Betrayal and Treason

CRIME
%ries Editor John flagan
Norfrhwesten2 U~zivcrsity

EDITORIAL,ADVISORY BOARD

John Ilraith~aite~ Rrzbert J. Ilursik, Kathleen Daly,

Malcolm M. FeeXey' Jack Katz, Martha A. Myers, Rabrrrl J. Sampson, and
Wesfey G, Skogan

Bre~kil.1~
Away from Broketz Windows: Bulfintore Evidence attd the Natiotzwidt~Fight Aguinsf
Crime, Grhne, Fear, ~ttzdDecline, Ralpfi B, Taylor
Costs uttd Bcvl@fs of Preventing. Crinte, Brar2clorl C. Welsh,
David P. Farrington, ax9d Lawrex~ceW Shemar2
in An?eric~,Gary LaFree
Losing Legitimacy: Strcef Ct-;inteatld the Declirze of Social fi.isfilSufio~zs

The ContmunifyIxrsticc ideal, Todd Clear and David Karp

WhkZkeblowi~tgn f Work: To~lgiTlCh~~ices In Exposir~gFrazrd, Waste, and
Abtrse an Clze J L ? ~Terance
, L), Miethe

C@sunlZiesof Conttfzunity Dkorder: Wor~zen'sCareers in Violerll Crltne,

D&c>rah R, Baskh~a ~ lra d B. Sommers
Poverty, ElhnicilyI and Violent Crhzc, lames E. Short

Crirrile attd P~iblicPolicg: Puftin8 Tjtcary to Work edited b y Hugh l?. Barlc~w
Confro! Balance: Tozo"~rdG Genlrml Thmry c?fDevila?icc,Charles R. Ettle
Rape and Society: Xmdings on Ihr Pvublerr~sof Sexual Assault,
edited b y Patr-ida Strarles and Ror2ald J. Berger
Incqunlity, Crinte, and Socinl Corzfrol,George S. Bridges
and Martha A. Myers

Forthcoming
L a f i ~ Horrzicide:
~o A Fhe-Cify Study, hnniro M a r t h ~ a
and Treason
Trust and Loya

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Library of Congress Gatalcjging-in-Publicatic>nData

Ben.-Yehuda,Nachman.
Betrayal and treaso)~:violat.ic)nsof trust and Icjyaltyl Nachman Ben-Yehuda.
p,cm. - (Crime and society)
Indudes bibliographical reference and index,
ISBN 0-8133-9VB6
1. B&rayal. 2. Treasc~n. I. Title. 11. Crime & sc~cietli;

00-043985
GIP

The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American
National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials
239.4&--19M.
 To
Cnvoline and Jean Wittrnbevy and
Beatrice and Abralzanz Hez'lbruun
whose friendship I have learned
to cherislz dear4
 "I Did Not Betmy"
---Note written by Uri Zlfan, an Israeli paratrooper who was
captured by the Syrians in 1955, while on an intelligence
missit)n, and "r&ured. He hid a few notes with the abavc?
statement on his body prior to committing suicide in the
Syrian prison.
 Contents

PART ONE
I Introduction: Violating Tmst and Loyalty
2 Violathg Trust m d Loyalty:A Typolow
3 Violathg Trust and Loyalty: Categories and Cases

PART TWO
4 Treason
5 Violating Tmst and Loyalty h r i n g Wosld War II: Part 1
6 Violathg Trust m d Loyalty Durhg World War II: Part 2
7 Radio 7"raitors: Lord. Haw-Haw and Tokyo Rose
8 Intellectual Betrayal: Ezra Pound and &ut Hamsun
9 Edward W11: A Traitor Monarch?
18 The Case of Malkali Tenepal-Malinl=he
1I Treason in Judaism and Israel
Conclusion
This page intentionally left blank
2.1 A typology of betrayal

Photos
Benedict Amold
Statue of Na.thm Hale
@isling intlniform.
P4tah with his enlarged government
Vlasov i~~spectstroops
Jsyce tlceompmied by two guards
Pound gives the fascist salute;
The Wlindsars meet Hitler
Mantezuma I1 meets H e r n h G'ortks
Uri 111m
This page intentionally left blank
 ing of this project is clear in my mind. It was during a miver-
sity facz~ltystrike in 1994 when one faculty member last his nerve and de-
cided to break the strike shortly beiore it mded anyway. His own state-
ment that the .rest of the faculty may view him as a "@isli~'"rompted
me to start readings on this topic (the incident is recorded in futler detai,l
in Chapter 3). n e r e we= a few other incentives. Preceding this incident
was my invdvement in politics and deviance (1989) and my prrrject m
poliLical assassinations by Jews (1.993) where so many of the cases of: as-
sassixzatim we= in the context of accusations of '"betrayal:' M a t heled
my quest even more was the 1995 assassination of Israeli premier Uitzhak
Rabin (discussed in Chapter 11),again in the context of his being accused
by so many peoyle from the fsraeri right and. rcl.igi.ous right as being a
""traitor." The instigation against Kabin and his government in the context
of betrayal was ominous. My pre~riousinterests in constructionism,
power, and politics made studying betrayill a natural extension of my
work. As is usualiy the cme, the road from plmging into the prc?ject to its
elnd was a long one. It is time to express my gratitude to all those who
gave a helping hand along the way.
My first patitrude is to Etti, Tzach, and Gu): whose love, devotion, and
dedication enabled me to transform, this project from an idea into a book.
The Israeli-Canada exchange program enabled my research in the ti-
brary of the Llniversity of Toronto on Remdict Arnold (Israeli libraries
had nofhi~zgon this man). The Z,ondon School of Economics, Department
of Sociolrzgy, enabled me to spend two wonderful summrs (1996--1997)
in London collect* data about various cases of betrayal and treason. I
ant pmticdarly grateful to Eileen Barker; Paul Rock, and Stanley Cohen,
whose help and support were crucial. 1especially appxleciate P a d Rock's
many praeticaf and essmtial cclmments on an earlier draft. In London, I
enjoyed the genemns, conrteous, and very effective assistmce of Ibrari-
ans and staff from the Wiener Library, the British Library, and particularly
the Imperial War Museum.
As f was spending large m o m t s of time in both libraries, I lenrncd to
appreciate th different entrmces to both. At that t h e , entry to the British
Library was through the British Museurn. That entry meant passing near
the Rosetta Stone. Entry to the Imperial W;;rr MUS~LIIZI memt passhg by
two huge sixteen-inch naval guns, Although :I could never decide which
xii Rcknozvl~igmert&

was mow impresshe (a syn-tbolic dilemxna for a person who faced daily
dilemmas of deciding what was and what was not treason), I evezztually
discovered that I preferred the Rosetta Stone after all.
Einat Usant, Vered Vinitzky-Seroussi, Iris Wolf, Dalit Rudner, Avi
Shoshana, and Michd h r o n helped at various stages of this l e ~ ~ g t h y
project as research assistants. 1am very grateful to them alf for their dcdi-
cated and indispensable help.
Barbrara Wehstein was extremely helpful in puttkg me in touch with
Ross Hassig. Without his penetrating critical work my understandjng of
the Mdinche case would have been less than &sired. I am very grateful
to both.
Uzi Amit-Kohn, Gershon Ben-Sf-rachar$Stanly Cohen, Martin Glad-
man, m r i a n n a Bar, A d m Seligman, and John Simpson volunteered
m n y insighthl commnts and assistancel which helped to crystallize
the appmach presented in this volume. Barry Schwartz, John Simpsm,
and Erich Coo& kindly provided usefui and pointed comments as to
how to proceed with this project at some crucial: moments in the sttmnrter
of 1.997.1am also grateful to Jennifer B. Swearingen, whose editorial sug-
ge"tlc,ns and comments were very helpM in preparhg the mafiuscript
for publication.
Last, but certainly not least, it is a genuine pleasure to achowlebge my
deepest gratitude to an outstantfing crimhok,gist, John Hagan, without
whose proiessional support and gujdance this book hvould not have been
possible. 1am also very grateful to Ron Gillis, Erich Goode, Simm Singer,
and-agah-John Hagan, whose ccmstructive =view prwided produc-
tive contments and suggestions. m e i r i,ndispensable assistance most cer-
tainly made this book significantly better. It is indeed an honor and a
pleasure to have had the privilege of benefiting from the insights of such
outstanding colleagues.
Part One
This page intentionally left blank
 Introduction:
ating Trust and Loya

h this book we shall acquaint ourselves with a dazzling spectrum of be-

haviors that qualify for the dubjous title of '%betrayal." We shall try to de-
velop an understanding of the essence of this fascinating f o m of behav-
iar and exannine whether behind its m n p varied manifestations the= is
a comrmm anafpticd and. empiricd core, Are the= such acts that, when
committed, increme significantly t k pmhability of being brmded as
"betrayaX"? As we shadX see, betrayal does indeed present a ul-riversal
structure.
The actual behaviors that fall into the "betrayal" category form a fasci-
natkg spectrum.,Outlirrhg this spectruln recyuires same vivid and pow-
erful illustrations, Hence, E have tried to invoke as many illustrations as
posshle. This is a good place to start. I have deliberately chosen some-
what problelnatic cases to whet the appetite for what follows,

The Yehuda Gil Affair. &rkg December 1997 and 'January 1998, the
Israeli public was amazed to learn that a Massad (Israeli foreig~~ secret h-
telligmce service) operathe called Yehuda Gil, who was in charge of col-
lecting and processing information about Syria, was suspected of fahri-
crating sowces and falsifying his reports. The general implicati.on was that
he made Syria appear much more threatening, with belligerent inten-
tions, than it actuaily was. I-lis =ports made it appear as if Syrim Presi-
dent Hafez Ai-Assad was planning anolfner war against Israel. Gil, was
probably effective in hhelphg to crcate a false impression in the summer oi
1996 by telling Mossad that Syria was p l a m h g a surprise, but limited,
ground atrt-ack in the Golan Heights, which supposediy aimed at seizing
some territory Part of his dflception was based on =ports of t h ~ a t m i n g
movements by Syrian army units, This falsi.fied information might kave
caused great h a m if Israel had acted on it. fJuclkiiythat did not happen,
as other checks and bdances were operating.1
 :In March 1999, a Tel Aviv district court convicted Gil m charges of pro-
viding false infomaticm, iz~tendingto harm the state's security and steal-
ing tens of thousands of doilars from Mossad. Me W= given a five-year
prison sentence.

The Bus No. 300 At"fair, On April 12,11984, four Palestinjans boarded 1s-
rael's Egged bus no, 300 in %l Aviv. The bus was heading to Ashkelon, a
southern Israeli town on the Mediterrmean coast. Along the way, the
Palestinians hijacked it. Later, Israeli soldiers stormed the bus and re-
leased the passengers. Two of the Palestinians were killed durislg the ac-
tion, Two others were taken prisoner, inf;errogatedby SHABAC (Israel's
domestic secret security service), m d later killed.
:In what was probably the most spectacular (and nasty) cover-up opera-
ticm in the history of the lsraeli secret services, SHABAC initially denied
that its people were ordered to, and did indeed, kill the two Palestjnians.
Civil servmts in SHABAC lied and manipulated other civil servants (in-
cfuding, among other things, an attempt to falsely implicate Brigadier
General Yilzhak Mordechai, later Isracl's minister of deftinse). Evel~tually,
this cover-up was exposed (by some SF-IABAC whistle-blowers).Z
In both cases, the same violation of values and norms occurred. Al-
though Gif's mtives were coolplex (he held a personal grudge for not be-
ing promoted, a political inclination to the right, m d a problematic per-
sonality), it can be easity argued that Gil violated in the most fun-
danental way both the trust invested inhim bp Mossad and his loyalty to
be truthful to the organization of which he was a member fur many years.
h the case of bus no. 300, there c m hardly be a doubt that the chiefs of
SHAESAC and those who participated in the cover-up betrayed the trust
and lyalty invested in their positions in the most Fundamental way

The Puzzle
Social life, the very essence of sociological inquiries, is a complicated is-
sue. 011the one hand, cultures and societies are ""out there," as if they
constitute separate entities that we can talk about, orient ourselves to-
ward, and study. 01the other hand, these entities are "fiere" because we
construct t-hem to "'be" there. That is, without us and o w language, they
have no existence. For a sociologist this problem is magnified because,
clearly the terms we have devised to describe and anaiyze c d t u ~ and s
societies m abstractions..m e y form hlrhal C. Wright Mills cai,l,ed "the so-
ciological imaginationH-a sort of consciousness based m a particular
pertleption that is shaped by the abstractions we use, not unlike one of
those stories in\Polving Bar011 R/lunchhausen, or perhaps Alice's Wonder-
land. People" social life may appear quite chaotic, but with a good con-
ceptual agparaks, its er workir.~gsand order can be made clear.
Taking a long and criticat look at cultures easily yields one basic obscr-
vation. Most people in any one particular culture would agree about cer-
tain aspects of their life, such as facts, which they take for granted. Fur-
thermore, W can get moro =fined agrements regarding these facts if we
consult the relevant experts. Wowever, when we demand to know the
meaning of these facts-the way they are interpreted m d contextual-
ized-tkn we very quickly etncounter a problem r&rred to as the social
construction of reality. That is, different people and experts, as well as
their rr-?fclrt?ncegroups, crt?ate a dazlirng, fantastically complicated, and
fascinati.ng kaleidoscope of varykg ddinitims (and constructions) of re-
ality. If we are not careful, we can easily get lost in a myriad of syntbolic
moral ulliverses of meaning with Wonderlmdfs Cheshire catfs partially
materialized smiling mouth chuckling at us from different corllers.
:I shall examine very closely one partiedar aspect of social life-the
puzzle inwolving the violatim of trust and loyalty which is rderred to as
"betrayal." 1 sha:tl explore the nature oE trust and loyalty, the differenl. em-
pirical manifestations of their violaths, and their memings. A major h-
cus of this i n p i r y is on one particular form of violation of trust m d loy-
alty-tmsm. Thjs form of social behaviar provides us with some
interestirtg and impmtmt insights about the ways in which we construct
realities m d create meaning.
Some oli the more interesting and hstructive aspects of cttlbrcs are to
be found in contrasts. Among the more enchanting contrasts are those be-
tween truth and that Mthich is not twth, between loyalty and its betrayal,
between goad and evil, between right and wrong, and between trust and
lack of it, Studyhg these contrasts brings one, first, to the issue of social
and moral boundaries-d, second, to istiues of power. Momover, by h-
cushg on the Hegelirnn concept of mtit;hesis, this book can be thought of
as raising the age-oZd Hobbesian question, How is social order passfile?
This general plot is occasitmed by directhg attention to how why, where,
and when challenges to the status qzto emerge and function as cataiysts
for processes of social change or stability. Concepts of deviance and con-
formity are endemic to such an inquiry, as well as tl-te ccmcept of truth.

Trust, Loyalty, and Their Violations

In exploring the nature of t k s e concepts, we shall have an interesting op-
portunity to examine culturally created contrasts. We shall look at confor-
mity, loyalty, and trust, as well as deviance. When we focus on treason,
the relevance of these topirs to processes of sociat change and slability, to
mord boundaries and the way they are formed and.changed, and to the
power bchind these processes will becom cleamr. With loyalty#the im-
portant ~ e s t i o is
n that of "loyalty to who" or ""t what." L~cryaltyis some-
thing WC negotiate. Rust is not, Trust, loyalty, and their violation touch
some very profound and powerful feehgs we all have about the moral
n a t w of our cdtures, what is right anci what not, and how violators
should be treated. That is, the nature of the societal reaction to deviants
becomes an issue, too, Moreover, the results of examisling violations of
tmst and loyalty can be surprihing and are. not atways moralty pleasant.
The materialization of a douhlc violation is the malytical k a r t of be-
trayal. It afso involves sipificant, but different levels of, threat potential.
Violations of loyalty and tmst can appear in such varied and different
contexts as religion, politics, science, the military, industry commerce,
and personal relations. These violations often involve using deceptive
techniques such as lying. Thus, discussing violations of twst usually in-
volves examining trutln and its subversion. Hence, in some profound
sense, discussions about trust and its violations assume that there are
some parameters of reality that we all accept as true, as genuine, as au-
thentic. Constructions of ~ a l i t yarc woven on thit; shared and accepted
f omdational framework.
Trust involves a particular type of ~lationship,where the participants
perceive that a genuine, authei~tic,and truthful interaction exisb. Violat-
ing that trust and. subverting that truth typically in\rolves lying, cheating,
conceatment, and deception. Loyalty, first and foremost, involves fidelity,
Kolating these mord codes invokes strorlg emotional responses because
feelings of trust and. loyalty are typicalfy constructed as deep and pro-
found.
To achieve a better understancfing of these concepts, I shdl d y on a
contextual constsuctionist interpretation (Ben-Yehuda 1995:20-21)' and
then continue with looking at the characteristics of trust and loyalty

Carztextzlal Canstvuctz'onz'sn~
and Ctlf ture
h recent years a theoretical disthctior~(whose antecedents can be traced
to Schutz, Mead, fames, and others) has emerged behnieen the so-called
objective and cmstwctionist views. The objective view is a varimt of trhe
positivist approach, which is closely related to fu~~ctionalisrn, It assumes
that deviance (or more gcrnerally, social issues m d problems) constitutes
an ol5jective and measufable reality and, in particuiar, that it consists of
objective conditions and harm. 011the other hand, there is the cmstruc-
tionist approach (also referred. to as subjective or relativist). This ap-
proach maintai.ns that deviance and social issues a d problems do m t
present the characteristics of a so-called objective rca:lity and that they are
the result of collecthe social defhitions of what some organized members
of a culture view as a problematic, harmful, or dangerous condition(s).
That is, the nabre of what is, a d what is not, defhed as reality is not a
result of some ob~edivecondition but rather is a social construction. As
Goode puts it, ""t the subjectivist, a given condition need not even exist
in the objective sense to hc? defined as a social problem" (1989:328).
Both Best (1989,1995) and Goode (1989,1997:5841)point out that there
are two variants of the constructionist perspective. First, there is strict
constmctictnism (for example, see Best 19931, and second, there is contex-
tual co~~structio~~ism, As Gaode (1989:328-329) notes, the first varimt ar-
gues that the expert or scientific evatuation of, for example, deviance, so-
cial problems, or other issues represents simply one "clai~n-making"
activity out of many such activities, This view argtres that scientific claims
are socially cmstmcted, as are other claims, and can be studied as such.
This view negates the existence of an objective dirnensiftn of reality and
argues that there are different versions of rcalit).; each one just as valid as
another, inchding this statement itself. Ohviausly, postmodernism" h-
fluence can be easily detected here.
'The second Frarimt argues that although S L E C phenomena
~ as devimce
and social problems are the results of '"him-making"" activi.ties, the so-
called ob~ectivedimension can be assessed m d evaluated by relevant ex-
perts on the basis of scien.t.ificevi,dence. This view xccpts that jn a given
time and place, it is possible to use empirical facts to reach a consensus
(wen a temporary one) about the nature of reality. This perspective hn-
plies that although there may indeed be djfferf-?m.t.versions of reality, they
should not be accepted as equal. Contextual constructionism attempts to
f h ~ dout and slrbstantiate MIhich version is more empirically valid. Works
that utjlize this Cheoretjcal perspective typicalXy contrast the "objective"
with the "constructedf' versions of reality and utjlize empirical evidence
as a basis for evaluating different ccmstructions.
It is important to note that co~~textuaf constructiosris~~ does not claim to
know the absolute "tmth"l or to be absolutely "objective." Rather, it by-
passes the epistemological problematics irrvolved in deciding m "objec-
tivity" by establishing a consensus clf relevant experts. The goal of cmtex-
tual cmstmctionists is to collect empirical evidence and make informed
and ir^ltt.fligentchoices based on the ~Xetiantand important facts for spec-
ified narratives for versions). Although this agreed-upon, fact-based con-
sensus is temporary and relative, it prwides a powerful baselitne with
which we can evaluate a variety of clairn-making activities.
Specific cases of treason and betmyal exist with,in speeific moral and
culitural contexts. One observation that must be made immediately is that
this is typically not the case in betrayai between individuafs. 'l'he ccrntcxt
of such c s e s is such that hmost (if lnot all) of them, interpreting wfio vi-
olated whose trust and loyalty is not too difficult to establish. n e context
(and there for^ the interpretation) of betrayal on the collective leveI is
much less clear. However, although the specific cclntext and interpreta-
tim of diffemt cases may sometimes be unclear, the social structure of
the cases is not. The very structure of betsayal means that it always in-
volves essmtial violaticms of both tmst and loyalty. "Thus, t-he conceptual-
ization that I utilize takes the factual level of each case and examines the
way in which these facts arc socially cmstmcted and interpreted vis-&-vis
violations of trust and loyalt)i, This is a genuine exercise ill examhing the
facts as opposed to the social construction c?f those facts-that is, a cmtex-
tual cmstmctimist approach.

Essence and Constructionism

This book attempts to combhe two perspectives. Ch-t the one hand, E as-
sume that the label "betrayaif%wit) be ulliversalf y invoked \zrhenever both
trust a d loyalty are violated. This is an essential statement. It implies
that these violations can be objec-tively described md measured. On the
other hand, the content and meaning of these violatims are always (and
necessarily) contextual: and, thus, highly susceptible to social constmc-
ticms. Et is this level that yields the statcment that "betrayal lies in the eyes
of the beholder,'" pparaphrase on Becker's (1963) classical work on de-
viance. To some extent, betrayal does Ijc in the observer's eyes, but not
completely The construction of betrayal is lilnited by a universal struc-
ture of vioiations. It is pssi&le that such stmctrares underlie and tjn^litthe
generalizability of Becker" argument about other forms of deviance as
well. Contextual constructionism enables us to bridge these t w perspec-
tives: essential and construdionist. However, there will always be tension
between these two levels of analysis,

Culture and Betrayal

Wlat arc. the basic characteristics of cdture that make betrayal possible?
C h the personal level, it =quires t?l. Icast: two characteristics: the ability to
deceive or fie or mmiQulate and the speclific mothation to d.o so. The two
criteria can be easily met. We are quite capable of both lying and develop-
ing devious motivations. Still, we must remetnber that the overwfielmb~g
majority of peopie are not involived. constantly in behavior la:beled. by
their ~ s p e d i v cultures
e as "treacherous.'Wowever, m e these tvvo crite-
ria arc met, we are stilf left with the questim of the "cdturd Ml)nyPuwhich
goes beyond specifie personal mothation. The answer for that, f believe,
can be found in a major cultural facet: socially constructed moral bomd-
aries. 'This cultural aspect is composed of both power and mora:lity
 Culturc can be conceptualized as being composed of a nunnber of sym-
bolic moral universes,4 each of which competes with the others for sym-
bolic resources (support, recog~~ition, influence) as well as eco~~ounic re-
sources. In fact, this structure is intrinsic to a pluralstic society The
problem is that morality in such a society becomes a cclmplicated and ne-
gotiated issue. Moreover, the problem becomes immensely more complex
once we allow into this conceptualization the existence of different, some-
times antagmistic, societies. Viewing cdtufaf structure from this per-
spective will ellable us to better undersbnd betrayai at both the collective
and the personal level.
117 the past decade the topic of tmst has captured the attention of yuite a
few schftlas. S,ince trust is h a s d on both personal acquaintance and the
convergence of interests, it is very 1ikeXy that trust is influenced by social
structures a d societal institutions. The conditions under which societal
trust i,ncrc.ases or decreases, as well the type and distribution of trust in
different societies, have increasingly occupied the attention of vasious
schslars,s
Devimce, as so many have pointed out, is void of meaning without
considering what is not deviant-that is, conformity and conventional
morality, The conformist conventional morality that lies at the base of this
study co~~si.sts of trust and loyalty. Thus, before we dehe into examining
different types and cases of violations of trust and loyalty, we need first to
exarnine haw trust and loyalty are cmceptualized.
Betrayal is dangerous. W e n trust m d loyalty are violated, the threat
potential for interpersonal relations or for state integrity (especially dur-
ing periods of conRict) is pmfound.

Characterizations of Trust and Loyalty

Trust
Defining trust is not an easy undertaking, and the literature presents
quite a k w approaches. In some cases, the definition of the term blends
with the consequences of the prcsence (or lack) of trust.
Luhmann (1988)m d Johnson-Ceorge and Swap (1982) define tmst as a
behavior, or attitude, that penn,jts ri,sk-taking behavior. Shilarly, G m -
betta (1988) m d Kee and. Knox (1.970) sugg@stthat trust is inversely re-
lated to the willingness to become vuherable to the actions of another
person or gr02113. This appr~achis focllsed on expectationsl and G m -
betta, for example, does not even distinguish between tmst and coopera-
tion (although cooperation can be easily conceptualized as ~ s u l t i n g
from
(1988) m d Cook and Wall. (191f3Q)center their defhitian
around the concept of confidence; Dasgupta (3988) and Good (1988) focus
on prltdictabiliv; and Mver, Davis, and Schcrorman p995) concentrate
on the characteristics of the trustor and trustee. C)liver (1992) chose to fo-
cus on the mchanisms of trust within the context of organj.zatims, pre-
ferring to examine how trust ackally works. Tl~every process through
which trust is socially constructed m d maintahed is an interesting topic.
(1988) m d Kramer, Brewer, and Hama (1996) chart same of the
possibilities (for example, a proces that follows Baysian prhciples).
Coleman's influential work (1990) discllsses the issue of trust as a par-
ticular fnrm of relations and focuses on syskms of trust rmging from the
micro-level between individual trustor and trustee to fie macro-level of
society Coleman states that trust involves expressions of codidence
within a specified set of relations. Establishing this confidence, partieu-
larly in close and intimate relations, =quires time, and there are sets of
behaviors and verbal, expressions that can st.rengthen or weaken this
trust. Thus, ""the trust= may engage in actions explicitly designed to lead
the potential tmstor to place trustf"(p. 96). At the most basic level, Cole-
man-like others-poi.nts out. that trust involves behavhr trhat takes into
cmsidcration the element of risk, &e interesting issue is what happens
when the tmstee breaks the trust.
Trust, says Coleman, permeates society. The much earlier works of
Durkheim. (1.933) and Simmel (1950) implied that transactions involving
trust range from personat, intimate relaticlns to monetary loans, trade,
politics, science, the arts, wdicine, law, and so forth. Trustless societies
will find that existence is very prclblematic.
5e1ipmFuecentwork (3997) distinguishes between trust and cmfi-
dence. Confidence refers to a situation where roles are clear and one
knows what to expect; that is, confidence is based on clear expectations.
Trust is what one needs when m e does not have confidence. Seligman
makes Ihe insightful poi.nt Eh& the gelneral erosim of trust i,n cantempo-
rary cultures creates some very serious prOblems in the htcgration of
those cultms. Sefigman feels fiat fie decline of the integrative p w e r of
trust is due to the new perceptio~nof individuals, in which the individraal
is reduced to a sum total of group identities and an abstract matrix of
ntles. This emsion of trust accompanies the deciine of personal integrity,
res~)onsibility,and smse of belonghg. According to Seligman, the mod-
ern crisis in identity formation and mairtt-enance trmslates into a crisis in
tmst. The problem is not one of extremes, hut of d e g ~ e s "The
. general
question of wbat is the optirnum level of norms, laws, and sanctions to
maintain trustworthiness on the part of tmstees is a c o q I e x one" "(Cole-
m m 1990:134).
Aware of the problems involved in definilng trust, Friedrichs
(3996:11-12) is right in pointilrg out that although trust is a central. cul-
tural notion, the= is no s h g k meaning for the term. "It has referred both
to property of indiwiduals and ~rganizationsand to expectations defh~ing
various types of relationshipsf"(p, 11).
There can hardly be a doubt that tmst involves relationships based on
confidence, prtrdictability and the willingness to take risks (that is, the de-
1;iberate suspension of suspicio~~).'The trust relationship is based, in the
most fundamental way, on deliberately avoiding lies, deception, and ma-
nipulation.
Eklnan f1992), whose wnrk focuses on lies and deceptions, does not fail
to notice that deception can easily ruin trust:

No import-ant relationship survives if trust is totally lost. If you discover

your friend has betrayed you, l i d to you repeatedly for his own advantage,
that friendship cannot continue. Neither can a marriage be mare than a
shambles if one spouse learns that the other, not once but many times, has
again and again been a deceiver, I: doubt any form of government can long
survive except by using force to oppress its awn people, if the people believe
its leaders always lie. f1992:3;?4)

Tlze Importance of Trtlst

What is so cdturally important about trust, and why? Seligman (1997)
(and earlier, Misztal 1994)has pointed out that trust contributes to the co-
hesiveness and integration of cultures. 9ligman's work tends to mark a
distinctive sociologicaf (as opgosed to psychological) meming of trust.
Giddens's sociological approach (4991) sutjgests that in modern societies
trust is increashgly shifted from the individual level of friendsfiip to ab-
stract expert systems in the public domain. Thus, the creation and. pro-
cessing of trust is removed to a detached and anonymous culbral level.
Let me continue this by suggesting that-two lines of reasoning can be fob
Iowed here,
?"he first is functional. As pcsited by exchange theory, trust enables
exchange; without it no social exchange is possible. Trust invokes the
concepts of re1iabili.Q faithfulness, and responsibility. Trust is m e of the
elements that Durkheim (3933) refen; to in his discussion of the '"re-
contractual" elelnexrts that are absolutely required for social cohesion
and solidarity to exist, As such, trust has acquimd a quality of sacred-
ness. Undoubtedly, trust is an essential integrative i n g ~ d i mof
t the cut-
tlaral "collective conscience,'"hat is, of the central and core vdue sys-
tem, and it lies at the foundation of consensual social constructions of
symbcric moral universes. The argument here can be easily made more
complex if we rementber that we expect, indeed even hope, that. s m e
cultural roles may involve deliberate violations of trust in the form of
deceivhg and I;ing. For example, diplomats arc expected to lie, and it is
difficult to imagine fie survival of pofiticians without their inwolwement
in some form of conceaX.mentor manipulatim of the truth. Nevertheless,
lower levels of social and personal trust may mean that social disintegra-
ticm is occurring and that holding the ctrtturc. together may require using
more force and formal rules"Because trust is considered to be sacred, the
violation of trust is interpreted and rcacted to emotionally,
This cmceptualization, which is focused on examining cdtures from
their moral point of view exemplifies the major issue facing us. In a
morally monochromatic society, one that is dmjnated by m e symbolic
morai universe, the demarcaticm of moral boundaries is nonproblematic,
and moral meanings are simple m d easy to grasp. However, whe11 soci-
eties are composed of diverse and competing symbolic moral universes,
the meaning of morat codes can become very problematic. As I have
shown elseurherc (1985), such societies arc prone, by the very nature of
their moral structure, to experience repeated moral crusades aimed at re-
definhg their moral boundaries. Living in a multimoraiit,y society is far
from simple, and people who search far the elusive comfort that lies in
certairrty (deceptive and shallow as it may be) have a tendency to turn
uncertah~tyinto certainty.6
T'Iws, alihough the m e a n i ~ ~ofg trust is rather straightfor\vard im a
monochromatically m r a l society, it is far from that in a society character-
ized by a multiplicity of symbcrlic m r a l universes. The meaning of m y
forms of betrayal in such societies is contested. 'The majn wason is that-
the base value of trust becomes unclear. Such questions as trust in who?
in whathare crucial issues in these multicultural societies. Moreover, if we
choose to leave one sodety and look at its moral structure from the out-
side, making comparisons between different societies, the meanhg of
many forms of betrayai (for exan-tple, treason, whistle-blowirrg, ccrllabora-
ticln) becoms ixnnenscly complex. Indeed, betrayal will aliways involve
violation of trust, But the syec$c nzeant~tgof that violation is context de-
pendent. Hence, altt-tough the cmstruction of the specific culturai cate-
w r y of violatit~gtrust, in iEs various forms, is universal, the specific
meaning of that category is not.
For example. Friedrichs (like a few others) feels that the central charac-
teristic of white-collar crirninality is the violation of trust (1996:11). and he
titled his book i r r z ~ s t n lCrirrrinals. In this respect, one may indeed find
some comrnon anatyticaf parallels betvveen L\lhite-collar crimiz~alsand
traitors. Moreover, Friedrichs pohts out that when levels of societal dis-
trust increase, people tend to become distrustful and c>inical(1936:12).
The second line of ~ a s m i n g is more ethnome&odolsgical. W ~ a aret
the mderlying assulnptions of the social rel&ionship called trust, whose
violation causes such a harsh reaction? Trust assumes such social relation-
ships as loyal"Ey,7fiendship, faith, and belief. It also assums that there is
an implicit c~~lality of such social refatimship as primary relationship and,
to some degree, perhaps eve11 intimacy- These qualities constitute both
necessary and sufficient condit-ionsfor the social construction of reality it-
s&. Without these, no such constructions wodd be possible because it
would not be feasibte to maintain consistency pers;istence, and prtldictian
of social relationships. Faithfuhess, as implied. by trust and loyalty, is an
essential m d vital ingredient of social life, Without it, "society-could sirn-
ply not exist . . . for any length oE time"' (Simmelfin Wolff f,950:379).Viola-
tion of trust shatters what actors view as the "natural order of things" be-
cause it destroyt; the perception of reality constructions. Moreover,
violation of trust tends to involve deception m d lying, wfiich, according
to Simme2, are among the most destructive forces in social interactions
(Wolff 1950:312-3 16).
However, it needs to be stated th& s m e lying may be absolutely neces-
sary for a successfull, ongoing social, relationship, Social interaction can-
not survive without some measure of deception. If we wew honest all t-he
time, about everylhing and evcryolle, social inkractian-as we h o w it---
woujd probably not be possible because societies and cultures would dis-
integrate into chaos, k r y k w people, if any, can-r wmt t
the complete, unaduiterded truth. Lying and deception, therefore, are
continuous variables. Deception can range from sinnplp putting on
makeup and other cosmetics to deceptive fnfidetity Some lies a d decep-
tions are socially accepted; others are not. h d , t?$ai.n, we are faced here
with a contextual variable. h a way, some lies may be used to affjrmtnlst.
?"hey may be used to show how much we cart. about our interacting part-
ners. We may hide from them unpleasant truths and construct a more
comfortable reality This view supports the constructionist apymach
taken here, and it does not contradict the statement about the common
conceptual core. However, examining deception cont-exwally as a contin-
uous variable implies that the contilluum has ends and extremes, S h -
mel's observation that clteception has a high potentid to rufn c u l t w s
must be interprekd in this context.
Violation of trust disrupts the perception, or illusion, of consensual re-
ality constmctjons. However, the tfijng that is denied a d s h a t t e ~ din
treason, for example, is not only a social relationship but another funda-
mental facet of the human existence: the social self, In this sense, L&-
mann's (1995:127-329) observation that the opposite of trust is not dis-
trust but a sellse of dread or even anomie and a state of anxiey producing
normlessness fits well.
Hence, t-he vhlation of tmst tends to e k i t a strclng emotional maction
in the form of severely hurt feelings. For exanngle, the invocdion of a
c h a s e of treason necessitates showing an ifztelztkn to systematirally be-
tray, deceive, and lie to the victirnis. Thus, traitors are typicalv grrnished
severely becmse treason always elicits the motivation for revenge or, its
Western equivalent, justice.

Loyalty
The element that accompanies trust h our analysis is loyalty. This ele-
ment introduces a tone of mcertahty into violations of trust. Although it
is difficult: to circumvent the issue of trust loyalty rewirt.s a directional
definition-IyaIty to w h m , or to what, It is not too difficult to see that
we can tmst and not be loyal (for example, having a bank account). It is
much m r e difficult to be loyal m d distrustful. However, some people
defined. as traitors have maintained. that they were loyal to a specific
country but mistrusted its specific form of gove ent, such as loyal Ger-
mans who distrusted Hitler. Let us examine two illustrative cases.

The Case of Mordechai Va'anunu. Israel's policy regarding its nuclear

weaponvmgrm has been crystallized in &e statemat, "Israel shail not be
the first one to use nu&= weay-ons." This policy on nuckar w a p m s has
been characterized as being ""deliberately opayuer"see Avner Cohm 1998).
Va'munu djsagreed and &ou(i;ht &at 1111 dixlnmre was a better poficy
Born in 1954 to a Jewir;h orthodox fadly, Va"anunu studied at Ben-
Gurion ulliversity in the Israeli Negev. Needing some s o m e of income,
he began to work inJmuary 1,977 as a techicim in the Israeli nudcar re-
actor near Dimma. Vakanuslu was trajxzed in 1976 fur the job and siwed
an agreement in which he agreed to keep bis knowledge secret and confi-
dential. After about eight years, he kfir his job (accordirrg to some sources
he was laid off). Tn the early 1980s, Vakanunu begm to be polit.icalfy active
and demonstrated affinities with the Israeli left. Moreover, he was also
disillusioned with the Jewish faith. In January f 984 he left Israel for Aus-
tralia, where he converted to Christianity. From there he continued his
voyage to Londall where he told the Sunday Times (August 1986) that Is-
rael had an arselnal n( ahovlC 200 nllclenr weapons (way above what most
experts thought the countv actually had). He was rewaded quite nicely
by the newspaper (scrme sourtles state that he was paid US$1C)O,C)Of)).In
September 1984, just a few days before the S u t ~ d a y7inzcs published the
story, agents of the Israeli s e c ~service
t (Mossad)used a ""honey trap" (an
agent called ""Cindy") to lure V a h u n u into leaving Londm and travel-
ing to Rome. There he was E d ~ ~ a p p eby d agelzts of the Mossad, brought
to Israel, charged with espionage and treason, and in 1988 sentmced to
seventeen years in prism.8 For reasons that are not entimly clear, he was
kept in solitary coninernew for about twelve years ( s o m say for secur2y
reasons, others maintain that this was a measure of revenge aimed to
drive him crazy). He was let out of solitary confinement in 1998. In a self-
serving interview that he gave to the Szrnday Tinzls on April 39, 1998, he
stated Ihat he would not hesitate to do what he did aga.in becarnse he had
acted under a deep conviction and belief ill the appropriatmess of his ac-
ticms, acting ccnarageously alone against the entire Israeli security estab-
lishment. Va'anunu was qwick to point out trhat his revelations were made
out of a genuille concern for Israeli sorriety, despite the fact that Israel has
come to view him as guhlic enemy number one."
'There is, of course, nothing unique about Va'rtnunu's saccount. Many
whistle-blowers, or spies, have given similar accounts exgresshg loyalty
to their countr)i (or organization) but distrust toward specific govern-
mmts (or executives), polides, or rcgimes.

The Case of Machum Martbar, A somewhat similar case came to its cul-
mhation on. July 16, 1998, when three Israeli judges cmvicted fiAy-two-
year-dd. Nachum Manbar of betraying Israel by supplyhg Iran (dmQ
1992-1994) with materials required to manufacture agents for chemical
warfare for a hefty profit. Specificalfy, Nanbar was fad g d t y of aiding,
and attempting to aid, the enemy (Iran) in its conflict with Israel and giv-
ing the e n e y hfurmation intended to damage Israel? ndional security.
Manbar, an ex-KibbMznjk alld ex-paratrooper in tbc lsraelj army, was
sentenced to sixteen years in prison. His act of treason was stated as
""worse &an that of Vakal-runu,'"lMdIsrael's prilne minister-Bhyamir
Netanyahu-stated trhat Marlbar "'sold his s o d to the devil."^^ Manbar, of
course, denied the chaqes and claimed that the state of Israel allowed
other Israelis to trade with Irm and that, therefore, what he did was not
so deviant, The prosecution responded by stating, first, that the st..ate au-
thorized many activities that independent indivjduals were not allowed
to do and second, that Manbar was never allowed to sell chemicals to Iran
that cotdd be used in chemical warfare. Ilvfmbi-tr" accounts were rejeded
by the court,

Within a mftitary cmtext, the main association of tmst is with liepend-

&ilit.y reljabilit.~,but most of all of with loyalty and hcnce wit-h honor, In
a boundary defining paper, Captain Omerod (W.S. Marine Corps :Re-
serve) writes that:

loyalty is defined as faithfulness to commitments or obligatians, or an adher-

ence to a saver-eign, a government, a cause, or the like. It ecjnnotes sentiment
and the feeling of devotion that one holds for one's country; creed, family;
and friends. In the military sense, loyalty is defined by the Marine Corps . . .
 as "the quaXiv <of rendering EaijthEuI and willing service, while accepting
one's duties and responsibilities with selflessness. This evaluation is a mea-
sure of loyalty to the unit, the Marine Corps, and the Natian, not just to se-
niors. (1997:55)

Pincher, who discusses treason within the framework of loyalty

(1987:l-14), states that loyalty means 'konstancy in a trust or obligation"
(p. 1)."Thus, even the definiticm of loyalty invokes trust. But the two can,
and should, be separated analytically and linguistically Lay alty means
constancy in a relationship, dependency, and long-term faithfulness be-
tween (or ammg) the parties involved; and t ~ a s o nmeans that ""lcrylty"
becomes negotiated, bmken, or questio~~able.
One can be loyal to many things-to one" friend, country, religion,
territory, politic& systern, and so on. An interesting conflict may emerge
when one is faced wjth incommensusabl,e loyalties: between one" soun-
try and one's friends; between m d s country and family (for example,
the case of the Walker spy ring); between one's country and one's politi-
cal vjews; or between one's political and professional views. When
Daniel Ellsberg revealed to the Nr?w Yra& Times what has become known
as the Pentagon Papers, he clearly showed his preferred moral loyalty:
Stopping the war in Viewam. took precedence over his obligations to his
employers in the Uefense Department. When Wmunu revealed. the
scope and magnitude of Israel's nuclear weapon program he too opted
for loyalty to his ideas about. peace rather than to his previ,ous employer
in the Israeli nuclear program. The klstory of religions clearly provide us
with some spectacdar examples: 'f"homas Becket, Jeanne d"Arc, Jesus,
and many olhers.
An important distinction Pincher makes is between major and minor
loyalties. Not every loyally is characterized by the same d e g ~ of e impor-
tance, moral weight, or impact. 'Thus, Pincher argues that it is not only
possible but warranted to stratify one" llrzyaltics by criteria of importance.
Pincher does not spell out who exactly is to perform this stratification of
loyalties or hocv it can be accomplished. His suggestion is related to Ihe
issue of value incommensurabili.ty discussed in 199'3,by Cohen and Ben-
Ari. The problem, simply put, is that many situaticms are characterked by
i~~cornmens~lrabilii-y of values, as individuds tend to rank and stratify
their values. Loyalty is hdeed a value, and incomensurability betwem
loyalties may rise, for example, between the loyalty to one's country ver-
sus Ihe loyalty to one's ffre~zds.What Pincher fails to telS us is that loyal-
ties arc stratified accodhg to the prevailing cultural moralities adhemd.
to by a specific indiwidual or gmup.
Fletcher (1993) advocates returnhg to loyalty to o ~ ~ esotmtry
's as a cen-
tral remedy for many modcrn ills. Combinjng loyalty to one" ccauntry
and increased national trust as main ingredients of modern identities
may, in fact, pave the way for renewal in nationalism (and hence, in re-
newed defhitions of treason).
Loyaity is a more complex variable than trust, Furthermore, in a plural-
istic society where any one person occupies a set of roles and possibly
holds a number of loyalties, it may not be uncmmnn to face a painful
dilemma of irtcommensurahility. The '"enemy" (Aho 1994) in such soci-
eties may be difficult to defhe. And yet societies and culhlres have to de-
f ne their moral boundaries, & a & y creating and contextualizing their
""strangers" and '"enemies." Excluding both different individuals and cat-
egories of people ena:bles thr cmstmction of collective feelings oE c&e-
sive togetherness and identity. The case of Marlene Dietrich (discussed in
detail later h this book) is a good illustration lfor the first case, and the ex-
clusim of Jews by Nazism (or more t;enerdl>i,anti-Sen-titism) is an illus-
tration for the second. Xnability to do that may mean social clisintegration,
loss oE local and cohesive cultures, and-possibly-the formation of a
new cuttural order. A gtobal one perhaps. H w e v e ~ even , such new
boundaries will exclude some m d incl~~de others. The " e n e ~ ~ yw"Ml still
be there, in a diffemt format and context. Betrayal may actudly be one of
those social categories that will survive even globahation.

