel at the plant
was subsequently stopped. At present, the plant produces natural- and depleted-
uranium metal products, calcium, zirconium, zirconium alloys, and zirconium
tubing for reactor fuel rods.
Nuclear Reactors
The Nuclear Weapons Program Supporting the nuclear weapons program
remained the primary mission of the nuclear fuel cycle complex until the late 1980s
(see below). In the 1950s and 1960s, however, the fuel cycle complex expanded the
scope of its work to serve the nuclear power program, nuclear naval-propulsion
program, and research reactor facilities. In most cases, nonweapons fuel cycle activ-
ities were initiated at the existing defense facilities. This integration of defense and
civilian activities continues to be a distinctive feature of the Russian nuclear fuel
cycle. Figure 3.2 shows locations of main facilities involved in the nuclear fuel cycle
and development and production of nuclear weapons.
The Nuclear Power Program The Soviet nuclear power program began in 1954,
when the USSR's first five-megawatt AM reactor went into operation at the Insti-
tute of Physics and Power Engineering in 0 bninsk. In the 1960s, prototypes of the
water-cooled, water-moderated VVER-type reactors and the channel-type, graphite-
moderated RBMK-type reactors were brought on line at the Novovoronezh and
Beloyarsk nuclear power plants, respectively. A massive deployment of nuclear
power plants in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe began in the 1970s. This large-
scale construction effort continued until the Chernobyl disaster in April 1986, when
the nuclear power program entered the period of stagnation.
At present, there are 29 nuclear power reactor units at nine sites in Russia. The
nuclear power plants are managed by Rosenergoatom, which is part of Minatom. 69
The reactors have a combined capacity of 21,242 megawatts electric and generate
Figure 32
Locations of the main nuclear fuel cycle and weapons development and assembly facilities
approximately 12-13 percent electricity of the total electricity in Russia. In Ukraine,

15 nuclear power reactors generate approximately one-third of nation's electricity.
Armenia and Lithuania have one nuclear power plant each. The BN-350 reactor in
Aktau, Kazakhstan, was used to desalinate sea water but was shut down in 2000.
Outside of the former Soviet Union, Soviet-designed nuclear power plants are
currently in operation in Bulgaria, Hungary, Finland, and the Czech and Slovak
Republics.
Most Soviet nuclear power reactors use ceramic, uranium oxide pellet fuels with
uranium enriched to between 2 and 4.4 percent uranium-235.7° The BN-type
fast-neutron reactors use 17-26 percent enriched fuel.
Naval Propulsion Reactors Since the mid-1950s, the Soviet Union (and now
Russia) has built and operated 245 nuclear-powered submarines, five nuclear-
88 Chapter 3
powered surface ships,71 and nine nuclear-powered civilian icebreakers. An esti-

mated 468 reactors were installed on these ships. Most submarine reactors are fueled
with uranium-aluminum fuels. Reactors on the submarines of the first and second
generations (built in 1957-1981) were fueled with 20 percent enriched uranium.72
Third-generation submarines are propelled by reactors fueled with uranium enriched
to 45 percent uranium-235J3 In addition to uranium-aluminum cermet fuel, nuclear
icebreakers use 90 percent enriched uranium-zirconium fuel. The liquid-metal-
cooled reactors of the Alpha-class submarines were fueled with 90 percent enriched
uranium-beryllium fue1. 74
Research Reactors During the 1950s and 1960s, the Soviet Union constructed a
large number of research reactors. As of 1998, Russia had more than 60 opera-
tional research and test reactors and critical assemblies (not including reactors used
for defense-related activities)J5 Three operational research reactors existed in former
Soviet republics other than Russia, and eight were in operation in East European
and other countries. High-power reactors (over 20 megawatts) are used for research
on reactor materials and components. Less powerful reactors are used for radio-
isotope production and fundamental research. The principal purpose of critical and
sub critical assemblies is to study reactor core physics and to train personnel.
Research facilities utilize a variety of fuels with different compositions and uranium
enrichment levels. (Some facilities use plutonium or plutonium-uranium fuels.)
Most reactors, however, use ceramic-uranium fuel enriched to 36 or 90 percent
uranium-235. 76
Production of Fissile Materials for Weapons

Production and processing of HEU and plutonium for nuclear weapons was the
primary mission of the Soviet nuclear complex. These functions were performed by
large production combines currently managed by Minatom's Fourth Main Direc-
torate. Plutonium for weapons was produced by a complex of 13 production
reactors and three radiochemical plants located in Chelyabinsk-65, Tomsk-7, and
Krasnoyarsk-26. HEU for weapons was produced from 1949 to 1989 at the enrich-
ment sites in Sverdlovsk-44, Tomsk-7, and Krasnoyarsk-45. In Chelyabinsk-65 and
Tomsk-7, plutonium and HEU were converted to metal and fabricated into warhead
components.
Production of HEU for weapons was discontinued in the Soviet Union in 1989.
The production of separated plutonium, however, continues in Russia today.
Approximately 1 ton of reactor-grade plutonium is separated each year from irra-
diated VVER-440 reactor fuel at the RT-1 plant in Chelyabinsk-65. 77 Approximately

1.5 tons of weapon-grade plutonium is produced annually by the three production
reactors still in operation in Tomsk-7 and Krasnoyarsk-26. At present, this pluto-
nium is a by-product of heat and electricity produced by the reactors for the local
populations. Since October 1994, newly produced plutonium has not been used for
weapons purposes in RussiaJ8
Russia's stocks of weapons-grade fissile materials are estimated to include more
than 1,000 tons of HEU and up to 150 tons of plutonium. 79 In addition, approxi-
mately 30 tons of reactor-grade plutonium has been separated from the spent fuel
of VVER-440 reactors. A significant fraction Russia's stocks of fissile materials is
in nuclear weapons. so More than 500 tons of HEU and approximately 100 tons of
plutonium are expected to be recovered from nuclear weapons in the process of
arms reductions. 81
Initially, and possibly for decades to come, fissile materials from Russian nuclear
weapons will be stored in a specially designed storage facility in Chelyabinsk-65
and in storage facilities in Tomsk-7 and at the dismantlement plants. 82 Simultane-
ously, the nuclear industry will be working to identify technologies for their dispo-
sition. A large fraction of HEU will be down-blended to low-enriched uranium fuel
for commercial power reactors. According to the U.S.-Russian agreement, signed
in 1993, the United States is to purchase over the period of twenty years low-
enriched uranium derived from at least 500 tons of HEU from dismantled Russian
weapons. The technological infrastructure to down-blend HEU was established by
Minatom by the fall of 1994, and the first shipments of low-enriched uranium to
the United States occurred in May 1995.
Plutonium disposition is a more difficult task. Minatom's initial plan was to burn
plutonium-uranium mixed oxide fuel (MOX fuel) in BN-800 and BN-600 fast-
neutron reactors. According to the plan, MOX fuel would be produced and used
largely at the Mayak complex in Chelyabinsk-65. s3 (Minatom is also investigating
the possibility of using MOX fuel in thermal reactors and reactors of other types.)
Implementation of Minatom's plans, however, is not feasible in the foreseeable
future for economic reasons. Indeed, the construction of the South Urals nuclear
power plant with BN-800 reactors in Chelyabinsk-65 was halted in the 1980s
because of environmental opposition and currently cannot be restarted because of
insufficient funding.
90 Chapter 3
Production of Plutonium and Tritium for Nuclear Weapons Plutonium-239, the

principal plutonium isotope used in nuclear explosives, is produced in any uranium-
fueled nuclear reactor. In Russia, virtually all plutonium was produced in reactors
dedicated to its production. Production reactors are characterized by relatively low
levels of fuel irradiation: Typical burn-up values for such reactors are 400-600
megawatt days per ton. Higher burn-up rates result in an increased fraction of plu-
tonium-240, which has relatively high rates of emission of spontaneous neutrons,
and this therefore degrades the quality of the plutonium as a weapons material. s4
According to the generally accepted classification, weapons-grade plutonium con-
tains less than 6 percent plutonium-240.
Extraction of plutonium from irradiated fuel is carried out in special radiochem-
ical facilities. Because of its high levels of radioactivity, spent fuel is processed
remotely, in thick-walled concrete canyons. The process results in large volumes of
radioactive and toxic waste, the management and disposition of which require a
sophisticated technological infrastructure.
The production reactors were also used to produce other nuclear materials for
weapons, such as tritium. Tritium, in the form of a tritium-deuterium gas mixture,
is used to boost fission primaries in thermonuclear weapons. Usually, tritium is
produced by neutron irradiation of lithium-6 targets in a nuclear reactor. 85 Tritium
is subsequently extracted from the targets in a vacuum furnace and purified
chemically. During the initial period of the Soviet nuclear weapons program, the
production reactors also produced, by neutron irradiation of bismuth targets, polo-
nium-210 for polonium-beryllium neutron generators used in nuclear weapons to
initiate a chain reaction. (Subsequently, polonium-beryllium generators were
replaced by outside neutron generators based on the electrostatic accelerator
technology.)S6
Reactor Technology Development In the Soviet Union, plutonium for weapons
was largely produced in channel-type, graphite-moderated, water-cooled reactors.
In all water-graphite production reactors, fuel elements-cylinders of natural-
uranium metal in aluminum cladding-are loaded in vertical fuel channels located
inside the reactor's graphite core. To flatten the power and neutron distribution in
the reactor core, some reactors also use HEU spike fuel rods.
The Soviet nuclear industry developed three generations of plutonium production
reactors (see table 3.3). The A reacto~ a first-generation reactor, was brought on
line in June 1948 in Chelyabinsk-65. It was designed by N. A. Dollezhal and had
a capacity of 100 megawatts (the capacity was later increased to 900 megawatts).
Table 3.3
Soviet plutonium production reactors
Power,
megawatts
(initiall
Reactor Operational Type Purpose maximum)
Mayak Production Association (Chelyabinsk-65)

A 1948-1987 water-graphite, once-through plutonium 1001900
IR-AI 1951-1987 water-graphite, once-through plutonium 501500
AV-l 1950-1989 water-graphite, once-through plutonium 300/1,200
AV-2 1951-1990 water-graphite, once-through plutonium 300/1,200
AV-3 1952-1990 water-graphite, once-through plutonium, 300/1,200
tritium
OK-1S0 1951-1965 heavy-water tritium 100?
OK-190 1955-19S6 heavy-water tritium 100?
Ruslan 1979-present water-water tritium, isotopes no data
Ludmila 1989-present heavy-water tritium, isotopes no data
Siberian Chemical Combine (Tomsk-7)
1-1 1955-1990 water-graphite, once-through plutonium 600/1,200
EI-2 1956-1990 water-graphite, closed-circuit plutonium 600/1,200
ADE-3 1961-1992 water-graphite, closed-circuit plutonium 1,600/1,900
ADE-4 1964-present water-graphite, closed-circuit plutonium 1,600/1,900
ADE-5 1965-present water-graphite, closed-circuit plutonium 1,600/1,900
Mining and Chemical Combine (Krasnoyarsk-26)
AD 1958-1992 water-graphite, once-through plutonium 1,600/1,SOO
ADE-l 1961-1992 water-graphite, once-through plutonium 1,600/1,SOO
ADE-2 1964-present water-graphite, closed-circuit plutonium 1,600/1,SOO
The reactor was cooled by means of a once-through cooling cycle in which cooling
water was pumped from an external source, forced through the cooling channels,
and discharged into the environment. The reactor held approximately 150 tons of
uranium fuel in vertical channels inside its 1,353-ton graphite coreY It was used
solely to produce plutonium.
Second-generation reactors (such as the AV-1 reactor, brought on line in 1950)
had vertical cylindrical cores of graphite with vertical channels for control rods and
fuel. Compared to the A reactor, the AV-1 reactor had increased power and safety.
Like the A reactor, second-generation reactors were once-through reactors and were
used exclusively to make plutonium for weapons. 88
92 Chapter 3
Third-generation reactors were built after 1958 and were designed as dual-use
reactors. 89 The three ADE-type reactors still in operation are the third-generation
reactors (table 3.4). Each has a capacity of approximately 2,000 megawatts and
produces roughly 0.5 tons of weapons-grade plutonium per year. Steam produced
by these reactors is utilized to generate up to 350 megawatts of heat and 150
megawatts of electricity. Unlike first- and second-generation reactors, third-
generation reactors utilize a two-circuit cooling system with a closed primary circuit,
heat exchanger, steam generator, and electricity turbine.
Development of Radiochemical Technologies The development of the Soviet
school of radiochemistry began in the Radium Institute of the Academy of Sciences
through the efforts of academician V. G. Khlopin. In 1946, the Radium Institute
developed the acetate-fluoride technology for industrial-scale extraction of pluto-
nium and uranium from irradiated uranium fuel. This technology was validated at
the pilot radiochemical facility U-5 in the NII-9 institute (currently VNIINM) in
Table 3.4
Technical characteristics of the ADE reactor
Power upto 2,000MW

Electricity generation 150-200MWe
Heat output 300-350 Gcal h
Moderator graphite
Coolant water
Number of channels 2,832
Number of fuel elements per channel 66-67
AmolUlt of natural uranium 300-350t
AmolU1t of HEU 75 kg
Fuel burn-up 600-1,000 MW-day/t
Fuel composition (natural uranium) uranium metal
Fuel composition (HEU) cermet (8.5% U0 2 in an aluminum matrix)
Fuel element diameter 35mm
Cladding aluminum alloy
Cladding thickness >1mm
Spent-fuel storage method wet
Standard storage time 6 months
Maximum permissible storage 18 months
Source: T. Cochran, S. Norris, and o. Bukharin, Making the Russian Bomb: From Stalin to
Moscow and subsequently implemented at the first radiochemical plant (Plant B) in

Chelyabinsk-65. 90
During the initial period, Plant B used for plutonium separation the oxidation-
reduction process of precipitation of sodium uranyl-triacetate. The process was
implemented in two stages. The first stage involved separation of uranium and plu-
tonium from fission products and separation of plutonium from uranium by acetate
precipitation. In the second stage, plutonium was purified by precipitation with
lanthanum fluorides.
Radiochemical separation technologies have been continuously improved over
time to increase process safety, efficiency of extraction, and the purity ofthe uranium
and plutonium products extracted, as well as to decrease the use of chemicals and
the generation of toxic and radioactive wastes. Because of the very high corrosive-
ness of fluorides, the lanthanum-fluoride technology used to purify plutonium was
expensive and not safe. Therefore, when the second reprocessing plant (Plant
BB), built in Chelyabinsk-65 in the late 1950s, was being designed, the decision
was made to replace the lanthanum-fluoride technology with a double cycle of
acetate precipitation. The acetate technology, although safer, was also expensive,
and it resulted in large volumes of waste and required an extensive support infra-
structure. In the early 1960s, therefore, the second cycle of acetate precipitation
(for the purification of plutonium) was replaced by sorption technologies, based
on selective sorption of plutonium by ion exchange resins. The use of the sorption
technologies allowed the plant to improve the quality of the plutonium it pro-
duced. This process, however, was also not safe, and after the 1965 explosion of a
sorption column in Chelyabinsk-65,91 it was decided that the plant would make
a transition to chemical extraction technologies. (Research on chemical extraction
began as early as the late 1940s.) This work has resulted in a PUREX-type process
(which stands for Plutonium-Uranium Extraction): a multistage process in which
uranium and plutonium are extracted selectively from a nitric acid solution by
tri-butyl-phosphate. PUREX is currently used by all radiochemical plants in
Russia.
Many Soviet research institutes and organizations were involved in developing
radiochemical technologies. The Radium Institute, the Institute of Inorganic Mate-
rials, and the Institute of Chemical Technologies were responsible for research,
development, and pilot testing. 92 The Institute of Chemical Machine-Building in
Sverdlovsk designed and manufactured radiochemical equipment. The Institute
of Energy Technologies (VNIPIET) was responsible for designing radiochemical
94 Chapter 3
installations. The plutonium combines bore the principal responsibility for validat-
ing and implementing new technologies that were developed.
The Plutonium Production Complex The industrial production of plutonium for
weapons was carried out by an integrated complex of three plutonium combines in
Chelyabinsk-65, Tomsk-7, and Krasnoyarsk-26.
CHELYABINSK-65 (MAYAK PRODUCTION ASSOCIATION) The Chelyabinsk-65
combine, now the Mayak Production Association, is located in Ozersk, in the north-
ern part of the Chelyabinsk oblast. 93 The combine was established in 1948 and was
the first facility to produce plutonium and plutonium components for nuclear war-
heads. Plutonium was produced at Chelyabinsk-65 by five uranium-graphite reac-
tors (A, IR-AI, AV-1, AV-2, and AV-3) commissioned between 1948 and 1955.94
These reactors were shut down between 1987 and 1990. At present, the reactors
are monitored for research purposes and are being prepared for decommissioning.
The reactor plant also includes light-water and heavy-water reactors that have been
used to produce tritium and other isotopes.
Irradiated fuel from Chelyabinsk-65's production reactors was reprocessed
within the combine. Radiochemical Plant B started reprocessing operations on 22
December 1948. Its first years were exceptionally difficult. The lack of knowledge
and experience, inadequate technologies and equipment, and the high corrosiveness
and radioactivity of technological solutions resulted in a large number of accidents
and numerous personnel exposures. 95 Plant B underwent several modernization
efforts and continued to work at its capacity until 1959. Subsequently, production
at the plant began to decrease, and the plant was shut down in the early 1960s.
Later, Plant B's site was used to build the currently operating RT-1 reprocessing
plant.
As production levels at Plant B decreased leading up to its eventual closing, the
reprocessing of irradiated fuel from production reactors was continued at Plant BB.
The construction of Plant BB, which was designed to replace Plant B, started in
1954, and the plant was completed in 1959. In 1987, after the shutdown of two of
the five production reactors, Plant BB was also shut down, and the production of
weapons-grade plutonium at Chelyabinsk-65 ceased. From 1987 to 1990, when the
last of the five production reactors was shut down, irradiated fuel from the pro-
duction reactors still in operation in Chelyabinsk-65 was shipped for reprocessing
to Tomsk-7.
The plutonium product of the radiochemical facilities at Chelyabinsk-65 was
transferred to Plant V (also known in the West as the Tatysh plant), a chemical and
metallurgical plant built in 1948 to produce plutonium metal and to manufacture

warhead components." A second line of Plant V was designed to manufacture HEU
weapons components. At present, the plant continues to process fissile materials
and to fabricate weapons components. Like the chemical and metallurgical plant
in Tomsk-7, Plant V became involved in 1997 in disposition of HEU from disman-
tled weapons.
In addition to plutonium, Chelyabinsk-65 has also produced tritium and other
special isotopes. 97 Since 1951, tritium was produced in the 50-megawatts AI reactor,
fueled with 2 percent enriched uranium. Later, tritium was also produced in
heavy-water reactors, of which the OK-180 was the first. 98 (The production of
tritium probably did not begin in the OK-180 reactor until 1954.) On 27 Decem-
ber 1955, a second heavy-water reacto~ OK-190, began operation at Chelyabinsk-
65. The OK-180 and OK-190 reactors were shut down in 1965 and 1986,
respectively, and were replaced by two new facilities: the light-water (water-cooled,
water-moderated) Ruslan reactor (start-up in 1979) and the heavy-water Ludmila
reactor (start-up in 1980).99 These reactors continue to produce tritium and isotopes
for the radio-isotope plant (plutonium-238, cobalt-60, carbon-14, iridium-192, and
others).
Isotopes produced by the reactors at Chelyabinsk-65 are separated from irradi-
ated target materials at the RT-1 plant, brought into service in 1976. Tritium targets
are transferred to the Mayak's tritium plant, the only facility in Russia that
produces tritium and tritium components of nuclear warheads. 10o The isotopes are
transferred to the radio-isotope plant (in operation since 1962), which manufac-
tures alpha, gamma, and beta radiation sources, plutonium-238 and strontium-90
thermal generators, and a wide range of radionuclides. 10l
The Mayak Production Association is a key facility supporting the fuel cycles of
nuclear power and other reactors. The RT-1 plant absorbed a considerable part
of the old defense radiochemical facility (Plant B). Its first production line was
designed to process aluminum-uranium HEU fuel from naval-propulsion and pro-
duction reactors. In 1978, the plant started reprocessing spent fuel from VVER-440
reactors. At present, three production lines of the RT-1 plant reprocess spent fuel
from VVER-440, BN-600, naval propulsion, and research reactors. The plant also
reprocesses HEU fuel from the production reactors. In its reprocessing work, the
plant utilizes PUREX-based technologies. In addition to its reprocessing facility, the
plant has spent-fuel transfer stations, temporary spent-fuel storage facilities, waste
management and vitrification facilities, and facilities for storing separated uranium
and plutonium. The RT-1 plant is capable of reprocessing 400 tons of VVER-440
96 Chapter 3
fuel and 10 tons of naval-propulsion fuel (corresponding to 20-30 reactor cores)

per year.
In addition to reprocessing spent fuel, the RT-1 plant is involved in radioactive
waste management and research and pilot production of uranium-plutonium MOX
fuel. The combine began the construction of an industrial-scale MOX fuel fabrica-
tion facility (Area 300) in the 1980s.102 The construction of the half-built facility
was stopped in 1989.
Chelyabinsk-65 is a major fissile-material storage site. Approximately 30 tons
of reactor-grade plutonium is stored at the RT-1 plant. 103 The combine also is home
to large quantities of fissile materials recovered from dismantled Soviet and Russian
nuclear weapons. In the summer of 1994, construction began on a central storage
facility at Chelyabinsk-65 for plutonium and HEU from dismantled weapons.
The first phase of the storage facility is scheduled to go into operation in 2002
and will be able to accommodate 25,000 containers. The second phase, if a deci-
sion is made to proceed with its construction, will double the storage capacity
to 50,000 containers. The storage facility, designed by the Institute of Energy
Technologies (VNIPIET) in St. Petersburg will be capable of storing materials up to
100 years. 104
Chelyabinsk-65's primary facilities are supported by an extensive research and
technological infrastructure, including the central plant laboratory, device-building
plant, tool-building plant, machine and repair shop, and specialized construction
unit. The city is home to a branch of the Moscow Institute of Physics and Engi-
neering, Russia's leading university in the area of applied nuclear physics.
TOMSK-7 (SIBERIAN CHEMICAL COMBINE) The Siberian Chemical Combine III
Tomsk-7 was established in 1949 to produce fissile materials for weapons and
weapons components. 10S Plutonium was produced in Tomsk-7 by five reactors:
1-1, EI-2, ADE-3, ADE-4, and ADE-5. The 1-1 reactor (start-up on 20 November
1955) was a once-through reactor used for the sole purpose of producing pluto-
nium. The EI-2 and ADE-3 were brought on line in September 1958 and July 1961,
respectively, and the ADE-4 and ADE-5 reactors were started up in 1965 and 1967.
With the exception of the 1-1, all of the Tomsk-7 reactors had a closed primary
cooling circuit and were used for the production of both plutonium and heat and
electricity.
Tomsk-7's firstthree reactors were shut down on 21 August 1990 (1-1), 31 Decem-
ber 1990 (EI-2), and 14 August 1992 (ADE-3). The two reactors still in operation
have a combined capacity of 3,800 megawatts and produce 660-700 megawatts
of heat and 300 megawatts of electricity. The reactors cover the internal heat
requirements of the nuclear complex as well as providing heat to the city of Seversk
(Tomsk-7) and the nearby oil and chemical complex.
Irradiated fuel from the Tomsk-7 reactors is reprocessed at an on-site radio-
chemical plantthat was brought into operation in 1956. Prior to 1983, the plant used
the acetate precipitation process but subsequently adopted the PUREX technology.
Until recently, plutonium from the radiochemical plant at Tomsk-7 was trans-
ferred to the combine's chemical and metallurgical plant, where it was converted to
metal, processed metallurgically, and fabricated into warhead components. 106 Since
1 October 1994, any newly produced plutonium has been converted to plutonium
dioxide and placed in storage.
The chemical and metallurgical plant at Tomsk-7 was also designed to process
HEU and fabricate HEU warhead components. In 1994, the plant became involved
in HEU down-blending activities under the 1993 U.S.-Russian HEU agreement. In
Tomsk-7, HEU is converted to the oxide form. A large fraction of the uranium is
processed radiochemically to remove chemical impurities (traces of fission prod-
ucts, transuranic elements, etc.). Pure uranium oxide powder is packaged inside
hermetically sealed containers. Prior to 1996, all HEU oxide was shipped to
Sverdlovsk-44 and Krasnoyarsk-45 for fluorination and down-blending. In late
1996, however, an HEU fluorination and down-blending facility was brought into
operation in Tomsk-7 as well.10 7
KRASNOYARSK-26 (MINING AND CHEMICAL COMBINE) The Krasnoyarsk-26
combine 108 was established in 1950 109 to produce plutonium for weapons.
The reactor plant, radiochemical plant, laboratories, and storage facilities of
Krasnoyarsk-26 are located 200-250 meters underground in a multilevel system
of underground tunnels inside a mountain.
The Krasnoyarsk-26 reactor plant was brought in operation on 25 August 1958,
and by 1964, the plant consisted of three graphite reactors (AD, ADE-1, and
ADE-2). In 1964, a reprocessing plant began operation at Krasnoyarsk-26 as well.
(Between 1958 and 1964, irradiated reactor fuel was reprocessed by the radio-
chemical plants in Chelyabinsk-65 and Tomsk-7.) Plutonium dioxide, the combine's
final product, was transferred to the chemical and metallurgical plants in
Chelyabinsk-65 and Tomsk-7 for conversion to metal and fabrication into nuclear
weapon components. Since October 1994, however, separated plutonium has been
stored on-site as plutonium dioxide.
Krasnoyarsk-26's two once-through reactors (AD and ADE-1) were shut down
in 1992.110 The third reactor has a two-circuit cooling system and is similar to the
ADE-4 and ADE-5 reactors in Tomsk-7. Like the ADE-4 and ADE-5 reactors in
98 Chapter 3
Tomsk-7, the ADE-2 reactor in Krasnoyarsk-26 generates heat and electricity for
the local populations and cannot be shut down before a replacement source of
power becomes available.
Krasnoyarsk-26 has been proposed as a site for a new radiochemical complex (des-
ignated RT-2) to reprocess spent fuel from VVER-1 000 reactors. The design work on
the plant was initiated in 1972, and in 1976, the construction of RT-2's first phase,
a spent-fuel storage facility, began at a surface site 4-5 kilometers north of the under-
ground military complex. The storage facility was completed in December 1985 and
has a capacity of 6,000 tons of fuel; by 1995, 15-20 percent of the storage capacity
was filled. '11 Construction of the 1,500-ton-per-year radiochemical plant, the second
phase of the RT-2 complex, also began in the late 1970s. The construction was halted
in 1989 with the facility only 30 percent completed because of insufficient funding
and environmental opposition. Although the Russian government decided in Febru-
ary 1995 to finish the construction of the facility,112 construction has not yet resumed,
and the future of the radiochemical complex remains uncertain.
HEU Production Natural uranium contains approximately 0.711 percent

uranium-235. In contrast, weapons-grade uranium may have uranium-235 concen-
trations of 90 percent and higher. In the Soviet Union, HEU was produced by
gaseous-diffusion, electromagnetic, and centrifuge-enrichment techniques, all of
them based on the mass difference between uranium-235 and uranium-238.
In a gaseous-diffusion facility, uranium hexafluoride gas is forced through special
barriers. The velocity of molecules that contain uranium-235 is higher than that of
molecules with uranium-238 at the same temperature, and more uranium-235 mol-
ecules than uranium-238 molecules pass through the barrier material. When iso-
topes are placed in a centrifuge, isotope separation occurs because of the centrifugal
forces and specially induced countercurrents. Electromagnetic isotope separation
techniques are based on the trajectory difference for ionized molecules of uranium-
235 and uranium-238 moving in a magnetic field that is orthogonal to the plane of
their movement.
Regardless of the technique used, a single separation unit is capable of enriching
uranium only to a fairly small extent. To achieve high levels of enrichment, indi-
vidual separation units are linked to form an enrichment cascade. Each cascade
consists of a number of stages in which separation units work in parallel. Enriched
uranium, the product of any particular stage, becomes a feed material for the next
stage. Uranium with slightly depleted levels of uranium-235 is fed into lower stages.
This process is repeated until the uranium-235 content in the depleted uranium
reaches the cutoff levels (typically, 0.1-0.3 percent). Separative work, accomplished
by an enrichment facility, is measured in kilograms separative work units (SWU).
At a tails assay of 0.3 percent uranium-235, approximately 200 SWU is required
to produce 1 kilogram of 90 percent enriched uranium using natural uranium as a
feed.
Gaseous Diffusion Technology In the USSR, large-scale work on uranium isotope
separation technologies began in the fall of 1945.113 The initial focus was on the
technologies of gaseous diffusion (I. K. Kikoin), electromagnetic separation (L. A.
Artsimovich), and thermal diffusion (A. P. Alexandrov and I. K. Kikoin). In 1946,
influenced by the Smith Report, published in the United States, and intelligence data,
the Soviet Union decided to concentrate all isotope separation research efforts
on the gaseous-diffusion technology. The design bureaus at the Kirov Plant in
Leningrad and Gorky Machine-Building Plant became the principal development
centers. Scientific support was provided by research institutes of the Academy of
Sciences and other agencies and ministries.
In parallel with the research being conducted, a decision was made to begin con-
struction of an industrial isotope separation facility in Verkh-Neivinsk (Sverdlovsk-
44). The first gaseous-diffusion plant, 0-1, was brought into operation at Combine
813 in Sverdlovsk-44 in early 1949. The plant had 7,040 machines and a design
capacity of 7,500 SWU per year. During its first year, howeve~ the 0-1 plant was
unable to produce any weapons-grade uranium: Even with an ineffective double
use of upper enrichment stages the plant could produce uranium enriched only to
75 percent uranium-235, which was insufficient for use in weapons. The enrich-
ment level of the uranium produced was subsequently raised to 90 percent by elec-
tromagnetic separation facilities at Plant 418 in Sverdlovsk-45.
Technical difficulties, related mainly to losses of UF6 gas through its decomposi-
tion, were overcome in 1950, and the plant started producing tens of kilograms of
90 percent uranium per year. By the end of 1953, three larger and more capable
plants, 0-3, 0-4, and 0-5, had been constructed in Sverdlovsk-44. By the early
1960s, gaseous-diffusion plants had also been built in Tomsk-7, Angarsk, and
Krasnoyarsk-45. Improvements in gaseous-diffusion technologies and construction
of gaseous-diffusion plants at each of the USSR's four uranium enrichment sites
continued up to the mid-1960s.
Electromagnetic Isotope Separation The electromagnetic separation technology
was also applied on the industrial level. The Leningrad Institute of Electrophysics
Equipment (NIIEFA), headed at that time by O. V. Efremov, was the lead institute
100 Chapter 3
for developing the technology.'14 An industrial separation facility, SU-20, was

completed at Plant 418 in Sverdlovsk-45 simultaneously with the gaseous-
diffusion plant 0-1 in Sverdlovsk-44. The SU-20 facility initially had to enrich the
uranium produced by the 0-1 plant to the 90 percent level, as noted above, until
improvements in gaseous-diffusion technology eliminated that need. The SU-20
facility was then redirected to enriching non uranium isotopes. Some of its buildings
that had been built to house the isotope separation equipment were subsequently
annexed to establish a plant to assemble and disassemble nuclear warheads. Another
electromagnetic separation facility, S-2, was built in 1969 in Arzamas-16. The facil-
ity was used for the production of high-purity isotopes of plutonium, americium,
and other elements for the purpose of establishing their nuclear constants and for
other nuclear physics research. l1s
Centrifuge Technology Despite considerable advances in gaseous-diffusion
technology, uranium enrichment plants remained energy-intensive. In the 1960s,
therefore, the Soviet Union began a transition to a more efficient centrifuge isotope
separation technology.
Laboratory research on centrifuge isotope separation began in late 1946 in the
Sukhum Institute of Physics and Technology. It was conducted by a group of
German scientists and engineers headed by M. Steenbeck. '16 In the fall of 1951, the
research was moved to the Design Bureau of the Kirov Plant in St. Petersburg, where
it was headed by N. M. Sinev. Other principal centrifuge development centers
included the Department of Molecular Physics of the Kurchatov Institute (Moscow),
the Institute of Aviation Materials (VIAM, Moscow), the Experimental Machine-
Building Design Bureau (OKBM, Nizhni Novgorod), and the Urals Electrochemical
Plant (Combine 813, Sverdlovsk-44).
The first pilot centrifuge enrichment plant went into operation in Sverdlovsk-44
on 4 October 1957. Between 1962 and 1964, an industrial-scale centrifuge plant
was built and started up in Sverdlovsk-44.117 By the mid-1970s, centrifuge technol-
ogy has become the primary enrichment technology in the USSR, and the use of
gaseous-diffusion machines for uranium enrichment was discontinued in the Soviet
Union in 1991.11 8 The transition to centrifuge enrichment technology reduced energy
consumption and increased the capacity of the Soviet enrichment complex. 119 Since
the 1950s, seven generations of centrifuges have been designed and put into pro-
duction. Centrifuges of the seventh generation are currently being produced and
installed. 120 Technology improvements have allowed considerable reductions in
specific energy consumption and improved reliability of centrifuges.
The Uranium Enrichment Complex The uranium enrichment complex in

Russia consists of four primary facilities: the Urals Electrochemical Plant in
Sverdlovsk-44,121 the Siberian Chemical Combine in Tomsk-7, the Electrochemical
Combine in Krasnoyarsk-45, and the Angarsk Electrolysis and Chemical Plant
(Irkutsk oblast). Sverdlovsk-44 accounts for 49 percent of Russia's enrichment
capacity (10 million SWU per year), and its electrochemical plant is the oldest and
largest enrichment plant in Russia. The combines in Krasnoyarsk-45, Tomsk-7, and
Angarsk account respectively for 29, 14, and 8 percent of Russia's enrichment
capacity.
In the past, the complex operated as an integrated uranium enrichment enterprise.
The Angarsk plant produced low-enriched uranium that was, presumably, fed into
the HEU cascades of the other facilities. The plants in Sverdlovsk-44, Krasnoyarsk-
45, and Tomsk-7 produced HEU. In addition to the isotope separation plants, the
complexes in Angarsk and Tomsk-7 operate conversion facilities that produce UF6
feed for the enrichment cascades.
Since HEU production for weapons stopped in 1989, each plant has been oper-
ating independently. They re-enrich uranium tailings and produce LEU for power
reactors as well as nonuranium isotopes. Since the 1990s, all three former HEU
facilities are involved in down-blending HEU from weapons under the U.S.-Russian
HEU agreement. The facilities also produce 1.5 percent enriched blend stock for the
down-blending process. As of 1997, the complex was operating at 100 percent of
its capacity of 20 million SWU per year.
The Sverdlovsk-44 plant entered the Western enrichment market in 1973 and has
been the primary Russian producer of enrichment services for Western customers.122
The plant operates cascades that are dedicated to enriching natural (as opposed
to reprocessed) uranium and thus are not contaminated with reactor-generated
isotopes of uranium. Also, the plant has an infrastructure (a toll station, etc.) to
handle the cylinders for enriched uranium product that are standard in the West.
Sverdlovsk-44 is reportedly the only Russian facility with permission from
Gosatomnadzor to enrich uranium to 30 percent uranium-235. 123 (The other three
plants are permitted to enrich uranium only to 5 percent uranium-235.) As of 1995,
however, no uranium for research reactors or other HEU users was produced in
Sverdlovsk-44.
The Tomsk-7 plant, which in the past enriched uranium recovered from the
irradiated fuel of plutonium production reactors, has a contract with the French
company Cogema to increase the level of enrichment of uranium recovered in French
reprocessing plants to 4 percent uranium-235 for fabrication into reactor fuel in
102 Chapter 3
France. 124 Cogema has helped Tomsk-7 develop an infrastructure to service Western
clients. 125
Nuclear Weapons Development

Nuclear weapons research and development in Russia is the responsibility of
Minatom's Department of Nuclear Weapons Development and Testing (formerly,
the Fifth Main Directorate). The department manages the following six institutes:
the Institute of Experimental Physics (VNIIEF, Arzamas-16), the Institute of
Technical Physics (VNIITF, Chelyabinsk-70), the Institute of Automatics (VNIIA),
the Institute of Measurement Systems (NIl IS), the Institute of Impulse Technolo-
gIes (VNII IT), and the Design Bureau of Road Transportation Equipment
(KB ATO). The first three institutes are directly involved in weapons research
and development and scientific support of deployed weapons. The system of
weapons research and development centers in Russia resembles, to a certain
extent, the system of three national nuclear weapons laboratories in the United
States. 126 In particular, the missions and the history of the weapons centers in
Arzamas-16 and Chelyabinsk-70 are similar to those of the Los Alamos and
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories; the Institute of Automatics is often
compared to the Sandia National Laboratories. As discussed below, howeve~
considerable differences also exist between the Russian weapons institutes and the
U.S. national laboratories.
VNIIEF (Arzamas-16) The All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of

Experimental Physics has the status of Russia's federal nuclear center and is
Russia's oldest nuclear weapons research and development center. The institute's
history began in 1946, when the PGU established Design Bureau 11 (KB-11)
to design and build an actual nuclear weapon. 127 A decision was made to locate
the design bureau in the former Sarov monastery, 75 kilometers southwest of
Arzamas in the Nizhni Novgorod (formerly Gorky) oblast and 410 kilometers
from Moscow. The institute and its associated city are known as Arzamas-16.
In 1994, by a decree of the Russian government, the existence of the ZATO
of Arzamas-16 was made public. The city received the official name Kremlev, which
was later changed to Sarov. Arzamas-16 shares its restricted area of 232 square
kilometers with the weapons R&D institute and the Avangard warhead assembly-
disassembly facility. It has a population of 83,000, approximately 18,000 of whom
work in the Institute of Experimental Physics and 3,500 at the serial-production
plant.
Structurally, VNIIEF consists of three scientific and research departments

(NIOs),128 which form the scientific and research sector (NIS),'29 two design bureaus
(KB-1 and KB-2),'30 and two pilot production plants (the Kommunist plant and
the plant of high explosives, or Plant 2).131 From the very beginning, the institute's
principal mission has been to conduct nuclear weapons R&D and to provide sci-
entific support to nuclear weapons throughout their life cycle: development, pro-
duction, deployment, and dismantlement. The VNIIEF is considerably different
in many respects from its counterparts in the United States, the Los Alamos and
Livermore National Laboratories. The U.S. laboratories develop a physics package
that is subsequently transferred to the Sandia National Laboratory for weaponiza-
tion. In contrast, the VNIIEF conducts a complete weapons R&D cycle: from the-
oretical and computational research to making a prototype warhead and developing
technologies for its mass production. VNIIEF activities include theoretical and
applied physics research, warhead design, development of special materials, non-
nuclear and nuclear testing, surveillance of deployed weapons, and diagnosis and
resolution of problems arising during warhead dismantlement. 132
Responsibilities are divided among VNIIEF's departments and bureaus as follows.
The science and research departments, NIO-1 and NIO-2, conduct theoretical
research in the physics of nuclear weapons.133 The NIO-3 is the hydrodynamics
department and is responsible for computer modeling of nuclear explosion
processes. The design bureaus, KB-1 and KB-2, work on physics packages (nuclear
explosive assemblies) and warhead engineering, respectively.134 They are also respon-
sible for design documentation. The NIO-4, a part of the KB-1 bureau, is respon-
sible for experimental hydrodynamics and high-explosives experiments. 135 The
NIO-5 operates VNIIEF's nuclear research facilities. The NIO-13 conducts experi-
ments in physics of high densities and pressures using experimental laser and other
facilities. 136
The VNIIEF's Kommunist plant (also known as Plant 1) assembles prototype
warheads, and its high-explosives plant (Plant 2) produces explosive lenses for
experimental and prototype devices.137 VNIIEF also has a scientific research testing
complex (NIIK). NIIK's Departments 15 and 16 conduct nonnuclear testing of
physics packages and warheads.138 Prior to 1990, when the Soviet Union conducted
its last nuclear test, Department 14 was responsible for the preparation and execu-
tion of nuclear tests.139
VNIIEF experimental research facilities include electron accelerators; an air-
cooled uranium-graphite pulse reactor on fast neutrons, BIGR, which is capable of
producing pulses of 2,500 megajoules; two sodium-cooled pulse reactors on fast
104 Chapter 3
neutrons, BR-1 and BIR-2M, capable of producing 50 and 5 megajoules, respec-

tively; a homogeneous-solution pulse reactor, VIR-2M, producing up to 81 mega-
joules; a high-power pulse laser, SERAFIM; and a 120-terawatt, 12-channel laser
facility, ISKRA-5, capable of producing 30 kilojoules.
Director and science director share the responsibility for overseeing its work. As
of 2000, R. I. Il'kayev was VNIIEF's director '40 and V. N. Mikhailov was its science
director. '41 Since the beginning of KB-ll and until 1992 (prior to V. N. Mikhailov),
the position of science director was occupied by Yu. B. Khariton. Deputy Science
Director Yu. A. Trutnev is in charge of the institute's theoretical sector.142 In 2000,
VNIIEF's chief designers were S. N. Voronin (KB_1)'41 and G. N. Dmitriev (KB_2).'44
VNIITF (Chelyabinsk-70) The Russian Federal Nuclear Center-VNII of

Technical Physics (VNIITF) is Russia's second principal weapons design center. '45
The need for a second weapons center emerged in the early 1950s as a result of the
rapid expansion of soviet nuclear weapons development. The Soviet leadership was
concerned that the heavy workload would stress the Arzamas-16's capabilities and
degrade the quality of weapons R&D. A second center, on the other hand, would
improve the overall R&D quality through competition between the two institutes.
Another objective of establishing a second center was to increase the survivability
of the nuclear infrastructure in the event of war.
Scientific Research Institute 1011 (NIl-lOll), Chelyabinsk-70's original
name, was established by a joint decree of the Council of Ministers and the CPSU
Central Committee on 5 April 1955. The decision was made to locate the institute
at Lake Sinara, 80 kilometers south of Sverdlovsk (and 20 kilometers north of
Kasli). NIl-1011's first director was D. E. Vasilyev and its first science director was
K. I. Shchelkin.
In 1964, the institute was renamed the NIl of Device Building. On 28
February 1992, according to a classified presidential decree, it became the
Russian Federal Nuclear Center-VNII of Technical Physics (RFYaTs-VNIITF). The
associated town received a new name, Snezhinsk. 146 Chelyabinsk-70, however,
remains the conventional name for both the institute and the town. As of 1999,
the institute's director was G. N. Rykovanov, and E. N. Avrorin was its science
director. The chief designers were A. N. Averin (KB-1) and A. N. Sen'kin
(KB-2).
At the time of VNIITF's founding, approximately one-third of KB-ll 's personnel
were transferred to the new institute. The first specialists started to arrive at
Chelyabinsk-70 in August 1955, and by 1957, NIl-lOll had already successfully
tested its first explosive device. Relocation of personnel from Arzamas-16 to the
Urals continued until 1959.
The VNIITF's organizational structure is similar to that of VNIIEF and consists
of the science sector, including the Departments of Theoretical Physics (NIO-1 and
NIO-2) and the Department of Mathematics and Theoretical Hydrodynamics
(NIO-3), two design bureaus (KB-1 and KB-2), a scientific research testing complex
(NIIK), and the industrial production base,'47 which consists of the Division of
Material Science and two pilot production plants: Plant 1 produces electronic,
mechanical, and other components of nuclear warheads, and Plant 2 manufactures,
among other things, high-explosives components and assembles experimental and
prototype nuclear warheads. 148
The VNIITF's experimental base is somewhat inferior to that of VNIIEF.
Its pilot production facilities, however, were built later than those in Arzamas-
16 and are more modern. VNIITF's experimental facilities include a metal-core,
impulse fast reactor, BARS; two solution-type fast reactors, IGREK and YAGUAR;
an impulse electron accelerator, IGUR-3; an electric discharge facility, GNUV;
two X-ray facilities, KRUS and IRTP-2; and a multichannel laser facility, SOKOL-
2.
In addition, VNIITF conducts experiments on five impulse reactors at the
Institute of Device Building in Lytkarino (TIBR-1, BARS-2, BARS-3M, BARS-4,
and IRV). The VNIITF testing complex has conducted research for other Minatom
research institutes as well. Until recently, cooperative research projects were carried
out on the graphite impulse reactor IGR in Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan.
VNIIA (Moscow) The All-Russian Science and Research Institute of Automatics

(VNIIA) is the third warhead design institute. The institute was formed in 1953
from Design Bureau 25 (OKB-25), which was originally subordinated to the
Ministry of Aviation Industry, in response to the rapidly growing demand in the
area of firing systems. Its first chief designer was N. L. Dukhov, who, prior to this
assignment, had been chief designer in the KB-11. After Dukhov's death, the chief
designer position was occupied by V. A. Zuevsky and A. A. Brish. As of 2000, Yu.
P. Barmakov and G. A. Smirnov served as the institute's director and chief designer,
respectively.
The Institute of Automatics develops nuclear warheads based on physics pack-
ages designed in the VNIIEF and VNIITF. It is also the leading design institute in
the area of automatic components, neutron generators, firing circuitry, and special
pyrotechnic and explosive devices. 149
106 Chapter 3
Other Minaton Institutes In addition to the three institutes (VNIIEF, VNIITF, and
VNIIA) that directly design nuclear weapons and their components, the Department
of Nuclear Weapons Development and Testing includes two more research institutes
and a design bureau.
The Scientific Research Institute of Measurement Systems (NIl IS) in Nizhni
Novgorod develops certain radio-electronic components of nuclear warheads. The
institute was formed on 23 February 1966 as a branch of the Arzamas-16 design
bureau from the Special Design Bureau of Plant 326, which previously belonged to
the Ministry of Radio Industry.150
The Design Bureau of Road Transportation Equipment (KB ATO) in Mytischy,
Moscow oblast, designs equipment for transporting nuclear weapons, including
specialized trucks, as well as warhead storage and transportation containers. It
was established on 25 March 1963 from the Special Design and Technology Bureau
and an affiliated pilot production plant that previously belonged to the Moscow
Regional Economic Authorities (Mosoblsovnarkhoz).151
The Institute of Impulse Technologies (NIl IT) develops measurement systems for
registering high-speed processes taking place in nuclear tests. It branched out from
the KB-ll in the late 1950s or early 1960s.
Nuclear Warhead Assembly

The first set of nuclear explosive devices was produced by the KB-ll's experimental
pilot facility in Arzamas-16. Between December 1949 and March 1950, the KB-ll
assembled five RDS-1-based nuclear bombs (Item 501). Even before the first nuclear
test, however, the First Main Directorate had begun developing the capability to
mass-produce nuclear weapons. The first discussions regarding the location of a
serial assembly plant for such weapons had already taken place in 1947. The initial
proposal was to establish such a plant at Plant 253, which was subordinated to
PGU. Eventually, howeve~ the decision was made to build a warhead production
facility close to the KB-ll, thereby allowing for close interactions between design-
ers and manufacturers of nuclear weapons.
The first nuclear warhead production facility, Avangard, was established in March
1949 and produced its first output in December 1951.152 Prior to the completion
of Avangard, warhead assembly continued at the KB-11. (Thereafte~ the KB-ll
continued to assemble nonserial and experimental devices.)
The increasing size and diversity of the nuclear arsenal called for an expansion
of the warhead production complex. In 1954, a decision was made to build a device-
building plant in Penza-19 that was to specialize in electrical-mechanical and elec-
tronic components and subassemblies of nuclear warheads. 153 A complex of warhead

design and production facilities also was developed in the Urals and in Siberia
(Chelyabinsk-70, Sverdlovsk-45, Zlatoust-36, and Novosibirsk). In the late 1950s,
Plant 48 in Moscow (currently, the Molniya Scientific Production Association),
which was producing bomb casings and automatic components of nuclear war-
heads, was modernized and expanded. 154 In 1955, the serial-production complex
was separated organizationally and became Minsredmash's Sixth Main Directorate.
The directorate's first head was V. I. Alferov, who prior to this assignment had been
director of one of the divisions of the Avangard plant.
The Sixth Main Directorate became the current Department of Nuclear Weapons
Production, which is responsible for the serial production of nuclear warheads and
their technical maintenance and disassembly. It consists of eight facilities: the
Electrokhimpribor Combine (Sverdlovsk-45), the Start Production Association
(Penza-19), a device-building plant (Zlatoust-36), the Avangard Electromechanical
Plant (Arzamas-16), the Molniya Scientific Production Association (Moscow), the
Sever Production Association (Novosibirsk), the Urals Electromechanical Plant
(Yekaterinburg), and the Nizhnyaya Tura Machine-Building Plant (Nizhnyaya
Tura).155
The Avangard Electromechanical Plant (Arzamas-16) On 14 February 1950, the

CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers jointly issued a decree
establishing on the KB-ll site a serial production plant, Plant 551 of USSR's
Glavstroy (subordinated to the Construction Ministry).'56 The plant was established
to produce Item SOl-type nuclear bombs based on the RDS-1 device, modified for
serial production. Plant 551 was designed to have a capacity of producing 20 Item
501 weapons per yearY7
The plant's warhead assembly activities were conducted in close cooperation with
other facilities. Plant 219 of the Ministry of Aviation Industry (Minaviaprom) in Bal-
ashikha cast metal casings for explosive devices. After machining, casings
were sent to the Bolshevik plant in Leningrad for assembly. Plant 12 in Electrostal
produced uranium components. Plant 48 in Moscow made aerodynamic casings.
Minaviaprom's Plant 25, which was specializing in avionics equipment, produced
automatic components for both physics packages and nuclear bombs. Plant 80 in
Dzerzhinsk (Gorky oblast) manufactured high-explosives components designed by
the KB-11. Combine 817 in Chelyabinsk-65 manufactured plutonium components.
Plant 551 was responsible for the final assembly of physics packages and finished
weapons.
108 Chapter 3
Item 501 bombs, the production of which started at Plant 551 in December 1951,
continued to be hand-assembledYs In April 1954, in accordance with a govern-
mental decree, the plant started to assemble RDS-2-based gravity bombs. (This
production, however, did not last long. 159 ) In 1954, the plant, which at that time
was renamed Plant 3, started producing bombs based on the RDS-3/RDS-3T.'60
Plant 3's first director was V.1. Alferov, who previously had been the KB-ll's deputy
chief designer and deputy director.
In addition to nuclear weapons assembly, the Avangard plant also produced
neutron sources. In the 1960s, Avangard began to manufacture radio-isotope
sources of energy for space applications and physical security equipment. 161
The Start Production Association (Penza-19) On 20 July 1954, the USSR Council
of Ministers approved a decree calling for the establishment of a dedicated facility
to manufacture electronic warhead components that were designed by Design
Bureau OKB-25 in Moscow (currently, the Institute of Automatics, or VNIIA). A
decision was made to locate the facility, to be known as Plant 592, at the railway
station Seliksa (currently, Zarechny) near Penza. Construction on the plant began
in April 1955, and it produced its first products in 1958. The plant's first director
was M. V. Protsenko, who occupied this position until 1989.
In the 1960s, the plant was renamed the Penza Device-Building Plant, and later,
this plant was the basis for establishing the Start Production Association. In addi-
tion to the device-building plant, Start also included the Kuznetsk Machine-
Building Plant, which produced specialized equipment for the warhead pro-
duction complex.
At present, Start manufactures firing systems, permissive-action link devices, and
other electromechanical and electronic components and subassemblies of nuclear
weapons. In addition, the facility produces physical protection equipment and auto-
mated instrumentation and control systems. 162
The Electrokhimpribor Combine (Sverdlovsk-45) The Electrokhimpribor

Combine became involved in nuclear weapons production in the late 1950s and, in
many respects, duplicated the Avangard Electromechanical Plant in Arzamas-16.
The combine assembles physics packages and warheads from components and sub-
assemblies supplied by facilities of the Fourth and Sixth Main Directorates and by
the Dzerzhinsk High-Explosives Plant.
The Molniya Production Association (Moscow) The Molniya Scientific Pro-

duction Association (NPO) was formed from Plant 48, which was transferred
to the nuclear complex in 1948 to manufacture ballistic outer casings of nuclear
bombs. Subsequently, the Molniya Plant started to manufacture subassemblies of
automatic components of nuclear warheads. In 1989, the Molnia plant was used as
the foundation for the Molniya NPO, which also included plants in Plavsk and
Makhachkala. '63
The Device-Building Plant (Zlatoust-36) The device-building plant in Trekhgorny

assembles nuclear warheads from physics packages produced by other plants of
Minatom's Department of Nuclear Weapons Production. 164 The plant may also man-
ufacture depleted-uranium components of nuclear warheads. 165
The Sever Production Association (Novosibirsk) In 1954, a decision was made to

establish a facility in Novosibirsk that, like the Molniya Plant in Moscow, would
manufacture automatic subassemblies and equipment. The plant, currently the Sever
Production Association, began production in 1958. 166
The Urals Electromechanical Plant In 1957, the Ministry of Shipbuilding trans-

ferred to Minsredmash its communication equipment plant in Sverdlovsk. After the
transfe~ the plant, renamed the Urals Electromechanical Plant, began to manufac-
ture precision mechanical, electronic, and electric components and subassemblies
for nuclear weapons. 167
The Nuclear Weapons Life Cycle
During the early years of the nuclear program, the military's role was to support
nuclear testing and to collect information regarding the effects of nuclear weapons
on living organisms, military equipment, and buildings. This work was conducted
by the 12th Department of the General Staff, which was established especially for
those purposes. Its first chief was General V. A. Bolyatko.
Although the first serially produced nuclear warheads in the Soviet Union were
considered available for use by the military, the military did not have operational
control of these weapons. Instead, the weapons were controlled by the specially
established 12th Main Directorate of the PGU (subsequently, the 12th Main Direc-
torate of Minsredmash). The warheads were stored at Pilot Production Plant 2 of
110 Chapter 3
the KB-1l.'68 The bombs were stored in a state of incomplete assembly-that is,
they were stored without the central metal assembly, detonators, and neutron gen-
erators. According to war plans of that period, the Plant 2 would transfer weapons
to the military after receiving an order from the government.
The responsibility for planning nuclear strikes was assigned to the Sixth Main
Directorate of the Ministry of Defense, which had been formed in the 1950s from
the 12th Department of the General Staff. The directorate also had a department
responsible for the development of ballistic missiles. General V. A. Bolyatko became
the directorate's first head. 169
In the early 1950s, preparations began for increasing the Ministry of Defense's
role in weapons development and production. In May 1951, a group of military
certification officers responsible for quality control of warhead materials, compo-
nents, and subassemblies started working in Arzamas-16. 170 In early 1952, Arzamas-
16 initiated courses to train specialists in the area of warhead maintenance and
diagnostics. Graduates of these courses subsequently formed a special unit that was
transferred to the Ministry of Defense.
By the mid-1950s, nuclear weapons designers were capable of producing explo-
sive devices suitable for incorporation into tactical weapons systems. Although
tactical weapons were intended to provide direct support to battlefield troops, in
the beginning they were in the custody of the Minsredmash's 12th Main Directorate
and could be released to the troops only by a special order from the State Defense
Committee. 17l
In 1957, Minsredmash established a Main Directorate, which became respon-
sible for quality assurance during the warhead manufacturing phase as well as
maintenance and surveillance of deployed warheads. The directorate's other respon-
sibilities included the training of technical military personnel and the construction
and operation of nuclear weapons storage facilities. The new directorate was staffed
with Ministry of Defense personnel. l72
After Minsredmash established a new Main Directorate, the Soviet Union's serial
production plants started sending nuclear weapons to the directorate's storage facil-
ities. From the storage facilities, the directorate's personnel delivered warheads to
military units and mated them with delivery systems. It was also responsible for
servicing warheads and making final preparations for their use. During the same
period, the Ministry of Defense's Sixth Main Directorate, which had been used as
the basis for establishing Minsredmash's Main Directorate, was disbanded, and its
functions were transferred to the newly established Sixth Directorates of the General
Staffs of the appropriate military services. l73
In 1959, Minsredmash's Main Directorate was transferred back to the Ministry

of Defense. In December 1959, it was absorbed by the newly created Strategic
Rocket Forces. This important part of the nuclear weapons complex regained its
status as Main Directorate of the Ministry of Defense in 1974, and it is currently
known as the Ministry of Defense's 12th Main Directorate (12th GUMO).'74 In
2000, in an effort to standardize the safety and security of nuclear weapons in the
Ministry of Defense, the 12th Main Directorate took over warhead management
responsibilities from the Sixth Main Directorates of the Navy, Air Force, and
Strategic Rocket Forces. 175
The transfer of nuclear weapons to the control of the military has resulted in
fundamental changes in the warhead development and production cycle, which over
time has acquired its current features.
Nuclear Warhead Design

The design institutes of the Fifth Main Directorate of Minatom (and Minsredmash
in the past) begin to work on a new design only after the customer, the Ministry
of Defense's 12th Main Directorate, provides performance specifications for a
planned weapon. The 12th Main Directorate's requirements are determined on
the basis of technical specifications, which are developed by the Sixth Directorate
(in cooperation with other directorates) of the service of the armed forces for
which the weapon will be produced. '76 Performance specifications set forth
the general requirements for a new warhead, including its yield, weight, and
dimensions.
In producing tactical and technical requirements for planned weapons, the Min-
istry of Defense's 12th Main Directorate closely coordinates its work with warhead
designers from Minatom's Department of Nuclear Weapons Development and
Testing. 177 Finally, the requirements are approved by the Minister of Defense
and handed over to Minatom's warhead design institutes. At that point, tactical and
technical specifications include such parameters as the warhead's expected yield,178
its weight and dimensions, the level of reliability expected, its principal life cycle
parameters (warranty and maintenance intervals), and its safety and control fea-
tures (permissive-action links, safety features, etc.).179
After the tactical and technical requirements have been approved by the Ministry
of Defense and coordinated with Minatom, the Institute of Experimental Physics
(VNIIEF) in Arzamas-16 and the Institute of Technical Physics (VNIITF) in
Chelyabinsk-70 begin R&D to determine a conceptual design that will satisfy the
requirements yo The physics concept for a new warhead is developed by a small
112 Chapter 3
"author group." The chief theorist, who leads this group, supervises the warhead
design process from the theoretical research stage to the beginning of serial
production (if the design reaches this stage).'8 ' The progress is also controlled
by an on-site representative of Ministry of Defense's 12th Main Directorate, who
serves on the staff of the senior military representative assigned to the design
institute. 182
The physics and design concepts of new nuclear devices (both its primary and
secondary subassemblies) are developed by the NIO-1 andlor NIO-2 departments
of one of the research institutes. 183 Another research department, the NIO-3, which
specializes in theoretical hydrodynamics, uses computer simulations to verify the
design principles. 184 The results of these simulations are later applied to evaluate
test data. 1ss
Upon completion of R&D, the results are transferred to Design Bureau 1 (KB-
1)186 of the same institute, which is responsible for designing a physics package. 1s7
Typically, in working on a new device, designers employ standard electronic and
automatic components and subassemblies that have been developed by one of the
warhead design institutes and are produced serially.1ss The design bureau subse-
quently manufactures a pilot unit of the explosive device at its manufacturing
facilities. 1s9
After a working design is developed, KB-1 designers may modify the design, if
necessary, to take into account the existing technical capabilities of the serial-
production facilities. 190 After that, the pilot unit is subjected to environmental, accel-
erated aging, and mechanical tests althe facilities of the institute's NIO-15 and NIO-
16 departments. 191
Before 1990, when the Soviet Union stopped nuclear testing, new devices were
transferred to the NIO-14 department for nuclear testing."2 Nuclear test data were
fed back to the institute's theoretical department for analysis.in One of the most
important pieces of data would be the correlation between the projected and actual
yields of the device. A significant difference in those yields would trigger additional
R&D to establish the cause the problem and to identify ways of dealing with it.
After the KB-1 redesigned the device (if necessary), a new cycle of nonnuclear and
nuclear tests would be carried out. (As warhead design expertise and experience
have increased over the years, the number of deviations in expected and actual yields
has decreased. By the late 1980s, design and observed yields were in agreement in
93-95 percent of all tests.)194 If the data are in agreement, the KB-1 begins engi-
neering work on of the physics package. 195
At all stages of the development of a new device, the work of the research insti-
tute to which the design project is assigned (for example, VNIITF) is supervised by
representatives of the other warhead design institute. l96 According to long-
established practice, special attention is paid to design features that would permit
safe and simple procedures for dismantling the warhead at the end of its life. Incor-
porating these features is a mandatory part of the design process. 197
Once the design for the new device is approved, the KB-l transfers the design
documentation for the device (and, if necessary, its subassemblies and components)
to Design Bureau 2 (KB-2) for weaponization. 198 The KB-l and KB-2 involved in a
particular project do not necessarily belong to the same institute: in some cases, for
example, the KB-2 of Arzamas-16 built a warhead from a physics package designed
by the KB-l of Chelyabinsk-70, and vice versa. '99
At the beginning of the development process for a particular weapon, Minatom
designates which assembly plant of its Sixth Main Directorate would be responsi-
ble for serial production of the weapon. 2OO In the final stage of the warhead design
process, the design bureau of the assembly plant develops equipment and techno-
logical processes that will be implemented during the serial production.201
Representatives of the 12th Main Directorate of the Ministry of Defense control
both the R&D for and the serial production of nuclear warheads.202 The produc-
tion plant assigned to produce the weapon provides an assembled warhead for
certification to a special commission consisting of the senior military representative
at the assembly plant, the military representative supervising the production of war-
heads of a given type, the chief designer or his representative, and a representative
of the assembly plan!.203
Warhead Management in the Ministry of Defense

After the special commission signs a form indicating that it accepts the warhead, it
is placed, along with any required accessories, in a transportation container, which
is sealed and transferred to a representative of the 12th Main Directorate. The
container then is placed in one of the 12th Main Directorate's storage facilities. In
the case of the Sverdlovsk-45 production complex, the storage facility is collocated
with the assem bly plant inside the closed city.204
From the storage facility of the 12th Main Directorate, warheads are transferred
to the Sixth Directorate of the service for which they are intended. This procedure
includes loading warheads on a special train and delivering them to a centralized
storage facility of the Sixth Directorate of the service involved.2 0s
114 Chapter 3
The Sixth Directorate of each service keeps the 12th Main Directorate informed
about all operations involving the nuclear warheads in its possession, such as their
maintenance and their movements from the storage facility to front-line units
and back. The 12th Main Directorate thus has complete knowledge at all times
of the location and technical status of every single warhead throughout its life
cycle.206
More than 500 specialized nuclear weapons storage facilities, including national
stockpile storage sites, regional storage facilities, and facilities associated with front-
line units, are believed to have existed in the Soviet Union and its East European
allied countries.207 At present, nuclear weapons are stored in approximately 80 loca-
tions in Russia, most of them centralized warhead storage facilities.
Approximately 30 storage sites (half of which are operational at present) were
controlled by the 12th Main Directorate as national stockpile storage facilities.
Many were constructed deep inside Russia, and a number are associated with the
serial-warhead-production complexes in Zlatoust-36 and Sverdlovsk-45. A typical
national stockpile storage facility, also known as an "Installation S," is a group of
storage bunkers located inside a protected area. The protected area also houses a
residential area, barracks for the military personnel, and various technical and
support areas.
Regional storage facilities of individual armed services are located in every mili-
tary district, each of the Navy's fleets, every Strategic Rocket Forces army, and each
strategic aviation regiment.20s An example of a typical regional storage facility built
in the 1960s (the period when the majority of these storage facilities were con-
structed)209 is the nuclear weapons storage facility near Berdichev in Ukraine. "[The]
site consists of a double-fenced area measuring approximately 4,900 by 1,650 feet
and a small single-fenced support area. The double-fenced area contains two cruci-
form buildings, a drive-through checkout building, and a small unidentified build-
ing. Each [of the two cruciform buildings, measuring 175 by 190 feet] is a heavily
constructed drive-through building and is encircled by a road. The support area
consists of an administration building and four support buildings."21o
A release of warheads from centralized storage facilities to combat units for
deployment is conducted under orders from the Sixth Directorate of the respective
service and is coordinated with the 12th Main Directorate.211 A release order is
issued on request from the Directorate of Operations of the service involved. When
requesting deployment, the Directorate of Operations acts on the basis of General
Staff's plans regarding combat readiness or a large-scale exercise, or, in the time of
war or crisis, according to the Plan of Operations. According to Soviet practice, in
peacetime, nuclear weapons of the Ground Forces and the Air Forces were kept in
central storage facilities and not with combat units.
In the fall of 1991, according to unilateral initiatives by the U.S. and Soviet pres-
idents, the Soviet Union started to remove from nuclear-technical units nuclear
artillery shells, mines, and warheads of tactical ballistic missiles for the purpose of
eliminating them. In addition, the Soviet Union began to consolidate in centralized
storage facilities tactical weapons from front-line units of the Navy and the Air
Defense Forces. The consolidation process was largely completed by the end of
1993.
Warhead Dismantlement
At the end of a warhead's warranty life, the Sixth Directorate of the service to which
the warhead is assigned returns it to the 12th Main Directorate, which ships the
warhead to a storage facility collocated with the dismantlement plant associated
with whichever plant of Minatom's Sixth Main Directorate originally assembled the
warhead. 212 The plant then receives the warhead for dismantlement, and the
warhead is transferred from the storage facility to the plant's disassembly cells.
The first step in the warhead dismantlement process is a separation of its physics
package from the rest of the warhead. After that, the warhead primary is separated
and is taken apart. The disassembly of its primary begins with a removal of its outer
casing, electric blankets, and its firing system (detonators and cables). Then, plant
technicians remove the primary's high-explosives components to gain access to the
metallic core and disassemble that into its tamper, reflector, and pit components.
The fissile-material components are placed in storage containers. 213 On average,
three to four containers are required to accommodate fissile-material components
from one warhead. Fissile materials are currently stored in the form of warhead
components. 214 In the future, howeve~ they will be converted to forms that will be
more convenient for storage and will allow international transparency.
Chemical and radioactive wastes generated in the course of dismantlement are
stabilized, compacted, and disposed of. Warhead components and subassemblies are
transferred for further disassembly and storage or disposition to the corresponding
manufacturing facilities.
After the warhead has been disassembled, members of a special commission sign
a form that confirms its dismantlement. Copies of the form are sent to Minatom
and the 12th Main Directorate. This ends the warhead's life cycle.
4
The Strategic Rocket Forces
The History of the Strategic Rocket Forces
Rocket Technology in the 1930s-1950s

The foundation for Soviet rocket technology was laid during the years preceding
World War 11. In the late 1920s and early 1930s, work in this field was concen-
trated at the Gas Dynamics Laboratory (GDL) in Leningrad and the Rocket Propul-
sion Study Group (GIRD) in Moscow. The laboratory in Leningrad, which became
the first state rocket laboratory, was established on 21 May 1921 by a decision of
the Council of People's Commissars to develop the inventions of N. I. Tikhomirov,
a chemical engineer who had come up with technology for creating rocket projec-
tiles that used smokeless powder. In June 1928 it was renamed the Gas Dynamics
Laboratory of the Military Scientific Research Committee of the USSR Revolution-
ary Military Council, and in 1931 it became part of the Military Inventions Direc-
torate of the Technical Headquarters of the Director of Armaments of the Red Army.
GIRD was formed in September 1931 in Moscow as a team of enthusiasts from the
Society for the Advancement of Aviation and Chemistry (Osoaviakhim). After
summer 1932 GIRD worked in close contact with the Military Inventions Direc-
torate of the Red Army. The first head of the GIRD Scientific and Technical Council
was F. A. Tsander, who was succeeded by S. P. Korolev in November 1931. GDL
and GIRD were united in 1933 to create the Scientific Research Institute of Rocket
Propulsion (RN11), headed by former GDL Director I. T. Kleymenov. The RN11 was
originally under the jurisdiction of the People's Commissariat of Naval Affairs, but
it soon became accountable to the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry and
was renamed Nl1-3. '
The prewar projects were not sufficiently advanced enough to enable anything
close to the actual development of long-range ballistic missiles. Most focused
118 Chapter 4
on solid-propellant unguided rockets and, to a lesser degree, on cruise missiles

with liquid-fuel rocket engines. The repression of NII-3's administrators and
many of its leading researchers in 1937-1938 also affected the course of the work.
Nevertheless, the group of scientists and engineering personnel that later played a
decisive role in the development of rocket technology took shape in the prewar
years.2
Germany's use of its A-4 (V-2) rockets in the last stages of World War II gave the
rocket development efforts in the Soviet Union a powerful new momentum. 3 At first,
the future military role of ballistic missiles was unclear, since missiles were far infe-
rior to aircraft in terms of range and accuracy (the German experience in this respect
was more negative than positive). In spite of this, the rocket technology projects in
the USSR were the focus of considerable interest. The invulnerability of ballistic
missiles to existing antiaircraft weapons provided hope that missiles could become
an effective weapon in the future, after their combat characteristics had been
improved.
Another important factor contributing to the attention paid to missile develop-
ment in the USSR was the existence of an organization that had a direct interest in
this development: the Guard Rocket Launcher Units (Gvardeyskiye Minometnyie
Chasti, or GMCh), which had been created during the war as part of the artillery.
Its leaders, in particular a member of the GMCh Military Council, Major General
L. M. Gaydukov, insisted on a thorough analysis of the German experience in long-
range ballistic rockets development and the importance of pursuing similar projects
in the Soviet Union.
The state program for the development of long-range ballistic missiles was offi-
cially authorized by a USSR Council of Ministers decree of 13 May 1946, "Ques-
tions of Rocket-Propelled Armaments." 4 The decree authorized the establishment
of the missile development industrial infrastructure and set up the military struc-
tures that would be responsible for the testing, acquisition, and maintenance of mis-
siles. The program's first task was to be the reproduction of German rockets: the
A-4 ballistic missile and the Wasserfall antiaircraft rocket. It was assumed that the
experience gained through these reproductions could then be used for development
of indigenous missiles. In the initial stages of the work, Soviet engineers extensively
used German specialists and captured equipment and parts and were thereby able
to assemble several A-4 missiles, which were flight-tested in 1947-1948.
The first Soviet missile system,s with an R-l rocket, code-numbered 8All, was
developed at NII-88 of the Ministry of Defense Industry in 1947-1950.6 The
The Strategic Rocket Forces 119
R-1 (SS-1)7 was an exact copy of the German A-4 rocket, but it had been built
independently at the Soviet production facilities and used domestic materials and
technology. Tests of the R-1 system began on 17 September 1948 and ended in
October 1949. The system was accepted for service by a government decree on 25
November 1950. The R-1 had a conventional explosive device weighing 785 kilo-
grams, and at its maximum range of 270 kilometers it had an accuracy of 5 kilo-
meters downrange and 4 kilometers cross-range. 8
The missile's short range was determined by the design of the original A-4 missile,
which included fuel and oxidizer tanks located inside the missile body, which sub-
stantially increased the missile's dry weight. In addition, since the warhead did not
separate from the missile during flight, the missile's body had to withstand signifi-
cant aerodynamic load during reentry, which further increased the missile's weight.
These drawbacks of the R-1 design were evident even before the start of the project,
but the government instructions had given the developers no choice, ordering them
to make an exact copy of the German prototype.
By 1946 the work on the R-2 (SS-2) system, with considerably improved design,
had already begun, parallel to the assembly of the A-4 and the development of
the R-1. The R-2 was the first missile with a separable warhead and an integral
fuel tank. 9 Radio-assisted guidance resulted in improved cross-range accuracy. The
engine thrust and specific thrust were also improved by increasing the alcohol
content of the fuel, the combustion chamber pressure, and the nozzle expansion
ratio. All of these changes more than doubled the range without affecting relative
accuracy (at the maximum range of 576 kilometers, the maximum downrange
deviation was 8 kilometers and maximum cross-range deviation was 4 kilometers).
The R-2 design was the first to use aluminum alloys, considerably reducing the
missile's dry mass. Flight tests of the R-2 system, code-numbered 8Zh38, began in
September 1949, and the missile was accepted for service on 27 November 1951.10
Although the R-2 system had better technical characteristics than the R-1, its
operational performance was far from satisfactory. The complex was slow and vul-
nerable because of the numerous facilities required to launch the missile, including
cryogenic equipment for handling liquid oxygen and equipment for radio guidance.
The ground equipment necessary for a launch consisted of more than 20 different
vehicles. Launch preparations took up to six hours, including about four hours on
the launch site. 11
The need to create a missile system satisfying tactical requirements more
completely led to a decision in 1951 to develop the R-ll system (SS-1b Scud A).
120 Chapter 4
The new system, which was also developed by NII-88, used a storable oxidizer
(nitric acid) and had an autonomous inertial guidance system and better ground
equipment than previous systems. The R-ll had the same range and yield as the R-
1 but was much lighter and more convenient to use.
Flight tests of the R-11 missile and its associated ground equipment were carried
out from April 1953 to February 1956." On 13 July 1956 the missile system, code-
numbered 8A61, was accepted for service." The R-ll was the first in a series of
tactical and theater missiles that remained in the Ground Forces after the Strategic
Rocket Forces were established as a separate service.
Efforts to increase the range of missiles accompanied the improvements in their
performance. Among the steps in this direction was the development of the R-5
(55-3) missile, which had a range of 1,200 kilometers: double that of the R-2.
The R-5 project was a spin-off of another project intended to develop the R-3
missile, with a projected range of 3,000 kilometers, that was conducted in
1947-1949. Work on the R-3 proved that development of a single-stage missile with
a range of 3,000 kilometers was technically possible but impractical, as this range
could be achieved more easily with two-stage missiles, which could also approach
intercontinental ranges. As a result, the R-3 program was terminated, and a deci-
sion was made to develop a single-stage R-5 missile with a 1,200-kilometer range
instead.
The blueprints of the R-5 missile were ready by October 1951. The R-5's design
integrated both fuel and oxidizer tanks with the missile body. The autonomous
inertial guidance system that worked in tandem with radio guidance to provide
cross-range corrections provided an accuracy of 1.5 kilometers downrange and
1.25 kilometers cross-range. Flight tests of the system, code-numbered 8A62, began
on 15 March 1953 and continued until February 1955. 14 The conventional version
of the missile was never accepted for service, because during its development it
became possible to deploy the missile with a nuclear warhead.
The first efforts toward development of "special" warheads for ballistic missiles
began in 1952-1953. The Geran and Generator R&D projects involved experi-
mental launches of the R-2 missile, which were carried out in 1953-1956. Missile
warheads used in the tests contained radioactive liquid that was to be dispersed over
the target. These research projects were later terminatedY
The first Soviet missile to carry an actual nuclear warhead was a direct follow-
on to the R-5 missile. Flight tests of the new missile, designated R-5M (55-3), began
in January 1955 and ended in 1956. During the flight tests, the 50viet Union carried
out its first full-scale test of a nuclear warhead delivered by a ballistic missile. An
R-5M missile with a nuclear warhead was launched from the Kapustin Yar test
range on 2 February 1956 and detonated in the designated area near Lake Balkhash.
The R-5M missile system was accepted for service on 21 June 1956.
By modern standards, missiles of the R-5 class are considered intermediate-range,
but at the time of its development R-5 was considered the first strategic missile,
because its range of 1,200 kilometers allowed it to be used against strategic targets
in Europe. After the first nuclear and nonnuclear missile systems capable of strik-
ing targets in the nearby theaters of war entered active service, the Soviet Union
concentrated its efforts on the development of intercontinental missiles.
The First Intercontinental Missiles

Soviet designers undertook research aimed at exploring various designs for mis-
siles capable of reaching intercontinental ranges in 1950. Among the considered
configurations were cruise missiles, multiple-stage ballistic missiles, and missiles
with a maneuverable (cruise) second stage. The results of the R&D were summed
up in a 1954 governmental decree that called for the development of the inter-
continental Buran (V-350) and Burya (Device 40) cruise missiles and R-7 ballistic
missile. 16
The research stage of the work on intercontinental delivery systems coincided
with the development of nuclear and thermonuclear warheads that could be carried
by the new missiles. Shortly after the first test of a thermonuclear warhead in 1953,
the technical specifications of the R-7 missile were reconsidered to increase its
payload to 5.5 tons from the 3 tons previously specified. This would allow the
missile to carry a nuclear warhead instead of a 3-ton conventional one. To achieve
the new payload specification, the missile's launch weight had to be increased from
180 to 280 tons.
The R-7 (SS-6) intercontinental missile used parallel staging, so the missile con-
sisted of a central module and four peripheral modules arranged symmetrically
around it. This arrangement of stages was a compromise that imposed significant
cost in terms of weight efficiency but allowed all the stages to be fired on the ground.
Flight tests of the R-7 missile began on 15 May 1957 and was completed on 27
November 1959. On 20 January 1960 the missile system was accepted for service
with the Strategic Rocket Forces (RVSN), which had been established as a separate
military service of the Soviet armed forces just a few days before, on 17 December
1959.
The R-7 missile was not only the first intercontinental missile in the world, but
also its first space launch vehicle. The world's first artificial satellites, the PS-1 and
122 Chapter 4
PS-2, were launched into orbit during the tests of that missile on 4 October and 3
November 1957. The space launch was performed by 8K71PS rockets, which were
slightly modified versions of the R-7 missile.
In 1958-1960 the R-7 was replaced by a follow-on, the R-7A (8K74) missile,
which had a longer range (12,000 kilometers rather than only 8,000) and improved
accuracy. The flight tests of the R-7 A were conducted from December 1959 to July
1960, and it was accepted for service in September 1960.
After the success of the ballistic missile development program with the R-7 and
R-7 A, the Soviets terminated their intercontinental cruise missile program in 1959,
despite successful tests of the Burya cruise missile conducted that same year. (The
competing Buran project had been canceled even earlie~ in 1958.) Cruise missiles
were determined to be inferior to ballistic missiles because of their slower speed and
greater vulnerability, so there was no longer a need to pursue the cruise missile
research.
Preparations for deployment of the R-7 began long before the missile was
accepted for service. A government decree of 11 January 1957 authorized con-
struction of the Angara installation, an operational missile base for the first missile
regiment. To achieve maximum coverage of the u.s. territory,17 the installation was
located in the Plesetsk region of Arkhangelsk oblast in the north of the European
part of the USSR. The location chosen also had existing transport infrastructure
that could be used for the delivery of equipment and missiles.
The R-7 and R-7A were deployed on a very limited scale, primarily because of
the extremely high construction costs of the launch complexes they required. At
some point the Soviet leadership even considered termination of the Angara con-
struction because of the expense involved. As a result, only three launch complexes
with four launchers for the R-7 and R-7A were ever completed. These missile
systems entered service between January 1960 and July 1961. In addition, two
R-7 launch complexes were constructed on the Fifth Scientific Research Test Range
of the Ministry of Defense (later known as the Baykonur Space Center). One of
the Baykonur launch complexes was used during the flight tests of the missile in
1957-1959; the other was completed in October 1960. Starting in 1960, the R-7
launch complexes at Baykonur were used only for space launches, although they
could have been used for combat missiles in a time of crisis.'S The R-7A launch
complexes in Plesetsk were also turned over for use in space launches in 1963-1964.
The combat effectiveness of the first ICBMs of the R-7-class was far from
adequate. The large size of the missiles and launch pads, the long prelaunch
preparations they required, and their rather poor accuracy meant that they could
be used mainly as a means of psychological and political pressure. Subsequent devel-
opment of strategic missiles focused on improving missile systems to enhance their
combat and operational capabilities.
The Main Stages in the Development of Strategic Missiles

The history of the development of strategic nuclear weapons that followed the
deployment of the R-7 missiles (and of the RVSN) can be divided into several stages,
each connected with the deployment of a new generation of missile systems and the
corresponding changes in the organizational structure of the rocket forces and the
principles of their operations. During the first stage (1959-1965) intermediate- and
intercontinental-range missiles were being deployed in so-called group-start launch
complexes. The massive deployment of silo-based intercontinental missiles charac-
terized the second stage (1965-1973). This allowed the Soviet Union to achieve
parity with the United States in the number of deployed land-based ballistic mis-
siles. The second stage ended with the conclusion of the first strategic arms limita-
tion agreement (SALT I), which effectively froze the structure of the land-based
ICBM group in terms of the total number of ICBM silos, their locations, and the
number of heavy missiles. The third stage (1973-1985) was marked by the deploy-
ment of ICBMs with multiple warheads (MIRVs) and mobile intermediate-range
missiles. During the fourth stage (1985-1991), the Strategic Rocket Forces acquired
new silo-based and mobile missiles with higher combat effectiveness and surviv-
ability, and intermediate-range missiles were eliminated as the result of the Inter-
mediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, signed in 1987. The fifth stage, which began in 1991,
has been connected with the conclusion of strategic arms reduction treaties (START
I and START II). It has been marked by a considerable reduction in the RVSN force
and by changes in its structure. This stage may eventually include the complete
elimination of MIRVed missile systems and heavy missiles in particular. Figure 4.1
shows the main stages of development and the service life of the Soviet and Russian
missile systems.
1959-1965 The first stage of RVSN development was marked by a buildup of the
intermediate- and intercontinental-range missile force. Among the distinct features
of the first-generation missile systems is the structure of their launch complexes,
which included several launchers located close to each other. The survivability of
ICBMs, that is their capability to withstand a nuclear attack, which was very low
124 Chapter 4
1955 1000 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1980 1985 2000
R-5t\1 (SS-3)
R-7 (SS-6)
R-7A(SS-6)
R-12 (SS-4)
R-12U(SS-4)
=-
=
-
R-14 (SS-5)
R-14U(SS-5)
=
R-16 (SS-7)
R-16U(SS-7)
R-9A (SS-8)
R-26
UR-2 00
=
UR-100(SS-11 Moo 1) I
UR-10 CU (SS-11 Mod 3)
UR-10CK(SS-11 Mod 2)
=
D
RT-2 (SS-13 Mod 1)
RT-2P (SS-13 Moo 2)
RT-2 Cf'
=
R-36 8K6? (SS-9 Mod 112)
R-36 SK69(SS-9 Mod 3)
=
GR-1
=
MRUR-100(SS-17 Mod 112)
MR UR-1 00UTIH (SS-17 Mod 3)
=
R-36t\1 (SS-18 Mod 112/3)
R-36t\1UTIH(SS-18 Moo 4)
UR-1 00N (SS-19 Mod 112)
UR-1 00 NUTIH (SS-19 Mod 3)
Temp-2S (SS-X-16)
=
Piooeer (SS-20)
R-36t\12 (SS-18 Mod 5/6)
RT-23 (SS-24 M oo 1)
RT-23UTTH 1SZh60(SS-24 Mod 2)
-
RT-23UTTH 15Zh61 (SS-24 Mod 1)
Tcpu (SS-2S)
Tcpu-;\1 (SS-27)
-
1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1980 1985 2000
=
=
Rese9rch 9nd
Flight tests
dev~o~ent COrri:l9t duty
AcceiJed for s8fY ice
Figure 4.1
The main stages of development of land-based missiles
in this arrangement, was not yet the primary concern in the development and
deployment.
The establishment of the first RV5N combat units accompanied the deployment
of the first-generation missiles: the intermediate-range R-12 (55-4) and R-14 (55-5)
and intercontinental R-16 (55-7) missiles developed and accepted for service in
1955-1961. In the first half of the 1960s the 5trategic Rocket Forces received silo-
based versions of these missiles-the R-12U, R-14U, and R-16U-as well as the
R-9A (55-8) ICBM."
The single-stage R-12 (code-numbered 8K63) missile was the first strategic missile
that used storable fuel and autonomous inertial guidance. It was developed by OKB-
586 (Chief Designer M. K. Yange!) and was accepted for service after a series of
flight tests conducted from June 1957 to the end of December 1958. The R-12
(55-4), which had a range of 2,000 kilometers, could reach targets almost anywhere
in Western Europe.
The R-14 (code-numbered 8K65) missile, which was also developed by OKB-586,
had approximately double the range of the R-12. It also had a shorter launch prepa-
ration cycle and was more reliable than the R-12. The flight tests of the R-14 (55-
5) missile were conducted from July 1960 to February 1961, and the missile system
was commissioned on 24 April 1961.
The two-stage R-16 (55-7) missile, also developed by OKB-586, was the first inter-
continental missile suitable for large-scale deployment. Compared to the R-7, this
missile had a much shorter launch preparation time and was lighte~ smaller, and
therefore easier to handle. The stages of the R-16 missile were arranged in tandem,
which later allowed the missile to be adapted for silo basing. Like the R-12 and
R-14, the R-16 used storable-fuel components and had an autonomous inertial
guidance system.
5ince the R-16 was to be the first operationally deployed intercontinental missile,
its development schedule was extremely tight, which played a role in an accident
that occurred during the preparations for the first test launch of the missile on 24
October 1960: The missile exploded on the launch pad, taking the lives of more
than one hundred people.20 Despite the accident, flight testing of the R-16 continued
and was completed by the end of 1961. 5erial production of the missiles began
before the end of the flight tests, and the first RV5N regiment equipped with R-16
missile systems entered service by the end of 1961.
A significant shortcoming of the R-12, R-14, and R-16 missile systems (as well
as all previous systems, including the R-7 and R-7 A) was their vulnerability to a
nuclear explosion and therefore their low survivability in a case of a nuclear con-
flict. 21 To improve the survivability of these missiles, the Soviet Union began the
development of silo launch complexes for the R-12 and R-14 missiles, but the mis-
siles had to be modernized to be accommodated in silos. The resulting versions of
the missiles, designated R-12U and R-14U, were suitable for deployment in silos as
well as with open launchers.
Most of the 600 or so R-12/R-12U missiles deployed in the 1960s remained in
service until they began to be replaced by the mobile Pioneer (55-20) system in 1978.
The R-14/R-14U missiles were deployed in smaller numbers-around 100 at the
126 Chapter 4
most-because their coverage of targets in Europe was only slightly larger than that
of the R-12/R-12U missiles."
The R-16 missile also underwent modification that allowed it to be used with two
different types of launch complexes. The tests of the silo-based version of the R-16
missile, the R-16U, began in January 1962. Both silo-based and ground launch ver-
sions of the missile system were accepted for service in 1963. The R-16/R-16U
missile became the basic intercontinental missile of the Strategic Rocket Forces, just
as the R-12/R-12U had become the basic intermediate-range missile. Between 1961
and the end of 1965, 197 launchers for R-16 and R-16U missiles were deployed.
Around a third of the missiles were deployed in silo launchers.
The R-9A (55-8) system, development of which began in 1959, was the last of
the combat missile systems that used cryogenic propellant (liquid oxygen)." The R-
9A was developed for use with ground launch (Desna-N and Dolina) and silo launch
(Desna-V) complexes. To maintain the missile in constant high launch readiness, the
launch complex included cryogenic equipment that constantly kept the necessary
supply of liquid oxygen. During the fully automatic launch sequence, fueling of the
missile with liquid oxygen, the most time-consuming part of the launch prepara-
tions, took only eight minutes. The system was commissioned in 1965, but the scale
of deployment remained limited, and the number of deployed R-9A missiles seems
never to have exceeded 23.
Another project considered in the 1960s was the all-purpose UR-200 missile.
Development of the UR-200 began at OKB-5224 in the early 1960s under the super-
vision of Chief Designer V. N. Chelomey. The UR-200 was slated to be used as an
ICBM and a space launch vehicle, but its development was terminated in 1965 in
favor of the competing R-36 missile.
The main factors limiting the combat effectiveness of first-generation Soviet
missile systems were their vulnerability and low combat readiness. 25 Although
silo-based missiles were less vulnerable than those launched from open launch
pads, first-generation missile systems lacked an adequate ability to withstand the
destructive effects of a nuclear explosion. 26 Furthermore, individual launchers were
arranged in groups that consisted of several launchers separated by only a few dozen
meters. Such a group could be easily destroyed by a single warhead. The launch
readiness of the first-generation missiles ranged from a few dozen minutes to several
hours, depending on the alert status. Missiles could be kept on full alert (fueled) no
longer than 30 days, which meant that the highest degree of readiness could be sus-
tained only during times of crisisP
1965-1973 The most distinctive features of second-generation 50viet missile

systems, created in the second half of the 196 Os, were permanently fueled missiles
that had a very high level of readiness and the use of hardened single-silo launch-
ers (as opposed to the clusters of launchers employed for first-generation missiles)
and command centers. The use of single-silo launchers scattered over a large area
significantly improved the survivability of these missile systems and increased the
operational effectiveness of the RV5N force. In addition to their increased readi-
ness, reliability, and survivability over first-generation missiles, second-generation
missiles were more accurate, had lower maintenance costs, required fewer person-
nel, and in general were easier to handle.
The main missiles created and adopted during the second generation were
the UR-100 (55-11) missile, developed by OKB-52, and the R-36 (55-9) missile
system developed by OKB-586. In addition to these two main missiles, the 50viet
Union deployed its first solid-propellant ICBM, the RT-2 (55-13), developed by
OKB-1.
The light UR-100 (55-11) missile, development of which began in 1963, became
the main component of the 50viet ICBM force. This missile, equipped with a 1.1-
megaton warhead, had a range of 10,500-12,000 kilometers. Because of its relative
simplicity and the low cost of the missile and its launch complex, the UR-100
became the basis of the 50viet "missile shield," and as many as 990 missiles of this
type were deployed during the years of its service.
The heavy R-36 missile (55-9), developed specifically for the destruction of U.5.
ICBM deployment areas, was the second basic component of the strategic missile
force. The missile carried a heavy warhead with a yield of up to 10 megatons. Its
high yield compensated for its relatively low accuracy, so the missile could be used
to destroy hardened missile silos.
In contrast to the first-generation missiles, which had to be fueled immediately
prior to launching them, the UR-100 and R-36 were fueled only once, when they
were placed in their silos. After that the missile was "ampulized" or sealed and kept
in this state, fully ready for launch. This reduced the time required to launch
the missile from several hours to a few minutes, and the primary limitation on
launch readiness became the time required to wind up the gyroscopes of the
guidance system. 5ince the refueling equipment could now be separated from the
missile system, there was no longer a need to keep missile silos in groups, and
they could therefore be arranged in a way that would preclude a single missile
from destroying several silos, an arrangement known as "single launch." The
128 Chapter 4
RT-2 missile (55-13) was also located in single-launch silos, but in contrast to the
UR-100 and the R-36, it did not require fueling, since it was a solid-propellant
missile.
The first single-launch missile systems went operational in July 1966. The R-36
and UR-100 missiles were commissioned in July 1967 and the RT-2 in December
1968. The large-scale construction of launchers for the UR-100 and R-36, however,
began long before these missiles were commissioned.
Construction of the silo launchers for and the deployment of the UR-100 and
R-36 missiles began in 1965 and proceeded at a very high rate. Within seven years,
by 1972,288 R-36 silos and 990 UR-100 silos had been deployed. The annual rate
of deployment reached its maximum in 1967, when 290 UR-100 and 78 R-36 silos
were constructed.28 Among the factors that made this high rate of construction pos-
sible was the relatively simple design of the silos and command centers, which were
not hardened against a nuclear explosion. 29 The RT-2 were designed to have a much
higher degree of hardness, but the missile itself was not as capable as the UR-100
in terms of payload and range, so the deployment of the RT-2 system was limited
to 60 units.30
The next step in the development of the second-generation missiles was the
enhancement of their ability to penetrate missile defense systems, which were being
developed in the United 5tates and the 50viet Union at that time. 5uch enhancement
resulted in development of two follow-on missiles to the UR-1 00, the UR-100K (55-
11 Mod 2) and UR-100U (55-11 Mod 3). The new missiles, which were somewhat
larger than their predecessor, were commissioned in 1971 and 1973, respectively.
The UR-100K was equipped with decoys, and the UR-100U missile carried three
reentry vehicles that were not independently target able. A similar three-reentry-
vehicle warhead was also created for the R-36 missile. The use of multiple reentry
vehicles allowed the effective kill radius of the warhead against certain targets to
be increased and increased the probability of ABM penetration.
Another project aimed at developing effective means of penetrating missile
defenses was the development of the orbital version of the R-36 missile (the frac-
tional orbital bombardment system, or FOB5). The orbital version of the R-36
missile (55-18, code-numbered 8K69), was commissioned in 1968 and deployed at
the Fifth Test Range (Baykonur). In all, 18 launchers for the orbital version of the
R-36 were deployed.
Shortly after the RT-2 was commissioned, a decision was made to begin work on
the follow-on version. The new missile, the RT-2P (55-13 Mod 2), had slightly better
accuracy (CEP reduced from 1,900 to 1,500 meters) and carried a 0.75-megaton
warhead. The RT-2P entered service in December 1972. During its deployment,
all 60 of the RT-2 missiles deployed in 1968-1970 were replaced with RT-2P
missiles.
The silos of all second-generation missiles were located several kilometers from
each othe~ which, in combination with their level of hardening, rendered it nearly
impossible for a single enemy warhead to destroy two launchers.31
The events of the late 1960s and early 1970s largely determined the course of
subsequent development of Soviet strategic nuclear forces. The first of these events
was a change in attitudes among the Soviet military and political leadership con-
cerning strategy for using nuclear weapons. Before the late 1960s, the military con-
sidered creation of superhardened silo launchers inexpedient. The Soviet strategy
for using nuclear weapons relied on launching missiles before the arrival of enemy
warheads, that is, in a preemptive (preventive) strike or a launch-on-warning strike.
Discussions among the military and political leadership in 1969-1970 led to a shift
in the Soviet strategy: The strategic forces needed to withstand a nuclear attack and
retain the capability to deliver a retaliatory strike. This necessitated the creation of
sufficient nuclear potential to guarantee the delivery of a retaliatory strike in the
event of an enemy nuclear attack, and this, in turn, required a higher level of pro-
tection for launchers and command posts from the kill factors of a nuclear blast
and necessitated other measures to enhance the survivability of missiles in all stages
of their use in combat. 32
The second event of this period with a significant impact on the subsequent devel-
opment of the RVSN was the Interim Agreement Between the USSR and the United
States on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive
Arms-the SALT I Treaty-signed in 1972. This treaty, which entered into force on
3 October 1972, prohibited the construction of any additional fixed-site ICBM
launchers beyond those already built or under construction by 1 July 1972. The
treaty permitted the modernization of launchers, but it prohibited the re-equipping
of light missile launchers to accommodate heavy ICBMs. The SALT I Treaty there-
fore effectively limited the number of Soviet heavy ICBMs to the 308 silos that had
been built by the time it was concluded."
Although SALT I was supposed to remain in force for only five years, the USSR
and the United States announced in September 1977, not long before its expiration,
that they would continue observing its terms beyond the expiration date.
1973-1985 The third stage of the Strategic Rocket Forces development consisted
mainly of efforts to enhance the survivability and combat effectiveness of Soviet
130 Chapter 4
missiles of the third generation. The main measures taken to attain this objective
were the MIRVing of ICBMs, the creation of superhardened silo launchers, and
enhanced protection of all missile system components from the kill factors of a
nuclear blast. The launch preparations for the missiles of the third generation took
less time, and these missiles had more effective ABM penetration aids. Third-
generation missile systems used autonomous inertial guidance systems with digital
onboard computers for flight control, including independent targeting of reentry
vehicles. In addition to securing effective flight control, the use of the digital com-
puters facilitated remote retargeting and led to the development and incorporation
of an automated battle management system.
Three fixed-site systems were developed during this period to replace the two
main systems of the second generation, the UR-100 and R-36. New mobile systems
with solid-propellant missiles were also developed.
The decision as to which of two proposed new missile systems would be devel-
oped as a follow-on for the main second-generation missile, the UR-100, generated
serious disagreements in 1969-1970 between the two competing teams, headed
by developers M. K. Yangel, the chief designer of the Yuzhnoye Design Bureau
(formerly OKB-586), and V. N. Chelomey, chief designer of TsKBM, the Central
Machine-Building Design Bureau (formerly OKB-52).34 This conflict resulted in
a decision to develop two missiles of the lightweight class to replace the UR-100.
Chelomey's TsKBM was given the assignment to develop the UR-100N (55-19) mis-
sile system, and the Yuzhnoye Design Bureau went to work on the MR UR-100 (55-
17). The original intent was that the work would be conducted on a competitive
basis up to the stage of the engineering design. Later, however, the competition was
extended to the stage of flight tests. As a result, although the MR UR-100 missile
had a smaller payload than the UR-100N, the competition ended with the com-
missioning of both systems in December 1975.
In addition to the lightweight missiles, the R-36M (55-18) heavy missile was devel-
oped in the Yuzhnoye Design Bureau on a noncompetitive basis. This system was
also commissioned in December 1975. 35
The MR UR-100 and R-36M missiles were the first liquid-fuel missiles that used
a so-called cold launch method, in which the missile main engine did not start until
the missile had been ejected from the silo by a special charge: a pressure accumu-
lator. This launch method reduced the heat and acoustic load on the missile and
allowed the fuller use of silo volume.
The MR UR-100 missile was equipped with four independently targetable reentry
vehicles with a yield of up to 750 kilotons, whereas the UR-100N carried six war-
heads with a yield of up to 550 kilotons and was more accurate (CEP of 350 meters
as compared to 470 meters for the MR UR-100). For this reason, among others,
the UR-100N was deployed more extensively than the MR UR-100 (maximum
deployments of 240 and 130, respectively).
The heavy R-36M missile could carry eight more powerful (900 kilotons), inde-
pendently targetable warheads and was highly accurate (CEP of 430 meters). It
was also used in a single-warhead version. The main model was the MIRVed one,
however, and most of the R-36M missiles that were deployed were MIRVed. The
number of single-warhead R-36M missiles, which had begun to be deployed earlier
than the MIRVed version, never exceeded 36.
When the third-generation systems were being deployed in the RVSN in
1974-1976, the R-16U and R-9A launchers were removed from combat duty,
dismantled, and then replaced by a corresponding number of SLBM launchers,
according to the terms of SALT I.
Excessive haste in the development of the UR-100N missile led to the failure
to discover certain design flaws during tests of the system. These defects caused
resonance oscillation of the missile's airframe when it was fired at full range, and
this dramatically diminished its accuracy. The defect was discovered during train-
ing launches only after the mass deployment of the missiles, and its correction
required additional work on the missile after it had been deployed with operational
RVSN units. In the second half of the 1970s the UR-100N was used as the basis
for the improved UR-100NU (SS-19) system, which was adopted on 5 November
1979.
The MR UR-100 and R-36M systems also underwent additional adjustments to
improve their performance. Further work on the control and guidance system gave
the MR UR-100UTTH missile an accuracy rate comparable to that of the UR-100N
(CEP of 350 meters). The R-36MUTTH missile had improved guidance and a
modified warhead deployment stage (the bus), which enhanced its accuracy and
allowed for a reduction in the yield required for the warhead to achieve its objec-
tive. The number of warheads on the missile was increased to 10. The maximum
range of the single-warhead version was also increased, to 16,000 kilometers.
When the R-36M was replaced with the R-36MUTTH, the total number of
deployed R-36MUTTH missiles was increased to the maximum allowed under
the SALT I Treaty: 308 units. To bring the number of deployed R-36MUTTHs
to this level, the last remaining R-36 missiles were decommissioned in 1980.
The deployment of the MR UR-100UTTH in place of the MR UR-100 was
accompanied by another increase in their number, from 130 to 150, which was
132 Chapter 4
accomplished without violation of SALT I by reducing the number of UR-100

missiles deployed. The replacement of the UR-100N by the UR-100NU was also
accompanied by an increase to 360 launchers, again by eliminating some deployed
UR-100 missiles.
In addition to the creation of liquid-propellant missiles, during this period in
RVSN history the first mobile missile system with a solid-propellant intercontinen-
tal missile, the Temp-2S (SS-X-16), was developed in 1972-1975 at the Moscow
Institute of Thermal Technology under the supervision of A. D. Nadiradze. (The
previously developed mobile RT-15 and RT-20P missiles either had a shorter range
or were not completely solid-propellant.) The Temp-2S (SS-X-16) system was devel-
oped but never adopted,36 but it did serve as the model for the creation ofthe Pioneer
ground-mobile system (SS-20) with an intermediate-range missile a year and a half
later. The Pioneer system, adopted in 1976, was tested in three different models:
two single-warhead versions and one version with three independently targetable
warheads. The MIRVed version (known in the United States as the SS-20 Mod 2)
became the main one deployed.
The mobile launchers of the Pioneer system were not particularly resistant to the
kill factor of a nuclear burst (the level of their protection was only 0.2 kilograms
per square centimeter or 3 pounds per square inch),37 but their mobility secured the
survivability of some missiles in a first strike and guaranteed the ability to deliver
a retaliatory strike. In all, 441 Pioneer systems were deployed between 1978 and
1986. 38 The deployment of the Pioneer systems was accompanied by the removal
of intermediate-range systems of the first generation-R-12 and R-14-from
operational status (although the number of intermediate-range missiles had been
reduced from 658 in 1977 to 521 in 1986, the total number of warheads deployed
on those missiles had increased from 658 to 1,403 over the same period).
On 19 June 1979 the Soviet Union and the United States signed the Strategic
Arms Limitation Treaty, known as SALT II, although the treaty never entered
into force, because it was never ratified by the United States. If it had entered into
force, each side could have had no more than 2,250 strategic delivery vehicles
(ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers) as of 1 January 1981, and the number of MIRVed
ICBMs would have been limited to 820. The treaty would have prohibited the cre-
ation of mobile launchers for fixed ICBMs. It allowed the creation, testing, and
deployment of only one new type of ICBM of the lightweight class, equipped with
no more than 10 independently targetable warheads. The protocol to SALT II, con-
cluded for a term of two years, prohibited the testing of mobile land-based missile
systems.
Although SALT II did not enter into force, its principles essentially guided the
actions of the Soviet Union and the United States subsequent to its signing, partic-
ularly with respect to the limits on the number of MIRVed ICBMs. Between 1978
and 1986 the RVSN had 818 MIRVed missiles. The number was later reduced, when
the fourth-generation systems with single-warhead missiles were deployed.
1985-1991 The fourth stage in the development of the RVSN was distinguished
by the further improvement of silo missile systems and the adoption of mobile land-
based systems. The main objectives of this stage were to enhance the survivability
and combat effectiveness of Soviet missile systems. The increased accuracy of land-
and sea-based ballistic missiles and the greater number of warheads they could carry
had created a situation in which even hardened silo launchers could not secure the
survivability of enough missiles for a guaranteed retaliatory strike. 39 In recognition
of this, the Soviet Union and the United States focused their efforts on developing
mobile intercontinental missiles, because their survivability was secured by the
uncertainty of their location rather than hardening of silos. The United States later
stopped development of its mobile land-based missiles, for a number of reasons,40
but the development process continued in the Soviet Union and ended with the
adoption of mobile missile systems.
The fourth-generation systems adopted for use in the RVSN in 1985-1991
included the Topol ground-mobile system (SS-25), developed by the Moscow Insti-
tute of Thermal Technology, the rail- and silo-based versions of the RT-23UTTH
(SS-24) missile, developed in the Yuzhnoye Design Bureau, and the modified
silo-based heavy R-36M2 (SS-18) missile, also developed in the Yuzhnoye Design
Bureau.
The ground-mobile Topol system, adopted in 1988, was the culmination of many
years of attempts to create an operational road-mobile intercontinental missile. 41
Topol system missiles were equipped with a single warhead with a yield of 550 kilo-
tons. At their maximum range of around 10,500 kilometers, they had an accuracy
(CEP) of around 400 meters. Between 1985 and 1990, 288 Topol systems were
deployed in nine regiments.
The RT-23UTTH system, adopted in 1989, was the Soviet counterpart of the
U.S. MX Peacekeeper missile. The three-stage solid-propellant missile system was
equipped with 10 independently targetable warheads of 550 kilotons each. They
were more accurate (CEP of 200 meters) than the third-generation systems. As men-
tioned above, the RT-23UTTH was deployed in both a silo-based version and a rail-
mobile version. The fixed-site RT-23UTTH missiles were deployed in UR-100NU
134 Chapter 4
silos, and the rail-based RT-23UTIH missiles were located on specially equipped
trains with three launchers each. In all, 56 silo-based and 36 rail-based RT-23UTTH
missiles were deployed. Further deployment was interrupted by the breakup of the
Soviet Union and the start of the strategic arms reduction process.
The R-36M2 system was adopted on 11 August 1988 and was put on combat
duty in December 1988. It differs from previous R-36M models, the R-36M and
R-36MUTTH, in terms of several improvements made in the design of the missile
itself and its launch canister.42 Like the R-36MUTIH, the R-36M2 has 10 inde-
pendently targetable warheads.
In 1987 the Soviet Union and the United States concluded the Treaty on the
Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (known also as the
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, or simply the INF Treaty). Pursuant
to this treaty, all missile systems in the United States and the Soviet Union with a
range from 500 to 5,500 kilometers were eliminated in 1988-1991. These included
the RVSN's intermediate-range R-12, R-14, and Pioneer (SS-20) missiles. In all, 654
missiles and 509 launchers of the Pioneer system, 149 missiles and 72 launchers of
the R-12 system, and 6 R-14 missiles were eliminated in compliance with the INF
Treaty.
1991-Present The present stage in the development of the land-based strategic

nuclear forces began on 31 July 1991, when the Treaty between the USSR and the
United States on the Elimination and Reduction of Strategic Offensive Arms (START
I), envisaging a substantial reduction in the number of strategic delivery vehicles
and warheads, was signed.
When the START I Treaty was signed, the RVSN had 1,398 combat missile
systems, including 326 UR-100K and UR-100U (SS-l1), 40 RT-2P (SS-13), 47 MR
UR-100 (SS-17), 300 UR-100NU (SS-19), 308 heavy R-36MUTIH and R-36M2
(SS-18) missiles, 56 silo-based RT-23UTTH (SS-24) systems, 33 rail-mobile RT-23
and RT-23UTIH (SS-24) systems, and 288 ground-mobile Topol (SS-25) systems.
The deployed missile systems were equipped with a total of 6,612 warheads."
Table 4.1 presents the total numbers of Soviet and Russian ICBMs deployed over
the period 1960-2000.
According to the terms of the START I Treaty, the total number of strategic
delivery vehicles (land- and sea-based ballistic missiles and strategic bombers) on
each side had to be reduced to 1,600 units, and the total number of deployed war-
heads had to be reduced to 6,000. Furthermore, the total number of warheads on
land- and sea-based ballistic missiles was not to exceed 4,900. The START I Treaty
set special ceilings for the land-based component of strategic forces: The number of
warheads on mobile land-based systems could not exceed 1,100, and the number
of warheads on heavy missiles could not exceed 1,540. The last of these restrictions
meant that the number of Soviet heavy ICBMs had to be reduced by half, from 308
to 154.44 The treaty also limited the total throw weight of land- and sea-based bal-
listic missiles to a level equivalent to 54 percent of the Soviet level on 1 September
1990 and prohibited the creation of new types of heavy ICBMs and the rapid reload
of ICBM launchers.
In September 1991, the Soviet Union responded to several U.S. measures to
lower the combat readiness of its strategic forces with a unilateral pledge not to
move its rail-mobile missile systems outside the restricted basing areas defined in
START I.
After the breakup of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991, the missiles subject to
reduction in accordance with START I were located in four independent states:
Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. In May 1992 Belarus, Kazakhstan, and
Ukraine signed the Lisbon Protocol, pledging to eliminate all of the strategic offen-
sive arms located within their territory in the following seven years. The START I
Treaty entered into force on 5 December 1994, after it had been ratified by all of
the countries that had signed the Lisbon Protocol. The land-based strategic force
reductions envisaged in START I are being accomplished by removing old ICBMs
from service and by liquidating RVSN units outside Russia. By the beginning
of 1998 all UR-100K and UR-100U, MR UR-100, and RT-2P missiles had been
eliminated.
All strategic nuclear warheads were removed by the end of April 1995 from the
territory of Kazakhstan to Russia, where some have been eliminated and some are
being used to replace older missiles of a comparable type. All of the 104 heavy-
ICBM silo launchers in Kazakhstan were eliminated by October 1996. All strategic
missiles and their warheads were removed from the territory of Belarus by the end
of 1996. All strategic nuclear warheads were removed from Ukraine by the end of
1996, and the elimination of silo launchers in Ukraine began on 5 January 1996.
In contrast to Kazakhstan and Belarus, howeve~ Ukraine announced that all of the
missiles within its territory were its own property and not that of Russia. Conse-
quently, all of these missiles will be eliminated at Ukrainian enterprises. The only
exception to this Ukrainian policy is the group of 32 UR-100NU missiles Russia
has bought from Ukraine for the renewal of its own missile force.
Table 4.1
Deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles
ICBM launchers 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 19n 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
R-7/R-7A 2 0
R-16 32 90 170 197 197 197 197 197 197 190 190 190 190 190 138 78 0
R-9A 17 23 23 23 23 23 23 19 19 19 19 19 19 9 0
R-36 (8K67) 12 80 135 170 220 260 260 268 268 260 240 170 65 0
R-36 (SK69) 12 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 0
OR-lOO, OR-lOOK, 182 514 659 859 982 990 955 905 810 840 850 750 650 640 580
UR-lOOU
RT-2/RT-2P 40 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60
MR oR-lOO, 10 20 50 100 140 150
MR UR-
lOOUTTH
R-36M 10 10 36 76 176 190 188
R-36MUTTH,
R-36M2 50 120
UR-looN, 60 100 120 180 240 240
UR-lOONUTTH
RT-23/RT-
23UTTH (rail)
RT-23UTTH (silo)
RT-2PM
RT-2PM2 (silo)
Heavy miosile 12 80 135 170 220 260 260 268 278 270 276 246 241 240 308
launchers
MIRVed miosile 10 80 156 246 456 620 698
launchers
Total launchers 2 12 38 96 193 226 420 820 1,020 1,255 1,434 1,517 1,502 1,460 1,375 1,467 1,481 1,331 1,249 1,338 1,338
Table 4.1 (continued)
ICBM launchers 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
R-7/R-7A
R-16
R-9A
R-36(SK67)
R-36 (SK69)
oR-iOO, OR-lOOK, 550 550 520 475 448 420 378 370 360 326 0
OR-lOOU
RT-2/RT-2P 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 40 0
MR OR-lOO, 150 150 150 150 150 150 138 120 100 47 0
MR UR-
lOOUTTH
R-36M 188 108 0
R-36MUTTH, 120 200 308 308 308 308 308 308 308 308 308 308 290 248 186 180 180 180 180 174
R-36M2
OR-lOON, 300 330 330 360 360 360 360 350 300 300 300 235 200 170 170 160 160 150 150 140
UR-lOONUTTH
RT-23/RT- 12 24 33 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36
23UTTH (rail)
RT-23UTTH (silo) 20 56 56 56 56 36 10 10 10 10 10 10 0
RT-2PM 45 n 126 150 170 288 306 315 336 354 360 360 360 360 360 360
RT-2PM2 (silo) 10 20 24
Heavy miosile 308 308 308 308 308 308 308 308 308 308 308 308 290 248 186 180 180 180 180 174
launchers
MIRVed miosile 758 788 788 818 818 818 812 810 788 744 700 635 562 464 402 386 386 376 376 350
launchers
Total launchers 1,368 1,398 1,368 1,353 1,371 1,370 1,376 1,390 1,378 1,398 1,006 950 898 818 762 746 747 746 746 734
ICBM warheads 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 19n 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
R-7/R-7A 2
R-16 32 90 170 197 197 197 197 197 197 190 190 190 190 190 138 78
R-9A 17 23 23 23 23 23 23 19 19 19 19 19 19 9
R-36 (8K67) 12 80 135 170 220 260 260 268 268 260 240 170 65
R-36 (SK69) 12 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
OR-lOO, 182 514 659 859 982 990 955 905 810 840 850 750 650 640 580
OR-lOOK,
UR-lOOU
RT-2IRT-2P 40 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60
MR oR-ioo, 411 40 80 200 340 500 540
MR UR-
lOOUTTH
R-36M 811 10 10 36 356 1,156 1,268 1,322
R-36MUTTH, 10 500 1,200
R-36M2
UR-looN, 611 360 600 620 780 1,140 1,240
UR-lOONUTTH
RT-23/RT- 10
23UTTH (rail)
RT-23UTTH (silo) 10
RT-2PM 1
RT-2PM2 (silo)
Total warheads 2 12 38 96 193 226 420 820 1,020 1,255 1,434 1,517 1,502 1,460 1,375 1,797 2,041 2,261 3,069 4,126 4,942
ICBM warh eads 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2=
R-7fR-7A
R-16
R-9A
R-36 (8K67)
R-36 (SK69)
oR-iOO, 550 550 520 475 448 420 378 370 360 326
UR-lOOK,
UR-lOOU
RT-2/RT-2P 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 40
MR oR-lOO, 411 540 570 600 600 600 600 552 480 400 188
MR UR-
lOOUTTH
R-36M 811 1,322 752
R-36MUTTH, 10 1,200 2,000 3,080 3,080 3,080 3,080 3,080 3,080 3,080 3,080 3,080 3,080 2 ,900 2,480 1,860 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,740
R-36M2
UR-lOON, 611 1,600 1,930 1,980 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,100 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,410 1)00 1,020 1,020 960 960 900 900 840
UR-lOONUTTH
RT-23IRT- 10
2 3UTTH (r ail) 60 120 240 330 360 360 360 360 360 360 360 360 360 360
RT-23UTTH (silo)lO 200 560 560 560 560 360 100 100 100 100 100 100
RT-2PM 1 45 n 126 150 170 288 30<; 315 336 354 360 360 360 360 360 360
RT-2PMl (silo) 10 20 24
Total warheads 5,272 5,862 6,240 6,375 6,393 6,392 6,416 6,560 6,670 6,612 6,106 5,nS 5,156 4,314 3,700 3,580 3,581 3,530 3,540 3,324
No te: From Rob ert S. Norris and Thomas B. Cochran, U.S. USSRlRu.s.sian Strategic Offemive Nuci&1.r FQrce~ (NRDC, 1997), pp. 17-21, The START Treaty Memorandum of Understanding Data.
140 Chapter 4
The Future of the Strategic Rocket Forces

In January 1993 Russia and the United States signed the START II Treaty, envis-
aging further strategic force reductions, particularly the complete elimination of
land-based ballistic missiles with multiple reentry vehicles. In accordance with
the START II Treaty, Russia and the United States should have no more than
3,000-3,500 strategic warheads by 2003, with no more than 1,750 on SLBMs and
the rest on ICBMs and heavy bombers. A protocol to the treaty, signed in Septem-
ber 1997 in New York, allows Russia to keep its MIRVed missiles, which are to be
eliminated under the treaty, until 31 December 2007. At the same time, the proto-
col requires these missiles to be deactivated by the original deadline of 1 January
2003.
The future development of the RVSN will depend on two essential factors:
whether the START II Treaty enters into force and the state of the Russian economy.
The first factor will affect Russia's choice of a development strategy for strategic
nuclear forces in general and the RVSN in particular, and the second will determine
its actual ability to form the required force and keep it in a state of combat
readiness.
As of the beginning of 2001, the RVSN had 150 UR-100NUTTH systems
deployed in Russia, 174 deployed R-36MUTTH and R-36M2 systems, 36 rail-
based RT-23UTTH missiles, and 360 Topol systems. All of the UR-100K and
UR-100U, RT-2P, MR UR-100UTTH systems, and silo-based RT-23UTTH systems
have been removed from combat duty, and almost all of their launchers have been
eliminated. By January 2001, Russia had deployed its first 24 silo-based Topol-M
missiles.
Compliance with the terms of the START I Treaty, which is already in force, will
necessitate the reduction of another 20 R-36MUTTH missiles (to arrive at the
allowed level of 154 heavy ICBMs) and, possibly, some of the UR-100NUTTH
andlor RT-23UTTH missiles (to comply with the Treaty's restrictions on the total
number of warheads and total throw weight).45 The actual dynamics of land-based
missile reductions will depend on the expiration of the missiles' service life. The
ability to continue servicing the missiles will also playa significant role.
The UR-100NUTTH and Topol are the only Russian systems currently in
operation that are produced in Russia. Most of the production facilities for the
R-36MUTTH/R-36M2 and RT-23UTTH were located in Ukraine.
Judging by the current extended service life (21 years) and initial deployment
schedule, we can predict that the 360 UR-100NUTTH missiles deployed between
1980 and the end of 1984 (160 of which are in Russia) will reach the end of their
extended service life between 2000 and 2005. It is possible, however, that these mis-
siles will remain in service after 2005, because some could have been replaced by
newer ones after 1984. The 32 UR-100NUTTH missiles purchased from Ukraine
to replace older missiles, for example, could remain operational until 2009.46 A
further extension of the service life-to 25 years----{:ould also postpone the removal
of the UR-100NUTTH from service.
The originally calculated 10-year service life of the R-36MUTTH, deployed from
1979 to 1983, expired in 1989-1993. For those missiles that still remain opera-
tional it probably was extended to at least 15 years. This extended service life
expired at the end of 1998 and may have been extended even further. Some of the
R-36MUTTH or R-36M2 missiles withdrawn from Kazakhstan could also be used
to renew the Russian heavy missile force, but there are no precise data on how these
missiles might be used. There are also no data on the number of R-36MUTTH mis-
siles that were replaced by R-36M2 missiles, which could remain operational at
least until 2003-2005 even without the extension of their service life.
If Russia implements the START II Treaty, all of its MIRVed ICBMs would have
to be deactivated by the beginning of 2003 and eliminated by the end of 2007. Part
of the START II reductions could be accomplished by reducing the number of war-
heads on the 105 UR-100NUTTH missiles from six to one. Under the provisions
of START II, all of the silo launchers for multiple-warhead ICBMs are supposed to
be either eliminated or converted for single-warhead missiles (only 90 of the 154
heavy missile launchers may be converted). To accomplish the reductions envisaged
in the START II Treaty, therefore, Russia will have to eliminate the 154 heavy
ICBMs allowed by the START I Treaty and all of the RT-23UTTH and all of the
UR-100NUTTH except for the 105 that can be converted into single-warhead
missiles. All that will then remain of Russia's present arsenal will be 105 UR-
100NUTTH missile systems and around 360 Topol systems. In addition to that,
Russia plans to continue production and deployment of Topol-M missiles (both the
silo-based and road-mobile versions).
The terms of the START II Treaty allow Russia to have around 800-1,000 ICBM
warheads, but they can be deployed only on land-based single-warhead missiles;47
as noted above, the treaty allows no multiple-warhead missiles after 2007. To reach
that number of warheads, Russia would have to increase the number of single-
warhead missiles it deploys to compensate for the reduction in the number of
warheads that would result from the replacement of multiple warheads on inde-
pendently targetable reentry vehicles with single warheads. This new force of single-
warhead missiles, however, is unlikely to be created by 2003 or even by 2008, since
142 Chapter 4
it would require production rates of more than 80 missiles a year, which Russia
cannot sustain.
In this context, Russia hopes to conclude an agreement on further strategic force
reductions (START III), which would lower the ceiling on Russian and U.S. strate-
gic weapons to 1,500 warheads on each side. Such an agreement would allow Russia
to avoid having to produce large quantities of new missiles to bring its strategic
forces up to the START II ceilings.
An alternative to START II, from the Russian standpoint, would be keeping some
of the heavy missiles allowed by the START I Treaty (R-36MUTTH and R-36M2)
and all UR-100NUTTH and RT-23UTTH systems until they reach end of their
operational lives. This decision would keep the RVSN force at the START I levels
for some time. The expiration of the missiles' service life, however, would lower the
number of Russian strategic missiles to a level comparable to that of the START II
ceilings within a few years after the date specified in START II.
The Organizational Structure of the Strategic Rocket Forces
Missile Troops Prior to Creation of the Strategic Rocket Forces

During the prewar years and the initial period of World War II, rocket armaments-
unguided rocket projectiles-were given to regular military units, primarily in the
Air Forces. Later during the war, as the production of multiple rocket launchers
commonly known as Katyusha was expanded, the artillery units that included these
systems grew rapidly and were reorganized as special forces: the Guard Rocket
Launcher Units (GMCh). These forces had a very high status, as they were subor-
dinated directly to front headquarters. After the end of the war, they served as the
organizational basis for the subsequent creation of the Rocket Forces, armed with
ballistic missiles. After the creation of the first intercontinental ballistic missiles, the
Rocket Forces were converted into a separate service of the armed forces: the Strate-
gic Rocket Forces (RVSN).
The initial organizational structure of the Rocket Forces was established by a
Council of Ministers decree of 13 May 1946. Pursuant to this decree, all operations
connected with rocket armaments were to be directed by the commander of artillery
of the Soviet Ground Forces. The Fourth Directorate (Rocket Weapons Directorate),
established as part of the Main Artillery Directorate (GAU), was given responsibil-
ity for the planning and oversight of projects in the creation of rocket hardware.
In addition to this, Scientific Research Institute 4 of the Ministry of Defense (NII-
4) was established on the grounds of the Academy of Artillery Sciences to perfect
methods for the combat use and maintenance of new rocket armaments.
The Council of Ministers decree called for creation of the first rocket unit of the
Soviet armed forces. The 92nd Rocket Launcher Regiment, stationed in Germany,
had been reorganized as the Special Brigade of the Supreme High Command Reserve
(BON RVGK) by 15 August 1946. In the beginning the brigade's main duties were
the study of the German A-4 rocket and its launch equipment and the mastery of
their use. A test range was established at the same time for future tests of ballistic
rockets and the training of specialists: The Fourth State Central Test Range (GTsP-
4) of the USSR Ministry of the Armed Forces was established near the settlement
of Kapustin Yar in Astrakhan oblast, pursuant to the decree. In 1947 the special
brigade was moved from Germany to Kapustin Yar and became the basis of the
testing units of the GTsP-4.
The adoption of the first Soviet combat missile system, the R-1, and then of the
R-2 was followed by the formation of new missile units. The second unit, the
23rd Special Brigade of the Supreme High Command Reserve, was formed in
December 1950. (At the same time, the first unit-the 92nd Special Brigade, created
earlier-was renamed the 22nd Special Brigade.) In 1952 another two special
brigades, the 54th and 56th, were formed on the Kapustin Yar test range. On 15
March 1953 the special brigades were renamed engineering brigades of the Supreme
High Command Reserve (and their numbers were changed: the 22nd Special
Brigade became the 72nd Engineering Brigade, the 23rd became the 73rd, the
54th became the 85th, and the 56th became the 90th). The 77th and 80th Engi-
neering Brigades were also formed in March 1953. 48 Each engineering brigade had
six R-1 or R-2 launchers and consisted of three battalions. The 233rd Engineering
Brigade, equipped with an R-llM system (modified R-ll), was formed in May
1955.49
The engineering brigades with the R-1 and R-2 missile systems were expected to
perform certain operational functions during front operations. The headquarters of
the Supreme High Command was supposed to turn the brigades over to the control
of the front commander, who would then direct their operations through the front
artillery commander, in the same way that the Rocket Launcher Units were con-
trolled during the war.
On 18 April 1953 the Directorate of the Deputy Artillery Commander for Special
Equipment (UZKA) was created to handle the increasing volume of work connected
with the creation, perfection, and production of missiles and with the start of
projects for creating launch vehicles for nuclear weapons. The Fourth Directorate
was transferred from the Main Artillery Directorate to the Directorate of the Deputy
Artillery Commander for Special Equipment. The next in the evolution of the Rocket
Forces step was the 1955 decision to organize it as a separate branch of the armed
144 Chapter 4
forces. This decision led to the creation of the post of deputy minister of defense
for special weapons and rocket engineering. The UZKA Directorate units in charge
of rocket armament acquisition and development were reorganized to form the
Office of the Director of Rocket Armaments, which reported to the deputy minis-
ter of defense for special weapons and rocket engineering. 50
When the Rocket Forces were armed with missile systems with nuclear warheads
(the R-5M in 1956 and the R-llM in 1958), the combat capabilities of the engi-
neering brigades increased dramatically. Units of the Rocket Forces were now able
to perform strategic functions in nearby theaters of war. This led to changes in their
operational procedures. Engineering brigades were no longer transferred to the
operational jurisdiction of front commanders. Instead, the decision to employ these
units was made by the Supreme High Command. In August 1958, the 77th, 90th,
and 223rd Engineering Brigades of the Supreme High Command Reserve, equipped
with tactical missiles, were transferred to the Ground Forces, and only the strate-
gic missile units remained under the jurisdiction of the deputy minister of defense
for special weapons and rocket engineering. 51
The adoption of the R-12 missile system in the late 1950s was followed by the
creation of several new combat units. 52 In 1958 the Rocket Forces acquired new
organizational units: engineering regiments of the Supreme High Command Reserve.
Each engineering regiment had four launchers organized in two engineering battal-
ions. The adoption of intermediate-range missiles with nuclear warheads in 1956
was accompanied by the deployment of some engineering battalions at permanent
deployment sites, which allowed the battalions to remain in a constant state of high
readiness for a strike against predetermined targets. 53
Production of the USSR's first intercontinental missiles (the R-7s) in the early
1960s marked the beginning of a qualitatively new stage in the development of the
Rocket Forces. The new systems gave the Rocket Forces the fundamental ability to
perform strategic functions in distant regions. The new capabilities again required
changes in the organizational structure of the command and control of rocket
armaments.
The Formation of the Strategic Rocket Forces

By the end of 1959 the Soviet armed forces had one intercontinental ballistic missile
unit, several engineering brigades, and more than 20 engineering regiments armed
with intermediate-range missiles. Eighteen of the engineering regiments of the
Supreme High Command Reserve were part of the Strategic Aviation branch of the
Air Forces. The other regiments were under the jurisdiction of the deputy minister
of defense for special weapons and rocket engineering. This decentralization com-
plicated the use and development of rocket armaments. 54
As a consequence of this, a Council of Ministers decree established a new service
of the armed forces, the Strategic Rocket Forces (RVSN), on 17 December 1959, at
virtually the same time that the first intercontinental R -7 missiles were put on
combat duty. This elevation in the status of the Rocket Forces to that of a separate
service of the armed forces reflected the qualitative change in their capabilities
and the recognition (although it was somewhat premature) of their ability to
perform strategic functions without outside assistance during the course of military
operations.
By order of the minister of defense, issued on 31 December 1959 pursuant to the
earlier Council of Ministers decree, the RVSN acquired four engineering brigades,
three aviation divisions, and 18 engineering regiments from the Strategic Aviation
branch of the Air Forces, as well as military academic institutions, scientific research
institutes, test ranges, bases, and weapon depots. The minister of defense's order
envisaged the creation of a number of RVSN administrative bodies: the Main Rocket
Forces Staff, the Main Rocket Armaments Directorate (GURVO), combat training
and military academic institution command elements, and a rear services staff.
In addition to the combat units, six missile arsenals, two missile test ranges-the
Fourth State Central Test Range (GTsP-4) in Kapustin Yar and Scientific Research
Test Site No.5 (NIIP-5, in Baykonur)-Scientific Research Institute No.4 (NII-4),
the F. E. Dzerzhinskiy Artillery Engineering Academy, and some other artillery engi-
neering institutes were turned over to the RVSN. In 1960-1962 the Leningrad Air
Force Engineering Academy and several engineering institutes were also added to
the RVSN.
The headquarters of the 43rd and 50th missile armies were established in 1960
on the bases of former strategic aviation armies of the Air Forces in Vinnitsa
and Smolensk for the command and control of the RVSN units equipped with
intermediate-range missiles in the western part of the country. The six engineering
brigades of the Supreme High Command Reserve, two divisions of the Air Forces,
and one artillery division served as the basis for the creation of nine missile
divisions. Another division was created in the Far East from the 96th Air Forces
Division. 55
Command elements of artillery test ranges were created for the command and
control of the other intermediate-range missile units and the new brigades equipped
with intercontinental missiles. The ICBM forces grew at a particularly rapid rate:
Eleven intercontinental missile brigades were formed simultaneously in 1960
146 Chapter 4
(while the missiles themselves were still undergoing flight tests). While these brigades
were being deployed, the command elements of the artillery test ranges were reor-
ganized as the command elements of five top-level operational rocket units-missile
corps-by 10 March 1961. The missile corps were later stationed in Kirov, Vladimir,
Omsk, Chita, and Khabarovsk. Brigades with intercontinental missiles were reor-
ganized as missile divisions in 1960-1961, and the previously created engineering
regiments and engineering brigades of the Supreme High Command Reserve were
reorganized as missile regiments and intermediate-range missile divisions. 56 The
command elements for the 24 newly formed missile divisions had been created by
30 May 1961 from the command elements of 22 missile brigades and 2 fighter avi-
ation divisions. (One of these divisions, stationed in Shadrinsk, was dissolved in
1962.)57 Three more command elements for missile brigades, stationed in Shadrinsk,
Tyumen, and Itatka, were created in 1964. (The missile brigade in Shadrinsk was
apparently created on the basis of the division that was formed in 1961 and
dissolved in 1962.)
The subsequent evolution of the RVSN organizational structure reflected the evo-
lution of missile systems and the principles of their operations. The creation of units
equipped with systems with multiple launchers (the R-12/R-12U, R-14/R-14U, R-
16/R16U, and R-9A systems) was completed by 1966. By that time the RVSN had
begun to be equipped with the new single-launch systems (R-36 and UR-100). The
deployment of those systems in 1965 was accompanied by the creation of another
two separate missile corps in Orenburg and Dzhambul. That same year the units
stationed in Dombarovskiy, Zhangistobe, Derzhavinsk, Kartaly, and Uzhur served
as the basis for the creation of another five missile divisions (which were later
equipped with heavy R-36 ICBMs), and the unit in Saryozek became a missile
brigade. The headquarters of missile brigades in Saryozek and Leninsk (Baykonur)
were established in 1968 and 1969, respectively.58 (The latter probably was intended
for the servicing and maintenance of the R-36 missiles with orbital warheads.) In
1970 the missile corps stationed in Vladimir, Orenburg, Omsk, and Chita served as
the basis for the creation of another four missile armies "for the purpose of improv-
ing troop management and enhancing the reliability of the command and control
system"59 (the other corps, stationed in Kirov, Khabarovsk, and Dzhambul, were
dissolved). In this way, the number of missile armies rose from two to six (The first
two were the armies with headquarters in Vinnitsa and Smolensk).60
The SALT I Treaty, which was concluded in 1972 and prohibited the creation of
new silo launchers, effectively froze the organizational structure of the RVSN units
equipped with ICBMs. The only exceptions to this freeze were the units equipped
with the R-16 and R-9A missiles eliminated under the treaty to allow deployment
of additional SLBM launchers, which were either dissolved or reorganized and
equipped with the newly deployed Pioneer (SS-20) road-mobile IRBMs. In 1970,
for example, the missile brigade in Kattakurgan was dissolved, and the missile
division in Ussuriysk was transferred from the RVSN to the Far Eastern Military
District. Missile brigades were dissolved in Itatka in 1972, Tyumen in 1976, and
Shadrinsk in 1979. The missile brigade in Saryozek was dissolved in 1980.
The intermediate-range branch of the RVSN was eliminated in 1988-1991,
because these troops had been equipped with the R-12, R-14, and Pioneer systems
that were eliminated in accordance with the INF Treaty, concluded in 1987. In addi-
tion, 58 missile regiments-45 equipped with Pioneer systems and 13 equipped with
R-12 missiles-were disbanded. Some of these units may have been reorganized
as units equipped with intercontinental missiles. After the elimination of the
intermediate-range Pioneer systems, some of the missile bases that had accommo-
dated them were used for the new Topol (SS-25) road-mobile systems.
Five missile divisions in Gvardeysk, Pruzhany, Kolomyya, Ostrov, and Kannelava
(created in 1960 and 1961) and the 50th Missile Army in Smolensk were disbanded
in 1990. The missile division in Belokorovichi was dissolved in 1991, and the
divisions in Lutsk and Romny were disbanded in 1992.61
A USSR presidential decree issued in November 1991 envisaged the creation of
a new armed forces service, Strategic Deterrence Forces (SSS), from the RVSN, the
Air Defense Forces, and the Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief of Military
Space Forces. The decree was never implemented, however, because it was issued
just before the breakup of the Soviet Union. For some time in 1992 the RVSN
was considered to be part of the Joint Armed Forces of the new Commonwealth
of Independent States, but after the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense was
established in March 1992, the RVSN was transferred to Russia's jurisdiction (with
the exception of the units stationed in Ukraine).
Present Organizational Structure of the Strategic Rocket Forces

The Strategic Rocket Forces are one of the four branches of the armed forces of the
Russian Federation. The RVSN now consists of stationary-missile troops, mobile-
missile troops, special troops, and rear services units and institutions. The special
RVSN troops include, in particular, the communication troops and the nuclear tech-
nical units. 62
148 Chapter 4
The RVSN commander-in-chief exercises immediate control of RVSN troopS.63

The RVSN Main Staff is under the jurisdiction of the RVSN commander-in-chief
and is responsible for the planning and operational control of the troops.
The RVSN includes a number of directorates in charge of the main areas of RVSN
operations: 64
• The Operational Directorate of the Main Staff is directly responsible for the
operational command and control of RVSN units and subunits and the planning of
their combat employment.
• The Main Rocket Armaments Directorate (GURVO),65 headed by the RVSN
deputy commander-in-chief for weapons, is responsible for the choice of missile
specifications, the support of the industrial development of new missile systems, and
their testing. The directorate is in charge of the scientific test ranges and scientific
research institutes of the RVSN.
• The Main Rocket Armament and Rocket Hardware Service Directorate and
Maintenance" (GUERVO) is responsible for the servicing and maintenance of
missile systems used by the RVSN.
• The Combat Training and Military Academic Institutions Directorate, headed by
the RVSN deputy commander-in-chief for combat training, is responsible for the
training of RVSN personnel. The training and advanced training of RVSN officers
are conducted at four higher military command engineering institutes in Krasnodar,
Perm, Rostov-on-Don, and Serpukhov and the Peter the Great Military Academy
in Moscow. 67
• The Communications Directorate, headed by the RVSN chief of communications
troops, is responsible for the functioning of command, control, and communication
(0) systems. The directorate has jurisdiction over units of the RVSN communica-
tions troops and the corresponding scientific research institute.
· The Sixth Directorate is responsible for nuclear munitions support services. The
Sixth Directorate has jurisdiction over the nuclear technical units of the RVSN,
responsible for the acceptance of ballistic missile warheads at nuclear munitions
assembly plants, their transport to centralized storage facilities, their transfer to
combat units, the scheduled maintenance inspections of nuclear warheads, and the
storage of warheads that are not on combat duty.
The RVSN Office of Rear Services is responsible for troop supplies.
The heads of key directorates are the RVSN deputy commanders-in-chief III
charge of the corresponding areas, and the chief of Main Staff is the first deputy
commander-in-chief.
Units of the Strategic Rocket Forces The RVSN are subdivided into missile armies,
missile divisions, missile regiments, separate units, and military academic institu-
tions.6s The missile army is the highest operational formation of the RVSN, usually
consisting of several light ICBM divisions and one heavy ICBM division. It also has
subunits of special troops and an arsenal for the storage of nondeployed missiles.
The missile division is the smallest subunit capable of performing combat func-
tions autonomously. It consists of several missile regiments, the division head-
quarters, a nuclear-technical base for the servicing of warheads, and a technical
missile base servicing ballistic missiles. The missile division with mobile ground
systems also includes a separate combat engineering battalion responsible for the
maintenance of the position areas and patrol routes of missile systems.
The missile regiment is the basic RVSN combat unit directly responsible for
combat operations. It consists of several launchers, a regimental command post,
and support services and subunits. The exact composition of the missile regiment
depends on the type of missile system.
Light- and medium-ballistic-missile regiments (those with the UR-100,
RT-2P, MR UR-100, UR-100N, and silo-based RT-23UTTH) usually have 10 silo
launchers. The heavy-ballistic-missile regiments (those with the R-36, the R-36M,
and their modifications) have six launchers. Five of the six heavy-ICBM divisions
have one regiment each with 10 launchers. The RT-23UTTH rail-mobile regiment
has three launchers on a special train. The Topol road-mobile regiment has 10
mobile launchers.
The fixed-site light- and medium-ICBM divisions consist of from 4 to 11 regi-
ments (from 40 to 110 launchers). The heavy-ICBM divisions are deployed with
from 5 to 10 regiments and have from 30 to 64 silo launchers, respectively. The
road-mobile divisions have from three to five regiments, and the rail-mobile divi-
sions consist of three or four regiments. This means that each missile division
equipped with Topol systems has 27,36, or 45 launchers, and each rail-mobile divi-
sion has 9 or 12 mobile launchers.
The Locations of RVSN Units When the START I Memorandum of Understand-

ing was signed, the RVSN had 26 missile divisions, united in six missile armies.
Missile systems were located within the territory of four Soviet republics: Russia,
Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. Concentration of these forces within the terri-
tory of Russia had been completed by the end of 1996, and they were reduced to
19 divisions, united in four armies. 69
Russia As of the beginning of 2001, the RVSN force within Russian territory had
756 deployed ICBM launchers. The RVSN was divided organizationally into four
missile armies consisting of 19 divisions locations of which are shown in figure 4.2:
150 Chapter 4
• ICBM bases
o Former ICBM bases
* Rocket armies headquarters
• Test sites
Figure 42
Locations of Strategic Rocket Forces bases
• A heavy-ICBM missile division (R-36MUTTHlR-36M2) with 52 launchers,

located near Dombarovskiy in Orenburg oblast (12 of the 64 launchers that the
division had in 1991 had been eliminated or deactivated by 1997).70
• A heavy-ICBM missile division consisting of seven regiments (46 launchers),
located near Kartaly in Chelyabinsk oblast.
• A heavy-ICBM missile division consisting of four regiments (24 launchers), located
near Aleysk in Altay Kray.7 1 All missiles are deactivated.
• A heavy-ICBM missile division with 52 launchers, located near Uzhur in
Krasnoyarsk Kray (12 of the 64 launchers that the division had in 1991 had been
eliminated by 1997).
• A Guards Missile Division, consisting of six UR-100NUTTH regiments (60
launchers), located near Kozelsk in Kaluga oblast.
• The Taman Missile Division, located in Tatishchevo in Saratov oblast,72 consist-
ing of eight UR-100NUTTH regiments (80 launchers) and three regiments of
silo-based Topol-M missiles (24 missiles). Until 2000, the division included ten silo-
based RT-23UTTH missiles.
• The Temopol-Berlin Missile Division, consisting of four rail-mobile RT-23UTTH

regiments (12 launchers), located near Bershet in Perm oblast. 73 (The division was
previously equipped with UR-100K/UR-100U systems, all of which have now been
eliminated. )
• The Guards Vienna Missile Division, consisting of four rail-based RT-23UTTH
regiments (12 launchers), located near Krasnoyarsk. 74 (This division also was
previously equipped with UR-100K/uR-100U systems, all of which have now
been eliminated.)
• A Guards Missile Division consisting of four rail-based RT-23UTTH regiments
(12 launchers), located near Kostroma.
• A missile division consisting of four Topol regiments (36 launchers), located near
Teykovo in Ivanovo oblast. 75 (This division is another that was previously equipped
with UR-100K/UR-100U systems, all of which have now been eliminated.)
• The Kharbin Missile Division, located near Drovyanaya in Chita oblast,76 con-
sisting of two Topol regiments (18 launchers). (The division was previously
equipped with UR-100K/UR-100U, all of which had been eliminated.)
• The Kiev-Zhitomir Missile Division, located near Yoshkar-Ola and consisting
of four Topol regiments (36 launchers). (The division was previously armed with
six regiments of RT-2P missiles with 60 launchers, all of which have now been elim-
inated.)
• The Guards Rezhitsk Missile Division, located near Vypolzovo in Tver oblast. 77
After the elimination of the division's MR UR-100UTTH systems, it has two Topol
regiments (18 launchers).
• The Melitopol Missile Division, consisting of five Topol regiments (45 launchers),
located near Yurya in Kirov oblast.
• A missile division consisting of five Topol regiments (45 launchers), located near
Nizhni Tagil in Sverdlovsk oblast.7 8
• The Guards Glukhovo Missile Division, consisting of five Topol regiments (45
launchers), located near Novosibirsk.
• A missile division consisting of five Topol regiments (45 launchers), located near
Kansk.
Irkutsk.
Bamau!.
Kazakhstan Two heavy-ICBM divisions, apparently part of the missile army head-
quartered in Omsk, were stationed in Kazakhstan. These divisions, located in
Derzhavinsk 79 in Turgay oblast and Zhangistobe in Semipalatinsk oblast, had eight
regiments with 52 R-36MUTTHIR-36M2 launchers each.
152 Chapter 4
The elimination of the RVSN group in Kazakhstan had been completed by the
end of September 1996. All nuclear warheads and missiles had been moved from
Kazakhstan to storage and recycling facilities in Russia, and the last silo launcher
was eliminated in September 1996.
Ukraine The 43rd Missile Army was located in Ukraine and had its headquarters
in Vinnitsa. It consisted of the 46th (Nizhnedneprovsk) and 19th Missile Divisions
with respective headquarters in Pervomaysk in Nikolayev oblast 80 and in Khmel-
nitskiy. The 19th Missile Division consisted of nine UR-100NUTTH regiments (90
launchers). The 46th Missile Division consisted of four UR-100NUTTH regiments
(40 launchers) and five silo-based RT-23UTTH regiments (46 launchers).
At the end of 1995 all of the missiles had been removed from the launchers, and
the elimination of the 40 UR-100NUTTH launchers in Pervomaysk had begun.
Belarus The 33rd and 49th Missile Divisions in Belarus were apparently part of
the 50th Missile Army, with its headquarters in Smolensk. These divisions, located
near Lida in Grodno oblast and in Mozyr in Gomel oblast, had three Topol regi-
ments each (27 launchers in each division). By the end of 1996 all 54 systems of
these divisions had been moved to Russia. Some of the missiles were relocated in
Vypolzovo and Yoshkar-O lao
Another three Topol regiments (27 launchers) were briefly deployed near Postavy
(on the re-equipped former Pioneer ground-mobile missile system base) in 1991.
These systems were moved to Russia soon afterward. (The Kherson Missile Divi-
sion in Postavy was disbanded in 1993.)
As a result of the elimination of the RVSN groups in Belarus, Kazakhstan, and

