AKBAYAN-YOUTH vs.

COMELEC (2001)
impossibilium nulla obligatio est
There is no obligation to do impossible things
FACTS:
On January 25, 2001, AKBAYAN-Youth, together with other youth movements sought the extension of the
registration of voters for the May 2001 elections. The voters registration has already ended on December 27,
2000. AKBAYAN-Youth asks that persons aged 18-21 be allowed a special 2-day registration. The Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) denied the petition. AKBAYAN-Youth then sued COMELEC for alleged grave abuse of
discretion for denying the petition. AKBAYAN-Youth alleged that there are about 4 million youth who were not
able to register and are now disenfranchised. COMELEC invoked Section 8 of Republic Act 8189 which provides
that no registration shall be conducted 120 days before the regular election. AKBAYAN-Youth however counters
that under Section 28 of Republic Act 8436, the COMELEC in the exercise of its residual and stand-by powers,
can reset the periods of preelection acts including voters registration if the original period is not observed.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the COMELEC exercised grave abuse of discretion when it denied the extension of the voters
registration.
2. Whether or not the Supreme Court can compel respondent COMELEC, through the extraordinary writ of
mandamus, to conduct a special registration of new voters during the period between the COMELEC’s
imposed 27 December 2000 deadline and the 14 May 2001 general elections.
RULING:
1. No. The COMELEC was well within its right to do so pursuant to the clear provisions of Section 8, RA 8189
which provides that no voters registration shall be conducted within 120 days before the regular election.
The right of suffrage is not absolute. It is regulated by measures like voters registration which is not a mere
statutory requirement.

Beyond this, it is likewise well-settled that the law does not require that the impossible be done. The law
obliges no one to perform an impossibility, expressed in the maxim, nemo tenetur ad impossible.
In other words, there is no obligation to do an impossible thing. Impossibilium nulla obligatio est.
Hence, a statute may not be so construed as to require compliance with what it prescribes cannot, at the
time, be legally, coincidentally, it must be presumed that the legislature did not at all intend an
interpretation or application of a law which is far removed from the realm of the possible.

The State, in the exercise of its inherent police power, may then enact laws to safeguard and regulate the
act of voter’s registration for the ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly and peaceful election, to
the incidental yet generally important end, that even pre-election activities could be performed by the duly
constituted authorities in a realistic and orderly manner – one which is not indifferent and so far removed
from the pressing order of the day and the prevalent circumstances of the times. RA 8189 prevails over RA
8436 in that RA 8189’s provision is explicit as to the prohibition.

Suffice it to say that it is a pre-election act that cannot be reset.

Further, even if what is asked is a mere two-day special registration, COMELEC has shown in its pleadings
that if it is allowed, it will substantially create a setback in the other pre-election matters because the
additional voters from the special two day registration will have to be screened, entered into the book of
voters, have to be inspected again, verified, sealed, then entered into the computerized voter’s list; and then
 they will have to reprint the voters information sheet for the update and distribute it – by that time, the
May 14, 2001 elections would have been overshot because of the lengthy processes after the special
registration. In short, it will cost more inconvenience than good. Further still, the allegation that youth voters
are disenfranchised is not sufficient. Nowhere in AKBAYANYouth’s pleading was attached any actual
complaint from an individual youth voter about any inconvenience arising from the fact that the voters
registration has ended on December 27, 2001.

Also, AKBAYAN-Youth et al admitted in their pleading that they are asking an extension because they failed
to register on time for some reasons, which is not appealing to the court. The law aids the vigilant and not
those who slumber on their rights.

2. The Supreme Court cannot control the exercise of discretion of a public officer where the law imposes upon
him the duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any manner in which he is required to act, because it
is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court. The remedy of mandamus lies only to compel
an officer to perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one.
IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY
MONTEJO, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
QUALIFICATIONS of the Members of the House of Representatives Art. VI, Sec 6. For purposes of the Election
law, “residence” is the same as “domicile”. Successfully changing residence requires an actual and deliberate
abandonment of the old one.
Facts:
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the
First District of Leyte in 1995, providing that her residence in the place was seven (7) months.
On March 23, 1995, Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and also a
candidate for the same position filed a petition for cancellation and disqualification with the COMELEC charging
Marcos as she did not comply with the constitutional requirement for residency as she lacked the Constitution’s
one-year residency requirement for candidates for the House of Representative.

