BORJA ESTATE vs.

SPOUSES ROTILLO BALLAD and ROSITA

BALLAD
FACTS: The Ballad spouses had been employed as overseers of the
Borja Estate by its owners, the spouses Manuel Borja and Paula
Borja, since 1972. As overseers, the Ballad spouses’ duties included
the collection of owner’s share of the harvest from the tenants,
collected monthly rentals from the lessees of the apartment,
oversee the lands and buildings entrusted to them and were
instructed to report any untoward incident or incidents affecting
said properties to the administrator. They were allegedly required
to work all day and night each week including Saturdays, Sundays
and holidays, but they are being compensated reasonably, until
Manuel Borja died, and when they were dismissed by Francisco
Borja, the brother of the deceased. Francisco Borja stopped giving
the Ballad spouses their allowances. For twenty-seven (27) years
that the Ballad spouses were in the employ of the Borjas they were
purportedly not paid holiday pay, overtime pay, incentive leave pay,
premiums and rest day pay, 13th month pay, aside from the
underpayment of their basic salary. Ballad spouses alleged that
Francisco Borja unceremoniously dismissed them and caused this
dismissal to be broadcasted over the radio, which caused the
former to suffer shock and physical and mental injuries such as
social humiliation, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral
anxiety, health deterioration and sleepless nights. Thus, the filing of
a case against petitioners before the Labor Arbiter which ruled that
the Ballad spouses had been illegally dismissed, after concluding
that they had been employees of the Borjas. Borjas filed before the
NLRC a Motion for Reduction of Bond. NLRC dismissed the
petitioners’ Motion for Reduction of Bond. Petitioners’ appeal was
likewise dismissed in the same Resolution for failure to post a cash
or surety bond within the reglamentary period.
ISSUE: WON an appeal bond is indispensable for perfecting an
appeal
RULING: The appeal bond is required under Article 223 of the Labor
Code which provides: ART. 223. Appeal. – Decisions, awards or
orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed
to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar
days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders. . . . In case of
a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer
may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond
issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the
Commission, in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in
the judgment appealed from. Thus, it is clear from the foregoing
that the appeal from any decision, award or order of the Labor
Arbiter to the NLRC shall be made within ten (10) calendar days
from receipt of such decision, award or order, and must be under
oath, with proof of payment of the required appeal fee
accompanied by a memorandum of appeal. In case the decision of
the Labor Arbiter involves a monetary award, the appeal is deemed
perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond also within
ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decision in an amount
equivalent to the monetary award. Evidently, the posting of a cash
or surety bond is mandatory
G.R. Nos. 178034 & 178117/G.R. Nos. 186984-85 : OCTOBER 17,
2013
ANDREW JAMES MCBURNIE, Petitioner, v. EULALIO GANZON, EGI-
MANAGERS, INC. and E. GANZON, INC., Respondents.
REYES, J.:
DOCTRINE: Before a case for illegal dismissal can prosper, an
employer-employee relationship must first be established.
Considering that McBurnie, an Australian, alleged illegal dismissal
and sought to claim under our labor laws, it was necessary for him
to establish, first and foremost, that he was qualified and duly
authorized to obtain employment within our jurisdiction. A
requirement for foreigners who intend to work within the country is
an employment permit.
FACTS:
On October 4, 2002, Andrew James McBurnie (McBurnie), an
Australian national, instituted a complaint for illegal dismissal and
other monetary claims against Eulalio Ganzon, EGI-Managers, Inc.,
and E. Ganzon, Inc., (respondents). McBurnie claimed that on May
11, 1999, he signed a 5-year employment agreement with the
company EGI as an Executive Vice-President who shall oversee the
management of the company hotels and resorts within the
Philippines. He performed work for the company until sometime in
November 1999, when he figured in an accident that compelled him
to go back to Australia while recuperating from his injuries. While in
Australia, he was informed by respondent Ganzon that his services
were no longer needed because their intended project would no
longer push through.
The respondents contend that their agreement with McBurnie was
to jointly invest in and establish a company for the management of
the hotels. They did not intend to create an employer-employee
relationship, and the execution of the employment contract that
was being invoked by McBurnie was solely for the purpose of
allowing McBurnie to obtain an alien work permit in the Philippines,
and that McBurnie had not obtained a work permit.
On September 30, 2004, the Labor Arbiter (LA) declared McBurnie
as having been illegally dismissed from employment. The
respondents filed their Memorandum of Appeal and Motion to
Reduce Bond, and posted an appeal bond in the amount of
P100,000.00. They claimed that an award of more than P60 Million
Pesos to a single foreigner who had no work permit and who left the
country for good one month after the purported commencement of