Ukraine, therefore, seven RVSN divisions located outside Russian territory ceased
to exist or were reorganized. Another two missile divisions within Russian territory
were disbanded in connection with the removal of the UR-100K and UR-100U
missile systems from service: a missile division located near Yasnaya in Chita oblast,
and a missile division located near Svobodnyy in Amur oblast (disbanded in 1994).81
The reduction of the RVSN forces by nine divisions necessitated the dissolution
of two of the six missile armies that had existed at the time of the breakup of the
USSR. The 43rd Missile Army (Vinnitsa) and 50th Missile Army (Smolensk) were
dissolved. The headquarters of the remaining four missile armies were located in
Vladimi~ 82 Orenburg, Omsk, and Chita. 83
Despite the reduction in RVSN's organizational units and number of personnel,
new units were created during the same general period. Four new missile regiments
were put on combat duty in 1996. 84 Some of these regiments apparently had been
moved to Russia from Belarus.
The further reduction of strategic arms envisaged in the START I and START II
Treaties will probably lead to radical changes in the present organizational
structure of the RVSN. The proposals approved by the Russian leadership in
2000 call for demoting the RVSN from its current status as a service to that of a
branch of the armed forces in 2002. This would probably mean that the current
army structure would be eliminated. In 2005 the RVSN may be united with the Air
Forces.
Missile Systems
Overview
The distribution of responsibilities among the defense industry and the armed forces
during the creation, testing, and maintenance of strategic missiles corresponds
to the common principles of the creation and maintenance of weapons and mili-
tary equipment in the Soviet Union. Research institutes and design bureaus of
the defense industry are responsible for basic research and development of new
systems. Design bureaus and the defense industry are responsible for manufac-
turing of test missiles, which are flight-tested by the testing units of the RVSN
in close cooperation with the designers. After the flight tests are completed, the
RVSN and the Ministry of Defense may recommend the systems for subsequent
deployment.
According to the practice, established in the Soviet Union, the development of a
missile system consists of several basic stages: basic research (NIR), research and
development (NIOKR, which includes engineering design, system integration,
production and testing of components, and integrated flight tests), and the serial
production of the system. The basic research stage usually includes formulating per-
formance specifications for a new system. The research work may include develop-
ment of the system's preliminary design. The work on this design helps research
institutes and design bureaus formulate detailed performance specifications for the
system.
At the final stage of basic research, the performance specifications for the pro-
posed system are reviewed by one of the research institutes of the Ministry of
Defense or the RVSN, which acts as a representative of the customer. For missile
systems, the Main Armaments Directorate of the Ministry of Defense and the Main
Rocket Armaments Directorate of the RVSN assume the role of the customer.
154 Chapter 4
During the review the customer may submit suggestions concerning the technical
specification of the proposed system.
The basic research stage does not usually require a high-level authorization and
may be initiated by an internal order of the ministry responsible for development
of missile systems or by the Military-Industrial Commission. Moving on to the R&D
(NIOKR) stage, in contrast, which begins with the preliminary design, requires a
governmental decree. In the Soviet Union this usually took the form of a joint decree
of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers. 85 In Russia the
procedure for making decisions on the development of combat missile systems has
not yet been invoked, because development began on all of the existing systems and
the systems in development before the breakup of the USSR. When it becomes
necessary to implement the procedure, the authorization to move to the R&D stage
will probably take the form of a decree issued by the Russian government.
The preliminary design stage involves determining the system's overall configu-
ration and its components, analysis of alternative designs, and establishing the tech-
nological requirements. Procedures for coordination between the prime contractor
and its subcontractors, responsible for separate subsystems, are also determined
during this stage. After the preliminary design is ready, it undergoes another review
by the customer's representative.
The coordination of the operations of all organizations participating in the devel-
opment and testing of the missile system (research institutes, design bureaus, pilot
and serial-production plants, test ranges) is the responsibility of the organization
acting as the prime contractor. In accordance with the schedule specified in the gov-
ernmental decree that authorizes the move to the design stage, a state commission
is formed to conduct tests of the system and its components and evaluate their
results. The state commission includes representatives of the customer (the Ministry
of Defense) and the prime contractor, usually the chief designers of the system and
of its main subsystems, such as engines, control and guidance systems, and launch
complexes. The chief designers are also members of another body formed at this
stage, the council of chief designers, which is supposed to help evaluate the perfor-
mance of the system and its components and facilitate resolving any problems that
may occur during integration and testing.
The testing program for the new system includes separate ground tests of the sub-
systems and assemblies. The final stage of the program is the ground test of the
entire system. Any problems, defects, and malfunctions discovered during these tests
are followed by the appropriate changes in design and technological documenta-
tion. After the ground test program is completed, the council of chief designers
schedules flight tests of the system. The decision to schedule flight tests requires the
approval of the state commission, which may disagree with the opinion of the
council of chief designers and overrule their decision.
Flight tests of combat missiles are usually divided into two stages: designer flight
tests (LKI) and so-called combined flight tests. The designer flight tests are con-
ducted to check the system's design in a field experiment. These tests can indicate
the need for changes and improvements in the system design. The combined tests
are conducted to check whether the system's performance corresponds to the per-
formance specifications outlined at the initial stages of development and to obtain
information for use in making the decision whether to commission the system.
Following the combined tests, the state commission issues a report on the results
of those tests, offering its opinion on whether the system corresponds to the per-
formance specifications. This report is later used by as the basis for the government
decision on commissioning the system.
The common practice in the USSR was for the development and serial produc-
tion of missiles to be conducted by different organizations. Development was the
job of the head design bureau, working as a prime contractor. Serial production was
organized at one of the serial production plants of the Ministry of General Machine
Building, which received all of the technological documentation concerning the
system from the design bureau that designed it. Since neither the design bureaus nor
production plants were subordinated to the Ministry of Defense, the decision to
adopt a system was not a prerogative of the Ministry of Defense, and system pro-
duction therefore had to be authorized by a governmental decree, which instructed
various ministries and departments to make the necessary arrangements for serial
production of the system.
Theoretically, an evaluation period should precede the adoption of a new system,
during which it is used by the troops. In most cases in the Soviet Union, however,
representatives of industry were able to secure a decision to commission the system
almost immediately after the successful completion of flight tests. As a result of this
approach, if a system was not commissioned after the flight tests but "approved for
use" or "approved for experimental use" instead, this indicates that the system was
considered a failure and did not warrant commissioning and subsequent broad-scale
deployment.
The Missile Industry

The missile industry was established as a separate branch of the defense industry
by a USSR Council of Ministers decree of 13 May 1946 that specified the
15 6 Chapter 4
distribution of duties among the ministries of the defense complex in connection

with the development of combat missiles. The implementation of this decree resulted
in the creation of key organizations responsible for the development of missiles and
their components.
The decree appointed the Ministry of Armaments the head agency responsible for
the creation of liquid-propellant ballistic and antiaircraft missiles. During World
War II, this ministry had been in charge of the production of artillery systems. The
responsibility for the development of rocket-propelled projectiles with solid-
propellant motors was assigned to the Ministry of Agricultural Machine Building.
The Ministry of Aviation Industry was expected to take charge of the development
of cruise missiles ("rocket-propelled aircraft-projectiles"). The Ministry of Aviation
Industry was also put in charge of liquid-propellant rocket engines and aerodynamic
tests. The Ministry of Electrical Equipment Industry (later reorganized as the Min-
istry of Communication Equipment Industry) was made responsible for ground and
onboard guidance equipment and radar stations for the detection and tracking of
targets. The Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry was given responsibility for gyro-
scopic stabilization equipment and other systems connected with the use of
naval rocket armaments. The Ministry of Chemical Industry was put in charge of
liquid fuels, oxidizers, and catalysts, and the Ministry of Machine-Building and
Instrument Building was in charge of launchers, launch equipment, and other
components.
The same decree ordered the creation of main directorates or rocket armament
directorates and the corresponding scientific research institutes and design bureaus
in each of the ministries listed. Scientific Research Institute 88 (NII-88), formed in
the Ministry of Armaments from Artillery Plant No. 88 in Kaliningrad in Moscow
oblast, was the head organization developing liquid-fuel propellant missiles. Some
of NII-88 divisions-OKB-l (now the S. P. Korolev Space Rocket Corporation
"Energiya"), OKB-2 (now the A. M. Isayev Chemical Machine-Building Design
Bureau), and several other scientific research organizations-later became separate
entities. The head organization in charge of solid-propellant rockets was established
at the State Central Design Bureau No.1 of the Ministry of Agricultural Machine
Building (later NII-l of the Ministry of Defense Industry).
The decree also provided for the creation of several institutes and design bureaus
that became the head organizations in charge of the development of various missile
subsystems. NII-885 of the Ministry of Communication Equipment Industry was
designated as the head institute for the development of control and guidance
systems. Two institutes were later formed from the NII-885: the Russian Scientific
Research Institute of Space Instrument Building (RNIIKP) and the N. A. Pilyugin

Scientific Research Institute of Automatic Equipment and Instrument Building
(NIIAP). The State Design Bureau of Special Machine Building (GSKBspetsmash,
now the V. P. Barmin Design Bureau of General Machine Building), established from
the special design bureau of the Kompressor plant of the Ministry of Machine Build-
ing and Instrument Building, became the head design bureau in the development of
launchers and refueling and other ground equipment.
The head design bureau responsible for the creation of liquid-propellant rocket
engines was OKB-456 of the Ministry of Aviation Industry (now the V. P. Glushko
Scientific Production Association of Power Engineering Machine Building). Starting
in 1944, the Ministry of Aviation Industry also had jurisdiction over the former
Scientific Research Institute of Rocket Propulsion, renamed NII-1 (now called
RNIIINII-1 MAP and commonly known as the M. V. Keldysh Research Center).
This institute also continued working in the field of rocket propulsion.
The job of creating gyroscopic instruments for rockets was assigned to NII-10 of
the Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry. The development of electrical equipment
for ballistic missiles became the function of NII-627 of the Ministry of Electrical
Equipment Industry (now the All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Electro-
mechanics). Development of chemicals and fuels for rocket engines was assigned to
a new institute of the Ministry of Chemical Industry: the State Institute of Applied
Chemistry (GIPKh).
The research institutes and design bureaus established in 1946 became the basis
of the space rocket industry in the USSR. The institutes later built up a network of
subcontractors and became the new head organizations in new fields of space rocket
engineering. During its existence, the Soviet missile industry grew into a branch with
hundreds of enterprises employing more than a million people.
The coordination of all rocket engineering projects was originally the responsi-
bility of the Rocket Armament Committee of the USSR Council of Ministers, also
established in 1946. The committee, later renamed Special Committee No.2, was
officially accountable to the Council of Ministers, but it was actually under the direct
jurisdiction of the Politburo. Politburo member G. M. Malenkov was appointed the
first chairman of the committee. 86
In the late 1940s and early 1950s the Ministry of Armaments was reorganized as
the Ministry of Defense Industry (MOP, or Minoboronprom), and later as the
State Committee for Defense Technology (GKOT), in the middle of the 1950s. In
1965 the committee was transformed into the new Ministry of General Machine
Building (MOM, or Minobshchemash), which was responsible for the development
158 Chapter 4
and production of strategic missile systems, and the Ministry of Defense Industry,
responsible for tactical and theater missiles. The spheres of activity of the two min-
istries later lost their original distinctions, and enterprises of the Ministry of Defense
Industry also worked on strategic missile systems.
The Ministry of General Machine Building had jurisdiction over the head
enterprises in the development and serial production of missiles, rocket engines,
control and guidance systems, and gyroscopic instruments, as well as the enterprises
developing launch complexes and the main components of missile launch support
equipment. During the development of missile systems, the enterprises of the Min-
istry of General Machine Building worked in close contact with related ministries
responsible for the development of separate components and subsystems.
The creation of nuclear warhead devices was placed under the jurisdiction of
the Ministry of Medium Machine Building (whereas reentry vehicles were designed
by the enterprises that were developing the missiles). The Ministries of Radio
Industry and Electronics Industry were put in charge of the development and
creation of radio-electronic equipment. Enterprises developing and producing
gyroscopic instruments for missile control and guidance systems were transferred
from the Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry to the Ministry of General Machine
Building.
Virtually all of the ministries that formed the core of the Soviet military industry
were dissolved after the breakup of the USSR in 1991.87 The military industry enter-
prises were transferred to the jurisdiction of the republics where they were located.
The enterprises within Russian territory were originally transferred to the jurisdic-
tion of the new Russian Federation Ministry of Industry, which had a departmen-
tal structure corresponding to the abolished ministries (departments of general
machine building, aviation industry, etc.). The Committee of the Russian Federa-
tion for Defense Industries (Goskomoboronprom; renamed the Ministry of Defense
Industry in May 1996), was created later to manage the defense enterprises. In 1994
more than 30 enterprises of the former Ministry of General Machine Building
were transferred from the jurisdiction of the Committee for Defense Industries to
the control of the Russian Space Agency.88 In April 1997 the Ministry of Defense
Industry was dissolved.
Primary Contractors This section contains information about the head enterprises
responsible for the development of missile systems and the main subcontractors
developing the more important subsystems of those systems. The location of these
development facilities and their associated production plants is shown in figure 4.3.
Figure 4.3
Locations of the main ICBM development and production facilities
In the earliest stages of the Soviet missile development program, when the missiles
were relatively simple and were produced quickly in large quantities, the serial pro-
duction of one type of missile could be conducted at several plants at once. Start-
ing in the late 1950s the head development enterprises and serial plants gradually
formed strong (and usually exclusive) ties. Each head developer was tied to a par-
ticular serial plant, which built the products of that developer. Because of this, the
information about serial plants is included in the data on the development organi-
zations with which they were associated.
Central Design Bureau of Experimental Machine Building (OKB-1) From 1946
to 1954 all ballistic-missile development projects were conducted by a single head
organization: Scientific Research Institute 88 (NII-88) of the Ministry of
Armaments. 89 From the very start of this work, the head subdivision of NII-88 in
charge of the development of ballistic missiles was Division No.3 of the Special
Design Bureau (SKB) of NII-88. Division No.3 was headed by S. P. Korolev, the
160 Chapter 4
chief designer of long-range ballistic missiles. In April 1950 the division was reor-
ganized as the Experimental Design Bureau No.1 of NII-88 (OKB-1 of NII-88). In
August 1956 OKB-1 became a separate enterprise, directly subordinate to the
Ministry of Defense Industry (later the State Committee for Defense Technology).
OKB-1 developed the first Soviet ballistic missile (the R-1), the first missile
with storable fuel components (R-ll), and the first ballistic missile with a nuclear
warhead (R-5M) and began work on the first intercontinental missile (the R-7)
while it was still part of NII-88. After OKB-1 became a separate entity, it completed
the work on the R-7 ICBM and then developed the R-9A ICBM (1959-1965)
and the first solid-propellant ICBM, the RT-2 (1961-1968). The serial produc-
tion of missiles was organized at plants chosen and re-equipped specifically for
this purpose: Plant 385 in Zlatoust (the R-1 missile and then the R-ll), Plant
586 in Dnepropetrovsk (the R-1 and R-2 missiles and later the R-5 and R-5M),
Plant 1 in Kuybyshev (the R-7 and R-7A), and Plant 1001 in Krasnoyarsk (the
R-9A).
After the creation of the first intercontinental R-7 missile and the launches of the
first artificial satellites with its help in 1957, OKB-1 started concentrating on space
research projects. The further development of operational and tactical missiles (the
R-ll and R-llM) and sea-based missiles (the R-llFM) was turned over to the
design bureau of Plant 385 in Zlatoust (SKB-385).90 In 1959 the further develop-
ment of rockets based on the R-7A ICBM was turned over to Branch No.3 of
OKB-1, established at Plant 1 in Kuybyshev. 91 OKB-1 continued working on the
liquid-fuel R-9A and solid-propellant RT-2 ICBMs, but they took up less of its time
than manned space flight, interplanetary stations, and other space programs.
In the 1960s OKB-1 was gradually excluded from work on liquid-propellant
combat missiles by competing organizations OKB-586 and OKB-52. In the second
half of the 1960s OKB-1 (renamed the Central Design Bureau of Experimental
Machine-Building, or TsKBEM, in 1966) stopped working on the development of
combat missile systems altogether and concentrated completely on rockets and space
technology.
The Yuzlmoye Design Bureau (OKB-SS6) Special Design Bureau No. 586 (OKB-
586), now known as the Academician M. K. Yangel Yuzhnoye Design Bureau, was
founded on 10 April 1954 from the chief designer's division of Plant 586 in Dne-
propetrovsk. The serial production of R-1 and R-2 missiles, developed in OKB-1 of
NII-88, had been organized at this plant in the early 1950s. OKB-586, which was
headed by Yangel from the start, concentrated on development of long-range bal-
listic missiles with storable fuel components.
Yangel began working in this field in 1952, while he was at NII-88 (Yangel
worked first as S. P. Korolev's deputy and was then appointed the director of
NII-88). To avoid a conflict between Korolev, who was a strong proponent
of cryogenic-fuel missiles, and Yangel, who advocated using storable fuel, the
Ministry of Defense Industry established an alternative design organization on
the grounds of Plant 586 that assumed responsibility for storable-fuel missile
development.
Development of the first intermediate-range and, late~ the intercontinental bal-
listic missiles using storable fuel and equipped with an autonomous guidance system
(the R-12, R-14, and R-16) began in OKB-586 in the late 1950s and early 1960s.
Later OKB-586 submitted the best design for a heavy ICBM (R-36), and it then
created all subsequent models of Soviet heavy ICBMs (R-36M, R-36MUTTH, and
R-36M2). In addition to working on the heavy ICBMs, OKB-586 (renamed the
Yuzhnoye Design Bureau in October 1966) developed the MR UR-100 and MR
UR-100UTTH systems in the 1970s.
While OKB-586 was developing its own missiles, the production facilities of
Plant 586 (renamed the Yuzhnyy Machine-Building Plant in October 1966 and then
Yuzhmash-the Yuzhnyy Machine-Building Plant Production Association) began
serial production of the missiles developed at OKB-586, along with Plant 1001 in
Krasnoyarsk (now the Krasnoyarsk Machine-Building Plant Production Associa-
tion) and the Omsk Aviation Plant (now the Polyot Production Association).
In addition to developing liquid-propellant silo-based ICBMs, OKB-586/the
Yuzhnoye Design Bureau also worked on the creation of mobile solid-propellant
intercontinental missiles. The first experiment in the creation of these systems was
the RT-20P mobile ground-launched ICBM, with a solid-propellant first stage and
a liquid-fuel second stage. Development of the RT-20P began in 1964 and was can-
celled in 1969.92 Late~ in the 1970s and early 1980s, the Yuzhnoye Design Bureau
created a heavier solid-propellant ICBM, the RT-23 , designed for silos and
rail-mobile launches. A special production and experimental testing facility was
established in Pavlograd (now the Pavlograd Mechanical Plant, part of the Yuzhnyy
Machine-Building Plant Production Association) to work on solid-propellant
missiles.
The Yuzhnoye Design Bureau's experiments with solid-propellant missiles led
to the development of the "cold launch" or "mortar launch" method for ballistic
missiles. The cold launch was tested first on the RT-20P missile and thereafter was
used for all third-generation ICBMs (with the exception of the UR-100N and the
UR-100NUTTH).
162 Chapter 4
In addition to developing combat missile systems, the Yuzhnoye Design Bureau

also worked on command missiles for the Perimeter combat communication system.
In the 1970s it developed the first-stage solid-propellant motors of the R-39 SLBM,
developed by the Machine-Building Design Bureau (Chief Designer V. P. Makeyev).
The engines were produced at the Pavlograd Mechanical Plant. 93
In the late 1980s and the 1990s the Yuzhnoye Design Bureau and Yuzhnyy
Machine-Building Plant Production Association were named the head developer
and producer of the silo version of the updated RT-2PM2 missile, which was
intended to replace the Topol missile system. In April 1992, following the breakup
of the Soviet Union, these functions were turned over to Russian organizations (the
Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology and the Votkinsk Mechanical Plant).94 If
the START II Treaty enters into force, all of the current RVSN missiles developed
by the Yuzhnoye Design Bureau (the R-36MUTTH/R-36M2 and RT-23UTTH) will
be subject to elimination.
The Yuzhnoye Design Bureau is located in Ukraine, and the Russian Ministry
of Defense therefore has no plans for involving it further in the development of
missiles. By the terms of an agreement between Russia and Ukraine, however, the
Yuzhnoye specialists will continue to assist in servicing the ICBMs they developed
until those missiles have been removed from service and eliminated. This means that
the Russian military could employ the services of Ukrainian specialists if the START
II Treaty is not ratified and some of the heavy R-36MUTTHIR-36M2 missiles are
kept on operational status.
The Yuzhnyy Machine-Building Plant Production Association is now working,
with the help of the United States, on projects for the elimination of the RT-23UTTH
and UR-100N missiles that were located within Ukraine's territory.95 Besides this,
the Yuzhnoye Design Bureau plans to work with several Russian enterprises in the
use for space launches of R-36MUTTH/R-36M2 missiles removed from combat
service (Project SS-18K).
M. K. Yangel was the chief designer of OKB-586/Yuzhnoye Design Bureau
from 1954 to 1971. V. F. Utkin became chief designer after Yangel's death. S. N.
Konyukhov replaced Utkin in 1990.
The Central Machine-Building Design Bureau (OKB-52) Special Design Bureau
No. 52 (OKB-52) of the State Committee for Aviation Technology, headed by
General Designer V. N. Chelomey, began working on ballistic missiles in
1958-1959. Prior to that the OKB-52 had worked on cruise missiles for the Soviet
Navy. After the Ministry of General Machine Building was established in 1965,
OKB-52 was transferred to its jurisdiction and renamed the Central Machine-
Building Design Bureau (TsKBM). In the late 19S0s and early 1960s Chelomey
submitted plans for a series of so-called all-purpose missiles that could be used
both as combat ballistic missiles and as space launch vehicles. The first of the
OKB-S2's development projects in this field was the UR-200 ICBM, which was
followed by the heavy UR-SOO and light UR-100 (SS-l1). Of these missiles
only the UR-100 was adopted. It became the core of the Soviet ICBM force.
The work on the UR-200 was halted and the heavy UR-SOO was used only as
a space launch vehicle (UR-SOOK, also known as Proton). Later the OKB-S2 devel-
oped several new UR-100 ICBM models as follow-oilS to the original. These
improved second-generation UR-100K and UR-100U missiles were in turn replaced
by the third-generation UR-100N and UR-100NU missiles in the second half of the
1970s.
Serial production of the missiles developed at OKB-S2/the Central Machine-
Building Design Bureau was conducted at the M. V. Khrunichev Machine-Building
Plant, which was attached to the design bureau at the beginning of the 1960s. UR-
100 missiles were also produced at the Omsk Aviation Plant (now the Polyot
Production Association) and possibly at other enterprises as well.
Most of the work involved in designing the UR-100 and its later models was con-
ducted by Branch No.1 of OKB-S2, located on the grounds of the Khrunichev plant.
In 1976 this branch was separated from the Central Machine-Building Design
Bureau and is now part of the M. V. Khrunichev State Space Scientific Production
Center.
The UR-100NUTTH system, adopted in 1979, was the last combat missile system
the Central Machine-Building Design Bureau developed. After that the bureau (now
called the Machine-Building Scientific Production Association) stopped working on
new ICBMs, but it continued to exercise designer's oversight of existing missiles.
The Khrunichev Space Center is no longer working on combat ballistic missiles
either. In the late 1980s and the 1990s the space center developed the Rokot light
space launch vehicle, based on the UR-lOON missile, and is converting the remain-
ing UR-100Ns into launch vehicles at its production facility.
V. N. Chelomey headed the OKB-S2/Machine-Building Scientific Production
Association (NPO) from the time of its founding to 1984. G. A. Yefremov has
headed the NPO since 1984.
The Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology (NII-1 MOP) The main function
of NII-1 of the Ministry of Defense Industry when it was established in the mid-
1940s was the creation of solid-propellant rockets. The lack of technology for the
production of highly effective and long-lasting solid rocket fuels in the USSR
164 Chapter 4
precluded the development of a solid-propellant intercontinental missile until the

mid-1960s. The institute was not asked to develop an intercontinental ballistic
missile until 1967. By the middle of the 1970s NII-1 had created the mobile Temp-
2S system with an intercontinental missile. The system was not adopted, but it did
serve as the basis for the development of the Pioneer intermediate-range road-mobile
system in the second half of the 1970s. That system was commissioned in 1976.
The institute's subsequent work on mobile systems with solid-propellant missiles
resulted in the creation of the mobile Topol system with an intercontinental missile,
which was adopted in 1988. The institute, now known as the Moscow Institute of
Thermal Technology State Enterprise (MITT), is currently the head developer of the
improved Topol-M model, which is expected to replace the current land-based
mobile and silo-based systems. The missiles developed by the Moscow institute
are manufactured at the Votkinsk Mechanical Plant, located in Votkinsk in the
Udmurt Autonomous Republic.
Chief Designer A. D. Nadiradze headed NII-1/MITT from 1967 to 1987. After
his death in 1987, B. N. Lagutin became the institute's chief designe~ and Yu. S.
Solomonov succeeded Lagutin in 1997.
The Arsenal Design Bureau (TsKB-7) Central Design Bureau No.7 (TsKB-7) was
founded in 1949 in Plant 7 in Leningrad (Frunze Plant) for the development of naval
artillery weapons. The design bureau started participating in the creation of several
missile systems in the early 1960s. Under the supervision of Chief Designer P. A.
Tyurin, Central Design Bureau No.7 participated in the development of the first
solid-propellant ICBM, the RT-2, and was named the head developer of the RT-15
mobile land missile, based on the second and third stages of the RT-2. After OKB-
lithe Central Experimental Design Bureau of Machine-Building completed work on
the RT-2 system, which was commissioned in 1968, TsKB-7 was responsible for the
development of the follow-on RT-2P system, which was commissioned in 1972.
In addition to this, Central Design Bureau No. 7 developed the first solid-
propellant sea-based missile, the R-31 (code-numbered 3M17) in the 1970s. It later
stopped working on missile systems and concentrated on spacecraft. The bureau,
later renamed the Arsenal Design Bureau, has been under the jurisdiction of the
Russian Space Agency since 1994.
Main Subcontractors The head design bureaus and institutes worked closely on
the creation of missile systems with organizations responsible for the creation and
development of separate components of ballistic missiles and missile systems.
Developers of Liquid-Fuel Rocket Engioes

THE V. P. GLUSHKO SCIENTIFIC PRODUCTION ASSOCIATION OF POWER ENGINEERING
MACHINE BUILDING (OKB-456) The V. P. Glushko Scientific Production Association
of Power Engineering Machine Building, also called the Energomash NPO, founded
in 1946 as OKB-456 of the Ministry of Aviation Industry, is the leading enterprise
in the development of powerful liquid-fuel rocket engines. In all, this bureau has
developed around 60 types of rocket engines. The engines on the R-1, R-2, and R-
5 missiles, the R-71R-7A, R-9, and R-16 intercontinental missiles, and all models of
heavy missiles of the R-36 series were developed in OKB-456. V. P. Glushko headed
OKB-456lEnergomash NPO from 1946 to 1989. B. I. Katorgin has been the Ener-
gomash general designer since 1991.
The Energomash NPO is located in Khimki in Moscow oblast. The serial pro-
duction of engines developed by the Energomash NPO was organized at plants in
Samara, Perm, and Omsk.
THE A. M. ISAYEV CHEMICAL MACHINE-BUILDING DESIGN BUREAU (OKB-2) The A.
M. Isayev Chemical Machine-Building Design Bureau was originally a subdivision
of NII-88. In 1956 the design bureau became an autonomous organization: OKB-
2 of the Ministry of Defense Industry. The enterprise, headed by A. M. Isayev, was
the first in the Soviet Union to begin developing liquid-fuel engines operating on
storable-fuel components. The engines developed by OKB-2 were used extensively,
first for guided antiaircraft missiles, then for operational and tactical missiles and
the final stage of staged missiles and space launch vehicles, as well as for spacecraft.
Another pioneering OKB-2 development was the so-called submerged engine design,
in which the engine was located within the fuel tank. This design, which reduced
the dimensions of missiles considerably, turned OKB-2 into an almost exclusive sup-
plier of liquid-fuel engines for the sea-launched missiles developed by the Makeyev
Design Bureau. Isayev headed the bureau until 1971. After Isayev's death, B. N.
Bogomolov headed the enterprise, and he was then replaced at the end of the 1980s
by its present directo~ N. I. Leontyev.
The Isayev Chemical Machine-Building Design Bureau is located in Kaliningrad96
in Moscow oblast. One of the serial-production plants that produces the bureau's
engines is the Ust'-Katav Wagon Plant (in Ust'-Katav in Chelyabinsk oblast).
THE CHEMICAL AUTOMATIC EQUIPMENT DESIGN BUREAU (OKB-154) The Chemical
Automatic Equipment Design Bureau was founded in 1941 in Voronezh as OKB-
154 of the Ministry of Aviation Industry. The design bureau began working on pro-
jects for the creation of liquid-propellant rocket engines in 1958. Its conversion to
166 Chapter 4
a design bureau for the creation of rocket engines was connected with the reduc-
tion of aviation in favor of rocket hardware at the end of the 1950s. OKB-154 was
the main developer of liquid-fuel engines for the ballistic missiles developed by OKB-
52 (the UR-200, the UR-500, and the UR-100 and its later models). In addition,
OKB-154 developed engines for the second stage of the R-9 A missile, modifications
of which were later used on the Voskhod, Molniya, and Soyuz space launch vehi-
cles, and an oxygen-hydrogen engine with a thrust of 200 tons for the Energiya
space shuttle system. The serial production of engines developed by the bureau was
mainly concentrated at the Voronezh Mechanical Plant.
S. A. Kosberg headed the design bureau from 1941 until his death in 1965, when
A. D. Konopatov became chief designer. Since 1993 the bureau has been headed by
V. S. Rachuk.
Developers of Control and Guidance Systems The leading organization in the
development of missile control and guidance systems is the N. A. Pilyugin Scientific
Research Institute of Automatic Equipment and Instrument Building (NIIAP) in
Moscow. The institute became an autonomous organization in the late 1950s or
early 1960s, after its separation from NII-885 of the Ministry of Communication
Equipment Industry, which was the main developer of guidance systems when the
missile program was initiated. The separation occurred after autonomous guidance
became dominant in the strategic missile engineering. 97 NII-885 later ceased to play
an active role in the creation of combat missiles and concentrated on the control
and guidance of space delivery vehicles and spacecraft. NII-885 is now called the
Russian Scientific Research Institute of Space Instrument Building (RNIIKP) and is
under the jurisdiction of the Russian Space Agency.
The Pilyugin Institute developed control and guidance systems for the missiles
produced by OKB-1, OKB-52, and NIl-I. Its main developments include control
and guidance systems for the UR-100 and MR UR-100 missiles and the Pioneer and
Topol ground-mobile missile systems. 98 The institute was also involved in develop-
ment of guidance for the R-36 family of heavy missiles. It was headed by N. A.
Pilyugin until 1982. After Pilyugin's death, V. L. Lapygin became chief designer and
headed the institute until 1997.
In addition to the Pilyugin Institute, alternative centers for the development of
control and guidance systems were established in Kharkov and Sverdlovsk with
the support of NII-885 in the 1950s. The Kharkov enterprises (the Khartron
Scientific Production Association (NPO) and several plants) later became the chief
developers and suppliers of guidance systems for the missiles of the Yuzhnoye Design
Bureau. The Automatic Equipment Scientific Production Association (NPO) in

Sverdlovsk (now Yekaterinburg) was the chief developer of control and guidance
systems for SLBMs.99 Since the breakup of the Soviet Union and the loss of the enter-
prises in Kharkov, the Pilyugin Institute has been the only Russian design bureau
that can develop guidance systems for combat land-based missiles and space launch
vehicles. However, the Automatic Equipment NPO in Yekaterinburg might be able
to compete with it in the future.
Developers of Launch Complexes and Launch Support Equipment The V. P.
Barmin Design Bureau of General Machine Building (KBOM) in Moscow was
founded in 1941, and in 1946 it became the head organization developing the
launch support equipment for missile systems. This design bureau developed
the launch complexes for the first ballistic missiles, from the R-1 to the R-7,
distinguished by their large dimensions and complexity. Later it developed the silo
launchers for the R-12, R-14, R-16, and R-9 missiles. In the mid-1960s the
KBOM was reorganized for the development of large launch complexes for space
rockets (N-1 and Energiya-Buran). The design bureau is now under the jurisdiction
of the Russian Space Agency.
The creation of highly automated launch complexes for combat missile systems
and space delivery vehicles is now concentrated in the Transport Machine-Building
Design Bureau in Moscow, which is the leading enterprise in this branch. Another
organization developing silo launchers is the Central Design Bureau of Special
Machine Building (St. Petersburg). This design bureau, previously called Central
Design Bureau No. 34 and headed by Chief Designer Yeo G. Rudy, developed the
silo launcher for the R-36 missile.
The Transport Chemical Machine-Building Design Bureau (Moscow) develops
refueling and neutralizing equipment and temperature and humidity control
systems.
Rocket Fuels The State Institute of Applied Chemistry (GIPKh) in St. Petersburg
is the Russian leader in the development of rocket fuels. This institute, founded in
1946, has created virtually all of the liquid fuels used in missiles and space equip-
ment. The first solid composite fuels were perfected there in the 1960s under the
supervision of Director and Chief Designer V. S. Shpak. One of the leading enter-
prises developing solid rocket fuels is the former NII-125, now the Soyuz Federal
Dual-Purpose Technology Center in Lyubertsy in Moscow oblast. The Biysk Chem-
ical Combine and the Yenisey Chemical Combine in Krasnoyarsk are the largest
producers of solid rocket fuels in Russia.
168 Chapter 4
Missile Life Cycle

The operation and maintenance of combat missile systems involve a number of
stages. A missile system is officially in use after the military representative at the
manufacturing plant has accepted it from the producer. After this the system is put
on alert, serves combat duty, and is then removed from the combat duty and dis-
mantled at end of its service life. The combat duty stage also includes periodical
inspections of the missile system and, when necessary, repairs to keep the system
operating reliably.
Depending on the plans for their deployment, the combat missile systems accepted
by the military representative can be sent from the manufacturing plant where they
are produced either directly to operational RVSN divisions for combat duty or to
one of the RVSN arsenals for storage in expectation of deployment later. When
missiles are put on combat duty, specialists of the missile division conduct com-
prehensive preparations and checks of the missile system. The list of procedures to
be conducted during this stage is different for different types of systems, but it
generally includes the following elements:
· initial tests of the missile and launch equipment
• installation of the missile into its silo (for silo-based systems) or onto its
transporter-launcher (for mobile systems)
· comprehensive checks of the missile and launch equipment
• preparation of the missile for long-term combat duty (liquid-fuel silo-based mis-
siles are fueled and ampulized during this stage)
· installation of nuclear warheads
After the preparatory work has been completed, the combat missile system is put
on combat duty and is on permanent alert from that time on until it is removed
from service (except for when it is removed for inspection and maintenance).
Each missile system has its own operational features, dictated by its own unique
characteristics: intervals between periodic inspections, length of inspections, tem-
perature and humidity requirements for storage, level of automation of operational
processes, and so on. Combat missile systems are designed to ensure maximum
simplicity and safety, minimum cost of operation, and minimum number of per-
sonnel required to operate the system.
Periodic Inspections Periodic inspections of missile systems on combat duty secure

their reliability and operability. The maintenance schedule for a particular missile
includes the assessment of its performance on various levels and at various inter-
vals. A maintenance schedule is drawn up for each separate type of missile system
on the basis of its specific features. The content and regularity of periodic inspec-
tions have changed significantly with each successive generation of combat missile
systems.
A standard inspection schedule was first instituted in the RVSN in 1964, setting
the same intervals between service inspections of all launch sites and facilitating the
planning of technical maintenance. The result was enhanced operational reliability
and combat readiness of missile systems. 100 A system for the collection of data on
the technical state of missile hardware was established at the same time, providing
for the regular collection of information about malfunctions and breakdowns, their
subsequent analysis, and recommendations for design changes in response to the
problems encountered.
In general, there are several levels of scheduled maintenance for each type of
system. Lower-level inspections at brief intervals (daily, weekly, and possibly
monthly) can be performed without reducing the missile's alert state. Operations
that require more thorough inspections are conducted at longer intervals (six
months, a year, or three years) and may require the removal of the missile from
alert, the removal of warheads, and even removal of the missile from the launcher.
Maintenance work performed without removing the system from combat duty is
performed by the personnel of the RVSN units that operate the system. More thor-
ough inspections are conducted by the personnel of the regimental (or division)
servicing area. Mobile systems, for example, undergo maintenance inspections at
long intervals (one year and three years) as well as semiannual (or seasonal),
monthly, weekly, and daily service checks. The one-year and three-year inspections
are conducted in the servicing area of the regiment by its personnel with the help
of other regimental service units and subunits. More frequent maintenance is per-
formed by the personnel that operate the missile without removing the system from
alert. 10l The periodic inspections of missile systems of the third and subsequent
generations are largely automated. 102
The maintenance schedule established for a particular type of missile envisages
the regular replacement of certain components of missiles and missile systems with
a shorter service life than the system as a whole. The gyro-stabilized platforms of
first-generation systems, for example, were replaced regularly.
If regular scheduled inspections reveal deviations from acceptable performance
parameters in any of the subsystems or elements of a system, unscheduled repairs
must be performed, and the missile system is temporarily removed from combat
duty for repairs. Depending on the type of repair required, warheads may be
170 Chapter 4
removed from the missile. The missile may also be removed from the launcher and
sent to the division missile servicing area. Alternatively, personnel from the servic-
ing area may be instructed to perform on-site repairs.
Repairs on missile bases and repairs requiring the help of specialists from servic-
ing areas are confined to the replacement of inoperable parts or modules with new
(spare) parts supplied by the manufacturer. More complex repairs are performed
at manufacturing plants. A missile removed from combat duty or the substandard
components of the missile system are sent to the manufacturing plant for defect
analysis and repair. If one or several missile systems are removed from combat duty
for a long period of time for repairs (or for a scheduled in-plant inspection, if
one is required), those missiles may be replaced by missiles from the reserve supply
of the operational missile base or from the arsenal.
In-Plant Seroicing The discovery of malfunctions in a missile that cannot be cor-

rected in the field or of flaws in its design creates the need for in-plant servicing. In
addition, at the end of its guaranteed service life, each type of missile must undergo
quality control inspections in the manufacturing plant to facilitate decisions as to
whether its service life can be extended.
After the expiration of their guaranteed service life, solid-propellant missiles
require a quality control check of their charge, and liquid-propellant missiles require
quality control checks of their fuel, the aging of structural materials in an aggres-
sive medium, and other parameters of their physical state.
In addition to this, the plants that manufacture missile systems participate in
maintaining the operability of those on combat duty by supplying spare parts, acces-
sories, and reserve modules for components to be replaced during scheduled main-
tenance or repairs. In some cases (particularly in the case of systems recently put
on combat duty or, conversely, systems reaching the end of their service life), spe-
cialists from industry participate in the periodic inspections.
After the breakup of the Soviet Union the RVSN had to solve the problem of
what to do about the in-plant servicing of the missiles and components of missile
systems produced in Ukraine. The result was an agreement between Russia and
Ukraine on participation by Ukrainian specialists in the servicing of the RVSN's
Ukrainian-produced missile systems.
Service Life Extension After the initial service life of a missile system has expired,
either it has to be removed from combat duty and eliminated or a decision has to
be made to extend the period of the system's use. This period can be extended if
the actual technical state of the missile system at the end of its guaranteed service
life allows for its continued operation without any decrease in reliability and safety
(or with an acceptable decrease of reliability).
The decision to extend a missile system's service life is made on the basis of a special
set of studies and tests conducted jointly by the RVSN, the system's designers, and its
manufacturers. Extension of missile systems' service life is particularly important
in Russia now that the funding of the production of new missiles is problematic. In
this context, measures have recently been taken in Russia to extend the service
life of missile systems currently in operation. The period of operation of the UR-
100NUTTH systems, for example, was extended to 21 years, and the service life of
the Topol systems was extended from 10 years to 15. The RVSN command expects
the service life of the UR-1 OONUTTH missiles to be extended to 25 years or more. '03
Training Launches Training launches of missiles on combat duty are conducted

regularly to confirm the performance of missiles and to maintain the skills of combat
crews. An annual quota of missiles is set aside to be used for training launches,
which are conducted either from test ranges or from those operational deployment
areas that have an area around them reserved for the fall of the separated stages.
Prior to a training launch, the missile warheads are replaced with special substi-
tutes, and the combat crews launch the missile at a simulated target on the Kam-
chatka peninsula or in the Pacific Ocean.
In addition to training launches, there are regular launches of missiles for quality
control checks of missile series and of missiles with long storage periods to check
their performance after long combat duty time. These launches are conducted on
test ranges.
Elimination of Missile Systems The final stage in the use of missile armaments
is their elimination after their removal from service. The first step in removing a
missile from combat duty is reducing its alert status. After this has been done, the
warheads are removed from the missile, and the RVSN Sixth Directorate turns it
over to the 12th Main Directorate of the Ministry of Defense for further use or dis-
mantlement. In the case of a liquid-fuel system, the fuel is removed, and then the
missile and its launch canister are removed from the launcher and sent to the appro-
priate liquidation facility. The liquidation of the missile and its launch canister
on the base includes the neutralization of the missile propellant tanks and the
extraction of elements containing precious metals from instrumentation section.
This is followed by the disassembly and cutting of the missile's airframe.
172 Chapter 4
The START I Treaty set several conditions for missile elimination procedures. A
mobile missile is considered eliminated only after destruction of the missile itself,
its launch canisters, and its transporter-launcher. The protocol to the treaty speci-
fies all the procedures to be followed for liquidation. The treaty also defined the
procedure for the elimination of silo launchers. In contrast with the requirements
for mobile missiles, the conditions of the START I Treaty do not require the actual
elimination of silo-based missiles and their launch canisters. A silo-based missile is
considered eliminated when its silo is destroyed.
Combat Operations of the Strategic Rocket Forces
The purpose of combat duty for missiles, which was instituted in the RVSN in 1960,
is to keep them in a state of constant readiness for launch. The RVSN combat duty
procedures are defined in the Statute on the Combat Duty of Units of the Rocket
Forces, which defines the different levels of combat readiness and sets forth the oper-
ational procedures of RVSN units and subunits at each leve1. 104 The statue was orig-
inally approved in 1960 and has been revised as necessary since then. The original
statute specified the procedures that the personnel servicing missiles, warheads, and
launch support and refueling equipment had to follow at different stages of combat
readiness. Later the statute was revised to conform to technical and organizational
changes in strategic weapons and the Strategic Rocket Forces.
One of the fundamental principles of combat duty is constant combat readiness
of each command post, from the central RVSN command station to the regiment
or the individuallauncher'05 (including armies and divisions). The personnel on duty
at all levels are responsible for the keeping the missiles ready for launch and for the
monitoring of missile status.
The missile systems of the first generation had three or four levels of readi-
ness: constant readiness, high readiness, and full readiness (the R-12 also had an
"increased high" readiness level). In the state of constant readiness, the missiles were
in silos or assembly sites in servicing areas without their warheads and (in the case
of the R-12) without gyros. The shift to high readiness necessitated the attachment
of the warheads and installation of the gyros. Increased high readiness for open-
launch sites necessitated the placement of the missiles on the launch pad and the
approach of refueling vehicles, as well as the entry of the necessary launch data into
the missiles' guidance system and a check of the guidance system. Full alert meant
that the missiles were fueled and aimed. Because of service life limits, missiles could
remain in a fueled state for periods ranging from 30 days (missiles with storable
components) to just 24 hours (the R-9A missiles with cryogenic components).
The deployment of single-launch systems reduced reaction time (the amount of
time that elapses between receipt of a command to launch a missile and the actual
launch) from hours to minutes, and after that the levels of readiness were revised
and the most common status was "constant high readiness."106 Missiles on combat
duty were equipped with warheads at all times and were fueled and ready in their
silo launchers. This put higher requirements on duty personnel, because they would
have to launch the subunit's missiles promptly when they received the order to
do so.
The hierarchy of duty personnel in the RVSN include the personnel of the RVSN
Main Staff and of the missile armies, missile divisions, and missile regiments. In the
case of mobile systems, the crews of the individual launchers are also part of the
hierarchy.
Mobile missile systems on combat duty travel along routes within their deploy-
ment zone, the area of which does not exceed 125,000 square kilometers (approx-
imately 350 kilometers by 350 kilometers). In the event of a crisis, ground systems
can be taken out of their deployment zone and scattered over a larger area. Rail-
based systems patrol areas at distances of up to 1,500 kilometers from their base
locations and can be in transit for one or two months. 107 According to the terms of
the START I Treaty, no more than half of all deployed rail-based systems can be in
motion at any given time. The established procedures for those systems in the RVSN
probably conform to this requirement.
In line with the unilateral USSR initiative of October 1991, rail-based missile
systems do not leave their base stations for patrol. Their locations are changed
regularly within the confines of certain oblasts (Kostroma and Perm oblasts and
Krasnoyarsk Kray), and they are not sent on the main patrol routes. lOS
Targeting
Each missile on combat duty has a specific flight assignment, specifying the geo-
graphic locations for the delivery of its warheads after it receives a launch command.
The targets of ICBMs are defined in the integrated Plan of Operations of the Strate-
gic Nuclear Forces, which sets the targets for nuclear strikes for all elements of the
strategic nuclear forces. 109 The integrated plan for the use of the strategic forces is
drawn up by the Armed Forces General Staff. Within the confines of this plan, the
RVSN is expected to keep a certain number of missiles, capable of destroying those
174 Chapter 4
targets, ready for launch. The RVSN Main Staff issues the appropriate orders to
armies and divisions for the performance of this function.
The adoption of the third-generation missile systems with on-board computers
and the development of the automated system of battle management gave the RVSN
the technical ability to change missiles' flight assignments remotely and to change
scenarios of the use of nuclear forces in line with changing events. The adoption of
the fourth-generation systems (the R-36M2, RT-23UTTH, and Topol) provided
the capability for quick retargeting,110 which was essential in the case of mobile
systems, because the flight trajectory of missiles on the move along the combat
route has to be recalculated constantly as the location of the launchers changes. The
ability to change targeting coordinates therefore presented no additional technical
difficulties.
One of the characteristic features of the RVSN is its ability to engage in launch-
on-warning strikes and retaliatory strikes. A launch-on-warning strike would
probably involve silo-based missiles, which are vulnerable to highly accurate
warheads, especially the currently deployed MIRVed R-36MUTTH/R-36M2 and
UR-IOONUTTH missiles. The mobile systems, with their survivability better secured
by their mobility, are better adapted for use in a retaliatory strike.
The missiles currently deployed in Russia are on combat duty with their target
information removed, in accordance with agreements concluded between Russia
and the United States and Russia and Great Britain (a similar agreement is con-
cluded with China and some nonnuclear states). Some of the silo-based missiles have
been reprogrammed with "neutral" flight assignments (aimed at targets in the
ocean). Fourth-generation systems are now on combat duty with zero flight assign-
ments. These changes are largely symbolic, however, because it takes no more
than a few minutes to retarget systems in accordance with operational plans for
their use.
Actions Following a Launch Command

After the decision has been made to use nuclear weapons and the specific scenario
of their use has been chosen, the General Staff issues the appropriate orders to ser-
vices of the armed forces on the use of nuclear weapons. To issue the order to use
nuclear weapons, the Central Command Center of the General Staff (which acts as
the Supreme High Command Central Command Center) unlocks specific launchers
and transmits the appropriate authorizing codes. In the case of the RVSN, the battle
management signal first reaches the RVSN's Central Command Center and is then
sent down the chain of command to the regiments whose launchers are to be used. lll
After the authorizing codes and the order to use weapons have been transmitted,
the personnel on duty have to enter the authorizing codes and launch the missiles.
The command and control system also envisages the possibility of launching mis-
siles directly from the Supreme High Command Central Command Center without
the participation of the personnel on lower levels.
The receipt of the launch command at the launcher is followed by automated
launch preparations. The interval between the transmission of the launch command
and the launch itself-reaction time-depends on the missile and launcher and on
the state of the missile and launcher at the time the command is received. Activa-
tion of the missile's guidance system (the transfer to onboard power supplies, the
transfer of gyros to operating mode, etc.) and the ignition of the first-stage propul-
sion system (or the pressure accumulator of a cold-launch system) must precede
the launch. (Furthermore, before a silo-based missile can be launched, the shock
absorber system that supports the container has to be transferred to operating mode,
and the silo cover has to be opened.
Launching the missiles of a mobile system requires more operations and more
time than fixed-site launches. Mobile missiles can be launched either from prede-
termined sites or from any location on their route. 112 When the launch command is
received, the transporter-launcher (ground or rail) stops, the launcher is secured in
the soil with hydraulic supports, and the canister containing the missile is raised to
a vertical position. After this, the pressure accumulator is ignited and the missile is
fired from the canister.
For silo-based missiles, all of the launchers in a regiment (either 6 or 10) are con-
trolled from a single command post, which can secure launches in any combina-
tion. Each launcher of a road-mobile missile, however, is moved and controlled
individually, and the launch is conducted from each separate launcher. When
road-mobile launchers are stationed in permanent shelters in garrisons, the launch
can be conducted remotely, without the participation of the mobile launcher crew.
The Command, Control, and Comm1Ulication System

The RVSN battle management system is designed for the continuous monitoring
of the state of missile systems on combat duty and the reliable transmission of
launch orders. The structure of the system includes command centers of various
levels, the automated command and control system, and the communications
system. 113
The RVSN's main administrative body is the RVSN Main Staff. Battle man-
agement is exercised from the RVSN Central Command Cente~ located near
176 Chapter 4
Vlasikha in the Odintsovskiy region of Moscow oblast. '14 In addition to the

Central Command Center, the RVSN also has a permanent Reserve Command
Center.
The command centers of lower levels of the RVSN have different technical fea-
tures that correspond to their differing functions. Missile armies, divisions, and
regiments with silo-based missiles have permanent command centers. (Regimental
command centers are located in a separate hardened silo on the base of the regi-
ment.) Units equipped with mobile systems have mobile command centers. Each
missile army has a permanent hardened command center and an airborne reserve
command center. l1S
The permanent command centers represent a group of structures equipped with
the necessary command and control equipment and technical systems to secure the
functioning of equipment and combat crews. The permanent centers are protected
from the effects of a nuclear burst.
Communications between command centers originally used the same communi-
cations systems as all branches of the armed forces. Soon after the establishment of
the RVSN, however, the need arose for a battle management and communications
system that would guarantee the transmission of orders to each command center
and each launcher under any conditions. To this end, the RVSN communications
troops and the Office of the Chief of RVSN Communications Troops were created
in 1960. Since that time a diversified reserve communications system has been
developed to provide communications among the command centers of the Strategic
Rocket Forces. The system includes nodes of different levels and independent
communications systems connecting them. The central node provides direct
channels of communication between the Central Command Center and RVSN
units. 116
The RVSN communications system now includes the main system, a reserve
system, and a system that provides additional redundancy. The main system uses
wire communications and consists of diversified cable networks. The reserve system
uses satellite communications, mobile communication links with a higher rate of
survivability, and adaptive radio communication equipment resistant to radio-
electronic interference. 117
The Perimeter system, which was put on combat duty in 1985, provides an addi-
tionallevel of redundancy in the battle management system. llS The Perimeter system
uses special command missiles launched at lofted trajectories over ICBM basing
areas to transmit launch commands directly to the low-level command centers or
individual silos.
Appendix 4A Land-Based Missile Systems
This appendix contains information about all of the intercontinental and

intermediate-range missile systems used by the RVSN. A number of sources were
invaluable in providing the bulk of the data on the technical characteristics of the
missile system presented here.ll9 The heading for each section provides the
SovietlRussian name for the system the section discusses as well as (in parentheses)
the number and name of the system generally used in Western sources.
R-SM (SS-3 Shyster)

The R-SM missile system (see figure 4A.l) was the first Soviet missile that carried
a nuclear warhead. Its maximum range-l,200 kilometers-secured the accessibil-
ity of strategic targets in Europe. In combination with the destructive effects of the
nuclear warhead, this allowed the missile to be categorized as a strategic weapon.
The development of the R-SM system was undertaken pursuant to a USSR
Figure 4A.l
R-SM (55-3) missile
178 Chapter 4
government decree of 10 April 1954. The head developer was OKB-1 NII-88,
headed by S. P. Korolev.
Table 4A.1 lists the chief technical characteristics of the R-5M, which had the
code number 8K51 and was known in the West as the SS-3 Shyster. The R-5M was
based on the R-5 missile, developed by OKB-1 of NII-88 in the first half of the
1950s. The R-5 was a single-stage, single-warhead missile. Its main design feature
was that both fuel and oxidizer tanks were integrated with the missile body.l20 This
feature, combined with a warhead that was separated after burnout and the absence
of aerodynamic fins, increased the missile's payload ratio to almost twice that of the
R-1 missile. With a bigger payload (1,350 kilograms as compared to 1,000) and a
Table 4A.1
Technical characteristics of the R-SM missile
Designation R-5M 8K51, 55-3, Shyster

Development began 10 April 1954
Design bureau OKB-1
Manufacturer Plant 586 (Dnepropetrovsk)
Flight tests January 1955-February 1956
Combat duty 10 May 1956
Commissioned 21 June 1956
Number of stages 1
Propellant cryogenic liquid
LalUlcher open grOlUld-level
Number of warheads and their yield 1 x 300kt
Payload/throw weight 1,350kg
Maximum range 1,200km
Guidance inertial with radio correction
Accuracy maximwn error 1.5km cross-range, 1.25km
downrange
Length 20.747m
Maximum diameter 1.652m (body), 3.452m (fins)
LalUlch weight 28.610t
Propellant weight 24.760t (including hydrogen peroxide)
Oxidizer liquid oxygen
Fuel 92 % ethyl alcohol
Thrust (sea level/vacuum) 432/500kN
Specific impulse (sea level/vacuum) 2,158/2,433 m/sec
LalUlch readiness 2 hours
Service life
comparable dry weight (4,390 kilograms as compared to 4,030), the launch weight
of the R-5M was more than twice as large as that of the R-1 (28,610 kilograms as
compared to 13,430). The R-5M's better overall design and the increase in specific
impulse of its engine from 206 to 219 seconds increased the range of the missile to
almost five times that of the R-1.
This increase in range required the installation of a radio-assisted guidance system
that allowed the missile to achieve an acceptable level of accuracy. The missile's
range control system was autonomous inertial, and the lateral guidance system was
assisted by radio correction. Flight control was accomplished with four fins on small
pylons at the tail section and four jet vanes placed at the nozzle exit. The down-
range accuracy of the R-5M was 1.5 kilometers and its lateral accuracy was 1.25
kilometers, which were far better than the accuracy of the R-1 and R-2 missiles. In
combination with its 300-kiloton nuclear warhead, this accuracy provided for the
effective destruction of soft-area targets.
The R-5M differed from the R-5 in having redundancy of the main modules of
the guidance system and the main cables. The R-5M was the first Soviet missile to
be equipped with such redundant equipment to enhance its reliability.
Flight tests of the R-5M were conducted on the Fourth State Central Test Range
(Kapustin Yar) from January 1955 to February 1956. During the flight tests,
the first full-scale test of a missile with a nuclear warhead was conducted on 2
February 1956 (Operation Bayka!). A nuclear warhead with a yield of 0.3 kilotons
was delivered to a predesignated point near Aralsk and successfully detonated. The
system was commissioned on 21 June 1956.
The R-5M missile, which was called the SS-3 Shyster in the West, was deployed
in forward positions in the western part of the Soviet Union. In all, 48 R-5M mis-
siles were deployed in 1956-1957. '21 (According to Russian sources, the first two
regiments with R-5M missiles were not put on combat duty until 1959.) Develop-
ment of the more effective R-12 missile halted the deployment of the R-5M on a
broader scale. The R-5M missiles remained with the RVSN until 1961 and were
then replaced by R -12s.
R-7 (55-6 Sapwood)

The R-7 was the first intercontinental-range ballistic missile. The first sketches of
the missile were drawn up during the work on Project T-1, Theoretical and Exper-
imental Inquiries into the Creation of a Two-Stage Ballistic Missile with a Range
of 7,000-8,000 Kilometers, which was ordered in a government decree of 13
February 1953. The weight of the payload, which was originally supposed to be of
180 Chapter 4
a conventional type, was expected to be 3 tons. In October 1953, shortly after the
test of the first thermonuclear device, the specifications were revised and the payload
was increased to 5.5 tons, with the warhead accounting for 3 tons (the warhead
now had to be nuclear). This increase in the payload required a major redesign of
the missile, which increased the launch weight from 170 to 280 tons.
The decree authorizing the development of the two-stage ballistic missile, which
was designated R-7 and given the code number 8K71, was adopted on 20 May
1954. Since most of the work had been already done during the work on the T-1
project, work on the preliminary design of the R-7 was completed by July 1954,
and this design was approved by the USSR Council of Ministers on 20 November
1954. A decree authorizing measures to secure the testing of the R-7 missile and
other measures to assist its development was issued on 20 March 1956.
Table 4A.2 lists the chief technical characteristics of the R-7, which was known
in the West as the SS-6 Sapwood. The R-7 used parallel staging and consisted
of one central module and four peripheral units. The peripheral units made up
the first stage, and the central module served as the second stage. When the missile
was launched, the propulsion systems of all five modules were ignited simultane-
ously. This design, characteristic of the first Soviet and U.S. ICBMs, is inferior
to the tandem staging design used in later ICBMs, but it makes possible the igni-
tion of all engines in a controlled environment and at normal levels of atmospheric
pressure.
Each module of the R-7 was equipped with a four-chamber, open-cycle liquid-
fuel sustainer engine 122 that used liquid oxygen and kerosene as propellant. Flight
control was achieved by special steering engines rather than by jet vanes (as in the
R-5M). Each of the peripheral modules had two single-chamber steering engines,
and the central module had four. In addition, each of the peripheral modules had
a small air fin at its tail section.
The missile had a combined guidance system, consisting of an autonomous iner-
tial guidance system that provided attitude control and flight path control during
powered flight as well as radio guidance system. The autonomous control system
also ensured synchronous fuel consumption among the first-stage modules. The
radio guidance was used for range as well as lateral flight trajectory corrections and
allowed the missile's accuracy to be increased. The use of radio control required the
installation of control centers at distances of several hundred kilometers to the right
and left of the launcher, which limited the direction of launch to a 40-degree sector.
The launch complex for the R-7 was a very large structure that included a rein-
forced concrete launch pad mounted above a flame duct about 40 meters deep,
Table 4A.2
Technical characteristics of the R-7 and R-7A missiles
Designation R-7 8K71, SS-6, Sapwood

R-7A 8K74, SS-6, Sapwood
Development began R-7 20 May 1954
R-7A 2 July 1958
Design bureau OKB-1
Manufacturer Aviation Plant lIProgress Plant (Kuybyshev)
Flight tests R-7 15 May 1957-November 1959
R-7A 24 December 1959-July 1960
Combat duty 1 January 1960
Commissioned R-7 20 January 1960
R-7A 12 September 1960
Number of stages 2
LalUlcher open grOlUld-level
Number of warheads 1 x 5 Mtja 1 x 3 Mtb
and their yield
Payload/throw weight R-7 5.3-5.5t
R-7A 3t
Maximum range R-7 8,000km
R-7A 12,000 km;' 9,500kmb
Guidance R-7 inertial with range and lateral radio correction
R-7A inertial with range radio correction
Accuracy maximum error 10 km
Length R-7 34.220m first versions, 33.000m last versionc
R-7A 31.4mb
Maximum diameter 10.300m (fins)
LalUlch weight R-7 280t
R-7A 276t
Propellant weight R-7 253t (including hydrogen peroxide and pressurized gas)
C

Fuel T-1 kerosene
Thrust (sea level! 3,80015,000 kN
vacuum)
Specific impulse -/3,150mlsec
(sea level/vacuwn)
LalUlch readiness about 24 hours; 2 hours from the moment missile installed on
lalUlcher a
Service life
a S. G. Kolesnikov, Strategicheskoye raketno-yadernoye oruzhiye (Strategic Nuclear Missiles)

(Arsenal-Press, 1996).
bYe. B. Volkov, ed., MER SSSR (RF) i SShA (ICBMs of the USSR (Russian Federation) and
the United States) (RVSN, 1996).
C Raketno-kosmicheskaya korporatsiya "Energiya" imeni S. P. Koroleva, 1946-1996 (S. P.
Korolev "Energiya" Space Rocket Corporation, 1946-1996), 1996.
182 Chapter 4
railroad paths, and command bunkers and other launch support equipment. The
missile was suspended over the launch pad by four masts.
The flight tests of the R-7 began on 15 May 1957. After the first six launches (in
two of which the missiles were used as the first space launch vehicles), both the
warhead and the warhead separation system underwent significant modification.
The analysis of telemetry showed that during the first launches the warhead
collided with the missile airframe after separation and was then destroyed during
reentry. After the shape of the reentry vehicle was changed from a cone to a rounded
cone, the modified warhead reached the target successfully during the second series
of flight tests, conducted from 29 March to 10 July 1958. The combined flight tests
followed, from 24 December 1958 to 27 November 1959. Eight of the 16 missiles
launched during those tests were manufactured at the serial-production plant (the
first missiles were manufactured at a pilot-production plant). After the tests had
been completed, the first R-7launch complexes were put on combat duty in Decem-
ber 1959, and the missile was commissioned on 20 January 1960.
While the R-7 missile was still being tested, the Council of Ministers published a
decree on 2 July 1958 on the use of that missile as the model for the updated version,
the R-7A (figure 4A.2), with higher performance specifications. Modernization of
the missile was made possible by the creation of a lighter thermonuclear warhead
and the development of better gyroscopic instruments. The R-7A missile, code-
numbered 8K74, was equipped with a lighter warhead and more powerful engines
and carried more fuel. These measures increased its range from 8,000 to 12,000
kilometers. In addition, the improved gyros eliminated the need for range radio
corrections without adversely affecting the missile's accuracy.
The flight tests of the R-7 A were conducted from December 1959 to July 1960.
The flight tests consisted of eight launches, seven of which were successful. l23 In
January 1960 a full-range flight was performed, during which the reentry vehicle
was delivered to the Pacific Ocean. The R-7A system was commissioned in Sep-
tember 1960.
Missile systems with R-7 and R-7A missiles were on combat duty on the Fifth
Scientific Research Test Range of the Ministry of Defense (the Fifth NIIP, later
known as Baykonur) and the Angara installation in Arkhangelsk oblast (later the
53rd NIIP, or Plesetsk). In all, five launch complexes with six launch positions were
deployed.
R-12 (55-4 Sandal)

The R-12 missile system (figure 4A.3) was the first strategic system that used
storable-fuel components and an autonomous guidance system. The decree of the
Figure 4A.2
R-7A (55-6) missile
Council of Ministers that authorized the system's development, On the Creation

and Production of the R-12 Missile (8K63), was issued on 13 August 1955. 124 The
prime contractor for the missile's development and production was OKB-586, which
by that time was headed by M. K. Yangel, who advocated development of storable-
fuel missiles.
Table 4A.3lists the chief technical characteristics of the R-12, which was designed
as a single-stage missile with a separable warhead. The missile had aluminum-
magnesium alloy tanks, and the top (oxidizer) tank was divided in two by a hori-
zontal separator located in the middle of the tank. The oxidizer in the bottom half
of the tank was used first, which provided additional stability in flight. The missile
was equipped with a four-chamber liquid-fuel engine. Flight control and guidance
were accomplished with the aid of four graphite jet vanes located at the nozzle exit.
With a 2.3-megaton warhead and accuracy of 5 kilometers (maximum deviation),
the missile could destroy soft area targets.
184 Chapter 4
Figure 4A.3
R-12 and R-12U (55-4) missiles
The design flight tests of the R-12 were conducted on the Fourth State Central
Test Range (Kapustin Yar) from 22 June 1957 to December 1958. The R-12 missile
system was commissioned on 4 March 1959.
The missile was originally designed for use with an open ground launch complex
but was later adapted for deployment in silos. A series of test launches of the R-12
from the experimental Mayak silo launcher began in September 1959. The work
on a modification of the R-12, the R-12U missile (code-numbered 8K63U; see figure
4A.3) that could be used as a ground-based and a silo-based missile began in May
1960. The standard silo launch complex for the R-12U, designated Dvina, consisted
of four silo launchers. Tests of the R-12U missile and the Dvina complex were
held from December 1961 to December 1962 and ended with the adoption of the
complex and the R-12U missile on 9 January 1964. The first five regiments with
land-based R-12 missile systems were put on combat duty on 15 and 16 May 1960,
and the first regiment with the silo-based missiles went on combat duty on 1 January
1963.
Table 4A.3
Technical characteristics of the R-12 and R-12U missiles
Designation R-12 8K63, R-12, SS-4, Sandal

R-12U 8K63U, R-12, SS-4, Sandal
Development began R-12 13 August 1955
R-12U 30 May 1960
Design bureau OKB-586
Manufacturer Plant 586 (Dnepropetrovsk), Omsk Aviation Plant
Flight tests R-12 22 June 1957-December 1958
R-12U December 1961-December 1962
Combat duty 15 May 1960 (open launch), 1 January 1963 (silo)
Commissioned R-12 4 March 1959
R-12U 9 January 1964
Number of stages 1
Propellant storable liquid
LalUlcher R-12 openlalUlch
R-12U open lalUlch, Dvina lalUlcher (hot lalUlch)
Number of warheads and 1 x 2.3Mt
their yield
Payload/throw weight 1.6t
Guidance autonomous inertial
Length 22.1m
Maximum diameter 1.65m
LalUlch weight 47.1 t
Propellant weight 37.0t
Oxidizer AK-27I (mixture of 27% of nitrogen tetroxide and 73%
of nitric acid inhibited by iodine)
Fuel TM-185 kerosene
Thrust (sea level/vacuum) 628/721kN
Specific impulse 2,237/2,570 m/sec
(sea level/vacuwn)
LalUlch readiness 205 minutes from readiness state 4, 140 minutes from
readiness state 3, 60 minutes from readiness state 2, 30
minutes from readiness state 1
Service life 7 years in readiness state 4, 3 years in readiness state 3,
3 months in readiness state 2, 30 days in readiness state 1
186 Chapter 4
The R-12 and R-12U missiles were deployed in a maximum of 608 launchers
(1965-1966). They began to be replaced by Pioneer ground-mobile missile systems
in 1978. The remaining missiles and launchers were destroyed in compliance with
the INF Treaty in 1988-1991.
R-14 (SS-S Skean)

The R-14 missile system (figure 4AA) was based on an idea that was proposed and
tested by the OKB-586 team during its work on the R-12 missile. The R-14 was
larger than and had twice the range of the R -12, which was to a large extent based
on the R-5 technology. In essence, the R-14 exhibited the maximum potential of a
single-stage ballistic missile.
The development of the R-14 was authorized by a decree of 2 July 1958. The
preliminary performance specifications called for a missile with twice the range of
the R-12 (4,000 kilometers as opposed to 2,000). The flight tests were to begin in
Ii
Figure 4AA
R-14 and R-14U (55-5) missiles
April 1960. M. K. Yangel's OKB-586 was chosen as the prime contractor. The pre-
liminary design was completed in December 1958.
Table 4AA lists the chief technical characteristics of the R-14, which was code-
numbered 8K65 and was known in the West as the SS-5 Skean. The overall design
of the R-14 was similar to that of the R-12. The mass of the propellant was in-
creased by increasing the diameter of the tanks. The propulsion system consisted
of two twin-chamber liquid-fuel engines. The substitution of unsymmetrical
dimethylhydrazine for TM-185 kerosene fuel increased specific impulse and elimi-
nated the need for an igniter. In addition to this, the turbopump was driven by a
gas generator powered by the main propellant components rather than by hydro-
gen peroxide. Flight control was still accomplished with the aid of jet vanes. In
contrast to earlier single-stage missiles, the R-14 had a system that reduced fuel
requirements by decreasing the amount of residual fuel.
The fully autonomous inertial guidance system for the first time included a
gyro-stabilized platform, which reduced instrument errors and improved the
missile's accuracy. Also for the first time, in the R-14, after the warhead separated,
the missile body was decelerated by dedicated solid-propellant engines, which also
contributed to better accuracy. In general, although the R-14 had more than twice
the range of the R-12, it had the same maximum error. The R-14 was equipped
with the same warhead as the R -12, but the reentry vehicle was shaped as a rounded
cone because of the greater heat load.
The flight tests of the R-14 began in July 1960 and ended in December 1960 125
or February 1961,126 The R-14 system was commissioned on 24 April 1961. The
first regiment with a land-based R-14 missile system was put on combat duty on 1
January 1962.
The decision to begin developing a modification of the R-14, the R-14U missile
(code-numbered 8K65U; see figure 4AA) that could be used as a silo-based and
ground-based missile, was made in May 1960. The launch complex for the R-14,
designated Chusovaya, consisted of three silo launchers located less than 100 meters
from each other. The design and flight tests of the ground-launched R-14U began
on 12 January 1962, and those for the silo-based version began on 11 February
1962.
The R-14 and R-14U missiles were deployed in a maximum of 97 launchers
(1965-1969). They were replaced by Pioneer ground-mobile missile systems
between 1978 and 1983 and were removed from service in 1984. Six remaining
nondeployed missiles were destroyed in compliance with the INF Treaty in
1988-1991.
188 Chapter 4
Table 4AA
Designation R-14 8K65, R-14, SS-5, Skean

R-14U 8K65U, R-14, SS-5, Skean
Development began R-14 2 July 1958
R-14U 30 May 1960
Flight tests R-14 July 1960-February 1961;' from 6 June 1960 b
R-14U February 1962-0ctober 1963;' from 12 January
1962 (open launch),b from 11 February 1962 (silo)b
Combat duty R-14 1 January 1962
Commissioned R-14 24 April 1961
R-14U 9 January 1964;' 15 July 1963 (silo)b
Number of stages 1
LalUlcher R-14 open lalUlch
R-14U open lalUlch, Chusovaya silo lalUlcher (hot lallllch)
Number of warheads and 1 x 2.3Mt
their yield
Payload/throw weight 1,500-2,155kg
Length 24Am
Maximum diameter 204m
Oxidizer AK-271
Fuel lUlsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine (UDMH)
Thrust (sea level/vacuum) 1,480/1,740 kN
Specific impulse 2,406/2,830 mlsec
(sea level/vacuwn)
LalUlch readiness
Service life 30 days (fueled)
, Yeo B. Volkov, ed., MER SSSR (RF) i SShA (ICBMs of the USSR (Russian Federation) and
b V. Pappo-Korystin, V. Platonov, and V Pashchenko, Dneprovsky raketno-kosmicheskii
tsentr (The Dneprovsk Space Rocket Center) (PO YuMZ, KBYu, 1994).
R-16 (55-7 Saddler)

The R-16 missile was the first intercontinental missile with storable liquid fuel. In
an extension of its earlier projects, OKB-586 developed a two-stage missile in the
late 1950s and early 1960s that was superior to the first R-7 ICBM in terms
of combat readiness, maintenance efforts, and cost. The decree authorizing the
development of the system, On the Creation of the R-16 (8K64) Intercontinental
Ballistic Missile, was issued by the Council of Ministers on 17 December 1956.
OKB-586 was made the prime contractor. The design and flight tests were sched-
uled to begin in June 1961.
Table 4A.5 lists the chief technical characteristics of the R-16, which was known
in the West as the SS-7 Saddler. The R -16 was a two-stage missile with tandem stage
separation and a single warhead. The propulsion system of the first stage included
a liquid-propellant sustainer consisting of three twin-chamber engines (comparable
to those on the R-14) and a four-chamber steering engine. The gimbaled combus-
tion chambers of the steering engine were located on the outer surface under fairing
that also served as aerodynamic surfaces. The second stage had a single twin-
chamber liquid-fuel engine that was similar to the first-stage engines (but had a dif-
ferent nozzle) as well as a four-chamber steering engine. Three different types of
warheads were developed for the R-16, with different yields and weights; all had
a rounded cone shape. After warhead separation, the second stage was decelerated
by dedicated solid-propellant rocket motors. The missile was launched from the
Sheksna-N ground launch complex, that consisted of two open launch pads, a
command post, and a fuel storage depot.
Firing tests of the first and second stages of the R-16 began in August 1960. Flight
tests began on the Fifth Scientific Research Test Range of the Ministry of Defense
(Baykonur). The first launch in this series of tests was scheduled for 24 October
1960. During the prelaunch check sequence, the engine of the missile's second stage
was accidentally ignited. Since the missile was filled with fuel (the missile was fueled
during a previous, unsuccessful launch attempt), this resulted in a fire that killed
more than 100 people.
Flight tests were resumed on 2 February 1961 and continued until the end of
1961. The missile was commissioned on 20 October of that same year, and the first
missile regiment equipped with R-16s was put on combat duty a few weeks later,
on 1 November.
When the work on the standardized R-12U and R-14U missiles began in May
1960, projects were also initiated to create an R-16U (figure 4A.5) missile and a
Sheksna-V silo launch complex to accompany it. The Sheksna-V consisted of three
190 Chapter 4
Table 4A.5
Designation R-16 8K64, 55-7 Saddler

R-16U 8K64U, 55-7 Saddler
Development began R-16 17 December 1956
R-16U 30 May 1960
Flight tests R-16 24 October 1960-December 1961
R-16U 10 October 1961-February 1962 (open launch),
January 1962-July 1963 (silo)
Combat duty R-16 1 November 1961
R-16U 5 February 1963
Commissioned R-16 20 October 1961
R-16U 15 June 1963 (open launch), 15 July 1963 (silo)
Number of stages 2
LalUlcher R-16 open lalUlch
R-16U open lalUlch, Sheksna-N silo-lalUlcher (hot lalUlch)
Number of warheads and 1 x 5 Mtja two versions-l x 3 Mt or 1 x 6 Mtb
their yield
Payload/throw weight 1,475-2,175kg
Maximum range 11,000-13,000 km
Accuracy CEP 2.7kmib maximum error 10km a (CEP 4.3km)
Length 34.3 mja 30.4 m b
Maximum diameter 3.0m (first stage), 2.7m (second stage)
LalUlch weight R-16 140.6t
R-16U 146.6t
Propellant weight BOt
Oxidizer AK-271
Fuel unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine (UDMH)
Thrust (sea level/vacuum) 2,554/3,040 kN (first stage), 751.51949 kN (second stage)
Specific impulse 2,420/2,840 m/sec (first stage), 2,370/2,870 m/sec (second
(sea level/vacuwn) stage)
LalUlch readiness from several hours to tens of minutes depending on the
state of readiness
Service life 30 days (fueled)
b S. G. Kolesnikov, Strategicheskoye raketno-yadernoye oruzhiye (Strategic Nuclear Missiles)
Figure 4A.S
R-16U (55-7) missile
silo launchers arranged m a straight line 60 meters apart,127 an underground

command post, and a fuel storage facility. The silo launchers had a double-tube
design, were 45.6 meters deep, and had an internal diameter of 8.3 meters. The
internal diameter of the launch tube was 4.64 meters. 128 The flight tests of the
ground-launched R-16U missile were held from 10 October 1961 to February 1962.
The flight tests of the silo-based version began in January 1962. The first launch
from a silo launcher was conducted on 13 July 1962.129 The ground-launched
R -16U was commissioned on 15 June 1963 and the silo-based version was com-
missioned on 15 July 1963 (at the same time as the R-12U and R-14U)Yo The
first regiment equipped with the silo-based R-16U were put on combat duty on 5
February 1963.
192 Chapter 4
Between 1961 and the end of 1965, 186 open and silo-based launchers for the
R-16 and R-16U (mostly open ones) were deployed.l3l The R-16 and R-16U mis-
siles were removed from service in 1976.
R-9A (SS-8 Sasin)

The intercontinental R-9A missile (figure 4A.6) was the last missile that used cryo-
genic fuel to be adopted for Soviet military use. The proposal for a new ICBM using
oxygen-kerosene fuel with an initial weight of around 100 tons (just over a third
of the weight of the R-7) was submitted to the government in April 1958. A Council
of Ministers decree on the development of the R-9 missile was published on 13 May
1959. The Korolev OKB-1 was named the head developer.
Table 4A.6 lists the main technical characteristics of the R-9A missile, which was
given the code number 8K75 and was known in the West as the SS-8 Sasin. The
Figure 4A.6
R-9A (55-8) missile with heavy warhead
Table 4A.6
Technical characteristics of the R-9A missile
Designation R-9A 8K75, 55-8, 5asin

Development began 13 May 1959
Design bureau OKB-1
Manufacturer Plant 88 (Kaliningrad), Progress plant (Kuybyshev) (since
1963)
Flight tests 9 April 1961-February 1963 (Desna-N), from 22 February
1963 (Dolina), from 27 5eptember 1963 (Desna-V)
Combat duty 14 December 1964 (open lalUlcher), 26 December 1964 (silo)
Commissioned 21 July 1965
Number of stages 2
LalUlcher Desna-N open lalUlch, Dolina automated open lallllcher,
Desna-V silo lalUlcher (hot lalUlch)
Number of warheads and light or heavy warhead; 1 x 5 Mt
their yield
Payload/throw weight 1,650-2,095 kg
Guidance autonomous inertial, autonomous inertial with radio correction
Accuracy maximum error 20 km downrange and 10 km cross-range
(autonomous guidance), maximum error 8km downrange and
5 km cross-range (radio correction)
Length 24.3m
LalUlch weight 80At
Propellant weight 71.1 t
Fuel T-1 kerosene
Thrust (sea level/vacuum) 1,600/1,627kN (first stage)
Specific impulse -/3,107m/sec (first stage), -/3,300m/sec (second stage)
(sea level/vacuwn)
LalUlch readiness 8-10 minutes (Desna-V), 20 minutes (Dolina)
Service life up to 1 year in readiness state 1
194 Chapter 4
R-9A was designed as a two-stage ICBM with a tandem stage arrangement. The
fuel tanks of the first stage had the conventional cylindrical shape and were made
of chemically milled aluminum-magnesium alloy panels. The second stage had a
cylindrical-conical shape with a spherical oxidizer tank and an internal conical fuel
tank. The missile used the hot stage separation method, so the stages were
connected by a special adapter.
The first stage was equipped with a four-chamber, open-cycle liquid-fuel engine
developed in OKB-456. The second stage had a four-chamber open-cycle engine
developed by OKB-154. For the purposes of thrust vector control, the combustion
chambers of the first stage engine were hinged. On the second stage, thrust vector
control was achieved by nozzles that were operated by the turbopump exhaust.
In addition, to provide aerodynamic stability to the second stage during the first
seconds of its autonomous flight, four aerodynamic fins at its tail section opened
during the stage separation (the first stage burned out very rapidly, so the second
stage ignited while there was still significant aerodynamic drag). The tail section of
the second stage was jettisoned within a few seconds after the stage separation. In
the R-9A missile, propellant tanks were pressurized by the main fuel components'
combustion products, which eliminated the need for special gas tanks.
The missile originally had an inertial guidance system with radio correction. The
inertial system operated during the entire powered flight, and the radio correction
was used during the last few tenths of a second of the powered flight. Later, however,
the radio guidance component was excluded from the design. For the first time in
a Soviet missile system, the control and guidance system of a missile provided the
capability remote control of the missile's condition.
The missile could be equipped with two types of warheads, light and heavy, for
use at different ranges. Both had a rounded-cone shape and were connected to the
missile by a conical joint.
The missile was originally developed for use with an open-ground launch
complex, but development of a silo launcher complex began in 1960. In all, three
different types of launch complexes were developed: the Desna-N and Dolina open-
ground complexes and the Desna-V silo complex. The Desna-N complex consisted
of two launchers, a command post, a storage facility for missiles and fuel compo-
nents, and a prelaunch radio control post. The Dolina complex had a similar com-
position, but it also had an automated launch support system, reducing launch
preparation time to 20 minutes. During that time the missile was delivered from the
storage, installed on the ground launch structure, fueled, and aimed and the control
and guidance system was activated. The minimum interval between launches from
adjacent launchers was 9 minutes, and the minimum interval between consecutive
launches from a single launcher was 2.5 hours. The Desna-V silo complex consisted
of three silo launchers lined up close to one another, an underground command
post, underground storage facilities for fuel components and compressed gas, and
a radio command post. The silo launchers were 36 meters deep and had an inter-
nal diameter of 7.8 meters. The inside diameter of the launch tube was 5.5 meters.
The Desna-V complex was the first to solve the problem of launching a cryogenic
missile directly from a silo.
Among the distinctive features of the R-9A system was the use of liquid oxygen,
supercooled to -186°C, as an oxidizer. Cryogenic equipment was developed for the
storage of the oxygen on the launch site, securing low evaporation loss (2-3 percent
a year) and fast fueling during the launch preparation. The resulting reduction of
the time needed to fuel the missile made it comparable to the time of other launch
preparation procedures, the main one being revving up the gyros. The missile could
stay in high-alert condition for a year and remain fueled for 24 hours.132
The flight tests of the missile were conducted on the Fifth Scientific Research Test
Range of the Ministry of Defense (Baykonur). They began on 9 April 1961, first
from an adapted launch complex and then from the experimental Desna-N open-
launch complex. This stage was completed on 14 February 1963. After that the
flight tests continued from the Dolina open and Desna-V silo launch complexes.
The last flight test of this series was conducted on 2 February 1964.133 The series
of flight tests was very difficult, primarily because of problems with engines. Of the
first 32 launches, 15 were failures. In all, 54 launches of the R-9A missile were
conducted during the tests.
The missile with the Dolina and Desna-V complexes was adopted on 21 July
1965. The missile with the Desna-N complex was rejected, because the launch
preparation cycle took at least two hours.
The first missile regiments equipped with R-9A missiles were put on combat duty
in December 1964 (four regiments with land-based missiles and one with silo-based
missiles). The system was deployed on an extremely limited scale. According to
Western data, only 23 R-9A launchers were deployed (in 1963-1964). The R-9A
missiles were removed from service in 1976.134
R-26
The R-26 (code-numbered 8K26) missile project was one of the first projects in
the development of second-generation ICBMs with ampulized propellant tanks. The
start of experimental design work on the project, proposed by OKB-586 as an
196 Chapter 4
improvement on the R-16, was ordered by a government decree of 23 May 1960.

The preliminary flight tests of the R-26 were scheduled for December 1961, but the
project was canceled, partly because of technical difficulties and partly because of
competition from the light ampulized UR-100 missile proposed by OKB-52. OKB-
586 later proposed a better design for a heavy ICBM, the R-36. Work on the R-26
model was officially canceled by a government decree on 9 July 1962, soon after
the start of the R-36 project.
Mockups of the R-26 missile were displayed in parades in Red Square, which
was the reason why Western sources mistakenly associated it with the R-9A (55-8)
ICBM.
R-36 (55-9 Scarp)

The heavy R-36 missile (figure 4A.7) was created specifically for the destruction of
u.S. ICBM deployment areas. Furthermore, the possibility of penetrating an enemy's
ballistic missile defenses was one of the chief aims of the development project.
Because of this, two models of the missile were developed: a high-accuracy ballis-
tic missile equipped with a high-yield warhead and penetration aids, and a frac-
tional orbital missile that could deliver its warhead into a low Earth orbit and attack
its target from the unprotected azimuth.
The heavy (code-numbered 8K67) and orbital (code-numbered 8K69) models of
the R-36 were created in accordance with the government decree "On the Creation
of Intercontinental Ballistic and Global Missiles and for Heavy Space Launch
Vehicles," adopted on 16 April 1962. OKB-586 was the head developer. The pre-
liminary flight tests of the 8K67 missile were scheduled to begin in the fourth quarter
of 1963, and the tests of the 8K69 were scheduled for the third quarter of 1964.
Table 4A.7lists the main technical characteristics of the R-36, which was known
in the West as the 55-9 Scarp. The R-36 was designed as a two-stage liquid-
propellant missile with tandem staging. The experience accumulated during the
creation and production of the R-16 missile was used extensively in the develop-
ment of the R-36. The overall design of the first stage of the R-36 was similar to
that of the first stage of the R-16. Some improvements were made, howeve~ one
was the shared divider between the fuel and oxidizer tanks, which reduced the empty
space inside the missile. Propellant tanks were pressurized with the combustion gases
of the basic fuel components. A synchronous tank evacuation system installed in
both stages allowed the amount of residual fuel to be reduced.
The propulsion system of the first stage of the R-36 consisted of three twin-
chamber engines and a steering engine with four hinged chambers. The second-stage
ii
I
Figure 4A.7
Variants of the R-36 (55-9) missile (left to right): 8K67 with light warhead, 8K67 with heavy
warhead, 8K67P with 3 MRV warheads, the orbital variant 8K69
propulsion system included a twin-chamber liquid-propellant sustainer, comparable

in design to the first-stage engine, and a four-chamber liquid-fuel steering engine.
All of the engines used the open cycle. After the cold separation of the stages, the
reentry vehicle was decelerated by solid-propellant motors. The missile was origi-
nally supposed to have inertial guidance with radio correction. The flight tests,
however, demonstrated that the fully autonomous inertial guidance provided the
necessary level of accuracy, and the missile was then adopted without the radio
guidance system.
The missile was placed in a silo launcher 41.5 meters deep, with an outer tube
8.3 meters in diameter and a launch tube 4.64 meters in diameter. In contrast to
the Sheksna-N silo launcher of the R-16U missile, the launch tube could not be
rotated, so the guidance system rotated the missile into the assigned azimuthal plane
198 Chapter 4
Table 4A.7
Technical characteristics of the R-36 missile
Designation R-36 8K67, SS-9 Mod 1/Mod 2, Scarp

R-36 8K69, SS-9 Mod 3, Scarp
R-36 8K67P, SS-9 Mod 4, Scarp
Development began 16 April 1962;' 12 May 1962b
Design bureau OKB-586/Yuzhnoye Design Bureau
Manufacturer Plant 5861Yuzbnyy Machine-Building Plant
Flight tests R-36 (8K67) 28 September 1963-May 1966
R-36 (8K69) December 1965-May 1968
R-36 (8K67P) from August 1968
Combat duty R-36 (8K67) 5 November 1966
R-36 (8K69) 25 August 1969
Commissioned R-36 (8K67) 21 July 1967
R-36 (8K69) 19 November 1968
R-36 (8K67P) 26 October 1970
Number of stages 2
LalUlcher silo (hot launch)
Number of warheads and R-36 (8K67) single light or heavy (10 Mt) warhead
their yield R-36 (8K69) single orbital
R-36 (8K67P) 3 x 2-3 Mt (no independent targeting)
Payload/throw weight 3,950-5,825 kg
Maximum range R-36 (8K67) 10,200km with heavy warhead; 15,200km
with light warheada
R-36 (8K69) 40,000km
Accuracy Maximum error 5 km
Length 31.7m
Maximum diameter 3m
Oxidizer nitrogen tetroxide
Specific impulse -/2,954m/sec (first stage), -/3,112.5m1sec (second stage)
(sea level/vacuwn)
LalUlch readiness 5 minutes
Service life 5 years, extended to 7.5 years
a V. Pappo-Korystin, V. Platonov, and V. Pashchenko, Dneprovsky raketno-kosmicheskii
after it left the silo launcher. After the missile was installed in the silo and fueled,
the airtight inner chambers of the propellant tanks sustained the stable properties
of the fuel components. The ampulized missile was kept fueled and ready to launch
throughout its service life, which was initially set at 5 years but later extended to
7.5 years.
Two types of warheads were developed for the 8K67 missile, the heaviest of which
had a yield of 10 megatons. 135 This warhead, known as the 8F675, became the most
powerful of the nuclear warheads the Soviet Union adopted. 136 The combination of
the missile's high accuracy (by the standards of that time) and its high-yield warhead
turned this into the first Soviet missile system capable of posing a genuine threat to
U.S. ICBMs. The orbital model (8K69) was equipped with an orbital warhead that
consisted of the warhead itself, the guidance system, and an engine that provided
stabilization of the warhead in orbit and its descent.
The flight tests of the R-36 missile were conducted on the Fifth Scientific Research
Test Range (Baykonur). Tests of the 8K67 missile were conducted from 28 Sep-
tember 1963 to May 1966, and the orbital model (8K69) was tested from Decem-
ber 1965 to May 1968. The 8K67 missile was commissioned on 21 July 1967, and
the orbital 8K69 missile was adopted on 19 November 1968.137
The first regiment equipped with the R-36 missiles was put on combat duty
on 5 November 1966, and the first regiment with orbital R-36 missiles was
put on combat duty on 25 August 1969 (on the Fifth Scientific Research Test
Range).
The R-36's large throw weight (up to 5.8 tons) enabled it later to be equipped
with multiple reentry vehicles (MRVs). Projects to accomplish this began in the
Yuzhnoye Design Bureau (formerly OKB-586) in November 1967. The flight tests
of the R-36 missile with three warheads (not yet independently targeted) began in
August 1968. The version of the missile with the MRVs, code-numbered 8K67p,
was adopted on 26 October 1970.
Between 1965 and 1973,268 R-36 launchers were deployedYs Replacement of
R-36 missiles with R-36M began in 1975, and R-36 missiles were removed from
service in 1978.139 The system with the orbital R-36 missile (8K69) was removed
from service in January 1983 in connection with the conclusion of the Strategic
Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II), which prohibited such systems.
GR-1
Research projects to explore the possibility of creating a global-range missile
began in OKB-1 in 1961. The development of the GR-1 global-range missile was
200 Chapter 4
authorized by a decree of the USSR Council of Ministers on 23 September 1962.

The GR-1 was intended to destroy targets at any range and from any direction,
which was supposed to solve the problem of delivering warheads to their targets
despite the u.s. missile defense system, which was designed to cover the main direc-
tions of a missile strike from the territory of the USSR. The global-range missile
was supposed to put its reentry vehicle in a low orbit at an altitude of around 150
kilometers and then deliver the reentry vehicle to the target by deceleration of the
warhead at a certain point of its trajectory.
The GR-1 (code-numbered 8K713) was a three-stage missile that used cryogenic
fuel. It was developed largely on the basis of the R-9A design. It was also supposed
to have used the same launch sites and ground support equipment as the R-9A.
With a launch weight of 117 tons, the GR-1 was intended to carry a 2.2-megaton
warhead and achieve cross-range accuracy of 5 km and lateral accuracy of 3 km with
an unlimited range.
The GR-1 project was cancelled in 1964 in favor of the orbital model of the
R-36 missile (8K69). Because the GR-1 missile never reached the stage of flight
tests, it was never given a name by the u.s. Department of Defense. As a result of
the mistaken association of the GR-1 missile, displayed in parades in Red Square,
with the tested but never displayed UR-200 ICBM, however, many Western sources
refer to the GR-1 as the SS-X-10.
UR-200 (SS-X-10)
The UR-200 (code-numbered 8K81) missile was the first ballistic missile developed
by OKB-52, which was headed by V. N. Chelomey. The "all-purpose missile" (UR)
envisaged in the government decree of 16 March 1961 that authorized the system's
development was supposed to serve as both an ICBM and a space launch vehicle.
With virtually the same launch weight as the R-16 (138 tons), the UR-200 was sup-
posed to have a much greater payload (3.3 tons, including a 2.7-ton warhead and
the instrumentation section). The missile was expected to be launched from the
Sheksna-N silo launcher of the R-16U missiles and from open launch sites.
The flight tests of the UR-200 missile began in November 1963 on the Fifth
Scientific Research Test Range of the Ministry of Defense (Baykonur) and consisted
of nine launches. The development of the UR-200 was canceled in 1965 in favor of
the competing R-36. The UR-200 was called the SS-X-10 in the U.S. Department
of Defense classification system. Western sources for a long time mistakenly asso-
ciated it with the GR-1 missile, which was never flight-tested but was displayed in
parades in Red Square.
UR-I00 (SS-l1 Sego)

The light UR-I00 missile (figure 4A.8) was created as a simple and relatively inex-
pensive missile that could be used to increase the number of missiles in the Soviet
ICBM force and provide quantitative parity with that of the United States. Work
on the missile was officially authorized by a government decree of 30 March 1963.
OKB-S2 (the Central Machine-Building Design Bureau) was named the head
developer.
Table 4A.8 lists the main technical characteristics of the UR-I00 missile (code-
numbered 8K84), which was known in the West as the 55-11 Sego. The UR-I00
was a two-stage single-warhead missile. The oxidizer and propellant tanks of both
stages had shared dividers to reduce the missile's size and weight. In addition, the
top of the first-stage oxidizer tank had the shape of an inverted cone. The space
Figure 4A.S
UR-IOO and UR-IOOU (55-11) missiles
202 Chapter 4
Table 4A.8
Technical characteristics of the UR-IOO, UR-lOOK, and UR-loau missiles
Designation UR-100 8K84, SS-l1 Mod 1, Sego

UR-100M 8K84M, SS-ll Mod 1, Sego
UR-lOOK 15A20, RS-10, SS-ll Mod 2, Sego
UR-100U 15A20U, RS-10, SS-ll Mod 3, Sego
Development began UR-100 30 March 1963
Manufacturer Khrwlichev Plant (Moscow), Omsk Aviation Plant, others
Flight tests UR-100 19 April 1965-27 October 1966
UR-100M 23 July 1969-15 March 1971
UR-lOOK 2 February 1971-24 November 1971
UR-100U July 1971-January 1973
Combat duty UR-100 24 November 1966
UR-100M 1 March 1971
Commissioned UR-100 21 July 1967
UR-lOOK 28 December 1971
UR-100U 26 September 1974
Number of stages 2
Number of warheads and UR-100 1 x 1.1 Mt
their yield UR-lOOK 1 x 1.3Mt
UR-100U 3 x 350kt (no independent targeting)
Payload/throw weight UR-100 760-1,500kg
UR-lOOK 1,200kg
UR-100U 1,200kg
Maximum range UR-100 11,000km
UR-lOOK 10,600-12,000km
UR-100U 10,600-12,000km
Accuracy UR-100 CEP 1.4 km;a maximum error 5.0 km
(CEP 2.2km)b
UR-lOOK CEP 900 mj a maximum error S.Okm
(CEP 2.2km)b
Length UR-100 16.7m
UR-lOOK 18.9m
UR-100U 19.1 m
LalUlch weight UR-100 42.3t
UR-lOOK 50.1 t
UR-100U 50.1 t
Table 4A.8 (continued)
Propellant weight UR-lOOK 45.3t

UR-100U 45.3t
Thrust (sea level/vacuum) 784/876kN (first stage), -/149kN (second stage)
Specific impulse 2,744/3,067m/sec (first stage), -/3,200 m1sec
(sea level/vacuwn) (second stage)
LalUlch readiness several minutes
Service life several years

provided by this arrangement was used to host the nozzle of the second-stage engine.
The first stage had four gimbaled closed-cycle liquid-fuel engines, and the second
stage had a single-chamber open-cycle liquid-fuel sustainer and a four-chamber
liquid-fuel steering engine. The separation of the stages was achieved with the aid
of dedicated solid-propellant motors. The missile had a fully autonomous inertial
guidance system that guided the missile along a predetermined trajectory. The
control and guidance system also provided for the automatic remote control of
the state of the missile, automatic launch preparations, and the automatic launch
of the missile.
The missile could be equipped with two different types of warheads: a light
warhead to be used at intercontinental ranges and a heavy intermediate-range
warhead. The missile could be used only against soft, unprotected targets, because
the yield of its warhead (the light one) was only 1.1 megatons and its accuracy was
relatively low (CEP of 1.4 kilometers). The missile was kept in a simple and
inexpensive silo covered with a flat, pneumatically driven sliding roof.
The UR-100 was the first missile to be used with a sealed transport and launch
container (TPK). The missile was completely assembled and loaded into this sealed
container at the manufacturing plant and then delivered to the launch complex in
the container. The container was inserted into the silo and secured there using four
supports in the container's top section. The missile was then fueled through the con-
tainer's outlets, after which the missile and canister were ampulized and kept in a
permanent state of readiness for launch. When the missile was ampulized, the engine
204 Chapter 4
assemblies were isolated from the fuel components by membranes, securing their
preservation when the missile was kept fueled for a long time.
The flight tests of the UR-100 missile were conducted on the Fifth Scientific
Research Test Range of the Ministry of Defense (Baykonur) from 19 April 1965 to
27 October 1966.'40 The first launch from a silo was conducted on 17 July 1965. '41
The missile was commissioned on 21 July 1967 (at the same time as the R-36).
The first three regiments with UR-100 missiles were put on combat duty on 24
November 1966.
In subsequent upgrading, the UR-100 missile was equipped with a lighter warhead
with better flight performance characteristics and with a new control and guidance
system that improved prelaunch operations and expanded the missile's retargeting
capabilities. The updated model, called the UR-100M (code-numbered 8K84M),
was also distinguished by its improved launch equipment and an autonomous power
supply system. 142 The flight tests of the UR-100M missile were conducted from 23
July 1969 to 15 March 1971.'41
The UR-100 was the main ICBM adopted for use by the RVSN. Between 1966
and 1972, 990 launchers of these missiles were deployed. 144
Many of the UR-100 missiles were replaced by upgraded UR-100K (code-
numbered 15A20) and UR-100U (code-numbered 15A20U) modifications in the
mid-1970s. The development of the UR-100K missile began in the mid-1960s. The
main changes that were introduced during the upgrade included a bigger first stage
and improvement of the propulsion systems for both stages. These changes increased
the throw weight by 60 percent and increased the launch weight by 8 tons.
The range was increased in the UR-100K to 12,000 kilometers, and the accuracy
was increased by approximately 50 percent (reducing the CEP to 1 kilometer)
through the use of improved sensors. In addition, the missile was equipped with
decoys that were released at the end of the boost phase before the separation of
the warhead. The warhead itself was covered with a radar-absorbing material. The
improved control and guidance system enhanced the missile's combat readiness
considerably by employing accelerated revving of gyros and allowed the missile's
targeting information to be changed remotely. The enhanced endurance of the
autonomous power supply system in the silo launcher allowed all launch prepara-
tion procedures (including retargeting) to be completed in autonomous mode.
The flight tests of the UR-100K missile were conducted from 2 February to 24
November 1971.'45 The missile was commissioned on 28 December 1971.'46
The UR-100U missile was distinguished from the UR-100K by the installation
of a three-warhead MRV instead of a single warhead (but the maximum range
of the MRV was shorter than that of the single-warhead version). The three war-
heads were placed on a special platform and covered by a fairing that was released
after the missile had passed through the lower atmosphere. The UR-100U was tested
from July 1971 to January 1973. The missile was commissioned on 26 September
1974.'47
When the UR-100U was being developed, measures were taken to enhance its
survivability-to increase the hardening of the silo launcher and improve the launch
container shock absorbers. The superhardened silo launcher consisted of a mono-
lithic reinforced concrete tube with a steel launch equipment compartment. The tube
was covered with a lid that was driven by an explosive charge. The canister and
missile were suspended from two supports at the top and stabilized by horizontal
shock absorbers at the bottom. All these measures increased the hardness of the silo
by more than one order of magnitude. 148
A total of 420 UR-100K/UR-100U launchers were deployed from 1973 to
1977.'49 During the course of this deployment, the UR-100 missiles were removed
from service, in 1974. '50 All of the UR-100K and UR-100U missiles had been
removed from combat duty by the end of 1994 in connection with the expiration
of their service life and the reductions envisaged in the START I Treaty.
RT-2 (55-13 Savage)

The RT-2 was the first Soviet combat system with a solid-propellant intercontinen-
tal missile. The creation of a solid-propellant missile with a range of 10,000-12,000
kilometers was first authorized in a Council of Ministers decree of 20 November
1959. OKB-1 was chosen as the head developer of these missiles.
The work on the solid-propellant intercontinental missile was supposed to be
conducted in two stages. During the first stage, the developers were supposed
to create the solid-propellant RT-1 ballistic missile, with a range of 2,500-3,000
kilometers. The RT-1 was developed and passed flight tests, but it was not com-
missioned. The missile, which had a launch weight of 35.5 tons and a payload of
800 kilograms, had a range of only 2,000 kilometers: the same range as the R-12
missile.
As the work on the RT-1 proceeded, the performance specifications of the RT-2
and its development schedule were revised. The government decrees that changed
it were issued on 4 April 1961,29 July 1962, and 16 July 1963.151 The preliminary
design of the RT-2 missile (code-numbered 8K98) was completed in 1963. A rail-
mobile system with the RT-2 missile was also considered, but this project did not
go beyond the preliminary design stage.
206 Chapter 4
Table 4A.9 lists the main technical characteristics of the RT-2 missile, which was
known in the West as the SS-13 Savage. The RT-2 was a three-stage single-warhead
missile that used hot stage separation. During the boost phase, the missile was
stabilized by four aerodynamic fins. The missile had a range of 10,000-12,000
kilometers with a 500-kilogram warhead or 4,000-5,000 kilometers with a
heavie~ 1,400-kilogram warhead.
The missile was deployed in a hardened silo. Its great weight required the first
stage to be transported separately, so the missile was assembled in its silo. After the
missile had been assembled and the warhead installed, the silo was sealed, and the
temperature and humidity inside were kept at levels that protected the propellant
and missile body from deteriorating.
The missile used an original launch method, a prototype of the cold launch. The
bottom section of the silo contained water and was separated from the rest of the
silo. When the missile's motor ignited, the mixture of steam and gas that formed at
the bottom of the silo pushed the missile out of the silo.
The flight tests of the RT-2 were conducted from February 1966 to October
1968 in two series. Seven launches were conducted from the Fourth State Central
Test Range (Kapustin Yar) during the first series, from February to July 1966.
These launches were conducted from an adapted silo launcher that had been
built earlier for one of the missiles developed by OKB-586, and the reentry vehicles
landed near Lake Balkhash. Six of the seven launches of this series of tests were
successful.
For the second series (full-range flight tests), the launches were moved to the
Plesetsk Test Range (53rd NIIP). Between 4 November 1966 and 3 October 1968,
25 RT-2 missiles were launched from that site, and 16 of the launches were suc-
cessful. Twenty-one of the 25 missiles were launched at intermediate range (with
the reentry vehicles landing on the Kura test site on the Kamchatka peninsula) and
four were launched at maximum range (landing in the Pacific). The RT-2 system
was commissioned on 18 December 1968.
The RT-2 missiles were deployed near Yoshkar-Ola. In spite of its highly hard-
ened silo launchers and relative convenience, the system's combat capabilities were
limited by its low throw weight and by the short service life of the solid-propellant
charge. For these reasons, the deployment of the RT-2 system was confined to
60 units.
Development of an updated model of the missile, code-numbered 8K98P,
equipped with penetration aids and an improved guidance system, began in 1968.
This missile, which was called RT-2P (figure 4A.9), also used the new butyl
Table 4A.9
Technical characteristics of the RT-2 and RT-2P missiles
Designation RT-2 8K98, RS-12, SS-13 Mod 1, Savage

RT-2P 8K98P, RS-12, SS-13 Mod 2, Savage
Development began RT-2 4 April 1961
RT-2P 18 December 1968
Design bureau RT-2 o KB-lICentral Experimental Macrune- Building
Design Bireau (TsKBEM)
RT-2P Arsenal Design Bureau
Manufacturer
Flight tests RT-2 February 1966-3 October 1968
RT-2P January 1970-January 1972
Combat duty RT-2P 8 December 1972
Commissioned RT-2 18 December 1968
RT-2P 28 December 1972
Number of stages 3
Propellant solid
LalUlcher silo (cold launch)
Number of warheads and 1 x 750kt
their yield
Payload/throw weight RT-2P 470 kg (warhead);' 600 kg (throw weight)b
Maximum range RT-2 9,400km
RT-2P 9,500km
Accuracy RT-2 maximum error 4kmib CEP 1,900m (maximwn error
4.4km)'
RT-2P maximum error 4kmib CEP 1,500m (maximwn error
3.4km)'
Length RT-2 21.1 m;b 21.2m'
RT-2P 21.1 m;b 21.35 m'
Maximum diameter 1.84 (first stage), 1.5 m (second stage), 1.0 m (third stage)
LalUlch weight RT-2 51.0tb
RT-2P 51 t'
Oxidizer
Fuel
Thrust (sea level/vacuum) 97t (first stage), 44t (second stage), 22t (third stage)
Specific impulse 2,587/2,705 m/sec (first stage)
(sea level/vacuwn)
LalUlch readiness 3-5 minutes
Service life RT-2 10 years
RT-2P 10 years, extended to 15 years
Raketno-kosmicheskaya korporatsiya "Energiya" imeni S. P. Koroleva, 1946-1996 (S. P.

c S. G. Kolesnikov, Strategicheskoye raketno-yadernoye oruzhiye (Strategic Nuclear Missiles)
208 Chapter 4
Figure 4A.9
RT-2P (55-13) missile
rubber-based PAL-1717 propellant, which had higher plasticity than previously used
propellants and did not deteriorate during long-term storage.
Projects for the modernization of the RT-2 were conducted at the Arsenal Design
Bureau.152 The flight tests of the RT-2P were conducted from January 1970 to
January 1972, and the system was commissioned on 28 December 1972.
The service life of the RT-2 and RT-2P systems was originally projected to be
10 years. Periodic engine tests on firing stands confirmed that the missile retained
its performance with time and allowed its service life to be extended to 15 years.
The systems were on combat duty for more than 20 years and were dismantled
in the early 1990s in compliance with the START I Treaty. By mid-1996 all RT-2P
missiles had been removed from service and partially replaced with Topol road-
mobile missiles.
RT-15 (SS-X-14 Scamp)

The RT-15 system was the first Soviet attempt to create a mobile intermediate-range
missile system. The RT-15 was developed during the work on the RT-2 project, con-
ducted in accordance with a Council of Ministers decree of 4 April 1961. The missile
was supposed to have been developed in a submarine-launched version and a road-
mobile version. The head developer of the ground model of the RT-15 (code-
numbered 8K96) was the TsKB-7 Special Design Bureau (now the Arsenal Design
Bureau), headed by P. A. Tyurin. The missile was based on the second and third
stages of the RT-2 missile and was supposed to have a range of 2,000-2,500 kilo-
meters. 153 The two-stage solid-propellant missile was emplaced in a launch canister
on a mobile launcher that was modeled on a heavy tank.
The RT-15 system passed state acceptance tests and was recommended for serial
production and experimental use in 1968. The Ministry of Defense, howeve~
rejected the missile, arguing that it required too many launch support vehicles. After
a certain period of experimental use, the system was taken out of service altogether.
According to Western data, the program to develop the missile, designated the
SS-X-14 Scamp by the u.S. Department of Defense, was canceled in 1970. There
were 19 launches in all within the confines of the RT-15 program, including two
training launches in 1969 and 1970. '54
RT-25
The same government decree of 4 April 1961 that authorized the development of
the RT-15 also authorized the development of another missile, the RT-25 (code-
numbered 8K97), which was supposed to have been based on the first and third
stages of the RT-2 missile and have a range of 4,000-4,500 kilometers. The Min-
istry of Defense, howeve~ rejected the RT-25 missile during the development stage,
and work on it was terminated.
RT-20P (SS-X-15 Scrooge)

The RT-20P was the first Soviet road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile. OKB-
586 completed the preliminary design of the two-stage, single-warhead missile
(code-numbered 8K99) in December 1964. The first stage had a solid-propellant
motor and used four gimbaled nozzles for flight control. The second stage included
a single-chamber liquid-propellant engine that used asymmetrical dimethylhydrazine
as fuel and nitrogen tetroxide as oxidizer. Pitch and yaw control was achieved by
side injection of turbopump exhaust gases into the nozzle, and roll was controlled
by four nozzles that also used the turbo pump exhaust. With a launch weight of
210 Chapter 4
30.2 tons, the missile was supposed to deliver a warhead weighing 545 kilograms
for up to 7,000 kilometers or to secure the intermediate-range delivery of a 1,410-
kilogram warhead.
The initial RT-20 system specifications envisaged three alternative basing
methods: road- and rail-mobile and silo-based. '55 Only the road-mobile version,
however, was developed. The missile was transported in a launch canister on a self-
propelled launcher modeled on the T-10M heavy tank. The missile was launched
out of the canister by the cold launch method. The guidance system for the missile
used new, high-precision gyros, and flotation gyro integrators enhanced the system's
accuracy. In addition, the missile could be remotely retargeted. 156
The flight tests of the missile began in October 1967 on the Plesetsk Test Range.
In all, there were nine experimentallaunches. 157 The RT-20P project was canceled
in October 1969.158
Temp-2S (SS-X-16 Sinner)

The Temp-2S system was the first Soviet attempt to develop an operationally effec-
tive road-mobile ICBM. Experimental design projects for the system began after the
publication of a Council of Ministers decree of 10 July 1969.'59 The head developer
of the system was the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology (Chief Designer
A. D. Nadiradze). The mobile transporter-launcher was developed by the Titan
Central Design Bureau (TsKB) of the Barrikady Plant in Volgograd.
Table 4A.10 lists the main technical characteristics of the Temp-2S (code-
numbered 15Zh42), which was a three-stage solid-propellant missile with a single
warhead, launched from a canister. The canister was mounted on a mobile launcher
on a wheeled chassis. With a launch weight of 44 tons, the missile was designed to
deliver a payload of 940 kilograms for a range of up to 9,000 kilometers. The missile
was equipped with a single 0.65-1.5 megaton warhead. The maximum error was
1.2-1.6 kilometers.
The flight tests of the Temp-2S, named the SS-X-16 Sinner by the U. S. Depart-
ment of Defense, began in April 1972. By the end of 1974, 26 missiles had been
launched from the test range in Plesetsk. The last of the launches, conducted in April
1976, was a failure. 16o
The Temp-2S system was accepted for experimental deployment but never com-
missioned. According to Western sources, some 200 missiles had been produced at
the Votkinsk Mechanical Plant, and about 60 of these had been delivered to the
storage facility in Plesetsk before the SALT II Treaty was signed.
Table 4A.l0
Technical characteristics of the Temp-2S missile system
Designation Temp-2S 15Zh42, RS-14, SS-16, Sinner

Development began 10 July 1969
Design bureau Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology
Manufacturer Votkinsk Mechanical Plant
Flight tests beginning of 1972-end of 1974;' 1972-1976
Combat duty 21 February 1976
Commissioned not commissioned
Number of stages 3
Propellant solid
LalUlcher road-mobile on wheeled truck
Number of warheads and their yield 1 x 0.65-1.5 Mt
Payload/throw weight 940 kg
Accuracy maximum error 1.2-1.6km
Length lS.5m
Propellant weight
Oxidizer
Fuel
Thrust (sea level/vacuum)
Specific impulse (sea level/vacuum)
LalUlch readiness
Service life
The first two missile regiments equipped with Temp-2S systems were put on
combat duty on 21 February 1976. '61 According to Western data, up to 50 missiles
could have been deployed in Plesetsk by the middle of 1978. When the Soviet Union
signed the SALT II Treaty, it agreed not to produce, test, or deploy either the
Temp-2S missile or its third stage. 162 By 1985 all of the support equipment had
been removed from the Plesetsk test site and the INF Treaty defined the system as
nondeployed.
212 Chapter 4
MR UR-I00 (SS-17 Spanker)

The MR UR-I00 missile (code-numbered 15A15) (figure 4A.I0) was created to
replace the light UR-I00 ICBM. The order of the Ministry of General Machine
Building authorizing the development of the missile, On the Development of
the 15A15 Missile System, was signed in September 1970. The flight tests were
scheduled to begin in 1973. The Yuzhnoye Design Bureau, which was headed
by V. F. Utkin by that time, was chosen as the head developer.
Table 4A.ll lists the main technical characteristics of the MR UR-I00 missile,
which was referred to in the West as the SS-17 Spanker. The MR UR-I00 was a
two-stage missile that used storable liquid fuel. Its dimensions were carefully spec-
ified to enable its deployment in the UR-I00 silos, so measures were taken to secure
a tighter design. The diameter of both stages of the MR UR -100 was greater than
Figure 4A.I0
MR UR-I00UTTH (55-17) missile
Table 4A.ll
Technical characteristics of the MR UR-I00 and MR UR-I00UTTH missiles
Designation MR UR-100 15A15, RS-16A, SS-17, Spanker

MR UR-100UTTH 15A16, RS-16B, SS-17, Spanker
Development began MR UR-100 September 1970
MR UR-100UTTH 16 August 1976
Design bureau Yuzhnoye Design Bureau
Manufacturer Yuzhnyy Machine-Building Plant (Dnepropetrovsk)
Flight tests MR UR-100 26 December 1972-17 December 1974
MR UR-100UTTH 25 October 1977-15 December 1979
Combat duty MR UR-100 6 May 1975; 11 November 1976
(hardened silos)
MR UR-100UTTH 17 October 1978
Commissioned MR UR-100 30 December 1975
MR UR-100UTTH 17 December 1980
Number of stages 2 + bus
Propellant storable liquid, solid-propellant bus
Number of warheads and 4 x 550-750 kt, single warhead
their yield
Maximum range MR UR-100 10,320km
MR UR-100UTTH 10,200km
Accuracy MR UR-100 Maximum error no more than 1,080 rna
MR UR-100UTTH Maximum error 920 m b
Length 21.6 m (with container)
Maximum diameter 2.25m (first stage), 2.1m (second stage)
Specific impulse 2,897/3,121 mlsec (first stage)
(sea level/vacuwn)
LalUlch readiness
Service life 10 years

214 Chapter 4
that of the UR-100 missile: 2.25 meters for the first and 2.1 meters for the second
stage. The lower spherical cap of the first-stage propellant tank had a convex
surface, and the top of the engine fit into that space. The second-stage tank had a
toroidal shape, with the engine situated in its central cavity. The first stage was
equipped with a single-chamber liquid-propellant closed-cycle sustainer engine and
a four-chamber open-cycle liquid-propellant steering engine. The second stage was
equipped with a single-chamber closed-cycle liquid-propellant sustainer. The thrust
vector was controlled by a gas injection into the nozzle. Four nozzles operating on
turbopump exhaust gas were used to control rol1. 163
The solid-propellant bus carried four independently targeted warheads and an
instrument compartment with the control and guidance system. Because of the
limited internal dimensions of the silo launcher, the nose fairing consisted of two
folding parts, which were deployed after the missile left the silo.
The MR UR-100 missile was deployed, as planned, in converted UR-100
silos. The conversion process included hardening the existing silo without dis-
mantling it. The missile in the transport container was suspended in the silo on two
shock-absorbing straps.'64 The missile's limited volume required the cold launch
method.
Cold launch tests of the missile began in May 1971. Full-scale flight tests
were conducted on the Fifth Scientific Research Test Range (Baykonur) from 26
December 1972 to 17 December 1974. After the start of the tests of the standard
model with four warheads, the missile was tested in a single-warhead version (the
missiles were designated 55-17 Mod 1 and 55-17 Mod 2, respectively, by the U.S.
Department of Defense).
The first regiment with the MR UR-100 missile system was put on combat duty
on 6 May 1975. The MR UR-100 system was adopted on 30 December 1975
(at the same time as the UR-100N and R-36M). Soon after that, on 16 August
1976, the government authorized development of a modification of the missile.
The preliminary design of the MR UR-100 system with improved performance
characteristics (UTTH), designatedMR UR-100UTTH (and code-numbered 15A16)
was completed by the Yuzhnoye Design Bureau in December 1976. The MR UR-
100UTTH system was hardened, and it had a better control and guidance system
and a modified warhead section (code-numbered 15F161). The flight tests of the
system began on 25 October 1977 and ended on 15 December 1979. The MR UR-
100UTTH missile was commissioned on 17 December 1980 (at the same time as
the R-36MUTTH). The first regiment with the MR UR-100UTTH system was put
on combat duty on 17 October 1978.
By 1979 the number of deployed MR UR-100 missiles had reached 130, and
all of the single-warhead MR UR-100 missiles were replaced by multiple-warhead
missiles in 1979-1980. All of the MR UR-100 missiles were replaced by MR UR-
100UTTH missiles in 1982-1983. In addition, another 20 MR UR-100UTTH
missiles were deployed to compensate for the reduction in the number of UR-
100 missiles, bringing the total number of deployed MR UR-100UTTH missiles
to 150.
At the time of the exchange of data in connection with the START-I Treaty in
1991, the USSR had 47 deployed MR UR-100UTTH silos. All of these missiles have
now been dismantled, and all of the launchers have been eliminated (except one
that was kept as a museum exhibit).
R-36M (55-18 Satan)

R-36M The heavy R-36M missile system (figure 4A.ll) was developed by the
Yuzhnoye Design Bureau as a replacement for the heavy R-36 ICBM. The decree
of the USSR Council of Ministers that authorized the system's development, On the
Development and Production of the R-36M (15A14) Missile System, was issued on
2 September 1969. The preliminary design was completed in December 1969 and
envisaged different versions: with a single warhead and with multiple and maneu-
verable reentry vehicles.
Table 4A.12 lists the main technical characteristics of the R-36M missile, which
was known in the West as the SS-18 Satan. The R-36M was designed as a two-
stage missile with multiple independently targeted warheads or with a single
warhead. In terms of its overall design, the R-36M was similar to the R-36 missile,
but the airframe weight was reduced through advanced technology and a tighter
design. An assembly of four single-chamber closed-cycle engines was used on
the first stage. The second stage had a single-chamber closed-cycle sustainer
and a four-chamber open-cycle steering engine. The second-stage engine was
situated in the cavity of the toroidal propellant tank. Flight control during the
first-stage burn-up was achieved by using gimbaled engines. The missile was
equipped with an autonomous inertial guidance system that included an onboard
computer.
For the first time in a missile, the tanks of the R-36M were pressurized by so-
called controlled fire (injecting fuel into the oxidizer tank and oxidizer into the fuel
tank). After stage separation the first stage was decelerated by venting the propel-
lant tank. This measure eliminated the need for special deceleration motors and
simplified the tank pressurizing equipment. The more efficient design and the more
216 Chapter 4
Figure 4A.ll
Variants of the R-36M (55-18) missile (left to right): R-36M missile with single warhead,
R-36M missile with MIRVs, R-36MUTTH missile, R-36M2 missile
effective closed-cycle engines increased the missile's throw weight from 5.8 tons to
8.8 tons. The launch weight of the missile, which had the same dimensions as the
R-36, reached 209.6 tons.
The payload of the R-36M missile included a bus with eight independently
targetable warheads and an instrument section with a control and guidance system.
The cone-shaped warheads were situated in pairs along the outer surface of the
instrument section.
The missile was stored and transported in a fiberglass launch container, which
was mounted in a converted R-36 silo launcher. The R-36M launcher was a super-
hardened structure with a tube 39 meters deep and 5.9 meters in diameter. 165 The
missile was ejected from the canister during launch by a solid-propellant charge
located in the bottom of the canister. The first-stage sustainers were ignited after
the missile left the silo.
The flight tests of the R-36 system were originally scheduled to begin in 1971 but
were later postponed. Cold launch tests began in January 1971. Flight tests of the
missile began on 21 February 1973. The tests of the three different versions of
the R-36M ended in October 1975, and the missile system was commissioned on
30 December 1975.
The missile was equipped with either the 15F143 MIRV warhead section (which
included eight reentry vehicles) or the 15B86 single-warhead section (this version
was commissioned on 20 November 1978), which were developed specifically for
the R-36M. Two modifications of the 15F678 reentry vehicle, which was equipped
with a terminal homing guidance, were flight-tested from July 1978 to August
1980.'66 This warhead has never been deployed. 167
The first regiment with the R-36M missile system was put on combat duty on
25 December 1974.168 All of the R-36M missiles were replaced by R-36MUTTH
missiles between 1980 and 1983.
R-36MUTTH A government decree authorizing the development of a follow-on

system, On the Improvement of the Tactical Performance Characteristics of the R-
36M (15A14) and MR UR-100 (15A15) Missiles, was issued on 16 August 1976,
just a few months after the R-36M system was commissioned. The preliminary
design of the new system with improved tactical performance, designated the R-
36MUTTH and code-numbered 15A18, was completed by the Yuzhnoye Design
Bureau in December 1976. The missile's improved accuracy allowed to reduce the
warhead yield. This was done without sacrificing the missile's effectiveness, which
meant that the number of warheads on the MIRVed version of the missile could be
increased from 8 to 10 and the maximum range of the single-warhead version could
be increased to 16,000 kilometers. 169
Flight tests of the R-36MUTTH missile began on 31 October 1977. The tests of
the version equipped with the 15F183 MIRVed warhead section were completed in
November 1979, and the missile was commissioned on 17 December 1980.
Deployment of the missile, designated the 55-18 Mod 4 by the U.S. Department
of Defense, began in 1979. The first three regiments with the R-36MUTTH missile
system were put on combat duty on 18 September of that yearYo By 1980, 120
R-36MUTTH missiles had been deployed and had replaced the last remaining
R-36 missiles. All of the R-36M missiles previously deployed were replaced by the
218 Chapter 4
Table 4A.12
Technical characteristics of the R-36M, R-36MUTTH, and R-36M2 missiles
Designation R-36M 15A14, R5-20A, 55-18 Mod l/Mod 2/Mod

3, Satan
R-36MUTTH 15A18, R5-20B, 55-18 Mod 4, 5atan
R-36M2 15A18M, R5-20V, 55-18 Mod 5/Mod 6,
Satan
Development began R-36M 2 5eptember 1969
R-36MUTTH 16 August 1976
R-36M2 9 August 1983
Manufacturer Yuzhnyy Machine-Building Plant (Dnepropetrovsk)
Flight tests R-36M 21 February 1973-1 October 1975
R-36MUTTH 31 October 1977-November 1979
R-36M2 March 1986-March 1988
Combat duty R-36M 25 December 1974; 30 November 1975
(hardened silo)
R-36MUTTH 18 5eptember 1979
R-36M2 30 July 1988
Commissioned R-36M 30 December 1975
R-36MUTTH 17 December 1980
R-36M2 11 August 1988 (15F173 warhead section),
23 August 1990 (single-warhead),' 1991
(15F175 warhead section)b
Number of warheads and R-36M two single-warhead versions (Mod 1,
their yield Mod 3), 8 x 900 kt;' 8 x 550-750 kt d
R-36MUTTH 10 x 550-750kt
R-36M2 single-warhead or 10 x 550-7S0kt
Maximum range R-36M 16,000km (light warhead), 11,200km (heavy
warhead), 10,200km (MIRVed)b
R-36MUTTH 11,500kmb
R-36M2 11,000km MIRVed, 16,000km single-
warhead;b 15,000 km d
Accuracy R-36M maximum error 1,000 m
R-36MUTTH maximum error 920 m
R-36M2 maximum error 500 m
Length R-36M 36.6m
R-36MUTTH 36.3m
R-36M2 34.3m

LalUlch weight R-36M 209.6t
R-36MUTTH 211.1 t
R-36M2 211.1 t
Propellant weight R-36M 188.0t
R-36MUTTH 188.0t
R-36M2 no data
Thrust (sea level/vacuum) R-36M 4,163/4,520kN (first stage)
R-36MUTTH 4,163/4,520kN (first stage)
R-36M2 no data
Specific impulse R-36M 2,874/3,120mlsec (first stage)
(sea level/vacuwn) R-36MUTTH 2,874/3,120mlsec (first stage)
R-36M2 no data
LalUlch readiness
Service life R-36M 10 years
R-36MUTTH 10 years
R-36M2 15 years
a I. D. Sergeyev, eci., Khronika osnovnykh sobytii istorii Raketnykh voisk strategicheskogo
naznacheniya (Chronicle of Main Events in RVSN History) (RVSN, 1994).
b V. Pappo-Korystin, V. Platonov, and V. Pashchenko, Dneprovsky raketno-kosmicheskii
C S. G. Kolesnikov, Strategicheskoye raketno-yadernoye oruzhiye (Strategic Nuclear Missiles)
dYe. B. Volkov, ed., MER SSSR (RF) i SShA (ICBMs of the USSR (Russian Federation) and
R-36MUTTH in 1982-1983, and the total number of deployed R-36MUTTH mis-

siles reached 308-the maximum number set by the SALT I Treaty. After 1988 some
of the R-36MUTTH missiles were replaced by R-36M2 missiles of the Voyevoda
system.
R-36M2 Voyevoda Performance specifications for a modernized heavy missile,

designated the R-36M2 and code-numbered 15A18M, were drawn up in June 1979.
The design of the new missile system was completed in June 1982.
The R-36M2 had several new design features. The second-stage engine, for
example, was submerged in the propellant tank (this design had previously been
used only on Soviet SLBMs), and the launch canister was changed. In contrast to
220 Chapter 4
the R-36M, the R-36M2 had 10 warheads arranged in two tiers on a frame-type
launcher mounted on the instrument section. 17l
The flight tests of the R-36M2, equipped with the 15F173 MIRVed warhead
section, began in March 1986 and ended in March 1988. The first regiment
equipped with R-36M2 missiles was put on combat duty on 30 July 1988.172 The
system with the 15F173 MIRVed warhead section was adopted on 11 August
1988 173 and was put on combat duty in December 1988. Flight tests of the missile
with the 15F175 warhead section were completed in September 1989,'74 and this
version was commissioned in August 1991 (the single-warhead version of the
R-36M2 was commissioned on 23 August 1990).1'5
At this time only the R-36MUTTH and R-36M2 missiles remain deployed. As
of January 2001 Russia still had 180 deployed launchers of those missiles (the mis-
siles had been removed from nine of these launchers). The elimination of the 104
R-36MUTTH and R-36M2 launchers in Kazakhstan was completed in September
1996.
UR-lOON (55-19 Stiletto)

The UR-100N missile system (figure 4A.12) was developed in the early 1970s as a
replacement for the light UR-100 ICBM. The Central Machine-Building Design
Bureau, headed by General Designer V. N. Chelomey, was chosen as the head
developer for the system.
Table 4A.13 lists the main technical characteristics of the UR-100N (code-
numbered 15A30), which is a MIRVed, liquid-propellant two-stage missile. In terms
of the overall design the UR-100N is comparable to the UR-100 but has a larger
diameter and longer propellant tanks, which allowed the missile's launch weight to
be more than doubled and its throw weight to be increased 3.5-fold. The first stage
has four single-chamber closed-cycle engines with gimbaled nozzles, and the second
stage has a single-chamber open-cycle sustainer and a steering engine with four
hinged nozzles.
The greater throw weight of the UR-100N allowed the missile to be equipped
with a bus carrying six independently target able warheads, each with a yield of
550 kilotons. The payload also included an instrument section with a control and
guidance system.
The silos for the UR-100N missiles were constructed at the locations of the UR-
100 silo launchers and were hardened against a nuclear blast. 176 In contrast with
the MR UR-100, which was designed to fit in the existing UR-100 silo launchers,
the construction of a UR -lOON silo required demolition of the old UR -100 silo. The
Figure 4A.12
UR-lOON and UR-lOONUTTH (55-19) missiles
UR-100N used the hot launch method, so the missile was ejected from the silo by
the sustainer engine thrust.
Flight tests of the UR-100N were conducted on the Fifth Scientific Research Test
Range of the Ministry of Defense (Baykonur) from 9 April 1973 to October 1975.
The system was commissioned on 30 December 1975.
The first regiment with the UR-100N missile system was put on combat duty on
26 April 1975.177 The UR-100N missile, called the 55-19 Stiletto by the u.S. Depart-
ment of Defense, was deployed in greater numbers than the competing MR UR-
100. By the end of 1975, 60 UR-100N launchers had been deployed, and 180 of
these missiles were deployed from 1976 to the end of 1978.178 Deployment of the
single-warhead version of the UR-100N missile (the 55-19 Mod 2) began in 1977.
In all, 60 single-warhead UR-100Ns were deployed.
222 Chapter 4
Table 4A.13
Technical characteristics of the UR-lOON and UR-I00NUTTH missiles
Designation UR-lOON 15A30, R5-18A, 55-19 Mod l/Mod 2,

Stiletto
UR-l00NUTTH 15A35, R5-18B, 55-19 Mod 3, 5tiletto
Development began UR-lOON 1970
UR-l00NUTTH 16 August 1976
Design bureau Machine-Building Scientific Production Association
Manufacturer Khrwlichev Plant (Moscow)
Flight tests UR-lOON 9 April 1973-0ctober 1975
UR-l00NUTTH 26 October 1977-26 June 1979
Combat duty UR-lOON 26 April 1975; 18 December 1976
(hardened silo)
UR-l00NUTTH 6 November 1979
Commissioned UR-lOON 30 December 1975
UR-l00NUTTH 17 December 1980
Number of warheads and UR-lOON single-warhead (Mod 2), MIRV 6 x 550 kt
their yield (Mod 1)
UR-l00NUTTH MIRV 6 x 550-750 kt
Accuracy UR-I00NUTTH maximum error 920m
Length UR-l00NUTTH 24.3m (with container)
Propellant weight 93.1 t
Specific impulse
(sea level/vacuwn)
LalUlch readiness
Service life extended to 21 years
Since the UR-100N development and flight test schedule was very tight, the
designers failed to detect a serious flaw in the missile's design that caused it to lose
accuracy when it was fired at full range. The problem was discovered during train-
ing launches conducted after the missile had already been deployed. The designers
changed the design to correct the problem, and the design change had to be applied
to the deployed missiles in the course of field-level maintenance.
A decision was made on 16 August 1976, soon after the system was deployed,
to develop a version of the missile with improved tactical performance characteris-
tics. The modernized missile included an improved guidance system and engines and
a new instrumentation section. The command centers of the missile system were
also modified to increase their hardness substantially.
The flight tests of the improved system, called the UR-100NUTTH and code-
numbered 15A35 (see figure 4A.12), were conducted from 26 October 1977 to 26
June 1979, and the system was commissioned on 5 November 1979. The first
regiment equipped with the UR-100NUTTH (SS-19 Mod 3) missile system was put
on combat duty on 6 November 1979. '79 All of the single-warhead UR-100N mis-
siles were replaced by UR-100NUTTH missiles in 1980-1982, and the replacement
of the remaining UR-100N systems with MIRVs was completed in 1983. By 1984
the number of UR-100NUTTH missiles had risen to 360. Replacement of some of
the UR-100NUTTH missiles with new missile systems began in 1987.
When the START I Treaty was signed in 1991, the Soviet Union had 300 UR-
100NUTTH missiles: 130 deployed in Ukraine and the rest in Russia. After the
breakup of the USSR, Ukraine claimed the missiles within its territory. Consequently,
Ukraine is responsible for the elimination of the missile launchers in compliance
with the START I Treaty. (All of the nuclear warheads on missiles in Ukraine were
moved to Russia.) Russia also bought from Ukraine 32 of its UR-100NUTTH
missiles, which were kept in storage and were never filled with fuel.
There are now 140 deployed UR-100NUTTH launchers in Russia. Because the
life expectancy of the missiles was extended to 21 years in 1995, they can remain
in service at least until 2005. UR-100NUTTH missiles that were deployed in the
late 1980s could be kept in service even longer: The service life of the missiles could
be extended to 25 years.
If the START II Treaty enters into force, Russia will have to eliminate all of its
land-based MIRVed ICBMs. The only exceptions would be 105 UR-100NUTTH
missiles, which could be kept in service if the number of warheads on them is
reduced from six to one.
224 Chapter 4
Pioneer (SS-20 Saber)

The Pioneer missile system (figure 4A.13) was an intermediate-range ground-
launched mobile system developed in the mid-1970s on the basis of the Temp-2S
system. The head developer of the system was the Moscow Institute of Thermal
Technology, headed by A. D. Nadiradze.
Table 4A.14 lists the main technical characteristics of the Pioneer missile (code-
numbered 15Zh45), which was known in the West as the SS-20 Saber. The two-
stage solid-propellant Pioneer missile system was apparently based on the first and
second stages of the Temp-2S missile. The engines of the first and second stages were
made of composition materials using the "cast-in-place" technology. The missile
was encased in a launch container, which was mounted on a transporter-launcher
modeled on the MAZ-547V six-axle wheeled truck. The transporter-launcher was
Figure 4A.13
Missile of the Pioneer system (55-20)
Table 4A.14
Technical characteristics of Pioneer missile system
Designation Pioneer 15Zh45, RSD-I0, SS-20, Saber

Pioneer-UTTH 15Zh53, RSD-10, 55-20, Saber
Development began Pioneer 1973; 4 March 1966 a
Manufacturer Votkinsk Machine-Building Plant
Flight tests Pioneer 21 September 1974-9 January 1976
Pioneer-UTTH 10 August 1979-14 August 1980
Combat duty 30 August 1976
Commissioned Pioneer 11 March 1976
Pioneer-UTTH 17 December 1980
Propellant solid
LalUlcher road-mobile lalUlcher on a wheeled truck
Number of warheads and 1 x 1Mt (Mod 1, Mod 3), MIRY 3 x 150kt (Mod 2)
their yield
Maximum range Pioneer 5,000km
Pioneer-UTTH 5,500km
Accuracy Pioneer maximum error 1,300 m
Pioneer-UTTH maximum error 1,000 m
Length 16.49m
Propellant weight
Oxidizer
Fuel
Specific impulse
(sea level/vacuwn)
LalUlch readiness
Service life
, Yeo B. Yolkov, ed., MER SSSR (RF) i SShA (ICBMs of the USSR (Russian Federation) and
the United States) (RYSN, 1996).
226 Chapter 4
equipped with systems and assemblies to keep the missile in a state of constant
combat readiness, to make the necessary preparations for its launch, and to launch
the missile. The missile could be launched either from a special shelter (with a sliding
roof) in the garrison or from a geodetically prepared field site. Before the launch,
the launcher was first mounted on hydraulic supports, after which the canister was
raised to a vertical position, and the missile was then fired from the canister with
the aid of a pressure accumulator. Ignition of the first-stage engine followed ejec-
tion of the missile from the canister. The launch was conducted by remote control
from a mobile control station.
Flight tests of the system were conducted on the Fourth State Central Test Range
(Kapustin Yar) from 21 September 1974 to 9 January 1976. The Pioneer missile
system was adopted on 11 March 1976, and the first regiment equipped with
Pioneer missiles was put on combat duty on 30 August 1976.
According to Western data, three versions of the missile were tested: two single-
warhead (55-20 Mod 1 and Mod 3) and one MIRVed (55-20 Mod 2). The MIRVed
version with three lSO-kiloton warheads was considered the main version of the
missile. The warheads on this model were attached to the bus and not covered by
a common fairing.
Flight tests of a modernized version, the Pioneer-UTTH (code-numbered 15Zh53)
system began on 10 August 1979 on the Fourth State Central Test Range. The tests
continued until 14 August 1980, and the improved system was adopted on 17
December 1980. '80 The Pioneer-UTTH has the same propulsion system as the
Pioneer but has an improved bus and guidance that improves its accuracy (CEP)
from 550 meters to 450, increases its maximum range by 10 percent, and increases
the warhead coverage area.
In all, 441 Pioneer systems were deployed between 1978 and 1986. The number
had been reduced to 405 by the time the INF Treaty was signed in 1987.181
All of the Pioneer systems (509 launchers and 654 missiles) were eliminated in
1988-1991 in compliance with the INF Treaty. Seventy-two of those missiles were
eliminated by launching them, and all of the launches were successful.
RT-23UTTH Molodets (55-24 Scalpel)

The creation of the RT-23UTTH system was the result of years of attempts to create
a combat missile system with a solid-propellant ICBM suitable for deployment in
silos as well as on mobile launchers. The order of the Ministry of General Machine
Building that authorized the development of the system, On the Creation of a
Mobile Rail-Based Combat Missile System with the RT-23 Missile was signed on
13 January 1969. The head developer was OKB-586 (Yuzhnoye Design Bureau).
The difficulties the design bureau encountered during the development of the rail-
based version of the missile led to a change of plans, and on 23 July 1976 the design
bureau was ordered to begin development of a silo-based RT-23 missile instead.
The preliminary sketches of the RT-23 silo-based missile, code-numbered
15Zh44, were completed in March 1977. They were rejected, however, and a new
set of performance specifications, envisaging a better propulsion system and a new
reentry vehicle, had been completed by December 1979. The new preliminary design
proposed the use of the 15F143 MIRVed warhead section that had been used on
the R-36M missile. A rail-based system with the RT-23 missile, code-numbered
15Zh52, was being designed at the same time. The preliminary design of that system
was completed in June 1980. Table 4A.15 lists the main technical characteristics of
the RT-23 missile, which was known in the West at the 55-24 Scalpel.
Flight tests of the silo-based version of the RT-23 began on 26 October 1982, but
the USSR Defense Council decided on 10 February 1983 not to adopt the silo-based
version because too many accidents occurred during the tests. Flight tests of the rail-
based RT-23 system began in January 1982 and were completed in April 1985. That
system was approved for experimental use in November 1987.
Creation of a modified version of the RT-23, the RT-23UTTH Molodets system
(figure 4A.14), with one missile and three basing modes----;;ilo-based and rail- and
road-mobile-was ordered on 9 August 1983.182 The road-mobile version was later
rejected, and only two versions of the missile were developed.
The RT-23UTTH is a three-stage MIRVed solid-propellant missile. In the silo-
based version (code-numbered 15Zh60), the first-stage motor has a gimbaled nozzle
for flight control; the first-stage motor of the rail-based model (code-numbered
15Zh61) has a fixed nozzle. Pitch and yaw control is achieved by tilting the nose
section of the missile relative to the missile's axis. Four aerodynamic fins at the nose
fairing provide roll control during the first- and second-stage powered flight. The
engines of the second and third stages have extendible nozzles that allowed specific
impulse to be increased without increasing the missile's dimensions.
The missile's bus carries 10 warheads, arranged in a single tier, and the instru-
mentation section with an inertial guidance system. This guidance system provides
a maximum error of 0.5 kilometers, which means that the 550-kiloton warheads
can be used for the destruction of hardened point targets. The missile is stored and
transported in a launch canister and launched by the cold method.
The silo-based version was deployed in silos previously used for the UR-
100NUTTH missiles. The rail-based version is deployed in a railcar. Before the
228 Chapter 4
Table 4A.1S
Technical characteristics of the RT-23 and RT-23UTTH missiles
Designation RT-23 15Zh52, RS-22B, SS-24 Mod 1, Scalpel

RT-23UTTH 15Zh60, RS-22A, SS-24 Mod 2, Scalpel
RT-23UTTH 15Zh61, RS-22V, SS-24 Mod 1, Scalpel
Development began RT-23 6 July 1979
RT-23UTTH 9 August 1983
Manufacturer Pavlograd Mechanical Plant
Flight tests RT-23 January 1982-April 1985
RT-23UTTH (15Zh60) 31 July 1986-November 1988
RT-23UTTH (15Zh61) 27 February 1985-22 December 1987
Combat duty RT-23UTTH (15Zh60) 19 August 1988
RT-23UTTH (15Zh61) 20 October 1987
Commissioned RT-23 experimental use since November 1987
RT-23UTTH 28 November 1989
Number of stages 3
Propellant solid
LalUlcher RT-23 rail-mobile (cold lalUlch)
RT-23UTTH (15Zh60) silo (cold launch)
RT-23UTTH (15Zh61) rail-mobile (cold lalUlch)
Number of warheads MIRV 10 x 550kt
and their yield
Maximum range RT-23UTTH (15Zh60) 10,450km
RT-23UTTH (15Zh61) 10,100km
Accuracy maximum error 500 m
Length RT-23UTTH (15Zh60) 22.4 m (with container)
RT-23UTTH (15Zh61) 22.6 m (with container)
Propellant weight
Oxidizer
Fuel
Thrust 210t (first stage), 107t (second stage), 21 t (third stage)
(sea level/vacuwn)
Specific impulse
(sea level/vacuwn)
LalUlch readiness
Figure 4A.14
Silo-based version of the RT-23UTTH (55-24) missile
missile is launched, the roof of the car slides open, a special device diverts the over-
head contact system, and the container is raised to a vertical position. The missile
is then fired from the canister with the aid of a pressure accumulator. The dimen-
sions of the launcher (silo or railcar) limit the length of the missile in both versions.
Because of this, the silo-based model has a folding nose fairing, with flaps that close
after the missile leaves the container. The rail-based model is equipped with an inflat-
able nose fairing.
The rail-based RT-23UTTH regiment includes three launchers with missiles, a
command center, and railcars with launch support equipment and personnel living
quarters. The missile can be launched from predetermined sites as well as from any
location on the system's patrol route.
Flight tests of the rail-based RT-23UTTH model began on 27 February 1985 and
ended in December 1987, and the tests of the silo-based model were conducted from
230 Chapter 4
31 July 1986 to November 1988. Both models of the missile system were commis-
sioned on 28 November 1989.'8 3
The first regiment equipped with the rail-based model was put on combat duty
on 20 October 1987, and the first regiment with the silo-based model was put on
combat duty on 19 August 1988. '84 In all, 56 silo-based and 36 rail-based RT-
23UTTH ICBMs were deployed (some of the rail-mobile systems were equipped
with RT-23 missiles rather than RT-23UTTHs). Forty-six silo-based RT-23UTTH
missiles that were located in Ukraine have been removed from service and elimi-
nated in compliance with the START I Treaty. The nuclear warheads of those
missiles were moved to Russia. As of January 2001, there were 36 rail-based
RT-23UTTH missile systems deployed within Russian territory. If the START II
Treaty enters into force, all of the RT-23UTTH missile systems will have to
be eliminated.
RT-2PM Topol (55-25 Sickle)

The RT-2PM Topol (figure 4A.15) was the first commissioned road-mobile system
with an intercontinental missile. The project that led to the development of the
system was authorized on 19 July 1977. The Moscow Institute of Thermal Tech-
nology, headed by A. D. Nadiradze, was chosen as the head developer. The mobile
launcher on a wheeled chassis was developed by the Titan Central Design Bureau
of the Barrikady Plant in Volgograd. Because the SALT II Treaty, signed in 1979,
prohibited the development of more than one new missile (which for the USSR
was the RT-23UTTH), officially the Topol system was being developed as an
updated model of the RT-2P silo-based missile system. In reality, the Topol belongs
to a different line, which began with the Temp-2S and Pioneer road-mobile
systems. 1SS
Table 4A.16 lists the main technical characteristics of the Topol missile, which
was known in the West as the SS-25 Sickle. The Topol missile system includes a
three-stage solid-propellant ballistic missile. The solid-propellant motors are made
using cast-in-place technology with composite-material casing. Flight control during
the first-stage boost phase is accomplished with the aid of four gas jet vanes and
four aerodynamic surfaces deployed after the missile leaves its canister. Another four
aerodynamic surfaces are used for stabilization.
The Topol, with a throw weight of 1,000 kilograms, carries one 550-kiloton
warhead. The warhead section contains the propulsion system for the warhead and
a guidance system that provides accuracy (maximum error) of 900 meters. 186
According to Western data, the missile was tested at least once with four indepen-
Figure 4A.1S
Missile of the Topol system (55-25)
dently targetable reentry vehicles, but there was no further development of this
verSIOn.
The missile is stored and transported in a container mounted on a mobile trans-
port launcher. The launcher is modeled on a seven-axle wheeled truck and is
equipped with an internal inertial navigation system developed by the Signal Scien-
tific Research Institute (St. Petersburg), securing the possibility of an autonomous
launch from any spot on the combat patrol route. The system can also be launched
from a shelter (with a sliding roof) in the permanent deployment area. In addition
to the mobile launcher, the system includes a mobile command post and other
support facilities situated on four-axle, all-terrain wheeled chassis.
Flight tests of the system (code-numbered 15Zh58) were conducted on the
Plesetsk Test Range from 8 February 1983 to 23 December 1987. After the
232 Chapter 4
Table 4A.16
Technical characteristics of the Topol missile system
Designation RT-2PM 15Zh58, Topol, RS-12M, SS-25, Sickle

Manufacturer Votkinsk Machine-Building Plant
Flight tests 8 February 1983-23 December 1987
Combat duty 23 July 1985, 28 April 1987 (with a mobile regimental
command center), 27 May 1988 (with a modified mobile
regimental command center), 30 December 1988 (with a
new-generation automated combat control system)
Commissioned 1 December 1988
Number of stages 3
Propellant solid
LalUlcher road-mobile lalUlcher on a wheeled truck
Number of warheads and 1 x 550kt
their yield
Payload/throw weight 1,OOOkg
Accuracy Maximwn error 900 m
Length 21.5m
Maximum diameter 1.80 m (first stage), 1.55 m (second stage), 1.34 m (third stage)
Propellant weight
Oxidizer
Fuel
Specific impulse
(sea level/vacuwn)
LalUlch readiness
Service life 10 years, extended to 15 years
successful completion of the first series of tests, which ended in the middle of 1985
(there were 15 test launches in April 1985), the first regiment was put on combat
duty near Yoshkar-Ola on 23 July 1985, but the work on the missile's combat
control system apparently continued. The first regiment equipped with a mobile
command center was put on combat duty on 28 April 1987 (at Nizhni Tagil), and
the first missile regiment with an updated version of the mobile command center
was put on combat duty on 27 May 1988 (at Irkutsk). The test launches of the
missile were completed on 23 December 1987, but the final decision to commission
Table 4A.17
Technical characteristics of the Topol-M missile system
Designation RT-2PM2 Topol-M, 55-27