In her Amended Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, the petitioner changed seven months to since childhood
under residency. Thus, the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.
On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner’s proclamation showing that she
obtained the highest number of votes in the congressional elections in the First District of Leyte. The COMELEC
reversed itself and issued a second Resolution directing that the proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the
event that she obtains the highest number of votes.
In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, Marcos claimed that she was the overwhelming winner of the
elections based on the canvass completed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers.
Issue:
Whether or not Imelda Marcos was a resident of the First District of Leyte to satisfy the one year residency
requirement to be eligible in running as representative.
Held:
Yes. The court is in favor of a conclusion supporting petitioner’s claim of legal residence or domicile in the First
District of Leyte.
Residence is synonymous with domicile which reveals a tendency or mistake the concept of domicile for actual
residence, a conception not intended for the purpose of determining a candidate’s qualifications for the election
to the House of Representatives as required by the 1987 Constitution.
An individual does not lose her domicile even if she has lived and maintained residences in different places. In
the case at bench, the evidence adduced by Motejo lacks the degree of persuasiveness as required to convince
the court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed incurred. It cannot
be correctly argued that Marcos lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the
late President Ferdinand E. Marcos.
It can be concluded that the facts supporting its proposition that petitioner was ineligible to run for the position
of Representative of the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC was obviously referring to petitioner’s various
places of (actual) residence, not her domicile.
Having determined that Marcos possessed the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House
of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC’s questioned resolutions dated April 24, May 7,
May11, and May 25 are set aside. Provincial Board of Canvassers is directed to proclaim Marcos as the duly
elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.
* To successfully effect a change in domicile, one must demonstrate: (1) actual removal or an actual change of
domicile, (2) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and
(3) acts which correspond with the purpose (Marcos v. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 331)
JAPSON VS. COMELEC
Facts:
Ø Both petitioner Manuel B. Japzon (Japzon) and private respondent Jaime S. Ty (Ty) were candidates for the
Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, in the local elections held on 14 May
2007.
Ø Japzon instituted SPA No. 07-568 by filing before the COMELEC a Petition [5] to disqualify and/or cancel Ty's
Certificate of Candidacy on the ground of material misrepresentation. Japzon averred in his Petition that Ty was
a former natural-born Filipino, having been born on 9 October 1943 in what was then Pambujan Sur, Hernani
Eastern Samar (now the Municipality of General Macarthur, Easter Samar) to spouses Ang Chim Ty (a Chinese)
and Crisanta Aranas Sumiguin (a Filipino).
Ø Ty eventually migrated to the United States of America (USA) and became a citizen thereof. Ty had been
residing in the USA for the last 25 years. When Ty filed his Certificate of Candidacy on 28 March 2007, he falsely
represented therein that he was a resident of Barangay6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for one
year before 14 May 2007, and was not a permanent resident or immigrant of any foreign country.
Ø While Ty may have applied for the reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship, he never actually resided
in Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for a period of one year immediately preceding
the date of election as required under Section 39 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991
Ø Inspite of having reacquisition in his Philippine citizenship, Ty continued to make trips to the USA, the most
recent of which was on 31 October 2006 lasting until 20 January 2007.
Ø Ty already took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, he continued to comport himself as
an American citizen as proven by his travel records. He had also failed to renounce his foreign citizenship as
required by Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003,
or related laws.
Ø Japzon prayed for in his Petition that the COMELEC order the disqualification of Ty from running for public
office and the cancellation of the latter's Certificate of Candidacy.
Ø Ty admitted that he was a natural-born Filipino who went to the USA to work and subsequently became a
naturalized American citizen. Ty claimed, however, that prior to filing his Certificate of Candidacy for the Office
of Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 28 March 2007, he already performed
the following acts: (1) with the enactment of Republic Act No. 9225, granting dual citizenship to natural-born
Filipinos, Ty filed with the Philippine Consulate General in Los Angeles, California, USA, an application for the
reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship; (2) on 2 October 2005, Ty executed an Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines before Noemi T. Diaz, Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate General in Los Angeles,
California, USA; (3) Ty applied for a Philippine passport indicating in his application that his residence in the
Philippines was at A. Mabini St., Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar. Ty's application was
approved and he was issued on 26 October 2005 a Philippine passport; (4) on 8 March 2006, Ty personally
secured and signed his Community Tax Certificate (CTC) from the Municipality of General Macarthur, in which
he stated that his address was at Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar; (5) thereafter, on
17 July 2006, Ty was registered as a voter in Precinct 0013A, Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar; (6) Ty secured another CTC dated 4 January 2007 again stating therein his address as Barangay 6,
Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar; and (7) finally, Ty executed on 19 March 2007 a duly notarized
Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship.
Ø He had reacquired his Philippine citizenship and renounced his American citizenship, and he had been a
resident of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for more than one year prior to the 14 May
2007 elections. Therefore, Ty sought the dismissal of Japzon's Petition in SPA No. 07-568.
Ty acquired the highest number of votes and was declared Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar, by the Municipal Board of Canvassers on 15 May 2007. [7]
Ø The COMELEC First Division found that Ty complied with the requirements of Sections 3 and 5 of Republic Act
No. 9225 and reacquired his Philippine citizenship, to wit:
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office, and the purpose of
the citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to
another nation, shall govern our people and our country or a unit of territory thereof.
Ø Evidences revealed that Ty executed an Oath of Allegiance before Noemi T. Diaz, Vice Consul of the
Philippine Consulate General, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. on October 2, 2005 and executed a Renunciation
of Foreign Citizenship on March 19, 2007 in compliance with R.A. [No.] 9225. Moreover, neither is Ty a
candidate for or occupying public office nor is in active service as commissioned or non-commissioned officer in
the armed forces in the country of which he was naturalized citizen
Ø Ty did not commit material misrepresentation in stating in his Certificate of Candidacy that he was a resident
of Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for at least one year before the elections on 14
May 2007. It reasoned that: Although Ty has lost his domicile in [the] Philippines when he was naturalized as
U.S. citizen in 1969, the reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship and subsequent acts thereof proved that he
has been a resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar for at least one (1) year before
the elections held on 14 May 2007 as he represented in his certificate of candidacy.
Ø The petition was denied and COMELEC was in favor of the defendant failing to obtain a favorable resolution
from the COMELEC, Japzon proceeded to file the instant Petition for Certiorari, that the COMELEC had
committed grave abuse of discretion and lack of discretion for dismissing the petition.
Ø Japzon prays for the Court to annul and set aside the Resolutions dated 31 July 2007 and 28 September 2007
of the COMELEC First Division and en banc, respectively; to issue a new resolution denying due course to or
canceling Ty's Certificate of Candidacy; and to declare Japzon as the duly elected Mayor of the Municipality of
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar.
Ø Ty sought the dismissal of the present Petition. According to Ty, the COMELEC already found sufficient
evidence to prove that Ty was a resident of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, one year
prior to the 14 May 2007 local elections. The Court cannot evaluate again the very same pieces of evidence
without violating the well-entrenched rule that findings of fact of the COMELEC are binding on the Court.
Ø The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), meanwhile, is of the position that Ty failed to meet the one-year
residency requirement set by law to qualify him to run as a mayoralty candidate in the 14 May 2007 local
elections.The Court finds no merit in the Petition at bar.
Ø . On 19 March 2007, he personally executed a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship before a notary public. By
the time he filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar, on 28 March 2007, he had already effectively renounced his American citizenship, keeping solely
his Philippine citizenship.
Ø The Court of Appeals set aside the appealed orders of the COMELEC and the Court of Appeals and annulled
the election of the respondent as Municipal Mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan on the ground that respondent's
immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the
Philippines. Being a green card holder, which was proof that he was a permanent resident or immigrant of the
United States, and in the absence of any waiver of his status as such before he ran for election on January 18,
1988, respondent was held to be disqualified under §68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881).
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defedant has complied with the residency requirement for elective positions.
RULING:
Yes, the defendant solely complied the residency requirements for elective position.

Ø It bears to point out that Republic Act No. 9225 governs the manner in which a natural-born Filipino may
reacquire or retain[17] his Philippine citizenship despite acquiring a foreign citizenship, and provides for his rights
and liabilities under such circumstances. A close scrutiny of said statute would reveal that it does not at all touch
on the matter of residence of the natural-born Filipino taking advantage of its provisions. Republic Act No. 9225
imposes no residency requirement for the reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship; nor does it
mention any effect of such reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship on the current residence of the
concerned natural-born Filipino. Clearly, Republic Act No. 9225 treats citizenship independently of residence.
This is only logical and consistent with the general intent of the law to allow for dual citizenship.
Ø There is no basis for this Court to require Ty to stay in and never leave at all the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for the full one-year period prior to the 14 May 2007 local elections so that he could
be considered a resident thereof. To the contrary, the Court has previously ruled that absence from residence
to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected,
does not constitute loss of residence.[24] The Court also notes, that even with his trips to other countries, Ty was
actually present in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, for at least nine of the 12
months preceding the 14 May 2007 local elections. Even if length of actual stay in a place is not necessarily
determinative of the fact of residence therein, it does strongly support and is only consistent with Ty's avowed
intent in the instant case to establish residence/domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar.
Ø Japzon repeatedly brings to the attention of this Court that Ty arrived in the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 4 May 2006 only to comply with the one-year residency requirement, so Ty could
run as a mayoralty candidate in the 14 May 2007 elections. In Aquino v. COMELEC,[25] the Court did not find
anything wrong in an individual changing residences so he could run for an elective post, for as long as he is able
to prove with reasonable certainty that he has effected a change of residence for election law purposes for the
period required by law. As this Court already found in the present case, Ty has proven by substantial evidence
that he had established residence/domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, by 4 May
2006, a little over a year prior to the 14 May 2007 local elections, in which he ran as a candidate for the Office
of the Mayor and in which he garnered the most number of votes.
Ø To successfully challenge Ty's disqualification, Japzon must clearly demonstrate that Ty's ineligibility is so
patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving
effect to the apparent will of the people would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic
institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and promote. In this case,
Japzon failed to substantiate his claim that Ty is ineligible to be Mayor of the Municipality, the instant Petition
for Certiorari is dismiss.
Macalintal vs. COMELEC (2003)
FACTS:
Section 4 of R.A. No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act) provides that all citizens of the Philippines
abroad, who are not otherwise disqualified by law, at least eighteen (18) years of age on the day of elections,
may vote for president, vicepresident, senators and party-list representatives.
Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 disqualifies from voting an immigrant or permanent resident who is recognized as
such in the host country, UNLESS he/she executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared for the purpose by
the Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not
later than three (3) years from approval of his/her registration under the said law. -Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189
in relation to Section 4 of the same Act empowers the COMELEC to order the proclamation of the winning
candidates (president, vicepresident, senators and party-list representatives).
Sections 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 created the “Joint Congressional Oversight Committee” with the power to
review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the COMELEC.