his employment was a patent nullity.
On March 31, 2005, the NLRC denied the motion to reduce bond
explaining that in cases involving monetary award, an employer
seeking to appeal the LA decision to the Commission is
unconditionally required by Art. 223, Labor Code to post bond
equivalent to the monetary award.
The motion for reconsideration was denied, the respondents
appealed to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (with
extremely urgent prayer for the issuance of a Preliminary Injunction
and/or Temporary Restraining Order) docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
90845.
The NLRC dismissed their appeal due to respondent's failure to post
the required additional bond. The respondents motion for
reconsideration was denied on June 30, 2006. This prompted
respondents to filed with the CA the Petition for Certiorari docketed
as CA-G.R SP No. 95916, which was later consolidated with CA-G.R.
SP No. 90845
The CA granted the respondent's application for a writ of
preliminary injunction on February 16, 2007. It directed the NLRC,
McBurnie, and all persons acting for and under their authority to
refrain from causing the execution and enforcement of the LA
decision in favor of McBurnie, conditioned upon the respondents
posting of a bond in the amount of P10,000,000.00. The
reconsideration of issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction
sought by McBurnie was denied by the CA.
McBurnie filed with the Supreme Court a Petition for Review on
Certiorari (G.R. Nos. 178034 and 178117) assailing the CA
resolutions that granted the respondent's; application for the
injunctive writ. On July 4, 2007, the Court denied the petition. A
motion for reconsideration was denied with a finality on October 7,
2007.
McBurnie filed a Motion for Leave (1) To File Supplemental Motion
for Reconsideration and (2) to Admit the Attached Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration, a prohibited pleading under Section 2,
Rule 56 of the Rules of Court. Thus, the motion for leave was denied employer-employee relationship. The absence of the employment
by the Court and the July 4, 2007 became final and executor on permit instead bolsters the claim that the supposed employment of
November 13, 2007. McBurnie was merely simulated, or did not ensue due to the non-
fulfillment of the conditions that were set forth in the letter of May
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT the case for illegal dismissal should
11, 1999. Third, besides the employment agreement, McBurnie
prosper.
failed to present other competent evidence to prove his claim of an
RULING: NO. Considering that McBurnie, an Australian, alleged employer-employee relationship. McBurnie failed in this regard. As
illegal dismissal and sought to claim under our labor laws, it was previously observed by the NLRC, McBurnie even failed to show
necessary for him to establish, first and foremost, that he was through any document such as payslips or vouchers that his salaries
qualified and duly authorized to obtain employment within our during the time that he allegedly worked for the respondents were
jurisdiction. A requirement for foreigners who intend to work within paid by the company. In the absence of an employeremployee
the country is an employment permit, as provided under Article 40, relationship between McBurnie and the respondents, McBurnie
Title II of the Labor Code which reads: Art. 40. Employment permit could not successfully claim that he was dismissed, much less
for non-resident aliens.· Any alien seeking admission to the illegally dismissed, by the latter. Even granting that there was such
Philippines for employment purposes and any domestic or foreign an employeremployee relationship, the records are barren of any
employer who desires to engage an alien for employment in the document showing that its termination was by the respondents
Philippines shall obtain an employment permit from the dismissal of McBurnie. Hence, the Motion for Reconsideration filed
Department of Labor. Clearly, this circumstance on the failure of by McBurnie is DENIED; the previous resolution of the Court is
McBurnie to obtain an employment permit, by itself, necessitates LIFTED.
the dismissal of his labor complaint. First, before a case for illegal
dismissal can prosper, an employer-employee relationship must first
be established. Although an employment agreement forms part of
the case records, respondent Ganzon signed it with the notation per
my note. The respondents have sufficiently explained that the note
refers to the letter which embodied conditions that the project
financing for the hotel project in Baguio City must be successful and
McBurnie’s acquisition of an Alien Employment Permit, for the
employment’s effectivity. These conditions failed to materialize.
Second, McBurnie failed to present any employment permit which
would have authorized him to obtain employment in the
Philippines. This circumstance negates McBurnie’s claim that he had
been performing work for the respondents by virtue of an
Roche Philippines v Nlrc
SALINAS V NLRC (ATLANTIC GULF AND PACIFIC CO)
319 SCRA 54 November 24, 1999

FACTS: Petitioners were employed with Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. (AG &
P) Salinas was a carpenter from 1983-1988, Alejandro a bulk cement
operator and crane driver from 1982-1989 as bulk cement operator, Cortez
a carpenter and forklift operator from 1979-1988, and Samulde a lubeman
and stationary operator from 1982-1989.