Violations of Tmst and Loyalty

Trud and loyalty are fundamental facets of cultures, When they fail,
chaos follows. The violation of trust and loyalty is typically characterized
by one of the many forms of betrayai, for ertample, treason. It is important
to note that invoking the term ""teason,'% turn, elicits a set of concepts
associated with it, such as revolt, sedition, insurrection, disobedience,
mutiny, uprising, and suhversiftn. Skilar terms are associated with other
farms of betray&, such as treachcry, deception, trickery, perfidy, m d infi-
delity. It is thus obvious that m y one particdar form of betrayal is associ-
ated with complex cognitions and emotions. In the next chapter I shati
chart the different forms of betrayal, and in Chapter 3, I will explore each
form in depth.

Cultural Percept im of Violating Trust and Loyalty

Individuals and gmups do not take lightly violations of trust and loyalty.
However, the distinctiun between betraying onc's country and betray'ing
me% close friend, lover, or farnib is significant. Treason has frequently
elicited the death penalty. In fact, in both Israel and the United e g d o m ,
w k r e the death penatty does not exist for reguiar criminal behavior, trea-
son is nevertheless punishable by death. Not so for personal betrayal,
Even the terms are different: Treason is used primarq within the political
context and betrayal in the personal contertc.
Moreover, acts of b c t r a d seem to be co~~structed
as main cultural tales.
The theme of betrayal of trust and loyalty is strong and powerful and lies
at the very core Of many cultws. Let us examh~esome illustrations.

ts of Betrayal from Ancieat Greece

Accou~
Reading the history of both ancient Greece and irnperial Rome reveals
numerous accounts oi betrayd. Ancient Greece provides us with an era
and a location rife with narratives involving changing loyalties and sup-
pow"Cfreason,especialXy as Greek moved thejs loyalties from one side to
another, Two illustrations are present& here,
'fhe first illustration is the "last stmdf?at.tle staged by King Lemidas
m d his t h e hundred Spartans at the pass of mermopfiae (inAugust or
September 980 13.c.).That battle turned. agaitnst the Spartans when a
Greek ~ n e g a d enamed Ephialtes informed the attackiq Persians of a
passage through the hills. Utilizing that passage the Persims cot~1dbring
a significant number of soldiers behind the Spartans. That done, the fate
of the battle was doomed, against the Spartans. Thus, the activities cJf one
Greek who sided with the Pershns aga,inst the Greeks hclped the Persians
win a decis-ivebattle (Dupuy and Dupuy 1970~26;Phi14p 1934:12).
The second illustration is focused on the activities of Alcibiades, a
statesman and warrior, in the fifth celntury R.C. His actions, and the con-
text, are too complicakd to be described bere in detail, but let me just give
a gene'& and brief outline. Alcibiades was active during the Pefopon-
nesim Wars. Me kept switching from Athens to Sparta and vice versa,
maneuvering in a very complex political and military situation. While he
led Athenian forces to battte, a campaign against hirn had been raging in
Athens. Me kvas m r t enough to escape to Sparta as an Atknian court
sentmced him to dcath. In Sparta, he gave the 5pa"t"ns some crucial ad-
vice on how to win their contlict with Athem. Evex~tuaily, Alcibiades lost
his base of power in Sparta, too, and he again fled to Tissaphemes. From
these, he tricd. to pave a possible comeback to Athens, and in fact, be re-
turned and later headed the Athenim fleet to battle. He returned from his
baMles to a hero's welcome and was dected as strdegos for 407406 R.C.
and appointed as the chief commander of all Athenian forces, Following a
failed naval battle in Notium (sprillg of 406 B.C.), his oppcments were able
to elect new commanders, and Alcibiades had to flee again, That was the
beginning of his end. Although be tried to find a new asylum in Asia,
when Lysandros demanded that he be given to him, an order was given
to kiil him. Reading the history of hlcibiades, in its relevant context, sim-
ply leaves one gasping with a iast-spinning head.12 If the situated and
contextual meming of treason can be obfuscated and made totally con-
t a t liependent, then the adventures of Alcibiadt3.s illustrate it. Moreover,
the city of Athens once saw him as a hem, then passed a dealh sentence
agairzst him as a traihr, then welcomd him again as a hero. The changing
cmfigurations of power m d moralities, as reflected in his public image
m d his actions, are simply staggerhg.

Pehaps the most salient cultural construction that comes to mind is the
prototypical betrayai of Judas Iscariot. According to the prevalent Chris-
tian ~rersio~~,
Judas betrayed Christ by exposing his movements and sell-
ing that infornation to the chief priests m d elders for & i r e pieces of sil-
ver. 7'hey provided thc.armed guard brought: to the Garden of Gethsemme
near Jerusaleln to arrest Christ, who went there to pray with the Apos-
tles Collawing the Last Supper. Morcroves, it was Judas who identified
Christ by a kiss, adclressing him as "master.'Thus, Judas, appearing
dose to Christ, kjssing him and addl-essi,mg him with an hierarchical
term., was the one whO, underneath that facade of friendship, trust, and
loyalty, betrayed him.
The traitor in this narrative plays a powerful cdtural script, m i l e he
appew"o be a cliose and loyal friend, he is deceitful. Allhougfii Judas"s
motives aren't tntimly clear, he is constructed as m archetypical traitor.
The man who pretends to be trustworthy one of "us," and loyal actually
errzhodies the opposite traits, H e is nut loyal to the gmup but to that inan-
irnate object cailed money; he is engaged h deliberately misleading be-
havior, which projects loplty m d love, while in fact, he is very host;ile.
All th major elements of betrayal can be found inthis narrative: violation
of trust, loyaltyf and commitment, coupled with a Eundamental cltecep-
tion. Indeed, the name of Judas lscariot has become a culhral icon. It: is
interesting to note that Nazi ideology used the term "Judas-Jude" to cre-
ate a comection m d idmtification between "Jedgm d "traitorff (Snyder
1976:IM).

OtFzer Biblical Illustrations

The Bihlle provides us with some other intriguing illustrations. How
about Samson and Delilah"23 Around the year 1161 B.C. the Israelites
f o ~ ~ nthemselves
d e r domination of the Fhilistines, m e of the Is-
u ~ ~ dthe
raelite judges was Sarnson, born at the supposed inremention of an angel
to a mother who was married for many years but had been "oarrcsn. The
mgel told her that this divhe intervention would yield a boy who would
be dedicated to God and who would rid the Israelites of the Philist-ines"
yoke. Samsm grew to have an amzilrg physical strength. Eventually he
married a Philistine girl, but the marriage did not work. Sarnsfrn then
turned his superior physical strengt%lagainst the Philistines, lkiilllng mmy
of their people.
The critical rnorncynt came when Samson met Defilh. W~ethershe was
actually sent to him by the Philisthes or used by them after she got in-
volved with Samson is not known, In any event, it is clear that Delilah
acted as an agent of the Phifisfines, charged with the task of fh~dingout the
sccret of his strength. Smsan must have been aware of fhe treaderous na-
ture of Deljlafii because at first he evaded. her questions, Evenhxaliy, h w -
ever, she wcm him over, m d he told her the secret of his strengfi-his hair.
That was his end. Once she cut his hair, the powerless Smson was arrested
m d ridiculed, His dea&-like his lif+w;.ls vialent, With his bare hmds he
tore down the milistinc-, temple, destroying self along with his enemies,
Del,i,lahwas awarded eleven hw~dredpieces o( silves for hcr successful
mission. It is clear that Samson" trust in Delilah was betrayed. Was
Delilah a traitor? This is not an easy question to mswer. Clearly, her loyal-
ties, like those of Judas, fay with money and with the Jl"hilistines. Clbvi-
ously, Sarnson should have not trusted her,
Another Biblical story involves fael, Heber Hakeinifswife, who assassi-
nakd Sisera (Mlho had oppressed the people of lsracl auelly for twelnty
years), Aiter his defeat in the battle against Rarak,l4 Sisera came to Jael's
tent to rest, trusting that he was in a safe place and irr tbr company of a
loyal woman. But Jael, ading loyally to her own peaple, violated Sisera's
tmst and.murdered him in his sleep.

The &erne cJf betrayal is also very powerfui in cmtemporary culturd fic-
tion. Clne of the most SMCC~SS~LII.seicnce fiction books, Du~se,by Frank
Herbert (made into a movie in 19%), has treason at its root (Dr. Uue be-
trays the trust of the Duke, causing his d o d a f l and death). Many sci-
e11ce fiction and adventure movies have betrayal as a main theme. The
first Star Mlam trilogy has treacher). as a major theme (Darth Vader moves
to the Dark Side ol the Force); hzdilrnn Juries and fbe Tazple of Dam (1984)
has hdiana Jones telf the head of the Kali cult that ""you betrayed Shiva";
Fahrenheit 451 (1967) has a 'Yfirc.fighterm"tray his assigned employers;
Fafiidden Isla~et(1956)has Dr. Morbeus betraying everyme, even himself;
2001-A Space Odyssey (1968) deals with a bekayal by a computer; and
TJze M a l r h (1999) has its own traitor, The eighteenth James Bond movie,
GoEden Eye (1995) has t ~ a s t mat its center. War movies frequently have
traitors and betrayat at their center as well. TI-rr. Bridge on the Riwr Kzwi
(1957), A &id86 at Xemagen (1969), Apocal:jpse Now (1979), Rattle uf the
Bulge (1965), The Cozrt-rie$eit Tuaifor (1862), The Guns of Navarone (1961),
Sfu@ 17 (1963) are all first-rate war movies involving betrayal as a main
theme. Major a c t i o ~adventure
~ movies released in the late 1990s have be-
trayal as a central theme: Amold Schwarzeneggefs 1996 m o v i Eraser has
treason as a mail1 theme; both The Net (1996) and Braveheart (1995) also
have tstlason at their center. Other popular movies, such as Air Force 7,
play on the theme of betrayal as well. One could easily write a decent-
sized work on the theme of betrayal and treason in movies alone.
'The cry "traitar'kr ""tieaso~~""invokes powerful culkral icons. It: tends
to unite people against the traitor and requires that they exercise power
through their ability to define specific contextual forms of behawior as
trust ~riolationsand disloyalty. This process requires the reexamhation of
moral boundaries and the definition of who is to be trusted and why, The
pmishment of a traitor strengthens the cohesion and integration of a cul-
ture's moral perceptions. The history of"the British monarchs is full ol
tales of treason. The Tower of London even has a "Traitor" Gate," We
need not go far to remind ourselves of such farnous traitors as Thomas B
Becket and momas More. But treacherous behavior was quite prevalent
in the 19;70s-1990s, too, Let us examisle some illustrations,

Contemporary Exanz ples of Violations of Trust and Loyalty

Charges of Betrayal in the Philippines. For almost a y?xarter of a cm-
tury, the conff,ictbetwem the Christidn majority and the Muslim minority
in the southern Philippines has torn that country apart. In Septennber
1996 a ceremony took place fn Malacar?angPalace in Manila for the s ip-
ing of a peace treaty between then President Fidel R m o s and Muslixn
rebel leader Nur Misuari. The cesemony was supposed to continue in
Mindanao, home for most of the Pi-tilippines' 6 milljon Muslims. How-
ever, m n y of the Christians in Mindanao were unwilling to accept the
peace treaty, Anyone watclnhg television news could hear people stating
their disbelief in this peace and see the signs of protest in processions of
Christians wcusing liarnos of betrayal.13

Betrayal in the Church, In Ex~gland,a more personal scandal took place

in Scpternber 1996. 'The BBC and dajly newspapers report& that a Ro-
man Catholic bishop had disappeared. The fifty-six-year-old Bishop of
Argyll and the Isles, the Rt. Rev. Roderick Wight, had disappeared on
Manday, Septe~~ber 9,1996. C-011cem about his disappearmce prompted
calls in the media by church ofiials h r the bjshop to h o w signs of life,
and prayers were said for hirn. Then, on September 16, the vanishing
bishop &d send a sign of life. As time passed, it becam clear that the
bishop had. prcibably disappeared with a forty-me-year-old divorc4e-
Ka thleen MacPhe b whom he had had a long-"andjng iriendship
and who had con with hhn about her divorce. This revelation cre-
ated a heated debate about the celibacy rule for Roman Catholic priests.
At this pojnt, the disappearing hihop was portrayed as a good and hon-
est man, very well-liked by his parish, who had just fallen in love.]"
However, the ati~ospherechanged dramatically when anothcr woman,
m n a Whibley, appeared on television and told stunned viewers that
she and Bishop Wrigbt had had a romantic affair fifteen years earlicr, the
result of which was I-he birth of her son Kevin Wibley Fifieen-year-old
Kevin appeared on television, too, a d made sorme unflattering state-
ments about his absent father. This opened the kodgates for other
womem to come forward and confess about their relationships with
priests. For example, Mrs. Adriama AlsworUl told astonished audiences
that her two children were f a t h a d by a parish priest. Bishop Wright now
was portrayed more as a dishonest, deceivjng, and manipulative man.
His rtrsili;nation was accepted.
Leading figures in the Catholic Church labelcd the runaway bishop a
traitor,l7 describing his acts as betrayal. The Bishop W= never really the
man he pretended to be. En other words, Bishop Wright was accused oi vi-
olating trust and lvalty, That this violation inwolwed a monumental de-
crcption only d d e d fuel to the burning fumace of rage against hian28
cT)n %ptember 22,1996, News of the Wcrrld published an cxtcnsive inter-
view with Bishcrp Wright." h it, the away bishop adn-titted that six-
teen years earlier, he had indeed had a relationship with Ms. WhibleyJ
and he asked for her and Kevjn" forgiveness. r-fc also admitted that at the
time of the interview, he was romantically Fnvalved with Kathleen
Macmee, a divorced m & e r of t h e e c,hildren, and in a joint interview
both lovers talked about their illicit love. Xt is interesting to note that the
couple found it important to state that they did not have sex." Respond-
ing to a question in the televised interview, the Bishop added that he ac-
cepted the responsibility for his betrayal oi the cburch, His clarifkatim
was that he understood betrayal to mean that he had left the church,ZJ
which was a very different "understandimg" than the one provided ear-
lier by the leaders of the church.
These drmatic events created a g ~ aeteat t of discussion in the media
about celibacy and the fact that the= were m y cases of priests having
such relatimshjys with women. The charge of betrayal in these cases is
obvious: It is a betrayal of a commitment. Moreover, because of the naturt-
of this viotation of trust, it is typically done in secret and defhlitely in-
volves deception (certainly at th begixtsrjng).
:It is i n t e ~ s t h gthat the issue of sexuai standards for the clergy has E-
maincd a focus of pllblic discussion (Woodward 1997). In this case, an act
of deviance helped to launch a pubfic debate about moral boundaries,
Betrayal in Wong Kong. En July 1997, FIong Kong became past of China,
and Britain's last governor of Hong Kong, Chris Fatten, left the cowtry.
The nonviolent event received gelzerous global coverage and was cele-
brated lavishly by the Chinese, During the few years leading uy to the
move, a dclbate had raged. Was nondemcratic China going tcr tderate a
more delnocratic Hang Korrg? Governor Pattell certainly tried to intro-
duce a number of dernmratk measures before his departure, but that was
not to China's liking. Janathan Uimbleby" book The last Governor leaves
little doubt regardjng the nature of Patteds accusations against some of
the top adzninistrators in Britain, Jenkins (199;a)and Heald (19971, both re-
viewers of the book, were quick to grasp it-treason.
'The implications of Governor Patten's thoughts are profound in the
sense that what he experienced was fiesce objection from a series of
British high officials who seemed to have done their utmost to appease
China" antidemocratic inclinations by blocking every step toward
democracy taken by Patten. Patten" eexperiarncc also ixnplies that his op-
pments deceived the British political democracy in orcler tcr keep millions
of inhabitants in Mong Kong in Che darkncss of nondemocracy As Jc~zkins
states, Patten's accusations suggest that he was betrayed by opposing
Bril;ish officials. h other words, treason on the Briitish side is insinuated.
Moreover, in July 1997, six Hong Kong police ofiicers resigned over plans
to use tough new steps agairtst democracy activists. mese new stepwere
viewed by China as new l w s agai~~st treason," Of course, Patten's critics
would give a different versi.on of events, perhaps focused on principles of
realpolitik.

Reflexivity and Morality

Betrayal as a socially cmstructed phmcrmnon cmstitutes a complicated
subject. However, at its very core lies an essential min slrueture and a
process. To begin with, betrayaI can be accomplished onIy by those who
are. members of the gmup that they betray. This issue of "membership" is
of crucial impctrtance. Without it, charges of betrayat may somd hoilow.
Thus, the charge of Newnham (19%) that New Zealand could. be viewed
as a "treasmouS"' state because of its ~lationshipwith South africa dur-
ing apartheid requires a very liberd view of what membership means.
Athough membership is a necessary condition, it is nut sufficient. .A
structure cmposed of two major violations needs to materialize if we are
it? invoke the label of betrayd. C)ne violation is of trust, the other of loy-
alty. When a member of a group is engaged in a process of violating both
tmst and loyalty, the invocation of the term "traitor" to chararkrize fie
behavior of that individual is not far behind. However, there are several
important factors to consjlfer when making such a characterization. Did
the behavim occur in the open or in stealth? What are the Easons given
by the indiwidual for tbr bcrhavior? There are different types and degrees
of betrayal. Was the betrayal a discrete event or an ongoing activity?W r e
the viofations of trust and. loyalty carried out by one person or by a
group? Mihat was the social stabs of the individud c ~ group? r 'The contat
in whi_h the bettayai occurs is of crucial importmce.
:In pluralistic cultures the meming of '"membership" in a collective can
become extremely probhatic. n e s e problems am complicated further
by t-he meaning one attades to "1oyyalty""and to "trust" Although individ-
uals from two opposing symbolic moral universes m y agree that betrayal
involves issues of m b e r s h i p and viola~onsoE trust and loyalty, their ap-
plication of these concepts will probably be e12tirtJly different, To push this
m t to its extreme, a Pjazi and a Jew may agree that my argument E-
15;11(;lingthe nabre of betrayal is valid, but they may choose entimly differ-
ent cases and may even interpret &em ha contradictory mamer, render-
ing their initial agreement irdevant. In other words, it is not enough let
esthlish some princir>lesand then apply tbrm in an undiBerentiated mat-
ter. mere are qrxalitative differences between cases, and we need to pay at-
tention to the relevant context or else we may end up with some absurdi-
ties. m a t are these differences? One major factor is morality.
What this argument imflies is that it may be impractical, perhaps even
futile, to discuss "betrayal'kithout being judgmentd at the same time.
""Jddgmental"' in tbis case simply means a conte-al ethical and moral
evalualjon of the case, the selectinn of cases, and the langzlage used, Thusf
I agree with Goode (1997) that, first and foremost, we need to get our facts
straight. :However, m e we do that, there is noth121g wtmg with attribut-
ing moral v a l ~ ~to e s the facts when that e v a l ~ ~ a tseelns
i o ~ ~ necessary and
appmpriate. For example, it is difficult, even wrong, to describe and inter-
pret a ct,ncentration/death camp in completely neutral terms.
Even if the tone of a presefiation seems neutraii, the very act of select-
ing cases and illustrations, as well as the choice of words to describe these
cases, f o m s a judgmental process. It may thus be advantageous to be
open about the posilion from \zrhich one m k e s evaiznative statements, se-
lects cases, and chooses words,
The fact that we do not have, for example, the account of Judas Iscariot
far his actions makes it very easy br us to brand hinn as a traitoc How-
ever, knowhg much more about such traitors as Benedict Amold, Vidkun
(Iluisting, Roger Casement, Lcrd Haw-Hw, Malinali Tenepal, Ozaki Hot-
sumi, and others discussed h the chapters of this book, makes the deci-
sion in their cases much mort. difficult. I will take their designations as
traitors by the dominant cuiturt-s in which they lived as given and will ex-
plore why they were treated as such. Furthermore, I will use the cases to
test the hypothesis that in each case violations of trust and loyalty oc-
curmd. However, in asking such questions as ""whose loyalty and trust
were breachefl'bnd ""what was the meaning of those breaches?""we
shall quickly reach issues of moral boundaries and hcommensurability
of values, as well as decipherirtg the specific context of tbe cases, At that
point, it will be wise to make a moral stand on these issues; m t only will
it e~~hance the hterpretation and make it more u~~derstmdable, but it is
unavoidable (see Hausner 1998).
:111 summary this book seeks to expose the elementary forms of betrayal
m d the common core that criharacterizes all a d s of betrayal. It is this c m -
mon core that permits me to examine the different cases as instances of a
configuration or syndrome that not only is defhitionalty unified but also
has c o m o n dynantics. The combhation o( th-is core and the cascs re-
quires laying out a typology of betrayd. Together, this core and typology
will e ~ ~ a bus
l e to examine infidelity and espionage as fom of the same
gez~eralphenomenon. This approach compels us to view betrayal as a
continuum or spectrunn rather than an either-or proposition. Moreover,
this approach implies that the characterization of a given act as an in-
stance of betrayal is laherentIy probiernatic. Fhally, I examine betrayd as
a type of deviant behavior and,as such, as amenable to the sorts of analy-
sis to which sociologists have subjected m m traditional forms of de-
viance. In, this respect, this book continues my previous work, which ex-
amined deviance in science, witchcraft, science fiction (1985), politics
(1990), assassination (1993) and myth (4995).

The first three chapters form Part I. This part provides the conceptual
framework (Chapter I), a typology of betrayal (Chapter 2), and an in-
depth exploration of different types of betrayaf (Chapter 3). Hawing ac-
quainted ortrselves with t k conceptual framework, t then focus on one
particular form of t~achery-treason. Tn this particular form, the issues
of membership, power, morality, m d moral boundarieeas well as those
of violating trust atnd loyaity-are very salient. Part 2 first gives a histori-
cal and conceptual: review of treason (Chapter 4) and then delves into
quite a k w cmes of treasm, acmss time and countries, utilizing the con-
ceptual framcvork laid out in Part I, X examjne the various cases in-
volved in World War ZI (Chapters 5 and S), the cases of radio trairtors Lord.
Haw-Haw and Tokyo Rose (Cl~apter71, the cases of Ezra Pound m d b u t
Hamsun (Chapter 8)' the case of Kkg Edward WI as a possible traitor
(Ghapter the case of Malinche (during the Spanish conquest of Mex-
icwChapter 101, and some cases of treason in Judaism and Israel (Chap-
ter 11).The Conclusion presents a summary of the boors main ideas and
fhdhgs.
This page intentionally left blank
 ating Trust and Loya

The Analytical and Structural Nature

of Violating Tmst and Loyalty
The behavior that evokes the label of betrayal consists of a universal
stmcturt? in which wiotating moral boundaries of two important values
takes place: those of trust and loyalty. mese violations tend to involve
different levels of threat potentials, both for the inteversonal level (for
example, hfidelity) and the state level (for example, sedition, treason).
The traitor is a persan who pretends to be very close, even intimately so,
loyal, and tmstvvorthy to specified individuals and/ or collectives, but in
reality he or she is as far as m e can be from the &owe pretense. "Far,'"
howe~rer,is an hnocent term, The traitor is diametrically opposed, even
hostile, to the essence/persm/ collective being betrayed. Sometim.es, at
the basis of betrayai there may lurk a sizeable lie and dtrtception. Both es-
pionage ""moles" and infidel spouses illustrate this. That lie is typically
of a person who pretends to be friendly and manages to deceke the rele-
want audience i~~tcr believing that his or her falsiied presentation of self
is f;;"~w"inelytrue. It is a lie of a djsltoyal persan who pretends to be byal.
.A lie of a persm who pretends to be honest and interested, but is in fact
manipulatrive, uninterested, a d dishmest. Emotionally, this i s a rather
exptnsivc combination. -The lie and deception seem to be clearer when
the act of betrayal is on the personal level than on the national, or state,
level,
'This interpretation makes it clear that often m act af betrayal vialates,
on the personal level, an Fnragined consensus regarding shared interclsts
and personal identifies and, on the collective level, a sense of an imagined
c o m m i t y (r2nderson 1,491) and of cdlective memorics and national
identities. Betraya2, therefore, breaches the syxnbolic moral boundaries of
28 Viulnti~tgTrust and Loyalty: A Typott7gy

some of the values we cherish the most-those we consider to be very

high in our moral hierarchies and priorities. 'T'he challenge created by be-
trayat on the boundaries of any symbolic moral zlnicferse is formidable-
At the very heart of the various manifestations of betrayal lies a viola-
tion, a deviance from trust and loyalty. It is the systematic, planned
(sometimes cmcealed) violation of these values that bvokes the cztIttxral
label of ""treason" or ""beh.ayal." This is the haurnark and the most impor-
tant distinctive characteristic of betrayal. The cmstmction of the degree
of severity of the betrayal. is typicatly proportion& to the constmcted de-
gree of the violation, There must also be the perception that the one re-
ferred to as "traitor" & '%m of us,'" that is, an assumption of loyalty. If
not, thc label "traitnr" may become problemdic. Thus, a spy who was
""planted" in a different culture thm bis or her own can earn the trust of
those around him, but he or she is not genuinely part of that culture. That
is, the djrection of loyalty is different. Being a bona fide member of a
group is a preconditim of betrayal of that group. Without such a genuine
membership, there can be no meaning to betrayal. For example, the claim
that Willim Joyce (Lord Haw-MW) W= h e r i c m and not English casts
a s h a d w m his betrayal of loyalityeRegardlclss of the legal subtieties in-
volved, the fact is that he defined himself as E~~glish. In that smse, his in-
sistence on a self-adopted English identity rnade his breach of loyalty to
the English m interesting issue.
Betrayal involves the issue of morality in the most: intimate way: It
touches issues of trust, loyalty, honesty, and commitment. Mowwer,
morality is not the mly issue here. h o t h e r major ingredient is power.
First, the power to betray; secmd, the power to decide who betrayed wbo
or what. The salience of these two elements-power and morality-in
cases of treason constitutes the main reasm for my decision to focus on
treason on the collective level in the second part of the book.
As Akerstrom (1991) pointed out., one of the major difkremces between
a hero and a traitor is whether the person in question has a collectivity
supporting him. As an o p e n i n illustration we can use the case of Bene-
dict Amdd, who was mast certainly viewed as a bona fide tra.itor by the
Americans, but not so by the British, The case of Nathasr Hale provides an
inwerse example.

Arnold was born Jmuary 14, 1741, in Norwich, Connecticut. When he

was fourteen years old, he ran away horn h o m to participate in the
h h~dianWar of 17561763. On April 9,1775, at the age of thirty-
F ~ n c and
fo~tr,he joined the Continetntal Army as a captain seming with Colond
Ethan Aflcn and participated in a command position in the successhl at-
 Viulnti~tgTrust and Loyalty: A Typott7gy

PHOTO 2.1 Berz~dictAmotd, E~zguat~itlg by 1. F1"cldr'rigI

2 i"83,from a drnwr'rzg by Pierre Eztgene dia Si?rziti2re,c, 3 777.
SOURCE: R q n P l f d f i ~ Clare
~ r ~ Brtzndf, The Man and the
Mirror: A Life af Benedict ArnoLd CMerxt York Xa~zdom
S-Xotlsr.,3994). 1,hoto from The Collection of the New
York kIistorica1 %xlieqf 40979,

tack on the British-held Fart Rconderaga (New York) in May 1775. He

was later pmmoted to the rank of a colonel. h the fall of 1775, h o l d was
appointed by General George Washington to lead a miti.tary f m e of
about 700 men ta capture Montreal. Despite a remarkable land march
through the Maine wilderness, the attack m the city (Bcernber 31.,1775,
in the middle of a snowstorm) failed. During that mjlitary operation
Amold s~1,Meredserious injuries. Later, h o l d , took part jn a few actions,
the most notable of which was the October 11, 17176, battle of Valcour Is-
lmd. "There, having cmstntcted a flotslla on Lake Chaplain, tbr force he
commanded xnanaged to inf"lict s m e rnajor damage on a much superior
clnemy fieet,
:111 Fehruary of 1777, Amold was passed over for promotion to major
general. by Congress..'The bitterness caused by this incident must have
been profound for Am&.
30 Viulnti~tgTrust and Loyalty: A Typott7gy

:In Agril 1777 British forces raided Uanbury. Arnold (who was visiting
his family in New Haven at the time) got hirnself very quickiy involved in
a fight against Chose British forces (together with Generill David Wooster).
Amold's combat conduct won him much appreciation-& his much
sought after promotion to the rank of major general. However, his pmmtl-
tion clid not restore his semiority over those whO were promoted before
him, bring September and October oi that year, the Battles of Saratoga
took place. &ring those battlt.s he was wounded im his kg. Washington
achodedged Amold's courageous role in Saratoga and showered him
with precious gifts. :In October 1777 be was cited as the victor of the Bat-
tles of Saratoga. His battle conduct forced Congress to restore his senior-
ity At this paint, it appears that Washingtozz cmsidered Arnald to be his
best- field commander and one of his most tmsted and reliable military
men, Unquestionably, Amold was an able and dedicated military com-
mander. F-fe is co~zsideredby many to have been one of the most capt?ble
generals of the Americm Revolutionary
Arnold" svvounds prevented him from going back to an active fietd
command, and he was appointed military governor of Philadelpkia fob
lowing the Krlitish evacuation of that city in June 1778. There he irnrnersed
himself in the pteasures of city life and embarked on some commercial
ventures. In June he also met Margaret (Peggy) Shippen, who was to have
a major influence on his life.
The following year (1279) prtwed to be a stormy year for Amdd. While
he was the military govcrnor of Phjladelphia, he was suvected of viola-
tions in raising funds (February) to support an extravagant lifestyle. Dc-
spite AmoZd" protests, Congress ordered in April that he be court-
martided. The trid began in June and ended in Jmuary 1780 with h o l d
being cleared. of all charges except me.1 The sentence that the court rec-
ornmended was an 'bofEicial puhlic prim and from the commander in
chief." Congress c m f j r m d the verdict on Fcbruary E!, 1780.2 Even that
was too much for Amold, fur he expected to be iully acquitted.
At this point in his life, Amold must have felt p t t y
his distinguished nnilitary record, his career path was not smooth and
was rrddled with some very unpleasant events. His promotion to the
rank of major general had been delayed, and when he fhally won his
promotion, his seniority was ofillcially recog~zizedonly later. He had to
experience the unpleasant (and.humiliatirtg) event of facing charges of
corruption in a court-martial, and he was found guilty on one charge. He
must have felt mismated, frustrated, and upset, and his bitterness must
have been growirrg throughout 1779. Brandt suggests that Amold. must
have felt abandoned and btrayed by his country, so that

i f the Congress-if America-had truly abandoned him, perhaps he shaufd

retu1-n the favctr; if the country in tzrt-rosecause he I-tad suffel-ed so much was
 Viulnti~tgTrust and Loyalty: A Typott7gy 31

truly incapable of appreciating his talents and granting his heart's desires-a
secure fcjrtune and a secure status in a secure society-then perhaps he
should offer his sexlrices to a count^ that could. f1994:175)

Certainly his military record stood in cmtradiution to the other hurniliat-

ing events that occurred to him,
Another major event hdped to fuel his discmtent-his Agril marriage
to Peggy (16s previous wife, Margaret Mansfield, had died in June 1729;),
who was a young woman of Z,oyalist sympathies, The connection be-
twerrn the two was to prove very significant for Amold. Peggy was about
twmty years yoranger than Amold, and she came from a pro-British fam-
ily. Brandt f1994:17ti) suggests that Amold's idea of betraying the Amerj-
cans was supported by Peggy and that they both emerged from their
honeymoon (April 1779) with some mature ideas about shifting their
loyalties to the British. It is well worth noting that during the previous
British occupation of Philadelphia, Peggy had cultivated a good relation-
ship with a Kritish dficer, Major John h d r e . It is thus rather obvious
that 1779 must have bcen a year when A m l d was in a very high degree
of dissonance, an emotional state that was not alleviated by Peggy" po-
litical sympathies.
In May 177"ae began to develop cantacts with the British. His techi-
caI contact (through correspondence) was, not surprisingly,John h d r 4 .
tlowever, the person he was dealing with on the British side was Sir
Henq Clinton. Arnold p v i d c d the British With vduable intelligence re-
g a r h g Americilils military situations, For exampleFhe gave C h t o n p ~ -
cious infornation about: American capabilities regarding the defense of
Charleston (South Carolina), whieh, led to a s~~ccessful British siege of the
city. General Henry Clinton captured it by assault on May 12. In May
1780, Amold proposed to the British the capturt- of a major mi1itar)i in-
stallation for a fee of f10,00Q in clash m d a clommmd of a battalion in the
British Army*The British answer was not forthcomhg (Brandt P994:190).
?"he military instaflation Arnold had in mind must have been West
Point. And, indeed, during the months of March-June 1780 ArnoXd inten-
sified his efforts to make sure he became the cornmmder of West Point.
tle began by lohbying General Phililp Schuyler for the appointment.
Meanwhite, Amold. received a letter from Washi,ngtm (Jume 4,1780) b n ?
which it could be hferred that the Americans were cmsiberhg the inva-
sion of Canada. h o l d passed this secret and crucial informatim to the
British (Brandt 1"394:191-192). Later, he made an effort to learn about the
actual opemtimal invasion plans, which he also sent to General Clinton.
Although General Clintm acted according to this information and
changed his operatimd plans,the wl.rolc idea of: invadi,ng Canada was a
pure fabrication that was memt to help Washzngtm and Lafayette hide
their true goal-a major attack in New York against Clinton" forces
32 Viulnti~tgTrust and Loyalty: A Typott7gy

(Krandt 1994:193). When Arnold learned about the tme plan, he tried to
send a wmlimg to Clinton, but that warning arrived too late,
Eventually, h o l d ' s presszxsc worked, and 811 Augzlst 3, 1B0, he was
awillrded the command of West Poht (and some areas around it). He ar-
rived here m August 5. In that year Amold negotiated with t-he British
the s ~ ~ r r e ~of
~ dWest
e r Point forts and territories (and possibly George
Washixlgton as weIl)Vor a heSty sum of f20,000 plus an equal rank in the
British Army-a very clear act of hetrqal, both of trust and loyalv*On
September 22, 17811, Arnold and his British contact, Major John h d r 4 ,
met to further discuss Arnold"s betrqal plans, The next day Andrd was
captured by the Amerkans. This fluke occurrence foiftzd this h t e ~ s t i n g
plot of betrayal. The exposarc. of Arnold was nokv just a matter of time.
Major Andr4 served in the 54th Foot in the British Army as adjutant
gemral to General Sir Henry Clinton, British commander of New Vork.
hdrtjt was cor~spondingwith .Amo)d in 1779 and was involved in Ihe
1780 negotiations with him regarding the surrender of the West Point ter-
ritory and fortikations to t-he British. Having met Arndd on September
22,1780, Andrtjt was tryjag to rekm to Brjtish lines. e)n Sptember 23 he
was caught by t h e e Americans (who were later awarded with special
medals and some cash rewards), and this led to the surrender of Amold's
treacherous plan. When A m o l d faulld out about the capture of Andrk, he
realized that his time was up. He fled as yuicHy as he could and reached
New York on September 26. Although the British tried to neljoliate the R-
lease of Andrk, it did not succeed because General George Washington
demanded that h o l d be exchanged for Andr4, h d r 4 was tried as a spy
and executed Zly hangirrg m October 2,1780, at Tappan, New York, f-iis
remains were reinterred in Westminster Abbey in Z,ond011 on November
28,1822."
Amold was made a general in the Briltitjh A m y and ~ c e i v e dES,325 fnr
his efforts. Me fnrmed a rclgirnent. of British troops and was effecthe in
leading raids against the colonies along the Chesapeake Bay P c e m b e r
1780) m d in New London, Comecticut.
Ch December 1781, Arnold left the United States, never to return, and
went to England, He involved himself in some business enterprises,
which were not very succesSfUI.
In May 1792, James Maitland, Earl of L,auderdale, made a remark at the
House of Lords that General Amold was guilty of apostasy from princi-
ples. h o l d could not let that just pass. Ilc. spent years oE his life making
the point that he was ~ m an t apostate, a turncoat, or a traitoc He de-
manded that the earl make a public apology The request was c o q l i e d
with, but in language that h o l d thou&t was insuffiicient. tle thus chal-
d earl to a duel, whieh took place on J d y 1,1792- i2mo:ld shot
l e ~ ~ g ethe
first but missed. LauderdaJie ~ h s e to d fire, clahisrg that he had no bad
 Viulnti~tgTrust and Loyalty: A Typott7gy 33

feefings toward Amold. Although at first he refused to re-apologize,

eventually m apology was made and the c d i c t ended.
I)nri,ng the wars of the French Revolution, Arnold was mable to pro-
cure a military commission. 717 the spring of 1794 he sailed on a trading
ship to the West Illdies and arrived in Guadeloupe a short t h e before it
was occupied by the French fleet. Captured by the F ~ n c hhe , w s yues-
timed aboarci a Frcrnch ship. Fearing for his life, Amold did not ident-4fy
hhnself and gave his French interrogator false information about hirnself,
inclucfing a false n m e . During the night Arnold managed to escape and
reached the British Beet, which was anchored near mother part of the is-
land. At that time, Arnold offered his services as an adviser to the British
commander-Sir Chwles (;fey-and as a volunteer quartermaster for Ihe
British force that fought the French in the West Indies during 1794---1795.
Amdd retunled to Ex~giandin July of 1795.
However, Amold. was not yet at peace with himelf and the world. In
December 1796 he submitted to BritisEr prime minister Pitt a plan to ""lb-
erate Chile, Peru, and both Mexicos" from Spanish influence. This plan
called for an expedition colnmmded by Amold. He never received a re-
ply. Only m e year l a t e ~
inJanuary 1798jfearing a threat of invasion from
Napdeon Bonaparte, h o l d proposed to the First Lcrd of Admiralty a
command of fire ships inthe English Charnel. The propmal was rcljected.
horn this point on, Amold tried again to involve himself in commercial
enterprises, an area in which he typically failed almost cmsistently,
which is what occurred this time, too. He died in London, in relative
anmyrnily, after a short and agonizing illness, on June 14, 1801, leaving
behind a debt of a few thousmd pounds. Peggy died cm August 24,18134.5
'There can hardly be a doubt about Amo:(d%ecxceptiond characteristics
and personal history. He was a courageous military man but a very
poorly performing mertlhant. Mi;ls he a hero or a traitor? First, it must be
stated clearly that by all criteria he betrayed the Americans..He prtlte~~dcd
to be loyal to them, but he was not. He mast certasy also betrayed the
tmst vested in hirn by the Americans. AII of this deception was dofie in
extreme secrecy. Had it not been for the random captllre oJ: An&&,
Amold" treason w d d have had some dire consequences for the Ameri-
cms. Thus, in terms of damage, the potential was enormous. Brandt
(1994),as well as a host of others, tends to attribute the motivation for this
betrayal to personal motivation. However, this personal mothation (for
example, the expectatim that his military achievements he properly rec-
og~~ized) was in itself formulated and expressed jn t e m s of a military and
revolutionary code of the culture in which he lived.
Not discounting this personal motivation, both Rmdall (1990; see also
Wauck 1993) and Wsight (1986) rightly point out that the d i , e m a of
choosing between loyalty to the British and to the Axnericans at the time
34 Viulnti~tgTrust and Loyalty: A Typott7gy

of the &volution was a genuine and painful one. Regardless of Arnaldls

perscrnal mcrtivation, the issue of which cowtry to trust, which to be loyal
England or the new emerging and crystallizing United States-was
neither simple nor easy. Furthermore, examining the demonization of
Amdd, Uucharme and Fine (19%) point out that because the qwstion of
loydty was so painful and because

so many Americans I-tad engaged in acts contrary to those espoused during

the rage militalre, it was necessary to emphasize that AmoXd was totally dif-
ferent, to magnify his greed and make it exceptional. Rather than igniting a
tzritch-hunt against the numerous minor traitors in their midst . . . the
colonists singfed out the hero of Qu&ec and Saratoga as uniquely unpatri-
otic, and colectively ostracized him, providing him a permanent place in
their history. (p. 4345)

The major tools in that demmizatim p m e s s were (1)biography and

(2) motive. Uucharme and Fine (1995)point out that there is a tendency to
portray Arnold as ""a self-celztered, glory-seekhg madmm,'khose ""ac-
tions were consistent with his character'7p. 1317) and that his actions
were best explained by three main motives: a stormy relationship with an
unappreciative Congress, a distaste for the affiliatim with the French, and
a belief that fne cauld end the revolution (for example, that giving West
Point to the British could serve as a turning point). Greed is typically
added to tkse. In addition, his cowagous and outstanding military per-
formance for the revolution prior to his trcasm is neukatized.
Benedict Amold was a courageous m m with sipificant combat &ills.
He was not a coward. However, after his move to the British, he was
never regasded as a hero, For the Americans, prior to Arnold" ddefection,
he was the hero of the battle at Fort Xconlieroga, the sirge of Montreal,
the battle at Valcour Island, and the Sarataga battles. And yet his n m e
was also associated with administrative corrupt-ian and abuse of his rank,
Although eventually h o l d was cmsidered a major traitor by the Amer-
icms, he was not viewed so scornfully by the British.
:In contrast to the stigmatizatjon and demoni.zation of Amold, others
who e"gaged in espionage were glorified. 011e was Major Andr4,
Amold" BBrish cantact, whom history has portrayed as having bee11 de-
serted and.betrayed by Arnold m d hung by the Americans as a spy An-
other cmkmporary figurt. who is glorified is the spy Nathan Hale.