Arguments of Macalintal: (1) Section 5(d) is unconstitutional because it violates Section 1, Article V of the 1987
Constitution which requires that the voter must be a resident in the Philippines for at least one year and in the
place where he proposes to vote for at least six months immediately preceding an election. He cites the ruling
of the Supreme Court in Caasi vs. Court of Appeals, wherein it was held that a “green card” holder immigrant to
the United States is deemed to have abandoned his domicile and residence in the Philippines; (2) Section 18.5
is unconstitutional, as it affects the canvass of votes and proclamation of winning candidates for president and
vice-president; (3) Sections 19 and 25 creating the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee are
unconstitutional intrudes into the independence of the COMELEC. Should the rules promulgated by the
COMELEC violate any law, it is the Court that has the power to review the same via the petition of any interested
party, including the legislators.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 violates Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution;
(2) Whether or not Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is unconstitutional insofar as it involves the canvass of votes
and proclamation of winning candidates for president and vice-president;
(3) Whether or not the creation of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee violates Section 1, Article IX-A
of the Constitution mandating the independence of constitutional commissions.
RULING:
(1) No. Contrary to Macalintal’s claim that Section 5(d) circumvents the Constitution, Congress enacted the law
prescribing a system of overseas absentee voting in compliance with the constitutional mandate. Such mandate
expressly requires that Congress provide a system of absentee voting that necessarily presupposes that the
“qualified citizen of the Philippines abroad” is not physically present in the country.
The provisions of Sections 5(d) and 11 are components of the system of overseas absentee voting established
by R.A. No. 9189. The qualified Filipino abroad who executed the affidavit is deemed to have retained his
domicile in the Philippines.
He is presumed not to have lost his domicile by his physical absence from this country. His having become an
immigrant or permanent resident of his host country does not necessarily imply an abandonment of his
intention to return to his domicile of origin, the Philippines.
Therefore, under the law, he must be given the opportunity to express that he has not actually abandoned his
domicile in the Philippines by executing the affidavit required by Sections 5(d) and 8(c) of the law.
x x x x Ordinarily, an absentee is not a resident and vice versa; a person cannot be at the same time, both a
resident and an absentee. However, under our election laws and the countless pronouncements of the Court
pertaining to elections, an absentee remains attached to his residence in the Philippines as residence is
considered synonymous with domicile. x x x x For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are
dictated by the peculiar criteria of political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election law, what has
clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used synonymously with
domicile. x x x x
To repeat, the affidavit is required of immigrants and permanent residents abroad because by their status in
their host countries, they are presumed to have relinquished their intent to return to this country; thus, without
the affidavit, the presumption of abandonment of Philippine domicile shall remain.
(2) Yes. Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is repugnant to Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution only insofar as said
Section totally disregarded the authority given to Congress by the Constitution to proclaim the winning
candidates for the positions of president and vice-president. Congress could not have allowed the COMELEC to
usurp a power that constitutionally belongs to it or, as aptly stated by petitioner, to encroach “on the power of
Congress to canvass the votes for president and vice-president and the power to proclaim the winners for the
said positions.” x x x x The canvassing of the votes and the proclamation of the winning candidates for president
and vice-president for the entire nation must remain in the hands of Congress.
NOTE: Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 was declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL with respect only to the power given to
the Comelec to canvass the votes and proclaim the winning candidates for President and Vice-President, which
is lodged with Congress under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution. However, its constitutionality was UPHELD
insofar as the authority given to the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for the Senators and party-
list representatives.
(3) Yes. By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review, amend, and revise the IRR for The Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003, Congress went beyond the scope of its constitutional authority. Congress trampled
upon the constitutional mandate of independence of the COMELEC. The second sentence of the first paragraph
of Section 19 stating that, “the Implementing Rules and Regulations shall be submitted to the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee created by virtue of this Act for prior approval,” and the second sentence
of the second paragraph of Section 25 stating that, “it shall review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing
Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Commission,” whereby Congress, in both provisions, arrogates unto
itself a function not specifically vested by the Constitution, should be stricken out of the subject statute for
constitutional infirmity. Both provisions brazenly violate the mandate on the independence of the COMELEC.
Nicolas-Lewis vs. COMELEC (2006)
In a nutshell, the aforequoted Section 1 prescribes residency requirement as a general eligibility factor for the
right to vote. On the other hand, Section 2 authorizes Congress to devise a system wherein an absentee may
vote, implying that a non-resident may, as an exception to the residency prescription in the preceding section,
be allowed to vote.
In effect, qualified Filipinos who are not in the Philippines may be allowed to vote even though they do not
satisfy the residency requirement in Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.
FACTS:
Petitioners are successful applicants for recognition of Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 which accords to
such applicants the right of suffrage, among others.
Petitioners sought registration and certification as “overseas absentee voter” but were advised by the Philippine
Embassy in the United States that, per a COMELEC letter to the DFA dated September 23, 2003, they have yet
no right to vote in such elections owing to their lack of the one-year residence requirement prescribed by the
Constitution.
Faced with the prospect of not being able to vote in the May 2004 elections owing to the COMELEC’s refusal to
include them in the National Registry of Absentee Voters, petitioner Nicolas-Lewis et al., filed on April 1, 2004
this petition for certiorari and mandamus.
ISSUE:
Whether or not individuals who retained and/or reacquired Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A. 9225 may
vote as absentee voter under R.A. 9189.
RULING:
The Court accords merit to the petition.
As may be noted, there is no provision in the dual citizenship law – R.A. 9225 – requiring “duals” to actually
establish residence and physically stay in the Philippines first before they can exercise their right to vote.
On the contrary, R.A. 9225, in implicit acknowledgment that “duals” are most likely non-residents, grants under
its Section 5(1) the same right of suffrage as that granted an absentee voter under R.A. 9189.
It cannot be overemphasized that R.A. 9189 aims, in essence, to enfranchise as much as possible all overseas
Filipinos who, save for the residency requirements exacted of an ordinary voter under ordinary conditions, are
qualified to vote.
Sections 1 and 2 of Article V of the Constitution, respectively reading as follows:
SECTION 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are
at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place
wherein they propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election. xxx.
SEC 2. The Congress shall provide … a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.
In a nutshell, the aforequoted Section 1 prescribes residency requirement as a general eligibility factor for the
right to vote. On the other hand, Section 2 authorizes Congress to devise a system wherein an absentee may
vote, implying that a non-resident may, as an exception to the residency prescription in the preceding section,
be allowed to vote.
In effect, qualified Filipinos who are not in the Philippines may be allowed to vote even though they do not
satisfy the residency requirement in Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.
Accordingly, the Court rules and so holds that those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under
Republic Act No. 9225, the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003, may exercise the right to vote
under the system of absentee voting in Republic Act No. 9189, the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003.
ASISTIO V. AGUIRRE (G.R. NO. 191124; APRIL 27, 2010)
FACTS: On January 26, 2010, private respondent Enrico R. Echiverri (Echiverri) filed against petitioner Luis A.
Asistio (Asistio) a Petition for Exclusion of Voter from the Permanent List of Voters of Caloocan City (Petition for
Exclusion) before the MeTC, Branch 52,Caloocan City presided over by public respondent Judge Arthur O.
Malabaguio. Echiverri alleged that Asistio is not a resident of Caloocan City, specifically not of123 Interior P.
Zamora St.,Barangay 15,Caloocan City, the address stated in his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Mayor in the
2010 Automated National and Local Elections. Echiverri, also a candidate for Mayor of Caloocan City, was the
respondent in a Petition to Deny Due Course and/or Cancellation of the Certificate of Candidacy filed by Asistio.
According to Echiverri, when he was about to furnish Asistio a copy of his Answer to the latters petition, he
found out that Asistios address is non-existent. To support this, Echiverri attached to his petition a Certification
issued by the Tanggapan ng Punong Barangay of Barangay 15 Central, Zone 2, District II of Caloocan City. He
mentioned that, upon verification of the 2009 Computerized Voters List (CVL) for Barangay 15, Asistios name
appeared under voter number 8, with address at 109 Libis Gochuico,Barangay 15,Caloocan City. Judge
Malabaguio rendered a decision removing the name of Asistio from the list of permanent voters of Caloocan
City.