Development began before 1992
Manufacturer Votkinsk Machine- Building Plant
Flight tests from 20 December 1994
Combat duty 24 December 1997 (silo)
Commissioned April 2000
Number of stages 3
Propellant solid
LalUlcher silo (cold lalUlch); road-mobile version is lUlder development
Number of warheads and single-warhead
their yield
Maximum range more than 10,000km
Accuracy maximum error about 800 m
Length 22.7m
Propellant weight
Oxidizer
Fuel
Specific impulse
(sea level/vacuwn)
LalUlch readiness
234 Chapter 4
the Topol system was not made until 1 December 1988, more than three years after
the start of its experimental use.
Some of the Topol systems were deployed in new deployment areas, and others
were deployed at the bases that had been used for Pioneer missile deployment before
Pioneer missiles were eliminated in accordance with the INF Treaty, which was
signed in 1987. When the START I Treaty was signed in 1991, the Soviet Union
had 288 Topol missile systems. Their deployment continued after START I was
signed. At the end of 2000 the RVSN had 360 deployed Topol missiles.
Topol-M (55-27)
The Topol-M missile was developed as a single-warhead missile suitable for mass
deployment in silos and in the mo bile mode. Development of the system began in
the early 1990s. The head developer of the silo model was the Yuzhnoye Design
Bureau. The development of the mobile version apparently was entrusted to the
Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology. The entire project was turned over to the
Moscow institute in April 1992, soon after the breakup of the Soviet Union.
Table 4A.17 lists the main technical characteristics of the Topol-M missile, which
is known in the West as SS-27. The Topol-M, like the Topol, is a three-stage solid-
propellant single-warhead ICBM. Among the differences between the two missiles
is a larger first stage of the Topol-M, which increased the launch weight by 5 percent
(from 45.1 tons to 47.2) and the throw weight by 20 percent (from 1,000 kilograms
to 1,200).187
Flight tests of the system began on 20 December 1994 on the Plesetsk Test Range,
with the expectation that the tests could be completed by the end of 1996. Limited
funding, however, extended the program. After four flight tests (one of which was
unsuccessful), the first two missile systems entered service at the Tatishchevo missile
base in December 1997. The missiles were deployed in silos that previously hosted
UR-1 OONUTTH and RT-23UTTH missiles. The first regiment of ten missiles entered
combat duty on 30 December 1998.
Flight tests continued after the missile's initial deployment. On 27 September 2000
the Strategic Rocket Forces carried out the eleventh flight test of the missile. This
test was the first flight test of the ground-mobile version of the missile system. By
January 2001 the number of deployed Topol-M missiles was brought to 24. All
these missiles are deployed in silos at the Tatishchevo missile base.
5
Naval Strategic Nuclear Forces
The History of the Creation of the Ballistic-Missile Submarine Fleet
Nuclear Weapons on First-Generation Submarines

The first projects in the deployment of nuclear weapons on submarines in the Soviet
Union began in the middle of the 1950s. Because postwar Soviet military doctrine
assigned the Navy an auxiliary role in wartime, equipping it with nuclear weapons
was originally viewed solely as a means of enhancing the effectiveness of naval oper-
ations in actions against large ships and groups of ships and against naval bases.
Because of this, the nuclear weapons on surface ships and submarines originally
were not intended for strategic missions.
The improvement of nuclear warhead devices, resulting in the considerable reduc-
tion of their size and weight, was accompanied by the creation of ballistic and cruise
missiles and by experimental projects in the placement of those delivery vehicles on
submarines. ' It had been demonstrated by the middle of the 1950s that such systems
could potentially be created, but the relative merits of torpedoes and ballistic or
cruise missiles as platforms for nuclear weapons were still uncertain.
Torpedoes In contrast to missiles, torpedoes were already standard naval arms by

the beginning of the 1950s. The warhead sections of the torpedoes of that time,
however, were much smaller than the airborne nuclear bombs being used. In the
early 1950s the Ministry of Medium Machine Building, without consulting the
Navy, began developing nuclear 1550-millimeter and 533-millimeter (the traditional
caliber) torpedo warheads in cooperation with the NII-400 research institute' of the
Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry. These torpedo projects were called the T-15
and T-5, respectively.' The larger torpedo was supposed to be used on the first Soviet
nuclear-powered submarine of the Project 627 (November) class, and the
23 6 Chapter 5
traditional-caliber torpedo was supposed to be deployed on diesel-powered sub-

marines. The Navy, however, categorically objected to the placement of the larger
torpedo on submarines while the project was still in the preliminary design stage.
A test of the RDS-9 nuclear device for the T-5 torpedo in October 1954 ended
in failure. In spite of this, the Navy insisted on the development of the T-5 torpedo
and the cancellation of the T-15 project, because the latter would reduce the tacti-
cal capabilities of a submarine on which it was deployed by turning an all-purpose
ship into a weapon against coastal targets. As a result, the decision was made in
April 1955 to continue the work on the T-5 torpedo. The first underwater nuclear
test of the T-5 was conducted at the Novaya Zemlya test site on 21 September 1955
as part of the T-5 torpedo project to study the effects of the kill factors of a nuclear
burst on naval surface ships and submarines. 4 State tests of the T-5 torpedo were
conducted on 10 October 1955. The tests included a 10-kiloton nuclear explosion
at a depth of 35 meters, 10 kilometers away from the firing submarine. 5
The T-5 torpedo thus became the first Soviet naval nuclear weapon, chiefly
intended for tactical missions against large ships and groups of naval ships. If nec-
essary, howeve~ submarines equipped with the T-5 could use the torpedoes to attack
enemy naval bases and ports.
Ballistic Missiles The first investigations into the possibility of deploying missiles
on Soviet submarines date back to 1949, when the preliminary specifications
for the design of a diesel submarine armed with rocket-propelled projectiles were
drawn up at NII-4 of the N avy 6 under the supervision of Rear Admiral N. A.
Sulimovskiy. Within the framework of this project, known as P-2, Central Design
Bureau No. 18 (TsKB-18)7 of the Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry produced the
preliminary design of a submarine armed with R-1 ballistic missiles and Lastochka
cruise missiles. 8 This work was headed by F. A. Kaverin. Work on the P-2 project
was 500 N terminated because of problems with stabilizing the missile before
launch!
In spite of this, Sulimovskiy's team at the NII-4 Navy Institute continued to seek
ways of arming submarines with ballistic missiles. In 1953 the team managed to get
missile designers involved in the project: S. P. Korolev, chief designer of OKB-1 of
NII-88 of the Ministry of Armaments, and N. N. Isanin, chief designer of Central
Design Bureau No. 16 10 of the Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry, became interested
in the idea of missile-armed submarines. i1
In January 1954 the Soviet government issued a decree providing for the start of
a project for the development of a submarine with a ballistic missile. By May of the
Naval Strategic Nuclear Forces 237
next year the R -11FM missile, a modified version of the R -11 tactical land missile,
was tested in a swaying test stand on the Kapustin Yar range. 12
Flight tests of the R-llFM missile took place in fall 1955. One of submarines,
the B-67, was converted for that purpose by September 1955. The converted sub-
marine, designated Project V-611 (Zulu IV 1/2), had two missile launchers, which
on 16 September 1955 fired missiles from the White Sea to a test range on the Kola
peninsula. The test launch on 16 September 1955 was the first time a ballistic missile
was launched from a submarine.
Refitting of a series of five diesel-powered missile submarines as submarines
of the Project AV-611 class began in 1956.13 New submarines of the Project 629
(Golf) class that carried three R-13 ballistic missiles (the 0-2 system, SS-N-4)
were being designed at the same time. The R-13 missile had a range of 600 kilo-
meters. Between 1958 and 1962,23 missile submarines of the Project 629 class were
built.
The principal drawback of the diesel submarines was their vulnerability to anti-
submarine warfare systems. A diesel submarine on patrol had to charge its batter-
ies regularly (once everyone or two days). To do this, it had to surface or switch
to snorkel regime. This revealed its location and precluded covert patrol.
The first step in reducing the vulnerability of submarines was the development of
nuclear-powered submarines. The construction of Soviet nuclear-powered missile
submarines, which could remain submerged on combat patrol, began in 1958. The
first of these, the K-19 of the Project 658 (Hotel) class, was commissioned at the
end of 1960. Another seven nuclear-powered Project 658 submarines, equipped with
ballistic missiles, were built in 1961-1962. These ships, like the diesel Project 629
submarines, carried three R-13 missiles each.
Another measure to enhance the security of missile submarines was the develop-
ment of a missile system that would allow the launching of a missile from a sub-
merged submarine. Although the prelaunch preparations of the R-llFM and R-13
missiles were conducted underwater, the submarine had to surface for 15-20
minutes to launch all the missiles. Because the missiles' relatively short range con-
fined their use to zones heavily protected by antisubmarine warfare, the need to
surface seriously diminished the ship's combat effectiveness.
Projects in the creation of missiles with underwater launch capability resulted in
the development of the R-21 missile (0-4 system, SS-N-5). Many of the first-
generation missile submarines were rearmed with the D-4 system, which included
three R-21 missiles, in 1963-1967. Unlike previous missiles used on Soviet sub-
marines, which required surface launches, the R-21 missile could be launched from
238 Chapter 5
a depth of 40-60 meters. In addition to its underwater launch capability, the R-21
had a range of 1,400 kilometers, more than double the range of the R-13.
Virtually from the start of the projects for the creation of naval missile systems,
there was the assumption that the missiles created would carry nuclear warheads.
The 0-1 system with the R-llFM missiles, for example, was originally expected
to be armed with nuclear weapons. 14 The progress made in the development of
the R-13 missile made by the end of the 1950s, however, led to the decision that
the R-13, and not the R-llFM, would be the first submarine-launched nuclear
warhead missile. The first test of the R-13 missile with a nuclear warhead was
conducted on 20 October 1961. In that test, the missile was launched at targets on
the Novaya Zemlya test range." The yield of the warhead was 1.45 megatons. All
submarines with the 0-2 missile system were subsequently equipped with nuclear
warheads.
Crnise Missiles Projects in the creation of submarines armed with cruise missiles
were conducted in Central Design Bureau No. 18 of the Ministry of Shipbuilding
Industry in the early 1950s. The P-2 project was followed by the development of
several submarine models to be equipped with cruise missiles designed by S. A.
Lavochkin, G. M. Beriyev, and V. N. Chelomey. The best design was the P-5 cruise
missile, developed by OKB-52 of the Ministry of Aviation Industry, which was
headed by V. N. Chelomey. The P-5 design was based on a new launch method:
directly from the container, with the wing opening in flight. This new launch method
had the potential to double the inventory of missiles on board. Preparation and
launch time was reduced considerably in the P-5 project, and this reduced the
amount of time the ship needed to be on the surface to carry out a launch. The
missile was also distinguished by smaller dimensions than those of other missiles
developed at that time.
Flight tests of the P-5 missile were conducted on the Kapustin Yar range in 1956.
Preparations for tests in the White Sea began in summer 1957. The S-146 diesel
submarine of the Project 613 (Whiskey) class was equipped with cruise missiles for
the tests. When the tests began at the end of 1957, it was clear from the results
obtained that there was no point in continuing the work on competing cruise missile
projects.
At the end of the 1950s the P-5 cruise missiles began to be incorporated into the
Navy. Six Project 613 submarines were converted into cruise missile carriers in
1959-1960. The conversion project was designated Project 644 (Whiskey Twin
Cylinder). The converted ships carried two P-5 missiles each. Another six Project
613 ships were refitted into Project 665 (Whiskey Long Bin) submarines that
carried four cruise missiles each. Construction began on the first three diesel sub-
marines of the new Project 651 (Juliet) class at the Krasnoye Sormovo plant in
Gorky in 1960-1961. These ships were equipped with four P-5 missiles each. Before
1969, 16 missile-armed submarines of the Project 651 class had been built and
equipped with P-5 missiles. In addition, the nuclear-powered submarines of the
Project 659 (Echo I) class, built in Komsomolsk-on-Amur in the beginning of
the 1960s, were also equipped with P-5 cruise missiles. The first ship of this class,
the nuclear-powered K-45 submarine, was incorporated into the Pacific Fleet on 28
June 1961.16 In all, five nuclear-powered submarines of the Project 659 class were
built.
In spite of the success of the program for the construction of submarines armed
with cruise missiles, the latter were inferior to ballistic missiles in terms of range
and accuracy. In addition to their inferiority to ballistic missiles, cruise missiles at
that time could be used only against coastal targets. As a result, the cruise missile
program was already being revamped by the beginning of the 1960s. The OKB-52
began development of a new missile system with a new P-6 cruise missile, based on
the P-50 cruise missile design, for the destruction of multiple and large single naval
surface targets.
The new submarines of the Project 675 (Echo II) class and Project 651 (Juliet)
class were also armed with P-6 antiship cruise missiles. The missile systems on those
submarines were multipurpose systems and facilitated the use of cruise missiles
against naval and coastal targets. Like the missiles of the 0-2 and 0-4 ballistic-
missile systems, the P-5 and P-6 cruise missiles were equipped with nuclear
warheads.
The first-generation submarines armed with ballistic and cruise missiles served in
the Northern and Pacific Fleets. In the beginning they patrolled adjacent and adjoin-
ing seas,17 and the missiles were aimed at large industrial centers in Western Europe.
By the beginning of the 1960s, however, the missile submarines of the Northern
Fleet had begun regular patrols in the Atlantic close to the u.s. coast. By the end
of the 1960s the submarines of the Pacific Fleet also began to go on ocean patrol
regularly.
The work on the first-generation Soviet missile submarines laid the foundation
for the infrastructure of the Soviet naval strategic nuclear forces and for the fun-
damental Soviet principles of the use of naval missiles. The missile submarines
of the first generation remained in service until the second half of the 1980s and
the beginning of the 1990s. As more modern strategic submarines were incorpo-
240 Chapter 5
rated into the Navy, the first-generation ships were converted into platforms for
tests of new missiles and other weapons and hardware. Figure 5.1 shows the main
stages of sea-launched ballistic missile development.
Second-Generation Missile Submarines