Dctaiis about Hale's enigmatic figure, ntission, and caphlre are sub~ects
on which historians disagree. However, it is plausible to assume that
 Viulnti~tgTrust and Loyalty: A Typott7gy

PHOTO 2.2 Stntiie of MalJznn Fllnle ir-zfionlc$CIfe

in Cfzic~go.Pf1020 by aut h r ,
Chicago Tribune btkildi~~g

since British headquarters we= at New York, General Washington was

inte~stedin inding out about t k s e headquarters, the size of the military
force there, its supplies, weapons, and. logistics, Why Hale was chosen for
an intdigence mission is unclear. Moreover, there was no contemporary
mmtion oZ: Hale, or hjs mission, until Ham& Adam puhlishcd Hs-
fory of New EngEnlzd in 1799.
The stmdard account states that Hale was born in 1755 in Coventry,
Connecticut. Me graduated f r m Yale in 1773 and taught in schools in
:New London and East Haddam, Connecticut, for two years prior to cm-
listhg in the Connecticut militia in June 1775 at tl-te rank of lieutenant.
The unit in whieh, he served took part in the siege of Boston durjng the
summer of 175,and followkg that he became an offices ;in the newly es-
tablished Cmtinental A m y Promoted to the rank of captain in January
1776, he arrived inNew York with his unit inAprj:L1776. Hale took pmt in
the capture of the BI-itish warship Ash (mid-May).
36 Viulnti~tgTrust and Loyalty: A Typott7gy

Ch September IQ Qneral Washington asked Colonel Knowlton to find

a vdunteer for an espionage mission in New York. Hale agreed to spy cm
the Britir;h and provide the hformation that General George Washington
required. One historical version states that he embarked on his mission on
September 12. Wearing civilian cloths, H& used a small boat (the Scliuyler,
a sloop piloted by a a r l e s Pond) to sail, from Connecticut to Huntington,
Long Island., He passed British lines in Madattan and used. his profession
as a teacher for a cover. Having spent a few days gathering information
about the British h Brooklyn, he tried to return to the h e r i c a n side, but
his attempt was ~nsuccessfrrl~ and he was caught m September 21.
t3.n one thing there is no disagreemat-his end. Iheco
of the British forces in North America, Sir William Howe, ordered Hale's
execution m charges of espionage and treason, wihuut a trial. Hale was
not allowed the privifege of a clergyman or a Bible, and on Sptember 22,
1776, he was hmged. Stmdhg on the scaffold he is reputed to have said
fie following eternd statement: "I only regret that 1have but oncr life to lose
h r my countryf"or "I only rc?gret &at 1have one fife to give for my coun-
try")). Hdc's last kvords, ~ v e d e dby a British officer yeam after the execu-
tion, were suppressed and his last Ietters destroyed because fie British had
no intmtion of helping this man become a martyr. Yale Ciniversity has a
statue of Hale (put- there in 1914), m d a copy of this statuc (made in 1973)
stands mar the entrance to CM headquarters in Langtey These statues por-
tray an intermting fictionaf image becaux no portrait of Hale is in exis-
tence. Hale became m official hero of irhe state of Go~mectkut 1985.6

OSher figures 1discuss in detail later fall into the s m e category. Vidkun
Quisling and Lord Haw-Haw were certainly not considered traitors by
the Nazis, but Norway and England respectively executed them on
charges of treasm afier Wr%dWar 11. The famous poet Ezra Pound. came
very close to being gut on trial for treason but was spamd from that by his
incarceration in a mental hospifai. Mlfnouglr fascist- Itaty did not see him
as a traitox; the United States almost did. Jmathan Pollard was certainly
viewed by h e r i c a n s as a traitor, but not by Israelis. Aldrich Ames was
viewed as a traitor by Americans, and Kiln Fhilby was viewed in that
way in the U d e d Khgdom, but neither of lhem was perceived as such
by the former Soviet U ~ ~ i o n ,

Toward a Typology of Betrayal

The mtagonistic violation of trust and loyalty; m d hence the crossing of
mord boundaries by a genujne member in the collective or dyad, is inter-
 Viulnti~tgTrust and Loyalty: A Typott7gy 37

preted as betrayal. It can range from the personlal level to the level of an
orgmization, sueh as a nation-state.
It is importmt to note that despite the universal structure that disth-
wishes betrayal from other forms of behavior, betrayal has the chamcteris-
tics of a conthuous (or multidhensional) variable ra&er than a discrete
one. Several climensions mpplement the basic stmcknre of betrayai and can
alter its construction. For example, was the violation done in secret or not?
Was conceahent involved? Was an acbal and overt t u m c o a ~ ginvolved.
or not? As we shalt see later, vialathg trust m d loyalty ha deceptive man-
ner and cmcealhg an actual turncclating tends to be pexeived differently
than when such viohtions are committed o p d y Also, the issue of per-
sonal or national betrayal is impodmt. m e can, of course, chuoscz one or
more dhensims to focus on ininterpreting betrayal. h this text, violations
of tmst and loyalty are perceived to be the hportant ones. 1shall use other
dimensions when the context demands &at For example, the classification
of betrayal here utilizes the dimension of rnernbership as a majn criteria.
?'here is a major cult-ural difference between the insider M"ho changes
sides, a so-called "hrncoat," m a
nd the outsider who pretends to be an in-
sider (mostly, a "spy"'). Membership h a group, and thus the acqrrisition
of an identity that depmds on membership in a particutar group c ~ dyad,r
is a powerful and important variable. Being past: of a group or a collecti,ve
creates nut only a strong sense of genuine belonging but also a strong dis-
tinction bemeen those in the in-group and those in the out-group, which
is discctly related to who ir;to be trusted and who is not. This smse of cui-
tural belong4ng can serve as a robust criterion for a classification schem,
as we shall see below.
Violatkg trust and loyalty are not single-variable issues. They involve a
variety of problems and arc thus multidimensiond and complex topics.
First, there is the issue of whether the violator is a bona fide member of a
group. SCCond, there is the issue of who is the target of the treacherous
scherne, an individud or a group. 1Phird, the question of whether the vio-
lation of tmst and loyalty was done in secwt is an important one. Fourth,
the mothat-ion of the betrayer is a sig~~ificant issue. Fifth, the damage
from the betrayal needs to be assessed. Sixth, the societal reaction to the
betrayer needs to be addressed. In any given case, the specific name a d
meaning assigned to a particmla violation of trust and loydty depends
on the distinctive combination of the above issues.
Some of the issues tend to gailn prominence over others. 'f'he first three
variables seem to be dombant. We can create an interesting and empiri-
cally useful typology for different forms of violating trust and loyalty by
cmss-tahulata membership in a group against the target/victim. This
typology crcates distinct cells in a table that uniks &&rent types of be-
trayal into a coherent mity (see Table 2.1).
38 Viulnti~tgTrust and Loyalty: A Typott7gy

TABLE 2.1 A Typology of Betrayal

T~rg&/lrict.iln In-Croup Ozaf-Grc~zap
Tnfidelity adultery Con artistry
Informing Private investigation
Mutiny Professional betrayal

ColZective Collabaration Espionage

(general) Defectors & desertion Surveillance
Espionage
Treast~n
Internatioal betrayal
State-sponst~redterror
Human rights violations
Mutiny

Whistle-blow ing
ColZective Political turncoating
(the in-grc>up) Conversion
Strik&reaking
Assassination

It must be noted that the meming of membership here is on the level of

perception and construction and that the specific content of membership
in groups can be a complicated and tbomy issue. b r example, to what
group exaaly did the pr+Worl,d War XI Stldeten Germans belong, and
who has the legitimacy to prwide m answer? Likewise, the specific con-
tent of targetlvictim may have different meanings. Zn addition, categories
of betrayal may have djfferent interptaf.ions. For example, muti~~y,
which appears in two places in the table, may be interpreted as members
of a group acting against individualtargets, as in naval mutiny, or it could
be interpreted as a collective act of insurgence.
Table 2.1. charts the major types of betrayal that our classification yiclds.
The typology allows us to c m e n e under one theoreticai umbrella an in-
tercsting spcsctrurn of what m y look like different: phenmenri.
We must note that the "Personal" and '"In-group" cell may have subdi-
visions based on such different variables as motivation, structure, or can-
text (for example, betkveen a romantic di~nensionand a nonromantic
friendship). fieason appears on the left side of the table, in the "fn-
groupffcolurn. The reason for that is that violating trust is not enough to
win any person the dubious title of traitor, After all, trust can be violated
by formal organizations, thmugh white-collar crime, and the like. The
 Viulnti~tgTrust and Loyalty: A Typott7gy 39

added element here is that not only is trust violated, but the assumptions
of commitment m d loyalty are broken as well.
In the illustrative case of personnl betrayal in a romantic relationship,
the assumption of sexual exclusivity is violated. in addition to trust.
Hence, betrayal in this categcny implies that a quality chi-tracteristicof pri-
mary relationships, referred to as gerneinschdt, was violated, often in a
deliberate1y deceitful mamer.
Moreover, some of the other categories in the table may have subeiivi-
sions, too. For example, one ends up wjth very diferent types of spies, if
one examines such cases as Judas, Pollard., and Hale (for example, see Ha-
g m 1989,1997).

Dimensions of Betrayal

An underlying and important dimension in the typology is the di-

chotonny between secrt3t and nonsecret violations of trust. Fol.l,swing Sim-
me1 (see Wolff 1950:330-3761, Scheppele" lmdmark study on the sociol-
ogy of secrecy (1988:3-23) defir~esa secret as "a piece of information that
is intentionally withl?eld by one or more social actor(s) from one or more
other social actor(s)'"C1988:12). Secret violations of trust (for exampte, infi-
delity, some forms of espionage, con artistry, informing) altvays invdve,
in an explicit manner, a major form of deception where the betrayer pos-
sesses information crucial to the betrayed. Indeed, Scheppele points out
that secrecy and deceptim are t w sides of the same rttality (1988:22, n.
29). Nonsecret violations of trust (far example, poli,tieai turncoating and
some forms of collaboration and treason) are m r e problematk. Although
there may be little or no deceptim, these cases involve a violation of trust
of members in the in-group, and the perceptio~~ is that the violator has
er contrary to the hteresks of the collecthe. The thorny
point, of course, is who defines or interprets these hterests m d who can
enforce this interpretation..In such cases, the betrayal can be corxephlal-
ized as crossing moral, boundaries between hostlile organizations or col-
lective identities. :ill thjs sense, it is possible to claim that there is some
form of deceptim behind nonwcret violations of trust as weil (see also Ku
1998).

D e c q t ion
Deception here is focused on defh~itictnsof moral ct, itment and inter-
est. The violator may argue that his (or her) crossing of moral bounctaries
was not a betrayal at all but an embodiment of the true interests and
40 Viulnti~tgTrust and Loyalty: A Typott7gy

mord commitments of the collective. Thus, the violator of trust and loy-
alty may be p e ~ e i v e dby memhers cJf the betrayed collective as involved
in activities that not onfy betrayed them but that were p~sa1t-c.d decep-
tively, as if they were in their best interests. The perpetrator of what ap-
pears to be a ncmsecwt betrayat is in fact engaged in a huge deception by
pretending to be wfiat he (or she) is not m d by prcsenthg a harmful be-
havior to the collective as a helpful behavior. The deception lies in the
warping of reality B la Orwell" 12984 doublethink. Viewed in this way, de-
ceptio~~ indeed lies behhd violations of trust and 1oyall.y-
htmduchg the element of deception in this fashim raises the issue of
the manipulation of cmstructions of reaiity. Violations of trust and loy-
alty; secret or not, always hvolve such mmipulations. The degree of ma-
nipulation and lying in secret vidations by far exceeds those of nonsecret
violations. However, even the nonsecret cases share a decent amount of
subversion. Consequenlly, discussions of trust: and loyalty and their vh-
lation revire some understanding of deception as well,
There are many studies a d works on deception. One of the better and
more thoughtful. definitions of, and approaches to, lies and deceptions
was developed by Ekrnan (1992). He states that a lie or deceit occurs
when "mperson intends to miskad ancrther, doing so deliberately, with-
out prior notification ol this purpose, and without having been expllicitly
asked to do so by the target." He then distinguishes between two hrms of
lie: concealment-whcm a "Ear wit;hholds some information without ac-
tualL1.y sayjng anything untrue," and fals8cation-when the liar not ml,y
withholds informatim but "presents false information as if it were true"
(1992:28).
Although concealme~ltmay seem to be less disreputable because it
may not involve inventing untrue accounts, it is quite capable of leading
audiences to believe in a rt.ality that is based cm false assumptions and
infori~atian.
Ekmm bases his inclusive defhition on a few elements, First, an intent
to deceive must exist. This element is mentioned by almost everycme wbo
has done work in this area. %cond, this intention implies that the de-
ceiver or liar made a cltoice (to lie rather than not), Third, the target of a lie
c ~ar deception did not give his or her corzserz t to be misled, and the liar did
not g b e any prior nol@catkn of the intent to make a false presentation.
This is an kportant point because, for example, no one considers calling
actors in movies or theaters "liars" despite the fact that they, by choice
and intent, make a false presentation. Fhally, the distinction between.
conceahent and falsification is indeed illuminating. As E h a n points
out, given a choice, liars will always choose concealment rather than falsi-
fication. The main reason is that csnceallaent is much easier to accom-
 Viulnti~tgTrust and Loyalty: A Typott7gy 41

plish, and liars tend. to assume that it is less reprehensible than falsi6ca-
tion (1992:29).
Ekman notes that there are many social situations where we need to
conceal-for example, poker and other similar games, and commercial
and political negotiatims. Furthermore, Ekman points out that in some
situations concealment is essential for survival. Far example, Jews had to
conceal their identities under Nazi rule or occupation. '"Marranos" or
"A~usim"were Jews who were foxed to convert to Christianity and pre-
tended to do so, klrhjle keeping pasts of their Jewish identity in secret,
during the early and later Middle Ages in Spain, When the term ""decp-
ticm" is used in this book, it is very much in accordance with Ekman's ap-
proach.

.A significant dimension in understanding betrayal is the motivation of

the pmsm involved in that act. Motivation in the psychokgical sense is a
complicated issue to base conclusions on and-in my view-provides
rather shaky ground for generalizations,flow is one to infer motivation?
From behavior? From statements gken by the one accused sf betrayal?
From both? Clearly; when hformation elicited from both behaviar and
personal statements is congruent, one%confidence in that Wormation as
explaining the betrayal increases. tlcrwever, what if the information is in-
consiste~~t? What if one wishes to discuss, for exmple, "patriotic traitors"
(such as those described by Littllejohn's 1972 work, or Marlcne Dietrich
and Willy Rrandt)?Is that an oxymoron?
.h crudal factor is t:hc source of our information regading Ihc motiva-
tion, Confessions elicited during arrest and trial arc clearly suspect and
problematic. Auto27iographies written after the fact k p e n t l y have an ax
to grhd. Nevertheless, motivation in the cultural. sense is someirtring we
need to pay some attention to, that is, motivation as expressed and under-
stood within the culmat contr~xtin which it is formed. This particular an-
gle also ties us to C.. Wright Mills's idea that biographies m d acczom~tsare
to be understood wiihh their pasticular contexts and not in the abstract.
The solution to this prtiblern, f believe, is to combine the p e r s p ~ t h e s .
The issue of bekayal should be taken at face value. 'That is, we need to ask,
ourxhes, in each case, whose trust m d lyalty was violated. This ques-
tion will always involve us in discussing morality and symbolic moral
universes. Power will come next-the power to betray and to decide who
betrayed (and smetimes to prosecute and execute a punishment). Maw-
ever, it is also useful to be inyuisitive (carefully) &out the "why,'9that is,
about motivation.
42 Viulnti~tgTrust and Loyalty: A Typott7gy

Personal M I Z Collectz'zle
~

One b p o r t m t distjnction that the table prc>jectsis provided by the divi-

sion between the ""Personal" and the "CoZlective." Although sometimes
the disthcticm may be blurred, it is never&eless a powerful m.A signffi-
cant difference exists between a specific person as the target of be&ayal
and a coliective group as the target of betrayal, The treason of men like
Vidkun Quisiing, h t h o n y Blunt, and fcrnathan Pdlard was not aimed at
m y one particular person, although specific people werc victimized by it.
Un U?e otlner hmd, a police informm directs his or her acts against very
specific targets. The same would hold true for a prisoner of war in a camp
providing his captors with reliitlale hnformatio~nregardk~gwhat is gohg on
in the barracks, t h s reducing even further the limited independace of
other POWs who bust that infomer and believe that he is loyal to them.
'The categories included in the Tc.rsona1" row of Table 2.1 are, obvi-
ously, very hteresting. fnfidelq tales make their way regularly onto the
front pages of tabloids and respected newspapers alike. Con artists and
private eyes are frecyuently made into popular cultural heroes in novels,
movies, television series, and other symbolic cultural products, FXowever,
the categories included in the "Collective" sections of 'IBbte 2.1 are the
ones t shall focus on. Questions of morality, power, and motivation are
much more salient there and thus make these types of betrayal more rele-
vmt for studying devimce and morality*
The different cells presetnted in Table 2.1 refer to various socially con-
structed types of behaviors where the issues of trust and loydty m d their
violations are central subjects. Although these categories arc^ analyticaily
distinct, they are not completely alien to one another. In Chapter 3,t shall
discuss in, more depth each one of the ceils and the types included in
them.
 ating Trust and Loya
Categories and Cases

In this chapter X shalf discuss at some letngth the diife~rztmmifestations

of violating trust and loyalty that were outlined in the typology of the
previous chaptel. In this way, we shall acquaint ourselves more thor-
oughly with each of these different manjfestations. The different: cetls in
Table 2.1 portray distinct types of betrayals. In this chapter, these distinct
typemill be brought to life by examining empirical cases =presentative
oZI &em. %lt.cting the illustrative cases was lnot an easy task because there
are so many of them. 1finally chose cases that seemed intrinsically inter-
esting. I could have-just as easily-selected other cases. My only lhnita-
tion was, simply put, the size of this book.

Infidelity, Adultery,
Informing, and Mutiny
The first cell X shall fncm on includes acts of betrayal committed by a
member of a g r o q or dyad in whieh the violation of tmst and loyalty is
aimed at a person. Typically the threat potential fnr the ~lationshipin
such cases is high.

I12fideIityaltd Adultery
33% type of betrayd refers to violations of tmst by individuals who view
thems&es, or are viewed by others, as either close or very close to one
mother, The term "infideiity" usually rcfcrs to people who are romanti-
cally involved; the term. "adultery" i s used to &scribe violations of trust
and loyalty between married people; anci the term "betrayal" is used to
refer to p e m e who arc close fsirmds, but not romantically or sexudly in-
volved (although adultery can be constructed as betrayal as well), There
44 Violating Tr~tsl~ l hyalty:
~ d Categolaies and Cases

is, of course, a qualitatjve difference between the two because the type of
assumed trust and loyalty that is hmken is qualitatively judged to "o dif-
ferent C)bviously there is much more p k s s i o n a l literature. about infi-
delity. However, history and fiction contah numerous accounts of events
that h e been presented as "betrayal'" (for example, the stormy dation-
ship between mamas B Becket and King Henry IT). A l ~ o u g hthis book is
not focused on infidelity and addtery, the context of this study makes it
important to look at it, even briefly.
Adultery is a very interestkg topic. One can look at worldwide trends
and statistics of adultery,br combine a study of prevalence together with
interviews, and thus gai" a deeper understanding and insight.2 Were. I ex-
amhe some of the main. conclusions from various studies about infidclljty
and adultery.

N a t m of fnfidelity. Many works have been written about adultery

Hawever, Lawsm (1.988)provides some of the more interesting insights
into its nature. As her work shows, historically speaking, the nature and
meaning of adultery are?not simple. In. the narrower sense of the term,, a
married man or woman who has sex with other than his wife, or her hus-
b a d , may be considered an addterer. Sirnple emugh, no? :In keepi~~rnl;
wi& the academic reputati.011 of making the ""sjmple" ""emplex," let us
ask a few more questions. For example, who is the partner? 1s that parher
a prostitute? Another married. person? Is t-he extramarital '"at'fair"' a short
one-night stmd or a longtime rommce? How about a lover or a mistress?
What if the betrayed spouse knows and agrees to the affair? Is the partner
(any parher) also guilty of adultery? It does not take too long to ~ a l i z e
that characterizing dultefy can give one a headache. It may be worth-
while to point out that betrayed partners may reduce the complexity
above to such rather simple issues as,"Did you do it m didn't you?" thus
reconstructing thc issue in a different manner. Althoufih t present inf-
delity in terms of qualitatkely different categories, those involved may
present it in terns of differences of degree. Moreover, the dual standard
in adultery withk some orthodox cultures (for example, some religious
fundamntalists believe that a married man can connmit adultery only
with a married woman) proviejes support for the contextual constmctictn-
ism of betrayal.
At the basis of extramarital affairs lies a violation of both. tmst and loy-
alty (not included are extramarital affairs with m w a l consent, such as
mate swapping, group sex, or swinging).Sexual exclusivity is the folmda-
tion of marriage, or an equivalent (peshags preparatory) relationshiy,
?"hat is, fie partners are committed to having sex only with one another
and are forbidden b m having sex with others. Trust, faith, and fideljty
between the partners arc supposed to ensure that this exclusivi~is main-
 Violating Tr~tsl~ l h~y a df f y : Categolaies and Cases 45

tained. Some cultures (for example, orthodox Judaism, Fundamentalist Is-

lam) exercise such a stri-ent system of social contrd that even those
who are tempted to violate this trust i n d it ver)i difficdt to do so. Other
cultures are much more tolerant. In any event, this particular violation of
tmst and loyallry kquently brings a complete disintegration of the ~ l a -
tionship. h~deed,it is estimated that infidelity m d adultery are the pri-
mary cause oi divorce in both Europe and North America. These viola-
tions of tmst a d loyalty are also major motives for domestic viotence.3
Because these violations are so difficu1"Co characterize, there are different
names given to this particular breach of tmst, ranging f r m '*adulteryfr
and "iinEidelity"9o ""unfaithful spouse" and '"affair" to the much more
n e ~ ~ t rterm
a j "extramarital affaic'"
b w s o n (1988) notes that adultery is typically perceived as posjng a
g a v e h e a t . It is parbayed as having the pc)t""tial to ruin a m a r r i e (or
relationship) altogether, fncleed, a 1974 survey by thc N'ationd @inion
Research Center (NOEIC) based at the University of Chicago found that
those favoring the view that having an extramarital affair is alkwys
wrong ""wona majority in every age group,"" with the srnatlest majority
among the IS29-year-old group (59 percent agreed with the statement),"
And irr 1994, the very same age group ccmdemned adultery in an even
clearer voice. Lawson found that arnong her rcsponde~~ts

it was the most traditional men-l-hose mast strcmgiiy adhering to the myth
of Romantic Marriage----who spoke of their liaisons in this way. In other
wards, "casual affairs" were what highly permissive women but highly tra-
ditional men, recalling their feelings when they married, had, They indicate
the continuing greater breach implied by a wife's aduttexy- compared with
that of a hwband; she commits adultery generally only when her feelings
are deeply involved or Likely to become s c ~ t k t erisks are too great for her to
pIay as he can-W-hile he is entitled to his "bit on the side." pawson
1988:38-39)

However, Z,awson does not indicate whether this threat is equally valid h
situations where the partner knows about the infidelity as opposed to
having no knowletige of the affair.
Andber persistat cu,ltural image of adultery is adultery as theft, ixn-
plyjllg that a man steals another mm%pproperty: " H e "ossesseskwfiat is
not his to %eakeffeven if the woman "ives%erself to him, for she does not
own her own self, not even her body., . . [Her husband] owns her and
can-hdeed, sometin?.es must-punish her, even kill her" ((Lawson
1988:41), A second image is of adultery as threatening tbe lineage. This
image implies that wives are "the property of men and so were children"
(p-45).
46 Violating Tr~tsl~ l hyalty:
~ d Categolaies and Cases

Lawsm also describes three prevalent types of adultery. The first is par-
allel adulfery:

An affair at any historical period, with a concubine or a mistress whose rela-

tionship to the husband is well h o w n and even accepted by the w i f e a s in
the case of Nefsan and Lady Hamilton; or "the king's W-bore" (as NeXt
Gwynn called herself) and her royal sponsor, Charles 11; or a fater king, Ed-
ward V11 and Mrs. Keppel, who was invited, sa it is said, by Queen Alexan-
dra to the king" bbedside befc~rehe died. . . . Similar examples in America are
the well-known and accepted or condoned relationships of many presidents
from F. D. Raosevelt to L. B. Jc~hnsan,whose wife, Lady Bird, is reported as
saying, "My husband Xoved all people, and half the world's people are
women." ((p, 52)

'The second type is tmditictt~ala d a l f e y "whero the relationsfiip . . . is

considered a breach of the marriage" ((pp.52-53). lijipicall~~ this rclatim-
ship is kept seeret, with a significant: effort to prevent the spouse from
lenrnjng aboM it (vpicalfy, frimds and relatives often possess h w l e d g e
of this damaging infornation),
The last farm of adhlltery is recrr..afimaladultey, a relationship that

satisfies a desire to play. . . . It is, as its name implies, Xighthearted, not seri-
ous or cl-rmmitted, but fi?rfzil.r,Fie de ~fit~rid,
filling empty moments rather than
hours, time away from normal family and working environments, a leisure
activity like an excellmf meal with a good bottle of wine, a hedonistic adven-
ture of the flesh rather than of the spirit, though it is the spirit that may be
enhanced. (g. 54)

One can ercpmd the level of generalization of this category and add to it
such practices as gmup sex. As Lawson rightly points out, thjs type of
aduttery can be tmnsformed into the first or second type.
"li, make thirrgs somewhat mom complicated, let us &ink of a strong
e ~ ~ o t i o nhvolvement
al between heterosexual individuals married to sth-
ers. If no sex is involved, should we still view it as adultery? Probably not.
But the noninvolved spouse will probably not like this relationship be-
cause it is on the verge sf violating both trust and loyalty Let me use a
few illustrative cases,
:It is not insignificant: that in the case of the romantic inwcrlwement of
Bishop Roderjck Wright with div0rci.e Mrs- Kathleen MacPhee, an affair
that shook the United. Khgdorn in the summer of 1996,5 the romntically
inwolved couple felt it was important to state, irr pubiic, that they had no
sexual relations.
 Violating Tr~tsl~ l h~y a df f y : Categolaies and Cases 47

Cultural fiction, in the foms of books and movies, reinforce this point as
well. For example, in the 1470 war movie Hell B L M ~which S, takes place on
the idand of Malta duri,ng World War H, actrcss Elizabeth Shepherd plays
a w m m married. to naval officer Ronald A l h . She is indespair about the
miserable state of her marriage, which seems to be in bad need of love and
affection but is jxnmersed instead in re~ectimand biHerness md-for all
practical pul^poses-going down the drain hn her despair, she betrays her
husband and finds much-needed comfort in another officer" arms
(played by Janes Frmcixus). However, it is clear that despite the fact that-
she hitiated the affair with her new lover, the sex she is irrvolved in is dis-
tant, alienated, and frozen, In other wordis, t-he scriptwriter and d i ~ c t o r
portray an motionless affair-That portrayal is what enables her to return
to her husband at the end oi the m v i e (after he saves, hemically, the life of
her lover in a daring and suicidd operation against W o a t pen" Sicily).
'This is an important point because an etnotional involvememt wodd prob-
ably mean she would have to be ""killed" at the end of the movie,
What about sex without emoticmal invotvement (for example, with a
prostitute) or with a, very minimal level of such involvmetnt? h the sum-
mer of 1946, t:he powerful political consdtant to President Bill Clinton,
Dick ikforris (married tcr Connecticut lawyer Eileen McGann) lost his po-
sition follocving a p21bliC disclosure in a taklloid that he had a year-long af-
fair with a $200-an-hour call, girl Sherry Rowlands.Weiiusweek, which
used this story in a larger report about adultery, points out that there is a
new understanding of ad~xltc~ry: "It is a sin of the heart and mind as much
as-or even more than-the body." Morris" relationship with Sherry
Rwlartds, according to this new understand@ (consistmt with the at-
mosphere of "political carrechess'"), is that "he carried on a lmg-term re-
latimshlp with another w o m n that went beyond sex into the realm of in-
tirnacy*'" 7 e magazine's ertcensive report quotes psychiatrist Dr. Frank
I'ittman as noting that most infidelity is done on the telephone rather
than Inbed. Accordkg to Pittman, the ""essenceof an affair . . . is in estab-
lishi~~g a secret intimacy with s o m e w . . . . Infidelity isn't about Mlhom
you lie wit;fi.It's whom you lie to."""
h additional element that needs to be considered is motivation. What
about a married couple whose relations are not tcx.,g ~ a tsex , is dull and
inrequent, and then one of the parhers finds a lover? Or wha.t if one of
the parhers is temporarily or permanently prevented from having sex
(for example, due tcr an incaparitatirrg concfition or illless of a spouse)?
Should we take into co~nsiderationthe factor of motivationWhould we
give it a prominent place in the ml;sis? The moral problem here is that
if we do so, we may risk providing an indirect justification for violating
the parhessf loyalty m d the trust inthe sexual exclzrsivity of marriage.
48 Violating Tr~tsl~ l hyalty:
~ d Categolaies and Cases

As is becoming clear, even the relatively sirnpk category of adultery is

far from simple, The so deceptively sjmple violaticrn of marital exclusive
sexual rules is turning into a rather complex issue, To make this point:
even more interesting, Lawson (1988) points out that h a number of her
cases,Vhe affair s e v e ~ dthe old relatrionship and opened the door to a
new relatio~~ship:

While over 70 percent of the faithful remained married to their original

spouse, this was true of just over half of the adulterous; and the more li-
aisons a person had, the more likely it was that they would not remain mar-
ried to the Brst spouse. If they did divorce, only 10 percent . . . married their
lovers. (g. 287)

The rate of remarriage for women hawing an affair in order to separate

from their husbands hvas much higher than those of men.
Glass (31998) has isolated three main factors that characterize an extra-
marital affair: (9) the existence of secrecy (for ertample, they meet without
tefling o ~ e r about
s it), (2) emotional intimcy (fcrrexample, they disclose
inner feehgs and information to one another that they do not disclose to
their married partners), and (3) sexual chemistry (i.e., physical attraction).
GIass's findings led her to collclude that although malcs tend to have ex-
tramarital affairs that are based on sexual attraction, &males tend to con-
duct such affairs on the basis of emotional involvement.10

Pxevalence and Its Meaning. One very impmtmt question regards the
prevalence of infidelity fnr males and females, hdiffertlnt cultums, and in
different h e periods. 'This is an impctrtant issue because it can give us
some significant clues not only about sexual behavior but also about how
people in everyday ~ a l i t ybehave
- in t e r m of loyalty and tntst.
Akhough there is little i,n the way nl =liable cross-cdtural and longiku-
dina) idormation about the magnitude of infidelit): the few available
studies are suggesti\ie. It is generally estilnated that in about 50 percmt of
marriages-i,ntesnatio~~alf,y-one parher will he unfaithfulall
:InJanuaq 2000 Bri.tisJn electronic and print media, disclosed some amaz-
ing facts. Summaries of routine DNA exminations done in tbr previous
year in several laboratories (some of whi& performed thousands of such
exmisratims) revealed that the fatfier of evev seven& (or tenth, depmd-
ing on the laboratory) child is not his biological father. These fi~~dings
should not really s~trpriseus because if the rate of marital infidelity is
around 50 percmt, then it stands to reason that at least some of these affairr;
may a d in pregnancy and childbk& (see Rogers 2000; Nachshon 2(300).
Let us look more-. dosely at some studies on this topic done in Israel. A
study cmdu.cted in 1988 revealed. that 63 percent of men m d 50 percent
 Violating Tr~tsl~ l h~y a df f y : Categolaies and Cases 49

of w m e n admitt& that they either had been disloyal to their parhers or

would have been it; they had been given a chance to do so. Only 29 per-
crcrlt of the males and 41 percent of the females stated that they M nevcr
betrayed their partners. En mother study, 60 percent of married women
admitted that they had exprienced extramarital sexual relations. Profes-
sionals who specialize h sex alc3 marriage, estimate that h Israel 70 per-
cent of married, men and 50 pescmt of marricd women have had at least
one extrmarital affair. Yotmger couples, in the age range of 25-25, cite
the discovery of an extramrital affair as a reason, or excuse, to hitiate
separation or divorce proceedings much more frequently than older cou-
ples (ages 36-55). :It seems that as people grow older, they learn to com-
promise and be more flexible and are less willing to termhate reldion-
ships.l2
:111 the context oE Israeli culture, at least one important observation must
be made. If the numbers qrxoted above indeed reflect rca:lity, then this cul-
ture tolerates a rather high degree of jnfjdelity, Since this culture is also
characterized by a relative low level of divorce, one must assume that ei-
ther m s t of these infidelities m effectively concealed hln urls~~specting
spouses or that they are absorbed and tolerated wit.hin existing arrange-
ments.
In a sense, these f;indbgs suggest an explmatio~~ for a c~~rious
phenom-
enon. Ms. Binyamin Netanyahu (""RCbi"') was ejected Israeli prime mjnis-
tcr in 1996. NetanyAu admitted, prior to his election, on public television
m u a r y 14, 1,9931, in a rather drmatic interviecv, that he had betrayed
his third wife (Sarah) and that he had had an extramarital affair. It turned
out that his affair was with marketing psychologist Ruth Bar, who was
married to an ophll\aXmologi& 'The &air between Netanyahu and Mrs.
Bar began pl-ior to his marriage to Sal& and contixzued afterwasd.lWis
fact did not interfere with his election campaip and was not used by his
political opponents agaiinst him. 'This phenome~~on (probably not possible
in American or British contexts) is quite understandable given the pes-
missive practice of infidelity in Israeli culture.
'The major cmcllusio~~ from the studies of prevalence is, clearly, that h-
fideli"cyand adultery are in fact common occurrences. Indeed, an interest-
ing and theoretically challenghg point of view is provided by Baker's
(1996) evolutionary interpretation of betrayal. Mis sociobioiogical point of
view holds that betrayal between parhers is commm because it. provicrtes
an opportunity for increasing offsprint;.
Prevalence has m r a l meanings*h2 August 1998, Newweek kformed its
readers that infidclq in a i n a is "rampant"' and that the Chinese author-
ities, alarmed by the increasing divorce rates (close to 25 percent), were
seriously considering turning adultery into an illegal b&avior, punish-
able by law (for example, forced labor). tn a somewhat similar fashion, in
50 Violating Tr~tsl~ l hyalty:
~ d Categolaies and Cases

1998 Malaysia. was in the process of defining extramarital sex as illegal

and punisbabte by law.lWC)bviously, a deeper anatysis of these cases
would have to cmsider sociocz~ltural factors, such as madernizatio~~,
reli-
gious beliefs, fertility?and. so forth. However, fur our purposes the ilIus-
trative &sewation of a possible intervention of the law, &at is, of the
state, in adultery is instmctive. In the min, it can be interpreted that the
state does not view adultery as a private ksue and feels that it has to use
strong social cmtrol to regulate this behavior,

Some GuXturally Farnous Illustrations, fn the past decade, a few rather

explosive cases of infidelity, i~~volving farnous international celebrities
and politikans, wme reported in the international media: Dick Morris,
who was mentioned earlier (his wife remained with him); Princess
Stephanie of Monaco, wbo was betrayc.d by her husband, Daniel Ducruet
(shc Bled for djvorce inOctober 1996); the pzlblic disclosure &at Franc;:ois
Mittcrrmd, president of France, had a longtime mistress, Anne Pingeot
(and their daqhter, Mazarine). Both e Pingeot and her daughtcr ap-
peared at Mitterrand's funcrd beside hjs wife and theis children; Eliza-
beth Hurley, an actress and model 'for Est4e Lauder cosmetics, who de-
cided not to separate from Huf;h Grant, who was arrested on June 27,
1995, in Hollywood with a female prostitute (a part-ti~seactress and
model who took the professional name "Di:vine'' Brown)?s
A late 19Ws affair that still echoed i.11the mid-1990s was a double be-
trayal-betwee11 Prince Charles and Camilla Parker Bokvles and between
Prhcess Diana and lames Hewitt. Indeed, in 19917 British commentator
McDonat;hirr even suggested in public that '"there's a place for m h a ~ ~ e s t -
to-Gad mistress," "stating that Camilla Parker Bowles be Prince Charles's
permanent mistress and lover.16 It did not take th tabloids long to dis-
close to fie public, using front page headlines, fiat Earl Charks Spencer,
Princess Dims" brother, was not fait.hful to his wife and was involved h
a nurnber of extramarital affaiss.17 Ead Spencer denied the allegations.
A strtlng denial of the accusation that be was i n v o i v d in an e x t m a r i -
tal affair was also issued by forty-one-year-old British Parliament mem-
ber Piers Merchant, However, in October 199"7"is sexual involvement
with a seventeen-year-old girl was exposed (with some rather se3nsational
pictures) inpublic by the Sunday Mirmr,
Each country has its own adultery tales of its famous citizens, In Israel,
for example, s o m rather illustriatls st0ric.s involve the famous Moshe
Dayan, who is rumored to have experienced quite a few affairs and who
d e d one of them by leavirrg his wife, :Ruth, and living with his lover,
Rachel. hnother tale involves him paying a large s m of money to cme of
his lovers-twewy-two-year-old ElisReva Chizis-to squelch the story;m
Binyarnin Netanyahu, who cheated on his third wife by having an affair
 Violating Tr~tsl~ l h~y a df f y : Categolaies and Cases 54

(and admitted it on public television); Zalman Shazar, who was the presi-
dent cJf Israel and was involved with both the farnous romantic poet
Rachel and with Galda Meir; Ben-Gurion, who seelns to have had two
lovers (Miriam Cohen and Doris May) while he was married to Pola; and
ex-chief of staff, parliament member, and mirrister Rafael Eitan ("Raful'"),
who built an impressive house for h,is lover (later wife).'Y
The most famous case of kfidelity durhg the last decade of the twenti-
eth century undoubtedly is the affair that Bill Clinton, then president of
the United States (married to Hitlary, and h his fiRies), had wiEh Monica
Lewinsky (a staff worker in the White House, single, and in her twm-
ties).z(jHaving dmied the existence of the affair for a long time, m Mon-
day, Augzlst 17,1998, Clinton admitted publicly to actually havjng had the
affair (followhg Ms. Lewinskyfst e s t i r n v and the public allegatinn of the
existence of a dress with incrhinating DNA evidence on it). Durirtg the
djscussions on w h e ~ eto r in?peach Presida~tClintoll in Ihe House of Rep-
resentatives in Mlaskington, D.C., the Speaker of the House Bob Livisrgston
announced (December 19, 1998) that hr was resigning from Congress in
view oE his ocvn infidelities. Considering the widdespscad prevalence of ex-
tramarital a f airs, this shou%d,not really surprise us.

IdcsrrtiQing Adultery. and Its Generafizabilitly. A recent research effort

aimed at fjnding out whether adulterers can be identified by telltale be-
havioral s i p s . A report by Norton and Hastings (1997) on Bussfs=search
indicates that it may be possible to create a behaviaral ""guide" for deter-
minjng whether a spouse is cheathg.
A ~ l a t e dissue regardi~~gadultery is the gmeralizability of this particu-
lar form of vi,olatiq trust m d loyalty to other forms. For example, can a
politician who violates his wiWs trust and loyalty be trusted not to vio-
late the loyalty and tntst: of those who elected him or her into office? hrt.
these two manifestatio~zsof betrayal conrrected nn the personal psycho-
logical level? This issue was raised in an editonal. in Lond.on"s widely cir-
cufated E'uerzi~gSfa1zdarCI1.2I The commentator was ~ s p o n d i n gtc:,a debate
betcveen two British gentlexnen. C)ne (Sir Peregrine Worsthorne) had
clairned that dishonest p r i n k life was associated with diSSlmest public
life because it meant that deceit had becclme a way of life. His adversary,
Claus vctn Bdocv, had coumtered the argument by maintaining that adul-
tery had nothing to do with deceit in public life.

In Summary* At the basis of adultery lies behavior that violates trust

and loyalty and is deceitfd. It is typically done in secret, ushg various
deceptive techniques, and involves miskading and cheating a loyal and
trusting partner.. Even in cases of parallcl adultery, it is dear that the
spouse is the victim of these particular breaches oi trust and loyalty, .Al-
52 Violating Tr~tsl~ l hyalty:
~ d Categolaies and Cases

thou& the nature of the victinnization process is clear, its deconstruction

~ v e a l that
s as one delves into tbe different types of addtery, its history,
and its motivations, the victimisation arg~~ment is weakened consider-
ably Moreaves, Lawson's 1988 work clearly points out that the weak po-
sition of women is at the root of their weakened bargaining position h
cases of adultery.
A distixlction not made by Lawson needs to be introduced bere. One of
the relevant qucstims is whe&er the threat patentxal of ruining a relation-
ship exists when a disloyal partner is successful in decei\iing the other
partner that he or she is in fact loyal. Is sexual faithlessness hhemntly
corrosive of a marriage, or does it become cormsive only when a spouse
discovers the iutfidelity? Trust is a socially and interpersonally con-
structed, phenomenon that can be built out of a diversity of materials. Xt is
passible to cmclude that if the decepticm is successful, it may not under-
xnine a relationship or a social strzlcturc. However, the fact that its disinte-
grative nature emerges once it is discovered may mem that there is some-
t h i ~ ~corrosive
g about infidelity itself. Given the bigh prevalence of
infidelity, this conclusinn must have some validity. Hcr\ivever; it: m y be
the case that a social structure can tolerate and absorb a large volume of
betrayal (or deviance) before it becomes threatened.
Based on interviebvs with promhent researchers m d on published re-
search, the September 30, 19116, Newszueek cover story about adultery
ctafmed that as women were gailling m m powa, their tolerance for old-
style adultery was disappearimg. Moreover, this equalizdicm of power
mems that adultery is more prevalent, because it allows more women to
experitmce adultery and this brhavior is thus now spread more evenly
betwee11 the sacs. Hence, although in the past m o males ~ we= involved
in adultery, today both males and females are involved in this behavior in
similar ratios.
Nezuszmck quotes f,awson-a w e l l - h w n autf.cority on the sub~ect-on
the new meanixrg of adulteq-: "It is no longer acceptable for men to feel
they own their women's bodies . . . so the ccmlmodity exhanged in ro-
mance is no longer sex, but intimcy Today the deepest betrayal is not of
the flesh but of the heart" (p.4).Tkus, the pesceptim today of betrayal in
the case of adultery may be not so much the violatim oE the exclusive sex-
ual rule but the vi,olation of intimacy-thd is, emolional betrayal. If this
is true, it is indeed an interesting mist because the underlying assump-
ticm is that married couples (or people in similar relationships)must keep
not d y their fd&ty in terms of sexud exclusivity but in t e r m of emo-
tional exclusivity as well.
These combified developments may imply that females have less toler-
ance for males' infidelity, that there is more infidelity on the part of fc-
males, and that there has been a redrawing of the boundaries of what
 Violating Tr~tsl~ l h~y a df f y : Categolaies and Cases 53

adultery realy means in the arca of emotions. ft is interestkng to note that

in a few rather publicized cases, for example, those of Dick Morris,
Fran~oisMitterand, Bjinyamin Netanyahu, Kin Clinton, and Hugh Grmt,
the pattern and the response =actions were of the old pattedreaction
and not what could be expected from the new. That is, despite the viola-
tion of sexual tmst and loyalty, thc sporlses remained with their infidd
partners. Their behavior seems to contradict the implications of the report
in Newsrueek.