Meanwhile, Echiverri filed with the COMELEC a Petition for Disqualification,which was docketed as SPA No. 10-
013 (DC). The Petition was anchored on the grounds that Asistio is not a resident ofCaloocanCityand that he had
been previously convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Asistio, in his Answer with Special and
Affirmative Defenses (Com Memorandum),raised the same arguments with respect to his residency and also
argued that the President of thePhilippines granted him an absolute pardon.
ISSUE: Should Asistios name be removed from the permanent list of voters in Precinct 1811A of Caloocan
City?
HELD: The right to vote is a most precious political right, as well as a bounden duty of every citizen, enabling
and requiring him to participate in the process of government to ensure that it can truly be said to derive its
power solely from the consent of its constituents. Time and again, it has been said that every Filipinos right to
vote shall be respected, upheld, and given full effect. A citizen cannot be disenfranchised for the flimsiest of
reasons. Only on the most serious grounds, and upon clear and convincing proof, may a citizen be deemed to
have forfeited this precious heritage of freedom. In this case, even if the appellate docket fees were not filed on
time, this incident alone should not thwart the proper determination and resolution of the instant case on
substantial grounds. Blind adherence to a technicality, with the inevitable result of frustrating and nullifying the
constitutionally guaranteed right of suffrage, cannot be countenanced.
The residency requirement of a voter is at least one (1) year residence in the Philippines and at least six (6)
months in the place where the person proposes or intends to vote. Residence, as used in the law prescribing
the qualifications for suffrage and for elective office, is doctrinally settled to mean domicile, importing not only
an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative
of such intention inferable from a persons acts, activities, and utterances. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent
residence where, when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. In the
consideration of circumstances obtaining in each particular case, three rules must be borne in mind, namely: (1)
that a person must have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2) once established, it remains until a new one is
acquired; and (3) that a person can have but one residence or domicile at a time.
Domicile is not easily lost. To successfully effect a transfer thereof, one must demonstrate: (1) an actual removal
or change of domicile; (2) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a
new one; and (3) acts which correspond with that purpose. There must be animus manendi coupled with animo
non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time;
the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be
actual.
Asistio has always been a resident of Caloocan City since his birth or for more than 72 years. His family is known
to be among the prominent political families in Caloocan City. In fact, Asistio served in public office as Caloocan
City Second District representative in the House of Representatives, having been elected as such in the 1992,
1995, 1998, and 2004 elections. In 2007, he also sought election as City Mayor. In all of these occasions, Asistio
cast his vote in the same city. Taking these circumstances into consideration, gauged in the light of the doctrines
above enunciated, it cannot be denied that Asistio has qualified, and continues to qualify, as a voter of Caloocan
City. There is no showing that he has established domicile elsewhere, or that he had consciously and voluntarily
abandoned his residence in Caloocan City. He should, therefore, remain in the list of permanent registered
voters of Precinct No. 1811A,Barangay 15,Caloocan City.