The next stage in the development of missile-armed submarines was connected with
the assignment to them of strategic functions. The first step in this direction was
taken by the United States in 1960, when the first U.S. nuclear-powered submarine
with ballistic missiles (SSBN), the George Washington, entered service. The perfor-
mance characteristics of this submarine were obviously superior to the characteris-
tics of the Soviet ships of the Project 658 (Hotel) class. The George Washington
carried 16 Polaris missiles with a range of around 2,200 kilometers. Between 1960
and 1967 the U.S. Navy acquired 41 Polaris submarines.
The Soviet program for the creation of strategic submarines of the second gener-
ation was a response to the Polaris program in the United States. Soviet strategic
missile-armed submarine cruisers (Raketnyi Podvodnyi Kreiser Strategicheskogo
Naznacheniya, or RPKSN)'8 of the Project 667A (Yankee I) class, comparable to
the George Washington in terms of performance, began entering service in 1967,
almost eight years after the U.S. ships. The submarines of the Project 667 A class
were armed with the 0-5 missile system, which included 16 R-27 (SS-N-6) missiles.
The range of the R-27 was 2,400 kilometers, which was more than 1.5 times the
range of the R-21 missiles on the first-generation missile submarines.
The Project 667A series of submarines became the largest series of strategic
submarines built in the Soviet Union. Between 1967 and 1974, 34 of these missile-
armed cruisers were built. After incorporation into the Navy's fleet, the strategic
missile-armed cruisers of the Project 667A class began intensive patrols of the ocean
and the waters near the u.s. coast. Because the patrol areas of the Soviet ships were
in the western Atlantic and the eastern Pacific, the Project 667 A submarines had to
penetrate strong antisubmarine warfare lines. Although the new submarines were
much quieter than those of the first generation, U.S. antisubmarine forces still
managed to track Soviet submarines with relative ease.
The need for Soviet submarines to penetrate ASW lines was eliminated in the early
1970s when the R-29 sea-launched intercontinental missile (the 0-9 missile system,
SS-N-8) was created. The new missile system, which included 12 R-29 missiles, was
deployed on submarines of the Project 667B (Delta I) class. The R-29 had a range
of 7,800 kilometers, and the Project 667B submarines therefore could restrict them-
selves to patrolling the seas adjacent to the Soviet Union and still be within range
1 q<;<; 1000 1 qf)~ 1q70 1q7~ 1000 1qR~ 1 QQO 1qq~ 2000
,-----,-----,-----,-----,-----,-----,-----,-----,----,
~~'~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~::::::::::::::::::::::::~
R-13 (SS-N-4)
R-21 (SS-N 5)
R-11FM R-27 (SS-N 6 Mod 1) ......
R-27U (SS N-6 Mod 2)
RT-15M
=
~~~
R-29 (SS-N-8)
R-31 (SS-N-H)
R-29R(SS-N-18)
R-29RM (SS-N-23)
R-39 (SS-N-20)
1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
c:==::J Research and development _ Operationally deployed

c:==::J Flight tests _ Accepted for service
Figure 5.1
Main stages of development of SLBMs
;::
~
Vo
~
~
~.
~
~
,if
6'
;;
~
""
~
242 Chapter 5
of targets in the United States. So-called bastions, in which the Soviet submarines
operated, were created in the Barents Sea, White Sea, Kara Sea, Sea of Norway,
Okhotsk Sea, and Sea of Japan and in ice-covered regions of the Arctic in the begin-
ning of the 1970s.'9 These bastions were protected by minefields and were patrolled
by attack submarines and, when possible, by surface ships and aircraft. In addition
to the protection, safe and reliable communications with strategic submarines were
also possible in the bastions.
The submarines of the Project 667B class were used to perfect such tactics as
launching missiles from a pier (the first experiments were conducted in 1975),
from the seabed,lO and after surfacing through the ice in the Arctic." The adop-
tion and development of these tactics enhanced the survivability of Soviet
strategic submarines. The increase in the range of the missiles they carried and
the reduction of the detectability of Soviet strategic missile-armed cruisers
turned the submarines into the least vulnerable component of the strategic forces
and rendered the detection and preemptive destruction of all of the strategic missile-
armed submarines on patrol before they could use their weapons virtually
impossible.
In all, 18 submarines of the Project 667B class were built between 1972 and 1977.
Four strategic submarines of the Project 667BD (Delta II) class were built at almost
the same time, and each of those, was equipped with 16 ballistic missiles, in con-
trast to the 667B's 12. While the new submarines were being built, a program was
being conducted for the modernization of the first second-generation strategic
missile-armed cruisers. In particular, the nuclear-powered Project 667A submarines
were equipped with new R-27U missiles with a range of 3,000 kilometers (Project
667AU).
The Soviet Navy thus acquired 56 strategic missile-armed cruisers of three classes
in under 10 years-from 1967 to 1977. Further increase in the number of strate-
gic submarines was limited by the SALT I Treaty, according which the USSR could
have no more than 62 strategic submarines. The number of strategic missiles on
submarines, under the treaty, could not exceed 950.
lbird-Generation Missile Submarines

The next stage in the development of naval strategic missiles and of the next
generation of missile submarines began in the mid-1970s and featured the creation
of MIRVed SLBMs. An important feature of the strategic submarines of this gen-
eration was their significantly lower noise level than that of previous submarines
and their updated hydroacoustic system. Another common feature of these
submarines was their maximum adaptation to the conditions of patrol under the
Arctic ice.
The first strategic missile-armed submarine of the Project 667BDR (Delta III)
class, equipped with the D-9R missile system, which included 16 R-29R (SS-N-18)
missiles, was built in 1976. The range of these missiles, depending on their config-
uration (from three to seven warheads), was 6,500 to 8,000 kilometers. In all, 14
strategic missile-armed cruisers of the Project 667BDR class were built between
1976 and 1982.
The first heavy22 strategic missile-armed cruiser of the Project 941 (Typhoon) class
entered service in the early 1980s. Project 941 submarines, which were the largest
in the world, were armed with 20 solid-propellant R-39 (SS-N-20) missiles with a
range of 10,000 kilometers. Each missile had a launch weight of 84 tons, which
was 2.5 times the weight of the R-29R missile, and could carry up to 10 indepen-
dently targetable warheads. In all, six submarines of the Project 941 class were built
between 1981 and 1989.
The strategic missile submarines of the Project 667BDRM (Delta IV) class, built
at almost the same time as the heavy Project 941 submarines, were a logical exten-
sion of the Project 667 family of submarines with liquid-fuel missiles. The sub-
marines of the Project 667BDRM class were armed with the D-9RM missile system,
which included 16 R-29RM (SS-N-23) missiles. Each missile could carry up to eight
warheads, and with a launch weight that was only a little over half the weight of
the solid-propellant R-39, had the same range as the R-39. Seven missile-armed
submarines of this class were built between 1985 and 1990.
The improvement in the performance characteristics of sea-launched cruise mis-
siles led to their consideration as strategic delivery vehicles in the mid-1970s. During
that time, the United States began equipping its attack submarines of the Los Angeles
class with Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs).
A Soviet missile comparable to Tomahawk cruise missile, the R-55 Granat
(SS-N-21), was developed at the Novator Machine-Building Design Bureau in
Sverdlovsk (Chief Designer L. V. Lyulyev) in 1976-1984.13 This missile could be
launched from a standard 533-millimeter torpedo tube and carry a 100-kiloton
nuclear warhead to ranges of more than 2,500 kilometers. 24 The third-generation
attack submarines (Projects 671RTM, 945A, and 971) and some converted Project
667AT submarines were equipped with the R-55 cruise missiles.25 The Meteorit-
M (SS-N-24) supersonic cruise missile, developed by the Machine-Building
Scientific Production Association was also tested in the USSR in the early 1980s. A
strategic missile submarine, the K-420, was converted according to the Project
244 Chapter 5
667M specifications to test this missile. The converted submarine became the only
ship of the Project 667M class. Although the missile was tested successfully in
December 1983 and a series of submarine launches was scheduled in 1984, the
missile system was not adopted.26 In 1991 the presidents of the United States and
the Soviet Union made unilateral pledges to remove tactical nuclear weapons and
nuclear SLCMs from all their surface ships and submarines. The cruise missiles on
attack submarines are now equipped with conventional warheads.
The Present State of the Ballistic-Missile Submarine Fleet

By the time the START I Treaty was signed in 1991, the Soviet Union had 62
ballistic-missile submarines. The naval strategic nuclear forces included 12 RPKSNs
of the Project 667 AU class, 1 of the Project 667AM class,27 18 of the Project 667B
class, and 4 of the Project 667BD class, as well as a number of third-generation
strategic submarines: 14 ships of the Project 667BDR class, 6 of the Project 941
class, and 7 of the Project 667BDRM class. Compliance with the START I Treaty
should lead to the removal of all strategic submarines of the second generation
from naval service (Projects 667 AU, 667 AM, 667B, and 667BD). It should be noted
that the service life of virtually all of these submarines was scheduled to expire
by 1998-1999 in any event. 2S Table 5.1 lists the number of submarines and
sea-launched missiles that have been deployed by the Soviet Union and Russia.
According to the terms of the START II Treaty, signed by Russia and the United
States in January 1993 but not yet entered onto force, by 2003 both sides would
reduce the number of deployed warheads to 3,000-3,500, and each side would have
no more than 1,750 of its permitted quota of warheads on SLBMs. The START II
Treaty does not require any additional reductions in Russian naval strategic forces
other than those required by START I Treaty. When the treaty was signed, Russia
was expected to have only 23-25 strategic submarines (of the Project 667BDR, 941,
and 667BDRM classes) in service by 2003 if it did not commission any new ships.
The actual rate of decommissioning was much higher than originally anticipated,
however. Although the official number of Russian strategic submarines on 1 January
2001 was 28,29 few were capable of going out on combat patrol. 30
One of the main reasons for the accelerated removal of Russian submarines from
service was the lack of funds for submarine maintenance. Using a submarine for
25-30 years requires an interim overhaul of the ship every 7-8 years. Failure to
perform these interim overhauls reduces the service life of the submarine to 10-15
years. 31 By the middle of 1995 only 20 Russian strategic submarines had kept up
with overhaul schedules, and in 2000 there were only 10 Russian strategic sub-
marines that did not require overhau1. 32
Routine maintenance of the Russian submarine fleet has been precluded by the
absence of the necessary funding. The lead Project 667BORM submarine, for
example, has been in a dock since 1991. 33 The modernization of the first of the
Project 941 ships was never completed for the same reason. The overhaul of the
Project 941 submarines has been complicated by the need to equip them with
the new 0-19UTTH missile system with improved tactical performance character-
istics. Work on this system began at the end of the 1980s, but the lack of funds has
caused delays in this program. In 1998, after four flight tests, all of them unsuc-
cessful, the program was canceled. Meanwhile, the production of the R-39 missiles
for the 0-19 missile system has also been halted. This means that there are not
enough usable solid-propellant missiles to equip all six of the Project 941 submarines
currently in service. 34 If the funding situation does not improve, the Russian Navy
might not have a single Project 941 ship left in service soon." Two heavy strategic
submarines were removed from service in 1995-1996. 36 According to some esti-
mates, at the beginning of 1996 only one of the Project 941 ships was still in
service. 37
The strategic submarines of the Project 667BOR class, which are scheduled to
stay in service until 2007, are unlikely to remain in service after 2003 unless the
funding for overhaul increases. Two of those submarines had already been decom-
missioned by 1999. 38
At the end of 1996 the Northern Machine-Building Enterprise in Severodvinsk
started building the lead strategic missile-armed cruiser of the Project 955 class,
the Yuri Dolgorukii, a fourth-generation missile submarine. The construction was
suspended in 1998, when the R-39UTTH missile program was canceled. Now it
waits for a missile that will replace the canceled R-39UTTH. If construction of
the Project 955 submarines proceeds and the first ship of this class enters service
in 2007-2008, Russia could keep its naval strategic forces at the level of seven
submarines.
The Structure of Naval Strategic Forces
The naval strategic nuclear forces in the Soviet Union and later in Russia never
were a separate branch of the armed forces but rather were a natural part of the
Navy. Moreover, one of the main functions of the Russian Navy as a service is the
Table 5.1
Deployed ballistic-missile submarines, SLBM lalUlchers, and SLBM warheads
Ballistic-missile submarines 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
V-611, AV-611 0
629 7 14 20 22 22 22 22 21 18 16 14 13 12 9 4 2 0
629B 0
629A 9 10 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13
601
605
619
658 7 7 4 4 2 2 2 0
658M 2 4 4 7 7 7 7 7 7
701
667A,667AU 2 12 19 31 33 33 34 34 34 34 34 31
667AM
667B 13 16 18 18 18
667BD 4 4 4 4 4
667BDR 9
667BDRM
941
SALT I-accounta ble 12 19 31 34 36 42 51 55 59 62 62

submarines
Total ballistic-miosile 13 23 31 37 37 37 37 37 39 41 45 52 62 64 66 71 80 83 85 87 85
submarines
Ballistic-missile submarines 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
V-611, AV-611
629
629B
629A 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 12 12 0
601 0
605 0
619 0
658
658M 4 2 2 0
701 0
667A,667AU 27 24 24 23 22 20 19 18 17 14 12 7 7 7 2 0
667AM 0
667B 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 16 12 12 12 4 4
667BD 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 0
667BDR 12 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 13 13 12 12 12 11 11
667BDRM 2 2 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
941 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
SALT I-accountable 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 61 56 56 56 48 40 38 38 32 26 26
submarines
Total ballistic-missile 84 83 83 83 83 83 82 79 76 70 62 56 56 56 48 40 38 38 32 26 26
submarines
SLBM la unchers 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 196 5 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 19n 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
V-611, R-llFM 2 2 10 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 10 2
AV-611
629 R-llFM 9 9 9 9 9
629 R-13 12 33 51 57 57 60 60 57 54 48 42 39 36 27 24 18 18 12 9
629B R-21 2 2 2 2 2 2
629A R-21 15 18 24 27 30 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39
601 R-29
605 R-27K 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
619 R-39
658 R-13 9 15 24 21 21 18 12 12
658M R-21 12 12 18 18 18 21 21 21 21 21 21 18 18 18
701 R-39
667A, R-27, 16 32 96 192 304 496 528 528 544 544 544 544 544 496
667AU R-27U
667AM R-31 12
667B R-29, 12 12 36 96 156 192 216 216 216

R-29D
667BD R-29D 16 64 64 64 64 64
667BDR R-29R 16 16 48 96 144
667BDRM R-29RM 16
941 R-39 20
SALT I-accountabl e SLBM 96 192 304 496 540 564 640 764 816 872 920 920
launchers
SALT II-accountable SLBM 954
launchers
MIRVed SLBM la unchers 16 48 96 144
Tot al SLBM launchers 2 10 12 33 63 87 104 104 104 104 104 143 196 288 400 591 633 658 734 858 905 955 1,000 994
SLBM la unch ers 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 200J
V-611, R-llFM 2
AV-611
629 R 11FM
629 R 13
629B R-21 2
629A R-21 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 36 36 18
601 R 29
605 R27K 4 4
619 R 39
658 R 13
658M R 21 18 18 18 18 18 18 15 12
701 R 39
667A, R-27, 16 432 384 384 368 352 320 304 288 272 224 192 112 112 112 36
667AU R-27U
667AM R-31 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
667B R-29, 12 216 216 216 216 216 216 216 216 216 216 216 216 216 216 192 144 144 144 96 48 48
R29D
667BD R-29D 16 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 48 48 16
667BDR R-29R 16 192 224 224 224 224 224 224 224 224 224 224 224 224 224 208 208 192 192 192 176 176
667BDRM R-29RM 16 16 32 32 48 80 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112
941 R 39 20 20 20 40 60 80 80 100 100 120 120 120 120 120 120 80 80 80 80 80 80
SALT I-accountable SLBM

launchers
SALT II-accountable SLBM 950 950 950 954 958 962 959 954 942 946 931 848
launchers
MIRVed SLBM la unchers 192 244 244 264 284 320 336 356 372 424 456 456 456 456 440 400 384 384 384 368 368
Total SLBM launchers 989 989 989 993 997 1,001 998 990 978 964 931 848 848 848 732 608 576 576 496 416 416
SLBM warheads 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 19n 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
V-611, R-llFM 2 2 10 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 10 2
AV-611
629 R-llFM 9 9 9 9 9
629 R-13 12 33 51 57 57 60 60 57 54 48 42 39 36 27 24 18 18 12 9
629B R-21 2 2 2 2 2 2
629A R-21 15 18 24 27 30 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39
601 R-29
605 R-27K 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
619 R-39
658 R-13 9 15 24 21 21 18 12 12
658M R-21 12 12 18 18 18 21 21 21 21 21 21 18 18 18
701 R-39
667A, R-27 16 32 96 192 304 496 528 528 544 544 544 544 544 596
667AU
667AM R-31 12
667B R-29, 12 12 36 96 156 192 216 216 216
R-29D
667BD R-29D 16 64 64 64 64 64
667BDR R-29R 16 48 144 288 432
667BDRM R-29RM 16 4
941 R-39 20 10
MIRVed SLBM warheads 48 144 288 432

Total warheads 2 10 12 33 63 87 104 104 104 104 104 143 196 288 400 591 633 658 734 858 937 1,051 1,192 1,282
SLBM warhea ds 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 200J
V-611, R-llFM 2
AV-611
629 R-llFM
629 R-13
629B R-21 2
629A R-21 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 36 36 18
601 R-29
605 R-27K 4 4
619 R-39
658 R-13
658M R-21 18 18 18 18 18 18 15 12
701 R-39
667A, R-27 16 432 384 384 368 352 320 304 288 224 192 112 112 112 36
667AU
667AM R-31 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
667B R-29, 12 216 216 216 216 216 216 216 216 216 216 216 216 216 216 192 144 144 144 96 48 48
R-29D
667BD R-29D 16 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 48 48 16
667BDR R-29R 16 576 6n 6n 6n 6n 6n 6n 6n 6n 6n 6n 6n 6n 6n 624 624 576 576 576 528 528
667BDRM R-29RM 16 4 64 128 128 192 320 448 448 448 448 448 448 448 448 448 448 448
941 R-39 20 10 200 200 400 600 800 800 1,000 1,000 1,200 1,200 1,200 1,200 1,200 1,200 800 800 800 800 800 800
MIRVed SLBM warheads 576 8n 872 1,072 1,272 1,536 1,600 1,800 1,864 2,192 2,320 2,320 2,320 2,320 2,272 1,872 1,824 1,824 1,824 1,776 1,776
Total warh eads 1,373 1,617 1,617 1,801 1,985 2,217 2;262 2,434 2,470 2,732 2,795 2,712 2,712 2,712 2,564 2,080 2,016 2,016 1,936 1,824 1,824
No te: From Rob ert S. Norris and Thomas B. Cochran, U.S.-USSRIRu.ssian Strategic Offensive Nuclear Force.s (NRDC, 1997), pp. 26-30, The START Treaty Memorandum of Understa nding Data.
252 Chapter 5
support of operations of strategic missile-armed submarines. In accordance

with this, the Navy is divided into combat, command and control, support, and
service subsystems. 39 The combat subsystem includes the ballistic-missile submarines
with their ballistic missiles. The command and control subsystem consists of a
group of stations and equipment for the transmission of commands to missile-armed
submarines. The support subsystem includes surface ships, attack submarines,
aircraft, reconnaissance systems, and other equipment enabling strategic submarines
to resist the enemy. The service subsystem is a diversified infrastructure of facili-
ties that provide the strategic submarines and their weapons with the necessary
maintenance.
The Structure of the Navy

The Navy is one of the four branches of the armed forces of the Russian Federa-
tion. It includes the Northern, Pacific, Baltic, and Black Sea Fleets and the Caspian
Flotilla, as well as other subdivisions. The naval forces are under the direct juris-
diction of the commander-in-chief of the Navy, who is also the deputy minister of
defense. 4o
The Main Staff of the Navy, subordinated directly to the commander-in-chief of
the Navy, is responsible for the planning of naval operations and determining
long-term Navy development plans. The main branches of the Main Staff of the
Navy are the operations, intelligence, mobilization, communications, antisubmarine
warfare, air defense, and radio-electronic warfare directorates. 41 The chief of the
Main Staff of the Navy is the first deputy commander-in-chief of the Navy.
The other deputies of the commander-in chief of the Navy are the following:
the first deputy commander-in-chief of the Navy
the deputy commander-in-chief of the Navy for armaments, who is also the chief
of shipbuilding, armaments, and naval operations. The deputy commander-in-chief
of the Navy for armaments has jurisdiction over the Main Technical Directorate of
the Navy, the Main Shipbuilding Directorate of the Navy, the Naval Missile and
Artillery Directorate, the Naval Antisubmarine Warfare Directorate, and the Naval
Radio-Technical Directorate and other directorates and services42
• the deputy commander-in-chief of the Navy for combat training, who is also the
chief of the Naval Combat Training Directorate
• the deputy commander-in-chief of the Navy for rear services, who is also the chief
of the Naval Rear Services Directorate
In addition, the commander-in-chief of the Navy has direct jurisdiction over the
commanders of the Northern, Pacific, Black Sea, and Baltic Fleets and the Caspian
Flotilla, the commanders of naval aviation, and the commander of the naval
infantry.
The command structure of the fleets is comparable in many respects to that of
the Navy as a whole. The fleets are made up of flotillas, squadrons, naval bases,
brigades, and separate divisions.
The Combat Subsystem of Naval Strategic Forces

Strategic missile submarines are organized into divisions of ships of the same class
(a division usually consists of up to eight submarines). Larger units-flotillas-
consist of one or more divisions of strategic missile submarines. A flotilla can
also include attack submarine divisions." At the beginning of 2001 the Russian
Navy based its strategic submarines with the Northern Fleet and with the Pacific
Fleet. Figure 5.2 shows locations of the main bases of the Russian strategic naval
fleet.
The Northern Fleet had a division of heavy strategic missile-armed cruisers of
the Project 941 (Typhoon) class belonging to the First Nuclear Submarine Flotilla
(based at Nerpichya)44 and two divisions of Project 667BDRM and 667BDR sub-
marines belonging to the Third Nuclear Submarine Flotilla (based at Yagelnaya).45
The remaining strategic submarines of the Project 667B (Delta I) class, which are
being decommissioned but are still covered under START I treaty, were in a sepa-
rate division located at Ostrovnoy.
The Pacific Fleet had two divisions of Project 667B (Delta I) and Project 667BDR
(Delta III) strategic missile-armed cruisers belonging to the submarine flotilla based
in Rybachiy on the Kamchatka peninsula. A separate division of strategic sub-
marines, located in Pavlovskogo Bay, included Project 667B (Delta I) ships.
The expiration of the service life of second-generation submarines (Projects 667B
and 667BD) and the START I reductions will considerably reduce the combat sub-
system of the Russian naval strategic forces. As a result, in the next decade the
Russian naval strategic forces probably will have no more than three divisions of
strategic missile submarines, two in the Northern Fleet and one in the Pacific. With
the decommissioning of 667BDR submarines in 2003-2005, the Pacific Fleet will
be left without strategic missile submarines, so all strategic submarine operations
will most likely be concentrated in the Northern Fleet.
The Command and Control of Naval Strategic Forces

There is a distinction between the operational and administrative command and
control of strategic submarines. Matters connected with combat training and
N
~D Co
"'"
~
Severomorsk
Gremikha
o
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Q
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.~ I
Rybachiy
I
/
V
Pavlovskoye
MIssile submarine bases
o Former missile submarine bases
1:1: Northern and Pacific Fleet headquarters
• Test site
D SLBM arsenals
Figure 5.2
Main strategic naval fleet bases
material and technical supplies are completely within the jurisdiction of the fleets
and are handled by the appropriate directorates and services.
Operational command and control is practiced when strategic submarines are on
combat patrol in an assigned area or are on combat duty in their home base, as
well as at times of crisis. During these periods the commanding officer of a strate-
gic missile-armed cruiser is under the direct jurisdiction of the commander-in-chief
of the Navy (through the Main Staff of the Navy). The commander-in-chief directs
the combat operations of strategic missile submarines in accordance with the oper-
ational plan of the General Staff. The targets of a nuclear strike and the support
facilities for a nuclear strike (as well as the number of strategic missile-armed cruis-
ers on combat patrol in assigned regions and on combat duty in ports) are defined
by the General Staff, which also transmits the order of the Supreme High Command
to use nuclear weapons. 46
The Support of Naval Strategic Forces Operations

The support of naval strategic forces operations in combat includes the following
measures:47
• safeguarding of the security of strategic missile-armed cruisers in transit and in
combat patrol areas
• operations to find enemy ships and divert and remove them from the strategic sub-
marines' patrol areas
• protection of strategic missile-armed cruisers in ports from attacks from the air,
sea, and land and from acts of sabotage
These functions are performed in conjunction with other naval operations and
involve virtually all combat forces of the Navy. Measures taken to protect strategic
submarines are primarily intended to enhance their survivability and increase the
effectiveness of naval strategic forces in an armed conflict. The focal point of these
measures is antisubmarine defense on strategic missile-armed cruiser patrol routes
and in patrol areas.
In a crisis the Russian Naval Forces would be expected to perform several offen-
sive operations to debilitate the enemy: in particular, threats to the enemy's aircraft
carrier groups, maritime communication lines, shore facilities, and strategic sub-
marines. Attack submarines would be expected to play the central role in the per-
formance of these functions. Such actions, which would be taken simultaneously in
various parts of the world's oceans, would be intended to divert the antisubmarine
forces and weapons of the adversary and thereby reduce the threat to Russian
256 Chapter 5
strategic missile-armed cruisers. In addition, naval forces would conduct search and
destroy operations against enemy attack submarines in the patrol areas of Russian
strategic missile-armed cruisers.48
Among the most important tasks assigned to the Navy is the protection of strate-
gic missile submarines in ports. This is a particularly important Navy function,
because during peacetime most Russian strategic submarines are in ports. The bases
of strategic submarines are defended against aircraft and cruise missiles by naval air
defense units. The Russian coast guard (the naval infantry and coastal rocket and
artillery troops) defends the bases against amphibious landings and attacks from
land.
The Northern Fleet

The bases of the Russian Navy's largest fleet, the Northern Fleet, are on the Kola
peninsula and the coast of the White Sea. The Northern Fleet has about 30 large
military garrisons. 49 Its main naval bases are Severomorsk (where the fleet's head-
quarters are located), Zapadnaya Litsa Inlet, Ara Inlet, Ura Inlet, Sayda Inlet,
Gremikha, Polyarnyy, and Pechenga. 50
Units of the Northern Fleet The largest surface ship units of the Northern Fleet
are its operational squadron, which includes the surface ships of the oceanic zone,
and the Kola Flotilla.
The division of the Northern Fleet made up of Project 941 strategic submarines
belongs to the First Nuclear Submarine Flotilla. The First Flotilla also includes divi-
sions made up of attack submarines of the Project 949A (Oscar II), 949 (Oscar I),
671RTM (Victor III), 645 and 645A (Sierra 1/11), and 670M (Charlie II) classes.51
The Project 941 heavy strategic missile-armed cruiser division, which includes all
six ships of that class, is based in Nerpichya Bay, approximately 10 kilometers from
Zapadnaya Litsa Inlet.
The Third Nuclear Submarine Flotilla of the Northern Fleet consists of two strate-
gic submarine divisions: One has Project 667BDR (Delta III) and 667BD (Delta II)
submarines,52 and the other consists of seven Project 667BDRM (Delta IV) ships.
Both divisions are based in Yagelnaya Bay in Sayda Inlet. 53 The Third Flotilla also
includes a division of Project 971 (Akula) nuclear-powered attack submarines. 54
The submarine division based in Gremikha comprises Project 667B (Delta I)
strategic submarines as well as Project 671 (Victor I) nuclear-powered attack sub-
marines. 55 All of these ships are being removed from service, so the division will be
dissolved.
Northern Fleet Bases

Zapadnaya Litsa Zapadnaya Litsa was the first Soviet naval base to have nuclear-
powered submarines, which were first stationed there in 1958. Construction of
facilities and installations for the servicing of nuclear-powered submarines began
in Zapadnaya Litsa Inlet in the late 1950s.
The 31st Division of Project 658 (Hotel) class missile submarines was formed in
Zapadnaya Litsa in 1961. The division was moved to Sayda Inlet in 1964, and
Zapadnaya Litsa has been used as an attack submarine base since then. 56 Missile
submarines returned to Zapadnaya Litsa at the end of the 1970s, when the Project
658M ships were moved there from Gremikha. The Project 941 (Typhoon) heavy
missile-armed submarines that were being incorporated into the naval strategic
forces began to be based in Zapadnaya Litsa in the early 1980s. 57
The Zapadnaya Litsa facilities are located in Malaya Lopatka, Bolshaya Lopatka,
and Nerpichya Bays, on the eastern side of the inlet, and in Andreyev Inlet on the
western side. 58 The city of Zapadnaya Litsa is south of Bolshaya Lopatka Bay.59
Strategic submarines of the Project 941 class are based in Nerpichya Bay. Bolshaya
Lopatka Bay, a nuclear attack submarine base, is located approximately two kilo-
meters north of Nerpichya. A floating repair facility is based in Malaya Lopatka Bay,
one kilometer north of Bolshaya Lopatka. 60 A nuclear reactor refueling base and a
temporary storage site for spent nuclear fuel are located in Andreyev Inlet. 61
Sayda Inlet Sayda Inlet is located on the western side of the Kola Gulf. It is 10
kilometers long and between 2 and 3 kilometers wide. Strategic missile-armed
submarines are based in Yagelnaya Bay, in the southern part of the entrance to
Sayda Inlet. 62 The entrance to the bay is partially blocked by two islands, Ploskiy
and Yagelnyi. The city of Gadzhiyevo is located on the shores of Yagelnaya
Bay.63
Yagelnaya is the Northern Fleet's largest strategic submarine base. The 18th
Division of Project 629 (Golf I) missile submarines was formed here in the late
1950s. Missile submarines of the Project 658 (Hotel) class have been based in Yagel-
naya since 1964, and Project 667A (Yankee I) strategic missile-armed cruisers began
arriving in the bay in 1967. In the middle of the 1970s, when the deployment of
the Soviet nuclear submarine fleet reached its peak, there were three divisions of
strategic submarines of the first and second generations in Yagelnaya Bay.64 Shelters
designed for the protection of submarines and for ship repair services and capable
of accommodating two strategic submarines have been built in the cliffs on the shore
of the bay.
258 Chapter 5
Gremikha Gremikha65 is located on the Kola peninsula at the mouth of the

Yokanga River, which flows into the Barents Sea, and is approximately 300 kilo-
meters southeast of Murmansk. 66 The city is connected to the outside world only
by a sea lane. The Ostrovnoy strategic submarine base is in the western part of the
city. Witte (Bezymyannyi) Island closes the bay off from the north, leaving a passage
only one kilometer wideP
Strategic submarines arrived in Gremikha in 1970, when the division of Project
658M missile submarines was transferred there. 68 Gremikha has also been the base
of the Project 667B (Delta I) strategic missile-armed submarines, which served as
the basis for a division stationed there, since 1974.69 The submarines have been
decommissioned, and the division has been dissolved.
Other Bases Dock inspections of the Northern Fleet's strategic missile-armed cruis-
ers are conducted at Naval Ship Repair Plant 82 in Roslyakovo (south of Severo-
morsk on the shore of the Kola Gulf)Jo Minor repairs of strategic submarines are
handled by floating repair shops and enterprises of the shipbuilding industry: the Sev-
mashpredpriyatiye Production Association and Zvezdochka Scientific Production
Association in Severodvinsk and the Nerpa Ship Repair Plant in Snezhnogorsk. 71
A liquid-propellant strategic missile loading station is located in Okolnaya Inlet
in the Kola Gulf (south of Severomorsk), and a similar station for solid-propellant
missiles is located in Nenoksa (near Severodvinsk). The main arsenal of sea-
launched strategic missiles is in Revda (approximately 150 kilometers southeast of
Murmansk).
The Pacific Fleet

The second largest fleet in Russia is deployed in Primorsky Kray and on the Kam-
chatka peninsula, in the Kuril Islands, and on Sakhalin Island. The main naval bases
are Vladivostok (where the fleet has its headquarters), Petropavlovsk-Kamchatski,
Sovetskaya Gavan, Pavlovskoye, Zavety Ilyicha, Olga, Vladimir, and Korsakov.72
Units and Bases of the Pacific Fleet The largest operational units of the Pacific
Fleet are the operational squadron and the Kamchatka and Primorskaya Flotillas.
In mid-1990s the operational squadron had 25 oceanic surface ships, including
missile-armed cruisers, large ASW ships, destroyers, and amphibious warfare ships.
The squadron is based in Abrek Bay (at Strelok Gulf).73
The strategic missile-armed submarines of the Pacific Fleet belong to the Kam-
chatka Flotilla and to a separate submarine division (based in Primorsky Kray).
By the beginning of the 1990s the Kamchatka Flotilla had two strategic submarine
divisions, one consisting of nine Project 667BDR ships, and the second consisting
of Project 667A and 667B submarines. By the end of 1996, eight of the Project 667B
submarines had been decommissioned in compliance with the START I reductions
and in connection with the end of their service life.14 The flotilla also has divisions
with Project 949A (Oscar II), 971 (Akula), and probably 671RTM (Victor III)
nuclear-powered attack submarines.75 The flotilla is based in Rybachiy on the
shore of Krasheninnikov Bay, 15 kilometers southwest of Petropavlovsk-
Kamchatski opposite Avachinskaya Inlet. 76
The Pacific Fleet's nuclear submarine division, based in Primorsky Kray, consists
mainly of ships scheduled for removal (or already removed) from service. The divi-
sion probably will be converted into an elimination facility in the near future. The
division is based in Pavlovskogo Bay, approximately 65 kilometers from Vladivos-
tok on the east coast of the Strelok Gulf.77
The servicing areas for the Pacific Fleet's strategic missile-armed ships are located
on the Kamchatka peninsula and in Primorsky Kray. Several facilities were built on
the shores of Avachinskaya Inlet. One of them, Gornyak Ship Repair Plant No. 30,
is on the west (inner) shore of the inlet, close to the city of Primorsky (Petropavlovsk-
50).1 8 The plant repairs submarines and refuels their reactors. A radioactive waste
storage site is located north of the Gornyak plant."
Submarine servicing areas in Primorsky Kray are located on the shore of Chazhma
Bay on the Shkotovo peninsula. The Navy Ship Repair Plant, located there, repairs
ships and fuels submarine reactors. SO Installation 927-III at the southwestern tip of
the peninsula is a storage site for radioactive waste (including highly active waste).
The spent nuclear fuel of submarine reactors is also stored there prior to being
shipped to the processing plant. s1
One of the largest ship repair plants, the Zvezda plant, is located in Bolshoy
Kamen, 35 kilometers from Vladivostok on the western side of the Shkotovo penin-
sula. The plant handles ship repairs, submarine dismantlement, and reactor refuel-
ing. The nearby Vostok Shipbuilding Plant was used to complete the construction
work on ships built and launched at the Leninskiy Komsomol Shipbuilding Plant
in Komsomolsk-on-Amur.82
Strategic Missile Submarines and Sea-Launched Ballistic Missiles
Development of Missile Submarines and Their Weapons

All of the strategic submarines in the Russian naval inventory today were built
before 1992-that is, before the breakup of the Soviet Union. Hundreds of
260 Chapter 5
institutes, design bureaus, and enterprises, making up a huge industrial complex

that took shape over several decades in the Soviet Union, participated in the cre-
ation of the Soviet fleet of strategic submarines.
The key roles in the creation of the missile submarines and their weapons were
played by the Navy, the Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry, and the Ministry
of General Machine Building. The Navy drew up the specifications for strategic
submarines and their weapons and oversaw their development. The Ministry of
Shipbuilding Industry was responsible for the development and construction of
strategic missile-armed cruisers, as well as the production of mines and torpedoes,
electromechanical and hydroacoustic equipment, and some of the radio-technical
equipment for submarines. The Ministry of General Machine Building had juris-
diction over the development of ballistic missiles for submarines.
Other ministries and departments also participated in the development of strate-
gic missile submarines. Among the most important ones was the Ministry of
Medium Machine Building, which was in charge of the development and produc-
tion of nuclear warheads and nuclear reactors for submarines. The Ministries of
Radio Industry, Communication Equipment Industry, Instrument Building, and the
Electronics Industry participated in the creation of radio-technical and navigation
equipment and communication systems.
The central link of the weapons development system that existed in the Soviet
Union, the Military-Industrial Commission of the USSR Council of Ministers (VPK),
was dissolved after the breakup of the Soviet Union, and its functions were trans-
ferred to the Council of Ministers, the Ministry of Defense, the State Committee for
the Defense Industry, and individual enterprises. The absence of centralized control,
the considerable reduction of appropriations for research and experimental design
projects and for purchases of combat equipment, and the chronic delays in the
payment of defense enterprises that accompanied the dissolution of this central
link in the system disrupted the normal operations of the existing system for the
development and production of strategic submarines and their weapons.
In spite of the shipbuilding industry's present difficulties, Russia is still building
submarines. In particula~ Project 971 (Akula) and Project 949A (Oscar II) nuclear
submarines and Project 887 (Kilo) diesel-powered submarines were incorporated
into the Navy in 1992-1996. Sevmashpredpriyatiye in Severodvinsk is building
Project 885-class fourth-generation attack submarines (work on the lead ship of
this class, the Severodvinsk, began at the end of 1993). The start of construction
work on the lead ship of the Project 955 class, the Yuri Dolgorukii, was ordered in
1995, and work on the hull began in 1996,83 though construction has since been
halted.
Navy Participation in Strategic Missile Submarine Development The process of

developing and building strategic missile-armed submarines (and other warships) is
coordinated by the Main Shipbuilding Directorate of the Navy (GUK).84 After the
ships have been put in service, the Main Technical Directorate of the Navy (GTU)
is responsible for their maintenance (including the maintenance of their nuclear
propulsion plants) and repair. 85 The Navy shipbuilding plants that perform in-dock
maintenance and minor repairs are subordinated to the Main Shipbuilding Plant
Directorate of the Navy.86 The Navy coordinates its work on ship repair and
maintenance with the shipbuilding industry.
Other directorates of the Navy that take part in development of strategic sub-
marines and their weapons and other equipment are 87
• the Naval Missile and Artillery Directorate: responsible for the development,
production, and maintenance of ballistic missiles on submarines
• the Naval Antisubmarine Warfare Directorate (formerly the Mine and
Torpedo Directorate): responsible for the development and creation of mines and
torpedoes 88
• the Naval Communications Directorate: responsible for communication systems 89
• the Naval Radio-Technical Equipment Directorate: responsible for the radar,
hydroacoustic, and nonacoustic equipment of submarines
In addition, the Main Navigation and Oceanography Directorate of the Ministry
of Defense is in charge of developing navigation equipment for submarines. 90
The maintenance of naval nuclear munitions is under the jurisdiction of the Sixth
Directorate of the Navy, subordinate to the commander in chief of the Navy and
the 12th Main Directorate of the Ministry of Defense.
Most Navy directorates have scientific research institutes under their jurisdiction.
These research institutes are in charge of the development and production of various
weapons. The head institute of the Main Shipbuilding Directorate is the Central
Scientific Research Institute for Military Shipbuilding (TsNII-1),91 the head institute
of the Missile and Artillery Directorate and Antisubmarine Warfare Directorate is
the Navy Central Research Institute for Armaments, and the head institute of the
Radio-Technical Equipment Directorate is the Navy Central Research Institute for
Radio-Technical Armaments.92 All of these institutes are located in SI. Petersburg.
The functions of the naval scientific research institutes include the compilation of
262 Chapter 5
tactical performance specifications for new weapons systems and the oversight of
their development and production.
Strategic Submarine Design In the Soviet Union all submarine development and
construction was coordinated by the First Main Production Directorate of the
Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry.93 All Soviet ballistic-missile submarines were
designed by two design bureaus: Central Design Bureau No. 16 (TsKB-16) (the
Volna Central Design Bureau after 1966 and part of the Malakhit Naval Machine-
Building Bureau after 1974) and Central Design Bureau No. 18 (TsKB-18) (now
the Rubin Central Design Bureau of Naval Equipment, or Rubin TsKB MT).94 The
design for the first missile submarine, the B-67 of the Project V-611 (Zulu IV 1/2)
class, was drawn up in Leningrad in Central Design Bureau No. 16. Later, in
1956-1958, the same bureau designed the Project 629 (Golf) missile-armed diesel
submarine. After completing that project, Central Design Bureau No. 16 concen-
trated on the modernization of submarines for the testing of new systems with
ballistic missiles,95 and the development of strategic submarines was transferred to
Central Design Bureau No. 18. In October 1966 Central Design Bureau No. 18 was
renamed the Rubin Leningrad Design and Installation Bureau (LPMB), and in
September 1989 the enterprise acquired its current name.
Central Design Bureau No. 18/the Rubin Central Design Bureau of Naval Equip-
ment was the main organization designing submarines for almost the entire history
of Soviet submarine development. In the first postwar years Central Design Bureau
No. 18 developed the Project 611 (Zulu), Project 613 (Whiskey), and Project 615
(Quebec) submarines. It also began development of air-independent propulsion sub-
marines of the Project A615 (Quebec) and Project 617 (Whale) classes. In the 1950s
the bureau developed the first Soviet cruise-missile submarines: the prototype Project
644 (Whiskey Twin Cylinder) and the Project 651 (Juliet).
In September 1956 the bureau began developing the first nuclear-powered sub-
marines of the Project 658 (Hotel) class with ballistic missiles and Project 659 (Echo
I) class with cruise missiles. These successful projects were continued in the 1960s.
It was asked to design the Project 675 (Echo II) cruise missile submarine and the
strategic submarines of the second generation: Project 667A (Yankee), Project 667B
(Delta I), and Project 667BD (Delta II). Central Design Bureau No. 18 became a
"monopolist" in the design of strategic submarines and its successor, the Rubin
Central Design Bureau, is still one today.
In the 1970s the Rubin Central Design Bureau developed the strategic
missile-armed submarines of the Project 667BDR (Delta III), Project 941 (Typhoon),
and Project 667BDRM (Delta IV) classes, the Project 949 (Oscar) cruise missile sub-
marine, and the titanium hull Project 685 Plavnik (Mike) attack submarine." In
the 1980s the Rubin Central Design Bureau completed development of the Project
949A (Oscar II) cruise missile submarine and the fourth-generation ballistic-missile
submarine of the Yuri Dolgorukii class. 97
P. P. Pustyntsev headed Central Design Bureau No. 18 from December 1951 to
1974. I. D. Spasskiy has occupied the position of general director of the Rubin
Central Design Bureau from March 1974 to the present. All ballistic-missile sub-
marine projects were supervised by Chief Designer S. N. Kovalev. 98
Although most of the work of designing strategic submarines was concentrated
in the Rubin Central Design Bureau, other institutes of the Ministry of Ship-
building Industry also participated in their development. In particular, the ministry's
head scientific research institute, the A. N. Krylov Central Scientific Research Insti-
tute, played a significant role. Its functions included scientific and technical evalu-
ations of the tactical performance specifications the Navy drew up for submarines.
The institute is also the country's leading scientific organization in several fields of
shipbuilding: the maneuverability, noise level, and durability of submarines and
their protection from electromagnetic fields. 99 Systems for the manual and automatic
control of missile submarines were developed in the Avrora Scientific Production
Association in Leningrad. 10o
Strategic Submarine Production The production of RPKSNs was concentrated at

two shipbuilding plants: Plant 402 (now the Northern Machine-Building Enterprise
Production Association, or PO Sevmashpredpriyatiye) in Severodvinsk (Molotovsk
until 1957) and Plant 199 (the Leninskiy Komsomol Shipbuilding Plant, also
known as the Amur Shipbuilding Plant) in Komsomolsk-on-Amur. '01 Figure 5.3
shows locations of the main research, design, and production facilities involved
in the development and production of strategic submarines and sea-launched
missiles.
The Northern Machine-Building Enterprise Production Association (Plant 402)
The Northern Machine-Building Enterprise Production Association (Sevmashpred-
priyatiye) is the largest Russian enterprise producing nuclear submarines, and in the
future it will be the only one. The decision to establish Shipbuilding Plant 402 at
the mouth of the Northern Dvina was made in May 1936.102 The plant had begun
building battleships and submarines even before the start of the war.
The first diesel-powered submarine of Project 611 (Zulu) class, produced by Plant
402, was launched in Molotovsk in 1953. In all, the plant built 18 of the Project
N
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~
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Co
Bolshoi Kamen
Figure 5.3
Locations of the main submarine and SLBM development, production, and maintenance facilities
611 and AV-611 (Zulu V) ships and 16 missile-armed submarines of Project 629
and 629B (Golf) classes. In the early 1960s the Severodvinsk plant started building
only nuclear-powered ships. The keel of the first Soviet nuclear-powered submarine,
the K-3 of the Project 627 (November) class, was laid at the plant in 1954, and the
submarine was completed in 1958. The plant built all 13 ships of the Project 627
and 627A (November) classes. This was followed, after a brief delay, by the con-
struction of two other classes of nuclear-powered submarines, the Project 658
(Hotel) with ballistic missiles and the Project 675 (Echo II) with cruise missiles, and
by an experimental attack submarine with a liquid-metal reactor (the Project 645).
The Severodvinsk plant subsequently became the main plant of the two that were
building strategic submarines at that time. It built all ships of the Project 667 class
and the heavy strategic missile-armed cruiser of the Project 941 (Typhoon) class.
The titanium hull nuclear-powered submarines of Project 661 (Papa), Project 705
(Alfa), and Project 685 (Mike) class were also built in Severodvinsk. In addition to
this, nuclear-powered submarines that were built at plants in Leningrad and Gorky
were moved through a system of rivers and canals to Severodvinsk for the comple-
tion of construction work and for tests. In all, 157 submarines, including 123
nuclear-powered submarines, were built at Sevmashpredpriyatiye between 1956 and
1994.'03
The Severodvinsk plant is now building, at the rate of one or two submarines a
year,104 the Project 949A (Oscar) class cruise missile submarines and the nuclear-
powered attack submarines of the Project 971 (Akula) class. At the end of 1993 the
plant began working on the first fourth-generation attack submarine, the Severod-
vinsk, and in November 1996 it began building the lead strategic missile-armed
cruiser of the new generation, the Yuri Dolgorukii.
The Amur Shipbuilding Plant (Plant 199) The decision to build Plant 199 (Lenin-
skiy Komsomol Plant, Amur Shipbuilding Plant) in Komsomolsk-on-Amur was
made in 1931. The plant was expected to build ships for the Pacific Fleet. Although
the construction work on the plant was not completed until after World War II, it
was already building submarines of the Leninets class and the lead destroyer of the
Project 38 class in the mid-1930s. During World War II Plant 199 provided the
Navy with two Project 26-bis cruisers and five destroyers of the Project 7 class. ' °S
In 1945-1957 the plant built destroyers, patrol escort ships, and large ASW ships,
and in 1954-1957 it built 11 submarines of the Project 613 (Whiskey) class. The
Navy commissioned seven missile-armed submarines of the Project 629 (Golf) class
in Komsomolsk-on-Amur between 1959 and 1962. At the end of the 1950s Plant
266 Chapter 5
199 became the second Soviet enterprise to build nuclear-powered submarines. It

built Project 659 (Echo I) and Project 675 (Echo II) cruise-missile submarines. In
the 1960s and 1970s the plant also built strategic missile-armed submarines of the
Project 667A (Yankee) and Project 667B (Delta I) class. The Project 667B ships were
the last strategic missile-armed cruiser class built in Komsomolsk-on-Amur, as the
Amur River proved too shallow to accommodate heavier ships bound for the bases
of the Pacific Fleet. In the middle of the 1970s the plant was converted for the pro-
duction of nuclear-powered attack submarines and diesel submarines. The ships of
the Project 671RTM (Victor III), Project 971 (Akula), and Project 877 classes were
built there. Although the plant is still working on the nuclear-powered submarines
the keels of which were laid before 1990, it probably will not be building any more
in the future. 106
Sea-Launched Ballistic Missiles Ballistic missiles for submarines of the first

generation-the R-11FM and R-13-were designed in OKB-1 NII-88 under the
supervision of S. P. Korolev. In August 1955 the work on the R-11FM missile was
transferred to the SKB-385 Special Design Bureau in Zlatoust,'07 (which was headed
by V. P. Makeyev as of June of that year.) SKB-385 was made responsible for design
documents, experimental adjustments, and flight tests.
In 1959 SKB-385 moved to Miass in Chelyabinsk oblast. It was renamed the
Machine-Building Design Bureau (KBM) in the middle of the 1960s and was later
named the V. P. Makeyev Machine-Building Design Bureau State Missile Center in
1993. Almost all the ballistic missiles used by the Soviet Navy were developed at
that enterprise, and the design bureau became the head enterprise of the Ministry
of General Machine Building designing sea-launched ballistic missiles. The V. P.
Makeyev Machine-Building Design Bureau is now the only enterprise in Russia
developing SLBMs.
Other design bureaus also participated in the creation of the first missiles with
underwater launch capabilities: OKB-10 NII-88 (Chief Designer Yeo V. Charnko)
and OKB-586 (Chief Designer M. K. Yange!).
At the end of the 1950s Central Design Bureau No.7 (now the Arsenal Design
Bureau) in Leningrad was involved in the work on the SLBMs. Prior to that it had
designed artillery weapons for ships and land-based missile systems. The solid-
propellant R-31 missile (0-11 system) was developed in Central Design Bureau
No.7, headed by Chief Designer P. A. Tyurin. In 1977 the one-of-a-kind strategic
missile-armed cruiser of the Project 667 AM (Yankee II) class was armed with the
R-31 missiles. SLBM engines were developed in OKB-2 (Chief Designer A. M.
Isayev) in the Moscow suburb of Kaliningrad. (OKB-2 was later renamed the A. M.
Isayev Chemical Machine-Building Design Bureau.)
Special Design Bureau 626 of the Ministry of Radio Industry in Sverdlovsk
(Automatic Equipment Scientific Production Association), NII-885 of the same min-
istry (Automatic Equipment and Instrument-Building Scientific Production Associ-
ation), MNII-1 of the Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry in Moscow (Agat Central
Scientific Research Institute), NII-49 of the Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry in
Leningrad (Granit Central Scientific Research Institute), NII-303 of the Ministry of
Shipbuilding Industry in Leningrad (Electropribor Central Scientific Research
Institute), the Control and Command Instrument Scientific Research Institute in
Leningrad, and the Geofizika Scientific Production Association in Moscow partici-
pated in the creation of missile control and guidance systems. 10S The support equip-
ment for the transport, handling, and servicing of missiles was developed in the
Design Bureau of Transport Machine Building in Moscow.l09 The production of sea-
launched ballistic missiles was concentrated at two enterprises: the Krasnoyarsk
Machine-Building Plant and the Zlatoust Machine-Building Plant.
Naval Reactors Water-moderated, water-cooled reactors for nuclear-powered

submarines of the first generation were developed under the supervision of
N. A. Dollezhal at the Chemical Machine-Building Research Institute (NIIKhim-
mash) of the Ministry of Medium Machine Building, located near Zagorsk
(now Sergiyev Posad). In 1953, the divisions of the Chemical Machine-Building
Research Institute that were responsible for the transport nuclear reactor design
branched out of the institute to form the NII-8 Research Institute. '10 NII-8 was in
charge of designing the reacto~ the reactor control and safety systems, and the
ship's biological shielding system. Among the institutes and design bureaus that
took part in the development of the first-generation naval nuclear reactors are
Gorky Machine-Building Plant 92 (reactor metal frame), OKB-12 (reactor control
and safety systems), Central Scientific Research Institute No. 45 of the Ministry
of Shipbuilding (heat exchange system).'11 The turbines for the first reactors were
developed jointly by NII-8 and the Furnace Design Bureau of the S. A.
Ordzhonikidze Baltic Plant."2 The Special Design Bureau of the Leningrad Kirov
Plant developed the pumps for the primary cooling circuit as well as the steam
turbine assembly.113
The scientific supervision of projects in the creation of nuclear propulsion
plants was the job of the I. V. Kurchatov Atomic Energy Institute. '14 Reactors for
nuclear submarines of the second and third generations were developed by the
268 Chapter 5
I. V. Kurchatov Atomic Energy Institute and NII-8, which was renamed the Scien-
tific Research and Design Institute of Power Engineering Technology (NIKIET).
Naval nuclear reactors were also developed by the Machine-Building Design Bureau
in Gorky (now Nizhni Novgorod).
Submarine reactors were built at Plant 92 in Gorky (Nizhni Novgorod)115 and at
the Izhorsk Plant in Kolpino (SI. Petersburg).116 Fuel elements and assemblies for
submarine reactors were produced at the Machine-Building Plant in Electrostal. 117
Navigation and Hydroacoustic Equipment, Battle Management Systems, and

Weapons for Submarines The first Soviet navigational systems for submarines
(Pluton) was created in the mid-1950s at the Moscow MNII-1 of the Ministry of
Shipbuilding Industry (now the Agat Central Scientific Research Institute) under the
supervision of Chief Designer E. I. Eller. The systems were installed on missile-armed
Project 629 and Project 658 submarines.118
The strategic submarines of the Project 667A class were equipped with the Sigma
navigational system, developed at the Leningrad NII-303 of the Ministry of
Shipbuilding Industry (Electropribor Central Scientific Research Institute). Sub-
sequent generations of navigational systems packages (Medveditsa, Andromeda,
and Symphoniya) on nuclear submarines of the second and third generations were
also developed at the Electropribor Central Scientific Research Institute. '19
The Gals Central Design Bureau, the Azimut Scientific Production Association,
and the Okeanpribor Scientific Production Association in Leningrad, the Kvant
Scientific Research Institute in Kiev, and the Gorizont Production Association
in Rostov-on-Don participated in the creation of navigational systems. 120 Hydroa-
coustic systems for strategic missile-armed cruisers were developed at NII-3
of the Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry (now the Morfizpribor Scientific Research
Institute) in Leningrad and at NII-10 (Altair All-Union Scientific Research Institute)
in Moscow. The A. N. Krylov Central Scientific Research Institute (Leningrad) and
the N. N. Andreyev Scientific Research Institute of Acoustics (Moscow) played a
significant role in the development of submarine hydroacoustic systems. 12l The Agat
Central Scientific Research Institute in Moscow developed battle management
systems for strategic submarines. 122
NII-400 of the Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry (now the Gidropribor Central
Scientific Research Institute), Central Design Bureau No. 18 (Rubin Central Design
Bureau of Naval Equipment), and Central Design Bureau No. 16 (now part of the
Malakhit Bureau) participated in the development of torpedo armaments for sub-
marines. Antisubmarine rocket torpedoes were developed at the Novator Machine-
Building Design Bureau in Yekaterinburg, the Moscow Institute of Thermal Tech-

nology, and the Region State Enterprise in Moscow. 123 Torpedo fire control systems
were developed in the 1950s at NII-303 (Electropribor Central Scientific Research
Institute).'24 In the 1990s torpedo armaments were produced at the Uran Scientific
Production Association (St. Petersburg), which was formed in 1976 from the
Gidropribor Design Bureau and the Dvigatel plant. 125
The Main Stages in Strategic Submarine Development and Construction

Projects in the creation of new types of strategic missile-armed submarines were
launched on the initiative of the Navy or of industry (the Ministry of Shipbuilding
Industry or the Ministry of General Machine Building). Proposals for new projects
were submitted to the Military-Industrial Commission of the USSR Council of Min-
isters, which then instructed the ministries involved in the creation of strategic
missile-armed cruisers to draw up the tactical performance specifications for the
ship and for its equipment and weapons. Tactical performance specifications, there-
fore, were defined simultaneously in the Navy (Central Scientific Research Institute
No.1 of the Ministry of Defense), the Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry (A. N.
Krylov Central Scientific Research Institute and Rubin Central Design Bureau of
Naval Equipment), and the Ministry of General Machine Building (the Central
Machine-Building Scientific Research Institute, known as TsNIIMash, and Makeyev
Design Bureau). The proposals of the military and industrial institutes were then
submitted to superior agencies for consideration (the Main Shipbuilding Directorate,
the Missile and Artillery Directorate, and the Main Staff in the Navy and the
First Main Directorate of the Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry) and then forwarded
to the Military-Industrial Commission for approva1. 126
The next step in the process was the issuance of a joint decree of the CPSU Central
Committee and USSR Council of Ministers, which was drafted by the Military-
Industrial Commission on the basis of the reports of the Navy and the defense
branch ministries. The decree defined the tactical performance specifications (the
purpose of the ship and its main characteristics), named the executing entities (the
organizations and individuals responsible for the development and construction of
the strategic missile-armed cruiser and its equipment and weapons), and appointed
overseers from the Main Shipbuilding Directorate of the Navy.127
Competitive rough drafts were then submitted by various development organiza-
tions. About 10 different options were usually considered during this stage, which
generally took from six months to a year. During the next stage-the preliminary
design-the main technical features and appearance of the strategic missile-armed
270 Chapter 5
cruiser and the composition of its equipment and weapons were defined. The pre-
liminary design phase took around half a year to complete and involved fewer
options and alternative designs. 12s
After one of the alternative designs was chosen, the final design was developed.
Like the preliminary design, it had to be approved by a decree of the CPSU Central
Committee and USSR Council of Ministers. Then the final set of blueprints was
drawn up and forwarded to the plant chosen to build the submarine. The develop-
ment of the final plans and blueprints took one or two years. Military representa-
tives of the Main Shipbuilding Directorate of the Navy oversaw the work on the
blueprints and the construction of the submarine.
The construction of the ship began with the laying of the keel, during which the
first two sections of the pressure hull were welded together. '29 Building the hull and
required equipping it with the required equipment took two or three years on the
average. The next important stage in the construction project was the launching of
the ship. After the ship had been launched, the final construction work and dock
trials took approximately six more months. The crew arrived approximately a
month and a half before the start of the dock trials, after undergoing a course of
training at a submarine crew training center. 130 The dock trials were conducted by
specialists from the plant that built the submarine, and the crew participated in the
tests in the capacity of observers.
The dock trials were followed by at-sea tests, during which the ship made its
first, brief sea voyage. Specialists from the plant checked and adjusted all systems
during this stage, including systems that affected the ship's noise level. When this
phase of tests was over, a report was compiled, with a list of the suggestions for
changes.
After the dock trials and at-sea tests had been conducted, an official state
acceptance test schedule was drawn up, and a state acceptance commISSIOn was
appointed. The commission was made up of members of the government and
representatives of the Ministry of Defense, the Navy, naval research institutes, the
Naval Academy, and the ministries of the defense industry. During the state com-
mission's tests, the performance characteristics of the submarine were checked and
torpedoes and missiles were fired. Specialists from the plant were on board along
with the ship's crew during these tests. 131
The acceptance report for the submarine was signed after the state tests had been
conducted. If the characteristics of the ship deviated from the tactical performance
specifications, the report listed these problems and the deadlines for their correc-
tion. In the event of a conflict between the Navy and the shipbuilding plant, the
final decision was made by an arbitration commission chaired by the commander-

in-chief of the Navy.
When the missile-armed submarine had been officially accepted by the Navy, it
was transferred to its base. If it was an experimental ship, it was in experimental
use for one or two years.
The Service Life of Strategic Submarines

After the strategic submarine had been incorporated into the Navy, it entered regular
naval service. The main type of combat service for strategic submarines is covert
combat patrol, during which the strategic submarine is at sea in a state of constant
readiness to launch missiles. During the Soviet era the typical combat patrol usually
lasted around two or three months. 132 The strategic submarine generally made two
or three combat patrols in two years. 133 During the interval between these patrols,
which typically lasted six to nine months, the ship was turned over to the relief
crew, all necessary maintenance and repairs were performed, and the crew was
trained for patrol. Between patrols, the ship went to sea for crew training drills,
missile and torpedo firing practice, and alert duty in the port.
The maintenance and repair work between patrols was performed by the per-
sonnel of ship repair plants and floating repair shops under naval jurisdiction.
During the patrols the crew would record the operating time of each mechanism
and all equipment failures. The malfunctions would then be corrected between
patrols (the repairs usually took around a month and a half). Besides this, worn
instruments and equipment were replaced. Dock inspections were conducted before
the submarines left the base. In-dock maintenance (hull maintenance) and repairs
were performed once every two years on average. 134
Routine maintenance inspections (and minor repairs) were scheduled once every
four years for each submarine and were usually conducted by the personnel of naval
ship repair plants. During these repairs the submarine's missiles and torpedoes
were removed. The shipbuilding industry plants (the Zvezdochka and the Nerpa
plants) also participated in the routine maintenance of submarines in the Northern
Fleet. Routine maintenance in the Pacific Fleet was conducted by the Navy Ship
Repair Plant in Shkotovo-22 and the Gornyak Ship Repair Plant No. 30 near
Petropavlovsk -Kamchatski.135
Medium-level maintenance (at intervals of up to 10 years) was performed at a
civilian ship repair plant and was the responsibility of the shipbuilding industry. It
usually included the recharging of reactor cores and the modernization of the ship
(the replacement of existing equipment with newer models). The submarines were
272 Chapter 5
repaired at the Zvezdochka Scientific Production Association and Sevmashpred-

priyatiye Production Association in Severodvinsk and at the Zvezda plant in Bolshoy
Kamen (Primorsky Kray). These repairs took from one year to a few years. 136
Major repairs were performed after considerable wear and when the ship had to
be put in a building slip for work on the hull. The need to replace the reactor com-
partment, re-equip the missile compartment, or refit the ship for other functions
were other reasons for major repairs. These repairs could take several years.
The 1990s were distinguished by longer intervals between repairs and the longer
duration of repairs. In particula~ repairs on the lead ship of the Project 667BDRM
class at the Zvezdochka plant have already taken 5 years (as compared to the
standard 1.5 years). The medium-level maintenance of the lead ship of the Project
941 class at Sevmashpredpriyatiye was supposed to have been completed in 1993.
Nevertheless, the ship is still at the plant and is not expected to be back in service
any time soon.137
Deactivation of Nuclear Submarines

The service life of a strategic submarine is usually 20-25 years. After a nuclear-
powered submarine is taken out of naval service, it is scheduled for deactivation,
which includes the following procedures:138
removal of missiles
removal of spent nuclear fuel
dismantling of the missile compartment (elimination of SLBM launchers)
radiological decontamination
removal of all equipment suitable for continued use or recycling
removal of the reactor compartment and its delivery to a properly equipped and
ecologically safe location for storage or disposal
The procedures involved in the deactivation of Russian strategic missile-armed
cruisers are conducted at the Zvezdochka Scientific Production Association in
Severodvinsk and the Zvezda plant in Bolshoy Kamen in the Far East. There are
plans to begin recycling strategic missile-armed cruisers at the Nerpa plant in
Snezhnogorsk soon: U.S.-supplied equipment for the dismantling of submarines is
being installed there.
Because so many multipurpose and torpedo-armed nuclear submarines as well as
missile-armed submarines were removed from service in the 1990s when the recy-
cling work was only partially funded, they turned into a potential source of radioac-
tive pollution in the Northern and Pacific Fleets. According to official data, around
80 nuclear submarines had been removed from service by the beginning of 1993,139
and the number exceeded 150 by fall 1996.'40 According to the State Committee
for Oversight of Radiation Safety (Gosatomnadzor) data, around 100 nuclear sub-
marines were expected to be removed from service in Russia by 2000. 141 Additional
difficulties are created by the lack of the necessary funding for the repair and main-
tenance of submarines and the consequent need to decommission ships before they
reach the end of their guaranteed service life because of the lack of timely repairs.
Combat Patrol
Organization of Combat Patrol

Prior to the appearance of intercontinental SLBMs, missile-armed submarines could
attack designated targets only from launch positions relatively close to the coast-
line. The submarines of the Project AV-611, 629, 658, and 667 A classes were there-
fore required to patrol within a special combat patrol area. Each submarine was
assigned to main and backup combat patrol areas, with designated launch areas and
waiting areas. During a crisis, ships moved from their waiting areas to their launch
areas, from which each submarine could launch its missiles after the transmission
of the launch command. Waiting and launch areas for each submarine were chosen
in such a way as to secure the possibility of the protracted maneuverability of sub-
marines with maximum stealth and within the required reaction time. A submarine
could also be assigned to a special restricted patrol route. On this route it was sup-
posed to be within range of its assigned targets at all times. 142
The locations of the combat patrol areas of submarines of the first generation
were determined by the maximum range of their missiles. The patrol areas of sub-
marines of the Project AV-611, 629, and 658 class, for example, were in the Atlantic
and Pacific oceans and the Barents and North Seas and the Sea of Japan. The dis-
tance between their launch positions and their targets never exceeded a few hundred
kilometers; not until the submarines were equipped with the D-4 missile system
could the distance be increased to about 1,400 kilometers.
The range of the R-27 (SS-N-6) missile, with which the strategic missile-
armed cruisers of the Project 667A (Yankee I) class were armed, was around 2,400
kilometers, and the patrol areas of these strategic submarines were around 2,000
kilometers off the coast of the United States. Starting in 1973 the patrol areas of
the Project 667 A submarines in the Atlantic moved approximately 550 kilometers
east from their previous positions, probably because of the adoption of the new
R-27U missile with a range of 3,000 kilometers. '43
274 Chapter 5
The next missile system-the R-29 (SS-N-8), with which the Project 667B (Delta
I) submarines were equipped-gave the Soviet strategic submarines a very impor-
tant new capability. These missiles had a range of around 8,000 kilometers, which
meant that submarines could reach targets at virtually every point on their route.
Starting in 1973, Soviet strategic submarines had the capability of reaching almost
any target in the United States from their ports on the Kola peninsula, in the Far
East, and on the Kamchatka peninsula.
According to Western sources, the Project 667B, 667BD, and 667BDR submarines
are on combat patrol in the Greenland Sea, the Barents Sea, and the Sea of Okhotsk.
Sometimes one or two submarines are near the Bering Strait. The patrol areas of
the third-generation strategic submarines-the Project 941 (Typhoon) and Project
667BDRM (Delta IV)-are in the eastern part of the Barents Sea, west of the Novaya
Zemlya archipelago. 144
Combat Service of Strategic Submarines After the missile-armed submarines of

the first generation were incorporated into the Navy and had made experimental
voyages in the late 1950s, they entered combat service in adjacent seas. Diesel-
powered missile-armed submarines made a few combat patrols along the u.s. coast-
line before 1963. Submarines began making occasional patrols to distant regions
after 1963, and continuous service (including service near the coastline of the United
States) was instituted in September 1966 for missile-armed submarines, both diesel-
powered and nuclear.'45 When the Project 667 A (Yankee I) submarines entered
service, the intensity of the combat patrols of strategic submarines increased dra-
matically, and there were always 12-15 missile-armed submarines at sea at any given
time. 146
The first combat patrol of the Project 667 A strategic missile-armed cruisers in
the Atlantic began in June 1969. '47 Strategic submarines of that class also began
serving in the Pacific 16 months later, in October 1970. By 1971 at any given time
four Project 667A submarines were on patrol, three in the Atlantic and one in the
Pacific. 148 In August 1973 the deployment pattern changed, and each of the two
fleets had two strategic submarines on patrol. This pattern of strategic submarine
deployment was sustained until at least 1976. '49
In the Northern Fleet, Project 667A submarines usually went to sea every 26 days,
and their service cycle in the Atlantic usually lasted 77-78 days, including the time
spent in transit. The ships generally spent 53 days on each tour in combat service
zones in the Atlantic. 150
The Project 667 A submarines serving in the Pacific had a comparable schedule.
Ships went to sea every 29 days, spent from 10 to 13 days in transit, and were in
their service areas for 52-56 days per tourY' The submarines usually took the short-
est route to the service area from Rybachiy Base near Petropavlovsk-Kamchatski.
Sometimes their route took them through the Bering Sea past the Aleutian Islands.
Starting in the middle of the 1970s, after the submarines were armed with inter-
continental SLBMs and could launch missiles from their ports, from 20 to 22 ships
were kept at a high level of readiness to launch (both at sea and on at-pier combat
duty) at any given time.152 This rate of deployment was sustained until the begin-
ning of the 1990s.
The organization of combat patrol in the Soviet Navy called for a relatively
low at-sea deployment rate. As a rule, only 15-25 percent of the Soviet strategic
missile-armed cruisers were on combat patrol at sea at any particular time. 153
The Navy's operational plans specified that all submarines capable of going to
sea should do so during the period of threat preceding the outbreak of a warY4
Even submarines carrying no weapons were supposed to leave the offshore basing
areas during threat periods. The missiles for these submarines were supposed to
be loaded at sea. Strategic submarines that were unable to go to sea for some
reason but were able to fire missiles were supposed to stay on alert duty in the
basing area.
The number of strategic missile-armed cruisers on combat duty at any given
time was reduced by half in the 1990s,155 and most of those were on duty in
basing areas. Western experts estimate that from four to six Soviet/Russian
missile-armed submarines at a time were on combat patrol at sea in the early
1990s.'56
Stages of Combat Patrol The main stages of a tour of combat duty for a Russian
strategic submarine are departure from its base, passage to its assigned combat
patrol area, combat patrol, and return to its base. The strategic missile-armed
cruiser's route is planned by the Operational Directorate of the Navy in conjunc-
tion with the Main Staff of the Navy. The patrol routes of strategic submarines are
planned in accordance with the operational plans of the General Staff of the armed
forces, which stipulate the number of strategic missile-armed cruisers that must be
on combat patrol and on alert duty in basing areas at any time. 157
Departure from Base Leaving the basing area is an extremely important stage of
covert submarine patrol. Other Nations' Navies Use various methods to detect the
276 Chapter 5
nation's submarines as they leave their bases. In particular, the United States regu-
larly monitors the basing areas of Russian submarines with satellite surveillance
systems.
A strategic submarine at a pier is an easily identifiable target. Strategic submarines
can be distinguished easily from other types of submarines, which have smaller
dimensions, in pictures taken by reconnaissance satellites. Surveillance is usually
done by low-orbit satellites equipped with visible and infrared band cameras and
synthesized-aperture radars. Since these satellites cannot provide continuous cover-
age of the base and can provide information about submarines in port only at inter-
vals of one to three days, submarines usually leave their bases during the periods
when the base is not under surveillance.
The next frontier the Russian strategic submarine must cross covertly is a few
dozen miles from the departure point. One or two U.S. attack submarines are usually
patrolling the approaches to strategic missile-armed cruiser basing areas at any
given time. 15s One of the main functions of these attack submarines is the detection
of passing Russian submarines. Since the base outlets and the approaches to them
are very well known, U.S. submarines are sometimes able to perform this function
successfully, especially in good weather conditions. Because ofthis, the strategic sub-
marines usually leave the bases at night and in cloudy or stormy weather. To reduce
the probability of detection, a search-and-pursuit ASW operation is usually con-
ducted against alien submarines before the strategic submarine sets off for its patrol
route. When the strategic missile-armed cruiser leaves port, it is accompanied by
security forces, consisting of patrol escorts, minesweepers, and antisubmarine
helicopters. 159
Passage to Combat Patrol Area Project AV-611, 629, 658, and 667 A submarines
on combat patrol had to spend a long time in transit from their bases to their service
areas. The route the submarines took in the Atlantic to their service areas took them
across the Cape Nordkapp-Medvezhyy Island and Iceland-Faeroe Islands borders.
Sometimes they made the crossing through the Shetland-Faeroe Islands zone or the
Strait of Denmark.
The speed of the submarine during the crossing was chosen to take into account
that the transfer had to be made covertly but as quickly as possible. The average
speed of a Project 667A submarine crossing the Atlantic was 12-14 knots, so it
took the submarine 11-13 days to reach its patrol area. '60
During the crossing the Soviet strategic submarines were at their most vulnera-
ble to ASW systems. The antennas of hydroacoustic detectors of the u.S. SOSUS
network, which had been deployed at the borders of Cape Nordkapp, Medvezhyy
Island, Greenland, Iceland, the Faeroe Islands, and Great Britain and along the
Aleutian Islands in the Pacific, played a key role in U.S. detection of Soviet sub-
marines. These antennas not only registered when Soviet submarines crossed these
borders but at times could also detect them at a considerable distance from the
borders. A timely report of a Soviet ship leaving its base, this enhanced the effec-
tiveness of their detection. After the submarine had been detected by the SO SUS
border antennas, an ASW plane was usually sent to the presumed location of the
submarine to determine its position and course and, if necessary, to keep it under
surveillance. Information about the location of the submarine could then be trans-
mitted to antisubmarine surface ships or attack submarines.
Soviet submarines used several methods to escape detection and reduce the effec-
tiveness of ASW systems. A submarines could stay in direct proximity to merchant
ships or naval ships with a noise level high enough to muffle the sound of the sub-
marines. The submarines traveled at the quietest possible speed near the locations
of hydroacoustic antennas. A submarine periodically changed course to verify that
it was not being tracked by ASW systems and to reduce the detectability of the ship
by the antennas. 161
In some cases a strategic missile-armed cruiser was escorted to its service area by
an attack submarine, which was expected to guarantee the combat security of the
Submarine. The ships could follow established routes either independently, without
staying in contact, or in pairs, communicating by means of a secure underwater
acoustic system. 162
Combat Patrol A missile-armed submarine on combat patrol was in a constant
state of readiness to use nuclear weapons on the orders of the Supreme High
Command. This imposed several requirements on the submarine. First of all, the
submarine's security had to be safeguarded; that is, it had to be in a position pre-
cluding its detection and destruction by the enemy before the completion of its
combat mission. The combat security of Soviet submarines was ensured by estab-
lishing secure regions in their patrol areas and by reducing their detectability by
enemy ASW forces. Second, the reliable and timely transmission of the order to use
nuclear weapons from the Supreme High Command required reliable communi-
cations with the submarine. Finally, the degree of success of the combat mission
would depend on the accuracy of the information the submarine had about its exact
location at the instant of launch.
278 Chapter 5
SECURING STEALTH OF STRATEGIC SUBMARINES After a Soviet missile system

capable of launching ballistic missiles underwater had been created, Soviet design-
ers concentrated on reducing the noise level of the submarines that would carry
these missiles. In the 1960s u.S. hydroacoustic systems had been able to detect Soviet
nuclear submarines at a distance of several hundred kilometers. By the beginning
of the 1990s, the concentrated efforts of Soviet designers to reduce the noise
level of Soviet missile-armed ships produced a submarine with a noise level com-
parable to the natural sounds of the ocean. Modern Russian submarines cannot be
detected at distances in excess of a few dozen kilometers even in the most favorable
conditions. 163
A Russian strategic submarine travels at minimum speed between four and five
knots in the combat patrol area. 164 The running depth of a submarine on patrol is
chosen with a view to the need, on the one hand, to secure the best possible
conditions for underwater and surface surveillance and, on the other, to complicate
the detection of the submarine itself. Submariners regularly take measurements of
the hydrological characteristics of their surroundings for the choice of the best
possible depth and speed in each specific region. Russian strategic submarines use
hydroacoustic equipment, usually operating in passive mode, to monitor the sur-
rounding area. The submarine periodically makes a U-turn to verify that it is not
being shadowed.
The submarine's hydroacoustic systems are used in the active mode only when
they cannot threaten the stealth of the submarine or when stealth ceases to be crit-
ical. In particular, active sonar is sometimes used just before the submarine surfaces,
when target coordinates have to be fine-tuned before torpedoes are fired, when the
submarine is running under ice and it is necessary to measure the thickness of the
ice and detect nearby obstacles, and when the submarine is running in extremely
shallow water. 165
COMMUNICATION WITH STRATEGIC SUBMARINES The Naval Main Staff commands
and controls strategic submarines on combat patrol through fleet headquarters with
the aid of a system of radio and satellite transmitting and receiving facilities oper-
ating continuously throughout Russia. The system for the command and control of
naval strategic forces comprises communications channels operating on the basis of
different physical principles, which enhances the reliability of the entire system under
the most unfavorable conditions. The system includes fixed radio-communications
transmitting and receiving facilities operating on different bands of the spectrum;
satellite, airborne, and shipboard communications relay stations; mobile land-
based transceivers; and hydroacoustic stations and relays. The elements of the
command, control, and communications system are usually connected to one another
by cable and radio relay lines of communication. 166
The guaranteed communication of commands to submarines on combat patrol
is secured by their simultaneous transmission in different parts of the spectrum,
including at least two at very long waves (VLW), five at short waves, and five at
satellite communications frequencies. Signals are transmitted regularly in accor-
dance with the assigned schedule of communications with strategic missile-armed
cruisers. 167
In addition, the submarine receives signals transmitted using very-low-frequency
(VLF) electromagnetic waves. These signals, at a frequency of a few dozen Hertz,
in contrast to the shorter electromagnetic waves, can penetrate the water at a depth
of 200-300 meters. Signals from the Zevs VLF station on the Kola peninsula, for
example, can be registered by strategic submarines in virtually any part of the world.
The rate of transmission on the VLF channel is quite low, however, so it is used
only for the transmission of general commands in special codes to all submarines
on combat patro1. 168 A single code, for example, can be used to transmit the message
"Surface for the order to use weapons" or "Assume full combat-ready positions."
In peacetime the VLF channel periodically transmits the "situation normal" code at
designated times. The lack of receipt of this code at the designated time is a warning
of a state of emergency.169
VLW signals can penetrate the water at depths of up to five meters. '70 To
receive these signals, submarines have to surface to periscope depth or use towed
receiver antennas. In the 1980s there were five fixed-site VLW stations in the Soviet
Union, located in Molodechno, Nizhni Novgorod, Tashkent, Krasnodar, and
Khabarovsk. 171 In combination, these stations secured communications with Soviet
submarines in most of the world's oceans (except for the distant waters of the South-
ern Hemisphere, the western Atlantic, and the eastern Pacific). The stations are still
operating, regularly transmitting signals at five frequencies from 3 to 30 kilohertz.
The VLW channel is used for the transmission of general orders for all submarines
and of battle management signals. 172
Mobile land-based and airborne VLW communications stations were developed
in the Soviet Union to secure the reliable transmission in a combat zone of an order
to use weapons. In 1985 the Navy received Tu-142MR planes for VLW communi-
cations. During the period of threat preceding the outbreak of war they are sup-
posed to be on continuous alert in their assigned areas, ready to transmit signals
to strategic submarines.173 By the end of 1992 Russia had 13 Tu-142MR planes:
7 assigned to the Pacific Fleet and 6 assigned to the Northern Fleet. '74
280 Chapter 5
The most diversified Russian network for radio communications uses short and
ultra-short-wave bands and is made up of numerous fixed and mobile land-based
transmission centers and radio relay stations. The network also includes satellite,
airborne, and shipboard relay stations. Before the first Soviet VLW relay stations,
the Goliath and Hercules,'75 began working in the early 1960s, short-wave com-
munication was the only method of transmitting information to submarines on
combat patrol near the u.S. coast and in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. The
principal drawback of short- and very-short-wave communications is the need, in
enabling the submarine to receive the communications, to deploy antennas that
reveal the submarine's location.
Underwater sound communications can be used in tandem with radio communi-
cations in some cases. Their chief advantage is the absence of the need to surface
or to use towed antennas. The operating radius of underwater sound communica-
tions, however, is no more than 30 kilometers. 176
A strategic submarine on combat patrol usually does not transmit any informa-
tion to shore. The service orders that are given to the commanding officer of the
strategic submarine along with the passage route before the ship leaves base list
the situations in which radio contact is possible. These situations could include the
detection of shadowing attempts the submarine cannot evade without help, a major
accident on board, a medical emergency, or death of a crew member.
In addition, the service orders envisage periodic radio transmissions to the sub-
marine. At the scheduled times, the submarine surfaces to periscope depth and
deploys its antenna to receive information transmitted on medium-wave, long-wave,
short-wave, and ultra-short-wave bands. Modem submarines can also receive signals
at operating depth, since they are equipped with towed antennas for the reception
of outside signals. 177
STRATEGIC SUBMARINE NAVIGATION SYSTEMS In the middle of the 1950s the loca-
tion of a Soviet submarine could be determined with the aid of available Soviet radio
navigation systems. The Decca and Loran-A systems in use by the Soviet Union at
that time could determine a location within a range of 0.3-0.5 miles at a distance
of up to 600 miles from the base during the day and of 0.5-1.5 miles at a distance
of up to 300 miles at night. 178 When the submarine was far from shore, astronom-
ical measurements were used to determine the coordinates of the ship with an accu-
racy range of under one mile. Since the weather did not always permit astronomical
measurements, however, the difference between the actual location of the subma-
rine and the estimated location (possible error) could be as great as 10 miles during
the interval between measurements.
In the beginning of the 1960s submarines began to be equipped with the first
radio sextants, which facilitated solar and lunar measurements and even measure-
ments based on some bright stars in any kind of weather. Besides this, the sub-
marines acquired inertial navigation systems, which reduced measurement error
considerably. After this, the error in estimated location did not exceed four miles if
astronomical measurements were taken once every two days. The implementation
of inertial navigation systems in Soviet submarines allowed them to start patrolling
in the Arctic in the early 1970s.
The problem of navigation support in areas far from the coast of the USSR and
the problem of all-weather support were not solved completely until satellite navi-
gation systems were created. Several satellite navigation systems were deployed over
the years in the USSR.'79 The first of these, deployed beginning in 1967, included
three satellites. By the beginning of the 1980s the system, now known as Parus,
included six satellites. The locating accuracy of the system was under 100 meters.
Deployment of the Tsikada system, consisting of four satellites and intended pri-
marily for civil navigation, began in 1976. Military ships could use the signals of
both systems.
Demands for a higher degree of navigation accuracy stimulated the development
of the second-generation of Soviet satellite navigation systems. In contrast to the
earlier ones, they were based on three user coordinates (instead of two) and three
speed vector components. In 1982 the Soviet Union began deploying the satellites
of the Glonass system (Uragan), comparable to the U.S. Navstar System/Global Posi-
tioning System (GPS). The deployment of this system, which includes 24 satellites,
was completed in 1996. The declared accuracy of the completely deployed Glonass
system is 10 meters for each coordinate and 0.05 meters per second for each speed
vector component. 180
Actions Following a La1Ulch COlllUland Project AV-611 , 629, 658, and 667A
strategic submarines were supposed to move, when directed, to launch position
areas to launch missiles at targets. The location of the launching areas was indi-
cated in the General Staff package that was opened after the transmission of the
order to institute red-alert status and proceed to the launching areas. Another
package from the General Staff kept in the personal safe of the commanding officer
of the strategic submarine was opened following the transmission of the order to
use nuclear weapons. This package contained the codes that had to be entered into
the submarine's missile control and guidance system to launch the missile. The deci-
sion to enter the code and launch the missile was made only after the authenticity
282 Chapter 5
of the order was verified simultaneously by two individuals: the commanding officer
of the submarine and its deputy commanding officer. ls1
Prelaunch procedures began after the submarine arrived at the launching area.
These included the move to firing depth, the fine adjustment of the submarine's loca-
tion, tests of the submarine's main missile systems, and targeting. The prelaunch
procedures on submarines of the first generation took about an hour. Later the
procedures were automated, and this reduced launch preparation time considerably.
On modern submarines, all launch preparation procedures, including surfacing to
the launch depth, take no more than 15 minutes. 182
The procedure used in the Soviet military for transmitting the order to use
missiles to submarines was changed in the early 1970s. At that time, the autho-
rization codes needed for the submarine's missile control and guidance system
began to be transmitted along with the launch order over lines of communication
with the strategic missile-armed submarine. The strategic weapon control and
guidance system thus became more centralized. This procedure is the one currently
III use.
Technical upgrades over the years have improved the performance characteristics
of submarine launch control systems. The first submarines could launch a single
missile every 15-30 minutes. The Project 667A strategic missile-armed cruisers were
capable of firing four-missile salvos; the intervals between successive launches were
no more than three seconds, and the interval between the first two successive salvos
was under three minutes. 183 The interval between the second and third salvos was
around 30 minutes because it included prelaunch preparations for subsequent salvos
and adjusting the position of the submarine. Third-generation strategic submarines
can fire a salvo of any number of missiles from their combat inventory in a random
sequence. 184
Soviet plans for the use of strategic submarines called for the return of the sub-
marines to their bases after a first missile strike for the reloading of their launchers
with new missiles and for preparations to go back to sea. Special ships were built
to transport SLBMs and load the missiles on the submarines in the sea. 18S In the
1960s and 1970s these functions were performed by the Project 323A and 323B
(Lama) ships. Two different models of the Project 1791 (Amga) class ships were
built in the middle of the 1970s, and in 1985 the Northern Fleet acquired the ship
Alexandr Brykin (Project 11570), designed specifically for the transport of R-39
missiles to Project 941 submarines. 186
Appendix SA Ballistic-Missile Submarines
This appendix includes information about missile-armed submarines of the Soviet

and Russian Navy. A number of sources were consulted in compiling the data pre-
sented here. 1s7 The heading for each section provides both the Soviet/Russian name
for the submarine discussed in that section and (in parentheses) the common western
designation as well.
Project V-611 (Zulu IV 112) and Project AV-611 (Zulu V)188

Work on the creation of the first Soviet missile-armed submarine began in 1954.
A government decree of 26 January 1954 called for modification of the Project
611 (Zulu) diesel submarine to accommodate the 0-1 missile system with two
R-11FM missiles. The resulting design, which was developed at Central Design
Bureau No. 16, was called Project V-61l. Director N. N. Isanin of Central Design
Bureau No. 16 was appointed chief designer of the project. The ballistic missile was
developed under the supervision of S. P. Korolev in OKB-l. The preliminary design
for the submarine was completed by September 1954, and the blueprints were ready
at the end of 1954.
Table 5A.1 presents the main technical characteristics of the Project V-611 sub-
marine (or Zulu IV 1/2, as it was known in the West). The Project V-611 subma-
rine was equipped with an additional missile compartment (beyond those of the
Project 611 submarine on which it was based) with two launch tubes running
through the pressure hull. Installation of the missile system required changing the
submarine's weapons inventory: The reserve torpedoes, mines, and artillery weapons
were removed. One of the four groups of batteries in one of the bays was disman-
tled to make room for launch support equipment.
To launch the missiles it was carrying, the Project V-611 submarine first had to
surface. After it did so, the cover of the launch tube was opened, and the missile
was lifted out of the tube and mounted on the launch stand with two struts that
were thrown aside at the moment of launch. The prelaunch procedures were per-
formed while the submarine was still submerged and took two hours. Preparations
for launching the first missile took five minutes in a surfaced position. After the first
missile had been launched, it took another five minutes to prepare to launch the
second one. Missiles could be launched at swells of four points and at a running
speed of up to 12 knots. '89
The submarine was refitted according to the V-611 design at Plant 402 in
Severodvinsk (Molotovsk prior to 1957). The latest Project 611 submarine under
284 Chapter 5
Table 5A.1
Technical characteristics of the Project V-611 and AV-611 submarines
Project/Designation V-611 Zulu lV1/2

AV-611 Zulu V
Development began January 1954
Design bureau TsKB-16
Chief designer N. N. Isarun
Manufacturer V-611 Plant 402 (Severodvinsk)
AV-611 Plant 402 (Severodvinsk), Plant 199 (Komsomolsk-
on-Amur)
Production or refitting V-611 1953-1956
AV-611 1954-1958
In service V-611 1956-1964 (as missile submarines)
AV-611 1957-1968 (as missile submarines)
Number of ships V-611 1
AV-611 5
Missile armament D-l missile system with 12 R-I1FM missiles
Torpedo armament 10 533 mm torpedo tubes
Propulsion diesel-electric
Length 90.5m
Beam 7.5m
Draft V-611 5.14m
AV-611 5.15m
Displacement surfaced V-611 1,875 m'
AV-611 1,890 m'
Displacement submerged V-611 2,387m'
AV-611 2,415m'
Depth 170m (operational), 200m (maximum)
Surface speed 16.5kt
Submerged speed V-611 13kt
AV-611 12.5 kt
Snorkel speed 6.5kt
Crew 72
Duration of patrol 58 days
construction was delivered in sections to Plant 402 from the Leningrad Shipbuild-
ing Mechanical Plant. Construction of this first experimental missile-armed subma-
rine, which was assigned the tactical number B-67, was completed in September
1955.
Another five diesel submarines of the Project 611 class were refitted started
in 1956 to meet the specifications of the Project AV-611 (Zulu V) design, which
was an updated version of the Project V-611 design. (Figure 5A.1 depicts the Project
AV-611 submarine.) Construction work on four Project AV-611 submarines was
completed at Plant 402 in Severodvinsk. The last of the AV-611 submarines built
in Severodvinsk was placed in service at the end of 1957. One AV-611 was refitted
at Shipbuilding Plant 199 in Komsomolsk-on-Amur; it was placed in service in the
Pacific Fleet in 1959.
The first missile-armed submarine (the B-67) of the Project V-611 class served in
the Northern Fleet. In September 1955 the first launch of a ballistic missile from a
submarine was conducted on board the B-67, and the submarine was used for sea
trials of the D-1 missile system in 1956-1958. The B-67 was refitted in line with
the Project PV-611 design in 1959 for tests of the first Soviet underwater-launch
missile system.
Four of the Northern Fleet's Project AV-611 submarines were consolidated in the
40th Brigade after they entered service the fifth AV-611 was incorporated into the
Pacific Fleet. They were used to perfect tactics for the use of submarines in combat
and operational methods of submarine crews on combat patrol.
_.-._-- ~
co
88 co 88
Figure SA.1
Project AV-611 (Zulu V) submarine
286 Chapter 5
The D-l missile system was removed from serVICe III 1967 because better
systems had been created by that time. In the second half of the 1960s the AV-611
submarines were converted into test platforms for various systems: hydroacoustic,
navigation, and communication. They remained part of the fleet until the late
1980s.
Project 629 (Golf I), Project 629B (Golf I), and Project 629A (Golf 11)190
When the work on the first experimental Project V-611 missile-armed submarine
began, a government decree of 26 January 1954 provided for the simultaneous
development of a missile-armed diesel-powered submarine that would be developed
as a missile submarine from the very beginning. (As noted above, the Project V-611
submarines were existing submarines refitted to the Project V-611 specifications.) In
May 1954, the Navy's Main Shipbuilding Directorate issued the technical perfor-
mance specifications for the ship, later called Project 629 (figure 5A.2), to Central
Design Bureau No. 16.
The new submarine was originally supposed to carry R-IIFM missiles. Soon after
the start of the project, however, it because clear that arming the submarine with
ballistic missiles with a range of only 250 kilometers would preclude strikes at
targets deep within enemy territory in the presence of in-depth antisubmarine
defense. Furthermore, equipping the R-llFM with a nuclear warhead would reduce
its range to 150 kilometers. Thus the decision was made to develop a new missile
system, the D-2, for the Project 629 submarine.
<;;;;;;;;P.-
Figure SA.2
Project 629 (Golf I) submarine
The new tactical and technical performance specifications for the Project 629 sub-
marine and the 0-2 missile system were approved on 11 January 1956. In March
1956 completely revised designs for both the submarine and the missile system
were submitted to the Navy's Main Shipbuilding Directorate. Because of the delay
involved in the development of the new missile system, the first three Project 629
submarines were to be equipped with R-11FM missiles.
When the plans for the Project 629 submarine were being drawn up, the design
of the Project 641 (Foxtrot) torpedo submarine was chosen to serve as the basis for
the new submarine. Only the electrical-mechanical propulsion unit for surface and
underwater operation, however, and the package of hydroacoustic, radar, and radio
communications systems were taken from the Project 641 design without any
changes. 191
Table 5A.2 presents the main technical characteristics of the Project 629-class
submarines, known in the West as the Golf class of submarines. The Project 629
submarine had six compartments. The pressure hull consisted of a cylinder and
truncated cones at the bow and stem. Three launch tubes with lifting and turning
devices and launchers were located near the fourth compartment. The missiles were
kept in upright tubes located directly behind the conning tower. The launch stand
was raised to the upper section of the launching plate before a launch. Launches
were conducted in a surfaced position and could be conducted at swells of four to
five points and at a running speed of up to 15 knots. 192
The Project 629 submarine had a combat control system that allowed the flight
assignment of the submarine's missiles to be corrected automatically as the subma-
rine's position changed. The installation of this system reduced preparation time for
missile launches considerably. The prelaunch procedures, conducted in a submerged
position, took around one hour. The first missile could be launched 4 minutes after
the submarine surfaced, and all three of the submarine's missiles could be launched
within 12 minutes in a single surfacing. 193
The Project 629 submarine was superior to the Project AV-611 in several respects.
Its basic load of missiles was increased by one unit over that of the Project AV-611,
and its range was four times as great. The use of a high-strength steel hull increased
the ship's maximum running depth by a third. Its endurance in submerged position
and in snorkel mode was also enhanced. '94 The Project 629 ships were equipped
with the most modern five-blade quiet propellers, which considerably improved the
submarine's noise characteristics.
In January 1959 the Soviet leadership decided to turn all of its technological
documentation concerning the Project 629 over to the People's Republic of China.
288 Chapter 5
Table 5A.2
Technical characteristics of the Project 629 and 629A submarines
Project/Designation 629 Golf I

629A Golf II
Development began 629 January 1956
629A March 1958
Chief designer N. N. Isarun
Manufacturer Plant 402 (Severodvinsk), Plant 199 (Komsomolsk-on-Amur)
Production or refitting 629 1958-1962
629A 1966-1972
In service 629 since 1959
629A 1967-1990
Number of ships 629 22
629A 14 (refitted from Project 629 submarines)
629B 1
Missile armament 629 D-l missile system with R-I1FM missiles; D-2 missile
system with 3 R-13 missiles
629A D-4 missile system with 3 R-21 missiles
Torpedo armament 6 533-mm torpedo tubes a
Propulsion diesel-electric
Length 629 98.4m
629A 98.9m
Beam 629 8.2m
629A 8.2m
Draft 629 7.85m
629A 8.5m
Displacement surfaced 629 2,794m3
629A 2,820m3
Displacement submerged 629A 3,553m"
Depth 260 m (operational), 300 m (maximum)
Surface speed 15kt
Submerged speed 12.5 kt
Snorkel speed 8kt
Crew 629 about 80
629A 83
, A. S. Pavlov, Voyennyye korabli SSSR i Rossii, 1945-1995 (Naval Ships of the USSR and
Russia, 1945-1995) (Yakutsk, 1994).
After relations between the Soviet Union and China deteriorated, the Soviet spe-
cialists were recalled from China in August 1960, but most of the documents and
equipment stayed in China.
The decision to start the work on the new 0-4 missile system with R-21 missiles
and the capability of launching missiles underwater, which was supposed to replace
the 0-2 system on the Project 629 submarines, was made in March 1958.'95 After
the system was adopted in May 1963, the work of refitting the Project 629 ships
to handle the new missiles began. The design of the refitted submarines with the
0-4 system, approved in October 1962, was called Project 629A.'96
The R-21 missiles of the 0-4 system could be launched from a depth of 40-50
meters at swells of up to five points and a running speed of up to four knots. The
interval between the submarine's first two successive missile launches was around
five minutes, and the third missile could only be launched after one of the first two
had been fired. The time required to launch all three missiles after determining the
position of the submarine was around 45 minutes. 197
Construction work on the Project 629 submarines began in 1957 at Plant 402 in
Severodvinsk and Plant 199 in Komsomolsk-on-Amur. The lead ships of the Project
629 class were launched less than a year after construction began, and the dock
tests and sea trials were conducted at the end of 1958. Seven of the Project 629 sub-
marines had been built by 1960. The Navy received seven in 1960 (five for the
Northern Fleet and two for the Pacific Fleet) and another six in 1961 (five for the
Northern Fleet and one for the Pacific Fleet). The last two Project 629 submarines
entered service in the Pacific Fleet in 1962. In all, 22 missile-armed submarines of
the Project 629 class were built: 15 in Severodvinsk and 7 in Komsomolsk-on-Amur.
The 23rd submarine of that class (Project 629B)198 was built at Plant 402 to serve
as a test bed for new missile systems with liquid-fuel and solid-propellant missiles.
It was equipped with two R-21 missiles. '99 The first submarines of the Project 629
class were refitted according to the Project 629A design in the beginning of 1967,
including eight ships in the Northern Fleet and six in the Pacific Fleet.
The Project 629 submarines of the Northern Fleet made up the 16th Division,
based in Oleniya Inlet. This division was part of the 12th Squadron, with its head-
quarters in Yagelnaya. 2OO In September 1968 two of the Project 629A ships were
transferred from the Northern Fleet to the Pacific Fleet. Another four submarines
of this class were transferred from the Northern to the Pacific Fleet between October
1971 and November 1974. The six submarines of the Project 629A class and its
modifications remaining in the Northern Fleet and making up the 16th Division
were transferred to the Baltic Fleet at the end of the 1970s.
290 Chapter 5
The Project 629 submarines in the Pacific Fleet were part of the 29th Division of
missile submarines and were based first on the Kamchatka peninsula and later in
Pavlovskogo Bay.201 There were seven ships of the Project 629 A class left in the
Pacific Fleet by the mid-1970s.
Only six Project 629A submarines were still in service by the end of 1989: four
in the Baltic Fleet and two in the Pacific Fleet. In 1990 all of the submarines of that
design were taken out of service.
One of the submarines of the Project 629A class, K-102, was refitted according
to the Project 605 (Golf IV) design in 1969-1973 for tests of the R-27K (SS-NX-
13) antiship ballistic missiles. 202 Four launchers were deployed on the ship, which
had been elongated by 18.3 meters.203 Another submarine, K-118, was refitted
according to the Project 601 (Golf III) design in 1969-1974 for tests of the R-29
(SS-N-8) ballistic missiles.204 Six R-29 launchers were deployed on the ship with a
displacement of 4,000 tons. 2OS
Three more submarines, the K-61, B-42, and K-I07, were converted into sub-
marine relay stations according to Project 629R design in 1973-1979. The missiles
and torpedo tubes on their stern were removed. The conversion work was done
at the Dalzavod Shipbuilding Plant in Vladivostok. One submarine (K-153) was
refitted according to the Project 619 (Golf V) design in 1976 for tests of the R-39
missile. 206 One launcher was mounted on the ship.
The K-129 submarine sank with its entire crew in the North Pacific (1,390 kilo-
meters northwest of Oahu, Hawaii) in March-April 1968. According to the official
Soviet Navy account, the submarine was running in snorkel mode and slipped below
its maximum running depth. 207 The ship ended up at the depth of more than 5 kilo-
meters. The site of the accident was located by the u.S. SOSUS system of acoustic
distant submarine detection, and part of the ship was raised to the surface during
the CIA's Jennifer project in July 1974.208
Project 658 (Hotel I) and Project 658M (Hotel II)

The decision to build the nuclear-powered missile submarines of the Project 658
design 209 was made on 26 August 1956.210 The submarines of the Project 658 class
were to be equipped with the 0-2 missile system with R-13 missiles. Work on the
design for the submarine began in September 1956 and was completed in the first
quarter of 1957. 211 There was no preliminary design stage for this submarine,
because the deadline for the construction of the lead ship was too close.212
P. Z. Golosovskiy of Central Design Bureau No. 18 was the first chief designer
of the Project 658. I. B. Mikhailov headed the project in February 1958 and was
then replaced by S. N. Kovalev in October 1958. I. D. Spasskiy was the deputy chief
designer from the start of the project. 213
A decision was made in March 1958 to begin converting the nuclear missile-
armed submarines according to the design of Project 658M (figure 5A.3), which
provided for the installation of the D-4 missile system with underwater launch capa-
bility.214 Kovalev of Central Design Bureau No. 18 was appointed chief designer of
Project 658M.
Table 5A.3 presents the main technical characteristics of the Project 658-class
submarines, known in the West as the Hotel class of submarines. The Project 658
was a modified version of the first Soviet Project 627 (November) nuclear-powered
ship. The main difference between the Project 658 and the basic Project 627 design
was the missile compartment, which on the Project 658 ships was similar to that of
the Project 629 ships.215 In addition, the missile-carrying Project 658 submarines
have small diving rudders on the stem to control the submarine at high speed in
submerged mode, a quieter and more efficient electrohydraulic rudder control
system, and a low-pressure ballast tank evacuation system. 216
The submarine was armed with three R-13 ballistic missiles (D-2 missile system),
which were kept, just as on the Project 629 ships, in vertical containers just behind
the conning tower. All three missiles could be launched within 12 minutes after the
submarine surfaced.217
Deployment of the D-4 missile system on the submarines required major changes
in the ship's design. To compensate for the buoyancy that resulted from a missile's
==
Figure SA.3
Project 658M (Hotel II) submarine
292 Chapter 5
Table 5A.3
Technical characteristics of the Project 658 and 658M submarines
Project/Designation 658 Hotel I

658M Hotel II
Development began 658 August 1956
658M March 1958
Chief designer S. N. Kovalev
Manufacturer Plant 402 (Severodvinsk)
Production or refitting 658 October 1958-December 1962
658M 1963-1967
In service 658 January 1961-1967
658M 1964-1991
Number of ships 658 8
658M 7 (refitted from Project 658 submarines)
Missile armament 658 D-2 missile system with 3 R-13 missiles
658M D-4 missile system with 3 R-21 missiles
Torpedo armament 4 533-mm and 4 400-mm torpedo tubes
Propulsion 2 water-moderated VM-A reactors (70 MWt each), 35,000 shp
Length 114m
Beam 9.2m
Draft 7.31m
Displacement surfaced 4,080 m 3
Displacement submerged 5,000 m 3a
Depth 240 m,b 300 m (maximwn)b
Surface speed 18ktb
Submerged speed 26kt
Crew 104b
Russia, 1945-1995) (Yakutsk, 1994).
b I. D. Spasskiy, ed., Istoriya otechestvennogo sudostroyeniya, tom 5: Sudostroyeniye v pos-
levoennyy period 1946-1991 (The History of National Shipbuilding, vol. 5, Shipbuilding

in the Postwar Period, 1946-1991) (Sudostroyeniye, 1996).
leaving its tube and keep the submarine at the same depth, the launch tube had to
be filled with water before the launch/ 's which required installation of additional
ballast tanks on the Project 658M.
The keel of the K-19, the lead submarine of the Project 658 class, was laid on 17
October 1958. Work on this submarine was completed on 12 November 1960.219
In all, eight strategic missile-armed submarines of the Project 658 class were built,
all at Shipbuilding Plant 402 in Severodvinsk.
The modernization of the lead submarine according to the Project 658M design
was completed on 30 December 1963.220 All of the ships of the Project 658 class
but one (K-145) were refitted as Project 658M ships to accommodate the 0-4 system
in 1963-1967.
Two of the Project 658 submarines built in 1960 were sent to Zapadnaya Litsa
and formed a brigade along with the Project 627 A submarines. In January 1961 the
brigade served as the basis for the First Flotilla, which consisted of two divisions-
the 3rd (Project 627 A ships) and the 31st, which included all Project 658-class ships.
The 31st Division was transferred to Gadzhiyevo (Sayda Inlet, Yagelnaya Base) in
March 1964 to join the 12th Squadron, which later became the Third Nuclear Sub-
marine Flotilla of the Northern Fleet.221 At the end of the 1960s, after the division
had begun to be augmented by new strategic submarines of the Project 667A class,
the Project 658M submarines formed the 18th Division, which was transferred to
Gremikha at the end of 1970. The missile-armed Project 658M submarines of the
Northern Fleet were taken out of service in 1986-1991.
Two of the Project 658 submarines (K-178 and K-55) were transferred to the
Pacific Fleet in September 1963 and September 1968, respectively, and served on
the Kamchatka peninsula as part of the 45th Nuclear Submarine Division. 222 Both
of these ships were later refitted according to the Project 658M design. They were
taken out of service in 1988 and 1990, respectively.
The K-145 was refitted according to the Project 701 (Hotel III) design in 1969-
1970 for tests of the R-29 missile.223 The submarine's hull was lengthened to 130
meters, and its displacement was increased to 5,500 tons on the surface and 6,400
tons submerged. Its maximum speed was reduced to 18 knots on the surface and 22
knots submerged. 224 Six R-29 missile launchers were deployed on the ship. The K-
145 was recommissioned as a missile-armed ship of the Project 701 class in 1976. 225
There were several serious accidents on the lead submarine of the Project 658
class, the K-19. 226 The first occurred in February 1961, when the ship could not
leave port because the loss of pressure in the first cooling circuit of the reactor. The
next incident occurred in summer 1961 during the K-19's first combat patrol as part
294 Chapter 5
of the naval exercises in the Atlantic near South Greenland. 227 During this patrol,
on 4 July 1961, the coolant pumps on the port side reactor failed. The crew managed
to repair the cooling system, but 22 crew members died of radiation exposure. In
1962-1964 the entire reactor compartment of the K-19 had to be removed and
replaced. 228
On 15 November 1969, the K-19 collided with the American submarine Gata
(SSN-615), which was shadowing the Soviet ship, in the Barents Sea. 229 The colli-
sion almost completely destroyed the acoustic equipment in the submarine's bow
and damaged its torpedo tubes.
There was a serious fire onboard the K-19 on 24 February 1972. The submarine
was returning from combat patrol and was at a depth of 120 meters, 1,300
kilometers northeast of Newfoundland. Efforts to save the submarine took 40 days
and were complicated by severe storms. More than 30 ships participated in the
rescue operation. In early April the ship was towed back to the naval station of the
Northern Fleet. The accident took the lives of 28 members of the K-19 crew.230
Project 667 A (Yankee I), Project 667AU (Yankee I), and Project
667AM (Yankee II)
Work on the new nuclear missile-armed submarine of the Project 667 design231 began
at Central Design Bureau No. 18 in 1958. During the preliminary design stage
Central Design Bureau No. 18 submitted two alternative designs, one of which was
approved. Both designs were drawn up by A. S. Kasatsiyer, and he was appointed
the chief designer of the project. The project ran into difficulty when serious prob-
lems developed with the launch tube design. The correction of the problems neces-
sitated so many changes that the result was an absolutely new design, called Project
667A (figure 5Ao4). S. N. Kovalev was appointed chief designer of the new project.232
The technical plans for the 667A were drawn up and approved in 1962.233
Table 5Ao4 presents technical characteristics of the Project 667A-class sub-
marines, which were known in the West as the Yankee class of submarines. The
outer hull of the Project 667 A ship (the bow and stern, the steering gea~ and the
fins) was designed to minimize drag in submerged mode. In contrast to Soviet sub-
marines of the previous generation, the Project 667 A submarines had diving rudders
on the conning tower sail.2 34 The pressure hull, which consisted of cylinders and
cones, was divided into 10 compartments and was distinguished by its relatively
large diameter (904 meters).235
The submarines of the Project 667A class were armed with the 0-5 missile system,
which included 16 R-27 missiles with a range of around 2,400 kilometers. The
- _ • ...>-
Figure SAA
Project 667 A (Yankee I) submarine
launchers were in the fourth and fifth compartments (eight tubes in each), arranged
in two rows. The missiles could be launched, from a depth of 40-50 meters with
swells measuring up to five points and at a running speed of up to four knots, in
four successive salvos, with four missiles in each. 236 Prelaunch procedures took eight
minutes, and the interval between launches in a salvo was eight seconds.237 After
each salvo it took three minutes to stabilize the submarine at the launch depth, and
there was an interval of 20-35 minutes between the second and third salvos so that
the water could be pumped out of the ballast tanks in the launch tubes. The sector
of fire was 20°.
The submarine's main propulsion plant included two separate units on the
port and starboard sides, each of which included a water-cooled, water-moderated
reactor, a steam turbine unit with a turbogear assembly, and a turbogenerator with
automatic controls. The turbines allowed the ship to run at 27 knots when sub-
merged. An auxiliary power unit was used for the startup and shutdown cooling of
the main unit and for an uninterrupted supply of electrical power in emergencies
and also as a reserve source of power to run the ship in surface position. 238
The noise generated by the ship was reduced by using quiet propellers, lining the
pressure hull with rubber sound-absorbing material, and coating the outer hull with
nonresonance, soundproof rubber. The submarine had a vibration-absorbing rubber
coating on the bases of all of its main and auxiliary mechanisms.239
The Tucha combat data management system was installed on the Project 667A
missile-armed cruisers.24o Battle management signals could be received at depths of
up to 50 meters with the towed Para van antenna. 241
296 Chapter 5
Table 5AA
Technical characteristics of the Project 667A, 667AU, and 667AM submarines
Project/Designation 667A Yankee I

667AU N avaga, Yankee I
667AM N avaga M, Yankee II
Development began 667A 1958
Design bureau TsKB-18 (Rubin LP MB)
Chief designer 667A S. N. Kovalev
667AM O. Ya. Margolin'
Manufacturer Sevrnashpredpriyatiye (Severodvinsk), Leninskogo
Komsomola Plant (Komsomolsk-on-Amur)
Production or refitting 667A 1964-1974
667AU 1972-1983
667AM 1977-1980
In service 667A 1967-1983
667AU 1972-1994
667AM 1980-1990
Number of ships 667A 34 (some were refitted as Project 667AU
and 667AM submarines)
667AM 1 (refitted from 667A)
Missile armament 667A D-5 missile system with 16 R-27 missiles
667AU D-5U missile system with 16 R-27U missiles
667AM D-l1 missile system with 12 R-31 missiles
Propulsion 2 water-moderated reactors, 52,000 Shpb
Length 132m
Beam 11.6m
Draft 8m
Displacement surfaced 7,760m3
Displacement submerged 667A 9,600m3
667AM 10,OOOm3
Depth 400mb
Surface speed 13kt
Crew 120
a I. D. Spasskiy, ed., Istoriya otechestvennogo sudostroyeniya, tom 5: Sudostroyeniye v pos-
levoennyy period 1946-1991 (The History of National Shipbuilding, vol. 5, Shipbuilding

in the Postwar Period, 1946-1991) (Sudostroyeniye, 1996).
b A. S. Pavlov, Voyennyye korabli SSSR i Rossii, 1945-1995 (Naval Ships of the USSR and
Russia, 1945-1995) (Yakutsk, 1994).

The Sigma navigational systems package was installed on the first four 667A
missile-armed cruisers. The first Soviet inertial navigation system, the Tobol, was
installed on subsequent ships of the class.242 The Tobol package allowed the ships
to navigate in the Arctic and the polar region243 and to launch its missiles from
positions at latitudes of up to 85°. In addition, the Tobol package for the Project
667A ships was the first to use data from the Soviet satellite navigation system.244
The keel of the lead cruiser of the Project 667A class, with the tactical designa-
tion K-137, was laid in 1964 at the Northern Machine-Building Enterprise in
Severodvinsk. In July 1967 the K-137 passed its performance tests,'45 and it was
incorporated into the Northern Fleet at the end of 1967. 246 In all, 34 strategic
submarines of the Project 667 A class were built between 1964 and 1974: 24 ships
were launched in Severodvinsk, and 10 were launched in Komsomolsk-on-Amur.
In 1972-1983 some of the Project 667A ships were equipped with the D-5U
missile system with R-27U missiles. The R-27U missiles had a longer range (up to
3,000 km) than the R-27s and could be equipped with multiple reentry vehicles
(though these were not independently targetable).247 Submarines refitted with the
D-5U missile system were designated Project 667 AU.
In the Northern Fleet, the first missile-armed submarines of the Project 667A class
joined the 31st Strategic Submarine Division, based in Sayda Inlet, in 1967. Another
division was formed at the end of the 1960s: the 19th Division of Project 667A
strategic missile-armed cruisers. 248 Both divisions were part of the 12th Squadron,
which was converted into the Third Submarine Flotilla in December 1969.
Two Project 667A divisions of the Pacific Fleet-the 8th and the 25th-were
based on the Kamchatka peninsula. 249 Both divisions were part of the Second Sub-
marine Flotilla (the 15th Squadron before November 1973).250 Some of the Project
667A strategic submarines had been transferred to Pavlovskoye (Primorsky Kray)
by the mid-1970s.
All of the Project 667A and 667 AU ships were decommissioned between 1988
and 1994. During their period of service, the missile-armed submarines of the
Project 667A and 667AU class completed 590 combat patrols in distant regions of
the world's oceans.251
In 1977 the K-140 submarine was armed with the 0-11 missile system with the
first Soviet sea-based solid-propellant missiles (Project 667AM, or the Yankee 11).252
The missile system included 12 R-31 missiles. When the cruiser was refitted, its sub-
merged displacement was increased to 10,000 tons.253 The refitted submarine could
launch missiles from depths of up to 50 meters and could fire all of the weapons it
carried in less than a minute using the dry launch method.254
298 Chapter 5
The K-420 submarine was converted beginning in 1982 for tests of the Meteorit-
M (SS-N-24) cruise missile.255 The design of the converted ship was called Project
667M (Yankee SSGN). The length and width of the cruiser were increased to 153
and 16 meters, respectively.256 Twelve cruise missile launchers were mounted outside
of the pressure hull (six on each side). The first cruise missile launches from the
refitted ship were conducted in December 1983 in the Northern Flee!.'57
Some of the Project 667 A submarines were converted according to the Project
667AT (Yankee Notch) design in 1982-1991. 258 From 20 to 40 Granat (SS-N-21)
cruise missile launchers were installed on the converted submarines. In contrast to
the K-420, which was refitted for the Meteorit-M missile, on these ships there was
no change in the shape of the deck behind the conning tower. The displacement of
the ships was increased to 11,500 tons, their hulls were lengthened to 140 meters,
and their towers were extended by 3 meters. 259
The K-403 submarine was converted into a special-purpose submarine, the
KS-403, according to the Project 09780 (Yankee Pod) design in 1979-1984. Radio
equipment was installed on the ship in place of its missile bay, and the sonar dome
housed a towed passive-sonar array.260 In 1990 the K-411 cruiser was converted into
a small-submarine delivery platform, the KS-411, according to the Project 09774
(Yankee Stretch) design. 261
In May 1974 a Project 667 A submarine running at a depth of around 65 meters
collided with the American attack submarine Pintado (SSN-672) near the naval
station in Petropavlovsk. The Soviet ship suffered minor damage.262
The decompression of a launch tube caused an explosion and started a fire on
the K-219 submarine of the Project 667AU class on 3 October 1986, when the sub-
marine was on combat patrol 970 kilometers east of Bermuda. The crew managed
to surface the ship and shut down the reactors. A towline was attached to the sub-
marine, but it could not be kept afloat and it sank to a depth of 5,500 meters on 6
October. Four people died in the accident.
Project 667B (Delta I) and Project 667BD (Delta II)'63

The preliminary specifications for the Project 667B submarine (figure 5A.5) were
approved in 1965. The design for the submarine was drawn up in Central Design
Bureau No. 18 (Rubin Central Design Bureau of Naval Equipment).
Table 5A.5 presents technical characteristics of submarines of the Project 667B
class, known as the Delta class of submarines in the West. The pressure hull of the
Project 667B submarine consisted of 10 compartments. 264 The submarines of this
~.@
~
.. ".''''''''
...... c
Figure SA.S
Project 667B (Delta I) and Project 667BD (Delta II) submarines
new class had a greater displacement and larger dimensions than the Project 667A
ships.
The Project 667B submarines were armed with the D-9 missile system, which
included 12 R-29 missiles. The range of the R-29 enabled the Project 667B ships to
conduct constant combat patrol in adjacent and adjoining seas. In addition, the
ships could be put on pierside combat duty in their basing areas.
The underwater launch of missiles from a Project 667B submarine could be con-
ducted in a single salvo in swells measuring up to six points and at speeds of up to
five knots. 265 A high level of automation reduced the time required for prelaunch
procedures to no more than one-fifth of the reaction time of the Project 667 A
ships.266 To achieve the necessary accuracy of their missiles' fire, the submarines
300 Chapter 5
Table 5A.5
Technical characteristics of the Project 667B and 667BD submarines
Project/Designation 667B Murena, Delta I

667BD Murena-M, Delta II
Development began 667B 1965
667BD November 1972
Design bureau Rubin LPMB
Manufacturer 667B Sevrnashpredpriyatiye (Severodvinsk), Leninskogo
Komsomola Plant (Komsomolsk-on-Amur)
667BD Sevrnashpredpriyatiye (Severodvinsk)
Production or refitting 667B 1972-1977
667BD 1973-1975
In service 667B December 1972-present
667BD September 1975-1996
Number of ships 667B 18
667BD 4
Missile armament 667B D-9 missile system with 12 R-29 missiles
667BD D-9D missile system with 16 R-29D missiles
Propulsion 667B 2 water-moderated reactors, 52,000 shpa
667BD 2 water-moderated reactors, 55,000 shpa
Length 667B 139m
667BD 155m
Beam 12m
Draft 9m
Displacement surfaced 667B 9,000m'
667BD 10,500m'
Displacement submerged 667B 11,000 m'
667BD 13,000 m'
Depth 390m (operational),a 450m (maximum)a
Surface speed 12kt
Submerged speed 667B 25kt
667BD 24kt
Crew 667B 120
667BD 130
Russia, 1945-1995) (Yakutsk, 1994).
were equipped with the Tobol-B navigation system, which included the Tsiklon-B
satellite navigation and communications system. 267
Project 667BO was launched for the purpose of increasing the number of missiles
on the Project 667B submarines. The preliminary specifications for the new design
were issued in June 1972. The design of the 667BO (see figure 5A.5) was drawn up
in the Rubin Design Bureau.
The Project 667B design was used as the basis for the new design. The pressure
hull of the Project 667B was lengthened by 16 meters in the fourth and fifth
compartments. This made room on the ship for four additional launch tubes.
The alteration increased displacement by 1,500 tons and reduced full speed by
one knot.
The ships of the 667BO design were armed with the 0-90 system, which included
16 R-290 missiles.268 The 4 additional missiles were fired in a separate (second)
salvo from the first 12.269
During the work on the new project, several measures were taken to reduce the
submarine's noise level. The mechanisms of the steam turbine unit were mounted
on foundations equipped with a two-stage cushion system. New vibration- and
sound-absorbing coatings were used. Vibration-absorbing insulation was introduced
to separate the pipes and hydraulic equipment from the submarine's hul!.'70
The lead ship of the Project 667B class, the K-279, was built at the Northern
Machine-Building Enterprise in Severodvinsk and was incorporated into the North-
ern Fleet on 22 December 1972. In all, 18 missile-armed submarines of the Project
667B class were built between 1972 and 1977 (10 in Severodvinsk and 8 in
Komsomolsk-on-Amur). The Project 667B submarines were the last strategic
missile-armed submarines built in Komsomolsk-on-Amur.
The lead cruiser of the Project 667BO design was incorporated into the Navy on
30 September 1975.271 Three other submarines of this class were built in 1973-1975,
all at the Northern Machine-Building Enterprise in Severodvinsk.
The lead missile-armed submarine of the Project 667B class joined the strategic
submarine division of the Northern Fleet in Yagelnaya Bay in 1973. Later that year
the decision was made to create the separate 41st Division of strategic Project 667B
submarines. The division moved to Gremikha in 1974 and became part of the 11th
Submarine Flotilla.272
In the Pacific Fleet the submarines of the Project 667B class were incorporated
into the 25th Strategic Submarine Division on the Kamchatka peninsula.273 Some of
the ships had been transferred to the Pavlovskoye Base in Primorsky Kray by the
early 1990s.
302 Chapter 5
The patrol areas of the missile-armed submarines of the Northern Fleet were
usually located near Greenland and the Barents Sea. The passage to the patrol area
from the base took around two or three days. Missile-armed submarines of the
Project 667B class started patrolling in the Pacific Fleet in early 1976. Later that
year they began making regular patrols. 274
In mid-1991 the Northern and Pacific Fleets had nine Project 667B submarines
each. The decommissioning of these submarines began in 1992. By the beginning
of 1996, 15 ships had been taken out of service. All of the 667B ships are expected
to be eliminated in compliance with the START I Treaty.
The Project 667BD ships were part of the Third Submarine Flotilla of the
Northern Fleet, based in Yagelnaya Bay. All of these ships were decommissioned
in 1995-1996.
Project 667BDR (Delta III)275

The performance specifications for the Project 667BDR design were compiled in
1972. The design for the submarine was drawn up in the Rubin Design Bureau
(Central Design Bureau of Naval Equipment).
Table 5A.6 presents technical characteristics of the Project 667BDR-class sub-
marines, commonly known in the West as the Delta III class of submarines. The
Project 667BDR submarine is armed with the D-9R missile system, which includes
16 R-29R missiles. Depending on the type of warhead with which they are equipped,
their range is from 6,500 to 8,000 kilometers. The R-29R missile was the first Soviet
..........
I-±:~~-
Figure SA.6
Project 667BDR (Delta III) submarine
Table 5A.6
Technical characteristics of the Project 667BDR submarines
Project/Designation 667BDR Kalmar, Delta III

Development began 1972
Manufacturer Sevmashpredpriyatiye (Severodvinsk)
Production or refitting 1975-1982
In service 1976-present
Number of ships 14
Missile armament D-9R missile system with 16 R-29R missiles
Torpedo armament 4 533-mm and 2 400-mm torpedo tubes a
Propulsion 2 water-moderated reactors, 60,000 Shpb
Length 155m
Beam 12m
Draft 9m
Displacement surfaced 10,600m3
Displacement submerged 13,000m3
Depth 400mb
Surface speed 13kt
Crew 130
, v. P. Kuzin and V. I. Nikolskiy,

Voyenno-morskoy flot SSSR 1945-1991 (The Soviet Navy
1945-1991) (Istoricheskoye morskoye obschestvo, 1996).
b A. S. Pavlov, Voyennyye korabli SSSR i Rossii, 1945-1995 (Naval Ships of the USSR and
Russia, 1945-1995) (Yakutsk, 1994).
MIRVed sea-based ballistic missile. It can carry from three to seven warheads and
can fire a salvo of any number of missiles. 276 The Almaz-BOR battle management
system was installed on the Project 667BOR submarines to control the submarine's
torpedo weapons and its combat maneuvering, and this system secured the subma-
rine's ability to fire depth torpedoes. 277
The Tobol-BO inertial navigation system, installed on first Project 667BO sub-
marines, was later replaced with the Tobol-M-l and then with the Tofol-M-2
system. In addition, the Shmel sonar navigation station was installed on the ships
to determine the location of the submarine using hydroacoustic transponder
beaconsp8 The Rubikon hydroacoustic system was installed on the submarines of
this design in place of the Kerch package that had been used on the Project 667BO
ships.279
304 Chapter 5
The lead Project 667BDR submarine was incorporated into the Navy in 1976. In
all, 14 submarines of this design were built in 1975-1982.280 All were built at the
Northern Machine-Building Enterprise in Severodvinsk.
The Project 667BDR missile-armed submarines in the Northern Fleet formed a
strategic submarine division based in Yagelnaya Bay in Sayda Inlet and in Oleniya
Inlet. They were transferred to Yagelnaya in the early 1990s. In the Pacific Fleet the
667BDR submarines were incorporated into the strategic submarine division based
on the Kamchatka peninsula (Rybachiy Base).
When the START I Treaty was signed in 1991, the Northern Fleet had five
667BDR submarines (three in Yagelnaya and two in Oleniya), and the Pacific Fleet
had nine. Since then two submarines of that class have been decommissioned, one
in the Northern Fleet (in 1994) and one in the Pacific Fleet (in 1995).
Project 941 (Typhoon)281

The preliminary specifications for the heavy strategic submarine cruiser (TRPKSN)
of the Project 941 (Typhoon) class (figure 5A.7) were approved in December 1972. 282
A government decree of 19 December 1973 provided for the start of the work to
design and build the ship. The design was drawn up in the Rubin Design Bureau
(now the Central Design Bureau of Naval Equipment). S. N. Kovalev was the chief
designer on the proj ect.
Table 5A.7 presents technical characteristics of Project 941 submarines, which
are commonly known in the West as Typhoons. The Project 941 cruiser has a cata-
DO "=
o El .-
Figure SA.7
Project 941 (Typhoon) submarine
Table 5A.7
Technical characteristics of the Project 941 submarines
Project/Designation 941 Taiftm, Typhoon

Development began December 1973
Manufacturer Severnoye Machine-Building Enterprise (Severodvinsk)
Production or refitting March 1977-September 1989
In service December 1981-present
Number of ships 6
Missile armament D-19 missile system with 20 R-39 missiles
Torpedo armament 2 650-mm and 4 533-mm torpedo tubesa
Propulsion 2 water-moderated reactors (190MWt each), 100,000shpa
Length 170m
Beam 23m
Draft 1l.5m
Displacement surfaced 24,500m3a
Displacement submerged 33,800m3a
Depth 500mb
Surface speed 16kt'
Submerged speed 27kt'
Crew 150
Russia, 1945-1995) (Yakutsk, 1994).
b T. Nilsen, I. Kudrik, and A. Nikitin, Severnyi {lot-potentsialnyi risk radioaktivnogo
zagryazneniya regiona (The Northern Fleet-Potential Risk of the Radioactive Contamina-

tion of the Region), Bellona Report No.2, 1996.
maran structure unique in a Soviet/Russian submarine. It has two separate pressure

hulls, with a diameter of 7.2 meters each,283 located parallel to one another on the
horizontal plane and two separate pressurized capsules (the torpedo bay and the
control room). The missile compartment is located between the pressure hulls in
the bow of the ship. Both hulls and all of the capsules are connected to one another
by passageways. The control room and its light sail are off-center to the stern. The
pressure hulls, the control room, and the torpedo bay are made of titanium, and
the inner hull is made of steel. 2S4
The submarine is armed with the 0-19 missile system with 20 solid-propellant
R-39 missiles having a range of 10,000 kilometers. 285 It is equipped with an
306 Chapter 5
automated torpedo missile system that includes six 650-millimeter and 533-mil-
limeter torpedo tubes. 2s6 The submarine's propulsion plant, which includes two 190-
megawatt reactors and two steam turbines, secures speeds of up to 27 knots. 287
Despite their greater displacement, the Project 941 submarines are quieter than
earlier Soviet submarines. 288 To reduce its noise level, a two-stage rubberized-cord
pneumatic shock absorber system was installed on the ship, the modular arrange-
ment of mechanisms and equipment was incorporated, and new sound-absorbing
coatings were used. 289 The heavy missile-armed ships of the Project 941 design are
equipped with the Skat hydroacoustic system, consisting of four sonars. The Skat
package can track 10-12 targets simultaneously.290
The lead heavy cruiser of the Project 941 class, the TK-208, was launched in Sep-
tember 1980 and joined the Northern Fleet after intensive tests on 12 December
1981.291 In all, six ships of the Project 941 class entered service between 1981 and
1989. All six submarines were united in a division assigned to the first Nuclear
Submarine Flotilla based in Zapadnaya Litsa (Nerpichya base) in the Northern Fleet.
Two of the 941 submarines were taken out of service in 1995 and 1996.292 The lead
ship of the class has been undergoing repairs since 1991 and as of summer 2000
was still in docks.
According to the original modernization plan, the Project 941 strategic sub-
marines were to be equipped with an upgraded version of the D-19 missile system. 293
Howeve~ development of the new missile system, called the D-19UTTH, was can-
celled in July 1998. This may mean that the Project 941 submarines will soon be
decommissioned.
667BDRM (Delta IV)

The decree on the creation of the Project 667BDRM submarines294 (figure 5A.8) was
issued on 10 September 1975. 295 The design was drawn up in the Rubin Design
Bureau (Central Design Bureau of Naval Equipment) with S. N. Kovalev as the chief
designer.
Table 5A.8 presents technical characteristics of the Project 667BDRM submarine,
commonly known in the West as the Delta IV. The missile-armed ships of the Project
667BDRM design, which were developed at almost the same time as the Project
941 heavy strategic submarine cruiser, are the latest modification of the Project 667
series of submarines with liquid-fuel missiles. The new ships have a larger pressure
hull and longer bow and stem sections than the Project 667BDR submarines, which
has increased their displacement by 1,200 tons and their length by 12 meters.296 For
Figure SA.S
Project 667BDRM (Delta IV) submarine
enhanced durability, the pressure hull and the bulkheads at both ends and between
bays were made of electro-smelted steel, which has higher plasticity.297
The Project 667BDRM submarines are armed with the D-9RM missile system,
which has 16 R-29RM missiles equipped with four independently targetable reentry
vehicles. The underwater launch of ballistic missile can be conducted from a depth
of 55 meters with swells measuring six to seven points and at a running speed of
up to six knots, with all the missiles fired in a single salvo.298
The Project 667BDRM ships are equipped with the TRV-671 RTM missile-
torpedo system, which includes four 533-millimeter torpedo tubes. In contrast to
the system installed on the Project 667BDR ships, the torpedo system of the Project
667BDRM submarine can accommodate all types of torpedoes, antisubmarine
missile-torpedoes, and hydroacoustic decoys. The Omnibus BDRM battle manage-
ment system provides centralized control of all types of combat operations. 299 It
gathers and processes data and facilitates the choice of tactical maneuvers and deci-
sion making on the use of torpedo weapons and missile-torpedoes in combat.
The Shlyuz navigation system with which the submarine is equipped secures the
necessary level of missile accuracy.300 Location updates are secured by astrocorrec-
tion at periscope depth twice a day. The navigation system also includes a sonar
transponder beacon locating system. 301 The Skat-BDRM sonar systems package is
installed on the submarines. 302
When the Project 667BDRM submarine was being designed, several measures
were taken to reduce its noise level considerably over that of previous models in the
308 Chapter 5
Table SA.S
Technical characteristics of the Project 667BDRM submarines
Project/Designation 667BDRM Delfin, Delta IV

Development began September 1975
Manufacturer Sevrnashpredpriyatiye (Severodvinsk)
Production or refitting February 1981-1990
In service December 1985-present
Number of ships 7
Missile armament D-9RM missile system with 16 R-29RM missiles
Torpedo armament 4 533-mm torpedo tubes
Propulsion 2 water-moderated reactors, 60,000 shpa
Length 167m
Beam 12m
Draft 8.8m
Displacement surfaced 11,800 m 3
Displacement submerged 13,600m3
Depth 400m
Surface speed 13kt
Submerged speed 22-23kt
Crew 130
Russia, 1945-1995) (Yakutsk, 1994).
Project 667 family. All mechanisms and equipment were situated in a common
framework, separated from the pressure hull by a buffer. Local sound absorbers
were installed around the power bays, more effective acoustic coatings were used
on the inner and outer hulls, and the ship was fitted with quiet five-blade propellers
with improved hydroacoustic properties. These measures lowered the noise level of
the ship to one-third the level of the 667BDR ships.303
Construction of the lead Project 667BDRM submarine began on 23 February
1981, and the ship was launched in February 1984. The first missile-armed
submarine of that design was incorporated into the Northern Fleet in December
1985. In all, seven ships of that class were built at the Northern Machine-Building
Enterprise in Severodvinsk between 1985 and 1992. The program of scheduled
maintenance of these submarines began when the first ship of this class was put in
docks in 1995. In November 1999, after four years of repair work, it went back
to sea.
All of the missile-armed submarines of the 667BDRM design are in service in the
Third Strategic Submarine Flotilla of the Northern Fleet, based in Yagelnaya Bay.
Appendix 5B Sea-La1Ulched Ballistic Missiles
This appendix presents information about various SLBMs deployed by the Soviet
and Russian Navy. A number of sources were consulted in compiling the data pre-
sented here. 304 The heading for each section presents both the SovietlRussian name
for the system discussed in that section and (in parentheses) the common Western
designation(s) as well.
R-llFM (0-1 Missile System)

The work of creating the first sea-based ballistic missile began pursuant to a gov-
ernment decree of 26 January 1954. S. P. Korolev (then the chief designer of OKB-
1 NII-88) was appointed chief designer of the 0-1 missile system with R-ll missiles.
The organizations participating in the development project with OKB-1 included
NII-885 of the Ministry of Communication Equipment Industry (control and guid-
ance systems, Chief Designer N. A. Pilyugin), OKB-2 NII-88 (propulsion systems,
Chief Designer A. M. Isayev), NII-49 (navigation systems, Director N. A. Charin),
Naval NII-1 (navigation systems, Director E. I. Eller), and Central Design Bureau
No. 34 (TsKB-34) (free-swinging test unit, Chief Designer Yeo G. Rudyak).305
The liquid-fuel R-llFM missile (figure 5B.1) was an updated version of the
land-based R-ll (Scud A) missile, which had been commissioned in July 1955.
Table 5B.1 provides the main technical characteristics of the R-llFM missile, which
was a single-stage, single-warhead missile equipped with a single-chamber liquid-
fuel rocket engine and pressure fuel feeding system. Flight control during the
boost phase was achieved using gas vanes. Four aerodynamic fins were used for
stabilization.
The missile was mounted in a dry launch tube running through the submarine's
conning tower and hull. The missile had to be launched in surface position, and it
had to be lifted with the launch stand onto the upper section of the launch tube and
held there with a special belt. Its instrument and engine compartments were made
waterproof. 306 In addition to that, the missile's control and guidance system under-
went considerable modification from the R-ll, so the guidance system was able to
receive launch data from the submarine's navigation system. 307
310 Chapter 5
Figure SB.1
R-IIFM (SS-lb) missile
The tests of the R-IIFM were conducted in three stages. In the first stage the
missile was launched from a stationary launch pad; the second stage included
launches from a free-swinging launch pad. During the third stage the missile was
launched from a submarine. The first and second stages were conducted on the
Fourth State Central Test Range (Kapustin Yar). Three launches were conducted
from a stationary unit, comparable in structure to the standard submarine launcher,
in September-October 1954. There were 11 launches of the R-IIFM from the free-
swinging unit between 25 May and 30 July 1955. The third-stage flight tests were
conducted on the B-67 submarine, refitted according to the Project V-611 design.
In these tests, the missiles were launched from the White Sea to a test site on the
Kola peninsula. The first launch from the submarine on 16 September 1955 was
successful. In all, eight launches were conducted between 16 September and 13
October 1955, seven of which were successful.
Table 5B.l
Technical characteristics of the R-11FM missile
Designation R-llFM 8Kll;' 8A61FM,b SS-lb, Scud

Missile system D-1, 2 missiles
Submarine Project V-611, Project AV-611
Development began 26 January 1954
Design bureau OKB-l Nll-88, SKB-385
Manufacturer Plant 385
Flight tests September-October 1954 (fixed launch pad), 25
May-30 July 1955 (swinging launch pad), 16
September 1955-May 1958 (submarine)
Commissioned 20 February 1959
Number of stages 1
LalUlch mode surface, from the deck
Number of warheads and their 1 x 10kt;b 1 x 0.5Mt'
yield
Payload/throw weight 975 kg'
Maximum range 150km;d 167km
Guidance inertial
Accuracy CEP 1.5 km downrange; 0.75 km cross-ranged
Length lOAm
LalUlch weight 5A66t;' 5A40td
Oxidizer AK-2OI (20% nitrogen tetroxide and 80% nitric acid,
inhibited by iodine)"
Fuel T-1 kerosene"
• S. G. Kolesnikov, Strategicheskoye raketno-yadernoye oruzhiye (Strategic Nuclear Missiles)

b A. Shirokorad, "Rakety nad morem" (Missiles over the sea), Tekhnika i oruzhiye, no. 2,
1996.
" A. M. Petrov, D. A. Aseyev, and E. M. Vasiliyev, Oruzhiye Rossiiskogo {lota (Russian Fleet
Armaments) (Sudostroyenie, 1996).
d Raketno-kosmicheskaya korporatsiya "Energiya" imeni S. P. Koroleva, 1946-1996 (S. P.

312 Chapter 5
The R-llFM project was turned over to Special Design Bureau No. 385 (SKB-
385, Chief Designer V. P. Makeyev) in Zlatoust in August 1955. Special Design
Bureau No. 385 (SKB-385) was instructed to issue design documents for the missile,
conduct the necessary experimental tests and flight tests, organize serial production,
and turn the missile over to the Navy.308
Performance tests of the system to check the missile's capacity for sustained
combat readiness on long cruises were conducted in the Northern Fleet from August
to October 1956. The B-67 submarine took its first long cruise with fueled missiles
on 16 August 1956, sailing through the White, Barents, and Kara seas. The cruise
included running in surface and submerged positions at various speeds, seabed
rest for two days, and subsequent launches. Missiles that had been on board the
submarine for 37, 82, and 47 days were launched on 12 September and 3 October
1956. 309 The tests confirmed that the missile could be used in combat after pro-
tracted submarine patrol and set the specifications for the next generation of
missiles and submarines. After those tests, OKB-l's participation consisted only in
designers' oversight and the development of launchers, and SKB-385 took over the
organization and execution of all projects.
The design documents for the R-llFM missile were completed by the end of 1956,
and facilities were simultaneously being prepared for the missile's production. The
production of propulsion systems and missiles for tests on the stationary test unit
began in 1957. These tests had been completed by fall 1957 and were followed by
flight tests with launches from the free-swinging test unit. The final stage of the tests,
from March to May 1958, consisted of four launches from the submarine (three of
which were successful).
The R-llFM missile was commissioned on 20 February 1959.310 Project AV-611
and Project 629 submarines were armed with the R-llFM missiles. Between 1958
and 1967, 77 launches of R-llFM were conducted, and 59 were successful. 311 The
D-1 missile system was removed from service in 1967. 312
The R-llFM missiles were designed to be used with the RDS-4 nuclear
warhead. 313 It seems, however, that the missiles were not equipped with nuclear
warheads on regular patrols. The nuclear weapons were apparently stored on shore
and were supposed to be issued to submarines only when there was a threat of
attack.
R-13 (0-2 Missile System, SS-N-4)

The submarines armed with R-llFM missiles had to patrol regions with developed
ASW systems and could not deliver strikes at targets deep within enemy territory.
For this reason, a government decree of 25 August 1955 ordered the creation of a
new sea-based missile with a range of at least 400 kilometers. The new missile was
intended to carry a nuclear warhead.
The preliminary specifications for the missile weapon system, called the D-2, were
approved on 11 January 1956. 314 In the first half of 1956 NII-88 of OKB-1 pro-
duced the rough sketches of the system, after which all of the documents were turned
over to Special Design Bureau No. 385 (SKB-385), which was asked to complete
the system. The design documents for the D-2 system were completed in the
beginning of 1957, and tests of the engines of the new missile began in December
1958.315
Table 5B.2 presents the technical characteristics of the R-13 missile, which was a
single-stage missile with a separable warhead. The missile (figure 5B.2) was equipped
Figure SB 2
R-13 (SS-N-4) missile
314 Chapter 5
Table 5B 2
Designation R-13 4K50,' SS-N-4, Sark

Submarine Project 629, Project 658
Development began 25 August 1955
Design bureau SKB-385
Manufacturer
Flight tests June 1959-March 1960 (land), November
1959-August 1960 (submarine)
Commissioned 13 October 1961
Number of stages 1
LalUlch mode surface, from the deck
Number of warheads and their yield 1 x lMt
Maximum range 600kmb
Guidance inertial
Accuracy CEP 4km'
Length l1.835m
Maximum diameter 1.300 m (airframe) 1.900 m (fins)
LalUlch weight 13.745<"
Oxidizer AK-271b
Fuel TG-02 (mixture of xylidine and trimethylamine)b
• A. Shirokorad, "Rakety nad morem" (Missiles over the sea), Tekhnika i oruzhiye, no. 2,
1996.
bA. M. Petrov, D. A. Aseyev, and E. M. Vasiliyev, Oruzhiye Rossiiskogo {lata (Russian Fleet
CS. G. Kolesnikov, Strategicheskoye raketno-yadernoye oruzhiye (Strategic Nuclear Missiles)
with a single-chamber liquid-fuel main engine with a pump fuel feed system and a
four-chamber liquid-fuel steering engine. The R-13 was the first SLBM that used
thrust vectoring of the steering engine for flight control (as opposed to jet vanes and
fins). Nevertheless, four aerodynamic fins (much smaller than those on the R-llFM)
were used for boost-phase stabilization.
The flight tests of the R-13 missile on the stationary and free-swinging test units
were conducted on the Fourth State Central Test Range (Kapustin Yar) between
June 1959 and March 1960. The submarine tests of the 0-2 missile system began
in November 1959 and were completed in August 1960. The series of tests con-
sisted of 19 launches on the test range (15 successful) and 13 launches from the
submarine (11 successful).316
The 0-2 system with the R-13 missile was commissioned by the Navy on 13
October 1961. It was deployed on Project 629 and Project 658 submarines.
While the system was in service, it underwent a modification that increased the
period of continuous storage of the oxidizer-fueled R-13 in the combat-ready state
from three months to Six. 317 The warranty storage period for missiles in fixed-site
storage depots was extended from five years to seven. 318
The R-13 missile was in service from 1960 to 1972.319 During this time, there
were 311 test launches of the missile, 225 of which were successful. 320
R-15 (0-3 Missile System)

The government decree providing for the creation of the D-3 missile system was
issued on 20 March 1958, and OKB-586 in Dnepropetrovsk was instructed to create
the R-15 missile for the 0-3 system. The missile was supposed to have a range of
1,000 kilometers 321 and was supposed to be launched directly from the launch
tube (the 0-1 and 0-2 missile systems required the missile to be raised from the
tube before launch).322 In 1955 Special Design Bureau No. 143 (SKB-143) began
designing the Project 639 submarine (Chief Designer V. P. Funikov), with a dis-
placement of 6,000 tons. It was supposed to be armed with three R-15 missiles. In
1958 Central Design Bureau No. 16 was working on the Project V-629 design for
a diesel submarine that would carry one R-15 missile. The missile's size and weight,
however, precluded the development of a submarine design satisfying the perfor-
mance specifications. In December 1958 the work on the 0-3 system and the
submarines for its deployment, which was still at the technical design stage, was
canceled. 323
R-21 (0-4 Missile System, SS-N-S)

The decision to start the development of the new 0-4 missile system with R-21 mis-
siles (figure 5B.3) and underwater launch capability was made on 20 March 1958
(at the same time as the decision to develop the 0-3 system). The 0-4 system was
supposed to have been used on the Project 629 submarines, which were originally
designed to carry the 0-2 system. The development of the new missile system was
originally assigned to OKB-586 (Chief Designer M. K. Yange!). The project was
later turned over to Special Design Bureau No. 385 (SKB-385) pursuant to a decree
of 17 March 1959.324
316 Chapter 5
Figure SB.3
Tests of the underwater launch technique for missiles had begun in 1955, at
almost the same time as the work on the R-11FM missile. A government decree of
3 February 1955 assigned the missile design part of the underwater launch capa-
bility project to OKB-10 ofNII-88 (Chief Designer Yeo V. Charnko). Special Design
Bureau No. 626 (SKB-626, Chief Designer N. A. Semikhatov) was assigned the work
on the launch control system. 325
The underwater launch method was tested in three stages. Experimental launches
of special mockups of the R-11FM from a submerged stationary launch tube were
conducted during the first stage. The mockups were launched from tubes suspended
from a submarine during the second stage, and the third stage tested full-range
launches of a missile from a submarine in motion.
Two different mockups of the R-11FM missile were designed for the cold launch
tests: the S4.1 with a solid-propellant engine and the C4.5 with a liquid-fuel engine
(fueled for 4.5 seconds of flight). The first launch from the submerged test unit was
conducted on 23 December 1956.326 To continue tests, the 5-229 submarine of the
Project 613 (Whiskey) class was refitted according to the Project V-613 design to
accommodate two launch tubes suspended from the sides of the ship's midsection.
The design provided for a launch of the mockup from a depth of 15-20 meters at
a running speed of three to four knots. There were three launches of the 54.1
mockup from the 5-229 in the Black 5ea in June 1957. Without waiting for the
end of the pop-up tests, a commission of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers
ordered the conversion of the B-67 submarine (Project V-611 design) according to
the Project PV-611 design for the third stage of the tests.
By the time of the final stage in the tests of the underwater launch system in July
1959, the R-llFM had been converted for underwater launch (this model was code-
numbered 54.7) and so the R-llFM missile continued to be used in the under-
water launch tests. The conversion and preparation of the B-67 submarine for the
tests had also been completed by that time.327
The 0-4 system used the so-called wet launch method, in which the missiles were
launched from launch tubes filled with water in advance. The first launch of the
54.7 missile from the B-67 submarine was conducted in August 1959 and was unsuc-
cessful, resulting in a delay of a year in the tests. The second launch on 16 August
1960 was also unsuccessful. In that test, filling the launch tube with water damaged
the nose section of the missile and displaced it from the launch pad. The third launch
from the B-67 submarine on 10 5eptember 1960 was successful. 328
The tests conducted with the 54.7 missiles were accompanied by experimental
launches of the K1.1 missile, the prototype of the R-21. The ejection tests of the
K1.1 missile were conducted in the Black 5ea from a stationary submerged test unit
at a depth of 40-50 meters and from the 5-229 submarine. Between May 1960
and October 1961 there were six launches from the test unit and three from the
submarine. 329
A submarine of the Project 629B design was built for the final tests of the 0-4
system. The integrated tests of the system began in February 1962. The first under-
water launch of an R-21 missile was conducted on 24 February 1962. In all, 27
launches were conducted during the tests. 330 The D-4 missile system was commis-
sioned on 15 May 1963.331 The Project 629A and Project 658M submarines were
equipped with this system.
Table 5B.3 presents technical characteristics of the R-21 missile, which was in
service from 1963 to the end of 1989.332 The storage time of a fueled R-21 missile
was increased from six months to two years during the period in which it was in
318 Chapter 5
Table 5B.3
Designation R-21 4K55, 55-N-5, 5ark

Submarine Project 629A, Project 658M
Development began 20 March 1958
Design bureau OKB-586, later 5KB-385
Manufacturer
Flight tests 24 February 1962-1963'
(submarine)
Commissioned 15 May 1963b
Number of stages 1
LalUlch mode lUlderwater, from a flooded tube
Number of warheads 1 x 1Mt; 1 x 0.8Mt
and their yield
Maximum range 1,400kmb
Guidance inertial
Accuracy CEP 2.8km'
Length 12.9m
Oxidizer
Fuel
a A. M. Petrov, D. A. Aseyev, and E. M. Vasiliyev, Oruzhiye Rossiiskogo {lata (Russian Fleet

1996.
c S. G. Kolesnikov, Strategicheskoye raketno-yadernoye oruzhiye (Strategic Nuclear Missiles)
use. 333 During that period, there were 228 launches of R-21 missiles, 193 of which
were successfu1. 334
R-27 (D-S Missile System, SS-N-6) and R-27U (D-SU Missile System, SS-N-6)
The D-5 system with the R-27 missile (figure 5B.4) was created as a result of the
work performed in the early 1960s in Special Design Bureau No. 385 (SKB-385)
toward the development of a ballistic antiship missile. The preliminary results of
this work led to the submission of an SKB-385 proposal to the Navy and the USSR
government at the end of 1961 for the creation of a system with a small single-stage
missile for the destruction of strategic land targets. This system, called the D-5, was
intended to be installed on the missile submarines of the Project 667 A class. 335 The
decree authorizing the creation of the D-5 system with the R-27 missile was issued
on 24 April 1962.336
Figure SBA
320 Chapter 5
Table 5B.4 presents technical characteristics of the R-27 missile, which was a
single-stage liquid-fuel single-warhead missile. It was the first missile that had its
main engine immersed in its fuel tank, which allowed the dimensions of the missile
to be reduced considerably. The missile's airframe was made of aluminum alloy
panels, welded and chemically milled to produce a "wafflelike" texture. Combined
caps were used for the oxidizer and fuel tanks to eliminate the space between them
and create a tighter design. The control and guidance equipment for the missile was
located in the sealed compartment above the oxidizer tank, eliminating the need
for a separate instrument compartment. The guidance system for the first time (on
a Soviet SLBM) included a gyro-stabilized platform. Later this dense configuration
was used for all of the liquid-fuel SLBMs developed by SKB-385IMachine-Building
Design Bureau (KBM).m
The propulsion system of the R-27 included a single-chamber sustainer with
a thrust of 23 tons and a twin-chamber steering engine with a thrust of 3 tons.
The hinged chambers of the steering engine were situated at a 45° angle to the
stabilization plane (instead of the usual arrangement with four chambers on the
plane).
The 0-5 system employed a new method for securing the missile in its launch
tube, using several shock-absorbing rubber-metallic belts. In combination with the
elimination of aerodynamic fins on the missile, this reduced the dimensions of the
launch tube considerably. Increasing the mass effectiveness gave the R-27 four times
the range of the R-13 (2,400 kilometers as compared to 600) at almost the same
launch weight (14.2 tons as compared to 13.7).338
The R-27 was launched from a flooded tube. An adapter at the bottom of the
missile created a gas cavern that reduced the hydraulic shock resulting from the
ignition of the engine in the water-filled tube.
A distinctive feature of the R-27 missile was its status as the first sea-based missile
ampulized in the manufacturing plant. This ampulization facilitated the missile's use
and reduced its operating costs. It also reduced the time required for preparations
in servicing areas before the missiles were loaded onto the submarines.
The 0-5 system was tested in three stages. Pop-up tests of the underwater launch
procedure, the rocket engine, and the launch tubes made up the first stage, which
consisted of six launches from a submerged test unit and six from a refitted Project
613 submarine. 339 During the second stage, there were 17 launches from a land-
based test unit (12 of which were successful) between June 1966 and April 1967.340
There were six launches from the K-137, the lead submarine of the Project 667A
class, during the third stage of the tests. 341
Table 5BA
Designation R-27 4K10, RSM-25, SS-N-6 Mod 1, Serb

R-27U RSM-25, SS-N-6 Mod 21Mod 3, Serb
Missile system R-27 D-5, 16 missiles
R-27U D-5U, 16 missiles
Submarine R-27 Project 667A
R-27U Project 667AU
Development began R-27 24 April 1962
R-27U 10 June 1971
Manufacturer Zlatoust Machine-Building Plant, Krasnoyarsk Machine-
Building Plant
Flight tests R-27 June 1966-April 1967 (land), August
1967-end of 1967 (submarine)
R-27U September 1972-August 1973 (submarine)'
Commissioned R-27 13 March 1968 b
R-27U 4 January 1974 b
Number of stages 1
LalUlch mode lUlderwater, from a flooded tube
Number of warheads and R-27 1 x 1Mt
their yield R-27U 1 x 1 Mt (Mod 2), 3 x 200 kt (no independent
targeting) (Mod 3)
Payload/throw weight 650 kg'
Maximum range R-27 2,400km'
R-27U 3,000km d
Guidance inertial
Accuracy R-27 CEP 1.9 km d
R-27U CEP 1.3-1.8km d
Length 9.65m,c 7.1m (without warhead)d
Maximum diameter 1.5mc
LalUlch weight 14.2<'
a A. M. Petrov, D. A. Aseyev, and E. M. Vasiliyev, Oruzhiye Rossiiskogo {lota (Russian Fleet
1996.
C START I Memorandum of Understanding, 1 September 1990.
d T. Cochran, W. Arkin, R. Norris, and]. Sands, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Vol. 4: Soviet
Nuclear Weapons (Ballinger, 1988).
322 Chapter 5
The first launch of the R-27 missile from the K-137 ship was conducted in
August 1967 in the Northern Fleet. The tests were completed successfully that same
year, and the O-S system with the R-27 missiles was commissioned on 13 March
1968. 342
A government decree providing for the modernization of the D-5 missile system
was issued on 10 June 1971. The developers were instructed to carry out two main
assignments: They had to equip the missile with a three-RV warhead without any
change in its range, and they had to increase the range of the single-warhead model
by 20 percent and its accuracy by 1S percent. The updated missile, based on the
R-27, was called the R-27U, and the missile system, based on the O-S, was called
the O-SU (see table SB.4). The R-27U missile was distinguished from the R-27 by
its greater engine thrust and improved guidance system. The warheads of the
R-27U, like those of the R-27, were not independently targetable. 343
Sea trials of the R-27U missiles were conducted from September 1972 to August
1973, and all 16 of the launches in the tests were successful. 344 The O-SU system
was commissioned on 4 January 1974. 345 The new strategic submarines of the
Project 667AU design and the modernized ships of the Project 667A design were
equipped with the O-SU system, which was kept in service until 1990.
The R-27 missile was also used as the basis for the R-27K antiship missile (code-
numbered 4K18, SS-NX-13), equipped with a radar terminal guidance system. The
R-27K missile was approved for experimental use in 1974. 346 Only one submarine
was equipped with R-27K missiles: the K-102 of the Project 629 class, refitted
according to the Project 60S design.
While the O-S system was in service from 1968 to 1988, 429 of the 492 test
launches of R-27 missiles were successful: The system had the highest maximum
and average number of launches a year of all the Soviet naval ballistic missile systems
(S8 launches in 1971, and 23.4 launches a year on average during the entire period
of service). While the O-SU system was in service, 1S0 of 161 launches of R-27U
missiles were successful. Launches of R-27 and R-27U missiles in combat training
exercises ceased in 1988. 347 (There were experimental launches after this for micro-
gravity research.)
The service life of the R-27 and R-27U missiles was extended from the original
5 years to 13 during their period of service. 348
0-6 Missile System

The 0-6 system with solid-propellant missiles was being developed by Central
Design Bureau No.7 in Leningrad (now the Arsenal Design Bureau) in 19S8-1960.
Two versions were being considered. The first had a missile with a larger and heavier
charge of ballistite propellants, which were already in industrial production by that
time and were being used in tactical unguided rockets. The second would use the
new hybrid solid propellants based on crystallized oxidizers and fuel. The prelimi-
nary design of the 0-6 system was completed in 1960. Use of the ballistite pro-
pellants in the missiles of the system would have required the first and second
stages of the missiles to include a cluster of four engines. The dimensions of such a
missile would have been too large for the installation of the launch tubes inside
a submarine's pressure hull, so the submarine design proposed by Central Design
Bureau No. 18 envisaged their external placement outside of the hull, two on each
side. The submarine would have to surface to launch the missiles, and the shafts
would have to be raised into a vertical position before launch. 349
The start of the 0-6 experimental design project was ordered by a USSR Council
of Ministers decree of 18 June 1960, but the project was canceled by 4 June 1961. 350
RT-15M (0-7 Missile System)

When a project for the creation of long-range solid-propellant missiles was ordered
by a Council of Ministers decree of 4 April 1961, the Special Design Bureau No.
385 (SKB-385) was instructed to develop the RT-15M solid-propellant SLBM. The
missile, code-numbered 4K22, was supposed to have been based on the second and
third stages of the RT-2 missile (code-numbered 8K98).351 The delivery platform for
the missile system, which was called the 0-7, was supposed to be the Project 667
nuclear submarine originally designed for the R-21 missiles of the 0-4 system. 352
Table 5B.5 presents technical characteristics of the RT-15M missile.
The final stage of the work on this project would include ejection tests on a float-
ing test unit, five launches from a Project 613 submarine, and flight tests in the
fourth quarter of 1963 consisting of 20 launches from a Project 629B submarine.
SKB-385 did not show much interest in the RT-15M missile because it felt that
liquid-fuel missiles were more promising (with a projected range of 2,400 kilome-
ters, for example, the solid-propellant RT-15M was three times as heavy as the
liquid-fuel R-27), and the tests of the RT-15M missile fell far behind schedule.
Underwater launch tests from a submerged test unit were not completed until the
middle of 1964. The start of integrated tests of the RT-15M missiles in July 1963
was postponed pending results of the tests of the intercontinental solid-propellant
R-2 missile. 353 Work on the D-7 system was later canceled because of the excessive
weight and size of the missile and its inadequate range. 354
324 Chapter 5
Table 5B.5
Technical characteristics of the RT-15M missile
Designation RT-15M 4K22

Missile system D-7
Submarine to be deployed on Project 667 submarines
Development began 4 April 1961
Manufacturer
Flight tests up to mid-1964 (from submerged lalUlch pad)
Commissioned not commissioned
Number of stages 2
Propellant solid
LalUlch mode lUlderwater
Number of warheads 1 x 1Mt
and their yield
Payload/throw
weight
Guidance inertial
Accuracy
Length 10.5m
LalUlch weight Sat
R-29 (0-9 Missile System, SS-N-S)

The R-29 missile (figure 5B.5) was the first intercontinental-range SLBM. Special
Design Bureau No. 385 (SKB-385) began designing an intercontinental SLBM in
1963. Proposals for a comparable missile were also submitted by OKB-52 (General
Designer V. N. Chelomey), where the light ampulized UR-100 ICBM was being
developed at that time. After the proposals of the chief designers were discussed at
a meeting of the USSR Defense Council in 1964, the design proposed by SKB-385