They five petitioners filed separate complaints for illegal dismissal and
consolidated by labor arbiter. They claimed that they had been covered by
a number of contracts renewed continuously, with periods ranging from
five (5) to nine (9) years, and they performed the same kind of work
throughout their employment, and such was usually necessary and
desirable in the trade or business of the respondent corporation; and their
work did not end on a project-to-project basis, although the contrary was
made to appear by the employer through the signing of separate
employment contracts.

The labor arbiter dismissed petitions on the ground that the petitioners are
project employees whose work contracts with AG & P indicate that they
were employed in such category; that they have been assigned to different
work projects, not just to one and that their work relation with AG & P,
relative to termination, is governed by Policy Instruction No. 20 (rule
governing project employees). On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the labor
arbiters findings.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners are merely project employees

HELD: No, the petitioners are regular employees. The mandate in Article
281 of the Labor Code, which pertinently prescribes that the 'provisions of
written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the
oral agreements of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be
regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which
are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the
employer' and that ‘any employee who has rendered at least one year of
service, whether such service is continuous or broken shall be considered a
regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and
his employment shall continue while such actually exists,' should apply in
the case of petitioner.
It is basic and irrefragable rule that in carrying out and interpreting the
provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing regulations, the
workingman's welfare should be the primordial and paramount
consideration. The interpretation herein made gives meaning and
substance to the liberal and compassionate spirit of the law enunciated
in Article 4 of Labor Code that "all doubts in the implementation and
interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code including its
implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor" .
It is beyond cavil that petitioners had been providing the respondent
corporation with continuous and uninterrupted services, except for a day
or so gap in their successive employment contracts. Their contracts had
been renewed several times, with the total length of their services ranging
from five (5) to nine (9) years. Throughout the duration of their contracts,
they had been performing the same kinds of work (e.g., as lubeman, bulk
cement operator and carpenter), which were usually necessary and
desirable in the construction business of AG & P, its usual trade or
business.
Undoubtedly, periods in the present case have been imposed to preclude
the acquisition of tenurial security by petitioners, and must be struck down
for being contrary to public policy, morals, good customs or public order.
The questioned Resolution of the NLRC is SET ASIDE and another one is
hereby ENTERED ordering the respondent corporation to reinstate
petitioners without loss of seniority and with full back wages.
SESSION DELIGHTS V. CA (G.R. NO. 172149; FEBRUARY 8, 2010)
CASE DIGEST: SESSION DELIGHTS ICE CREAM AND FAST FOODS,
Petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS (Sixth Division), HON.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (Second Division) and
ADONIS ARMENIO M. FLORA, Respondents.
FACTS: The private respondent filed against the petitioner a
complaint for illegal dismissal, entitled Adonis Armenio M. Flora,
Complainant versus Session Delights Ice Cream & Fast Foods, et. al,
Private respondents.
The labor arbiter decided the complaint on February 8, 2001, finding
that the petitioner illegally dismissed the private respondent. The
decision awarded the private respondent backwages, separation
pay in lieu of reinstatement, indemnity, and attorneys fees, under a
computation that the decision itself outlined in its dispositive
portion.
On the petitioners appeal, the NLRC affirmed the labor arbiters
decision.
On July 4, 2003, the CA dismissed the petition and affirmed with
modification the NLRC decision by deleting the awards for a
proportionate 13th month pay and for indemnity.
The petitioner timely filed a motion for reconsideration which the
CA denied in its resolution of March 30, 2006, now similarly assailed
before us.
In January 2004, and in the course of the execution of the above
final judgment pursuant to Section 3,Rule VIII of the then NLRC
ISSUE: [1] Was the computation of the awards proper? [2] Did it
Rules of Procedure, the Finance Analyst of the Labor Arbiters Office
violate the principle of immutability of final judgments?
held a pre-execution conference with the contending parties in
attendance. The Finance Analyst submitted an updated computation
HELD: We state at the outset that, as a rule, we frown upon any
of the monetary awards due the private respondent in the total
delay in the execution of final and executory decisions, as the
amount of P235,986.00. This updated computation included
immediate enforcement of the parties rights, confirmed by a final