That Asistio allegedly indicated in his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor, both for the 2007 and 2010 elections,
a non-existent or false address, or that he could not be physically found in the address he indicated when he
registered as a voter, should not operate to exclude him as a voter of Caloocan City. These purported
misrepresentations in Asistios COC, if true, might serve as basis for an election offense under the Omnibus
Election Code (OEC),or an action to deny due course to the COC.But they do not serve as proof that Asistio has
abandoned his domicile in Caloocan City, or that he has established residence outside of Caloocan
City. GRANTED.
G.R. No. 189698 February 22, 2010 ELEAZAR P. QUINTO and GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR., Petitioners, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent. CJ Puno
Section 2(4), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution and the implementing statutes apply only to civil servants
holding apolitical offices. Stated differently, the constitutional ban does not cover elected officials,
notwithstanding the fact that [t]he civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and
agencies of the Government, including government-owned 8or controlled corporations with original charters.]
This is because elected public officials, by the very nature of their office, engage in partisan political activities
almost all year round, even outside of the campaign period.
Facts:
Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to enforce and administer election laws, COMELEC issued Resolution No.
8678, the Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of Candidacy (CoC) and Nomination of Official Candidates of
Registered Political Parties in Connection with the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections. Sections 4 and 5
of Resolution No. 8678 provide:
SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.—a) Any person holding a public appointive office or position
including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and employees in
government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the
filing of his certificate of candidacy.b) Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be considered
resigned upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the same or any other elective office or position.
Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto resigned from their offices the moment they file their CoCs,
petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr., who hold appointive positions in the government and
who intend to run in the coming elections, filed the instant petition for prohibition and certiorari, seeking the
declaration of the afore-quoted Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 as null and void. Petitioners also contend
that Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, the basis of the assailed COMELEC resolution, contains two conflicting
provisions. These must be harmonized or reconciled to give effect to both and to arrive at a declaration that
they are not ipso facto resigned from their positions upon the filing of their CoCs.
The SC in its 2009 decision penned by Justice Nachura ruled that the said resolution is not violative of the equal
protection clause. Hence this motion for reconsideration.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the provision on the deemed resigned is violative of the equal protection clause.
2. Whether or not the provision suffers from Overbreadth
Ruling:
1. No. The intent of both Congress and the framers of our Constitution to limit the participation of civil service
officers and employees in partisan political activities is too plain to be mistaken. But Section 2(4), Article IX-B of
the 1987 Constitution and the implementing statutes apply only to civil servants holding apolitical offices. Stated
differently, the constitutional ban does not cover elected officials, notwithstanding the fact that [t]he civil
service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including
government-owned 8or controlled corporations with original charters.] This is because elected public officials,
by the very nature of their office, engage in partisan political activities almost all year round, even outside of
the campaign period. Political partisanship is the inevitable essence of a political office, elective positions
included
The law does not violate the equal protection clause. Farias ruling on the equal protection implications of the
deemed-resigned provisions cannot be minimalized as mere obiter dictum. the legal dichotomy created by the
Legislature is a reasonable classification, as there are material and significant distinctions between the two
classes of officials. the legal dichotomy created by the Legislature is a reasonable classification, as there are
material and significant distinctions between the two classes of officials. the legal dichotomy created by the
Legislature is a reasonable classification, as there are material and significant distinctions between the two
classes of officials. Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The
former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite
term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials
hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold
their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of
the appointing authority. The dichotomized treatment of appointive and elective officials is therefore germane
to the purposes of the law. For the law was made not merely to preserve the integrity, efficiency, and discipline
of the public service; the Legislature, whose wisdom is outside the rubric of judicial scrutiny, also thought it wise
to balance this with the competing, yet equally compelling, interest of deferring to the sovereign will.

2. No. According to the assailed Decision, the challenged provisions of law are overly broad because they apply
indiscriminately to all civil servants holding appointive posts, without due regard for the type of position being
held by the employee running for elective office and the degree of influence that may be attendant thereto.

Such a myopic view obviously fails to consider a different, yet equally plausible, threat to the government posed
by the partisan potential of a large and growing bureaucracy: the danger of systematic abuse perpetuated by a
powerful political machine that has amassed the scattered powers of government workers so as to give itself
and its incumbent workers an unbreakable grasp on the reins of power.
The restriction is valid regardless of the position sought, even for baranggay elections. it is well to note that
from as far back as the enactment of the Omnibus Election Code in 1985, Congress has intended that these
nonpartisan barangay elections be governed by special rules, including a separate rule on deemed resignations
which is found in Section 39 of the Omnibus Election Code. In any event, even if we were to assume, for the
sake of argument, that Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and the corresponding provision in Section 13
of RA 9369 are general rules that apply also to elections for nonpartisan public offices, the overbreadth
challenge would still be futile.
TAGOLINO VS HRET (G.R. NO. 202202 MARCH 19, 2013)
J. Perlas-Bernabe
Facts: On November 30, 2009, Richard Gomez (Richard) filed his certificate of candidacy (CoC) with the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), seeking congressional office as Representative for the Fourth Legislative
District of Leyte under the ticket of the Liberal Party. Subsequently, on December 6, 2009, one of the opposing
candidates, Buenaventura Juntilla (Juntilla), filed a Verified Petition, alleging that Richard, who was actually a
resident of College Street, East Greenhills, San Juan City, Metro Manila, misrepresented in his CoC that he
resided in 910 Carlota Hills, Canadieng, Ormoc City. In this regard, Juntilla asserted that Richard failed to meet
the one (1) year residency requirement under Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
(Constitution) and thus should be declared disqualified/ineligible to run for the said office. In addition, Juntilla
prayed that Richard’s CoC be denied due course and/or cancelled.
On February 17, 2010, the COMELEC First Division rendered a Resolution6 granting Juntilla’s petition without
any qualification. The dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVE, to GRANT the Petition to
Disqualify Candidate for Lack of Qualification filed by BUENAVENTURA O. JUNTILLA against RICHARD I. GOMEZ.
Accordingly, RICHARD I. GOMEZ is DISQUALIFIED as a candidate for the Office of Congressman, Fourth District
of Leyte, for lack of residency requirement.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, Richard moved for reconsideration but the same was denied by the COMELEC En Banc through a
Resolution dated May 4, 2010.7 Thereafter, in a Manifestation of even date, Richard accepted the said
resolution with finality “in order to enable his substitute to facilitate the filing of the necessary documents for
substitution.”
On May 5, 2010, Lucy Marie Torres-Gomez (private respondent) filed her CoC together with a Certificate of
Nomination and Acceptance10 from the Liberal Party endorsing her as the party’s official substitute candidate
vice her husband, Richard, for the same congressional post. In response to various letter-requests submitted to
the COMELEC’s Law Department (Law Department), the COMELEC En Banc, in the exercise of its administrative
functions, issued Resolution No. 889011 on May 8, 2010, approving, among others, the recommendation of the
said department to allow the substitution of private respondent.
The substitution complied with the requirements provided under Section 12 in relation to Section 13 of Comelec
Resolution No. 8678 dated October 6, 2009.
xxxx
In view of the foregoing, the Law Department RECOMMENDS the following:
xxxx
2. TO ALLOW CANDIDATE LUCY MARIE TORRES GOMEZ AS A SUBSTITUTE CANDIDATE FOR RICHARD GOMEZ:
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Issue: Whether or not there is valid substitution.
Held: No. A. Distinction between a petition for disqualification and a petition to deny due course to/cancel a
certificate of candidacy.
The Omnibus Election Code (OEC) provides for certain remedies to assail a candidate’s bid for public office.
Among these which obtain particular significance to this case are: (1) a petition for disqualification under Section
68; and (2) a petition to deny due course to and/or cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78. The
distinctions between the two are well-perceived.
Primarily, a disqualification case under Section 68 of the OEC is hinged on either: (a) a candidate’s possession of
a permanent resident status in a foreign country; or (b) his or her commission of certain acts of disqualification.
Anent the latter, the prohibited acts under Section 68 refer to election offenses under the OEC, and not to
violations of other penal laws. In particular, these are: (1) giving money or other material consideration to
influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (2) committing acts of
terrorism to enhance one’s candidacy; (3) spending in one’s election campaign an amount in excess of that
allowed by the OEC; (4) soliciting, receiving or making any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97
and 104 of the OEC; and (5) violating Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, subparagraph
634 of the OEC. Accordingly, the same provision (Section 68) states that any candidate who, in an action or
protest in which he or she is a party, is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the
COMELEC to have committed any of the foregoing acts shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate for
public office, or disallowed from holding the same, if he or she had already been elected.
It must be stressed that one who is disqualified under Section 68 is still technically considered to have been a
candidate, albeit proscribed to continue as such only because of supervening infractions which do not, however,
deny his or her statutory eligibility. In other words, while the candidate’s compliance with the eligibility
requirements as prescribed by law, such as age, residency, and citizenship, is not in question, he or she is,
however, ordered to discontinue such candidacy as a form of penal sanction brought by the commission of the
above-mentioned election offenses.
On the other hand, a denial of due course to and/or cancellation of a CoC proceeding under Section 78 of the
OEC is premised on a person’s misrepresentation of any of the material qualifications required for the elective
office aspired for. It is not enough that a person lacks the relevant qualification; he or she must have also made
a false representation of the same in the CoC. The nature of a Section 78 petition was discussed in the case of
Fermin v. COMELEC, where the Court illumined:
Let it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC is not based on the lack of
qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a material representation that is false, which may relate
to the qualifications required of the public office he/she is running for. It is noted that the candidates states in
his/her CoC that he/she is eligible for the office he/she seeks. Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in
relation to the constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the
candidate subsequently states a material representation in the CoC that is false, the COMELEC, following the
law, is empowered to deny due course to or cancel such certificate. Indeed, the Court has already likened a
proceeding under Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC since they both deal
with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with the distinction mainly in the fact that a “Section 78”
petition is filed before proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of the winning
candidate. (Emphasis supplied)

