HON. FRANKLIN M.

DRILON, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner,

vs.
MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, VICE-MAYOR JOSE L. ATIENZA, CITY TREASURER ANTHONY ACEVEDO,
SANGGUNIANG PANGLUNSOD AND THE CITY OF MANILA, respondents.
GR No. 112497. August 4, 1994

Facts:
Pursuant to Section 187 of the Local Government Code, the Secretary of Justice had, on
appeal to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer, declared Ordinance No. 7794, otherwise known
as the Manila Revenue Code, null and void for non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in
the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain provisions contrary to law and public
policy.
In a petition for certiorari filed by the City of Manila, the Regional Trial Court of Manila
revoked the Secretary’s resolution and sustained the ordinance, holding inter alia that the
procedural requirements had been observed. More importantly, it declared Section 187 of the Local
Government Code as unconstitutional because of its vesture in the Secretary of Justice of the power
of control over local governments in violation of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the
Constitution and of the specific provision therein conferring on the President of the Philippines only
the power of supervision over local governments.
The court cited the familiar distinction between control and supervision, the first being “the
power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter,” while the
second is “the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their functions is
accordance with law.”

Issues:
(1) Whether or not Section 187 of the Local Government Code is unconstitutional; and
(2) Whether or not the Secretary of Justice can exercise control, rather than supervision, over the
local government

Held:
The judgment of the lower court is reversed in so far as its declaration that Section 187 of
the Local Government Code is unconstitutional but affirmed the said lower court’s finding that the
procedural requirements in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code have been observed.
Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the constitutionality or legality
of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these grounds. When he
alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his own
judgment for the judgment of the local government that enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon did
set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own version of what the Code
should be.
An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. It they are not followed, he
may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to
do it himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. The supervisor or superintendent merely
sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have
the discretion to modify or replace them. In the opinion of the Court, Secretary Drilon did precisely
this, and no more nor less than this, and so performed an act not of control but of mere
supervision.
Regarding the issue on the non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment
of the Manila Revenue Code, the Court carefully examined every exhibit and agree with the trial
court that the procedural requirements have indeed been observed. The only exceptions are the
posting of the ordinance as approved but this omission does not affect its validity, considering that
its publication in three successive issues of a newspaper of general circulation will satisfy due
process.

Section 187 of the Local Government Code:

Procedure For Approval And Effectivity Of Tax Ordinances And Revenue Measures; Mandatory
Public Hearings.—The procedure for approval of local tax ordinances and revenue measures shall be
in accordance with the provisions of this Code: Provided, That public hearings shall be conducted for
the purpose prior to the enactment thereof; Provided, further, That any question on the
constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances or revenue measures may be raised on appeal within
thirty (30) days from the effectivity thereof to the Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision
within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of the appeal: Provided, however, That such appeal
shall not have the effect of suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and the accrual and payment
of the tax, fee, or charge levied therein: Provided, finally, That within thirty (30) days after receipt of
the decision or the lapse of the sixty-day period without the Secretary of Justice acting upon the
appeal, the aggrieved party may file appropriate proceedings with a court of competent jurisdiction.