was chosen. 355 The government resolution on the development of the D-9 missile
system with R-29 missiles was issued on 28 September 1964,356
Table 5B.6 presents technical characteristics of the R-29 missile, which was a
two-stage missile with a single warhead. Its airframe was a welded structure made
of aluminum-magnesium alloys with no space between the tanks. To reduce the
missile's dimensions, the first -stage main engine and second-stage engine were
Figure SB.S
immersed in the missile's fuel tanks. In addition, the nose section, a rounded cone
in front and a flaring conical skirt in back, was oriented backward and located in
the cavity of the fuel tank. The missile's guidance system equipment was located
directly under the shroud, where the warhead is usually located. The propulsion
systems of both stages consisted of a single-chamber liquid-fuel main engine and a
twin-chamber liquid-fuel steering engine.
The very efficient design of the R-29 missile gave it a range of 7,800 kilometers-
that is, more than three times the range of the R-27-with a launch weight of 33.3
tons and a throw weight of 1.1 tons. This range enabled submarines equipped with
R-29 missiles to execute combat patrols in areas protected by Soviet air defense and
ASW systems. If necessary, the missiles could even be launched from basing areas,
because the system had both underwater and surface launch capabilities. To secure
326 Chapter 5
Table 5B.6
Technical characteristics of the R-29 and R-29D missiles
Designation R-29 4K75, RSM-40, SS-N-8 Mod 1, Sawfly

R-29D RSM-40, SS-N-8 Mod 2, Sawfly
Missile system R-29 D-9, 12 missiles
R-29D D-9D, 16 missiles
Submarine R-29 Project 701 (6 missiles), Project 667B (12
missiles)
R-29D Project 667B (12 missiles), Project 667BD (16
missiles)
Development began R-29 28 September 1964'
Manufacturer
Flight tests R-29 March 1969-December 1971 (land), 15
December 1971-November 1972 (submarine)
Commissioned R-29 12 March 1974
R-29D 1978
Number of stages 2
LalUlch mode lUlderwater from a flooded tube, surface
Number of warheads and their 1 x 0.5-1Mt; 1 x 800ktb
yield
Payload/throw weight 1,100kg'
Maximum range R-29 7,800 km
R-29D 9,100km
Guidance inertial with stellar azimuth correction
Accuracy R-29 CEP 1,500mb
R-29D CEP 900mb
Length 13mc
Maximum diameter 1.8 me
LalUlch weight 33.3<,
a A. Shirokorad, "Rakety nad morem" (Missiles over the sea), Tekhnika i oruzhiye, no. 2,
1996.
b T. Cochran, W. Arkin, R. Norris, and]. Sands, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Vol. 4: Soviet

c START I Memorandum of Understanding, 1 September 1990.
the necessary absolute accuracy with this dramatic increase in range, the guidance
system for the first time used stellar azimuth correction. Also for the first time, the
guidance system included an onboard digital computer. 357
The R-29 was also the first Soviet SLBM that carried penetration aids. Collapsi-
ble light decoys were situated in special cylindrical containers welded into the fuel
tank of the second stage and were released at the moment of warhead separation.
The first tests of the missiles and elements of the 0-9 system were conducted in
the Black Sea Fleet in 1971-1972. These tests included a series of launches of full-
scale models of the missile with the propulsion system of the first stage and a sim-
plified guidance system. The tests of the 0-9 system were later moved to the State
Central Naval Test Range in Nenoksa, where 20 launches were conducted from a
land-based test unit between March 1969 and December 1971. 358 The final stage
of the tests of the system included a series of launches from the K-145 submarine,
converted according to the Project 701 design,359 and the K-279, the lead ship
of the Project 667B design. The first submarine launch was conducted in the
White Sea on 15 December 1971. The tests were continued in August-November
1972. 360 There were 19 launches in all in the final series of tests, 18 of which were
successful. 361
The 0-9 missile system was commissioned on 12 March 1974 and was deployed
on 18 submarines of the Project 667B class. The 0-9 was later modernized, which
increased its range to 9,100 kilometers. The updated system, called the 0-90, was
adopted in 1978 and was deployed on four modernized submarines of the Project
667BD design, on which the number of missiles in the system was increased from
12 to 16. Some of the Project 667B submarines were also refitted for the R-29D
missiles (see table 5B.6) of the 0-90 system. 362

The R-31 missile (figure 5B.6) was the first Soviet solid-propellant SLBM adopted
for service. In the early 1970s the Navy requested that a new system be developed
to replace the 0-5 system on the Project 667A submarines, which were scheduled
for overhaul and modernization. Competitive proposals were submitted by the
Machine-Building Design Bureau (Chief Designer V. P. Makeyev) and the Frunze
Plant Design Bureau (later renamed Arsenal Design Bureau, Chief Designer P. A.
Tyurin), which was awarded the contract to develop the system, later designated as
the 0-11.
Table 5B.7 presents technical characteristics of the R-31, which was a two-stage
single-warhead missile. The engines of the first and second stages used hybrid
328 Chapter 5
Figure SB.6
solid-propellant charges. For the first time in the Soviet missile development
program, the second-stage motor had an epoxy case. 363
In contrast to the liquid-propellant R-21, R-27, and R-29 missiles, the R-31
missile could be launched underwater without the preliminary flooding of the tube.
The missile was ejected from the tube, sealed at the top by a soft cover, with the
aid of a pressure accumulator. The missile surfaced in cavitation mode-in a gas
cavern sustained by a special circular hydrodynamic device on the forward com-
partment. The first-stage motor was ignited after the missile surfaced. 364
The dry launch method reduced the system's reaction time considerably by elim-
inating the need to fill the launch tube with water and reduced the noise level
of the ship during launch preparations. In addition, there was no need for the
intricate network of pipelines, the large ballast tanks, and the high-speed pumps
Table 5B.7
Designation R-31 3M17, R5M-45, 55-N-17, 5nipe

Submarine Project 667AM
Development began June 1971
Design bureau Arsenal Design Bureau
Manufacturer Arsenal Plant
Flight tests from 1973 (land), 26 December 1976-1979 (submarine)
Commissioned September 1980 (accepted for experimental use)
Number of stages 2
Propellant solid
LalUlch mode llllderwater from a dry tube
Number of warheads and their 1 x 500kt'
yield
Payload/throw weight 450kgb
Maximum range 3,900km'
Guidance inertial
Accuracy CEP l.4km'
Length 11.06m,a 10.6m (without warhead)b
Maximum diameter 1.54mb
LalUlch weight 26.9tb
Oxidizer
Fuel
a T. Cochran, W Arkin, R. Norris, and]. Sands, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Vol. 4: Soviet
b START I Memorandum of Understanding, 1 September 1990.
required to launch missiles from flooded tubes and to balance the ship after wet
launch. 365
Flight tests of the R-31 missile on a land-based test unit were conducted in
1973. 366 The first underwater launch was conducted on 26 December 1976 in the
White Sea."7 The flight tests were completed in 1979, and the Project 667 AM sub-
marine, equipped with R-31 missiles, was incorporated into the Navy in 1980. 368
Although the R-31 missile satisfied the requirement for a longer range than the
R-27 and was easier to use than the liquid-propellant SLBMs, its combat perfor-
mance characteristics were inferior to those of the liquid-propellant missiles that
had been developed by that time. With a weight of 26.9 tons, close to the weight
of the R-29 missile, the R-31 had only half the range, and it had less than half the
330 Chapter 5
throw weight of the R-29. Furthermore, its accuracy was even slightly lower
than that of the R-27. Consequently, deployment of the 0-11 system was confined
to a single missile submarine, the K-140, refitted according to the Project 667AM
design for the flight tests of the system. In 1989 all of the R-31 missiles were
destroyed using the launch method, and the system was removed from combat
service. 369
R-29R (D-9R Missile System, SS-N-18)

In the middle of the 1970s the 0-9 system with single-warhead missiles was used
as the basis for the creation of the D-9R system with MIRVed missiles. Three ver-
sions of the MIRVed missile based on the R-29 were developed-R-29R, R-29RL,
and R-29RKYO
Table 5B.8 presents technical characteristics of the R-29R missile (figure 5B.7) of
the D-9R system. The first two stages of the missile were similar in general to
the design of those of the R-29 missile. The R-29R missiles, however, instead of the
single-warhead and instrument compartment of the R-29s, had a so-called combat
stage, consisting of the propulsion system, an instrument compartment, and inde-
pendently targetable warheads (one, three, or seven). The propulsion system of the
bus was a four-chamber liquid-fuel engine that provided independent targeting of
each reentry vehicle. The chambers of the engine were located on the outer conical
surface of the missile's nose section. The warheads, with a rounded cone shape, were
oriented inward and angled away from the longitudinal axis of the missile and were
located in the internal cavity of the spherical-conical second-stage fuel tank cap.
Penetration aids (decoys) were also situated in the bus. The maximum range of
the single-warhead version of the missile was 8,000 kilometers, and the MIRVed
versions had a range of 6,500 kilometers. 371
Flight tests of the missiles were conducted from November 1976 to October 1978
in the White and Barents Seas from the K-441 submarine, the lead ship ofthe Project
667BDR design. The test series consisted of 22 launches (4 single-warhead missiles,
6 with three warheads, and 12 with seven warheads).372
Fourteen strategic submarines of the Project 667BDR design were equipped
with the D-9R system. The seven-warhead model was later rejected, and all of the
missiles currently carry four warheads.

Preliminary work on a missile system with solid-propellant ICBMs began at the
Machine-Building Design Bureau (Chief Designer V. P. Makeyev) in 1971. The
Table 5B.8
Technical characteristics of the R-29R missile
Designation R-29R 3M40, RSM-50, SS-N-18, Stingray

Missile system D-9R, 16 missiles
Submarine Project 667BDR
Development began February 1973
Design bureau Machine-Building Design Bureau (KBM)
Manufacturer
Flight tests November 1976-0ctober 1978 (submarine)a
Commissioned 1979
Number of warheads and their yield 1 x 450kt, MIRV 3 x 200kt, MIRV 7 x 100kt
Payload/throw weight 1,650 kgb
Maximum range 8,000 km (single-warhead), 6,500 km (MIRVed)
Guidance inertial with full stellar correction
Accuracy CEP 900m'
Length 14.1 m b
Maximum diameter 1.80 m b
LalUlch weight 35.3tb

c T. Cochran, W. Arkin, R. Norris, and]. Sands, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Vol. 4: Soviet
development of the system, called the 0-19, with R-39 missiles (figure 5B.8) began
pursuant to a USSR Council of Ministers decree in September 1973.
Table 5B.9 presents technical characteristics of the R-39, a three-stage MIRVed
solid-propellant missile. The engines of the first and second stages have epoxy cases.
To minimize the missile's dimensions, the second- and third-stage motors have
retractable nozzles. The nose section includes a bus with a guidance system and
a liquid-fuel propulsion system that carry 10 reentry vehicles. The warheads are
rounded cones with a smaller cone angle than the warheads of earlier SLBMs. All
10 are located at the back section of the bus, around the nozzle of the third-stage
engme.
332 Chapter 5
Figure SB.7
R-29R (SS-N-18) missile
The missile is mounted m the launch tube, suspended by a special shock-

absorbing device at the top of the airframe, on a circular support in the upper section
of the tube. The missile is launched from a dry tube by a pressure accumulator. At
the instant of launch the special solid-propellant charges in the shock-absorber
system create a gas cavern around the missile to reduce the effects of hydrodynamic
pressure on the missile during the underwater phase. The first-stage engine is ignited
when the missile leaves the launch tube. 373 Flight control during the boost phase is
accomplished by the injection of exhaust gases from the sustainer engine into the
supercritical section of the nozzle through eight symmetrically arranged valves.
Flight tests of the R-39 missile were conducted in several stages, beginning in
1979. Underwater and surface launches from a dry launch tube with a pressure
accumulator were first tested by conducting nine launches from a floating test unit
Figure SB.8
and seven from the K-153, a submarine refitted according to the Project 619 design
in 1976 (one launch tube was installed outside of the ship). Integrated flight tests
from a land-based test unit on the State Central Naval Test Range (Nenoksa)
included 17 launches, but more than half were unsuccessful because of problems
with the engines of the first and second stages. After the engines had been modi-
fied, 13 launches were conducted from the lead submarine of the Project 941 design
(TK-208), 11 of which were successful,374
The D-19 system was adopted in 1984 after intensive use on board the TK-208.
Another five heavy strategic missile-armed cruisers of the Project 941 class were
later equipped with this system. Each of these ships carries 20 missiles.
The adoption of the system was followed by the development of a modified
version that had better accuracy and a larger warhead separation footprint. This
334 Chapter 5
Table 5B.9
Designation R-39 3M65, RSM-52, SS-N-20, Sturgeon

Submarine Project 619 (tests, 1 missile), Project 941
Development began September 1973
Design bureau Machine- Building Design Bureau (KBM)
Manufacturer
Flight tests from 1979'
Commissioned 1984
Number of stages 3
Propellant solid
LalUlch mode lUlderwater from a dry tube, surface
Number of warheads and their yield MIRV 10 x 100ktb
Payload/throw weight 2,550 kg'
Guidance inertial with full stellar correction
Accuracy CEP about 500 mb
Length 16.0m'
Maximum diameter 2Am a
LalUlch weight 90.0t (with the elements of the lalUlch system),a
84.0t (without the elements of the lallllch
system)a
Oxidizer
Fuel
a T. Cochran, W Arkin, R. Norris, and]. Sands, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Vol. 4: Soviet

missile was commissioned in 1989. 375 Work on the follow-up version of this missile
began in the late 1980s. The new missile system was supposed to be installed on
missile-armed submarines of the Project 941 class during scheduled maintenance.
The missile was also to be deployed on the missile submarines of the Yuri Dolgo-
rukii class. Flight tests of the modified missile began in 1996, but the first launches
were unsuccessful. 376 In July 1998, after the unsuccessful fourth test, the devel-
opment program was canceled in favor of a new solid-propellant missile to be
developed jointly by the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology and the Machine-
Building Design Bureau.
R-29RM (D-9RM Missile System, SS-N-23)

Work on an updated version of the D-9R system, the D-9RM system with the R-
29RM intercontinental missile (figure SB.9), began in the Machine-Building Design
Bureau in 1979. 377
Table SB.10 presents technical characteristics of the R-29RM, a three-stage liquid-
fuel MIRVed missile. The engines of all three stages are submerged in fuel tanks. In
contrast to those of the R-29 and R-29R, the first-stage engine of the R-29RM has
four steering chambers in addition to the main one. Another distinctive feature of
the R-29RM missile is the integration of its third-stage propulsion system with its
bus propulsion system. The two systems use common propellant tanks. 378 The R-
29RM bus is designed to carry 4 or 10 independently targetable reentry vehicles. 379
The warheads are mounted in the inner cavity of the angled cone-shaped cap of the
Figure SB.9
R-29RM (SS-N-23) missile
336 Chapter 5
Table 5B.10
Technical characteristics of the R-29RM missile
Designation R-29RM 3M37, R5M-54, 55-N-23, 5kiff

Missile system D-9RM, 16 missiles
Submarine Project 667BDRM
Development began 1979'
Design bureau Machine-Building Design Bureau (KBM)
Manufacturer
Flight tests from June 1983 (land)b
Commissioned 1986
Number of stages 3
Number of warheads and their yield 4 MIRV, tested in the MIRV lOx 100 kt
configurationb
Payload/throw weight 2,800 kg'
Guidance inertial with full stellar correction, uses satellite
navigation
Accuracy CEP 500md
Length 14.8m'
Maximum diameter 1.90m'
LalUlch weight 40.3<,

b T. Cochran, W. Arkin, R. Norris, and]. Sands, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Vol. 4: Soviet
c START I Memorandum of Understanding, 1 September 1990.
d S. G. Kolesnikov, Strategicheskoye raketno-yadernoye oruzhiye (Strategic Nuclear Missiles)
upper tank of the second stage and extend along the periphery of the third-stage
main engine. The diameter of the airframe was increased from 1.8 m to 1.9 m in the
R-29RM, which increased the fuel mass without adding much length to the missile
(an increase from 14.1 meters to 14.8). The dimensions of the launch tube were
kept the same. The R-29R's launch weight of 35.8 tons was increased to 40.3 tons
in the R-29RM, the missile's throw weight increased from 1,650 to 2,800 kilograms,
and its maximum range increased from 8,000 kilometers to 8,300.
Tests of the R-29RM began in June 1983 with a series of launches from a float-
ing test unit. These were followed by 16 launches from a land-based unit. The next
stage included final revisions and sea trials. The D-9RM system was adopted in
1986. 380
The D-9RM system is deployed on seven strategic submarines of the Project
667BDRM design, each of which carries 16 R-29RM missiles. The 10-warhead
version of the missile was not deployed.
The system had undergone one modernization by 1988. During the moderniza-
tion project, the missile was equipped with improved reentry vehicles and measures
were taken to allow depressed-trajectory launch and launch from high latitudes.
The warheads were hardened against the effects of nuclear weapons. 381
In September 1999 the Russian government decided to resume production of the
R-29RM missiles, which had been discontinued in 1998. 382 These newly produced
missiles will be used to equip Project 667BDRM submarines as they undergo
scheduled maintenance.
6
Strategic Aviation
The History of the Development of Strategic Aviation
The First Soviet Strategic Bombers

The development of strategic aviation' in the USSR was influenced considerably by
the absence of a strategic bombing tradition in the Soviet Union. Whereas Great
Britain and the United States expected bombers to play an independent role in the
performance of strategic missions during the bombing of cities in Germany and
Japan in World War II,' the Soviet Union did not assign the same significance to the
operations of bomber aircraft. Although the planes of Soviet Long-Range Aviation
(LRA) did bomb cities in Germany, these operations were not classified as strategic
missions. Long-range aircraft were primarily expected to destroy key military targets
deep within enemy territory.
Long-Range Aviation's lack of an independent strategic role was largely due to
the lack of Soviet bombers capable of executing bombing raids on a massive scale.
The only long-range bombers in the LRA were the Pe-8 aircraft, which were used
to bomb Berlin during the first months of the war.' Later in the war these aircraft
were also used for bombing missions against targets deep inside German territory.
The number of these long-range bombers was rather low, howeve~ and these raids
could not affect the strategic situation. There were only 93 of the Pe-8 aircraft at
the beginning of the war, and the number had decreased to 32 by the end. 4 The
strategic bombing operations of the Allies during World War II apparently moti-
vated the Soviet Union to begin working on the creation of its own heavy bomber
for strategic bombing raids. The work of creating this plane, known as Aircraft 64,
started in A. N. Tupolev's OKB-156 design bureau in 1943. 5
The preliminary design of Aircraft 64 was ready in August 1944, and the final
performance specifications for the new bomber were approved in 1945. By that time
340 Chapter 6
another design bureau-V. M. Myasishchev's design bureau-had submitted

two designs of a bomber comparable in characteristics and configuration to the
American B-29, but these designs were rejected. 6 Although exceptional importance
had been assigned to the Aircraft 64 project, it was clear in the middle of 1945
that the development of the plane would take a long time. Instead of continuing
the work on Aircraft 64, the Soviet leadership in June 1945 decided to order an
exact copy of the American B-29 bomber. OKB-156 was instructed to produce
the copy. Work on Aircraft 64 was first suspended and then stopped
completely.'
Work on the Soviet copy of the B-29 bombe~ designated Tu-4, was completed in
May 1947. The Tu-4 differed from the prototype in its Soviet engine and its more
powerful defensive armament. The serial production of the new bombers began that
same year, and the aircraft entered service in 1949. In all, 847 planes were built by
1952,8
When the Soviet Union acquired nuclear weapons, some of the Tu-4 bombers
were converted for nuclear missions. The modified nuclear-capable aircraft was des-
ignated Tu-4A. These aircraft were used in the first Soviet airdrop tests of nuclear
weapons and in troop exercise in Totsk in September 1954.
The First Soviet Intercontinental Bombers Although the Tu-4 was the best bomber
the USSR had in the late 1940s and early 1950s, it could be used only for strikes
within nearby theaters of war. Projects in the creation of intercontinental delivery
systems were conducted simultaneously in several fields in the late 1940s and early
1950s: the equipping of bombers with refueling systems, the establishment of
forward bases, and the development of new aircraft.
The development of midair refueling systems began in V. S. Bakhmistrov's design
bureau in 1948. Tests of the first such system developed were conducted on 16 June
1949, and in 1952 some of the Tu-4 bombers were converted into aerial tankers.
Although refueling capability made the Tu-4 bomber capable of delivering weapons
to U.S. territory, the work in the area of refueling systems was conducted only on
a limited scale. 9
Since the Soviet Union, unlike the United States, could not deploy a network of
forward-based airfields, its work in the creation of forward bases focused on inter-
mediate landings in the water or on ice airstrips. The seizure of forward-based
airfields in other countries was also considered. All of these plans were eventually
abandoned as impractica1. 10
Strategic Aviation 341
The first Soviet projects in the creation of upgraded aircraft focused on the
modernization of the Tu-4 bomber. In 1948 Tupolev's OKB-156 began working on
Aircraft 80, which represented an intermediate stage in the development of an inter-
continental bomber.11 By January 1951 it had developed Aircraft 85, which demon-
strated a range of 12,000 kilometers with a bomb load of 5,000 kilograms in flight
tests. The development of the first models of Aircraft 85 was accompanied by prepa-
rations for its serial production, but by that time the idea of developing bombers
with piston engines had been rejected, and the Aircraft 85 project was canceled in
November 1951.u
While OKB-156 was working on Aircraft 85, it and other design bureaus and
institutes were also looking into promising designs for heavy intercontinental
bombers. The specifications the Air Forces drew up in the late 1940s called for a
plane with a range of 10,000 kilometers and a maximum speed of 850 kilometers
per hour.
The specifications required the bomber to be equipped with turbojet engines. At
the same time, results of research conducted in OKB-156 in 1950 showed that
the turbojet engines the Soviet Union had or was developing at that time were not
sufficiently efficient to enable the aircraft to achieve the specified range. These
results also indicated that bombers with turboprop engines could meet the require-
ments, and preliminary work on a turboprop engine bomber began in OKB-156 in
1950.
In spite of the OKB-156 findings, Myasishchev managed to persuade the gov-
ernment that a turbojet bomber could be developed with a range of 12,000 kilo-
meters. OKB-23, headed by Myasishchev, was established on 24 March 1951 to
develop this plane. Soon after that, in July 1951, the government also approved the
work on Aircraft 95, the intercontinental turboprop bomber Tupolev had proposed.
The M-4 bomber, designed in Myasishchev's OKB-23, made its first flight on 20
January 1953. Although the plane did not achieve the necessary range, arrange-
ments for its serial production was ordered, and the M-4 entered service in Long-
Range Aviation units in 1954.
The OKB-156's Aircraft 95/1 made its first flight on 12 November 1952, and a
second model, the 95/2, equipped with the standard NK-12 engines, had been built
by February 1955. The serial production of those planes had been arranged by that
time, and the new bomber, called the Tu-95, entered service in 1956.
In 1956 OKB-23 finished working on the 3M bombe~ an updated M-4 with more
powerful and more efficient engines. The serial production of 3M bombers began
342 Chapter 6
at the end of 1956. Figure 6.1 shows stages of development and service of this and
other Soviet strategic bombers.
The 3M and Tu-95 bombers became the first Soviet intercontinental delivery
systems. By the end of the 1950s Long-Range Aviation units had around 60 3M
planes and around 60 Tu-95 planes, which could be used to deliver nuclear weapons
to u.S. territory. The bombers were deployed on airfields deep within the territory
of the USSR and were on permanent alert. 13
To increase the effective range of the bombers, the Soviet Union began work on
midair refueling capability for the new aircraft. By the end of the 1950s all of the
M-4 planes had been converted into aerial tankers for the 3M bombers, which were
equipped with the "probe-and-drogue" refueling system. In addition, plans were
drawn up for the delivery of an intercontinental strike using a network of interme-
diate polar airfields. Landings and takeoffs from temporary snow airstrips in the
Arctic were perfected during the Kupol exercise in the late 1950s. Experimental
landings of Tu-95 planes on ice airstrips were conducted in 1958. 14
The deployment of the 3M and Tu-95 bombers was followed by projects to
develop the follow-on planes. OKB-23 began developing the M-50 supersonic inter-
continental bomber, which was designed to be equipped with a cruise missile with
a range of around 1,000 kilometers to increase the aircraft's effective range, in 1956.
The M-50 made its first flight in October 1959, but all of the work in this field was
canceled when OKB-23 was closed down in 1960.1'
Eurostrategic Bombers Work on intercontinental bombers in the second half of

the 1940s occurred in tandem with the development of a bomber to replace the Tu-
4 in nearby theaters of war. Several design bureaus began working on this project
simultaneously in 1948. Two alternatives were considered: the Aircraft 88 design
proposed by Tupolev's OKB-156 and the 11-46 design of S. V. Ilyushin's design
bureau. The development of Aircraft 88 was ordered in 1950, and an experimen-
tal model of this plane made its first flight on 27 April 1952. 16 The serial produc-
tion of this plane, designated the Tu-16, was ordered soon afterward, and the new
bomber started reaching Air Force units in early 1954.17
After the work on the Tu-16 had been completed, OKB-156 started working on
a supersonic bomber intended to replace the Tu-16. In April 1958, even before the
first flight of the experimental model of the new plane, Aircraft 105 (which took
place on 21 June 1958), a decision was made to revise the design and develop
the next model, Aircraft 105A, equipped with different engines. That plane made
its first flight on 7 September 1959, and the start of the serial production of the
344 Chapter 6
resulting bomber, designated the Tu-22, was ordered soon afterwardY The new
bomber was commissioned in 1962, by which time Long-Range Aviation had 10 of
the Tu-22B planes (the model equipped for the delivery of free-fall bombs).
Equipping Bombers with Cruise Missiles The first projects in the creation of cruise
missiles in the Soviet Union began in the first half of the 1950s. The initial work in
this area concentrated on radar-guided antiship cruise missiles. The first air-launched
missile developed in the Soviet Union was the KS-1 (AS-1), created in A. I.
Mikoyan's design bureau. KS-1 missiles were carried by the naval aviation Tu-4 and
Tu-16KS aircraft. Later this design bureau developed the K-10S (AS-2) antiship
missile, deployed on Tu-16K-10 planes, and the KSR-2 and K-ll (AS-5a and AS-
5b) missiles, deployed on the Tu-16K-1l-16 bombers. These projects were con-
ducted under the supervision of A. Ya. Bereznyak. Most of the Tu-16K planes were
in naval aviation.
The development of antiaircraft missiles and jet fighter planes, which virtually
precluded the use of free-fall bombs for the destruction of targets protected
by air defense systems, drove the need to deploy cruise missiles on Long-Range
Aviation bombers. The equipping of bombers with missiles secured the possibi-
lity of delivering strikes from positions beyond the range of antiaircraft
weapons.
By the middle of the 1950s, the Kh-20 (AS-3), a supersonic cruise missile with a
range of 350-400 kilometers, had been developed. The missile was developed to be
deployed as part of the Tu-95K-20 airborne missile system, development of which
had begun in March 1955. The first test launches of the missile were conducted in
1957, and in 1959 the Tu-95K plane entered service and was commissioned. Only
15 of the Tu-95K-20 systems were built, howeve~ because the missile deployed on
the bomber reduced the plane's range considerably.19 When the work on the Tu-
95K-20 system began, the possibility of deploying the Kh-20 cruise missile on the
3M bomber was also considered, but the work in that area was canceled because
the bomber's low clearance precluded the placement of a missile under the plane's
fuselage. 20
Strategic Aviation in the 1960s

The radical revision of Soviet military doctrine in the early 1960s had a direct effect
on the subsequent development of Long-Range Aviation and a significant impact
on the state of aircraft research and engineering facilities in the Soviet Union. The
new Soviet doctrine assigned land-based ballistic missiles the principal role in the
execution of strategic missions in nearby theaters of war and on other continents.

A new branch of the armed forces was created in December 1959 to perform these
functions: the Strategic Rocket Forces.
One of the immediate results of the changes in Soviet military doctrine was the
reorganization of Long-Range Aviation in 1960, which included the disbandment
of the air armies that had been under the direct jurisdiction of the Supreme High
Command. The USSR's strategic bombers were assigned to aviation corps that were
subordinated to the Air Forces Command. Most of the design bureaus were reor-
ganized to support missile projects, and aircraft production plants were reorganized
for the production of ballistic missiles. The dissolution of Myasishchev's OKB-23
and the transfer of all the bureau's production facilities to Chelomey's OKB-52,
which was beginning to work on ballistic missiles, is a characteristic example of the
reorganization of the early 1960s.
The changes of the early 1960s brought all work on new intercontinental bombers
to a virtual halt. Design bureaus concentrated on improving existing airborne missile
systems and creating new missiles for existing aircraft.
In May 1960 Tupolev's OKB-156 began developing the probe-and-drogue refu-
eling system for the Tu-95K aircraft. The renewed need for aerial refueling resulted
from the considerable reduction in the range of the plane when it was carrying a
cruise missile. 21 The serial production of the model of the bomber with the refuel-
ing system, called the Tu-95KD, was set up in 1962, and the first Tu-95KD entered
service in 1963, with M-4-2 planes used as tankers. Another project in this field
involved equipping the Tu-22 bombers with an airborne refueling system; converted
Tu-16Z planes were used as the tankers for those aircraft.
In the early 1960s Long-Range Aviation began working on tactics that could be
used to penetrate enemy air defenses. At that time Air Forces units began experi-
mental flights of Tu-95 and 3M bombers at low altitudes. In addition, new air-
launched cruise missiles continued to be developed. The KSR-5 (AS-6) and Kh-22
(AS-4) cruise missiles, developed in the 1960s, were originally intended for the
Tu-22 bombers. The KSR-5 was an antiship missile with a range of about 300 kilo-
meters, and it was developed both as a conventional antiship missile and as a nuclear
warhead missile capable of striking ground targets. The KSR-5 missiles were part
of the Tu-16K-10-26 and Tu-16K-26 airborne missile systems.
The Kh-22 missile, which also had a range of about 300 kilometers, was intended
from the beginning for deployment on Long-Range Aviation bombers. The airborne
missile system that included the Tu-22K bomber and the Kh-22 missile was
commissioned in 1964, but the results of the development project were not
346 Chapter 6
completely satisfactory, because the Tu-22K could carry only one missile and was
inferior in this respect to the Tu-16 it was supposed to replace (which carried two
missiles).
The main development project of the 1960s was the new supersonic bomber to
replace the Tu-16 and Tu-22 planes, which did not meet all Air Forces specifica-
tions. The preliminary specifications for the new plane were drawn up in 1961. The
bomber was intended to have a range of 2,000 kilometers and be equipped with
two or three supersonic long-range cruise missiles.
The design bureaus of A. N. Tupolev, P. o. Sukhoy, and A. S. Yakovlev were com-
peting for the new bomber project. 22 The T-4 (Sotka) design proposed by Sukhoy
Design Bureau was chosen in 1962. The bureau was originally expected also to
develop the Kh-45 missile to be used on the bomber, but this development project
was later turned over to the Raduga Design BureauP
During the work on the T-4 project, Sukhoy Design Bureau ran into several
problems, primarily in connection with the high cost of the project. In addition, in
1964, OKB-156 drew up an alternative design, Aircraft 145, and submitted it to
the Soviet leadership as a comparatively inexpensive upgrade of the existing Tu-22
bomber. A decree was issued in 1964 authorizing development of Aircraft 145, later
called the Tu-22M. The final decision on the serial production of the Tu-22M at
the aircraft plant in Kazan, which originally had been expected to produce the T-
4, was made in 1967.24 The production order for the T-4 was reduced from the orig-
inal 250 planes to 50, and the responsibility for the production was shifted to the
Tushino Plant in Moscow. An experimental model of the T-4 made its first flight in
August 1972, but work on the project was suspended soon after the start of serial
production of the Tu-22M."
The first model of Aircraft 145, designated the Tu-22MO, was ready in August
1969. A small series of nine Tu-22MO planes was built in 1969-1971, and nine Tu-
22M1 planes were built in 1971-1972. Production of the Tu-22M2, which could
carry up to three Kh-22 missiles, began in 1972, and the plane was commissioned
in 1976.26
The Tu-22M bomber27 was the source of disagreements between the Soviet Union
and United States during the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks the two nations con-
ducted in the 1970s. The United States insisted that the Tu-22M could deliver strikes
to U.S. territory and consequently should be considered a strategic bomber. The
Soviet Union kept arguing that the bomber did not have strategic capabilities. To
settle the problem of the strategic capabilities of the Tu-22M, when the Soviet Union
signed the SALT II Treaty in 1979 it pledged not to give this bomber midair
refueling capability and not to produce more than 30 Tu-22M bombers a year.
The Creation of Modern Bombers

Changes in the political leadership of the Soviet Union in 1964 led to another revi-
sion of the basic premises of military doctrine by the end of the 1960s and resulted
in the assignment of priority in Soviet military policy to the achievement of quan-
titative and qualitative weapons parity with the United States. One of the results of
the change of policy was the start of work on a new supersonic strategic bomber
in the late 1960s. The preliminary specifications for the new bomber were drawn
up in the Air Forces in 1967 and called for the bomber to be equipped with long-
range Kh-45 missiles and short-range missiles for the penetration of enemy air
defenses. The only design that met these specifications was the design drawn up at
Sukhoy Design Bureau in 1969-1970 for the T-4MS bomber, a plane with a
variable-sweep wing based on the T-4 design. The Air Force Command objected to
Sukhoy's participation in the new bomber project, however, because the design
bureau was so busy with other aircraft design projects.
The preliminary specifications for the bomber were therefore revised in 1970 and
the competition was reopened, this time with the participation of Tupolev's OKB-
156. Sukhoy resubmitted the T-4MS design. In addition, Myasishchev submitted a
design of an M-18 plane, similar in general to the United States' B-1 bomber, and
the M-20, a canard-type aircraft. Both were planes with a variable-geometry wing.
OKB-156 submitted the designs of Aircrafts 132 and 135, similar to the Tu-144
passenger jet.
Because the decision to award the development project for the new bomber to
OKB-156 was made in the earliest stages of the competition, the Air Forces insisted
that the bureau start work on a version of the design with a variable-geometry wing.
OKB-156 (by this time headed by A. A. Tupolev) then submitted the design for the
modified craft with the variable-geometry wing, Product 70, in 1975, and it was
approved for development. The plane, later called the Tu-160, made its first flight
in December 1981. The new bomber was originally slated to carry the hypersonic
long-range solid-propellant Kh-45 missile. Soon after the work on the Tu-160 began,
however, a decision was made to equip it with long-range Kh-55 cruise missiles
instead.
The first Tu-160 bombers started reaching Air Forces units in May 1987. These
bombers could carry 12 Kh-55 cruise missiles on rotary launchers in their bomb
bays. They could also carry 24 short-range Kh-15 (AS-16) attack missiles instead
of the Kh-55 missiles.
The modernization of the existing Soviet bomber force continued while the new
strategic bomber was being developed. The Tu-95K/KD bombers were equipped
with new avionics in the mid-1960s. The refitted planes, designated Tu-95KM, had
348 Chapter 6
an inertial navigation system, new electronic warfare systems, and a new radar. The
bombers' Kh-20 missiles were replaced with Kh-20M missiles with longer range.
The modernization also increased the bomber's effective operating radius.
The beginning of Tu-22M2 production was followed by a modernization project
resulting in the Tu-22M3 bombe~ distinguished from the previous model by its
lighter weight, more powerful engines and, as a consequence of this, a larger
payload. The Tu-22M3 made its first flight on 20 June 1977, and the new bomber
was commissioned in 1983.
The decision was made in February 1973 to start a project for the deployment
of Kh-22 missiles on Tu-95 bombers. The new Tu-95K-22 system included one or
two missiles on pylons under the wing or in the cargo bay. The Tu-95K-22 bomber
made its first flight in October 1975, and conversion of the existing Tu-95K planes
into Tu-95K-22s began in the late 1970s; this model has been in service since the
mid-1980s. The Tu-95K, Tu-95KD, and Tu-95KM bombers were also converted
into delivery systems for Kh-22 missiles. The possibility of equipping the Tu-95 with
KSR-5 missiles was also considered, and the Tu-95M-5 plane was developed, but
this project was abandoned when a decision was made in favor of the Tu-95K-22
and the start of the work on the Tu-95MS bomber.
The possibility of deploying Kh-55 (AS-15) missiles on Tu-95 planes was also
considered during the project to equip the Tu-95 bombers with cruise missiles, and
a Tu-95-55 plane was developed and equipped for tests. The plane passed in-plant
trials in 1978, but the conversion of the entire Tu-95 force was never ordered, as
the new Tu-95MS planes were chosen for production instead of the conversion of
the existing bombers. The Tu-95MS was a modification of the Tu-142, a naval
reconnaissance aircraft, which was, in turn, a modification of the Tu-95 bomber.
The Tu-95MS made its first flight in September 1979 and entered service in 1984.
The plane originally carried six Kh-55 missiles (the Tu-95MS6 version). Later the
number of missiles was increased to 16 by mounting 10 missiles on pylons under
the wing (the Tu-95MS16 version).28
The Present State and Future of Strategic Aviation

In September 1990 Soviet Long-Range Aviation units were armed with 83 Tu-95MS
aircraft-56 Tu-95MS16 and 27 Tu-95MS6-and 13 Tu-160 bombers. In addition,
another Tu-95MS16 bomber and two Tu-160 bombers had been built and were
still in the production plants in Kuybyshev and Kazan. Long-Range Aviation also
had 46 Tu-95K-22, 16 Tu-22K, and 1 Tu-95M. Another 10 Tu-160 bombers
and 4 Tu-95MS16 planes had been built before the end of 1991. Some of the
bombers were outside Russia-in Kazakhstan and Ukraine-when the Soviet Union
broke up. By now all of the serviceable bombers in Kazakhstan have been with-
drawn and moved to Russia. Ukraine, however, claimed the planes left within its
territory as its own, so it had 19 Tu-160 planes and 25 Tu-95MS planes in its
possession as of 1991.
Russia has long been seeking to transfer these bombers from Ukraine to Russia.
The possibility of transfer was discussed until 1997, when Russia announced that
it did not want to buy the planes. The talks were resumed, however, in 1999 and
eventually resulted in the transfer of 8 Tu-160 and 3 Tu-95MS aircraft from Ukraine
to the Russian base in Engels.
All of the Tu-95K and Tu-95K-22 planes within Russian territory have been elim-
inated. Table 6.1 presents the total numbers of these and other Soviet and Russian
strategic bombers as well as the weapons that they carry.
After the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia announced that it would stop
producing new bombers. The facilities for the production of the Tu-95MS planes
at the plant in Samara were closed down in 1995. In 1997, however, the plant
in Kazan began work on finishing construction of those Tu-160 planes that had
been mothballed in 1992. The first of these aircraft entered service in May
2000.
Russia now has 65 Tu-95MS bombers and 15 Tu-160 planes, counting the ones
transferred from Ukraine and those newly produced. In their present state, the
bombers are capable of carrying 900 cruise missiles. All of the Tu-95MS and Tu-
160 bombers were built in the second half of the 1980s, so they probably could
remain in service in Long-Range Aviation at least until 2010 and perhaps as long
as until 2015. Russia is now working on the creation of new cruise missiles to
replace the missiles with which Long-Range Aviation is equipped today.29
The Structure of Strategic Aviation Long-Range Aviation has undergone several

changes during its existence that reflected the capabilities of bombers and the
changes in the role assigned to bomber aviation in the performance of operational-
strategic and strategic functions.
At the end of the 1930s the Soviet armed forces set up three special-purpose air
armies directly subordinated to the Supreme High Command. These special-purpose
armies included heavy- and light-bomber and fighter brigades 30 and were expected
to conduct broad-scale operational-strategic missions.
The special-purpose armies were disbanded in 1940 and their heavy-bomber reg-
iments were reorganized as the Long-Range Bomber Aviation of the Supreme High
Table 6.1
Deployed Soviet and Russian strategic bombers and their weapons
Strategic bombers 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
3M 20 23 40 50 56 58 58 58 58 58 54 54 54 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52
Tu-95 35 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
Tu-95K 20 37 47 57 65 69 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70
Tu-95K-22
Tu-95MS
Tu-160
Total bombers 20 58 85 115 138 150 160 168 172 173 169 154 154 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 152
Strategic bomber
w eapons
3M 1/2 40 46 80 100 112 116 116 116 116 116 108 108 108 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104
Tu-95 1/2 70 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60
Ty-95K 20 37 47 57 65 69 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70
Tu-95K-22 1/2
Tu-95MS 6/16
Tu-160 12
Long-range air-
launch ed cruise
missiles
START 1-
accountabl e
w ea pons
Total weapons 40 116 170 210 239 253 263 270 275 276 268 238 238 234 234 234 234 234 234 234 234 234
Strategic bombers 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
3M 52 52 52 52 52 52 45 30 15 o
Tu-95 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 20 10 o
Tu-95K 70 70 70 70 60 50 40 30 24 20 20 16 16 16 o
Tu-95K-22 10 20 30 40 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 35 24 17 10 10 7 2 o
Tu-95MS 20 30 40 55 65 80 84 86 65 65 65 63 63 63 62 62 62
Tu-160 11 15 19 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 15
Total bombers III ill III III ill 152 165 160 155 151 159 163 162 157 117 106 95 86 79 79 75 72 77
Strategic bomber
weapons
3M 112 104 104 104 104 104 104 90 60 30 o
Tu-95 1/2 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 40 20 2 o
Ty-95K 70 70 70 70 60 50 40 30 24 20 20 16 16 16 o
Tu-95K-22 112 20 40 60 80 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 70 48 34 20 20 14 4
Tu-95MS 6116 120 180 240 330 390 480 504 516 390 390 390 378 378 378 372 372 372
Tu-160 12 96 132 180 228 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 96 180
Long-rang e air- 120 180 240 830 486 612 684 744 462 462 462 450 450 450 444 468 552
launched cruis e
missiles
START 1- 855 902 614 603 592 569 562 562 551 562 616
accountable
weapons
Total weapons 234 234 234 234 244 254 370 410 446 502 638 740 794 852 554 532 510 484 470 470 458 472 552
Not(: From Robert S. Norris and Thomas B. Cochran, U.S.-USSR/Russian Strat(gic Off~nsjv~ Nuclwr Paras (NRDC, 1997), pp. 38-41; Paul Duffy and Andrei Kandalov, Tupolw: Th~ Man
and His Aircraft (Ailife Publishing, 1996), p. 223; and The START Treaty Memorandums of Understanding Data. All Tu-95MS bombers are counted as carrying six cruise missiles. Starting from
1992, data are for Russia only.
352 Chapter 6
Command in November 1940. It consisted of five aviation corps and three separate
air divisions. The aviation corps were dissolved after the start of World War II, and
the number of planes in the regiments was reduced from 60 to 20. Units of Long-
Range Bomber Aviation were transferred at that time to the jurisdiction of front
commanders.
A directive of the State Defense Council dated 5 March 1942 reorganized Long-
Range Bomber Aviation as Long-Range Aviation, under the direct jurisdiction of
Supreme High Command headquarters. LRA forces were assigned the responsi-
bility of delivering strikes against enemy operational and strategic rear services. By
summer 1943 Long-Range Aviation had more than 1,000 planes united in eight
aviation corps. Only an extremely limited number of LRA bombers had a range of
several thousand kilometers, however, and they could not be used for strategic
bombing raids like the ones the United States and Great Britain were conducting in
Germany in 1943-1945. This was probably one of the reasons that the LRA was
converted into the 18th Air Army in December 1944 and transferred to the juris-
diction of the Air Force Command.
In April 1946 the 18th Air Army was the basis for a revived Long-Range Avia-
tion of the Armed Forces of the USSR, consisting of the 18th, 43rd, and 50th air
armies. After the first missile systems began to be deployed in the mid-1950s, LRA
acquired engineer regiments armed with R-12 and R-14 missiles. In the second half
of the 1950s the LRA included 18 missile regiments.
Nuclear weapons were issued to LRA units for the first time in 1954-1955. The
establishment of technical bases on LRA airfields for the storage and maintenance
of nuclear weapons was completed by the end of 1954, and the issuing of nuclear
weapons to active units began soon afterward. The nuclear weapons in those
technical facilities were handled by the personnel of a new main directorate of the
Ministry of Medium Machine Building, and they were never officially turned over
to the armed forces.
After the intercontinental 3M and Tu-95 began reaching its units, Long-Range
Aviation missions included the delivery of strategic strikes on other continents
in addition to the destruction of targets in nearby theaters of war. Until the early
1960s, LRA bombers were the only Soviet delivery systems capable of executing a
strategic strike within U.S. territory.
LRA was reorganized in the early 1960s when all LRA units equipped with bal-
listic missiles were transferred to a new service of the armed forces: the Strategic
Rocket Forces. The LRA air armies were disbanded, and their divisions and regi-
ments were transferred to the heavy-bomber aviation corps subordinate to the Air
Force Command. This reorganization reflected the changes in aviation's role in the
new Soviet military doctrine of the time, assigning the highest priority to strategic
missile strikes. The functions of LRA units became participation in a nuclear strike
by strategic nuclear forces and the destruction of critical targets in nearby theaters
of war and on other continents.
The basic elements of Long-Range Aviation structure remained the same through-
out the 1960s and 1970s. Changes that were made primarily affected the internal
structure of large and small aviation units. In particular, the air divisions con-
sisting of two air regiments were converted into three-regiment divisions in the
1970s.
The next significant change in the structure of strategic aviation occurred in 1980
as part of the broader reorganization of the Soviet armed forces. The headquarters
of the LRA Command and the LRA Staff were eliminated. The armed forces then
had five air armies, two of which (the 37th Moscow and 46th Smolensk) were strate-
gic and three of which (the 4th, 24th, and 30th) were theate~ under the direct juris-
diction of the Supreme High Command." In 1988 the LRA Command was restored
using the command element of the 37th Moscow Air Army. Since the 37th strate-
gic army was disbanded, the 30th theater Irkutsk Air Army was converted into the
30th Strategic Air Army.
When the Russian Federation armed forces were being formed, the structure of
the headquarters of the LRA commander were kept intact, but the command struc-
tures of the air armies were dissolved in 1994. During this process, the strategic
bombers of the Russian armed forces were transferred to divisions under the direct
jurisdiction of the LRA commander. The present LRA structure includes air divi-
sions of the Tu-95MS and Tu-160 strategic bombers and an air division of Tu-22M3
long-range bombers." Plans for the reform of the Air Forces call for the elimina-
tion of the LRA Command and the creation of a single air army incorporating all
of these units.
The Locations of Strategic Aviation Units

By the time the Soviet Union broke up, strategic bombers were in service in two air
armies under the jurisdiction of the Long-Range Aviation Command: the 46th
Smolensk Army and the 30th Irkutsk Army (the locations of main bases are shown
in figure 6.2). Among the units of the 30th Irkutsk Air Army were
• the 79th Heavy-Bomber Air Division, stationed in Semipalatinsk (Kazakhstan)
and made up of the 1223rd and 1226th Tu-95MS air regiments (27 Tu-95MS6 air-
craft and 13 Tu-95MS16 aircraft)33
• Strategic bomber ba ses
o Form er stra tegic bomber bases
• Flight le$ \ center
Figure 6.2
Strategi c bomber bases
• the 73rd Heavy-Bomber Air Division, stationed in Ukrainka and made up

of three regiments of Tu-95K and Tu-95K-22 bombers (15 Tu-95Ks and 46
Tu-95K-22s)
• the 31st (Belaya), 55th (Vozdvizhenka), and 201st (Engels) Heavy-Bomber Air
Divisions, made up of Tu-22M bombers
Among the units of the 46th Smolensk Army were
• the 106th Heavy-Bomber Air Division, made up of a Tu-95MS bomber regiment
(25 Tu-95MS16 aircraft) stationed in Uzin (Ukraine), a Tu-95MS bomber regiment
(22 Tu-95MSs) stationed in Mozdok, and the 409th regiment of 11-78 tankers sta-
tioned in Uzin 34
• the 13th Heavy-Bomber Air Division, which included the 184th regiment of
Tu-160 bombers (19 aircraft) stationed in Priluki (Ukraine)
• the 15th (Ozernoye), 22nd (Bobruysk, Belarus), and 326th (Tartu, Estonia) Heavy-
Bomber Air Divisions, made up of Tu-22M bombers
All of Russia's strategic bombers are now united in air divisions under the juris-
diction of the Strategic Aviation High Command. The Strategic Aviation of the
Russian Air Forces includes the following units:
• the 22nd Heavy-Bomber Air Division, made up of the 121st Guards Heavy-
Bomber Air Regiment of Tu-160 bombers (15 aircraft) stationed in Engels," the
182nd Heavy-Bomber Air Regiment of Tu-95MS bombers (25 Tu-95MS aircraft)
transferred to Engels from Mozdok,36 and the 203rd Guards Heavy-Bomber Air
Regiment of tankers based in Engels37
• the 73rd Heavy-Bomber Air Division in Ukrainka, made up of two air regiments
of Tu-95MS aircraft (16 Tu-95MS16s and 26 Tu-95MS6s) transferred to Ukrainka
from Semipalatinsk.
In addition to these units, Strategic Aviation has three divisions of Tu-22M3
bombers stationed in the European and Asian parts of Russia, the training center
in Ryazan, and other units.
Bomber Development and Production
The Development of Bombers

OKB-156 A. N. Tupolev's design bureau (OKB-156) was established back in 1922
when an experimental design bureau was set up in the Central Aerohydro-
dynamics Institute (TsAGI) for the design and production of different types of
full-metal aircraft. This bureau and the institute's Metal Plane Construction
356 Chapter 6
Commission were headed by A. N. Tupolev. In 1936 a design department of that

institute (the experimental construction sector) and the experimental structures
plant separated from the institute and united to form Aviation Plant 156 of the
People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry. In 1938-1941 that plant was the base for
the Central Design Bureau No. 29 of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs
(NKVD), which was the workplace of many of the aviation experts who had been
repressed in those years, including Tupolev, V. M. Petlyakov, V. M. Myasishchev,
and R. L. Bartini. The production facilities of Central Design Bureau No. 29 were
used to build experimental models of the planes designed in the bureau. In July
1941 the enterprise was moved to Omsk,38 but it moved back to Moscow in mid-
1943 and continued to operate as Plant 156, which later became OKB-156, with
Tupolev as its head.
OKB-156 developed the Tu-4 strategic bomber (chief designer A. N. Tupolev),
and the Tu-16, Tu-22, and Tu-22M bombers (lead designer and later chief designer
D. S. Markov). The Tu-95 bomber was developed under the supervision of Markov
and N. I. Bazenkov; Bazenkov later became the chief designer of the whole Tu-95
family of aircraft. After Bazenkov's death in 1976, N. V. Kirsanov became the
Tu-95's chief designer, and he was succeeded in the late 1980s by D. A. Antonov.
The Tu-160 plane was developed under the supervision of chief designer V. I.
Bliznyuk.
A. N. Tupolev headed OKB-156 until his death in 1972. A. A. Tupolev (his son)
has occupied the position of general designer at OKB-156 since 1973.
OKB-156 is now called the A. N. Tupolev Aviation Scientific and Technical
Complex, made up of the main design and production association and experimen-
tal plant in Moscow, a branch in Tomilino, a flight test facility in Zhukovskiy, and
the Samara, Kazan, and Voronezh branches of the design bureau.
OKB-23 OKB-23 was established on 24 March 1951 pursuant to a Council of

Ministers decree ordering the development of a jet bomber with intercontinental
range. The design bureau was established on the grounds of Aviation Plant 23 in
Moscow. The bomber projects were supervised by V. M. Myasishchev, who became
the general designer of OKB-23 in 1956.
When OKB-23 was established, Myasishchev drew up the plans for the 1M
(M-2) bomber, which later served as the model for the M-4 strategic bomber (also
known as the 2M, the 103M, and Project 25). An experimental model of the M-4
was built in December 1952. The next OKB-23 development project was the 3M
bomber (also known as the M-6 and 201M), built in 1956. 39 From 1956 to 1960
OKB-23 and Aviation Plant 23 worked on modified versions of the 3M bombers

with different engines.
In 1953 OKB-23 began developing a refueling system for the 3M bomber to
increase its range and used the M-4, 3MS, and 3MN bombers as the models for the
M-4-2, 3MS-2, and 3MN-2 aerial tankers. The work on the M-4 and 3M bombers
and the follow-up engineering and refitting of these planes at OKB-23 were accom-
panied by supersonic bomber design projects. All of this work began in 1952 and
included the review and consideration of the M-30, M-31, M-32, M-33, M-34, and
other bomber designs. The M-34 was a plane with a takeoff weight of 180 tons,
a cruising speed of 1,350-1,450 kilometers per hour, an effective range of 8,000
kilometers, and a flight altitude of 17,000 meters.40 Neither of the M-30-M-34
projects was completed.
Work on the M-50 supersonic intercontinental bomber began at OKB-23 in 1956.
The bomber's effective radius was to be increased by equipping it with M-59 and M-
61 missiles with a range of up to 1,000 kilometers, which were also being developed
at that time in OKB-23. An experimental model of the M-50 bomber made its first
flight on 27 October 1959. Work on the experimental model was accompanied by
the development of another plane, the M-52, modeled on the M-50.
The work on the M-50 and M-52 bombers and the development of cruise
missiles stopped in October 1960 when OKB-23 was liquidated. Its production
facilities were turned over to V. N. Chelomey's OKB-52, which was working on the
creation of ballistic missiles. Myasishchev was appointed director of the Central
Aerohydrodynamics Institute.
In 1967 Myasishchev became the general designer of the experimental machine-
building plant established in 1966 on the grounds of the former flight test range of
OKB-23.41 In the early 1970s Myasishchev participated in the competition for the
supersonic bomber project, submitting the designs for the M-18 and M-20 bombers.
The Production of Bombers

The serial production of strategic bombers was concentrated at the aviation plants
in Kazan and Kuybyshev. Plants in Moscow and Voronezh also participated in the
serial production of bombers. Figure 6.3 shows locations of main design bureaus
and production facilities involved in development and production of strategic
bombers.
The first models of the Tu-4 plane were built at State Aviation Plant 22 in Kazan
(now the Kazan Aviation Production Association). In 1952 the Kazan plant began
building Tu-16 bombers. In 1959, after the Tu-22 development project had been
Figure 6.3
Locations of the main development and production facilities of the aviation industry
completed, the plant became the only producer of Tu-22 planes and was later the
sole producer of all of the Tu-22M models, which were built between 1959 and
1969. An experimental series of nine Tu-22MO planes was produced at the plant in
1969-1971, and a comparable series of nine Tu-22M1 planes was built there in
1971-1972. Production of Tu-22M2 planes began at Plant 22 in 1972 and contin-
ued until 1983. In all, the plant built 211 of those planes. The serial production of
Tu-22M3 planes began at the plant in 1976. By 1993 the plant had built 268 of
those planes.42 Preparations for the production of the T-4 bomber at the plant also
began in the early 1970s, but the work was halted in 1974 when the project was
canceled.
The first serial models of the Tu-160 bombers were built at the Kazan plant in
1987. By 1992, when the Russian leadership decided to suspend the production of
heavy bombers, Plant 22 had built 33 of the Tu-160 planes. 43 A few other bombers
in production were also mothballed in 1992. Work on those planes was resumed in
1997, and in May 2000 the first of these aircraft entered service.
After the decision was made to start serial production of Tu-16 bombers, it
was ordered that such production also be arranged at Plant 1 in Kuybyshev and
Plant 64 in Voronezh in addition to Plant 22, which was the main producer of the
Tu-16 planes, was ordered. Plants 1 and 64 continued building Tu-16 planes until
1963.
One of the plants participating in the production of Tu-4 bombers was State
Aviation Plant 18 in Kuybyshev (now the Aviakor Company in Samara), which
produced Tu-4 planes from 1949 to 1952. The plant also built the first Tu-95 planes
in 1955 as well as 50 Tu-95 and Tu-95M planes in 1955-1958. After 1958, Plant
18 became the sole producer of the Tu-95 bomber and its different models, includ-
ing the new Tu-95MS planes built between 1981 and 1992. The possibility of
resuming the production of Tu-95MS planes in Samara existed until 1995, when
the assembly facilities were dismantled. 44 The serial production of one of the Tu-95
models, the Tu-142 aircraft, was organized at Plant 18 and then moved to
Taganrog in the mid-1970s.
Bombers developed in OKB-23 were produced at Experimental Plant 23 III
Moscow (the Plant in Fili, now the Khrunichev Machine-Building Plant), which also
produced Tu-4 planes until 1952. The M-4 and 3M bombers continued to be built
and refitted there until the beginning of the 1960s. The plant also built the experi-
mental model of the M-50 bomber. After OKB-23 was shut down in 1960, the plant
was turned over to Chelomey's OKB-52 and was later converted for the production
of missiles.
360 Chapter 6
The Development of Aircraft Engines

Several design bureaus participated in the development of engines for the bombers
developed during the postwar years in the Soviet Union. The engine for the first
Soviet long-range bomber, the Tu-4, was developed under the supervision of A. D.
Shvetsov in OKB-19 (later the Perm Motor Design Bureau and now the Aviadviga-
tel Company in Perm). The ASh-73TK water-cooled piston engine generated 2,400
horsepower (1,790 kilowatts).45 It was produced at Plant 36 in Rybinsk (the Rybinsk
Motor Production Association after 1976 and now the Rybinsk Motor Company;
in 1997 it merged with the Rybinsk Motor Design Bureau).
The VD-4K piston engine was developed in the Rybinsk Design Bureau (OKB-
36, and the Rybinsk Motor Design Bureau after 1966) in 1951 and was installed
on the experimental model of OKB-156's Aircraft 85. V. A. Dobrynin and his suc-
cessor P. A. Kolesov supervised the development of turbojet engines in OKB-36. The
Rybinsk Design Bureau's first jet engine development project was the VD-5 engine,
which was intended for the M-4 bomber. Next it developed the VD-7 turbojet engine
for the first 3M bombers, which had a thrust of 11,000 kilograms (107.8 kilonew-
tons). This engine was also intended to be used in the M-50 bomber. Later the
bureau developed several modified versions of the VD-7 engine. The VD-7V, which
was more efficient and easier to maintain than the VD-7, was installed on the 3MD
and 3MN bombers. It had a slightly lower thrust than the VD-7: 9,500 kilograms
(93.1 kilonewtons). Another version of the engine, the VD-7P, was developed for
the 3ME high-altitude bomber.
By 1958 the Rybinsk Design Bureau had developed the VD-7M engine, with a
thrust of 16,000 kilograms (156.9 kilonewtons), which was installed on Tu-22
aircraft. The engine was later improved, and its thrust was increased to 17,500
kilograms (171.8 kilonewtons). The new model, called the RD-7M-2, was installed
on Tu-22 bombers starting in 1965.
One of the first Soviet turbojet engines that could be installed on a strategic
bomber was the AM-3 engine, developed in A. A. Mikulin's design bureau in
Moscow (Plant 300, now the Soyuz Scientific Production Association. This engine,
with a thrust of 8,750 kilograms (85.8 kilonewtons), was used on the first M-4
bombers and the Tu-16 bombers. Mikulin's design bureau also designed the
more powerful and efficient RD-3M and RD-3M-500 (10,500 kilograms/l02.9
kilonewtons) engines, using the AM-3 engine as a model. The new engines were
installed on the M-4 and Tu-16 bombers and on the 3M bomber (the 3MS model)
starting in 1956.
Another design bureau participating in the development of engines for the first jet
aircraft was V. Ya. Klimov's design bureau in Leningrad (Plant 117, now the Klimov
NPO). The first turbojet engine developed in this design bureau, the VK-1, was a
modification of the RD-45 engine, which was, in turn, a licensed version of Rolls
Royce's Nene engine. The turbocharged version of this engine, the RD-45F, was used
on the 11-28 and Tu-14 planes and on Aircraft 82, one of the prototypes developed
during the Tu-16 bomber development projects.
The Kuznetsov Design Bureau was involved in the development of turboprop
engines. The design projects for these engines were supervised by N. D. Kuznetsov,
who later headed a motor design bureau in Kuybyshev (now the Trud NPO).
German specialists were involved in the bureau's work on the TV-2 engine, modeled
on the German UMO-022 engine and developed under Kuznetsov's supervision. A
propulsion unit that included two turbocharged TV-2 engines, the 2TV-2F, with
around 12,000 effective horsepowe~ was installed on the Aircraft 9511, the first
experimental model of the Tu-95 bomber.
The TV-12 (also known as the NK-12) engine by 1955 by the Kuznetsov Design
Bureau and was installed on Aircraft 95/2 and on the first serial-production Tu-95
planes. This engine had 12,500 effective horsepower (9,330 kilowatts). The Tu-95
planes were later equipped with the more powerful NK-12M engines (15,000 effec-
tive horsepowerlll,190 kilowatts) and the updated NK-12MV and NK-12MP. At
the end of the 1950s the bureau was also working on a new engine for the Tu-95,
the NK-20, but this project was canceled. The NK-20 engine was intended to have
18,000 effective horsepower. Another unfinished development project was the
NK-16 engine, intended for the high-altitude Tu-96 bomber. Work on this project
was later suspended and the engine was never built.
N. D. Kuznetsov's design bureau became the main developer of turbojet engines
for bombers in the second half of the 1950s. At the end of the 1950s the bureau
was working on the NK-6 engine for one of the models of Aircraft 105A (the
Tu-22 project). The NK-6 was later designated for Aircraft 125 (also part of the
Tu-22M project). These projects were never finished, howeve~ because work on
the NK-6 engine was never completed.
The Kuznetsov Design Bureau's first turbojet engine installed on a serial-
production bomber was the NK-144-22 engine, a modified version of the NK-144,
developed for the Tu-144 supersonic passenger aircraft and installed on the first Tu-
22M bombers. The NK-22 engine, with a thrust of 20,000 kilograms (196 kilo-
newtons) was another update of the NK-144-22 design and was used on the
362 Chapter 6
Tu-22M1 and Tu-22M2 bombers. A later attempt by the bureau to modernize the
engine produced the NK-23, but this model was never adopted for use.
A new three-shaft engine with electronic controls, the NK-25, was developed by
the bureau and used on the last Tu-22M2 bombers. This engine, with a thrust of
25,000 kilograms (245 kilonewtons), was also used on the Tu-22M3 and Tu-22MR
planes. In 1977 the Kuznetsov Design Bureau began working on a new NK-32
engine. The tests of the engine, with a thrust of 25,000 kilograms, began in 1980,
and the engine was later installed on all of the Tu-160 planes.
The Development of Cruise Missiles

The first cruise missiles for Soviet aircraft were developed in the beginning of the
1950s by A. I. Mikoyan's design bureau. The department responsible for develop-
ing the cruise missiles was headed by A. Ya. Bereznyak, who supervised the KS-1
(AS-1), K-10S (AS-2), KSR-2 and KSR-ll (AS-5) projects. All of these projects
involved antiship missiles that were used by naval aviation. In addition, Mikoyan's
design bureau developed the Kh-20 (AS-3) cruise missile, which could destroy
targets deep within enemy territory. This missile was used on the Long-Range
Aviation strategic Tu-95K bombers.
That department of the design bureau later became a separate design bureau
developing air-launched missiles. Bereznyak headed the new design bureau, known
as the Raduga Design Bureau. This bureau developed the KSR-5 (AS-6) antiship
cruise missile, used by naval aviation in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and the Kh-
22 (AS-4) cruise missile, used on the Tu-22, Tu-22M, and Tu-95K-22 bombers.
When the work on the T-4 bomber project began at the Sukhoy Design Bureau
in 1962, development also began on the solid-propellant Kh-45 aero ballistic missile
for the new bomber.46 The project was soon turned over to the Raduga Design
Bureau, but it was never finished, because the T-4 project was canceled. The pos-
sibility of using the Kh-45 missile on the new Tu-160 strategic bomber was con-
sidered in the second half of the 1970s, but the Kh-55 cruise missile was chosen for
that bomber instead.
Development of the Kh-55 (AS-15) long-range cruise missile, similar in capabili-
ties to the u.s. Tomahawk cruise missile, began in the Raduga Design Bureau in
1976. The first test flight of the missile was conducted in 1978, and the missile was
officially commissioned on 31 December 1981.47 The Kh-55 cruise missile is
deployed on the Tu-95MS and Tu-160 bombers, each of which has its own version
of the missile. The Kh-55M (AS-15C), a nonstrategic version of the missile, was
also developed.
In the late 1950s projects for the development of two cruise missiles, the M-59
and M-61, were conducted at OKB-23 as part of the work on the M-50 strategic
bomber. Work on these missiles stopped when the M-50 project was canceled and
OKB-23 was liquidated.
Table 6.2 provides details on the characteristics of the various Soviet air-launched
cruise missiles.
Strategic Aviation Operations
Of all the components of the strategic forces, strategic aviation is the most highly
dependent on high levels of combat readiness for its invulnerability. During peace-
time, however, the Soviet Union never kept its strategic bombers on alert with
nuclear munitions. The Russian Long-Range Aviation presumably follows the Soviet
practice.
In peacetime Long-Range Aviation units perform training flights in accordance
with the established flight training program. Nuclear weapons for bombers are
stored at technical facilities (maintenance and technical bases, or RTBs) close to
airbases.48
Bombers are supposed go to a higher degree of readiness only during a period of
tensions. The order that raises the readiness level of strategic aviation as well as
other forces is probably issued by the General Staff of the armed forces. Following
such an order, Air Forces units reinforce the command center personnel. The exact
composition of units that are put on higher alert is determined by the General Staff,
which takes into account the circumstances and its operational plans. As the crisis
develops, more units may be put on alert, and some aircraft could be dispersed to
backup airfields, where they continue to prepare for their missions.
When the degree of readiness is raised, engineering crews prepare the bombers
for flight. This preparation includes fueling cruse missiles (if necessary), loading
them onto bombers, and preparing the aircraft for takeoff. The crews then assume
their positions; in some cases bombers many start their engines. This highest degree
of readiness could be sustained for about one hour.
A distinctive feature of strategic aviation is that the command to use nuclear
weapons must be preceded by the command to load the munitions onto the bombers
and the takeoff command. The first command probably would be transmitted along
with the order to raise the degree of readiness. This command authorizes the engi-
neering crews to transfer the nuclear weapons from the storage site to the planes
and to load them onto the bombers. The crews then perform the necessary checks
Table 6.2 w
~
Technical characteristics of Soviet air-lalUlched cruise missiles ""-
Mission Design Bureau

Q
{;
Platform Service In service
,:;;
~
Designation LalUlch mass Warhead mass Speed Range
KS-1 AS-1 antiship Mikoyan OKB

Tu-4K, Tu-16KS Naval Aviation 1953
2,737kg 500kg 1,080km/h 80km
Kh-20 AS-3 land-attack Mikoyan OKB
Tu-95R LRA, Naval 1959
Aviation
11,OOOkg 2,300kg 1.8M/2M 600kml
350km
K-10S AS-2 antisrup, land-attack Mikoyan OKB
Tu-16K-10, Naval Aviation 1961
Tu-16K-10-26
4,350kg 1,OOOkg l.2M 250km
KSR-2 AS-SA antisrup, land-attack Mikoyan OKB
Tu-16K-11-16, LRA, Naval 1962
Tu-16K-10-26, Aviation
Tu-16K-26
3,OOOkg 1,OOOkg l.2M 230km
KSR-11 AS-5B antisrup, land-attack Mikoyan OKB
Tu-16K-11-16, LRA, Naval 1962
Tu-16K-l0-26, Aviation
Tu-16K-26
3,000kg 1,000kg l.2M 230km
Kh-22 AS-4 land-attack Raduga OKB
Tu-22K, Tu-22M LRA 1964
5,900kg 1,000kg 3M 300km
KSR-5 AS-6 antisrup, land-attack Raduga OKB
Tu-16K-l0-26, LRA, Naval 1968-
Tu-16K-26 Aviation 1970
5,000kg 1,000kg 3M 400km
Kh-55 AS-15 land-attack Raduga OKB
Tu-95MS, Tu-160 LRA 1984
1,250kg 410kg 0.8M 3,000km
Kh-15 AS-16 aero ballistic missile Raduga OKB
Tu-160, Tu-22M3 LRA 1988
1,200kg 150kg 5M 150km
366 Chapter 6
of weapons. It is possible that the cruise missile flight assignments would be chosen
at this time in accordance with the scenario of use specified in the order to load the
weapons on the bombers.
The launch order, which authorizes the use of nuclear weapons, is transmitted to
the bomber crews either when they are still at the base or when they are in flight.
After this order has been transmitted, the bombers would proceed to the targets
specified in their flight assignments. The bombers would have to reach designated
launch points before their cruise missiles could be launched. Otherwise, a system of
locks would prevent them from launching their missiles.
Appendix 6A Strategic Bombers
This appendix contains information about strategic bombers deployed by the Soviet
Union and Russia. The heading for each section provides both the Soviet/Russian
designation for the aircraft the section discusses and (in parentheses) the name by
which the aircraft is commonly known in the West.
Tu-4 (Bull)
Projects for the creation of a long-range bomber that would give Soviet Long-Range
Aviation units the ability to deliver strategic bomb strikes began in 1943. By August
1944 OKB-156 had drawn up plans for Aircraft 64, with basic parameters compa-
rable to those of the U. S. B-29 bomber. The designed maximum range of the plane,
with a payload of 4,000 kilograms, was 6,500 kilometers. 49 Once the government
approved the design, OKB-156 began developing Aircraft 64. After a progress report
in June 1945, however, the Soviet government decided to put an end to the project
and to create an exact copy of the B-29 bomber (by that time the Soviet Union
already had a few of those planes in its possession). Work on Aircraft 64 was thus
halted.
OKB-156 was instructed to draw up plans for a copy of the B-29, originally called
the B-4 or Object R, and to arrange for its serial production. All of the work was
supposed to be finished within two years. The bomber development program was
assigned top priority and was constantly monitored by the Politburo.
Three captured B-29 bombers were moved from the Far East to Moscow in
June-July 1945. One was turned over to the Flight Test Institute in Zhukovskiy for
the training of personnel and the compilation of flight documents, a second plane
was supposed to be dismantled for structural analysis and use in work on blueprints
of the aircraft, and the third was left intact to serve as the master copy.
The work on the blueprints began in July 1945. The designers chose not to
copy the American engine, substituting the domestic ASh-73TK engine developed
under the supervision of A. V. Shvetsov. The turbocompressor with the control
system, magneto, and heat-resistant bearings, however, were copies of those in the
American engine. A more powerful domestic cannon armament than that on the
B-29 was mounted on the bomber.
The first serial B-4 plane was ready in spring 1947, and the plane made its first
flight on 19 May 1947; soon after this the plane was named the Tu-4 (figure 6A.l).50
Full-scale production of the bomber was arranged after the start of the flight tests,
which continued until 1949. Preparations for serial production had begun in 1947
at Plant 22 in Kazan and Plant 18 in Kuybyshev. Plant 23 in Moscow was also
assigned to serial production of the Tu-4 in 1948 and began building the Tu-4 planes
in 1950. Serial production of the aircraft continued until 1952, during which time
847 planes were built.
Figure 6A.l
Tu-4 (Bull) bomber
368 Chapter 6
Table 6A.1 lists the main technical characteristics of the T-4 bombe~ which was
produced mainly in the bomber version with the possibility of its conversion into a
long-range reconnaissance plane. Some planes were later converted into a nuclear
bomb delivery platform, the Tu-4A. During the conversion process, the bomber was
equipped with a thermostatic bomb bay with an electrical heating unit and an
electronic control system, a bomb mounting system was developed, and measures
were taken for the shielding of the crew.
The Tu-4 planes began entering service on a mass scale in 1949. In Long-Range
Aviation units they replaced the 11-4, B-25, and Pe-8 wartime bombers and restored
B-17 and B-24 aircraft. 51 Flying from bases in the Soviet Union with a standard
bomb load, the Tu-4s were capable of attacking targets in Europe, North Africa,
the Middle East, and Japan.
Projects for the development of an aircraft capable of destroying targets within
U.S. territory began immediately after serial production of the Tu-4 began. One of
the projects was to equip Tu-4 planes with a midair refueling system. A few Tu-4
planes equipped with wingtip-to-wingtip refueling systems entered service after
1952, but Tu-4 planes were never equipped with the refueling system on a mass
scale.
Work on the Kometa airborne missile system, consisting of the Tu-4K weapons
platform plane, two KS-1 cruise missiles, and the Kometa-1 and Kometa-2 control
and guidance systems, began in 1948.52 The first experimental model of the Tu-4K
delivery system had been built by 1951. In-plant tests of the system were conducted
in 1951-1952, and acceptance tests were conducted from July 1952 to January
1953. The system was adopted for naval aviation after the completion of the tests.
The Burlak system, consisting of a long-range Tu-4 bomber towing two MiG-15
fighter planes, was developed in the early 1950s to reduce the bomber's vulnerabil-
ity to fighter aircraft. The project was canceled, however, shortly after the techni-
cal feasibility of this design had been demonstrated.
In 1955, 300 Tu-4 planes were converted into Tu-4D transport planes. This
model was adapted to be able to transport and drop an airborne assault force of
28 paratroopers, as well as their combat equipment, situated in P-90 cargo cabins
and P-85 transport containers suspended under the wing. The Tu-4D plane could
still be used as a long-range bomber. These planes remained in service until the
early 1960s. An experimental model of a Tu-4T transport plane was also built in
1956.
In 1950 OKB-156 investigated the possibility of re-equipping the Tu-4 force with
TV-2 turboprop engines (Aircraft 94). This project was canceled, howeve~ because
Table 6A.l
Technical characteristics of the Tu-4 bomber
Designation Tn-4 Bull

Design bureau A. N. Tnpolev OKB-156
Manufacturer Plant 22 (Kazan), Plant 18 (Knybyshev), Plant 23 (Moscow)
First flight 19 May 1947
Serial production 1947-1952
Commissioned 1949
Airframe mid-wing monoplane, straight wing, large aspect ratio, four
engines on leading edge of wing
Engines 4 ASh-73TK piston engines, (4 x 2,400 hp/4 x 1,790 kWt)
Refueling on some planes, wingtip-to-wingtip
Nominal payload 6,000kg
Service range 5,400km (with 3,000kg load), 3,580km (with 9,000kg load)
Service ceiling 11,200m
Speed 435km/h (maximwn at sea level), 558km/h (maximum at the
height of 10,250m)
Offensive armament Tn-4 6 1,000-kg bombs
Tu-4A 1 nuclear bomb
Tu-4K 2KS missiles
Defensive armament 10 12.7-mm UB macrune-gWls, replaced by 20-mm B-20E or
23-mm NS-23 cannons
Length 30.179m
Height 8.460m
Wing span 43.047m
Wing area 161.7m'
Maximum load 9,000kg
Maximum range 6,200 km (with 3,000 kg load)
Takeoff weight 46,700 kg normal, 65,000 kg maximum
Fuel weight 4,280kg (with oil)
Empty weight 35,270 kg
Crew 7
370 Chapter 6
the performance of the Tu-4 planes with the new engines improved no more than
14-20 percent.
Six Tu-4 planes were converted into Tu-4LL ("airborne laboratory") planes at
different times for tests and final adjustments of piston, turboprop, and turbojet
engines. These planes were used in tests until the beginning of the 1960s. At the
end of the 1950s some of the Tu-4 planes were converted into Tu-4UShS naviga-
tion trainer aircraft, and a few of the Tu-4s were converted into command post
aircraft. The Tu-70 passenger plane and a modified version of it, the Tu-75 military
transport plane, were modeled on the Tu-4 bomber.
The Tu-4 bombers in LRA units were gradually replaced with Tu-16 planes start-
ing in 1954 and then with Tu-95 intercontinental bombers starting in 1956. The
only remaining Tu-4s at the start of the 1960s were in the transport aviation units
and academic institutions or were being used as airborne laboratories by the Navy
and the Ministry of Aviation Industry.
Tu-16 (Badger)
Work on the Tu-16 bomber (figure 6A. 2) was motivated by the need to develop a
high-speed jet bomber to replace the Tu-4 in theater missions. One of the main
objectives was to double the Tu-4's maximum speed in order to enable the bomber
to evade jet fighters.
The first projects in the development of a heavy jet bomber began in OKB-156
in early 1948, soon after the completion of the Tu-4 project. One of these had been
Project 82, a swept-wing aircraft" that was designed to be equipped with the RD-
45F or VK-1 jet engines. With these engines, the bomber should have had a speed
of Mach 0.9-0.95 54 would have had the same range and payload as the Tu-4.
After the preliminary specifications of the new bomber had won the Soviet mili-
tary's approval, a government decree of July 1948 ordered the start of the experi-
mental design work on Aircraft 82. An experimental model of the plane, the first
Soviet plane with a swept wing, made its first flight on 24 March 1949. It reached
a speed of 934 kilometers per hour during the test, exceeding the speed of the
straight-winged Tu-14 bombe~ also equipped with VK-1 turbojet engines, by 20
percent. OKB-156 then began work on Aircraft 83, a bomber based on the Aircraft
82 design, but this project was canceled because the Air Forces decided they were
satisfied with the characteristics of the 11-28 jet bomber and ordered its serial
production instead.
In 1950 OKB-156 used the Aircraft 82 project results as the basis for Project 494,
a long-range heavy jet bomber superior to the Tu-4 and 11-28. The new plane was
Figure 6A.2
Tu-16 (Badger) bomber
designed to have a range of 7,500 kilometers with a bomb load of 6,000 kilograms.
Projections put the maximum speed of the bomber at 1,000 kilometers per hour
and its service ceiling at 12,000-13,000 meters; its maximum bomb load was to be
12,000 kilograms. Three different engine configurations were considered for the
bomber: two AM-3 engines with a thrust of 8,750 kilograms each, four TR-3A
engines with a thrust of 5,000 kilograms each, or four TR-5 turbofan engines, also
with a thrust of 5,000 kilograms each.ss
Among those engine choices, the work on the TR-5 (AL-5) engine project was
the farthest along in 1950, so the government decree of June 1954 on the start of
the project instructed OKB-156 to design and build an experimental long-range
bomber, Aircraft 88, equipped with two TR-5 engines but reserved the possibility
of equipping the plane with AM-3 engines. Improvements to the AM-3 engines were
essentially completed by August 1951, and the whole aircraft project was then refo-
cused on the model with the AM-3 engines. The first experimental model of Air-
craft 88, called the Tu-16, made its first flight on 27 April 1952. The decision to
start the serial production of the bomber was made in December 1952.
372 Chapter 6
Table 6A.2
Designation Tu-16 Badger A

Tu-16A Badger A
Tu-16KS Badger B
Tu-16K-10 Badger C
Tu-16K-10-26 Badger C
Tu-16K-11-16 Badger G
Tu-16K-26 Badger G
Design bureau A. N. Tupolev OKB-156
Manufacturer Plant 22 (Kazan), Plant 1 (Kuybyshev), Plant 64 (Voronezh)
First flight Tu-16 27 April 1952
Tu-16K-10 1958
Commissioned Tu-16 1954
Tu-16K-10 October 1961
Tu-16K-11-16 1962 (Naval Aviation)
Airframe cantilever high mid-wing monoplane
Engines AM-3A (2 x 85.8kN/2 x 8,750kg) turboJets,
RD-3M (2 x 93.1kN/2 x 9,500kg), RD-3M-500
(2 x 93.1kN/2 x 9,500kg) turbojets
Refueling wingtip-to-wingtip
Service range 5,800 km (with 3,000 kg load), 4,850 km (with 2 missiles lUlder
wings)
Speed Tu-16 900-950km/h (cruise), 1,050km/h (maximum)
Tu-16K 750-850km/h (cruise)
Offensive armament Tu-16 100kg to 9,000kg bombs
Tu-16A nuclear free-fall bombs
Tu-16KS 2 KS-l missiles
Tu-16K-10 1 K-I0S missile
Tu-16K-10-26 1 K-10S missile and 2 KSR-5 or KSR-2 missiles
Tu-16K-11-16 2 KSR-2 or KSR-l1 missiles, bombs, or
combination
Tu-16K-26 2 KSR-2 or KSR-l1 or KSR-5 missiles, bombs,
or combination
Defensive armament 7 23-mm AM-23 cannons
Length 34.8m
Height lO.36m
Wing span 33.00m
Wing area l64.65m'
Maximum load 9,OOOkg
Maximum range 7,200 km (transfer)
Takeoff weight 76,OOOkg (normal), 79,OOOkg (maximum)
Fuel weight 36,OOOkg
Empty weight 37,200kg
Crew 6
The speed achieved during the tests exceeded the required speed, but the neces-
sary range was not achieved because the plane was too heavy. Efforts to reduce the
weight during the construction of the second experimental model of Aircraft 88
trimmed it 5,500 kilograms (which limited the maximum speed at low and medium
altitudes). The second experimental model exceeded the assigned range during a test
flight in April 1953. Table 6A.2lists the main technical characteristics of the Tu-16
bomber.
Serial production of the Tu-16 started at Plant 22 in Kazan in 1953 and also at
Plant 1 in Kuybyshev and Plant 64 in Voronezh in 1954. While those planes were
still in production, they began to be equipped with more powerful RF-3MT engines,
a modified version of the AM-3 with a thrust of 9,520 kilograms. 56 Later, when the
planes were already in service, the AM-3 and RD-3M engines were replaced with
improved RF-3M-500 engines with a longer service life. Serial production of the
Tu-16 bombers stopped in 1963. In all, 1,509 of those planes were built in the Soviet
Union over the decade of their production.
The first Tu-16 planes began reaching line units in early 1954. Tu-16 bombers
began to replace the Tu-4 bombers at that time and became the main Soviet theater
bomber. A modified version, the Tu-16A bomber, was developed specifically to
deliver nuclear weapons. It had an insulated bomb bay and was painted to protect
it from nuclear explosion radiation. 57
A wingtip-to-wingtip midair refueling system was designed for the Tu-16 to
increase its range. Tests of the experimental models of the tanker aircraft and the
plane to be refueled began in 1955. After the adoption of that system, some Tu-16s
were converted into tankers, known as Tu-16Zs. These tankers could be recon-
figured to serve as bombers if necessary.
374 Chapter 6
Tests of experimental models of the Tu-16KS plane, equipped with two KS-1 (AS-
1) antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs), began in August 1954. The combat radius of the
Tu-16KS was 1,800 kilometers, and the range of the KS-1 missile was 90 kilometers.
The Tu-16KS planes were used by naval aviation. Serial production of the Tu-16T
torpedo plane, intended for torpedo attacks on large naval surface targets and for
aerial minelaying, was also organized in the mid-1950s. After 1965 the Tu-16T
planes were converted into Tu-16S rescue planes with a Fregat boat in the bomb bay.
In 1955 the Tu-16 was used as the basis for the development of the Tu-16K-10
airborne missile system, which included a K-10 weapon system with a K-10S (AS-
2) cruise missile and the EN onboard guidance system. The cruise missile was carried
in recess under the bomber's fuselage. An experimental model of the Tu-16K-10 was
built in 1959, and serial production of the system began in 1959. The Tu-16K-10
system was adopted for naval aviation in October 1961.
A new missile system, the K-1l-16, with Rubin-1 radar and new KSR-2 (AS-5A)
and KSR-11 (AS-5B) cruise missiles, which were a modification of the MiG-15 air-
plane, was adopted in 1962. Tu-16K-1l-16 planes could carry two KSR-2 or KSR-ll
missiles on wing-mounted pylons. These planes, which were converted into Tu-16K-
11-16S from Tu-16, Tu-16A, and Tu-16KS aircraft, were adopted for naval aviation.
Work on a new missile system, the K-26, equipped with the KSR-5 (AS-6) ASCM
began in 1962. The airborne missile system with those missiles, called the Tu-16K-
26, began reaching line units in the second half of the 1960s. A distinctive feature
of the K-11-16 and K-26 systems was the possibility of using the aircraft as con-
ventional bombers without the missiles.
Modernization of the K-10 system was also undertaken during the work on the
Tu-16K-26 system. Planes equipped with the K-10 system then started carrying
two KSR-5 or KSR-2 missiles in addition to the K-10S missile; the complete system
was referred to as the Tu-16K-10-26. After the K-10S missiles were removed from
service, those planes were used only with the KSR-5 missiles.
Other versions of the Tu-16 plane included the Tu-16R reconnaissance plane
(Project 92), testing of which began in 1955; the Tu-16P and Tu-16Ye electronic
warfare planes (equipped with the Yelka system)58 that were developed in the mid-
1950s; and the Tu-16RM naval reconnaissance plane. Some ofthe Tu-16K-1 0 planes
were converted into Tu-16RMs in the late 1960s. In 1963 conversion of some of
the existing Tu-16 planes into Tu-16N tanker aircraft for the refueling of Tu-22
bombers (probe-and-drogue system) began.
The Tu-16 plane was used by the Air Forces and naval aviation in Russia until
1993. They were also used in the Soviet military operations in Afghanistan in the
1980s.
The delivery of Tu-16 bombers to China began in 1958, and the serial produc-
tion of those planes, called the N-6, was later organized there. Around 20 Tu-16KS
planes were sold to Indonesia in summer 1961. In the 1960s, Tu-16 planes were
sent to Egypt (the Tu-16KS in 1967 and the Tu-16K-1l-16 in 1973) and Iraq (the
Tu-16K-11-16).
M-4, 3M (Bison)
Work on the development of bombers capable of delivering weapons at intercon-
tinental range began in the Soviet Union in the early 1950s. A government decree
of 24 March 1951 ordered the conversion of Plant 23 in Moscow into a design
bureau headed by V. M. Myasishchev, who had submitted the design for the 2M
strategic jet bomber. The design bureau was given the assignment of developing and
organizing the production of a bomber with a range of 11,000-12,000 kilometers
when carrying a bomb load of 5,000 kilograms and a speed of 900 kilometers per
hour.
Four AM-3A turbojet engines, developed in A. A. Mikulin's design bureau, were
chosen as the propulsion system for the new bomber. One of the designs submitted
(Project 26) would have equipped the plane with more powerful VD-5 engines, but
those engines were not ready when the plane was being developed. The experimental
model of the plane was built quickly-by December 1952-and the new bomber
made its first flight on 20 January 1953. During in-plant tests the plane reached a
speed of 947 kilometers per hour and a service ceiling of 12,500 meters. The flight
tests of a second experimental model, slightly different from the first, began on 23
December 1953.
The maximum range of the experimental models with a bomb load of 5,000 kilo-
grams was only 8,500 kilometers, which meant that the bomber would not be
capable of delivering weapons from the Soviet Union to U.S. territory. Neverthe-
less, the plane, which was designated the M-4, was commissioned in 1954. The first
10 aircraft had been built by July 1955 at Plant 23 in Moscow. Table 6A.3 lists the
main technical characteristics of the M-4 bomber.
Soon after serial production of the aircraft began, an attempt was made to equip
the M-4 with a Kh-20 cruise missile to secure the possibility of delivering strikes
from points beyond the reach of enemy air defense systems. The attempt was aban-
doned, however, because the bomber's low clearance precluded the placement of a
missile under its fuselage. The possibility of mounting the missile above the fuse-
lage was considered, but that design was ultimately rejected. A high-altitude version
of the M-4 (Device 28), equipped with VD-5 engines, was proposed as part of the
air defense penetration projects, but that design was not developed either.
376 Chapter 6
Table 6A.3
Technical characteristics of the M-4 and 3-M bombers
Designation M -4 2M, Bison A

3M M-6, Bison B
3MS M-6, Bison B
3MD M-6, Bison C
Development began 24 March 1951
Design bureau V. M. Miasishchev OKB-23
Manufacturer Plant 23 (Moscow)
First flight M-4 20 January 1953
3M 27 March 1956
Commissioned M-4 1956
3M 1955
Airframe high-swept wing, four turbojet engines buried in wing-roots
Engines turbojet
M-4 AM-3 (4 x S5.SkN/4 x S,750kg), RD-3M-500
(4 x 93.1kN/4 x 9,500kg), RD-3M-500A
(4 x 102.9kN/4 x 10,500kg)
3M VD-7 (4 x 107.SkN/4 x 11,000kg)
3MS RD-3M-500A (4 x 102.9kN/4 x 10,500kg)
3MN VD-7B (4 x 93.1kN/4 x 9,500kg)
3MD VD-7V (4 x 93.1kN/4 x 9,500kg)
Refueling M-4 no
3M probe-and-drogue
Nominal payload 3M 5,000kg
Service range M-4 S,100km
3M 11,S50 km, 15,400 km (with refueling)
3MS 9,440km, 12,400km (with refueling)
3MD 10,950km, 13,600km (with refueling)
Service ceiling 12,150 m
Speed M-4 930kmlh (maximum), SOOkm/h (cruise)
3M 940 kmlh (maximum), SOO km/h (cruise)
3MS 925 kmlh (maximum), SOO km/h (cruise)
3MD 925 kmlh (maximum), SOO km/h (cruise)
Offensive armament M-4 free-fall bombs (total weight up to lS,OOOkg)
3M free-fall bombs (total weight up to 24,000 kg), 2 nuclear
2,OOO-kg bombs or one nuclear 4,OOO-kg bomb
Defensive armament 6 23-mm AM-23 cannons
Length M-4 47.67m
3M 5l.7m
Height 1l.5m
Wing span M-4 50.53m

3M 53.14m
Wing area M-4 326.35m'
3M 351.7m'
Maximum load M-4 18,000kg
3M 24,000kg
Maximum range
Takeoff weight 202,000 kg (maximum)
Empty weight M-4 79,700kg
3M 74,430kg
Fuel weight
Crew M-4 8
3M 7
Improvements in the design of the M-4 to increase its range led to the creation
of a new bomber called the 3M (also the M-6). The new plane's more efficient and
more powerful VD-7 engines were the decisive factor in the achievement of the
required range. The 3M bomber (figure 6A.3) made its first flight in March 1956.59
Serial production of the 3M, replacing the M-4, was launched at Plant 23 at the
end of 1956.
In addition to the engines, the differences between the new bomber and the M-4
included (among others) the 3M's lighter airframe and larger fuel reserve. (See Table
6A.3 for the technical characteristics of both aircraft.) The combination of all those
measures increased the 3M's range to 11,850 kilometers, and all of the 3M series
planes were equipped with refueling equipment that could increase their range to
15,400 kilometers. When the plane was commissioned in 1958, it essentially became
the first Soviet strategic delivery vehicle capable of attacking targets deep within
U.S. territory on a two-way mission.
Although the 3M bomber had intercontinental range, its use was complicated by
the frequency of the required maintenance inspections of the VD-7 engines. Because
of this, those engines were replaced by more reliable RD-3M-500A engines in
1958-1960, and the model of the bomber equipped with those engines was desig-
nated the 3MS. The change in engines, howeve~ reduced the plane's range to 9,400
kilometers. A new model of the VD-7 engine, the VD-7B, had been developed by
1960. It had the required service life and was more efficient than the VD-7, but
it had less thrust. The model of the plane equipped with the VD-7B engines was
designated the 3MN. Although the 3MN had speed and altitude indicators slightly
378 Chapter 6
Figure 6A.3
3M (Bison) bomber
inferior to those of the 3MS, its range was 15 percent greater. 60 In 1960 Long-Range
Aviation regiments began to be equipped with the 3MD plane, the last serially
produced model of the bomber, with a wing with a larger aspect ratio, a tapered
fuselage tipped with the probe of the aerial refueling feed unit, and new equipment.
The serial production of the 3M bombers stopped in 1963. In all, 93 M-4 and
3M planes of all versions were built, including about 10 M-4s and 9 3MDs.61
As the 3M bombers entered service, the existing M-4 planes were converted into
M-4-2 tankers. The 3MS-2 tanker had also been developed at the same time as the
3MS bomber, and it was adopted at virtually the same time as the basic model. The
tanker aircraft based on the 3MN was called the 3MN-2. One regiment of 3MS-2
tankers (one regiment) were part of the LRA until 1994.
When OKB-23 was shut down in 1960, projects in the further modernization of
the 3M were suspended. An attempt was made to equip the 3M bombers with two
Kh-22 cruise missiles in the mid-1970s, but this model was not adopted. 62
At the end of the 1970s one of the existing 3M bombers was reconfigured to
transport large pieces of equipment developed during the work on the Energiya-
Buran space launch vehicle. The equipment was mounted on fittings on the fuse-
lage. During the conversion process, some structural elements were reinforced or
replaced, the rear fuselage was lengthened, and a twin tail and new control system
were installed. The plane was first called the 3MT, and later it was called the Atlant-
VM-2. The plane made its first flight on 29 April 1981 and its first flight carrying
cargo on 6 January 1982. It made 150 flights in all.
Tu-95 (Bear)
The work on the Tu-95 bomber (figure 6AA) was part in the efforts in the early
1950s in the Soviet Union to create bombers capable of delivering nuclear weapons
to U.S. territory. The work began in OKB-156 right after serial production of the
Tu-4 plane began. The first projects concentrated on different versions of the Tu-4,
and then the focus shifted to a new multi engine plane with piston engines. Within
Figure 6AA
Tu-95 (Bear) bomber
380 Chapter 6
the framework of these projects, experimental models of piston engine planes were
built and tested in 1949 and 1951, but by that time the development of jet fighters
showed that these bombers had no future.
In March 1951 projects were launched in the Soviet Union for the creation of an
intercontinental jet bomber, which later led to the development of the M-4 plane.
OKB-156 objected to a bomber with turbojet engines because the bureau's analy-
ses had showed that a plane equipped with the AM-3 engines (the only ones avail-
able at that time) could not have a range in excess of 10,000 kilometers. A plane
equipped with four turboprop engines with 12,000-15,000 effective horsepower
each,63 on the other hand, should have been able to achieve the assigned perfor-
mance levels: a range of more than 13,000 kilometers and a speed of more than
800 kilometers per hour at an altitude of 10,000 meters.
OKB-156 then designed a bomber with turboprop engines known as Aircraft 95.
Projects conducted jointly with the Central Aerohydrodynamics Institute to study
the aerodynamic properties of the swept wing for the Tu-16, led to the choice of a
35-degree sweep angle for the wings. The aircraft's swept wing facilitated the place-
ment of a single large born b bay behind the central wing torsion box, very close to
the plane's center of gravity.
The lack of a sufficiently efficient engine created the greatest difficulties in devel-
oping the new bomber. Analysis of various combinations of different types and
numbers of engines led to conclusion that the new intercontinental bomber would
need four turboprop engines with at least 10,000 effective horsepower each. The
most powerful turboprop engine at the end of the 1940s was the experimental VK-
2, but its power rating of 4,800 effective horsepower was not nearly high enough.
The TV-2 engine had been created in N. D. Kuznetsov's OKB-276 by the beginning
of the 1950s, and its TV-2F version had 6,250 effective horsepower. OKB-276 was
also working on the TV-12 engine, which was expected to have the required power
rating.
After Tupolev's proposals had been considered, the government decided to order
the start of experimental design work on Aircraft 95. The government decree on
this project was adopted on 11 July 1951. It requested two different versions of the
plane: one with four 2TV-2F engines (each of which included two TV-2F engines
with a common reduction gearbox) and one with four TV-12 engines.
N. I. Bazenkov was appointed to supervise the project, and he later became the
chief designer of the whole Tu-95 family of planes. After Bazenkov's death in 1976,
N. V. Kirsanov became the chief designer of the series, and D. A. Antonov headed
the work on the Tu-95 bombers at the end of the 1980s.
The experimental model of Aircraft 95/1 with the 2TV-2F engines was built at
Experimental Plant 156 in 1952. The plane's reduction gear and the counter-
rotating coaxial four-bladed propellers were developed in OKB-120 under the
supervision of K. N. Zhdanov. Each pair of engines had around 12,000 effective
horsepower. Aircraft 95/1 made its first flight on 12 November 1952. On its 17th
flight on 11 May 1953, the plane crashed after a fire started in the third engine.
The second experimental model, Aircraft 95/2, equipped with the new TV-12
engines, was built by June 1954 and made its first flight on 16 February 1955. The
demonstrated range during the tests was about 15,000 kilometers (with a 5,000
kilogram payload). The plane had a speed of 882 kilometers per hour and a ceiling
of 11,300 meters. 64 Serial production of the new bomber, called the Tu-95, was
launched at Plant 18 in Kuybyshev before the end of the in-plant tests in January
1956. Table 6AA lists technical characteristics of the Tu-95.
The first two Tu-95 serial-production planes were built in August 1955 and made
their first flights in October 1955. In contrast to the experimental Aircraft 95/2, the
first Tu-95 planes were fully equipped, and as a result they displayed a range of
12,100 kilometers (with a bomb load of 5,000 kilograms), a maximum speed of
850 kilometers per hour, and a service ceiling of 10,200 meters. Subsequent serially
produced planes were equipped with more powerful and more efficient NK-12M
engines instead of the NK-12 to increase their fuel reserve and takeoff weight. The
model so equipped, designated the Tu-95M, demonstrated a maximum speed of
905 kilometers per hour, a service range of 12,150 meters, and an effective range
of 13,200 kilometers in test flights conduced in September-October 1957. Although
it did not meet the initially specified range and speed requirements, the Tu-95M was
commissioned in October 1957.
The bomb load of the Tu-95 and Tu-95M planes could consist of free-fall bombs
of up to 9,000 kilograms. Reductions in the plane's range brought the payload up
to 15,000 kilograms. The cannon armament of the Tu-95, consisting of six 23-
millimeter AM-23 guns controlled with the Argon radar gunsight, secured the
protection of the plane from almost every direction.
The development of the first Tu-95 models was accompanied by the start of pro-
jects to reduce the bomber's vulnerability to air defense systems. The decision to
develop the high-altitude Tu-96 strategic bombe~ which was supposed to have a
ceiling of 17,000 meters, was made in 1952. An experimental model of the plane,
equipped with NK-12M engines, was built in 1955, but work on that project
stopped after the flight tests because the higher service ceiling did not secure the
bomber's invulnerability.
382 Chapter 6
Table 6AA
Designation Tu-95 Bear A

Tu-95M Bear A
Tu-95K Bear B
Tu-95K-22 Bear G
Tu-95MS Bear H
Manufacturer Plant 18 (Kuybyshev)
First flight Tu-95 12 November 1952
Tu-95K 1 January 1956
Tu-95K-22 October 1975
Tu-95MS September 1979
Commissioned Tu-95 August 1957
Tu-95K 1959
Tu-95K-22 1982
Tu-95MS 1981
Airframe cantiliver mid-wing monoplane, four turboprop engines in wing
Engines turboprop, NK-12 (4 x 9,330kWtl4 x 12,500hp), NK-12M,
NK-12MV or NK-12MP (4 x 11,190kWtl4 x 15,000hp)
Refueling probe-and-drogue
Service range Tu-95 13,200km
Tu-95M 13,200km
Tu-95K 10,300km
Tu-95MS 6,500 km (with maximum load)
10,500km (with nominal load)
Combat radius Tu-95K-22 5,580 km (with one missile)
4,900 km (with two missiles)
Speed Tu-95MS 830 km/h (maximum), 550 km/h (maximum at sea
level)
Offensive armament Tu-95M bombs (total weight up to 12,000 kg)
Tu-59K 1 Kh-20 missile
Tu-95K-22 1 or 2 Kh-22 missiles
Tu-95MS 6 Kh-55 missiles (Tu-95MS6),
up to 16 Kh-55 missiles (Tu-95MS16)
Defensive armament Tu-95 6 23-mm AM-23 cannons
Tu-95K-22 4 23-mm AM-23 cannons
Tu-95MS 2 23-mm GSh-23 cannons
Table 6AA (continued)
Length Tu-95 46.9m

Tu-95MS 49.6m
Height Tu-95 12.5m
Tu-95MS 13.3m
Wing span 50.05m
Wing area Tu-95 283.7m'
Tu-95MS 288.9m'
Maximum load 20,OOOkg
Maximum range
Takeoff weight Tu-95 182,OOOkg (maximum)
Tu-95MS 185,OOOkg (maximum)
Fuel weight Tu-95MS 84,OOOkg
Empty weight Tu-95MS 94,400kg
Crew Tu-95 8
Tu-95MS 7
In another project, the Tu-95 was equipped with cruise missiles for the delivery
of strikes while the plane was outside the operating radius of enemy air defense
systems. Work on the Tu-95K-20 airborne missile delivery system began in March
1955. The system consisted of a Tu-95K plane and a Kh-20 (AS-3) supersonic cruise
missile with a range of 350 kilometers recessed in the plane's weapons bay. The
prototype of the Tu-95K delivery system made its first flight on 1 January 1956.
Test launches of the missile, guidance system, and airborne equipment were con-
ducted from 1956 to 1958. Serial production of the Tu-95K began in spring 1958,
and the Tu-95K-20 system was adopted in September 1959.
The adverse aerodynamic effects of the missiles and additional fuel tank reduced
the Tu-95K's range considerably and necessitated the development of an in-flight
refueling system. Projects leading to the creation of a probe-and-drogue system for
the Tu-95K began in May 1960 and were completed in 1961. The modified version
of the plane with the refueling system was called the Tu-95KD. In the 1960s some
of the Tu-95K and Tu-95KD planes were equipped with updated avionics and
navigation aids. This model was called the Tu-95KM.65
A decision was made in the early 1970s to reconfigure the Tu-95K and Tu-95KD
to carry the missile system based on the Kh-22 cruise missile (similar to the one on
the Tu-22M planes). The new system, called the Tu-95K-22, included two Kh-22N
missiles on pylons under each wing or one Kh-22M in the bomb bay. The first test
384 Chapter 6
flight of the Tu-95K-22 was conducted in October 1975, and conversion of the
Tu-95K planes into Tu-95K-22 planes began in the late 1970s. After a period of
experimental use, the Tu-95K-22 system was adopted in 1982.
Development of the Tu-95M-5, a Tu-95M plane equipped with two KSR-5
missiles, was the focus of projects in 1976-1977. The project was canceled in con-
nection with the decision favoring the production of the Tu-95K-22 and the start
of the work on the Tu-95MS.
Various modified versions of the Tu-95 were developed in the late 1950s and early
1960s. One was the Tu-95Y, created in 1956. This plane was intended to deliver a
super-high-yield thermonuclear weapon,66 but the weapon project was canceled in
the late 1950s, and the plane was turned over to an active unit and used for train-
ing purposes. When the work on the super-high-yield thermonuclear device was
resumed in 1961, the plane was overhauled at Plant 18 in Kuybyshev and was used
to deliver the thermonuclear device in the test of 31 October 1961. The weight
of the device, with a nominal yield of 100 megatons, was 24.8 tons. Another
one-of-a-kind version of the Tu-95 was the Tu-95N plane, a converted serial-
production plane that was supposed to be used as a platform for the RS strike
aircraft developed in P. V. Tsybin's OKB 256.'7
The Tu-95RTs reconnaissance aircraft was developed in the early 1960s and was
later used for long-range maritime reconnaissance. The first experimental plane of
this model made a test flight in September 1962, and serial production began in
1963. The Tu-95RTs began reaching naval aviation units in 1964 and was adopted
in spring 1966.
Work on the Tu-95RTs led to the creation of the Tu-142 plane, also intended for
maritime reconnaissance. The first experimental model of that plane, a highly
updated and reconfigured Tu-95RTs, was built in summer 1968. Tests of the Tu-
142 began in June 1968, and it was adopted for naval aviation in December 1972.
Serial production of the Tu-142 planes was organized first at Plant 18 in Kuyby-
shev and then at Plant 86 in Taganrog in the middle of the 1970s.
Work on the Tu-142M, an updated version of the Tu-142 intended in part for
use in the detection of submarines, began in 1972. The Tu-142M made its first flight
on 4 November 1975 and was adopted for naval aviation in 1980. The Tu-142M
was in turn the model for the Tu-142MR, the communications relay plane used in
communications with submarines.
The Soviet ALCM projects of the mid-1970s led to the development of the long-
range Kh-55 cruise missile, originally intended for deployment on the new Tu-160
supersonic bomber. The possibility of deploying it on Tu-95 bombers was also inves-
tigated. As part of this project, a serial-production Tu-95M was converted into a

delivery vehicle for the Kh-55 long-range cruise missile in 1976. Tests of the plane,
called the Tu-95M-55, began in 1978, but they did not lead to a decision to convert
the existing Tu-95 pool.
A new plane called the Tu-95MS was developed for the deployment of the Kh-
55 cruise missiles. This bomber was based on the Tu-142 plane and therefore
differed from the serial-production Tu-95 planes. The Tu-95MS made its first flight
in September 1979, and its serial production began in 1981. The missile system
based on the Tu-95MS originally included six Kh-55 cruise missiles mounted on a
rotary launcher in the plane's bomb bay. The model so equipped is usually referred
to as the Tu-95MS6. The Tu-95MS16, carrying an additional 10 missiles on pylons
under the wings, was developed later. The Kh-55 cruise missiles on the Tu-95MS
bomber differ slightly from those on the Tu-160.
When the START I Treaty was signed in 1991, Long-Range Aviation units had
147 Tu-95 bombers: 84 Tu-95MS planes and 63 Tu-95K-22, Tu-95K, and Tu-95M
planes. Another 11 Tu-95U planes were in training centers. After the breakup of
the Soviet Union, some of the bombers were outside Russia. There were 23 Tu-
95MS planes, 1 Tu-95K, and 1 Tu-95M left in Ukraine and 13 Tu-95MS-16 and
27 Tu-95MS-6 planes deployed in Kazakhstan. All of the Tu-95MS bombers in
Kazakhstan have since been moved to Russia. Ukraine declared the planes in its
territory to be its property, and they are subject to elimination in compliance with
the START I Treaty.
The Tu-95 and Tu-95MS planes of Russian Long-Range Aviation units are located
on two bases. The 13 Tu-95MS16 and 5 Tu-95MS6 planes in Engels are part of the
121st Guards Heavy-Bomber Air Regiment of the division based in Engels. The
21 Tu-95MS16 planes and 24 Tu-95MS6 bombers on the base in Ukrainka were
transferred there from the Semipalatinsk base in Kazakhstan. In 2000 Russia
acquired three additional Tu-95MS aircraft from Ukraine, bringing the total number
of Tu-95MS bombers to 66.
All Tu-95K-22 bombers have now been eliminated. Eight Tu-95 planes designated
for testing remain at the Flight Test Institute in Zhukovskiy, and one Tu-95K is on
permanent display in Ryazan.
The Tu-95MS planes built from the middle of the 1980s to the early 1990s prob-
ably will stay in service until 2010-2015. Russia is now working on the creation of
a new cruise missile for these bombers to replace the Kh-55 missiles reaching the
end of their service life.
386 Chapter 6
M-SO (Bounder)
Work on the M-50 supersonic intercontinental bomber began in Myasishchev's
OKB-23 in 1956. The design for the bomber called for the use of four of the
"16-17" engines developed under the supervision of p. F. Zubets. The plane was
supposed to be equipped with a long-range M-61 supersonic cruise missile, which
was also being developed in OKB-23.
This delta wing aircraft with a standard aerodynamic configuration was 57.48
meters long and had a wingspan of 35.1 meters. Two engines were mounted on
pylons and two less powerful engines were on the wing tips. The operating range
was expected to be around 10,000 kilometers, which would have, in combination
with the specified range of 1,000 kilometers for the cruise missile, allowed the use
of the bomber for the delivery of strategic strikes against the United States.
An experimental model of the plane was built in 1959 and made its first flight
on 27 October 1959. The engines that were supposed to have been installed on the
plane were not ready, so the experimental model had two VO-7 engines (on pylons
under wings) and two VO-7B engines. The plane displayed Mach 0.99 speed in this
configuration.
All work on the M-50 bomber stopped in 1960 when OKB-23 was closed down.
Tu-22 (Blinder)
The Tu-22 bomber (figure 6A.5) resulted from Soviet efforts to develop a super-
sonic heavy bomber after serial production of the Tu-16 began. Three different
designs were considered in OKB-156 during the preliminary stage: Aircraft 98, a
medium-range supersonic bomber; Aircraft 105, a long-range supersonic bomber;
and Aircraft 108, an intercontinental supersonic cruise missile delivery platform.
The first two designs would have had a swept wing, and Aircraft 108 was supposed
to have a delta wing. Aircraft 105 was the model chosen for the further develop-
ment efforts that led to the creation of the Tu-22. Aircraft 98 was later the model
for the Tu-128 long-range fighter. The Aircraft 108 design was never used.
The original design of Aircraft 105 was an updated version of the Tu-16 (Air-
craft 88) and called for the use of four VO-5 or VO-7 turbojet engines. The sweep
angle of the wing was to be increased to 45 degrees. The government decree pro-
viding for the start of experimental design projects for the creation of this plane
was issued in August 1954.68
The experimental model of Aircraft 105, equipped with VO-7M engines, made
its first flight on 21 June 1958. Apparently, it was clear even before the start of the
tests that the plane required considerable modernization. The decision to create an
Figure 6A.S
Tu-22 (Blinder) bomber
upgraded version, Aircraft 105A, with more powerful NK-6 engines, was made in
April 1958, shortly before that first flight. The creation of a second Aircraft 105A,
with VD-7M engines, was also ordered. The NK-6 engines were not ready by the
time these models had been designed, however, and only the second aircraft was
built. It made its first test flight on 7 September 1959. That same year the serial
production of the plane based on Aircraft 105A, called the Tu-22, was organized
at Plant 22 in Kazan. Table 6A.5 lists technical characteristics of the Tu-22.
During the period of serial production, which lasted until 1969, Plant 22 in Kazan
built more than 300 Tu-22 planes. The main models were the Tu-22B, a delivery
system for free-fall bombs; the Tu-22K missile-carrier; and the Tu-22R reconnais-
sance plane. Ten Tu-22B bombers were built, and they were used primarily for train-
ing and tests. The Tu-22R was the main model produced during the first years of
production.
In 1962 a Tu-22R plane was equipped with a midair refueling system and
renamed the Tu-22RD. Beginning in 1965, all of the Tu-22 models produced were
388 Chapter 6
Table 6A.S
Designation Tu-22B Blinder A

Tu-22K Blinder B
Development began August 1954
Manufacturer Plant 22 (Kazan)
First flight 21 June 1958
Commissioned Tu-22B 1962
Tu-22K 1967
Airframe low/mid-swept wing, two engines at either side of rudder fin
Engines turbojet VD-7M (2 x 156.9kN/2 x 16,000kg) or RD-7M-2
(2 x 161.8kN/2 x 16,500kg)
Service range 4,900km
Combat radius 1,300-2,200 km
Service ceiling 14,700-13,300m
Speed 1,510km/h (maximum with VD-7M), 1,610km/h
(maximum with RD-7M-2)
Offensive armament Tu-22B 250-kg-9,OOO-kg bombs, several nuclear bombs
Tu-22K 1 Kh-22 missile
Defensive armament 1 23-mm R-23 cannon
Length 41.6m (42.6m with fueling probe)
Height 10.0m
Wing span 23.6m
Wing area 162.3m'
Maximum range 5,650km (transfer), 7,150km (transfer with refuleing)
Takeoff weight Tu-22B 85,000kg (nominal), 92,OOOkg (maximum)
Tu-22K 94,000kg (with 4 take-off boosters)
Fuel weight 42,500kg
Empty weight Tu-22K 48,100kg
Crew 3
equipped with the refueling system. Converted Tu-16Z planes were used as the
tanker aircraft. The Tu-22RM, with new airborne electronic equipment, was
developed in 1972. Another equipment upgrade in the early 1980s produced the
Tu-22RDM reconnaissance planes.
The Tu-22K cruise missile delivery system was supposed to have been the main
model of the Tu-22 bomber and was supposed to have been equipped with Kh-22
(AS-4) missiles. The first Tu-22K plane was ready for tests in 1961, and the Tu-22K
system with the Kh-22 missile began reaching active units in 1965. Tests of the plane
and missile continued until 1967, when the Tu-22K was adopted.
The Tu-22 bomber was expected to replace the Tu-16 plane, but its combat per-
formance capabilities kept it from being an equivalent substitute. In particula~ the
Tu-22K could carry only one missile, in contrast to the Tu-16 models, which could
carry two or three.
Attempts to improve the Tu-22 plane were undertaken in OKB-156. In particu-
la~ Aircraft 106 was supposed to have a range of 6,750 kilometers and a speed of
2,000 kilometers per hour. The new bomber would have been equipped with NK-
6 engines. This work, however, was soon discontinued in favor of other projects.
Starting in 1965, Tu-22 planes produced were equipped with more powerful
RD-7M2 engines, which increased the maximum speed to 1,600 kilometers per
hour. The Tu-22P radio-electronic warfare aircraft and the Tu-22U training plane
are other modifications of the Tu-22 design.
T-4
Work on new medium-range heavy-bomber projects began in the Soviet Union in
the late 1950s and early 1960s. The new plane was needed because the Tu-22
bomber that was designed as a replacement for the Tu-16 did not meet all Air Forces
specifications for the replacement. The preliminary performance specifications for
the new plane were drawn up in 1961. It was expected to be a supersonic jet with
a combat radius of around 2,000 kilometers. 69
A competition for the development of the new bomber was announced, and
designs were submitted by the design bureaus of A. N. Tupolev, A. S. Yakovlev, and
P.O. Sukhoy. After the designs had been reviewed, the T-4 design of the Sukhoy
Design Bureau was chosen in 1963.
The preliminary sketches of the T-4 aircraft were ready in 1964. 70 The design was
of a "tailless" airplane with small all-moving foreplanes and a delta wing. Four
engines were to be housed in pairs in pods beneath each wing. The plane was
supposed to carry three solid-propellant Kh-45 guided missiles under the fuselage.
390 Chapter 6
The Sukhoy Design Bureau was also expected to develop the Kh-45 missile, but the
project was later transferred to the Raduga Design Bureau.
The consideration of alternative configurations for the plan led to a change in the
location of its engines. The final design located all four engines in a single pod under
the fuselage. A team headed by P. A. Kolesov developed the RD-36-41 engines for
the T-4 in the Rybinsk Design Bureau. The design changes reduced the number of
missiles to two.
According to the preliminary performance specifications, the bomber was sup-
posed to have a range of 6,000 kilometers, a cruising speed of 3,000 kilometers per
hour, a maximum speed of 3,200 kilometers per hour at an altitude of 20,000-
24,000 meters and a ceiling of 25,000-30,000 meters. The length of the T-4 was
44.5 meters, its wingspan was 22 meters, its wing area was 295.7 square meters,
and its standard takeoff weight was 114,000 kilograms. 71
A mockup of the T-4 was built in 1968, and construction of the first experimen-
tal model began in 1969 at the Tushino Machine-Building Plant, which had been
assigned to the design bureau for the project. Titanium and steel alloys were used
extensively in building the model. New design features of the T-4 included fly-by-
wire controls.
The experimental model of the T-4 made its first flight on 22 August 1972. It
later made about 10 more test flights, which were completed in 1974. The plane
reached a speed of Mach 1.28 and altitude of 12,100 meters during the tests. Prepa-
rations for the production of the first experimental series of T-4 planes began soon
after the start of the tests.
In 1974, however, the T-4 project was canceled. One of the main reasons for
the cancellation was the government's decision to begin serial production of the
Tu-22M bomber.
The Sukhoy Design Bureau used the T-4 design as the basis for its T-4M strate-
gic bomber design in 1967-1969. The T-4M was a modified version of the T-4 with
a variable-geometry wing. The bureau also drew up preliminary plans for a T-4MS
model, another plane with a variable-geometry wing, in 1969-1970, and submitted
them in the competition for the supersonic strategic bomber project.
Tu-22M (Backfire)
After OKB-156 had finished the work on the Tu-22, it started working on possible
designs for the next bomber. One was a modification of the Tu-22 with better
performance characteristics that resulted from a change in the wing sweep angle
and the use of more powerful engines. Aircraft 106 was one of the results of these
projects. After various options had been reviewed, the bureau acknowledged that
modernizing the existing Tu-22 would not produce the performance characteristics
required by the Air Forces.
Another OKB-156 project in this direction was development of Aircraft 125, a
canard wing aircraft equipped with two NK-6 engines. Aircraft 125 was supposed
to have a range of 4,500-4,800 kilometers and a cruising speed of 2,500 kilome-
ters per hour. The aircraft's design called for the extensive use of titanium alloys
and state-of-the-art electronics. The design was submitted in the competition for
the new bomber project in 1962, but the T-4 design submitted by Sukhoy was
chosen.
As an alternative to the T-4 design, OKB-156 proposed Aircraft 145, which was
presented as a modified version of the Tu-22. This multipurpose supersonic bomber
would have flown at subsonic speeds at low altitudes and switched to supersonic
speed to penetrate enemy air defenses. Its range at subsonic speed was supposed
to be 6,000-7,000 kilometers. A variable-sweep wing was used on Aircraft 145 to
fulfill range and speed requirements. The aircraft was supposed to be equipped with
Kh-22 cruise missiles, which had already been adopted by that time.
Work on Aircraft 145 led to a decision by the Soviet government to suspend the
work on the T-4 plane in favor of Tupolev's design. A government decree issued in
1967 envisaged the start of experimental design work on Aircraft 145, which was
called the Tu-22M. The new bomber was supposed to have a maximum speed of
2,300 kilometers per hour and a range of 7,000 kilometers without refueling. Table
6A.6 lists the main technical characteristics of the Tu-22M.
The first Tu-22M plane, the Tu-22MO, made its first flight on 30 August 1969.
The Tu-22MO did not meet the requirements during in-plant tests, which continued
until April 1970, and only a limited series of that model was built. Two of the
Tu-22MO planes of that experimental series were turned over to the Long-Range
Aviation training center in February 1973. The first model of the next version,
the Tu-22M1, was built in July 1971. The Tu-22M1s were also produced in a
small quantity and were turned over to naval aviation after tests that lasted around
four years.
The first Tu-22M model to be produced in a large quantity was the Tu-22M2.
Flight tests of that plane began in 1973. The plane was equipped with NK-22
engines and had a range of 5,100 kilometers and a maximum speed of 1,800 kilo-
meters per hour and could carry up to three Kh-22 cruise missiles. It did not have
terrain-following capability, but it was nevertheless capable of relatively long flights
at low altitude for the penetration of enemy air defenses. 72 In 1976 the Tu-22M2
392 Chapter 6
Table 6A.6
Technical characteristics of the Tu-22M bomber
Designation Tu-22MO Tu-26 Backfire A

Tu-22Ml Tu-26 Backfire A
Tu-22M2 Tu-26 Backfire B
Tu-22M3 Tu-26 Backfire C
First flight Tu-22MO 30 August 1969
Tu-22Ml June 1971
Tu-22M2 1972
Tu-22M3 20 June 1977
Serial production Tu-22Ml 1971 (small series)
Tu-22M2 1973-1983
Tu-22M3 since 1977
Commissioned Tu-22MO was not commissioned
Tu-22Ml 1976 (Naval Aviation)
Tu-22M2 1976
Tu-22M3 1981
Airframe low/mid variable-geometry wing, two engines at tail
Engines turbojet
Tu-22MO NK-144-22 (2 x 196.2kN/2 x 20,000kg)
Tu-22Ml NK-22 (2 x 215.7kN/2 x 22,000kg)
Tu-22M2 NK-22 (2 x 215.7kN/2 x 22,000kg)
Tu-22M3 NK-25 (2 x 245.1kN/2 x 25,000kg)
Refueling lUltil 1979,a probe-and-drogue
Nominal payload 6,000 kg
Service range Tu-22MO 4,140km
Tu-22Ml 5,000km
Tu-22M2 5,100km
Tu-22M3 7,000km
Service ceiling Tu-22MO 13,OOOm
Tu-22Ml 13,OOOm
Tu-22M2 13,OOOm
Tu-22M3 14,000m
Speed Tu-22MO 1,530km/h (maximum)
Tu-22Ml 1,660 km/h (maximum)
Tu-22M2 900 km/h (cruise), 1,800 km/h (maximum)
Tu-22M3 900 km/h (cruise), 2,300 km/h (maximum)
Offensive armament Tu-22M2 1-3 Kh-22 missiles
Tu-22M3 1-3 Kh-22 missiles, 6-10 Kh-15 missiles, 250-9,OOO-kg
bombs (total weight up to 24,000 kg)
Defensive armament Tu-22MO no

Tu-22M1 2 23-mm GSh-23 cannons
Tu-22M2 2 23-mm GSh-23 cannons
Tu-22M3 1 23-mm two-barrel GSh-23 cannon
Length Tu-22MO 41.5m
Tu-22M1 41.5m
Tu-22M2 41.46m
Tu-22M3 42.46m
Height 11.05m
Wing span Tu-22MO 22.75 m (swept), 31.6 m (spread)
Tu-22M1 25 m (swept), 34.28 m (spread)
Tu-22M2 25 m (swept), 34.28 m (spread)
Tu-22M3 23.30 m (swept), 34.283 m (spread)
Wing area Tu-22M3 183.6m' (swept), 175.8m' (spread)
Maximum load Tu-22M3 24,000kg
Maximum range
Takeoff weight Tu-22MO 121,000 (maximum)
Tu-22M1 122,000 kg (maximum)
Tu-22M2 122,000 kg (maximum)
Tu-22M3 124,000 kg (maximum), 126,400 kg (with take-off
boosters)
Empty weight
Crew 4
a Refueling system was dismantled to comply with assurances that the Soviet Union gave at
the time of signing the SALT II Treaty in 1979.
bomber was adopted for use by the Air Forces and naval aviation. Over the course
of serial production, which continued from 1973 to 1983, 211 Tu-22M2 planes
were built in all (including the prototypes), all at Plant 22 in Kazan.
The capabilities of the Tu-22M2 were one of the problems discussed during
the U.S.-Soviet Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. The United States insisted that the
Tu-22M had the necessary range to deliver strikes within U.S. territory and that the
planes should therefore be included in the total number of Soviet strategic delivery
systems. The Soviet Union consistently denied the strategic capabilities of the
Tu-22M because its effective range was only 5,100 kilometers. To solve the problem,
when the SALT II Treaty was being signed, the Soviet Union offered assurances that
the Tu-22M did not have strategic capabilities and that there were no plans to give
it those capabilities. The Soviet Union notified the United States of the decision not
394 Chapter 6
to equip the Tu-22M bombers with aerial refueling systems and not to increase the
rate of production, which was 30 planes a year at that time. The refueling equip-
ment that has already been installed was later removed from all of the Tu-22M
planes.
The start of the serial production of the Tu-22M2 was immediately followed by
a project to modernize the aircraft to increase its speed and range. An attempt to
equip the plane with NK-23 engines, an upgraded version of the NK-22, was un-
successful. When the NK-25 engine with electronic control was developed, it was
installed on some of the planes, which were called Tu-22M2Es. In spite of this
modification, the plane still did not have the specified performance characteristics.
The next stage of modernization involved changes in the plane's airframe. The
new model had a longer nose and a different arrangement for the air inlets, and the
maximum sweep angle of the adjustable part of the aircraft's wing was increased
to 65 degrees. Measures were taken to reduce the plane's weight and install modern
equipment. The new plane, called the Tu-22M3 (figure 6A.6), made its first flight
on 20 June 1977.
The Tu-22M3 bomber began reaching the troops at the end of the 1970s, and it
was adopted in 1983. The range of the plane had been increased to 6,800 kilome-
ters, and its maximum speed had been increased to 2,300 kilometers per hour. The
standard load was also twice that of the Tu-22M2. The Tu-22M3 could carry up
to three Kh-22 cruise missiles or 10 short-range Kh-15 (AS-16) missiles. It could
also carry free-fall or smart bombs. In 1985 the Tu-22M3 was used for training
flights in extremely close-order battle formations at maximum speed near the ground
to demonstrate its low-altitude air defense penetration capabilities. 73
Projects to improve the flight and combat characteristics of the Tu-22M con-
tinued after the development of the Tu-22M3. They resulted in the Tu-22MR long-
range reconnaissance plane in 1985 and the new advanced model, the Tu-22M4, in
1990. 74
Tu-160 (Blackjack)
Projects to develop a supersonic strategic bomber began in the Soviet Union in 1970.
During the competition for the development of the new plane, designs were sub-
mitted by the Tupolev's, Myasishchev's, and Sukhoy's design bureaus. Tupolev's
OKB-156 submitted a bomber design with an ogive wing, similar in appearance to
the Tu-144 passenger plane. This design, however, could not secure the necessary
range at subsonic speeds and was rejected. OKB-156 then drew up the design for
Aircraft 70, with a variable-geometry wing, which was eventually approved by the
./'
./ >
/
/
/
Figure 6A.6
Tu-22M3 (Backfire C) bomber
Air Force. The decision to start the experimental design work on the plane was
probably made in 1975. The team working on the new bomber was headed by
v. I. Bliznyuk.
By 1981 two test models of the bomber and an airframe for static tests had been
built at the experimental plant of OKB-156 in Moscow (Plant 156). Aircraft 70
made its first flight on 19 December 1981. One of the two test planes was lost during
later flight tests.?5 The production of the lead series of the aircraft, designated the
Tu-160 (figure 6A.7), began soon after the start of tests at the Kazan plant. The
serial production of the Tu-160 began at the plant in 1984. The original plan called
for the construction of 100 Tu-160 planes, but production was halted in January
1992, which limited the total number of planes built to 36 units. 76 Production was
resumed in 1998, and in May 2000 first of the new planes entered service.
Table 6A.7 lists the technical characteristics of the Tu-160, which has an inte-
grated configuration, with low-mounted, variable-geometry wings and a long and
sharply swept fixed root panel. Engines are mounted as widely separated pairs in
underwing ducts.
396 Chapter 6
Figure 6A.7
Tu-160 (Blackjack) bomber
The plane's variable-geometry wings (which can change angles within a range
from 20 degrees to 65 degrees) secure its capability for performing a variety of mis-
sions at supersonic and subsonic speeds. It has all-moving vertical and horizontal
tail surfaces and analog computer control.
The bomber is equipped with four NK-32 turbofan engines,?7 the development of
which began in OKB-276 in 1977. Reducing the plane's radar and infrared signa-
tures was the focus of the aircraft design project. In particular, when the engines
were developed, special measures were taken to reduce the radar cross-section
of engine components. Measures were also taken to reduce the engine's infrared
signature. Flight tests of the new engines began in 1980 on a specially equipped
Tu-95 plane.
The Tu-160 can carry up to 12 long-range Kh-55 cruise missiles, mounted on two
rotary launchers in two bomb bays. A Kh-15 missile can be added to the weapon
inventory for the destruction of targets at short range. The complement of bombs
can consist of various types of smart bombs, including the largest-caliber bomb of
1,500 kilograms (KAB-1500) and conventional or nuclear free-fall bombs.
Table 6A.7
Designation Tu-160 BlackJack

First flight 19 December 1981
Serial production since 1984
Commissioned after 1987
Airframe low/mid variable-geometry wing, four engines paired in pods
Engines turbOjet NK-32 (4 x 245 kN/4 x 25,000 kg)
Service range 14,000km (with 9,000kg load), 10,500km (with 40,000kg load)
Combat radius more than 7,300 km (with refueling)
Speed maximum 2,200 km/h, at sea level 1,030 km/h
Offensive armament 12 Kh-55 missiles or 24 Kh-15 missiles, can carry free-fall or
guided bombs
Defensive armament no
Length 54.1m
Height 13.1m
Wing span 35.6m (minimwn), 55.7m (maximim)
Wing area 232m'
Takeoff weight 275,000kg (maximum)
Empty weight 110,000kg
Crew 4
The plane is equipped with a navigation and battle management system consist-
ing of an inertial navigation system, an astronavigation system, radar for the long-
range detection of land and naval surface targets, and an electro-optical bombsight.
The bomber is not equipped with cannon armament. Its defensive weapons include
a set of electronic warfare systems.
All Tu-160 bombers are equipped with a probe-and-drogue refueling system
with a retractable refueling probe. 11-78 and 3MS-2 planes can be used as the tanker
aircraft.
398 Chapter 6
The first Tu-160 bombers began reaching LRA units in May 1987. The subdivi-
sion chosen for the experimental use of the plane was the 184th Bomber Air
Regiment based in Priluki. By the end of 1991 the 184th Regiment had 19 Tu-160
bombers.7 8 After the breakup of the Soviet Union, Ukraine claimed all 19 of the
planes in Priluki, but in 2000 eight of these aircraft were transferred from Ukraine
to Russia.
Re-equipping of the 121st Guards Heavy-Bomber Air Regiment, based near
Engels, with Tu-160 planes began in 1992. The first of those planes reached the
regiment on 16 April 1992. By May the regiment already had three planes. 79
7
Strategic Defense
Air Defense Forces
The Air Defense Forces were established as a separate branch of the Soviet
armed forces to protect the country against possible strategic strikes from air
and space. 1 The original function of the Air Defense Forces consisted in detecting
and repulsing enemy strategic air attacks. Later they were assigned the functions
of missile attack detection, missile defense, space monitoring, and the operation
and maintenance of antisatellite systems. Even in peacetime, the Air Defense
Forces are on constant alert duty, the purpose of which is early detection of air
and missile attack and providing an early warning of any attack detected to the
Supreme High Command and to civilian and military administrative bodies. In
wartime it is the job of the Air Defense Forces to defend Soviet territory from enemy
strikes.
The history of the Air Defense Forces in the armed forces of the Soviet Union
begins in 1927, when a department (converted into a directorate in 1930) in charge
of air defense was established at the headquarters of the Red Army. In 1932 the Air
Defense Directorate was transferred to the immediate jurisdiction of the People's
Commissariat of Defense. In addition to the central air defense directorates of
military districts, there were air defense administrations subordinate to the
commanding officers of district troops.
In 1937 air defense districts were created for the defense of Moscow, Leningrad,
and Baku, and air defense divisions and brigades were stationed around Kiev,
Minsk, Odessa, Batumi, Khabarovsk, and several other cities and important
industrial regions. The air defense districts, divisions, and brigades included air
reconnaissance posts, warning and communications posts, searchlight units, and
surface-to-air artillery. Fighter aviation remained part of the Air Forces and was
400 Chapter 7
supposed to be transferred to the operational jurisdiction of the Air Defense Direc-

torate only after the start of a war.
In November 1941 the Air Defense Directorate served as the basis for a new
branch of the armed forces: the Air Defense Forces of National Territory.' By June
1943, howeve~ the air defense zones and fronts had been transferred to the control
of the Soviet Army artillery commander. The Air Defense Forces regained the status
of a branch of the Armed Forces in 1948.
The Air Defense Forces (ADF) have been reorganized several times, and some
attempts have been made to decentralize the strategic defense system and to trans-
fer ADF units to the jurisdiction of other services of the armed forces. In spite of
this, until recently the Air Defense Forces remained a separate service of the armed
forces whose job was to protect the country from strategic strikes. The air defense
of units of other branches of the armed forces (including their defense during
military operations) was the job of the air defense branches of those services.
The main components of the strategic national defense forces, which constituted
the basis of the Air Defense Forces, were the following:
· Radio-Technical Troops, responsible for airspace surveillance and air attack detec-
tion; these troops provide air defense with necessary targeting information
• Surface-to-Air Missile Troops, responsible for the fighting off of air attacks
• Fighter Aviation of the Air Defense Forces, the main function of which is the
elimination of enemy manned and unmanned aircraft
The Missile and Space Defense Forces,' consisting of the following:
The early-warning system for timely missile attack detection
The ballistic missile defense corps for the Moscow missile defense
The space surveillance system for the monitoring of objects in space
The process of liquidating the Air Defense Forces as a separate service of the
Russian armed forces began in July 1997. The Missile and Space Defense Forces
were transferred to the jurisdiction of the Strategic Rocket Forces. By December
1998 missile engineering and surface-to-air missile troops and ADF fighter aviation
were turned over to the Air Forces. 4
Radio-Technical Troops
The Radio-Technical Troops (RTV) became a separate branch of the Air Defense
Forces in 1955. The main functions of the Radio-Technical Troops are the moni-
toring of the airspace over national territory and adjacent territories, the detection
of air attacks, and the collection of the targeting information for air defense units.
Strategic Defense 401
The first attempts to equip the Soviet armed forces with radar systems for the
detection of aircraft and the aiming of surface-to-air fire were undertaken in the
Soviet Union in the years preceding World War II. In 1930 the plans of the
Military-Technical Directorate of the Red Army envisaged research into radio-
technical methods of aircraft detection based on the active use of radio waves.
Applied research projects began in October 1933.5 The first detection rada~ the
RUS-1, and long-range detection radar, the RUS-2, were adopted in 1939-1940.
During the war, the Air Defense Forces also used fire control radars and radar gun
sights for antiaircraft night fighter planes. 6
Soviet radar development projects continued in the postwar years. The P-20
Romashka, P-15, and P-19 Tropa VHF-band radars were created and adopted in
the early 1950s. 7 The P-20 radar later served as the basis for many updated ver-
sions (P-25/30, P-35/37, and P-37R) that are still being used by the Air Defense
Forces of Russia and those of another 49 countries in the world. 8 The P-15 and
P-19 were distinguished by their ability to detect low-altitude targets. The P-8
VHF-band rada~ adopted in 1950, was the first radar for the detection of aircraft
under the conditions of passive and active jamming. For a long time the radars
created in the 1950s and 1960s and their modified versions served as the basis of
the Soviet Union's system of constant airspace surveillance. The 39N6 and 35N6,
low-altitude VHF-band radars, were created and adopted in the USSR in the early
1950s to replace the P-15 and P-19 radars.9 In 1991 the P-37 long-range detection
radar was upgraded to give it the same low-altitude capabilities. The 1L117 radar
was created and adopted at the same time and is now being issued to the troops.l0
One of the requirements imposed on new-generation radars was the capability to
detect and track stealth aircraft.
One of the distinguishing features of the Soviet radar engineering program
was its emphasis on long-range detection radars operating in the VHF band. One
of the advantages of using this band is the much longer detection range it offers.
The P-14 Lena radar and its modified versions (Dubrava and Oborona), for
example, could detect objects at distances of 500-900 kilometers. Another impor-
tant feature of VHF-band radar is its ability to detect stealth aircraft. The
most advanced Russian VHF-band radar today is the 55Zh6 long-range detection
radar.
VHF-band radars as well as those operating in the SHF and UHF bands enabled
the Soviet Union in the 1950s-1960s to establish a network of ground radars to
detect air attacks from every direction but north. Construction of radars in the
402 Chapter 7
northern regions would have been too difficult, so airborne early warning (AEW)
radars were developed in the USSR in the 1960s to monitor the approaches to
national territory from the Arctic.
The first airborne radar projects date back to the early 1950s. The AEW Tu-126
plane with the Liana radar system was modeled on the Tu-144 passenger plane
and was developed and adopted in 1961. A separate Tu-126 squadron consisting
of nine aircraft" was established in the Air Defense Forces and deployed on the
Kola peninsula. The squadron was transferred to Kaunas in the latter half of the
1970s."
The AEW planes defended Soviet national territory against raids by bombers from
the north in conjunction with fighter-interceptor aircraft. The Tu-126 tactical doc-
trine envisaged regular flights along the Arctic coast of the USSR at low and medium
altitudes to create optimal conditions for the detection of incoming bombers flying
at altitudes of 9,000-10,000 meters.
In 1984 the squadron began to be armed with new A-50 radar reconnaissance
planes with the Shmel rada~ modeled on the Il-76MD transport plane. The dis-
tinctive features of the new system were its true look-down capability and its
capability for the direct vectoring of fighter-interceptors to the detected targets. This
capability meant that the A-50 could serve as a radar station and as an airborne
command center of an air combat force. In 1989 an AEW squadron consisting
of 20 A-50 planes, based on the AEW regiment, was moved from Kaunas to the
settlement of Berezovka near Pechora.
Until 1992 the Soviet/Russian radio-technical troops maintained virtually
100-percent radar coverage of the perimeter of the USSR state border at medium
and higher altitudes. An almost gap-free radar coverage was established at low
altitudes in the country's western regions. After the disintegration of the unified air
defense system and the reduction of the radio-technical subunits of the Russian Air
Defense Forces, Russia lost almost 40 percent of this radar coverage. 13 In spite of
that, Russian radio-technical troops are still capable of defending most of the
perimeter of Russia's territory.
Surface-to-Air Missile Troops

S-25, S-75, and S-125 Systems Development of surface-to-air missile (SAM) tech-
nology began in the Soviet Union almost immediately after the end of the World
War II with studies of the surface-to-air missiles that Germany had developed during
the war years. Soviet designers were instructed to reproduce models of German
equipment in the Council of Ministers decree of 15 May 1946, On Rocket-Propelled
Armament, which also envisaged the start of Soviet ballistic-missile projects. 14 Flight
tests of the R-1 01 and R-1 02 antiaircraft missiles, analogous to the German Wasser-
fall missile, and the R-llO, analogous to the German Typhoon unguided rocket,
began in the USSR in summer 1948.1' Even before the start of the flight tests, a
special commission was formed to establish guidelines for future SAM projects. In
spring 1949, after the Politburo had reviewed the results of the commission's work,
it passed a resolution ordering the start of projects in the creation of a SAM system
for the air defense of Moscow. 16 The main requirement the resolution imposed was
that the system developed should be capable of countering a raid by as many as
1,000 bombers.
The Third Main Directorate of the USSR Council of Ministers was established
on 9 August 1950 to take charge of the development of the Soviet air defense system.
Politburo-level oversight of the work was the job of the special committee headed
by L. P. Beria." The directorate included Design Bureau 1, headed by S. L. Beria
and P. N. Kuksenko, which became the head developer of SAM systems. The team
headed by P. D. Grushin in S. A. Lavochkin's design bureau was instructed to create
an antiaircraft missile for Moscow's first air defense system, and the guidance radar
was to be developed by the Design Bureau 1 divisions headed by A. A. Raspletin,
G. V. Kisunko, and A. L. Mints. Systems for the detection radars were to be
developed under the supervision of L. V. Leonov.'8
The developers submitted the design of the Berkut air defense system in March
1951. It included the A-100 long-range UHF-band detection radar, which also
provided targeting information. The Berkut system's main weapon was the V-300
single-stage liquid-propellant antiaircraft missile. Target tracking and guidance was
provided by multichannel19 B-200 radars.20 The design of the Berkut system
originally envisaged the inclusion of a combat force of G-400 fighters.
Flight tests of the V-300 missile began in 1951, and in October 1952 the V-300
was tested in conjunction with the B-200 tracking radar. The first successful test of
the surface-to-air system with a real target was conducted on 25 May 1953 on the
Kapustin Yar test range. During the test a V-300 missile shot down a Tu-4 unmanned
target drone. The success of the tests contributed to the decision to start building a
SAM system for the air defense of Moscow and the Moscow industrial region. 21
The air defense development program was reorganized in 1953 after the death of
I. V. Stalin. The Third Main Directorate was converted into the Main Special
Machine-Building Directorate. Beria and Kuksenko lost their posts at Design Bureau
1, and Raspletin occupied the office of Design Bureau 1 chief designer. OKB-2,
headed by Grushin, was established to work on SAM projects."
404 Chapter 7
The deployment of SAM launchers for the Moscow air defense system, designated
S-25 (SA-1), began in fall 1953. The launchers were situated in two tiers at dis-
tances of 44 and 88 kilometers from the center of the city, with overlapping cover-
age. The A-100 long-range detection radars were deployed in positions forming two
rings around Moscow at distances of 25-30 kilometers between them and 200-250
kilometers from the center of the city.
The entire system was united in the First Separate Air Defense Army (originally
the Special-Purpose Army) and was divided into four air defense corps, each of
which consisted of 14 regimentsP The regiments were divided into two tiers, six in
the one closest to Moscow and eight farther away. Each S-25 regiment could fire
a total of 20 missiles simultaneously at 20 air targets. Sixty SAMs were in full
readiness for launch simultaneously. The 5-25 system's original intercept range was
around 45 kilometers.
The S-25 system was commissioned on 7 May 1955. By that time some antiair-
craft systems were on alert in the experimental-use mode-without missiles-in
rocket launcher battalions. The S-25 system was placed on permanent alert in the
fully combat-ready mode in June 1956. 24 The components of the S-25 system, which
stayed in service until 1987, were upgraded and modified several times over its term
of service.
During the final stage of the work on the S-25 system, the division of Design
Bureau 1 headed by G. V. Kisunko investigated the possibility of creating a mobile
(rail-based) version of the system. This version, which the designers called the S-50,
was intended for deployment initially as part of the Leningrad air defense and later
for the air defense of critical administrative and industrial sites throughout the
country. The part of the proposal concerning the air defense of Leningrad was
rejected, howeve~ because of the start of the work on the Dal air defense system.
The Moscow regional air defense did not solve the problem of defending the most
important industrial centers and cities in the Soviet Union. Repeated flights over the
territory of the Soviet Union by U.S. bombers that had been reconfigured for air
reconnaissance graphically demonstrated the Soviet Union's vulnerability to an air
attack. The Soviet leadership instructed designers to create an air defense system
that would defend the majority of the country's territory. The experience gained in
creating the regional air defense had revealed the inordinate cost of covering the
country's territory and borders with fixed-site systems like the S-25. The mobile
version (S-50) would have cost almost as much.
The decision to develop a less expensive point defense antiaircraft system for mass
deployment was made in 1954, before the testing of the S-25 system was com-
pleted." The project was assigned to Design Bureau 1, and the development of
the missile was assigned to Grushin's OKB-2. The result was a medium-range air
defense system26 known as the 5-75 (5A-2) or Dvina." The system consisted of the
equipment of one 5-25 channel and V-750 5AM launchers with solid-propellant
boosters. Tests of the 5-75 system began in January 1957 and were completed on
28 November 1957. After the 5-75 was commissioned, these systems began to be
deployed around the main industrial centers in the Soviet Union.
Improvement of the S-75 system began even before it was commissioned. During
the first stage of improvements, the system was equipped with a V-755 missile with
a longer range and a lower intercept altitude.28 The Air Defense Forces commis-
sioned the air defense system with the upgraded missile, called the 5A-75 Desna,
in 1959.'9 Another modification of the system, the 5-75M Volkhov with a V-757
missile, entered service in 1961. It had a maximum effective altitude comparable to
that of the Desna, but its intercept range was longer by more than a third. 30 For a
long time this system was the main antiaircraft system of the Soviet Air Defense
Forces.
The 5-75 air defense system was designed to intercept planes at altitudes of up
to 30,000 meters. At the same time, it was not adapted for low-altitude intercept,
so low-altitude flights could be used for air defense penetration. This led to a deci-
sion in March 1956 to develop an antiaircraft system for low-altitude targetsY Tests
of the new 5-125 Neva (5A-3) short-range antiaircraft system with a V-600 5AM
began in March 1961. 32 The system's lowest intercept altitude was 300 meters. Like
the 5-75, the 5-125 was a mobile system.
The 5-125 system was upgraded in 1964. The new system, called the 5-125M
Pechora, designed to intercept low-altitude, high-speed targets, was armed with the
new V-601 missile and an upgraded tracking and guidance radar. The new model
lowered the minimum intercept altitude to 50 meters. 33 The engagement zone of
the latest models of the 5-125 system covers the whole range of altitudes from a
minimum of 20 meters to a maximum of 18,000 meters. 34
The possibility of using nuclear warheads in antiaircraft systems was envisaged
for the assured destruction of major targets during a massive enemy air attack. The
nuclear warheads for 5AMs had a yield of a few kilotons. Nuclear-tipped 5AMs
were developed for all air defense systems used by the Air Defense Forces, with the
exception of the short-range 5-125 system.
S-500 and S-200 Systems Work on long-range 5AM systems began in the second
half of the 1950s, when the first medium-range systems were being developed. A
406 Chapter 7
long-range system would secure the regional air defense of the country's major
industrial regions with fewer SAM units. The S-500 Dal multichannel system,
designed in the late 1950s by the design bureau of S. A. Lavochkin, was intended
to be the first such long-range system. The missiles of this system were to be the
first Soviet missiles with an active-radar-homing warhead.
The expectations for the new system and the reputation of its general designer
were so high that the decision to build Dal facilities for the Leningrad air defense
system was made before the test model had been built. The tests then revealed that
the ground-based radar equipment that NII-244 of the Ministry of Radio
Industry was developing for the Dal system did not have the required capability.
The antiaircraft missiles the Lavochkin Design Bureau had developed for the S-500
did meet specifications, howeve~ when they were aimed by other equipment. Work
on the S-500 Dal system was stopped in 1963, a few years after Lavochkin's death,
and was never resumed. 35
Design Bureau 1 was working on long-range antiaircraft systems at the same time
as the Lavochkin Design Bureau. Its Special Design Bureau No. 30 (SKB-30) branch,
headed by Kisunko, was designing a modified version of the S-25 multichannel
system that would have a range double that of S-25. Under the supervision of
Raspletin, SKB-31 (another division of Design Bureau 1) designed the single-channel
S-200 SAM system with an active-radar-homing warhead. Work on the "double
5-25" was stopped for several reasons, and a long-range system, designated the
S-200 Angara (SA-5), was instead adopted for the Air Defense Forces in 1963. 36
The S-200 system included a two-stage SAM (code-numbered 5V21) that missile
allowed the system's range to be extended to 150 kilometers, with an intercept alti-
tude of 20,000 meters." The first S-200s were deployed in the Leningrad air defense
system. Some of the facilities that had been intended to house S-500 components
were used instead for the deployment of the new systems because the work on the
S-500 had completely stopped by that time. 3S
Two significant upgrades were made to the S-200 system over the course of its
deployment. In 1970 the maximum intercept range was increased to 240 kilome-
ters, and the intercept altitude was raised to 29,000 meters. The updated system
was called the S-200V Volga. The next upgrade was completed in 1975. The new
S-200D Vega system had intercept capabilities at altitudes from 300 to 40,000
meters and an intercept range of 300 kilometers. 39
Joint SAM brigades were formed in the surface-to-air missile branch of the Air
Defense Forces in the first half of the 1970s to enhance the effectiveness of SAM
forces. The brigades had long-range S-200 systems for high-altitude intercept and
S-125 low-altitude systems. This multitier air defense provided more reliable cov-
erage. Another important result of the creation of the joint brigades was reducing
the vulnerability of the SAM units, since the low-altitude systems provided defense
against low-flying aircraft.
S-300 Systems The creation of effective air defense systems and the improvement
of their capabilities led to a search for new defense penetration tactics. One of the
most important moves in this direction was the deployment of long-range air-
based cruise missiles. The Soviet SAM systems created and adopted in the 1950s
and 1960s were not designed to deal with the threat posed by a massive cruise
missile attack. First of all, cruise missiles would outnumber bombers in such an
attack. In addition, cruise missiles flying at low altitudes could be used to penetrate
air defenses. 40 Strategic bombers had also begun to be equipped to fly in terrain-
following mode. To deal with these targets effectively, the SAM systems of the
next generation had to be capable of simultaneous interception of several targets
at any altitude.
The decision to start developing the S-300 family of standardized, multichannel
SAM systems for the Air Defense Forces and the air defense branches of the Ground
Forces and Navy was made in the middle of the 1970s. The systems intended for
different branches of the Armed Forces received different designations: The S-300P
was intended for the Air Defense Forces, the S-300V was for the Ground Forces,
and the S-300F was for the Navy. The Almaz Scientific Production Association
(NPO) (formerly Design Bureau 1) was assigned the development of the S-300P
system, and the Antey and Altair Scientific Production Associations developed the
S-300V and S-300F systems.
The multichannel S-300P system with a 5V55 SAM was tested and adopted in
1980.41 The first S-300P systems replaced the obsolete S-25 systems in the Moscow
air defense system.
All of the equipment and launchers of the original version of the S-300P system
were situated on trailer platforms. During deployment all elements of the system
were connected by cables. This model was called the S-300PT. Elements of the
S-300PS self-propelled version of the system, developed later, were mounted on
all-terrain-vehicle chassis. Cable connections were used in this model as well. The
next version, the S-300PM, used radio-relay links to connect the system elements.
This version was commissioned in 1985. 42
In 1990-1992 the Almaz NPO revised the design of the S-300PM to improve its
combat performance. The upgraded version, called the S-300PM1, used a new SAM
408 Chapter 7
and new software. These upgrades increased the range of the S-300PM1 to 150
kilometers (as compared to 90 kilometers for the S-300PM) and lowered the bottom
of the SAM envelope from 25 meters to 10.43 Another upgrade, completed in 1997,
increased the system's range to 200 kilometers. This version of the system, desig-
nated S-300PM2, includes the new 48N62 missile.
Russian Surface-to-Air Missile Troops Since the breakup of the Soviet Union and
the setting up of the armed forces of the Russian Federation in 1992, Russia's
surface-to-air missile troops have been reduced considerably. Some of these reduc-
tions resulted from a modernization program undertaken for air defense systems,
the main objective of which was the standardization of equipment among the ser-
vices of the armed forces. The tactical performance characteristics of systems of the
S-300P category enabled them to be used as replacements for existing medium- and
short-range systems. Because of this, systems of the S-75 and S-125 class were almost
completely removed from service by the end of 1996. The number of long-range S-
200 systems was also cut drastically-from 1,200 at the end of 1991 to approxi-
mately 400 at the end of 1996-and these were also replaced by S-300s (the closest
substitute was the S-300PM1).
The strongest operational force of Russian surface-to-air missile troops at this
time is deployed in the Moscow Air Defense District: a total of 35-37 SAM regi-
ments (around 900 S-200 and S-300P launchers). The combined operational force
covering the St. Petersburg region and the Northern Fleet basing areas on the Kola
peninsula is only slightly smaller than the Moscow force: It is made up of around
23 regiments (600 SAM launchers). One or two regiments (around 50 S-300P
launchers) are deployed in the Kaliningrad Special Defense District. An operational
force of surface-to-air missile troops covers the Pacific Fleet basing areas on
the Kamchatka peninsula and in Primorsky Kray and the industrial regions of the
Urals and Siberia. In all, around 750 SAM launchers are deployed in the Asian part
of the country. Approximately nine SAM regiments (close to 150 launchers) are
deployed in the North Caucasus. 44
Fighter Aviation of the Air Defense Forces

In the first years after the creation of the Air Defense Forces, air defense missions
were assigned to ordinary fighters. The first specialized fighter-interceptors in the
Soviet Union were the MiG-1 and MiG-3 fighters, designed just before World War
II. A division of long-range Pe-3 interceptors equipped with radar range finders
began air defense operations in summer 1943.
There were four successive generations of fighter-interceptors in the fighter avia-

tion of the Air Defense Forces in the postwar period. The first generation of inter-
ceptors consisted of the first Soviet jet fighters: the MiG-9, MiG-15, MiG-17, and
MiG-19, which were usually modified for air defense missions. The modifications
consisted mainly of the removal of some of the guns and other armament to reduce
the planes' weight, the installation of radar range finders or radar gun sights on the
planes, and their reconfiguration for the first (essentially experimental) air-to-air
missiles. 45
The radar range finders used on the first fighter-interceptors enabled the pilots of
fighter planes to detect targets at a distance of three to four kilometers and approach
them for visual confirmation. The interceptors could not search for targets without
outside assistance, and they were therefore guided from a ground command post
using data provided by early-warning radars. The Vozdukh command system was
created for this purpose in the early 1960s (and was subsequently upgraded several
times). The Lazur receiver was installed on board the interceptors (and was also
upgraded numerous times).
Later the interceptors were equipped with radar gun sights that allowed them to
search for and intercept targets without outside assistance. In spite of this, the guid-
ance system receiver is still an element of the airborne radio-electronic equipment
of all Russian interceptors. Various upgrades of the Rubezh command guidance
system are used now to guide fighter-interceptors to their targets. 46
The second generation of fighter-interceptors consisted of planes intended for
antiaircraft missions from the start: the Su-9, Su-ll, Su-15, Yak-25P, Yak-28P, and
Tu-128. These planes were developed as a component of integrated air-launched
missile intercept systems, which combined an interceptor, airborne radio-electronic
equipment, and specially designed air-to-air missiles. The Air Defense Forces
MiG-21 fighter-interceptors (MiG-21PF, MiG-21PFS, and MiG-21PFM) differed
from other second-generation aircraft in that respect, since they were not dedicated
interceptor aircraft, but rather modified versions of Air Forces fighter planes.
The first integrated air-defense system-the Su-9-51, consisting of an Su-9 fighte~
a TsD-30T radar gun sight, and RS-2US guided missiles-was adopted in 1958. The
first air-to-air missiles used passive radar homing. Active-homing missiles were
deployed on fighter planes in the early 1960s. The air-to-air missiles developed in
subsequent years used various types of homing-semiactive and active radar and
infrared.47
Third-generation Soviet fighter-interceptor systems, the MiG-23 and MiG-25
interceptors of Air Defense Forces fighter aviation, were based on third-generation
410 Chapter 7
jet fighters. The radars of the third-generation systems for the first time had real
look-down capability.
The development in the 1950s of fighters capable of intercepting targets while
on long airborne patrol was an important advance in the development of Soviet
fighter-interceptors. These interceptors were intended primarily for the defense of
approaches to the Soviet Union from the north. Their development was imperative
for the successful defense of the Soviet Union's northern perimeter, because it was
impossible to deploy a dense network of airfields in the northern regions of the
country.
The first Soviet interceptor capable of long patrols was the Yak-25p, com-
missioned in 1953. In 1960 the Yak-25Ps were replaced by the newer Yak-28Ps,
which were used as fighter-interceptors for more than 20 years. In the mid-1960s
the Air Defense Forces were armed with Tu-126 AEW aircraft and Tu-128 inter-
ceptors, which were capable of long airborne patrol. The Tu-126 AEW system
was later replaced by the A-50 system, which is still in operation. The Tu-128 inter-
ceptors were modernized in 1974 and then remained in service until the late
1980s.
The present (fourth) generation of fighter-interceptors consists of modified ver-
sions of the MiG-31 and Su-27 aircraft. These planes were designed as a result of
efforts to develop interceptors combining enhanced endurance at supersonic speeds
with the ability to intercept several targets at once. The need for interceptors
with these characteristics arose when u.s. bombers were equipped with cruise
missiles and when the United States started work on the supersonic strategic B-1
bomber.
The Zaslon phased-array radar project for the simultaneous tracking of several
targets was launched in 1972 in the USSR. The Zaslon radar was originally intended
for the long-range Tu-148 interceptors, which had been developed as replace-
ments for the Tu-128. The Tu-148, however, did not meet the ADF's speed require-
ments, and a decision was made to use the new radar on a plane modeled on the
MiG-25.
Tests of this new fighter, the MiG-25MP, began in 1975. In 1979 the plane was
adopted for use by ADF fighter aviation and renamed the MiG-31. The MiG-31
was equipped with the Zaslon SBI-16 radar and could carry up to eight long- and
intermediate-range missiles.48 The plane could simultaneously track up to 10 targets
at a wide range of altitudes, including targets flying in terrain-following mode, and
fire at as many as four of them at the same time. It was the first serial-production
Soviet fighter equipped with an in-flight refueling system.
The avionics of the MiG-31 enabled it to be used as part of an integrated oper-

ational formation. Using a special communications system, four MiG-31s could
exchange radar data and thereby constitute an integrated force of interceptors
covering an area up to 800 kilometers in width.49 With the aid of the data exchange
system, an interceptor in the operational force could be guided to targets detected
by another plane in the force. In addition, each of the MiG-31s could guide up to
three fighters of other classes (Su-27, MiG-23, MiG-25, and MiG-29) to a target.
The MiG-31 interceptor could also receive targeting information from ground-based
or airborne (A-50) radar systems.
The MiG-31 was updated in later years, and during these projects the modified
plane, known as the MiG-31B, was equipped with an upgraded version of the
Zaslon radar and two additional underwing pylons for missiles. This became the
standard design for all of the MiG-31s that are in service in Air Defense Force fighter
aviation units. Another updated version of the MiG-31 was built in the early 1990s
with all-new airborne radio-electronic equipment. This plane, the MiG-31M, was
equipped to use six KS-l72 super-long-range missiles and four R-77 long-range
missiles so and could track up to 29 targets simultaneously and fire at six of them at
once. 51
Another fourth-generation interceptor was the Su-27, which came in a two-seater
version called the Su-27UB (now being produced as the Su-30). The high flight
performance specifications of the Su-27 and the capability of equipping planes of
this type with the latest air-to-air missiles-the R-27M, R-2 7A, and R-77-turned
the plane into a highly effective fighter-interceptor.
The process of removing the fighter-interceptors of the third generation from
service and replacing the with planes of the fourth generation has been virtually
completed in Air Defense Forces fighter aviation units today. With a total fighter
force of 825 aircraft, ADF fighter aviation has around 100 MiG-23 interceptors,
425 MiG-31s, and 300 Su-27s. A strong operational force of ADF fighters has been
created in the country's northwest: Three MiG-31 regiments (85 planes), two Su-
27 regiments (65 planes), and a MiG-23 regiment are assigned to the Leningrad
Military District. An Su-27 fighter regiment is assigned to the Kaliningrad Special
Defense District. Three fighter regiments (one MiG-31 regiment with 25 planes and
two Su-27 regiments with a total of 60 planes) are assigned to the North Caucasus
Military District. Two fighter aviation regiments--{)ne MiG-23 regiment (30
fighters) and one MiG-31 regiment (25 planes)-are assigned to the Volga
Military District. The Asian part of the country and the Far East are covered by a
total of 10 regiments: one MiG-23 regiment (40 planes), three Su-27 regiments
412 Chapter 7
(80 planes), and six MiG-31 regiments (180 planes). The Moscow Air Defense Dis-
trict has six fighter aviation regiments: one equipped with MiG-23s (30 planes),
three with MiG-31s (85 planes), and two with Su-27s (65 planes).52
Missile and Space Defense Forces

The Missile Defense and Space Defense Troops were created as special arms of the
Air Defense Forces by a General Staff directive of 30 March 1967 on the basis of
the missile and space defense units that were already a part of the Air Defense Forces
by that time. The process of integrating missile defense and space defense in a single
structure was completed in 1983, and this was reflected when the Missile Defense
and Space Defense Troops were renamed the Missile and Space Defense Forces.
They consist of a separate ballistic-missile early-warning (BMEW) army," the
Missile Defense Corps,s4 and the Space Surveillance Corps.55
The First ARM Projects The first theoretical investigations into the possibility of
creating antiballistic missile defense systems began in 1948-1951 at NII-4 of the
Ministry of Defense, which was studying various aspects of ballistic-missile use, and
NII-885, which was developing guidance systems for ballistic missiles. Development
projects in the creation of ABM systems began soon after a group of top-level offi-
cials from the Ministry of Defense sent a proposal to the CPSU Central Committee
in August 1953 to suggest the start of such projects. This led to a government decree
in early 1954, giving Design Bureau 1, the head developer of Soviet SAM systems,
a year to investigate the possibility of creating ABM systems. 56
In August 1954 a special Design Bureau 1 team headed by Professor N. A.
Lifshits reported the results of studies of the possibility of creating ABM systems
based on the latest radar equipment and achievements in SAM engineering. After
the first phase of the research and development had been completed, G. V. Kisunko
was appointed to head the ABM projects. His Department 30 of Design Bureau 1
was transformed into Special Design Bureau No. 30 (SKB-30) of Design Bureau 1
and was reorganized completely for ABM development projects.
After a series of experiments to study the resistance of ballistic-missile warheads
to the effects of conventional fragmentation warheads and nuclear warheads com-
pleted in the middle of 1956, Kisunko's team moved on to the stage of experimen-
tal design, which was to begin with the construction of an experimental ABM system
to study its efficiency. The government decree ordering the construction of this
system was issued on 17 August 1956. 57 Construction of the system, known as
System A, began in July 1956 on Test Range A (Sary-Shagan), established specifi-

cally for this purpose west of Lake Balkhash in Kazakhstan. 58
A long-range radar was installed on the site in 1957,59 and the first test launches
of the missile interceptors were conducted in October of that same year. V-1000
interceptor missiles designed in P. D. Grushin's OKB-2, equipped with a conven-
tional fragmentation warhead, were used in the test launches. The V-1000 used
aerodynamic surfaces for attitude control and was guided by commands from a
ground-based radar.60 Full-scale tests of System A began in 1959, and the first suc-
cessful intercept of a real target-the reentry vehicle of an R-12 intermediate-range
ballistic missile launched from the Kapustin Yar test site-took place on 4 March
1961. There were 11 intercepts in all over the course of the System A tests.61
The Moscow ARM System The System A pilot system was developed primarily to
confirm experimentally the fundamental possibility of ballistic target intercept. Even
before the work on the system entered the final stage, however, a government decree
was issued (on 8 April 1958) to order the development of a preliminary design of
the Moscow ABM system. 62 In 1959 the Ministry of Defense drew up the
performance specifications for this system, called System A-35. According to these
specifications, System A-35 was supposed to guarantee the intercept of several
ballistic missiles with multiple reentry vehicles attacking Moscow simultaneously.
The reentry vehicles were supposed to be intercepted outside the atmosphere, which
meant that System A-35 would have to be equipped with a new missile, since V-
1000 relied on aerodynamics and therefore could not perform intercept outside
atmosphere.
The decree authorizing the start of experimental design work on the A-35 ABM
system for Moscow and its test range pilot version (the Aldan system) was issued
in 1960. G. V. Kisunko's design bureau was appointed the head developer of the
system and acquired a higher status in Design Bureau 1 (it was reflected, among
other things, in the change of its name from SKB-30 to OKB-30)." The new A-350
interceptor missile to be used in the pilot system was designed in Grushin's OKB-
2, and the development of the nuclear warhead for the A-350 was assigned to NII-
1011 (Chelyabinsk-70).64 All ABM projects outside OKB-30 were canceled soon
after the publication of the decree ordering the start of experimental design work
on System A-35."
The preliminary design of System A-35 was approved in fall 1962.66 According
to this design, System A-35 was supposed to consist of a main command center,
414 Chapter 7