Informing
The term, "informing" applies to a variety of activities, rangjng from sim-
ple hformixrg on classmates (sgtlealers) to police and htelligence hform-
ing. Tax authorities use informers as well. For example, Israeli income tax
authorities used to have Nliashinan (literally translated as "squealer">,
which was a telephone service that anyone could call anonymously to re-
port tax violations. Wormers am sometimes idmtified with cdlaborators..
IUustrations for infnrmers can be fomd in many areas. For example, Ak-
erstrom" so& (1.991) is focused on police informers.
Many individuals feel that '"squeaiing" is ismorally ambiguous. For ex-
ample, Knesset (Israeli parliment) rnetnbers in the state of Israel tried to
pass laws that would. belp protect whistle-blowers against persecution,
but the president of Israel (Ezer Weitzisam) m d the former chief of staff
(Refael Eitan) objected because they kljt that "quealers'%hovlld be not re-
warded or supported.
An interesting case fllustrates s w e the complexities of ""squealing." Ac-
cording to Kdidman and Weston (19981, David Kaczynski. helped the FKt
capture his brother, Ted Kaczynski, suspected of being the Una:borrrber.
Ted wa~;suspected as the man b&i.nd a seventeen-year letter-bomb spree
rc3sult-ingin three deaths and twenty-three ifijured people. Was that squeal-
ing inrmoral? &e brother squealed m mother, but did he not prevent fu-
ture terrible injuries?
'This case had m interesthg twist whezz David felt that he was betrayed.
David expected the FBI to keep his role in the arrest of his brother secret
and understood that the prosecution would not seek the death penalty.
Both expectations WE shattered. Davi,d's rnle in finding the Unabonnbes
was revealed, and the prosecution did ask for the death. penalty, h public
statements, David made no secret of his claim that the FBI violated his
trust and loyalty on these two issues and that he felt betrayed. As things
turned out, David" brother did not receive a death sentence.
&e other in-depth illustration for this issue is Knox's 1997 study. By
focusing on a k w f i g u ~ sKlnox's
, (19"37) work eontextrralizes both heroes
and hformers h the late-eighteenth-century political struggle for Irish in-
54 Violating Tr~tsl~ l hyalty:
~ d Categolaies and Cases

dependence. b o x uses these Irish historical figures to understand who

the rebels and heroes were, who the villains and collaboraitive informers
were, what motivated them, and what canclusions can be drawn about
Irish political m d ideolqical, culture. Through this process &m is able
to decipher the Irish culturd enigma, with its pwzling contradiictions.
His work portrays quite vividly those contradicting charackristics of the
idealistic Irishmen: persistence, naivet4, determination, as well as their
arrogance, ineptikrde, and mrealistic utopian ideals-m explosive con-
coction that Led evemtualfy to tragedy, culminat.ing h miserable dcaths of
tens of thousands of people,
Another interesting case of informing unfolded in 1953Gthe case of
Sascha Anderson.. Because of the politics) changes in Germany, t-hc con-
cealment and deception originally involved in the case we= exposed, and.
the true facts were established.
Sascha Andcrson was one of the most central f i g u ~ isn foriner East
Germany" subversive movemmt, He was considered a dissident hero by
those supporting =&stance to the totalitarian E& German politicai cul-
ture and was deeply immersed in networks of artists and u n d e ~ r o u n d
dissidents hformer East Berlin, When the Berllh 1Nall crumbled and East
Germany ceased to exist in the early 199Qs,documents from the Stasi (the
East German secret service) revealed that, in fact, h d e r s o n was one of
their very best and most important informers. While pretending to be
part of the mcrvement against the East German ~ g i m eAnderson,
, from
about the mid-1920s on, gave the totalitarian regime all the hformation
he could gather (including s m e very personal impressions and evalua-
tions) on members he met and knew among the resistance, betraying
their trust and loyalty.
One interesting aspect of this case is that Charm Film Productions
made a 1996 documentary about Anderson (for Charnel 4 Television), in
which he was canfro~~ted with some of his acts. At the time the docume11-
tary was made he was hiding out in Rome. h one of the morc tantalizing
parts of the docun-tentary,two of his previous Stasi operators wew inter-
viewed. m e of them stated that h d e r s o n was indeed co~~cemed about
the freedm of artistic expression and that no arrests were made withjn
the dissident group about vvhich Anderson was hforming. C)f course, it
was not necessary With such qudi:!, sqclealing provided by Anderson it
was better to let those innocent dissidents continue their activities be-
cause they posed no real threat to the regime. The seeortd operator stated
that it was his impression that Anderson regarded the hforming as a sort
of a game inwhich he saw hhself as an actor. That is, he did not see h h -
self as really involved in the acts, denying the moral meanimg of his in-
farming. This explains Andcrsm's answer to the yuestion of.his intimate
collaboration with the Stasi. He stated that although the Stasi believed he
 Violating Tr~tsl~ l h~y a df f y : Categolaies and Cases 55

was working for them, he mdly was not, Certainly, a person who man-
ages to convhtce himself that h a t e v e r he is doing is just a '"me"" mfght
also believe that he realty did not cotlaborate-Aft- all, the "real" Ander-
son (whoever that was) was not hvolved in this dangerous ""game." h-
derson is indeed. an interesting case of self-de1usian.
117 this particular context, "informing" aand "collal-7oration" are not djs-
similar. In both cases we have two opposjng and clashing symbofic
moral universes, where one tries to enlist ""itformers" or "collaborators"
h ln the other to obtain an advantageous edge in the conflict, Mereas
""collaborationm"tends to be used more in war-like situations, ""inform-
ing'" tends to be used mow in police work. One of the m m fascinating
cases, combining two such opposing universes against a third, is the
""Luciano Project," where a legal, military organization formed a coliiabo-
rative alliance with an illegal and criminal organization.
'The klrinter of I942 was a difficult time. Nazi submarines were hitting
ships off the east coast of the United Statesl" and rumors of sahotage
ning WM. Far example, the S.S. Ni,mrur-rdie, a luxury liner that
was being converted to a troop ship (to be christened Lgfiryefte) and fast
enough to outrun U-boats, suddenly burst into flames at her Eiludson
fiver pier while about 2,500 workers were inwolved in the conversion
works (February 9)- Attempts to squelch the fire caused the ship to cap-
size at the dock. Salvaging efforts failed., and she was sold for scrap h
1946. Although never proven, sabotage was suggested as the explanation
for l.he slndderl and unexpected fire." "is context prodwed one of the
strangest partnerships between U.S. Naval Intelligence a d the Mafia,
moraily two very different organizations.
'The goal of this collaboration was to secure the port of New York from
Nazi infiltrators, Such bosses as ""LuckyF'Lwiano, Joe "Socks"' Lmza, and
Meyer Lansky were hvolved in this prclject, as well as more than 350
naval personnel, The U.S. Navy estimated €-hat I:.,ucianofscontribution
was "useful" but regarded the whole project as an embarrassing episode,
better forgcrtten. Campbell, who provides tbr story of this project (1.977),
disagrees m d feels Chat the U.S. Navy had nothing to be ashaned of. fn-
deed, if anything, 'Troject Luciano" 'provides m e of the best illustrations
of the d d sayifig that wars create some rather strange bedfellsws.
'These examples illustrate that- &though many people despi,se inform-
ers, they sometimes provide information that helps society and saves
lives.

Mutiny
Murky appears in our typolow twice. Here the term is used to denote
military insurrection, When a group of soidiers feel that their command-
56 Violating Tr~tsl~ l hyalty:
~ d Categolaies and Cases

ing officer no longer desewes their loyalty and trust, they move agajnst
that commander.
'The most dramatic muthies, and those that receive the most atte~~tion,
have been aboard ships and at sea, The k a g e of a crew revolting agajnst
the captain of a warship on the high seas is sornethg that has capthated
the i m g h a t i m . Indeed, some classic books and movies have been ere-
ated on this theme, such as Herman Wouk" Pulitzer Prizew
I"il2e Gli~zeMziliny (made into a movie in 1954f, the movie The Mzdtiny tllr
fhe B O Z I I 0962
Z ~ ~ and 1984, based on an actual mutiny in t,81)6),and Sergei
Eisensteh" P925 Russian movie Potemkin, which was based on the P905
revolutionary mutiny cm the battleship fite~kil2.As tbr works of Mlen
(1989), Hadfield (1929), and Guttsidge (1992) reveal, naval insurrection
has not been rare, and attempts to seize control of ships are part and par-
cel of the histories of many navies in the world.
'There are several interesting cases of mutiny. One involves Farce X,
which was composed of British Royal Navy soldiers who were sent to as-
sist American forces in the South Pacific during World War 11. Their
mutiny sternmed fmm "rc?sen.tment.against orders to a remote war zolIe
considered principally someone else" province" "uttridge 1992:223).
Gfenton (1986) and Bakeless (1998:31%327) liescribe the 1781 mutiny of
the Pe~~nsylvania line, which developed aft-er incmpetence and mishan-
dling during the American Revalution, Another example is the 1743
muthy of Lord Sempill's l-fighlmd Regiment (the so-catled Hack Watch
Mutiny). The mutiny developed when the anxious soldiers of the rclgj-
meat learned that they were to be sent abroad, contrary to their terms of
recruitment (MacWilliam 19112).
A mutiny (naval or otherwise) basically means crossing the moral
boundaries dictated by the m i l i t a ~chain of command, using power to
accomplish this crossing. By its very nature, a mutiny is an open, not se-
cret, insurrection, howver, the rnilitary cm-and often does-censor in-
formation about such events,

Collaboration, Defection, Dese~iort,

Espionage and Spying, International Betrayal, Mutiny,
State-Sponsored Terror, and Human Rights Violations
The second cell we shall focus on includes acts of betrayal in which an in-
member commits a violation of trust and loyalty against the gezzeral col-
lective. The issue of whether the behavior in question was conduct& in
secret is of crucial importance. Atthough treason is part of this cell, I shall
not djscuss it here; I devote all of Chapter 4 to the topic.
 Violating Tr~tsl~ l h~y a df f y : Categolaies and Cases

The term ""collaboration" "motes both positive and negative qualities.

Co1la:boration between msicims, scientists, or physicians is typically as-
sumed to be positive. In ~ f e r e n c eto war or cmfiict, the term connotes an
agogether diMerent and negative meaning, for examfle, collaborating
with the enemy. There is a subtext to this negative meaning, and it is asso-
ciated with treason. We shall delve into the issue, and cases, of collizbora-
tion mare thoroughly in Chapters 5 and 6.

Defectiotz
Defection refers to a situation whese two adversarial groups are compet-
ing, or are locked in a connict, and one or mom members of one group
shift their loyalties to the other and typically move from Che territory of
one group to that of the other. Defection cast take place in secret (for ex-
am*, when spies, or the military, are iwolved) or in pubXic (for exam-
ple, in politics). Moreover, defedion-by definition-involves negotiated
and changed loyalties and trust in the most straieforward. w q . The par-
ticular form of vidation of trust and loyaity that we discuss here is perpe-
trated by a member of the in-group who changes his or her loyalty and is
not aimed against anyone in particular, but against the group (although
individual actors can, m d frequently arc., hurt). Although defection can
be observed in a n u ~ ~ b of e rareas (for example, politics, religim, sport,
commerce, industry, and even police work [Zil:berbel.tj 1997]), it does not
invoke a unified societal reac.tion.
Illustrations for defectl.011 are numerous. 'The history of Czarist Russia
and the Soviet Union has some fascinating tales about defectors, one of
the most famous of which is the case of prince Aneirey Nikhaylavich
Kuhsky (1528-1583), Kuhsky was a military commander in Czar Ivan
(She Terrible) IV's regime in the middle of the sixteenth century, He was
liked by the czar m d became one of his closest, most valued, and twsted
associates. However, between 1563 and 1564 Kurbsky lost his special po-
sition with the czar, and in 1564 he defected to Poland and joisted the
forces of King Sigismund :II: Augustus of Poland-Lithuania, who was
fighting against Russia. Kitlg Sigismund was generous bath militarify and
fhancially with Kurbsky, After his defection, Kurbsky wrote the czar a
few letters, Mlhich serve as useful historical documents for the period.
This defection clearly shook Ivan, who c o n t e q l d e d leaving his throne.
Instead Ivan began suspecting conspiracies everywhere and ruthlessly
moved to cclnsolidate his power, resuiting in a rt;ip of terror tfor exam-
ple, see Keenan 1971).
58 Violating Tr~tsl~ l hyalty:
~ d Categolaies and Cases

In recent t h e s , the term ""dfection" h s been used most widely with;in

the context of Mthat has become k n m as the intelligence community,
where. officers of one country-typicalfy inpossession of some important:
informat-im-move to a rival country.24 Clefection was very prominent
within the intelligence community during the cold war betwecm the West
m d the East.
Intelligence jargon differentiates between a ""defector," who fits the
above characterization, and a "defector in place,'" which refers to a poten-
tial defector who has denounced his or her count-ry but has not left it.
Such defectors typically continue their work and become ' h d e s . " Of
course, m l e s can become defectors. Some examples include British spies
such as Bwgess, Nacfem, and Philby (&sczxssed below), and Arkady
Shevchenko, a valuable Soviet mole in the service of the Americms who
fh~allydefected to the United States." H a m d e stays too long, he risks be-
ing caught,
Peshaps the most successful. known American mole the Soviets ever
had was Aldrich H. Ames (rtscruited in 1985), who caused sevew damage
to U.S. interests.%He was caught i,n 1994 Mlhi:[etrying to Aee and received
a sentmce of life in prison, A case of a Soviet mole working for the Amer-
icans was Dimitri I'olyakov, who was operative for twenty years.
Polyakov was betrayed by Arnes m d executed by the Soviets in 1986.27
Defectors may possess valuable assets (for exampIe, information), and
their defection can thus give the side they defect to some obvious intelli-
g e x e and operational advantages. The first hi,gh-rankhg Soviet intelli-
gence officer to defect to the West was probably Schnneka Ginsberg.28
Ginsberg was a former resident of the Soviet Uniorz who joined the Soviet
Military Inklligence (GRU) in 1923m d transferred to the NKVD (Sta:lin's
secret police) in 1934, rising to the rank of major general there, He became
disillusioned with Stalin and defected to the French in 1937. Ginsherg
then traveled to Canada and from there to the U~zitedStates, mere he
contacted the FBI, whjch hdped to grant him alicn residmt status.2We
later visited London and gave crucial intelligence infornation to the
British as well..Unfortunately, the British faited to follow some of the im-
portant leads Ginsberg provided them and did not use all the information
in m effective way*Ginslbert;'~body was hund cm :I;&mary 10,14$1, in a
Bellevue Hot4 m m in Washjngton, DC., shot in the temple, wilh three
suicide notes. Chances are that he was the victim of a successful assassi-
nation,""
Some famous defectors include the fdlowing: Afansy M. Shorokhov
(alias Vladimir Petrov), who dekcted to Australia in 1954; Guy Burgess
and E>onalJ Madean, two British diplmats who liefected to the Soviet
Union in 1951 (KGB moles for twenty years); lgor Gouzenko, a Soviet
GRU agent stationed in Ottawa, Canada, who defected to the West in
 Violating Tr~tsl~ l h~y a df f y : Categolaies and Cases 59

September 1945; Polish secret service officer Michal Golienewski, who de-
fected in Oecernber 1960 to the h e r i c a n CIA in W s t Berlin (actually a
Soviet male in the Polish secret service) and helped to expose m d arrest.
George Blake (a Soviet spy in British MTb) and Harry Houghton (from the
Portland spy ring, discussed later in this book); and KGB Major Anatoli
Goljtsin, who dtkcted to the West from his Soviet post in Helsinki, Fin-
land, in 1962.
Defectors may possess not only valuable information but dso vduable
m d tmgible assets, like a fighter plane. In the mornhg hot~rsof August
16, 1966, an Iraqi fighter pilot, Mcxnir Radfa, defected with his Soviet-
made h'liG-21 fighter plane to Israel. Illat operation took much effort
from the 1sraet.isecret service, but persuading Munir to steal Chat MiG-2t
and defect to Israel was m e of the most brilliant, useful, and valuable op-
eraitions of the Israeli Mossad. The ability of the Israeli Air Force to e x m -
h e , firsthand, \zrhat was ther.~the first-line fighter plane of some of its
Arab neighbors certainly gave them an ubvious edge. Despite various ef-
forts, Mmir did not integrak into Israeli culture and experienced difficul-
ties finding a job- Helped by Israeli authorities, Nunir left the country to
live elsewhere. He died, in August 1998. Israeli authorities were asked to
help in his burial and did so, far away from both Israel and :Iraq (Black
m d Morris 1991:20&218; Dan 1998).

Whittaker Chambers and Alga Hiss, 011e particularly notable case

wfierfi?facts and constructims are interczstjng to follow is the case of W i t -
taker Chmbers (1901-1961), an editor for Time magazine. He was a dedi-
cated American C o m u n i s t vvho joined the p m y in 1924 and became a
spy for the Soviets in 1933, Disillusioned with communism, he quit bath
the party and spyixlg in 1937, that is, he shifted his loyalties to tbe Ameri-
cans. In 7939, fobwing the nonaggression pact s i p e d by Nazi Gemany
and Ihe Soviet Union, he warned the St&e Department about its pemetra-
t h by Soviet agents. Specifically, he t d d Adolf Rerle, assistant secretary
of state, that Alger Hiss was a Communist and a spy. His warnings wew
iglwred.31 h 1942 he was in contact with the FBI but was hesitant about
giving more names." On August 3,19118, he gave voluntary testimony to
the House UII-American Activities Committee, in which he said that Al-
ger Miss was working for Ihe Sovkts. That was a significant picce ol in-
formation. It started a case arwnd d g e r Hiss that to some extent is still
puzzling even today.33
Alger Hiss was born in 1904 in Baltimore and developed an. impressive
career in different departments of the W.S. administration. In 1936 he cm-
tered the State Deparment w h e he ~ served in some key roles, including
advising President Roosevelt during the Valta Conference (February
4-11,1945). Hiss quietly left the Skate Clepartment to become the president
60 Violating Tr~tsl~ l hyalty:
~ d Categolaies and Cases

of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in 1947, Following

Chambers's statement in 1948, Hiss denied the charges and sued Cham-
bers for libel. One men?ber of the comittee, Republican Richard M.
:Nixm,accused Hiss of lying and convirrced Chambers to reveal some ev-
idence he supposedly had against Hiss. Hiss continuously claimed that
he was not a spy. The accm,sa.t.ionsmade by Chantbers and thc dmials and
counteraccusation made by Hiss helped to produce two trials. Under the
statute of limitations, :Hiss crruid not be tried for espionage, and he was
t h e r e f o ~i-t-tdictedon two counts of perjury. In his first trialt, in July 1,949,
the jurnrs could not c m e to a decision, Hiss's second trial began in No-
vember 1949. He was convicted on January 21,1950, and sentenced to five
years inprison (he actraally semed forty-four months).
For many years, the question of whetZler Hiss was really a spy haunted
An-terica.3As I'olmar and ALLen (1997) point out, this plazzlix~gcase was
solved in the 1,990s.First, in 1992 General Dmitri Volkogunov, a Russian
historian in, charge of the KGB and. military in.tel.1igence archives, re-
vealed that he had searchrjd the relevant files, found n o ~ i n gand , that
tkrefore the accusations against Hiss had been "completely ground-
le~s."3~ However, Volkogonov admitted that he "couXd not rule out the
pclssibility that some rt;cclrds had been overlooked or even destroyed.'qb
Second, in 1993 a Hungarian historian doing rclsearch on Ihe Hmgarian
secret police-Maria Schmicft-stated. that she had. discovered docu-
ments that indicated that Mr. Hiss was a Communist s ~ y i However, 3~ the
most credible evidence was produced in 1929, the same year in which
Hiss died.. In that year, decrypted Soviet intelligence messages (code
name "Venonam")rom the 1940s were released by the N U (National Se-
curity Agency) and tinked Hiss directly to espionage." "eciiically, one
document, dated March 30, 1945,identifkd. a Soviet spy in America
code-named "Ales." The message identified "Ales" as working in the
State Departrrrexrt and as the person who accompanied President Rao-
sevelt to the 1945 Valta Conference and then flew on to Moscow. There,
"Ales" met Aneirei VyshinskL; then Soviet Commissar for F o ~ i g nAf-
fairs, and was cited for his aid to the Soviets. We h o w that Hiss worked
at the time of the YaIta Cosrference in the State Department and that he
accompanied President RocrseveIt to the Yalta Conference as an advi~er.3~
Hiss himself admitted that he spent a nighl im Moscow aficzr the S'atta
Conference, but he denied that he was Ales. His version was that he
went to Moscow to see the subway system.4Uwilable evidence (Cham-
bers's testimony and evidence, historian Maria Scrhnrridt" statement, and
the Venona files) thus seems to suggest that Hiss was indeed a Soviet spy
and that throqhout World War 11 be provided to the Soviets inside fn-
formation that probably helped to mdermine the policies of the United
States government, which tmsted him by allowing hixn to work in a sen-
 Violating Tr~tst~ l h~y a df f y : Categolaies and Cases 64

sitive role and to which he swore loyalty The violations of trust and loy-
alty im this case are very &vious.
If bdeed Hiss was a spy, he was very successful at creating a deceptive
filcade and managed to conceal his defection for a very long period of
time. Not only did he damage U.S. national security but his deception
created a bitter and divisive national co~~troversy-quitean achievement
for a spy who was also a bma fide traitor. Hiss died on November 15,
1996, in New York City at age ninety-two.43

The Cold War, The cold war saw quite a few spectacular cases of defec-
ition.42 There were some famous defectors from the Soviet Union: Kan-
stantin Volko~r,Vladimir Petrov, Anatoly Golitsin, and Yuri N'osenko,
among others. Three of the most famous defectors from the Soviet Union
were Oleg Gordievsky, @or Sergeievitch Gouzenko, and Oleg Penkovsky.

Oleg Gurrlievsky
G d i e v s k y was born in 1938 and developed a career in the KGB. Appar-
ently, sometime h the 11970s (probably 1974) he began to work for British
htelligenre (M16). His motivation to spy for the Wst, supposedly, was
heled by tbr brutal Soviet hvasion to Czechoslovakia in 19658. For more
than a decade he W= able to provide his British operators with valuable
information, fn 1985 his cover was blown by a double agent in the Ameri-
can CIA, and he defected to Britain. His defection was formally an-
nounced by the British Foreign Office in S e p t e d e r 1985. Gordi,evsky
paid a very high personal price for defection, as he left his wife and two
daqhters in the Soviet Wm. His wife dhoxed him, and althougl~in
1991 his fmily was allowed to leave the Soviet 19nio11, Che fantily did not
retunite.43

61eg Penkovsky
Penkovsky presents us with an altogether difkrent case, Born in 1919, he
took part it1 the Red Army's fight against the Nazi Wehnnncht, and after
the war he was trained as an htelligence ofticer. Me eventual:tybecame an
officer with Soviet Maitary fntelligencc (GRU). Like Gouzcnko (discussed.
below), his first attempts at estail?lishingcontact with Western intelligence
were rather f"rust-rating.However, evcn.tua:lfyhe was successful in makhg
such a contact with both the British and the A m d c m s , From April 1961.
until August 1942, he passed large volumes of vital classified information
to the Americans and British,. Some nl this information proved quite irn-
portant to President Kemedy during the Cuban missile crisis of October
1962 because it enabled the Americans to have a better assessment of So-
viet inte~~tians.Soviet intelligence was successful h exposkg Penkovsky
and arrested him on October 22,1962. In a show trial, in May 3963, he was
62 Violating Tr~tsl~ l hyalty:
~ d Categolaies and Cases

sentenced to death. On May l?, 1963, it was amomced that he had been
executed "by the mefiod =served for the Soviet Union's wwst traitors:
fie was dowly fed into a live k n a c e , with some of his crlosest fnrmer col-
leagues forced to watch" (Volkman 1994:30).Clearly, Penkovsky was one
of the best and most producthe pro-West '"defectors in pla~e.~,44

Igcrr Sergeievifch Gozkserzko

Gouzenko (1"39-1982) is, perhaps, one of fie mow cdorfuj cases oE de-
fectim. Mavillg been trained in military intefligence in Moscow in 1941,
Gouzcnko was sent in June 1943 to the Soviet embassy in Ottawa,
Cmada, as a ciplier clerk (officially defined as a "civilian employee"'),111
September 1944 fie received unexpected orders to return to the Soviet
Union. Gouzenko and his wife decided that they were not going back.
W ~ ahappened
t next wodd be a good script for a Hollywood movie.
Gouzenko left the Soviet embassy on Sepk"R713er 5,1943, with a pile of
classified documents, intending to defect to the Canadians on September
6, with his pregnmt wife and son. Here was a man who possessed in-
valmble k n o h d g e that was vitd to the West's understanding of Soviet
information-gathering methods, Was he received with joy and apprecia-
tion? Not at all. At first, Canadian officials refused to give hirn asyfum. It
was one of his neighbors, a sergeant in the Canadian Air Force, who ac-
tually gave him asylum. OnIy after a while, when the opaque Canadian
authorities began to grasp the importance of the information Gouaenko
possessed, and the fact that hc was risking his life, did thcy decidc. to
grant him official asylum.
"The information Gouxnko brought weaied that the Soviets were op-
erating a si,zeable espionage organization in Canada. These revelations
led to exposures m d arrests of more then ten spies, all involved in an in-
tcnsive effort to fil~dinformation about atomic weapons and transkr it to
the Soviet Union. It is notewort-hy that Gouzenko also provided informa-
tion (alas, inconclusive) that ALger Hiss was a Soviet spy," A A m d j a n
Royal Comxnission that hivestigated. the Gouzenko affair submitted its re-
port on June 1946, stating there that Gauzenko had "revealed the exis-
tence in Canada of a widespread conspiracy to &bin secret official infor-
mation,""" and that the Soviets had tried to create a fifth column
organizatim in Canada, whose god i t was to collect miljtary, polit.i.cal,
and general hforrnation.47
Two famous defectors from the West were Edward Lee Howard a d
Harold (Kim) FhiXby

Edzoard L. Howard
Howard was born h 1951 in New Mexico. After an. unsteady period of
employment and moves within and outside the United States, he applied
 Violating Tr~tsl~ l h~y a df f y : Categolaies and Cases 63

to the CIA and was contacted in 1980 (in Chicago). He was trained by the
CIA for a variety of tasks and was eventually statimed in the American
embassy in Moscow. Both he m d his wife worked thcrfi?as intelligence of-
ficers, Because Moward failed polygraph tests, his employment by the
CIA was terminated in 1983 and he rebrned to the U ~ ~ i t eStates.
d h t-he
mi&1980s Moward traveled a few times to Ewope and was in contact
with KGB oficers in Vicnna. fn return for the information he gave them,
he was given cash. The CL4 cau@t cm to his betrayal and in September
1985 was ready to arrest him.,Howard was quicker, however, and by that
time he was already on his way to Moscow (the last part of the journey in
the trunk of a Soviet embassy car).48

Harold (Kiln) Philby

I'hilby is an altogether diffewnt, and much more complicated, case. The
gel~eralcontext is that of the famous ""C:annbridge spy ring." 'The term
refers to a group of British spies who were recruited by Soviet NMVD in
the 1930tj, and t-he name relates to the fact that the major figures werl, re-
cruited at Cambridge University49 The core group consisted of Dmald
Madean,'Wuy Burgess,'x A n t h y Blunt,SZ Harold (Km) Philby'qJohn
Cairncross," Alan Nunn Ma)i," sand Leo Long." These spies were quite
effective in carnsing sig~zificantdamage to the West and were probably
among the best-knwn spies of all time. In March 1351, as the British
ScoCIand Yard was hot cm their trail, Burgess and Maclean defected to t-he
Soviet Union. Cairncross, Blunt, May, and Long remained in the West.
Blunt and Long were promised i unity from punishment in exchange
for information. Blunt evenh;lally cmkessed and became socially isolated;
iJongwas less prominent: to begin with. May was caught and sentenced to
ten years in prison in 1946 but was actualjy released in 1952. Philby de-
fected and moved to Moscow." Although t-he two most talked about spies
from this group are Blunt and Phiby, it is qrxjte possible that- the m r e ef-
fective and important spy was actually Maclean,
Philhy must he viewed hthe contertt of thr ideological rivalries, World
War II, and the sexual exchanges (as well as l.he heavy drinking of
Maclean) among that group of spies. Phjlby was born in 1922 and in the
193@ attended Cambridge blniversity, vvhem he was recrUited to Swiet
intelligence. He left Carnbridge in 1,933for a fascinating castler as a spy.
He managed to become a member of British M15 (British Security Service
in charge of domestic security and counterespionage activities in the
United Kingdom) during World War I, and after leavhg Carnbridge he
covered-as a journalist-the Spanish Civil War. After Spain, British M16
(British security service in charge oE espionqe and foreign intelligence,
also h o k m as SE) recrujted him agaiin. Phjby developed quite a career
in STS and. was given some of the most sensitive and classified positions
64 Violating Tr~tsl~ l hyalty:
~ d Categolaies and Cases

there. He had no y u a h s passing all the information he considered valu-

able to his Soviet operator. As CIA suspicions against Philby were mtlmt-
ing in the early 2950s fas w d as those of some of his British colfeagues),
he was forced to leave the British .intelligenceservice.
His next assignment was as a reportc;r in the Middle East. Even there he
was able to continue his espionag work. Philby's personal life was quite
turbulent; he had a few affairs (some with wives of his associates), and as
a spy, he was able to dodge rather successfully a few Soviet defectors vvho
poi,nted their h g e r at him. But t?ll good things come to an emd. In 1963
British ME6 had enough evidence to confront Philby. In that cmfronta-
ticm, Philby was offert-ld the same deal that Blunt and Long received: im-
munity from prosecution for infomnati.011. Plnjlhy confessed but defected
to the Soviet Uni~n.~B
Even after the end of the cold war, defections associated primarily with
intelligence were rather common. One such example is the famous easfy
August 1995 defection from Iraq to Jordan of Hussejn Kamal Al-Hassan
and Generaf Satldam Kamd, both maried to the daughters of Iraqi p s i -
dent Saddam. Hussejn. 0 x 1 August 12, 1995, Saddam H~~sscin, in a fiery
speech, called them "traitors" and threatened to execute them. After
spending time in Jordan, and accepthg Saddarn Hussein's tater assertion
that Chey would not be harmed if they relzltmed to Iraq, chey chose to be-
lieve him and =turned to Iraq. Shortly after =turning they were killed.
h o t h e r recent case occurred in Srptember 1997 when fang Sung Gil,
Nor* Kttrem ambassador to Egpt, and his wife dcfected in Cajro to CIJZ
agents who rushed the couple to safety in the United States, As was the
case with p ~ v i o udefections,
s tbe North Kortran~;reacted in anger, accusing
the CIA of committing a hostile act.. That: ang-er may have bee11 magnified
because fang was the axis around which Pymgyang's Middle East pdicy
was turning, Obviously, the CIA hoped that ex-ambassador Jang's breadth
of knowledge wouXd be helpful in unveiling the mystery surrounding
some suspected, shad:y international transactions made by the North Kore-
m s (for example, selling mfssiles to Syria, Libya, Iran, and E g ~ t ) . ~ g
Intelligence-orienCed defection is certainly an interclsting furrn of be-
trayal. It hvolves the violation of trust m d loyalty in betraying secrets to
an alien and frequently hostile national adversary. This particular type of
defection CharacrteristicaIly a s s m e s a secret form,", Defectors are con-
structed, differently by those they defect from and those they defect to.

A categcny mlated to defectim is desertion. In its most popular meming,

the term refers to the behavior of a soldier MIho leaves a military post
wi.thout authorization, intending not to return. Such posts can be in
 Violating Tr~tsl~ l h~y a df f y : Categolaies and Cases 65

trenches, tanks, naval forces, or an administrati:vc position. Whmas de-

fection mems goiw to the otJler/opposite side of the conflict, desertion
means walking away from a post wi.lhout changing sides. Much like de-
fectors, deserters most certahly violate both trust invested in them and
loyalty to their gmup. Indeed, desertim mceives tbr s e v e ~ sof t punish-
mmts (espedally if done in the context of combat).
Desertion entails a lart;er category oi behaviors associated with military
duties that involve both loyatty and trust. Such behaviors include being
AWOL (absence without leave), which has been treated frequently as be-
trayal. During World War 11, both desertion and AWOL infractions took
place amlmg the various combatmts. For example, one out of sixtea So-
viet prisoners of war (POWs) w e found to be deserters. Much of the
Hungarian Army deserted to the Swiet Red Army, Mass desertion took
place with the Burma National Army when it left the fapmew to fiit;bt
with the Brjtish (March 1945). Despite the mythdogies about them, Japan-
ese soldiers deserted as well (especially as the war prog~ssed),The U.S.
A m y had a total of 40,000 deserters. The Welzr@lacl.lfaccused about 35,000
soldiers of desertion m d s e ~ ~ t e ~ to
~ cdeath
e d close to 23,000, of whom at
least 15,000 were actually executed. Because the U.S. Army tended to
charge deserters with the lesser offense of AWOt, only one soldier was ex-
ecuted. More than IQQ,00Q soldiers deserted from the British army61
Many potmtial U,S, soldiers evaded the draft during the Vie
mmy by kavir~gthe country. h Israel, it became clear &at du151-1
invasion to liebanon (whjch b q m in the su, er ol' 1982) large nun?bers of
soldiers (especiafty h the resemes) fomd.ways to evade joinhg the war,
Cmscimticrus objection to mflitary service is not cognized as a legiti-
mate m a t and politicai category in a number o.E countries. In such situa-
tions this behavior is constructed as a violation of loyalty and trust. 'Tbus,
people who define themselves as such in these countries may face a grim
and bittes dispute with clrafting administrations and are ofien branded as
traitors, Other countries are able to absorb such behavior without con-
structing it in such negative terms.
Deserters have played a role in quite a few fictional cultural creations,
both as heroes and antiheroes. hrhaps one of the most memorable roles
of a deserter is played by Marlon B r a d o in Francis Ford Coppola's 1979
violent, yet cryptic, Vietnam War m v i e Apuc@Iyp,st.Now.
A category close to desertion and defection, tbougtn in a very different
context, is conversion, which is discussed later 117 this chapter.

Espionage and S p y i ~ g
Not every spy is a traitor, and not every traitor is a spy A spy that would
qualify as a traitor must be a person that is a bona fide member of the in-
66 Violating Tr~tst~ l hyalty:
~ d Categolaies and Cases

group in a particular collective or organization, whose secrets that person

gives ("betry'" to another, sometimes hostile, coflective or orglmization.
It is the trust, loydty and faithfuhess that this member of the colkctive
violates, which earns that person the label of traitor. Zjrpically such acts
are. committed in s e c ~and t hy using deception, 'I'he traitor, in such cases,
~ t gives the impression of deccncy, loyalty, hon-
needs to prrzselrt a f r o ~th&
esty and commitment, but the underlyhg reality is th exact opposite of
this false and deceptive impression.
A person who fakes membership in the group or the collective as-
sume+wiflingly and deliberately-a fake and decepthe identiv That
perstrn pretends to be a bona ficie member of a cdlective but really is not.
Such is the case with a trmsplanted spy with a fake identity. Sucks a per-
son can badly qualifJrfur the term '"traitor" because he or she does not
violate any real trust or loyalty C)bviously, not classifying such a person
as a bona fide traitor may becorn problematic if: Chat person generates
(deliberately so) feelings of tmst and loyal9 for many years, whereas his
or her genuine loyalty is to an altogether d i f f e ~ n collectke.
t Hwever,
members of the collective whose secrets the spy managed to disclose
tend typically to expl.ess their feelings-mce that spy is exposed-in a
rhetoric of betrayal, no matter w h t h e r the spy's identity was fake or
genuine,
There are nurnerous illustrations of people who hid their true iden-
tity and interests and pretencfed to be something else, thus gaining ac-
cess to valuable illlorntation and d a m g i n g the group or eokrtive,
whose trust and loyalty they viollated. Let us review a few illustrative
cases.

The "Esek Bish" in Egypt. In 1951. Israeli military intelligence orga-

nized a spy web in Cairo. Recruited members wert?sent for training to Is-
rael and by f 953 all the members of the spy network were back in Cairn
ready for action. These spies pretended to be tmstfuf. and loyal Emptims,
but they were not.
In f"34 the United States demanded that Britah evacuate the Suez
Canal region. At that time, Israel was concerned about the growing
American alienation toward Israel and felt that a continued British
presellce could be used to its advantage. Thus, Israel's military intelli-
gence wanted, to prevent, or at least stall, the British evacuation. They
rt.as0nc.d that hitting British targets in Egypt would achieve their de-
sired goal by forcing the British gover~zmentto reevaluate its willing-
ness to comply with the h e r i c a n demand. Despite imer disputes in
Israel mgardhg the wisdclm of activatitlg its Cairo spies against British
targets, the decision was made, and the Israeli spies were ordered to
spring into action.
 Violating Tr~tsl~ l h~y a df f y : Categolaies and Cases 67

The m a h strategy was to plant bombs in various places (on July 2 and
M). The aceivity on July 23 was fatal. One of the spies (Philip Matanson)
was caught with a smldering bomb when he entercd the Rio cinema, It
did not take fong for the Egyptians to figure out what was going on, and
within a matter of days all the mernbers of the spy net were ca-t and
arreted (with an additimal nine members, plus one innocent Egypti""
Jew-Yoseph Karmona, and Major Meir Binet, a repmsentative of Israeli
rnilitary intelligence who was indirectly associated with the net). The cap-
ture of the Israeli spy net was made public on July 26,1954, m d their trial
began on December 11, 2954. K;trm.ona either committed suicide or died.
while being twtured; Binet committed suicicie; Dr. Moshe Marzuk and
Shmuel Azar were sentenced to dcath (and hanged on January 31,1955).
Two were acquitted, and the rest were sentenced to spend long periods in
prison.
In Israel, a political.storm arose around the questio~nof who exactly au-
thorized the activation of the net h this amateurish way. The affair was
never s o h d satisfactody. Et led, however, to the resipation of both Pin-
has Lavm (minister of"d t f e ~ ~ sand
e ) David Ben-Curion (prime minister).
Clearly, the fag around the authorization and.orders to activate the net re-
flects the sad fact that those in charge were avoidi?g their respmsibiii.ty
to give truthful accounts. 'Thus, both trust and loyalty were compromised
in a most significant way. The affair itself, referred to as "the Lavm affair"
or moro commonly as the "Esek, Bish" "ranstated, p d a p s , as the "fi-
asco"") eesoded the foundations of the Isracli regime.62
Further insult accompanied the question of releasing the jailed mem-
bers of the net. Two members were released after seven years, m d four
others were released only after the Six Day War Uune 1967) in an ex-
change oi prisoners agreement between Israel and Egypt. Thus, not d y
did members of the net feel betrayed by those who authorized their mis-
sion but refuscd to take full rtlsponsibility, but they also felt they were ig-
nored and left to rot in prison when massive exchanges of prismers took
place between Israel md Egypt after the 1956 Sinai Campaip.
Betrayal in this case was a multiple issue: First, Egyptian citizelns joined
an espionage ring against their countr).; second., intelligence officers in Es-
raeli military intelligctnce (and perhaps some pditicians too) betrayed
their spies by sending them on. a risky and questionable operatio~nand
then refmsed full responsibil3y; third, the Israeli gove
gres"i""ly pwsue the =lease of the spies, particularly after the 3956 Sinai
Campaign.

Tyler G . Kent, Cases of spying arc. abundant. The title of E~ightl@y% il-
Oldest Professill~s.
luminating 1,986 book is indeed instructive: TI-re Srrc.o~~d
Une illustrative examplc is the case of v i e r G. Kent.63 Born in 1911 h
68 Violating Tr~tst~ l hyalty:
~ d Categolaies and Cases

Manchuria to American parents, Kent was an Amencan who worked as a

cipher clerk in the U.S. embassy in London from October 5,1939. Affiliat-
ing himself, fnr ideologiicat reasons, with a pro-Nazi nctwork, he was able
to feak to the Nazis much of the pre-war Churchill-Roosevett cable corre-
spondence..F,wentualt?i,MIli etiposed both him a d his contacts. 'These in-
dividuals were charged in court and sentenced to various prison terms.
Kent was rcleased f m prison in September 1945 and deporkd to the
United Staf;es.T'herc., he continued to exprtrss his racist and fascist views
until he died in 1988. In realitypKent was a Nazi sympathizer who pre-
tended to be trustfu.1and loyal, but who in fact caused his countsy much
damage.
Aside from the instructive tales of spykg in the B;ibleh4and such actual
cases as Mata Hari,b5 ""Cicero,"& Harold f K h ) Philby, Whittaker Cham-
bers, Rchard Sorge, Aldrich Ames, Markus Wolf, and a host of others, it is
inte~stingto note that some ralher farnous people of words were spies as
well. These include Emest Hemingway, G m h m Greene, Somerset
Maugham, clergyman Giovami Montini,hT and Daniel Defoe.68 And a re-
cent book clailss that even William Wardsworth, one of the most ac-
claimed British poets, was spying in 1799 for the British against Germanyt
as part of an espimage network.69
'Three rather famous cases in which Israel was involved are also worth
exploring.