Corollary thereto, it must be noted that the deliberateness of the misrepresentation, much less one’s intent to
defraud, is of bare significance in a Section 78 petition as it is enough that the person’s declaration of a material
qualification in the CoC be false. In this relation, jurisprudence holds that an express finding that the person
committed any deliberate misrepresentation is of little consequence in the determination of whether one’s CoC
should be deemed cancelled or not. What remains material is that the petition essentially seeks to deny due
course to and/or cancel the CoC on the basis of one’s ineligibility and that the same be granted without any
qualification.
Pertinently, while a disqualified candidate under Section 68 is still considered to have been a candidate for all
intents and purposes, on the other hand, a person whose CoC had been denied due course to and/or cancelled
under Section 78 is deemed to have not been a candidate at all. The reason being is that a cancelled CoC is
considered void ab initio and thus, cannot give rise to a valid candidacy and necessarily, to valid votes. In Talaga
v. COMELEC (Talaga), the Court ruled that:
xxxx
While a person who is disqualified under Section 68 is merely prohibited to continue as a candidate, a person
who certificate is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all, as if
he/she never filed a CoC.
RESOLUTION No. 6558
VICTORINO SALCEDO II vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ERMELITA CACAO SALCEDO
Facts:

This is a petition for Certiorari filed by petitioner Victorino Salcedo II seeking to reverse the earlier Resolution
issued by its Second Division on August 12, 1998.
Neptali P. Salcedo married Agnes Celiz, which marriage was evidenced by a certified true copy of the marriage
contract issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Ajuy, Iloilo. Without his first marriage having been dissolved,
Neptali P. Salcedo married private respondent Ermelita Cacao in a civil ceremony. Two days later, Ermelita Cacao
contracted another marriage with a certain Jesus Aguirre, as shown by a marriage certificate filed with the Office
of the Civil Registrar.
Petitioner Victorino Salcedo II and private respondent Ermelita Cacao Salcedo both ran for the position of mayor
of the municipality of Sara, Iloilo in the May 11, 1998 elections, both of them having filed their respective
certificates of candidacy However, petitioner filed with the Comelec a petition seeking the cancellation of
private respondent's certificate of candidacy on the ground that she had made a false representation therein
by stating that her surname was "Salcedo." Petitioner contended that private respondent had no right to use
said surname because she was not legally married to Neptali Salcedo. Private respondent was proclaimed as the
duly elected mayor of Sara, Iloilo.
In her answer, private respondent claimed that she had no information or knowledge at the time she married
Neptali Salcedo that he was in fact already married; that, upon learning of his existing marriage, she encouraged
her husband to take steps to annul his marriage with Agnes Celiz because the latter had abandoned their marital
home. Neptali Salcedo filed a petition for declaration of presumptive death which was granted by the court that
Neptali Salcedo and Jesus Aguirre are one and the same person; and that since 1986 up to the present she has
been using the surname "Salcedo" in all her personal, commercial and public transactions.
Comelec's Second Division ruled that since there is an existing valid marriage between Neptali Salcedo and
Agnes Celiz, the subsequent marriage of the former with private respondent is null and void. Consequently, the
use by private respondent of the surname "Salcedo" constitutes material misrepresentation and is a ground for
the cancellation of her certificate of candidacy.
However, in its en banc Resolution, the Comelec overturned its previous resolution, ruling that private
respondent's certificate of candidacy did not contain any material misrepresentation. A Motion for
Reconsideration filed by the petitioner was affirmed by the division which gives rise to the petition to review
such promulgation.
Issue:

1.Whether or not the use by respondent of the surname "Salcedo" in her certificate of candidacy constitutes
material misrepresentation under Section 78 in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Held:

Private respondent did not commit any material misrepresentation by the use of the surname "Salcedo" in her
certificate of candidacy.
A false representation under section 78 must consist of a "deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a
fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible." It must be made with an intention to deceive the
electorate as to one's qualifications for public office. The use of a surname, when not intended to mislead or
deceive the public as to one's identity, is not within the scope of the provision. There is absolutely no showing
that the inhabitants of Sara, Iloilo were deceived by the use of such surname by private respondent. Petitioner
does not allege that the electorate did not know who they were voting for when they cast their ballots in favor
of "Ermelita Cacao Salcedo" or that they were fooled into voting for someone else by the use of such name.
The Court AFFIRMS the en banc Resolution of the Commission on Elections denying the petition to cancel private
respondent's certificate of candidacy.
EMILIO RAMON “E.R.” P. EJERCITO, petitioner, vs. COMELEC and EDGAR “EGAY” S. SAN
LUIS, respondents.
Peralta, J. 25 November 2014 G.R. No. 212398

Doctrine • Jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify candidates is limited to the grounds enumerated in
Sec 68 OEC
• An election offense has both criminal and electoral aspects
• The conduct of preliminary investigation is not required in the resolution of the electoral aspect
of a disqualification case; Rules of Court do not apply in election cases
• Contributions made by third parties are included in the election spending limit set under the law