eight early-warning radars arranged in a circle around Moscow (with overlapping

sectors), and 32 battle stations. 67 Each battle station was to consist of a two-channel
(target and missile) precision detection and tracking radar, a guidance radar, and
eight launchers of A-350 interceptors with conventional fragmentation warheads
similar to those of the V-1000 interceptor missile. 68 Tracking a target required the
simultaneous operation of the radars of three different stations (i.e. six radars). The
radar and other equipment intended for System A-35 was comparable to that of
System A. In its fully operational state System A-35 was supposed to secure
the simultaneous intercept of five or six targets (one target consisting of the last
stage of the ballistic missile and its reentry vehicle) attacking Moscow from
different directions. Two interceptor missiles were to be used for the destruction
of each target. 69
Construction of facilities in the Moscow region to house System A-35 began in
1962. The Moscow ABM system was scheduled to be placed on combat duty on
7 November 1967. 70 While the system was being developed, however, several sig-
nificant changes were introduced into its design. A 1963 decree ordered the revi-
sion of the System A-35 design to use the radars more efficiently. Instead of the six
precision tracking radars required for tracking a single target in System A and
the first version of A-35, only two were to be used for this purpose.71 High-yield
nuclear warheads on the interceptor missiles were supposed to compensate for any
reduced accuracy that resulted from the change. Two different new warheads for
the A-350 missile had already been designed in NIl-lOll. The first had a higher
neutron yield, and the second, which turned out to be more efficient, had a higher
X-ray yield. 72
The revised preliminary design of System A-35 was completed in 1964. It reduced
the number of battle stations from 32 to 16. 73 Despite the decrease, however, the
new system secured the simultaneous interception of six to eight targets instead of
the original goal of five or six. 74 The facilities being built around Moscow in prepa-
ration for the ABM system were united in a separate ABM corps of the Air Defense
Forces in 1965. 75
Technical difficulties that arose during the development of System A-35 kept the
developers from meeting the November 1967 deadline for putting the Moscow ABM
system on combat duty. The only system ready by September 1967 was the Aldan
pilot system deployed on the Sary-Shagan test site. Furthermore, tests of System A
clearly indicated that the ABM system could not defend Moscow against a massive
attack without substantial changes. The main problem was the system's inability to
intercept ballistic missiles with independently targetable reentry vehicles and ABM
penetration aids. In October 1967, after an analysis of the results of the System A
tests, a commission of the Ministry of Defense advised against the full-scale deploy-
ment of System A-35 and against the creation of the Avrora national missile defense
system, which was also being developed in OKB-30.
The technical difficulties encountered during the development of the Moscow
ABM system led the political leadership to reconsider its attitude toward missile
defense projects. Work on the deployment of System A-35 was virtually halted. In
particular, the decision was made to reduce the number of early-warning radars to
the two units that had already been built in Kubinka (Akulovo) and Chekhov.
The change in attitude toward missile defense among the Soviet leadership was
accompanied by significant changes in the Soviet ABM development program. One
of the subdivisions of the Vympel Design Bureau was renamed the Scientific-
Technical Center (NTTs) in May 1968, and A. G. Basistov was appointed as its
head. The new cente~ which was competing with the OKB-30, began working on
a new ABM strategy for Moscow, acknowledging the impossibility of developing
impenetrable ballistic missile defenses. In accordance with that new strategy, an
ABM system was expected to intercept only a single warhead or a limited strikeJ6
At the end of 1969 the Vympel Central Scientific Production Association (TsNPO)
was established to supervise all Soviet ABM, BMEW, and space surveillance proj-
ects. Basistov's Scientific-Technical Center became the head organization of the
Vympel TsNPO.
These changes in the Soviet ABM program made it possible for the United States
and Soviet Union to start negotiations on the limitation of ABM systems. These
negotiation talks, which began in 1969, ended with the signing of the U.S.-Soviet
Treaty on the Limitation of Antiballistic Missile Systems (the ABM Treaty) on 26
May 1972.77 By signing the treaty, the Soviet Union and United States pledged not
to deploy more than two ABM systems each, one to defend the nation's capital and
another to defend its land-based ballistic missile deployment area. A protocol to the
ABM Treaty, signed in 1974, reduced the number of permitted systems from two
to one. The ABM system allowed by the protocol can have no more than 100 inter-
ceptor missiles and their launchers and no more than six sites that include battle
management radarsJ8
In 1971, while the fundamental provisions of the ABM Treaty were being defined,
8 of the 16 battle stations and 4 of the 8 battle management radars for System
A-35 were being built around Moscow. Only three of the stations and one of the
radars, however, were close to completion. By that time the efficiency of System
A-35 had already been called into question, as reflected in a 1971 government
416 Chapter 7
decree that ordered the completion of any construction work on the system that
was in progress and the cancellation of any further construction work associated
with it. According to the decree, the system was to be adopted for experimental use
in its reduced formJ9
Acceptance tests of the Moscow ABM system, which consisted of the main
command center, one Dunay-3 early-warning radar, and three battle stations, were
conducted in 1971. The first section of System A-35 was approved for experimen-
tal use in June 1972. The facilities of the second section were put on combat duty
in 1974. 80
The Moscow ABM system that was approved for experimental use in 1974
included a main command center near Akulovo and eight battle stations situated
along the perimeter of the Moscow Major Ring near Bereya, Solnechnogorsk, Klin,
and Zagorsk (Sergiyev Posad).81 Two precision tracking radars and two battle man-
agement radars were situated in each of these battle stations, as well as 16 ground
launchers of A-350 interceptor missiles. In all, therefore, 64 interceptors were
deployed.
In addition, the system also included two early-warning units, each consisting of
two radars: one modeled on the Dunay-3 (Chief Designer V. P. Sosulnikov),82 which
shared a site with the command center in Akulovo,83 and a second, more modem
Dunay-3U (Chief Designer A. N. Musatov)84 near Chekhov. 85 The UHF-band86
radars of each unit had a separate transmitter and receiver, 87 each consisting of two
phased arrays facing in opposite directions. The search sector of each radar was
around 65°.88 The system was designed to intercept up to four targets.
In summer 1975 Kisunko was relieved of his duties as the ABM project super-
visor and I. D. Omelchenko was appointed chief designer of System A-35. A gov-
ernment decree was issued that same year to order another major update of System
A-35. According to the decree, the updated system was supposed to intercept a single
multiple target, a ballistic missile with multiple reentry vehicles and ABM penetra-
tion aids, instead of several simple targets. 89 During the modernization of the system,
which mainly affected the software of the computer cente~ the radar equipment of
the battle stations was united in an integrated data processing system.
Acceptance tests of the upgraded system, called the A-35M, began in May 1977.
It was adopted for use by the Missile Defense Corps after a brief period of experi-
mental use, and was then placed on alert 90 (although at a low level of readiness).
As a precaution, the system's liquid-propellant interceptor missiles were not
deployed on launchers in peacetime and were kept unassembled in storage depots.
The missiles were supposed to be installed on the launchers only during periods of
tensions. Dummy missiles replaced the actual interceptors on the launchers in peace-
time to preserve the launchers' electronic equipment. 9l
The follow-up work and subsequent modernization of System A-35 was accom-
panied by intensive development of a new-generation Moscow ABM system devel-
oped in the Vympel TsNPO. The research on this new system was headed by A. G.
Basistov. The fundamental principles driving the development of the new system
were the need to counter a single or limited strike against Moscow and the need for
a two-tier defense. 92 The second tier, in which the target would be intercepted within
the atmosphere rather than beyond it (as in the first tier), would solve the problem
of decoy discrimination.
The performance specifications for the new system were coordinated with the
Air Defense Forces in December 1969, and the preliminary design of the system
was drawn up and approved by the interdepartmental commission by 1971. 93 After
the ABM Treaty was signed in 1972, the design was revised to make the system
treaty-compliant. The work on the new design was completed at the end of 1973.
Soon afterward, in May 1974, a government decree ordered the creation of an
experimental model of the new two-tier ABM system on the Sary-Shagan test site.
Design work continued there in 1975-1976. The final decision to start building
the new Moscow ABM system, called System A-135,94 was made in 1978. 95 The
construction of the central radar of the future system began soon afterward.
Construction of silo launchers for the interceptor missiles of System A-135 began
in 1981.
Construction of the facilities for and designer tests of the system were completed
by 7 November 1987, and the state acceptance tests of the system were completed
by the end of 1989. Shortly before the end of the tests, in fall 1989, the Soviet gov-
ernment made a decision to modernize the system yet again to improve its combat
performance capabilities. 96 The necessary work was done while System A-135 was
in its period of experimental use, which continued until the middle of 1994. 97 After
that System A-135 was commissioned and was placed on combat alert. Starting
in 1979, the battle stations of System A-35M were gradually dismantled as the
facilities of System A-135 were built. System A-35 was removed from service in
1990.
The core of System A-135 consists of the multipurpose Don-2N radar,98 designed
in the Radio-Technical Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences under the
supervision of V. K. Sloka,99 and the command center, situated in a single facility
near Sofrino, 30 kilometers northeast of Moscow. 100 The Don-2N radar provides
tracking of targets detected by the early-warning system and guides interceptors
418 Chapter 7
to the targets. The radar station is a hardened structure in the shape of a

four-sided pyramid about 40 meters tall. Each face has a circular phased-array
antenna (16 meters in diameter) 101 and a square one (lOA meters x lOA meters).102
The Don-2N station provides the simultaneous observation of the entire upper
hemisphere.
System A-135 uses updated A-350 long-range exoatmospheric interceptors and
53T6 high-acceleration intermediate-range endoatmospheric interceptors,103 both
launched from silos. The A-350 launchers are located in six positions along the edge
of the Moscow Major Ring (the re-equipped positions of System A-35 and two new
ones). The intermediate-range interceptors are deployed in five positions between
the Moscow beltway and Moscow's Minor Ring. 104
National Missile Defense Projects The success of the first experiments in the inter-
cept of ballistic missiles in 1961 promoted the start of research into ABM systems
for the protection of national territory. One of the designs for the national ABM
system, the Taran, was submitted in 1963 by V. N. Chelomey. The Taran system
was expected to intercept attacking ballistic missiles at a point over the North Pole.
UR-100 (SS-l1) ballistic missiles, designed in OKB-156 and equipped with a nuclear
warhead with a yield of around 10 megatons, were proposed as the system's inter-
ceptors. ' OS The intercept point for the target was supposed to be determined by
extrapolating data about the target's trajectory received from the early-warning
radar. It was assumed that the accuracy provided by the early-warning radar in com-
bination with the interceptors' high-yield warhead would be enough to destroy any
attacking missiles without the need to guide the UR-100 missiles during the final
engagement phase. The TsSO-S UHF-band radar (Chief Designer A. L. Mints),
slated to be located 500 kilometers north of Moscow, was to be used as the early-
warning radar in the Taran system.
The designers' main argument in favor of the Taran system was the capability it
seemingly provided of using the same missile as an offensive and defensive weapon.
The designers also argued that the high-yield nuclear warhead could destroy more
than one target in the event of a massive missile strike. Chelomey's idea was actively
supported by N. S. Khrushchev, and a government decree was issued on 3 May
1963 to order the start of the Taran project.
The preliminary design of the Taran system, drawn up under A. L. Mints's
supervision, was ready in July 1964. During this stage the designers realized that
an intercept of an incoming missile would be impossible without terminal guidance
of the interceptor. As a result, they proposed that the system be combined with
System A-35 and that the UR-100 be modified to be guided by the A-35 radars. All
of the work on the Taran project stopped in October 1964, almost immediately
after Khrushchev's removal from office. 106
After the Taran design had been rejected in 1964, Kisunko, who was appointed
chief designer of ABM systems in 1965, started work on the Avrora national missile
defense. This work was conducted at the same time as the work on the A-35
Moscow ABM system. The Avrora system was supposed to counter a massive
nuclear missile strike against the main administrative and industrial regions in the
European part of the Soviet Union.
The Avrora system was quite similar to System A-35 in structure. It was a
single-tier system with exoatmospheric intercept capability and radar guidance
of nuclear interceptors. Decoy discrimination prior to endoatmospheric intercept
was to be accomplished by detonating a precursor high-yield nuclear charge
before the arrival of the interceptors. The observation of trajectory parameters
and polarization of the target's reflected radar signals was thought to provide
enough information for discrimination of heavy reentry vehicles from light
decoys.
Work on the Avrora system reached the stage of preliminary design, which was
completed in summer 1967. Construction began on a small-scale prototype, the
Argun system, consisting of the large, rotating phased-array 5N24 radar (Chief
Designer A. A. Tolkachev), on the Sary-Shagan test site shortly thereafter. When the
project was reviewed at a meeting of the Defense Ministry commission in October
1967, however, the commission decided that the plans failed to secure the reliable
functioning of the system under the impact of multiple nuclear bursts during a
massive strike. The commission also expressed doubts about the efficiency and fea-
sibility of the proposed decoy discrimination method. The Avrora design was then
rejected.
The possibility of using lasers, microwaves, and space-based systems in ABM
systems was investigated in the course of work on the Soviet Union's ABM research
projects. Experiments in the use of lasers for ballistic-missile defense were conducted
in the Terra-3 Scientific-Experimental Facility built on the Sary-Shagan test site in
the late 1960s. The facility included an LE-1 experimental laser, which was used for
the precise determination of target coordinates and the transmission of information
about trajectory parameters and the shape and size of objects. These projects were
conducted by the Institute of Experimental Physics (Arzamas-16), the Physics
Institute and General Physics Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and the
I. V. Kurchatov Atomic Energy Institute.
420 Chapter 7
Another field of research concerned the development of space ABM and anti-
satellite battle stations. A government decree of 1976 assigned the responsibility for
the coordination of projects in this field to the Energiya Scientific Production Asso-
ciation (NPO). During the work on the resulting program, which was called Kaskad,
the Energiya NPO drew up the preliminary design for a space combat system
consisting of two types of stations, one with interceptor missiles and another with
combat lasers. The battle stations were supposed to be modeled on the updated
design of the Salyut orbital station. Light two-stage antimissiles (weighing only a
few dozen kilograms each) with infrared homing were designed and tested during
the work on these projects. Ten of these missiles were to be deployed on one version
of the battle station. Work on these projects continued until the early 1990S'07 and
produced the Skif-DM prototype of the space laser combat system. This prototype,
which was to be used to test the combat system's design features and on board equip-
ment, was supposed to be placed into orbit during the first flight test of the Energiya
launch vehicle in 1987.108
The Early-Warning System

Projects in missile attack detection began in the Soviet Union when the work on the
prototype ABM system was being completed. During the first stage of the develop-
ment of the ballistic-missile attack early-warning components, the main function of
those components was supposed to be the transmission of tracking information
to missile defense systems. Other functions were added later, and today the early-
warning system is an important element of the command and control system of the
strategic nuclear forces and the armed forces as a whole. All of the BMEW systems
are now assigned to the Third Separate Early-Warning Army109 of the Missile and
Space Defense Forces. 110
Early-Warning Radars The radar used for missile detection during the first
stage of the tests of the prototype ABM system (System A) was the RE-110ng-range
radar, which was developed in NII-37 of the Ministry of Radio Industry 111 and
went operational in 1957. 112 The RE-1 could detect the reentry vehicle of a ballis-
tic missile at a distance of around 1,200 kilometers. Later the Dunay-2 rada~
designed in NII-37 under the supervision of V. P. Sosulnikov, and the TsSO-P rada~
developed in the Radio-Technical Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences
(RTI) under the supervision of A. L. Mints, were used for long-range detection in
System A.
The A-35 Moscow ABM system, construction of which began, as noted above,
in 1962, included two early-warning radars: the Dunay-3 UHF-band radar, similar
to the one deployed on the test site, and the Dunay-3U, developed under A. N.
Musatov's supervision. Soon after the start of the construction of System A-35, it
was clear that the system would need additional long-range detection radars, situ-
ated farther out toward U.s. territory, to achieve the required level of effectiveness.
The preliminary design for the first dedicated early-warning radar was drawn up
in the Radio-Technical Institute in 1961.113 The radar was a modified version of the
Dnestr radar l14 designed in the institute using the equipment of the TsSO-P radar.115
The Dnestr was originally designed for the IS (Satellite Fighter)116 antisatellite
system. The modifications made to the Dnestr for its use as an early-warning radar
consisted mainly in changing the orientation of its antenna. 117 The new radar,
developed by Yu. V. Polyak's team in the Radio-Technical Institute, was called the
Dnestr-M.118 The preliminary design for the early-warning base configuration called
for two surveillance stations equipped with Dnestr-M radars in the USSR's north-
ern region and in the Baltic (RO-1 and RO-2, respectively),'19 as well as an early-
warning command center in the Moscow region. 120
Construction work began on the sites of the surveillance stations in 1963-1964
near Olenegorsk (RO-l) and near Skrunda (RO-2). One Dnestr-M radar was erected
on the site of RO-1. The RO-2 station had two radars, located a few kilometers
apart. '21 During the acceptance tests for the RO-1 station, which began in late 1968,
it was discovered that the station's radar has a high-false-alarm rate because of
ionospheric turbulence in the polar region. Solving this problem delayed the com-
missioning of the RO-1 station, and the RO-2 post in Skrunda was therefore the
first to be put on combat duty,122 which occurred on 15 February 1971, the official
date of the creation of the Soviet early-warning system. 123 The radars were operated
and maintained by an Early-Warning Division formed in 1967.'24
The Dnestr-M radar has a fixed phased-array antenna 200 meters long and 20
meters high 125 situated in a structure 200 meters long and up to 75 meters ta11. 126
The array scans an azimuthal sector of 120°.127 The Dnestr-M radars in the RO-2
station are situated in such a way that their observation sectors overlap and form
a 180-degree sector. 128 The Dnestr-M can detect the reentry vehicles of ballistic
missiles at distances of up to 5,000 kilometers. 129
Starting in 1968, the Radio-Technical Institute began work on the dedicated
early-warning radar network that was supposed to provide coverage of the USSR
in the west, southwest, and south directions. The design was approved in 1972
422 Chapter 7
and construction of new early-warning stations-separate radio-technical stations

(ORTUs)-began. '30 The stations that had already been built in Olenegorsk and
Skrunda also acquired the status of separate radio-technical stations, and the units
that were operating and maintaining the stations were transformed into brigades.
Two or three separate radio-technical stations were united in Early-Warning Divi-
sions, and these divisions were subordinated to the Third Early-Warning Army,
formed in 1977.131 The army command cente~ which also acts as the Central Early-
Warning Command Center, was located near Solnechnogorsk (Moscow oblast). The
alternate command center was placed near Kolomna. 132
The new early-warning stations were equipped with Dnepr radar, an upgraded
version of the Dnestr-M radar designed in the Radio-Technical Institute under the
supervision of Chief Designer Yu. V. Polyak. The new radar had the same scanning
sector as the Dnestr-M but it could detect reentry vehicles of ballistic missiles at dis-
tances of up to 6,000 kilometers. 133 Approaches from the west were covered by one
Dnepr radar near Nikolayev and one near Pestryalovo, 20 kilometers northwest of
Beregovo (this station is also known as Mukachevo station). Southern approaches
were covered by Dnepr radars built in the positions of the two space surveillance
system (SKKP) stations-OS-1 on the north shore of Lake Balkhash and OS-2
near Mishelevka, 90 kilometers northwest of Irkutsk. Like the Skrunda station, each
as station had two radars with overlapping sectors of coverage, so that each of the
two new early-warning stations covered a total azimuthal sector of 180°. Table 7.1
lists these and other Soviet and Russian early warning radars.
In the early 1970s the Soviet early-warning radar development program was inte-
grated with other early-warning programs. The preliminary design for an integrated
early-warning network, which was supposed to include above-the-horizon and over-
the-horizon radars and space satellites, was approved in 1972. In 1973 the Kometa
Central Scientific Research Institute (TsNII), headed by V. G. Repin, was appointed
to head the early-warning project. The design the Kometa TsNII drew up for the
integrated early-warning system set forth the requirements for the radar and space
detection systems, defined the principles that would govern the integration and
verification of their data, and described the procedures to be used for generating
the system's missile attack signal. 134
At the first stage of the project, both long-range detection radars of the Moscow
ABM system (Dunay-3 and Dunay-3U) were integrated into the early-warning
network. The early-warning system command center was upgraded to make the data
received from early-warning and ABM radars compatible. The first part of the early-
warning network was put on combat duty in 1976.135
Table 7.1
Early-warning and space surveillance radars
Station Radar type System Comments
Olenegorsk (Murmansk) Dnestr-M EW

Daryal EW Pilot scale receiver only
Irkutsk (Mishelevka) 2 Dnepr EW
Dnestr SSN
Daryal-U EW Not fully operational
Pechora Daryal EW
Krasnoyarsk (Yeniseysk) Daryal-UM EW Dismantled
SkrLUlcia, Latvia 2 Dnestr-M EW Not operational since August 1998
Daryal-UM EW Dismantled in 1995
Nikolayev (Sevastopol), Dnepr EW
Ukraine
Mukachevo (Beregovo), Dnepr EW
Ukraine Daryal-UM EW Construction suspended in 1991
Cabala, Azerbaijan Daryal EW
Balkhash, Kazakhstan 2 Dnepr EW
Dnestr SSN
Daryal-U EW Not operational
Gantsevichi, Belarus Volga EW
Note: EW-early-warning, SSN-space-surveillance network.
The next stage in the development of the integrated early-warning system con-
sisted of the construction of the new-generation large phased-array Daryal radars,
developed in the Radio-Technical Institute under the supervision of A. L. Mints and
v. M. Ivantsov. 136 An experimental model of the receiver was built on the site of the
Olenegorsk early-warning station. After the tests of the experimental model had
been completed, the radar was modified and called the Daryal-U. The Daryal-U
radar has separate transmitting and receiving VHF-band phased-arrays137 that
provide a detection range of around 6,000 kilometers, and the scanning sector is
100-110°.
The construction of two new early-warning stations equipped with Daryal-U
radars began around 1974, one near Pechora and the other near Mingechaur (the
Gabala-2 installation, also known as Lyaki) in Azerbaijan. The Daryal-U radar near
Pechora was put on combat duty in 1984, and the one in Mingechaur went on alert
in 1985.138 After the first Daryal radars entered service, radars of the Daryal family
were constructed at the existing early-warning stations. Daryal-U radars were
424 Chapter 7
installed on the sites of the Balkhash and Mishelevka stations. ' 39 Somewhat late~
the construction of upgraded Daryal-UM radars began in Skrunda and Mukachevo
(Beregovo). New Daryal radars were expected to replace all of the Dnestr-M and
Dnepr radars by the mid-1990s, by which time the latter should have reached the
end of their service life. Howeve~ the Dnestr-M and Dnepr radars are still opera-
tional. Figure 7.1 shows locations of these radars and their coverage.
Another radar was supposed to have been built in the first half of the 1980s at
the Yeniseysk early-warning station near Krasnoyarsk to cover the gap that existed
• Dnepr radars
• Dnestr-M radars
Figure 7.1
Locations of Dnestr-M and Dnepr early-warning radars and sectors that they control
Note: See Soviet Military Power, 1987 (DoD, Washington, D.C.), p. 48.
in the early-warning coverage in the northeastern direction. When the site was being
chosen for the new radar, which was supposed to be a Daryal-UM, the designers
suggested placing the new early-warning station near Krasnoyarsk. The Air Defense
Forces Command objected to this decision, suggesting Norilsk as the deployment
site instead,140 since that site would be ABM Treaty compliant (the treaty requires
that early-warning radars be deployed on the periphery of national territory and
oriented outward). The main argument against the deployment of a radar in Norilsk
was the inordinate cost of the project.
At the insistence of the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff, supported by
the Ministry of Radio-Electronic Industry, a decision was made to deploy the
new radar on the grounds of the Yeniseysk-15 station, 270 kilometers north of
Krasnoyarsk. The intention was to avoid the problems connected with the obvious
violation of ABM Treaty provisions by announcing that the new radar would be
part of the space surveillance system rather than the early-warning system. 141 To
accomplish this, a special General Staff order designated the Yeniseysk-15 installa-
tion as the OS-3 space surveillance station. 142
As the construction work near Yeniseysk entered its final stage, the United States
demanded that the work be stopped and that the radar be destroyed on the grounds
that its location violated the terms of the ABM Treaty.'43 The Soviet Union kept
insisting that the radar was intended to track objects in space, but the Soviet
Government finally admitted in 1989 that the construction of the Krasnoyarsk
facilities was not ABM Treaty compliant and ordered the dismantling of the equip-
ment and the physical destruction of the facilities that had been built.
When the next generation of early-warning radars was being developed, the Re-
search Institute of Long-Range Radio Communications (NIIDAR) proposed the
Volga radar design, modeled on the Dunay-3U long-range detection radar of the
Moscow ABM system,144 as an alternative to the Daryal. In contrast to the Daryal,
the Volga was a UHF-band radar,'45 which gave it some advantages over the Daryal.
It had lower potential than the Daryal, however, and consequently had a shorter
detection range,146 so the Daryal design was chosen as the basic one for the new
generation of early-warning radars. In spite of this, one early-warning position
equipped with a Volga radar was to be built. Construction work on the new system
began in 1982 near Gantsevichi in Belarus (48 kilometers southeast of Baranovichi).
The original schedule called for the commissioning of the new radar in 1987, but
the station did not begin experimental operations until December 1999. 147
More than two-thirds of the construction work on the new generation of early-
warning radars had been completed by the beginning of the 1990s. The breakup
426 Chapter 7
of the Soviet Union, however, prevented the complete re-equipping of the early-
warning system. The construction work on the Volga radar was completed only in
1999, more than 10 years behind schedule. The absence of funding and legal prob-
lems have prevented the incorporation of the Daryal-U radar in the Balkhash station
in Kazakhstan into the early-warning network.148 The work on the Daryal radar
near Irkutsk has not been completed either. 149 Construction of the new radar in the
Mukachevo (Beregovo) center was suspended in 1991. Installation of the equipment
of the Daryal-UM radar in Skrunda was also never completed. Figure 7.2 shows
locations of Daryal radars and the coverage they provide.
Since most of the early-warning radars were outside Russia, after the breakup
of the Soviet Union the majority were not located on Russia's national territory.
The Daryal-UM radar in Skrunda, which Russia turned over to Latvia, was
demolished on 4 May 1995. In accordance with the terms of a Russian-Latvian
agreement, the Dnestr-M radar in Skrunda stopped operations in August 1998
and is to be dismantled. The question of Russia's use of the early-warning stations
in Nikolayev and Mukachevo (Beregovo) in Ukraine has been settled, but con-
struction work on the radar in Mukachevo probably will not be resumed. The
future of the early-warning station in Azerbaijan is also uncertain. Although
this station is still operating as part of the Russian early-warning system, the
government of Azerbaijan does not want it to have the status of a Russian military
base.
If Russia wants to keep the early-warning radar network, it will have to make a
considerable effort to conclude agreements on the use of the radars located in the
former Soviet republics. The construction of new radars on Russian territory is not
really an option, since it would be extremely expensive.
Along with the early-warning stations that are united into the Third Early-
Warning Army, early warning is also provided by certain units of the missile defense
corps: the Don-2N radar of the A-135 Moscow ABM system and the Dunay-3
radars that were part of the A-35 Moscow ABM system.
Over-the-Horizon Radars In the 1940s and 1950s, at the same time as the Soviet
Union was working on above-the-horizon radars, it also began projects looking into
a possibility of detecting ballistic missiles by over-the-horizon (OTH) back-scatter
radars. The first research projects in this field were part of the Veyer research project,
initiated in 1946. '50 Technical problems encountered during the work on this project
led to its cancellation in 1949.151 Work on OTH radars was resumed at the end of
the 1950s in NII-37 (the Research Institute of Long-Range Radio Communications,
= -
=0 Operational Oaryal-U radars c:::::==:::::J 0 Volga radar (under construction)
=0 Oaryal-U radar under construction

Mothballed or demolished radars (Oaryal-U M)
~ •
•
Ounay-3 radar of the Moscow AB M system
Pilot Oaryal radar
Figure 72
Locations of Daryal and Volga early-warning radars and Moscow ABM system radars and
sectors that they control (circular sector controlled by the Don-2N radar of the Moscow
ABM system is not shown)
Note: See Soviet Military Power, 1987 (DoD, Washington, D.C.), p. 48.
428 Chapter 7
or NIIDAR). The design proposed by NII-37 was based on reflection of radar waves
from the ionosphere.
A working prototype of an OTH rada~ designated Duga, was built near
Nikolayev in early 1960s.152 The prototype confirmed that ballistic-missile launches
from Baykonu~ 2,500 kilometers from the radar site, could be reliably detected.
The results of the tests led to the construction of an experimental Duga-2 OTH
radar on that same site in 1970.153 The Duga-2 radar was oriented toward the Far
East,154 and during the tests of the system, which began in November 1971, it was
able to register multiple-four missiles each155-ballistic-missiles launches in the Far
East and in the Pacific.
Before the comprehensive tests of the experimental radar had been completed,
the Research Institute of Long-Range Radio Communications bid for the construc-
tion of two Duga-3 OTH radars was accepted. The first was to be built near Pripyat
(next to the construction site of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant),'56 and the
second was to be erected near the settlement of Bolshaya Kartel in Khabarovsk
Kray.157 The radars were to be oriented toward the north, so they were intended to
detect ballistic missile launches in the United States.
The first of the new radars-the one in Pripyat-was accepted for experimental
use in 1976. The first experiments with that system revealed that the failure to take
the ionospheric instability of the polar regions into account had made the system
virtually inoperable. After the construction work on the radar in Bolshaya Kartel
had been completed in 1978, the Air Defense Forces refused to accept it until it had
been confirmed that the system could detect Minuteman ICBM launches from U.S.
territory. By 1980 the developers were able to offer the military the necessary proof
that the system worked, and the OTH radar in Bolshaya Kartel was put on combat
duty on 30 June 1982.158
The Duga-3 OTH radars were on alert status as part of the BMEW system until
1990, but they were never commissioned. 159 The Pripyat site was closed down after
the Chernobyl accident. '60 The Bolshaya Kartel site was closed down in the early
1990s.'61
The Space-Based Early-Warning System In contrast to radar stations, the detec-

tors deployed on satellites can observe ballistic missiles almost immediately after
the launch and thereby provide the earliest possible warning of a missile attack. The
first Soviet research projects in the area of space-based early-warning satellites began
in the late 1960s. Among the work conducted as part of the research effort was
the launch of the prototype satellite (Cosmos-520) in 1972. The satellite's mission
probably consisted of testing orbital parameter adjustment procedures and the

mechanism of satellite communications with ground command postS. 162
The decision to start development work on a space-based early-warning system
was made in 1973. The system was expected to consist of two tiers: satellites in
highly elliptical orbits (HEOs) and geostationary (GEO) satellites. The Kometa
Central Scientific Research Institute (TsNII) was appointed to head the development
project, with K. A. Vlasko-Vlasov as the chief designer. The Kometa Central Scien-
tific Research Institute developed the control, data transmission, and processing
equipment for the system. The Lavochkin Design Bureau was responsible for
development of the necessary spacecraft, and the optical system was designed in
the N. I. Vavilov State Optics Institute. '63
Experimental launches of Cosmos satellites continued in 1973-1976. The
Cosmos-606 (1973), Cosmos-665 (1974), and Cosmos-862 (1976) were launched
into highly elliptical orbits. The first Soviet early-warning prototype satellite
launched into geosynchronous orbit was the Cosmos-775 (1975). The results of
the experimental launches led to a decision to concentrate on HEO satellites.
Launches into geosynchronous orbits were suspended and were not resumed until
1984.
The deployment of the space tier of the early-warning system began in 1977. In
subsequent years the Soviet Union had to launch from two to seven satellites each
year to secure the proper configuration of the system and keep it operating. The
satellites were launched into highly elliptical orbits from Plesetsk by Molniya launch
vehicles. (Geostationary satellites were launched from Baykonur by Proton space
launchers.) Table 7.2 lists early warning satellites launched after August 1990.
The complete Russian HEO satellite system consists of nine spacecraft. The
conditions of observation allow constant coverage of U.S. territory to be provided
with as few as four satellites. The apogee of the satellites' orbit is around 39,700
kilometers, the perigee is from 500 to 700 kilometers, and the inclination is 63.4°.
The ascending nodes of the orbits of satellites covering different surveillance zones
are separated by approximately 40°. The orbit parameters for the satellites were
chosen to ensure exactly two revolutions every stellar day, so the satellites follow
the same ground track. Each satellite observes u.S. territory at the apogee of its
orbit, located above 35° north and 10° east. 164
The satellites observation geometry allows them to detect plumes of ballistic mis-
siles in the boost phase against the background of space. This geometry eliminates
the problem of discriminating between a missile and light reflected by a cloud cover
or the Earth's surface. At the same time, the satellites lack of look-down capability
430 Chapter 7
Table 72
Soviet and Russian early-warning satellites lalUlched since 28 August 1990
Satellite Lallllch date Ceased operation
Satellites on highly elliptical orbits

Cosmos-2097 28 August 1990 April 1995
Cosmos-2176 24 January 1992 January 1996
Cosmos-2196 8 July 1992 April 1994
Cosmos-2217 21 October 1992 November 1996
Cosmos-2222 28 November 1992 September 1996
Cosmos-2232 26 January 1993 June 1998
Cosmos-2241 6 April 1993 January 1997
Cosmos-2261 10 August 1993 March 1998
Cosmos-2286 5 August 1994 March 1998
Cosmos-2312 24 May 1995 December 1997
Cosmos-2340 9 April 1997 Working (as of January 2001)
Cosmos-2342 14 May 1997 Working (as of January 2001)
Cosmos-2351 4 May 1998 Working (as of January 2001)
Cosmos-2368 27 December 1999 Working (as of January 2001)
Geostationary satellites
Cosmos-2133 14 February 1991 April 1995
Cosmos-215 5 13 September 1991 before January 1994
Cosmos-2209 10 September 1992 August 1996
Cosmos-2224 17 December 1992 June 1999
Cosmos-2282 7 July 1994 October 1995
Cosmos-2345 14 August 1997 February 1999
Cosmos-2350 29 April 1998 June 1998
limits the area that they cove~ so they can observe only the part of u.s. territory
where ICBM bases are located. Figure 7.3 shows approximate areas of coverage
provided by the constellation of satellites on highly elliptical orbits.
The Soviet space-based early-warning system reached initial operating capability
in 1978. At that time the system consisted of six HEO satellites. The ascending
nodes of the orbits and, consequently, the area of coverage were approximately 30°
west of their present position. ' 65 In 1981 all of the satellites of that system were
moved to orbits corresponding to the present location of the coverage area. The
system was commissioned and placed on combat duty in 1982.166 Information from
the early-warning satellites is transmitted to the control station in Serpukhov, from
~-~...,.
~p
~
~ ?
,jJ,r
.C!"
)\ '
A'I.,ff.-t~.:#
·qrr I \,
u K" ~
•
D
u.s. ICBM bases
Region oontinuously lTOIlitored by the
space-based early-warning system
\/""} ~ k'
~
J:
~'
Figure 7.3 ,tJ

Regions continuously monitored by first-generation early-warning satellites (regions monitored by geostationary satellites
are not shown) "~
'"w
~
432 Chapter 7
where it is transmitted in real time to the Central Early-Warning Command Center

and to the command center of the Air Defense Forces Main Staff.
In January 2001 there were four operating Russian HEO early-warning satel-
lites. '67 These were the Cosmos-2340 (launched 9 April 1997), Cosmos-2342 (14
May 1997), Cosmos-2351 (7 May 1998), and Cosmos-2368 (27 December 1999).
Although the system is not operating at full strength, these satellites in highly
elliptical orbits still secure the continuous coverage of ICBM bases in the United
States.
A full space-based early-warning system has to include satellites in geosynchro-
nous orbit in addition to the HEO ones. The Soviet Union has reserved seven
geostationary positions, known as Prognoz,168 for these satellites: 24° west, 12° east,
0 0 0
35° east, 80° east, 130 east, 166 east, and 159 west (Prognoz-l to Prognoz-7,
respectively).169
Beginning in 1984, the Soviet Union launched ten early-warning satellites into
geosynchronous orbit.1 70 All of them were either placed at the Prognoz-1 position
(24 0 west) from the very beginning or were moved there after being deployed at
other positions. The Prognoz-110cation enables the satellite placed there to monitor
U.S. territory under conditions comparable to the ones at the apogee of the highly
elliptical orbit. This position was chosen because the first geostationary satellites
were comparable to the ones deployed in elliptical orbits. So the observation geom-
etry of the first-generation satellites in geosynchronous orbit was chosen to detect
missiles against the background of space. In 1991 the first second-generation early-
warning satellite (the Cosmos-2133) was launched into geosynchronous orbit. The
sensors on the satellites of the second generation have a look-down capability that
allows then to detect launches against the background of the cloud cover and the
Earth's surface.
In January 2001 Russia had no operational geostationary early-warning satellites.
The last working satellite of this kind, Cosmos-2224 (launched on 17 December
1992) stopped performing station-keeping maneuvers in June 1999.
Antisatellite and Space Surveillance Systems

The first antisatellite weapon proposals were discussed in the Soviet Union even
before the launch of the first artificial satellite. An analysis of the potential capa-
bilities of satellite systems suggested that space weapons would playa significant
military role in the future. The creation of systems for the destruction of satellites
was therefore a matter of considerable concern. Active antisatellite defense required
simultaneous work on two projects: the development of antisatellite systems for the
destruction of space vehicles and the creation of a space surveillance system for the
detection and tracking of objects in space.
Antisatellite Systems The first design of an antisatellite system, the IS (Satellite

Fighter), was submitted by V. N. Chelomey and A. L. Mints in the late 1950s. The
system was to be based on the UR-200 missile being developed in OKB-52 under
Chelomey's supervision. TsSO-P radars were to be used as the main element of the
space surveillance system. The proposal was approved by the national leadership
in mid-1960. Chelomey's OKB-52 took charge of the development project. S. A.
Lavochkin's design bureau, which had been subordinated to OKB-52, was instructed
to develop the interceptor satellite. The control equipment was to be developed by
A. I. Savin's team in Design Bureau 1, and the spacecraft detection and tracking
system was to be developed at the Radio-Technical Institute of the Academy of
Sciences under the supervision of Mints. An alternative proposal envisaged an anti-
satellite system based on the R-7 missile developed under S. P. Korolev's supervi-
sion, an interceptor designed by A. I. Mikoyan, and the System A radar created by
G. V. Kisunko's team. Although the second proposal was not approved, the R-7
missiles were used, in the first test launches of the system that was developed, to
launch two maneuverable Polyot spacecraft in 1963-1964,17'
Changes in the political leadership of the country in 1964 had a significant impact
on the antisatellite program. The Kometa Central Scientific Research Institute
(TsNII), formerly part of Design Bureau 1, was put in charge of the development
of the antisatellite system. The work was to be supervised by Savin, who headed
the Kometa TsNII. The Lavochkin Design Bureau continued to work on the space
interceptor but was no longer under the jurisdiction of OKB-52. The UR-200 missile
project was canceled, and a modified version of the R-36 missile, created in M. K.
Yangel's OKB-586, was used in the system instead.
The first full-scale test of the new antisatellite system was conducted on 20
October 1968. The space interceptor was called Cosmos-249, and the target was
Cosmos-248, a satellite launched into orbit a day earlier. The first successful inter-
cept of a space target (Cosmos-248) occurred on 1 November 1968 after the launch
of the second interceptor (Cosmos-252).172
The antisatellite system included a ground command center in the Moscow region,
a space interceptor control station, and six launchers in Baykonur. l73 At the first
stage of the intercept, the space surveillance system had to determine the orbital
parameters of the target satellite. After that the interceptor satellite was launched
into the intercept orbit. After launch, the interceptor's orbital parameters were
434 Chapter 7
adjusted to guide it closer to the target. The interceptor then used its homing system
to complete the engagement. '74 The target was to be destroyed by the detonation of
the interceptor's fragmentation warhead.
By 1971 tests had demonstrated the possibility of destroying satellites in orbit at
altitudes ranging from 250 to 1,000 kilometers. Tests of the system were neverthe-
less continued to perfect various closing maneuvers and to test different types of
interceptors. The antisatellite system was commissioned and placed on combat duty
on 1 July 1979, after the final tests and a period of experimental use.175 Three other
test launches were conducted after the system was placed on alert. The last
interceptor (Cosmos-1379) was launched on 18 June 1982 as part of a large-scale
exercise conducted by the Soviet strategic forces. In August 1983 the Soviet Union
unilaterally suspended its antisatellite test program.
The Space Surveillance System The Soviet system for the detection and tracking
of objects in space was originally developed as part of the antisatellite systems that
were being developed in the early 1960s,176 As early as 1963, however, the depart-
ment headed by A. L. Gorelik in the Central Scientific Research Institute of the Air
Defense Forces proposed the creation of a space surveillance system to track all
space objects in orbits and monitor their movements. The preliminary design of the
system, drawn up with the participation of the Central Scientific Research Institute
of the Air Defense Forces, was approved by the Military-Industrial Commission in
1965.
The detection and tracking of space vehicles for space surveillance were originally
performed by Air Defense Forces optical stations, located in mountain regions. The
astronomical stations of the USSR Academy of Sciences were also involved in this
process. The first of the Dnestr satellite detection and tracking radars, developed
for the antisatellite system and deployed near Balkhash (the OS-1 space surveillance
station), was reoriented for space surveillance in 1967. A year later a second Dnestr
radar, on the grounds of the OS-2 space surveillance station in Mishelevka (Usolye-
Sibirskoye), was included in the space surveillance system. The two centers com-
bined created a radar barrier 5,000 kilometers long and could detect satellites at
altitudes of up to 3,000 kilometers as they passed over the Soviet Union.
Information from the optical and astronomical stations and the Dnestr radars
was processed in the Space Surveillance System Command Center, construction of
which began in the Moscow region in 1965. The first section of the space surveil-
lance system was put on combat duty in 1970. The Space Surveillance System
Command Center was put on combat duty in 1972.
In 1974 designers proposed including all existing early-warning, ABM, and space
surveillance radars in an integrated space surveillance system. This required changes
in the early-warning radar software to facilitate the detection and tracking of orbital
objects. 177
Neither the space surveillance system radars developed in the 1960s nor the early-
warning radars could detect satellites in geosynchronous orbits. To achieve this
capability, in the late 1970s and early 1980s the Soviet Union began development
of optical and laser systems for the detection and tracking of space vehicles and a
new generation of radars. The projects resulted in the establishment of the Krona
systems in the North Caucasus and Far East, consisting ofthe new-generation Krona
radar (Chief Designer V. P. Sosulnikov) and the laser radars developed under
the supervision of N. D. Ustinov (an experimental model of this lase~ LE-1, was
deployed as part of the Terra-3 laser system on the Sary-Shagan test site). Con-
struction of the Okno passive optical deep-space surveillance system, developed at
the Zverev Krasnogorsk Plant under the supervision of Chief Designer V. I. Chernov,
began near Nurek in Tajikistan in the late 1980s or early 1990s.178 The system began
trial operations in December 1999.
The Present Structure of Russian Air Defense Forces
At the end of 1991, at the time of the breakup of the Soviet Union, the Air Defense
Forces consisted of the Moscow Air Defense District and 9 separate air defense
armies, 18 air defense corps, and 16 air defense divisions, as well as the Missile
Defense Corps, consisting of two ABM corps, and the Space Surveillance Corps.
The Air Defense Forces were armed with around 2,220 fighter-interceptors, ap-
proximately 8,000 launchers of four different types of SAMs (and their numerous
modifications), and around 10,000 radars of various types.
When the armed forces of the USSR were divided after the breakup of the Soviet
Union, the air defense troops outside Russia were the 20th Separate Air Defense
Army (Belarus, 11th and 22nd air defense corps)'79 and the Eighth Separate Air
Defense Army (Ukraine, 49th and 60th air defense corps). The 19th Separate Air
Defense Army deployed in the Transcaucasus was moved to Russia along with its
two air defense divisions, but much of its equipment and weapons was turned over
to Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Air defense corps and divisions in the Baltic
were moved to Russia, and the headquarters of the 12th Separate Air Defense Army
was moved out of Central Asia (but most of the weapons and equipment remained
in the Central Asian republics).18o In general, after the redisposition of air defense
436 Chapter 7
units had been completed, Russia still had around 65 percent of the personnel and
equipment of the Soviet Union's Air Defense Forces. The personnel strength of the
Air Defense Forces of the Russian Federation was 380,000 when the branch was
created in 1992.
After 1992 the process of reduction continued in the Russian Air Defense Forces,
in connection with changes in the international situation and with the country's eco-
nomic difficulties. The 10th Air Defense Army, which had defended the country's
Arctic coast, was dissolved; defense of the Arctic coast is now the function of
an air defense division deployed in that region. ls1 In general, since the breakup of
the Soviet Union, the Air Defense Forces SAM troops have been reduced by 55
percent,182 fighter aviation forces have been reduced by 60 percent,183 and the radio-
technical troops have been reduced by 25 percent,184
During the reorganization of the Air Defense Forces that began in July 1997, the
Missile and Space Defense Forces were turned over to the Strategic Rocket Forces.
The remaining Air Defense Forces units-SAM and radio-technical troops and
fighter aviation-were by December 1998 placed under the jurisdiction of the Air
Forces.
Combat Duty
Air Defense Units

The Air Defense Forces troops defend around 400 critical government, economic,
and military facilities in Russia. Most of these facilities have direct SAM protection,
and the rest are protected by the common air defense system, fighter aviation, and
the long-range SAM systems of the Air Defense Forces.
To secure the performance of these defensive functions, some ADF subdivisions
are on permanent alert, even in peacetime. The level of readiness and the composi-
tion of operational air defense forces on permanent alert depend largely on the
overall level of political tension. Around 10 percent of the SAM units and radio-
technical units are on alert during peacetime. 1ss The personnel and systems not on
combat duty constitute an operational reserve. The command centers on the divi-
sion level and higher levels and the central command station of the ADF Main Staff
near Kupavna in Moscow oblast are on continuous permanent alert. The ADF
Command Center can order a higher level of readiness for forces on alert or increase
the number of units to be placed on alert.
These days the SAM brigades of the air defense branch of the Ground Forces,
armed with S-300V SAM systems, are under the operational jurisdiction of Air
Defense Forces and serve on alert duty with the SAM units of the Air Defense
Forces. Some of the ADF fighter aviation units are now on alert on airfields.
Each fighter regiment has an alert-duty wing consisting of four or two interceptors
that can take off whenever necessary for the interception or identification of detected
air targets. The fighter aviation units of the Air Defense Forces also include
separate helicopter squadrons for the interception of low-flying and slow-moving
targets. 186
Regimental command posts in the SAM troops are put on alert in accordance
with a schedule drawn up in advance. When a higher level of alert is announced,
the SAM units have to switch all of their target detection and tracking radars and
missile guidance radars to operating mode.
In the event of the detection of an air attack or a violation of the country's air
border, the regimental command post of the radio-technical troops transmits this
information to the command post of the ADF division or army, which then notifies
the central command post of the ADF Main Staff. Depending on the nature of the
event, the ADF division or army may be ordered to stop the intruder or counter the
attack with all of the forces at its disposal: subunits of the radio-technical and SAM
troops and fighter aviation.
Missile and Space Defense Forces

The main function of the early-warning units on alert duty is the timely detection
of a missile attack on Russia. In the event an attack is detected, the early-warning
system generates the "missile attack" signal used by the command and control
system of the strategic nuclear forces to bring the strategic forces to the level of
readiness that makes the delivery of a launch-on-warning strike possible.
The operational principles of the early-warning system envisage several stages in
the transmission of the "missile attack" signal. The control station of the space-
based early-warning system receives real-time information from the system's satel-
lites. This information is processed to detect signs of ballistic-missile launches. In
addition, the images recorded by the satellites sensors are constantly monitored by
operators on duty. The data processed in the control station, which includes infor-
mation about the detected launches, their origin and destination, and the satellite
images are automatically transmitted to the Central Early-Warning Command
Center in Solnechnogorsk and the alternate command center in Kolomna.
The duty officer at the command center assesses the credibility of the launch detec-
tion signals received by comparing and analyzing the computer data and visual
information. The alert-duty personnel of the command center must either confirm
the authenticity of any the launch detection signal received or notify the army
command center about a false alarm. 187
438 Chapter 7
Before the "missile attack" signal can be transmitted up the strategic battle man-
agement chain of command, the information from the early-warning satellites has
to be corroborated by early-warning radars, which transmit information directly to
the army's early-warning command center. To confirm the attack, the radars have
to acquire and track the targets for a designated period of time. 1SS Meanwhile, the
missile attack signal generated by the space-based early-warning system can in some
circumstances be used to put the command and control system of the strategic forces
on a higher level of combat readiness or to notify the political and military leader-
ship of a possible missile attack.
The combat algorithm of the early-warning system envisages the transmission of
two types of signals. If the satellites and radars detect a single launch of a ballistic
missile, the early-warning system transmits the signal "missile launch," which is
insufficient to trigger the automatic transmission of the missile detection signal to
the battle management system. The "missile attack" signal is automatically trans-
mitted only if both tiers of the early-warning system record credible information
about more than one ballistic missile launch. The "missile attack" signal is also
transmitted if there is credible information about two or more launches from only
the radar systems, without a signal from the satellites. This algorithm allows the
number of false alarms generated by the system to be reduced.1B 9
The "missile attack" signal transmitted to the early-warning army's command
center is then sent to the terminals of the Kazbek system, which is accessible to the
president, the defense ministe~ and the chief of General Staff. The "missile attack"
signal is also transmitted to the central, reserve, and alternate command posts of
the General Staff, the command centers of the services of the armed forces, the
headquarters of military districts, the naval fleets, and the Moscow ABM system.
Information about the missile attack is displayed on the terminals of the Krokus
system, which show the projected impact areas and the estimated time of impact of
the missiles detected.
The transmission of the "missile attack" signal to the terminals of the Kazbek
system switches those terminals from alert mode to the operating mode required for
the transmission of orders to strategic forces. With the aid of the Kazbek equip-
ment, the president of Russia then contacts the defense minister, the chief of General
Staff, and the central command post of the General Staff. This contact includes an
assessment of the situation and the options for actions in response. The choice
among these options is made on the basis of the information the early-warning
system provides with regard to the nature of the attack.
8
Nuclear Tests
The Soviet program of nuclear tests was launched on 29 August 1949 when
the USSR's first nuclear explosive device was tested on a test range near
Semipalatinsk. Between 1949 and 1990 the Soviet Union conducted a total of
715 tests, during which 969 different explosive devices were detonated. ' The last
Soviet nuclear test was conducted on the Novaya Zemlya test range on 24 October
1990.
Most of the tests (445 tests and 637 of the devices detonated) were conducted
for the purpose of nuclear weapons development. 2 This category includes tests of
explosive devices during the development of weapons and tests of nuclear muni-
tions in service. The yield of the explosions in this category ranged from a few tons
to 50 megatons. 3
The next category of tests conducted within the framework of the military
program were those to study the destructive effects of nuclear weapons. A total of
52 tests (69 different devices) fall into this category. Another 25 tests (42 explosive
devices) were conducted to enhance the safety of nuclear weapons and to study
the behavior of nuclear weapons in emergencies. Hydronuclear experiments, which
were not counted among the 715 tests, were also conducted as part of the program
to study nuclear weapon safety. There were 36 tests (on a total of 47 devices) in
the fundamental research program. The explosion on the Totsk test range during
an army field exercise forms a separate category by itself.
Of the 715 nuclear tests conducted by the Soviet Union, 559 tests (796 devices)
were part of military programs: the development of nuclear weapons, troop maneu-
vers, weapons safety, weapons effects, and fundamental research. The remaining
156 tests (173 separate explosions) were in the category of industrial explosions
(peaceful nuclear explosions, or PNE). Of these 156 tests, 117 (126 separate devices)
were industrial explosions conducted outside of the established test ranges. In
440 Chapter 8
addition, 7 industrial explosions (of 9 devices) were conducted on the Semipalatinsk

test range.
The USSR's test ranges were also used for conducting tests the purpose of which
was the development of explosive devices for the PNE program. These include 38
industrial devices that were sometimes tested jointly with military devices. In spite
of that, tests of the PNE devices never had any military applications. Therefore, of
the total 969 explosions of different devices tested in the Soviet Union, 173, or
around 18 percent, were not connected with the government's weapons develop-
ment program.
A distinctive feature of the Soviet program of nuclear tests in the atmosphere was
the relatively small number of surface bursts, which result in considerable radioac-
tive pollution of the site. There were 32 surface bursts during the whole period of
tests in the atmosphere. Most were bursts of low and extremely low yield: the yield
of surface bursts did not exceed 40 kilotons. The only exception was the test of the
RDS-6 device, which yielded 400 kilotons and was the highest-yield surface burst
carried out in the Soviet Union. In more than half of the surface bursts the yield of
the explosion was under one kiloton. In addition to conducting 32 ground surface
tests of nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union carried out three underwater explosions
and two above-water surface bursts. The PNE program included five excavation
explosions, which are classified as underground explosions but in many respects are
similar to surface bursts.
Most of the explosions during the period of atmospheric tests were air bursts.
In all, the Soviet Union conducted 177 airbursts of various yields. In addition, the
weapons effects program included four space explosions and one conducted at a
high altitude.
The Soviet Union conducted 496 underground tests, which included the previ-
ously mentioned five excavation explosions. Of the remaining 491 tests, 299 were
completely contained, with no release of radioactive products into the atmosphere.
In 173 tests there were insignificant releases of radioactive inert gases. In 19 tests,
which are classified as radioactive accidents, the release of radioactive gaseous prod-
ucts into atmosphere was substantia1.4
The Main Stages of the Soviet Nuclear Test Program
Tests of the First Soviet Nuclear Devices

The first Soviet nuclear explosion was detonated on 29 August 1949 on the Semi-
palatinsk test range, which was established expressly for that purpose. The test was
Nuclear Tests 441
the final stage of the Soviet program for the creation of a nuclear weapon. The
explosive device, designated RDS-1, was a plutonium bomb that was essentially an
exact copy of the u.S. Fat Man bomb. The yield of the explosion was 22 kilotons,
which corresponded to the expected yield of the device.
After the success of this first test, Soviet designers began improving the device's
design. This work produced the RDS-1M device, with an improved focusing-
system design. 5 This device was never tested, but the focusing system was used in
the RDS-2 device. In addition to new explosive lenses, the RDS-2 also had a new
design for the core, which reduced the probability of predetonation (or fizzle).6
The yield of the RDS-2 device, which was tested on 24 September 1951, was 38.3
kilotons'?
As in the RDS-1 test, the RDS-2 device was detonated from the top of a tower
30 meters high, but during the test of the RDS-2, the device was detonated by a
command from a bomber flying over the test site rather than from the ground
control center. The next test, conducted on 18 October 1951, was the first Soviet
test in which a bomber delivered the nuclear weapon to the detonation poin!.8 The
RDS-3 device, with a yield of 42 kilotons, was detonated at an altitude of 400
meters. 9 A bomb equipped with the RDS-3 charge was used later during the Totsk
field exercise. 10
The first three Soviet nuclear tests were followed by a pause that lasted until 1953.
The 1953 test series included five explosions, the first of which, on 12 August 1953,
was a test of the first Soviet thermonuclear device, the RDS-6. The other four were
airbursts of nuclear devices. The first of these, carried out on 23 August 1953, was
a test of a weapon based on the RDS-3T nuclear device. This weapon, which had
a yield of 28 kilotons, was later adopted for use by tactical aviation and the strate-
gic forces. 11 The last three tests of the series were most likely conducted for weapons
development purposes, for the tested devices had relatively low yields: 5.8, 1.6, and
4.9 kilotons.
The first nuclear explosion of the 1954 test program was part of the field exer-
cise at the Totsk range on 14 September 1954. This exercise included an explosion
of an aerial bomb based on the previously tested RDS-3 device. A series of tests of
tactical devices of low yield, from 0.03 to 4 kilotons, were conducted on the Semi-
palatinsk range in late September and early October 1954. All of the tests of this
series, which was completed on 8 October 1954, were successful. 12
The next test, on 19 October 1954, was the first test of the RDS-9 device, devel-
oped for the T-5 torpedo. This was the first failure in the history of the Soviet nuclear
test program. The device was later modified and tested successfully in 1955.13
442 Chapter 8
The highest-yield explosion of the 1954 series was the test of the RDS-3! device,
carried out on 23 October 1954. The RDS-3! was an RDS-3 equipped with an
advanced neutron initiator. This allowed the yield to be increased approximately
1.5-fold (the explosion of the RDS-3! device yielded 62 kilotons).14 The final two
tests in 1954, conducted on 26 and 30 October, were probably tests of different
models of munitions scheduled for deployment.
The 1955 test program started with a series of three explosions in July and
August. These were tests of different versions of the RDS-9 device that had been
tested unsuccessfully in 1954. The final test of that device, designed for the T-5
torpedo, was conducted on 21 September 1955 on the new test range on Novaya
Zemlya 15 and was the first Soviet underwater nuclear explosion. The two final
tests of the 1955 program were connected with the development of thermonuclear
devices.
The first test in 1956 was a full-scale test of the R-5M ballistic missile on 2
February 1956. The missile, equipped with a nuclear warhead, was launched from
the Kapustin Yar range. 16 The yield of the warhead the missile delivered to the
designated point near Aralsk was 0.3 kilotons. The 1956 test program also included
tests of nuclear artillery shells as well as design improvement tests and two
thermonuclear explosions. 17
The 1957 test schedule was more extensive. A nuclear device was tested on 19
January 1957, delivered to the detonation site by a ballistic missile.'8 A series of
tests of relatively high-yield devices-from 19 to 680 kilotons-was conducted on
the Semipalatinsk range in March and April 1957. Some of the explosions proba-
bly were munitions tests, and the higher-yield explosions were connected with the
thermonuclear weapons development program. The series of tests continued in
August 1957.
The 1957 program included the first weapons safety experiment, designed to
study the sensitivity of chemical explosives to a partial detonation (so-called one-
point safety). The explosion, which had a yield of 0.1 kiloton, was detonated on
26 August 1957.19
After 1957 all tests of high-yield explosive devices were moved to the test range
on Novaya Zemlya. The last high-yield test on the Semipalatinsk range was the 520-
kiloton explosion on 22 August 1957.
The Novaya Zemlya test range become the primary site for high-yield tests and
for the study of effects of nuclear weapon. The first dedicated weapons effects test
was conducted on 7 September 1957. The next test of this kind, on 10 October
1957, was part of the state certification tests of the T-5 torpedo. 20
Nuclear Tests 443
The 1958 test schedule began shortly after the end of the 1957 program. The last
test in 1957 was conducted on 23 December, and the first test of 1958 was on 4
January. The first part of the 1958 program was completed on 22 March 1958. At
the end of March 1958 the Soviet government announced a unilateral moratorium
on nuclear tests. The moratorium was interrupted for two series of tests in Sep-
tember and November 1958, which were expected to be the final series of tests pre-
ceding a lengthy moratorium on and the possible end of all nuclear tests. The last
tests of the series were conducted on 1 and 3 November 1958. The tested weapons
were delivered to the detonation site by ballistic missiles launched from the Kapustin
Yar range. 21
Tests of Thermonuclear Devices

The decision to launch a full-scale Soviet project in the creation of thermonuclear
explosive devices was made on 26 February 1951. By that time the team of devel-
opers working on this problem since 1948 had proposed a device that would use
lithium deuteride as the thermonuclear fuel. Work on that project produced the
RDS-6 device, which was tested on the Semipalatinsk range on 12 August 1953.
The explosion of this device, detonated from the top of a tower 30 meters high,
yielded 400 kilotons. Between 15 and 20 percent of the energy yield was produced
by nuclear fusion reactions. 22
In 1954 the team working on the thermonuclear project proposed the develop-
ment of a two-stage thermonuclear device based on what was known as the "third
idea." Work on this project was given a high priority, but a parallel project was
being conducted for the development of an alternative version: a weaponized version
of the RDS-6 device." That device was tested on 6 November 1955 with a yield of
250 kilotons.
A test of the first Soviet two-stage thermonuclear device was conducted on 22
November 1955. 24 The weapon, called the RDS-37, was delivered to the detonation
site by a Tu-16 bomber. The estimated yield was three megatons, but the yield of
the device was reduced by about half because conditions on the Semipalatinsk range
precluded such high-yield explosions." As a result, the explosion of the RDS-37
yielded only 1.6 megatons. The RDS-37 was the first tested deliverable two-stage
thermonuclear device.26
Most of the thermonuclear tests in 1956 and 1957 were conducted to obtain
information necessary for designs of future thermonuclear devices. The designers
themselves admitted that the quality of yield predictions for the first thermonuclear
explosions were rather poorP Two thermonuclear devices comparable to the
444 Chapter 8
RDS-37 were tested on the Semipalatinsk range in 1956 (30 August and 17 Novem-
ber).28 The next thermonuclear device, tested on the Novaya Zemlya range on 6
October 1957, was an improved RDS-37 design. The yield of the burst was 2.9
megatons. 29
The next step in the development of thermonuclear devices was the development
of weapons with better specific yield parameters and optimal dimensions for muni-
tions. The thermonuclear device tested on 27 February 1958 and 12 October 1958
had a length-to-diameter ratio of 1.5. 30 The yields of the explosions were 1.5 mega-
tons and 1.45 megatons, respectively. While that device was being developed,
another with a much more compact design was also under development. 31 The new
device had the same yield-to-weight ratio but was only a little more than half the
size of the device tested on 27 February and 12 October 1958. It was better suited
for weapons than previous designs, since its length-to-diameter ratio was in the
range of 2.0-2.2.32 Tests of that device were conducted on 23 February and 24
October 1958. The design of the device was later used as a basic one in the devel-
opment of different types of thermonuclear weapons. 33
It should be noted that the tests of 23 and 27 February 1958 could have been the
last full-scale Soviet tests of thermonuclear devices, because the Soviet Union had
proposed a moratorium on nuclear tests in March 1958 (and as noted above, had
in fact entered into such a moratorium unilaterally) and wanted to start negotiat-
ing a total ban on nuclear tests. (The proposed moratorium is discussed in the next
section, along with the reasons it was never officially enacted.)
After the Soviet Union lifted its self-imposed moratorium on nuclear tests in 1961,
Soviet designers were able to conduct a series of tests of thermonuclear devices with
a much higher specific yield. Among these were two similar devices tested on 27
and 25 September 1962.34 The specific yield of the thermonuclear device tested on
27 September 1962 was 3.5-4 times as great as that of the device based on the 1958
design and tested on 23 February 1958; its yield-to-size ratio was 3-3.3 times as
great. 35 The absolute yield of that device was around 15 megatons. 36 The yield of
the device tested on 25 September was 19.1 megatons. In general, the series of tests
conducted in 1961 and 1962 allowed Soviet developers to improve the characteris-
tics of thermonuclear weapons considerably.
During the 1961-1962 series the Soviet Union tested very-high-yield thermonu-
clear devices developed simultaneously in Arzamas-16 and Chelyabinsk-70. The
device developed by Arzamas-16 was tested on 30 October 1961. Its nominal yield
was 100 megatons, but the tested version had its yield reduced by half, so the energy
of the explosion was only 50 megatons. It was the highest-yield nuclear explosion
Nuclear Tests 445
ever carried out in the Soviet or any other test program. The high-yield device devel-
oped in Chelyabinsk-70 had a nominal yield of 50 megatons and was also tested in
a lower-yield version. The explosion of that version, carried out on 24 December
1962, yielded 24.2 megatons and was one of the last Soviet nuclear tests in the
atmosphere.
The 1958-1961 Moratorirun and Talks on the Cessation of Nuclear Tests

A comprehensive ban on nuclear testing was first proposed in 1954. At that time
neither the Soviet Union nor the United States supported the proposal, and both
sides continued their extensive programs of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons
development. In addition, the Soviet Union for a long time insisted that the nuclear
test ban be considered only in connection with broader measures directed toward
a complete nuclear disarmament. The Soviet Union changed this position only in
1956, when it first proposed the discussion of a nuclear test ban separately from
other disarmament measures. About a year later, on 26 March 1957, the Soviet gov-
ernment issued a statement that proposed a moratorium on all nuclear tests as the
first step toward a comprehensive ban on such tests. In this statement, the Soviet
Union for the first time agreed in principle to discuss the verification procedures
that would have to accompany any ban or a moratorium. 37 The United States sup-
ported the Soviet initiative, but no specific moves were made in 1957 to start the
moratorium or the talks on the test ban.
The Soviet Union took the first concrete step toward making the nuclear test ban
a reality in 1958. A Soviet government statement of 31 March 1958 announced that
the Soviet Union would not conduct nuclear tests as long as other countries also
refrained from testing. In April-May 1958 the United States and the Soviet Union
reached an agreement to hold a special meeting of an expert commission to study
methods of verifying compliance with the test ban.
The team of experts began work in Geneva on 1 July 1958 and finished its work
on 21 August. The commission concluded that existing methods for the detection
of nuclear explosions would serve as a reliable means of verifying compliance with
the ban on atmospheric tests with a yield of more than one kiloton and underground
explosions with a yield of more than five kilotons. A special network of monitor-
ing stations was to be established to verify each nation's compliance with the ban.
The commission's report included detailed descriptions of the monitoring station
equipment requirements and the verification system that would be used. It further
suggested that the verification of compliance might in some cases require on-site
inspections.
446 Chapter 8
As soon as the team of experts had finished its work, the United States proposed
that official negotiations on the nuclear test ban begin on 31 October 1958. A state-
ment published on 22 August 1958 said that the United States would institute a
one-year moratorium on nuclear tests on the same date as the start of the talks. On
30 August 1958 the Soviet Union agreed to begin the negotiations.
Despite the Soviet unilateral moratorium and the agreement to begin the test ban
negotiations, however, the u.s. nuclear test program continued. In April-August
1958 the United States carried out a previously scheduled series of 35 explosions
on its Pacific test range. In late August and early September 1958 the United States
conducted three high-altitude bursts in the South Atlantic. After the decision was
made to start the talks, a special program was drawn up in the United States for
37 tests to be conducted starting on 12 September 1958 and ending on 30 October,
the day before the talks were scheduled to begin.
The continuation of the U.S. nuclear test program even after it had agreed to
negotiate a ban on nuclear testing motivated the Soviet Union to conduct a special,
"final" series of tests, which began on 30 September 1958. There were 21 tests in
the series, a substantial portion of which were tests of high-yield devices.
Just before the start of the talks, in a statement of 25 October 1958, the presi-
dent of the United States repeated the conditions of the U.S. moratorium. One of
these conditions was that the Soviet Union would stop testing after the start of the
talks, scheduled for 31 October. In the Soviet response, published on 30 Octobe~
the Soviet Union effectively refused to commit itself to the cessation of nuclear tests
after the start of the talks, accusing the United States of seeking unilateral advan-
tages by linking the moratorium with the cessation of Soviet tests.
Two nuclear tests in the Soviet Union, carried out on 1 and 3 November 1958,
after the start of the talks, considerably influenced subsequent events. These tests
were probably conducted to study the effects of a nuclear burst on the radar of the
Soviet ABM system, a prototype of which had been deployed by that time on the
Sary-Shagan range. The talks in Geneva were expected to lead to a ban on atmos-
pheric nuclear tests, and the two tests therefore represented the last opportunity to
test the ABM radar in the field.
On 7 November 1958 U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower issued a statement
in direct response to these two Soviet tests. In the statement the United States
announced the cancellation of its official moratorium on nuclear testing. The state-
ment did note, however, that the United States would continue refraining from
nuclear tests.
Nuclear Tests 447
The Soviet Union stopped all further nuclear tests after the ones it conducted on
1 and 3 November 1958. These two therefore may have been the last tests of the
series scheduled for September-October 1958, which perhaps for some reason could
not be conducted before the start of the talks in Geneva. It is also possible that the
Soviet Union planned to continue the tests after 3 November 1958, but the program
had to be canceled after the negative reaction of the world community that followed
the November explosions.
The tests the Soviet Union conducted in November 1958 and the subsequent U.S.
cancellation of the moratorium surprisingly had no negative impact on the Geneva
negotiations. The difficulties that derailed the negotiations arose later and were con-
nected with the analysis of data received during the course of the last series of U.S.
tests, which called into question the reliability of methods for detection of low-yield
underground explosions. 3s In early January 1959 the Eisenhower administration
issued a statement on the new data, reporting that although low-yield testing could
still be reliably detected, such detection might require many more fixed-site moni-
toring stations than had originally been thought. Another difficulty that arose during
the talks was connected with so-called decoupling: A report published in the United
States in June 1959 said that the seismic magnitude of a nuclear test could be
reduced considerably by conducting the test in a large underground cavity.39
In the summer of 1959 the United States and the Soviet Union confirmed their
intention to continue the de facto moratorium on the tests. In a statement of 26
August 1959, the United States announced the extension of the U.S. moratorium to
the end of 1959. The Soviet Union responded by announcing its intention to refrain
from tests as long as the "Western powers" did not conduct them.
The focal point of the test ban talks during this time was still the reliability of
the monitoring system. In an attempt to solve the technical problems involved in
monitoring, the United States and the Soviet Union established two expert com-
missions. In June 1959 a joint technical commission began examining the possibil-
ity of detecting high-altitude nuclear explosions; in November-December, a second
group of experts in Geneva analyzed new data on the seismic impact of low-yield
underground bursts.4o Members of that team were unable to agree on the degree to
which the data received during the last series of U.S. tests in 1958 challenged the
reliability of the monitoring system, the basic features of which the parties had
already negotiated and approved.
The technical difficulties that arose during the talks gave the United States a
chance to announce the termination of its unilateral moratorium. A statement by
448 Chapter 8
Eisenhower on 29 December 1959 officially announced the end of the moratorium.

Soviet Prime Minister N. S. Khrushchev responded by reaffirming the earlier Soviet
stance, saying that the Soviet Union would refrain from testing as long as the
"Western powers" did not conduct nuclear tests.
Despite the United States' announcement of its decision to lift its moratorium and
despite the differences of opinion between the two sides with regard to the relia-
bility of the monitoring system, both the United States and the Soviet Union con-
tinued to refrain from nuclear tests and to work on the test ban agreement. In a
statement of 11 February 1960, the United States proposed the conclusion of a treaty
that would have prohibited tests in the atmosphere, in inner space, and under water.
In addition, there was to be a ban on underground explosions with a seismic mag-
nitude greater than 4.75. It proposed 20 inspections a year for the verification of
compliance with this agreement. The USSR responded by proposing a total ban on
explosions in space, the reduction of the number of inspections to three a year, and
a moratorium on low-yield underground tests not covered by the agreement. 41 In
its response of 29 March 1960, the United States agreed to the general provisions
of the Soviet proposal, particularly the moratorium on low-yield explosions.
Some unsettled matters, specifically the number and procedures of inspections and
the duration of the moratorium on low-yield underground tests, were to have been
discussed during the Paris summit meeting that began on 16 May 1960. The chances
of making considerable progress in the conclusion of a nuclear test ban agreement
at the summit had been considered quite good, but the discussions in Paris were
broken off as the result of the incident involving the U-2 spy plane shot down over
the Soviet territory on 1 May 1960.
Although the failure of the summit meeting almost derailed the nuclear test ban
talks, it did not lead immediately to the resumption of such tests. The Soviet Union,
United States, and Great Britain continued to refrain from conducting nuclear tests;
the only state conducting nuclear tests at that time was France, which tested its first
nuclear device on 13 February 1960, a test that later became the official Soviet
pretext for the ending of its moratorium.
The moratorium on nuclear tests that the Soviet Union observed after 3 Novem-
ber 1958 did not lead to the termination of its nuclear weapons development and
testing program. In 1959 the Novaya Zemlya test range began preparations for
underground tests, and construction of tunnels for nuclear tests there began in
1960.42 At the Semipalatinsk test range the Soviet Union conducted a series of so-
called hydro nuclear experiments. One series of twelve experiments, which involved
the collection of data about the alpha-active fallout that accompanies an accident
Nuclear Tests 449
with a nuclear weapon, was carried out at the Semipalatinsk range in 1960. 43 Similar
series were later conducted in 1961 and 1963.44
The talks in Geneva were suspended in June 1960 and were not resumed until
21 March 1961, that is, after a new president, John F. Kennedy, took office in the
United States. Shortly after the talks resumed, the United States and Great Britain
submitted a draft treaty prohibiting all tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and
under water and a ban on high-yield underground nuclear explosions. One of the
main issues complicating the conclusion of an agreement was the number of inspec-
tions required for the reliable verification of the test ban. The Soviet Union strongly
objected to the initial proposal of the United States and Great Britain, which called
for 12-20 inspections a year. The Soviet proposal continued to support quota of
three inspections a year. There were also disagreements over the authority of mon-
itoring agencies and the inspection procedures to be employed.
The disagreement over the number of inspections could have been settled during
the U.S.-Soviet summit meeting in Vienna on 3-4 June 1961. The United States
reduced its proposed number of annual inspections to eight, expecting that in the
course of negotiation this number could be reduced to five or six. The Soviet Union
rejected the new proposal, believing that its agreement to three inspections was
already a major concession. After an unsuccessful attempt to reach an agreement
with the new U.S. administration, the Soviet Union changed its attitude toward the
test ban negotiations.
In July 1961 the Soviet leadership made a major decision to resume atmospheric
nuclear tests. The decision was part of a set of major changes in the policy of the
Soviet leadership after the meeting in Vienna. Active preparations for tests on the
Semipalatinsk and Novaya Zemlya ranges began almost immediately after the deci-
sion to resume the tests was made.
The 1961-1962 Series of Tests and the End of Atmospheric Tests

The Soviet government announced its intention to resume nuclear tests in the atmos-
phere in its statement of 30 August 1961. The reasons it stated for the resumption
of tests were the absence of mutual understanding at the Geneva talks and the
French nuclear tests beginning in 1960. Subsequent Soviet government statements
put a stronger emphasis on the French tests, stressing that test data obtained by
France, a member of NATO, could be accessible to the United States and Great
Britain.
In fact, the Soviet decision to resume the tests was made primarily for political
reasons and was part of the Soviet leadership's efforts to put pressure on the United
450 Chapter 8
States and its allies. The unprecedented intensity of the 1961 Soviet test program-
59 nuclear tests in just over two months-as well as the special importance that
the Soviet leadership assigned to the tests of very-high-yield thermonuclear devices
indicates that an attempt to put pressure on the u.S. leadership was indeed one
of the main purposes of the test program. Of course, the tests also gave the Soviet
designers the opportunity to develop better nuclear and thermonuclear devices.
The military could also field-test operational weapon systems and conduct exten-
sive military exercises.
The first Soviet test after the lifting of the moratorium was conducted on the Semi-
palatinsk range on 1 September 1961. Like most of the tests at the Semipalatinsk
test site, it was a low-yield (16 kiloton) explosion. Indeed, the yields of 17 of the
29 explosions carried out at the Semipalatinsk test range in 1961 did not exceed
1 kiloton. Most of the tests (23 of the 29) were conducted for weapons develop-
ment purposes. Four of the six other tests were part of the Soviet weapons safety
program, and two were part of the fundamental research program. One of the tests
conducted for fundamental research was the first Soviet underground nuclear burst,
conducted in tunnel V-1 on the Degelen test site on 11 October 1961.
The 1961 test program at the Novaya Zemlya range included 26 tests. Most were
full-scale tests of operational systems: ballistic and cruise missiles, bombs, and
torpedoes. 45 Two of the full-scale tests of torpedoes on 23 and 27 October 1961
involved the study of the destructive effects of nuclear explosions on ships.46 The
23 October 1961 test was the last Soviet underwater nuclear explosion.
In contrast to the low-yield explosions at Semipalatinsk, the yield of at least 10
of the 26 explosions on the Novaya Zemlya range in 1961 exceeded one megaton.
As noted above, these included the test of a thermonuclear device with a nominal
yield of 100 megatons. The yield of the explosion of that device on 31 October
1961 was, as previously stated, 50 megatons.
The 1961 test program also included a series of high-altitude and space explo-
sions conducted to study how nuclear weapons affected the work of System A,
the prototype of the Moscow ABM system deployed at the Sary-Shagan range. The
missiles delivering the nuclear weapons in these explosions were launched from
the Kapustin Yar range. 47
The world reaction to the Soviet resumption of nuclear tests was sharply nega-
tive. On 3 September 1961 the United States and Great Britain issued a joint state-
ment condemning the Soviet decision to resume nuclear testing. The statement also
proposed the immediate end of all nuclear tests in the atmosphere. The Soviet Union
refused to consider the cessation of atmospheric tests only, asserting that a partial
Nuclear Tests 451
ban would be meaningless. The talks in Geneva were suspended on 9 September

1961, the day the Soviet response was published. Shortly before that, on 5 Sep-
tember, the United States had announced its intention to resume its own nuclear test
program, which originally was to be confined to underground explosions. The first
of those tests was conducted on the u.S. test range in Nevada on 15 September of
that year. 48 Later the United States also resumed tests in the atmosphere.49
In a joint statement of 13 November 1961, the United States and Great Britain
proposed the resumption of the test ban talks that had been suspended in Septem-
ber. The Soviet Union agreed, and the talks were resumed on 28 November 1961.
The Soviet Union suggested extending the test ban to include nuclear explosions in
space. It also proposed a moratorium on underground tests and suggested that an
effective monitoring system could be developed while the moratorium was in effect.
The moratorium was rejected, but the talks on the nuclear test ban continued,
although without much progress. 50
The 1962 Soviet nuclear tests began on 2 February with an underground explo-
sion conducted on the Semipalatinsk range to study the effects of nuclear weapons
on military equipment and structures. This explosion, conducted in a tunnel on the
Degelen site, was the second Soviet underground test (the first having been carried
out in October 1961, as noted above).
The February test was followed by a pause that lasted until 1 August. The series
of tests that began in August 1962 at the Semipalatinsk range was part of the Soviet
weapons development program. Most of the tests on the Semipalatinsk range in
1962 (28 out of 40) fell into that category, and the majority were low-yield bursts
(under 10 kilotons).
Most of the tests on the Novaya Zemlya range in 1962 were tests of operational
systems. The first test on the Novaya Zemlya range in 1962 was a test of a 21.1-
megaton bomb.51 About half of the 36 explosions on the Novaya Zemlya range
in 1962 yielded over one megaton, including, as mentioned above, the test of a
thermonuclear device with a nominal yield of 50 megatons. 52
In addition to the explosions on the test ranges, the Soviet Union in 1962
conducted another three tests--{)ne high-altitude explosion and two explosions
in space-of the Operation K series, which had begun in 1961.53 In contrast to the
1961 tests, the devices used in these tests had a much higher yield (300 kilotons).
Despite the lack of progress at the Geneva talks on such issues as the number of
inspections required to verify compliance with a ban on underground tests, by the
end of 1962 it was clear that the talks would produce an agreement that would ban
tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water. As a result, the latter part
452 Chapter 8
of December 1962 was marked by a quite intensive final series of Soviet tests. A
series of three explosions with an extremely low yield were conducted on the Semi-
palatinsk range to study nuclear weapons safety issues. There were 11 tests on the
Novaya Zemlya range in the last two weeks of 1962. The last Soviet atmospheric
test was the last test of 1962, conducted on 25 December 1962.
The tests conducted in 1961-1962 enabled the Soviet Union to make substantial
progress in the development of thermonuclear weapons with a high specific yield
and to perfect technology for the development of very-high-yield thermonuclear
devices, enabling Soviet designers to close the gap between levels of weapons devel-
opment in the Soviet Union and the United States that had existed before the 1958
moratorium. In addition, the 1961-1962 series included an extensive program of
operational weapons testing. In several cases the tests had been combined with troop
exercises in the use of nuclear weapons in combat, and there were also full-scale
tests of various delivery systems: ballistic and cruise missiles, torpedoes, and aerial
bombs. 54
Another important aspect of the test program of 1961-1962 was the series of 10
weapons safety tests and 5 tests for fundamental research included in the program.
The effects of nuclear weapons had also been the focus of considerable attention:
It was the purpose of 11 tests in 1961-1962, including the 5 high-altitude and space
explosions conducted during tests of the Soviet ABM system.
In June 1963 the United States proposed the conclusion of an agreement banning
nuclear tests in three spheres, leaving underground tests outside of the agreement.
The Soviet Union accepted the proposal almost immediately. The text of the treaty
was prepared during talks held in Moscow from 15 to 25 July 1963. The Limited
Test Ban Treaty (LTBT, or Moscow Treaty) was signed in Moscow by the foreign
ministers of the Soviet Union, United States, and Great Britain on 5 August 1963
and entered into force on 10 October of that year.
The signatories to the Moscow Treaty pledged not to carry out any nuclear explo-
sions in the atmosphere, in space, or under water and not to conduct underground
tests that might cause the spread of radioactive debris outside the territorial limits
of the states party to the treaty.
The Program of Underground Tests

Preparations for underground tests began in the Soviet Union long before the con-
clusion of the Moscow Treaty, and indeed, as noted above, the USSR conducted
its first underground test of a nuclear weapon as early as 1961. The site for
underground explosions on the Novaya Zemlya range was chosen in 1959, and
Nuclear Tests 453
the construction of tunnels began there in 1960. In June 1961, following the Soviet
decision to resume atmospheric tests, the tunneling work was suspended, and the
tunnels were mothballed. 55 Preparations for underground tests on the Semipalatinsk
range probably had been completed before the decision was made to resume the
tests in the atmosphere. As discussed above, the first Soviet underground nuclear
test was conducted on 11 October 1961, before the ban on atmospheric explosions,
and the second underground test, also conducted before the Moscow treaty was
signed, was the test of 2 February 1962 conducted to study weapons effects.
In 1963 the Soviet Union did not carry out any nuclear tests (with the exception
of hydronuclear experiments on the Semipalatinsk range).56 This pause in the Soviet
test program was probably due to the preparation of the test ranges for the start of
underground testing.
The 1964 test program began on 15 March on the Semipalatinsk range. Under-
ground tests on the Novaya Zemlya range began on 18 September 1964.'7 The inten-
sity of the tests during the first stages of the underground test program depended
largely on the speed with which the tunnels could be prepared for the explosions.
Shafts were also used for tests in the Soviet Union beginning in 1966, but explo-
sions in shafts were few in number until the late 1960s and early 1970s.
In 1965 the first nuclear blasting operation for the purpose of excavation was
conducted on the Semipalatinsk range, marking the beginning of the Soviet program
of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. The Semipalatinsk and Novaya Zemlya
test ranges were subsequently used for tests of PNE devices as well as for military
purposes.
The improvement of testing procedures led to the beginning of tests that included
simultaneous detonation of several nuclear devices. 58 The first tests of this kind
included two simultaneous detonations. Later on, in 1975, the number of simulta-
neous detonations in a single test reached as many as eight (on 23 August 1975).
The multiple-explosion tests were quite effective in reducing the cost of the tests
and, consequently, increased the intensity of the Soviet test program. The first
multiple-explosion test in a single tunnel was conducted on the Semipalatinsk range
on 3 December 1966, and the first multiple burst in different tunnels was conducted
on the Novaya Zemlya range on 21 October 1967.
Talks on a comprehensive nuclear test ban proceeded very slowly after the
signature of the Moscow treaty. In the second half of the 1960s the Soviet Union
and the United States concluded several agreements prohibiting tests in Latin
America and the Caribbean and on the Moon and other celestial bodies. These
agreements represented the continuation of efforts to ban the deployment of nuclear
454 Chapter 8
weapons in various regions, a process that had started with the 1959 Treaty
on Antarctica which prohibited any military activity there. Neither the Soviet
Union nor the United States, however, made any serious attempt to pursue a
comprehensive test ban.
Efforts to limit nuclear tests did not intensify again until the early 1970s, after
the Soviet Union and the United States began the active discussion of disarmament
issues that led to the conclusion of several U.S.-Soviet agreements, such as the ABM
Treaty and the agreement on the limitation of offensive arms (SALT I). In March
1974 the two sides agreed to set a limit on the yield of underground nuclear explo-
sions. This resulted in the U.S.-Soviet Treaty on the Limitation of Underground
Nuclear Tests (the Threshold Test Ban Treaty), which was signed in July 1974.
Under the terms of this treaty, the Soviet Union and the United States pledged not
to conduct underground tests of nuclear weapons with an aggregate yield exceed-
ing 150 kilotons. 59
The Threshold Test Ban Treaty was negotiated under the assumption that it would
be accompanied by the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, which would allow a
higher yield for PNEs outside of test ranges. Concluding this treaty, and especially
working out the verification procedures, turned out to be more difficult than nego-
tiating the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, however, and the PNE Treaty was not signed
until May 1976. By the terms of that treaty, single nuclear explosions for peaceful
purposes were not to have a yield exceeding 150 kilotons. The treaty did, however,
allow multiple explosions with a combined yield of up to 1.5 megatons.
In addition to setting limits on the yield of explosions, the Threshold Test Ban
Treaty provided, through a protocol to the treaty, for the exchange of data on the
location of test ranges and test sites, information about the geological features of
the test ranges, and data on the nuclear explosions carried out there. A protocol to
the PNE Treaty provided for the more extensive exchange of data prior to the tests.
Also under the protocol, inspectors were to be allowed access to the projected site
of scheduled explosions with a yield exceeding 100 kilotons.
The Threshold Test Ban and the PNE Treaties did not enter into force until
December 1990, after the sides agreed on new protocols to the treaties, changing
the procedure for and terms of inspections. In spite of that, the Soviet Union and
the United States observed the limits set in those treaties and did not conduct any
tests that yielded more than 150 kilotons after 31 March 1976.
After the Threshold Test Ban Treaty had been concluded but before it entered
into force the Soviet Union conducted a series of tests of high-yield devices. The last
Nuclear Tests 455
Soviet test with a combined energy yield of more than 150 kilotons was conducted
on the Novaya Zemlya range on 21 October 1975.60
The Cessation of Nuclear Tests

The negotiations on the comprehensive test ban were resumed in 1977 by the new
u.s. administration of President Jimmy Carter. The comprehensive ban was among
the arms control initiatives announced by the Carter administration in March 1977.
Consultations by experts began in June 1977, and the official test ban negotiations
were opened in October 1977. To facilitate the negotiations, in November 1977 the
Soviet Union expressed its willingness to declare a three-year moratorium on peace-
ful nuclear explosions if an agreement could be reached on the prohibition of tests
of nuclear weapons. The Soviet statement also favored an unlimited duration for
the future comprehensive ban. The Soviet Union indicated it was also willing to
agree, under certain circumstances, to accept on-site inspections for the verification
of compliance with a test ban treaty it signed. 61
In mid-1978, however, the United States began backing away from its initial
proposal for a comprehensive test ban. First the United States proposed that the
test ban treaty stay in effect for only five years. Then, in September 1978, the United
States proposed that this period be reduced to three years. Furthermore, it proposed
the exclusion of low-yield explosions from the treaty. In the end, the Soviet Union
and the United States agreed to concentrate on reduction of strategic offensive arms,
and the nuclear test ban talks, no longer a top priority, were allowed to languish.
The talks stopped almost completely after the Soviet troops entered Afghanistan in
December 1979, and they were officially ended on 20 November 1980.62 In June
1982 the Reagan administration announced that the United States would not resume
the test ban negotiations.
No further progress was made on the comprehensive test ban until 1985. In early
August 1985 General Secretary M. S. Gorbachev announced that the Soviet Union
was instituting a unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests as of 6 August 1985. 63 The
moratorium was originally supposed to stay in effect only until 1 January 1986, but
the Soviet Union later extended the period several times, calling on the United States
to join it and to begin negotiating a ban on nuclear tests. The United States refused
to join the moratorium and proposed, instead of the negotiation of a test ban, con-
sultations to review the provisions with regard to verification in the Threshold Test
Ban and PNE Treaties. The Soviet Union agreed to this proposal, and the consul-
tations began in July 1986.64
456 Chapter 8
In August 1986 the Soviet Union extended its unilateral moratorium to 1

January 1987. On 18 December 1986, shortly before the moratorium's expiration
date, the Soviet Union announced that it would resume tests of nuclear weapons
after the first U.S. nuclear weapons test in 1987. As a result, the unilateral Soviet
moratorium, which had lasted a year and a half, came to an end on 26 February
1987. In 1987 the Soviet Union also resumed its program of peaceful nuclear
explosions.
In November 1987 the USSR and the United States began official nuclear test ban
talks. A reliable system for the verification of compliance with any test ban treaty
that might be signed was one of the main issues at the talks, just as it had been in
earlier talks. The USSR and the United States agreed to conduct several joint exper-
iments in verification to find the best methods. A verification experiment on the
U.S. test range in Nevada was conducted in August 1988. Another joint verifica-
tion experiment was conducted on the Semipalatinsk test range on 14 September
1988. The yield of the nuclear explosion in that experiment, conducted in a shaft
on the Balapan site, was around 150 kilotons. 65
The 1989 Soviet nuclear test program was essentially the last Soviet nuclear test
program. In that year, the Soviet Union conducted seven tests on the Semipalatinsk
range, the last on 19 October. After that the Soviet political leadership made a deci-
sion to suspend the tests, although everything was ready for one more test on the
Novaya Zemlya range." That test was eventually conducted a year later, on 24
October 1990, and was the last Soviet nuclear test ever conducted. During that test,
eight explosive devices were detonated in tunnel A-13N on the Novaya Zemlya
range. Seven of the eight tests were part of the Soviet nuclear weapons development
program. The remaining test was conducted in the interests of nuclear weapons
safety. The total amount of energy released during the tests was around 70
kilotons. 67
The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

The political events that took place in the Soviet Union in 1991 and led to its dis-
integration had an immediate impact on the Soviet nuclear test program. The Semi-
palatinsk test range was closed down on 29 August 1991 by a decree of the president
of Kazakhstan. The president of Russia, which had inherited the status of a nuclear
state from the Soviet Union, announced the start of a one-year moratorium on
nuclear tests on 26 October 1991.'8 In his address to the UN General Assembly in
January 1992, Russian president announced that Russia was in favor of the com-
prehensive nuclear test ban.
Nuclear Tests 457
The actual work of concluding the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty began in
January 1994 within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.
After about two years of negotiations, the treaty was open for signature on 24
September 1996. To date, the treaty has been signed by all five recognized nuclear
states (the United States, Russia, Great Britain, France, and China). Although the
treaty has not entered into force officially, the signatories, including Russia, have
effectively pledged not to conduct nuclear tests.
The fundamental provision of the treaty prohibits "nuclear weapon test explo-
sions or any other nuclear explosions." According to an understanding reached at
the talks, this does not prohibit experiments with nuclear pulse reactors, inertial-
confinement fusion experiments (including research with military applications), or
so-called hydrodynamic experiments that do not include fission chain reactions.
The ban on nuclear tests is certain to create some difficulties in the maintenance
of the Russian nuclear arsenal in combat-ready status. In April 1996, shortly before
the concluding stage of the talks, the Russian leadership stressed that Russia would
sign the treaty, but it would also take measures to maintain the com bat readiness,
reliability, and safety of its nuclear weapons. It stressed that Russia might recon-
sider its attitude toward the treaty if the test ban should jeopardize the combat readi-
ness or safety of its arsena1. 69 The Russian parliament ratified the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty on 21 April 2000.
Computer simulations of the processes occurring during nuclear explosions and
nonnuclear tests of weapons and their components probably will lie at the basis of
the Russian program to secure the reliability and safety of the nuclear arsenal so
long as it maintains compliance with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. These
tests would include the hydrodynamic experiments that are still being conducted on
the Novaya Zemlya test range.
The Organization of Soviet Nuclear Tests
The main organizations responsible for making preparations for nuclear tests in the
USSR and for conducting the tests were the Ministry of Medium Machine Building
(Minsredmash) and the Ministry of Defense. 70 The Ministry of Medium Machine
Building was responsible for tests connected with the development of new nuclear
weapons, tests of weapons from the Ministry of Defense inventory, and weapons
safety tests. In addition, the Ministry of Medium Machine Building participated in
the organization of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and conducted its own
experiments to develop the technology of industrial nuclear explosions. Most of the
458 Chapter 8
Ministry of Defense's tests were conducted to study the effects of nuclear weapons
on buildings and equipment. In addition, during the period of atmospheric tests,
the Ministry of Defense conducted target practice and troop exercises, some of
which involved operational systems.
The long-range program of Soviet nuclear tests was drawn up by the Ministry
of Medium Machine Building in cooperation with the Ministry of Defense. Within
the ministries the program was prepared by the Fifth Main Directorate of the Min-
istry of Medium Machine Building and the 12th Main Directorate of the Ministry
of Defense, with participation of the Sixth Main Directorate of the Navy, which
had jurisdiction over the Novaya Zemlya test range. The program was then
approved by a joint decree of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of
Ministers. In addition to specifying the number and nature of tests to be conducted,
the plan included measures to improve the experimental and testing facilities of the
test ranges.
The Ministry of Medium Machine Building and the Ministry of Defense then used
the long-range program as the basis for a test plan for the calendar year. Each year's
plan was also approved by a special decree of the Central Committee and Council
of Ministers. The decree specified the dates of the tests and the organization in
charge of each of the tests and listed the organizations participating in the pre-
parations and performance of the tests. The government decree instructed the Min-
istry of Medium Machine Building and Ministry of Defense to form state
commissions responsible for planning, conducting, and reporting the results of
individual tests.
The appropriate subdivisions of the Ministry of Medium Machine Building and
the Ministry of Defense would then use the government decree as the basis for the
schedule of tests at each of the test ranges. A few months before a test, the Min-
istry of Medium Machine Building and the Ministry of Defense would form a state
commission to conduct that test. The commission would be responsible for the test
preparations, the test itself, and the report on the results of the test.
The chairman of the commission would represent either the Ministry of Medium
Machine Building or the Ministry of Defense, depending on the nature of the test.
The chairman was usually a representative of the organization in charge of the test.
If the commission was headed by a representative of the Ministry of Medium
Machine Building, his first deputy would be a representative of the Ministry of
Defense, and vice versa. Other commission members were representatives of the
institute that had developed the weapon, of the organizations participating in the
measurements, and of the test range where the test was to be conducted.
Nuclear Tests 459
To coordinate the work of representatives of various ministries and organizations

participating in the test, the government decree would set up a so-called provisional
subordination that overruled usual interministry links. The chairman of the
state commission was authorized to make decisions independent of the ministries
and other organizations involved in the test and was held fully responsible for the
test.
During the early years of Soviet nuclear tests, primarily when the tests were being
conducted in the atmosphere, a single test could serve a broad range of purposes.
The composition of the state commissions conducting and supervising the tests
changed, therefore, depending on the relative importance of various goals. The dis-
tribution of participants' functions could also vary depending on the purposes of
the test. Work with weapons under development, for example, was usually per-
formed by experts from the Ministry of Medium Machine Building. During full-
scale tests of operational weapons, which were sometimes combined with troop
exercises, experts from the Ministry of Defense and the active units participating in
the exercises assembled the weapons and prepared them for use in the test.
The tests became much more specialized after the end of atmospheric testing. All
tests of weapons from the Ministry of Defense's inventory were transferred to the
jurisdiction of the Ministry of Medium Machine Building. Consequently, represen-
tatives of that ministry did all of the work connected with the weapons to be used
in the tests. The Ministry of Medium Machine Building also retained jurisdiction
over weapons development and weapons safety and reliability tests. The only cate-
gory of tests that remained under the Ministry of Defense's jurisdiction was weapons
effects tests. However, in some cases, such as tests to study the radiation effects of
the resulting explosion, even weapons effects tests could be conducted under the
jurisdiction of the Ministry of Medium Machine Building. The Ministry of Defense
was directly in charge of tests to study effects of the blast wave generated by a
nuclear explosion.
The institutes of the Fifth Main Directorate of the Ministry of Medium Machine
Building-Arzamas-16 (the Institute of Experimental Physics) and Chelyabinsk-70
(the Institute of Technical Physics), responsible for weapons development-played
a key role in the preparations for all nuclear tests and in carrying them out. Each
institute had a sector responsible for nuclear tests. A representative of this sector
from the institute that designed a nuclear device being tested always held a position
as a deputy chairman of the state commission conducting the test. A representative
of the institute that designed the device was either the chairman of the commission
or his first deputy (if the test was being conducted for the Ministry of Defense). The
460 Chapter 8
chief theorist of the weapon being tested was usually appointed scientific supervi-
sor of the test.
The head organization of the Ministry of Defense responsible for tests was the
12th Central Scientific Research Institute (12th TsNII), which was subordinated to
the 12th Main Directorate of the Ministry of Defense. This institute did most of the
organizational work for weapons effects tests. The tests in this institute's program
were usually quite extensive, and the preparations for them could take several years.
The 12th Central Scientific Research Institute reviewed the proposals of the orga-
nizations participating in the tests, handled the logistics, coordinated the work with
the Ministry of Medium Machine Building, and supervised the construction of the
necessary test facilities.
Each test included an extensive program of physical measurements. The chief of
the physical measurement facility, who held a position as a deputy chairman of
the state commission, was responsible for the organization of the measurement
procedures. Among other elements of the testing complex were facilities for
handling the nuclear device, equipment for special measurements, and protective
structures. 71
During the first nuclear tests, the development of the measuring techniques to be
employed and of any special equipment needed for physical measurements was the
responsibility of institutes of the Academy of Sciences, in particular the Institute
of Chemical Physics. Later the institutes developing the nuclear weapons-Arzamas-
16 and Chelyabinsk-70-took over the development of methods of measurement
of various parameters of a nuclear explosion and its effects, and the Institute of
Impulse Technologies (VNII-IT) was responsible for the creation of the measure-
ment equipment itselfJ2 If a test was conducted for the Ministry of Defense,
measurement of the parameters of the blast and seismic waves as well as other
destructive factors was the responsibility of the 12th Central Scientific Research
Institute. The test range itself was responsible for monitoring radiation levels on the
test range and in adjacent areas during and after the test.
The mechanism for planning and carrying out industrial nuclear explosions was
essentially the same as that for the military test program, the main difference being
that the Ministry of Defense did not participate in industrial nuclear tests. The key
elements of the preparations for such tests-the drafting of the project plans and
the government decree, the creation of a state commission, and the supervision of
the test-were the responsibility of the Ministry of Medium Machine Building.
A representative of the institute that had developed the device (Arzamas-16 or
Chelyabinsk-70) was appointed the chairman of the state commission responsible
Nuclear Tests 461
for the test. A ministry that requested an industrial explosion was also involved in
preparation of the resulting test. Its responsibilities usually included preparation of
the site or tunnels and taking care of various administrative matters.
The Industrial Technology Research and Design Institute (VNIP-Ipromtekh-
nologii) was the organization in the Ministry of Medium Machine Building in charge
of industrial nuclear expiosionsJ3 It reviewed the proposals of the ministries request-
ing the tests, drew up a tentative plan for the testing, and then combined all of the
proposals into long-range and annual plans. The institute also did all of the plan-
ning for the test sites used in the military program (tunnels and shafts).
Test Ranges
The Semipalatinsk Test Range

The Semipalatinsk test range (figure 8.1) was established in 1947 to conduct the
test of the first Soviet nuclear device. The government decree that established the
Mountain Seismic Station (Installation 905), as the test range was originally called,
was adopted in August 1947. In 1948 the station was converted into Training Test
Range No.2 of the Ministry of Defense, and later into State Central Scientific Test
Range No.2 (GosTsNIP-2).74
The first director of the test range, Lt.-Gen. P. M. Rozhanovich, was replaced by
S. G. Kolesnikov in September 1948. 75 M. A. Sadovskiy, who was deputy director
of the Institute of Chemical Physics, was appointed scientific supervisor of the
test range.
The location chosen for the test range was at the junction of three oblasts in
Kazakhstan: Semipalatinsk, Pavlodar, and Karaganda. The test range personnel
lived in a town, long known as Semipalatinsk-21 but renamed Kurchatov in the
1990s, that was built for them on the bank of the Irtysh River. A special restricted
area-the scientific experimentation unit-was established on the grounds of
the test range for the storage of the components of the nuclear weapons to be
tested. The plutonium components of the device, its neutron initiator, and other
components were kept within this area after they had been delivered to the test
range.
Preparations for the first test at the Semipalatinsk range began in April 1949. An
order issued by Design Bureau 11 Director P. M. Zernov on 11 April 1949 gave to
a commission headed by Deputy Chief Designer K. I. Shchelkin the authority to
perform all of the preparations for the test. The test range facilities were certified
ready by a special state commission on 10 August 1949. Rehearsals of the test were
462 Chapter 8
7J030'
Kurchato
Location of atm spheric tests
Test site
border Sary-Uzen
Oegelen
• Lazurit
Telkem-1
Telkem-2
49'20'
• Industrial excavation or earth-moving explosions
Figure 8.1
The Semipalatinsk test range
conducted on 14, 18, and 22 August 1949, and the first nuclear explosion on the
Semipalatinsk range took place on 29 August.
For several years the Semipalatinsk range was the only Soviet nuclear weapons
test site. Before 1957 only three tests were conducted outside of the range: the explo-
sion during the Totsk exercise (14 September 1954), the underwater explosion on
Novaya Zemlya on 21 September 1955, and the nuclear explosion near Aralsk that
was part of the full-scale test of the R-5M ballistic missile (2 February 1956). During
those years, the Semipalatinsk range was used for work on the delivery of nuclear
weapons by aircraft and to test the first thermonuclear weapons.
Nuclear Tests 463
In 1957 tests of high-yield thermonuclear devices were transferred to a site estab-

lished specifically for that purpose on the Novaya Zemlya test range. Up to that
time there had been seven thermonuclear explosions on the Semipalatinsk range,
the last on 22 August 1957.77 Among these explosions were the test of the first Soviet
thermonuclear device, the RDS-6, and the detonation of the first Soviet two-stage
thermonuclear weapon, the RDS-37. The latter produced the highest yield of any
burst on the Semipalatinsk range. After the tests of thermonuclear devices had been
moved to Novaya Zemlya, the Semipalatinsk range was used mainly for relatively
low-yield explosions (under 50 kilotons), most of which were for weapons devel-
opment purposes.
Until the Limited Test Ban Treaty, which banned atmospheric explosions, went
into force, most of the tests on the Semipalatinsk range were air bursts. The largest
surface burst was the explosion of the RDS-6 device on 12 August 1953 (400 kilo-
tons). The last relatively high-yield surface burst (27 kilotons) took place on 24
August 1956. There was a series of surface bursts in 1961-1962, but most were
extremely low-yield explosions.
Over the time that it was used, the Semipalatinsk test range was the site of 116
air- and surface bursts. The last airburst took place on 1 December 1962, and the
last surface burst took place on 24 December 1962. Most of the atmospheric tests
on the Semipalatinsk range (100 of the 116 tests) were conducted for the purpose
of weapons development. The atmospheric explosions at Semipalatinsk were also
used in weapons safety experiments (11 tests) and for fundamental research (4 tests).
One atmospheric test was conducted to study weapons effects.
The 116 atmospheric tests do not include hydronuclear experiments, which
involved explosions of extremely low yield. Among these experiments was the series
of explosions to study alpha-radioactive fallout, which took place in 1960, 1961,
and 1963. This series included 38 experiments.78 Radioactive fallout was also
studied during some of the low-yield bursts (ranging from a few tons to a hundred
tons) in 1961 and 1962.79
The underground nuclear testing program on the Semipalatinsk range began
in 1961. The first underground test was conducted on 11 October 1961 and was
probably conducted to develop the technique for underground testing. One more
underground explosion was carried out on the Semipalatinsk range before the end
of the atmospheric nuclear tests (2 February 1962) to study the nuclear weapons
effects.
Underground nuclear tests at the Semipalatinsk range were usually conducted
on one of three sites: Degelen, Balapan, and Sary-Uzen. 80 Most of the underground
464 Chapter 8
tests-209 of the 340 underground tests on the Semipalatinsk range-were con-

ducted in tunnels on the Degelen site. 81 Tunnel tests were preferred to the types of
tests available at the other sites mainly because they allowed an extensive program
of physical measurements to be undertaken during and after the blast.
Most of the tests on the Degelen site were conducted for weapons development
(119 tests, 177 detonations). In addition, Degelen was the location of all weapons
safety tests on the Semipalatinsk test range (14 tests, 25 detonations) and all but
one of the weapons effects explosions (32 tests, 42 detonations). Most of the explo-
sions conducted for the development of devices for industrial explosions were also
conducted in tunnels (25 tests, 30 detonations). The Degelen site was also chosen
for two industrial explosions used to check the radioactive-debris removal technol-
ogy later used in the Dnepr industrial explosions. 82 In the 209 total underground
tests conducted on the Degelen site, 295 different devices were exploded. The last
test on that site took place on 4 October 1989.
Tests in shafts were conducted on the Semipalatinsk range's other two under-
ground sites, Sary-Uzen and Balapan. The first underground test in a shaft was an
excavation explosion on 15 January 1965 in shaft 1004 on the Balapan site. This
was the first Soviet industrial explosion, and it was not connected with the military
program. The next two shaft tests were also part of the PNE program. The first was
an excavation explosion on the Sary-Uzen site on 14 October 1965. The second
explosion on the same site on 18 December 1966 was carried out to test a PNE
device. The first shaft test of a nuclear weapon took place on 16 September 1967
on the Sary-Uzen site.
The first test on the Balapan site took place on 19 June 1968. The primary purpose
of the explosion in that test was probably the development of a shaft-sealing tech-
nique to prevent release of radioactive debris into the atmosphere (the purpose of
that test is listed in the official list of tests, published by Minatom, as "fundamen-
tal research"). The yield of this first completely contained shaft explosion was
around 18 kilotons.
Sary-Uzen was the main site for shaft tests until around 1973. The active use of
the Balapan site began in 1972, when it was the location of a series of relatively
high-yield bursts. The Sary-Uzen site was still used after tests began at the Balapan
site, but primarily for low-yield explosions (under 20 kilotons). Starting about 1974,
Balapan became the main site used for nuclear tests in shafts.
All told, the Balapan site was the location of 106 tests (168 individual detona-
tions) during its years of operation. Most of the tests on the Balapan site were
connected with nuclear weapons development (96 tests, 150 detonations). The
Nuclear Tests 465
Sary-Uzen site hosted 22 tests (23 detonations) in all, most of which were also
weapons development tests. The last explosion on the Sary-Uzen site was carried
out on 4 April 1980. The last test on the Balapan site took place on 19 October
1989 and was the last test on the Semipalatinsk range.
In addition to the explosions conducted at the three main sites, five other under-
ground tests were held on the Semipalatinsk range. A series of four bursts was con-
ducted on the Telkem for the purpose of developing canal excavation technology.
The first explosion in this series was an extremely low-yield burst on 21 October
1968, which was followed by a multiple detonation of three explosive devices to
produce a canal crater on 12 November 1968. The technology developed in con-
nection with these tests was later used in the industrial explosions of the Taiga series
in 1973. The Lazurit test on 7 December 1974 on the Murzhik site was conducted
for the purpose of developing dam construction technology that employed a
contained underground explosion. 83
Among the nonnuclear tests on the Semipalatinsk range was the nonnuclear
Shagan test, conducted in 1978 to study the effects of air blasts on various military
equipment. 84 The test involved the detonation of 5,000 tons of a conventional
explosive. A similar experiment was conducted on Novaya Zemlya on a much
smaller scale in 1987. 85
A decree issued by President N. A. Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan on 29 August 1991
closed the Semipalatinsk test range for nuclear testing. Pursuant to this decree, all
the range facilities became the property of Kazakhstan, including the three nuclear
reactors located on the grounds of the test range. 86 Two of the reactors-an IVG-
1M graphite impulse reactor and an experimental radioactive-gas-cooled reactor-
are located on the grounds of the Baykal-1 test facility 65 kilometers south of
Kurchatov. In 1970-1988 these reactors were used for full-scale tests of the proto-
type of a nuclear rocket engine under development. 87 The third reacto~ an IGR
graphite impulse reactor, is located on another test site 50 kilometers southwest of
Kurchatov, and it was also used as a test unit for the prototype of the nuclear rocket
engine. This third reactor was later used in experiments to enhance the safety of
nuclear reactors and in experiments in the irradiation of materials.
In 1993 Russia was negotiating a possible return of part of the Semipalatinsk
test range equipment from Kazakhstan to Russian organizations. The talks ended
without any result, and everything on the range was eventually turned over to the
National Nuclear Center of the Republic of Kazakhstan, which now includes
research institutes in Kurchatov and elsewhere in Kazakhstan. Scientists at that
center are now working on cooperative projects with the Russian Federation's
466 Chapter 8
Ministry of Atomic Energy. The Russian military units that had been responsible
for the test range operations were also disbanded in December 1993.
The Novaya Zemlya Test Range

The Novaya Zemlya test range (figure 8.2) was originally established for the purpose
of testing the effects of nuclear weapons (primarily torpedoes) on naval equipment.
The fact that Novaya Zemlya could be used for other types of tests and especially
for tests of high-yield devices also played an important role in choosing this
location. 88
The government decree ordering the organization of the Naval Scientific Research
Test Range on Novaya Zemlya, designated Installation 700, was signed on 31 July
1954.89 The settlement of Belushya was chosen as the center of the test range, and
65°00'
75"00'
Roga
Belu hya
Che
70°00'
Figure 82
The Novaya Zemlya test range
Nuclear Tests 467
the airfield serving the test range was located in the nearby settlement of Rogachevo.
The range's residential buildings and the facilities required for the tests conducted
on the range were built by a special division of the Naval Engineering Directorate
that was designated Spetsstroy-700. The first chief of Installation 700 and
Spetsstroy-700 was Yeo N. Barkovskiy. In November 1954 the command over the
test range was transferred to Yeo G. Starikov, who became the first director of
Installation 700. 90 The test range was placed under the jurisdiction of one of the
directorates of the Navy, headed by Rear Admiral P. F. Fomin.
A location near the southern end of the island in Chernaya Bay was chosen as
the site of the first test on the Novaya Zemlya range. The purpose of the test, which
was conducted on 21 September 1955, was to study the effects of nuclear explo-
sions on military ships. The device used in the test was designed to arm the T-5
torpedo. 91 It had a yield of 3.5 kilotons and was placed under a barge at a depth
of 12 meters. 92
The next test on Novaya Zemlya, also conducted to study the effects of nuclear
weapons, took place on 7 September 1957. A nuclear device with a yield of 32
kilotons was mounted on a tower 15 meters high on the coast of Chernaya
Bay.n Later that year Chernaya Bay was the location of the state certification
tests of the T-5 torpedo. The main part of the state tests involved the launch of a
nuclear torpedo from a submarine, which took place on 10 October 1957. The
torpedo exploded, with a yield of 10 kilotons, at the designated spot at a depth of
35 meters. 94
Since the conditions on the Semipalatinsk test range did not allow the testing of
high-yield thermonuclear weapons, in 1956 it was decided to transfer high-yield
tests to the Novaya Zemlya range. A special expedition set up in 1956 to find a
suitable location choose a field on the northern part of the island near Mityushikha
Bay.95 The first explosion on the Mityushikha site was carried out on 24 September
1957. The thermonuclear device in this test, delivered by a bomber, had a yield of
1.6 megatons. After this explosion was successfully conducted, all Soviet tests of
high-yield thermonuclear devices were moved to Novaya Zemlya.
Several government resolutions ordering the expansion of the test range preceded
the beginning of the high-yield thermonuclear explosions at Novaya Zemlya. A
government decree of 27 July 1957, for example, provided for the resettlement of
the civilian population of the Novaya Zemlya islands. After the 1957 test program
had been carried out, the government decided to expand the test range again and
to give it a new status. A government decree of 5 March 1958 ordered the con-
struction of new test facilities for the 1958 program on the grounds of Installation
468 Chapter 8
700. The decree also established the current boundaries of the range and assigned
it the status of the Sixth State Central Test Range."
An extensive program of tests of high-yield thermonuclear devices, including 15
thermonuclear bursts yielding up to 2.9 megatons, was carried out on Novaya
Zemlya in 1958. 97 In addition, tests of low-yield devices began on the test range. In
all, there were eight bursts on Novaya Zemlya yielding less than four kilotons each
in 1958.
The Novaya Zemlya test program of 1958 was completed on 25 October 1958,
shortly before the start of the nuclear test ban negotiations. The course of those
talks suggested that tests in the atmosphere would be halted even though a total
test ban agreement would not be concluded. Accordingly, preparations for under-
ground tests began on the test range in fall 1959. Tunneling operations began near
the mouth of the Shumilikha River in 1960 to construct five tunnels for underground
tests.98
Atmospheric tests on Novaya Zemlya (on the Mityushikha Bay site) were resumed
after the Soviet leadership decided to lift its self-imposed moratorium on nuclear
tests in 1961. Novaya Zemlya was the site of an unprecedented series of nuclear
tests in 1961-1962. In 1961, 26 nuclear weapons were detonated between 10
September and 4 November. As discussed earlier in the chapte~ those explosions
included the highest-yield nuclear explosion ever: the burst of 31 October 1961,
which yielded 50 megatons. This series of tests also included several tests of R-12
and R-13 ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads, tests of the nuclear KSR-2 anti-
ship cruise missile, and underwater and surface explosions carried out during
torpedo tests.99
A comparable series of tests was conducted in 1962. The yield in 14 of the 36
explosions on Novaya Zemlya between 5 August and 25 December 1962 exceeded
1 megaton, and in four cases it exceeded 19 megatons. The 1962 series was the last
series of atmospheric tests in the Soviet Union. The last two tests in the atmosphere
were conducted on 25 December 1962.
Over the entire period of Soviet atmospheric tests-that is, up to the end of
1962-there were 91 nuclear explosions on Novaya Zemlya. Three were under-
water explosions, one was a contact surface burst, and two were on the surface of
the water. 100 All of the others were air bursts.
The first underground nuclear test on Novaya Zemlya was conducted on 18
September 1964. In the beginning the Novaya Zemlya underground tests were
conducted (in tunnels, as were all tests on this particular site) on the site near the
mouth of the Shumilikha River on the south shore of the Matochkin Shar Strait.
Nuclear Tests 469
A new test field farther south, near Chernaya Bay was equipped for tests in 1972
because conditions on the site near the Shumilikha River did not allow testing
megaton-class devices. 101 The tests on this southern site were conducted in shafts.
The first explosion, conducted on 27 July 1972, was a low-yield burst that was
probably used for instrument calibration purposes. The next two explosions on the
southern site were carried out on 27 September 1973 (yielding close to 150 kilo-
tons) and 27 October 1973. The second explosion, with a yield of around 4 mega-
tons, was the highest-yield Soviet underground test ever performed. The next
explosion on the southern site was carried out during a test on 2 November 1974,
with a yield of around 2 megatons. The last test on the southern site of the Novaya
Zemlya range was a multiple detonation of three devices on 18 October 1975.102
The yield of each explosion exceeded 150 kilotons.
There were 39 underground tests in all on Novaya Zemlya between 1964
and 1990, and 133 explosions were carried out during these tests. The over-
whelming majority of the tests were conducted for weapons development purposes.
The last test on the range was a multiple detonation of eight nuclear devices
conducted on 24 October 1990. The combined yield of the devices was around
70 kilotons. '03
After the Semipalatinsk range was closed down in August 1991, Novaya Zemlya
was the only test range on the territory of the former Soviet Union equipped for
nuclear tests. The test range on Novaya Zemlya became Russia's property after the
break up of the Soviet Union, and a Russian presidential decree of 26 February
1992 granted Novaya Zemlya the status of State Central Test Range. The grounds
of the test range became federal property. At that time the Russian government also
ordered the upkeep of the range for two of four nuclear tests a year if necessary.
On 19 April 1996, shortly before the end of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
negotiations, the Russian government published its nuclear arsenal maintenance
program. One section of the program reserves the possibility of resuming nuclear
tests on Novaya Zemlya.
Although all nuclear tests have been stopped, the test range is still being used for
experiments with nuclear weapons. Among these are hydrodynamic experiments
that are still conducted on Novaya Zemlya.
Nuclear Explosions Outside of the Test Ranges

In addition to conducting tests on the grounds of the test ranges in Semipalatinsk
and on Novaya Zemlya, the Soviet Union also carried out explosions in other loca-
tions. Most of these were industrial nuclear explosions, which are described in a
470 Chapter 8
separate section of the chapter. In addition, there were 12 explosions elsewhere in

Soviet territory for nonindustrial purposes.
The first of these was the atmospheric explosion of 14 September 1954 during
the troop exercises on the Totsk range in Orenburg oblast. The bomb used in this
test employed the RDS-3 device, which had been tested on the Semipalatinsk range
in 1951.'04 The bomb was detonated at an altitude of 350 meters and had a yield
of 40 kilotons.
The next explosion outside Soviet test ranges, carried out on 2 February 1956,
was part of the full-scale test of the R-5M ballistic missile. lOS The missile was
launched from the Kapustin Yar missile range in the direction of Aralsk. The missile
successfully delivered its nuclear warhead to the designated point, where it produced
a surface burst yielding 0.3 kilotons.
The Soviet Union conducted several series of atmospheric nuclear tests outside of
its test ranges in 1957-1958 and again in 1961-1962 in which nuclear warheads
were delivered to the detonation point by ballistic missiles. The first of these tests
was conducted on 19 January 1957; the warhead in that test exploded at an
altitude exceeding 10 kilometers. Two similar tests were conducted on 1 and 3
November 1958. Each of the three explosions had a yield of 10 kilotons. Those
tests were conducted to study the explosion's nuclear weapons effects. Their primary
purpose was probably to study the effects on radars and other military equipment
of the electromagnetic impulse and other effects that accompany a high-altitude
nuclear explosion.
A similar series of tests was carried out in 1961. It included two air bursts (in the
tests of 6 September and 6 October 1961) that were probably designed to study the
effects of an atmospheric nuclear burst on the radars on the Sary-Shagan test site.
In addition, the effects of the electromagnetic impulse generated during the explo-
sion were studied during those tests, particularly the effects on various structures
(power lines and military equipment in particular).'06 The burst of 6 September 1961
at an altitude of around 50 kilometers yielded 11 kilotons, and the burst of 6
October yielded 40 kilotons.
The final series of tests connected with the missile delivery of nuclear warheads
was conducted in 1961-1962 and was referred to as "Operation K." This series
included five high-altitude and space explosions. Two explosions with a yield of 1.2
kilotons each took place on 27 October 1961 at altitudes of 150 and 300 kilo-
meters. A year later, in October-November 1962, three more high-altitude explo-
sions (300, 150, and 80 kilometers) were carried out as part of Operation K, all of
which had yields of 300 kilotons. The Operation K series was part of the tests of
Nuclear Tests 471
System A, the prototype of the Moscow ABM system deployed on the Sary-Shagan
test range. Each test of the series involved two missiles launched from the Kapustin
Yar range. System A was supposed to track and intercept the reentry vehicle of the
second missile after the detonation of the nuclear warhead on the first one. 107
Industrial Nuclear Explosions
Overview
The Soviet Union carried out an extensive program of nuclear explosions for
peaceful purposes108 involving 124 tests (135 separate explosions).'09 Another 32
tests (38 separate explosions) were conducted to develop the nuclear charges for the
industrial explosions. Around one-fifth of all Soviet nuclear tests, therefore, were
connected with the PNE program.
The Soviet Union began investigating the possibility of using nuclear explosions
for industrial purposes in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The result of this work
was the development of the Nuclear Explosions for the National Economy program
(Program No.7), which called for development of technology and safety procedures
for industrial nuclear explosions. A. A. Zakharenkov was appointed the program's
director and o. L. Kedrovskiy was appointed scientific supervisor. 110 Specialists
from around 10 different ministries worked on the commission. The Industrial
Technology Research and Design Institute of the Ministry of Medium Machine
Building (VNIPIpromtekhnologii, or VNIPIPT) was the primary organization in
charge of the program.
The first Soviet explosions connected with the PNE program were conducted on
25 October and 16 November 1964. These tests were followed by a conference of
nuclear weapons designers in November 1964 that considered the results of the
tests and worked out requirements for industrial explosive devices, paying special
attention to radiation safety.lll As a result, later industrial explosions used dedicated
explosive devices. In thermonuclear industrial explosive devices used after the
requirements were developed, up to 99 percent of the energy came from fusion reac-
tions, thereby reducing radioactive fallout effects. To reduce induced radioactivity
the devices used special neutron-absorbing materials. 112
Figure 8.3 shows locations of Soviet peaceful nuclear explosions (with the
exception of explosions for deep seismic sounding), as well as other nuclear tests
on the territory of the Soviet Union. The first Soviet industrial explosion was carried
out in shaft 1004 on the Semipalatinsk range on 15 January 1965. The program of
nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes was continued in 1965 (there were three
+ Oil and gas stimulation
• Extinguishing of gas we ll fires
• Underground cavities
l1 Ore breakage
• Underground cavities experiments
:t:( Toxic waste disposal
'¢- Methane emission prevention
*o Field exercise
Excavation, earth moving, subsidence craters
Figure 8.3
Soviet nuclear weapons tests and peaceful nuclear explosions (with the exception of deep seismic sOlUld-
ing explosions)
Nuclear Tests 473
more explosions that same year) and lasted until 1988, that is, virtually until the
end of the Soviet nuclear test program. The last Soviet industrial explosion, which
was part of the deep seismic sounding program, was conducted on 6 September
1988.
The main elements of the program of industrial nuclear explosions were deep
seismic sounding (39 explosions), formation of underground storage cavities (35
explosions, 10 of which were experimental), and oil and gas stimulation (21 explo-
sions). In addition, nuclear explosions were used for excavation, earth moving, ore
breakage, extinguishing gas well fires, and toxic-waste disposal. Nuclear Explosions
for the National Economy also envisaged the use of the technology of nuclear explo-
sions for the underground leaching of metals, for underground cracking, and for
the disposal of radioactive and highly toxic chemical wasteY' Work on developing
technologies for these uses was abandoned when the nuclear tests stopped.
Industrial nuclear explosions were usually carried out within the framework of
a program drawn up at the request of one of the ministries. The operational plan
was drawn up by the Industrial Technology Research and Design Institute.
The radiation effects of industrial nuclear explosions were evaluated by the V. G.
Khlopin Radium Institute. '14 Operations using the technology of nuclear explosions
were requested by the Ministry of Geology (52 explosions), the Ministry of Gas
Industry (26), the Ministry of Petroleum Industry (12), the Ministry of Petroleum
Refining and Petrochemical Industry (2), the Ministry of Mineral Fertilizer
Production (2), and the Ministry of Coal Industry, Ministry of Land Reclama-
tion and Water Management, and Ministry of Nonferrous Metallurgy (1 explo-
sion each). The other 27 explosions were carried out within the programs of
the Ministry of Medium Machine Building and were usually technological or
scientific experiments.
At the start of the program of industrial nuclear explosions the explosive devices
were developed by the Institute of Experimental Physics (Arzamas-16). The Insti-
tute of Technical Physics (Chelyabinsk-70) joined the program later but soon after
joining became the chief developer of devices for industrial explosions. lls
Seismic Sounding
The Soviet program of deep seismic sounding of the Earth's core with the aid of
nuclear explosions began in 1971 and continued almost uninterrupted until 1988.
From one to five explosions were carried out in this program each year except
1976, 1983, and 1986, when there were no explosions for seismic sounding (the
unilateral Soviet moratorium on nuclear tests was in effect in 1986). There were 39
474 Chapter 8
explosions for seismic sounding in all, all single bursts, with yields ranging from 2.3
kilotons to 22 kilotons. The explosive devices in these soundings were detonated
at depths ranging from 400 meters to 1,000 meters.
The Soviet deep seismic sounding explosions were carried out along the 14 seismic
profiles depicted in figure 8.4. The client ministry for the program was the Ministry
of Geology.
Two explosions of the series were accompanied by radioactive release accidents.
When the Globus-1 explosion was carried out (on 19 September 1971), there were
early releases of gases from the shaft in which the explosion was detonated. In the
Kraton-3 explosion (on 24 August 1978), a radioactive release resulted from viola-
tions of the technology for sealing the shaft. Land reclamation measures were taken
in the areas adjacent to the shafts after both of these accidents.
Oil and Gas Stimulation

Projects in the use of nuclear explosions for oil and gas stimulation were con-
ducted at the request of the Ministry of Petroleum Industry (12 explosions), the
Ministry of Geology (8), and the Ministry of Gas Industry (1).
The purpose of the projects requested by the Ministry of Petroleum Industry was
the stimulation of the oil flow from existing wells. The first explosion of this
program was carried out on 30 March 1965 (a multiple detonation of two devices
with a yield of 2.3 kilotons each) at the Grachevskoye deposit in Bashkiria (Butan
site). Later another three explosions were carried out in this oil field, one in 1965
(7.6 kilotons) and two in 1980 (3.2 kilotons each). The depth of the charges in these
explosions ranged from 1,340 to 1,400 meters.
Explosions were also carried out within the framework of the oil flow stimula-
tion program at the Osinskoye and Gezhskoye deposits in Perm oblast (the Grifon
and Geliy sites). There were two explosions at the Osinskoye deposit, on 2 and 8
September 1969. Each yielded 7.6 kilotons, and in each the charge was laid at 1,200
meters. In the Gezhskoye oil field there was one explosion on 2 September 1981
and two series of two explosions each on 28 August 1984 and 19 April 1987. The
interval between the two explosions in each of the series was five minutes. Each
explosion yielded 3.2 kilotons and the charge in each was laid at a depth of around
2,000 meters.
A single explosion yielding 2.5 kilotons was carried out on 18 June 1985 in the
Sredne-Balykskoye oil field (Benzol site) in the Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous
Okrug (Tyumen oblast). The depth of the charge in that explosion was around 2,800
meters.
Figure 8.4
Locations of Soviet peaceful nuclear explosions for deep seismic solUlrung
476 Chapter 8
The only explosion for gas stimulation (requested by the Ministry of Gas
Industry) was carried out on 25 September 1969 at the Takhta-Kugutinskoye
deposit in Stavropol Kray. The device in that explosion was laid at a depth of 725
meters and yielded 10 kilotons.
Virtually all explosions for oil stimulation requested by the Ministry of Geology
were carried out on sites in the Sredne-Botubinskoye oil field in Yakutia (Oka,
Vyatka, Sheksna, and Neva sites). The only exception was a single explosion at the
Yesi-Yegovskoye deposit in the Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug (Angara site).
The program was carried out to master the technology of oil stimulation during the
exploratory stage.
The first of these explosions requested by the Ministry of Geology was carried
out on 5 November 1976 on the Oka site. Two other comparable explosions were
carried out in 1978 and 1979 on the Vyatka and Sheksna sites. Four explosions
were carried out on the Neva site in 1982 and 1987. All of these explosions (except
the last) were comparable to the earlier ones on the Oka, Vyatka, and Sheksna sites:
the explosive devices yielded 15 kilotons and were detonated at a depth of around
1,500 meters. The last explosion (on 12 August 1987), at a depth of 834 meters,
yielded 3.2 kilotons. The last explosion of the Neva series may have been carried
out to create a cavity for the disposal of radioactive and toxic debris from the other
explosions in the program. 116 The explosion on the Angara site in the Khanty-
Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug on 10 December 1980 differed from the explosions
on the sites in Yakutia in the depth of the charge (2,485 meters). The explosive
device yielded 15 kilotons.
Experimental Projects at the Bolshoy Azgir Site

The industrial experiments the Ministry of Medium Machine Building conducted
on Installation Galit near Bolshoy Azgir in Kazakhstan represent a particularly
interesting program of industrial nuclear explosions. 1l7 Their main purpose was the
development of technology for creating underground cavities in rock salt forma-
tions. The program included 10 nuclear explosions carried out on the Bolshoy Azgir
site between 1966 and 1979. The devices used to create the underground cavities
had a yield from 10 to 103 kilotons, and the depths of the explosions ranged from
600 to 1,500 meters. The only exception was the first explosion (shaft A-I), which
had a yield of 1.1 kiloton. In that explosion, the explosive charge in shaft A-I was
laid at a depth of 165 meters.
The explosions created nine underground cavities, five of which are now full of
radioactive brine (cavities A-I, A-II, A-III, A-IV, and A-V). Cavity A-X is being used
Nuclear Tests 477
for the disposal of radioactive soil collected during decontamination of other sites.
The explosion in shaft A-IX created a subsidence crater that is not connected with
the underground cavity.118 That explosion had the highest yield (103 kilotons) of all
those carried out on the Bolshoy Azgir site and, in contrast to the rest, was carried
out in clay instead of the rock salt mass. 119
The cavities created by the explosions of 1 July 1968 (cavity A-II) and 22 Decem-
ber 1971 (cavity A-III) were used for two different types of experiments. Six low-
yield explosions (from 0.01 to 0.5 kilotons) were carried out in the water-filled A-II
cavity between 25 April 1975 and 10 January 1979 as experiments in the produc-
tion of transplutonium elements,120 conducted by the Institute of Experimental
Physics (Arzamas-16).121 Special devices with a high neutron yield were used in this
series of explosions.
Cavity A-III was used to study the effects of seismic decoupling (the reduction of
the seismic magnitude of an underground nuclear explosion when the explosion
is carried out in a large underground cavity). The first explosion in shaft A-III
created an almost spherical cavity with a radius of around 36 meters. An explosion
yielding 10 kilotons was carried out in that cavity on 29 March 1976. The seismic
magnitude of this explosion was reduced about 15-fold relative to normal
conditions. 122
Excavation, Earth-Moving, and Crater Formation

Five uncontained explosions were carried out in the Soviet Union to investigate the
possibility of using nuclear explosions for excavation purposes. The program of
peaceful nuclear explosions also included seven other explosions for the creation of
subsidence craters and for earth-moving purposes.
The first of the excavation explosions were conducted on the grounds of the Semi-
palatinsk range. The first explosion, on 15 January 1965 (which was the first Soviet
peaceful nuclear explosion ever) created a reservoir consisting of two bodies of
water. One was in the crater the blast created, and the other was the result of the
damming of the Shagan River. The second excavation operation on the Semi-
palatinsk range was conducted on 14 October 1965. The 1.1-kiloton explosion
formed a crater.
An experiment was conducted on the Semipalatinsk range in October-November
1968 to test technology for using nuclear explosions for canal excavation. The
experiment, called the Telkem project, was part of a program that investigated
the possibility of using nuclear explosions to form the Pechora-Kama canal.123 The
Telkem project included a low-yield explosion that was carried out on 21 October
478 Chapter 8
1968 (0.2 kilotons, detonated at 31.4 meters) followed by the detonation of three
similar devices, conducted on 12 November 1968. The explosions formed a canal
crater.
The explosion on the Taiga site in Perm oblast on 23 March 1971 represented
the final stage of the project that had begun in 1968 with the Telkem tests. The
main purpose of this explosion was the investigation of the possibility of using
nuclear explosions in the construction of the southern portion of the Pechora-Kama
canal. The Taiga explosion was produced by the detonation of three devices with a
yield of 15 kilotons each, which created a portion of the canal around 700 meters
long and around 340 meters wide. The depth of the crater was 10-15 meters. '24
This result showed that nuclear explosions would not be particularly effective in
the construction of the canal. The canal project plans were subsequently revised,
and the Taiga explosion was the last direct excavation blast in the Soviet Union.
After the uncontained excavation explosions in the Soviet Union were stopped,
the possibility of using contained explosions was studied. Experiments in this area
included the Kristall explosion on 2 October 1974 near Udachnyy in Yakutia. That
explosion, carried out at the request of the Ministry of Nonferrous Metallurgy, was
expected to create a waste disposal site for the Udachnyy Ore-Enriching Combine.
The 1.7-kiloton explosion at a depth of 100 meters created a dam that was sup-
posed to block the nearby river bed and form a lake for waste disposal. It is not
clear if the goal of the explosion was attained.
Soviet dam construction experiments involving nuclear explosions included the
Lazurit explosion of 7 December 1974 on the Semipalatinsk range. In that explo-
sion, a device with a yield of 1.7 kilotons was detonated under a slope at a depth
of around 70 meters. The earth moved by the blast formed a dam. The Lazurit
explosion was the last of the Soviet excavation experiments.
Experiments conducted by the Ministry of Medium Machine Building included
the Say-Utes series of explosions in Mangyshlak oblast in Kazakhstan in
1969-1970. The purpose of this series of three explosions was the mastery of the
technology for creating subsidence craters. Two of the explosions-those on 6
December 1969 and 23 December 1970-created craters on the surface that were
not connected with the underground cavity. A deeper explosion on 12 December
1970, however, did not create a surface crater.
Ore breakage explosions of the Dnepr series were carried out in the Novyy mine
in Apatity (Murmansk oblast) at the request of the Ministry of Mineral Fertilizer
Production in 1972 and 1984. The first explosion, on 4 September 1972, yielded
2.1 kilotons. The quantity of rock crushed by the explosion was increased by cre-
Nuclear Tests 479
ating a wide vertical airway in the rock for the shock wave of the nuclear blast. 12s
This special arrangement used in the explosion ejected the debris along the explo-
sion tunnel away from the ore. Special technology that had been tested on the Semi-
palatinsk range on 9 April 1971 prior to the first Dnepr explosion was used to
remove radioactive debris from the zone of the explosion. The second test of this
debris ejection technology was conducted on the Semipalatinsk range on 16 Decem-
ber 1974. 126 The second explosion of the Dnepr series, carried out in a similar
manner as the first, took place on 27 August 1984. This explosion was produced
by two devices with a yield of 1.7 kilotons each.
Undergr01Uld Storage Cavities

In addition to the Ministry of Medium Machine Building's experiments on the
Bolshoy Azgir site, industrial experiments in the underground storage cavities
were started in 1967 at the request of the Ministry of Gas Industry. There were 25
nuclear explosions in this program. Most of the cavities they created are still in
operation.
The first explosion of the series was carried out on 6 October 1967 on the Tavda
site in Tyumen oblast. The cavity it created apparently was never used. The first
storage cavity created by a nuclear explosion that was actually used was the one
created on 25 June 1970 at the Sovkhoznoye deposit in Orenburg oblast (Magis-
tral site). After 18 years of use, the site was closed down. Another two explosions
were carried out near Dedurovka in Orenburg oblast (Sapfir site). The cavities on
the Sapfir site are still operational.
The full-scale industrial use of nuclear explosions to create underground cavities
began in 1980 near the Astrakhan gas condensate deposit (Vega site). Between 1980
and 1984 there were 15 nuclear explosion on that site. In 1981-1984 the explo-
sions were conducted in series of two to six bursts each, with an interval between
the explosions of about five minutes. The explosions had yields between 3.2 and
13.5 kilotons at a depth of around 1,000 meters.
By 1986 seven underground cavities on the Vega site had been filled with gas
condensate. The rest were not filled and shrank considerably (up to 40 percent)
over time as a result of cave-ins. Six were closed because they lost too much of their
volume. 127
A series of nuclear explosions to form underground storage cavities were
conducted on the Karachaganakskoye oil field in Kazakhstan (Lira site) in 1983-
1984. Six explosions yielding 15 kilotons each were carried out in two series, one
on 10 August 1983 and the other on 21 July 1983. The interval between explosions
480 Chapter 8
in each series was five minutes. Each of the explosions had a yield of 15 kilotons,
and the explosive charges were laid at a depth of 840-960 meters. One of the
cavities was later filled with water (shaft 5T). The rest are being prepared for use.
Other Explosions
In five cases nuclear explosions were used in the Soviet Union to extinguish fires at
gas wells. They were the explosions of 30 September 1966 (Urta-Bulak, Uzbekistan),
21 May 1968 (Pamuk, Uzbekistan), 11 April 1972 (Krate~ Turkmenistan), 9 July
1972 (Fakel, Ukraine), and 25 May 1981 (Pirit, Arkhangelsk oblast). These explo-
sions had yields from 3.8 to 47 kilotons. The charges used to close each of these
wells in order to stop the fire within the well was laid in an inclined shaft 30-50
meters from the main well shaft. The explosive devices used for this purpose were
developed to withstand the high temperatures and pressure at the detonation points
and to fit into the shaft. 128 All explosions but one (Pirit) were successful in extin-
guishing the fire within the well where they were detonated.
Two explosions-Kama-1 and Kama-2, requested by the Ministry of Petroleum
Refining and the Petrochemical Industry and carried out on 8 July 1974 and 26
October 1973, respectively-were used to create cavities for the disposal of waste
from petrochemical production facilities in Bashkiria. The explosions yielded
10 kilotons each and the charges were laid at a depth of around 2,000 meters. The
cavities were subsequently used for their designated purpose.
An unusual explosion was carried out at the request of the Ministry of Coal
Industry on 16 September 1979 in the Yunkom mine near Yenakiyevo in Ukraine
(Klivazh site). The explosion, yielding 0.3 kilotons, was set off to prevent unex-
pected emissions of methane from the mine. 129
Summary List of Nuclear Explosions
Table 8.1 lists all Soviet nuclear explosions and certain properties and details of
each. According to official data, there were 715 nuclear tests and explosions for
peaceful purposes in the Soviet Union. During those tests, 969 nuclear explosive
devices were detonated. Eo
In accordance with the official data, each nuclear explosion is counted as a sep-
arate test in the case of airbursts, contact surface bursts, and underwater explosions.
Underground tests are categorized in a manner corresponding to the definitions in
the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions
Treaty. According to those treaties, any explosion carried out within the boundaries
Nuclear Tests 481
of a test range is counted as a test of a nuclear weapon. In this case each separate
test can be a single explosion or a series of explosions that occur within an area
limited by a circle with a diameter of two kilometers and within a time interval of
0.1 seconds. The only deviation from this rule on the official list is the test of 30
January 1973. The official publication lists all three explosions as one test "based
on the purpose of the test. " 131
All underground nuclear explosions conducted outside the boundaries of test
ranges are categorized as nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. Separate
explosions outside test ranges are categorized as a single event if the interval
between explosions does not exceed five seconds and if the distance between
any two explosions in the multiple detonation does not exceed 40
kilometers.
Explosions with a yield of less than a ton of TNT equivalent are not included in
the 715 tests. Explosions carried out for weapons safety studies and malfunction-
ing devices are exceptions to this rule. The information about some of the low-yield
bursts listed in the table was taken from data previously published. 132 These low-
yield bursts are listed in the table with the notation that they are not included in
the 715 tests on the official Soviet list, most likely because they fall into the cate-
gory of hydro nuclear experiments, which are not considered to be tests of nuclear
weapons under the terms of the test ban treaties.
The Information Presented in the Table

The Time and Place of Tests The date and time of the tests are listed in the table
in Moscow Decree Time. The time of the explosions was not announced officially,
but information from various sources can help determine the time of many of the
atmospheric tests and virtually all of the underground tests.133
The times of most of the Soviet underground nuclear explosions can be deduced
from seismic data. The most precise seismic data are available for the explosions
on the Balapan site of the Semipalatinsk range (in shafts)l34 and the explosions near
Bolshoy Azgir. 135 The time of most of the other explosions on the Semipalatinsk
range and outside of the ranges was taken from the summary list of Soviet nuclear
tests published previously.136 This does not apply to the underground tests on
Novaya Zemlya, however, because the exact official times of those tests, down to
the minute, have been published. 137 In two cases (two tests on 27 October 1966 and
two on 18 October 1975) the published times of two tests coincide, but the explo-
sions are assigned to different tests. This means that the difference in the time of
the explosions was more than 0.1 second. 138
482 Chapter 8
If a particular nuclear test was conducted on a test range, the name of the test
range is listed in the "Location" column, along with the specific test site on that
range, if that information is available. Most of the atmospheric tests were conducted
on one test field on the Semipalatinsk range and at the Mityushikha Bay site on
Novaya Zemlya. Nevertheless, some of the atmospheric tests on the ranges were
conducted outside those test fields. If the exact site of a test is unknown, only
the name of the test range is listed in the "Location" column. The sites of all under-
ground tests are known. If an underground explosion was recorded by seismic
stations, the coordinates (latitude North and longitude East) of the site are
included.
The coordinates of the airburst at the time of the troop exercises on the Totsk
range in Orenburg oblast were obtained from publications describing the exer-
cises.139 In the other 11 tests conducted outside of the test ranges, the nuclear weapon
involved in the test was delivered to the detonation site by a ballistic missile. In the
first of these tests (2 February 1956), the region of the explosion is known and is
listed as the location of the test in the table. In the other tests the explosions were
either high-altitude or space explosions. The "Location" column for those tests
indicates that the missile was launched from the Kapustin Yar range. The precise
coordinates of the detonation points in those tests have not been published.
Most of the underground tests on the Semipalatinsk range were conducted on
three sites: Degelen, Balapan, and Sary-Uzen. In addition, three industrial explo-
sions were carried out on the Telkem and Murzhik sites. 140 The most precise coor-
dinates are listed for the tests on the Balapan site. 141 Coordinates of tests conducted
on that site in 1987-1989 were obtained, with an accuracy of about 10 meters,
from an analysis of satellite imagery. The accuracy of the coordinates of tests on
other sites on the Semipalatinsk range is usually much lower.
Underground tests on Novaya Zemlya were conducted either on the northern site
near the Matochkin Shar Strait (close to the mouth of the Shumilikha River) or on
the southern site near Bashmachnaya Bay. The published results of seismic records
of the coordinates of underground bursts on Novaya Zemlya are rather inaccurate
and are therefore not cited.
The listed error in the coordinates in the table for industrial explosions, which
were obtained from seismic records and descriptions of the locations,142 might be as
high as several dozen kilometers. This does not apply, however, to the series of
explosions near Bolshoy Azgir. Those coordinates are based on an analysis of satel-
lite imagery and have a high degree of accuracy.143
Nuclear Tests 483
Method and Designation For atmospheric tests, the method of delivering the
explosive device to the detonation site is listed in the "Method" column whenever
possible. For underground tests, the method of laying the explosive charge is listed:
shaft (vertical) or tunnel (horizontal). The explosion of 1 September 1979 (Klivazh)
is listed as taking place in an existing coal mine. This explosion is classified on the
official list of Soviet explosions as a tunnel explosion. The explosions in Bolshoy
Azgir that were carried out in an existing cavity formed by an earlier nuclear explo-
sion are categorized on the official list as explosions in shafts.
For atmospheric tests, the names or numbers of the explosive devices tested are
listed in the "Designation" column. This information is readily available for the first
nuclear tests. For underground bursts, the names or numbers of the tunnels or shafts
are listed in the "Designation" column.
Purpose The classification of tests and explosions according to their purpose

strictly follows the categories of explosions and tests on the official list of Soviet
nuclear tests.144 The only exception is the classification of industrial explosions,
which is more detailed. All nuclear bursts are categorized according to the follow-
mg purposes:
• Weapons development: explosions carried out for the purpose of creating or
improving a nuclear weapon
• Weapons effects: explosions carried out for the purpose of studying the destruc-
tive effects of nuclear explosions on military and civilian objects
• Weapons safety: studies of the behavior of nuclear weapons during accidents and
studies of emergency procedures
• Fundamental research: fundamental research and technological experiments 145
• Troop exercises: only one explosion in this category, the one carried out during
the troop exercises on the Totsk range on 14 September 1954
• Development of industrial explosive devices: explosions carried out on test
ranges to develop nuclear explosive devices for industrial explosions
Explosions of all other types are categorized as industrial nuclear explosions on the
official list. The more detailed distinctions given in the table are based on publica-
tions describing the Soviet program of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. 146
Yield, Altitude, Effect The "Yield" column indicates the TNT equivalent of the
energy released by the explosion in kilotons or the range of energy yields. The figures
in this column correspond strictly to those on the official list. '47 The yield of the
484 Chapter 8
burst in some tests or the combined yield of a test can also be found in other sources
(seismic records, for example).148 In these cases the estimated yield is given in the
comments.
The "Altitude" column indicates the altitude or depth of the nuclear explosion
(in meters) in all of the cases for which this information is available. The "Effect"
column lists the conditions and radiological effects of the burst (altitude in meters
and yield q in kilotons of TNT equivalent) using the following abbreviations: '49
• S (contact surface burst): A test conducted on the surface of the earth at an
altitude not exceeding 35ql/3.
• A (airburst): A test conducted at an altitude exceeding 100qV3. This category'50
also includes the bursts of 26 October 1954 and 10 September 1956 at an altitude
of around 80qV3.
• HA (high-altitude burst): The only burst in this category was at an altitude of
80 kilometers.
• SP (space burst): The bursts in this category were at altitudes of 150 kilometers
or higher.
• WS (water surface burst): A burst on the surface of the water at an altitude not
exceeding 35qV3.
• UW (underwater burst): A burst below the surface of the water.
All other tests are underground bursts and are categorized according to their COll-
sequences: 151
• EXC (excavation explosion): An underground burst with surface effects, accom-
panied by the disturbance and movement of the soil at the epicenter and by radioac-
tive fallout. A crater forms on the surface.
• CCE (completely contained explosion): A completely contained underground
burst creating an underground cavity. No escaped gaseous products observed.