Janathan. Pollard. Jonathan Pollard was an American citizen who be-

trayed. his countv's secrets to Israeli intdligencer, Poliard began to work
for the U.S. :Navy in September 197'9 as a civilian intelligence analyst.
Aromd that time he made contact with a South African military attach4
in Washington, U.C. U.S. comterintetljgence discovered the liaison, and
his security clearance was Borngraded. In June 1984 his clearance was
upgraded again \zrhen he was reassigned to inteflige~~ce work in the Anti-
%rrorism Alert Center in the Naval Investigative Service. Pollard again
used his pri\lileged position to gain access to classified materials and gave
classified informat.ion to an Australjan naval officer and to a szxpporter of
the rebel guerrillas in Afghmistm.
That, apparently, did not satisfy Pollard. He next made contact with an
Israeli intelligence a p n t in NW York. That begm a relationship though
which Pollard was paid tens of thiolxsands of dollars by Zsraeh intelligence
(for example, at the "oginnir-tg, a monthly salary of $1,500, wliich was
raised in 1,985to $2,500, and various gifts valued at $l(l,C)OO-12,(3OQ). Po1-
lad. grwided Israel with highly classified. and valuabfe intdigencer infor-
mation. Becoming suspicious of Pollarcl"~requests for huge mounts of
data, his commmding officer ordered that he be wtched closety His
cover began to crumble, and inNovember 1985 Pollard" betrayal became
 Violating Tr~tsl~ l h~y a df f y : Categolaies and Cases 69

obvious. On Thursday, November 21,1985, the Pollards, followed by FBI

agents, drove to the Israeli errtbassy in Miashington, D.C., asking for asy-
lum. The lsraclis refused, and as Che Poljards left the embassy, they were
arrested. Pleading guilty to charges of espionage, Jonathm Pollald was
sentenced to life in prism, his wife was sentenced to five years in prison.
Although Amcl, hjs wife, was =leased in 1990 (they also divorced), F"d-
lard remained-at the time of writing this book-in prison, despite a
strong Israeli lobby to release hhn.
T'here is little doubt that Pollard violated both the trust and loyaity
vested, in him by his country and did it by way of deception, Pollard
clearly fits every criteria of treact-rery and qualifies fully as a traitcrrm
Moreover, the literature reveals that Pollard may have been loyal to no
one, makirtg him a qualitatively different type of spy than,say, Amold,
Hale, or Kent,

Eli Gohen. Born in Egypt in 1924' Cahm was an Arab lhguist who im-
migrated to Israel in 1957; hcJ. was rt.cruitc;d by the Israeli secret service
(vlossad) i,n May 1960. Assuming a false identity, he left Israel, fleaving
behind his wife and children) m d arrived in Syria in 1962. He established.
hhnself in Damascus as a rich fumfbre and tapestry exporter and made
many important friends. Cohm was highly successfd i,n penetsakg irn-
portant political and military circles in Syria. and provided Israeli. intelli-
gence with crucial information (ammg other things, about the S y r i m for-
tjfications im the Gotan Heighls), He was so popular that he was
cmsidcred for the post of deputy defense mjnister, Ever.ltually, Coheds
radio transmissions from Damascus wew detected, and he was caught
m d arrested on January 1K,t,965*He was torture& hterrogated, tried for
espionage, sentenced to death, and hanged on May 18,3965, in Damascus
in Marjeh Square before a clleering crowd of more than 10,000 with full
media coverage, Clearly; although Cohen was a spy, he warnot a traitoz71

Israel Beer. According to Israel Beer, fdowing the Nazi takezover of

Austria in 1938 (the so-called Anschluss), he fled from Vie~mato Palesthe,
There he joined the Hagam (a prestate underground Jewish organiza-
ticm). He prtrsented, hirnself as an experimced guerrilla anti-Nazi fighter
and as a person. who took m active part in the fight against the fascists h
the Spanish Civil Miar, Beer develuped quite a military career.
&ring the 1948 Israeli War of Independence, he was deputy chief of
operations of Ehe general staff and,later, head of plmniing and operations.
Following that war, he expected to be promted to a m y deputy chief of
staff.His expectation was not met, and he resiped from the army to be-
come a military carresponde~~t for a local. newspaper. From 1953 on, he
70 Violating Tr~tsl~ l hyalty:
~ d Categolaies and Cases

became close to David Ben-Gurion, as well as other defense officials, and

Ben-Gurion appointed Beer to write the history of the 1948 war.
Despite that: ob\ljons trust, there we= those who di,d not trust him.
n o s e who were suspicious (for example, Moshe Dayan, a m y chief of
staff, and Isser Harel, chief of the Israeli secret service) were correct. &er
was put u ~ ~ dsurveillance,
er and on March 30,1961, he was caught pass-
ing information to a KGB officer (Victor Soblow) in the Soviet ermbassy
in Tel Aviv. Before that, he also tried to establish an unauthorized contact
with R e h a r d Gehlen (the11 head of West Germany's intelligence) in May
1960. That attempt may have been a i m d to help him penetrate West Ger-
man inteuigence for his Soviet masters. Beer was armsted the next day,
put on trial for espionnge, and sentenced to fi,ftear years in prison. He
died in prison in 1968.
At the time of his arrest, he held the chair of military history at Tel Aviv
U'niversjty and worked as a ntilitary commentator for the Israeli dajly
Ha'laxtz. Beer m a j s l s an enigmatic fgurc, and there is still specdation
ahout how much of his cwer story was true. n e r e are feMi answers fnr
such basic questions of whetha he was really Jewish, h e t h a he was
from Vienna, wkther he fought in Spain or pasticipated in any guerril.la
wadarc., and whether he hrld a legitimate f'h.D. degree. A h r o u g h doc-
umentary made about him in February 1990 by Israelj telfvision b a n d
that the u n h o w n facts far exceed the known. Black and Morris poiM out
that '%eer% impressive curricuiuln vitae turned out to be completely bo-
gug 'The colonel had never been in the Sehutzbund, never foughl in
Spain, and had in fact been a lowly clerk in the Austrian Zioni.st Federa-
tim,""Wn one thing there =ems to be no argument: He was a spy fnr the
Soviets.
Beer was not the only spy planted in Israel during that tirne. Professor
Kurt Sitta, from the Israeli Techian, was such a spy too (he was caught in
June l960 m d sentenced to a five-year prison se11tence).7WC)fcourse, nei-
ther qualifies as a traitor.
Beer was probably transplmted Zly the Soviets in Palestine just as Eli
Cohen was transplanted by Israel in Barnascus. Both acquired fake idm-
tities, One needs to be reminded that Soviet intelligmce had a lot of expe-
rience in transplanting spies. The best-bornin example is Richard Sorge.3
Sorge began working for Soviet intelljgence in 1920 (hGermany), dis-
guised as a teacher, and visited a number of corntries in the late 4920s.
Using a cover of German correspmdent, Sorge worked as a Soviet spy in
Japan begjnning in 1933. Me created a valua:ble m d useful spy ring there
and was able to pass his Soviet operators extremely valuable hformation
about Japan, For example, in 49.21he was able to inform Stalin that Japan
did not plan any aggression against the Soviets and that their focus was
the south (the h t c h hdies and French hdochina), That iinformation en-
 Violating Tr~tsl~ l h~y a df f y : Categolaies and Cases 74

abled Stalin to divert essential military forces from the Far East to the
the Nazi Wehrnzadf (mom on this case in Chapter 6).
fight agai~~st

Recent Books on Spies and Espionage, Spies engage minds and

imqinations. The nurnber of hocrks (fiction and nonfiction) m d movies
about them is staggering* Books about spies as traitors are published
continuously; some even contain stunning revelations. These tend to
capture the headlines, especiatly when they s e m to suggest new dis-
coveries that appear to reveal dark and hidden information. Three ex-
amples from 1999 illustrate the point, First is Allen Weinstein and
Alexmder Vassiliev'?i work about Soviet espionage in
the Stalin era, T!ze hunted Woad: Sovicf Espio~agr.in A~rrerica-The Sfillin
Em (New VnrXr: Random House). In some respects this book may have
actually redefined the entire field of iwestigatim in this area, The sec-
ond book, The Mifrokitrin Archive: Thc KGB in Enro)/e and the West (I-on-
d m : A k n Lane, Penguin Press) is by Christopher Andrew and. Vasili
Mitrokhi~~. The revelations in this thick volume about the involvement
of the Soviet KC;K in a number of opera.t.icms(including some interesting
'"honey traps") are breathtaking. Should Mitrokhin be considered a trai-
tor for collecting all the damaging m d discrediting information while
he was worki.ng for the KGB? If his actions had been known to KGB, the
consequences for Mitrokhin, would certainly have been very dire. Fi-
nally, we have h/lark Hollingsworth and Nick Fielding's somher and
somewhat sad book, Defeladhg Zi'ztr Reul~ns:M15 and Zhi? Shrayler Aff:air
(London: Deutclil). Shayler was recruited by M15 in an attempt to refresh
and inject creativeness in the organization. Five years later, Sbayler pro-
duced a scathjng critique of M15. Among other aiticisms, he claimed
that M15 was incompetcnt and heavily bureaucratic and t h t many of its
officers experience prohkms of excessive alcohol consumption. Shlruld
S:hayler be considered a traitor for disclosing publicly all the darnaging
and discrediting s o m a t i o n he collected about M15? In a strange way,
hc. may have actually helped Britain to =vitalize and modernize MI5,
which was the original reason for his hiring. The motivations of
Mltrok;hh and Shayler are-apparently-very different. However, both
violated trust and loyalty, and thus both qualify for the title '"raitor.'"
All three books provide drantatic contrasts between factual truth vis-B-
vis its construction in the connplex and shady context of espionage and
questimable loyaltie.
The amount of literature about spies m d espionage is hdeed awesorne.7"
The mmy resources spent on espionage reveal the hportance attrj:buted to
int" (human-collected intelligewe, as opposed to "Elitlt,"' which is
ekctro~zicallycollected intellligencc). Contrary to thclt by indjvidnals, or
even companigs, theft of information in the form of espionage occupies the
72 Violating Tr~tsl~ l hyalty:
~ d Categolaies and Cases

attentjon of nations. They pour money into research, bribing, and bfck-
mailhg in order to get information, as well as deceive o&ers.
'There i s not a great deal of research on espi,mage from a social science
point of view. However, one of the mom interesting studies is by Frank
& g m (1989,1997). Hagan views espionage as the secretive theft of infor-
ma.t.ion. Mis informative and insightft~lwork focuses on exarniajng espi-
onage as a lorm of political crime, he has developed an empirical classjfi-
cation of spies based on their moti\lation, His typology consists of nine
main categories and orle miscellaneotls category for the cases that dn not
fit the main categories. His typology classifies spies according to the fol-
lowing categories: merilenary (Aldrich Ames); ideolcrgical N a u s Fuchs);
alienated/egocent-ric (Edward Lee Howard); buccaneerlsport (Jonathan
Pollard); professional (Rudolf Abel); compromised (Richiard Milkr); de-
ceived (Edwin Wilson recruiting technique); quasi agent (I'hilip Agee),
m d finallyI those hlrho clefect in order to avoid personal problems.
Hagads typology is ovati:vc and manages to surpass older typolo-
gies. For example, so-cdfed sex espionage (using sex to gai11 access to in-
formation; see, for example, Bower 1,990)can be broken into different: and
more generalized categories developed by Hagan. Other possi:ble ap-
proaches could focus cm a classificatory scheme based cm the method uti-
lized to gain inteitigense information. This codd include, for example,
human data collection, electronic surveillmce, data collection fPom open
sources, and even schemes cJf espimage fn c@erspace.Tb
Espionage has always been a hot: topic fnr popular culture, m d such
spies as John Le Carrd's Srniley and Xan Flemjng" Jjames Bond have be-
come culkral heroes. Book md movies have glanzorized the secret agent
into mythical proportions.

Double Agents, Dou231e s e n t refers to m agent who works for two in-
telfige~~ceorganizations, sometimes even without the agent's howledge.
Double agents push the boundaries between truth and deception to their
farthest limits. For example, dtaring W r l d War D, M5 (British intemal
counterespionage secret service) managed to capture every German agent
sent to Britaisr by the Nazi Germm Abwelzr" m d turn them into double
agents working for the British.

International Betrayal
hterrrational betrayal is a category of betrayal where both loyalty and
trust are violated on the international level.78 At least two salient possibil-
ities exist here.
One possibility occurs when a state is being betrayed by another
state(s). For example, the crisis created. by Hitler in 1938 over Czechoslo-
 Violating Tr~tsl~ l h~y a df f y : Categolaies and Cases 7'3

vakia, was "solved" by tthe September 29-m, 1938, signixrg of the Munich
Agreement. In this agreement, British premier Neville Chmberlajn and
French premier Edouard Dala&r betrayed Czechoslovakia to Hitler for a
questionable and &msy hope of peace.
"That was not the last time Czechostovakia was betrayed. In 1968
Alexander Dubcek led Czechoslovakia into a f ~ e d o m path that consisted
of himportant rclfurms in freedom of speech and the ecmorny The ""spring
of 1-"r%uef'did not last tong. The Soviet Union, worried that other Eastern-
bloc corntries would follow this freedom trail, invaded Czechoslovailcia
with full military force in August 1968 and crushed the ""spring" with an
iron fist. Not one coulltry in Eastern Europe moved to help Czeckodova-
h a resist or cope with this brubl conquest. Worse yet, some Eastern-bloc
countries participated in the militav invasion, For example, thousands of
Polish soldiers took part in the first wave d invasim. NOWestern country
helped either. The F ~ n c h prime mhiste~;Michel Debre, made a "f
remark about the .invasion: "a traffic accident on the road to d6tente
1994:2W). Later, in the 1980s a d early 1990s, the Polish Solidarity move-
ment and the Mazowieckj governmenl. m d e public apologies to the
Czech nation.
Certainly CzechoslowaEtia was not the only country that was b e t q e d
like this- In 1956 the Hungarims revolted agahst the oppressive Soviet
rule of the country. The Soviet army invaded Hungary, crushed the revolt,
and reirnstated a orthodox co mist dictatorship. In this case, too, no
country came to help the Hm~gariirtns.
Thusl in Czechoslovakia and Hungar)i feeljngs of being internationally
betrayed are not uncommon. However, those feelings, genuine and
strong as they are, are based on the ass~tmptionthat some Western or
Eastern-bloc country could have intervened and stopped a Sovief-led in-
vasion, a questionable assumption indeed.
.A somewhat sirnilar incident concerned the rerationship betwcen Italy
and Nazi Gemmy Fascist Italy m d Nazi Germmy signed a pact of coop-
eratir,n. n i s "Pact of Steel," as Mussolini called it, was s i p e d m May 22,
1939, inBerlin. by the hnlo countries' faseip n?inistcrs, Joachirn v011 Rbben-
trop of G e m m y and Count Galeazzo di Cortellazo Ciano of Zta3yYThis pact
contirnued the Rome-Berlin Axis treaty signed in 1936. Thus,one could
view Nazi Germany and hseist Italy as two nations wh
their m t u d interests eye to eye as genuine allies, in war m d in peace. It is
important to note that before this dliance was formed-particularly in
19%-the relations between these two countries had been strahed, and
points of conflict invollved cultural and political diHerences.79
This ailiance lasted until 1943. Fallwing the major defeat of the Axis in
the Mediterranean m d the Ailied strikes in Italy (h example, in Milan
and Turin), the Italians faced the prospect of either continuing to fight a
7'4 Violating Tr~tsl~ l hyalty:
~ d Categolaies and Cases

hopeless war or surmndering, Supported by the Italian army high com-

mand, and slrme of the fascist politicians, King Victor Emmanuel :IIX
called Mussolini to a conversation h which the Eng dismissed him from
office. On f d y 23, 1943, uyon having the palace, Mussoljni was placed
under house arrest. The fascist party and its apparatus were disbanded.
Fmm a Nazi German point of view, these events could certajnly be inter-
preted as betrayaI by Italy, that is, an act of international betrayaI. It is h-
teresting to note that these events occurred because of an imer stwctural
tension within the ltdian fascist movement-a d u d loyatty to both the
king and the Duce, Thus, this hternational treason could also be inter-
preted as treason within Italian fascisrn.80
'This case had m interesting sequel hvolvhg other allegations of trea-
son, Un Hitler" commands, on September 12,1943, Nazi airborne troops
(headed by Major Otto Skorzeny) freed thr Duce in a spectilcularly dra-
matic raid and brought him to Germcrany; Hitler then appointed Mus-
solhi as the puppet fascist head in control of Geman-occupied northern
Italy (thr Salo Republic), Mussoli~liused his positim to put on trial, and
execute, five of those who were involved in ousting him out from power,
and whom he saw as traitors. One of those five was his son-in-law and
foreign minister, signer of the ""Pact of Steel," Comt Ciano (January33,
1944).
The second possikliliy for international betrayal occurs when a state be-
trays the loyally and trust of a collective of sympathizers. Exmples
abcrm~d.The Ualta C o ~ ~ f e r e ~
(code-named
~ce "Argonaut'" took place Feb-
ruary 4-11,1945, at.Valta in the C r h e a and involved President Franklin D.
Roosevelt, Premier Wmstcm S. Churchill, m d Premier foseph Stalin. 01e
of the agreements achieved there was the repatriation of al)Soviet citizens.
During tbe war, thousands of Soviets had fled their country, After the war
ended, large numbers of Russians who were 117 was under Western AlLied
control were forced, many at g~~xrpai-nt, to board trains and return ta
Soviet-controlled areas, desthed for hcarceratiosr, torture, m d death.

Particufarly tragic was the experience of roughly 5.5 million Soviet citizens
repatriated after the war, of whom 2.3 miltfiun were handed over on the basis
of agreements emeluded at the Yalta ecjnference, often against their will. The
core of the repatriated were 2.1 million Qslnrbez'fer(""labor from the eastf'")and
about a million prisoners-of-war: The Cksfarbeiterhad mostly not gone to Ger-
many voluntarily. No~netheless,half af all those repatriated w e l c~m d e m e d
to hard tabor.81

There is little question that a very hrge numher of those repatriated to

Staiin's lethal and ruthless rclgilrrc kit completely betrayed by the West-
ern A12ies.82 After all, most of them were first forced to move from the So-
 Violating Tr~tsl~ l h~y a df f y : Categolaies and Cases 7.5

vict Union to Nazi-controlled regions, which must bave been a most diffi-
cult ercperience. WIany of those who survived trusted and were loyal ta
the Western ALlies. Most of them left a totalitarian regime to which they
never expected (or wanted) to be forcefully returned. One can easily in-
terpret this nonselective act of repatriation as international betrayal*It is
important to note that among the prisoners were White Russians who
had never achowllcdged the Soviet Union and who had lived outside the
country (more on this in Chapter Q), as well as groups of men who sup-
parted Nazi Germany.
A sirnilar incident took place in post-1945 Poland. The instant r e c o e -
ticm of the Soviet-sponsored gowemxnent by the West was rightly inter-
preted by the Polish governmmi-h-exile, and the legal opposition w i t h
the countsy, as an act of international betrayal.83
There are cases *ere the two possibilities are mingled. An example is
the 1,439 Molotov-l?ibbentrop pact. Despite a very basic ideological in-
cmpati:bility between Nazi Germany and the Stalin-led Soviet Union, in
Augu" 13939, :Nazi Germany" foreign minister-Joachirn von Ribben-
trop-and the Soviet U16on"s forcig~minister-Vyacheslalv Molotov-
signed a nonaggression pact that guaranteed the Swiet t r n i d s bordas
on its western and Baltic fronts and at the same t h e allowed Nazi Cer-
many to invade Poland (and to risk war hvilh both Britain and France, a
risk HitZer was willing to take),
?'he signfng of this pact can easily be fntr~rpretedas an act of betrayal.
The Soviet Union clearly compronnised Polish integrity as a state by em-
ablling Hitler to attack Poland (on Septezmber 1, 1939) without much ixn-
mediate risk for Nazi Germany. Mowover, the secret part of the pact di-
vided large parts of Eastern Etarope between Sjazi Germany and the
Soviet Unjon and thus betrayed East European states and Communist in-
dividuals in the West, who found the pact indefensible. It is possible that
Sovkt citizelns undcr Stalin's regirne also condemned the pact, but oppo-
sition to Stalin tmded to evaporate rather swifily, so that no strmg voices
against the agreement were heard L\lithin the country,

Mutiny
Muthy in this context refers to a collecthe insurredion not aimed at a per-
s d or specific t a ~ e tSome
. military insurrections (for example, against
poor living conditiom or nourishmen-t) can be thought of in this context
(for examplc, the mutiny of some 200 veterans of Montgomery's Eighth
A m y in Salerno in 15343; see David 1995). However, the major and more
=presentative illustrations arc. those involving large-scale insurgencies
m d their wars: the American Revolutio~~ (17751783), the French Revolu-
tion (1;792-1800), the Russian Revolution (1917-19122); the great 1857
7'6 Violating Tr~tsl~ l hyalty:
~ d Categolaies and Cases

mutisly in :India (Mibbert 1978; h p u y m d h p u y 1970:85H6O), the reli-

gious revolution in Irm; and the 1968 students revolts. As can be easily
seen, some civil wars c o d be nah;lrally classified into this category.
In Lal these cases, members from within the group get organized, de-
velop djstinct political cmsciousness, and engage in collective and direct
action a i m d at m o w i n g past: or all of a specific political ~gixne.It thus
should not surprise us to find that the rhetoric used in such conflicts fre-
y?xently utilizes such terms as "rebet'" and ""traitor." %ch internal con-
flicts, a h o s t by definitjon, require the =drawing of moral bomdaries
and consequently redefjnitims of loyalty and trust. fn these situations,
answerhg such questions as "are you with 'us' or against 'us'?"%ecomes
a crucial issue, regardless of how that ""us"is defined. n o s e engaged in
mutiny tend to be described as "traitorous rebels" by those against
whom they rise, and they are treated accordingly. horn the point of view
of those against whom the rebellhn is directed, the rebels are iutdeed
vierwed as violating both trust and loyaity to the group by going against
the stabs y?xo.
Social and political revdutions may elkit feelhgs and rhetoric typical
of accusations of betrayal, For example, when young Jews in pre-World
War 11 Eumpe joined t k Zionist movement, orthodox families, frcrm
which many of them c m e , feft betsayed. Some even mourned their chil-
dren as if they were gone. For some members of these f d i e s , the per-
ception was that their children rebelled ag"i""t tradition and vioiatcd
their loyalty and tmst in the "old ways'kf orthodox Judaism..U'n:like the
Zionist mvolution, insurgences need not always be successful, For exam-
ple, Greenbergfs 1987 work documents the successhl counterinsurgency
campaign (against the Cu zlnist-led peasant party) in the Phijppines
during 1.9461955. Success or faiJure of insurgences will certainly affect
the relevant rhetoric of '%etraydef8
m e next category is similar to muthy in that h both trust and loyalty
of large numbers of individuals are violated. .And inboth cases, these vio-
lations arc. constmcted differclntly by the betrayed and the betrayers.

State-Sponsored Terror and Human Xi@ ts Violat iotls

Sometimes a state becmes involved in betrayals agaiinst its own hdivid-
uals. M e n a mgime is involved, inexecuting large numbers of its own cif-
izms, like Nazi Germany, Pcrl Pot and the m m e r Rouge in Cambodia,
Stalin's purges and persecutions, m e is tempted to invoke the term, "be-
trayal." These regimes emerged from the sarne collective whose individu-
als it executed. The loyalty and trust of the victims in the state apparatus
were thus ~riolatedin the most fuxzdamental way. Cmsequently, one can
use the term ""betrayal of the state" h ssuh cases,
 Violating Tr~tsl~ l h~y a df f y : Categolaies and Cases 77

A very close category is the use of paramilitary ""dath squads," such as

those that existed in Brazil, South Africa, and Argentina. It can also be ar-
gued that states that violate h u m n rights m betraying their citizens by
violatixlg their trust and loyalty, Human rights is a continuous, not dis-
crete, variable, so the type and prtrvalence of those vicrlations, as well as
the context, are of crucial importance. The freque~~cy of such violations is
a genuine and worrisome issue, as various reports about vioiations of hu-
man rights indicate.
In all of these cases, those committing the violations have developed
vocabdaries of motives that help them to justify and.ideologize those vi-
olations (or even ignore them; see Cnhm 2fX)O). One example is 5talinfs
reign of terror, when milfions of Soviet citizens were accused of ""cottnter-
revolutionary" activities, of "betraying" the revolution. The victinns were
either deported or executed (sometimes after a mock trial and torture
elicikd "'cdessions") as jJtraitors'"ffor example, see Getty and Nanmnv
1999).
h o t h e r example is South Africa. Recent reports assert that during the
power struggles of the 1980s within SWAPO (South West Africa Peaple's
Osganization, formed in 1959 h todq's Namibia to oppose South African
rule), hundreds of its members were held against their will in SWAPO's
camps, cmelly tortured, and intermgated on charges of betraying the or-
ganization, Thus, an organization that had the god of rellcasing South
Africa from the yoke of apartkid and freeing Namibia from South
Africds cruel xgirnc directed some of its mnst tortwous methods against
its own rnembers.84
States frequently justify their wicrlations cJf human rights on the
grounds of ""scurity" or "publ.ic safety""They use Che '"ticking bomb" ar-
g m e n t , which refers to a political situation that is extremely volatile,
ready to ""explode." %cur@ agencies then make the case that in order to
ind, locate, and defuse the ""bmb," they need to resort to methods of in-
vestigation that vioiate human rights (for example, torture),

Whistle-Blowing, Political Turncoating,

Conversion, Strikebreaking, and Assassination
The third ceXl involves mmbers of the in-group who violate the tmst olF,
and loyaity invested fn them by, other members of the in-group. 'T'he dif-
ference between this cell and the previous one, in which betrayals are
committed against the general collective, lies in the level of sensitivity
that these two separate cells prtwide. fn all the cases cited here, members
of the relwant group would typicatly r c g d such acts with scorn, and tlne
78 Violating Tr~tsl~ l hyalty:
~ d Categolaies and Cases

violators of tmst and loyalty would typically fjnd it difficult to gcnerate

or ~ c r u isupport
t for their actions.

In the early 1,97135, thc casgo doors of two different McDonnell Douglas
DC-10%blew open in midair (in one case, causixrg the deaths of 350 pas-
sengers and crew mehers). h investigation discovered that a 19@ re-
port that pointed out: that therc? could be problems with that cargo door
was not given to the Federal hiation Authority.
:In 3971) Ford launched a new subcompact car-the Pinto. Tests indi-
cated that even a low-speed coiilisjon could result in a ruphared fuel tank.
Having costs in mind, Ford did not change the fauIty design. &spite
warnings, the car went into production. By 1978, seventy-three people
died in accidents result-ing from Pinto fires. An engineer who hvamed
about the faulty design was ignored and. demoted, and be later resigned..
In 1986 the space shuttie Challenger was launched against warnings by
a senior e ~ ~ g h ethat
e r the seals h the rocket boosters would not hold be-
cause the temperature range was below the safety range for them, The
Challenger exploded shcrrtly after liftoff because of this problem. The en-
gheer who reveaied this fact and later testified against the management:
became isolated and eventually had to leave his job, and he found it diffi-
cult tcr acquire a new job.8"
'These dramatic cases illustrate the problelxs created by organizations
when they fail to listen to wamhgs. In each case, the organization misrep-
~ s e n t e dor concealed important infomtion. 'The literature on wbistle-
blowing is full of such cases.
At the simplest level, whistle-blowers are individuals who report to
others within, or outside, an organization about various probtems within
the organiz;ation (hcompetence, illegal and/or methical activity, corrup-
tion, deceptive practices, etc.) in order to rectify and solve those psob-
lems. Ob~ljously,&is characterization is tot>broad, because organizations
have quality cmtrollers whose job is to do just that.
Whistle-blowing is characterized by the fact that key members in the
orgmization disappmve of it. This disapproval is related to sweral fac-
tors; managers fear that the report may go to the "wrong people" or to the
press, or it may be judged. to be too harsh. Organizations tend to rcquil-e
full loyalty from their members and full m u b l trust. A whistle-Howr
reveals hformat-ion about an organizatiol~that contradicts the in?age that-
the organization tries to construct about itself. Moreover, whistlc-btowers
tend to have the tmst of, and share loyalty to, the same oqanization. Dur-
ing their normal course of work they discover and acquire secrets and
dmaging informatinn about the workings of that organization, Their
 Violating Tr~tsl~ l h~y a df f y : Categolaies and Cases 79

choice at that point is to either stay loyal to the organization and keep
quiet for try to work on fie problem from within the organization), or be
loyal to other norms m d '%low the whistle.'"~orne decide that their gen-
uine loyalty is to the truth, and they "blow the whistle." Mmagers and
coworkers may view this whistle-blowing as an act of violating trust and
loyalty (or as split loyalties), in other words, as m act of betrayal.
The organization sees whistle-blowirtg as betrayjng of the h~terestsof
the organization, violating tbe rules of hierarchy, bgrpassing authority,
squealhg, damaging the reputation of the orgmization, acting in a hostile
manner toward the organization, poisming the atmosphere, and sup-
plmting cooperatim with suspicion. VVhistle-blowers, on fie other hand,
tend to justify their activities in such terms as doing me's job, being faith-
ful. to the community revealing the truth, and doing something that is in
the best interests of the orgmization.
.hlt.houghboth sides use the hetoric of trust and loyalty, the hterpreta-
tion of these terms, as well as their direction, is very different. Obviously,
organizations do not like M;histle-blnwers. Researtlh on *istie-blowing
indicates rhat the road t&en by whistle-bowers is di,fficult, with often
very heavy social, psychological, and economjc costs to the whistle-
blower. OfDay (197L2) points out that whistle-blowers risk isolation, in-
mased criticism, dcfmation of character, being moved to an insignifi-
cant job, being firedf and being exposed to other degradation and
harassment processes.Kh Glazer and Glazer point out that as in other cases
of betrayal, one of the differentiating variables determining whether a
whistle-blower will be awarded recognition and respect (and perhaps
cast into fie role of a cultural ""hrom")s whefier the whistle-blower re-
crcives or gelnerates the szxpport of a collecitive of people, that: is, mnbilizes
a significant amount of power.87
Because whistle-blowir~gis perileked by many as a "problem,"' many
organizations fand states) have established specialized inner mechanisms
that are supposed to critkaliy examine organizations in a m r e or less mu-
tine manner. Orgmizations and state bmaucracies have created positions
such as controller and ombudsman to deflect whistle-blowing. Although
this may reflect a gmuine desirc to improve, it also coopts criticism and
els it in such a way that tryrrmgdoing, cormption, mistakes, and the
like are either ignored, buried for y m s h "investriga,tiornsIf'or mudclfed in
various conflicting and.confusing "versions." The fact remains that de-
spite the= positions, whistle-blowing has not disappeared.
Some colrnlries have instituted legal protections for whistle-blowms
(for example, U,S, federal protection for whisde-blowers), The state of Ts-
rael has been trying, for quite some time, to pass lcgishtion that would
pmkct whistle-blo.cversbut has encounte~dformid,able opposition. One
80 Violating Tr~tsl~ l hyalty:
~ d Categolaies and Cases

source of opposition has been the power of burezlucracy; there is a conflict

among different authorities ~ g a r d i n gwho wouM be entrusted with en-
forcing the law. Others have exprtlsscd concern that such a law may en-
courage bogus coqlaints.WR For exmple, the president of Israel, Mr. Ezer
Weitzmann, stated in pubfic that he =fused to lend his support to a law
that a i m d to help and protect bona fide whistle-blokvers because these
people are "qquealers."RY Eventualb laws werc amended. (in1932,1994,
and 1997) in such a way that whistle-Mowers receive protection from
their potential persecutors." It remains to be seen how el"fec.livethis legis-
lation actually is,
Two anatytical issues are associated with whistle-blowing. 011e is
moral, and it concerns trust, loydty, and c o n c e h e n t . The other issue
concerns power,
Once a potentiat L\rhistle-Mower discovers that the organization for
which he or she works is involved in such activities as sexual harassment,
bullyCng, threats, cheating, concealment, or discrimination-conducted in
a way that deceives the put71ic antS misrepresents the organizatic,n-a
choice needs to be made, Either one must violate the trust relationships
between the potential whisde-blower and the organization and publicl_v
=veal the information or ofie must =main loyal and keep silent and try to
solve the problem koan within. This choice is not m d e in a vacuum,, The
issue of trust and fuyalty here is much more complex, because mahtain-
ing loyalty to and trust in the organization is cmly one avenue a m g oth-
ers. Loyalty to m d trust in the truth, in the public interest, or in the law
can easily dictate different courses of action. From the organization's
point of view, t k r e exists too a problem of who exactly the organization
owes loyalty to, and what type of trust relationships exist between the nr-
ganization and its environment. fn addition, fiere are the issues of osga-
nizational misreprt-sentation, deception, and conceaiment. The problem
of whistle-bokvhg thus involves primarily a moral dilemma centered
around truth and the issues of loyalv: trust, and their violation.
However, there is ancrtl~erdimension invoked here tclcr-that of power.
Typically, we have a powerful and rescrurceful orgmizatio~~ facing a lone,
powerless, and resourceless whistle-blower whose chances of coming out
on top are not very promising. Stucfie show that in the end, power often
trumps morality; as so many whistle-blowers have sadly found out.
Robinson describes five central moral features of whistk-blowing,
First, &ere is a question of \/vhose interests s h o d be served (individual
interests, o~anizationalinterests, or publk interests). Second, lies and de-
ception are involved in organizatimd cover-ups, often with profound
negative consequencedor the wictims of those cover-ups. Third, whistle-
blowers are exposed to psychological, social, and legd attempts to msas-
sisrate their character and delegitirnize them, These attacks are sometimes
 Violating Tr~tst~ l h~y a df t y : Categolaies and Cases 81.

physical, and there is a danger that the whistle-blower ma)i slip into de-
pression and atternpt to commit suicide. Fourth, the organization receives
negative exposttre as corrupt or deceptive practices are revealed. Finally,
what society does, or does not do, to protect whistle-blowers becomes an
issue.gl
It is im,perativc to point out that although whjstle-Howers arc fre-
quently described as "traitors," it as just as likely that those being '"his-
tled" aabout may themsefves be implicated as '"mitors," h ine sense that
they may have abused their power and position. and violated the trust
and loyalty invested in them. The illustrative cases with which we begart
this scrction exemplify this very well.

Political Turncoating
Politicians who are elected on the platform of one party and then change
their loyalty to another p a r 9 are referred to as "turncoats." Such an act
inwolves issues of trust, loyaity, and their violation.
'The term "political turncaating" mrnnotes a negative judg~aent.How-
ever, like other cases of violation of trust and loyalty, these very same
""turncoats" may be regarded by others as h o r a b l e , taking high risks by
disregarcting party politics. Turncoat-s may thus be viewed as loyalists (to
themseIves, to their principles) by one party and as traitors by other par-
ties. Yet, it appears that most people hold loyalty to the party as the more
important principle.92 However, much depencts on the context of the
event.
As Leach points out, the personal experience involved in changing
sides in the political, arena is typical1y "~tncomfortableand difficztlt,"B It
usually hvohes some sod-searching, new adjustments, confrontations
with friends, and sometimes even a new identity and way of Me. Let us
exmine a k w illustrative cases from two countries: England and Israel.
:In Hebrew, the coil.oquial,term for political turncoatixlg is Calanterism,
:In 1955 a man named Rachanlirn Calanta was elected to serve in the city
cotrncil of Jerusalem as a representative of the Nationat Religiorls Frornt
(idengfied with the MAFDAL Jewish orthodox religious pditical parq).
FUAt was ir^lvor\led im a municipal political conflict in-
volving trhe authorization for a new school of archaeology in thc same
building where a Jewish Reformed synagogue was supposed. to be built,
One resdt of this cmflict was that the h/rAI;DALdecided to quit the mu-
nicipal coulncil coalition. That move left the municipal roalitio~nwithout a
majority vote, fnterestingly, only one vote was required to reestablish the
majority vote of the coalition. In rr-?turnfor promises and different favors,
Cafanter crossed Che lines and rernained in the coalition as an hdepetn-
82 Violating Tr~tsl~ l hyalty:
~ d Categolaies and Cases

dent member. Doing that meant that he left the MAFDAL, on whose list
he had originalfy been voted.%
Although quite a few politicians on the national level (for example,
Moshe Uayan), includjng memhers of the Israeli hesset, as well as poiiii-
cians on the local (mostly mlanicipal) level, have either changed sides per-
manel~tlyor made s~tcha m w e temporarily for specgic issues without:
permanently leaving their original party Calanter was the first to do so,
His name has thus beccrme synonymous with negafiwe and stigmatized
political turncoating in Israel.
Leach providcs a landmark study in this area. FIis 1945 work covered
htmcoats in British poiitics horn M86 to the prment. This is how he dwu-
mel~tsand describes some of the most famous British turncoats in his
study:

* Joseph Chamberlain, whose move from the Liberal Party to the

Conservative Party w m him the unsavory title of '6archtraitor'r
and "Judas'" (p. 57).
* Winston Churchill is perhaps the most famous turncoat. He "en-
tered the Commons as a Conservative MP, crossed the floor to the
Liberals in 19M, and eventually returned to his original party in
f 924 (effectivdy),providing an unusual example of a politician suc-
cesshlly dekcting back to a party he had earlier deserted" ((p. 85).
* Oswald Mosley is another famous pditicjans who changed sides:
"He spent only ten years in Parliament, yet in that comparativ"iy
brief period. sat under four labels-Conservative, Independent,
Labour, and New Party. He was also for a time ctmefy associakd
wi& the ZJiiberalsU(p. 116). Qswald Mosley also became Britain's
most famous Ifitscist leader, h fact, Leach states that Ifassism was
the ol-2l-yideology to which Mosley remained committed and loyal.
* Ransay MacDona)d, another famous turncoat, had a long politic&
career that began in the early 1890s and ended in the mid-1930s.
He was a member of Parliament and played a lsey role in the estab-
lishment and crystallization of thc British I:.,abourParty pm), and
he was appointed its leader more than once. In January 1924
Britain elected its first Labour government, with MacDonald as
prime minister. This government lasted only &out njne months.
The elections that followed spelled a miqior defeat for Lhour, Fol-
htwing the hlfay 1929 elections, R/lacUr>naldformed a new Labour-
supported government and again became prime mhister. Follow-
h g the econorrtic crlsis, and faced by mjnisters who were not
supportive of MacDonald's ideas, he reslgned (August 24, 1931).
The next day he formed a national government that was supported
primarily by the Conservatkes, the Liberals, and a few members
 Violating Tr~tsl~ l h~y a df f y : Categolaies and Cases 83

of Labour. The October 1931 electiosls awarded a major victov to

MacDonaid's coalition, This political structure lasted until 1945.
However, &is political "exercjse" was perceived by other mem-
bers of Labour as betrayal. "MacDonald occupies the prime place
in the d e m o t r , g y of Che Labour Party Even now over sixty years
after the events of 1932, his treachery has neilher been forgotten
nor foqiven, Ramsay MacDonald is only remembered wit.hin the
Labour h r t y in so far as he is remembered at all, as the man who
betrayed the movement" (p. 148).
* Enoch Powetl provides " h e most dramatic and sensational deser-
tion of his party by a modern British politicianf"(p. ZOO), In 3.973, he
defected from the Conservative Party to the I,,abour Party in the
middle of m elecltim campaiw, calling his followers to follow suit.
* Roy Jenkins "was an archturncoat. When he deserted the Labour
Party to he@ found the SDP [Social Dennncrati.~ Party], it in\rof,ved
a rendition of both his fmily background m d his own long career
in Labor politics'"(p. 223) in a publicized controversy between
1979 and 19883. His desertio~~ of Labour was "deliberate and pre-
medilated" ((p. 226) and not the result. of some unexpected crisis.

'The summer of 1997 saw mather S L E C turncoatkg

~ by a British MP. Ac-
cordjng to 7%reErnes, just a few hours before the extremely popular newly
elected British prime mhister Tony Blair's visit to Lmdon's Uxbridge ""a
longtime Labor activist [announced] that he had decided to back the To-
ries. Michael Shrimpton, a party member since 1981, switched sides. . . .
At a press conference with Lord Parkiwon, the Conservative Party chair-
m n , Mr, Shrimpton said hc wa,t;'appalled' at the way Labor had be-
haved sisrce enterhg gave
The issues Leach discusses regarding krncoatiing seem to be valid for
similar discussions about betrayal: Where is the di;viding line between
genuine djsagreement and passhg to the opgosition? When shall we call
it 'Vefectionf"? mat are the personal costs to the turncoat? What is t-he
impact of the defection?
:Is there anything personally different about turncoats? LeacWs very
clear answer is negative. The issue of who becomes a turncoat, or a pcrliti-
cal defector, depends on a variety of factors, il~cludi,ngopportunity,
amount of identifiration with the original party the political structure,
and inducements offered. Leach p o i ~ ~out t s that much of the current de-
bate crvcr Ihe motivation fos changing one's party loyaities is bcused 811 a
dichotomy heheen ambition and principle,
Political turncoating is most certainly not confhed to Britain. :illAugust
1997, Walter Fekate, one of the most important and influential, leaders of
the South African Zulu Inkatha Frtedom Party (IFP), left his party and
84 Violating Tr~tsl~ l hyalty:
~ d Categolaies and Cases

moved to the African National Congres "K). OX3viously this caused

much mguish, anxiety, and anger among IFP mernbers, not to mention
surprise among ANC members. Here is what Inkatha" leader, Mango-
suthu Buthelezi, had to say about what was referred to as the "defection"
of his former right-hmd man, a person with whom he shared eighteen
years of political and social activities: "This is m abject betrayal. . . . We,
as human beings, had a friendship. For him to turn around and do this, it
shakes right to the mots my confidmce in human naturt...You start won-
dtzri-ng whom to trust."gb

Conversion is a category that msembles defection and desergon, but it

differs in context and target. And conversion is not untike politjcal turn-
coathg. Ideological m d religious cmversions typically invoke the issue
of betrayal." A pperson who kaves one ideological or religious gmuy to
become cclmmitted to another stands a pretty good chance of being
viewed by his or her preconversion symbo:(icmoral u~ziverseas betraying
that universe. Much depends, of course, on the manner in which this con-
version is made, but the invocation of the term ""btrayal" to describe that
pmces always lurks in the background. The main reason is that rne~nbers
in the collective that is beirtg left feel that the convert has betrayed thgir
tmst and loyall.).. On December 13, 3999, Nezusweck (pp. 3-35) published
a report about ultra-0rt.hodox Jews who decide to hecorn secular*The re-
port was titled ""lrrael's New Defectors," The use of the word "defectors"
is, tbviously ~vealing.
Basicalll;; canversion means changing sides. There are many illustra-
tions lfor conversion, some more famous and dramatic than others. Let us
look at a few of them.

The Rabela Hussein Affair, On July 6, 1996, The Times, reported on its
front page:

A Kuwaiti Islamic court has, in effect, sentenced a businessman to death for

cmverting from Islam to Christianity, five years after Westem sc~ldiersre$-
cued Kuwait from the clutches of Saddam Hussein.
Robert f-lwsein, M, has been forced to go into hiding after the court r u f d
that he is an apc>stat+a Muslim tzrt-rc> has left the faith . . . Mr. Hussein has
been forced to rnotre from safe house to safe house in Kuwait, his wife has
been abducted and raped and forced by her family to leave him, he is fohid-
den tcr see his two children, and his building business is in ruins. . . . Mr.
Hussein war; sent-encd on June 9 and given 28 days to appeal. . . . The court-
hearing lasted less than a minute and Mr. Hussein was declared an official
 Violating Tr~tsl~ l h~y a df f y : Categolaies and Cases 85

apostate from Islam. He is not alhavved to use his passport so he cannot take
refuge abroad.%

Although Kuwait is supposedly committed to "freedom of religion," Mr.

Hussein was tried by a Shia court for apostasy, a serious crime under
Sharia law.

The Jerusalem Mufti and Israeli Citizenship, The Arab Mufti of

Jerzlsalem, Sheik Altrarne Sabri, has hvamed, repeatedly the Pirat? dtizens
of East Jerusalem not to take Israeli d.tizenship. We has stated clearly that
doing so is treasmable. Sheik Sabri said that Islam did not allow Muslims
to accept Issaci.licitizensbp because they are asked to declare loyalty to the
State of Israel. "Palestinians living in East Jerusalem are allowed, by law,
to become Israeli citizens if they so wish. This is a direct result of the an-
nexation of East Jcmsalem to Israel in 1968. Since then and until the eariy
3990s very few East Jerusalem Arabs chose to become Israeli citizens.
However, following the Madrid Conferace in 3992, a sharp increase was
rclcorded hthe number of Pdeslinians asking Israeli citize~zship."*
A similar exampIe is that of the many Orthodox Jews in Europe whose
family members converted to secular Zionism between 1925 and 3938.
Far many pareills this conversion was a great tragedy and many
mourned their farniIy members as if they had died.