additional backwages and separation pay due the private
decision, is a major component of the ideal administration of
respondent computed from March 1, 2001 to September 17, 2003.
justice. We admit, however, that circumstances may transpire
The computation also included the proportionate amount of the
rendering delay unavoidable. One such occasion is when the
private respondents 13th month pay. On March 25, 2004, the labor
execution of the final judgment is not in accord with what the final
arbiter approved the updated computation.
judgment decrees in its dispositive portion. Just as the execution of
a final judgment is a matter of right for the winning litigant who
should not be denied the fruits of his or her victory, the right of the
The petitioner objected to the re-computation and appealed the losing party to give, perform, pay, and deliver only what has been
labor arbiters order to the NLRC. The NLRC disagreed with the decreed in the final judgment should also be respected.
petitioner and affirmed the labor arbiters decision in a resolution
dated October 25, 2004. The NLRC also denied the petitioner's That a judgment should be implemented according to the terms of
motion for reconsideration in its resolution dated January 31, 2005. its dispositive portion is a long and well-established rule. Otherwise
stated, it is the dispositive portion that categorically states the rights
The petitioner sought recourse with the CA through a petition for and obligations of the parties to the dispute as against each other.
certiorari on the ground that the NLRC acted with grave abuse of Thus, it is the dispositive portion which the entities charged with the
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The CA execution of a final judgment that must be enforced to ensure the
partially granted the petition in its decision of December 19, 2005 validity of the execution.
(now challenged before us) by deleting the awarded proportionate
13th month pay.
A companion to the above rule on the execution of a final judgment
is the principle of its immutability. Save for recognized exceptions, a
final judgment may no longer be altered, amended or modified,
even if the alteration, amendment or modification is meant to
correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or
law and regardless of what court, be it the highest Court of the land,
renders it. Any attempt on the part of the responsible entities
charged with the execution of a final judgment to insert, change or
add matters not clearly contemplated in the dispositive portion
violates the rule on immutability of judgments.
In the present case, with the CAs deletion of the proportionate 13th
month pay and indemnity awards in the labor arbiter's February 8,
2001 decision, only the awards of backwages, separation pay, and
attorney's fees remain. These are the awards subject to execution.
A distinct feature of the judgment under execution is that the
February 8, 2001 labor arbiter decision already provided for the
computation of the payable separation pay and backwages due, and
did not literally order the computation of the monetary awards up
to the time of the finality of the judgment. The private respondent,
too, did not contest the decision through an appeal. The petitioners
argument to confine the awards to what the labor arbiter stated in
the dispositive part of his decision is largely based on these
established features of the judgment.
We reject the petitioners view as a narrow and misplaced
interpretation of an illegal dismissal decision, particularly of the
terms of the labor arbiters decision.
While the private respondent failed to appeal the February 8, 2001
decision of the labor arbiter, the failure, at the most, had the effect
of making the awards granted to him final so that he could no
longer seek any other affirmative relief, or pray for any award
additional to what the labor arbiter had given. Other than these, the
illegal dismissal case remained open for adjudication based on the
appeal made for the higher tribunals consideration. In other words,
the higher tribunals, on appropriate recourses made, may reverse
the judgment and declare that no illegal dismissal took place, or
affirm the illegal dismissal already decreed with or without
modifying the monetary consequences flowing from the dismissal.
We see no error in the CA decision confirming that a re-
computation is necessary as it essentially considered the labor
arbiters original decision in accordance with its basic component
parts as we discussed above. To reiterate, the first part contains the
finding of illegality and its monetary consequences; the second part
is the computation of the awards or monetary consequences of the
illegal dismissal, computed as of the time of the labor arbiters
original decision.
To illustrate these points, had the case involved a pure money claim
for a specific sum (e.g. salary for a specific period) or a specific
benefit (e.g. 13th month pay for a specific year) made by a former
employee, the labor arbiters computation would admittedly have
continuing currency because the sum is specific and any variation
may only be on the interests that may run from the finality of the
decision ordering the payment of the specific sum.
In contrast with a ruling on a specific pure money claim, is a claim
that relates to status (as in this case, where the claim is the legality