Facts • Three days prior to the May 13, 2013 Elections, a petition for disqualification was filed by Edgar
“Egay”San Luis before the COMELEC against Emilio Ramon “E.R.” P. Ejercito, who was a
fellow candidate and, at the time, the incumbent Governor of the Province of Laguna.
• Causes of action: (1) Ejercito, during the campaign period for 2013 local election, distributed to
the electorates of the province of Laguna the “Orange Card” which could be used in any public
hospital within the Province of Laguna for their medical needs = a material consideration in
convincing the voters to cast their votes for Ejercito’s favor in violation of Sec 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code;
(2) Under Sec 5 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, the aggregate amount that a candidate may
spend for election campaign shall be “P3.00 for every voter currently registered in the constituency
where the candidate filed his certificate of candidacy” The Province of Laguna has a total of
1,525,522 registered electorate. Accordingly, a candidate for the position of Provincial Governor
of Laguna is only authorized to incur an election expense amounting to P4,576,566.00. However,
for television campaign commercials alone, Ejercito already spent P23,730,784. Even assuming
that Ejercito was given 30%discount as prescribed under the Fair Election Act, he still paid the
sum of P16,611,549. Hence, Ejercito committed an election offense under Sec 35 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 9615, in relation to Sec 68 of the OEC.
• On May 17, 2013, Ejercito and Ramil L. Hernandez were proclaimed by the Provincial Board of
Canvassers as duly-elected Governor and Vice-Governor of Laguna. Ejercito: 549,310 votes. San
Luis: 471,209 votes.
• The COMELEC First Division issued a Summons with Notice of Conference. Ejercito prayed
for the dismissal of the petition which was:
o Improperly filed because it is in reality a complaint for election offenses, thus, the case should
have been filed before the COMELEC Law Department, or the election registrar.
o San Luis failed to show, conformably with Codilla, Sr. vs. De Venecia, that he (Ejercito) was
previously convicted or declared by final judgment for being guilty of, or found by the
COMELEC of having committed, the punishable acts under Sec 68 of the OEC.
o Moot and academic by his proclamation as duly-elected Prov. Governor of Laguna for 2013-
2016.
• The COMELEC First Division resolved to grant the disqualification of Ejercito. Ejercito had
accepted donations of PhP 20,197,170.25 and PhP 3,366,195.05 from Scenema Concept
International, Inc. (SCI) in the form of television advertisements to be aired on ABS-CBN’s
Channel 2. Even assuming that the actual cost of both advertising contracts only amounted to
PhP12,818,470.56, Ejercito exceeded his authorized expenditure limit of PhP 4,576,566.00 which
is a ground for disqualification under Sec 68 (c) and concurrently an election offense pursuant to
Sec 100 in relation to Section 262 of the OEC.
• The COMELEC En Banc agreed with the findings of its First Division that San Luis’ petition is
an action to disqualify Ejercito. One ground for disqualification listed in Sec 68 is spending in an
election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by law. Hence, COMELEC has
jurisdiction over the petition. As to Ejercito’s assertion that the petition was prematurely filed on
the ground that the filing of an election offense and the factual determination on the existence of
probable cause are required before a disqualification case based on Sec 68 of the OEC may
 proceed, the COMELEC En Banc cited Lanot vs. Comelec which declared that each of the acts
listed as ground for disqualification under Sec 68 of the OEC has two aspects – electoral and
criminal. The electoral aspect may proceed independently of the criminal aspect, and an erring
candidate may be disqualified even without prior determination of probable cause in a preliminary
investigation.

Issues/ W/N COMELEC committed “GADALEJ” in disqualifying Ejercito – NO.

Ratio
The COMELEC First Division and COMELEC En Banc correctly ruled that the petition filed by
San Luis against Ejercito is not just for prosecution of election offense but for disqualification
as well. Ejercito cannot feign ignorance of the true nature and intent of San Luis’ petition. The title
of San Luis’ petition shows that the case was brought under Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, which is the specific rule governing the disqualification of candidates. Moreover, the
averments of San Luis’ petition rely on Sec 68 (a) and (c) of the OEC as grounds for its causes of
action which enumerates the grounds for the disqualification of a candidate for elective position.

An election offense has both criminal and electoral aspects. The electoral aspect may proceed
independently of the criminal aspect, and vice-versa. The criminal aspect of a disqualification case
determines whether there is probable cause to charge a candidate for an election offense. The
prosecutor is the COMELEC, through its Law Department, which determines whether probable
cause exists. If there is probable cause, the COMELEC, through its Law Department, files the
criminal information before the proper court. Proceedings before the proper court demand a full-
blown hearing and require proof beyond reasonable doubt to convict. A criminal conviction shall
result in the disqualification of the offender, which may even include disqualification from holding
a future public office. The conduct of preliminary investigation is not required in the resolution of
the electoral aspect of a disqualification case.

It is expected that COMELEC Resolution No. 9523 is silent on the conduct of preliminary
investigation because it merely
amended, among others, Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which deals with
disqualification of candidates. In disqualification cases, the COMELEC may designate any of
its officials, who are members of the Philippine Bar, to hear the case and to receive evidence
only in cases involving barangay officials.

The “exclusive power of the COMELEC to conduct a preliminary investigation of all cases involving
criminal infractions of the election laws” stated in Par. 1 of COMELEC Resol No. 2050 pertains to the
criminal aspect of a disqualification case. Hence, an erring candidate may be disqualified even without
prior determination of probable cause in a preliminary investigation.

Rules of Court do not apply in election cases. Ejercito asserts that the Advertising Contract dated
May 8, 2013 should not have been relied upon by the COMELEC as it was not formally offered in
evidence pursuant to Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. Such is inapplicable. Section 4,
Rule 171 of the Rules of Court is clear enough in stating that it shall not apply to election cases
except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient. In
fact, nowhere from COMELEC Resolution No. 9523 requires that documentary evidence should be
formally offered in evidence. The electoral aspect of a disqualification case is done through an
administrative proceeding which is summary in character. COMELEC Rules of Procedure are
subject to liberal construction.
Pursuant to Section 2, Rule 129, the COMELEC has the discretion to properly take judicial
notice of the Advertising Contract dated May 8, 2013. In accordance with R.A. No. 9006, the
COMELEC, through its Campaign Finance Unit, is empowered to “monitor fund raising and
spending activities, etc.”
 Ejercito should be disqualified for spending in his election campaign an amount in excess of
what is allowed by the OEC. The Court refused to believe Ejercito's assertion that the advertising
contracts between ABS-CBN Corporation and Scenema Concept International, Inc. were executed
without his (Ejercito) knowledge and consent. His express conformity to the advertising contracts is
actually a must because non-compliance is considered as an election offense.

Notably, R.A. No. 9006 explicitly directs that broadcast advertisements donated to the candidate
shall not be broadcasted without the written acceptance of the candidate, which shall be attached to
the advertising contract and shall be submitted to the COMELEC, and that, in every case, advertising
contracts shall be signed by the donor, the candidate concerned or by the duly- authorized
representative of the political party.1

Whether the advertising contracts were executed without Ejercito’s knowledge and consent, and
whether his signatures thereto were fraudulent, are issues of fact. Any factual challenge has no place
in a Rule 65 petition.

Contributions made by third parties are included in the election spending limit set under the
law. Ejercito asserts that COMELEC Resolution No. 9476 distinguishes between “contribution”
and “expenditure” and makes no proscription on the medium or amount of contribution made by
third parties in favor of the candidates, while the limit set by law, as appearing in COMELEC
Resolution No. 9615, applies only to election expenditures of candidates.