Roger Casement. One of the better-howiz, and most tragic, cases of

conversion, which ended with charges of treason and execution, was &at
of Sir Roger Casement. Born Septmber 1,3864, in County Dublin, Roger
Casement develoiped m impressive and distkguished career as a British
civil servant. He served as a diplomat, representing Great Britain, in such
varied places as Portuguese East Africa (Mozambiyue 1895-1K98), Angola
(1898-19WQ), Congo Free State (2901-1"30), and Brazil (190&1911). Case-
ment's work led him to expose the atrocities committed in the exploita-
tion of natives by white traders in Mrica (Congo) and South America
(Peru). His 1904 report &out the abuse of natives in the Congo won hiPM
international recognition and respect and brought about s m e profound
changes in Belgian rule of the -go. Casement was hit;hted following
his IN12 report about the abuse of the natives in Peru.
Poor health forced Casement to quit. his work, and he r e t i ~ din Irclmd
in 1912, Despite a brilhant career and impeccable service to the Crown,
Casement sympathized with Roman Catholic Irish nationalism. 'This was
unusual, considering the fact that he came from a Protestant family.
Pincher points out that Casement had been secretly baptized from Pmtes-
tmtism to Roman Catholicism, meaning that Casement experienced a re-
ligious conversion as we1t.l""
85 Violating Tr~tsl~ l hyalty:
~ d Categolaies and Cases

It did not take long lfor Casement to harness his hcredible abilities to
the Irish cause. Zn 1913 he helped orgmize vdmteers and in 1914 trav-
eled to New Uork to solicit American support for an anti-Britisk force.
When WorXd. War I began in August 1914, Casement felt that it was a
golden opportunity to seek German support for an ineiepmdent Ireland.
Specificdy, he wanted to havc tangible G e r m szxpport for anti-British
activities. Casement was not a man to waste time; he immediately trav-
eled to Berlin in November 1914,7b his disappointment, German leaders
made it clear that they were not gohg to risk m expeditionary force to
Ireland.. Moreover, Irish POWs refused Casement" ppsnosal to join a
brigade that he tried to organize to fight the British. He even failed to se-
cure German rniniml support for an Irish uprising planned Eor 1,916.
Despite their refusal of Casement" ppruposd for a direct and iorceful
German intervmticm in Ireland, the Germans were interested in s q p a r t -
ing the Irish national movement; Irish unrest would distract the British
and divest their military resources, Thus, the Germans sent Casement
back to Ireland, part& to help subdue the questionable 1916 revolt and
partly to continue his agitation there. Casement made his trip to Ireland
in a German U-19 submarine as a guest of its commander, Kapitanleut-
nant Weisbach. He lmded in Tralee Bay on April 20 1916.I"' It did not take
the British lmg to track Casente~~t,and m April 24 he was arrclsted. Case-
ment was taken to L m d m where he was charged with treasm, found
guilty in court, convicted of treason on June 29, and sentenced to death.
His glorious past and services to the British Empire did not do him much
good, m d appeals on his behallf were rejected. He was hanged on August
3,1916, in Pentoz~villef"rison.102
The contrast between the first half of his career and his end is most
striking. It appears that Casement experienced conversion in two signifi-
cant areas-the religious and the political. Casement was "the only Britcrn
tt?be executed far espionage durj,ng World War X," and his "was the first
execution h Britah for treason for more than a century"uJ3

The EJli Geva At"fair, h J w ~ 1,982,

e Israel began a d i t a r y campaign in
Lebanon, which included, a massive invasion of ground forces into the
country In fuly, the Israeli military forces were circling Beirut, and politi-
cims were debathg the possibility of e~~terirrg the city m d occzupyhg it.
Colonel Elli Geva, a brigade commmder, was outspoken in one of these
discussions among the Israeli military commmders. He warned the chief
of stae that such an elntry W@ unkvise. Later, in meting5 with his superi-
ors, he asked to be relieved of his command because he did not wmt to be
one of the commanders that would order his troops to enter Beimt. Ceva,
however, %reed to remain in uniform as a tank driver, This did not h p -
pen. Folfowing talks with Geva" direct commanders and political superi-
 Violating Tr~tsl~ l h~y a df f y : Categolaies and Cases 87

ors, he was Ordered not to return to Beirut, was fired from the army, and
prevented even from having a proper farewell with his soldiers.lw More-
over, he was refused a role, or command, in the lsradi army's serve.^^^
Did Geva betray the trust invested in him. as a commander and violate
his loyalty? Many individuals kel he did and that he changed sides. By
refrzsi.ng to take commixnd scsponsi,bility fbut agreeing to participate inan
invasion as a tank driver), his behavior could. be interpreted as betraying
his loyalty to his command and the trust they invested in him, The
Colonel Geva who refused to order his troops to e ~ ~ tBeirut
er was not the
same man as the one at the start of the war; his values were certainly
changed. This is il7deed a difficult case. On one hand, Geva was expected
to obey orders g j v m to him. 011 the other hand, he felt that orders to pen-
etrate Beirut would cost numerous lives. He did not see the point to that,
and this belief led him to state his objec-tion. But Geva was no conscien-
tious clbjectot R u s , the constructions cd Geva and of his superiors are
very different. FXe paid dcarly as his military career was shattered, and he
disappeared from Israeii publk life,

Strikebreaking
During the acadelnic year 1994-1995, the salior academic staff a.t. Israeli
universities declared a full teaching strike due to a conflict over low
salaries. It was the longest strike of academic staff in the his to^ cJf the
country; lasting seventy-six continuous days. As the strike continued,
anger and feelings of frustration were building up, At the time of the
strike, 1 was the chair of the department of swiolog and anthropology
m d I had to deal MIith all the ad~ninistrativeproblents crcated by the con-.
thued strike. n e w reiallq. was not much one could do excerpt wait for this
labor dispute to end.
Toward the end of the strike, though no one h e w at that- time that the
strike was going to end in one or tvvo more weeks, one of the senior hc-
ulty members in the deparment-let us call him "Professor K-asked to
see me. Wben we met in my office, Profcssor A told me that he had had it
with the strike. He was going to the president of Hebrew Uni:versity to
tell him that he personally was no longer on strike. He wanted his saiary
to be reinstated, and he was going to demand that the department-'Ssecre-
taries contact e v e q one of his students and inform them that his classes
were c o m n c i n g . m e n 1asked him wbrther he believed in the goals oE
the strike, he replied that he no longer believed that we-the slrikers-
could get what we wanted and that be had plans for the summer, which
he did not want to be diskrbed by the strike. Complying with his wish
meant quite a hit of work fos the admhist-rat.ivestaff bbclcawse his students
88 Violating Tr~tst~ l hyalty:
~ d Categolaies and Cases

had to be located (students had left campus during the strike), contacted,
and told that his cbsses (and his classes only) were on,
I suggested that he spe& to the dean of the facdty about hir; change of
heart.l(J6Despite my cmtempt for this despicable behavior at a very diffi-
cult mornent, I felt that his wishes should be ~ s p e c t e dHe
. repeated his
request to the dean, went: to the pre?sjdent of Mebrew tlnjversity and told
h h that he was a strike violator, and demanded that his salary be rein-
stated."""7e departmental administrative staff made m effort to locate
his students, sent them letters, m d even called them. The result was that
very few students came in, One must remember that the rest of Hfrfbrew
University was on full strike. Within two weeks or so, the strike ended
whesz the Israeli state treas~~ry agreed to respond positively to the over-
whelmixlg majority of our dcmands, These develctpmmts, obviously, put
the treacherous behavior of Professor A in a rather ridiculous light. More-
over, he never approached anyone with an apology or stated that he was
giving uy the strike" economic gains.
F r m my point of view, one of the most interesting aspects of this situa-
tion occurred at the eszd of the first conversation with Professor A: He
asked me to keep his request a secrct. X pointed out to him that it would
be utterIy impossible because the dean,the presidmt, a large administra-
tive staff i,n the department, and the faculty, not to mentio~zthe students,
wczuld necessarily know about it. It was not possible to keep such an op-
eratrim secret. He ~ s p o n d e dthat once people learned about his behavior
they would call him a "Q~islkg."
X was puzzled at that. I knew that C;luisljng was a name synonymous
with treason aromd the days of World War 11, but not more than &at. Cu-
rious, 1 weszt to the 1;ibrary and picked up Hsidalfs 1989 volul~e011 Quis-
ling. As X was readjng i.t, two things occurred to me. First, Profcrssor A was
flattering himself, He had very little in commm with Quisling. Althougb
Qujsling's treason is an open and difficult questjon, Pmfessnr A"s betrayal
of his colleagues, in one of their most difficult moments, was very &vi-
ous. Quisling" activities were motivated by a variety cJf motives, most
important of which was ideologica). Professor A was motivated by his
egoism, his frustration, and his i d i l i t y to forego his salary-two very
differcsnt cases altmgether. C)f course, the sdf-aggrandizement of cornpar-
ing hinnself to wsfin.g was perhaps typical of the person who breaks a
strike, violates his colleagues"rustI and. asks that this shamehl act be
kept secret. Second, it dawned on me that this issue of " ' t ~ a s was
d well
worth a study The resulhf that incident is this boak.
A labor strike is m interesting form of connlct. A typical strike has one
group "f laborers with a variety of delnands facing a much smaller group
of managers with cliMwnt demands. A strike draws clear boundaries be-
tween ""us"' and '"hem," and each side is required to take a stand. Thus, a
 Violating Tr~tsl~ l h~y a df f y : Categolaies and Cases 89

strike is not just a power struggle between laborers m d managemnt. The

nabre of the conflict is such that once the moral boundaries are d r a m , a
strong and emlltional rhetoric emerges. The abjlity of both sides to
achieve their goals depends, among other things, on the solidarity that
each side presents. The erositm of this solidarity =sulks in the loss of bar-
gainhg power by the collective.
Strikebreakers, obviously, are not liked or respected. Moreoves, atti-
tudes toward them differ according to whether fiey initially supported or
opposcd the strike. Breaking a strike afier first consenting, Like Professor
A, is not viewed lightly. Breaking the solidarity of th g r w p in this man-
ner wiolates a moral code of trust and loyally and can generate a very
emotional response. This breach of moral boundaries and changing of
sides justifies branding the skikebrezldter as a traitor. Moreover, because a
typical strike is a contest of power, a strikebreaker may tilt the balance.
One of the m r e memora:ble definitions of this type of betrayal was con-
structed by the writes Jack London: "A strikebreaker is a traitor to his
God, his country, his wife, his family and his class.'"oK
Before ending this section, a disclailner is necessary Strikes are meant
to hurt. Without tangible threats andior causFRg some damage, strikes
are useless. 'I'he question m a i n s , wherr-? is the boundary? In countries
where physiciansbaXaries are state controlled (and paid), one must ask
when does a physicianshstrike become so lire threatenilrg to the popula-
ticm that it m s t be stopped? Does a teachers' strike fireaten wefl-being
and cause damage? It is possible to conceive that a strike could he so
damaging that stri.k&reakers would be more than welcome. Xf this situa-
tion occurred, Jack London" '""dinition" would be rendered invalid.
However, it must also be poiinted out that deciding where the dividing
line is between a legitimate strike and a strike thabeverely hurts the pop-
ulation in an intolerable fashion is itself a subject far debate between
strikers and employers"'The truck drivers' skike over fuel prices h EU-
rope m d Englmd in ZOO0 is a good example. Drawing this line cast s m e -
times be a difficult task.

is a spedfic fnrm of assassinati.on that involves betrayal in an bter-

esting manner. It is wellf worth examjning.l@
7'he word '%assasshf%has an Arabic origin and refers to a particutar pat-
tern of killing that was practiced by an easfy Islamic tihiite religious cult-
called. the Ismaili, The goal of the early IsmaiXi was to purify Islam
through terrorism and killi~~g corrupt and irnmorat officiafs.1"" The Is-
mailis, however, had no exclusive rights on this form of killing. There
were earlicr movements that used assassination as part of their struggle,
90 Violating Tr~tsl~ l hyalty:
~ d Categolaies and Cases

Well-known groups are the Thugs (who killed for Kalil'l) and the Sicarii
(a group of Jews who practiced assassination in the Great Rewlt of A.D.
6&73).112 The order of Assasshs, however, is probably the most famous
of these groups.
Descrjbing and analyzi~~g the history of the order of Assassins has been
accomplished bp other schdars, and a full account of their hjstory and ac-
tivit.y is clearly beyond the scope of this work.11" brief account, how-
ever, is in order.
'The death in AD. 632 of the Islamic prophet, Mohammed, created a cri-
sis, One result of that crisis was the creation of the caliphate, which insti-
httionalked the Prophet's charisma. Abu Rakr became the caliph. How-
ever, there were those who d i s a g ~ e dand felt that Ali-the cousin and
son-in-1a.w of the Prophet-had a better and stronger claim than Abu
Bakr. This particular dissenting group became known as the 5hiatu Ali
(ALi's party) and later as Shai. That early col~fictgave birth to the most
important cleavage h Islam.ll"
Around the year AI),760, a particular grwp br& wiiy from Shiism.
'They call4 t%iemselvcsIsmailis, after Ismail, so11 of fafar al-Sadiq, grcat-
grmdsm of Ali and Hatirna. At the end of the elevcnth century, a sec.ct so-
ciety of the Ismailite sect was founded fn Persia by :Hasan ibn al-Sabbah,
who was born, at an unk~acvndate, in the Persj.an city d @t~xmand died
in 1124. Hasan apparentjy traveled extensively h the Middle East, North
Africa, and Egypt, W ing converts. His goal was to disseminate hetero-
dox doctrinrz and battle the Scljllq Empirts.
Hasan needed a base, and by 1090he had enoutgh followers to h d p blrn
conguer (40%-3091) the fortress of Alamut in the Elburz mountains (in
northern Persia, south of the Caspian %a). h l m u t b e m e the headquar-
ters of Hasan" sect, and Hasan became known as the Old Man of the
Momtain, or the Crmd Master. Hasan, however, wanted to gain more
converts and have morc3 bases. Me apparently felt that Idarn could, and
should, be purified by assassinatirtg in a systematic way all of its major
officials, whom he chose to define as corrupt. Hasan clearly aimed to
unify Islam into one coherent and integrated commm~ity.Hasall and his
sect thus developed the '"art of assassination.""
'They were quite successful fn spreading fear and terror (Rapclport
19%). Hasan's ruthlessness was justified on religj,nus grounds. He chose
young, inteujgent, and able people, full of enthusiasm and faith, They
were them trained and taught the principles of Hasan's interpretaticm of
the faith and then sent on their d e d y missions.
The groups of these young men were called Fidais. There are uncorrob-
orated reports (traced to n/larco Polo) that Hasan's young assassins at Ala-
mut were k d into a so-called gardcn of paradise where t h y c o ~ ~ s ~ ~ m e d
hahi&, The purpose of this supposed ritual was to persuade the con-
 Violating Tr~tsl~ l h~y a df f y : Categolaies and Cases 92.

verts that paradiscr awaited them and that death in the course of carrying
out their assassi~~ation plots woutd only hasten their entry to paradise.
Hence the name biashishin became synonpous with Hasan's sed.
There are a few good reasons to suspect the validity and truthfulness of
the story &out the hashish cmsumption,"s hut the fact that it was so-
cially tonslructed, told, and possihly believed created the dynarnic of a
self-fulfilting prophecy
The Assassir^ls, as they became known to the West by the Crusaders,
were quite successful and gained dmnst full cmtrol of Syria. Because, in
the Muslim context, the basis of power was personal, when a sultan, or an
amir, was assassinated, his base of power disintegrated.1" A~ssassilzations
within this cultucal context were thus a powerful pofitical, and social
weapon,
:111 the twelfth cenbry, the Assassins were led Zly the last Grand Master,
Ru&-al-Dh murshah. The end of R u b , and of the Assassins, came ~ I I -
der the double assault of the Mongols and of the M a d & sultan of Egypt,
Baybars.
In 1256 the fortress of AIalnut fell. Later, and throughout the 1270s,
many other fort~ssesof the Assassins thmugfnout the Middle East Ml.
nousands of Assasshs where killed. Tl~atwas the end of the ruthless or-
ganization that had thrown an ugly shadow over the regim fos a h s t
two centuries. Although the thirteenth century marked the virtual end of
the Assassins as a sect, reports about them and their idedcrgy and meth-
ods were carried into Europe by the Crusaders""7
The Assassixzs devcfaped a policy of organized murd.er, which exhib-
ited one of the m s t important features of political assassination: a sge-
cific target coupled with a carefully assasshation plot" The pat-
tern of assassination, however, was resting. The Assassins kilfed
in a padicdarfy vile m er-after they had befriended their victim,ll"
Thus, an "assassin" wwas a persorl who won the trust and loyalty of his
victim by deceit and then violated it in the most bmtal way This seems to
quatify this form of killing as betrayal. The probtem is that the "friend-
ship" sought by the assassin was never genuine or sincere. IIthis respect,
the assassins were like innphnted spies,"lg pretending to be loyal and
tmstworthy members of a collective, but in fact the opposite.
C)ne of the most f m o u s modern illustrations of this kcRnique is the as-
sassination of Leon Trotsky on August 20, 1940. As Lentz points out,
R a m h Mercader, disguising himself under the name of Frartk Jackson,
gained Trotsky's trust and loyalty and was able to brcach the securjty of
Trotsky" hbvse near Mexico City, Mercader then killed Trotsky with an
alpine ax. He was caught, served twenty years fn a Mexican prism, and
was released in 1969. Before his death in 1978 in Havana, Cuba, he was
pronounced a ""hero of the Soviet Union."
92 Violating Tr~tsl~ l hyalty:
~ d Categolaies and Cases

As I have shown elsewhere,l21 the pattern oi assassinations, cross-

culturally, is such that in the m;tjority of cases, the victim and the assas-
sin seem to be from the same coXlective cultural group. However, con-
trary to the Assassins, in most cases, the assassin and his or her victim
were not personatly acquainted. Thus the issues of personal loyalty
and trust, in most cases, are irrelevant.
There are many cases *ere people in prominent political positions
were assassinated because their views were interpreted by assassi~~s as
treackrous and dangerous pctl.iticalfyf idedogically, and / or socially The
November 4, 1995, assassination of Vitzhak Rabh In Tel h i v is one such
case (discussed in detail in Chaptefll).
Another example is the Irish politician Robert Erskine Childers, Barn
in England. in 1870,Childers developed an interesting career as an au-
thor, a professional yachtsman, and an activist for Irish nationalism. His
spy novel, T!ze KiLc'dlrc of the liarzds, details a German flan to invade Eng-
land.12Wmy take the book as a sort of a prophecy m Clnilders" part.
Childers, opposed to any-thing other than republic status for Ireland,
joined the Republican Army, and in the civil war in Ireland he fought
against the forces of the Zrish Free State. He was caught, tried, and exe-
cuted by a firh~gsyuad of soldiers of the Irish Free State on Ntrvember
24,1922.12"
Other prominent victims of political assassination indude Abraham
LincoZn (Aprit 14, 1865), Irish activist Michael Coliinsl2"August 22,
1922), Mohandas K. Gandhi (January 30, 1"348),Rev. Dr. Martin Luther
King Jr.(April 4,1968), and Robect F. Kennerrly (June 5,1968).
Finally, there is m e other form of assasinatim worth mentioning hrrc.,
and that is tyrannieide. If a ruler is perceived to betray his okvn people, by
violating their trust and loyalty to the point where the abuse of power be-
comes intolemble, s+ects may resort to murder as a way of escaping op-
pression. This particular form of killil~greminds us that betrayal can
come from members of a rulisrg elite. Such cases as the assasshations of
Julius Caesar (44 Iri.C.) and Caiigula (A.D. 411, and the Juiy 20, 1944, at-
tempt on Hiter's life testify to this possibiiii-y.

Con Artistry Private Investigation,

Professional Betrayal, Sumeillance, and Espionage
h the previous three parts I have discussed separately three of the cells
that appear in our classificatory table. In this part, I shdl discuss the final
two cells together.
'The first of these t w cells comprises acts of betrayal comnitted by an
outside member in such a way that the vidations of trust and foyale are
 Violating Tr~tsl~ l h~y a df f y : Categolaies and Cases 93

aimed at the personal level, These include con artistry, private investiga-
ticm, and professional betrayal.

Con Autkty
Con artists prese~~t m hteresthg combhation of both deception and vio-
lation of trust and loyalty. En this mspect, con artists are not dissimilar to
hnplanted spies. Both engage in deception about their true identity and
intentions. Contmry to implanted spies, who operate on the nat-ional level
( m d smetimes as industrial spies), con artists typically fan within the
crimirral jurisdiction. These individuale; present themselves as something
other than what they really are. A nonlawyer may built a front nf a
lawyer, a nonphysician act as a physician, a nonbroker as an honest bro-
ker, a nm-real estate agent as a bona fide real estate agent. Posing as a le-
gitimate bushess person, the con artist tries to trap the unsuspecting vic-
t h . The typical result of a successful (horn the point of view of the con
perscm) c m game is the swindling of resources (money, property, land, or
rights) from the victim. h lavishly austrated fictional con garne can be
seen in the 1973 movie Tfie Stitzg, Maurer" classic work (1.940; see also
1974) provides us with further h~sightsand ilustrations into this behawior
of betrayal,
Canning a h a y s involves constructing and psesenting a false social re-
ality and deceptive personal identity The aim of doing this is to build the
trust of the victim to such a dcgree that thc fie or she develops complete
and full confidence in the con artist, Once that is achieved, violatirrg the
faked trust and byalty can be accomplished. In other words, the "stingf"
takes place, to the miserable djsahantage of the vi,ctirn. The con?bjna.t.ion
of deception and the violation of unreal trust and loyalty in a crimhal
arena are t-he haurnarks of conning. Moreower, although the target of a
con game may typically be a specific persm, it need not be so. BJ-itish ty-
coon Robert Maxwell showed how a con artist c m fool and swhdle by vi-
olathg the tntst and loyalty of a very large number of innocent people
(more than once and in more than one corntry).
Conning can also be an important aspect of spyjng, It should not c m e
as a surprise that Seth (1972), for example, feels that Delilalz was a spy
(agent provocateur in his terms) m d actually betrayed Samsan. 'The mad-
ern tern for that would probably be '"honey trap" ((or"sex trapm).l"A con-
temporary example is tbe exposer of Israeli nuclear secrets-Mordechai
Va'anunu. Va'anunu was in the process of providk~gthe London Sr.rlzday
Times crucial information about IsraeYs nuclear program. In September
1986, only a few days before the story was to be published, Vafmmu dis-
appeared. He was trapped by ei.lrher sex, or the promise of sex, 0ffen.d by
an attractbe woman who called herself ""Chdy." Va%arrmustated that on
94 Violating Tr~tsl~ l hyalty:
~ d Categolaies and Cases

September 24,1986, he met "Cindy" h r the first time in Leicester Square in

Lcmdon, and they continued to meet several m m times. ""Cindy'" per-
suaded Vafanwlu to leave Londo~land come with her to Rome, suppos-
edly to visit her sister. They left London on Sptcmber 30, 1986, aboard a
British Airways tligbt to Rome. There they were met by a m m MIho pre-
sented himself as the frielnd of "Ci.mdy'sffsister and took t h m to a private
apartment just outside R m e . There &hanunu was attacked by two men,
dmgged, taken aboard a ship, and brought back to Israel to stand a trial
far trcaso~~.h fact, Va'mmu was kidlapped by an Israeli secret service
unit. ""Cindy" was a Mossad agmt, who corned V a h u n u by first build-
ing his trust inher and then wiolated it. She used Vafanunu%attraction to
her to 1 ~ ~him
r e into a fateful. ""LEcrrreytrap."=e

Private Investigation
Private eyes have the potential fur actirtg like "traitors," That may happen
when they present themselves as not what they actually are, trying to
gain the trust nnd loydty of tl-teir ""iarget,""only to violate it later and use
it against that "target." In this particular rcspect, private eyes c m very
close to con artists.

Professional Betrayal
This cdegory rcfers to si.tuations where professionals betray the trust and
loyalty of other individuals. Exasnpiles aholmd.. One simple examgie in-
volves therapists who take advantage of the vherability af their patients
and have sex MIith then. A particdarly problematic subcategory of this
case hvolves those professionals who sexually &use children.1" Patients
who come to therapists for support in resolving their psychological prob-
lems surely put: Cheis full trust and loyalty i,n these theragists. mvionsiy,
using that relationship of loyalty and tmst to gaixr access to sexual favors
is a severc.betrayai of trust. Other cases involve physicians who fail to tell
their patients the true nature of their disease, fearing Che patients' reac-
tions, or physicians who perform. unnecmsary surgeries, or lawyers who
cheat and take advantage of thrir clients. These issues are sometims de-
fined as "ethj,cal problems" and involve a varicty of relationships be-
tween professionals and their clients.
Likewise, a category of interest to acadelnics is the potentid vialation
of trust and loyaity between researchers and Chejir sub~ects.The elnphasis
here is on the one-to-one, personal interactions beheen the parties. Oste
such spectacular case was exposed in the spring of 3998 by British TV
Channel 4. In a .fascinating and moving dac~tnnentayabotlC Soviet cos-
monauts h r i Gqarin and.his colleagues, it was revealed that Vladimir
 Violating Tr~tsl~ l h~y a df f y : Categolaies and Cases 95

KomarovFone of Gagwin" colleagues, decided to By a spacecraft that he

knew had so many design flaws that it was doomed not to return to Earth
in one piece. Komarov vdunteered for the mission in order to save
Gagarin"~I&. On April 23,1967, he went into space and waited, there for
his death. His last words transmitted to Earth were cursing those who
sent him to his death. Fdlowing this event, Gagarin organized a cam-
paign for the sakty of pilots, which-by the way-was not wekomed by
Soviet officials (see Doran and Bizony 1998:19&21)1).
Another illustration hvolves scientists who report on observations that
have never been made, falsify and fabrirate dati-t,plagiarize other works,
and persecute scientists with whose views they disagree."g Broad and
Wade's 1982book on this topic is appropriately titled Betrayers of Tr;cdtfi.
More examples involve bankers and brokers who flagrantly violate the
trust given to them by their clients to embezzle money cheat, and steal,
sometimes on a colossal scale. 'This category is close to con artistry, ex-
cept that con artists set out deliberately to con their clients and. are typi-
catly involved in maU-scale operations. Mso, the type and quality of
trust: and loyal% between a patient and a pr&ssional are different than
those involved h a simple criminal '"on g m e . " The betrayal of the
cfient's trust here is obwious, and the damage to those cfients can be quite
devastating*

Brand" Mission. A most dramatic and tragic case involves a rather dia-
bolical. Nazi scheme from World War 11.'" h March 1944 the Nazis in-
vaded Hungary, Adolf E i c b a n n was assigned the gruesome task of
murdering the 8(2(l,f)1)0 Hungarian Jews.""Ve and his group of Nazis
c m to Budapest-and began their yrepara.t.ionsto activate the "final solu-
tion" for Hungarian Jews.'"P The Jews in Hungary werc divided into a
few main groups. "They were, however, w a m of tvhat the Nazis were do-
ing to European J e w "They tried to orga,nize help and created a "'saving
committee." On April 25, E i c h called UoeX band, a Hungarian Jew
to his office a d told him that the Nazis were willing to spare about one
million Jews iF the Allies would provi,de the Wehnnuchf with 10,0(30trucks
(to be used, accordhg to Eichmann, only on the Eastern Front), suhstm-
tial amounts of tea, coffee, cocoa, soap, and m undisclosed amournt of
money;'"""
On May 19, Brand left Hungary (accompanied by Andor '*Bandip'
Crosz) with this diabolical '%"blood for trucks" offer m d went to Turkey
m d from there to Syria. The plm was to prese~~t this "deal" to the British.
Contrary to Britist-r promises, when Brand arrived in Syria, he was ar-
rested by the British autkoritics on June 7,1944, and sent to Cairo where
fie was jmprismed for three and a h& w n t h s . Sowyer B& states that
the order to arrest Brand was issued by Sir Harold MacMichael, the
96 Violating Tr~tsl~ l hyalty:
~ d Categolaies and Cases

Bri.tish high comrmissimer for Palestine and Transjordan. h doing this,

MacMichael violated his promise to Mosbe Shertok, of the Jewish Agenq,
that Brand wodd not be arrested. 'The explanation give11 by MacMichael
for violating his c o m i t m m t was that "it is war now."133
:111 Cairo, Brand reported that he met with BriPish resident mirrister to
the Middle East, Lord Moyne, to discuss Eichmam's offer and Chat. when
Moyne heard about the Nazi "offer" to release Labout one million 'Jews, he
~ s p c m d e dby sayhg, "llow do you imagine it, Mr. Brand? What shall I
do with those million JewsWWf-rereshall 1 send them?"l34 Wasserstein
(1982) argues that the "account" given by Brand was a propagaslda Eaton-
cation and that Moyne and Brand probably never met. In any event, it is
obvious that Brand felt bitterfy betrayed.
However, one must &serve that the role Brand played was very com-
plicated. 7'hedebate about whet.her he was a pawn used by Eichmann to
expedite the extermination of Mungarfs Jews, or whether there really
was a genuirre "Hood for trucks" &al, Etas not been entirely resolved.
Wymm (BM) points out that the "deal" ooffertrdby Eichmam to Brand
was probnbiy a feeler from S.S. Reichsfuehrer Heinsich H i d e r , \zrhose
hidden agenda was to find out whether a separate peace or cease-iire
agreement codd be worked out between Nazi Germany and the West.
Regardless of how truthful Brand's report. was,l" it is obvious from his
behavior and testimonies that Voel Brand felt betrayed, bitter, and ex-
tremety mgry.136
Brand" mission failed. The Americans were willhg to enter these ne-
gotiations, if only to buy time and save Jewish lives. However, the Soviets
(suspicious, as usual, about thc. West's intentions) and thc. British (ex-
pressil~gfears that the Nazis might '"flood'' them with Jewish rehngees
and thus delay and sabobge the war effort) were not. The resIdll was that
the British a r ~ s t e dBrand.D.77 Beginning in May 1 9 4 , the Nazis deported
about 450,080 Jews from H u ~ ~ g ato r ythe death camp complex Auschwitz-
Birkenau, where they were systematically gassed and cremated. That
happened despite appeals h m Jewish leaders tct bomb fby air) the rail-
roads leading to AuscSlwilz, and the camp itself. The appeals were re-
jected.

Karski" Mission. The case of the Polish emissary Jan Karski is sorne-
what similar, Toward the end of 1942, Karski left Polmd canying some
alarrning messages to the West about the Nazi systematic eMorts to exter-
mhate European Jews provided by Jebvish leaders hWarsaw As a repre-
sentative of the Polish underground, Kasski met in July 1943 with Presi-
dent Roosevelt and told him what he had wibessed at Belzec, and in fie
fail of 7,944, his information about the extermjnation of European Jews
was published in the United States.13Wike Brand's mission, Karski's in-
 Violating Tr~tsl~ l h~y a df f y : Categolaies and Cases 97'

formation failed to elicit a response that was effective in altering the ex-
ternination process.
'These cases are included as illustraticms of professjonal betrayal be-
cause ineach case various professionals were presented with alarming in-
formation but failed to react in an effective way. The tmst and loyalty that
were assumed when both Karski and Brand set on their missions were
broken. Surely, a g ~ a t e response
r could have followed their discfosures
than silence and h a c t i o ~ ~ ,
'The next cell we shall focus on is one where an. outside member c m -
mits violations of trust and loyalty aimed at the collective, Tbere are two
typemofbetrayal in this celt: srtrveillance and espionage.

Surveillance
Surveillance is practiced by the military, by palice, and by private investi-
gators, m d it usually refers to the close supervision of activi.ties of specific
ALthough violatirrg trust and loyalty are not ty~icaliyinvolved
citizens.l.7""
in it, s o m forms of this prac.lice may involve issues of trust, for example,
when a spouse asks that his or her partner be put under surveillance
without that parher's howledge or agreement. Thus, altlnoul;h military
surveilla~cedoes not necessarily involve violating trust or loyalty; other
forms may."% the abstract Itvcl, one can argue that using surveiXlance
(for example, wiretappi"g) violates a generat sense of trust assumed by
citizens, However, when undercover cops and sting operations take
place, a much more specific and concmtc sense of violation oi trust and
loyalty is created.
An undercover agent or a sthg operation is based on instilling in an
unsuspecting target the false feeling that another persun is from the same
cultural group, is loyal, and c m be tnlsted. &ce htyalty and trust are es-
tablished, they are used to trap the unszxspecti;,ng person. Thus, alhough
the undercover agent does not betray the tmst of his masters, he is violat-
ing thr tmst and loyalty of the decei\.ed person.
Staples" ((1997)provocative s~~ggestisn is that Western societies have
experienced a shift Eram focusing surveiBance on specific and suspected
targets to a culture where everyone is a suspect. In contemporary life, we
are all subjected to mmy types of sllrveiilance on a routinc basis. He
refers to this phenomenon as the '"meticulous ritual of power.'? Such sur-
veiliance includes being taped on video cameras in stores, gas stations,
banks, s h a d s , cowts, buses, and worblaces; being; recorded on a d o
tapes in elevators and on telephones, and being tested by polygraphs,
perscmality- tests, dmg tests, genetic screening, and so forth.
Staples's observatiun calls attentiun to the fact that in modern,
information-processing cultures, much information is gathered about in-
98 Violnti~tgTrust and Loyalty: Categories and Cases.

nocmt citizens, many times without their knowledge m consmt. This in-
formation is gathered in formats that offer easy wtriwal. AlChough some
of .this gathering of in.fnrmatim is done for beneficial purposes (for am-
ple, persmal security), it also c m be used against citizens or in ways that
are inappropriat-eand u~~~ustified, Metn &is happens, the issue of violat-
ing trust and loyalty is invoked in full force.

Espionage: Spies Versus Traitov-Spies

Espionage does not altvays involve betrayal. Ilcrwever, it may violate
what appears to be trra&, but is not. Spies who are part of Che collective
whose secrets they steal and pass on to others easily qualify as traitors-
for example, Jonathm Pdlard. Spies who are implanted by one country
in another and who pretend to be genuine members of that other comry,
whilc passing its secrcts to the country that sent them (the same logic
would apply to industrid espicmage) cmnot be considered traitors. Let
us laak at some illustrations from Israel and elsewhere.
Israel has long been a traditional target for Soviet intelligence efforts,
and many of their fmplmted spies have been caught a d have received
w i d e s p ~ a dpuh)icityl" Among the more famous are the following.
Zekv h i , one of the most important Soviet spies in Israel, served as
an Israeli dipl"mat in a variety of roles but actualfy worked for the :KGB.
He was caught in 15356 and sentenced to fo~lrteenpears in prison.1": Two
other spies who were caught in the 1950s were Yitzhak Zilberman and
Levi Levi. Z i l b e r m , an engineer who worked for the metal industry in
Koar Corporation and for the KGB, was caught and sentenced to nine
years in prison in 1959.1" k v i Levi was implanted as a mole in the Tssaeli
secret service by the Polish secret services. He was cau@t a d sentmced
to ten years in prison h 1958.
The head of the KGB station in Israel during the 1980s was Alexander
Lumov who was assisted in his job by his wife, Anna Alexei (who worked
as a cipher clerk in the KGB statictn). In 1,988bolt.1 defected to Israel. 'That-
defectim helped to expose at least three other spies, One of them was
Gwgory Londin, who was drafted to the KGB in 1973 and sent as a spy to
Israel. He was caught and sentenced to thirteen years in prison in 1,988,
h o t h e r casualty of this defection was Roman Weisfeld., who immigrated
to Israel from the Soviet Union in 1980 m d was caught and sentenced in
1988 to fifteerz years for spying..
AIexander Rcdlis, who was the coach of the Israeli natimlal ping-pong
tern, was drafted by the KGB in 19% and arrived in Israel in 1979. He
collected and sent infarmation. to his Soviet masters until 1988. For his
 Violating Tr~tsl~ l h~y a df f y : Categolaies and Cases 99

services, he received tholxsmds of dollars, h December P996 he was sen-

tcnced tc:,four years in prison,
Two other cases illustrate the contrast between a "spy" and a ""eraitor-
spyf5Shimeon Levkm was an Israeli high-ranking officer in military in-
tclligence who began to pmwide the Soviets valuable information in 4983.
He becme a spy out of his okvn free will. Ctearly, Levism qualifies as a
bona fide traitor, On the other hand, Anatoly Gcndler, an electric engi-
neer, was drafted by the KGB in the 1 9 7 0 ~ sent
~ to Israel in 1983, and
caught: in Novcrnber 1996. Although he was paid for sencfing his masters
valuable information for a period of fifteen years, he cannot be consid-
ered a traitor.
'There have been other Soviet implanted spies in Israel, none of whom
qualifies for the dubious titIe "traitor" because they were not bona fide
mernbers oE the Israeli national collective; they just pretertded to be. Two
of the m s t famorls Soviet spies in X~rael~Markus Khgberg and Shabtai
Kalmanovitch-are well worth mentioning.
1113948 twenty-year-old Markus Klingberg i igrated to Israel. He de-
veloped an impressive career, achieving the rmk of w~iversityprofessor,
and served as the deputy chief of the biological insti-tute in Nes Tzima (a
short distance south of Tel Avh). According to a variety of sources, that
institute was the hub of Israeli R&D regarding biological and chemical
warfare, In fact, Klhgberg was a Soviet spy (""mnfe"'). K l i n g b e ~was in-
volved in top secret prcrjects, and the damage caused by him to Israeli na-
t i m d secttrity m s t have been cmsidcrablc. He was caught in 19133 and
sentenced to life in prison, &spite his ailing heallh, advmced age, and
the fact that the Soviet W o n no Ictnger existed, his ~ p e a t e d=quests in
the 1990s to be allowed to live orltside prison for the remaining years of
his life were resisted fervently by Israeli officials. However, on September
3,1998, the Israeli district court sf Be'er Sheva fhally decided that the ail-
ing eighty-yeas-dd Klingberg could finish his term ina house-mst: envi-
ronment in Israel under very severe and limitkg conditions.144
A KGR implanted Soviet spy was twenty-the-yt.ar-old Shabtai
Kal~-nanovitch.He immigrated to Israel in 1987 m d very quickly estab-
lished himself as a "flambqant businessman and socialite" and. made
successful contacts with various pclwerfd politicians and military offi-
cers. He was caught and sentelzced in 1989 to nine years in prison. 145
It was not only the Soviets who operated spies in Israel; there has been at
least in onc.case in which thc. Llnited States verated an Israeli spy: MaJor
Yoseph Amit.""he was arrcsted in March 1968 (about four mm&s after
Jonahm Pollard was arrested in the United States), m d the Haifa district
court sentenced him to twelve years in prison on charges of espionage. hf-
ter seven years in prison, he was released with variotts resfirictions.ld'
111t1 Violating Tr~tsl~ l hyalty:
~ d Categolaies and Cases

Two iflustrations from the United States of traitor-spies, contrasted

with an illustration of a nontraitor-spy, will concludt. this section. The
most famous case of espionage in recent years in the United States is
probably that of the Walkers, or ""family of spies," as they am somtimes
referred to. Chief lndarrant Officer 'John A, Mlalker 'Jr., his son Michael
r Commander Arthur J, Walker, and Navy cornmu-
Walker, his b r o ~ e Lt,
nications specialist ferry A, Whitworth passed the Soviets top secret infor-
mation probably from the 1960s until 3985, when they were c a w t . The
damage to U.S. national security (especially to the t7.S. submarine ser-
vice) caused by this g r o q of spies must have been enormous. Sontag md.
Drew (1998:249-250) comment that ""Sdemm . . . tesl;ified before a fed-
eral j~~dge, sayhg that the Walkershing might have had "owerful war-
ing implications for the Soviet side.%.~ndwhen Vitaly Yurckenko, a
hi@-ranking KGB officer, kfected in July 1985, he told the CIA that the
Walker-Whitworth ring was the most important espionage victory in
KGB history." John Walker received a sentence of life in prison, his son
was given twenty-five years in prism, and k t h u r Walker wap; sentenced
to three life termse14g
The second case is that of Aldrich Ames, who as a CIA comterintelli-
gence officer spied for nine years (1486-1994) fctr the Soviets and later for
the Russians. His activities cost the Eves of American agents and exposed
numerous covert operations. Moreover, his activities corrupted the re-
ports of CIA officers as well. Fur&emore, Ames passed to his Soviet op-
erdors almost all the informtim that passed his desk, including inor-
mation ahout o t h r countries. In this way, he gave tbe Soviets informatiorr
ahout Israeli agents and highly classified information about the MIddie
East (YehakeLi 1998).Ames was paid an incsrrdiblt sttrn of close to 3 mil-
lion U.5. dollars for his activities. Afier his capture, he was sentmccd to
life in prison,l@
Clearly, such spies as the Walkers, Pollard, and Ames M y quali.fy for
the term. "'traitor." They were all Americans who wilXingQ volunteered to
pass secret information to another country. 'They all violated the trust in-
vested in them by, and loyalty they owed to, their country.
Contrasting with. these cases is the case of a nontraitor-spy who was
implanted by the Soviets in the United States under a false identity: Col.
Rtlidolf Ivimovich Abel (190S1921) was born in Russia m d served in the
Red Army's unit of communication (he was fluent in English, Polish, Cer-
man, Russian, and Yiddish). &riw World War 11, he served in the Red
&my's intelligence and is said to have pelretrated the German Abweit~r.
During this period, he disguised himself under several different names
and j&s. At the end of the war, he was a major in the NKVD (People's
Cornissariat of Internat Affairs, or secret police)- Entering Canada ille-
gally in 1947under the fake name of Andrew Kayotis, he crossed the bar-
 Violating Tr~tsl~ l h~y a df f y : Categolaies and Cases 1111

der to the United States h 1948. He established himself there, and in the
mid-1950s he was working in New York City as a photographer under the
n m e Emil R. Gold&. fn fact, he was in c h a s e of the Soviet spy ring in
the Mew York area and in charge of operations in North and Central
America. His contacts with Moscow were made by using radio. abel
made the n?istake of giving a newsboy a hollocv nickel used to transmit
messages, and evmtually the FBI got on his trail. On June 22, 7.957, the
FBI arrested him. In the fall of 1957 he was tried, convicted, and sen-
te~~ced to thirty years in prison. On February 10,1962, he was exchanged
for Gary Powers, the American U-2 pilot whose plane was shot down
over the Soviet Union on May 1, 1960. Abel was trmsferred to train new
intellige~~ceoperatives in the Soviet Union and was later immortalized on
a Soviet stamp.l?(IAbel, one of the most thilented spies known, was clev-
erIy implmted in the United States. He most certainly was not a trajfor.

Summary
Chapters 2 and 3 form a continuurn. In. Chapter 2, X presented the min
classificatory scheme for the different forms of betrayal., classified by ex-
clrxsion/inclusic-rn of membership in collectives and t.he n a m e of the tar-
get. Using Chese axes yields a table in which one can group diffcrtnt types
of violations of tmst and loyalty. Chapter 3 discusses each classification in
the tattle and prowides empirical itlustrations.
'The wedth of taws provides empirical substance to the analysis A ma-
jor goal of this book is to present a comprehensive cmcqtual hamwork
in Which the many different mmifestations of betrayal could he made to
i t . This strategy requires that we become akvare of their mqiriad manifes-
tations,
One immediate conclusion from the presentation thus far is that the ex-
perience of betrayal is very common. There is nothixlg snciologically spe-
cial about betraying or being betrayed. The large number of types of be-
trayal makes a persuasi\le argument for the high prevalence of betrayal.
Betrayal is characteristic of our culture..
The widespread existence of betrayal, together with its s k m g denunci-
ation, indkate that a boundary game is being played here..The behavioral
patterns that: are referred to as "betrayals" m utiljzed by variotls cultural
agents as boundary markers signifJiing differences between right and
wrong. The social ccrnstructims of Judas Iscariot, Benedict Arncrld,
&than Hale, m d Mordechai Vafmunu all i1lustra.t.ethis vividly.
The social cmstmctim of betrayal is a sociological tale of cultural con-
trasts and paradoxes. The w i d e s p r ~ dbrhavior of infidelity a d adultery,
togthcr with the stmng clenunciation of it, p v i d e s a good illustration
for this. Although trust m d loyalty are deeply beld values, their common
violation hdicates that cultuses can absorb q&e a lot of mistrust and
dislnyalty and still function. In other words, betrayal is not tcda-
ated but adds to the calorful mosaic of our cultures, Moreover, mmy
""itraitors" are crucial for continued social life-the whistle-blowers, the
strikebreakers, the infomers, the spies, and others.
Betrayal helps both to mark and to accelztuate existkg moral botmd-
aries, but it also helps to change them-anotlter culltural paradox, h-
deed, many traitors pay a high personal price for their violation of trust
m d loyalty;but sometimes new social organizations m d networks are
created a I q the way.
Part Two
This page intentionally left blank
 Treason

In previous chqtefi, we examined the different: manifestations of be-

trayal, their constructions, and illustrative cases, Clne category of be-
trayal, howevel; merits special attention-trcason. The issues of power,
moraiity, and boundaries in this particular category arc. critically impor-
tant and are also very prt>blernatic. Indeed, many researchers note that
treason, perhaps like pornqraphy, is a matter of geography This part of
the book is thus devoted to examining the nabre of treason and some of
its empirical manifestations.
There are some questions to consider. Were individuals who have been
~ f e m to d as "guitty of treasonf%ma fide "traitors"? If so, in what sense?
Did these particular traitors (or their actions) make a difference?
The first thjng we need to do is exmine the very nature of treason. This
chaptefis devoted to exactly this pu'1pose. 7'hechapters that foilow in this
part focus on cases.
If we look at the behavios of the different individuals identified with
treason, we find that it disnfays both secret and nonsecret elements. For
example, treason that is committed in secret tends to be idel~tifiedwith
espionage. The issues of loyalty and trust play a major part in treason.
The traitor, and the collective that is betrayed, negotiate and =define
the direction of loyalty and the meaning of trust. The very nature of
treason inrplies that both loyalty and trust are cast, Fnterprcted, and m-
derstood in moral terms. Power determines the end product of these ne-
gotiations.
Consequently, moral issues are involved in the constructinn of the
""taitorr"(or the ""hro"") Even a brief look at such cases as Nalthm Hale,
Roger Casement, Benedict Arnold, nounas More, Malinche, and Z,ord
Haw-Haw makes this clear. Morcovcr, examining trezlsm enables us to go
from the personal level of interpretation to the collective level, which is a
more difficdt exercise in other forms of betrayal.
 Treasurz

Characterizations of Treason
Definitions
W ~ aist our cultural understanding of the term treason?
'The Qxfolii Endish: Dictioni~tydefines treason as "the action of betmy-
ing; betrayal of the tmst undertaken by or reposed in anyme; breach of
faith." The esteemed dictionary calls our attention to an hnportant histor-
ical distkdion by tellhg us that

In old English law, treasan tvas either Izigh Ireasurj, an offense against the
King" majesty or the safety of the commonwealth, or pcfl't or peEfy tre~son,an
offense cornmitt& against a subect. 13etit treasrrrn is now punished as mur-
der, and high treason is usually styled simply Ireas0~2.Many acts of high trea-
son are now treated as trease~nfelony. I-lr'gll Crc~son-~,~" treason prc)per-is in-
tel-p~td as the N ~ i ~ l a t iby
o na subject of his allegiance to his sovereip or to
the state (defined in England in 135&51)."