• PCE (partially contained explosion): A contained underground burst accompa-
nied by venting of trace amounts of short-lived radioactive inert gases into the
atmosphere.
• RA (radiation accident): A contained underground burst accompanied by early
and dynamic venting of radioactive vapor and hot gases into the atmosphere.
Table 8.1
Soviet nuclear explosions
Date Time Location Program Latitude Longitude

(DD.MM.YY) Method Designation Purpose Height (m) Yield (kt) Effect
29.08.49 03,00 Semipalatinsk

Tower RDS-l Weapons development 30 22 S
First Soviet nuclear explosive device.
Tower RDS-2 Weapons development 30 38.3 S
Airdrop RDS-3 Weapons development 400 42 A
First airburst. The weapon was later used during Totsk troop exercise.
12.08.53 Semipalatinsk
Tower RDS-6 Weapons development 30 400 S
First Soviet thermonuclear weapon.
Airdrop RDS-4 Weapons development 600 28 A
Weapons development 5.8 A
10.09.53 Semipalatinsk 2-:
Weapons development 4.9 A "
~
if
14.09.54 09,33 Totsk range, Orenburg oblast 52.6 52.84
,
:;-J
Airdrop Troop exercise 350 40 A
~
Explosion during troop exercise.
""-
00
Weapons development 0.2 A '-0
""
00
~

Q
{;
,:;;
Weapons development 0.03 A 00
Weapons development 2 A
Weapons development 0 4 S
Tower RDS-9 Weapons development 15 <0.001 S
First failure in Soviet weapons development program. Charge for the T-5 torpedo. '
RDS-3l Weapons development 62 A
RDS-3 device with improved neutron initiator. b
Weapons development 110 2.8 A
Airdrop Weapons development 55 10 S
Weapons development 2.5 1.3 S
Version of the RDS-9 device. b
Weapons development 2.5 12 S

Weapons development 2.5 1.2 S
21.09.55 Novaya Zemlya (Chernaya Bay)
Barge Weapons effects -35 3.5 UW
RDS-9 charge for the T-5 torpedo. c
<0.001 S
Event is not in the official list of 715 tests. d
Airdrop RDS-37 Weapons development 1,550 1,600 A
First two-stage thermonuclear weapon.
02.02.56 Outside Aralsk, Kazakhstan
Missile Weapons effects 0.3 S
Full-scale test of R-SM ballistic missile, lalUlched from Kapustin Yar test range.'
Weapons development 0.4 14 S
2-:
"
~
if
,
Weapons development 1 5.5 S :;-J
24.08.56 Semipalatinsk ~
Tower Weapons development 100 27 S
""-
00
"
Table 8.1 (continued) ""-
00
00
Q
{;
30.0S.56 Semipalatinsk
,:;;
Weapons development 900 A 00
Thermonuclear device. f
Weapons development 270 3S A
19.01.57 Kapustin Yar (missile lalUlch)
Missile Weapons effects 10 A
Height of explosion was more than 10 km.
OS.03.57 Semipalatinsk
Weapons development 6S0 A

Weapons safety 0.1 A
First weapons safety experiment. g
Tower F lUldamental research 15 32 S
Test also included study of weapons effects on ShipS.h
24.09.57 07,00 Novaya Zemlya (Mitushikha Bay)
Airdrop Weapons development 1,600 A
Thermonuclear device. f 2:
26.09.57 Semipalatinsk "
~
if
,
:;-J
06.10.57 07,00 Novaya Zemlya (Mitushikha Bay) ~
Weapons development 2,900 A
Thermonuclear device. f ""-
00
'0
a"""
'0

Q
{;
10.10.57 04,55 Novaya Zemlya (Chernaya Bay)
,:;;
Torpedo Weapons effects -35 10 UW 00
State certification tests of T-5 torpedo.'
23.02.58 Novaya Zemlya
<0.001 A
Event is not in official list of 715 tests)


F lUldamental research 40 A
<0.001 A
Event is not in official list of 715 tests)
F lUldamental research 0.16 A
30.09.58 05,50 Novaya Zemlya
2:
"
~
if
30.09.58 07,55 Novaya Zemlya ,
Weapons development 900 A :;-J
Thermonuclear device. f ~
Weapons development 290 A "''0"
~
"""
'0
N

Q
{;
,:;;
F lUldamental research 40 A 00
Weapons development <0.001 A
Device may have failed to reach nominal yield. k


F lUldamental research <0.1 A
2:
Missile 10 A
"
~
if
Weapons effects ,
01.09.61 Semipalatinsk :;-J
Weapons development 16 A ~
Weapons development 9 A "''0"
W
Table 8.1 (continued) ""-
'0
""-
Q
{;
,:;;
Test included study of weapons effects on radar.!
Weapons safety 0 0.38 S
Missile Weapons development 12 A
Test of R-12 missile, lalUlched from Novaya Zemlya.m
Missile Weapons development 1,150 A
Test of R-12 missile, lalUlched from Novaya Zemlya.m
Airburst over water.

Weapons development 0.001-20 A
Weapons development 0 0.4 S
Test of ballistic missile, lallllched from Kola Peninsula. n
Missile Weapons development 830 A
Test of ballistic missile, lallllched from Kola Peninsula. n
Weapons development 20-150 A
2:
~
if
Weapons safety 0 0.03 S ,
Weapons development 4.8 A ~
Weapons development 150-1,500 A "''0"
Co,
"""
'0
~

Q
{;
,:;;
Weapons development 1,500- A
10,000
Cruise Weapons development 15 A
missile
Test of the KSR-2 air-lalUlched antiship cruise missile. Q

11.10.61 Semipalatinsk (Degelen)

Tunnel A-l F lUldamental research 1 peE
First Soviet lUldergrOlUld explosion.
20.10.61 Novaya Zemlya (Mitushikha Bay) Raduga
Test of R-13 missileY
23.10.61 08,30 Novaya Zemlya (Chernaya Bay) Korall
Torpedo Weapons effects -20 4.8 UW
Test of nuclear torpedo. q
Weapons development 300 A 2-:
"
~
if
,
F lUldamental research 0.5 A :;-J
27.10.61 06,30 Novaya Zemlya (Chernaya Bay) Korall ~
Torpedo Weapons effects 0 16 WS
Test of nuclear torpedo. q -"-
'0
"


Missile Kl Weapons effects 300,000 1.2 SP
Study of weapons effects on work of System A prototype missile defense system.!
Missile K2 Weapons effects 180,000 1.2 SP
Highest-yield nuclear explosion. Nominal yield of device was 100Mt. Reduced-yield test.r
31.10.61 06,30 Novaya Zemlya (Mitushikba Bay)
31.10.61 06,38 Novaya Zemlya (Mitushikba Bay)
Weapons development 150-1,500 A
02.11.61 Novaya Zemlya (Mitushikha Bay)
02.11.61 Novaya Zemlya (Mitushikha Bay)
Weapons safety o <0.001 s

Weapons development 150-1,500 A
Weapons development 0 0.2 S
02.02.62 Semipalatinsk (Degelen) Argon-l 49.7 78.1
Tunnel A-l Weapons effects 0.001-20 CCE
Weapons development 3.8 A 2-:
05.08.62 07,10 Novaya Zemlya "
~
if
Airdrop Weapons development 21,100 A ,
Weapons development 0 9.9 S ~
""-
Weapons development 150-1,500 A '0
'0
Co,
Table 8.1 (continued) a
a
Q
{;
,:;;
Weapons development 20-150 A
22.08.62 Novaya Zemlya Sbkval
Cruise Weapons development 6 WS
missile
Test of KSR-2 air-lalUlched anti-ship cruise missile. q
10,000

<0.001 A
Event is not in official list of 715 tests.'
18.09.62 Semipalatinsk 2:
<20 A "
~
if
Event is not in official list of 715 tests.' ,
19.09.62 09,00 Novaya Zemlya :;-J
Weapons development 5,000- A ~
10,000
Co,
21.09.62 06,00 Novaya Zemlya a
~

Co,
N

Q
{;
,:;;
Weapons safety 0 0.21 S 00
Weapons development 0 7 S
50,000

Missile K3 Weapons effects 300,000 300 SP
Missile K4 Weapons effects 180,000 300 SP
2:
~
if
Weapons development 0 1.2 S ,
30.10.62 Novaya Zemlya :;-J
Weapons development 280 A ~
Co,
Weapons development 10 A a
w
Co,
""-
Q
{;
,:;;
Missile K5 Weapons effects 80,000 300 HA
Study of weapons effects on work of the System A prototype missile defense system.!
Tower Weapons effects 15 0.4 S
Tower Weapons development 8 0.1 S
Weapons development 0 <0.001 S

Weapons safety 0 <0.001 S
Weapons development 8.3 A 2:
23.12.62 Novaya Zemlya "
~
if
Weapons development 2.4 A ,
Weapons safety 0 <0.001 S ~
Co,
Weapons safety 0 0.007 S aCo,
Co,
~

Q
{;
,:;;
Weapons safety 0 0.G28 S 00
24.12.62 08AS Novaya Zemlya
Reduced-yield test. Nominal yield of device was 50 Mt.!
Last Soviet atmospheric explosion.
15.03.64 10,59,58 Semipalatinsk (Degelen) 49.8 78.06
Tunnel A-6 Weapons effects 20-150 CCE
Tunnel A-4 Weapons development 20-150 CCE
Tunnel A-2 F lUldamental research 0.001-20 PCE
Tunnel A-S F lUldamental research 20-150 PCE
SubtWlllel A-8sh Weapons development 0.001-20 RA
18.09.64 11,00 Novaya Zemlya (Northern site)
Tunnel G F lUldamental research 0.001-20 PCE

SubtWlllel A-6sh FlUldamental research 0.001-20 RA
Tunnel B Industrial devices development 0.001-20 PCE
Tunnel Z-5 Industrial devices development 20-150 CCE
15.01.65 08,59,59 Semipalatinsk (Balapan) Chagan 49.935 79.009
Shaft 1004 Excavation -175 140 EXC
First Soviet industrial explosion.
Tunnel A FlUldamental research 0.001-20 CCE
Tunnel Zh-3 Weapons development 0.001-20 PCE
Tunnel A-2p Weapons development 0.001-20 PCE
30.03.65 11,00 40 km east of Meleuz Butan 52.9 56.3
Shaft 617 Oil stimulation (MPl) -1,340 2.3 CCE
2-:
11.05.65 09,39,57 Semipalatinsk (Degelen) 49.79 78.12 "
~
if
Tunnel A-p Weapons development 0.001-20 PCE ,
10.06.65 10,00 40 km east of Meleuz Butan 52.9 56.3 :;-J
Shaft 622 Oil stimulation (MPl) -1,350 7.6 CCE ~
17.06.65 06A4,58 Semipalatinsk (Degelen) 49.82 78.06
'-0
Tunnel Zh-l Industrial devices development 0.001-20 CCE a
"
Co,
00
Q
{;
29.07.65 06,05,02 Semipalatinsk (Degelen)
,:;;
SubtWlllel A-lsh FlUldamental research 0.001-20 CCE 00
Tunnel 1 Weapons development 0.001-20 CCE
Tunnel Z-l Weapons development 0.001-20 CCE
14.10.65 07,00 Semipalatinsk (Sary-Uzen) Sary-Uzen 49.991 33.636
Shaft 1003 Excavation -48 1.1 EXC
Tunnel Zh-2 Weapons development 29 CCE
Tunnel Z-3 Industrial devices development 0.001-20 PCE
Tunnel E-l Industrial devices development 125 CCE
Highest-yield shaft explosion on Semipalatinsk range.
Tunnel 11 Weapons development 100 CCE
Tunnel A-4p Industrial devices development 0.001-20 CCE
22.04.66 05,58,00 Bolshoy Azgir Calit 47.884 47.889
Shaft A-I Cavity technology development -165 1.1 RA
Tunnel 25 Industrial devices development 4 CCE
Tunnel Z-6 Industrial devices development 20-150 CCE


Tunnel 24 Weapons development 20-150 PCE
Tunnel 17 Weapons development 0.001-20 PCE
Tunnel Z-lp Industrial devices development 0.001-20 CCE
Tunnel Zh-lp F lUldamental research 0.001-20 PCE
30.09.66 09,00 60 km south of Bukhara Urta-Bulak 39 64.5
Shaft ls Extinguishing of gas well fire -1,532 30 CCE
Tunnel 13 Weapons development 20-150 CCE
Tunnel A-l Weapons development 150-1,500 PCE
Tunnel A-2 Weapons development 150-1,500 PCE
Tunnel G Weapons development 0.001-20 PCE 2-:
19.11.66 Semipalatinsk (Degelen) "
~
if
Tunnel Zh-3p Weapons development 0.001-20 PCE ,
03.12.66 08,01,04 Semipalatinsk (Degelen) :;-J
Tunnel 14 Weapons development 0.001-20 CCE ~
Tunnel 14 Industrial devices development 0.001-20 CCE
'-0
First multiple explosion in one tWlllel. a
'0
Co,
Table 8.1 (continued) ~
a
Q
{;
18.12.66 07,57,57 Semipalatinsk (Sary-Uzen) 49.92 77.77
,:;;
Shaft 101 Industrial devices development 20-150 RA 00
30.01.67 07,01,58 Semipalatinsk (Degelen) 49.9 78
Tunnel 21 F lUldamental research 20-150 PCE
Tunnel 19 Weapons effects 0.001-20 PCE
Tunnel 25p Industrial devices development 20-150 CCE
Tunnel IIp Industrial devices development 0.001-20 RA
Tunnel IIp Industrial devices development 0.001-20 RA
Tunnel 13p Weapons development 0.001-20 PCE


Shaft 102 Weapons development 0.001-20 PCE
Shaft 105 Weapons development 10 CCE
06.10.67 10,00 160 km east of Turinsk, Tumen oblast Tavda 57.7 65.2
Shaft UndergrOlUld storage cavities -170 0.3 CCE
Tunnel B Industrial devices development 0.001-20 CCE
Tunnel B Industrial devices development 0.001-20 CCE
Shaft 106 Weapons development 0.001-20 CCE
Tunnel 507 Weapons development <20 PCE
2-:
07.01.68 06A6,58 Semipalatinsk (Degelen) 49.74 78.02 "
~
if
Tunnel 810 Industrial devices development 0.001-20 RA ,
24.04.68 13,35,57 Semipalatinsk (Degelen) 49.84 78.07 :;-J
Tunnel 505 Weapons development 0.001-20 PCE ~
21.05.68 07,00 70 km from Karsru, Uzbekistan Pamuk 38.9 65.1
'-0
Shaft Extingusrung of a gas well fire -2,440 47 CCE ~
~
Co,
N

Q
{;
,:;;
Tunnel 504 Weapons development <0.001 CCE 00
19.06.68 08,05,57.3 Semipalatinsk (Balapan) 49.98 78.986
Shaft 1053 F lUldamental research 0.001-20 CCE
Yield of explosion was about 18kt. u
01.07.68 07,01,59.9 Bolshoy Azgir Calit 47.909 47.914
Shaft A-II Cavity technology development -590 27 PCE
This cavity was later site of 6 more explosions.
Tunnel A-7 Weapons development 0.001-20 PCE
Tunnel A-7 Weapons safety <0.001 PCE
Tunnel 509 Weapons effects 0.001-20 CCE
29.09.68 06A1,57 Semipalatinsk (Degelen) Argon 49.81 78.18
Tunnel E-2 Weapons effects 60 CCE
21.10.68 06,52 Semipalatinsk (Telkem) Telkem-l 49.728 78.486
Shaft 2308 Canal technology development -31.4 0.24 EXC
Calibration explosion for 12.11.68 explosions.


Tunnel A-3 Weapons development <0.001 PCE
12.11.68 10,30 Semipalatinsk (Telkem) Telkem-2 49.712 78.461
Shaft 2305 Canal technology development -31.4 0.24 EXC
Shaft 2306 Canal technology development 0.24 EXC
Shaft 2307 Canal technology development 0.24 EXC
Linear crater created.
Tunnel Zh-2p Weapons development 20-150 CCE
Tunnel 24p Industrial devices development 0.001-20 PCE
2-:
"
~
if
,
Tunnel 709 Weapons development 0.001-20 CCE :;-J
31.05.69 08,01,57 Semipalatinsk (Sary-Uzen) 49.97 77.73 ~
'-0
~
W
Co,
""-
Q
{;
,:;;
Tunnel 710 Industrial devices development 0.001-20 PCE 00
02.09.69 08,00 20 km south of Osa, Perm oblast Grifon 57.5 54.7
08.09.69 08,00 20 km south of Osa, Perm oblast Grifon 57.3 56
26.09.69 10,00 Takhta-Kugulta, 90 km north of Stavropol 46 42.4
Shaft Gas stimulation -725 10 CCE
Tunnel A-7 Weapons development 150-1,500 CCE
Tunnel A-9 Weapons development 150-1,500 RA
Tunnel 506p Weapons safety 0.001-20 PCE
Tunnel 511 Industrial devices development 0.001-20 PCE


Shaft 1054 Weapons development 125 PCE
06.12.69 10,00 100-115km south-southwest of Say-Utes Say-Utes 43.8 54.8
Shaft 2T Creation of subsidence craters -410 30 CCE
Explosion created subsidence crater.
28.12.69 06A6,58 Semipalatinsk (Sary-Uzen) 49.95 77.75
Shaft 107 Weapons development 40 CCE
29.12.69 07,01,58 Semipalatinsk (Degelen) 49.79 78
Tunnel Sh-l Industrial devices development 0.001-20 PCE
Tunnel Sh-2 Weapons safety <0.001 CCE
Tunnel 610 Industrial devices development 0.001-20 PCE
2-:
Tunnel Sh-3 0.001-20 CCE
Weapons development
"
~
if
25.06.70 08,00 65 km northeast of Orenburg Magistral 52.2 55.7 ,
Shaft IT-2S UndergrOlUld storage cavities -700 2.3 CCE :;-J
28.06.70 04,57,58 Semipalatinsk (Degelen) 49.83 78.22 ~
'-0
~
'-0
Co,

Q
{;
,:;;
Tunnel 705 Industrial devices development 0.001-20 CCE 00
Shaft 125 Industrial devices development 0.001-20 PCE
Test of device for Taiga series of explosions.
12.12.70 10,00 100-115 km south-southwest of Say-Utes Say-Utes 43.9 54.8
Explosion did not create subsidence crater.

23.12.70 10,00 100-115km south-southwest of Say-Utes Say-Utes 43.8 54.8

Explosion created subsidence crater.
Tunnel 510p Industrial devices development 20-150 CCE
23.03.71 10,00 100 km north of Kransovishersk Taiga 61.4 56.2
Shaft lB Excavation -128 15 EXC
Shaft 2B Excavation -128 15 EXC
Shaft 3B Excavation -128 15 EXC
Row crater was created.
Tunnel 148/1 Industrial explosion 0.23 PCE
Technology tested during this explosion was later used in the Dnepr series of explosions.
2:
"
~
if
,
Tunnel 119 Weapons development 0.001-20 PCE :;-J
06.06.71 07,01,57 Semipalatinsk (Sary-Uzen) 49.99 77.72 ~
19.06.71 07,03,58 Semipalatinsk (Sary-Uzen) 49.99 77.71 Co,
~
Shaft 129 Weapons development 0.001-20 PCE "

Table 8.1 (continued) Co,
~
00
Q
{;
30.06.71 06,56,57.4 Semipalatinsk (Balapan) 49.946 7S.9S
,:;;
Shaft 1056 Weapons development 0.001-20 CCE 00
Yield of explosion was about 5 kt. u
02.07.71 20,00 25 km southwest of Vorkuta Globus 67.7 62
Shaft GB-4 Seismic sOllllrung -540 2.3 CCE
10.07.71 20,00 130 km southwest of Pechora Globus 64.2 54.S
19.09.71 14,00 40 km northeast of Globus 57.S 41.4
Kineshma
Shaft GB-l Seismic sOllllrung -600 2.3 RA
Tunnel A-S Weapons development 150-1,500 PCE
04.10.71 13,00 160 km northeast of Velikyi Ustyug Globus 61.6 47.2
09.10.71 09,01,57 Semipalatinsk (Sary-Uzen) 50 77.65
Shaft 111 Weapons development 12 RA
22.10.71 OS,OO 30 km south of Orenburg Sapfu 51.6 54.5
Shaft E-2 UndergrOlUld storage cavities -1,140 15 CCE


22.12.71 10,00,00.1 Bolshoy Azgir Galit 47.914 48.13
Shaft A-Ill Decoupling experiment -987 64 CCE
Cavity was later used for 29.03.76 explosion.
Shaft 1007 Weapons development 16 RA
2-:
Tunnel 191 0.001-20 CCE
Tunnel 191
Weapons development
0.001-20 CCE
"
~
if
Industrial devices development ,
Tunnel 191 Weapons safety <0.001 CCE :;-J
Total yield of test was 6kt. v ~
11.04.72 09,00 35 km southeast of Krater 37.4 62.1
Mary, Turkmerustan '-0
~
Shaft Extingusrung of a gas well fire -1,720 15 CCE '0

Co,
Table 8.1 (continued) N
a
Q
{;
,:;;
Tunnel 505p Weapons safety <0.001 CCE 00
Tunnel 157-M(Metro) Weapons effects 0.001-20 CCE
09.07.72 10,00 15 km north of Krasnodar, Ukraine Fakel 49.8 35.5
Shaft Extingusrung of a gas well fire -2,483 3.8 CCE
27.07.72 13,00 Novaya Zemlya (Southern site)
Shaft Yu-3 F lUldamental research 0.001-20 CCE
Tunnel 708 Weapons effects 8 PCE
20.08.72 06,00 250 km southwest of Uralsk Region 49.4 48.1
Shaft R-3 Seismic sOllllrung -490 6.6 CCE
Tunnel A-16 Weapons development 20-150 PCE

04.09.72 10,00 21 km northeast of Kirovsk, Murmansk oblast Dnepr 67.7 33.1

Tunnel Dnepr-l Ore breakage -130 2.1 CCE
21.09.72 11,00 70 km south-southwest of Buzuluk Region 52.2 51.9
Shaft R-l Seismic sOllllrung -490 2.3 CCE
03.10.72 11,00 80 km northeast of Elista Region 46.9 44.9
24.11.72 11,00 90 km south-southwest of Buzuluk Region 52.1 51.8
24.11.72 13,00 170 km south-southeast of Kustanay Region 51.9 64.2
Tunnel 3-2 Weapons development 0.001-20 CCE
Shaft 1204 Industrial devices development 140 RA
2-:
Tunnel 25pp 0.001-20 PCE
Weapons development
"
~
if
16.02.73 08,01,58 Semipalatinsk (Degelen) 49.82 78.16 ,
Tunnel 113 Weapons development 20-150 PCE :;-J
19.04.73 07,31,58 Semipalatinsk (Sary-Uzen) 50 77.65 ~
'-0
N
~
Co,
N

Q
{;
,:;;
Tunnel 806 Weapons development 0.001-20 CCE 00
Tunnel 806 Weapons safety <0.001 CCE
Shaft 1066 Industrial devices development 150- CCE
1,500
Yield of explosion was about 212kt.u
15.08.73 05,00 50km south-southwest of Turkestan Meridian 42.7 67.4
Shaft MN-3 Seismic sOllllrung -610 6.3 CCE
28.08.73 06,00 110 km east of Arkalyk Meridian 50.6 68.4
Shaft MN-l Seismic sOllllrung -400 6.3 CCE
Tunnel A-l Weapons development 1,500- PCE
10,000
Highest-yield Soviet lUldergrOlUld test.
19.09.73 06,00 230 km south-southeast of Dzheskazgan Meridian 45.7 67.8
Shaft MN-2 Seismic sOllllrung -400 6.3 CCE
20.09.73 Semipalatinsk (Balapan)
Shaft 1267 Weapons development <0.001 CCE
Shaft Yu-4 F lUldamental research 20-150 PCE

30.09.73 08,00 30 km south of Orenburg Sapfu 51.7 54.5

Shaft E-3 UndergrOlUld storage cavities -1,145 10 CCE
26.10.73 09,00 28 km west of Sterlitamak Kama 53.6 55.4
Shaft Kama-2 Waste disposal -2,030 10 CCE
Shaft Yu-l Weapons development 1,500- CCE
10,000
Highest-yield shaft explosion.
Shaft 1069 Weapons development 0.001-20 RA
14.12.73 10A6,57.2 Semipalatinsk (Balapan) 50.054 78.987
Shaft 1064 Weapons development 20-150 PCE
TWlllel 21p Weapons development 0.001-20 CCE
30.01. 74 07,56,58 Semipalatinsk (Degelen) 49.84 78.05
2:
TWlllel 603 Weapons effects 0.001-20 CCE
TWlllel 603 Weapons effects 0.001-20 CCE
"
~
if
,
Tunnel 603 Weapons effects 0.001-20 CCE :;-J
Event is listed as a single test despite the fact that the time difference between explosions ~
exceeded 0.1 sec.W
Co,
N
W
Co,
""-
Q
{;
,:;;
Tunnel 1l0p Weapons safety <0.001 CCE 00
Shaft 1207 Industrial devices development 20-150 PCE
The yield of the explosion was about 71 kt. u
Tunnel Z-lpp Weapons effects 0.001-20 CCE
08.07.74 09,00 22km west of Salavat Kama 53.7 55.1
Shaft Kama-l Waste disposal -2,130 10 CCE
14.08.74 18,00 190km northwest of Tazovski, rumen oblast Gorizont 68.9 75.8
Shaft G-2 Seismic sOllllrung -550 7.6 CCE
29.08.74 18,00 60 km west of Vorkuta Gorizont 67.2 62.1
Shaft G-l Seismic sOllllrung -590 7.6 CCE


Tunnel A-ll Weapons development 150-1,500 PCE
Tunnel A-ll Weapons development 20-150 PCE
Tunnel A-ll Weapons development 0.001-20 PCE
02.10.74 90 km northeast of Aikhal, Yakutia Kristall 66.7 112
Shaft Dam construction -100 1.7 PCE
16.10.74 09,31,57.6 Semipalatinsk (Balapan) Argon-3 49.985 78.896
Shaft 1005 Weapons effects 0.001-20 CCE
Shaft Yu-5N Weapons development 1,500- CCE
10,000
28.11.74 Semipalatinsk (Sary-Uzen)
07.12.74 08,59,58 Semipalatinsk (Murzhik) Lazurit 49.9 77.6
2-:
Shaft R-l Dam construction -75 1.7 PCE "
~
if
,
16.12.74 09,21,58 Semipalatinsk (Degelen) 49.79 78.13 :;-J
Tunnel 709p Weapons development 0.001-20 PCE ~
16.12.74 09AO,58 Semipalatinsk (Degelen) 49.87 78.09
Tunnel 148/5 Industrial explosion 3.8 CCE '-0
N
Technology tested during this explosion was later used in Dnepr series of explosions. '-0
Co,
~

Q
{;
,:;;
Shaft 1058 Weapons development 20-150 CCE 00
25.04.75 08,00,02 Bolshoy Azgir 47.909 47.914
Existing A-II Transplutonium elements -600 0.35 CCE
cavity
Explosion in cavity created 01.07.68.
Shaft 1205 Weapons development 20-150 CCE
Shaft A Weapons development 0.001-20 PCE


12.08.75 120 km southwest of Tiksi Gorizont 70.8 127.5
Shaft G-4 Seismic sOllllrung -500 7.6 CCE
Tunnel A-l0 Weapons effects 150-1,500 PCE
Tunnel A-l0 Weapons effects 0.001-20 PCE
Tunnel A-l0 Weapons effects 150-1,500 PCE
Tunnel A-l0 Weapons effects 0.001-20 PCE
Tunnel A-l0 Weapons development 20-150 PCE
Tunnel A-l0 Weapons development 150-1,500 PCE
Tunnel A-l0 Weapons development 150-1,500 PCE
Tunnel A-l0 Weapons development 20-150 PCE
For first time one test included 8 detonations.
29.09.75 14,00 80 km east of Norilsk Gorizont 69.6 90.5 2-:
Shaft G-3 Seismic sOllllrung -830 7.6 CCE "
~
if
05.10.75 07,27A4 Semipalatinsk (Degelen)
,
Tunnel 192 Weapons development 0.001-20 PCE :;-J
~
Shaft Yu-6N Weapons development 150-1,500 PCE '-0
N
Shaft Yu-6N Weapons development 150-1,500 PCE
"
Co,
00
Q
{;
,:;;
Shaft Yu-7 Weapons development 150-1,500 CCE 00
Tunnel 608p Weapons development 0.001-20 RA
29.03.76 Bolshoy Azgir 47.914 48.13
Existing A-Ill Decoupling experiment -990 10 CCE
cavity
Tunnel 609p Weapons development 0.001-20 CCE


29.07.76 08,00,01.4 Bolshoy Azgir Galit 47.871 48.139
Shaft A-IV Cavity technology development -1,000 58 CCE
04.08.76 05,56,58 Semipalatinsk (Balapan)
2-:
Shaft 133 0.001-20 PCE
Weapons development
"
~
if
28.08.76 05,56,57.5 Semipalatinsk (Balapan) 49.979 78.928 ,
Shaft 1202 Weapons development 20-150 CCE :;-J
Yield of explosion was about 53kt. u ~
Tunnel A-14 Weapons development 20-150 PCE '-0
N
'0
Co,
Table 8.1 (continued) w
a
Q
{;
,:;;
Tunnel A-15 Weapons development 0.001-20 CCE 00
Tunnel A-15 Weapons development 0.001-20 CCE
Tunnel A-15 F lUldamental research 0.001-20 CCE
Tunnel A-15 Weapons safety <0.001 CCE
05.11.76 07,00 120 km southwest of Mirnyi Oka 61.5 112.7
Shaft 42 Oil stimulation (Ministry of -1,525 15 CCE
Geology)
Shaft 1207-bis Weapons development 20-150 CCE
Total yield of test was about S4kt.u


26.07.77 20,00 80 km east of Norilsk Meteorit 69.5 90.5
Shaft M-2 Seismic sOllllrung -880 15 CCE
2-:
11.08.77 01,00 60 km southeast of Khilok, Cruta oblast 51 110.8
"
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Meteorit ,
Shaft M-5 Seismic sOllllrung -500 8.5 CCE :;-J
17.08.77 07,26,58 Semipalatinsk (Degelen) 49.83 78.17 ~
21.08.77 01,00 35 km southwest of T ura, Krasnoyarsk kray Meteorit 64.1 99.6 '-0
w
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Shaft M-3 Seismic sOllllrung -600 8.5 CCE
Co,
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Tunnel A-17 Weapons development 0.001-20 CCE 00
Shaft 1079 F lUldamental research 0.001-20 PCE
Total yield of test was about 78kt. u
10.09.77 19,00 120km northeast of Ust-Kut Meteorit 57.3 106.2
Shaft M-4 Seismic sOllllrung -540 7.6 CCE
Shaft A-V Cavity technology development -1,500 10 CCE
Tunnel A-7p Weapons development 0.001-20 PCE
Test involved experiments on missile radiation hardness. x
14.10.77 Bolshoy Azgir 47.909 47.914
cavity
Tunnel 136 F lUldamental research 0.001-20 CCE


30.10.77 Bolshoy Azgir 47.909 47.914
cavity
21.11. 77 Semipalatinsk (Degelen)
Shaft Glubokaya Weapons development 20-150 PCE
Shaft Glubokaya Weapons development 0.001-20 PCE
Tunnel 123p Weapons development 0.001-20 CCE 2-:
Tunnel 122p Weapons development <0.001 CCE "
~
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,
0.001-20
:;-J
Tunnel 122p Weapons development CCE
~
Shaft 2691 Weapons development 0.001-20 CCE '-0
w
W
w
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Tunnel 185p Weapons safety <0.001 CCE
Tunnel 133p Weapons effects 0.001-20 CCE
Tunnel 185-pp Weapons safety <0.001 CCE
Yield of explosion was about S7kt. u
Tunnel 104 Weapons development 20-150 PCE

09.08.78 21,00 90 km west of Sangar, Yakutia Kraton 63.7 125.3

Shaft KR-4 Seismic sOllllrung -560 22 CCE
(Northern site)
Tunnel A-18 F lUldamental research 0.001-20 PCE
24.08.78 21,00 120 km east-north east of Aikhal, Yakutia Kraton 65.9 112.6
Shaft KR-3 Seismic sOllllrung -525 22 RA
Yield of explosion was about 119 kt. u 2-:
12.09.78 Bolshoy Azgir 47.909 47.914 "
~
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Existing A-II Transplutonium elements -600 0.08 CCE ,
cavity :;-J
Explosion in cavity created 01.07.68. ~
'-0
Shaft 1211 Weapons development 20-150 PCE w
'-0
Co,
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Tunnel 605p Weapons effects 0.001-20 PCE 00
21.09.78 18,00 95 km southwest of Igarka Kraton 66.5 86.3
Shaft KR-2 Seismic sOllllrung -800 15 CCE
08.10.78 03,00 120 km southwest of Mirnyi Vyatka 61.5 112.9
Shaft 43 Oil stimulation (MG) -1,545 15 CCE
Tunnel 200asm Weapons effects 0.001-20 CCE
Study of radiation hardness of sea-based missiles. x
Shaft A-VII Cavity technology development -1,000 20-150 CCE
Shaft A-VII Cavity technology development 0.001-20 CCE
Total yield of test was 73kt. u
17.10.78 17,00 350 km south of Salekhard Kraton 63.2 63.3
Shaft KR-l Seismic sOllllrung -600 22 CCE


Total yield of test was about 44kt.u
30.11.78 Bolshoy Azgir 47.909 47.914
cavity
Shaft A-IX Cavity technology development -900 103 CCE
20.12.78 07,31,58 Semipalatinsk (Degelen) 49.86 78.09 2-:
Tunnel 803p Weapons development 0.001-20 PCE "
~
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:;-J
10.01.79 11,00,00 Bolshoy Azgir 47.909 47.914 ~
cavity '-0
Explosion in cavity created 01.07.68. w
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17.01. 79 10,59,59.1 Bolshoy Azgir Calit 47.919 48.122
,:;;
Shaft A-Vlll Cavity technology development -1,000 0.001-20 RA 00
Shaft A-Vlll Cavity technology development 20-150 RA
Total yield of test was 65kt. w
Tunnel 115pp Weapons safety <0.001 CCE
Tunnel 115-ppp Weapons safety <0.001 CCE


Shaft A-Xl Cavity technology development -900 0.001-20 CCE
Shaft A-Xl Cavity technology development 0.001-20 CCE
Shaft A-Xl Cavity technology development 0.001-20 CCE
Total yield of test was 21kt.w
Tunnel 195p F lUldamental research 0.001-20 PCE
Shaft 1085 Weapons development 20-150 PCE 2-:
Total yield of test was about 153 ku "
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21,00
,
12.08.79 130 km southwest of Verkhnevilyusk Kimberlit 61.9 122.2
:;-J
Shaft KM-4 Seismic sOllllrung -980 8.5 CCE
~
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'0
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Total yield of test was about 179 kt.Y
06.09.79 21,00 35 km southwest of T ura, Krasnoyarsk kray Kimberlit 64.1 99.6
Shaft KM-3 Seismic sOllllrung -600 8.5 CCE
16.09.79 YLmkom mine, 5 km east of Yenakievo Klivazh 48.2 38.3
Coal mine Prevention of methane emissions -900 0.3 CCE
Tunnel 175p Weapons effects 0.001-20 CCE
04.10.79 19,00 150 km southeast of Khany-Mansiisk Kimberlit 60.7 71.4
Shaft KM-l Seismic sOllllrung -840 22 CCE
08.10.79 00,00 120 km southwest of Mirnyi Sheksna 71.4 113.1


Shaft A-X Cavity technology development -980 0.001-20 CCE
Shaft A-X Cavity technology development 20-150 CCE
Shaft 1309 FlUldamental research 20-150 PCE
Total yield of test was about 93kt. u 2-:
21.12.79 07A1,58 Semipalatinsk (Degelen) 49.8 78.17 "
~
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Shaft Glubokaya-l Weapons development 20-150 CCE
Shaft Glubokaya-l Weapons development 0.001-20 CCE '-0
Total yield of test was about 137kt.u -"-
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Tunnel 603p Weapons safety <0.001 PCE 00
Total yield of test was about 19 kt. u
16.06.80 40 km east of Meleuz Butan 52.9 56.3
Shaft 1 Oil stimulation -1,400 3.2 CCE
(Ministry of Petroleum
Industry (MPI))
25.06.80 40 km east of Meleuz Butan 52.9 56.3
Shaft 3 Oil stimulation (MPI) -1,390 3.2 CCE


25.09.80 09,21,11 Semipalatinsk (Degelen) Dynamika 49.84 78.12
Tunnel K-l Weapons effects 0.001-20 CCE
Study of radiation hardness of military equipment.
08.10.80 09,00 35 km north of Astrakhan Vega 46.748 48.288
Shaft 1T UndergrOlUld storage cavities -1,025 8.5 CCE
2-:
Tunnel A-25 Weapons development 20-150 CCE "
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A-25 0.001-20
,
Tunnel Weapons development CCE
:;-J
~
Tunnel A-30 Weapons development 0.001-20 PCE '-0
Tunnel A-30 Weapons development 0.001-20 PCE -"-
w
Co,
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01.11.80 16,00 430 km northwest of Ust-Ilimsk Batoht 60.8 97.6
Shaft BT-l Seismic sOllllrung -720 8 CCE
Tunnel 204-pp Weapons development 0.001-20 RA
Tunnel ll1p Weapons development 0.001-20 PCE
10.12.80 10,00 200 km northwest of Khanty- Mansiysk Angara 61.7 66.8
Shaft Oil stimulation (MG) -2,485 15 CCE
Tunnel Z-2p Weapons development 0.001-20 PCE


Total yield of the test was about 100kt. u
25.05.81 08,00 65 km northeast of Naryan Mar Pirit 68.2 53.5
Shaft Extingusrung of a gas well fire -1,511 37.6 CCE
27.05.81 06,58,12.3 Semipalatinsk (Balapan) 49.992 78.979 2-:
Shaft 1203 Weapons development 0.001-20 PCE "
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Tunnel 603-ppp Weapons safety <0.001 CCE
'-0
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02.09.81 07,00 170 km northeast of Bereznyaki Gelyi 60.6 55.7
Shaft 4T/2 UndergrOlUld storage cavities -1,050 8.5 CCE
Shaft 2T/2 UndergrOlUld storage cavities -1,050 8.5 CCE


22.10.81 17,00 140 km west of Tura, Krasnoyarsk kray Shpat 63.8 97.5
Shaft ShP-2 Seismic sOllllrung -580 8.5 CCE
27.12.81 06A3,14.1 Semipalatinsk (Balapan) 49.93 78.792 2-:
Shaft 1312 Weapons development 20-150 CCE "
~
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:;-J
~
Tunnel 150 Weapons development 0.001-20 CCE '-0
-"-
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Tunnel 136-3p <0.001 CCE 00
Event is not in the official list of 715 tests.
Shaft 1219 F lUldamental research 20-150 CCE
31.07.82 00,00 80 km northeast of Ust-Ordynski Rift 53.8 104.1
Shaft RF-3 Seismic sOllllrung -860 8.5 CCE
Total yield of test was about Skt.u

04.09.82 21,00 190 km west of Dudinka Rift 69.2 81.6

Shaft RF-l Seismic sOllllrung -960 16 CCE
25.09.82 21,00 25 km southeast of Noginsk, Krasnoyarsk kray Rift 64.3 91.8
Shaft RF-4 Seismic sOllllrung -550 8.5 CCE
10.10.82 08,00 120 km southwest of Mirnyi Neva 61.5 112.9
2-:
16.10.82 09,10 35 km north of Astrakhan 46.754 48.27
Shaft 5T UndergrOlUld storage cavities
Vega
-990 8.5 CCE
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16.10.82 09,15 35 km north of Astrakhan Vega 46.743 48.213 :;-J
Shaft 3T UndergrOlUld storage cavities -975 13.5 CCE ~
'-0
-"-
'0
Co,
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Tunnel 150-2p <0.001 CCE
Event is not in official list of 715 tests.!
30.05.83 06,33A5 Semipalatinsk (Degelen) 49.74 78.19


Tunnel 150-3p <0.001 PCE
12.06.83 05,36A3.5 Semipalatinsk (Balapan) 49.92 78.914
20.07.83 07,00 140 km east of Uralsk Lira 51.363 53.306
Shaft 1T UndergrOlUld storage cavities -920 15 CCE
2:
Tunnel A-40 Industrial devices development 0.001-20 PCE "
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0.001-20
,
Tunnel A-40 Weapons safety PCE
:;-J
11.09.83 09,33,11 Semipalatinsk (Degelen) Dynamika 49.89 78.21 ~
Tunnel K-2 Weapons effects 0.001-20 PCE
Study of radiation hardness of military eqiupment. '-0
'-0
~
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Shaft 8RT UndergrOlUld storage cavities -1,050 8.5 CCE 00
Shaft 9RT UndergrOlUld storage cavities -1,050 8.5 CCE
Shaft llRT UndergrOlUld storage cavities -1,100 8.5 CCE
Shaft 13RT UndergrOlUld storage cavities -920 8.5 CCE
Tunnel A-21 Weapons effects 0.001-20 PCE


Tunnel 129 FlUldamental research 0.001-20 CCE
Yield of explosion was about 42kt.u 2:
29.03.84 08,19,08.2 Semipalatinsk (Balapan) 49.922 78.949 "
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20-150
,
Shaft 1335 Weapons development CCE
:;-J
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Tunnel 190 Weapons development 20-150 CCE Co,
Co,
Tunnel 190 Weapons development 0.001-20 CCE w
Co,
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Total yield of test was about 157ku
Tunnel 129p <0.001 PCE
11.08.84 21,00 80 km southwest of Pechora Kvarts 65.1 55.3
Shaft K-2 Seismic sOllllrung -760 8.5 CCE
25.08.84 21,00 100 km northwest of Surgut Kvarts 61.9 72.1
Shaft K-3 Seismic sOllllrung -725 8.5 CCE

26.08.84 06,30 Novaya Zemlya (Northern site) Dynamika

Tunnel A-l00 Weapons effects 0.001-20 CCE
Study of radiation hardness of military eqiupment. x
27.08.84 09,00 21 km northeast of Kirovsk, Murmansk oblast Dnepr 66.8 33.7
Tunnel Dnepr-2 Ore breakage -160 1.7 CCE
Shaft Dnepr-2 Ore breakage -160 1.7 CCE
18.09.84 00,00 50 km southwest of Mariinsk Kvarts 55.8 87.4
Shaft K-4 Seismic sOllllrung -560 10 CCE
Tunnel 200m-bis Weapons effects 0.001-20 PCE
2-:
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Tunnel A-26 Weapons development 0.001-20 RA :;-J
Tunnel A-26 Weapons development 0.001-20 RA ~
Tunnel A-26 Weapons development 0.001-20 RA
Tunnel A-26 Weapons development 20-150 RA '-0
'-0
'-0
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Tunnel 129-2p <0.001 PCE 00
Tunnel 803-bis Weapons development 0.001-20 PCE
Shaft 1411 F lUldamental research 0.001-20 PCE
Shaft 1353 Industrial devices development 0.001-20 PCE


Shaft 1061-bis Weapons development 0.001-20 PCE
18.06.85 110 km southwest of Surgut Benzol 60.5 72.2
Shaft Oil stimulation (MPl) -2,860 2.5 CCE
Shaft 1354 Weapons development 20-150 PCE 2-:
Total yield of test was about 86kt. u "
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Tunnel 175-pp Weapons development 0.001-20 PCE :;-J
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Tunnel 901 Weapons development 0.001-20 CCE '-0
'-0
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19.07.85 00,15 150 km west of Mizen Agat 66 40.8
,:;;
Shaft Seismic sOllllrung -770 8.5 CCE 00
Tunnel 152 Weapons safety 0.001-20 PCE
Tunnel 152 Weapons safety 0.001-20 PCE
Tunnel 130 F lUldamental research 0.001-20 PCE
Total yield of test was about 11 kt. aa
Yield of explosion was about 140 kt. aa


Tunnel 175-3p <0.001 CCE
Tunnel 164 F lUldamental research 0.001-20 PCE
2-:
Total yield of test was about 107kt."a "
~
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,
07.07.87 03,00 120 km southwest of Mirnyi Neva 62.1 112.8 :;-J
Shaft 68 Oil stimulation (MG) -1,515 15 CCE ~
Tunnel 168 F lUldamental research 20-150 CCE '-0
'-0
'0
Co,
a
Q
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00
Tunnel A-37A Weapons development 0.001-20 RA
Tunnel A-37A Weapons development 0.001-20 RA
Tunnel A-37A Weapons development 20-150 RA
Tunnel A-37A F lUldamental research 0.001-20 RA
Tunnel A-37A Weapons safety 0.001-20 RA
Total yield of test was about 72kt."a
Shaft 101 Oil stimulation (MG) -834 3.2 CCE
Tunnel 132p Weapons effects 0.001-20 PCE
Tunnel 132p Weapons safety 0.001-20 PCE
03.10.87 04,50 320 km south-southwest of Aktubinsk Batoht 47.6 56.2
Shaft BT-2 Seismic sOllllrung -1,000 8.5 CCE
Tunnel K-85 Weapons effects 0.001-20 PCE


Total yield of test was about 103kt.a a
Tunnel 164p F lUldamental research 0.001-20 PCE
13.02.88 06,05,05.8 Semipalatinsk (Balapan) 49.932 78.868 2:
Shaft 1361 Weapons development 20-150 PCE "
~
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Shaft 1361 Weapons development 0.001-20 PCE ,
Total yield of test was about 125 kt.a a :;-J
~
03.04.88 04,33,05,8 Semipalatinsk (Balapan) 49.907 78.906
Shaft 1336 Weapons development 20-150 PCE Co,
Yield of explosion was about 135 kt. aa ~
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Tunnel 704 Weapons effects 0.001-20 CCE 00
Shaft 1359 F lUldamental research 20-150 PCE
Yield of explosion was about 132kt.a a
Tunnel A-24 Weapons effects 20-150 PCE
Yield of explosion was about 4 kt. aa
22.08.88 38km northeast of Novyi Urengoi Rubin 66.6 77
Shaft RN-2 Seismic sOllllrung -830 15 CCE
06.09.88 160 km northeast of Velikiy Ustug Rubin 61.7 48.3
Shaft RN-l Seismic sOllllrung -800 8.5 CCE
Last industrial explosion.
Yield of explosion was about 150 kt."a Joint verification experiment.


Yield of explosion was about 1Skt. aa
Tunnel 169/1 Weapons development 0.001-20 CCE
Tunnel 169/1 F lUldamental research 0.001-20 CCE
Tunnel 169/1 Weapons safety <0.001 CCE
Tunnel A-27 Weapons effects 0.001-20 CCE
Tunnel 901p Weapons development 0.001-20 PCE 2-:
Tunnel 901p Weapons development 0.001-20 PCE "
~
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22.01.89 06,57,06.7 Semipalatinsk (Balapan) 49.941 78.787 ,
Shaft 1328 Weapons development 0.001-20 PCE :;-J
Shaft 1328 Weapons development 20-150 PCE ~
Total yield of test was about 118kt."a
'-0
~
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Co,
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Shaft 1366 Weapons development 20-150 PCE 00
Yield of explosion was about 63kt."a
Yield of explosion was about 22kt."a
Tunnel 169/2 Weapons effects 0.001-20 PCE

Tunnel A-13N Weapons development -600 20-150 CCE

Tunnel A-13N Weapons development -600 0.001-20 CCE
Tunnel A-13N Weapons development -600 <0.001 CCE
Tunnel A-13N Weapons development -600 <0.001 CCE
Tunnel A-13N Weapons safety -600 <0.001 CCE
Last Soviet nuclear test. Total yield of test was about 70kt.bb
Yeo A. Shitikov, "V interesakh flota" (In the Interest of the Fleet), in Yadernyi Arkhipelag (Nuclear Archipelago) (IzdAT, 1995),
p.60.
bYe. A. Negin, G. D. Kulichkov et al., Sovetskii atomnyi proekt (Soviet Atomic Project) (Nizhni Novgorod, 1995), p. 187.
C Shitikov, "In the Interest of the Fleet," p. 61.
d Yu. V. Dubasov, V. P. Dumik et al., "Khronologiya yadernykh ispytanii, provedennykh SSSR v atmosfere, kosmicheskom pros-
transtve i pod vodoy, 1949-1962 gg." (Chronology of the nuclear tests conducted by the Soviet Union in the atmosphere, in space,
and lUlder water, 1949-1962), TSNIIatominform Bulletin, no. 2, 1994, p. 37.
, Yeo B. Volkov, ed., MER SSSR (RF) i SShA (ICBMs of the USSR (Russian Federation) and the United States) (RVSN, 1996), p.
310.
f Soviet Thermonuclear Weapons Development. Report, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C., November 1964.
g V. N. Mikhailov, ed., Yadernye ispytaniya SSSR (Soviet Nuclear Tests) (IzdAT, 1997), p. 25.
h Shitikov, "In the Interest of the Fleet," p. 59.

1 Shitikov, "In the Interest of the Fleet," p. 68.
J Dubasov, Dumik et al., "Chronology of the nuclear tests conducted by the Soviet Union in the atmosphere, in space, and lUlder
water, 1949-1962," p. 38.
Notes to Table 8.1 (continued)
k This test was not included in the first published list of Soviet nuclear tests (Dubasov, Dumik et al., "Chronology of the nuclear
tests conducted by the Soviet Union in the atmosphere, in space, and lUlder water, 1949-1962") but was included in the official
list (I. A. Andryushin et al., Ispytania yadernogo oruzhiya i yadernye varyvy v mirnikh tselyakh SSSR, 1949-1990 gg. (Nuclear
Weapons Tests and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions of the Soviet Union, 1949-1990) (RFYaTs-VNIIEF, 1996)). Since the official list
includes information about all failures, the test of 19 October 1958 was most likely in this category.
1 G. V. Kisllilko, Sekretnaya zona: Ispoved' glavnogo konstruktora (Secret Zone: Recollections of the Chief Designer) (Sovre-
mennik, 1966), pp. 429-430.
illG. G. Kudryavtsev, "Ob'ekt-700" (Installation 700)," in Yadernyi Arkhipelag (Nuclear Archipelago) (IzdAT, 1995), p. 136.
Kudryavtsev, "Installation 700," pp. 136-137.
Kudryavtsev, "Installation 700," p. 139.
p Shitikov, "In the Interest of the Fleet," pp. 70-71.
q Shitikov, "In the Interest of the Fleet," p. 73.
r Mikhailov, Soviet Nuclear Tests, p. 19.
, Dubasov, Dumik et al., "Chronology of the nuclear tests conducted by the Soviet Union in the atmosphere, in space, and lUlder
water, 1949-1962," p. 40.
t Mikhailov, Soviet Nuclear Tests, p. 20.
U F. Ringdal, P. D. Marshall, and R. W. Alewine, "Seismic yield determination of Soviet lUldergrolUld nuclear explosions at the
Shagan River test site," Geophysics]. Int. 109 (1992).
v v. V. Gorin et al., "Semipalatinskii poligon: Khronologia podsemnyky yadernykh vzryvov i ikh pervichnye radiatsionnye effekty,
1961-1989" (Semipalatinsk test range: Chronology of lUldergrolUld nuclear explosions and their primary radiation effects,
1961-1989), TsNIIatominform Bulletin, no. 9 (1993), p. 26.
W Andryushin et al., Nuclear Weapons Tests and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions of the Soviet Union, 1949-1990.
x V. I. Fillipovski, "S Ladogi na Novuyu Zemlyu" (From Ladoga to Novaya Zemlya), in Yadernyi Arkhipelag (Nuclear Archi-
pelago) (IzdAT, 1995), p. 19l.

Y Ringdal et al., "Seismic yield determination of Soviet lUldergrolUld nuclear explosions at the Shagan River test site." According
to the official data presented in Andryushin et al., Nuclear Weapons Tests and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions of the Soviet Union,
1949-1990, the yield of this test did not exceed 150kt.
Z Gorin et al., "Semipalatinsk test range: Chronology of lUldergrolUld nuclear explosions and their primary radiation effects,
1961-1989," p. 30.
aa C. H. Thurber, H. R. Quin, and P. G. Richards, "Accurate locations of nuclear explosions in Balapan, Kazakhstan, 1987 to
1989," Geophysical Research Letters, 20, no. 5 (March 1993), pp. 309-402.
bb Mikhailov, Soviet Nuclear Tests, p. 133.
Afterword
Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces in Transition
The Russian edition of this book appeared in November 1998, and the bulk of the
research that went into it had been completed long before that. Since then the
Russian strategic forces have undergone a series of important transformations that
need to be reflected in the book if it is to provide an accurate account of the current
situation.
With a few notable exceptions, the changes, however profound, are mostly the
result of a natural evolution of the nuclear complex. A number of old missiles or
systems were withdrawn from service, and some new weapons were introduced.
Since this book is intended to be used as a reference, these changes have been intro-
duced into the text of the book whenever it was possible. The authors hope that
this has resulted in a book that correctly describes the current state of the Russian
nuclear complex and strategic arsenal.
Some of the developments in the Russian nuclear complex, however, require a
separate description, either because they affect more than just one system or because
they give a better view of the future of the Russian nuclear complex if they are
brought together. These developments are described in this afterword, which
attempts to present an overview of the most important events of the last three years
and discuss their impact on the future of the Russian nuclear complex.
The most important change that has occurred since 1997 is the structural reform
of the Russian armed forces, which is described in the first section of this afterword.
The reform has been quite radical in the sense that it has already resulted in the
elimination of one of the armed forces services, and it will probably bring more
changes in the next few years. At the same time, the impact that the reform has had
on the existing military structures that are included in the strategic forces has not
been that serious. As a result, almost all information about the structure of the
strategic forces presented in this book remains accurate.
568 Afterword
The second section of the afterword is devoted to the main arms control devel-
opments of the last three years, two of which are most important: ratification of
the START II Treaty and strengthening of Russia's opposition to the U.S. missile
defense plans. The outcome of the missile defense debate and progress at U.S.-
Russian negotiations on reduction of nuclear forces will playa very important role
in determining the future of the Russian strategic forces.
Among other factors that will shape the future of the Russian nuclear arsenal is
the capability of the Russian leadership to complete the restructuring and down-
sizing of its nuclear complex. The measures that have been taken so far and the
general overview of the effect of these efforts are described in the afterword's third
section.
Structural Reform
In 1997, after several years of deliberations and internal debates, the Russian lead-
ership began the structural reform of the armed forces. In July 1997 the Russian
president signed a decree that authorized the beginning of the transformation. ' The
underlying idea of the reform was to move away from the traditional five-service
structure of the Soviet forces, which included the Strategic Rocket Forces, the Navy,
the Ground Forces, the Air Forces, and the Air Defense Forces. By the time the
transformation began, there seemed to be general agreement in the military that the
armed forces should consists of only three services: the Air Forces, Navy, and
Ground Forces-one for each sphere of operations. The specifics of the transition,
however, were to be determined and remain highly contested even at the present
time.
The main provisions of the July 1997 presidential decree ordered dissolution of
the Air Defense Forces, which were to be split between the Strategic Rocket Forces
and the Air Forces.' The Missile and Space Defense Forces, which had control over
the early-warning, missile defense, and space surveillance systems, were transferred
to the jurisdiction of the Strategic Rocket Forces. In addition, the Military Space
Forces, which had been a separate branch of the armed forces since 1982, were sub-
ordinated to the Strategic Rocket Forces. The Air Forces and the remainder of the
Air Defense Forces, which included radio-technical and surface-to-air missile troops
and air defense fighter aviation, were merged to form the new Air Forces.
The intention of the reform was to reduce the number of personnel, streamline
development and acquisition procedures, and get rid of parallel structures that
existed in the old system. By this logic, it was natural that the Strategic Rocket
Afterword 569
Forces, which had significant expertise in procuring and maintaining missiles, would
take over other missile-related branches, the Military Space Forces in particular.
As far as Missile and Space Defense Forces are concerned, the rationale behind
merging them with the Strategic Rocket Forces was that the latter is the only strate-
gic service that could make full use of the information provided by the early-warning
system to launch its missiles promptly. It was believed that closer integration of the
early-warning system and the Strategic Rocket Forces' command and control would
facilitate a more stable and reliable force posture. Since all components of the Space
Defense Forces are closely linked to one another, missile defense and space surveil-
lance systems were transferred to the Strategic Rocket Forces as well.
The merger of the Strategic Rocket Forces with the Military Space Forces and the
Missile and Space Defense Forces was largely completed by November 1997 and
was accompanied by a 30 percent cut in personnel. Nevertheless, it was announced
that the new service is more effective than its predecessors combined. 3 As it turned
out, however, while the merger did allow some streamlining of development and
acquisition, the Strategic Rocket Forces have not been very successful in managing
space-related missions, previously assigned to the Military Space Forces, or in main-
taining the complex information-management structure that forms the core of the
early-warning and space surveillance systems. As a result, three years later, in August
2000, the Military Space Forces and Missile and Space Defense Forces were slated
to be removed from the Strategic Rocket Forces' jurisdiction to form separate
branches of the armed forces.
The transformation of the Air Forces seems to have been more successful. As the
result of this merger of the Air Forces and the Air Defense Forces units, the number
of personnel was cut by about 45 percent and the number of regiments by a third. 4
All of the strategic aviation units in the two services were combined into an air army
of the Supreme High Command. s The transition to the new structure of the Air
Forces was completed by the fall of 1998. 6
In summer of 1998, while the first steps toward restructuring of the armed forces
were in progress, the Russian president signed a document that outlined a broader
concept of military reform up to the year 2005/ The concept was set to continue
the restructuring initiated a year earlier and called for cutting the number of Russian
military personnel to 1.2 million by the end of 1998. In the next stage, which was
to begin in 2000 and end in 2005, the armed forces were to undertake a transition
from a four-service to a three-service structure. 8
The three services envisioned by the outline of the military reform were to cor-
respond to three spheres of operations: ground, air and outer space, and sea. A
570 Afterword
structure like this would have problems accommodating the Strategic Rocket Forces,
which has traditionally been one the most powerful services in the Soviet and
Russian military. This consideration was one of the factors that led the Ministry of
Defense to come up with a plan of creating a Joint High Command of Strategic
Deterrence Forces. The proposed structure was supposed to bring all strategic
nuclear forces-that is, ICBMs, strategic missile submarines, and long-range avia-
tion, under operational control of the Joint High Command, which would be
directly accountable to the Supreme High Command. 9
Under the plan, proposed by the Minister of Defense, the transition to the three-
service structure was to be completed in 1999. The Joint High Command and its
strategic nuclear forces would form a structure separate from all other services. The
Strategic Rocket Forces would form a core of the new command. In its most extreme
version the plan called for subordinating the 12th Main Directorate of the Ministry
of Defense, as well as conventional units that support operations of nuclear forces,
to the new command. 10
The idea of such a Joint High Command was met with very strong opposition
from the General Staff, which has traditionally carried out most, if not all, of the
functions of the proposed Joint Command. An intense discussion ensued, in which
the General Staff was supported by other services. As a result of this discussion, the
proposal to form a Joint High Command was withdrawn by the fall of 1999.
In 2000, when the transfer to the three-service structure of the armed forces was
supposed to begin, the General Staff unveiled a proposal that called for a strong
shift of priorities away from strategic nuclear forces to conventional forces. Among
other measures, the proposal envisioned deep cuts in the number of deployed nuclear
warheads and missiles. Since the cuts would have led to the Strategic Rocket Forces'
losing many of its regiments and much of its manpower, it was to be demoted to a
branch of armed forces and subordinated to the Air Forces.
The new proposal was no less controversial than the idea of the Joint High
Command. It was considered among other proposals at a special session of the Secu-
rity Council on 11 August 2000, which was supposed to finalize the military reform
plans for the next decade. The result of that session was to refrain from any radical
measures that would affect the Strategic Rocket Forces. Instead, the most impor-
tant outcome of the meeting was the announcement of further cuts of military per-
sonnel: The armed forces that report to the Ministry of Defense are to be cut by
375,000 by 2005,11 It was also announced that the transition to a three-service
armed forces would proceed as planned and be completed by 2005. During this
transition the Military Space Forces and the Missile and Space Defense Forces will
Afterword 571
be removed from the Strategic Rocket Forces' jurisdiction, although no further infor-
mation was given in the August 2000 announcement as to the fate of those two
organizations.
The problems created by the proposed military reform were again considered at
another session of the Security Council in November 2000. This session largely
upheld the previously made decisions about restructuring and personnel cuts. It was
announced that the Military Space Forces and Missile and Space Defense Forces
would be transformed into a single separate branch that reports directly to the
General Staff. The Strategic Rocket Forces will lose the status of a military service
and in 2002 will also be transformed into a branch of the armed services." The
plan for the transition to a three-service structure became more concrete in the
November 2000 Security Council announcement, so the restructuring should be
completed by the 2005 deadline envisioned when the idea was first discussed. The
Security Council instructed the General Staff to prepare the documents for the
corresponding government and presidential decisions, which are expected in March
2001. 13
For the moment it seems that the debate about the structure of the Russian armed
forces is largely over. Despite the profound changes, most services and branches
(with the notable exception of the Air Defense Forces) emerged from this debate
weakened but intact. This means that although Russia is moving toward a more
compact and modern military, the politics of decision making within the military
will remain essentially unchanged.
The Arms Control Agenda
The main question that was on the political agenda in 1998 was the ratification of
the START II Treaty by the Russian Duma. Although in 1997 Russia and the United
States signed a number of agreements that were supposed to facilitate the START
II Treaty's coming into force, closing the deal proved very difficult. As a result, by
the beginning of 2001 the START II Treaty had been ratified, but serious doubts
remained as to whether the treaty would ever enter into force. The future of the
next arms control agreement, START III, also remained uncertain.
During the summit in Helsinki in March 1997 the presidents of Russia and the
United States agreed to extend the START II implementation time by five years,
so the reductions required under the treaty will now have to be completed by 31
December 2007. The protocol to the treaty that contains these provisions was signed
in September 1997 in New York. In addition to this protocol, Russia and the United
572 Afterword
States signed a number of documents that were intended to clarify certain provi-
sions of the ABM Treaty.14
The protocol to START II was intended to remove the most serious obstacles on
the way to ratification of the START II Treaty by the Russian Duma. The extended
implementation period would give Russia more time to complete the reductions and
to allow it to withdraw its strategic weapon systems gradually as they reach end of
their operational lives. The protocol does not, however, address some of the issues
raised by the opponents of the treaty in Russia, namely, the problem of u.S. break-
out potential. 15 Instead, the United States and Russia reached an understanding that
these problems will be addressed in the START III Treaty, with the expectation
that the new treaty would enter into force before the START II reductions are
implemented.
In April 1998 the protocol to the START II Treaty was sent to the Duma for rat-
ification. The package of documents sent to the Duma also included the ABM Treaty
documents-a memorandum of understanding and agreed statements known as the
demarcation agreement. The Duma postponed ratification of the treaty, since the
president did not include in the draft legislation any specific provisions for future
arms reduction negotiations. Eventually the Duma drafted its own legislation that
specified these provisions explicitly. This process was completed in December 1998,
and the Russian president introduced the respective bill in the Duma on 22 March
1999.16 The Duma was originally expected to vote on the ratification of the START
II Treaty in early April 1999, but that vote was canceled when the United States
and its NATO allies began a military campaign against republics of the former
Yugoslavia.
The START II ratification bill was returned to the Duma floor in 2000, after the
parliamentary elections of December 1999, which dramatically changed the com-
position of the Duma in favor of parties that support the government, and after
presidential elections, which were held in March 2000. The new president expressed
his unequivocal support for the START II Treaty, and the Duma voted for its rati-
fication on 14 April 2000. The upper house of the Russian parliament promptly
approved the Duma's decision, and on 4 May 2000 the Russian president completed
the ratification process by signing the law passed by the parliament. 17
The Russian law that ratified the START II Treaty includes several important
conditions that have to be met before the treaty can enter into force. First and
foremost, the United States must ratify the START II protocol that extends its
implementation time, which was negotiated after the u.s. Senate gave its advice and
consent to the ratification of the original version of the treaty.1S
Afterword 573
Another condition set by the law is much more serious. It says that exchange of
START II ratification documents can begin only after the United States completes
ratification of the ABM Treaty documents signed in September 1997.19 Since it is
highly unlikely that the ABM Treaty documents in question will be approved by the
U.S. Senate, this condition effectively prevents the START II Treaty from entering
into force.
The link between the ABM Treaty documents and START II, established by the
Duma in the ratification law, reflects sharp disagreement between the United States
and Russia on the future of another important arms control agreement, the ABM
Treaty. The documents in question, known as the demarcation agreement, were the
result of very difficult negotiations in which the United States and Russia sought to
define a set of criteria that would allow those in charge of evaluating compliance
to distinguish between strategic missile defenses, which are limited by the ABM
Treaty, and nonstrategic systems, which would not be constrained by its provisions.
The demarcation agreement talks began as an attempt to clarify some provisions
of the ABM Treaty in order to allow development of nonstrategic missile defenses.
The negotiations showed, however, that separating strategic and nonstrategic
defenses is a very difficult technical problem that most likely does not have a satis-
factory solution. A more important outcome of the discussion was the growing
concern in Russia about the u.s. missile defense plans.
As Russia's opposition to the u.s. missile defense plans grew stronger, conclusion
of the demarcation agreement was perceived in Russia as the primary means of pre-
serving of the ABM Treaty. So when the Duma was drafting the START II ratifica-
tion law, approval of the demarcation documents was included in it as an attempt
to show Russia's disagreement with the u.s. position on missile defense and to deter
the United States from breaking out of the ABM Treaty.
By the time Russia ratified the START II Treaty, howeve~ the missile defense
debate had shifted away from the question of constraints on development of non-
strategic systems. In January 1999 the United States made a formal proposal to
Russia to modify the ABM Treaty to allow deployment of a strategic National
Missile Defense system. In May 1999 the U.S. Congress passed a bill that declared
deployment of a missile defense the policy of the United States. An attempt under-
taken before the U.S.-Russian summit in Moscow in June 2000 to find a compro-
mise that would allow the United States to begin deployment of a National Missile
Defense by modifying the ABM Treaty was unsuccessful.
Russia responded to the U.S. attempts to change the ABM Treaty by intensifying
its efforts aimed at preserving it. First, Russia on several occasions reiterated the
574 Afterword
Soviet position of linking START I to the ABM Treaty.20 Moreover, Russia insisted
that in the event of a u.S. breakout from the ABM Treaty, Russia might consider
withdrawal from other arms control agreements, including the treaties that ban
intermediate-range missiles and limit conventional forces in Europe. 21
The immediate pressure on the ABM Treaty was relieved when the United States
announced in September 2000 that the final decision on deployment of a National
Missile Defense system (and therefore withdrawal from the ABM Treaty) has been
postponed. The new Republican administration, however, is set to continue the
missile defense programs, and it is unlikely that Russia's opposition to those plans
will prevent the United States from withdrawing from the ABM Treaty.
Despite its sharp disagreement with the United States about the future of the ABM
Treaty, Russia does not seem to be willing to begin a confrontation with the United
States or to reverse the nuclear disarmament process. As an important sign of its
adherence to the arms control process, Russia ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty, which banned all nuclear weapon tests.22 In November 2000 Russia's pres-
ident unveiled a plan that calls for deep reductions in nuclear arsenals that reduce
them to the required level of 1,500 or fewer nuclear warheads on each side."
Most of the reductions suggested by Russia are motivated by economic consid-
erations, so it is in Russia's interest to preserve the existing arms control agreements
and continue the bilateral U.S.-Russian dialogue. A U.S. withdrawal from the ABM
Treaty could seriously set back the nuclear disarmament negotiations, but is unlikely
to stop the dialogue completely.
Strategic Modernization
Beginning in 1998, the Russian leadership made a number of important decisions

that to a large extent ended the uncertainty that plagued the Russian nuclear
complex and its strategic forces in the preceding years and outlined the main direc-
tions in their development for the next ten to fifteen years. These decisions were
prompted partly by the fact that in 1997 Russia successfully negotiated a protocol
to the START II Treaty that extended its implementation period. The extension
allowed Russia to make its weapons modernization program more realistic. In addi-
tion to this, the Russian leadership believed that by negotiating the aforementioned
demarcation agreement, it had secured U.S. adherence to the ABM Treaty, which
allowed Russia to plan for reductions of its strategic forces.
The future of the Russian strategic forces was the subject of a Security Council
meeting of 3 July 1998. The modernization program that the council approved
Afterword 575
included a number of steps that confirmed Russia's intention to comply with the
provisions of the START II Treaty. Another important feature of the approved
program was the decision to continue maintaining all three main components of the
strategic triad: land-based missiles, strategic submarines, and strategic aviation.24
It was decided by the Security Council that the Russian land-based missile forces
would rely on the new Topol-M (55-27) systems, which will be deployed in
both silo-based and road-mobile variants. The new Topol-M missile systems will
eventually replace all currently deployed missiles as the latter reach the end of their
operational lives or are eliminated as part of the START I reductions.
The modernization program the council approved acknowledged that Russia
could not keep its MIRVed missiles indefinitely and therefore will have to comply
with the START II provision that bans them. At the same time, the program appar-
ently made provisions to extend operational lives of R-36M2 (55-18 Mod 5/6)
missiles to keep them in service until 2008. This arrangement was made possible by
the extension of the time by which these missiles have to be eliminated, negotiated
in 1997 as a protocol to the START II Treaty. Although the protocol requires the
missiles to be deactivated, it allows them to be kept in silos, so they could be brought
back into operation if necessary. This was considered a very important hedge against
future developments, such as U.S. breakout from the ABM Treaty. Besides, the issue
of heavy missiles' having to be eliminated before they reach the end of their oper-
ationallives was a very sensitive one in the public debate in Russia over the START
II Treaty, so the option of keeping them in service was instrumental in gaining
support for START II ratification in the Duma.
The program outlined by the council apparently called for gradual withdrawal of
all other land-based missiles from service.25 The core of the land-based missile force
will instead consist of the new Topol-M (55-27) missile system in both its ground-
mobile and its silo-based versions. By the time of the Security Council deliberations
on the program, two silo-based Topol-M systems had already been deployed.26 The
modernization program adopted by the Council called for deployment of 350-400
of these systems by 2010." The plan also called for an increase in the annual
production rate of the Topol-M systems from 10 in 1999 to 50 by 2005. 28
In its proposed plan, the Security Council made a number of very important
decisions on the future of the strategic nuclear fleet. The first one was to cancel
the development of the missile that was supposed to be deployed on Project 941
(Typhoon) submarines and on the new submarines of the Yuri Dolgorukii class.29
The program for the development of this missile was several years behind schedule,
and all test launches of the new missile to that point had been unsuccessful. By
576 Afterword
canceling this program, the Security Council in effect made a decision to withdraw
Project 941 submarines from active service. 30 Construction of the lead ship of the
Yuri Dolgorukii class also was to be postponed, since it was designed to accom-
modate the missile the development of which was cancelled.
The canceled missile was to be replaced, according to the plan, by a new one
known as the "Bulava." In a highly unusual decision, the development of this missile
was assigned to the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology, heretofore the head
developer of land-based missile systems. 31 One of the arguments used in favor of
this arrangement was that the new missile will be made compatible with the Topol-
M (SS-27) missile and therefore will be cheaper to develop and manufacture."
According to the final plan, the first Yuri Dolgorukii-class submarine that would
carry the new missile would enter service in 2007. 33
The decisions the Security Council made in July 1998 meant that the core of the
Russian strategic fleet in the next 10 to 15 years will consist of six or seven Project
667BDRM (Delta IV) submarines that carry R-29RM (SS-N-23) missiles. These
submarines could stay in service until 2010-2015 as long as they are properly
maintained and equipped with newly manufactured missiles. Therefore, to keep the
Project 667BDRM submarines operational, the Russian government resumed pro-
duction of the R-29RM missiles, which had been discontinued in the mid-1990s. 34
The air-based component of the strategic triad received a significant boost from
the Security Council's decision to proceed with development of a new long-range
air-launched cruise missile that will replace the currently deployed Kh-55 (AS-15).
The plan discussed by the Security Council called for a strategic air force consist-
ing of six Tu-160 Blackjack and 30-40 Tu-95MS Bear H bombers." These projec-
tions underwent significant change, however, in 1999. First, Russia was able to find
resources to complete assembly of one Tu-160 aircraft that was mothballed at the
time the production of strategic bombers was suspended. This aircraft completed
tests in December 1999 and entered service in 2000. 36 Second, in July 1999 Russia
and Ukraine began negotiations that resulted in an agreement under which Ukraine
transferred to Russia eight Tu-160 Blackjack and three Tu-95MS Bear H bombers"
as well as several hundred Kh-22 (AS-4) short-range cruise missiles. 3s As a result of
these transfers, the Russian strategic aviation grew considerably stronger than had
been projected in July 1998.
The decisions the Security Council made in July 1998 determined the structure
of the Russian strategic forces for the next 10 to 15 years. If we take into account
the changes in production and deployment rates that have become evident since the
Security Council's program was adopted, then by 2010 Russia may have a strate-
Afterword 577
gic force that will consist of up to 300 single-warhead silo-based and mobile Topol-
M (55-27) missile systems; seven Project 667BDRM (Delta IV) submarines, which
will carry 448 nuclear warheads; and a strategic air force that will consist of 15
Tu-160 Blackjack and about 30 Tu-95MS Bear H bombers, which together could
carry up to 360 long-range air-launched cruise missiles. The total number of nuclear
warheads that Russia will be able to deploy will therefore not exceed 1,100.
This estimate shows why Russia has publicly advocated reductions in the number
of deployed nuclear weapons to 1,500 on each side and probably less than that.
If the next nuclear arms reduction treaty establishes a higher number, Russia will
probably be unable to maintain the level allowed by the treaty.
The program of maintaining Russia's strategic capability, which was considered
in the summer of 1998, was not limited to the problems of strategic offensive forces.
Among the items considered were measures aimed at maintaining and modernizing
the country's command and control system, the early-warning network, and the
space surveillance system. 39
Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia has been putting considerable effort
into keeping its early-warning network operational. Although the country's difficult
economic situation has prevented it from maintaining the kind of capability that
existed in the Soviet Union, Russia has nevertheless managed to prevent complete
disintegration of its early-warning network. Still, the number of satellites that Russia
was able to keep in orbit by 1998 provided only very minimal coverage of U.S. ter-
ritory. Most of the early-warning radars (which also provide space surveillance capa-
bility) were operating at a fraction of their capacity. Although in 1997 the Russian
government in a special agreement with Ukraine secured operations of the two
radars in the Ukrainian territory, the loss of the early-warning radar in Skrunda,
Latvia, which ceased operations in August 1998, opened a gap in Russia's radar
coverage.
Despite all these problems, Russia has continued to replenish the constellation of
early-warning satellites on highly elliptical orbits that provide surveillance coverage
of U.S. territory. So long as it maintains four satellites in these highly elliptical orbits,
the constellation can detect any launch of a U.S. land-based missile. In addition to
this, Russia has been working on second-generation geostationary early-warning
satellites that would provide coverage of the oceans and therefore could detect
missile launches from submarines. In 1998 the Missile and Space Defense Forces
opened a Far East satellite control center that is to be used to control geostation-
ary satellites that provide coverage of the Pacific Ocean. 40 Although Russia has not
had operational geostationary early-warning satellites since June 1999 and the
578 Afterword
control center has operated only in a trial mode thus far, its opening was a very
significant development.
To compensate for the gap in the radar coverage created after the radar in Skrunda
stopped operations, Russia intensified efforts to bring online the Volga rada~
deployed in Belarus. This radar entered trials in December 1999 and by November
2000 was ready to enter combat service.41
In addition to its early-warning missions, the Russian radar network is used to
track satellites in space.42 To provide better coverage of outer space, Russia has
deployed two Krona surveillance systems43 and brought into trial service the Okno
optical surveillance system. 44
It is still far from certain whether Russia will be able to find the resources nec-
essary to maintain its extensive early-warning and space surveillance networks. So
far there has been almost no public debate in Russia as to what kind of capability
is required to support operations of the country's strategic offensive and defensive
forces. In recent years the Russian leadership has undertaken significant efforts to
keep all options in this area open, but it will eventually have to scale back and opti-
mize its early-warning network to keep it from disintegrating.
Russia was confronted with a similar choice when it considered the future of
another important component of the nuclear complex: the industry that provides
development, production, and maintenance of nuclear weapons, which is managed
by the Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom). The nuclear weapons production
complex was built to provide support for the Soviet nuclear arsenal, which con-
sisted of tens of thousands of nuclear warheads. This capability is excessive for
maintaining the current or projected nuclear arsenal, so there was no reason why
Russia should maintain it. To maintain the capability to produce nuclear weapons
and provide the nuclear arsenal with adequate maintenance, Russia had to down-
size its nuclear complex.
Restructuring of the nuclear complex proved to be a difficult task, however, and
only in June 1998 did the Russian government finally adopt a program that out-
lined the plan for the needed reform. 45 As part of this program, Minatom has closed
serial weapon production lines at two of its four warhead production facilities:
Arzamas-16 and Penza-19. By 2003 these facilities will also stop their work on
nuclear warhead dismantlement. The program also called for significant reductions
in the number of personnel that work on serial production facilities for warheads. 46
Although the nuclear weapons production complex will still have excessive capa-
bility after implementation of the measures outlined in the 1998 program and other
Afterword 579
documents, the measures will be a major step toward providing a foundation for
more efficient operation of the complex.
The nuclear test ban that Russia agreed to observe when it signed and ratified the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty imposes serious constraints on modernization and
maintenance of nuclear weapons. To compensate for its inability to conduct nuclear
explosions under the treaty, Russia is carrying out a program of so-called hydro-
dynamic experiments at the Novaya Zemlya test site. In addition to this, the Novaya
Zemlya test site is maintained in readiness to resume underground nuclear explo-
sions should Russia decide to do so.
Conclusion
The measures that Russia has taken during the last several years to restructure its
strategic forces and nuclear warhead production complex indicate that in about a
decade it will reduce its nuclear forces to the level of approximately 1,000 strate-
gic warheads. It is very unlikely that any upcoming arms control agreement could
affect the current plans significantly, for Russia is planning to implement these
reductions in any event. Besides, it seems very unlikely that the United States and
Russia will reach any new arms control agreement any time soon.
If anything could force Russia to reconsider its plans, it would be the United
States' deployment of a national missile defense system. Should the United States
decide to proceed with deployment of such a system, which will require its with-
drawal from the ABM Treaty, Russia may respond with a number of measures that
could keep the number of weapons in its arsenal at a level higher than that cur-
rently projected. Among the options that Russia has in this regard are deployment
of the Topol-M (55-27) system with a multiple-warhead missile (rather than the cur-
rently planned single-warhead missile)47 or development of a new multiple-warhead
missile to replace the aging R-36M2s (SS-18s). Neither of these options, howeve~
would be likely to raise the number of weapons in Russia's arsenal above the limit
of 3,500 warheads set forth by the START II Treaty.
Although Russian opposition to the U.S. missile defense plans is currently very
strong and the conflict over the plans shows no sign of getting any less tense, any
decisions that Russia could make in response to a U.S. missile defense deployment
would be limited by the same economic constraints that exist now. It is therefore
in Russia's interest to avoid confrontation with the United States and concentrate
on protecting its long-term capability to maintain a viable nuclear arsenal. All this
580 Afterword
means that despite serious disagreement with the United States on a number of arms
control and broader political issues, Russia will try to reach a compromise on those
issues, which might be possible if the United States is willing to cooperate.
Ultimately, Russia's success in downsizing and reforming its nuclear complex and
strategic forces will depend primarily on its ability to find the resources necessary
for a full-scale military reform and to manage these resources effectively. The signs
of economic recovery that have appeared in Russia in the last two years present
the country with a rare opportunity to transform its military. The new Russian
leadership seems to understand that the ultimate goal of the reform should be the
creation of a professional, well-trained, well-equipped army.48 The next several years
will show whether it is ready to take advantage of this opportunity.
Appendix
Designations of Soviet and Russian
Strategic Systems
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles

5ALT,INF,
U.5. DoD NATO 5TART
Designation Code Designation Designation Treaties Comments
R-1 8A11 55-1 SCWlller

R-2 8Zh38 55-2 5ibling
R-llM 8Kll 55-1B 5cud A
R-5M 8K51 55-3 Shyster
R-7 8K71 55-6 Sapwood
R-7A 8K74 55-6 Sapwood
R-12 8K63 55-4 Sandal R-12
R-12U 8K63U 55-4 Sandal R-12
R-14 8K65 55-5 Skean R-14
R-14U 8K65U 55-5 Skean R-14
R-16 8K64 55-7 Saddler
R-16U 8K64U 55-7 Saddler
R-9 8K75 55-8
R-9A 8K75 55-8
R-26 8K66 Sasin
UR-200 8K81 55-X-10
GR-1 8K713 Scrag
RT-1 8K95
UR-100 8K84 55-11 Mod 1 Sego
UR-100M 8K84M 55-11 Mod 1 Sego
UR-lOOK 15A20 55-11 Mod 2 Sego R5-10
UR-100U 15A20U 55-11 Mod 3 Sego R5-10
582 Appendix
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (continued)

5ALT,INF,
U.5. DoD NATO 5TART
Designation Code Designation Designation Treaties Comments
R-36 8K67 55-9 Mod 1 Scarp Light RV

R-36 8K67 55-9 Mod 2 Scarp Heavy RV
R-36 8K69 55-9 Mod 3 Scarp
R-36 8K67P 55-9 Mod 4 Scarp 3MRVs
RT-2 8K98 55-13 Mod 1 Savage R5-12
RT-2P 8K98P 55-13 Mod 2 Savage R5-12
RT-15 8K96 55-X-14 Scamp
RT-20 8K99 55-X-15 Scrooge
RT-25 8K97
Temp-25 15Zh42 55-X-16 Sinner R5-14
Pioneer 15Zh45 55-20 Saber R5D-10
Pioneer- UITH 15Zh53 55-20 Saber R5D-10
UR-lOON 15A30 55-19 Mod 1 Stiletto R5-18 6 MIRVs
UR-lOON 15A30 55-19 Mod 2 Stiletto R5-18 Single warhead
UR-100NUTTH 15A35 55-19 Mod 3 Stiletto R5-18
MR UR-100 15A15 55-17 Mod 1 5panker R5-16 4 MIRVs
MR UR-100 15A15 55-17 Mod 2 5panker R5-16 Single warhead
MR UR-100UTTH 15A16 55-17 Mod 3 Spanker R5-16
R-36M 15A14 55-18 Mod 1 Satan R5-20A Single warhead
P-36M 15A14 55-18 Mod 2 Satan R5-20A 8 MIRVs
R-36M 15A14 55-18 Mod 3 Satan R5-20A Single warhead
R-36MUTTH 15A18 55-18 Mod 4 Satan R5-20B
R-36M2 Voyevoda 15A18M 55-18 Mod 5 Satan R5-20V
R-36M2 Voyevoda 15A18M 55-18 Mod 6 Satan R5-20V
RT-23 15Zh52 55-24 Mod 1 5calpel R5-22
RT-23UTTH 15Zh60 55-24 Mod 2 5calpel R5-22
Molodets
RT-23UTTH 15Zh61 55-24 Mod 1 5calpel R5-22
Molodets
RT-2PM Topol 15Zh58 55-25 Sickle R5-12M
RT-2PM2 Topol-M 55-27 R5-12M2
Appendix 583
Ballistic-Missile Submarines
Project u.s. DoD designation START Treaty Designation
V-611 Zulu IV 'I,

AV-611 Zulu V
629 Golf I
629A Golf II
601 Golf III
605 Golf IV
619 Golf V
65S Hotel I
65SM Hotel II
701 Hotel III
667A Yankee I
667AU Yankee I Navaga
667AM Yankee II Navaga-M
667B Delta I Murena
667BD Delta II Murena-M
667BDR Delta III Kalmar
667BDRM Delta IV Delfin
941 Typhoon Taifun
Sea-Launched Ballistic Missiles
SALT,
Missile U.S. DoD NATO START
Designation Code system Desigantion Designation Treaties Comments
R-11FM SKll or D-1

SA61FM
R-13 4K50 D-2 SS-N-4 Sark
R-15 D-3
R-21 4K55 D-4 SS-N-5 Sark
R-27 4K10 D-5 SS-N-6 Mod 1 Serb RSM-25
R-27U D-5U SS-N-6 Mod 2 Serb RSM-25 Single
warhead
R-27U D-5U SS-N-6 Mod 3 Serb RSM-25 3MRVs
R-27K 4K1S SS-NX-13
RT-15M 4K22 D-7
R-29 4K75 D-9 SS-N-S Mod 1 Sawfly RSM-40
R-29D 4K? D-9D SS-N-S Mod 2 Sawfly RSM-40
584 Appendix
Sea-Launched Ballistic Missiles (continued)

SALT,
Missile U.S. DoD NATO START
Designation Code system Desigantion Designation Treaties Comments
R-3l 3Ml7 D-ll SS-N-l7 Snipe RSM-45

R-29R 3M40 D-9R SS-N-l8 Mod 1 Stingray RSM-50 Single
warhead
R-29R 3M40 D-9R SS-N-l8 Mod 2 Stingray RSM-50 3 MIRVs
R-29R 3M40 D-9R SS-N-l8 Mod 3 Stingray RSM-50 7 MIRVs
R-29RM 3M37 D-9RM SS-N-23 Skiff RSM-54
R-39 3M65 D-l9 SS-N-20 Sturgeon RSM-52
R-39UTTH SS-NX-28
Bombers
Soviet and Russian
Designations NATO Designations Comments
Tu-4 Bull
Tu-l6 Badger
Tu-l6A Badger A Nuclear-capable
Tu-l6Z Badger A Fuel tanker (wing-to-wing)
Tu-l6N Badger A Fuel tanker (probe-and-drogue)
Tu-l6KS Badger B KS-l carrier
Tu-l6K-lO Badger C K-I0S carrier
Tu-l6K-lO-26 Badger C K-I0S carrier
Tu-l6RM Badger D Naval reconnaissance
Tu-l6R Badger E, K, L Reconnaissance aircraft
Tu-l6RM-2 Badger F
Tu-l6K-ll-l6 Badger G
Tu-l6K-26 Badger G
Tu-l6P Badger H, ]
Tu-22 Blinder
Tu-22B Blinder A Bomber
Tu-22K Blinder B Cruise-missile carrier
Tu-22R Blinder C Reconnaissance aircraft
Tu-22U Blinder D Trainer
Tu-22P Blinder E
Appendix 585
Bombers (continued)
Soviet and Russian
Designations NATO Designations Comments
Tu-22M Backfire
Tu-22MO Backfire A
Tu-22Ml Backfire A
Tu-22M2 Backfire B
Tu-22M3 Backfire C
M-4 Bison A
3M Bison B
3MS Bison B
3MD Bison C
M-50 BOWlder
Tu-95 Bear
Tu-95M Bear A
Tu-95K, KD Bear B Kh-20 carrier
Tu-95KM Bear C Kh-20 carrier
Tu-95RTs Bear D Naval reconnaissance
Tu-95MR Bear E Srategic reconnaissance
Tu-95K-22 Bear G Kh-22 carrier
Tu-95MS Bear H Kh-55 carrier
Tu-95MS6 Bear H6 Kh-55 carrier, 6 missiles
Tu-95MS16 Bear H16 Kh-55 carrier, 16 missiles
Tu-142 Bear F
Tu-142 Bear F Mod I Plant 18 (Kuybyshev)
Tu-142 Bear F Mod II Plant 86 (Taganrog)
Tu-142M Bear F Mod III
Tu-142M-3 Bear F Mod IV
Tu-142MR Bear ] Relay aircraft
Tu-160 BlackJack
Air-Launched Cruise Missiles
Designation U.S. DoD designation NATO Designation Comment
KS-l AS-l Kennel

K-l0S AS-2 Kipper
KSR-2 AS-SA Kelt
KSR-5 AS-6A Kingfish antiship
KSR-5 AS-6B Kingfish strategic
586 Appendix
Air-Launched Cruise Missiles (continued)

Designation U.S. DoD designation NATO Designation Comment
KSR-ll AS-5B Kelt

Kh-22 AS-4A Kitchen antiship
Kh-22 AS-4B Kitchen strategic
Kh-l5 AS-l6 Kickback strategic
Kh-l5S AS-l6 Kickback antiship
Kh-20 AS-3 Kangaroo
Kh-55 AS-l5A Kent RKV-500A (START II
Kh-55 AS-l5B Kent RKV-500B (START II
Air Defense and Missile Defense Systems

Designation U.S. DoD designation NATO Designation
S-25 SA-l Guild

S-75 SA-2 Guideline
S-125 SA-3 Goa
S-500 Griffon?
S-200 SA-5 Gammon
S-300V SA-12 Giant
S-300P SA-lO Grumble
A-35 ABM-l Galosh
A-135 ABM-2 Gazelle
Radars
Designation u.s. DoD Designation Comment
Daryal Pechora Early warning

Dnepr Hen House Early warning
Dnestr Hen House SKKP
Dnestr-M Hen House Early warning
Don-2N Pill Box ABM
Dunay-3 Cat House ABM, Early warning (Akulovol
Dunay-3U Dog House ABM, Early warning (Chekhovl
Notes
Chapter 1. Soviet and Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces
1. E. A. Negin, G. D. Kulichkov et al., Sovetskii atomnyi proekt (Soviet Atomic Project)

(Nizhni Novgorod, 1995), p. 55.
2. Negin, Kulichkov et al., Soviet Atomic Project, p. 56.
3. R. Rhodes, Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb (Simon & Shuster, 1995), p.
53; Negin, Kulichkov et al., Soviet Atomic Project, p. 59; V. N. Mikhailov, A. M. Petrosyants
et al., eds., Sozdaniye pervoi sovetskoi yadernoi bomby (Creation of the First Soviet Nuclear
Bomb) (Energoizdat, 1995), pp. 42-44.
4. Negin, Kulichkov et al., Soviet Atomic Project, pp. 61-63.
5. I. A. Andryusrun et al., Ispytania yadernogo oruzhiya i yadernye vzryvy v mirnikh tselyakh
SSSR, 1949-1990 gg. (Nuclear Weapon Tests and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions of the Soviet
Union, 1949-1990) (RFYaTs-VNIIEF, 1996), p. 1l.
6. Negin, Kulichkov et al., Soviet Atomic Project, pp. 187, 196.
7. Yu. Khariton and Yu. Smirnov, "Khariton version," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (May
1993), p. 29.
8. Andryushin et al., Nuclear Weapon Tests and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions of the Soviet
Union, 1949-1990, p. 12.
9. Yeo B. Volkov, ed., MER SSSR (RF) i SShA (ICBMs of tbe USSR (Russian Federation) and
tbe United States) (RVSN, 1996), p. 310.
10. G. G. Kostev, "Morskiye strategicheskiye. Stranitsy istorii i razvitiya" (Naval strategic
forces: Stages in their history and development), Morskoi sbornik, no. 10 (1994), pp. 6-12.
11. Data taken from R. S. Norris and T. B. Cochran, U.S.- USSR/Russian Strategic
Offensive Nuclear Forces (NRDC, January 1997).
12. V. Rigmant, "B-29, Tu-4-strategicheskiye bliznetsy" (B-29 and Tu-4-The strategic
twins), Aviatsiya i kosmonavtika, no. 17 (1996), p. 62.
13. V. Yeo Ilyin and M. A. Levin, Bombardirovshchiki (Bombers) (Viktoriya AST, 1996),
pp. 66-70, 90.
14. Volkov, ICBMs of the USSR (Russian Federation) and the United States, p. 266.
588 Notes
15. I. D. Sergeyev, ed., Khronika osnovnykh sobytii istorii Raketnykh voisk strategicheskogo
naznacheniya (Chronicle of Main Events in RVSN History) (RVSN, 1994), pp. 10-11.
17. Volkov, ICBMs of the USSR (Russian Federation) and the United States, pp. 264-268.
18. G. M. Korniyenko, Kholodnaya voyna (The Cold War) (MezhdlUlarodnyye otnosheniya,
1995), p. 95.
19. Volkov, ICBMs of the USSR (Russian Federation) and the United States, pp. 116, 127.
20. Volkov, ICBMs of the USSR (Russian Federation) and the United States, pp. 134-135.
21. T. Cochran, W. Arkin, R. Norris, and]. Sands, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Vol. 4:
Soviet Nuclear Weapons (Ballinger, 1988), p. 102.
22. P. Z. Golosovskiy, Ot "Dekabrista" do "Akuly" (From "Dekabrist" to "Akula")
(Leningrad, 1981).
23. O. V Golubev, Yu. A. Kamenskiy et al., Rossiyskaya sistema protivoraketnoy oborony
(Russia's ABM System) (Tekhnoconsult, 1994), p. 58.
26. Golubev, Kamenskiy et al., Russia's ABM System, p. 9.
27. R. L. Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to
Reagan (Brookings, 1985), p. 7.
28. Korniyenko, The Cold War, pp. 139-142; A. G. Savelyev and N. N. Detinov, The Big
Five: Arms Control Decision-Making in the Soviet Union (Praeger, 1995), p. 9.
29. Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, pp. 181-183.
31. Yu. A. Moszhorin, interview given to M. Tarasenko during the 20th Conference on
Cosmonautics, IIET RAN, January 1996.
32. Dorogi v kosmos (Roads to Space), vol. 1 (Izdatelstvo MAl, 1992), p. 149.
33. Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, p. 542.
34. Korniyenko, The Cold War, p. 158.
35. Strobe Talbott, Endgame: The Inside History of SALT II (Harper Torchbooks, 1977),
pp. 28-3l.
37. Talbott, Endgame, p. 35.
39. Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed at Vienna, 18 JlUle 1979.
40. Talbott, Endgame, p. 228.
41. See Article IV(9) of the SALT II Treaty with the accompanying agreed statements and
common lUlderstanrungs.
42. Korniyenko, The Cold War, pp. 234-247.
Notes 589

44. See chapter 7 for a discussion of the Soviet early-warning capabilities.
46. A. G. Savelyev and N. N. Detinov, The Big Five: Arms Control Decision-Making in the
Soviet Union (Praeger, 1995), p. 119.
47. Savelyev and Detinov, The Big Five, pp. 129, 177.
48. Korniyenko, The Cold War, pp. 251-256; Savelyev and Detinov, The Big Five,
pp. 133-134.
49. Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, Signed at Moscow on July 31,
1991.
50. "Bush annOlUlces wlilateral cuts in nuclear weapons, alerts" and "Gorbachev to slash
Soviet nuclear stockpile," Arms Control Today, 21, no. 8 (October 1991), p. 21.
51. Protocol to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed at
Lisbon on May 23, 1992 by the United States of America, the Republic of Byelarus, the
Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine.
52. James Rupert, "Sllilflowers planted to mark end of nuclear weapons in Ukraine,"
Washington Post, ]tUle 5, 1996, p. A28.
53. Col. Gen. Viktor Yesin, interview with Interfax, 24 November 1996.
54. "The Joint Understanding on the Elimination of MIRVed ICBMs and Further Reduction
in Strategic Offensive Arms," U.S. State Department Press Release, July 2, 1992.
55. The Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, Signed at Moscow on January 3,
1993.
56. A. Dolinin, "'Topolinaya roshcha' XXI veka" (A "poplar forest" of the 21st century),
Krasnaya Zvezda, 17 December 2000.
57. ITAR-TASS, January 19, 2000.
Chapter 2. The Structure and Operations of Strategic Nuclear Forces
1. There is virtually no precise information about the date of the establishment of the Defense
COlUlcil and about its composition and powers. It is possible that the Defense COlUlcil or a
similar body existed in the prewar years. During World War II the Supreme High Command
Headquarters (Stavka) was established to direct the armed forces and was headed by I. V.
Stalin, who was also the chairman of the COlUlcil of Ministers and the head of the State
Defense Committee. The experience of the headquarters and the State Defense Committee
probably was taken into accOlUlt when the postwar Defense COlUlcil was established.
2. I. V. Stalin was the general secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Russian Com-
munist Party (Bolshevik) (CPSU) from 1922 until his death on 5 March 1953. The position
of general secretary was abolished after Stalin's death. On 6 March 1953 G. M. Malenkov
was elected chairman of the Central Committee Presidium (and chairman of the COlUlcil of
590 Notes
Ministers). On 14 March 1953 N. S. Khrushchev replaced Malenkov as chairman of the

Central Committee Presidium. After Khrushchev was removed from office on 15 October
1964, L. I. Brezhnev became the first secretary (and general secretary after 1967) of the
Central Committee and remained in this position lUltil his death on 10 November 1982. The
office of general secretary was occupied by Yu. V. Andropov from 12 November 1982 to
9 February 1984 and by K. U. Chernenko from 13 February 1984 to 10 March 1985. The
last general secretary of the Central Committee was M. S. Gorbachev, who occupied this
position from 11 March 1985 to 24 August 1991.
3. Nevertheless, the chairman of the Defense COlUlcil was always the general secretary of
the Central Committee, not the chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium.
4. On 15 March 1990 M. S. Gorbachev, then the general secretary of the CPSU Central
Committee, was elected the first president of the USSR by the Congress of People's Deputies.
On 25 December 1991 Gorbachev gave up the duties of president of the USSR when the
Soviet Union ceased to exist.
5. A resolution passed at a meeting of the leaders of the CIS cOlUltries on 30 December 1991
said that the decision to use nuclear weapons would be made by the president of Russia with
the consent of the leaders of Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Ukraine and following consultations
with the heads of other CIS states. Now that Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine are party to
the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons as nonnuclear states, Russia has
complete control of the nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union.
6. B. N. Yeltsin has occupied this office since the first Russian presidential election on 12
]lUle 1991 lUltil his resignation on 31 December 1999. V. V. Putin was the acting president
lUltil presidential elections on 26 March 2000, which he won, and was sworn in as the
president of Russia on 7 May 2000.
7. In the postwar years the office of USSR minister of defense was occupied by I. V. Stalin
(1941-1947), N. A. Bulganin (1947-1949 and 1953-1955), A. M. Vasilevskiy (1949-
1953), G. K. Zhnkov (1955-1957), R. Ya. Malinovskiy (1957-1967), A. A. Grechko
(1967-1976), D. F. Ustinov (1976-1984), S. L. Sokolov (1984-1987), D. T. Yazov
(1987-1991), and Yeo I. Shaposhnikov (1991). The first Russian minister of defense was
P. S. Grachev, who was appointed to this position on 18 May 1992. The office was occupied
by I. N. Rodionov from 17 July 1996 to 22 May 1997, and 6ben until 28 March 2001 by
I. D. Sergeyev. The present Russian minister of defense is S. B. Ivanov.
8. After World War II the armed forces consisted of the GrolUld Forces, Air Forces, and
Navy. The Air Defense Forces were formed in 1954, and the Strategic Rocket Forces were
created in 1959.
9. I. D. Sergeyev, "V techenie blizhaishikh vos'mi let Vooruzhennye sily Rossii budut
polnostyu reformirovany" (In the next eight years the Russian armed forces will be com-
pletely reformed), Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniye, 19 September 1997, p. 1.
10. The Central Committee was formed at a congress of the CPSU, which was the supreme
party ruling body. The Central Committee's main flUlction was the supervision of party
activities between congresses. Plenums of the Central Committee were usually convened
once every few months. The Central Committee would form a Central Committee Politburo
and Central Committee Secretariat as standing bodies directing the activities of the party
between plenums. A larger body, the Central Committee Presidium, was created instead of
Notes 591
the Politburo at the 19th Party Congress in 1952. In 1953 the Presidium was reduced to 10
members, and in 1967 it was renamed the CPSU Central Committee Politburo.
11. The office of Central Committee secretary for defense was occupied in 1963-1976 by
D. F. Ustinov, who had headed the Military-Industrial Commission prior to this appointment.
After Ustinov became minister of defense in 1976, Ya. P. Ryabov became the Central Com-
mittee secretary in charge of defense and played a less important role in the decision-making
process. The situation changed again in 1986, when L. I. Zaykov who had greater role in
decision making became the Central Committee secretary for defense.
12. The job of the Central Committee International Department was traditionally confined
to the organization of interaction with commwllst parties abroad. Its status did not change
significantly lUltil 1986, when it was headed by A. F. Dobrynin, who had served as the
ambassador of the USSR to the United States prior to that and had played a significant
role in Soviet-American relations.
13. Prior to 1953 I. V Stalin was the chairman of the USSR COlUlcil of Ministers. After his
death the government was headed by G. M. Malenkov, who was removed from the office
of chairman of the COlUlcil of Ministers in 1955. The government was headed by N. A.
Bulganin in 1955-1958 and by N. S. Khrushchev in 1958-1964. After Khrushchev was
removed from office, A. N. Kosygin became the chairman of the COlUlcil of Ministers and
occupied that position lUltil 1980. The government was headed by N. A. Tikhonov in
1980-1985 and by N. I. Ryzhkov in 1985-1990. The last chairman of the USSR Council of
Ministers and the only chairman of the government who was not a Politburo member was
V S. Pavlov, who occupied this position in 1991.
14. A. A. Gromyko, who headed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1957 to 1985, was
instrumental in the administration of the ministry and in the definition of the USSR's foreign
policy line. The ministers of foreign affairs before him were V M. Molotov (1939-1949 and
1953-1956), A. Vysrunskiy (1949-1953), and D. T. Shepilov (1956-1957). In 1985 E. A.
Shevardnadze replaced Gromyko as foreign minister. In 1990 the ministry was headed by
A. A. Bessmertnykh, who held this office lUltil August 1991.
15. The Military-Industrial Commission began to playa prominent role in military-
technical policy decisions in 1957, when it was headed by D. F. Ustinov, who had been the
minister of defense industry prior to that time. After Ustinov left this office for the Central
Committee Secretariat in 1963, the commission was headed by L. V Smirnov, who held the
office lUltil 1985. Yu. D. Maslyukov headed the Military-Industrial Commission from 1985
until 1991.
16. In particular, the resolutions drafted by the commission monitoring arms limitation talks
were sent directly to the Politburo for approval, bypassing the Defense COlUlcil. See A. G.
Savelyev and N. N. Detinov, The Big Five: Arms Control Decision-Making in the Soviet
Union (Praeger, 1995), p. 20.
17. When the commission was created, it was headed by D. F. Ustinov, who was then the
Central Committee secretary for defense. After Ustinov became minister of defense in 1976,
the Central Committee Secretariat was not represented in the commission. After Ustinov's
death in December 1984, the commission was headed by A. A. Gromyko. In 1986 he was
replaced by L. I. Zaykov, who was the Central Committee secretary for defense and held the
position lUltil 1991.
592 Notes
18. Most of the work of the General Staff was performed by the Main Operations
Directorate. In addition, the General Staff set up a Treaty and Legal Directorate in the mid-
1970s, and it was also actively involved in the commission's work. In the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs most of the work was performed by the U.S. and Canada Department. S. F.
Akhromeyev, who occupied various positions on the General Staff (chief of the Main
Operations Directorate, then first deputy chief of General Staff, and later chief of General
Staff in 1984-1988), and G. M. Korniyenko, who headed the U.S. and Canada Department
in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and then became first deputy minister in 1977, played
a particularly prominent role in the commission's work. See Savelyev and Detinov, Big Five,
p. 6l.
19. Ibid., p. 115.
20. The decree on the start of a development project usually stipulated the dates of the main
stages of the work, down to the quarter (the completion of the blueprints, the beginning of
tests, and the start of series production), named the head developers of the system and its
components (including the name of the chief designer of the system) and the organizations
participating in the project, and instructed various agencies to take the necessary measures
for the creation of the system (the construction of various facilities, the appropriation of
territory, and the resolution of any social problems arising from the creation of the system,
such as relocation of residents, construction of housing, etc.).
21. The static overpressure created in the front of the nuclear blast shock wave is not
necessarily the main factor causing the destruction of the target. Nevertheless, the level of
protection is usually expressed in terms of overpressure, because the intensity of the other
destructive factors involved in the explosion usually correlates with that quantity.
22. The kill radius can be estimated by means of the equation R = kql /3, where R is the radius
in kilometers, q is the yield of the blast in megatons, and k is the coefficient of target hard-
ening. For urban structures (protection level of 0.3 atmospheres), k = 4, and in the case of
hardened silos (100 atmospheres), k = 004. See, for example, Yeo B. Volkov, MBR SSSR (RF)
i SShA (ICBMs of the USSR (Russian Federation) and the United States) (RVSN, 1996),
p.2l.
23. CEP and ME are connected with root-mean-square deviation 0, describing the probable
deviation of the warhead from the initial aiming point, with the following correlative
relationships: CEP = 1.18o, ME = 2.7o.
24. For example, if CEP is equal to the kill radius, it would take six warheads to destroy
targets with a probability greater than 0.98.
25. The kill radius increases in proportion to ql/3, where q is the yield of the weapon. This
means that the yield has to be eight times as great to double the size of the kill radius.
26. There is almost no information about the Russian command and control system. The
description in this chapter is a review of the system's operating principles based on a few
reports in lUlclassified literature. The information about the work of the command and
control system have been taken from B. G. Blair, Global Zero Alert for Nuclear Forces
(Brookings Institution, 1995), which is the most complete description of the Russian battle
management system available today in the open literature. In addition, some of the infor-
mation used here was cited in the following works: V Yeo Yarynich, Otsenka garantii (Guar-
antee Assessment) (MGIMO, 1994); V Yarynich, "Yadernye strategii i faktor upravleniya"
(Nuclear strategies and the factor of command and control), Segodnya, 30 March 1994,
Notes 593
p. 9; Steven]. Zaloga, "Russia's Doomsday Machine," Jane's Intelligence Review (February

1996), pp. 54-56.
27. In the few cases in which the Soviet Union took measures to put the nuclear forces
on high alert, these actions were taken on a limited scale and were not detected by U.S.
intelligence. See, for example, B. G. Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War (Brookings
Institution, 1993), pp. 23-26.
28. In the 1970s the Soviet Union started working on an extensive program to secure the
possibility of a lalUlch-on-warning strike. In 1982 the Supreme Soviet officially annolUlced
the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons. It is significant, however, that this did not
preclude the delivery of a first strike in response to the use of tactical nuclear weapons by
the enemy, and particularly in response to the use of tactical weapons to destroy targets
within the territory of the Soviet Union.
29. The basic provisions of Russian military doctrine include the following statement:
"Deliberate actions by an aggressor to pose a threat to strategic nuclear forces, the missile
attack early-warning system, nuclear power plants, and facilities of the atomic and chemical
industry could increase the probability of the escalation of a conflict involving the use of con-
ventional arms into a nuclear conflict." "Osnovnye polozheniya voennoy doktriny Rossiiskoy
Federatsii" (The basic provisions of the military doctrine of the Russian Federation),
Rossiyskiye vesti, 18 November 1993.
30. This command center, known as "Installation Beloretsk-15," is located in Bashkiria, near
the settlement of Tatly, 35 kilometers from Beloretsk. The command post buildings are
situated far lUldergrolUld, deep within Yamantau MOlUltain. M. Safarov, " ... komu bLmker?"
(Who gets the bLmker?) Komsomolskaya pravda, 14 March 1992, p. 2. Construction of the
installation had apparently not been completed as of 1997. V. Mikheyev, "Khochesh mira-
roi bLmkery" (If you want peace, start digging), /zvestiya, 3 April 1997, p. 3.
31. The Perimeter-RTs system, which includes modified RT-2PM (SS-25) missiles, is now
in use. Previosly the system included command missiles that were modified Pioneer (SS-20)
and MR UR-I00 (SS-17) missiles. V. Pappo-Korystin, V. Platonov, and V. Pashchenko,
Dneprovsky raketno-kosmicheskiy tsentr (The Dneprovsk Space Rocket Center) (PO YuMZ
KBYu, 1994), p. 105; Blair, Global Zero Alert, p. 52.
Chapter 3. The Nuclear Weapon Production Complex
1. The history of the nuclear weapons program is discussed in detail in the following publi-
cations: A. K. Kruglov, Kak sozdavalas atomnaya promyshlennost v SSSR (How the Soviet
Atomic Industry Was Created) (TsNIIatominform, 1995); V. N. Mikhailov, A. M. Petrosyants
et al., eds., Sozdaniye pervoi sovetskoi yadernoi bomby (Creation of the First Soviet Nuclear
Bomb) (Energoizdat, 1995); E. A. Negin, G. D. Kulichkov et al., Sovetskii atomnyi proekt
(Soviet Atomic Project) (Nizhni Novgorod, 1995); David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb:
The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956 (Yale University Press, 1994); T. Cochran,
R. S. Norris, and o. Bukharin, Making the Russian Bomb: From Stalin to Yeltsin (Westview,
1995); R. Rhodes, Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb (Simon & Shuster,
1995).
2. According to Rhodes (Dark Sun, p. 40), the decision to establish the commission was
prompted by a letter from Vernadsky to the Academy of Sciences about a New York Times
594 Notes
article regarding the use of atomic energy. The article was sent to the Vernadsky in the spring
of 1940 by his son, who at that time was teaching history at Yale.
3. Ibid., p. 53.
4. Mikhailov, Petrosyants et al., Creation of the First Soviet Nuclear Bomb, pp. 42-44.
5. Laboratory No.2 was established by the 12 April 1943 order ofthe Academy of Science.
After World War II, the laboratory was renamed the Laboratory of Measurement
Devices of the Academy of Science (LIPAN). Subsequently, the Laboratory became the I. V.
Kurchatov Atomic Energy Institute.
6. Kurchatov finished his first review of the technical data received from Britain in March
1943. The data mainly concerned uranium enrichment technologies, the feasibility of build-
ing a heavy-water reactor, the reaction of fission, and plutonium-239. Based on these data,
Soviet scientists resolved to initiate research on gaseous-diffusion enrichment technology
(which had been considered llilrealistic because of technical difficulties) and a natural-
uranium-fueled reactor. Earlier theoretical calculations by Soviet scientists had mistakenly
demonstrated that a sustained chain reaction in natural uranium systems was impossible
because of the lUlacceptably high neutron capture cross-sections for heavy water or graphite.
The information about plutonium and its potential uses in weapons possibly was the most
important information in the intelligence data (Rhodes, Dark Sun, p. 71).
7. The design work on the radiochemical plant began in 1946 in the Leningrad State
Building and Design Institute (GSPI-ll), currently the Research and Project Design Institute
of Energy Technologies (VNIPIET).
8. Currently the Bochvar Institute of Inorganic Materials (VNIINM).
9. A. M. Petrosyants, "On the History of HEU Production at Combine 813," in Mikhailov,
Petrosyants et al., Creation of the First Soviet Nuclear Bomb, pp. 249-288.
10. Currently the Institute of Experimental Physics (VNIIEF).
11. On 1 July 1946 Khariton signed the tactical and technical task order for a nuclear gravity
bomb (Mikhailov, Petrosyants et al., Creation of the First Soviet Nuclear Bomb, p. 217).
12. Ibid., p. 217.
13. Ibid., p. 223.
14. Ibid, pp. 221-225, lists the following principal institutions involved in the development
of the first atomic bomb: NII-6, GSKB-47, and NII-S04 of the Ministry of Agricultural
Machine-Building and NII-88 of the Ministry of Armaments. NII-6 was developing syn-
chronous detonators. NII-S04 (subsequently, Central Design Bureau 326 of the Ministry of
Commwllcation Equipment Industry) was developing an automatic altimeter fuse and deto-
nator power systems. Design Bureau 47 (GSKB-47) was working on the casing for the bomb.
The Design Bureau of the Kirov Plant in Chelyabinsk was working on some of the automatic
components, and the NII-88 was involved in designing a glUl-type explosive device.
15. At least three Soviet agents were working in the weapons program in Los Alamos. Claus
Fuchs, a German antifascist, was recruited by the Soviet Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU)
in 1942 after he had emigrated to Great Britain. (Subsequently, Fuchs was supervised by the
NKVD.) In December 1943, Fuchs, as a member of a British delegation, was sentto the United
States to work on the atomic problem. In August 1944, Fuchs was transferred to Los Alamos
to work on the designs of neutron generators and an implosion bomb. Fuchs, who had lUl-
Notes 595
restricted access to a wide range of technical information, passed to the Soviet Union such
critical information as the data on the principles of an implosion bomb, a detailed description
of the "Fat Man" design, and data on spontaneous fission for plutonium-240 and on chemi-
cal and physical properties of plutonium. David Greenglass, the second Soviet agent in Los
Alamos, was recruited by Julius Rosenberg early in 1945. Beginning in August 1945, Green-
glass worked in a shop that was machining HE components used in explosive lens experiments
conducted to design a neutron generator and an implosion bomb. (A public accOlUlt of Fuchs's
and Greenglass's activities is presented in Rhodes, Dark Sun.) Theodore Holl was the third
Soviet agent in Los Alamos. In the fall of 1944, Holl, a yOlUlg physicist sent to work in Los
Alamos, initiated contact with the Soviet intelligence. In 1944-1945, he passed to the Soviet
Union information on the implosion principle as well as a general diagram of the United States'
experimental explosive device (]. Albright and M. KlUlstel, "The boy who gave away the
bomb," New York Times Magazine, 14 September 1997, pp. 70-73).
16. I. A. Andryushin et al., Ispytania yadernogo oruzhiya i yadernye vzryvy v mirnikh
tselyakh SSSR, 1949-1990 gg. (Nuclear Weapon Tests and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions of
the Soviet Union, 1949-1990) (RFYaTs-VNIIEF, 1996), p. 11.
17. The Fat Man bomb contained a 6.2-kilogram plutonium sphere and weighed 4,500
kilograms. The pear-shaped bomb was 325 centimeters long (including fins) and 127 cen-
timeters in diameter. The yield of the device was 18 kilotons in the Trinity test and 21 kilo-
tons in the Nagasaki bombing. (The description of the Fat Man is from R. Rhodes, Dark
Sun, p. 193. The yields are from T. Cochran, W. Arkin, R. S. Norris, and M. Hoenig, U.S.
Nuclear Warhead Production, vol. 2 (Ballinger, 1987), p. 151).
19. The crew of the Tu-4 bomber that carried out the drop was commanded by Lt. Col.
K. I. UrzhlUltsev.
21. Ibid., p. 196.
22. V. A. Tsukerman and Ya. B. Zeldovich proposed the use of an external neutron genera-
tor to optimize the initiation of the chain reaction in a compressed pit in 1948. The project
head was A. A. Brish. The Kharkov Institute of Physics and Tedmology also participated in
the project (ibid., p. 196).
23. Yeo A. Shitikov, "In the Interest of the Fleet," in Yadernyi Arkhipelag (Nuclear Archi-
pelago) (IzdAT, 1995), p. 60. For the first time in the Soviet nuclear testing program the test
failed (Yu. Khariton and Yu. Smirnov, "Khariton version," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
(May 1993), p. 29).
24. The KB-ll was directed to develop a nuclear artillery shell in 1952 (Negin, Kulichkov
et al., Soviet Atomic Project, p. 196). According to Russian Federal Nuclear Center-VNII
of Technical Physics: Science and Information Bulletin (VNIITF, Snezhinsk, 1998, p. 21),
the first 203-millimeter Soviet nuclear artillery shell was developed by the VNIITF and
transferred to the stockpile in 1977.
25. Russia's Arms Catalog, vol. 4, Strategic Missile Forces (Military Parade, 1996-1997),
p.l96.
596 Notes
27. V. I. Ritus, "Kto esu ne ya?" (Who else if not me?), Priroda, August 1990, p. 12.
28. The principal advantage of using uthiwn-6 deuteride is that lUlder natural conditions
it is solid, whereas deuterium is gas. Keeping deuterium in liquid form requires complex
cryogenic equipment.
29. Khariton and Smirnov, "Khariton Version," p. 29. The RDS-6 was not a multistage
device based on the Ulam-Teller principle (like the "Mike" device tested by the United States
on November 1, 1952). The RDS-6 design, however, allowed building weapons of the
megaton class.
30. By that time, all work on thermonuclear weapons had been transferred from the Insti-
tute of Physics to the KB-11.
31. See for example, Negin, Kulichkov et al., Soviet Atomic Project, p. 199. Ulam and Teller
proposed their idea of radiation compression of a thermonuclear secondary in the winter or
spring of 1951.
32. The yield was reduced by a half from the design yield of three megatons by the replace-
ment of uranium components in the secondary with lead (Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb,
p. 315). Soviet designers achieved a good degree of control over the yield even during this
first test. In 1954, U.S. designers conducted six tests for this same purpose (program
"Castle"). The United States' first deliverable weapon based on the Ulam-Teller idea was
tested on 20 May 1956.
34. COlUlcil of Ministers Decree No. 5744-2162 of 27 December 1949.
35. Minsredmash's first chief was V. A. Malyshev. He was removed in 1955 after the
overthrow of G. M. Malenkov (as a head of the state) and N. S. Khrushchev's accession to
power. A. P. Zavenyagin succeeded Malyshev as the Minister of Minsredmash and remained
in this position lUltil his death in December 1956. B. L. Vannikov was acting minister lUltil
May 1957, when the position was given to M. G. Pervukhin. Two months later, however,
Pervukhin was accused of participating in the "antiparty group" and removed from his
post. E. P. Slavsky succeeded M. G. Pervukhin and remained in the office lUltil 1986. From
1986 to 1989, Minsredmash's minister was L. D. Ryabev. When the Ministry of Atomic
Energy and Industry was formed in 1989, V. F. Konovalov became its first minister. Kono-
valov was removed from the position in August 1991. Between September 1991 and the
establishment of Minatom in early 1992, B. V. Nikipelov was the acting minister. From early
1992 to April 1998, the Minister of Minatom was V. N. Mikhailov. He was succeeded in
April 1998 by Yeo O. Adamov, who was replaced by A. Yu. Rumyantsev in March 2001.
36. N. Poroskov, "Nastupit li v Rossii Chas Iks?" (Will Russia's Hour X come?), Krasnaya
Zvezda, 16 January 1996, p. 2.
37. Statement by V. F. Petrovsky, Deputy Head of the Soviet Delegation to the 44th UN
General Assembly, 25 October 1989. The statement reads that "this year [the Soviet Union]
is ceasing the production of highly enriched uranium." It is believed, however, that the Soviet
Union actually stopped producing HEU for weapons sometime in 1988.
38. Production reactors are used for production of weapon materials: plutonium and tritiwn.
39. In October 1989, M. S. Gorbachev annolUlced that the last plutonium production reactor
would be stopped by the year 2000. This position was later confirmed in the "Agreement
Notes 597
between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian
Federation Concerning the Shutdown of Plutonium Production Reactors and the Cessation
of Use of Newly Produced Plutonium for Nuclear Weapons," signed at Washington, D.C.,
23 June 1994.
40. Some non-Russian republics of the former Soviet Union were manufacturing a wide
range of radio-electronic components used in nuclear weapons and weapons maintenance
equipment. Minatom's leadership has resolved to establish such production capabilities in the
Institute of Automatics and the Institute of Impulse Technologies, which are subordinated to
its Fifth Main Directorate. As of 1997, however, some radio-electronic components of nuclear
weapons continued to be exported from outside of Russia (V. Zakharov, A. Sviridov, and
I. Achkurin, "Sostoyanie yadernogo oruzheinogo kompleksa v stranakh blizhnego
zarubezh'ya" (The status of the nuclear weapons complex in the near-abroad cOlUltries),
Yadernyi Control, no. 13 (January 1996), pp. 15-23).
41. Remarks by Minatom's Deputy Minister Lev Ryabev at the seventh Carnegie Endow-
ment Nonproliferation Conference, Washington, DC, 11-13 January 1999. The total nuclear
workforce in the closed cities is approximately 130,000.
42. V. Menshikov, "Vokrug situatsii s khraneniem plutoniya i obogashchennogo urana v
Tomske-7" (About the situation with the storage of HEU and plutonium in Tomsk-7),
Yadernyi Control (February 1995), pp. 2-5.
43. 1995 Gosatomnadzor Report (Moscow: Gosatomnadzor, 1996), p. 61.
44. The Soviet Union began exporting natural uranium in 1988 (Nukem Market Report
(May 1993), p. 7).
45. Kruglov, How the Soviet Atomic Industry Was Created, p. 85. See also]. Stein, "Impact
of CIS uranium supply on the world market," Report to the Nuclear Energy Institute's
Uranium Fuel Seminar, Monterey, Calif., September 28-0ctober 1, 1997.
46. Uranium mining techniques for conventional pit and lUldergrOlUld mining are not
different from those used in conventional mining. Uranium mining, however, requires addi-
tional safety measures, including radiation protection of miners, radon controls, and special
management of tails and processing waste.
47. ISL is based on pumping sulfuric acid and an oxidant into uranium-containing ore
bodies via a set of lUldergrolUld boreholes. Subsequently, the resulting uranium-containing
solution is pumped out. ISL techniques are typically used for low-density uranium ores
located below grolUld water and surrolUlded by clay or other impermeable materials (see, for
example, V. I. Vetrov, V. V. Korotkov, and V. V. Kwlichenko, "Sozdaniye predpriyatii po
dobyche i pererabotke uranovykh rud" (Development of uranium mining and production
facilities), in Mikhailov, Petrosyants et al., Creation of the First Soviet Nuclear Bomb,
pp. 188-190).
48. Typically, additional purification of uranium is required before it can be used in reactor
fuel or fed into an enrichment cascade (ibid.).
49. The Taboshar deposit, the USSR's first significant uranium deposit, was discovered in
1926. Prior to 1945, the deposit was used to produce radium (ibid., p. 171).
50. During 1945-1950, the Soviet Union produced 416.9 tons of uranium. During that same
period, it imported 1,639.9 tons from East European cOlUltries (ibid., p. 197).
598 Notes
51. T. Pool, "The uranium industry yesterday, today, and tomorrow," NUEXCO Review
(October 1993), pp. 19-23.
52. Approximately 300,000 tons of uranium was produced in the Soviet republics, 220,000
tons was received from the Bismuth complex in East Germany, 100,000 tons was received
from Czechoslovakia, 25,000 tons was imported from Bulgaria, and 19,000 tons was
imported from HlUlgary (0. Bukharin, "Analysis of the size and quality of uranium inven-
tories in Russia," paper presented at NEI's International Uranium Fuel Seminar, October
8-11,1995, Williamsburg, Va.).
53. At present, uranium mining is taking place at the following ore areas: Streltsovsk
(Russia), Kirovograd (Ukraine), Chu-Saryisk, Syrdarya, Iliisk, Caspyisk, Balkhash, and
Kokchetavsk (all in Kazakhstan), and Kyzylkum (Uzbekistan). Three large uranium ore
areas-Stavropol (Russia), Karamazar (Tajikistan), and Krivorozhski (Ukraine)-are
depleted. Promising uranium-bearing areas located in Russia are the Zauralsk, Eniseysk,
Vitim, Onezhski, Far Eastern, and Transbaikal areas (N. P. Laverov, V. I. Velikhin et al.,
"USSR uranium raw material base," Report to the IAEA Technical Committee (]PRS-UEQ-
93-002),5 February 1993, p. 3).
54. Estimates of uranium resources are from the following publications: Uranium in the
New World Market: Supply and Demand, 1993 (Uranium Institute, 1993); V. Yazikov,
"Kazakhstan's uranium resources", paper presented at Uranium Institute Symposium, 8-10
September 1993, London. The estimates probably do not include mining losses and uranium
that has already been mined (OECD, Report on the OECD NEA Uranium Group Mission
to the USSR," 1991, p. 20).
55. "The Russian approach to mining, milling and management," Nukem Market Report
(March 1998), pp. 4-27. In heap-leaching, mined ore is crushed, piled in a one to two million
ton heap approximately 30 meters high, and leached using sulfuric acid for about one year.
The eluent solution is then processed using an ion exchange circuit. In a block-leaching
process, a block of uranium ore in an excavation is loosened up by blasting and the result-
ing muck treated with acid.
56. Uranium hexafluoride is a very important compolUld for existing nuclear fuel cycle
tedmologies. It is stoichiometric chemically (wliike, for example, uranium oxides), and
fluorine-19 is the only isotope of fluorine. This makes UF 6 wliquely suitable to be a feed
for a gas centrifuge or gaseous-diffusion enrichment facility. Uranium hexafluoride also con-
veniently sublimates from solid into gas at 57°C at atmospheric pressure. At slightly higher
pressures and temperatures (above 1.5 atmospheres and 65°C), it becomes liquid.
57. The history of the uranium conversion industry in the Soviet Union is described in
Kruglov, How the Soviet Atomic Industry Was Created, pp. 178-181, 300.
58. Nuexco Monthly Report, No. 272, 1991.
59. C. Grey, "Up front in the CIS," Nuclear Engineering International (May 1994),
pp. 16-20.
60. In the early years, the production process included the steps of conversion of U3 0 S
to U0 2 and its subsequent reduction to uraniwn metal in a reaction with metallic calcium.
In 1946, the Soviet nuclear industry started to use an improved technology based on the
reduction of uranium tetrafluoride by calcium (Kruglov, How the Soviet Atomic Industry
Was Created, p. 299).
Notes 599
61. In addition to the listed plants, the Concern TVEL includes the Moscow Polymetal Plant,
which produces reactor control rods, and a number of other facilities.
62. The Electrostal plant produced HEU and natural-uranium components for the USSR's
first nuclear warheads. Later on, these technologies were transferred to Plant V in
Chelyabinsk-65 (Mikhailov, Petrosyants et al., Creation of the First Soviet Nuclear Bomb,
p.351).
63. In ceramic-metal fuel, uranium oxide powder is imbedded into a nonfissile (for example,
aluminum) matrix.
64. "Minatom of Russia," prospectus, 1992, p. 29.
65. The production of lithium-6 typically involves the production of metallic lithium and its
isotopic enrichment. Natural lithium contains 7.42 percent lithiwn-6.
66. The storage facility was scheduled to be completed in 1998 and is designed to accom-
modate 60 tons of lithium-hydrogen materials (3,200 containers). The facility is being
constructed with French assistance valued at $20 million (FBIS-SOV-94-223, 17 November
1994; Nonproliferation Review, 2, no. 3, p. 151; also Yadernyi Control, no. 2 (March-April
1998), p. 27).
67. W. Potter, "Project Sapphire," in]. Shields and W. Potter, eds., Dismantling the Cold
War: u.S. and NIS Perspectives on the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program
(MIT Press, 1997), p. 346.
68. The remaining 600 kilograms of HEU, mainly in the form of uranium-beryllium com-
pOlUlcis, was transferred to the United States in November 1994 in exchange for cash and
in-kind assistance (Operation Sapphire).
69. The Leningrad nuclear power plant is an independent operator and is not a part of
Rosenergoatom.
70. Prior to the Chernobyl disaster of 1986, the RBMK reactors used 1.8 percent
enriched uranium fuel. Subsequent to the disaster, to decrease the reactivity coefficient
in the core, the level of enrichment was increased to 2.4 percent uranium-235. VVER-
440 and VVER-I000 reactors are largely fueled with 3.6 and 4.4 percent enriched
uraruum.
71. The surface vessels are four Kirov-class cruisers (currently: Admiral Ushakov class,
Project 1144) and one command and commwllcation vessel (Project 1941).
72. Nuclear Waste in the Arctic: An Analysis of Arctic and Other Regional Impacts from
Soviet Nuclear Contamination, Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, September
1995, p. 134.
73. Ibid. See also Dennis Croesmann et al., "United States-Russian cooperation on protec-
tion, control and accolUlting for naval nuclear materials," paper presented at the 38th INMM
Annual Conference, Phoenix, Ariz., July 20-24, 1997.
74. Potter, "Project Sapphire," p. 346.
75. There are 113 research reactors and subcritical and critical assembly facilities. For a list
of research reactor facilities, see, for example, Cochran et al., Making the Russian Bomb,
pp. 198-201. Of them, 61 are in operation, 46 are in conservation or decommissioning,
and 6 are lUlder construction. Fifty-two belong to Minatom ("Gosatomnadzor report," 1997,
p.43).
600 Notes
76. M. Hibbs, "u.s. will help Russia develop LEU fuel for research reactors," Nuclear Fuel,
6 December 1993, pp. 7-8.
77. "Stopping weapon-grade plutonium production in Russia," U.S. Department of Energy,
Washington, D.C., May 1996. Reactor-grade plutonium contains an elevated concentration
of the isotope plutonium-240, which is produced by a subsequent neutron capture on
plutonium-239. High concentrations of plutonium-240 are achieved at high burn-ups of
reactor fuel, which are typical of nuclear power reactors.
78. Plutonium is stored as plutonium dioxide. Because of corrosion, spent fuel from pluto-
nium production reactors cannot be stored for more than 18 months and must be reprocessed.
The reactors will continue to operate (and produce plutonium) lUltil replaced. U.S. and
Russian experts are also working to convert the cores of these reactors to different fuel to
improve their safety and stop the production of weapons-grade plutonium.
79. D. Albright, F. Berkhout, and W. Walker, Plutonium and Highly-Enriched Uranium 1996
World Inventories, Capabilities, and Politics (SIPRI, Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 54,
113.
80. Yeo G. DzeklUl, "The practice of fissile material management at the PO Mayak," in
Proceedings of the Workshop on Reprocessing of Spent Fuel, Storage and Utilization of
Reactor- and Weapons-Grade Plutonium, December 14-16, 1992, Center for Arms Control
Studies, Moscow.
81. It is assumed that Russia's nuclear arsenal will shrink from 35,000 to 10,000 warheads
in the arms reduction process. It is also assumed that a nuclear warhead contains on average
20 kilograms of HEU and 4 kilograms of plutonium.
82. As of early 1995, there were approximately 23,000 containers of HEU and plutonium
in storage at Tomsk-7 (Yadernyi Control, no. 2 (February 1995), p. 3).
83. According to the plan, four BN-800 reactors were to be constructed in Chelyabinsk-65
and one at the Beloyarsk nuclear power plant site.
84. However, any plutonium (with the exception of that with high concentrations of
plutonium-238) can be used to manufacture a nuclear explosive device (see C. Mark,
"Explosive properties of reactor-grade plutonium," Science and Global Security, 4 (1993),
pp.111-128).
85. Tritium has a relatively short half-life of 12.4 years and therefore has to be replenished
to maintain a nuclear arsenal. Tritium requirements can also be met by recycling tritium from
retired weapons.
87. Kruglov, How the Soviet Atomic Industry Was Created, pp. 53-84.
88. Cochran et al., Making the Russian Bomb, pp. 76-79.
89. The first third-generation reactor (EI-2) was brought on line in September 1958 in
Tomsk-7.
90. M. V. Gladyshev, Plutoniy dlya atomnoy bomby (Plutonium for the atomic bomb) (TsNI-
latominform, 1996) p. 8.
91. In an acidic environment, ion exchange resins disintegrate with an emission of gases. A
failure to remove these gases can result in a pressure increase sufficient to cause structural
damage. Such an accident took place in Chelyabinsk-65 in 1965. An accwnulation of gases
Notes 601
caused an explosion in an ion exchange column, which penetrated the upper level of
the canyon building and landed on its roof (Gladyshev, Plutonium for the Atomic Bomb,
p.58).
92. The Institute of Inorganic Materials also was the lead institute for developing the
tedmologies to extract tritium and poloniwn-210 from irradiated lithiwn and bismuth
targets. The tritium and polonium projects were implemented lUlder the leadership of
z. V. Ershova.
93. In earlier years, the facility was also known as Base No. 10 and later as Combine 817
and the Mendeleyev State Chemical Plant.
94. The IR-AI reactor was also used for testing of new fuels.
95. In the initial period of Plant B's operation, more than 6,000 workers received a radia-
tion dose of more than 100 rem; some groups of workers at the reactor and radiochemical
plants received doses in excess of 400 rem; and 2,089 workers developed radiation-induced
health problems. The production of plutonium at the plant was accompanied by a number
of explosions and criticality events. The most significant accident was the explosion of a
highly radioactive waste storage tank on 29 September 1957. The explosion released 20
megacuries of radioactivity. Of this amolUlt, approximately 2 megacuries subsequently fell
out in a 105 by 89 kilometer footprint. The contaminated area became known as the East
Urals Radioactive Footprint (Cochran et al., Making the Russian Bomb, pp. 96-99).
96. Presumably, metallic plutonium was initially produced from plutonium fluorides by
reduction by calcium. A more modern technology involves electrolytic deposition of pluto-
nium from a molten salt solution (V. S. Yemelyanov and A. I. Yevstyakhin, The Metallurgy
of Nuclear Fuel (Pergamon Press, 1969), pp. 514-523; see also "Reconstruction of Histori-
cal Rocky Flats Operations and Identification of Release Points," ChemRisk, August 1992,
pp. 60-67).
97. Kruglov, How the Soviet Atomic Industry Was Created, p. 240.
98. The history of heavy-water reactors in Russia is described in ibid., pp. 230-240.
99. The Ludmila reactor is also known as the LF-2 reactor (Cochran et al., Making the
Russian Bomb, p. 79).
100. Ibid., p. 76.
101. "The Mayak Production Association: 45 Years," prospectus, ]lUle 12, 1993.
102. V. N. Mikhailov, E. V. Bogdan, V. M. Murogov et al., "Utilization of Plutonium in
Russia's Nuclear Power Industry," Post-Soviet Nuclear Complex Monitor, 18 March 1994,
pp.9-17.
103. Plutonium from the RT-l reprocessing plant is stored in special stainless steel contain-
ers (less than 3 kilograms per container). The containers (approximately 12,000) are located
in metal-lined concrete trenches. To minimize the radiation exposure of the plant's person-
nel, the trenches are covered by heavy plates made of lead and plastic. The facility is designed
not to flood and to withstand earthquakes of up to 6-7 magnitude on the Richter scale.
It is equipped with temperature control, cooling, and air quality control systems (Ye. G.
Dzehm, "The Practice of Fissile Material Management at the PO Mayak," in Proceedings
of the Workshop on Reprocessing of Spent Fuel, Storage and Utilization of Reactor- and
Weapons-Grade Plutoniwn, December 14-16, 1992, Center for Arms Control Studies,
602 Notes
Moscow; see also V. F. Zhukov, "Sistema ucheta, kontrolya i fizzashchity dioksida plutoniya
i puti ee sovershenstvovaniya na zavode RT-l" (The system of material protection, control,
and accOlUlting for plutonium dioxide at the RT-l plant and ways to improve it), Report to
the Conference on Nuclear Material Protection, Control, and AccOlUlting, Obninsk, March
9-14, 1997).
104. The facility will be located inside a separate protected area with the Chelyabinsk-65
combine. The lUldergrOlUld bLmker that houses the facility will include isolated storage areas
and principal support equipment. Additional equipment will be located in above-grolUld
buildings. There will be no actual plutonium processing inside the facility. If necessary (for
example, in the event of a container leakage), plutonium-processing operations will be carried
out at the plutonium-processing facilities of Chelyabinsk-65. (V. A. Golozubov, "Osnovnye
printsipy proektirovaniya rossiiskogo khranilishcha oruzheinykh delyaschikhsya materialov"
(Design principles for the Russian storage facility for fissile materials from weapons), in
Proceedings of the Workshop on Reprocessing of Spent Fuel, Storage and Utilization of
Reactor- and Weapons-Grade Plutonium, December 14-16, 1992, Center for Arms Control
Studies, Moscow, pp. 71-76).
105. The closed city of Tomsk-7 (Seversk) is 12 kilometers from Tomsk. The original name
of the facility was Combine 816.
106. Cochran et al., Making the Russian Bomb, p. 141.
107. A. Bieniawski and V. Balamutov, "HEU Purchase Agreement," Journal of Nuclear
Materials Management (February 1997), pp. 7-8. See also V. Privalikhin, "Perekuyem
mechi na orala" (Swords to plowshares), Rossiyskaya Gazeta, no. 223, 21 November 1996,
p.2.
108. The closed city of Krasnoyarsk-26 (Zheleznogorsk) is located on the Yenisey River,
65 kilometers from Krasnoyarsk. The facility's original name was Combine 815.
109. By USSR Council of Ministers' Decree No. 826/302 cdop of 26 February 1950.
110. The ADE-l reactor was designed and built as a dual-purpose reactor with a closed
primary circuit but was used as a once-through reactor.
111. Cochran et al., Making the Russian Bomb, pp. 153-154.
112. "On State Support of the Structural Re-configuration and Defense Conversion of the
Atomic Industry in Zheleznogorsk of the Krasnoyarsk Region," Decree of the President of
the Russian Federation no. 72, January 25, 1995.
113. For a detailed description of the early history of the gaseous-diffusion technology and
the uranium enrichment industry, see N. M. Sinev, Obogashchennyi uran dlya atomnogo
oruzhiya i energetiki: k istorii sozdaniya v SSSR promyshlennoy tekhnologii proizvodstva
vysokoobogaschennogo urana (1945-1952 gg.) (Enriched Uranium for Atomic Weapons and
Nuclear Power: On the History of the Soviet Industrial Technology and Infrastructure to
Produce Highly Enriched Uranium (1945-1952)) (TsNIIatominform, 1991), and Kruglov,
How the Soviet Atomic Industry Was Created.
114. At present, NIIEFA develops linear accelerators, equipment for thermonuclear fusion
research, and other types of research equipment.
115. M. Hibbs, "Russian data suggests seized Pu was enriched by Arzamas-16 calutron,"
Nuclear Fuel, 15 August 1994, pp. 9-10.
Notes 603
116. Albright et al., Plutonium and Highly-Enriched Uranium 1996 World Inventories,
p. 98. The first Soviet experiments using centrifuges to enrich uranium were carried out
by F. Lange, an immigrant from Germany, in the Kharkov Institute of Physics and Tech-
nology in the late 1930s (Sinev, Enriched Uranium for Atomic Weapons and Nuclear Power,
p.17).
117. "Conversion and enrichment in the Soviet Union," Nuexco Monthly Report, no. 272,
April 1991.
118. Gaseous-diffusion machines are currently used for removal of chemical impurities from
uranium feed and a number of other auxiliary ftUlctions.
119. Yeo Mikerin, V. Bazhenov, and G. Solovyev, "Directions in the development of uranium
enrichment technology," 1993. According to this paper, the transition to the centrifuge
technology reduced the energy consumption by a factor of 8.2 and increased the overall
enrichment capacity by a factor of 2.4.
120. Ibid.
121. The plant was also known as Plant 813.
122. As of 1997, the Sverdlovsk-44 plant had contracts with Nuclear Electric (United
Kingdom), Enusa (Spain), an entity in Sweden, U.S. companies (six contracts total), and
Siemens (Germany). In addition, the plant was enriching Urenco's tails to the level of natural
uranium ("Western enrichment contracts strengthen," Nuclear Engineering International
(November 1997), p. 4).
123. Sinev, Enriched Uranium for Atomic Weapons and Nuclear Power, p. 122.
124. Under a contract with Cogema, Tomsk-7 re-enriches up to 500 tons of uranium per
year. (Assuming that the tails and feed assays are 0.3 and 1.2 percent uraniwn-235,
Tomsk-7 returns to Cogema approximately 110 tons of 4.4 percent enriched uraniwn
per year.) (Cochran et al., Making the Russian Bomb, p. 188).
125. "Tomsk expects to earn $80 million in exports," UX Weekly, 2 October 1995, p. 3.
126. In the United States, three national laboratories design nuclear weapons. The Los
Alamos National Laboratory, established in Los Alamos, New Mexico, in 1942, designed
the first nuclear bomb. The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, established in
1952 not far from San Francisco, California, became the second nuclear weapons design
laboratory. Los Alamos and Livermore have been working on nuclear weapons in parallel
and are responsible for their corresponding designs. The Sandia National Laboratories were
established in 1945 in Albuquerque, New Mexico, to provide engineering support to Los
Alamos. Sandia also has a branch in Livermore. Sandia designs mechanical, automatic, and
electronic components of nuclear weapons and integrates physics packages with weapon
systems.
127. Special Committee selected the location for KB-ll on 13 April 1946. The location was
approved by commission Decision no. 21 (18 May 1946). The USSR COlUlcil of Ministers
issued Decree No. 1286-525, establishing KB-ll, on 21 ]lUle 1946. On 26 ]lUle 1946, the
COlUlcil of Ministers issued an order to the PGU, which specified the structure of the Design
Bureau. KB-ll was established as a branch of the PGUs Laboratory No. 2.
128. L. Saratova, "Muzeynyi aisberg" (Museum's iceberg), Gorodskoi Kuryer, no. 80
19 October 1995, p. 13.
604 Notes
129. S. Pestov, Bomba: Sekrety i strasti atomnoy preispodney (The Bomb: Secrets and
Passions of Hell) (Shans, 1995), p. 284.
130. V. Gubarev, Yadernyi vek: Bomba (The Nuclear Century: The Bomb) (IzdAT, 1995),
pp. 128, 320.
131. Ibid., p. 138. See also A. Yemelyanenkov and V. Popov, eds., Atom bez grifa sekretno:
tochki zreniya (Atom without the Stamp "Secret": Points of View) (Moscow-Berlin, 1992),
p.33.
132. It is assumed that VNIIEF's structure parallels that of VNIITF, which is outlined in
Sovershenno Otkryto, no. 4, p. 17.
133. Slovo 0 Zababakhine: Vospominaniya (The Word about Zababakhin: Recollections)
(TsNIIatominform, 1995), p. 138.
134. Yu. Zavalisrun, Obyekt 551 (Installation 551) (Krasny Oktyabr, 1996), p. 75.
135. It is assumed that VNIIEF's NIO-4 responsibilities are similar to those of the NIO-4
division of VNIITF (Sovershenno Otkryto, no. 4, p. 17).
136. Saratova, "Museum's iceberg." See also I. Mosin, "V tem yadernoy bomby" (In the
shadow of the atomic bomb), Pravda, 8 August 1992, p. 3.
137. Yemelyanenkov and Popov, Atom without the Stamp "Secret," p. 33.
138. Ibid.
139. Ibid.
140. Gubarev, Nuclear Century, p. 192.
141. Ibid., p. 216.
142. Ibid., p. 64.
143. Ibid., p. 79.
144. Ibid., p. 128.
145. From 1955 to 1964 the institute was known as NIl-lOll. From 1964 to 1992, its name
was the All-Union Research Institute of Device Building (VNIIP).
146. In 1997, Snezhinsk had a population of 49,000. Of those, 11,000 worked in the
institute ("Minatom-50 Years," exhibition, Polytechnic Museum, Moscow, August
1996).
147. "Russian Federal Nuclear Center-VNII of Technical Physics: Science and information
bulletin," VNIITF, Snezrunsk, 1998, p. 52.
148. The Word about Zababakhin, p. 138. See also Gubarev, Nuclear Century, pp. 128,
320.
149. "VNII Avtomatiki," prospectus.
150. Atompressa,4 (335), February 1999.
151. Atompressa, 8 (339), March 1999.
152. Yu. K. Zavalishin, "Avangard-Pervyi Serinyi ... (Avangard-The First Serial ... ),"
Atom (January 1996), pp. 11-12.
153. The USSR COlUlcil of Ministers issued a decree to build the plant on 20 July 1954.
Construction began in early 1955 (Sovershenno Otkryto, May 1995, p. 26).
Notes 605
154. Mikhailov and Petrosyants, Creation of the First Soviet Nuclear Bomb, p. 337. In
the late 1950s, Plant 48 was expanded and a new building was built to produce automatic
subassemblies for weapons as well as equipment for other plants of the Sixth Main
Directorate.
155. B. V. Gorobets, "Zadacha-Sokhrarut Potentsial" (The task is to preserve the poten-
tial), Atompressa, 21 (121), June 1994.
156. Pestov, The Bomb, p. 385. The decision to begin construction of the plant was made
even earlier, in March 1949 (Negin, Kulichkov et al., Soviet Atomic Project, p. 135).
157. Pestov, The Bomb, p. 385.
158. The first serially produced weapon was the RDS-3T bomb, the production of which
began in 1954 (M. Rebrov, "Bomby trekh pokoleniy" (Bombs of the three generations),
Krasnaya Zvezda, 27 October 1992, p. 2).
159. Negin, Kulichkov et al., Soviet Atomic Project, p. 190. The composite uraruum-
plutonium design of the RDS-3 device required significantly less plutonium, which
allowed the Soviet Union to increase the weapons stockpile without exceeding the capacity
of the plutoniwn production complex. In addition, the RDS-3 design had improved safety
features over the RDS-2. These two factors led to the replacement of the RDS-2 with the
RDS-3.
160. Ibid., p. 192.
161. M. Rebrov, '" Arzamas,' rezhimnyi 'Avangard'" (" Arzamas," secret "Avangard"),
Krasnaya Zvezda, 14 September 1994, p. 3.
162. I. Ushakov, "Zhemchuzruna oboronki" (The pearl ofthe defense industry), Sovershenno
Otkryto, no. 5 (1995), pp. 14-17.
163. Yu. Zavalishin, Installation 551, p. 200.
164. Ibid., p. 193.
165. Ibid., p. 194.
166. Ibid., pp. 202-204.
167. Ibid., p. 201.
169. V. N. Mikhailov, ed., Yadernye ispytaniya SSSR (Soviet Nuclear Tests) (IzdAT, 1997),
p. 67. See also Pestov, The Bomb, p. 387.
170. Negin, Kulichkov et al., Soviet Atomic Project, p. 192. Prior to the establishment of
this military certification organization, the quality control ftmction was implemented by a
special department of the KB-ll.
171. Mikhailov, Soviet Nuclear Tests, p. 67.
172. Ibid.
173. I. D. Sergeyev, ed., Khronika osnovnykh sobytii istorii Raketnykh voisk strate-
gicheskogo naznacheniya (Chronicles of Main Events in the History of the Strategic Rocket
Forces) (RVSN, 1994), pp. 9, 19.
174. Ibid., p. 9.
175. General Eugene Habiger, Department of Defense News Briefing, 16 ]tme 1998.
606 Notes
176. In the Ministry of Defense, nuclear weapons are controlled by the 12th Main Direc-
torate (N. Poroskov, "Nastupit li v Rossii Chas Iks?" (Will Russia's Hour X come?), Kras-
naya Zvezda, 16 January 1996). According to Soviet military practices, this means that this
directorate is a customer of the nuclear industry for nuclear weapons. However, in the ser-
vices, weapons are in the custody of the corresponding Sixth Directorates, which participate
in the development of nuclear weapons (Pestov, The Bomb, p. 388). Therefore, we assume
that technical requirements, as developed by Sixth Directorate's experts, become the basis for
the tactical and technical specifications for a new weapon that are provided by the 12th Main
Directorate to the nuclear industry.
177. Military representatives participate in the "development of technical requirements for
new types of products." In addition, representatives of the 12th Main Directorate participate
in Minatom's Scientific and Technical COlUlcil (Zavalishin, Installation 551, p. 80).
178. The Word about Zababakhin, p. 140.
179. For example, there are requirements on the "level of vibrations, dynamic loads, and
climate and use environment" (Gubarev, The Nuclear Century, p. 270).
181. Gubarev, The Nuclear Century, p. 316.
182. Zavalishin, Installation 551, p. 127.
183. Two theoretical research departments in the research institutes (NIO-l and NIO-2)
work in parallel. See The Word about Zababakhin, p. 138. At earlier stages of the Soviet
weapons development program one of the departments was responsible for primary design
and the other was responsible for designing secondaries. Later on, this distinction in respon-
sibilities disappeared. See Bomba-dva, Studiya "Nekos" (Bomb-Two, Nekos Studio) (IzdAT,
1994), p. 10.
185. Ibid.
186. Ibid., pp. 275, 278-279, 281, 320; The Word about Zababakhin, p. 78; Zavalishin,
Installation 551, p. 76.
187. The Word about Zababakhin, p. 78; see also Gubarev, The Nuclear Century, p. 306.
191. Saratova, "Musewn's iceberg."
192. Ibid.
194. Ibid.
195. Ibid., p. 275.
196. Ibid., p. 334.
197. Ibid., p. 20l.
198. See, for example, V. S. Gubarev, Arzamas-16 (IzdAT, 1992), p. 97.
Notes 607
199. The open literature cites atleast one example of such joint work. Gubarev, The Nuclear
Century, p. 254.
200. Zavalishin, Installation 551, p. 78.
201. Ibid., pp. 113, 118-119.
202. Ibid., p. 127.
203. Ibid., p. 125.
204. S. A. Zelentsov, presentation at the international workshop "Problems of U.S.-Russian
Relationships," Moscow, 25 ]lUle 1996.
205. Lieutenant-General!. Valynkin, Parliamentary hearings, "Problems of Nuclear Objects
Safety," Yadernyi Kontrol (May 1995), p. 9.
206. Ibid., p. 5.
207. For a discussion of the Soviet and Russian nuclear warhead storage infrastructure,
see]. Handler, "Russian nuclear warhead dismantlement rate and storage site capacity:
Implications for the implementation of START II and de-alerting initiatives," CEES Report,
Princeton University, February 1999.
209. Interview with Evgeni Maslin, Yadernyi Kontrol (May 1995), p. 9.
210. CISINPIC, photographic intelligence report, "Regional nuclear weapons storage site
near Berdichev, USSR, May 1963." In "CORONA: America's First Satellite Program," CSI
CIA, Washington, 1995, pp. 169-174.
212. Poroskov, "Will Russia's Hour X come?" p. 2.
213. This description of warhead dismantlement operations is taken from a discussion of
procedures for dismantling U.S. nuclear warheads in K. Cameron, "Taking apart the bomb,"
Popular Science (April 1993), pp. 64-69. Although specific operations for taking apart
Russian weapons may be somewhat different, the general principles are probably similar for
both U.S. and Russian warheads.
214. Experts from Arzamas-16 have developed AT-400R-type containers for fissile materials
from weapons. An AT-400R container is a double-walled vessel of stainless steel. The outer
vessel is a reinforced tube (505 millimeters long and 495 millimeters in diameter). The inner
vessel is made of three-millimeter-thick steel and is 300 millimeters long and 280 millimeters
in diameter. The container's lid, which is welded shut, has a device for monitoring the
environment inside the container. The space between the inner and outer vessels is filled with
fireproof polyurethane (briefing, Los Alamos National Laboratory, September 1993).
Chapter 4. The Strategic Rocket Forces
1. Yu. P. Maksimov, ed., Raketnyye voyska strategicheskogo naznacheniya (The Strategic

Rocket Forces) (RVSN, 1992), pp. 12-14.
2. In particular, S. P. Korolev, V. P. Glushko, B. V. Raushenbakh, and Yu. A. Pobedonostsev
worked in RNIIINII-3. Another organization that made a significant contribution to rocket
development was the design bureau headed by V. F. Bolkhovitinov. Projects in the use of
608 Notes
liquid-propellant rocket engines on airplanes were lalUlched at Bolkhovitinov's design

bureau in 1940-1941. In 1944 Bolkhovitinov's design bureau and the NII-3 were wlited
and turned over to the People's Commissariat of the Aviation Industry as NIl-I. A. M.
Isayev, K. D. Bushuyev, and V. P. Mishin came to rocket technology from Bolkhovitinov's
design bureau.
3. The immediate reason for the studies of German rocket hardware was a message from
W. Churchill to I. V. Stalin on 13 July 1944 requesting that British experts be allowed to
inspect the German rocket test range in Poland, which had been taken over by Soviet troops.
4. Nezavisimaya gazeta, 24 February 1995, p. 2.
5. A missile system is the missile itself and all of the equipment required to keep the missile
ready for lalUlch and to conduct the lalUlch.
6. The USSR COlUlcil of Ministers decree on the creation of the R-l missile was signed on
14 April 1948, when the work had already reached an advanced stage.
7. The letters and nwnbers in parentheses are the common U.S. designations of Soviet mis-
siles.
8. Raketno-kosmicheskaya korporatsiya "Energiya" imeni S. P. Koroleva (The Korolev
"Energiya" Space Rocket Corporation), 1996, pp. 31-33. A different date for the adoption
of the R-l, 28 November 1950, is cited in Maksimov, The Strategic Rocket Forces, p. 39.
9. Strictly speaking, warhead separation was first tested on the experimental R-IA missile,
but this work was conducted as part of the work on the R-2 missile. The oxidizer tank
remained separate from the missile body, because development of an integrated tank for the
cryogenic oxidizer (liquid oxygen) was much more difficult than that of an integrated fuel
tank.
10. "Energiya" Space Rocket Corporation, pp. 31-33.
11. Maksimov, The Strategic Rocket Forces, p. 70.
12. It took 35 lalUlches before the missile was accepted for service. Six of those were fail-
ures. B. Yeo Chertok, Rakety i lyudi (Missiles and Men) (Mashinostroyeniye, 1994), p. 374.
14. "Energiya" Space Rocket Corporation, p. 46.
15. The year 1953 is cited in Chertok, Missiles and Men, p. 304, as the date of the com-
pletion of the work in both areas. The period from 1953 to 1956 is cited in "Energiya" Space
Rocket Corporation, p. 38, but only the Geran project is mentioned. It also says that the
radioactive substance was either sprayed or dispersed by a conventional explosive charge.
16. Yu. A. Moszhorin, quoted in Nachalo kosmicheskoy ery: Vospominaniya veteranov
raketno-kosmicheskoy tekhniki i kosmonavtiki (The Dawn of the Space Age: Recollections
of Veterans of Space Rocket Technology and Cosmonautics), no. 2 (1994), p. 262.
17. With a calculated maximwn range of 8,000 kilometers, the R-7 missile from this
base could have reached the northern part of the United States, above the Seattle-Chicago-
Washington arc.
18. According to many accolUlts, an R-7A missile on the Baykonur range was being
prepared for lalUlch at the time of the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962. It should be
noted, however, that the missile was not delivered to the lalUlch pad. See, for example, V. M.
Notes 609
Bryushnin, Proryv v kosmos: Ocherki ob ispytatelyakh, spetsialistakh i stroitetyakh kos-

modroma Baykonur (Breaking through the Space Barrier: Essays on the Personnel, Special-
ists, and Builders of Baykonur) (SVKB, 1994), p. 105.
19. Although they were the first intercontinental missiles, the R-7 and R-7A are not catego-
rized as first-generation systems because they were ineffective and were deployed only on a
limited scale. The classification of generations here is taken from N. N. Smirnrtskiy, "K istorii
sozdaniya raketnykh kompleksov strategicheskogo naznacheniya" (On the history of the
creation of strategic missile systems), Glazami ochevidtsev: Vospominaniya ispytateley
kosmodroma Baykonur (Eyewitness Accounts: Recollections of the Baykonur Personnel),
no. 2 (1994), p. 9.
20. The fire and the explosion of the missile on the lalUlch pad killed 92 to 150 people,
including the RVSN commander-in-chief, Chief Marshal of Artillery M. I. Nedelin, and the
chief designer of the control and guidance system, B. M. Konoplev. It was the biggest cata-
strophe in the history of world rocket engineering.
21. The level of protection of missiles located on exposed lalUlch sites in relation to the
pressure blast at the front of the shock wave was arolUld 0.2 atmospheres. In other words,
a I-megaton weapon would have destroyed all of the missiles within a radius of arolUld 5
kilometers. The Jupiter and Thor intermediate-range missiles and the Atlas ICBM the United
States had in 1958-1959 had a maximum error of 3 kilometers and warheads with a yield
of 1-3 megatons. See Ye B. Volkov, ed., MER SSSR (RF) i SShA (ICBMs of the USSR (Russian
Federation) and United States) (RVSN, 1996), pp. 74, 91, 99.
22. According to Western sources, the maximum number of deployed R-12/R-12U missiles
was 608 in 1965-1966, and the number then decreased to 568 by 1969 and stayed at that
levellUltil 1977. There was a corresponding pattern in the number of deployed R-14/R-14U
missiles: After reaching a maximwn of 97 between 1965 and 1969, the number of deployed
wlits was steady at 90 from 1971 to 1977. T. Cochran, W Arkin, R. Norris, and]. Sands,
Nuclear Weapons Databook, Vol. 4: Soviet Nuclear Weapons (Ballinger, 1988), p. 191.
23. The R-9A missile was the first to use liquid oxygen in a supercooled state. Later the
tedmology was used in the N-l heavy space lallllch vehicle.
24. OKB-52 was part of the State Committee for Aviation Technology, and OKB-l and
OKB-586 were subordinated to the State Committee for Defense Technology.
25. The combat readiness of a missile system is measured by the interval between the trans-
mission of the lalUlch command and the lalUlch.
26. The level of protection of the silo lalUlcher was only a few atmospheres-that is, the kill
radius of warheads with a yield of 1 megaton was reduced to only 2 kilometers. Volkov,
ICBMs of the USSR (Russian Federation) and the United States, p. 74.
27. V. Pappo-Korystin, V. Platonov, and V. Pashchenko, Dneprovsky raketno-kosmicheskiy
tsentr (The Dneprovsk Space Rocket Center) (PO YuMZ KBYu, 1994), p. 159.
28. Cochran et al., Soviet Nuclear Weapons, p. 102.
29. A special commission headed by M. V. Keldysh was formed in the early 1960s to con-
sider whether it was necessary to build hardened silo lalUlchers with a protection level of
more than 2 atmospheres. The commission was tmable to reach an lUlequivocal conclusion
in support of hardened lalUlchers. As a result, the more economical model of a silo lalUlcher
with a low level of protection was chosen instead.
610 Notes
30. Iz istorii aviatsii i kosmonavtiki (From the History of Aviation and Space Travel),
no. 68-69, Moscow, HET RAN, 1996, p. 18.
32. Yu. A. Moszhorin, interview during the 20th Conference on Cosmonautics, IIET RAN,
January 1996.
33. The 308 heavy missile lalUlchers did not include the 18 lalUlchers of the orbital R-36
missiles. These lalUlchers, located on the Baykonur test range, were eliminated or converted
after the SALT II Treaty was signed.
34. At the highest level of the military-political leadership, CPSU Central Committee Secre-
tary D. F. Ustinov supported Yangel and Minister of Defense A. A. Gredlko supported
Chelomey. See Dorogi v kosmos (Roads to Space), vol. 1 (Izdatelstvo MAl, 1992), p. 149.
35. These three combat missile systems were completed and adopted simultaneously largely
because the current five-year plan, which was ending in December 1975, apparently included
the completion of these projects. The accelerated development schedule created by the
impending end of the five-year plan allowed certain design flaws in the UR-I00N to escape
notice, as discussed below.
36. The information about the adoption of the Temp-2S system is contradictory. It is quite
possible that the system was approved for use but was never deployed or was deployed on
an extremely limited scale.
37. S. G. Kolesnikov, Strategicheskoye raketno-yadernoye oruzhiye (Strategic Nuclear
Missiles) (Arsenal-Press, 1996), p. 88.
39. With a maximum error of more than 1 kilometer (the accuracy of Minuteman 11), a level
of lalUlcher protection of several dozen atmospheres secured a probable survivability rate of
40 to 60 percent. The reduction of the maximum error to 0.3-0Akm-characteristic of the
Minuteman III, the MX, and the Trident-2-put the probable survivability of silo lalUlchers
at no more than 5 percent, even with a protection level of 100 atmospheres.
40. The MX Peacekeeper missile was eventually deployed in fixed lalUlchers only. The
development of the Midgetman grolUld-lalUlched mobile system was halted in 1990.
41. Because the SALT II Treaty prohibited the creation of more than one new ICBM (which
for the Soviet Union was the RT-23UTTH), the Soviet Union called the Topol (SS-25) system
a modification ofthe RS-12 (RT-2P, SS-13) missile. Accordingly, the Topol system was called
RS-12M (RT-2PM).
43. The data presented here were taken from the memorandum of agreement on the START
I Treaty and reflect the status of the Strategic Rocket Forces in September 1990. The actual
number of weapons could differ from the "collllted" number. All heavy ICBMs were con-
sidered to be carrying 1 0 independently targetable warheads, although some were actually
single-warhead missiles. The UR-I00U missile, equipped with three warheads of the disper-
sion type, was cOlUlted as a single-warhead missile.
44. The term "heavy missiles" in the START I Treaty referred to missiles with a lallllch weight
in excess of 106 tons or a throw weight in excess of 4.35 tons-that is, all Soviet missiles
heavier than the UR-l00NUTTH.
Notes 611
45. The START I ceiling on the number of warheads on mobile missiles-l,100-is observed
automatically, because the Topol systems deployed today carry 369 warheads and the
rail-based RT-23/RT-23UTTH systems carry 360, for a total of 729.
46. V. Sergeyev, "Russia Is Buying Strategic Bombers and Missiles from Ukraine,"
Segodnya, 21 December 1995, p. 1.
47. According to the START II Treaty, the total number of strategic warheads should
not exceed 3,000-3,500. In addition, no more than 1,750 can be deployed on SLBMs. This
leaves 1,250-1,750 for ICBMs and bombers, but no more than 500 of those can actually be
deployed on bombers.
48. I. D. Sergeyev, ed., Khronika osnovnykh sobytii istorii Raketnykh voisk strategicheskogo
naznacheniya (Chronicle of Main Events in RVSN History) (RVSN, 1994), pp. 5-6.
49. Sergeyev, RVSN Chronicle, p. 7.
50. Maksimov, The Strategic Rocket Forces, pp. 40-41.
52. Meanwhile, three Supreme High Command Reserve engineering brigades, armed with
R-ll tactical missile systems, were turned over to the GrolUld Forces in 1958.
54. Ibid., p. 56.
55. Sergeyev, RVSN Chronicle, pp. 10-11.
58. Ibid., pp. 17-18.
60. Western publications refer to these armIes as the Northern, Southern, Moscow,
Central, Eastern, and Far Eastern armies (see Cochran et al., Soviet Nuclear Weapons,
p.53).
62. The Central Space Systems Directorate was also part of the RVSN from 1964 to
1982 (called the Main Space Systems Directorate, or GUKOS, after 1970) and was in
charge of space lalUlches and spacecraft guidance and control. In 1982 the Main Space
Systems Directorate became the independent Office of the Chief of Space Systems (UNKS),
directly accolUltable to the General Staff. In 1992 the office of the Chief of Space
Systems was reorganized as the Military Space Forces of the Russian Federation Ministry of
Defense.
63. The commanders-in-chief of the RVSN have been Chief Marshal of Artillery M. I.
Nedelin, Marshal of the Soviet Union K. S. Moskalenko, Marshal of the Soviet Union S. S.
Biryuzov, Marshal of the Soviet Union N. I. Krylov, Chief Marshal of Artillery V. F. Tolubko,
General of the Army Yu. P. Maksimov, General of the Army I. D. Sergeyev, General V. N.
Yakovlev, and General N. Solovtsov.
65. The directorate has now been renamed the Main Acquisitions Directorate.
612 Notes
66. It was the Office of the RVSN Chief Engineer from 4 November 1962 to 1 December
1968 and the Main Missile Armament Servicing and Maintenance Directorate from 1 Decem-
ber 1968 to 1993.
67. Krasnaya zvezda, 1 February 1997, p. 5. The Academy was previously known as
Dzerzhinskiy Academy.
68. Lt.-Gen. Igor Sergeyev, "Raketnyye voyska Rossii: segodnya i zavtra" (Russia's Rocket
Forces: Today and Tomorrow), Vestnik voennoy informatsii, no. 4 (April 1993), p. 3-1.
69. Segodnya, NTV, 17 December 1996, 21,00.
70. The data cited here and later correspond to the January 2001 memorandum.
71. This division was based in Tywnen lllltil 1964.
72. This division was based in Birobidzhan lllltil 1964.
73. Western sources previously cited its zone of deployment as Perm.
74. This division was based in Tomsk llllti11962. It is apparently the same division that was
previously said to be stationed in Gladkaya.
75. Krasnaya zvezda, 11 March 1997, p. 2.
76. This division was stationed in Nerchinsk lllltil 1965.
77. Western sources previously said it was stationed in Yedrovo.
78. Western sources previously said it was stationed in Verldmyaya Salda. This was origi-
nally the Pioneer system base.
79. Western sources previously said it was stationed in im. Gastello, a nearby small town.
80. Western sources previously said it was stationed in Derazhnaya.
81. The 27th Missile Division was turned over to the Military Space Forces and served as
the basis for State Test Lallllch Site No.2 (the Svobodnyy Lallllch Site). Five of the 60 exist-
ing UR-l OOK/UR-l OOU silo lallllchers will be converted for lallllches of the Rokot light space
lallllch vehicle, modeled on the UR-I00N missile.
82. Rossiyskaya gazeta, 1 February 1996, p. 1.
83. Kommersant-DAILY, 25 April 1997.
84. Krasnaya zvezda, 5 December 1996.
85. In some cases the Ministry of General Machine Building made the decision to order
sketches of a missile system.
86. The same official status was granted to the Special Committee created on 20 August
1945 for the coordination of nuclear weapon projects and Special Committee No.3, which
coordinated radar and air defense projects.
87. The exception was the USSR Ministry of Atomic Power Engineering and Industry (pre-
viously the Ministry of Medium Machine Building), which was reorganized as the Ministry
of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation.
88. The Russian Space Agency was established in 1992 to carry out nonmilitary space
programs. Prior to this, all space development projects were llllder the jurisdiction of the
Ministry of General Machine Building.
89. In the late 1940s and early 1950s the Ministry of Weapons was converted into the
Ministry of Defense Industry.
Notes 613
90. Now called the Academician V. P. Makeyev Machine-Building Design Bureau State
Missile Center.
91. Now called the Central Special Design Bureau (TsSKB).
92. This missile was called the SS-X-15 Scrooge in the NATO classification system.
93. Pappo-Korystin et al., Dneprovsk Space Rocket Center, p. 83. The development of
the "engine of the first stage of a solid-propellant missile for the Navy" was assigned to the
Yuzhnoye Design Bureau in September 1973. Firing tests of the missile's 3D65 engine began
in January 1980, and ilight tests of the same engine in a submarine-lalUlched missile began
in December 1981.
94. Pappo-Korystin et al., Dneprovsk Space Rocket Center, p. 108.
95. These missiles were developed in the Central Machine-Building Design Bureau and pro-
duced at the M. V. Khrwlichev Machine-Building Plant.
96. Kaliningrad was renamed Korolev by a presidential decree in 1996.
97. Istoriya Rossiiskogo NIl kosmicheskogo priborostroeniya (The History of Russia's Space
Device Research Institute), vol. 1 (RNIIKP, 1994), p. 21.
98. Volkov, ICBMs of the USSR (Russian Federation) and the United States, p. 138;
Maksimov, The Strategic Rocket Forces, p. 148; /zvestiya, 24 December 1997, p. 4.
99. Ballisticheskiye rakety podvodnykh Zodok: Izbrannye stat'i (Ballistic Missiles on Sub-
marines: Collected Papers) (Miass, 1994), p. 21; /zvestiya, 26 January 1994, p. 1.
100. Maksimov, The Strategic Rocket Forces, pp. 120-121.
101. Ibid., p. 152.
102. Ibid., p. 148.
103. P. Felgengauer, "Old tigers still have teeth," Moscow Times, 23 November 1995, p. 9.
The official extension of the service life was preceded by a 1995 experimentallalUlch of a
UR-I00NUTTH missile that had been on combat duty for 20 years and 8 months and by a
detailed in-plant analysis of two comparable missiles to confirm their operability. Another
training lalUlch of a UR-I00NUTTH ICBM that had been on combat duty for 20 years was
conducted in JlUle 1996 ("V yadernom schite proboin net" (No holes in the nuclear shield),
Rossiyskaya gazeta, 8 JlUle 1996, p. 1).
105. Alert duty for fixed-lalUlcher and rail-based missile systems is practiced at the level of
the regimental command post, controlling all regimental lalUlchers. Alert duty for grolUld-
mobile systems is in effect at each mobile lalUlcher.
107. /zvestiya, 15 November 1994, p. 7.
108. Ibid.
109. Segodnya, 23 February 1997, p. 1.
111. Segodnya, 23 February 1997, p. 1. The described procedures were demonstrated during
an inspection of the RVSN battle management system in the presence of the Prime Minister
V. S. Chernomyrdin on 22 February 1997.
614 Notes
112. /zvestiya, 15 November 1994, p. 7. The source refers to a rail-based system, but it also
applies to the grolUld-mobile systems.
114. Kommersant-DAILY, 25 April 1997, p. 5.
117. Krasnaya zvezda, 30 January 1997, p. 2.
118. In December 1990 an updated system was adopted and was called "Perimeter-RTs."
Pappo-Korystin et al., Dneprovsk Space Rocket Center, p. 105.
119. Volkov, ICBMs of the USSR (Russian Federation) and United States; "Energiya" Space
Rocket Corporation; Pappo-Korystin et al., Dneprovsk Space Rocket Center; Kolesnikov,
Strategic Nuclear Missiles; Cochran et al., Soviet Nuclear Weapons; and Sergeyev, RVSN
Chronicle. If the data in different sources are contradictory, the alternative data are cited in
the text with a reference to the corresponding source.
120. Neither of the propellant tanks on the first ballistic missiles-the German A-4 and the
Soviet R-l-were made integral with the missile body. Of the tanks of the R-2 missile only
the fuel tank was made integral.
121. Cochran et al., Soviet Nuclear Weapons.
122. In an open-cycle liquid-fuel engine, the gases powering the turbine of the turbopump
assembly are later expelled into the atmosphere. In a closed-cycle engine, the turbopwnp
exhaust gases are burned in the engine combustion chamber.
123. "Energiya" Space Rocket Corporation.
124. Pappo-Korystin et al., Dneprovsk Space Rocket Center.
126. Volkov, ICBMs of the USSR (Russian Federation) and the United States.
127. A. Matrenin and A. N. Mayorov, in Baykonur-chudo XX veka (Baykonur-A 20th
Century Wonder), compiled by M. I. Kuznetskiy and I. V. Strazhev (Sovremennyy Pisatel,
1995), p. 34.
129. Ibid.
133. Ibid.
137. Ibid.
Notes 615
140. Kolesnikov, Strategic Nuclear Missiles.
143. Sergeyev, RVSN Chronicle.
147. Ibid.
148. Ibid.
152. P. A. Tyurin, "Pervyi otechestvennyi morskoi strategicheskii tverdotoplivnyi raketnyi
kompleks D-ll" (The first domestic naval strategic solid-propellant missile system, the
D-11), Nevskiy bastion, no. 1 (1996), p. 24.
153. Iz istorii aviatsii i kosmonavtiki (From the History of Aviation and Space Travel),
no. 68-69, Moscow, HET RAN, 1996, p. 13.
156. Ibid.
157. Ibid.
162. The production of the third stage was prohibited because the intermediate-range Pioneer
missile (SS-20) was modeled on the first two stages of the Temp-2S missile system, and the
production of third stages could theoretically enable the Soviet Union to quickly convert the
two-stage Pioneer into intercontinental missiles.
163. Volkov, ICBMs of the USSR (Soviet Union) and the United States.
616 Notes
174. Ibid.
182. Steven Zaloga, "Molodets: Symbol of the Soviet Swan Song," Jane's Intelligence Review
(August 1996), p. 348.
185. The fact that the Topol system was called an updated version of the RT-2P was not
inconsistent with the terms of SALT II. The treaty did say, however, that the throw weight
of a "modernized" missile could not exceed that of its prototype by more than 5 percent,
and the missiles of the Topol system had almost twice the throw weight of the RT-2P.
187. According to the START I Treaty, a missile could be called a modification of the exist-
ing one if its throw weight did not exceed that of the original model by more than 21 percent.
The Topol-M missile thus satisfies the START I criteria for a modified missile.
Chapter 5. Naval Strategic Nuclear Forces
1. Germany began working on projects of this kind in 1942, but the idea was never imple-
mented (L. Kashcheyev, Germanskiye podvodnyye lodki: Vtoraya mirovaya voyna (German
Submarines: World War II) (Kharkov, 1994)). After the end of World War II, scientists in the
United States and the Soviet Union conducted in-depth studies of the German experience and
continued the research and development projects in this area.
2. In the 1950s NII-400 (now the Gidropribor Central Scientific Research Institute in St.
Petersburg) was the head enterprise of the shipbuilding industry developing naval weapons
and ammwlition.
3. Yeo Shitikov, "Novaya Zemlya: V interesakh Flota" (Novaya Zemlya: In the interest of
the fleet), Morskoi Sbornik, no. 8 (1994), pp. 69-7l.
4. Ibid.
5. The submarine was the S-144 of the Project 613 (Whiskey) class. Ibid.
6. NII-4 of the Navy (now the Scientific Research Institute of Armaments) was the head naval
organization in charge of the development of naval armaments.
Notes 617
7. Central Design Bureau No. 18 was at that time the only design bureau in the Soviet Union
working on submarine designs.
8. Cruise missiles were called aircraft projectiles lUltil the middle of the 1950s. Lastochka
was a modification of the 10Kh cruise missile designed by OKB-52 (Chief Designer Y. N.
Chelomey).
9. P. Z. Golosovskiy, Ocherki po istorii LPMB "Rubin". Istoriya proektirovaniya i stroitel-
stva podvodnykh Zodok: Dizel-elektricheskiye podvodnyye Zodki 1945-1971 (Notes on the
History of the Rubin LPMB. The History of Submarine Design and Engineering: The Diesel-
Electric Submarines of 1945-1971) (Leningrad, 1986), p. 27.
10. Central Design Bureau No. 16 (now part of the Malakhit Naval Machine-Building
Bureau in St. Petersburg) designed cruisers and destroyers prior to 1953.
11. A. A. Zapolskiy, Rakety startuyut s morya (Missiles Are LalUlched from Sea) (SPMBM
Malakhit, 1993), p. 15.
12. The ballistic missile was designed to be lalUlched from a submarine with swells of up to
5 points. This means rolling of up to 12° and pitching of up to 6°. The free-swinging test
wlit on the test range was supposed to simulate the heaving of the ship (Ibid., p. 31).
13. Project AV-611 was a modification of the Project V-611 submarine.
14. The USSR COlUlcil of Ministers decree on the development of the R-IIFM ballistic
missile with a nuclear warhead was published in July 1955. The final test of the D-l system
was to include lalUlching of the R-IIFM from a submarine on the Novaya Zemlya test site
with the detonation of the nuclear warhead. The lallllch position and battlefield for the
R-IIFM were chosen in summer 1957. The test was scheduled for the third quarter of
1958 (Shitikov, "Novaya Zemlya").
15. The missile was fired from the K-I02 submarine (Shitikov, "Novaya Zemlya").
16. G. G. Kostev, "Morskiye strategicheskiye: Stranitsy istorii i razvitiya" (Naval strategic
forces: Stages in their history and development), Morskoi sbornik, no. 10 (1994), pp. 6-12.
17. Adjacent seas are the ones bordering on a state and adjoining seas are the seas border-
ing on the adjacent seas. The Barents Sea, Sea of Okhotsk, Laptev Sea, and others are
adjacent seas to the Soviet Union. Adjoining seas include the North Sea, the Sea of Norway,
and the Sea of Japan.
18. Another acronym, RPLSN (strategic missile-armed submarine), was used for Soviet
missile-armed submarines of the first generation.
19. The term "bastions" is commonly used in Western sources. In Russian these areas are
called "fortified region."
20. "A pervyi start byl samym trudnym" (The first lalUlch was the hardest), Krasnaya zvezda,
17 June 1995, p. 1.
21. The problem of finding an opening in the ice cover for a missile lalUlch led to experi-
ments in surfacing through the ice. Several ice-breaking experiments were conducted in the
Arctic in 1980-1981. The main problem with a submarine's breaking ice to surface was that
this left heavy chLmks of ice on the missile deck after surfacing that could not be cleared off
quickly enough. A solution to this problem was eventually folUld, and the first lalUlch of an
R-29 missile from the Arctic zone was conducted on 3 July 1981. The missile was lalUlched
nine minutes after the transmission of the lalUlch command (Y. K. Korobov, "Podvodnyi
618 Notes
kreiser strategicheskogo naznacheniya" (The strategic submarine cruiser), Vestnik RAN, 66,
no. 11 (1996), pp. 1027-1031).
22. The Project 941 submarines required a special classification term, and these cruisers
began to be referred to as "heavy" (S. Ptichkin, "Otets 'Taiftma'" (The Father of the
"Typhoon"), Voyennyi parad (July-August 1994), pp. 190-192).
23. A. M. Petrov, D. A. Aseyev, and E. M. Vasiliyev, Oruzhiye Rossiiskogo {lota (Russian
Fleet Armaments) (Sudostroyenie, 1996), pp. 236-237; V. P. Kuzin and V. I. Nikolskiy,
Voyenno-morskoy flot SSSR 1945-1991 (The Soviet Navy 1945-1991) (Istoricheskoye
Morskoye Obschestvo, 1996), p. 332.
24. A. V. Karpenko, Rossiyskoye raketnoye oruzhiye 1943-93 (Russian Missile Armaments
1943-93), (Pika, 1993).
25. Kuzin and Nikolskiy, Soviet Navy, pp. 60, 78-80.
26. A. Shirokorad, "Rakety nad morem" (Missiles over the sea), Tekhnika i oruzhiye, no. 2
(1996).
27. The K-140 missile-armed submarine of the Project 667 class was refitted according to
the new Project 667AM (Yankee II) design in 1980 and equipped with the D-ll missile
system, the first Soviet missile system with solid-propellant R-31 (SS-N-17) missiles.
28. A. M. Ovcharenko, "Perspektivy morskikh strategicheskikh sil Rossii" (Prospects for
Russia's naval strategic nuclear forces), Nezavisimaya gazeta, 6 September 1994, p. 5.
29. Memorandum of Understanding: Data Exchanged by the Parties to the START Treaty
as of January 1, 1997.
30. Yeo Miasnikov, "Buduscheye morskikh strategicheskikh sil Rossii" (The future of Russia's
naval strategic nuclear forces), More, no. 2 (1996), pp. 66-69.
31. In recent years the absence of medium-level maintenance in the Russian Navy has led to
the scrapping of many surface ships and submarines before they have served for even 15
years. This happened specifically to the aircraft carrier cruisers.
32. B. Tyurin, "Razval korablestroyeniya-gibel flota" (The collapse of naval shipbuilding
will be the death of the navy), Morskoi sbornik, no. 7 (1995), pp. 8-15.
33. N. Kalistratov, "Morskiye strategicheskiye yadernye sily idut ko dny" (Russia's naval
strategic nuclear forces are sinking), Krasnaya zvezda, 13 January 1996, p. 3.
34. According to official data, there were five such missiles in the only R-39 storage depot
in Nenoksa as of 1 January 1996 (MOU: Data exchanged by the parties to the START
Treaty).Two heavy strategic missile-armed cruisers of the Project 941 class were at that time
lUldergoing repairs in Sevmashpredpriyatiye; their missiles, 40 in all, had been wlloaded and
eliminated, in March 1996 and December 1997, through lalUlch and detonation at a height
of about 10 kilometers. (Thomas Nilsen and Igor Kudrik, 80 Tons of Dangerous Chemicals
into the Environment, Bellona press release, 10 December 1997).
35. Tyurin, "Collapse of naval shipbuilding."
36. L. Belyshev, "Korablestroyeniye i razvitiye VMF" (Shipbuilding and the development of
the Navy), Morskoi shornik, no. 11 (1996), pp. 63-67.
37. ]. Handler, "Russia ready for START III," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (January!
February 1996), pp. 11-12.
Notes 619
38. MOU: Data exchanged by the parties to the START Treaty."

39. A. M. Ovcharenko, "Analiz effektivnosti gruppirovok raketnykh podvodnykh kreiserov
strategicheskogo naznacheniya proekta 667A (AU) v sisteme strategicheskikh yadernykh sil
Sovetskogo Soyuza" (Analysis of the effectiveness of the groups of 667A (AU) Strategic
Missile-Armed Cruisers in the Soviet Union's strategic nuclear forces)," Space Rocket Engi-
neering, Proceedings of the "Second Makeyev Reports" Scientific-Technical Conference,
Series 14, vol. 1 (40) (1996), pp. 53-64 (hereafter Ovcharenko, "Effectiveness of 667A
submarines").
40. Fleet Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov was people's commissar of the Navy and then the com-
mander-in-cruef of the Naval Forces of the USSR (the People's Commissariat of the Navy
was abolished on 25 February 1946) during World War II and after the war lUltil 1947.
When Kuznetsov was removed from office and demoted to rear admiral, Admiral I. S.
Yumashev was appointed commander-in-cruef of the Navy. In February 1950 the People's
Commissariat of the Navy was restored briefly, and N. G. Kuznetsov, then a vice admiral,
was again appointed people's commissar of the Navy in July 1951. Kuznetsov was removed
from trus top office for the second time in December 1955. Fleet Admiral S. G. Gorshkov
served continuously as commander-in-cruef of the Navy from January 1956 to 1985. The
office was occupied by Fleet Admiral B. N. Chernavin from 1985 to 1992. Fleet Admiral F.
N. Gromov was the commander-in-chief of the Navy from April 1992 to November 1997,
when he was replaced by Admiral V I. Kuroyedov.
41. I. Khmelnov, "Mozg voyenno-morskogo flota" (The brain of the navy), Morskoi sbornik,
no. 1 (1997), pp. 3-9.
42. Kuzin and Nikolskiy, Soviet Navy, p. 538.