Section 13 of R.A. No. 7166 sets the current allowable limit on expenses of candidates and political
parties for election campaign. Sections 100, 101, and 103 of the OEC are not repealed by R.A. No.
7166 as these provisions are merely amended insofar as the allowable amount is concerned. In tracing
the legislative history of Sections 100, 101, and 103 of the OEC, it can be said that the intent of our
lawmakers has been consistent through the years: to regulate not just the election expenses of the
candidate but also of his or her contributor/supporter/donor as well as by including in the aggregate
limit of the former’s election expenses those incurred by the latter. The phrase “those incurred or
caused to be incurred by the candidate” is sufficiently adequate to cover those expenses which are
contributed or donated in the candidate’s behalf. By virtue of the legal requirement that a contribution
or donation should bear the written conformity of the candidate, a contributor/supporter/donor
certainly qualifies as “any person authorized by such candidate or treasurer.” Ubi lex non distinguit,
nec nos distinguere debemus. (Where the law does not distinguish, neither should We.)

The inclusion of the amount contributed by a donor to the candidate’s allowable limit of
election expenses does not trample upon the free exercise of the voters’ rights of speech and of
expression under Section 4, Article III of the Constitution. As a content-neutral regulation, the
law’s concern is not to curtail the message or content of the advertisement promoting a particular
candidate but to ensure equality between and among aspirants with “deep pockets” and those with
less financial resources. Any restriction on speech or expression is only incidental and is no more
than necessary to achieve the substantial governmental interest of promoting equality of opportunity
in political advertising.
Holding Petition is DENIED. The May 21, 2014 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc, which upheld the
September 26, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division, granting the petition for
disqualification is hereby AFFIRMED.
Penera vs. COMELEC and Andanar
G.R. No. 181613, November 25, 2009; Ponente: Carpio, J.
DOCTRINE: Congress has laid down the law — a candidate is liable for election offenses only upon the start of
the campaign period. This Court has no power to ignore the clear and express mandate of the law that “any
person who files his certificate of candidacy within [the filing] period shall only be considered a candidate at the
start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy.” Neither can this Court turn a blind
eye to the express and clear language of the law that “any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate
shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period.”
Preliminaries:
1. The ultimate winner in this case is Mayor Rosalinda Penera after the Supreme Court promulgated its
November 25, 2009 Decision overturning its earlier decision (September 11, 2009 Decision) after a Motion for
Reconsideration was filed by aggrieved Mayor Penera.
2. This case was first decided by the COMELEC where both in the Division and the En Banc, the COMELEC ruled
against Mayor Penera and with Commissioner Rene Sarmiento being the lone dissenter in both decisions.
Effectively, through the final decision on the matter, Comm. Sarmiento’s dissent was upheld by the Supreme
Court.
FACTS: Penera and private respondent Edgar T. Andanar were mayoralty candidates in Sta. Monica, Surigao del
Norte during the 14 May 2007 elections. On 2 April 2007, Andanar filed before the Office of the Regional Election
Director (ORED), Caraga Region (Region XIII), a Petition for Disqualification against Penera, as well as the
candidates for Vice-Mayor and Sangguniang Bayan who belonged to her political party, for unlawfully engaging
in election campaigning and partisan political activity prior to the commencement of the campaign period.
Andanar claimed that on 29 March 2007 – a day before the start of the authorized campaign period on 30 March
2007 – Penera and her partymates went around the different barangays in Sta. Monica, announcing their
candidacies and requesting the people to vote for them on the day of the elections.
Penera alone filed an Answer denying the charges but admitted that a motorcade did take place and that it was
simply in accordance with the usual practice in nearby cities and provinces, where the filing of certificates of
candidacy (COCs) was preceded by a motorcade, which dispersed soon after the completion of such filing. The
COMELEC disqualified Penera but absolved the other candidates from Penera’s party from violation of section
80 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code.
On 11 September 2009, the Supreme Court affirmed the COMELEC’s decision to disqualify petitioner Rosalinda
Penera (Penera) as mayoralty candidate in Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte, for engaging in election campaign
outside the campaign period, in violation of Section 80 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (the Omnibus Election Code).
Penera moved for reconsideration, arguing that she was not yet a candidate at the time of the supposed
premature campaigning, since under Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436 (the law authorizing the COMELEC to
use an automated election system for the process of voting, counting of votes, and canvassing/consolidating
the results of the national and local elections), as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, one is not officially a
candidate until the start of the campaign period.
ISSUE: Whether or not Penera is liable for premature campaigning?

HELD: NO.
As explained by the Supreme Court in the case of Lanot vs. COMELEC, a person who files a certificate of
candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the campaign period.
Thus, the essential elements for violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code are: (1) a person engages
in an election campaign or partisan political activity; (2) the act is designed to promote the election or defeat of
a particular candidate or candidates; (3) the act is done outside the campaign period.
The second element requires the existence of a “candidate.” Under Section 79(a), a candidate is one who “has
filed a certificate of candidacy” to an elective public office. Unless one has filed his certificate of candidacy, he
is not a “candidate.” The third element requires that the campaign period has not started when the election
campaign or partisan political activity is committed.
Assuming that all candidates to a public office file their certificates of candidacy on the last day, which under
Section 75 of the Omnibus Election Code is the day before the start of the campaign period, then no one can be
prosecuted for violation of Section 80 for acts done prior to such last day. Before such last day, there is no
“particular candidate or candidates” to campaign for or against. On the day immediately after the last day of
filing, the campaign period starts and Section 80 ceases to apply since Section 80 covers only acts done “outside”
the campaign period.
Thus, if all candidates file their certificates of candidacy on the last day, Section 80 may only apply to acts done
on such last day, which is before the start of the campaign period and after at least one candidate has filed his
certificate of candidacy. This is perhaps the reason why those running for elective public office usually file their
certificates of candidacy on the last day or close to the last day.
The campaign period for local officials began on 30 March 2007 and ended on 12 May 2007. Penera filed her
certificate of candidacy on 29 March 2007. Penera was thus a candidate on 29 March 2009 only for purposes of
printing the ballots. On 29 March 2007, the law still did not consider Penera a candidate for purposes other than
the printing of ballots. Acts committed by Penera prior to 30 March 2007, the date when she became a
“candidate,” even if constituting election campaigning or partisan political activities, are not punishable under
Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. Such acts are within the realm of a citizen’s protected freedom of
expression. Acts committed by Penera within the campaign period are not covered by Section 80 as Section 80
punishes only acts outside the campaign period.
Congress has laid down the law — a candidate is liable for election offenses only upon the start of the campaign
period. This Court has no power to ignore the clear and express mandate of the law that “any person who files
his certificate of candidacy within [the filing] period shall only be considered a candidate at the start of the
campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy.” Neither can this Court turn a blind eye to the
express and clear language of the law that “any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take
effect only upon the start of the campaign period.”
In layman’s language, this means that a candidate is liable for an election offense only for acts done during the
campaign period, not before. The law is clear as daylight — any election offense that may be committed by a
candidate under any election law cannot be committed before the start of the campaign period. In ruling that
Penera is liable for premature campaigning for partisan political acts before the start of the campaigning, the
assailed Decision ignores the clear and express provision of the law