Petit or petty treason is defined as '"lmason agaixrst a subject; spec. the

rnurcier of one to whom the murderer owes allegiance, as of a master by
his servanl, a husband by his wilc, etc. Now only history"1
The Encyclopaedia Hebvnica conceptualizes trcason as the violation of
trust of the sovereign a d states that this is one of the most severe of-
f e ~ ~ sin
e sexiste11ce.2
The fifth edition (1993) of the Columbia E~zeycloyedinstates that treason
is an act of disloyalty. It points out that in the twentkth century treasrm
was mostly a wartime phe~~omenon..
The Encyclopuedin Brifanrrica offers a 1ittll-l defini.tional twist stating that
twason is a general namc. "for the crime of attacking &he safety of a sover-
eign State or its head." Trust m d loyalty are thus built into this defh~ition~
:It then fcxruses on the different manifestations of '*high t~ason"-SOr ex-
ample, cmceph;lalizing or planni~~g t-he murder of a ruler; making war
against the king; or kilfhg a high official."
A later edition of the Etzcyclopaedia Britanuica offers a somewhat mnre
problematic definiticm. It states &at treason refers to ""crimes against the
State. Treason is the crime of betraying a nation. or a sovereign by acts
considered dangerous to security." It also makes a distinction between
twason m d sedition, pointing out that '"edition, t h o w it may have the
same ultimate effect as treasnn, refers gelrerally to the offel~seoE organiz-
ing or encouraging opposition to governtnent in a manner (such as
speech or writing) that fails short of the mom dmgemus offenses cansti-
tuting treason."Waking a legal distinction betwem sedition. m d treason
is sipificant because it allows two versions of tbis particular type of be-
trayal to exist-the harder (treason) and the softcr (sedition)-md thus
leaves law enforcement with discretion, that is, with potential negotia-
tims regardjng the nat-ure of specific behaviors. If the societal definjtion
of ttreason is based on defining (extendjng or shrinking) the nature and
amount of variance associated with violations of loyalty and trust of par-
ticular citians toward the state, then distingtrjshing betkveen sedi,tinn
and treason is an expression of this process, Moreover, this definition is
interesting because it assclnles that the ""state"(or the n t l c d s ) camot ""b-
tray'7ts citizens. Furthermore, the dcfjnition assumes that it is possiblt to
deternirte the gmuine nature of ""security" m a
nd what is, or is not, "dan-
gemus" to it.
'The E n c c e $the Socilrl Scimcrrs states Chat treason is "essentiatly
a violation of allegiance to the cornmunib-."$
Treason therefore, first and foremost, consists of a behavior that is pre-
sumed to have betmyed trust and breached faith and that presents de-
bated loyalties. The issue, of course, is not as simple as it magi appear be-
cause establishing m act of treason rc.quirt.s an a priori act of estdlishing
a relationship of trust and loyatty. That: type of relationsip requires in
turn some shared consensus regarding the nahrre of that trust and loyalty
The issue of a genufne relationship is a crucial one..What if one pwtends
tt? be i,n such a rdationship but. really is not? What if swiety is so highly
differentiated morally that the very concept of a value consensus becomes
a poblernatic issue? What happens when the ruler or the arganfzation vi-
dates trust and loyalty? In a sockty where loyalty is unclear, klrhere trust:
is problematic, or where moral polarization is strong, treason cannot be
easily defi~~ed or established. It is reasonable to expect that in such a soci-
ety some melnbers may try to mobilize or generate enough power to so-
cially construct and enforce definitions of t ~ a s o nin order to establish
new, more appropriate moral boundaries.
'The case of a rather famous traitor-Socrates-is illustrative here.
Atheni.an society put Socrates on trial, found hiHl guilty, and sentenced
him to death by poisonfng in 399 B.C. His crime? biting what was inter-
preted as a crihallenge to the state. Arnn~~g other charges, Socrates was ac-
cused of corruptilrg the morals of the younger generation and teaching
science in a way that amplified skepticism and disbelief. It was thougbt
by Athenians that anyolle involved i,n such activities was emdangering the
inkegrib- and the safety of the state. According to Athenian law, Socrates
was a criminal. The moral code af Athens did not embrace freedom af ex-
pression.
Athenian society through the moral agents who defined. its moral
boundaries, conde ed and executed Socrates,b who rationalized his ac-
tivity with a very differat moral justification. Socrates's pseczrtors had
more legitimized power, so that when the two oppos* systems of
mordity collided, Socrates lost. In today" Western democrratic societies,
freedm of e x p ~ s s i mis hailed as a primary virtue. In regimes fiat are
more totalitarim or theocratic, individuals who speak their mind or crihal-
lenge the power structure are liable to find lhernselves imprisoned or
colnnlitted to insane asyiums.7

The threat potential of treason is perceived as very great. It is magnified

during periods of armed conflict (from local.zed clashes to full-scale
war). Conflict, as S h m e l (1955), Levine (1971), and Coser (1956) have
noted, is a time for crystatlization of internal conformity in Che face of
challenges to the state. Uuring such periods, state definitions of trust
and loyalty expand and harden, and what otherwise would be ccmsid-
ered as normal activity may become defh~edas treason. or sedition. In
times of conflict, nation-states tend to increase restrictions, which also
increases the temptation to violate them.

The Encljclrrpaeda BriiFu~nicupoints out that "the law whieh, punishes trea-
son is a necessary cmsequence of the idea of a State, and is essential to
the existence of the State."B PZ"loscoweadds that treason "is the one nabral
a i m , prmishable at all times asld in all types of social organization."Y
Judging by the socrieta.1reaction to treason, it is ixrdeed one oi the most se-
rious offenses imaginable. Both Nettler and tlurst arc. quick to point out
that treason is the only crime defined in. the United States Consti8ution.la
In Israell the death penalty does not exist, except in a few cases, including
treason. The EZcycdopaedia Brifal~~lim points out that punishments for trea-
son were ""b&barsus in the extreme." b r example, "the sente~~ce in the
case of a man was that the offender be drawn on a hurdle to the place of
execution, that there he be hanged by fie neck not until he be dead, and
that while yet alive he be disernboweled and that then his body be di-
vided into four quarters, the head and quarters to be at the disposal of the
Crownff(women were bumt).ll

Previous Works on Treason

Quite a few studies of treason have bee11 conducted in the past, These
tend to be divided into three categories. One category (the largest, by far)
consists of works that take a particular case-for example, Miil1ian-tJoyce,
Kdkun atisljng, Tyler Kent, the Frencln Adlniral Darlan, Aldrich Ames,
Benedict Amold-and. discuss it in d.epth.12 The second. category, and
clearly the minority, consists of works that deta.il a relativeXy large num-
ber of cases, some in an almost encyclopedic manner.13 n e s e wcrrks typi-
caIfy attempt to either give readers the "'who's who'" treason or make
generalizations based on a relatively large pool of cases. The third cate-
gory consists of works that focus in more detail cm a few chosen cases,
typically in specific historical periods or cultures." Unfortunately, no
""theoq" exists in this area (except, perhaps, Boveri" haold-but unsuc-
cessful-at tempt).
Many of the authors have used the crsiteria, of motivation in an atternpt
to create typologies or expfanations,l%ut overall, this approach has not
proven very productive in terms of hinging about generalizable ccmcep-
tualizations regardirrg treason. hdeed, focusing s ~ motivation
n must as-
sume that treachery itself is a nonproblematic act and that there is a con-
sensus regarding the nature, and direction, of loyalty anci trust.
Obviously these are prsble~xaticissues"For example, the line dividing le-
gitimate dissent and disloyalty is not always clear.16
111 the rest of this section I present some of the major works on t r w o n
m d their historical cmtexts.

John Bullnch
Bulloch" 1966 book folbws a typical route. Following quite a few short
descriptions of cases of treason, his min conclusions are that "thercl. it; a
design, a continuity of trcachev h general, evwy traitor has some defect,
some m t a l ixnbalancc which makes him what he is" (p, 178) and that
""in the years to come it will be . . . the men who believe, who will out-
weigh the weak and the greedy who betray their count-ry fos gain. Those
who commit acts akin to treason will do so consciously and wilhgly, not
weakly md sbpidly" (p. 183).Bullcrch explains thjs shift trYithin the con-
text of the cold war.
Like other authors, Bulloch is puzzled about why certain people be-
come traitors, and he resorts t~ the psychology of personal motivation to
explain this. Me lhns isolates a few reasms for t r e a ~ ~ideological
n: belief,
monetary gain, and social isolation. He even cites a case of t ~ a s o nwith a
homosc-lxualbackground, where individuats were forced into treacherous
acts.'Wis conclusion is very clear: ""Traitors are usually sad men; always
there is something wrong with them, some defect in their character or
some lack in their personal lives, failure in their jobs or in their social ad-
just~xents"((p. El). Ku1.Ior=hfsimpression that "traitors are sad peopleu is
shared, very strongly, by West in her 1901 work. Raitors may be sad peo-
ple (especially those who get caught), but: thrrc. are lots of miserhle and
sad people all arottnd us m d very few of them are traitors in Bullocfi's
sense of the term*
 Moreover, Bulloch" list of motivations raises some doubts about char-
acter defects. Is ideologicat belief a consepence of a charactttr defect?
How about greed? 7'r, put it: differently there are mny people with simi-
lar backgrounds m d traits who do not b e c m traitors.
Idndoubtedly several different personal motivations p h y an important
part in traitorous behavjor: greed, blacknnail, sex, ideology stupidi,ty,
vengeance, fear, and sensation seeking, among others, Secmt intelligent
services have dwetoped quite a body of kncrwiedge on this issue. So-
caled intelligence officers, whose nnission is to reesuit traitors, collabora-
tors, m d spies, are trahed to locate the weak spots of their potential re-
cruits and utilize them to fie maximum. Tme, recmit~nentof traitors does
not always occur in this way, but when it does, bowledge of what moti-
vates individuals to act is important and practical. hdividuals who wel-e
themsekes involved in recruiting traitors (for example, spies) tend to
view betrayal through the prism of motivati,on, because this is their
modus opermdi.
:I have selected exmples that ilustrate the dif-ferent types of motiva-
tion~,han approach similar to Bullloch'ss..However, 1 am primarily inter-
ested in the svcinl uatzrrc oi treason and only secondarily hterested in the
question of perscmal m o t h t i o n , Some scholars have p o i ~ ~ t eout
d that
these two are analytically inexlricabk. My effort to untangle the two as-
pects, in the hrrn of prioritization of attention, is done for the purposes of
focusing the interpret&on.
Because persond motivation may reflect cultural preferences, as C.
Wright Mllls pointed out, the "sociological Imagination" rrequil-es that we
examine the "grrsmal" within the "social.'%ather =ason for tbe above
prioritization is that charting the different- mothations provides us with a
finite set of rnotivatims that pmvidcs a typology based on motivation.
However, it leaves open the vestion of why people with similar weak-
nesses and motivations do not become traitors. mus, focusing exclusively
on motivation is, in my vicw, an inherentXy flawed approach because it is
incapable of providing us with a satisl'actcrry explanation about the very
nature of thc phel~ontenon..F~~rthermore, beyond the specific motivations
that may expIain the conversion of any particular individual into a trajtor,
we need to understand the larger cultural and social structures that both
produce and en;tble the very existence of these individual motivatia~~s* In
other words, we need to expose the social basis of Ireason, If we are to ar-
rive at a better understand% oE treason, W must understand fiat it is a
subcatego" of the larger phenomnon o( betrayal and that it is more irn-
portant for us to understand the meaning of this larger category in its rel-
evant social context.
Social life is full of cmflict and cmtradidian. Thus the defmt and the
deviant are nut necessarily undersocializd peripheral misfits or rebels.
Greater eznphasis m the structural and. cultural dimensions of dividcd
loyalty bighiights the sociological dimension of betrayal, providing a dra-
matic alternative to the view that traitors have dckctive personalities or
are just plain evil. Betrayat, in the perspective presented here, becomes
understartdable as an everyday culturai event. Its strucbre is universal,
m d its specific co~~tent
becomes culturally and contextually meaningful.

Higel West published the most recent book on t ~ a s m (1995), which is d-

most: encyclopedic in size (aithough his logic in selecting the specific
cases is not always entirely clear). AlPhough W s t is inclined tokvard per-
sonalized, psychological interpretations, he is keenly awarc that

Treachery- and betrayal are otder than the thirty pieces of silver paid to Judas,
but at the md of the twentieth century they are cancqts that appear increas-
ingly subjectirie, Are whistle-blowers to be discc~uragedas selfish monoma-
niacs, or are they to be celebrated as prc3tectors of valuable rights? Are defec-
tors nothing more than selfish careerists, or are they brave martyrs deQing
oppression to stand on principles? In an era wKch has seen the political pen-
dulum in Europe swing from totalitarianism, to dernocracli; and then back
again to democratic socialism, and during a period when the individual can
be seen tcr have triumphed over the state, the choices are less clear cut. 50
what was it that compelled the minority to try to change history? (p.19)

Thus, West does not really offer us a ct,ncegh;lalization of treason, except

that it is based on mativation.

Rebeeca West
h 1964 Rebecca West drafted one of the classical works in the area of trea-
son, which was republished in 1985. The first edition of her book inte-
grated her previous joumatistic rczports of the trials of Wiltiann Joyce and
j o h Arnery for The New Yorkr. These two individuals faced accusations
of treason at the end of World I/Var II.lWs West" interest in disloyalty in-
creased, she ai-i;ended other treason trials m d hameled her htellectual
pursuit more and m m into espionage. The 1985 Pmguin edition of her
work has a chapter on William Jc-tyce(Lord Haw-Haw), but the book also
delves into cases of espionage after World War XI, hcluding some aspects
of the cold was,
West discusses such cases as the so-catled Cambridge spy ring (men-
tioned in Chapter 3); Emil Klaus Fuchs (a British nuclear physicist who
spied for the Soviets); JuIills and Ethel Rosenberg (Americans who passed
information on nuclear weapons to the Swirts; both were executed in
1953); the 1961 Portlmd case involving five cmicted British spies Mtho
g w e the Sovjets valuable information &nut underwater weapons; the
1963 John Pmhmo affair, which led to the resignation of British prime
minister Macmitfan;'"ohn William Vassal, a British AdmiraIty clerk wbo
was arrested in 1962 and charged with passkg state secrets to the S-viets,
and a host of others. Clearly, W s t focuses on ""tllhg the stories" of some
convicted traitors.
Her conclusions are in two areas.20 First, she points out that the te~~sion
between public and pl-ivate liberties is such that traitors may fulfill. m im-
portant social function of introducing vital change into our cultures-a
h d of positive mutation that helps to crihange the moral bou~zdariesof
society Howeves, West has a much stronger conclusion regading the
dangerous and socially disintegrative nlmidc-ological traitors who c
resist the appeal of monetary rewards. She calls far a swift and m m -
biguous public stand. against traitors. Wheseas West" approach-mpha-
sizb~gthe personal and focusing m the cold war period-has become a
sort of standard, my appmach i s c u l t d and thus conceptually different:
than hers,

Mnrglaret Boveri
The next important work is R/fargaret Boveri's 1956 book, which also sur-
veys a large number of cases of trcason. Without explahing whir, she be-
g h s k r work by disthguishing among three forms of treason: (2) trea-
son; ( 2 ) propaganda; and (3) coilaboration, resistance, and secret service.
This framework serves as the bacbonc structure of her book. Alhottgh
Boveri is interested in personal motivations of betrayal, she is one of the
few who acbally makes a genuirre atternpt to examine treasm from a so-
ciological and histsrieal perspedive, and th~~s-theoreticaZ1y speakng-
her work is sounder and more interesting.
Boveri asks several interesthg questions:

Have we here had to do with random individual phenomena or has there

been a common element? What is it which brings Ezra Pound and Count
Stauffenberg between the co>versof the same book? Have they anything in
common? . . . The startling fact, huwweu; i s that when one examines their
aims, their deeds, and their ideas in terms of the sclciety which they faced,
there is a remarkable degree of similarity (p. 389)

She asserts that ""teason is a necessary element in the historic devel-

opment of politically organized societies*All radical poliltical change be-
gins witfi. treasonf"(p. 13).The question is, why? Boveri's historical and
sociologieal view tries to find out what it is about society that brings
forth treason.
She is quick to note that treachery is, first of all, a betrayal of trust (p,
13). Her point is that althougtn trust is essential for the functionjng of soci-
eties, these very same societies become more a d more bureaucratized,
depersonaitized, and characterized by diminishing of trust. These soci-
eties produce people who have an "atomized modern consciousness" ((p,
391). Clearly this is an argument similar to Max Weber's pessimistic view
about the disenchmtment of the world and to Selig~aan"1997 treatise on
tmst, Boveri paints this development with a crude historicd brush and
states that this ""major metamcrrphosis of European society" is a direct re-
sult of a development that began with the Frellch Revolution (pp.
3853-391). This logic implies that treason is expected to rise in modemiw.
Boveri concludes that at the root: of treason lies a revolt agair~st""the
prc3vaili.mg forms of rule devdoped by the mid& class i,n the njneteent-h
and twentieth centuries" (p. 391). She relies on one of Rebecca West" fas-
cinating ideas in her study cJf treason in which West states that in two
thousand years of Weskm njvilizatio1~and history we have, in fact, d o ~ ~ e
nothing more than completed a theologiral circle. At the time of Christ,
the economic and pbysical misery of people were explained in theological
terms,.This explanation kvas simple, straightforward, and easily gasped
by the masses. Two thousand years later, theo1ogica.l issues arc t ~ a t e das.
if they arc. eccmomic or social problems. 'fi,Boverifsmmind, traitors may in-
djcate that people wan.t. to free themselves from being elnsiiaved by cco-
nomic and pohtieal categories of thought. Two thous& years of histor).
have not made individuals more reasonable or rational, What traitors
may represel~tis peaple" rediscovery of, m d attelnpt to return to, their
souls.
Although Boveri does not etiplain treasm in preindustriatized cultures,
she claim that if we examine what the diSferclrt traitors surveyed in her
book were saying, then m e m s t come to realize that "they did not be-
lieve irr 'progress' and the absolute sovereignty of reason""(p,33)It.is in-
teresting that mmy of the spies for the Eastern European countries dur-
ing the cold war ( h r example, BIunt and Phiby) w d d prohiably use the
tern "'pmgrc.ssffto ~ustifytheir betrayals. Boveri, however, is convinced
that "'her" traitors "hated the power of money i,n daily life and the sup-
pression of in.ndi.vidua1it.y involved in the average factory or office exis-
tence"' [pp.391-392). In other words, these traitors were against revolu-
tion and wanted to return to the old conserv&ive moral ideology, She
quotes Marshal Pt?;tain,General Back, and others as supporting this idea.
These traitors, she claims, presented a similar contmpt toward parlia-
mentary democracy: "Q~isIing wanted to abolish it. Joyce despised it.
The Geisau Circle [a group of anti-Hitler German aristocrats, including
von Stauffenberg] was determined to prevent its return, at least in the
Weirnar form. Stauffenherg rejected the kegaiitarian fallacyf Laval re-
signed f r m the Social Democratic Party" ((p. 393).
Boveri conctudes her work by statixlg that "eccentrics like Joyce, @is-
ling, and Pound were capable of seeing the wwld only through a biood-
shot veil of romanticism" and that the traitor devimts described in her
book " m y themselves be the heralds of another p a t historical swing of
the pmdulum, that they may be in the vanguarcf of a rmction against the
great heresies of the sixteent-h and seventeenth centuries" (p. 398),
Boveri's work powerfully illustrates the case fnr the rmanticization of
dwiants and their transformation into cultural heroes." ULlnderlying
Boveri" argument is one s t r o ~ ~and
g valid pobt-the profound moral na-
ture of violating tmst,
As intert~stingand provocative as Boveri's theory is, its credibiliv is
weak. Reason did not begin in l.he modem era. Not alf,(or even most)
traitors fit her description as counterrevolutionarjes (for example,
Ozaki Hotsumi, :Richad Sorge, La Malinche, the m i t e Rose, the C m -
bridge Ring, f udas Iscariat, to name only a fe*. Whether societal trust
has decreased or increased in Europe since the French Revolution is
difficdt to =certain, However, the one important idea in Boverifs
study is its sociological-historicat perspective. Fortunately we have at
our disposal a better and. r n o sensitive
~ conceptual framework than
the one focusing on disencl-tantment and bureaucratization.
'There can be little doubt that Boveri's work is Che most serious attentpt
to dcvelop a comprehensive theoretical approach to treason. Tn significant
ways, my work follows Bavek; I focus on the macra-sociological level,
and X expmd the scope of cases beynnd Etllope. Boveci was indeed cor-
rect in assessing that there are common elements among different cases of
twason. 7'he similarity, however, does not lie in their personal account-
ings. It lies with the way we conceptu&ze txason as deviance.

Pincher" 1987 work excels with illustrations about spies. .A large part of
his work is devoted to the motivational issue-why do some people be-
come traitors and others do not. This particukr focus not o111y merits ana-
lytical attention but has s m e strong prartical aspects as welf. Looking at
traitorous spies from a mothational poifit of view may give intelligmce
oMicers some tools for clealing with and recruiting such spies. Fincher, of
course, is not the only author to examhe the motivation of traitors as a
pclssiblc explanatory prineipIe, Both Akerstrom and Frmk Hagan pursue
this perspective, toa.22 The main concept Pincher proposes is MICE-that
is, that traitors are motivated by Money Ideology, Comprmise, or Ego.
He points out that actual motivations arc not discrete and that a complex
colnbination of differmt motivatrions may exist. Moreover, other motiva-
tims referstld to by Pincher as "the Rottti,ng of authority and disrespect
for the law" may play their part as well.
Pinchcr provides a ra&er skaightfmward definition oE beason: ""anat-
tempt to overturn the g o v e m m t @ s t a s h e dby law, including the activi-
ties associated with such an attempt, such as tfne assassin.ation of leadersef'23
This is m intereswg but quite problematic approach. the one hand, a
political hterpretation given to a c r b h a l activity c m very easily accard-
ing to this defhitim, qualify that activiw as treason. Un the other hand,
many cases of traitorclus spies, mentioned by Pinehrr, wodd be dgficuit to
dassjQ as such with this def.nilion. Such individuals as Poilard, the Walker
family of spies, Ames, and Va'munu would hardly qualify as traitors un-
der his definition. A third probtem is his iz~sistcnceon "gwemxnent by
labv;'Wmy dictators, some with horrendous records, wodd qualify u ~ ~ d e r
this definition, Cto individuds who go against them qualify as traitors?
This leads to another problematic &sue. According to Pincher 'S definition,
the activgies of an opposition, any opposition, to any government estab-
lished by any lawf c m be easily portrayed as being treasm.
Piz~cherframes treason wi&in loyalty but adds that a ""traitor" basic
role is to betray trust,"% DistStjng~~ishhg between major m d minor viola-
tions of loyalty, he concludes that one major criterion of treason is the
damage it causes. Uamage he measures by the lmgth of the treason, fie
time context (during times of W ~ Jor. peace), how m y (or whet-her any)
individuals died as a result of the t~acbery,and the threat to the regime,zs
Although not explicit in his analysis, Pincher does point out that secrecy
is an important issue.

Cart J. Eriedra'dz
Friedrich discusses treason with;in a more general discussion of what he
rders tcr as "the pathdcrgy of pditks.'" Examining a variety of such phe-
nomella as violence, corruption, secrecy, propaganda, and betrayal,
Friedrich explores the negatke and positive functions of the existence of
such phenomena. He p o i ~ ~out t s that the legal etefh~itionsof treason can
be easiiy expanded to genccate an understmding that betrayal "consists
of supporting a rival organization, giving aid, whether material or other"
and that ""teason is basically a violation of trust."% Like others before and
after him, Friedrich makes the mativational issue a central one and details
various mntkatims to commit betrayal and trcasm: conflict of loyalties;
ideological cammitmmt; homelessness a d alienation; and persecution
m d ofplaitation o.f mjnorities. Me does mentim that the desire frtr enrich-
mmt can serve as a cause, too (but he omits sex),
 However, he is more interested in political forms of t ~ a s o nand,conse-
quently, distinguil;hes five types of treason: (1)a sihnation where old val-
ues clash with new ones; (2) revolutionary treason; (3)involvement with
an external enemy; (4)disrcgading orders of a regime; and (5) involun-
tary treason, when a regime acts in a twasonous way." "Friedrich points
out that betrayal and treason are not necessarily bad and m y actually
have a posi.tive function. Like Boveri, he states that these acts may lead
the way for crucial and important changes. 'rhe July 2(3,1944, plot to kill
Hitler is one example, and the resistmce to the Viebarn War is mother.
Betrayal, argues Friedrich, like other forms of political pathoiogies such
as violence, corruption, secrecy and pmpagmda, facilitates ""theadapta-
tion of a system or regime to changing conditjons occurring either in tl-te
system or in the social substructure, or in the outside environment."
These phenomena aro "interdependentf"; for example, if violace in-
creases, so will treaso11.2"
Friedricb seems to Limit his characterization of betrayaI to cases whesc
secrrcy is fnvolved. fnevitablyfthis particular characterization forces him to
delve into case of espionage*He thus strates that the ""betrayalof military
secrets is the very core of. . . treasonf'29and that "the lure of secrecy consists
h r the possessor of a secrtzt partly infie possibility of betraying iterf30

Gwynn Net tler

Nettler 'S unusual work ffo6t~seson treason from the perspective of crimi-
nology, Like Friedrich, Nettler directly associates t ~ a s o nwith deception
and adds that the very idea of treason is based on "the necessity of self-
defense" because "loyatty is a necessity of social lik?.'"l He argues that-
treason (and rcllated threats to a state's security) is usually a crime of de-
ceit because ""perpetrators p ~ t e n dto be what they artl not and they con-
ceal from some assioeiates what they are."32
Like Friedrich" work, this iappmach tends to limit Nettler" analysis to
cases of secret betrayal, mostly in the areas of espionage, sahotage, and
sedition, but there are several cases it c ot explaist, such as @isling, Pi.-
tah, Malinche, and Clegrctle, among others. It is no wonder that Nettler
feels comforbble with the kgal definitions of treason. His discussim takes
these clefinilions as a cornemtone.33 Overall, although Nettler is one of the
few criminologists (or sociologists) who has paid attention to the topic, his
work does not =ally offer us an "explanation" fm beason but rather fo-
cnnses on the legal dcfh~ition,on whjch he expands his discussjon.

Treason in the United States: Authors and Histoy

n e r e are a few works that focus their attention on treason in the United
States. Whereas Rakeless" 11998 work focuses on espionage in the Ameri-
can :Revolution,O'litole" 1991, work targets the history of American intel-
ligence, espionage, and covert action from the days of the Ameriem Rev-
dution to 1962. The title of C)"Toole's impressive work is N o ~ o r ~ hTreach-
te
ery. Rich in, historical accounts, 0'Tool.e" work avoids an analytical
framework. "rhese two works are representative of most works about
treaso~~ in the United States; they rely on. historical description of various
cases to "explain" itreason. The meticu%ouswork of W y l (1950) and the
outstanding book by Archer (1971) are also devoted to treason in the
U'nit-rd States, and both also use a hjstorical perspecti\re. Arckr's wwork
focuses on the distixlction beheen dissent and disloyalty as the major cri-
terion daerentiating traitclrs from others, whreas Weyl is more con-
cerned with a very detailed analysis of particdar cmes of treason. They
both begin their review of American treason in the colonial period., start-
ing with the case of Natha~lielBacon, who attaeked and burned
Jarnestown in 1676.34 111. swveying some of the ixnportant cases of treason
in the Uni.ted States, 1 have adopted the historical perspective used by
these authors,
As the colonies WE b ~ a k i n gaway from the SritiSh yoke and seeking
independence, charges of treason were flying in all directions, Such a ma-
jor conflict required foyalties to be defined and tmst tc:,be estahtished. In
fact, the Ueclaxation of Independence on July 4,1776, could be viewed as
"the ultimate: act of treason,""" "deed, with& hnio years, Americms had a
national definition for treason, and the the Cmstitution fratxfied on Sep-
tember 1%1,788)included the definitio~~ of treason, the only crime defined
in the Constitution,As the American War of Independmce continued, the
list of traitors grew and a few seem to stmd salient in that dishonorable
list: Ethan Men, who aAer being released from a British jail, negotiated a
proposal to make Vcrmont a Cmadlan province, which led several con-
gressmen to demand that he be arrested for treason;" Benedict Arnold
(caiscussed in Chapter 2) sold valwble military inteuigence to the British;
and Aaron Burr, an American vice president, negotiated with the British
tc:,split Loufsiana for a hefty amtlmt cJf mmey and conspired to become
m emperor of parts of Louisiana and Spanish Mexico (and, pet-haps, later
have Mississippi join too), Burr was eventudly caught in Alabama and
brought to fichmond, mrl;inia, to face charges of treason. The jury found
Burr not guilty (m~dreturned a similar verdict on other charges). Later
historical work mvealed that, hdeed, Burr was cmspiring against the
United States and that he was ""without doubt, America" most brilliant
traitol="s7
The breaiking away of the colonies from England created difficullt ques-
ticms of ioyalv and trust, and conspiracy and treason accmpanied the
trmsition to independence. Various illdivjduals and grouphad different:
national visions for the future, not to mntion their own personal dreams
and expectations.
 The War of 1812brought, again, the issue of treason to the forefront, For
example, the cmections that remained between m o d e Island and Eng-
land created new issues of loyalty and trust, and s:irnilar questions were
raised when Presidmt Pofk went to war with Mexico over the disputed
area between the Nueces river and Rio Grande river. There was s s much
oppoSition to this wm, that the issue of dissent versus disloyalty was the
focus of some rather hot debates.38
That conflict was barely fh~ishedwhen the United States faced a new
challenge: the Mormon rebeltjo~zof the f,85I)s, which is viewed by both
Archer and Weyl as an act of treason. Against charges of being disloyal to
the countr)i and practicing potygarny, g o u p m " f mmmuebelled and
resisted cooperation and unity with the United States, which shokved a
great deal of intolerance toward this religious group. Eventually$a politi-
cal settlement was reached, lltcErily a h o s t bloodless. Clearly, this conflict
concerned differing ideas about. xceptable lifestfles and values withh
the United States.%
h o t h e r rebellion was headed by John R r o m from Kansas, an aholi-
ticlnist who wmted to create m indqendent republic of fugitive slaves.
In an effort to create a slave uprising, Rrown led twenty-one followers
(amcmg them were. four blacks) in an attack on a kderal arsenal on Octo-
ber 16, 1859, at Harper" Ferry Virgixlia- 'The rebels were successful in
capturing the arsenal and roundjng up sixty citizens as hostages brlt inad-
vertently killed the mayor of the town. The rebeilion was suppressed
quickly, Brown was brought to trial on criharges of treason and conspiracy;
found guilty and executed by hanghg on December 2,1859."
Much like the period of ehe American Revolution and the War of 4KE,
the period of the Civil War had its share of treason and betrayal. How
could it not? The justification for the assassination of President Lhcolut
was in exactly such a context. Famous traitors, spies, and dissenters on
the edge ol: being considered traitors of the period included Rose Green-
how (who passed secret military idormation about federal. plans to at-
tack the Confecierate Army), B e k Bcryci (who spied fnr the Confederacy),
Clelncnt I,. Vallandigan (who opposed the Civil War and tried to involve
the French in an attempt to stop it), and Lambdjn P. Mjlligm (who helped
the Confederacy military eff ort).43
Ue~xent's1984 historical work provides m hteresting and sardo~zicac-
coullt a b u t secret political societies, conspiracies, and treason trials
around the pe"1od of the Amerkm Civil War. Hiti thoughtful work recre-
ates the out-of-control atmosphere nourished by the rnilitary clash, ac-
companied by political intrigues and some bizarre; personalitks, all help-
ing to create imaginary conspiracies and ntmors, which, in turn, solidify
into a slxiat reality where treason trials take place. The author shows how
a rurmor can be made into an accusation of treason by some rather sha:bby
chararters. Let us look at an example.42
In 1864, rumors were created that Confederate szxpporters in sotlthern
Canada we= involved in a plot to create an uprisjng in Camp Douglas (a
POW camp where more &an 8,001) Confederate prisoners were detained),
free Confederale prisoners, burn Chicago, and incite an uprising in the
Midwest, Quite a fmhstic scheme. Nevertheless, some individuals were
acbally suspeckd of beillg involved in this irnaghary t~acherousplot.
As Klement points out: "It was a rather strange turn of events. . . . The
"great conspiracy%was based upon fiimsy and questionable evidcnce that
no civit court woutd have found acceptable. . . . It was a fmtasy passed
off as fact, a travesty of justice, a political stratagem m d e respectable by
historians."43
At the beginnfng of the twentieth century labor disputes were the locus
of ins-inuations of treason. Quite a few American inhslrialists and capi-
talists defined the various exprcssims of risjng consciousness among I.a-
borers as a potential theat to, and betrayal of, free enterprise. On the
other hand, laborers ~lrhoseemed to side with employers, or slrikebreak-
ers, were def ned as violating trust and loyalty.4 This period ended when
World War I began (1.914).
Like other wars, World War I left its lcgacy in the area of betrayal. Some
labor activists were accused of treason. For example, Torn Mooney and
\iVarren BiIlings were charged with explodhg bombs in a crowded street
corner on July 22,1"36. Although sentenced ta death in a trial that began
in 1937, they were not executed; and they continued to insist on their in-
nocmce..They were finally released from prison in January and October
1939, rclspectivcly They had spent twenty-two years in prison for a crirne
they did not cornmit," Euugene V. Debs never hid his opposition to the
war and made no secret of his sympafrhies for Mooney and Billhgs. He
was arrested and sentenced to ten years inprison and deprived of his dt-
izenshiy. Debs ran as a socialist candidate for the U.S. presidency in 1920,
frorn his prison cell, and attracted about 1 million votes. President
Woodrow Wilson, in reference to Debs" objection to the U.S. involvement
in the war, stated, "This man was a traitor to his countq"46
Other smialist leaders, activists, and pacifists were charged with interfer-
ing with the ~ ~effort..
a r Anti-Bri_t.ish acl,vists were t ~ a t e din a shiIar fash-
ion (for example, Jeremiah OfRary who was indicted for a '"conspiracy to
it treason")." It is neverfieless true that G e m m agents were active
in the tl'nited States in m a t t e ~ ~to
p tmobilize support for Germany and
were involved in espionage and sabotage, Weyl estimates that German
sabotems may have been able to damage as much as $2@ million worth of
war materials, ships, manufacknrkg plmts, m d kri* explosives.48
 Between the end of World. SiYar 1 and the beginning of World War 11,
there was intensi\le pro-Nazi activity in the ldnited States. 'f'he goal, at the
xninimm, was to discowage the United States from joinhg the war in
Europe. A small minority of Arsrericans, some overtly anti-Semitic,
thought that fascism and Nazism were the "in tbing'hnd felt obtigated to
support it, even to the point: of creatizlg a Nazi-)ike political and social
movement and organizations. One exa-le is German-born Fritz Kuhn,
setf-appointeU*rer of the German-American Rund. E-Iis oqanizatbn
managed to attract m u n d 8,000 mernbers to its anli,-Smitic and Nazi W-
was cmvicted of embezzlement and forgery in 1940 and
sent to prison.
Some other Americms were criharged with sedition and with attempts
to establish a fascist gwernment in the United States. Sum of the m m
famous propagandists far the Nazi ideology included Mrs. Lois de
iJalayette Washbum, who believed that "the Jews'\vrere after her and
wanted to sell her into white slavery; Mrs. Hizabeth Dilling, the only
American woman who was iz~dictedon three successive occasions for
seditious conspiracy agaiinst her country and who organized political ral-
lies against the Lend-Lease Act; and Miss Catherine Curtis and. Miss
Lama Ingallti, who lobbied for the Nazis (Miss Ingalls was actuaZly paid
by the German ernbassy for her services). In her trial, Miss fngaUs, like so
many others accused of trcason before and after her, toId the court: "My
motives were born of a burniw patriotism and a high idealism. . . . I am a
truer patriot than those who convicted me!"@ C)ther f m o u s f i g w s were
pro-fascist Father Charles CoughIin, who preached endlessly against the
Jews and for fascism both cm the radio and in his newspaper (Socifzl Jus-
tice); Gerald L,. K. Smith, an ex-pastor who left the pulpit to preach the ha-
tred of fascism and alignment with the Nazi f i r e r , together with Huey
Long, Willlam Dudley Pelky (who felt that it was time for the United
Stdes to have a Hiller and a pogrom), Francis E. Tokvnsend, m d Con-
gressman William Lemke.
M i l e World War II was dragging on in Eumpe, the Unfted States was
getting closc? to etntering the war, h fact, on J d y 2, t,94f, a Washington
grand. jury convened and for the following fifteen months inquired into
the fascist and Nazi activities in the United States, These activities c u h i -
nated h charges, accusations, trials, m d sentelnces agaiinst a nutnber of
individuals.50 A total of 9,405 Axis agents we= arrested m d brought to
trial as a result of these investigatims," It is interesting in this cclntext to
point out Henry Ford's sympathies with Germany." The chief, and mast
famous, Nazi agcrnt in the United States prior to its entry into World War
I1 was undoubtedly George Sylvester Viereck. He was instrumental in
distributing Nazi propaganda and in promoting an isolationist ideology
Viereck was assisted by another crusader for fascism-Lawrence Dennis
(who worked for the state department for seven years) and by Mrs. Leslie
Fry another paid Nazi agent.""
One hteresting and dramatic Nazi operation that hvolved violating
trust and foyalty and which resu2tt.d in trcasm trials, took place in June
1942. On June 12, Gpitanleutnant Hans-Heinz Linder, crrmmandiz^lg U-
202, landed four Nazi agents m d four crates of explosives off the eastern
clnd of Long Idand near Amagansett usixrg rubber boats, Four days later,
on June 16, Kdpitanleutnant Joachim D e d e , crrmrnaneiing U-584, used
inflatable rubber boats and landed four Nazi agel~tswith explosives at-
Ponte k d r a Beach, seven miles south of Jacksonviile, Florida. X n all, eight
Abtuehr Nazi saboteurs, with plenty of expiosives, wert? on Americm soil.
Fortmately for the Americans, &is mission of destruction failed. Georg
Dasch, who Icd the group that landcd in Long Island and who despised
Hitler and Nazism, taiked another man into h;lrning himself h, and they
betrayed the rest of the p u p (as well as those who sent him). Me con-
tacted the FBI and they surrendered on June 18,Within twenty-four hours
his group was in fie hands of the F&f,and on June 23 fie l e a k of fie
other group (Edward Kerlhg) was captured and the rest were caught on
June 27'. Some of these eight saboteurs had relatives and friends in the
U ~ ~ i t eStases,
d and fourteen such people wew arrested, too. One of the
saboteurs, Herbert Haupt, was raised h Chicago by a pro-Germm family
O f the eight saboteurs, six were h a n d guilty of wartirne espionage and
were executed cm August 8, and two received long sentences in jail. Ten of
the American relatives and friends who were found guilt-)lof helping the
sabotews, and thus violating their lqalty to the United States as well as
the trust of their cowtry received prison sentm~es~54
However, pro-Nazi individuals m d groups were not the only agitators
in the United States; agitators for the Left were t ~ y h gto turn the United
States toward co
C)ne of the most fascinating cases of treason in that period W= that- of
Robert Jordan, a Harlern self-styled '"black f6hrc_.rHwho suggcrsted that if
black Americans wanted a better futurt;, they had better suppmt, alld
fight on, the Japanese side.%
After the end of World War 11, issues of treason were raised in the con-
text of the cold war, the :McCar&y persecutiofis," and again, with much
power and forcefdness, during the Viehlm War*Unlike previ,ous wars,
this very controversial conflict divided Americans and blurred the
boundaries of betrayal and treason+sg
Archer" s h malytic thrust is to contrast disloyalty wif-;hdissent, He
warns that governments h o u l d not equate political opposition with trca-
son, '"since todays Government policies may be proved to be wrong to-
morrow and changed aro completely" (p. f 79). ""National. uaity is
hardly hdped when Gove ent spokesmn attack dissenters as unpa-
triotic or traitorous" (p. 183). This issue is indeed an important one, but
difficult to resdve, because i n specific cases the bouneiary between dis-
sent m d disloyalty is often blurred. Appr~lpriatelyenough, Archer ends
his book with a quote from Voltairc: "I disapprove of what yczu say, but I
will defend to the death your right to say it" (p. 185).
Wepl 1950's work raises similar issues" His immense historical review
leads him to conclude that major politrical and military crises tend to be
accompanied by a variety of forms of bekayal. He points out that those
branded trajtors are not always rnornsters but olten true believers. Dissent
tends to be, and typically is, regarded aa disloyalty and traitorous in dic-
tatorial ~ g i r n e whose
s tolerance is nonexistmt or very severely limited.
Struggling against tyranny is often cast by Ihe tyrants into the language of
treason. Democracy, states Weyl, must act differently and allow its citi-
zens t e freedom to dissent. However, even democracy must face such is-
sues as aiding its enemies, nationalism, and-Weyl points out-treason
agairzst democracy itself, that is, the betrayal of human freedom.