43. I. V. Kasatonov, ed., Tri veka rossiyskogo {lota (Three Centuries of the Russian Fleet)
(Logos, 1996), p. 340.
44. A. S. Pavlov, Voyenno-morskoi {lot Rossii, 1996 g. (The Russian Navy, 1996) (Yakutsk,
1996), p. 13.
45. Ibid., pp. 14-15.
46. B. N. Makeyev, Voyenno-morskiye aspekty natsionalnoi bezopasnosti (Naval Aspects of
National Security) (Nonproliferation and Critical Tedmologies Committee, 1997).
47. M. Vego, Soviet Naval Tactics (Naval Institute Press, 1992).
48. Makeyev, Naval Aspects of the National Security.
49. O. A. Yerofeyev, "Reformirovat nado-razrushat nelzya!" (It must be reformed, but it
must not be destroyed!) Morskoi sbornik, no. 4 (1995), pp. 11-17.
50. T. Nilsen, I. Kudrik, and A. Nikitin, Severnyi {lot-potentsialnyi risk radioaktivnogo
zagryazneniya regiona (The Northern Fleet-Potential Risk of the Radioactive Contamina-
tion of the Region), Bellona Report No.2, 1996.
51. Nilsen et al., The Northern Fleet, pp. 90-91.
52. At the beginning of 1997, one of the Project 667BDR submarines was decommissioned
and its missile compartment was removed in accordance with the START I provisions.
53. Until 1994 the Project 667BDRM submarines were based in Oleniya Inlet.
54. Nilsen et al., The Northern Fleet, p. 103.
620 Notes
55. Ibid.
56. I. V. Kasatonov, Flot vyshel v okean (The Fleet Went to Sea) (Andreevskiy Flag, 1996),
p.142.
57. T. Nilsen, I. Kudrik, and A. Nikitin, Zapadnaya Litsa, Bellona Report No.5, 1995.
58. Nilsen et al., Zapadnaya Litsa and The Northern Fleet; ]. Handler, "The Northern
Fleet's nuclear submarine bases," Jane's Intelligence Review (December 1993), pp. 551-
556.
59. The city was called Severomorsk-7 in the 1960s. Zapadnaya Litsa is also known as
Murmansk-150, Zaozernyy, and Zaozersk.
60. Nilsen et al., Zapadnaya Litsa.
61. "Fakty i problemy, svazannye s zakhoroneniem radioaktivnykh otkhodov v moryakh,
omyvayushchikh territoriyu Rossiiskoy Federatsii" (Facts and problems connected with the
disposal of radioactive waste in the seas bordering on the territory of the Russian Federa-
tion), materials for a report of the Government Commission on the Sea Burial of Radio-
active Waste, compiled pursuant to Russian Federation Presidential Directive No. 613-rp
of 24 October 1992, Administration of the President of the Russian Federation, Moscow,
1993, p. 24. The zone is also known as Installation 928-III (Handler, "The Northern Fleet's
nuclear submarine bases").
62. Handler, "The Northern Fleet's nuclear submarine bases."
63. The city is also known as Murmansk-130 and Skalistyy.
64. Kasatonov, The Fleet Went to Sea, p. 143.
65. The city is also known as Yokanga, Ostrovnoy, and Murmansk-140.
66. Handler, "The Northern Fleet's Nuclear Submarine Bases."
67. Nilsen et al., The Northern Fleet.
68. Ibid.
70. Nilsen et al., The Northern Fleet; Igor Kudrik, "Decommissioning of nuclear-powered
submarines: Status report," Bellona press release, October 1997.
71. Snezhnogorsk (Vyuzhnyy, Murmansk-60) is located deep within Oleniya Inlet, on the
shore of Kut Harbor.
73. Pavlov, Russian Navy, pp. 5-6.
74. According to the official data, by 1 January 1997 the Rybachiy base hosted nine Project
667BDR, two Project 667B, and one Project 667A submarine ("MOU: Data exchanged by
the parties to the START Treaty"). This means that Project 667BD ships had by then been
decommissioned.
75. Pavlov, Russian Navy, pp. 5-6.
76. Detailed information about the Pacific Fleet bases was made available by Joshua Handler
(]. Handler, "Greenpeace Visit to Moscow and Russian Far East," Trip report, July-
November 1992;]. Handler, "Russia's Pacific Fleet-Submarine bases and facilities," Jane's
Intelligence Review, April 1994, pp. 166-171).
Notes 621
77. Handler, "Russia's Pacific Fleet."

78. Ibid.
79. Ibid.
80. G. G. Kostev, Problemy bezopasnosti pri ekspluatatsii i utilizatsii atomnykh podvodnykh
lodok (Problems of nuclear submarine safety) (Moscow, 1997), p. 100.
81. Handler, "Russia's Pacific Fleet."
82. Ibid.
83. "Nashi podvodnye sily" (Our submarine forces), Morskoi sbornik, no. 3 (1997),
pp. 3-8.
84. V. N. Burov, Otechestvennoe voennoe korablestroeniye v tretyem stoletii svoey istorii
(The Third Century of Russian Shipbuilding) (Sudostroyeniye, 1995), p. 538.
85. B. Tyurin, "Problemy obespecheniya tekhnicheskoi gotovnosti" (The problems of main-
taining technical readiness), Morskoi sbornik, no. 6 (1993), pp. 61-65.
87. Ibid.
88. V. Panferov, "Minno-torpednaya sluzhba VMF vchera, segodnya, zavtra" (Mine and
torpedo service of the Navy yesterday, today, and tomorrow), Morskoi sbornik, no. 6 (1997),
pp.8-11.
89. Yu. Kononov, "Svaz' VMF vchera, segonnya, zavtra" (Commwlication of the Navy
yesterday, today, and tomorrow), Morskoi sbornik, no. 5 (1997), pp. 10-13.
91. M. Barskov, "Glavnaya nauchnaya basa voennogo korablestroyeniya" (The main scien-
tific base of military shipbuilding), Morskoi sbornik, no. 8 (1997), pp. 58-59.
92. A. Baranenko and Yu. Tarasyuk, "Institutu radioelektronnogo vooruzheniya VMF-50
let" (50 years of the Radioelectronic Armament Institute of the Navy)," Morskoi sbornik,
no. 5 (1995), pp. 75-76.
93. From 1958 to 1965 this directorate was known as the First Directorate of the State Com-
mittee for Shipbuilding (GKS). After the State Committee for Shipbuilding was reorganized
as the Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry (MSP) in 1965, it became the First Main Directorate
of the Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry. Later the word "Production" was added to the
title.
94. Special Design Bureau No. 143 (SKB-143, since 1966, the Malakhit Naval Machine-
Building Bureau) worked on several ballistic-missile submarine designs (Project 639 with
the D-3 missile system and Projects 687 and 679 with the D-5 missile system). None of
these projects reached production stage (I. D. Spasskiy, ed., Istoriya otechestvennogo
sudostroyeniya, tom 5: Sudostroyeniye v poslevoennyy period 1946-1991 (The History
of National Shipbuilding, vol. 5, Shipbuilding in the Postwar Period, 1946-1991)
(Sudostroyeniye, 1996), pp. 144, 287-288).
95. Designs for new submarines to carry the D-ll and D-9 missile systems were also drafted
at Central Design Bureau No. 16 (the Volna Central Design Bureau) between the end of the
1950s and the beginning of the 1970s, but the ships were never built (Spasskiy, History of
National Shipbuilding, pp. 289-290).
622 Notes
96. I. D. Spasskiy and V. P. Semyonov, "To Build a Better Sub," u.s. Naval Institute Pro-
ceedings (August 1997), pp. 58-6l.
97. V. GlUldarov, "'Yuriyu Dolgorukomu' plyt v XXI vek" ("Yuri Dolgorukii" will sail to
the 21st century), Krasnaya zvezda, 5 November 1996, p. 1.
98. The growing complexity of the submarine design led to the establishment of the post of
general designer. The first general designers of the shipbuilding industry were I. D. Spasskiy
and S. N. Kovalev (Spasskiy, History of National Shipbuilding, p. 286).
99. P. Z. Golosovskiy, Ot "Dekabrista" do "Akuly" (From "Dekabrist " to "Akula"),
(Leningrad, 1981), p. 19l.
100. S. N. Kovalev, "Atomnye podvodnye lodki" (Nuclear-powered submarines), Vestnik
RAN, 66, no. 11 (1996), pp. 1004-1007.
101. The plants also built submarines armed with cruise missiles and torpedoes. In addition
to the plants in Severodvinsk and Komsomolsk-on-Amur, Plant 112 (the Krasnoye Sormovo
Plant) in Nizhni Novgorod and Plant 194 (the Admiralty Plant) in St. Petersburg built nuclear
and diesel submarines (Spasskiy, History of National Shipbuilding, p. 124).
102. Yu. Gladkevich, "Kak rozhdayutsya atomokhody" (The birth of nuclear-powered
ships), Krasnaya zvezda, 29 ]lUle 1992, p. 4.
103. V. Marinin and V. Dotsenko, "90 let otechestvennogo podvodnogo sudostroyeniya"
(90 years of national submarine engineering), Voyennyi parad (July-August 1994),
pp. 184-188.
104. L. Belyshev, "Korablestroyeniye i razvitiye VMF" (Shipbuilding and Navy develop-
ment), Morskoi sbornik, no. 11 (1996), pp. 63-67.
105. Yeo A. Shitikov, V. N. Krasnov, and V. V. Balabin, Korablestroyeniye v SSSR v gody
Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny (Shipbuilding in the USSR during the Great Patriotic War)
(Nauka, 1995), pp. 244-245.
106. A. Alekseyev and L. Samarkin, "'Barsy' stavyat problemy" ("Barses" pose problems),
Morskoi sbornik, no. 4 (1997), pp. 51-56.
107. N. V. Bardov, Yu. A. Bobryshev, V. F. Mironov, and Yu. G. Tarasov, "Nachalnyi etap
stanovleniya KB Mashinostroyeniya" (Initial stage in the establishment of the Machine-
Building Design Bureau), in I. I. Velichko, ed., Ballisticheskiye rakety podvodnykh lodok
Rossii: Izbrannye stat'i (The Ballistic Missiles of Russian Submarines: Selected Articles) (KB
im. Academia V. P. Makeyeva, 1994), pp. 77-92.
108. Zapolskiy, Missiles Are Launched from Sea, p. 24; V. L. Kleiman, L. M. Kosoy, and
o. Yeo Lukianov, "Generalnyi konstruktor Viktor Petrovich Makeyev" (General Designer
Victor P. Makeyev), in Velichko, Ballistic Missiles of Russian Submarines, pp. 8-20; V. G.
Poshekhonov, "Tsentralnomu nauchno-issledovatelskomu institutu Elektropribor-50 let"
(The Electropribor Central Scientific Research Institute turns 50), Sudostroyeniye, no. 7
(1995), pp. 59-63.
109. P. A. Tyurin, "Pervyi otechestvennyi morskoi strategicheskii tverdotoplivny raketnyi
kompleks D-ll" (The D-ll missile system, the first Soviet sea-based strategic solid-
propellant missile system), Nevskiy Bastion, no. 1 (1996), pp. 22-26.
110. A. M. Antonov, "Atomnye podvodnye lodki pro 627 i 627A" (Project 627 and 627A
nuclear-powered submarines), Sudostroyeniye, no. 7 (1995), pp. 76-82; N. M. Lazarev,
Notes 623
Pervye sovetskie atomnye podvodnye lodki i ikh voennaya priemka (The First Soviet Nuclear-
Powered Submarines and Their Commissioning by the Military) (Malakhit, 1996), p. 12.
111. Lazarev, First Soviet Nuclear-Powered Submarines, pp. 23-24.
112. Steam generators and the main turbo-gear assemblies were produced at the Baltic Plant
(Burov, Third Century of Russian Shipbuilding, p. 331).
113. Antonov, "Project 627 and 627A."
114. Ibid.
115. The Machine-Building Design Bureau and the plant make up the Machine-Building
Scientific Production Association (0. Bukharin and]. Handler, "Russian nuclear-powered
submarine decommissioning," Science and Global Security,S (1995), pp. 245-271).
116. Ibid.
117. T. Cochran, R. Norris, and o. Bukharin, Making the Russian Bomb: From Stalin to
118. Poshekhonov, "Electropribor Central Scientific Research Institute."
119. Ibid.
120. "Soviet submarine navigation and fire control systems," DST-1220S-151-86, DIA
Report, October 1986 (declassified 15 January 1993).
121. N. A. Dubrovsky, "Ostrota slukha-sredstvo zaschity ot napadeniya" (Sharp hearing
is a defense), Vestnik RAN, 66, no. 11 (1996), pp. 1036-1039; Kovalev, "Nuclear-powered
submarines. "
122. Golosovskiy, From "Dekabrist" to "Akula," p. 215.
123. Golosovskiy, From "Dekabrist" to "A kula, "p. 210; Yeo S. Shakhidzhanov, "Ot torpedy
do protivolododmogo kompleksa" (From the torpedo to the ASW system), Vestnik RAN,
66, no. 11 (1996), pp. 1021-1025.
124. Poshekhonov, "Electropribor Central Scientific Research Institute."
125. N. Friedman, The Naval Institute Guide to World Naval Weapons Systems, 1994
update (Naval Institute Press, 1994), p. 104.
126. The military ship development procedures are described in detail in Shitikov et al.,
Shipbuilding in the USSR; Golosovskiy, From "Dekabrist" to "Akula"; and Burov, Third
Century of Russian Shipbuilding.
127. Lazarev, First Soviet Nuclear-Powered Submarines.
128. Golosovskiy, From 'Dekabrist'to 'Akula'.
129. V. GlUldarov, "Zakladnaya doska" (A beginning), Krasnaya zvezda, 14 January 1994,
p. l.
130. Until 1994 the training center for nuclear submarine crews (the 93rd Naval Training
Center) was in Paldiski (Estonia). Some of its equipment was moved to Obninsk and
Sosnovyi Bor later.
131. S. Bystrov, "The submarine reactor," Krasnaya zvezda, 21 October 1989, p. 3.
132. "Yankee-class ballistic missile-lalUlching nuclear submarine (weapon system)-USSR,"
DIA Report, JlUle 1976 (declassified), p. 91; Kasatonov, Three Centuries of the Russian Fleet,
p. 316.
624 Notes
133. The Project 667A submarines, however, performed only one patrol a year on average
(Ovcharenko, "Effectiveness of 667A Submarines").
134. In-dock inspections of the strategic missile-armed cruisers in the Northern Fleet are
conducted at Naval Ship-Repair Plant No. 82 in Roslyakovo (Nilsen et al., The Northern
Fleet, p. 115).
135. Spasskiy, History of National Shipbuilding, pp. 226-227.
136. The duration of maintenance inspections depended on the available production facili-
ties. The in-plant maintenance of a Project 667A strategic missile-armed cruiser was not sup-
posed to take more than 24 months. Nevertheless, because of the lUlderdeveloped production
base in the 1970s, in-plant maintenance for a submarine could take three or four years, and
refitting could take five or six years. Production facilities in the Northern Fleet did not meet
the necessary standards lUltil 1982-1990, after which maintenance and repairs began to be
performed on schedule. Medium-level maintenance in the Far East took at least 30 months
even in the late 1980s (Ovcharenko, "Effectiveness of 667A submarines").
137. S. N. Kovalev, "0 sozdanii strategicheskikh atomnykh podvodnykh lodok ot pervogo
do tretiego pokoleniya" (The creation of strategic nuclear submarines from the first to the
third generations), presentation at conference on 95th Anniversary of Professional Submarine
Engineering in Russia (Third Makeyev Reports), MT Rubin Central Design Bureau MT, St.
Petersburg, 19 November 1996.
138. "Facts and problems connected with the disposal of radioactive waste," p. 68.
139. R. ZadlUlaysky, "Glavkom VMF Admiral Gromov prokommentiroval problemy
korablestroitelnoy programmy VMF Rossii" (Naval CIC Admiral Gromov comments on
problems of shipbuilding program for RF Navy)," Krasnaya zvezda, 23 January 1993, p. 2.
140. A. S. Diakov, V. K. Korobov, and Yeo V. Miasnikov, "Utilizatsiya podvodnykh lodok
v SShA i Rossii: Sravnitelnyi analiz" (Recycling nuclear submarines in the United States
and Russia: A comparative analysis), Proceedings of the International Conference on
"Radioactive Waste. Storage, Transport, Processing: Effects on the Human Being and the
Environment," 14-18 October 1996, St. Petersburg.
141. A. S. Diakov, V. K. Korobov, and Yeo V. Miasnikov, "Utilizatsiya podvodnykh atom-
okhodov" (Nuclear submarine dismantlement), Nezavisimoye voennoye obozreniye, no. 20
(1997), p. 6.
142. V. N. Potapov and A. S. Bliznyuk, "Sposoby boevogo primeneniya raketnykh
podvodnykh lodok i takticheskiye priyemy strelby ballisticheskimi raketami" (Methods of
using missile-armed submarines in combat and ballistic missile firing tactics), Space Rocket
Engineering: Proceedings of the Scientific- Technical Conference "Second Makeyev Reports,"
series 14, vol. 1 (40) (1996), pp. 65-69.
143. "Yankee-class ballistic missile-lalUlching nuclear submarine."
144. M. Vego, Soviet Naval Tactics, p. 161.
145. I. Kapitanets, "VMF v posledniye desyatiletiya" (The Navy in Recent Decades),
Morskoi sbornik, no. 2 (1994), pp. 8-13.
146. Ovcharenko, "Prospects for Russia's naval strategic nuclear forces."
147. "Yankee-class ballistic missile-lalUlching nuclear submarine.
Notes 625
148. The maximum number of missile-armed ships deployed in combat patrol areas
sometimes reached eight (Ovcharenko, "Effectiveness of 667A submarines," pp. 53-
64).
149. "Yankee-class ballistic missile-lalUlching nuclear submarine."
150. Ibid.
151. It is interesting that the Project 667A submarines left on patrol according to a strict
schedule, which was one of the reasons for the highly effective tracking of those submarines
by u.s. antisubmarine defensive forces in the 1970s ("Yankee-class ballistic missile-
lalUlching nuclear submarine").
153. When the technical performance specifications were being drawn up for the Project
667A submarines, the Operational Directorate of the Naval Main Staff wanted an opera-
tional (at-sea) ratio of 0.5. The actual rate was never higher than 0.23 (Ovcharenko,
"Effectiveness of 667A Submarines").
154. Makeyev, Naval Aspects of the National Security, p. 63.
155. Ovcharenko, "Prospects for Russia's Naval Strategic Nuclear Forces."
156. Milan Vego, Soviet Naval Tactics, p. 161.
157. Makeyev, Naval Aspects of the National Security, p. 63.
158. E. Miasnikov, "Submarine collision off Murmansk: A look from afar," Breakthroughs,
MIT DACS, 2 (Winter 1992/1993), pp. 19-24.
159. M. Vego, Soviet Naval Tactics, pp. 152-153.
160. "Yankee-class ballistic missile-lallllching nuclear submarine." It took diesel first-
generation submarines up to three weeks to get to the patrol areas in the Atlantic. During
this transition the ships usually were submerged during the day and surfaced at night.
161. Vego, Soviet Naval Tactics, pp. 163-164; Makeyev, Naval Aspects of the National
Security, pp. 63-67.
162. Several joint cruises by Project 667A submarines escorted by Project 671 attack sub-
marines revealed the drawbacks of hydroacoustic commwllcations systems and the incom-
patibility of radio commwllcation systems. The noisier Project 671 ships were revealing the
location of the Project 667A submarines. The practice of close-in protection of strategic
submarines therefore had to be abandoned. (Potapov and Bliznyuk, "Methods of using
missile-armed submarines.").
163. E. V. Miasnikov, Buduscheye strategicheskikh yadernykh sil Rossii: discussiya i argu-
menty (The Future of the Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces: Discussion and Arguments)
(Center for Arms Control Studies, Dolgoprudny, 1995), p. 48.
164. Vego, Soviet Naval Tactics, p. 163.
165. Vego, Soviet Naval Tactics, pp. 202-203.
166. Miasnikov, Future of the Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, p. 48.
167. Ibid.
168. M. Vego, Soviet Naval Tactics, p. 167.
626 Notes
170. V. A. Kotelnikov, "Radiosvyaz mezhdu beregom i morem" (Radiocommwlication

between the coast and the sea), Vestnik RAN, 66, no. 11 (1996), pp. 1012-1013.
171. A. G. Arbatov, ed., Yadernoye vooruzheniye i respublikanskiy suverenitet (Nuclear
Arms and Republic Sovereignty) (MezhdlUlarodnyye Otnosheniya, 1992).
172. D. L. Jones, "Sending signals to submarines," New Scientist, 4 July 1985, pp. 37-41.
173. V. Rigmant, "'Tupolevskie krylia' nad morem" ("Tupolev wings" over the seas),
Vestnik vozdushnogo (lota, 19 March 1997.
174. The Military Balance 1992-1993, Institute for Strategic Studies, 1993, pp. 96-97.
175. The Soviet Union began using the VLW band for submarine commwlication in 1952,
when the 100-kilowatt-power Goliaph station was built. The station provided commwlica-
tion with submarines at distances of up to several thousand kilometers. In the mid-1960s
another station-the Gerkules-was built (Kononov, "Commwlication of the Navy,"
pp. 10-13).
177. B. Blair, Logic of Accidental Nuclear War (Brookings Institution, 1993), pp. 159-163.
178. V. I. Koryakin and A. I. Khrebtov, Ot astrolyabii k navigatsionnym kompleksam (From
the Astrolabe to Navigational Systems Packages) (Sudostroyeniye, 1994), p. 207.
179. M. V. Tarasenko, Voyennwe aspekty sovetskoi kosmonavtiki (The Military Aspects of
the Soviet Space Program) (Nikol, 1992), p. 104.
180. This is virtually the same as the accuracy rate of the Navstar/GPS system (Tarasenko,
Military Aspects of the Soviet Space Program).
181. Blair, Logic of Accidental Nuclear War.
182. Ibid., p. 16l.
183. Petrov et al., Russian Fleet Armaments, p. 210.
184. Ibid., p. 216.
185. Kuzin and Nikolskiy, Soviet Navy, pp. 277-279.
186. Pavlov, Russian Navy.
187. Most of the information about the technical characteristics of submarines presented in
this appendix was taken from the following works: Spasskiy, History of National Ship-
building; Kasatonov, Three Centuries of the Russian Fleet; Burov, Third Century of Russian
Shipbuilding; A. S. Pavlov, Voyennyye korabli SSSR i Rossii, 1945-1995 (Naval Ships of the
USSR and Russia, 1945-1995) (Yakutsk, 1994); Golosovskiy, From "Dekabrist "to "Akula";
and N. Polmar and]. Noot, The Submarines of the Russian and Soviet Navies, 1788-1990
(Naval Institute Press, 1991).
188. V. Zharkov, "Bolshiye raketnye DEPL na osnove proekta 611" (The Project 611 design
for missile-armed diesel-electric submarines), Morskoi sbornik, no. 9 (1995), pp. 64-71.
189. Pavlov, Naval Ships of the USSR and Russia.
190. V. Zharkov, "Raketnye DEPL na osnove proekta 629" (The Project 629 design for
missile-armed diesel-electric submarines), Morskoi sbornik, no. 12 (1995), pp. 65-71.
191. Burov, Third Century of Russian Shipbuilding.
192. Ibid.
Notes 627
193. Ibid.
194. Ibid.
195. The decree of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR COlUlcil of Ministers was pub-
lished on 20 March 1958. The decree also provided for the start of the work on the D-3
system, originally intended for the 639 submarine, which was never built.
197. Ibid.
198. The design was drawn up in Central Design Bureau No. 16 in 1959-1960. Ya. Yeo
Yevgrafov was the chief designer.
199. Spasskiy, History of Naval Shipbuilding.
201. Ibid., p. 263.
202. The chief designer on the Project 605 was V. V. Borisov. The preliminary specifications
were approved by the Navy at the end of 1967. The design was submitted to the Main
Shipbuilding Directorate of the Navy in December 1969 and was approved in early 1970.
204. The chief designer on Project 601 was also Borisov. The preliminary specifications were
approved by the Navy at the end of 1967. The design was drawn up at the same time as the
Project 605 design.
206. The chief designer on Project 619 was Yu. N. Kormilitsyn. The Malakhit Design Bureau
(which had incorporated the Volna Bureau by that time) turned all of the Project 629 docu-
ments over to the Rubin Design Bureau in 1973 pursuant to a joint decision of the Navy and
6be Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry.
207. Some experts believe that the accident could have been the result of a collision with the
American nuclear submarine Swordfish (Scate class), which had some damage when it arrived
at the Yokosuka Naval Base three days later (N. Burbyga, "The submarine from 'Graveyard
Bay,'" Izvestiya, nos. 154-157, 3-8 July 1992).
208. Ibid.
211. Golosovskiy, From "Dekabrist" to "Akula".
212. Ibid.
214. As noted above, the decree of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR COllllCil of
Ministers of 20 March 1958 also provided for the installation of the D-4 system on the
diesel-powered ships of the Project 629 class.
216. Ibid.
217. Ibid.
628 Notes
218. A. Shirokorad, "Missiles over the sea."

220. Ibid.
221. I. V. Kasatonov, Flot vykhodit v okean (The Fleet Will Sail) (Astra-Lyuks, 1995),
p.282.
223. Kostev, "Naval strategic forces."
224. Polmar and Noot, Submarines of the Russian and Soviet Navies.
225. Admiral P. Kotov, "Generalnyi konstruktor" (General designer), Morskoi sbornik,
no. 10 (1994), pp. 13-15.
226. See, for example, N. Cherkashin, "Khirosima" vsplyvayet v polden (The Hiroshima
Surfaces at Noon) (Andreyevsky Flag, 1993).
227. I. Kapitanets, "VMF v posledniye desyatiletiya" (The Navy in recent decades), Morskoi
shornik, no. 2 (1994), pp. 8-13.
229. A. Mozgovoy, "Taran 'Khirosimy'" (The ramming of the Hiroshima), Rossiyskaya
gazeta, 25 September 1992, p. 7.
230. L. Zhiltsov, L. Osipenko, and N. Mormul, Atomnaya podvodnaya epopeya (The
Nuclear Submarine Saga) (Borges, 1994).
231. Kasatonov, Three Centuries of the Russian Fleet.
232. S. N. Kovalev was simultaneously working as the chief designer on Project 658.
235. Ibid.
236. Ibid.
237. Petrov et al., Russian Fleet Armaments, p. 210.
239. Ibid.
241. Potapov and Bliznyuk, "Methods of using missile-armed submarines."
243. Kostev, "Naval Strategic Forces."
244. "Yankee class ballistic missile-lalUlcrung nuclear submarine."
245. Sergey Ptichkin, "Father of the 'Typhoon.'"
246. Golosovskiy, From "Dekabrist" to "Akula."
249. A. M. Ovcharenko, "Analiz effektivnosti gruppirovok raketnykh podvodnykh kreis-
erov strategicheskogo naznacheniya proekta 667A (AU) v sisteme strategicheskikh yadernykh
Notes 629
sil Sovetskogo Soyuza" (Analysis of the effectiveness of the groups of 667A (AU) RPKSNs
in the Soviet Union's Strategic Nuclear Forces), Space Rocket Engineering, Proceedings of
the "Second Makeyev Reports" Scientific-Technical Conference, series 14, vol. 1 (40) (1996),
pp.53-64.
250. Ibid.; Kasatonov, The Fleet Went to Sea, p. 145.
251. L. N. Rolin and Yu. G. Rudenko, "Opyt ekspluatatsii morskogo raketnogo kompleksa
s raketoi RSM-25" (Experience of the use of the naval missile system with the RSM-25
missile), Space Rocket Engineering, Proceedings of the "Second Makeyev Reports" Scientific-
Technical Conference, series 14, vol. 1 (40) (1996), pp. 41-47.
254. P. A. Tyurin, "Pervyi otechestvennyi morskoi strategicheskii tverdotoplivny raketnyi
kompleks D-11" (The D-11 missile system, the first Soviet sea-based strategic solid-
propellant missile system), Nevskiy Bastion, no. 1 (1996), pp. 22-26.
255. Shirokorad, "Missiles over the sea."
258. Three submarines were refitted according to this design (jane's Fighting Ships 1994-95,
ed. Capt. Richard Sharpe OBE RN, 98th ed., 1996).
261. Ibid.
262. ]. Handler, "Greenpeace Visit to Moscow and Russian Far East."
264. Kuzin and Nikolskiy, Soviet Navy.
265. Potapov and Bliznyuk, "Methods of using missiles armed submarines."
270. Ibid.
271. Ibid.
273. Ibid.
274. The Soviet Submarine Force, DIA Report, December 1976, released 28 September 1994,
p. III-4.
630 Notes

279. Ibid.
283. Ibid.
284. I. Sutyagin, "Sharks of strategic designation," Submarine Review (October 1995),
pp. 74-80.
287. Ibid.
288. Kostev, "Naval strategic forces."
290. Sutyagin, "Sharks of strategic designation."
292. Belyshev, "Shipbuilding and the development of the Navy."
293. Gosudarstvennyi raketnyi tsentr . . KB imeni Akademika V. P. Makeyeva" (Academician
V. P. Makeyev Design Bureau State Missile Center) (Miass, 1997), p. 44.
297. Ibid.
299. Kasatonov, Three Centuries of the Russian Fleet; Burov, Third Century of Russian
Shipbuilding.
304. Most of the information about the technical characteristics of sea-based ballistic mis-
siles was taken from the following sources: Memorandum of Understanding on the Estab-
lishment of the Data Base for the Treaty between the USSR and the United States on the
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Weapons (Data as of I September 1990);
Petrov et al., Russian Fleet Armaments; Shirokorad, "Missiles over the Sea"; Raketno-
kosmicheskaya korporatsiya . . Energiya . . imeni S. P. Koroleva (The Korolev "Energiya"
Space Rocket Corporation), 1996; S. G. Kolesnikov, Strategicheskoye raketno-yadernoye
oruzhiye (Strategic Nuclear Missiles) (Arsenal-Press, 1996); and T. Cochran, W. Arkin, R.
Norris, and]. Sands, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Vol. 4: Soviet Nuclear Weapons (Ballinger,
1988). The absence of a footnote reference in descriptions of the technical characteristics of
missiles signifies that the information was taken from A. V. Karpenko, Ballisticheskiye rakety
Notes 631
podvodnykh lodok VMF Rossii (SSSR) (The SLBMs of the Russian (USSR) Navy) (Pica,
1993).
305. Zapolskiy, Missiles Are Launched from Sea, p. 24.
308. Bardov et al., "Initial stage in the establishment of the Machine-Building Design
Bureau."
310. Ibid.
311. Petrov et al., Russian Fleet Armaments.
313. Ibid.
314. V. Zharkov, "Project 629 design."
317. To guard against explosions on board, the R-13 missile was filled with only the oxi-
dizer. The missile was fueled on the ship just before lalUlch.
318. V. P. Makeyev, "Ballisticheskiye rakety R-13 i R-21" (The R-13 and R-21 ballistic
missiles), in I. I. Velichko, ed., Ballisticheskiye rakety podvodnykh lodok Rossii: Izbrannye
stat'i (The Ballistic Missiles of Russian Submarines: Selected Articles) (KB im. Akademika
V. P. Makeyeva, 1994), pp. 63-69.
319. Ibid.
321. Spasskiy, History of National Shipbuilding.
323. Spasskiy, History of National Shipbuilding, pp. 144-145.
325. Zapolskiy, Missiles Are Launched from Sea" p. 126.
326. Ibid., p. 128. According to another source ("Energiya" Space Rocket Corporation,
p. 60), the lalUlch was conducted on 26 December 1956.
327. Zapolskiy, Missiles Are Launched from Sea, p. 128.
328. Ibid.
333. Makeyev, "R-13 and R-21 ballistic missiles."
632 Notes
335. N. Velichko and R. Kanin, "RSM-25-pervenets vtorogo pokoleniya BRPL" (The

RSM-25, the first second-generation SLBM), Morskoi sbornik, no. 12 (1995), pp. 12-15.
337. Petrov et al., Russian Fleet Armaments; Shirokorad, "Missiles over the sea."
339. I. B. Kudryavtsev and V. T. Martynenko, "Obobscheniye i analiz opyta razrabotki,
ispytaniy I prakticheskikh strelb s raketnykh podvodnykh kreiserov strategicheskogo naz-
nacheniya proekta 667A(AU)" (Summary and analysis of projects in the development, testing,
and missile fire practice of Project 667A(AU) strategic submarines," Space Rocket Engineer-
ing: Proceedings of the Scientific-Technical Conference "Second Makeyev Reports," series
14, vol. 1 (40) (1996), pp. 70-75.
340. Ibid.
342. Ibid.
344. Ibid.
346. Ibid.
347. Kudryavtsev and Martynenko, "Summary and analysis of projects."
348. I. Veuchko and R. Karlin, "Nekotorye osobennosti razrabotki BRPL RSM-25, ee rol
dlya otechestvennogo morskogo raketostroyeniya" (Some distinctive features of the RSM-25
SLBM and its role in domestic naval missile engineering), Space Rocket Engineering:
Proceedings of the Scientific-Technical Conference "Second Makeyev Reports," series 14,
vol. 1 (40) (1996), pp. 27-33.
349. Tyurin, "D-11 missile system."
351. Iz istorii aviatsii i kosmonavtiki (From the History of the Aviation and Space Program),
no. 68-69, (HET RAN, 1996), p. 13.
352. Velichko and Kanin, "Some distinctive features of the RSM-25 SLBM."
354. F. I. Novoselov, "Sozdarliye podvodnoy raketno-yadernoy sistemy-obyektivnaya
neobkhodimost voenno-politicheskoi i strategicheskoi obstanovki vremen kholodnoy voiny"
(The creation of the submarine-based nuclear missile system-An objective necessity of the
military-political and strategic atmosphere of the Cold War years), Space Rocket Engineer-
ing: Proceedings of the Scientific-Technical Conference "Second Makeyev Reports," series
14, vol. 1 (40) (1996), pp. 9-2l.
355. V. L. Kleiman, L. M. Kosoy, and o. Yeo Lukianov, "Generalnyi konstruktor Viktor
Petrovich Makeyev" (General Designer Victor Petrovich Makeyev), in I. I. Velichko, ed.,
Ballisticheskiye rakety podvodnykh lodok Rossii: Izbrannye stat'i (The Ballistic Missiles of
Russian Submarines: Selected Articles) (KB im. Akademika V. P. Makeyeva, 1994), pp. 14-15.
Notes 633

359. G. G. Kostev, "Morskiye strategicheskiye: Stranitsy istorii i razvitiya" (Naval Strategic
Forces: Stages in their history and development), Morskoi sbornik, no. 10 (1994), pp. 6-12.
360. Kotov, "General Designer."
362. Ibid.
364. Ibid.
365. Because of the high density of the solid propellant, the weight of the water in the lalUlch
tube after lalUlch is approximately equivalent to the weight of the ejected missile (Tyurin,
"Collapse of naval shipbuilding"; Burov, Third Century of Russian Shipbuilding, p. 483.
367. Ibid.
371. Ibid.
375. Petrov et al., Russian Fleet Armaments; Shirokorad, "Missiles over the sea."
376. One of the last tests was conducted on 19 November 1997 ("Latest Russian SS-NX-
28 test ends with a bang," Jane's Intelligence Review, 1 January 1998).
378. Ibid.
379. Ibid.
382. V. Aleksin, "Vozrozhdeniye morskogo raketosroenoya" (Revival of sea-based missile
production)", Nezavisimoye voennoye obozreniye, 24 December 1999.
Chapter 6. Strategic Aviation
1. The term "strategic aviation" has never been officially used either in the Soviet Union
or in Russia. We use this term to refer to those Long-Range Aviation wlits that include
strategic bombers.
2. The planes of Great Britain and the United States began massive strategic bombing raids
on German cities in 1943. The bombing of cities was a also critical element of U.S. strategy
634 Notes
in the war with Japan. In general, the nuclear bombs that were dropped on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki were a logical extension of the United States' strategic bombing raids of 1944-1945.
See, for example, Horatio Bond, "Fire attacks on German cities," and Robert Nathans,
"Making the fires that Beat Japan," in Fire and the Air War (National Fire Protection
Association, 1946).
3. The maximum range of the Pe-8 bomber was 4,700 kilometers.
4. V. Yeo Ilyin and M. A. Levin, Bombardirovshchiki (Bombers) (Viktoriya AST, 1996),
p. 6l.
5. V. Rigmant, "Neizvestnaya 'shesdesyatchetverka'" (The Lmknown "64"), Aviatsiya i
kosmanavtika, no. 12 (1996), pp. 21-29.
6. The designs submitted by V. M. Myasishchev were labeled VM-22 and VM-23 (Ilyin and
Levin, Bombers, p. 64).
7. The official decision to cancel the Aircraft 64 project was made in ]tme 1947 after serial
production of the Tu-4 had beglUl (Rigmant, "The Lmknown '64' ").
8. V. Rigmant, "B-29, Tu-4-strategicheskiye bliznetsy" (B-29 and Tu-4-The Strategic
Twins), Aviatsiya i kosmonavtika, no. 17 (1996), p. 62.
9. S. Zaloga, Soviet and Russian Strategic Nuclear Weapons, 1949-Present (forthcoming),
pp. 3-17.
10. Ibid.
11. Ilyin and Levin, Bombers, pp. 66-70; V. Rigmant, "Posledniye porshnevye bom-
bardirovshchiki, Chast II" (The last piston engine bombers, part 11), Aviatsiya i kosmon-
avtika, no. 26 (1997), pp. 15-22.
12. The decision to cancel the work on Aircraft 85 was heavily influenced by the war in
Korea, during which U.S. B-29 bombers suffered heavy losses from MiG-IS jet fighters and
eventually had to stop making daytime ilights (N. Kirsanov and V. Rigmant, "Ne imeyuschiy
analogov" (Unparalleled), Aviatsiya i kosmonavtika, no. 11 (1992), pp. 14-17.
13. Although the bombers were kept at a high level of readiness for takeoff, their nuclear
mwlitions remained in maintenance facilities.
14. Ilyin and Levin, Bombers, p. 90.
15. Ibid., p. 27.
16. Ibid., pp. 73-74.
17. The Tu-16 bomber was used to deliver the first Soviet two-stage thermonuclear device,
the RDS-37, to the detonation site when it was tested on 22 November 1955.
18. V. Rigmant and A. Matashchuk, "Tu-22: pervyi seriynyi sverkhzvukovoi dalniy"
(Tu-22: The first serial-produced supersonic long-range aircraft), Aviatsiya i kosmonavtika,
no. 11-12 (1993), pp. 10-15.
19. Zaloga, Soviet and Russion Strategic Nuclear Weapons, pp. 9-23.
21. Kirsanov and Rigmant, "Unparalleled."
22. Myasishchev also participated in the competition in its initial stages, but as noted above,
his design bureau (OKB-23) was closed down in 1960.
Notes 635
23. V. Yakovlev and T. Grishayeva, "T-4: 'Russkoye chudo' iii tekhnicheskaya avantyura"
(T-4: "Russian miracle' or engineering folly), Aviatsiya i kosmonavtika, no. 9-10 (1993),
pp. 30-35.
24. The attitude of the administrators of the Kazan plant, who had strong objections to the
production of the T-4, played a definite role in that decision. Production of the T-4 at the
Kazan plant would have required the substantial reorganization of the production process at
the plant, which had been building the Tn-16 and Tn-22.
25. Yakovlev and Grishayeva, "T-4."
27. This plane is sometimes referred to as the Tu-26 in Western sources.
28. Although the Tu-95MS16 bomber can carry up to 16 cruise missiles, these aircraft
usually carry only six air-lalUlched cruise missiles (ALCMs) in the bomb bay. The addi-
tional 10 ALCMs, deployed on pylons lUlder the aircraft's wings, significantly reduce its
range.
29. One of the missiles being developed is the Kh-l0l cruise missile (Zaloga, Soviet and
Russian Strategic Nuclear Weapons).
30. L. L. Batekhin, ed., Vozduschnaya moshch Rodiny (Our COlUltry'S Air Forces might)
(Voenizdat, 1988).
31. M. Oparin, "Dalnyaya Aviatsiya-nadezhnoye sredstvo obespecheniya natsionalnoy
bezopasnosti" (Long-Range Aviation-A reliable means of safeguarding Russia's national
security), Aviatsiya i kosmonavtika, no. 26 (April 1997), pp. 4-5.
32. Ibid.
33. Western sources usually designate this base as Dolon.
34. A. Krayniy, "Khronika blUltuyuschego bombardirovschika" (Chronology of the rebel
bomber), Komsomolskaya pravda, 11 March 1992, p. 2.
35. N. Valuyev, "Engels-nasha sila, slava i oruzhiye" (Engels-Our strength, glory, and
weapon), Vestnik vozdushnogo (lota, no. 4 (1995), p. 41.
36. Before 1992 this regiment was called the 102nd Air Regiment and was part of the 106th
Division, which, in turn, was part of the 46th Air Army.
37. Valuyev, "Engels."
38. Plant 156 and Plant 81 (Tushino), which had been moved to Omsk in July 1941, were
combined to form Aviation Plant 166, which is now part of the Polyot Production Associa-
tion in Omsk.
39. A high-altitude long-range bomber (Project 28) was also lUlder development.
41. This plant became part of the Molniya Scientific Production Association (NPO) in 1976.
42. Zaloga, Soviet and Russian Strategic Nuclear Weapons, pp. 9-20.
43. In addition to that, two flying prototypes and one airframe for static tests were built at
the experimental plant of OKB-156 in Moscow.
636 Notes
45. V. Yeo Ilyin and M. A. Levin, "Malaya entsiklopedia otechestvennykh letatelnykh appa-
ratov" (Concise encyclopedia of domestic aircraft), Aviatsiya i kosmanavtika, no. 6 (1995)
p.37.
46. Zaloga, Soviet and Russian Strategic Nuclear Weapons, pp. 120-127.
47. V. Ilyin, "Katalog vooruzheniy: Krylataya raketa Kh-55" (Arms catalog: Kh-55 cruise
missile), Vestnik vozdushnogo {lota-Aerokosmicheskoye obozreniye (March-April 1997),
p.37.
48. William M. Arkin, Robert S. Norris, and Joshua Handler, Taking Stock: Worldwide
Nuclear Deployments 1998 (NRDC, 1998), p. 35.
49. Rigmant, "Unknown '64.'"
50. "The name of the Tu-4 plane was chosen personally by I. V. Stalin when he endorsed
the test order, crossing out the B-4 and writing Tu-4 in its place." V. P. Kuzin and V. I.
Nikolskiy, Voyenno-morskoy flot SSSR 1945-1991 (The USSR Navy 1945-1991) (Naval
History Society, 1996), p. 471.
51. These were Allied bombers that had to make emergency landings in parts of Eastern
Europe occupied by the Soviet Army and in the USSR (Rigmant, "B-29 and Tu-4-The Strate-
gic Twins)."
52. The team working on the guidance system in KB-l was headed by S. L. Beria.
53. In terms of configuration, Aircraft 82 was essentially the same as the Tupolev KB's
Aircraft 73. The main difference was the swept wing, with a sweep angle of 34°18'. Ilyin and
Levin Bombers, p. 72.
54. A speed of Mach 1 is the speed of sOlUld, which is 330 meters per second or arOlllld
1,200 kilometers per hour lUlder normal conditions. The speed of sOlUld depends on atmos-
pheric parameters, however-temperature, density, and composition-and therefore changes
depending on altitude and other conditions.
56. Ya. Entis, "Vdokhnuvshiy silu v krylia" (Breathing life into the wings), Armeyskiy
shornik, no. 2 (1995).
58. Electronic warfare systems were later installed on all of the Tu-16 combat and recon-
naissance planes. V. Rigmant, "Tu-16-Samolet-Epokha" (Tu-16-The plane defining the
era), Krylya rodiny, no. 6 (1996), p. 5.
59. The necessary quantity of VD-7 engines had not been produced by the time the first 3M
model, Aircraft 201, was built. For that reason, Aircraft 201 had a propulsion system that
consisted of different types of engines: AM-3M engines on the left and VD-7 engines on the
right. I. Sultanov, "Pervyi reaktivnyi strategicheskii" (The first strategic jet plane), Aviatsiya
i kosmonavtika, no. 12 (1996), pp. 29-39.
61. Ibid.
62. Ilyin and Levin, "Concise Encyclopedia of Domestic Aircraft," p. 5.
63. Thrust of a turboprop engine is generated mainly by its propeller. However, a substan-
tial part of the thrust (up to 12%) may be generated by the exhaust jet gases. To take this
Notes 637
into accOlUlt, power of a turboprop engine is measured by effective horsepowers, not in shaft
horsepowers.
64. In 1958 Aircraft 95/2 was converted into an airborne laboratory for advanced engine
tests. In particular, it was used for the testing and final adjustment of the NK-144A, NK-
144-22, and NK-22 engines for the Tu-144 and Tu-22M planes.
65. Kirsanov and Rigmant, "Unparalleled."
66. Instead of bomb hatches for bombs of standard dimensions, the Tu-95V was equipped
with a mOlUlting system for weapons that were too large for the bomb bay. Yu. M. Volin,
"Glazami ekpluatatsionnika" (Through the eyes of a maintenance specialist), Aviatsiya i
kosmonavtika, no. 10 (1995), pp. 33-36.
67. I. Sultanov, "Ot RS do SR" (From the RS to the SRi, Aviatsiya i kosmonavtika, no. 22
(1996), pp. 13-36.
68. Rigmant and Matashchuk, "Tu-22."
69. Kuzin and Nikolskiy, The USSR Navy, p. 476.
70. The T-4 plane was also called the Sotka (100 in Russian). This name was taken from
the specified takeoff weight of arolUld 100 tons.
72. Ilyin and Levin, Bombers, pp. 115-116.
73. V. Rigmant and A. Matashchuk, "Ot modernizatsll k novomu samolyotu (Iz istorii
sozdaniya bombardirovschika Tu-22M)" (From modernization to a new plane (From the
history of the Tu-22M bomber)), Aviatsiya i kosmonavtika, no. 5-6 (1994), pp. 21-27.
74. Kuzin and Nikolskiy, The USSR Navy, p. 485.
75. Ilyin and Levin, "Concise encyclopedia of domestic aircraft."
77. These engines were also known as NK-321.
78. The regiment also included a squadron equipped with Tu-134UBL training planes.
Chapter 7. Strategic Defense
1. The wlits that provide grolUld forces and naval forces with antiaircraft support are
separate branches of the respective services of the armed forces.
2. The Air Defense Forces became a separate service on 9 November 1941 by order of the
State Defense Committee.
3. Before 1983 the Missile and Space Defense Forces were called Missile Defense and
Antisatellite Troops, and all antisatellite systems were assigned to them. One of the main mis-
sions of the space surveillance system was the support of the operations of the antisatellite
system.
4. A. Ivanov and S. Babichev, "Glavnoye-sokhranit potentsial" (It's important to preserve
the potential), interview with Gen. A. Kornukov, commander-in-chief of the Air Forces,
Krasnaya zvezda, 27 January 1998, p. 1.
638 Notes
5. M. M. Lobanov, Razvitiye sovetskoi radiolokatsionnoy tekhniki (The Development of

Soviet Radar Technology) (Voyenizdat, 1982), p. 16.
6. Ibid., pp. 82, 156. The Redut-K and Gyuis shipboard radars and updated models of the
latter type of radar were also produced for the Navy. The U.S. lend-lease program was the
source of many radars and radar range finders.
7. N. Poroskov, "RLS 35N6: set' dlya rustov" (The 35N6 radar), Krasnaya zvezda, 9 Sep-
tember 1992, p. 2.
8. A. Babakin, "Radar-dolgozhitel" (Long-lived radar), Krasnaya zvezda, 4 March 1995,
p.2.
9. Poroskov, "The 35N6 radar". The 35N6 radar, with several of the same design features
as the P-15 and P-19, began to be developed in 1983 and was adopted for use by the radio-
technical troops in 1986.
10. A. Babakin, "Long-lived radar."
11. Aviatsiya i kosmonavtika, no. 12 (1991), p. 18.
12. N. Poroskov, "Shmel vidit vse" (Shmel sees all), Krasnaya zvezda, 10 January 1993, p.
2.
13. Gen. V. Prudnikov, "Voiska PVO i reforma" (Air Defense Forces and the Army reform),
Krasnaya zvezda, 10 December 1996, p. 1.
14. Raketno-kosmicheskaya korporatsiya "Energiya" imeni S. P. Koroleva (The Korolev
"Energiya" Space Rocket Corporation) (1996), pp. 12-17; Nezavisimaya gazeta, 24 Febru-
ary 1995, p. 2.
15. A. V. Karpenko, Rossiyskoye raketnoye oruzhiye 1943-1993 (Russia's Missiles
1943-1993) (Pika, 1993), p. 83.
16. A. Dokuchayev, "Gordaya taina 'Almaza'" (" Almaz" secret pride), Krasnaya zvezda, 12
September 1992, p. 5.
17. Ibid. Comparable entities-special committees and main administrations of the COlUlcil
of Ministers-were created earlier to organize the development of Soviet nuclear weapons
and ballistic missiles.
18. G. V. KisLmko, Sekretnaya zona: ispoved generalnogo konstruktora (Restricted Area:
Confessions of a General Designer) (Sovremennik, 1996), p. 213.
19. The number of target channels determines the number of targets the system is capable
of tracking simultaneously, and the number of missile channels determines the number of
interceptors that can be guided simultaneously.
20. Dokuchayev, "'Almaz' secret pride"; A. Garavskiy, "Legendarnaya S-25" (The legendary
S-25), Krasnaya zvezda, 27 May 1995, p. 4.
21. According to some sources, the S-25 regional air defense system was originally supposed
to be deployed arOlUld the industrial regions of Baku and Gorky, but these plans were never
implemented.
22. KisLmko, Restricted Area, pp. 267-268.
23. Each S-25 SAM system had the status of a regiment.
24. Garavskiy, "The legendary S-25," p. 4.
Notes 639
25. Dokuchayev, '" Almaz' secret pride."

26. SAM systems are classified according to range in the Air Defense Forces as follows: Those
with a range of llllder 25 kilometers are short-range systems, medium-range systems have a
range from 25 to 100 kilometers, and those with a range of over 100 km are long-range. The
antiaircraft missiles with a range of llllder 10 kilometers in the air defense branch of the
Grolllld Forces are called close-range systems.
27. It would be more accurate to describe the S-75 as a "redeployable" system. It took four
hours to prepare the system for transportation and another four or five hours to wlload it
and set it back up in its new position.
28. A. V. Korovin, "17D-boevaya laboratoriya" (17D-Combat laboratory), Krylya
rodiny, no. 1 (1994), p. 4. The V-750 antiaircraft missiles of the Dvina system had upgraded
modifications: the V-750V and V-751D. Karpenko, Russia's Missiles, p. 84.
29. The missiles of the Desna SA-75 system were designated the V-750VK and V-750VN.
Karpenko, Russia's Missiles, p. 84.
30. Ibid.
31. Dokuchayev, '" Almaz' secret pride."
32. Ibid.
33. Karpenko, Russia's Missiles, pp. 82-84.
34. Moscow Aerospace Salon: Prospectus (Lotos, 1995), p. 194.
35. In the early 1960s the SAMs of the S-500 system were displayed in several military
parades in Moscow. They were called "high-speed interceptors of aerospace targets" in the
narrative of the parade films. This was one of the reasons why Western experts called the
first installations of the Dal system that were being built southwest of Leningrad the "Tallinn
anti-ballistic missile system."
36. Dokuchayev, "'Almaz' secret pride."
37. Karpenko, Russia's Missiles, p. 84.
38. The use of facilities intended for the S-500 was the reason that the S-200 systems were
sometimes mistakenly thought to be part of the so-called Tallinn ABM system (see note 36).
39. Karpenko, Russia's Missiles, p. 84; Moscow Aerospace Salon, p. 194.
40. B. Bwllcin, "S-300 effektivneye Patriota" (The S-300 outperforms the Patriot), Krasnaya
zvezda, 27 ]lllle 1991, p. 2.
42. The radio links between the components of the system reduce its deployment time to
about five minutes. See, for example, Moscow Aerospace Salon, p. 195.
43. V. Dernovoy, "Nadezhnyi 'zontic' ot raketnogo dozhdya" (Reliable missile rain
"umbrella"), Krasnaya zvezda, 14 September 1996, p. 3.
44. IISS Military Balance 1996/97 (Oxford University Press, October 1996), pp. 114-
115.
45. The first Soviet air-to-air guided missile was the RS-IU, developed in 1956. The MiG-
17PF and Yak-25P fighter-interceptors were reconfigured to use this missile.
640 Notes
46. V. Smirnov and V. Feklistov, "Senezh-MIE i Rubezh-ME: vysokaya effektivnost i nadezh-

nost" (Senezh-MIE and Rubezh-ME: High efficiency and reliability), Voennyi parad
(September-October 1994), p. 148.
47. Semiactive seekers are guided by the target's reflection on the interceptor radar. In active
seekers, the illuminating radar is located on the missile. Infrared seekers use the infrared
signal from the aircraft engine to zero in on the target. The air-to-air missiles in service at
the present time in the Russian forces include the intermediate- and long-range R-27R and
R-27M missiles (semiactive seekers), the infrared-guided R-73 (close-range missile) and
R-27T (long-range missile), and the R-33, R-27A, and R-77 long-range missiles with active
radar seekers.
48. The MiG-31 armament included four long-range R-33 missiles on lalUlchers lUlder the
fuselage and two intermediate-range R-40TD missiles or four short-range R-60M missiles on
two pylons lUlder the wings.
49. This system was originally developed for the Tu-128 interceptors.
50. The KS-172 missiles are mOlUlted on lalUlchers lUlder the fuselage, and the R-77 missiles
are located on pylons lUlder the wings. Two close-range R-73 missiles can be substituted for
two of the four R-77 missiles.
51. /zvestiya, 14 August 1997, p. 5.
52. IISS Military Balance 1996/97, pp. 113-114.
53. O. Falichev, interview with Gen-Lt. A. Sokolov, Commander, the Early-warning Army,
Krasnaya zvezda, 7 February 1995, p. 2.
54. Yu. V. Votintsev, "Neisvestnye voiska ischeznuvshei sverkhderzhavy" (The Lmknown
forces of the deflUlct superpower), Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal, no. 9 (1993), p. 37.
55. See ibid., p. 26.
56. O. V. Golubev, Yu. A. Kamenskiy et al., Rossiyskaya sistema protivoraketnoy oborony
(Russia's ABM System) (Tekhnoconsult, 1994), p. 9.
57. Kisllilko, Restricted Area, p. 315.
58. The headquarters and living quarters were in the city of Priozersk. In addition to System
A, all subsequent ABM systems and the Dal S-500 SAM system were tested on the site in
Sary-Shagan.
59. G. Kisllilko, "Dengi na oboronu: Chetyre monologa 0 sekretakh 'zakrytoi' nauki"
(Money for defense: Four monologues on the secrets of "classified" science), Sovetskaya
Rossiya, 5 August 1990, p. 4.
60. The first test lalUlch of the V-I000 antimissile was conducted on 11 October 1957 and
was lUlsuccessful. M. Rebrov, "Gonka za mirazhami, ili kuda vedet 'raketnyi sled'" (The race
for a mirage, or where the "missile trail" leads), Krasnaya zvezda, 5 March 1994, p. 5.
62. OKB-30 was later renamed the Vympel Design Bureau. In the 1970s, this design bureau,
renamed the Research Institute of Radio Instrument Building (NIIRP), was combined with
other design, research, and production organizations that worked on ABM systems to form
the Vympel Central Scientific Production Association (TsNPO).
Notes 641
64. Ibid., p. 44.

65. Among the projects canceled were the Saturn mobile ABM system, developed at one of
the research institutes of the Ministry of Radio Industry, and the S-225 mobile antimissile
and antiaircraft system, developed by Special Design Bureau 31 of Design Bureau 1 lUlder
the general supervision of A. A. Raspletin. Golubev, Kamenskiy et al., Russia's ABM System,
p. 22; Kisllilko, Restricted Area, p. 439.
67. Votintsev, "Unknown forces," p. 32.
68. Ibid.
71. Ibid., pp. 45-46.
72. O. Golubev and Yu. Kamenskiy, "Raketnyi shcrut Moskvy bez grifa 'sekretno'"
(Moscow missile shield lUlclassified), Novoye vremya, no. 11 (1994), p. 48.
74. Golubev and Kamenskiy, "Moscow missile shield," p. 47.
77. The SALT I treaty, setting limits on strategic offensive arms, was signed at the same time
as the ABM Treaty.
78. All of the radars in the system are supposed to be within a circle with a diameter of 3
kilometers. All of the installations of the ABM system, including the antimissile lalUlchers,
are supposed to be within a circle with a radius of 150 kilometers and a center in the center
of the capital. The treaty and protocol placed several other restrictions on the ABM system
deployed arolUld the ICBM positioning areas.
80. Kisllilko, Restricted Area, pp. 502-506.
81. See Karpenko, Russia's Missiles, p. 165.
86. Ibid., pp. 431, 473.
87. See Kisllilko, Restricted Area, picture between pp. 448 and 449; Golubev, Kamenskiy et
al., Russia's ABM System, p. 51.
88. Soviet Military Power, 1987, (Department of Defense, Washington, DC) p. 48.
90. Ibid., p. 61.
642 Notes

93. Ibid., p. 65.
94. V. Litovkin, "Dengi na reformu u armii est" (The army has money for the reform),
/zvestiya, 11 March 1997, p. 5.
96. Ibid., p. 68.
97. Segodnya, no. 177 (1994), p. 2.
98. See N. Poroskov, "Vosmoye chudo sveta ot PRO" (The eight-ABM wonder), Krasnaya
zvezda, 4 April 1996, p. 2; M. Rebrov, "Plazmennoye oruzhiye: fantastika ili realnost?"
(Plasma weapon: Fiction or reality?) Krasnaya zvezda, 18 May 1996, p. 6.
99. "Chto zhe tam, za gorizontom?" (What is there, over the horizon?) Krasnaya zvezda,
11 September 1993, p. 4.
100. The system's radar is also known as the Pushkino radar.
101. V. Litovkin, "Raketnaya 'sotnya' pod zemley kruglosutochno sterezhet stolitsu" (The
lUldergrOlUld missile "Hlllldred" protects the capital rOlUld-the-clock), /zvestiya, 25 August
1993, p. 6.
102. Ibid. See also "What is there, over the Horizon?"
103. S. Goreinov, "Esli k nam izdaleka priletit vdrug raketa" (What if a missile comes from
afar?), Nedelya, no. 14 (21-27 April 1997), pp. 8-9. See also "50tb Anniversary of tbe
Novator Design Bureau," Military Parade (November-December 1997), p. 121.
105. M. Rebrov, "Proekt Taran" (The Taran project), Krasnaya zvezda, 18 ]lllle 1994, p. 6.
106. Ibid.
107. "Energiya" Space Rocket Corporation, pp. 419-420.
108. The satellite did not reach orbit, however, because of a lalUlcher malflUlction. M. V.
Tarasenko, Voyennyye aspekty sovetskoi kosmonavtiki (Military Aspects of Soviet Cosmo-
nautics) (Nikol, 1992), p. 41.
109. See, for example, Falichev, interview with Gen-Lt. Sokolov.
110. Falichev, interview with Gen-Lt. Sokolov.
111. NII-37 was later renamed Research Institute of Long-Range Radio Commwllcation
(NIIDAR).
112. Much of the information presented in this section was taken from the following pub-
lications: Votintsev, "Unknown forces"; KisLmko, Restricted Area; Falichev, interview with
Gen-Lt. Sokolov; O. Falichev, "Glaza i ushi prezidenta" (The eyes and ears of the president),
Krasnaya zvezda, 7 February 1995, p. 2.
113. S. Kniazkov, "SkrlUlde-ostrovok Rossii: Pravda vremennyi" (SkrlUlda-A temporary
Russian territory), Krasnaya zvezda, 5 May 1996, p. 3.
114. Ibid.
115. KisLmko, Restricted Area, p. 393.
116. Ibid.
Notes 643
117. Ibid., p. 393.

118. Kniazkov, "Sknmda." Polyak was the general designer of the Dnestr and Dnepr radars.
Votintsev, "Unknown forces," p. 33.
119. KisLmko, Restricted Area, p. 424.
120. Kniazkov, "Sknmda."
121. Ibid.
124. Ibid.
125. M. Rebrov, "Drugogo uzhe ne budet" (There will be no other), Krasnaya zvezda, 3
August 1994, p. 2.
127. Soviet Military Power, 1987, pp. 48-49.
128. Ibid.
129. See Votintsev, "Unknown forces," p. 32; FaIichev, interview with Lt.-Gen. Sokolov.
131. Ibid., p. 40.
132. V. Belykh, "Zachem nam eta Kabala?" (Do we need this burden?), /zvestiya, 18 July
1997, p. 5.
133. IISS The Military Balance 1996/97, p. 114.
135 Ibid., pp. 33, 34.
136. Ibid., p. 35.
137. B. Surikov, "Stanet Ii mir bezopasneye esIi demontirovat Krasnoyarskuyu RLS?"
(Would the world be a safer place if the Krasnoyarsk radar was dismantled?), Literaturnaya
gazeta, 24 January 1990.
139. Ibid., p. 36.
140. Surikov, "Would the world be a safer place?" The initial proposal called for deploy-
ment of the new radar near Yakutsk, but the analysis showed that construction providing a
power supply at that site and would be extremely expensive. Votintsev, "Unknown forces,"
p.35.
141. The ABM Treaty did not prohibit the deployment of large phased-array radars within
national territory for the tracking of space objects.
142. Votintsev, "Unknown forces," pp. 35-36.
143. The BMEWS radar in Krasnoyarsk was an indisputable violation of the ABM treaty.
However, the provisions of the treaty are intended to preclude the use of early-warning radars
for ABM battle management. The Daryal radar operates in the metric band, and it would be
impossible to use it as a battle management radar.
644 Notes
144. The Volga radar project was beglUl lUlder the supervision of A. N. Musatov.
146. See IISS The Military Balance 1989/90 (Autumn 1989), p. 35.
147. Kisllilko, Restricted Area, p. 499; "RLS v Baranovichakh: Idut ispytaniya" (A radar in
Baranovichi: Tests are lUlderway), Krasnaya Zvezda, 22 May 2000, p. 1.
148. Falichev, Eyes and ears of the president."
149. According to the London International Institute of Strategic Studies, this radar was not
operational as of 1996, (IISS The Military Balance 1996/97, p. 114).
150. A. Babakin, "Smotryaschie za gorizont" (Watching over the horizon), Krasnaya zvezda,
3 August 1996, p. 6.
151. Ibid.
154. The transmitter antenna was 210 meters x 85 meters and the receiver was 300 meters
x 135 meters.
155. Babakin, "Watching over the horizon."
156. O. Musafirova, "Vinovnikom chernobylskoi katastrofy stal Chernobyl-2?" (Is
Chernobyl-2 the real reason for the Chernobyl disaster?), Komsomolskaya pravda, 18 April
1994, p. 2.
157. See Kisllilko, Restricted Area, p. 496.
159. Ibid.
160. Musafirova, "Is Chernobyl-2 the real reason?"
161. See Kisllilko, Restricted Area, p. 497.
162. Tarasenko, Military Aspects of Soviet Cosmonauties, p. 80.
163. "Rossiya: rassekrechen voennyi sputnik" (Russia: The military satellite has been declas-
sified), Novosti kosmonavtiki, no. 2, 1-17 January 1993, p. 23.
164. P. Podvig, "The operational status of the Russian space-based early-warning system,"
Science & Global Security, 4 (1994), p. 368.
165. N. Johnson, Soviet Year in Space, 1989 (Teledyne Brown Engineering), p. 105.
166. Tarasenko, Military Aspects of Soviet Cosmonautics, p. 80.
167. The operational status of a satellite can be determined by analyzing the parameters of
its orbit. An operational satellite performs station-keeping maneuvers once every three
months. A satellite's failure to conduct such a maneuver within a three-month time frame is
an indication that it is no longer operable.
168. The names assigned to the positions were not connected with the names of the Prognoz
series of satellites.
169. Podvig, "Operational status of the Russian space-based early warning system," p. 378.
170. In addition to the Cosmos-775, which was lalUlched on 8 October 1975, the other
early-warning satellites lalUlched into geosynchronous orbits were the Cosmos-1546 (29
Notes 645
March 1984), Cosmos-1629 (21 February 1985), Cosmos-1894 (28 October 1987), Cosmos-
2133 (14 February 1991), Cosmos-2155 (13 September 1991), Cosmos-2209 (10 September
1992), Cosmos-2224 (17 December 1992), Cosmos-2282 (7 July 1994), Cosmos-2345 (14
August 1997), and Cosmos-2350 (29 April 1998).
171. The first Polyot satellite was lalUlched on 1 November 1963, and the second was
lalUlched on 12 April 1964. Tarasenko, Military Aspects of Soviet Cosmonautics, p. 33.
172. Ibid., pp. 34-35.
173. A. Dokuchayev, "Russkiye ne rasstrelivali amerikanskie sputniki" (The Russians did
not fire at the American satellites), Krasnaya zvezda, 30 July 1994, p. 6.
174. Ibid. The radar and infrared homing warheads were tested during the tests of the system.
Tarasenko, Military Aspects of Soviet Cosmonautics, p. 38.
175. Dokuchayev, "Russian did not fire," p. 6.
176. Much of the information in this section was taken from Votintsev, "Unknown forces."
177. B. Kononenko, "Pod kontrolem-'bezmolvnyi' kosmos" ("Silent" space is lUlder sur-
veillance), Armeyskiy sbornik, no. 6 (1996), p. 49.
178. An experimental model of the system was built on the grolUlds of the plant in the late
1980s and was essentially a miniature of the Okno system.
179. V. Prudnikov, "V integratsii PVO-osnova bezopasnosti sodruzhestva" (The integra-
tion of Air Defense Forces is the basis of commonwealth security), Krasnaya zvezda, 28
February 1995, p. 2.
180. Ibid.
181. V. Karkavtsev, "Samaya kholodnaya voyna" (The coldest war), Komsomolskaya
pravda, 11 April 1995, p. 3.
182. A. Ivanov and S. Babichev, "Glavnoye-sokhranit potentsial" (The main task is to pre-
serve the potential), Krasnaya zvezda, 10 December 1996, p. 1.
183. "Voiska PVO i reforma" (The ADF and military reform), Krasnaya zvezda, 29 January
1997, p. 2.
184. Krasnaya zvezda, 8 April 1995, p. 2.
185. S. Vasilyev, "Dezhurnye sily PVO bez dela ne sidyat"(The ADF duty forces have a job),
Krasnaya zvezda, 29 January 1997, p. 1.
186. A. Ivanov, "Skolko sputnikov-shpionov segodnya v kosmose?" (How many spy satel-
lites are in space today?), Krasnaya zvezda, 20 October 1993, p. 2.
187. D. Likhanov, "Za 40 minut do tretiey mrrovoi" (40 minutes before World War III),
Sovershenno sekretno, no. 5 (1993), pp. 3-4.
188. Ibid.
189. Ibid.
Chapter 8. Nuclear Tests
1. The number of tests depends, among other things, on the definition of a test. The numbers
here are taken from the official list of Soviet nuclear explosions, published by the Institute
646 Notes
of Experimental Physics (Arzamas-16): I. A. Andryushin et al., Ispytania yadernogo oruzhiya

i yadernye vzryvy v mirnikh tselyakh SSSR. 1949-1990 gg. (Nuclear Weapon Tests and Peace-
ful Nuclear Explosions of the Soviet Union 1949-1990) (RFYaTs-VNIIEF, 1996).
2. The classification of the nuclear explosions here strictly follows the one in Andryushin et
al., Nuclear Weapon Tests and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions of the Soviet Union.
3. The yield of a nuclear test is usually expressed in terms of the so-called TNT equivalent.
Under this definition, an explosion of yield q kilotons releases the same amolUlt of energy as
an explosion of q kilotons of TNT.
4. The information on radiation effects of lUldergrolUld tests is taken from the following
publications: V. V. Gorin et al., "Semipalatinskii poligon: Khronologia podsemnykh
yadernykh vzryvov i ikh pervichnye radiatsionnye effekty, 1961-1989" (Semipalatinsk test
range: Chronology of lUldergrolUld nuclear explosions and their primary radiation effects,
1961-1989) TsNIIatominform Bulletin, no. 9 (1993), pp. 21-32; Yu. V. Dubasov, O. L.
Kedrovskiy et al., "Podzemnye vzryvy yadernykh ustroistv v promyshlennykh tselyakh na
territorii SSSR v 1965-1988: khronologia and radiatsionnye posledstviya" (UndergrolUld
industrial nuclear explosions in USSR territory in 1965-1988: Chronology and radiation
effects), TsNIIatominform Bulletin, no. 1 (1994), pp. 18-29; A. M. Matushchenko, G. A.
Kaurov, G. A. Krasilov, and K. V. Kharitonov, "Yadernyi poligon bez grifa sekretnosti (daty,
sobytiya)" (Nuclear test range lUlclassified (dates and events)), in Novaya Zemlya: Proceed-
ings of the Naval Arctic Expedition, vol. 3, no. 4 (Moscow, 1994), pp. 54-67.
5. Yeo A. Negin, G. D. Kulichkov et al., Sovetskii atomnyi proekt (Soviet Atomic Project),
(Nizbni Novgorod, 1995), p. 187.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid., p. 190.
8. Ibid., pp. 189-190.
9. Ibid., p. 191.
10. M. V. Bocharov et al., "Svidetelstvuyut spetsialisty: otsenivaya radiatsionnye posledstviya
atomnogo vzryva na Totskom uchenii" (Experts testify: Considering radiation effects of the
atomic explosion in the Totsk exercise) TsNIIatominform Bulletin, no. 9 (1993), p. 68.
12. Ibid.
13. Yeo A. Shitikov, "V interesakh flota" (In the interest of the fleet), in Yadernyi Arkhipelag
(Nuclear Archipelago) (IzdAT, 1995), p. 60.
15. Shitikov, "In the interest of the fleet," p. 61.
16. V. N. Mikhailov, ed., Yadernye ispytaniya SSSR (Soviet Nuclear Tests) (IzdAT, 1997),
p. 147; Yeo B. Volkov, ed., MBR SSSR (RF) i SShA (ICBMs of USSR (Russia Federation) and
United States) (RVSN, 1996), p. 310.
17. The work on nuclear artillery shells began in 1952. Negin, Kulichkov et al., Soviet
Atomic Project, p. 196.
19. Ibid., p. 25.
Notes 647

22. Yu. Khariton and Yu. Smirnov, "Khariton version," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
(May 1993), p. 29. Unlike the "Mike" device, tested by the United States on 1 November
1952, RDS-6 was not a two-stage device. At the same time, RDS-6 was not simply a
"boosted" weapon. The principle used for igniting the thermonuclear reaction in RDS-6
would have probably allowed development of megaton-class weapons had work on this kind
of thermonuclear weapon continued.
23. D. Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956
(Yale University Press, 1994), p. 323.
24. The test was scheduled for 20 November 1955, but the mission was called off because
of the weather conditions at the test site. The bomber with the weapon had already taken
off and had to land with the thermonuclear device on board. Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb,
pp. 314-315.
25. Ibid., p. 315
26. In 1954 the United States conducted the Castle test series, which included tests of
various thermonuclear devices. All the explosions during the series were initiated either
from a barge or from a tower. One of the devices tested during the Castle series was later
used to build the Mark-17 thermonuclear bomb, which entered service in 1954. However,
the first airdrop test of Mark-17 from a B-52 bomber was not conducted lUltil20 May 1956.
F. H. Shelton, Reflections of a Nuclear Weaponeer (Shelton Enterprise, 1988), pp. 6-40,
7-34.
28. Ibid., p. 19.
29. Ibid., p. 149.
30. The published data show that as Soviet thermonuclear weapons were modified the length-
to-diameter ratio grew larger and at some point reached the value of 2-2.2 (Mikhailov, Soviet
Nuclear Tests, pp. 18-19). This indicates that the RDS-37 device may have been almost
spherical in shape. In the United States at the initial stages of the thermonuclear weapon
development, the length-to-diameter ratio was decreased from about 4 to 3. This indicates
that the first Soviet two-stage thermonuclear device may have been quite different from its
U.S. cOlUlterpart.
31. The devices tested on 23 and 27 February 1958 were apparently developed at Arzamas-
16 and Chelyabinsk-70. Although the source for that information does not say explicitly
which institute developed which device, it appears that the device tested on 23 February was
designed in Chelyabinsk-70. Mikhailov, Soviet Nuclear Tests, p. 18.
33. Ibid.
34. The devices tested on 25 and 27 September 1962 were developed in Chelyabinsk-70 and
Arzamas-16, respectively. Ibid., p. 20.
35. Ibid.
36. Soviet Thermonuclear Weapon Development, CIA Report, November 1964.
648 Notes
37. A. N. Kalyadin, Problemy zapreshcheniya ispytanii i rasprostraneniya yadernogo

oruzhiya (Problems of a Test Ban and the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons) (Nauka, 1976),
p.62.
38. The problem discovered during the analysis of the new data was that a seismic signal
generated by a low-yield explosion could be similar to that of an earthquake. The question
of discrimination among such signals had been discussed during the previous meeting of
experts in July-August 1958. The data available at that time indicated that reliable discrim-
ination between the two phenomena would not be a serious problem. See, for example,
Shelton, Reflections, p. 10-4.
39. The first version of the report, prepared in March 1959 and classified, stated that decou-
pling could reduce seismic magnitude up to 300-fold. The lUlclassified JlUle version of the
report stated that the magnitude could be reduced more than 10-fold. Shelton, Reflections,
p. 10-3.
40. Ibid.
41. The first Soviet response to the U.S. proposal, made public on 16 February 1960, con-
tained a proposal of a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests and reduced inspection quotas.
This position was corrected in the 19 March 1960 statement. The Soviet statement made on
21 March 1960 included the proposal of the moratorium on low-yield lUldergrolUld tests.
Kalyadin, Problems, p. 80.
42. V. P. Dumik, A. S. Karasev, and A. M. Matushchenko, "Arkticheskii poligon" (Arctic
test range), in Yadernyi Arkhipelag (Nuclear Archipelago) (IzdAT, 1995), p. 44.
44. Ibid.
45. Dumik et al., "Arctic test range," p. 45.
47. G. V. KisLmko, Sekretnaya zona: Ispoved' glavnogo konstruktora (Restricted: Confes-
sions of the general designer) (Sovremennik, 1996), pp. 429-430.
48. The United States was able to resume testing as quickly as it did only because the tested
weapon was taken from its operational inventory and the test therefore required almost no
preparatory work. Shelton, Reflections, p. 10-72.
49. The U.S. atmospheric test program was resumed on 25 April 1962 and continued lUltil
4 November of that year.
50. It should be mentioned here that the Soviet Union insisted on linking the nuclear test
ban to comprehensive disarmament. The inspection system mentioned in the Soviet proposal
was supposed to be part of a broader inspection network that would monitor compliance
with "total and comprehensive disarmament." The Soviet leadership at the time probably
lUlderstood that this link made most of its proposals concerning the test ban lUlacceptable.
51. G. G. Kudryavtsev, "Ob'ekt-700" (Installation 700), in Yadernyi Arkhipelag (Nuclear
Archipelago) (IzdAT, 1995), p. 148.
53. KisLmko, Restricted Area, pp. 429-430.
Notes 649
55. Kudryavtsev, "Installation 700," p. 133.

57. This was the only test carried out at Novaya Zemlya in 1964.
58. See, for example, Mikhailov, Soviet Nuclear Tests, p. 137.
59. After the treaty was signed the United States and the Soviet Union reached an lUlder-
standing that if in one or two tests a year the yield slightly exceeded the threshold, this would
not be considered a violation of the treaty.
60. The Soviet Union afterward conducted several tests that had cumulative yields close to
the ISO-kiloton threshold. In some cases the seismic data indicated that the threshold might
have been crossed. These are tests of 4 August 1979 (153 kilotons according to the seismic
data), 18 August 1979 (179 kilotons), 14 September 1980 (196 kilotons), 13 September 1981
(163 kilotons), 27 December 1981 (156 kilotons), and 26 May 1984 (157 kilotons). The
yield data here have been taken from F. Ringdal, P. D. Marshall, and R. W. Alewine, "Seismic
yield determination of Soviet lUldergrolUld nuclear explosions at the Shagan River test site,"
Geophysics]. Int., 109 (1992), pp. 65-77. According to the official data, published in
Andryushin et al., Nuclear Weapon Tests and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions of the Soviet
Union, yields of these tests did not exceed the ISO-kiloton threshold. The discrepancy could
be explained by the lack of reliable data about the geological conditions at the test site, which
are important in making estimates of test yields.
61. Kalyadin, Problems, p. 140.
62. Ibid., p. 142.
63. The last test before the moratorium was carried out on 25 July 1985.
64. Kalyadin, Problems, p. 149.
65. V. N. Mikhailov, "Vmesto predisloviya" (Instead of the Preface), in Yadernyi Arkhipelag
(Nuclear Archipelago) (IzdAT, 1995), p. 9.
66. Ibid. Preparations for one more test on the Semipalatinsk test range were completed in
May 1991. An 0.3-kiloton device was place in tWlllell08 at the Degelen test site. The device
was destroyed by a conventional explosion in 1995.
68. Russia extended the moratorium twice, on 19 October 1991 and 5 July 1993.
69. The treaty contains a "supreme national interests" clause that makes this theoretically
possible. The Russian statement was similar to one made by the United States.
70. This section is based on the information published in Mikhailov, Soviet Nuclear Tests,
pp. 66-87.
71. Ibid., pp. 73-74, 85.
72. Ibid., p. 78.
73. The complete name of the institute was the All-Union Scientific Research and Design
Institute of Industrial Technology of the Ministry of Medium Machine Building.
74. Mikhailov, Soviet Nuclear Tests, pp. 51-52.
75. The post of the director of the Semipalatinsk test range was held after Kolesnikov by (in
order of succession): A. V. Yen'ko, I. N. Gureev, N. N. Vinogradov, A. I. Smirnov, M. K.
Kantiev, V. I. Stupin, A. D. Ilyenko, and Yu. V. Konovalenko. Ibid., pp. 52, 95.
650 Notes
76. Ibid., p. 53.

77. Soviet Thermonuclear Weapon Development.
78. Six of the devices tested in 1960 contained plutonium and six contained uranium. There
were five plutonium and eight uranium devices tested in 1961. All 13 devices tested in 1963
contained plutonium. Mikhailov, Soviet Nuclear Tests, p. 28.
79. Ibid.
80. The data about test sites of individual tests were published in Gorin et al., "Semipalatinsk
test range."
81. In 1964-1965 three tests were conducted in tWlllelS that did not open to the surface but
instead ended in an existing tWlllel. This practice was then abandoned, and each test was
conducted in a separate tWlllel.
82. M. D. Nordyke, "The Soviet program for peaceful uses of nuclear explosions," Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory, UCRL-ID-124410, October 1996, pp. 46-49.
83. See ibid., p. 49; Dubasov, Kedrovski et al., "UndergrOlUld industrial nuclear explosion."
84. The explosion could have taken place on 15 November 1978. See T. B. Cochran, W. M.
Arkin, R. S. Norris, and]. I. Sands, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Vol. 4: Soviet Nuclear
Weapons (Ballinger, 1988), p. 374.
85. V. I. Fillipovski, "s Ladogi na Novuyu Zemlyu" (From Ladoga to Novaya Zemlya), in
Yadernyi Arkhipelag (Nuclear Archipelago) (IzdAT, 1995), p. 192.
86. The reactors on the territory of the Semipalatinsk test range were administered by the
Luch Scientific Production Association, which was responsible for development of nuclear
rocket motors. L. Kvasnikov and A. Kostylev, "Yadernye raketnye dvigateli" (Nuclear rocket
motors), Vestnik vozdushnogo {lota (Air Fleet News), no. 6 (1996).
87. Ibid.
88. Mikhailov, Soviet Nuclear Tests, p. 58; S. I. Bystrov, "Tak nacrunalsya nash yadernyi
flot" (This is how our nuclear fleet was created), in Yadernyi Arkhipelag (Nuclear Archipel-
ago) (IzdAT, 1995), p. 49.
90. Yeo N. Barkovskiy was still responsible for construction work on the test range after the
command was transferred to Starikov (Kudryavtsev, "Installation 700," p. 131). Later the
post of the director of the test range was held by (in order of succession) N. A. Osovskii,
N. L. Lutskii, 1.1. Pakhov, G. G. Kudriavtsev, Yeo P. Zbritskii, V. K. Steshenko, N. P. Minenko,
S. P. Kostritskii, V. K. Chirov, Yeo P. Gorozhin, V. A. Gorev, and V. S. Yarygin. Mikhailov,
Soviet Nuclear Tests, p. 95.
91. Shitikov, "In the interest of the fleet," pp. 60-61.
92. Dumik et al., "Arctic test range," p. 42.
93. Ibid., p. 43.
95. Ibid., p. 69.
Notes 651
97. Only four of these tests were conducted before 31 March 1958, when the Soviet Union
annOlUlced the wlilateral moratorium.
99. Ibid., pp. 70-74.
100. The explosions conducted over water are listed as airbursts. An example of such a test
is the explosion carried out on 13 September 1961.
101. Nordyke, "Soviet program for peaceful uses of nuclear explosions," p. 18.
102. Two devices, placed in one shaft, were detonated simultaneously. These two explosions
are listed on the official list as one test. The third device was in a different shaft and was
detonated almost simultaneously with the first two, but the time difference was too large to
list it as part of the same test.
104. Bocharov et al., "Experts testify," p. 68.
105. Volkov, ICBMs of USSR (Russian Federation) and United States, p. 310.
106. Howard Seguine, "U.S.-Russian meeting-HEMP effects on national power grid and
telecommwlications," Memorandum for Record, 17 February 1995.
107. Kisllilko, Restricted Area, pp. 429-430.
108. The Soviet PNE program is described in detail in Dubasov, Kedrovski et al., "Under-
grolUld industrial nuclear explosions," and Nordyke, "Soviet program for peaceful uses of
nuclear explosions."
109. The total number of PNEs includes 7 explosions (9 detonations) conducted on the
Semipalatinsk test range as well as 117 events (126 detonations) outside of test ranges. It
should be noted that according to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty all explosions conducted
at a test range are considered nuclear weapon tests regardless of their actual purpose.
110. Yu. V. Dubasov, A. S. Krivokhatski, K. V. Miasnikov, and N. P. Filonov, "Yadernye
vzryvnye tekhnologii: osobennosti provedeniya yadernykh vzryvov v mirnykh tselyakh"
(Nuclear explosion technology: Peaceful nuclear explosions), TsNIIatominform Bulletin, no.
1 (1994), p. 30.
111. Ibid.
112. Ibid.
113. Ibid.
115. Nordyke, "Soviet program for peaceful uses of nuclear weapons," pp. 9-10.
116. Ibid., p. 29.
117. The Bolshoy Azgir series of tests is described in A. S. Krivokhatski, Yu. V. Dubasov,
V. S. Dubrovin, Yu. G. Petrov, and V. A. Sokolov, "Radiatsionnye proyavleniya podsemnykh
yadernykh vzryvov v mirnykh tselyakh na solyanom mestorozhdenii Bolshoy Azgir"
(Radiation effects of lUldergrolUld peaceful nuclear explosions on Bolshoy Azgir site),
TsNIIatominform Bulletin, no. 9 (1993).
118. Ibid., p. 59.
652 Notes
119. L. R. Sykes,]. Deng, and P. Lyubomirskiy, "Accurate location of nuclear explosions at

Azgir, Kazakhstan, from satellite images and seismic data: Implications for monitoring de-
coupled explosions", Geophysical Research Letters, 20, no. (18), pp. 1919-1922.
120. Dubasov, Kedrovskiy et al., "UndergrOlUld industrial nuclear explosions," p. 21.
121. Nordyke, "Soviet program for peaceful uses of nuclear weapons," p. 51.
122. Ibid., p. 56.
123. The project, if realized, would have involved up to 250 nuclear explosions. V.
Menshcrukov and B. Golubov, "Ekologicheskie posledstviya podzemnykh yadernykh
vzryvov" (Environmental effects of lUldergrOlUld nuclear explosions), Yadernyi Kontrol, no.
10 (1995), pp. 14-18.
124. Nordyke, "Soviet program for peaceful uses of nuclear weapons," p. 20.
125. Ibid., p. 46.
126. Ibid., pp. 46, 48.
127. A. S. Krivokhatski et al., "0 resultatakh yadernykh vzryvov, provedennykh na
Astrakhanskom gasocondensatnom mestorozhdenii dlya sozdaniya podzemnykh khranil-
ishch" (On the results of nuclear explosions conducted on the Astrakhan gas field for
creation of lUldergrolUld storage reservoirs), TsNIIatominform Bulletin, no. 5-6 (1994), pp.
51-53.
128. The Urta-Bulak device was designed in Arzamas-16. The device for the Pamuk explo-
sion was designed in Chelyabinsk-70. Nordyke, "Soviet program for peaceful uses of nuclear
weapons," p. 35.
129. Menshcrukov and Golubov, "Environmental effects."
130. Andryusrun et al., Nuclear Weapon Tests and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions of the Soviet
Union.
131. The time difference between explosions in this test was about 4.5 seconds (Mikhailov,
Soviet Nuclear Weapons, p. 360).
132. Yu. V. Dubasov, V. P. Dumik et al., "Khronologia yadernykh ispytanii, provedennykh
SSSR v atmosfere, kosmicheskom prostranstve i pod vodoy, 1949-1962 gg." (Chronology of
the nuclear tests conducted by the Soviet Union in atmosphere, in space and lUlder water,
1949-1962), TsNIIatominform Bulletin, no. 2 (1994), pp. 36-43; Gorin at al., "Semi-
palatinsk test range."
133. The times given for atmospheric tests in the table are taken from Mikhailov, Soviet
Nuclear Weapons, or from publications that describe individual tests.
134. Ringdal et al., "Seismic yield determination"; C. H. Thurber, H. R. Quin, and P. G.
Richards, "Accurate locations of nuclear explosions in Balapan, Kazakhstan, 1987 to 1989,"
Geophysical Research Letters, 20, no. 5 (March 1993), pp. 399-402.
135. Sykes et al., "Accurate location of nuclear explosions."
136. Mikhailov, Soviet Nuclear Weapons, pp. 349-372.
137. Matushchenko et al., "Nuclear test range lUlclassified."
138. The time difference between the explosions probably did not, however, exceed one
second. Mikhailov, Soviet Nuclear Weapons, pp. 356, 362.
Notes 653
139. "Totskoye voiskovoye ucheniye s primeneniyem atomnogo oruzhiya" (Totsk field

exercises with a nuclear weapon), TsNIIatominform Bulletin, no. 9 (1993), pp. 60-72.
140. The sites of tests are taken from Gorin et al., "Semipalatinsk test range."
141. Coordinates of explosions conducted on Balapan site before 1987 are taken from
Ringdal et al., "Seismic yield determination." Coordinates of Balapan explosions conducted
in 1987-1989 are taken from Thurber et al., "Accurate locations of nuclear explosions."
142. Dubasov, Kedrovskiy et al., "UndergrOlUld industrial nuclear explosions."
143. Sykes et al., "Accurate locations of nuclear explosions."
Union.
145. Among the tests that are listed in this category are the first lUldergrOlUld explosion (11
October 1961) and the joint u.S.-Soviet verification experiment (14 September 1988).
146. Dubasov, Kedrovskiy et al., "UndergrolUld industrial nuclear explosions."
Union. This publication also lists yields of all multiple-explosion peaceful tests.
148. The primary sources of the yield data are Ringdal et al., "Seismic yield determination"
(Balapan tests before 1987), Thurber et al., "Accurate locations of nuclear explosions"
(Balapan tests after 1987); and Mikhailov, Soviet Nuclear Weapons (other tests at Semi-
palatinsk and all Novaya Zemlya tests).
150. Ibid.
151. The classification of tests by their radioactive effects, as well as data on effects of Semi-
palatinsk tests, is taken from Gorin et al., "Semipalatinsk test site." The data on radiation
effects of industrial explosions are taken from Dubasov, Kedrovskiy et al., "UndergrolUld
industrial nuclear explosions." The data on Novaya Zemlya tests are taken from
Matushchenko et al., "Nuclear test range lUlclassified."
Afterword
1. 0 pervoocherednykh merakh po reformirovaniyu VS RF i sovershenstvovaniyu ikh struk-

tury (On the First-Order Measures to Reform the Russian Armed Forces and to Improve
Their Structure), Presidential Decree No. 725S, 16 July 1997.
2. As another major measure, the decree downgraded the GrolUld Forces by transforming
the High Command of the GrolUld Forces into the Main Directorate. This measure effec-
tively demoted the GrolUld Forces to the status of a branch of the armed forces rather than
a separate service.
3. V. Terekhov, "Reforma" (The reform), Interfax-AiF, 24 November 1997.
4. I. Safronov, "VVS i PVO nesut tyazhelyie poteri" (Air Forces and Air Defense Forces suffer
heavy casualties), Kommersant-Daily, 25 March 1998.
5. Another air army of the Supreme High Command comprises military transport aviation.
V. Rog and A. Drobyshevsky, "Improvizatsii ne bylo" (There was no improvisation), Neza-
visimoye Voennoye Obozreniye, 15 December 2000.
654 Notes
6. Interfax report, Segodnya, 12 August 1998.

7. The document, "Osnovy (kontseptiya) gosudarstvennoi politiki po voennomu stroitelstvu
na period do 2005 goda" (Basics (concept) of the State's military development policy lUltil
2005) was signed by Boris Yeltsin in August 1998 (Y. Soloviyev, "President utverzhdayet plan
voennoy reformy" (President approves the plan for military reform), Nezavisimaya Gazeta,
4 August 1998).
8. The main provisions of the concept were described in an earlier article by the Minister of
Defense: I. Sergeyev, "Programma voyennogo reformirovaniya" (The program for military
reform), Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 18 September 1997.
9. Minister of Defense Igor Sergeyev officially lUlveiled this plan in October 1998 (Nezav-
isimaya Gazeta, 21 October 1998).
10. O. Odnokolenko, "Armiya razvalivayetsya deleniyem" (The Army is disintegrating by
fission), Segodnya, 21 November 1998.
11. Total cuts of all military forces will amolUlt to 600,000 personnel (Interfax, 9 Novem-
ber 2000).
12. The current plan envisions that in 2006 the Strategic Rocket Forces will be turned over
to the Air Forces (Vadim Soloviyev, "Umozritelnyi rezultat" (Imaginary results), Nezavisi-
moye Voennoye Obozreniye, 29 December 2000).
13. A. Korbut and S. Sokut, "President povelel nachat reformu" (President ordered to begin
the reform), Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniye, 24 November 2000.
14. These documents included a memorandum of lUlderstanding that names Russia, Belarus,
Kazakhstan, and Ukraine as the successor states of the Soviet Union and the so-called demar-
cation agreement: joint statements that specify which missile defense systems are considered
nonstrategic and therefore not limited by the ABM Treaty and outline confidence-building
measures related to nonstrategic missile defenses.
15. Breakout potential is a problem that resulted from the provisions of the START II Treaty
that lifted restrictions on "downloading," that is, carrying out warhead reductions by simply
reducing the number of warheads that are attributed to a lalUlcher without destroying the
warheads or lalUlchers. See Article III.2 of the START II Treaty.
16. Among the measures in this bill is the provision that requires the United States and Russia
to conclude a new arms reduction agreement by 31 December 2003. This agreement must
include specific provisions that would correct the most serious shortcomings of the START
II Treaty. If Russia and the United States fail to negotiate the new agreement by the end of
2003, the law will authorize the president to consider withdrawing from the treaty (Article
IV of the ratification law).
17. Federal Law No. 56-FZ of 4 May 2000, On Ratification of the Treaty between the
Russian Federation and the United States of America on Further Reduction and Limitation
of Strategic Offensive Arms.
18. Resolution of ratification passed by the U.S. Senate on 26 January 1996.
19. Article IX of the ratification law. The documents listed in the article are the memoran-
dum on succession, two agreed statements, and the agreement on confidence-building
measures.
Notes 655
20. According to the Soviet wlilateral statement made on 13 ]tme 1991, the Soviet Union
would consider U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty as an extraordinary event that might
jeopardize the Soviet Union's national interests and prompt Soviet withdrawal from the
START I Treaty.
21. Transcript of president's address to the Duma in connection with ratification of the
START II Treaty, Kommersant-Daily, 15 April 2000.
22. The treaty was ratified by the Duma on 21 April 2000.
23. "Vladimir Putin: Pauzy v yadernom razoruzhenii ne dolzhno byt" (Vladimir Putin: There
should be no pause in nuclear disarmament), Rossiskaya Gazeta, 14 November 2000.
24. E. Krutikov, "Doletit li yadernaya troika do 2010 goda?" (Will the nuclear triad survive
until 201O?), Segodnya, 4 July 1998.
25. The currently deployed UR-100NUTTH (55-19) missiles will reach the end of their lives
in 2003-2005, the RT-23UTTH (SS-24) missiles will have to be withdrawn from service by
2002, and the last Topol (SS-25) missile systems will have to be decomissioned in 200S-2010
(P. Podvig, "The Russian strategic forces: Uncertain future," Breakthroughs (Security Studies
Program, MIT) 7, no. 1 (Spring 1998), pp. 11-21).
26. S. Sokut, "Ministr posadil Topol" (The minister planted a Topol), Nezavisimoye Voen-
noye Obozreniye, 25 December 1997.
27. I. Safronov and I. Bulavinov, "Boris Yeltsin podnyal yadernyi shchit" (Boris Yeltsin raised
the nuclear shield), Kommersant-Daily, 4 July 1995.
2S. Y. Maslyukov, "Dogovor i sudba strategicheskikh yadernykh sil Rossii" (The treaty and
the future of Russia's strategic nuclear forces), /zvestiya, 16 December 1995.
29. The missile was known as R-39 Variant 2, Bark, or SS-NX-2S.
30. The R-39 (SS-N-20) missiles deployed on these submarines were approaching the end of
their service lives and had to be eliminated. Project 941 (Typhoon) submarines were to be
equipped with a missile that was being developed as a follow-on to the R-39, so the cancel-
lation of this program left these submarines with no missiles to be equipped with (D. Litovkin,
"Tay£tmy derzhat kurs na utilizatsiyu" (Typhoons are heading toward dismantlement), Yader-
naya Bezopasnost, no. 31, December 1999).
31. The Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology was the head developer of Pioneer (SS-
20), Topol (SS-25), Topol-M (SS-27), and a nwnber of other land-based missile systems.
32. V. Litovkin, "Yuri Dolgorukii budet peredelan esche na stapele" (Yuri Dolgorukii will
be redesigned while it is still in dock), /zvestiya, 9 September 1995.
33. Maslyukov "Treaty and future of Russia's strategic nuclear forces."
34. Litovkin, "Typhoons are heading toward dismantlement." There was no confirmation
that the decision to resume the production of R-29RM missiles was made in July 1995. Most
likely, it was made about a year later, in 1999, when it became clear that the development
of the new SLBM was falling behind the schedule.
35. Maslyukov, "Treaty and future of Russia's strategic nuclear forces."
36. Agentsvo Voyennykh Novostey, 14 December 1999. According to this report, there are
two more mothballed Tu-160 aircraft at the Kazan Aviation Production Association.
656 Notes
37. S. Sokut, "Vzaimovygodnoye resheniye" (A mutually beneficial solution), Nezavisimaya

Gazeta, 28 July 1999.
38. E. Kats, "Poderzhannye 'inomarki' dlya minoborony" (Used "Foreigners" for the Min-
istry of Defense), Segodnya, 20 October 1999.
39. Maslyukov, "Treaty and future of Russia's strategic nuclear forces."
40. V. Morozov, "Vsevidyascheye oko Rossii" (Russia's all-seeing eye), Nezavisimoye Voen-
noye Obozreniye, 14 April 2000.
41. I. Baichurin, "RLS v Baranovichakh: idut ispytaniya (Radar in Baranovichi: Trials are
lUlder way), Krasnaya zvezda, 20 January 1999; D. Voroshilov, "Volga pregradit put'
raketam" (Volga will block incoming missiles), Rossiya, 1 November 2000.
42. Another important mission of the early-warning network is to provide targeting infor-
mation to the Moscow missile defense system.
43. The systems reportedly include radar and laser sensors (Y. Golotyuk, "Orbitalnaya
oborona Rossii" (Russia's orbital defense), /zvestiya, 10 November 1999).
44. The station, which is deployed on the territory of Tajikistan, began trial service on 19
December 1999 (Evgeni Shalnev, "Okno s vidom na kosmos" (Window that looks into space),
Krasnaya zvezda, 3 October 2000).
45. The program, outlined in "On Restructuring and Conversion of the Nuclear Weapons
Complex in 1998-2000," was part of a broader plan to restructure Russia's defense indus-
try (0. Bukharin, "Downsizing Russia's nuclear warhead production infrastructure,"
PU/CEES Report No. 323, Princeton University, May 2000).
46. Ibid.
47. I. Korotchenko, "Yuri Solomonov: Topol-M sposoben preodolet perspectivnuyu PRO
lyubogo gosudarstva" (Yuri Solomonov: Topol-M can penetrate any missile defense system),
Nezavisimaya gazeta, 24 February 1999.
48. V. Tretiakov, T. Aldoshina, andM. Leontiev, "Armiya dolzlma byt' professionalnoi" (The
Army should be professional), excerpts from interview with Russian President Vladimir Putin,
Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniye, 29 December 2000.
Index
12th Department. See General Staff of the K-26, 374

Armed Forces Kometa, 368
12th Main Directorate. See First Main Aircraft
Directorate of the COlUlcil of Ministers; 103M (see Aircraft, M-4)
Ministry of Atomic Energy; Ministry of 1M, 356
Defense 201M (see Aircraft, 3M)
12th GUMO. See Ministry of Defense, 12th 2M (see Aircraft, M-4)
Main Directorate 3M, 4, 341-342, 352, 375-379
53rd NIIP. See Plesetsk test range 3MD, 360, 378
ABM Treaty 3ME,360
demarcation agreement, 572-574, 3MN, 357, 360, 377-378
654 3MN-2, 357, 378
Krasnoyarsk radar, 425, 643 3MS, 357, 360, 377-378
Moscow ABM system, 417 3MS-2, 357, 378, 397
negotiations, 8-10,454 3MT,379
START and INF talks, 21 engines, 360, 636
START II ratification, 573-574 serial production, 359
and u.s. missile defense proposal, Aircraft 105, 342, 386
573-575, 579, 655 Aircraft 105A, 342, 361, 387
Abrek Bay, 258 Aircraft 106, 389-390
Accidents Aircraft 108, 386
K-129 submarine, 290, 627 Aircraft 125, 361, 391
K-19 submarine, 293-294 Aircraft 132, 347
K-219 submarine, 298 Aircraft 145, 346, 391
R-16 missile, 125 Aircraft 201, 636
Adamov, Yeo 0., 596 Aircraft 64, 339-340, 366, 634
Admiralty Plant (Plant 194), 622 Aircraft 70, 394-395
Afghanistan, 16, 374,455 Aircraft 73, 636
Agat Central Scientific Research Institute Aircraft 80, 341
(MNII-1),267-268 Aircraft 82, 361, 370, 636
Airborne weapon systems Aircraft 83, 370
K-10, 374 Aircraft 85, 341, 360, 634
K-11-16,374 Aircraft 88, 342, 371, 373, 386
658 Index
Aircraft (cont.) Su-9,409

Aircraft 94, 368 T-4, 346-347, 359, 362, 368, 389-391,
Aircraft 95, 341, 361, 380-381, 637 635, 637
Aircraft 95/1, 341, 361, 381 T-4M,390
Aircraft 95/2, 341, 361, 381, 637 T-4MS, 347, 390
Aircraft 98, 386 Tu-126, 402, 410
11-28, 361, 370 Tu-128, 386,409-410, 640
11-76MD,402 Tu-134UBL, 637
11-78, 397 Tu-14, 361, 370
M-18, 347, 357 Tu-142, 348, 359, 384-385
M-2 (see Aircraft, 1M) Tu-142M, 384
M-20, 347, 357 Tu-142MR, 279, 384
M-30, 357 Tu-144, 347, 361, 394,402,637
M-31, 357 Tu-148,410
M-32,357 Tu-16, 342, 370-375, 636
M-33, 357 design bureau, 356
M-34,357 follow-on aircraft, 342, 346, 386, 389
M-4, 341-342, 375-379 in nuclear tests, 74, 443, 634
design bureau, 356-357 serial production, 357, 359, 373, 635
engines, 360 Tu-16A, 373-374
M-4-2, 345, 357, 378 Tu-16K, 344
serial production, 359 Tu-16K-l0, 344, 374
M-50, 342, 357, 359, 363, 386 Tu-16K-l0-26, 345, 374
M-52,357 Tu-16K-1l-16, 344, 374-375
M-6 (see Aircraft, 3M) Tu-16K-26, 345, 374
MiG-l,408 Tu-16KS, 344, 374-375
MiG-iS, 368, 374,409, 634 Tu-16N, 374
MiG-l7,409 Tu-16P, 374
MiG-17PF, 639 Tu-16R, 374
MiG-19,409 Tu-16RM, 374
MiG-21,409 Tu-16S, 373-374
MiG-23, 409, 411 Tu-16T, 374
MiG-25,409-411 Tu-16Ye, 374
MiG-29,411 Tu-16Z, 345, 389
MiG-3,408 Tu-160, 12, 19, 347, 394-398
MiG-31, 410-412, 640 cruise missiles, 362, 384-385
MiG-9,409 design bureau, 356
Pe-3, 408 engines, 362
Pe-8, 339, 368, 634 new production, 28-29, 348-349,576,
Project 26, 375 655
Project 28, 635 nwnber deployed, 28, 30, 348-349,
RS, 384 576-577
Su-ll,409 serial production, 359
Su-15,409 in Ukraine, 24, 28-29, 349, 576
Su-27,410-411 wllts, 353, 355
Su-30, 411 Tu-22, 386-389
Index 659
cruise missiles, 345, 362 engines, 361

design bureau, 356 exercises in Arctic, 342
engines, 360-361 low-altitude flights, 345
serial production, 357, 359, 635 serial production, 359
Tu-22B, 344, 387 Tu-95K, 344-345, 347-349, 355, 362,
Tu-22K, 345-346, 348, 387, 389 383-385
Tu-22M, 346, 390-391 Tu-95K-20, 344, 383
Tu-22P, 389 Tu-95K-22, 348-349, 355, 362, 383-385
Tu-22R, 387 Tu-95KD, 345, 347-348, 383
Tu-22RD, 387 Tu-95KM, 347-348, 383
Tu-22RDM, 389 Tu-95M, 348, 359, 381, 384-385
Tu-22RM, 389 Tu-95M-5, 348, 384
Tu-22U, 389 Tu-95M-55, 348, 385
Tu-22M, 390-394, 637 Tu-95N, 384
cruise missiles, 362, 383 Tu-95RTs, 384
design bureau, 356 Tu-95U, 385
SALT II controversy, 12-14, 346 Tu-95V, 384, 637
serial production, 346, 359 in Ukraine, 24
Tu-22MO, 346, 359, 391 Tu-95MS, 379-385
Tu-22M1, 346, 359, 362, 391 cruise missiles, 17, 19, 348, 362
Tu-22M2, 346, 348, 359, 362, 391, in Kazakhstan, 24
393-394 serial production, 349, 359
Tu-22M3, 348, 353, 355, 359, 362, Tu-95MS16, 348, 353, 355, 385, 635
394-395 Tu-95MS6, 348, 353, 385
Tu-22M4, 394 in Ukraine, 24, 28-29, 349, 576
Tu-22MR, 362, 394 wllts, 353, 355
wllts, 355 Tu-96, 361, 381
Tu-26 (see Aircraft, Tu-22M) Yak-25P, 409-410, 639
Tu-4, 4, 340, 366-370 Yak-28P, 409
cruise missiles, 344 Aircraft by Western designations
design bureau, 356 Backfire (see Aircraft, Tu-22M)
in nuclear tests, 595 Badger (see Aircraft, Tu-16)
refueling, 340-341 Bear H (see Aircraft, Tu-95MS)
serial production, 357, 359 Bear (see Aircraft, Tu-95)
Tu-4A, 340, 368 Bison (see Aircraft, M-4; Aircraft, 3M)
Tu-4D, 368 Blackjack (see Aircraft, Tu-160)
Tu-4K, 368 Blinder (see Aircraft, Tu-22)
Tu-4LL, 370 BOWlder (see Aircraft, M-50)
Tu-4T, 368 Bull (see Aircraft, Tu-4)
Tu-4UshS, 370 Aircraft engines
Tu-70, 370 2TV-2F, 361, 380-381
Tu-75, 370 AL-5, 371
Tu-95, 4, 341-342, 352, 379-385 AM-3A,375
cruise missiles, 17, 348 AM-3M,636
design bureau, 356 ASh-73TK, 360, 367
dismantlement, 28-29 NK-12, 341, 361, 381
660 Index
Aircraft engines (cont.) B-52, 8, 16

NK-12M, 361, 381 F-111A,8
NK-12MP, 361 U-2,448
NK-12MV, 361 Air Defense Forces
NK-144, 361 combat systems, 402, 406-407, 409-410,
NK-144-22, 361, 637 417,428,434-435
NK-144A, 637 dissolution, 37-38, 147,400,436,
NK-16, 361 568-569,571
NK-20, 361 history, 399-401,408-409,412,425,
NK-22, 361, 391, 394, 637 590, 637
NK-23, 362, 394 and nuclear weapons, 115, 405
NK-25, 362, 394 operations, 61, 399,432,436-437
NK-32, 362, 396 responsibilities, 37, 399-400,436
NK-6, 361, 387, 389, 391 structure, 38, 399-400, 435-437
RD-36-41, 390 units, 411, 414, 436-437
RD-3M, 360, 373 Air-defense radars
RD-3M-500, 360 1U17, 401
RD-3M-500A, 377 35N6, 401, 638
RD-45, 361 39N6,401
RD-45F, 361, 370 55Zh6,401
RD-7M2,389 A-100, 403-404
RD-7M-2, 360 A-50, 402, 410-411
RF-3M-500, 373 B-200, 403
RF-3MT, 373 P-14,401
TR-3A, 371 P-15, 401, 638
TR-5, 371 P-19, 401, 638
TV-12, 361, 380-381 P-20, 401
TV-2, 361, 368, 380 P-25, 401
TV-2F, 380 P-30, 401
TV-2P, 380 P-35, 401
VD-4K,360 P-37,401
VD-5, 360, 375, 386 P-37R,401
VD-7, 360, 377, 386, 636 P-8, 401
VD-7B, 377, 386 RU5-1,401
VD-7M, 360, 386-387 RU5-2,401
VD-7P, 360 Air-defense systems
VD-7V, 360 Berkut, 403
VK-1, 361, 370 5-125 Neva, 402, 405, 407-408
VK-2, 380 5-200, 405-406, 408, 639
Aircraft engines, British 5-200D Vega, 406
Nene, 361 5-225, 641
Aircraft engines, German 5-25, 402, 404-407, 638
UMO-022, 361 5-300, 407, 436
Aircraft, U.S. 5-300F, 407
B-1B, 10, 12, 16, 18, 347,410 5-300P, 407-408
B-29, 340, 366-367, 634 5-300PM, 407-408
Index 661
S-300PM1, 407-408 Alikhanov, A. I., 67

S-300PM2, 408 Almaz Scientific Production Association
S-300PS, 407 (Design Bureau 1, KB-1), 403-407,
S-300PT, 407 412-413,433, 641
S-300V, 407, 436 Altair Scientific Production Association,
S-50, 404 407
S-500 Dal, 404-406, 639-640 Altair Scientific Research Institute (NII-I0),
S-75 Dvina, 402, 405, 408, 639 157, 268
S-75M Volkhov, 405 Altay Kray, 150
SA-75 Desna, 405 Americium, 100
Air-defense systems by Western Amur oblast, 152
designations Amur River, 266
SA-l (see Air-defense systems, S-25) Amur Shipbuilding Plant (Plant 199), 259,
SA-2 (see Air-defense systems, S-75) 263, 265, 285, 289
SA-3 (see Air-defense systems, S-125 Andreyev Inlet, 257
Neva) Andreyev Scientific Research Institute of
SA-5 (see Air-defense systems, S-200) Acoustics, 268
Air Forces, 37-38, 353,400,436, Andropov, Yu. v., 590
568-569. See also Long-Range Aviation Angara installation, 122, 183. See also
and ballistic missiles, 142, 144-145, 153, Plesetsk test range
345,570 Angarsk, 77-79, 84, 99, 101
and nuclear weapons, 111, 115 Angarsk Electrolysis and Chemical Plant,
responsibilities, 37 79, 101
structure, 37-38, 353,400,436,568-569 Antey deposit, 83
weapons acquisition, 341-342, 346-347, Antey Scientific Production Association,
370, 374, 389, 391, 393, 395 407
Air-to-air missiles Antisatellite systems, 399,421,432-434,
KS-172, 411,640 637
R-27A, 411,640 Antisubmarine warfare (ASW)
R-27M, 411,640 in fortified regions, 276, 325
R-27R, 640 Naval Directorate of, 252, 261
R-27T, 640 ships, 258, 265
R-33, 640 SOSUS system, 276-277, 290
R-40TD,640 and Soviet submarine operations, 12, 237,
R-60M,640 240,276-277, 312
R-73, 640 Antonov, D. A., 356, 380
R-77, 411,640 Apatity, 478
RS-1U, 639 Ara Inlet, 256
RS-2US, 409 Aralsk, 179, 442, 462, 470
Akhromeyev, S. E, 592 Arctic
Aktau, 83, 87 bomber operations, 342
Akulovo, 415-416 protection of the coast, 402, 436
Aleutian Islands, 275, 277 submarine operations, 242-243, 281, 297,
Alexandrov, A. P., 99 617
Aleysk, 150 Arkhangelsk oblast, 122, 182,480
Alferov, V I., 71, 107-108 Armenia, 87, 435
662 Index
Arsenal Design Bureau (FrW1Ze Plant Aviation Plant 86 (Taganrog plant), 359,
Design Bureau, TsKB-7), 164, 208-209, 384
266, 322, 327 Avrora Scientific Production Association,
Artillery. See Nuclear artillery 263
Artsimovich, L. A., 67, 99 Avrorin, E. N., 104
Arzamas-16. See Scientific Research Azerbaijan, 423, 426, 435
Institute of Experimental Physics Azimut Scientific Production Association,
Astrakhan, 143 268
Atlantic ocean
K-19 accident, 294 Bakhmistrov Design Bureau, 340
submarine patrol, 239-240, 273-274, Baku, 399, 638
276,279-280, 625 Balapan, 456, 463-465, 481-482
U.S. nuclear tests, 446 Balkhash, 422, 434
Atlant-VM-2, 379 radar site, 422, 424, 426, 434
Automatic Equipment and Instrument- uranium mining area, 598
Building Scientific Production Balkhash, Lake, 121, 206, 413
Association, 157, 166, 268. See also Ballistic missiles, air-based, 15
NII-885 Ballistic missiles, land-based
Automatic Equipment Scientific Production GR-1, 199-200
Association (SKB-626), 167, 267, 316 Molodets (see Ballistic missiles, land-
Avacrunskaya Inlet, 259 based, RT-23UTTH)
Avangard Electromechanical Plant (Plant MR UR-100, 11, 130-131, 212-215
551), 102, 106-108 cold launch, 130, 220
Averin, A. N., 104 competition with UR-I00N, 11,
Aviadvigatel Company (OKB-19, Perm 130-131,221
Motor Design Bureau), 360 design bureaus, 161, 166
Aviakor Company. See Aviation Plant 18 MR UR-100UTTH, 17, 131, 212-215
Aviation Plant 1 (Kuybyshev plant), 160, number deployed, 27, 134-135, 140
359, 373 and the Perimeter system, 593
Aviation Plant 156, 356, 381, 395, 635 wlits, 149, 151
Aviation Plant 166 (Omsk plant, Polyot Oka, 21
Production Association), 161, 163, 635 Pioneer, 132, 134, 147
Aviation Plant 18 (Kuybyshev plant, deployment in Europe, 17, 132
Aviakor Company), 357, 359, 367, 381, design bureaus, 166
384 and the INF Treaty, 21, 134
Aviation Plant 22 (Kazan plant, Kazan number deployed, 224-226
Aviation Production Association), 357, and the Perimeter system, 593
359, 367, 373, 387, 394, 395, 635, 655 Pioneer-UTTH, 226
Aviation Plant 23 (Moscow plant, Pili and Temp-2S, 11, 132, 164, 615
plant), 356-357, 359, 367, 375, 378. wlits, 147, 152, 612
See also Khrwlichev Machine-Building R-1,118-120
Plant deployment on submarines, 236
Aviation Plant 64 (Voronezh plant), 357, design bureaus, 160, 165, 167
359, 373 R-1A, 608
Aviation Plant 81 (Tushino plant), 346, serial production, 160
390, 635 wlits, 143
Index 663
R-11, 119-120, 143, 160, 237, 309, 611 with multiple warheads, 7, 128
R-llM, 143, 160 R-36M, 11, 130-131,215-220
R-12, 3, 125, 182-186 cold lalUlch, 130
combat duty, 172 decommissioning, 27, 31, 131
and the Cuban crisis, 5 design bureaus, 161-162, 165-166
design bureaus, 161, 167 in Kazakhstan, 24, 141
elimination, 132, 134 MIRVed, 13, 131, 227
and the INF Treaty, 21, 134 nwnber deployed, 9, 27, 134, 140
in Long-Range Aviation, 352 R-36M2, 18, 133-134, 141, 216,
in missile defense tests, 413 218-220,575
in nuclear tests, 469 R-36MUTTH, 17, 131, 141, 216-220
R-12U, 124-125, 184-186 single-warhead version, 11, 131
units, 124, 126, 144, 146-147 as a space lalUlcher, 162
R-14, 3, 125, 186-188 START I requirements, 140
and the Cuban crisis, 5 START II requirements, 25, 29-31, 142
design bureaus, 161, 167 units, 149-151
elimination, 132, 134 R-5, 120, 160, 178-179
and the INF Treaty, 21, 134 R-5M, 3, 120-121, 177-179
in Long-Range Aviation, 352 design bureaus, 165
number deployed, 125, 609 in nuclear tests, 121, 442, 462, 470
R-14U, 124-125, 186-188 serial production, 160
units, 124, 146-147 R-0 4-5, 121-122, 179-182
R-16, 5, 9, 124-126, 189-192 in antisatellite system tests, 433
accident, 125 and the Cuban crisis, 608
decommissioning, 131 design bureaus, 160, 165, 167
design bureaus, 161, 165, 167 R-7A, 122, 160, 183
R-16U, 6, 124, 126, 189, 191-192, 197, as a space lalUlcher, 5, 122
200 R-9A, 9, 124, 126, 192-195
and the R-26 missile, 196 decommissioning, 131
and the R-36 missile, 196 design bureaus, 160, 165-167, 192
units, 146-147 and the GR-l missile, 200
R-2, 119-120, 143, 160, 165, 608, 614 serial production, 160
R-26, 195-196 units, 146-147
R-3, 120 RT-1,205
R-36, 196-199, 579 RT-15, 132, 164, 209
ampulization, 127 RT-2, 7, 127-129, 205-209, 324 (see also
in antisatellite system tests, 433 Ballistic missiles, land-based, RT-2P)
decommissioning, 131, 217 design bureaus, 160, 164
design bureaus, 161, 165-167 RT-20P, 132, 161, 209-210
development in context, 6-7, 126-128, RT-23, 15, 17, 19, 29, 226-228, 230
130 RT-23UTTH, 133, 226-230
number deployed, 7, 9, 128 decommissioning, 27, 29, 140, 162, 234,
orbital version, 7,9, 15, 17, 128, 200, 655
610 design bureaus, 161
and the R-36M missile, 215-216 nwnber deployed, 27, 134, 140
wllts, 146, 149 rail-mobile, 134, 149
664 Index
Ballistic missiles, land-based (cont.) units, 146, 149, 151-152

silo-based, 133, 149 UR-lOOK, 11, 128, 163, 204-205
and START treaties, 30, 140-142 UR-100M,204
in Ukraine, 24 UR-100U, 11, 128, 163, 201, 204-205,
units, 149-152 610
RT-25,209 UR-100N,220-223
RT-2P, 128-129, 206-209 (see also competition with the MR UR-I00
Ballistic missiles, land-based, RT-2) missile, 11, 130-131
decomissioning, 27, 135, 140 decommissioning, 27, 30-31, 133, 141,
design bureaus, 164 234, 655
number deployed, 134 and definition of a heavy missile, 13, 610
and the Topol missile, 15-16, 230, 610, design bureaus, 163
616 design flaw, 131, 610
wllts, 149, 151 as a space lalUlcher, 163, 612
RT-2PM (see Ballistic missiles, land-based, and START treaties, 26, 30-31, 141-142
Topol) test lalUlches, 613
RT-2PM2 (see Ballistic missiles, land- in Ukraine, 24, 135, 141, 152, 162
based, Topol-M) UR-100NU, 131-132
Temp-2S, 11, 15, 17, 132, 164, 210-211, UR-100NUTTH, 17, 221-223
610 UR-200, 126, 163, 166, 200, 433
Topol, 19, 133, 230-234 UR-500, 163, 166
and the Perimeter system, 593 Voyevoda (see R-36M2)
and tbe SALT II Treaty, 15-17, 610, 616 Ballistic missiles, land-based by Western
decommissioning, 30, 655 designations
design bureaus, 164, 166 SS-l (see Ballistic missiles, land-based,
in Belarus, 24, 152 R-1)
number deployed, 27, 30, 133-134, SS-ll (see Ballistic missiles, land-based,
140-141 UR-100)
wllts, 147, 149, 151 SS-13 Mod 2 (see Ballistic missiles, land-
Topol-M, 27-29, 233-234, 575-576, based, RT-2P)
579 SS-13 (see Ballistic missiles, land-based,
deployment in silos, 30 RT-2)
design bureaus, 162, 164 SS-17 (see Ballistic missiles, land-based,
mobile version, 27 MR UR-100)
number deployed, 27-28, 30, 140, 575, SS-18 (see Ballistic missiles, land-based,
577 R-36M)
wllts, 150 SS-19 (see Ballistic missiles, land-based,
UR-100, 6-7, 127-128, 130, 201-205 UR-lOON)
ampulization, 127 SS-lb (see Ballistic missiles, land-based,
decommissioning, 27, 132, 135, 140, R-ll)
design bureaus, 163, 166 R-2)
in missile defense projects, 418-419 SS-20 (see Ballistic missiles, land-based,
number deployed, 7, 127-128, 134, Pioneer)
silos used for space lalUlches, 612 Oka)
Index 665
SS-24 (see Ballistic missiles, land-based, D-19 (see Ballistic missiles, sea-lalUlched,
RT-23; Ballistic missiles, land-based, R-39 missile)
RT-23UTTH) D-19UTTH (see Ballistic missiles, sea-
SS-25 (see Ballistic missiles, land-based, lalUlched, R-39 Variant 2 missile)
RT-2P) D-2 (see Ballistic missiles, sea-lalUlched,
SS-27 (see Ballistic missiles, land-based, R-13 missile)
Topol-M) D-3 (see Ballistic missiles, sea-lalUlched,
R-5M) D-4 (see Ballistic missiles, sea-lalUlched,
R-12) D-5 (see Ballistic missiles, sea-lalUlched,
R-14) D-5U (see Ballistic missiles, sea-lalUlched,
SS-6 (see Ballistic missiles, land-based, R-27U missile)
R-7) D-6, 322-323
R-16) RT-15M missile)
R-9) R-29 missile)
SS-9 (see Ballistic missiles, land-based, D-9D (see Ballistic missiles, sea-lallllched,
R-36) R-29 missile)
SS-X-I0 (see Ballistic missiles, land-based, D-9R (see Ballistic missiles, sea-lalUlched,
UR-200) R-29R missile)
SS-X-14 (see Ballistic missiles, land-based, D-9RM (see Ballistic missiles, sea-
RT-15) launched, R-29RM missile)
SS-X-15 (see Ballistic missiles, land-based, Ballistic missiles, sea-lalUlched
RT-20) Bark (see Ballistic missiles, sea-lalUlched,
SS-X-16 (see Ballistic missiles, land-based, R-39 Variant 2)
Temp-2S) Bulava, 576
Ballistic missiles, land-based German R-llFM, 309-312
V-2 (A-4), 118-119, 143, 614 deployment on submarines, 4, 283,
Ballistic missiles, land-based u.s. 286-287
Atlas, 5, 8, 609 design bureaus, 160, 266
Jupiter, 609 with nuclear warhead, 238, 286, 617
Minuteman I, 5, 7 test lalUlches, 4, 237
Minuteman II, 7, 610 tests of lUlderwater lalUlch, 316-317
Minuteman III, 10, 16, 18, 22, 26, 610 R-13, 312-315, 631
MX Peacekeeper, 15-16, 18, 133, 610 deployment on submarines, 237,
Pershing II, 17, 19 290-291
Thor, 609 design bureaus, 266
Titan, 5 nuclear tests, 238, 468
Ballistic missile systems, sea-based R-15, 315
D-l (see Ballistic missiles, sea-lalUlched, R-21, 237, 289, 315-319, 323
R-11FM missile) R-27, 7,240,294, 319-322
D-ll (see Ballistic missiles, sea-lalUlched, R-27K, 290, 322
R-31 missile) R-27U, 242, 273, 297, 319-322
666 Index
Ballistic missiles, sea-lalUlched (cont.) Barkovskiy, Yeo N., 467, 650

R-29, 11-12, 240, 274, 290, 293, 299, Barmakov, Yu. P., 105
324-327, 329-330, 617 Barmin, V. P., 157, 167
R-29D, 12, 301, 326-327 Barnaul, 151
R-29R, 12, 17, 243, 302, 330-332 Barrikady Plant, 210, 230
R-29RK,330 Bartini, R. L., 356
R-29RL, 330 Bashkiria, 474, 480, 593
R-29RM, 17, 243, 307, 335-337, 576, Bashmachnaya Bay, 482
655 Basistov, A. G., 415, 417
R-31, 12, 164, 266, 297, 327-330, 618 Bastions. See Fortified regions
R-39, 17, 28, 30, 162, 243, 245, 282, Batumi, 399
290, 305, 330-334, 618, 655 Baykal, Operation, 179
R-39 Variant 2, 28, 245, 655 Baykonur test range (Fifth Scientific
R-39UTTH (see Ballistic missiles, sea- Research Test Range), 122, 128, 145,
lalUlched, R-39 Variant 2) 182, 189, 195, 199-200, 205, 214, 221,
RT-15M, 323-324 428, 608
Ballistic missiles, sea-lalUlched by Western Bazenkov, N. I., 356, 380
designations Belarus, 24, 135, 149, 152-153, 355,425,
SS-N-17 (see Ballistic missiles, 435, 578, 590, 654
sea-lallllched, R-31) Belaya, 355
SS-N-18 (see Ballistic missiles, Belen'kiy, S. Z., 73
sea-lallllched, R-29R) Belokorovichi, 147
SS-N-20 (see Ballistic missiles, Beloretsk-15. See Yamantau MOlUltain
sea-lallllched, R-39) Beregovo, 422, 424, 426
SS-N-23 (see Ballistic missiles, Bereya, 416
sea-lallllched, R-29RM) Bereznyak, A. Ya., 344, 362
SS-N-4 (see Ballistic missiles, sea-lalUlched, Berezovka, 402
R-13) Beria, L. P., 68-69,403
SS-N-5 (see Ballistic missiles, sea-lalUlched, Beria, S. L., 403, 636
R-21) Bering Sea, 275
SS-N-6 (see Ballistic missiles, sea-lalUlched, Bering Strait, 274
R-27) Beriyev, G. M., 238
SS-N-8 (see Ballistic missiles, sea-lalUlched, Bershet, 151
R-29) Beryllium, 73, 85, 90, 599
SS-NX-13 (see Ballistic missiles, sea- Bessmertnykh, A. A., 591
launched, R-27K) Bezymyannyi Island. See Witte Island
SS-NX-28 (see Ballistic missiles, sea- Birobidzhan, 612
lalUlched, R-39 Variant 2) Biryuzov, S. S., 611
Ballistic missiles, sea-lalUlched U.S. Biysk, 167
C-3 Poseidon, 8, 10 Biysk Chemical Combine, 167
C-4 Trident I, 16 Black Sea Fleet, 252, 327
D-5 Trident II, 18, 610 Bliznyuk, V. I., 356, 395
Baltic Fleet, 252, 289-290 Bobruysk, 355
Baranovichi, 425 Bochvar, A. A., 70
Barents Sea, 242, 258, 273-274, 294, 302, Bogomolov, B. N., 165
312, 330, 617 Bolkhovitinov Design Bureau, 608
Index 667
Bolkhovitinov, V. E, 607 Central Scientific Research Institute No. 1.

Bolshaya Kartel, 428 See Central Scientific Research Institute
Bolshaya Lopatka Bay, 257 for Military Shipbuilding
Bolshevik plant, 107 Central Scientific Research Institute No. 45,
Bolshoy Kamen, 259, 272 267
Bolyatko, V A., 109-110 Central Space Systems Directorate
Borisov, V. v., 627 (TsUKOS),611
Brezhnev, L. I., 590 Central Special Design Bureau (TsSKB),
Brish, A. A., 105, 595 613
Bulganin, N. A., 590-591 Ceramic-metal reactor fuel, 85, 88
Bulgaria, 83, 87, 598 Cermet fuel. See Ceramic-metal reactor fuel
Bushuyev, K. D., 608 Charin, N. A., 309
Charnko, Yeo V, 266, 316
Calciwn, 86, 598, 601 Chazhma Bay, 259
Carter, James, 16,455 Chekhov, 415-416
Caspian Flotilla, 252 Chelomey, V N., 126, 130, 162-163, 200,
Caspyisk, 598 220,238, 324,418,433, 617
Central Aerohydrodynamics Institue Chelyabinsk, 594
(TsAGI), 355, 357, 380 Chelyabinsk oblast, 94, 150, 165, 266
Central Design Bureau No. 16. See Volna Chelyabinsk-40, 3, 70-72. See also
Central Design Bureau Chelyabinsk-65
Central Design Bureau No. 18. See Rubin Chelyabinsk-65. See Mayak Production
Central Design Bureau of Naval Association
Equipment Chelyabinsk-70. See Scientific Research
Central Design Bureau No. 29, 356 Institute of Technical Physics
Central Design Bureau No. 34. See Central Chemical Automatic Equipment Design
Design Bureau of Special Machine Bureau (KBKhA, OKB-154), 165-166,
Building 194
Central Design Bureau of Experimental Chemical Machine-Building Design Bureau
Machine Building (OKB-1, TsKBEM, (OKB-2), 156, 165, 266-267, 309,403,
Korolev Design Bureau), 6, 127, 156, 405,413
159-160, 164, 166, 178, 192, 199, 205, Chemical Machine-Building Scientific
236,266,283, 309, 312-313, 421, 609 Research Institute (NIIKhimmash), 267
Central Design Bureau of Special Machine Chepetsk Mechanical Plant (ChMZ, Plant
Building (Central Design Bureau No. 514), 78-79, 84, 86
34, TsKB-34), 168, 309 Chernavin, B. N., 619
Central Machine-Building Scientific Chernaya Bay, 467, 469
Research Institute (NII-88, TsNIIMash), Chernenko, K. u., 590
118,120,156,159-162,165,178,236, Chernobyl
266,269, 309, 313, 594 accident, 75, 83, 86, 428, 599
Central Scientific Research Institute 12 over-the horizon radar site, 428
(TsNII-12),460 Chernov, V. I., 435
Central Scientific Research Institute for China, 174, 287, 289, 375,457
Military Shipbuilding (Central Scientific Chirov, V. K., 650
Research Institute No.1, TsNII-l), 261, Chita, 146, 152
269 Chita oblast, 83, 151-152
668 Index
ChMZ. See Chepetsk Mechanical Plant KSR-5, 345, 348, 362, 374, 384
Chu-Saryisk, 598 M-59, 357, 360, 363
CIS. See Commonwealth of Independent M-61, 357, 363, 386
States Cruise missiles, air-lalUlched by Western
Closed cities (ZATO), 76, 102, 113, 602 designations
Cogema, 101-102, 603 AS-l (see Cruise missiles, air-lalUlched,
Cold launch, 130, 161, 206, 210, 214, 217, KS-1)
316 AS-1S (see Cruise missiles, air-lalUlched,
Combine 813. See Urals Electrochemical Kh-55)
Plant AS-15C (see Cruise missiles, air-lalUlched,
Combine 815. See Mining and Chemical Kh-55M)
Combine AS-16 (see Cruise missiles, air-lalUlched,
Combine 816. See Siberian Chemical Kh-15)
Combine AS-2 (see Cruise missiles, air-lalUlched,
Combine 817. See Mayak Production K-10S)
Association AS-3 (see Cruise missiles, air-lalUlched,
Commission on Military-Industrial Affairs Kh-20)
of the Presidium of the USSR COlUlCil of AS-4 (see Cruise missiles, air-lalUlched,
Ministers. See Military-Industrial Kh-22)
Commission AS-5 (see Cruise missiles, air-lalUlched,
Commission on the Uranium Problem, 1, KSR-2; Cruise missiles, air-lalUlched;
68 KSR-11)
Commonwealth of Independent States AS-6 (see Cruise missiles, air-lalUlched;
(CIS), 23, 34, 147, 590 KSR-5)
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 456-457, Cruise missiles, intercontinental
469,574,579 Buran (V-350), 121-122
Control and Command Instrument Burya, 121-122
Scientific Research Institute, 267 Cruise missiles, sea-lalUlched
Cruise missiles, air-lallllched Lastochka, 236, 617
10Kh, 617 Meteorit-M, 243, 298
K-10S, 344, 362, 374 P-5, 238-239
K-11,344 P-5D,239
Kh-15, 347, 394, 396 P-6, 239
Kh-20, 344, 348, 362, 375, 383 R-55 Granat, 243, 298
Kh-20M,348 Cruise missiles, sea-lalUlched by Western
Kh-22, 345-346, 348, 362, 378, 383, designations
389, 391, 394, 576 SS-N-21 (see Cruise missiles, sea-lalUlched,
Kh-22M,383 R-55 Granat)
Kh-22N,383 SS-N-24 (see Cruise missiles, sea-lalUlched,
Kh-45, 346-347, 362, 389-390 Meteorit-M)
Kh-55, 17, 19, 28, 347-348, 362, Cruise missiles, U.S.
384-385, 396, 576 Tomahawk, 243, 362
Kh-55M,362 Cuba, 5-6
KS-1, 344, 362, 368, 374 Cuban crisis, 5-6, 608
KSR-11, 362, 374 Czechoslovakia, 8, 82-83, 598
KSR-2, 344, 362, 374, 468 Czech Republic, 87
Index 669
Dalzavod Shipbuilding Plant, 290 Dzerzrunskiy Artillery Engineering

Degelen, 450-451, 463-464, 482, 649 Academy, 146. See also Peter the Great
Department of Deputy Artillery Military Academy of the Strategic
Commander for Special Equipment Rocket Forces
(UZKA), 143-144 Dzhambul, 146
Derazhnaya, 612
Derzhavinsk, 146, 151 Early warning radars
Design Bureau 1. See Almaz Scientific Daryal, 423-427, 643
Production Association Daryal-U, 423, 426
Design Bureau 11 (KB-11), 2-3, 71-74, Daryal-UM, 424-426
102,104-108,110,461,595-596, DnepJ; 422, 424
603, 605. See also Scientific Dnestr, 421, 434
Research Institute of Experimental Dnestr-M, 421-422, 424, 426
Physics Don-2N, 417-418, 426-427
Design Bureau 25. See Scientific Research Dunay-2, 420
Institute of Automatics Dunay-3, 416, 421-422, 426
Design Bureau of General Machine Building Dunay-3U, 416, 421-422, 425
(KBOM, Barmin Design Bureau), 157, RE-1,420
167 TsSO-P, 420-421, 433
Design Bureau of Road Transportation TsSO-S, 418
Equipment (KB ATO), 102, 106 Volga, 425-427, 578, 644
Design Bureau of Special Machine Building Early warning radars, over-the-horizon,
(GSKBSpetsmash), 157 426,428
Design Bureau of Transport Machine Duga, 428
Building, 267 Duga-2,428
Deuteriwn, 73-74,90,596 Duga-3,428
Directorate of the Chief of Space Systems Veyer project, 426
(UNKS),611 Early warning sites
Dmitriev, G. N., 104 RO-1 (see Olenegorsk)
Dnepropetrovsk, 160, 315 RO-2 (see Skrunda)
Dobrynin, A. E, 591 East Germany, 82-83, 143, 598
Dobrynin, V A., 360 Efremov, D. v., 99
Dollezhal, N. A., 90, 267 Egypt, 375
Dolan, 635 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 446-448
Dombarovskiy, 146, 150 Electrochemical Combine (Krasnoyarsk-45,
Drovyanaya, 151 Zelenogorsk), 76-77, 79, 88, 97, 99,
Dukhov, N. L., 71, 105 101
Duma. See State Duma of the Russian Electrokhimpribor Combine (Sverdlovsk-45,
Federation Lesnoy), 3, 76-77, 99-100, 107-108,
Dvigatel Plant, 269 113-114
Dzerzrunsk, 84, 107 Electropribor Central Scientific Research
Dzerzrunsk High- Explosives Plant (Plant Institute (NII-303), 267-269
80), 107-108 Electrostal, 70, 79-80, 84, 86, 107, 599
Dzerzrunskiy Academy. See Peter the Great Electrostal Macrune- Building Plant (Plant
Military Academy of the Strategic 12), 70, 78, 84-85, 107, 268
Rocket Forces Eller, E. I., 268, 309
670 Index
Energiya Scientific Production Association. FSB. See Federal Security Service

See Central Design Bureau of Fuchs, Klaus, 594
Experimental Machine Building Fwlikov, V P., 315
Energomash. See Scientific Production Furnace Design Bureau of the
Association of Power Engineering Ordzhonikidze Baltic Plant, 267
Machine Building Fursov, V S., 70
Engels, 349, 355, 385, 398
Enrichment Gabala, 423
centrifuges, 3, 98, 100, 598, 603 Gadzhiyevo, 257, 293
electromagnetic separation, 98-100 Gals Central Design Bureau, 268
gaseous diffusion, 85, 98-100, 594, 598, Gantsevichi, 425
603 Gas Dynamics Laboratory (GDL), 117
Enrichment facilities Gaydukov, L. M., 118
D-1, 238, 283, 285-286, 309-312, 315 GDL. See Gas Dynamics Laboratory
S-2, 100 General Physics Institute of the Academy of
SU-20, 100 Sciences, 419
Ershova, Z. v., 70, 601 General Staff of the Armed Forces
Estonia, 355, 623 12th Department, 109-110
Central Command Center, 61, 63, 174,
Faeroe Islands, 276-277 438
Federal Security Service (FSB), 43. See also command of strategic operations, 38, 60,
State Security Committee 174, 281, 363, 438
Fifth Scientific Research Test Range. See Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU), 36,
Baykonur test range 594
Finland, 87 Main Operational Directorate, 36,41,57,
First Main Directorate of the COlUlcil of 114,591-592
Ministers (PGU), 2, 69-70, 75, 84, 102, and political leadership, 33-35, 39,41
106, 603 role in military reform, 570-571
12th Main Directorate, 109 role in u.S.-Soviet negotiations, 42,
Flerov, G. N., 68 591-592
Flight Test Institute, 366, 385 strategic planning, 57, 114, 173, 255,
FOBS. See Fractional orbital bombardment 275, 363, 591
system structure, 33, 35-36, 39-40, 43, 61, 63,
Fomin, P. E, 467 438, 592
Fortified regions (bastions), 242, 617 Generator project, 120
Fourth State Central Test Range (GTsP-4, Geneva, 445-447, 449, 451, 457
Kapustin Yar test range), 121, 143, 145, Geofizika Scientific Production Association,
179, 184, 206, 227, 237-238, 310, 314, 267
403,413,442-443,450,470-471,482 Georgia, 435
Fractional orbital bombardment system Geran project, 120, 608
(FOBS), 15, 128, 196 Germany, 68, 118, 339, 352,402,603,
France, 68, 102,448-449,457 616
Frenkel, Ya. I., 68 Germany, East, 82-83, 143, 598
Frunze Plant (Plant 7), 164 Gidropribor Central Scientific Research
FrW1Ze Plant Design Bureau. See Arsenal Institute (NII-400), 235, 268, 616
Design Bureau Ginzburg, V. L., 73-74
Index 671
GIPKh. See State Institute of Applied GTsP-4. See Fourth State Central Test
Chemistry Range
GIRD. See Rocket Propulsion Study Group Guard Rocket LalUlcher Units (GMCh),
Giredmet. See State Institute of Rare Metals 118,142
Gladkaya, 612 GUKOS. See Main Space Systems
Glazov, 79, 84, 86 Directorate
Glonass. See Satellites, navigation Gureev, I. N., 649
Glushko, V. P., 157, 165, 607 Gvardeysk, 147
GMCh. See Guard Rocket LalUlcher Units
Golosovskiy, P. Z., 290 HEU. See Uranium, highly enriched
Gomel oblast, 152 HEU-LEU agreement, 97, 101
Gorbachev, M. S., 20, 455, 590, 596 Hiroshima, 2, 69, 634
Gorelik, A. L., 434 Holl, Theodore, 595
Gorev, V. A., 650 Horsepowers, effective, 637
Gorizont Production Association, 268 Hllllgary, 83, 87, 598
Gorky Machine-Building Plant (Plant 92), Hydronuclear experiments. See Nuclear
99, 267-268 tests
Gorky. See Nizhni Novgorod
Gornyak Ship Repair Plant (Plant 30), 259, Iceland, 276-277
271 Il'kayev, R. I., 104
Gorozhin, Yeo P., 650 lliisk, 598
Gorshkov, S. G., 619 Ilyenko, A. D., 649
Gosatomnadzor. See State Committee for Ilyushin Design Bureau, 342
Oversight of Radiation Safety im. Gastello, 612
GosTsNIP-2. See Semipalatinsk test range Indonesia, 375
Grachev, P. S., 590 Industrial nuclear explosions. See Peaceful
Granit Central Scientific Research Institute nuclear explosions
(NII-49), 267, 309 INF Treaty. See Intermediate-Range Nuclear
Great Britain, 68, 174, 339, 352,448-452, Forces Treaty
457, 633 In situ leaching, 82, 597
Grechko, A. A., 590, 610 Installation 700, 466-467, 650. See also
Greenglass, David, 595 Novaya Zemlya test range
Greenland Sea, 274 Installation 905, 462. See also
Gremikha, 256-258, 293, 301 Semipalatinsk test range
Grocino oblast, 152 Installation S, 114
Gromov, F. N., 619 Institute of Aviation Materials (VI AM), 100
Gromyko, A. A., 591 Institute of Chemical Physics of the
GrolUld Forces, 37-38, 115, 120, 144,407, Academy of Sciences, 68, 72, 460-461
436,568,590,611,637,653 Institute of Physics and Engineering (MIFI),
GRU. See General Staff of the Armed 76, 86, 96
Forces, Main Intelligence Directorate Institute of Physics of the Academy of
Grushin, P. D., 403, 405, 413 Sciences, 67, 73, 596
GSKBSpetsmash. See Design Bureau of Interim Agreement. See SALT I Treaty
Special Machine Building Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty
GSPI-l1. See State Building and Design (INF Treaty), 123, 134, 147, 186-187,
Institute 211, 226, 234
672 Index
loffe, A. E, 67 missiles on the territory of, 24, 135, 141,

Iraq, 375 149, 151-152, 220
Irkutsk, 151, 233, 353,422,426 nuclear reactors, 87, 105,465
Irkutsk oblast, 101 nuclear status, 24, 135, 152, 590
Irtysh River, 461 and nuclear tests, 77,456,461,465,476,
Isarun, N. N., 236, 283 478-479
Isayev, A. M., 165, 267, 309, 608 and the START I Treaty, 24, 135, 589
Itatka, 146-147 Kazan, 346, 348-349, 356-357, 367, 373,
Ivanov, S. B., 590 387, 393
Ivanovo oblast, 151 Kazan Aviation Production Association. See
Ivantsov, V M., 423 Aviation Plant 22
Izhorsk Plant, 268 Kazbek system, 61, 63, 438
KB ATO. See Design Bureau of Road
Japan, 339, 368, 634 Transportation Equipment
Japanese Sea, 242, 273, 617 KB-l. See Almaz Scientific Production
Association
K, Operation, 451, 470 KB-l1. See Design Bureau 11
Kaliningrad Special Defense District, 408, KBO M. See Design Bureau of General
411 Machine Building
Kaliningrad. See Korolev Kedrovskiy, o. L., 471
Kaluga oblast, 150 Keldysh Research Center. See Scientific
Kamchatka Flotilla, 258 Research Institute of Rocket Propulsion
Kamchatka peninsula, 171, 206, 253, Keldysh, M. v., 609
258-259, 274, 290, 293, 297, 301, 304, Kennedy, John E, 449
408 KGB. See State Security Committee
Kannelava, 147 Khabarovsk, 146, 279, 399
Kansk, 151 Khabarovsk Kray, 428
Kantiev, M. K., 649 Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug,
Kapustin Yar, 143 474,476
Kara Sea, 242, 312 Khariton, Yu. B., 68, 71-73, 104
Karaganda oblast, 461 Kharkov, 67, 166-167
Karamazar, 598 Kharkov Institute of Physics and
Kartaly, 146, 150 Technology, 67, 595, 603
Kasatsiyer, A. S., 294 Khartron Scientific Production Association,
Kasli, 104 166
Katorgin, B. I., 165 Khimki, 165
Kattakurgan, 147 Khlopin, V G., 67-68, 70, 92, 473
Kawus, 402 Khmelnitskiy, 152
Kaverin, F. A., 236 Khrwlichev Machine-Building Plant, 163,
Kazakhstan 360. See also Aviation Plant 23
and the ABM Treaty, 654 Khrushchev, N. S., 418-419, 448, 590-591,
bombers on the territory of, 349, 353, 596
385 Kiev, 151, 268, 399
early warning facilities, 426 Kikoin, I. K., 99
fuel cycle facilities, 78, 82-83, 598 Kirov, 146
missile defense facilities, 413 Kirov oblast, 151
Index 673
Kirov plant, 99 Kovalev, S. N., 263, 291, 294, 304, 306,

Kirovo-Chepetsk, 79, 84 628
Kirovo-Chepetsk Chemical Plant (Plant Kozelsk, 150
752), 79, 84 Krasheninnikov Bay, 259
Kirsanov, N. v., 356, 380 Krasnodar, 148, 279
Kisunko, G. v., 403-404, 406, 412-413, Krasnokamensk, 83
416,419,433 Krasnoyarsk, 151, 160-161, 167,424-425,
Kleymenov, I. T., 117 602, 643
Klimov Scientific Production Association Krasnoyarsk Kray, 150, 173, 425
(Plant 117), 361 Krasnoyarsk Machine-Building Plant
Klimov, V. Ya., 361 Production Association (Plant 1001),
Klin,416 160-161,267
Kokchetavsk, 598 Krasnoyarsk-26. See Mining and Chemical
Kola Flotilla, 256 Combine
Kola Gulf, 257-258 Krasnoyarsk-45. See Electrochemical
Kola peninsula, 237, 256, 258, 274, 279, Combine
310,402,408 Krasnoye Sormovo Plant (Plant 112), 239,
Kolesnikov, S. G., 461 622
Kolesov, P. A., 360, 390 Kremlev. See Scientific Research Institute of
Kolomna, 422, 437 Experimental Physics
Kolomyya, 147 Krivorozhski deposit, 83, 598
Kometa Central Scientific Research Institute Krokus terminal, 61, 438
(Kometa TsNII), 422, 429, 433 Krylov Central Scientific Research Institute,
Kommwllst plant, 103 263, 268-269
Komsomolsk-on-Amur, 239, 259, 263, Krylov, N. I., 611
265-266, 285, 289, 297, 301, 622 Kubinka, 415
Konopatov, A. D., 166 Kudriavtsev, G. G., 650
Konoplev, B. M., 609 Kukseuko, P. N., 403
Konovalenko, Yu. v., 649 Kupavna, 436
Konovalov, V. E, 596 Kupol exercise, 342
Konyukhov, S. N., 162 Kura test range, 206
Kormilitsyn, Yu. N., 627 Kurchatov (Semipalatinsk-21), 105,461,
Korniyenko, G. M., 592 465
Korolev (Kaliningrgad), 156, 165, 267, Kurchatov Atomic Energy Institute, 84,
613 100,267-268,419,594. See also
Korolev Design Bureau. See Central Design Laboratory No.2
Bureau of Experimental Machine Kurchatov, I. v., 67, 69-71, 267, 465, 594
Building Kuril Islands, 258
Korolev, S. P., 117, 156, 159-161, 178, Kuroyedov, V. I., 619
192,236,266,283, 309,433, 607 Kut Harbor, 620
Korsakov, 258 Kuybyshev. See Samara
Kosberg, S. A., 166 Kuznetsk Machine-Building Plant, 108
Kostritskii, S. P., 650 Kuznetsov Design Bureau. See Trud
Kostroma, 151 Scientific Production Association
Kostroma oblast, 173 Kuznetsov, N. D., 361, 380
Kosygin, A. N., 591 Kuznetsov, N. G., 619
674 Index
Kvant Scientific Research Institute, 268 wllts, 353, 355

Kyrgyzstan, 82 LTBT. See Limited Test Ban Treaty
Kyzylkum, 83, 598 Luch Scientific Production Association, 650
Lutsk,147
Laboratory No.2 (LIPAN), 1, 69, 594, Lutskii, N. L., 650
603. See also Kurchatov Atomic Energy Lyaki,423
Institute Lyubertsy, 167
Lagutin, B. N., 164 Lyulyev, L. V, 243
Lange, Fritz, 603
Lapygin, V. L., 166 Machine-Building Design Bureau (SKB-385,
Latvia, 426, 577 Makeyev Design Bureau), 160, 162,
Laverov, N. P., 598 266, 312, 315, 320-320, 323-324, 327,
Lavochkin, S. A., 238, 406 330, 334-335
Lavochkin Design Bureau, 406, 429, 433 Machine-Building Experimental Design
Lebedev Physics Institute of the Academy of Bureau (OKBM), 100
Sciences, 419 Machine-Building Plant (Zlatoust-36,
Leningrad. See St.-Petersburg Trekbgorny), 76-77, 107, 109, 114
Leningrad Institute of Physics and Machine-Building Scientific Production
Technology, 67 Association (OKB-52, Central Machine-
Leningrad Shipbuilding Mechanical Plant, Building Design Bureau, TsKBM,
285 Chelomey Design Bureau), 126-127,
Leninsk, 146 130, 160, 162-163, 166, 196, 200-202,
Leninskiy Komsomol Shipbuilding Plant. 220, 357, 609
See Amur Shipbuilding Plant antisatellites system projects, 433
Leonov, L. v., 403 cruise missile projects, 238-239, 243, 617
Leontyev, N. I., 165 missile defense proposals, 418
Lesnoy. See Sverdlovsk-45 sea-lalUlched missile projects, 324
LEU. See Uranium, low-enriched Main Space Systems Directorate (GUKOS),
Lida, 152 611
Lifshits, N. A., 412 Makeyev Design Bureau. See Machine-
Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT, Moscow Building Design Bureau
Treaty), 452-453, 463 Makeyev, V P., 162, 266, 327, 330
LIPAN. See Laboratory No.2 Makbacbkala, 109
Lisbon Protocol, 24, 135, 589. See also Makhachkala plant, 109
START I Treaty Malakhit Naval Machine-Building Bureau
Lithium, 68, 79, 85, 599, 601 (SKB-143), 262, 268, 315, 617, 621,
Lithium deuteride, 74, 85, 443, 596 627
Lithuania, 87 Malaya Lopatka, 257
Long-Range Aviation Malenkov, G. M., 157, 589, 591, 596
and ballistic missiles, 5, 352 Malinovskiy, R. Ya., 590
and nuclear weapons, 72, 114, 352 Malyshev, V A., 596
number of deployed weapon systems, 4, Mangyshlak oblast, 478
28-30, 342, 344, 348-349, 576-577 Markov, D. S., 356
operations, 37, 352-353, 363, 633 Maslyukov, Yu. D., 591
structure, 38, 349, 352-353,569-570, Matochkin Shar Strait, 468, 482
575 Maud Committee, 68
Index 675
Mayak Production Association (Combine Ministry of Chemical Industry, 44, 84,

817, Chelyabinsk-65, Ozersk), 70, 156-157
76-80, 88-91, 93-97, 107, 599-602. Ministry of Commwllcation Equipment
See also Chelyabinsk-40 Industry, 43, 156, 166, 260, 309,
Medvezhyy Island, 276-277 594
Miass, 266 Ministry of Defense
Mikhailov, I. B., 290 12th Main Directorate (12th GUMO), 35,
Mikhailov, V N., 104, 596 77,111-115,171,261,458,460,570,
Mikoyan Design Bureau, 344, 362 606
Mikoyan, A. I., 433 nuclear warhead management, 113-115
Mikulin Design Bureau. See Soyuz Scientific oversight of nuclear facilities, 78
Production Association and political leadership, 33, 39,41-42
Military Space Forces, 37, 147,568-571, responsibilities, 35, 39,43
611-612 role in nuclear tests, 457-460
Military-Industrial Commission (VPK), 40, role in nuclear weapons development,
42,44-47,49,154,260,269,434,591 110-111
Minatom. See Ministry of Atomic Energy role in weapons acquisition, 44, 46-49,
Minenko, N. P., 650 78, 153-155, 260-261, 270, 413
Mining and Chemical Combine (Combine Sixth Main Directorate, 110-111
815, Krasnoyarsk-26, Zheleznogorsk), structure, 35, 147, 570
3, 76-80, 88-89, 92, 94, 97-98, 602 Ministry of Defense Industry
Ministry of Agricultural Machine-Building, (Minoboronprom), 157, 163, 612
156,594 Ministry of Economics, 45
Ministry of Armaments, 156-157, 159, Ministry of Electrical Equipment Industry,
236, 594 44, 156-157
Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom, Ministry of Electronics Industry, 43, 158,
Ministry of Medium Machine-Building, 260
Minsredmash), 43-46, 75-76, 78, 106, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 39-40, 42,
111, 158, 260, 457-461, 473, 476, 478, 591-592
578, 606 Ministry of Gas Industry, 473-474, 476,
12th Main Directorate, 109 479
16th Main Directorate, 76 Ministry of General Machine Building
Department of Nuclear Weapons (Minobshchemash, MOM), 43-44, 155,
Development and Testing (Fifth Main 157-158, 162, 212, 227, 260, 266, 269,
Directorate), 75, 102, 107, 111, 612
458-459, 597 Ministry of Geology, 82, 473-474, 476
Department of Nuclear Weapons Ministry of Heavy and Transport Machine
Production (Sixth Main Directorate), Building, 44
76, 107, 108 Ministry of Industry, 44-45, 158
Fuel Cycle Department (Fourth Main Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water
Directorate), 75, 88, 108 Management, 473
ministers, 75, 596 Ministry of Machine Building, 43
Sixth Main Directorate, 75, 107, 113, Ministry of Machine Building and
115, 605 Instrument Building, 156-157
Ministry of Aviation Industry, 43, 105, Ministry of Mineral Fertilizer Production,
107, 156-157, 165, 238, 370 473,478
676 Index
Ministry of Nonferrous Metallurgy, 473, Saturn, 641

478 System A, 413-415, 420, 433, 450, 471,
Ministry of Petrochemical Industry, 473, 640
480 Tallinn system, 639
Ministry of Petroleum Industry, 473-474 Taran, 418-419
Ministry of Petroleum Refining, 473, 480 Missile lalUlchers
Ministry of Radio Industry, 43, 106, 158, Chusovaya, 187
260,267,406,420,641 Desna-N, 126, 194-195
Ministry of Radio-Electronic Industry, 425 Desna-V, 126, 194-195
Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry, 43, 109, Dolina, 126, 194-195
156, 158, 260, 262-263, 269, 621, Dvina, 184
627 Slieksna-N, 189, 197, 200
Ministry of the Armed Forces, 143 Slieksna-V, 189
Minoboronprom. See Ministry of Defense Missiles. See Air-to-air missiles; Ballistic
Industry missiles, air-based; Ballistic missiles,
Minobshchemash. See Ministry of General land-based; Ballistic missiles, sea-
Machine Building lalUlched; Cruise missiles, air-lalUlched;
Minsk, 399 Cruise missiles, intercontinental; Cruise
Minsredmash. See Ministry of Atomic missiles, sea-lalUlched; Missile defense
Energy interceptor missiles; Surface-to-air
Mints, A. L., 403, 418, 420, 423, 433 missiles
Mishelevka, 422, 424, 434 MITT. See Moscow Institute of Thermal
Misrun, V. P., 608 Technology
Missile and Space Defense Forces, 400, Mityusruklia Bay, 467-468, 482
412,420,436-437, 568-571, 577, 637. MNII-1. See Agat Central Scientific
See also Missile Defense and Space Research Institute
Defense Troops Molniya Plant. See Molniya Scientific
Missile Defense and Antisatellite Troops, Production Association
637. See also Missile and Space Defense Molniya Scientific Production Association
Forces (Plant 48, Molniya Plant), 107, 109,
Missile Defense and Space Defense Troops, 605, 635
413. See also Missile and Space Defense Molodedmo, 279
Forces Molotov, V. M., 69, 591
Missile defense interceptor missiles Molotovsk, 263, 284. See also
A-350, 413-414, 416, 418 Severodvinsk
V-1000, 413-414, 640 MOM. See Ministry of General Machine
Missile defense systems Building
A-135,417-418 Morfizpribor Scientific Research Institute
A-35, 413-419, 421, 426 (NII-3), 117-118,268,607-608
A-35M,416-417 Mortar lalUlch. See Cold lalUlch
Aldan, 413-414 Moscow, 67, 117, 346, 353, 356, 366, 399,
Argun, 419 403-404,407-408,412,414-418,421,
Avrora, 415, 419 433-435, 452, 567, 589
Moscow ABM system, 7,400,413-417, Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology
419,421-422,425-427,438,450,472 (NII-l of the Ministry of Defense
(see also A-35, A-35M, A-135) Industry, MITT, Naruradze Design
Index 677
Bureau), 132-133, 162-164, 166, 210, structure, 245, 252-253, 255, 568, 590,
224, 230, 234, 269, 334, 576 619
Moscow oblast, 64, 106, 156, 165, 167, wllts, 38, 256
176, 422, 436 Navy Central Research Institute for
Moscow Polymetal Plant, 599 Armaments, 261
Moscow Treaty. See Limited Test Ban Navy Central Research Institute for Radio-
Treaty Technical Armaments, 261
Moskalenko, K. S., 611 Navy Ship Repair Plant, 82, 258, 624
MOlUltam Seismic Station, 462. See also Nazarbayev, N. A., 465
Semipalatinsk test range Nedelin, M. I., 609, 611
Mozdok,355 Nenoksa, 258, 327, 333, 618
Mozy" 152 Nenoksa test range. See State Central Naval
MRY. See Multiple reentry vehicles Test Range
Mukachevo, 422, 424, 426 Nercrunsk, 612
Multiple reentry vehicles (MRV), 199, Nerpa Ship Repair Plant, 258, 271-272
204-205, 297 Nerpichya, 253, 257, 306
Murmansk, 258 Nerpichya Bay, 256-257
Murmansk oblast, 478 Neutron initiator, 71, 73, 442, 461
Murmansk-130. See Gadzhiyevo Nevada test site, 451, 456
Murmansk-140. See Gremikha NIl IS. See Scientific Research Institute of
Murmansk-150. See Zapadnaya Litsa Measurement Systems
Murmansk-60. See Snezhnogorsk NII-I0. See Altair Scientific Research
Murzhik, 465, 482 Institute (NII-l0)
Musatov, A. N., 416, 421, 644 NIl-lOll. See Scientific Research Institute
Myasishchev Design Bureau (OKB-23), of Technical Physics
340-342, 345, 356-357, 359, 363, 378, NII-125. See Soyuz Federal Dual-Purpose
386, 634 Technology Center
Myasishchev, V. M., 341, 347, 356-357, NII-3. See Morfizpribor Scientific Research
375, 394, 634 Institute
NII-303. See Electropribor Central Scientific
Naruradze, A. D., 132, 164, 210, 224, Research Institute
230 NII-37. See Scientific Research Institute of
Nagasaki, 2, 69, 595, 634 Long-Range Radio Commwllcations
National Missile Defense (NMD), 573 NII-4 of the Navy. See Scientific Research
NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Institute of Armaments
Organization NII-4. See Scientific Research Institute 4 of
Naval Scientific Research Test Range. See the Ministry of Defense
Novaya Zemlya test range NII-400. See Gidropribor Central Scientific
Navoi, 83 Research Institute
Navy NII-49. See Granit Central Scientific
nuclear weapons management, 111, Research Institute
114-115,261 NII-627. See Scientific Research Institute of
operations, 255, 275 Electromechanics
responsibilities, 37, 235, 256 NII-8. See Scientific Research and Design
role in weapons acquisition, 260-261, Institute of Power Engineering
263,269-271, 274 Technology
678 Index
NII-88. See Central Machine-Building Sevrnashpredpriyatiye), 246, 258, 260,

Scientific Research Institute 263, 265, 272, 283, 285, 289, 293,
NII-885, 156, 166, 267, 309,413. See also 301, 304, 308, 618
Automatic Equipment and Instrument- Norwegian Sea, 242, 617
Building Scientific Production Novator Machine-Building Design Bureau,
Association; Russian Scientific Research 243, 268
Institute of Space Instrument-Building Novaya Zemlya, 274, 466-467
NII-9. See Scientific Research Institute of Novaya Zemlya test tange (Naval Scientific
Special Metals Research Test Range, Sixth State
NIIDAR. See Scientific Research Institute of Central Test Range), 3, 73, 236, 238,
Long-Range Radio Commwllcations 439, 442, 444, 448-453, 455-458,
NIIEFA. See Scientific Research Institute of 462-463,465-469,481-482, 579, 617
Electrophysics Equipment Novosibirsk, 79, 86, 109, 151
NIIKhimmash. See Chemical Macrune- Novosibirsk Chemical Concentrates Plant,
Building Scientific Research Institute 77-80, 84-85, 107
NIIRP. See Vympel Central Scientific Novouralsk. See Urals Electrochemical
Production Association Plant
NIKIET. See Scientific Research and Design Nuclear artillery, 73, 115, 442, 595
Institute of Power Engineering Nuclear devices
Technology Device 6c, 74
Nikipelov, B. V, 596 Item 501, 106-108
Nikolayev, 422, 426, 428 RDS-1, 2,4, 72, 106-107,441
Nikolayev oblast, 152 RDS-2, 2, 72, 108,441, 605
Nizhnedneprovsk, 152 RDS-3, 2, 72-73, 108,441-442,470,605
Nizhni Novgorod (Gorky), 100, 106, 268, RDS-37, 3, 74,443-444,463,634,647
279, 622 RDS-3I, 73, 442
Nizhni Novgorod (Gorky) oblast, 102, 107 RDS-3T, 72, 108,441, 605
Nizhni Tagil, 151, 233 RDS-4, 72-73, 312
Nizhnyaya rura, 107 RDS-6, 2,440-441,443,463,596,647
Nizhnyaya Tura Macrune- Building Plant, RDS-9, 73, 236, 441-442
107 Nuclear devices, u.s.
NKVD. See People's Commissariat of Fat Man, 2, 72,441,595
Internal Affairs Mark-17, 647
Nordkapp, Cape, 276-277 Mike, 596, 647
N orilsk, 425 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT),
North Atlantic Treaty Organization 24
(NATO), 17, 19,449,572 Nuclear power plants, 87
North Sea, 273, 617 Beloyarsk, 86, 600
Northern Dvina River, 263 Chernobyl, 75, 83, 86, 428, 599
Northern Fleet, 239, 252-253, 256-258, Novovoronezh, 86
271-272 Nuclear reactors
deployed submarines, 239, 252-253, A, 70, 90-91, 94
256-258, 271-272, 274, 285, 293, 297, AD, 91, 97
301-302, 304, 306, 309-309,408, 624 ADE-1, 91, 97, 602
Northern Machine-Building Enterprise ADE-2, 91, 97-98
Production Association (Plant 402, ADE-3, 91, 96
Index 679
ADE-4, 91, 96-97 lUldergrOlUld explosions, 451-453,

ADE-5, 91, 96-97 463-465,468-469,482
AM,86 lUlderwater explosions, 462, 484
AV-1, 91, 94 weapons safety tests, 439, 442, 450, 452,
AV-2, 91, 94 456-457, 459, 463-464, 481, 483
AV-3, 91, 94 weapons safety tests, one-point safety, 442
BN-350, 85, 87 Nuclear tests, U.S.
BN-600, 85, 89, 95 Castle series, 647
BN-800, 89, 600 Trinity, 595
EI-2, 91, 96, 600 Nurek,435
F-1, 70, 84
1-1,91,96 Obninsk, 86, 623
IGR, 105, 465 Odessa, 399
IR-AI, 91, 94, 601 OKB-I. See Central Design Bureau of
IVG-1M,465 Experimental Machine Building
LF-2, 601 OKB-I0. See Special Design Bureau 10
Ludmila, 91, 95, 601 OKB-l2. See Special Design Bureau 12
OK-180, 91, 95 OKB-120. See Special Design Bureau 120
OK-190, 91, 95 OKB-154. See Chemical Automatic
RBMK, 78, 80, 85-86, 599 Equipment Design Bureau
Ruslan, 91, 95 OKB-156. See Tupolev Design Bureau
spent fuel, 80, 89-90, 95-96, 98, 600 OKB-19. See Aviadvigatel Company
VVER-1000, 78, 80, 85-86, 98, 599 OKB-2. See Chemical Machine-Building
VVER-440, 78, 80, 85-86, 89, 95, 599 Design Bureau
VVER-type, 86 OKB-23. See Myasishchev Design Bureau
Nuclear tests. See also Peaceful nuclear OKB-25. See Scientific Research Institute of
explosions Automatics
airbursts, 440-441, 463, 468, 470, 480, OKB-276. See Trud Scientific Production
482,484 Association
atmospheric tests, 452, 463, 470, 648 OKB-30. See Vympel Central Scientific
contained, 440, 464-465, 478, 484 Production Association
decoupled, 447, 477,648 OKB-36. See Rybinsk Motor Design Bureau
ftmdamental research tests, 88, 439, 450, OKB-456. See Scientific Production
452, 463-464, 483 Association of Power Engineering
high-altitude explosions, 440, 450-452, Machine Building
470,482,484 OKB-52. See Machine-Building Scientific
Hydronuclear experiments, 439, 448, 453, Production Association
463, 481 OKB-586. See Yuzhnoye Design Bureau
joint u.S.-Soviet verification experiment, OKBM. See Machine-Building Experimental
456 Design Bureau
the last prepared test, 649 Okeanpribor Scientific Production
multiple-explosion test, 453 Association, 268
radioactive release accidents, 440, 474 Okhotsk Sea, 242, 274, 617
space explosions, 484 Okolnaya Inlet, 258
surface explosion, 440, 463, 468, 470, Olenegorsk,421-423
484 Oleniya Inlet, 289, 304, 619-620
680 Index
Olga, 258 Bolshoy Azgir site, 476-477, 479,

Omelchenko, I. D., 416 481-483
Omsk, 146, 151-152, 165, 356, 635 Butan site, 474
Omsk Aviation Plant. See Aviation Plant Dedurovka, 479
166 Dnepr series, 464, 478-479
Onezhski, 598 Fakel site, 480
Operation Baykal, 179 Galit site, 476
Operation K., 451, 470 Geliy site, 474
Operation Sapphire, 599 Gezhskoye, 474
Orenburg, 146, 152 Grachevskoye deposit, 474
Orenburg oblast, 150,470,479,482 Grifon site, 474
Osoaviakhim. See Society for the Klivazh experiment, 483
Advancement of Aviation and Chemistry Klivazh site, 480
Osovskii, N. A., 650 Krater, 480
Ostrov, 147 Kristall explosion, 478
Ostrovnoy. See Gremikha Lazurit, 465, 478
OTH. See Early-warning radars, over-the- Lira site, 479
horizon early Magistral site, 479
Ozersk. See Mayak Production Association Neva site, 476
Oka site, 476
Pacific Fleet, 252-253, 258-259, 271-272 Osinskoye deposit, 474
air defense, 408 Pamuk, 480, 652
submarines deployed, 239, 279, 285, radioactive release accidents
289-290, 293, 297, 301-302, 304 Globus-1,474
Pacific Ocean, 240, 273-275, 279 Kraton-3,474
ballistic missile lalUlches to, 171, 182, Sapfir site, 479
206 Shagan test, 465
early-warning coverage, 577 Sheksna site, 476
submarine accidents, 290 Sovkhoznoye deposit, 479
Pakhov, I. I., 650 Sredne-Balykskoye oil field, 474
Paldiski, 623 Sredne-Botubinskoye oil field, 476
Parus. See Satellites, navigation Taiga series, 465, 478
Pavlodar oblast, 461 Takhta-Kugutinskoye deposit, 476
Pavlograd, 161 Tavda site, 479
Pavlograd Mechanical Plant, 161-163. See Telkem proj ect, 477
also Yuzhnyy Machine-Building Plant Vega site, 479
Production Association Vyatka site, 476
Pavlov, V. S., 591 Yesi-Yegovskoye deposit, 476
Pavlovskogo Bay, 253, 259, 290 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty,
Pavlovskoye, 258, 297, 301 454-455, 480
Peaceful nuclear explosions, 439-440, Pechenga, 256
453-454,457,460-461,464,469, Pechora, 402, 423
471-481,483 Pechora-Kama canal, 477-478
Angara site, 476 Penza, 108
Astrakhan gas condensate deposit, 479 Penza Device-Building Plant. See Start
Benzol site, 474 Production Association
Index 681
Penza-19. See Start Production Plant 36. See Rybinsk Motor Production
Association Association
People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs Plant 385, 161. See also SKB-385
(NKVD), 68, 356, 594 Plant 402. See Northern Machine-Building
Perimeter system, 65-66, 162, 176, 593, Enterprise Production Association
614 Plant 418, 99-100
Perm, 148, 165, 360, 612 Plant 48. See Molniya Scientific Production
Perm Motor Design Bureau. See Association
Aviadvigatel Company Plant 514. See Chepetsk Mechanical
Perm oblast, 151, 474, 478 Plant
Pervomaysk, 152 Plant 551. See Avangard Electromechanical
Pervukhin, M. G., 596 Plant
Pestryalovo, 422 Plant 586. See Yuzhnyy Machine-Building
Peter the Great Military Academy of the Plant Production Association
Strategic Rocket Forces, 148, 612 Plant 64. See Aviation Plant 64
Petlyakov, V M., 356 Plant 7. See FrW1Ze Plant
Petropavlovsk-50, 259 Plant 752. See Kirovo-Chepetsk Chemical
Petropavlovsk-Kamchatski, 258-259, 271, Plant
275,298 Plant 80. See Dzerzhinsk High-Explosives
Petrzhak, K. A., 68 Plant
PGu. See First Main Directorate of the Plant 81. See Aviation Plant 81
COlUlcil of Ministers Plant 813. See Urals Electrochemical
Pilyugin, N. A., 157, 166-167, 309 Plant
Plant 1. See Aviation Plant 1 Plant 815. See Mining and Chemical
Plant 1001. See Krasnoyarsk Machine- Combine
Building Plant Production Association Plant 816. See Siberian Chemical
Plant 112. See Krasnoye Sormovo Plant Combine
Plant 117. See Klimov Scientific Production Plant 817. See Mayak Production
Association Association
Plant 12. See Electrostal Machine-Building Plant 86. See Aviation Plant 86
Plant Plant 96. See Rulon Plant
Plant 156. See Aviation Plant 156 Plant B, 71, 93-95
Plant 166. See Aviation Plant 166 Plant BB, 93-94
Plant 18. See Aviation Plant 18 Plant V, 71, 94-95, 599
Plant 194. See Admiralty Plant Plavsk, 109
Plant 199. See Amur Shipbuilding Plant Plesetsk, 122, 210-211, 429
Plant 219 of the Ministry of Aviation Plesetsk test range (53rd Scientific Research
Industry, 107 Test Range), 122, 182, 206, 210-211,
Plant 22. See Aviation Plant 22 231,234
Plant 23. See Aviation Plant 23 Ploskiy Island, 257
Plant 25 of Ministry of Aviation Industry, Plutonium, 1-3, 69-71, 76, 78, 80, 88-97,
107 100-101, 108,441,461,594-597,
Plant 253 of the First Main Directorate, 600-602, 605, 650
106 dioxide, 97, 600
Plant 300. See Soyuz Scientific Production plutonium-238, 95, 600
Association plutonium-239, 90, 594, 600
682 Index
Plutonium (cont.) Region State Enterprise, 269

plutonium-240, 90, 595, 600 Repin, V. G., 422
reactor-grade, 80, 88, 96, 600 Research and Project Design Institute of
weapons-gracie, 77, 80, 88-92, 94, 97, Energy Technologies (VNIPIET), 594.
600 See also State Building and Design
Pobedonostsev, Yu. A., 607 Institute
Polonium, 90, 601 Revda, 258
Polyak, Yu. v., 421-422 Reykjavik, 20
Polyarnyy, 256 Rocket Propulsion Study Group (GIRD),
Polyot ProductionAssociation. See Aviation 117
Plant 166 Rodionov, I. N., 590
Pomeranchuk, I. Yu., 73 Rogachevo, 467
Postavy, 152 Romanov, Yu. A., 73
Power plants. See Nuclear power plants Romny, 147
PriarglUlsky Mining and Chemical Rosenergoatom State Enterprise, 86, 599
Combine, 83 Roslyakovo, 258, 624
Pricaspiisky Combine, 83 Rostov-on-Don, 148, 268
Priluki, 355, 398 Rozhanovich, P. M., 461
Primorskaya Flotilla, 258 RT-l radiochemical plant, 80, 89, 94-96,
Primorsky, 259 601
Primorsky Kray, 258-259, 272, 297, 301, RT-2 radiochemical plant, 80, 98
408 Rubin Central Design Bureau of Naval
Pripyat, 428 Equipment (Rubin TsKB MT, TsKB-18),
Project T-1, 179-180 236,238,262-264,268-269, 290-291,
Protsenko, M. v., 108 294,298, 301-302, 304, 306, 323, 617,
Pruzhany, 147 627
PUREX process, 93, 95, 97 Rubin Leningrad Design and Installation
Pushkino, 642 Bureau. See Rubin Central Design
Pustyntsev, P. P., 263 Bureau of Naval Equipment
Putin, V. v., 590 Rubin TsKB MT. See Rubin Central Design
Bureau of Naval Equipment
Rachuk, V. S., 166 Rudy, Yeo G., 167
Radio- Technical Institute of the Academy Rudyak, Yeo G., 309
of Sciences (RTI), 417, 420-423, 433 Rulon Plant (Plant 96), 84
Radio-Technical Troops, 37,400,402, Rumyantsev, A. Yu., 75, 596
436-437, 568, 638 Rusinov, L. I., 68
Radium Institute of the Academy of Russian Scientific Research Institute of
Sciences, 67, 69-70, 92-93,473 Space Instrument-Building (RNIIKP),
Raduga Design Bureau, 346, 362, 390 157, 167. See also NII-885
Raspletin, A. A., 403, 406, 641 Russian Space Agency (RKA), 44-45, 158,
Raushenbakh, B. v., 607 164, 166-167, 612
Reactors. See Nuclear reactors RVSN. See Strategic Rocket Forces
Refueling Ryabev, L. D., 596
probe-and-drogue, 342, 345, 374, 383, Ryabov, Ya. P., 591
397 Ryazan, 355, 385
wingtip-to-wingtip, 368, 373 Rybachiy, 253, 259, 275, 304, 620
Index 683
Rybinsk, 360 Scientific Research and Design Institute of

Rybinsk Motor Design Bureau (OKB-36), Industrial Technology
360, 390 (VNIPlpromtekbnologii), 461, 472, 473
Rybinsk Motor Production Association Scientific Research and Design Institute of
(Plant 36), 360 Power Engineering Technology (NII-8,
Rykovanov, G. N., 104 NIKIET), 267-269
Ryzhkov, N. I., 591 Scientific Research and Project Design
Institute of Energy Technologies
Sadovskiy, M. A., 461 (VNIPIET), 93, 96, 594. See also State
Sakhalin Island, 258 Building and Design Institute
Sakharov, A. D., 73-74 Scientific Research Institute 224 (NII-244),
SALT I Treaty, 8-10, 12-15, 123, 129, 406
131-132, 146, 219, 242, 454 Scientific Research Institute 4 of the
SALT II Treaty, 12, 14-19, 132-133, 199, Ministry of Defense (NII-4), 142, 145
210-211, 230, 346, 393, 588, 610, Scientific Research Institute of Armaments
616 (NII-4 of the Navy), 236, 616
Samara (Kuybyshev), 165, 348-349, 356, Scientific Research Institute of Automatic
359, 361, 367, 381, 384 Equipment and Instrument-Building
Sapphire, Operation, 599 (NIIAP). See Automatic Equipment and
Saratov, 150 Instrument-Building Scientific
Saratov oblast, 150 Production Association
Sarov. See Scientific Research Institute of Scientific Research Institute of Automatics
Experimental Physics (VNIIA, OKB-25), 76, 102, 105-106,
Sary Shagan test range, 413 108,597
Saryozek, 146-147 Scientific Research Institute of Chemical
Sary-Shagan, 413, 446, 450, 640 Machine-Building, 93
Sary-Uzen, 463-465, 482 Scientific Research Institute of Chemical
Satellites, early warning, 61, 428, 430, 432, Technologies, 93
438, 577, 644 Scientific Research Institute of Device
geostationary, 429, 432, 577 Building (VNIIP), 604. See also
in highly elliptical orbits, 429, 432 Scientific Research Institute of Technical
Satellites, first artificial Physics
PS-1, 121 Scientific Research Institute of
PS-2, 122 Electromechanics (NII-627), 157
Satellites, navigation Scientific Research Institute of
Glonass (Uragan), 281 Electrophysics Equipment (NIIEFA), 99,
Parus, 281 602
Tsikada, 281 Scientific Research Institute of Experimental
Satellites, Prognoz orbital points, 432 Physics (VNIIEF, Arzamas-16, Sarov), 3,
Savin, A. I., 433 72,76-77,101,102-108,110-111,
Sayda Inlet, 256-257, 293, 297, 304 113,419,444,459-460,473,477,578,
Say- Utes, 478 646-647, 652. See also Design Bureau
Scientific Production Association of Power 11
Engineering Machine Building Scientific Research Institute of Impulse
(Energomash, 0 KB-45 6, Glushko Technologies (VNII IT), 102, 106,460,
Design Bureau), 157, 165, 194 597
684 Index
Scientific Research Institute of Inorganic Seversk. See Siberian Chemical Combine

Materials (VNIINM), 76, 92-93, 594, Sevmashpredpriyatiye. See Northern
601 Machine-Building Enterprise Production
Scientific Research Institute of Long-Range Association
Radio Commwllcations (NIIDAR, NII- Shadrinsk, 146-147
37),420,425-427,428, 642 Shagan River, 477
Scientific Research Institute of Shaposhnikov, Yeo I., 590
Measurement Systems (NIl IS), 102, 106 Shchelkin, K. I., 72, 104,461
Scientific Research Institute of Radio Shepilov, D. T., 591
Instrument Building. See Vympel Central Shetland Islands, 276
Scientific Production Association Shevardnadze, E. A., 591
Scientific Research Institute of Rocket Shevchenko, 83
Propulsion (NII-l of Ministry of Shevchenko, V. B., 70
Aviation Industry), 117, 157 Ships
Scientific Research Institute of Special Kirov-class, 599
Metals (NII-9), 70, 92 Project 11570, 282
Scientific Research Institute of Technical Project 1791, 282
Physics (VNIITF, NIl-lOll, Project 26-bis, 265
Chelyabinsk-70, Snezhinsk), 3, 76, 102, Project 323A, 282
104-107,111-113,413-414,444-445, Project 323B, 282
459-460,473,595,604,647,652 Shkotovo Peninsula, 259
SDI. See Strategic Defense Initiative Shkotovo-22 Navy Ship Repair Plant, 259,
Second State Central Scientific Test Range. 271
See Semipalatinsk test range Shpak, V S., 167
Second State Test Lallllch Site (Svobodnyy Shumilikha River, 468-469, 482
lalUlch site), 612 Shvetsov, A. D., 360, 367
Seliksa, 108 Siberian Chemical Combine (Combine 816,
Semenov, N. N., 68 Tomsk-7, Seversk), 3, 76-79, 84, 88-89,
Semikhatov, N. A., 316 91,94-99, 102-102, 600, 602-603
Semipalatinsk, 353, 355, 385 Signal Scientific Research Institute, 231
Semipalatinsk oblast, 151, 461 Sinara, Lake, 104
Semipalatinsk test range (Second State Sinelnikov, K. D., 67
Central Scientific Test Range, Sinev, N. M., 100
GosTsNIP-2), 2-3, 72, 77,440-444, Sixth State Central Test Range. See Novaya
448-453,456,461-465,467,469-471, Zemlya test range
477-479,481-482,649-650 Skalistyy. See Gadzhiyevo
Semipalatinsk-21. See Kurchatov SKB-143. See Malakhit Naval Machine-
Sen'kin, A. N., 104 Building Bureau
Sergeyev, I. D., 590, 611 SKB-30. See Special Design Bureau 30
Sergiyev Posad (Zagorsk), 267, 416 SKB-31. See Special Design Bureau 31
Serpukhov, 148,430 SKB-385. See Machine-Building Design
Sever Production Association, 107, 109 Bureau
Severodvinsk (Molotovsk), 258, 260, 263, SKB-626. See Automatic Equipment
265,272,283,285,289,293,297, Scientific Production Association
301, 304, 308, 622 SKKP. See Space surveillance system
Severomorsk, 256, 258, 620 Skobeltsin, D. v., 67
Index 685
Skrunda, 421-422, 424, 426, 577-578 Terra-3, 419, 435

Slavsky, E. P., 71, 75, 596 Space-based early-warning system, 61-62,
Sloka, V. K., 417 428-430,432,437-438
Slovak Republic, 87 Spasskiy, I. D., 263, 291
Smirnov, A. I., 649 Special Committee on the Atomic Problem,
Smirnov, G. A., 105 69,403, 603, 612
Smirnov, L. v., 591 Special Design Bureau 10 (OKB-10 of NII-
Smolensk, 145-147, 152, 353, 355 88), 266, 316
Snezhinsk. See Chelyabinsk-70 Special Design Bureau 12 (OKB-12), 267
Snezhnogorsk, 258, 272, 620 Special Design Bureau 120 (OKB-120),
Society for the Advancement of Aviation 381
and Chemistry (Osoaviakhim), 117 Special Design Bureau 30 (SKB-30), 406,
Sofrino, 417 412-414. See also Vympel Central
Sokolov, S. L., 590 Scientific Production Association
Solnechnogorsk, 416, 422, 437 Special Design Bureau 31 (SKB-31), 406
Solomonov, Yu. S., 164 Special Design Bureau of the Kirov Plant,
Solovtsov, N. Ye., 611 100, 267
Sosnovyi Bor, 623 Spetsstroy-700, 468. See also Novaya
Sosulnikov, V. P., 416, 420, 435 Zemlya test range
SOSUS. See Antisubmarine warfare Stalin, I. v., 68, 75, 403, 589-591, 608
Sovetskaya Gavan, 258 Starikov, Yeo G., 467
Soyuz Federal Dual-Purpose Technology START I Treaty, 19, 21, 134
Center (NII-125), 167 elimination procedures, 172
Soyuz Scientific Production Association implementation, 29-31, 135, 140-142,
(Plant 300, Mikulin Design Bureau), 153, 244, 253, 259, 575, 619
360, 375 ratification process, 24, 135, 574
Space lalUlch vehicles and sea-based cruise missiles, 23
8K71PS, 122 specific limits, 21, 29, 134-135, 173,
Energiya, 156, 166-167, 379,420 610-611,616
Molniya, 166,429 and the START II Treaty, 25-26
N-1, 167, 609 succession, 23-24, 135, 223, 230
Proton (UR-500K), 163, 429 START II Treaty, 25-31, 140-142, 153,
Rokot, 163, 612 162, 223, 230, 244, 568, 571-575, 579,
Soyuz, 166 589,611,654-655
SS-18K, 162 START III Treaty, 27, 31, 142, 571-572
Voskhod, 166 Start Production Association (Penza Device-
Space surveillance stations Building Plant, Penza-19, Zarechny), 3,
OS-l (see Balkhash) 76-77, 106-109, 578
OS-2 (see Mishelevka) State Building and Design Institute (GSPI-
OS-3 (see Yeniseysk) 11),594. See also Research and Project
Space surveillance system (SKKP), 400, Design Institute of Energy Technologies
422,425,432-435, 569, 577, 637 State Central Design Bureau 1, 157. See
Space surveillance systems also Moscow Institute of Thermal
Krona, 435, 578 Technology
LE-1 laser, 419, 435 State Central Naval Test Range (Nenoksa
Okno, 435, 578, 645 test range), 327, 333
686 Index
State Central Test Range. See Novaya number of deployed weapons, 134, 140,
Zemlya test range 142
State Committee for Defense Industries operations, 168-176
(Goskomoboronprom, responsibilities, 36
Roskomoboronprom), 45, 158 structure, 37-38, 147-148, 153,400,436,
State Committee for Oversight of Radiation 568-571,611
Safety (Gosatomnadzor), 78, 101, 273 wllts, 147-152
State Defense Committee (GKO), 1, 69, weapons acquisition, 153
110,589,637 Strelok Gulf, 258-259
State Dwna of the Russian Federation, Streltsovsk, 83, 598
26-27,29,457,571-573,575, 655 Streltsovskoye deposit, 83
State Industrial Committee for Meruwn Strontium, 95
Machine Building, 76. See also Ministry Stupin, V. I., 649
of Atomic Energy Submarine collisions, 294, 298, 627
State Institute of Applied Chemistry Submarines
(GIPKh), 157, 167 Project 09774, 298
State Institute of Rare Metals (Giredmet), Project 09780, 298
70 Project 601, 290, 627
State Institute of Roentgenology and Project 605, 290, 322, 627
Radiology, 67 Project 611, 262-263, 265, 283, 285
State Security Committee (KGB), 39,43. Project 613, 238-239, 262, 265, 317,
See also Federal Security Service; 320, 323, 616
People's Commissariat Project 615, 262
Stavropol, 598 Project 617, 262
Stavropol Kray, 476 Project 619, 290, 333, 627
Steenbeck, M., 100 Project 627, 235, 265, 291
Stepnogorsk, 83 Project 627A, 265, 293
Steshenko, V K., 650 Project 629, 9, 237, 268, 286-290
St.-Petersburg (Leningrad), 67, 96, 99-100, construction, 265
107,117,164,167,231,261,263, design bureau, 262, 627
265-269, 322, 361, 399,404,406,411, missile systems deployed, 312, 315, 322,
599,616-617,622,639 627
Strategic arms limitation talks, 41-42, 346, patrol, 273, 276, 281
393,591. See also ABM Treaty; SALT I wllts, 257
Treaty; SALT II Treaty Project 629A, 286-290, 317
Strategic arms reductions talks. See START Project 629B, 265, 286-290, 323
I Treaty; START II Treaty Project 629R, 290
Strategic aviation. See Long-Range Project 639, 315, 621, 627
Aviation, 37-38, 353,400,436, Project 641, 287
568-569 Project 644, 238, 262
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), 18,20-21 Project 645, 256, 265
Strategic Rocket Forces (RVSN), 36 Project 645A, 256
history, 5, 117, 120-121, 123-127, 129, Project 651, 239, 262
131-134,142,144-147 Project 658, 9, 268, 290-294
nuclear weapons management, 111, 114, construction, 237, 265
171 design bureau, 262, 628
Index 687
patrol, 273, 276, 281 PrOject 671, 256, 625

wllts, 257 Project 671RTM, 243, 256, 259, 266
Project 658M, 257-258, 290-294, 317 Project 675, 239, 262, 265-266
Project 659, 239, 262, 266 Project 679, 621
Project 661, 265 Project 685, 263
Project 665, 239 Project 687, 621
Project 667, 265, 294, 306, 323, 618 Project 701, 9, 293, 327
Project 667A, 7, 12, 27, 240, 242, 268, Project 705, 265
294-298 Project 845, 265
construction, 266 Project 877, 266
design bureau, 262 Project 885, 260
missile systems, 319, 322, 327 Project 887, 260
patrol, 273-276, 281-282, 624-625 Project 941, 17, 19, 30, 243, 245,
wllts, 257, 259, 293, 620 304-306
Project 667AM, 12, 296, 330 construction, 265, 272
Project 667AT, 243, 298 decomissioning and elimination, 28, 30,
Project 667AU, 242, 244, 294-298, 322 245, 576, 618, 655
Project 667B, 11-12, 17, 19, 27, 30,243, missile systems deployed, 333-334, 575,
245,272,298-302, 306-309 655
construction, 242, 244, 266 nwnber of deployed submarines, 28,
design bureau, 262 243-245
elimination, 29, 244, 259 patrol, 274, 282
missile systems, 240, 242, 274, 327 wllts, 253, 256-257
patrol, 242, 274 Project 945A, 243
wllts, 253, 256, 258, 620 Project 949, 256, 263
Project 667BD, 12, 253, 256, 274, Project 949A, 256, 259-260, 263, 265
300-301 Project 955, 28-30, 245, 260
Project 667BDR, 12, 17, 30, 243, Project 971, 243, 256, 259-260, 265-266
302-304 Project A615, 262
construction, 243 Project AV-611, 4, 237, 265, 273, 276,
design bureau, 262 281,283-287, 312, 617
elimination, 27, 30, 245, 253, 619-620 Project PV-611, 285, 317
missile system deployed, 330 Project V-611, 237, 262, 283-286, 310,
number of deployed submarines, 28, 244 317,617
patrol, 274 Project V-613, 317
wllts, 253, 256, 259 Submarines by Western designations
Project 667BDRM, 17, 19, 30, 243, 245, Akula (see Submarines, Project 971)
272, 306-309 AHa (see Submarines, Project 705)
design bureau, 263 Charlie II (see Submarines, Project 670M)
missile system deployed, 337 Delta I (see Submarines, Project 667B)
number of deployed submarines, 28, 244, Delta II (see Submarines, Project 667BD)
576-577 Delta III (see Submarines, Project
patrol, 274 667BDR)
wllts, 253, 256, 619 Delta IV (see Submarines, Project
Project 667M, 244, 298 667BDRM)
Project 670M, 256 Echo I (see Submarines, Project 659)
688 Index
Submarines by Western designations (cont.) Zulu IV 1/2 (see Submarines, Project V-611)
Echo II (see Submarines, Project 675) Zulu V (see Submarines, Project AV-611)
Foxtrot (see Submarines, Project 641) Zulu (see Submarines, Project 611)
Golf I (see Submarines, Project 629) Submarines, by ship
Golf II (see Submarines, Project 629A) B-42,290
Golf III (see Submarines, Project 601) B-47, 237, 262, 285, 310, 312, 317
Golf IV (see Submarines, Project 605) K-l02, 290, 322, 617
Golf V (see Submarines, Project 619) K-l07, 290
Golf (see Submarines, Project 629) K-118, 290
Hotel I (see Submarines, Project 658) K-129, 290
Hotel II (see Submarines, Project 658M) K-137, 297, 320, 322
Hotel III (see Submarines, Project 701) K-140, 297, 330, 618
Hotel (see Submarines, Project 658) K-145, 293, 327
Juliet (see Submarines, Project 651) K-153, 290, 333
Kilo (see Submarines, Project 887) K-178,293
Mike (see Submarines, Project 685) K-19, 237, 293-294
November (see Submarines, Project 627) K-219, 298
Oscar I (see Submarines, Project 949) K-279, 301, 327
Oscar II (see Submarines, Project 949) K-3, 265
Oscar (see Submarines, Project 949) K-403, 298
Papa (see Submarines, Project 661) K-411,298
Quebec (see Submarines, Project 615) K-420, 243, 298
Sierra I (see Submarines, Project 645) K-441, 330
Sierra II (see Submarines, Project 645A) K-45, 239
Typhoon (see Submarines, Project 941) K-55, 293
Victor I (see Submarines, Project 671) K-61, 290
Victor III (see Submarines, Project KS-403, 298
671RTM) KS-411,298
Whale (see Submarines, Project 617) S-144, 616
Whiskey Long Bin (see Submarines, S-146,238
Project 665) S-229, 317
Whiskey Twin Cylinder (see Submarines, TK-208, 306, 333
ProJ ect 644) Yuri Dolgorukii, 28-29, 245, 260, 263,
Whiskey (see Submarines, Project 613) 265, 334, 575-576
Yankee (see Submarines, Project 667A) Submarines, by ship, U.S.
Yankee I (see Submarines, Project 667A) Gato (SSN-615), 294
Yankee II (see Submarines, Project Pintado (SSN-672), 298
667AM) Swordfish (SSN-579), 627
Yankee Notch (see Submarines, Project Submarines, commwllcation with
667AT) Goliath station, 280, 626
Yankee Pod (see Submarines, Project Hercules station, 280, 626
09780) Submarines, U.S.
Yankee SSGN (see Submarines, Project George Washington-class (Polaris), 5, 7-8,
667M) 240
Yankee Stretch (see Submarines, Project James Madison-class (Poseidon), 8, 10, 16
09774) Los Angeles-class, 243
Index 689
Ohio-class (Trident I), 16 Teykovo, 151

Tennessee-class (Trident 11), 18, 610 Threshold Test Ban Treaty, 454
Sukhoy Design Bureau, 346-347, 362, Tikhomirov, N. I., 117
389-390 Tikhonov, N. A., 591
Sukhoy, P.O., 346, 389 Titan Central Design Bureau, 210, 230
Sukhum Institute of Physics and Tolkachev, A. A., 419
Technology, 100 Tolubko, V E, 611
Sulimovskiy, N. A., 236 Tomilino, 356
Surface-to-Air Missile Troops, 400, 402, Tomsk, 602, 612
408, 568 Tomsk-7. See Siberian Chemical Combine
Surface-to-air missiles Torpedoes
5V55,407 T-15, 235-236
R-101,403 T-5, 73,235-236,441-442,467
R-102,403 Totsk, 340,439,441,462,470,482-483
R-llO, 403 Training Test Range 2, 462. See also
V-300, 403 Semipalatinsk test range
V-600, 405 Transport Chemical Machine-Building
V-601,405 Design Bureau, 167
V-750, 405 Transport Machine-Building Design Bureau,
V-750VK, 639 167
V-750VN, 639 Trekhgorny. See Zlatoust-36
V-755,405 Tritiwn, 73-74, 76-77, 85, 90-91, 94-95,
V-757,405 596, 600-601
Surface-to-air missiles, German Trud Scientific Production Association
Wasserfall, 118,403 (OKB-276, Kuznetsov Design Bureau),
Sverdlovsk, 93, 104, 109, 166-167, 243, 361-362, 380, 396
267 Trutnev, Yu. A., 74, 104
Sverdlovsk-44. See Urals Electrochemical TsAGI. See Central Aerohydrodynamics
Plant Institute
Sverdlovsk-45. See Electrokhimpribor Tsander, F. A., 117
Combine Tselinny combine, 83
Sverdlovsk oblast, 151 Tsikada. See Navigaton satellites
Svobodnyy, 152 TsKB-16. See Volna Central Design Bureau
Svobodnyy lalUlch site. See Second State TsKB-18. See Rubin Central Design Bureau
Test LalUlch Site of Naval Equipment
Syrdarya River, 598 TsKB-34. See Central Design Bureau of
Special Machine Building
T-1, proJect, 179-180 TsKB-7. See Arsenal Design Bureau
Taboshar, 82, 597 TsKBEM. See Central Design Bureau of
Taganrog, 359, 384 Experimental Machine Building
Tajikistan, 82, 435, 598 TsKBM. See Machine-Building Scientific
Tamm, I. E., 73 Production Association
Tartu, 355 TsNII-1. See Central Scientific Research
Tashkent, 279 Institute for Military Shipbuilding
Tatishchevo, 150, 234 TsNIIMash. See Central Machine-Building
Tatysh plant. See Plant V Scientific Research Institute
690 Index
TsSKB. See Central Special Design Bureau Uran Scientific Production Association, 269
Tsukerman, V. A., 595 Uranium
Tsybin, P. v., 384 conversion, 84, 598
Tupolev Aviation Scientific and Technical depleted, 98, 109, 598
Complex. See Tupolev Design Bureau enrichment, 3, 70, 75, 77-79, 84-85, 88,
Tupolev Design Bureau (OKB-lS6), 4, 98-101,594,597-599, 603
339-342,345-347,355-356,366,368, hexafluoride, 78, 84-85, 98-99, 101,
370-371, 379-380, 387, 389-391, 598
394-395 highly enriched (HEU), 70, 76-78, 80, 85,
Tupolev, A. A., 347, 356 88-90, 95-98, 101, 596, 599-600
Tupolev, A. N., 339, 346, 355-356, 389 low-enriched (LEU), 77-78, 89, 101
Turbiner, V. A., 71 metal, 70, 78, 84-86, 598
Turgay oblast, 151 natural, 78, 80, 82-84, 86, 98-99, 594,
Turkey, 6 603
Turkmenistan, 480 reprocessed, 78, 80, 84
Tusruno Aviation Plant. See Aviation Plant tetrafluoride, 84, 598
81 uranium-235, 78, 80, 87-88, 98-99, 101,
rver oblast, 151 599, 603
Tyumen, 146-147, 612 uranium-238, 74, 98
Tyumen oblast, 474, 479 weapons-grade, 98-99
Tyurin, P. A., 164, 209, 266, 327 Urta-Bulak, 480, 652
UrzhlUltsev, K. I., 595
Udachnyy, 478 Ussuriysk, 147
UDMH. See Unsymmetrical Ust'-Kamenogorsk, 78-79, 85
dimethylhydrazine Ust'-Katav, 165
Udmurt Autonomous Republic, 164 Ust'-Katav Wagon Plant, 165
Ukraine, 24, 28-29, 82, 87, 114, 135, Ustinov, D. E, 590-591, 610
140-141, 147, 149, 152, 162, 170, 223, Ustinov, N. D., 435
230, 349, 355, 385, 399,426,435, Utkin, V. E, 162, 212
480, 576-577, 589-590, 598, 654 Uzbekistan, 82-83, 480, 598
Ukrainian Institute of Physics and Uzhur, 146, 150
Technology, 68-69. See Kharkov Uzin, 355
Institute of Physics and Technology
Ukrainka, 355, 385 Vannikov, B. L., 69, 596
Ulbinsky Metallurgical Plant (UMZ), Vasilevskiy, A. M., 590
78-80, 84-85 Vasilyev, D. E., 104
UMZ. See Ulbinsky Metallurgical Plant Vavilov State Optics Institute (GO!), 429
UNKS. See Directorate of the Chief of Velikhin, V. I., 598
Space Systems Verkh-Neivinsk, 99
Unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine Verkhnyaya Salda, 612
(UDMH),187 Vernadsky, V. I., 67
Ura Inlet, 256 Very long frequency (VLF) commwlication,
Uragan. See Satellites, navagation 279
Urals Electrochemical Plant (Combine 813, VIAM. See Institute of Aviation Materials
Sverdlovsk-44, Novouralsk), 3, 76-79, Vienna, 14, 151,449,588
88, 97, 99-101, 597 Vinnitsa, 145-146, 152
Index 691
Vinogradov, N. N., 649 Warhead sections

Vitim, 598 15B86,217
Vladimir, 146, 152, 258 15F143, 217, 227
Vladivostok, 13-14, 258-259, 290 15F161,214
Vladivostok agreement, 13 15F173,220
Vlasikha, 176 15F175,220
Vlasko-Vlasov, K. A., 429 15F678, 217
VNII IT. See Scientific Research Institute of 8F675, 199
Impulse Technologies White Sea, 237-238, 242, 256, 310, 312,
VNIIA. See Scientific Research Institute of 327, 329-330
Automatics Witte Island, 258
VNIIEF. See Scientific Research Institute of
Experimental Physics Yagelnaya, 253, 257, 289, 293, 304
VNIINM. See Scientific Research Institute Yagelnaya Bay, 256-257, 301-302, 304,
of Inorganic Materials 309
VNIITF. See Scientific Research Institute of Yagelnyi Island, 257
Technical Physics Yakovlev, A. S., 346, 389
VNIPIET. See Research and Project Design Yakovlev, V. N., 611
Institute of Energy Technologies Yakutia, 476, 478
VNIPIpromtekhnologii. See Scientific Yamantau MOlUltain, 64, 593
Research and Design Institute of Yangel Design Bureau. See Yuzhnoye
Industrial Technology Design Bureau
Volgograd, 210, 230 Yangel, M. K., 125, 130, 160-162, 183,
Volna Central Design Bureau (Central 187,266, 315,433, 610
Design Bureau No. 16, TsKB-16), 236, Yarygin, V. S., 650
262,268,283,287, 315, 617, 621, Yasnaya, 152
627. See also Malakhit Naval Machine- Yazov, D. T., 590
Building Bureau Yedrovo, 612
Voronezh, 165, 356 Yefremov, G. A., 163
Voronezh Mechanical Plant, 166 Yekaterinburg (Sverdlovsk), 107, 167, 269
Voronezh plant. See Aviation Plant 64 Yeltsin, B. N., 590
Voronin, S. N., 104 Yenakiyevo, 480
Vostok Shipbuilding Plant, 259 Yenisey Chemical Combine, 167
Votkinsk, 164 Yeniseysk, 424-425, 598
Votkinsk Mechanical Plant, 162, 164, Yen'ko, A. v., 649
210 Yevgrafov, Ya. Ye., 627
Vozdvizhenka, 355 Yokanga River, 258
VPK. See Military- Industrial Commission Yokanga. See Gremikha
Vympel Central Scientific Production Yosbkar-Ola, 151-152,206,233
Association (OKB-30, Scientific Yumashev, I. S., 619
Research Institute of Radio Instrument YLmkom mine, 480
Building, NIIRP), 413, 415, 640 Yurya, 151
Vympel Design Bureau. See Vympel Central Yuzhmash. See Yuzhnyy Machine-Building
Scientific Production Association Plant Production Association
Vypolzovo, 151-152 Yuzhnoye Design Bureau (OKB-586, Yangel
Vyuzhnyy. See Snezhnogorsk Design Bureau), 6, 125, 127, 130, 133,
692 Index
Yuzhnoye Design Bureau (cont.)

160-162, 183, 187-187, 189, 195-196,
199,206,209,212,214-215,217,227,
234, 609
antisatellite systems, 433
sea-lallllched missile development, 266,
315
space lalUlchers, 162
Yuzhnyy Machine-Building Plant
Production Association (Plant 586,
Yuzhmash), 160-162
Zagorsk. See Sergiyev Posad

Zakharenkov, A. A., 471
Zaozernyy. See Zapadnaya Litsa
Zaozersk. See Zapadnaya Litsa
Zapadnaya Litsa, 257, 293, 306, 620
Zapadnaya Litsa Inlet, 256-257
Zarechny. See Penza-19
ZATO. See Closed cities
Zauralsk, 598
Zavenyagin, A. P., 596
Zavety Ilyicha, 258
Zaykov, L. I., 591
Zbritskii, Yeo P., 650
Zeldovich, Ya. B., 68, 73, 595
Zelenogorsk. See Electrochemical Combine
Zernov, P. M., 71, 461
Zevs VLF station, 279
Zhangistobe, 146, 151
Zhdanov, K. N., 381
Zheleznogorsk. See Mining and Shemical
Combine
Zhukov, G. K., 590
Zhukovskiy, 356, 366, 385
Zircoruwn, 85-86, 88
Zlatoust, 160, 266-267, 312
Zlatoust-36, 76-77, 107, 109, 114
Zubets, P. E, 386
Zuevsky, V. A., 105
Zverev Krasnogorsk Plant, 435
Zvezda plant, 259, 272
Zvezdochka Scientific Production
Association, 258, 271-272
The Center for Arms Control, Energy and
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The Center for Anns Control, Energy and Environmental Studies is an independent,
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itary policy, which focuses on technical problems related to political decisions in
these areas. In its research the center benefits from the ties it has with the Moscow
Institute of Physics and Technology-one of the leading Russian technical universi-
ties. In addition to its arms control research, the center has a graduate-level educa-
tion program in energy policy for MIPT students. The center is commited to
conducting open research that aims at providing a foundation for an informed dis-
cussion of issues of international security.
The MIT Security Studies Program (SSP) is a graduate-level research and education
program based at the Center for International Studies at the Massachusetts Insti-
tute of Technology. The program's primary task is educating the next generation of
scholars and practitioners in international security policy making. Its teaching ties
are mainly, but not exclusively, with the Political Science Department at MIT.
However, the SSP faculty includes natural scientists and engineers as well as social
scientists, and the program is distinguished by its ability to integrate technical and
political analyses in studies of international security issues. The SSP faculty, several
of whom have had extensive government experience, frequently advise or comment
on current policy problems. SSP supports the research work of graduate students,
faculty and fellows, and sponsors seminars, conferences, and publications to bring
its teaching and research results to the attention of wider audiences.

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RUSSIAN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES

EDITED BY PAVEl PODVIG I FOREWORD BY FRANK VON HIPPEL

Oleg Bukharin, Timur Kadyshev, Eugene Miasnikov, Pavel Podvig,

Edited by Pavel Podvig

The MIT Press

Printed and bOlllld in the United States of America.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

UA776.R37 R87 2001

List of Major Weapons Systems IX

1 Soviet and Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces 1

Production of Fissile Materials for Weapons 88

4 The Strategic Rocket Forces 117

Strategic Aviation Operations 363

Land-Based Missile Systems

Sea-Launched Ballistic Missiles

I first traveled to Moscow in 1983 to brainstorm with a group of senior Russian

Boris Zhelezov graduated from the Moscow Institute of Communications in

Making the First Nuclear Weapons

monuclear device, designated RDS-37, were tested in October-November 1955. The

The First Strategic Weapons

Achieving Quantitative Parity

The Soviet leadership traditionally paid serious attention to achieving a strategic

The SALT I and ABM Treaties

Strategic Modernization in the 1970s

The SALT II Treaty

The Modernization Program at the End of the 1970s

Union intensified their strategic modernization. In 1981 the Reagan administration

The START I Treaty

The Breakup of the Soviet Union

established on 8 December 1991. On 25 December 1991, the president of the Soviet

The START II Treaty

number of declared warheads. In particular, START II has no requirement that in

The Current State and Future of Russian Strategic Forces

railroad-based RT-23IRT-23UTIH (SS-24) missile systems. Russia could retain 105

The Structure of the Armed Forces

The Supreme High Command

The Armed Forces

capable of carrying out strategic missions in a theater of war or theater of military

The Decision-Making Mechanism

organs. The fundamental features of the mechanism securing interaction by all of

chairman of the Military-Industrial Commission, and the chairman of the State

The Defense Industry

Heavy and Transport Machine Building, the Ministry of Electrical Equipment

Weapons Development and Production

constant underfinancing of the Ministry of Defense. Under these conditions, the

Operations of Strategic Forces

command structure and strategic delivery vehicles could be viewed as evidence of

The ability to deliver a counterstrike, therefore, cannot be considered certain even

of urban structures the required overpressure is approximately 0.3 atmospheres,

Use of Strategic Nuclear Forces

commander would issue a so-called preliminary command, which is necessary for

decision-making mechanism that was a distinctive feature of the command and

The History of Nuclear Weapons Development

Early Developments in Nuclear Physics

The Beginning of the Nuclear Program

The Beginning of the Nuclear Weapons Program

The First Soviet Nuclear Explosion

Advances in Nuclear Warhead Development

The Development of Thermonuclear Weapons