of the termination of the employment relationship). In this type of
cases, the decision or ruling is essentially declaratory of the status
and of the rights, obligations and monetary consequences that flow
from the declared status (in this case, the payment of separation
pay and backwages and attorneys fees when illegal dismissal is
found). When this type of decision is executed, what is primarily
implemented is the declaratory finding on the status and the rights
and obligations of the parties therein; the arising monetary
consequences from the declaration only follow as component of the
parties rights and obligations.
In the present case, the CA confirmed that indeed an illegal
dismissal had taken place, so that separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement and backwages should be paid. How much that
separation pay would be, would ideally be stated in the final CA
decision; if not, the matter is for handling and computation by the
labor arbiter of origin as the labor official charged with the
implementation of decisions before the NLRC.
As the CA correctly pointed out, the basis for the computation of
separation pay and backwages is Article 279 of the Labor Code, as
amended, which reads:
x x x An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be
entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to
his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the
time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his
actual reinstatement.
By jurisprudence derived from this provision, separation pay may be
awarded to an illegally dismissed employee in lieu of reinstatement.
Recourse to the payment of separation pay is made when continued
employment is no longer possible, in cases where the dismissed
employees position is no longer available, or the continued
relationship between the employer and the employee is no longer
viable due to the strained relations between them, or when the
dismissed employee opted not to be reinstated, or payment of
separation benefits will be for the best interest of the parties
involved.
This reading of Article 279, of course, does not appear to be
disputed in the present case as the petitioner admits that
separation pay in lieu of reinstatement shall be paid, computed up
to the finality of the judgment finding that illegal dismissal had
taken place. What the petitioner simply disputes is the re-
computation of the award when the final CA decision did not order
any re-computation while the NLRC decision that the CA affirmed
and the labor arbiter's decision the NLRC in turn affirmed, already
made a computation that on the basis of immutability of judgment
and the rule on execution of the dispositive portion of the decision
should not now be disturbed.
Consistent with what we discussed above, we hold that under the
terms of the decision under execution, no essential change is made
by a re-computation as this step is a necessary consequence that
flows from the nature of the illegality of dismissal declared in that
decision. A re-computation (or an original computation, if no
previous computation has been made) is a part of the law
specifically, Article 279 of the Labor Code and the established
jurisprudence on this provision that is read into the decision. By the
nature of an illegal dismissal case, the reliefs continue to add on
until full satisfaction, as expressed under Article 279 of the Labor payment of the legal interest of 12% from the finality of the
Code. The re-computation of the consequences of illegal dismissal judgment, in accordance with our ruling in Eastern Shipping Lines,
upon execution of the decision does not constitute an alteration or Inc. v. Court of Appeals. DENIED.
amendment of the final decision being implemented. The illegal
dismissal ruling stands; only the computation of monetary
consequences of this dismissal is affected and this is not a violation
of the principle of immutability of final judgments.

We fully appreciate the petitioners efforts in trying to clarify how

the standing jurisprudence on the payment of separation pay in lieu
of reinstatement and the accompanying payment of backwages
ought to be read and reconciled. Its attempt, however, is out of
place and, rather than clarify, may only confuse the implementation
of Article 279; the core issue in this case is not the payment of
separation pay and backwages but their re-computation in light of
an original labor arbiter ruling that already contained a dated
computation of the monetary consequences of illegal dismissal.

That the amount the petitioner shall now pay has greatly increased
is a consequence that it cannot avoid as it is the risk that it ran when
it continued to seek recourses against the labor arbiters decision.
Article 279 provides for the consequences of illegal dismissal in no
uncertain terms, qualified only by jurisprudence in its interpretation
of when separation pay in lieu of reinstatement is allowed. When
that happens, the finality of the illegal dismissal decision becomes
the reckoning point instead of the reinstatement that the law
decrees. In allowing separation pay, the final decision effectively
declares that the employment relationship ended so that separation
pay and backwages are to be computed up to that point. The
decision also becomes a judgment for money from which another
consequence flows the payment of interest in case of delay. This
was what the CA correctly decreed when it provided for the