~ E nglnnd: Authors and Histoy

T m s o in
Treason and the histmy of Ex~glanda h o s t seem to go hand in hand. fn-
deed, the topir of treason is very much part of the atmosphere in London.
n e r e is the "Traitor" Gate" at the Tower of London, shown to curious
wisitors. A visit to London" Dungeons, not too far south across the
names, reveals the stories of other larnous traitors, this time in a rather
graphic fashion (as does the nearby Clink exhibition). The history of the
United Kingdm thus provides us with a 1art;e number of cases of trea-
scm, some of which are bcluded in Wharam's 1995 work.
A few English cases involving treason (or suspicion of treason) became
h o r n worldwide as a result of very famous movies made about them.
An outstanding movie about the conflict betweern King Henry 11 and
Becket is the superbly acted 1964 movie Beckt, starring Peter OToonle as
King Henry II and &chard Burtm as the doomed archhishp of Canter-
bury, Thornas Becket. Kecket, who served under Menry 11as archbishop of
Canteibury, had a long and bitter dispute with the king, as a result of
which he fled England and lived for six years in exile. m e n Becket re-
turned to England, the old c d i c t was renewed, and Kecket was mur-
dered by four knights in Cantcrbur)i Cathedral on December 23, 1170.
Becket was cmonized in 1123by Pope Alexander IK
The n o m a s More affair was the axis of two very good movies, both
nannfd A Nalzfir All Smsons*The first was made in 19% with Paul Scofield
playing More. This splendid version won six Oscar awards. A second pro-
duction was made for televisinn in 11988, starring Charlton Mcston as
More. More, in a famous conflict with FXenry VIIX, refused to accept the
k h g as the head of the Church of England. He was charged with treason
in what has become one of the most famous treasm kials, found guilty,
and beheaded in the Tokver of Lmdo11 on July 6,1535. He was cmmized
in 1935. More, no doubt, was one of the best-known and.well-respected
statesmen, schotars, and humanists of his time, and perhaps one cJf the
peat"" t f all tintes.39 tZnother movie invdving Mjng Henry V111 (and Car-
dinal Wlsley ) is Atzr-lc ilf: the Tha~lsar-zdDays (1969), starring Genevieve Bu-
e Rolep and Kchard Burton as King Henry Vf1l.a That movie,
too, raised issues of loyalty to, and trust inf the monarchy and ciergy. Fi-
nally, a more recent movie about t ~ a s o nis Braveheart (1995), starring Mel
Gibsm as VViiliam Wallace, the legendary fourteenth-century Scottish
rebel warrior wfio led Scots during the irst pears of their rebellio~~ agairnst
British d e . He was captured and was executed (actually, publicly tor-
htred to k a t h ) as a traitor cm August 23, 1305, in London." 3 e movie
won five Oscar awards.
Several books have been written on people defined as traitors in the
United Kingdom." "arm's 1995 work, wbich is quite legalistic, is one
of them. It focuses on eleven famous Etnglish treason trials, from the Essex
Rebellion (1601) to the trial of Wllhm. J q c e (1945). Like 0Toole" 1991
work, Wharamfs is rich with detail (although not as comprehensive as
UToole's), and it offers a tecl-cnjcal unjf-ying framework-the law-ae-
coding to whirh the different trials were carried out.@
Weale" 1994 work is focused on British traitors h TVVorld War 11, He
concludes:

Thew is a pervasive air of unrealty surrr~undingthe story of the British rene-

gades of World VVar Two. It is difficuIt to see how even the most intelligent and
best educated of them . . . could possibly believe that what they were doing
was, as they claimed to believe at the time, in the b e t intersts of Britain. . . .
The common denominator i f there is one, which was shared by the rene-
gades and their imrnrtdiate sponsms, was their utterly unrealistic view of the
tzrorld, whether out of simple stupidity . . . or for more complex psycholagi-
cal reasc)~~.(pp.1527-1 98)

h d yet Weale" work itself reveals the ideological basis behind some of the
more famow renegades (for example, Amery, Joyce, Bailly-Stewart) m d a
fcw others. :lsr fact, the Nazis searched, for Bri~shsympathizers (not to men-
tion anti-%mites) to help their cause. m a t is so strmge, or wave& in the
worldview of m ideologist? Perhaps from a Westem, democratic contem-
porary perspective ideological commitment seems ""unrealistic,"" even
bizarre, but it only accmbates the skeng.t%tof that ideological commitment.
However, when this explanation faas short, there arc3 always those ""cm-
plex pvchological reasons."
 Motivation keeps coming up again and again as an organizing prtnci-
ple. It is indeed an interesting cmcept. "T%leorc.tically,
if we were to take all
h o w cascs of treason and classify Chem according to the motivation of
the traitors involved, we would certahly cmate an interesting list, per-
haps not much different h m similar dassificatory lists of mothations for
espionage."" As important as motivatio~~ is, it alone camot explah trea-
son. To h d a more satisfying interpretation, we have to look at social iin-
teractions m d institutions.
I'secedjrrg Male's 1994 work, Seth's 1973research focused on the eMorts
by the Nazis (aided, to a farge degree, by turncoat John Amery) to per-
suade British and Commonwealth POWs under German cmtroi to join
the wm effort on the Nazi side an$ bccome part of the Nazi Wehrmacht.
The name given to this potential force was the BriGsh Legion of St. Gease,
later known simply as the British Free Corps. Alfiough the Nazis con-
trolled several hw~dredthousand Paws, kwer &an a hmdrcd agreed to
participate in the British Free Corps. Thus, this attempt to persuade a mass
of individuals to viofate their loyalty to, and the tmst invested in them by,
their comtry sirnp)y failed,
There were quite a few famous cases of betrayal in Britain during the
the cold war, especiatfy espionage. As Britain moved from World War 11
to the cold war, there occurred a sociological shift from public and open
dissent (on the baderline of betsayal) to secret and deceptive betrayal.
Although English history is full of anecdotes and accounts of betrayal,
other countries have their share, too. Klernent's 1984 work, mel~tioned
earXier, describes how the American Civil War period was characterized
by heightened conscicrusness of conspiracy and treason. During majm
conflicts, issues of loyalty and trust become paramount. Tolerance for dis-
sidence, deviance, and complex moral stands is almost impossible to sus-
tain. Charges of distoyalty and treasm can be effecthe symbolic toots in
the hands of determined leaders in campaigns to redefine mord bomd-
aries and bolster their own agenbas. During codict, the boundaries be-
t w e n patriotism and treason, between loyalty and betrayal, becorne
clearly delineated; rhetoric creates a social reality where goad is pitted
against evil, with no middle ground. Although KZement focuses on the
American Civil War, he cites other cases that support this historical gener-
alization." Shilas situations occzrrred durj,ng the McCarthy witch-bunt:
against American Colnmunists in the 13511~~ the Stalinist purges and per-
secutims of the 1930s,66 and the 1490-1650 European L\litch-hUnts.67
'The generalization we can make here is that intliznes of crisis and social
change, various moral entrepreneurs will try to take advantage of the
fluid, conhsed, and uncertain situation to redefine the moral boundaries
of the cdture. Their success depends on several factors, chief m o n g
which is their ability to generate, mnbilize, and use power.
 Focusing on Treason
Although betrayal on the personal level is an interesthg topic, one about
which numerous novels have been written, our m a h hterest lies with be-
trayal on the nationat, state, collective, or orgmizational level. 'I'he main
reason is that the two elelnents so importmt for our understanding of de-
vianc+morali~ and power-are very salimt there, These elements oifer
us a way to understand treason.
Treason implies violating one" cmmitment, trust, and loyalty to a par-
ticular symbolic moral miverse characterizing a collective. This violation
is conceptualized as an almost universal "crime" and is severely pun-
ished by mast cztlttures.68 Treascl~~ is thus hvoked whe11 m obligation of
allegimce (expressed in terms of trust and loyallty) to a particular social
(and moral) order exists on the individual level and when an intention to
violate that obligation exists, which is duly followed by relevant adioneb9
Committing an act of betrayal requires makQ a moral. decision, Tt means
that at least two different behavior options exist and that one of them is
defined as immoral and treacherous. 'This is an important p i n t . In, many
cases of national or collective t ~ a s m the, mnral choice is not very clear
because one may feel loyal to an idea or to a political, social, or moral sys-
tem different than the one in which that individual lives. Sometimes,
these two are mutuafly antagmistic.
Violating one's trust and loyalty to a nationaf collective, a state, a state
orgmization, or rUIer/s wjll clearly in\Poke a societal reactior~in the form
of m accusation in treason. What makes one choice treacherous m d m-
other not? The cmrial variahle here is power-the power "f those making
the cdtural interp~tationof a specific b&avior to mean that it violates
trust and loyalty in the form of '"treachery." Thus, the successful defiiyli-
ticm (that is, &:be one that is both accepted a d serves as a basis for action)
of any specific person as a traitor is limited to a particular configmtion
of power and mrality Change that confjguration and a different inter-
pretation will emerge.
Lord Haw-Haw (William Joyce), executed by the British as a traitor,
was highly respected and esteemed. by Nazi Germany. Likewise, mem-
bers of the White Rose, executed by Nazi Gemany as traitors, were
fiighly respected bp the nm-Nazi world.. Josephus Flavius, respected by
the Romans, has been considered an archetypical triritor by many Jews, It
is precisely this qualiy of betrayal that is so interesti~ngand worthy of
examining.
This qualiw of betrayal raises mother issue that is relevmt to contem-
porary public discourse. When two or more political or ideollrgical points
of view clash, the risk of a particular choice running h t o culturai inter-
pretations that may define that choice as tl-eacherous is significant. In-
deed, when definitims of treason emphasize that it violates ""atlegiance to
the communityf9he assumption that the nature cJf this "allegimcef~s
nonproblematic needs to be challezzged.

The Stmcture and Cantent of Treason:

A Summary
It is a common observatio~zthat treason Iies in the eyes of the beholder
and that there is no such thisrg as genuine or authentic treason, hdeed,
the specific ctnzfmfof treason may not be universal. In this sense, what is
defined by some as treaso~zcan be defined by others as heroism. The rea-
son for this is that th sociological sf ndciure of treason is genuine and uni-
versal, a l t h o w it is pclssi27le to fill this miversal structure with different
cmtents.
Treason is based on a social construction of reality, which is what makes
this type of social interaction culturally meaninghl. lltis particufar social
constmction is based on the violation of two specific .forms of social rela-
t h s h i p , which are typically referred to as trust and loyalty. As pointed.
out earlier, trust and loyalty characterize the personal and as well as the
callective, natio~zal,and even international levels,
Violations of trust and loyalty on the persond level arc commonly E-
ferred to as ""betrayal" and on the collective or natimal level as ""t~ason.'"
Both betrayal and treason often necessitate deceptive behavior and lm-
guage (for example, concealing, lyixrg) m the part of those hvolved h
t k s e relationships. Moreover, the wide variety of behaviors hvolved in
treason m y lead us to conclude that the very category of trczason covcrs
qualitatively dlffesent behaviors. We shall see that it is not too difficult to
deconstruct the differcmt cases of treasm to their basic assumptions and
facts. m c e that is done, the co~ztextualmeming of treason becomes in-
hemtly problematic.
5tr"nge as it may perhaps sound, betrayal on the personal level is much
less problematic, easier to estabtish, and clearer to interpret. For exmgle,
marriage typically means sexual exclusivity Violating that is interpreted
as betrayal, adultery cheating, and so forth. It is not difficult to determine
wfio is commi.trtingthe adultery and cvho is hurt by this behavi,~.The vi-
olation of trust and lyalty in such cases is obvious, But treason is more
difficult to interpret. h n d yet various manifestations oE treason reveal a
solid underlying structure.
The structure that defines treason is the violation of trust and loyalty
between bona fide members of a national collective. Trust and loyalty a d
their various violations (includislg treason) constitute gezzuke and uni-
versal structures, However, the content of what exactly constitutes tmst,
as well as the direction of loyalty, in specified groups and cdtures may
vary considerably,

Approaching the Problem

The genuinely important elements of this work are the principles oE orga-
nization, that is, examining betrayal as a particular form of devimce
structured a b q the viotations of the values and norms of trust and loy-
alty and classified by the relations of those defined as traitors to the col-
lectjve or dyacl. a c e these principles are established, cases can be inter-
preted within them.
Of course, we cannot discuss treason without context. Some illustra-
tions must be brought in. Good sociology, in my view involves interest-
ing and instructiw puzzles and tales. Although the specific tales of
treachery are interesthg, 1 am much more hterested in the possible cm-
ceptualizations and generalizations that can be drawn from such talcs,
Rather than focusing on one particular case or building an encyclopedia
of treachay, I shall focus in a historical and cross-.cdtu,raf perspective on
several cases and will generate m d suppoX"Iexactly those understandings
mentioned above.
In producjng this work I was faced wiCh the crlassical problem of histor-
ical research, that of selection. Which cases to select? I decided to select
the more famous cases, from several cdtures, and from speci.fic periods.
Clearly, periods ol unrest and cultures uncfergoi.ng profomd social and
political changes are good places to look for cases of treason, Hence, in
the next few chapters I present Lvhat I hope are quite a few interesting ac-
counts about specjfic cases of treaso~~.
:In doing tkis part of t k work, I became acutely aware oi Anthony
Glees" rreview (in the Timrs Literary Sztppleme;rzt) of Nigel West's 1995
book on treason. Mavi,ng reviewed West's large encyclopedj,~volumef
elees notes, exasperatedly, "By the end of the book we are no wiser about
the naturc. of treachery than we were at the bei;iming.'"7@I hope that by
the end of this book, the reader will be Wjser m d will achieve some pow-
erful m d practical gmeralizabk insi&ts about the nature oi treason, as
well as its structure and various manifestations.
Moreover, the study of treason, as m e particular rnmifestatim of be-
trayal, can hrnish some very h d a r n m t a l insights into the character of
sociai order, trust, loyalty, and the assumptions that underpin them all.
Failhfui. to contextual constructionism, examining treason bp examining
its basic nature, its different empirical manifestations, and the ways in
which it is cmstructed and charged with meaning in a variety of cmtexts
yields valuable insights into the nature of appearances, mirrors, and
masks,71 and how actual behavior contrasts with social constructions.
This page intentionally left blank
 ating Trust and
ty During Wor d War 11:
Part 1

The 1939-1945 period of World War X I provides a fascinatjngly rich time

slot within which to examine cases of treason and other forms of be-
trayal.Wor1d War II is particularly inte~sting,especiaily fie European
theater, because at least four different syxnbolic moral universes clashed
there. The first was commmism, the second was Ifassism and Nazism, the
third was the dder monarchic societies (fctr wample, Vugoslavia), and fie
f a ~ ~ rw
t hs democmcies..Each of these politically delined sym:bolic moral
unkerses represented djfferent cultural worldviews regarding almost
every aspect of human life, Moreover, the clash an-tong these symbolic
moral universes was fierce, costing the lives of millions ol indi\sjduals.
Power, includhg the power to annihilate entire ethnic groups, was very
pmmb~en t.
'Thus, this was a period whe11 one master system of governing was SLIP-
ported over another. Such a major cbange on the cultural level necessar.ilp
translates tct the individual kvel in terns of such defining persmai char-
acteristics as biographies, worldview, and identities. This historical con-
flict provides us with a stmcturc within which cases of betrayal unfold.
Such structures may be typical of codicts like World War 11. tietmspec-
tivelyr and in most people's minds, that was the last war Where it was
clear who hught who and why-what many have mferred to as a ""just
war,'hwhere gcrod and evil were clearly delineated. This perception he-
comes especiaily sharp when, one examines the conflict b e t w e n Nazi
Germany and the Allies. R a t is, tmst and loyalty we= sharply dcfhed.
In reality, the picture was sometimes less clear. What better place and
time to took for betrayal? In the following pages, we shall examine sev-
eral different cases of betrayal in World War 11,
130 Vintalitzg Trrtsl and hyalty Durr'12g WurIcZ War 11: Part l

VVorld War I1 raised the issues of loyalty, tmst, and deceit, on both the
personal m d national levels, to a mapitude and intensiv not frequently
found ino&r historical periods. We will be examining the issuc of betrayal
in different countries, but it must be remembered that personal betrayal
was also an issue, for exampk, the bekayal of Jews hiding from the Nazis,
Clne m o u s case involves what: may have been the worst traitor of
Miorld War 11-Hamld (Pole) Cole. When the war began, Cole deserted
the British Army and aligned with the Nazis. Although British intelli-
gence th~r~tght he was helpkg to save the lives of Allied pilots who para-
chuted into occupied Europe, he was actually betrayirrg m n y of them to
the Germans. He was also effec"cive in betraying other Arlird agents. As
the war progressed, he joined the Americans and helped them hunt dokm
his previous German masters. Cole was shot and killed on January 9,
1946, in a shoot-out with the French police in Paris. haz,ingly, among
the people he betrayed to the Nazis was his lover-Suzanne Warren-
who was also the mother of their child."
One general statemat that needs to be made is that clashing armies E-
sort to deception whenever they cm; that is, they deliberately mislead
their oppments and viofate their trust and loyalty. Bp W i n g their enemy
through manipulating their trust and loyalty they can score better and
cheaper victories. MiliQry history has several such episodes: the Jilpmese
attack on Pearl Harbor; the surprise attack of Egypt m d Syria on Israel in
0ctol;ler of 1973; and the surprise Nazi comteraeack in the Adernes (the
Rattle of the Bulge) in December 1%4. However, manipulating the trust:
and foyalty of oy-pctnents is not restricted to the military field. Hitler cer-
tainly manipulated both the Atlkd powers and the Soviets before the be-
g h i n g of World War IIby signing international agreemel~tshe had no in-
tention of keeping and by violathg them whenever it suited his purposes.
Reseaxhers in =cent years have even speculated that Churchill was in-
volved in similar nrrmipulatiol~s* First, Rusbridger and Nave (1991) assert
that by not telling Roosevelt about the impending attack on Pearl Harbor,
Churchill ensured the entry of the United Statres into World War E. Sec-
ond, K'tlaer (1994) mintains that by deliberately ignoring Rudolf Mess's
(Hitler" deputy) mission of peace to England. (Hess" strange flight to
b g 1 m d occurred on May 10,1%1), Churchill guaranteed that the Soviet
Union would be dl-agged into World War If. Kilzer even implies that
Hess's mission was genuine and that it could have prevented botfn the
war and the extermination of Europem Jews. f i r d , Uennistone (9997)
states that England used secret s:ignaf intelligence in an attclmpt to get
Turkey involved in the war m the side of the Allies and to help open a
second front against Nazi Germany in the Balkans. With this ifiroduction
and the illustrative cases in mind, let us examine the first category of
World War 11cases.
 Violating Tr~tsl~ l hyalty
~ d D ~ i r i ~Worlc2
fg War 11: Part l

Fifth CoXumnism

One of the more intriguing phenomena to emerge in tbis period is groups

of secret sympathizers m d supporters of an enemy who engaged in espi-
onage or sabotage within defense lines or national borcfrrs, also known as
ism. The origin of the term is traceable to the Spanish Ciwil
War when the Nalj.nnalist general Ennili~Moa at-tacked Madrid i,n 1934
with four m y colums. Gcneral Mola coined the term "fifSh column" tto
describe the Nationalist supporters in Rcradrid who assisted his assault.
Later, the British used the term to descrfie people w hized wi&,
or spied for, the Nazis. British accounts blamed a fif lfor the sur-
prising and umxpected rapid collapse of French military forces con-
fronting the successlul May 1940 Nazi onslaught. There was also British
concern &out the possi:ble existence of a fifth column arnung the many
~fugeewho tled to England from the Conthent, Ernest Hemingway"~
play Fqtfi Ccrlurrtrz (about the Spanjsh Civil War) helped to M u s e the term
in the United S"ttes*Even President RooseveZt believed in fifth columns;
he stated in a fireside chat on May 26, 1940, that there was a "Fifth Col-
untn that betrays a nation unprepared b r treaehery"3

Fifth Colum~isnrin World Wuu I1

During the war, leaders took action to suppress, or encourage, fjfth-
cohmn efforts. Winston Chmbill's order to create the Special Operation
Executive, which aimed to b d l e the fires of resistmce and ""st E ~ ~ r o p e
ablaze," must have had the idea of a fifth column behind it.Woreover,

Churchit1 had ordered a wholesale round-up of people whom he feared

might start a Fifth Column that could be infiltrated by the German Inteltli-
gence services. Among these tzrere 150 classed as "pmminent."W~nityMit-
Sir OswalcS and Lady Mosley were among
ford's sister and bro>thez=.jn-law,
the first to be detained, Others, such as the Duke of Westminster, . . . were
tzrarned to keep their mouths shut and nat spread defeatist rumors and to
sever all links with Germany?

The threat of growing populaf support for fascism was very real in t-he
early 1930s.6 As we shall see in the case of Kng Edward Vlfl (later Duke
of W i n d s o sysympathy fur fascism. touched some prominent figures, who
f o r m d various networks of sympathizers,
In the szxlnrner of 1940, Major Genmal Willjam Donovm, director of the
Ofice of Strategic Services (055) during World War f1,7 helped to draft a
132 Vintalitzg Trrtsl and hyalty Durr'12g WurIcZ War 11: Part l

ent that examined the impIications oi a fifth c o l u m for the Unlted

whjch created somefiing of a panic about: the penetralion of Nazi
agents hAmerica.-me of the results of that pmic can be seen in m h-
struche document from the perjod by Farren (1940). In it, the author calls
for workers to assist the war effort: m d provides them with guidelines on
how to ide~~tify saboteurs and prevent them from hfiltrating importmt
work places.9 Higham" 1985 work attempts to document the collabora-
ition of some Americms with the Nazis from at least 1933. This collabora-
tion cmsisted of political support and various conspiratmid p&.'""
Fifth columnism was not confhed to only a European context. A m-
late$ development took place on Febmary 19,3942, when Prtjsident 1Coo-
sevelt issued an executive directive that culminated in the dete~ztionof
about 120,000 peopl ayanese descent on the West Coast. Abwt two-
thirds of these we ricm citizens with a Japanese culturat heritage
(Nisei). It is importmt to note that many Nisei were eventually drafted
into the U.S. Army m d Navy and they supported, the U.S. war effiurt in
many significant ways. I-lowver, the act of detairra such a large num-
ber of people clearly behind it much smspicion, distrust, and a fear of
a Japanese fifth colu l That fear, one must hastily add, had some em-
pirical grounds in the behavior of thc. Sudeten Gemms (discussed fater)
and some populdior~sin the U'kraine, Yugoslavi,a, and a few other coun-
tries, who provided support for Nazi ideolngical and territorial expan-
sionist claims. One of the major mtrospective counterarglaments is that
these Nisei wcre U.S. citizens and hence owed their alXegiance to the
United States, which they tmsted. However, this argument did not hold
much m a y in 1942.
As late as 1946, a Canadian royal commission. that had studied Igor
Gouzenko" defection (discussed. in Chapter 3) stated in its report that the
Soviets had been involved in creating a fifth-cdumn organization in
Canada. In reality, the Soviets in Canada were involved in operating a
rather mundane intelligence organization whose goal it was to collect h-
formation about atomic weapons.
Basically fifth columr\ism mans Eh& a c o u ~ ~ t (say,
r y counky X) con-
t d s a large number oi people who live in another country (say country
U). "T'hesepeople are orgmized secretly and pretend to be loyal and trust-
worthy dtizens of corntry Y,while hfact their loyalty and trust belong to
count^ X. Thus, t h y conceal their true loyalty and engage FR continu-
ously deceitful behavior. Onw hostilities erupt between collntry X and
countr>i V, a fifth column bccomes a =source for espionag, subversion,
and sabotage, creating mrest and chaos.
fifth ccliumnism has been generalized to also include political influence
and subversion. Although country X may utilize a fifth column to create
chaotic conditions, enabling the invasion of country V, country X may af.-
ternatively use a fifth colu to better control events within comtry V, It
was in this context that th zis used political espionage during the war
to innuence political decisionmaking processes in their favor, and even
created such processes.12 For exampie, up to September 1939, it was a
Nazi-stated goal to keep England out of a ccrntimntal war. Until the
Japanese attack 811 Pearl Harbor, it kvas a stated Nazi political goal to keep
the United States "neutral" and out of the war (Britain, of course, had a
diametricaily opposed goal). To help achieve this goal, the Nazis sup-
ported sympathizers in these countries. 'Thus, both politic4 and military
eiiorts are included in fifth columnism. Metaphorically speaking, it is not
too difficult to imagine that, like termites, a fifth colu c m erode the de-
termhation, stre~~gth, m d capabilities of country U to such an extent that
country X codd conquer it with ease and swifhess, The issues of m r a l
boundaries and the betrayal of loyalty, trust, and deception arc. all very
neatly focused in fifth colum,nism, In many aspects, a fifth col
haps the ultimate example of tseasm.

Ripka focused his 1945 work on the Henleinist pro-Nazi movement in

CzeclhoslovaEa. He showed how Herrlehists were hvolved in sabotage,
espionage, the accumulation of explosjves and weapons, and deceptive
operations. He describes the activities of these pro-Nazis in Czechoslova-
Ea h terms of a fifth column.
h o t h e r docurnmt, titled The Gemran Fqfh Column in Polnl-rd, published
by the Polish Ministry of Information in 1940, examines the issue of the
German minority in Polmd and in other European com~tries,such as Bel-
gium, Holland, Luxembourg, France, and. Norway. It concludes that
"subversive activities and conspiracy against the State wert? the p r o g m
and political conception. dsminat&~g the G e r ~ ~ mhorities
an durkg the
period preceding the war" (pp. 11-12). These minorit.ies became one of
the standard excuses that the Nazis used to justify their brutal and unpro-
voked hvasions of these countries..
It is interesting that both this document and :Ripka%(BG)examjne, in
detail, the claim that Cermm minorities were ill-treated and severely dis-
crimhated agaiinst by their host countries. Ripka, for example, notes that
during 1937-1.938, Germans made up 22.3 percent of the population of
Czechoslovakia and they hefd 2.2 percent of the seats in parliament and
23-1 percclrt of tbe civil service posts. I:,ikewise, no crlaims of discrhina-
t h agaixlst Germans in Poland. (or the existence of a fifth, colurn there)
could be empiric* proven.
Altrt7ough this attempt to expose the hypocrisy of the Nazisklaims is
interesting and instmctke, it would not have made any diflerence to the
134 Vintalitzg Trrtsl and hyalty Durr'12g WurIcZ War 11: Part l

Nazis. The '"German mjnority" 'issue was just an excuse used for public
consumption. The real motivation was one of racial Gern-tm hegemcmy
m d expansionism, as indeed stated quite blwztly in Mitlds Neirr I ( u ~ l t ? f :
Regard.less of this, German minorities were called upon (and expected)
by the Nazis to aid them in their political and territorial claims before and
after the Nazis seized power, The nature of this help ranged from poEticd
support to espionage, conspiracy, smuggling weapons and. explosives,
and sabotage..
7"he most comprehensive work abed fifth co s is that by Louix De
fang," De fang examined meticulously the e ce of a possible Ger-
man fifth cdumn, country by country, in Spain, Austria, CzechoslovaZtia,
Poland, Norwy, Balkans, Switzerland, and in more generd terms, in
Western and Eastern Europe and the United States. The answer she pro-
vides to questicms of the existence and effectiveness of Nazi fifth columns
e o m hmd, &ere can hardy be a doubt that elements of
sted. That is, there were ;indeed German mhorities (and
gmizations) whose goal it was to &stabilize the regirne
of their host corntries and cause its downfall. Although the most preva-
lent activity of these organizations was espionage, they were also FR-
volved 117 sbotage and tried to disr?lgt daily life. However, the frevency
size, and type of aclvities of these organization
different countries. For example, whereas fifth-co
strong in Czechodovakia, it was virtuaily nonexistent in Poland. Uc: Jong
notes that the activities of these Pllazi sympathizers resdted partially from
instructions that came directly from Nazi Germany (for example, pre-
A~zsChlzi~;~Austria) and partially from these imdividuals' w n interpreta-
tim of their identification with Nazism. Werc they effectbe? Again, the
answer is complex and is case specific.
'fhey were quite effective in Czechohvakia. Konrad Henlein had al-
ready established a Nazi-like party inOctober 1933. Durhg the 15335elec-
tions, this party wan about 60 percent of German-speaking voters. The
activities of the pro-Nazi H d e i n i s t movement w e very h d p M to
Hitkc Theis continuous provocative agitation in the St~detenland(which
increased after the Austrian-&man Anschluss in March 1938) apparenq
helped to persuade the British that the Nazi clairn to parts of Czechosto-
vakia had ""smething to it" m d that Czechoslovakian htegrity could no
lmger be maintahed. That the Czech government was very effective in
quickly and siiviftly squdching the specific September 1938 agitaticm was
of no usc? to Czedosfovakian nationd integrity. l-he weak state ol the
British a r m d forccs at that tim.e, coupled with what appeared to be a dis-
belief that Czechoslovakian unity could be maintained, contributed to the
sig~zingthe Munich Pact. hdeed, follawhg that 9pternber 1938 agree-
mmt, the Sudetenland was gi-ven to Nazi Germany, and Monrad Henleh
was =ply rewarded by the Nazis with the appolntrnent as head of the
Sudetenland. :ill May 1939 he was promoted to the position of Gauleiter,
heading the civilian adminjstrdion, jn Czechoslovakia,l4
However, De Jong points out that in mmost of the cowtries she sur-
veyed, t-he German rninority was not strong or organized as an effective
politicd force. M a t most Nazi sympathizers in most c o t ~ ~ ~ t rdidi e swas
simpIy to talk loudy about their new belief and used Geman Nazi in-
sig"ia and figures in public as pofnts of identification. It needs to be
added that in such countries as Holland, Switzerland, and Britain, the
German groups, as such, simply dld not have legitimate grievances. Can-
sequently, Nazi organizations in these countries never acquked extensive
popular support. C)ne examfle is South Mrica, where the government ex-
posed and broke a Nazi organization.
Obviously, the Nazis were always interested in increasing tensions and
unrest in societies that ob~ectedto them, and so they always encouraged
subversive activities ai-nned at promothg such disintegrative processes,
The best case of this is Austria. It is quite clear that Kurt von
Schusehnigg" Ai?Lurian gover~nme~~t fell because of the systematic activ-
ity of a group of Nazis, headed a d supported by Berlin and Munich.
ism had a rathctr problematic empirical existence in
World War 11. As a conceptual propagmda tool, it was priceless,.At a time
of great anxiety and uncertajnw the idea that some sort of widespread
pclwerful secret conspiracy existed, wbose purpose was to disintegrate
countrks frorn withjn, k d hjdder~fears and was used to expla,in s m e
otherwise puzzIing phenomena (for example, the rapid collapse of
France). However, a careful examinaticm, country by country, for the exis-
tence of a fifih colurnn reveals a complex reality that. is not very support-
ive of the concept, As couXd be expected, fnllowing World War If, the term
slowly vanished frorn use. 'f'he main reason for this was probabty that
cptions (for cxamplc, Austria), no genzline widespread
actually existed, a realization that became quite clear
during the poritwar years.
It needs to be added t-hat the abovc conclusiorl is valid on:ly if cve take
the term. "fifth column" tto mean a well-organized cmspiratmial body, as
the tern originaily memt. If we reintevret the concept to denote a body of
sympathizers, then the term could be used to mean the faciljtation of
change from one political/cultural form to mother. Haweves, such a rein-
terpretation of the term, eliminating its origil~aiconspiratorial naturt~,
raises other difficutties. For example, what il a large part of the populalion
of a country-penly and publicly-befieves that the country slnould fol-
low a path that others object to7 What if others view this part of the popu-
lation as treacherous or as composh~ga fifth col~x~m? Clearly in a situa-
tion where a populatim is so badly split between different worldviews,
136 Vintalitzg Trrtsl and hyalty Durr'12g WurIcZ War 11: Part l

and one part decides to use the rhetoric of trcason to describe its disagree-
ment with dissenters (that is, to &legitimize oppcments as disloyal and
untrustworthy), the concept of fifllh columnism becornes completely in-
valid and useless, .An example that comes to mind is the accusation made
by so many in the Jewish Israeii political right (and religious right) that tbr
Israeli left is "treacherous" "(same have even used the term "fifth c~lumn"),
.As recently as Novmber 1939, accusations were made in Israel by some
ultra-Orthodox Jews that hnmigrmts from Russia to Israel constituted a
i & h colwm because they werc set on corrupting the country.

Collaboration
The delinition of the term ""cllaboration" is context dependent, In the
neutral sense of the term, it means cooperation, or harmonictus wmk and
effort. Many professional, academic, polj.tical, and economic teams "'col-
laborate." However, within the non-neutral context of a conflict, or war,
the term typically denotes something like "working with the other (cm-
emy) side" or helping occupyjng hrces.. Thus, the meaning of the term
depends on me%ppoit of view that is, on morality and on one" ppower to
enforce particdar moral intevretaticms.
For example, in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, what Israelis have de-
fined as ""PaI.estinian assistants,""in what map appear as a positively
charged jargon (suyfm in M r e w ) , were ~ f e r r e dto as despised ""collabo-
rators'"~ othcr I'alestinians. It is signiS'icant that even in Issaeli E-fcbrew
slang, such Palestinian coltaborators have been referred to as sht inkus,
meanrr7g '"hose who stinkH-clearly a negative rc-rferenct-1. Overall,
arotlnd 5,000 I'alesthian collaborators (mostly undercover) have helped
Israel in its occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, of whom around
1,200 have been murdered by other Pale~thims~15
Intelligance (poljce and military) colla,borators have a limit-rd lengCh of
operational life. After that, the organization that used them must shelter
them, sometimes for very long periods of t h e . The question of betrayal
arises at two poiints in the career of such col1;rboratars: the decision to col-
laborate and l& after the operational period ends.
CoIIaboration forces into sharp focus the issues of morality and power,
as well as those of trust and loyalty-their direction and violation. 81-
thou& there are different Qpes of collaboration, I shall continue by fa-
cusing on one of those types-dlaboration within the cmtext of a na-
tional conflict, which is an integral part of treason.

Background
The general back;mund in Europe after World War I was one of major
eccmomic crisis and st-radows of both cclmmunism and fascism looming
over the fand. This was a period of unrcst, unrertainv, confusion, and op-
portunity regarding changes to boundaries of morality. The ascent of
Hitler's National %cialism must be viebved wit-;hinthis context..'The Eu-
rope that Hitler was facing had quite a few fascist mwements, most of
whjch were rather sympathetic to him. Mussoli~~i's Italy and Franco's
Spain moved directly into fascist totalitarian social orders, Other caun-
tries had fascist movements, but not as strong. Thus, for yuite a few peo-
ple, t.he "choice" appeared to be between communism and fascism (or its
Nazi varimt).
Let" briefly review some of the key dates and events durirrg the period..
tlitler was appointed chancellor on fanuary 30, 1933. Following the
Reichstag fire on March 5, 1933, Germny went to Reiehstag electictns.
The Nazis won 288 uut of 647 deputies (44.5 percent). After consolidation
of Hitter's power, new elections in November gave the Nazis 93 percent
of the votes. In Mar& of 1936, Germany denolmced the Locarno Fact, and
German troops were sent to the mineland, In March of 1938, German
troops crossed the border i ~ ~Austria.
to September 29-30 witnessed the
pitiful and wretched appeaserne~~t attempt at Munich by French premier
Daladier and British prime minister Chamberlain to Hitler and Mus-
solinfJ6 I'he s p r i ~ ~ g summer of 1939 witnessed quite a few puhlic calls
and
to Hitler to avoid war, to no avail.
Germany attacked Poland m Septesnber 1,1939, and World War 11 be-
gan. Within a short period of time, Nazi Germany occupied and cm-
trolled much of Europe: Belgium surrendered in May 1940, France
yielded in June 1940, and Romania in October 1940, fln 1941 Germm
troops marched into Bulgaria (March), launched major offensives in
Pllorth Mrica, Yugosl,avia, and Greece (April), and on J w ~ 22,
e the victori-
ous Nazi Miehrmachf attacked the Soviet Union. German U-boats experi-
enced ml-tjor victories in the Atlantic, and Britain was heavily bombed
from the air, Until the summer of 1941, and following the hitial Nazi vic-
tories on the Russian f m t , Europe seemed to yield to Hitler. But FR 1943it
began to be clear, as the W-boats werr;, losing the Battle of the Atlantic,
Staijngrad was rcltaken bp Sovkt troops, and the Nazi M'mth Afsican cam-
paign was collapsing, that Nazi Germany was probably gohg to lose the
war. In June 19.24, follwing the landintgs of Allied forces in Normndy it
became obvious that Nazi Germany was loshg the war. 'The question
was, how tong before it wauld collapse completely, That happened in
May 1945.

The Meaning of Collabovation

Millions of peope were undcr Pllazi occmpa.t.ion between 1939 and 1,945,
and until 1943 it s e m d that the Nazis had a very strong grip over h-
rope. The Japanese irritiaf expansion in the Far East created a sometruhat
138 Vintalitzg Trrtsl and hyalty Durr'12g WurIcZ War 11: Part l

similar situation. Both German)i and. Japan controlled large areas and
popdations using relatively small military forces. How was that possi-
ble? Warmbruun (1943) suggests two major a causes for the swcess of
that control: (1)swift and decisive military defeats; m d (2) threats to use
violence and actual use of it. What was one supposed to do? HW was
one supposed to behave under one of the mast ruthless and racist
regimes to have ever existed on this planet?

Collaboration and resistance . . . are vague [terms] and defy precise defini-
tion; callaboratian could mean anything from volunteering for the Wlfen
S.S. to buying a picture pastcard of Marshal Pktain, likewise "resistance""
could be derailing an enemy troop-train or singing an obscene parody of
"Lilti Marlene'"! Qtitflejohn 2 972:336)

LittlejQhn's work is focused on those he termed "patriotic traitors" and

describes, in detail, collaborators with Nazi Germany in different Euro-
pean countries. However, it is important to note that the very same term
can easily be apflied to such individuals as Willy Krandc Malelne Diet-
rich, or Claus von Stauffenberg (discussed in later chapters). Jt is also im-
portant tcr note that :Nazi Cermmy was not thr only occupying force. Im-
perial Japan occupied large parts of Sout"rreastAsia and China, and Italy
controlled other parts in southern Europe and North Africa, Durtng the
war, and afterward, countries fell under the occupation of different Allied
count.ries, but more prornounced was the occupatian of many coun.t.riesby
Soviet troops.
Warmbruun points out that collaboration with the Nazi occupation in
E w p e assumed one of three forms.l7 First was "'voluntary collabora-
t h , " which meant embracing Nazi interests, for whatever reason, rang-
ing from such motkation as personal gain to politicaf identification with
Nationat Socialjsm. This position typically meant that m y parts of Ihe
orig4mal culture of the preoccupied state were washed away in favor oi
the Nazi culture as dictated by the Nazi masters. Warmbmun has no
doubt that this particular form of collaboratio~nis akin to treason. 9cond
was ""sbbmissim to German dcmands on the grounds of "superior force."""
Warmbruun finds this particular behavior to be unavoidable ""accommo-
dation," because not complying could man death. Cda:boration here
meant tlne mininlum necessary. Obviously "muperiar force" was not al-
ways deadly, and "acccmlmodation" could provide a cover for tbose who
were not willing to take even moderate risks. Thjrd was ""reasonabk col-
laboration," a position typically taken by administrators and justified on
the grounds of having ta protect and shield the population, or parts of it,
from the horrors of a brutal, occupation..Warmbruun is obviously weary
of this "wise guy" agproach. He points out that ""any collaboration with
the absolute evil represented by National Socialist principles, poficies,
and fnstitutions, backed up by the pcrice power of the totalitarian state,
was bound to corrode the good intentions of all cdaborating jndjviduals
or groups" "InJarmbrum1963:274).
t s the policy of 'keasmable cdaborationf%as
As he so wisdy p o i ~ ~out,
taken by the Jewish Goundls under Nazi occupatianflgand it Ied to self-
defeat and self-destruction. The Jews who operated those councils
thought they were dcrfng some good, perhaps even deluding themscrlwes
that they could save some Jcws..But that hope, given the Nazi Find Solu-
tion plan, was a vain one. While perhapmnot always fully aware of it,
many of these Jews simply pIayed a role for the Nazis by counseling other
Jews to st~bxnit,

In each occupied country the great majority of the population came to

terms with the reality of the occupation. . . . Most people, against their will,
were caught in a social system which of necessity continued to function un-
der the occupation, to some extent to the advantage of the German war
economlv,. . . Unw-ifling adjustment was the rule----intentionaI resistance
the exception.f"

'The pat-i;c.msof collaboration durjng Worid War II occurred in several

areas: political, militar~r,administrative, and economic, tn each of these
areas, helping the enemy assumed differcsnt depths and forms.20
CoUaboratim could mean the crossing of morat boundaries by violat-
ing precoltaboratjon trust and loyalty. And yet the content m d direction
of trust and loyalty are the main issues here. Without lietermhing their
naturel the meaning of colla,horatio~z(and it is printarily a m r a l mean-
ing) sirnply dissipates. Indeed, s m e of the most spectacuhr cases of trea-
son date to this period. Let us look at some.

Collaboration in Europe, 1939-1945

Adolf Hitler was appointed ChanceHor on January 30, 1933. From Chat
point in time, Nazi expansionism was only a mattcr of time and expedi-
ency As the Nazis conquered more territories, more people fell under
Nazi political, economic, military, and cultural hegemony and control.
The choices these people faced were few. Collaboration and resistance
were two general options, divided into numerous subcategories. Ques-
tims of resistmsc"' and collaborationf'2 and the way in which these op-
tions directly related to issues of trust, l o y a l t ~md. their violation, were
an almost daily ~ a t i t yfor people under occupation. Who or what was
one s~pposedto trust? To wfiom or to what did m e give loyalty? Let's eex-
arnine some of the possibilities.
140 Vintalitzg Trrtsl and hyalty Durr'12g WurIcZ War 11: Part l

Austria and Sqss-Inquart

The first country into which the Nazi Wehumncht marched was Austria
(March 12, 3938) in the process of the Anschltrss ('"ranion"') hetwem Nazi
Germany and Austria. That step follcrwed a lcmg history of Nazi aggrrs-
sion. First, on July 25, 1934, Austrim chancellor Engelbert Dolfuss was
murdered in the Chancellery h 7Jienna by Austrian Nazis who wanted
Austria to become a Nazi state. W e n t h i s did not work, Hitler ~ r e a t e n e d
the new chancellor-Kurt von khuschnigg-on March 1938, and de-
manded his resignation. The reason for this specific threat was that
Schuschnigg was p1 img a plebiscite m Austrian independence. Hitler
demanded that khusChnigg be replaced by an Atastrim Nazi-Arthur
Seyss-Inquart. This took place on March 11. FXowever, the plot became
even more interesthg when Nazi Herr~annGoering told Syss-Illquart to
send a cable to Germany demandjng the entry of the Nazi a r q into Aus-
tria to restore order. Indeed, Seyss-lnquart &eyed Ihe suggested guide-
lines, a d consequent@ units of the Wettntaadlt marcl-ted into Austria.
Seyss-Illquart, an e~nthusiastic-supporter of 'che Ai-lschlzrss and a longtime
devoted Nazi, became the Reich gvvernor of Austria.
Seyss-Inquart did not hide his Nazi sympathies or his political views.
His actions hclped to terminate Austrian independence, which Icd to Ihe
integration oi Austria with Nazi Germany. Seyss-Inquart remajned h oi-
fice until April 1939. Seyss-Inquart's career cclntkued, and from May 3940
mtiI 1,945 he was Reich comntissioner in the occupied Netherlands.
Among other actions, he was directly responsible for making the Nether-
lartdskconomy serve Germmy ~ c r u i t e dforced labor on the mapitude
of 5 milljon people who were sent to Germny, and was effective in Ihe
rounding up of Labout 117,000 Jews wbo were sent to their deaths in
Poland. He was a r ~ s t e din May 1945, tried at Nuremberg, found guilty of
war crimes, and hanged on October 16,1946.23
Was Seyss-fnquart an AustPian traitor? To answer this question one
must answer some other difficult questions. For example, how m y Aus-
trians actually supported the Anschllrss in 1938? If very m n y did, then
Seyss-Xnquart did nclt betray the trust and loyalty of many or even possi-
Zlly tbe majority of,Austrians. On the contrary Xlscr, if the aspiraticm to
unite Austria with Nazi Germmy was viebved as a positive and necessary
process, for the bcnefit of both countries, then the hvocatim of the label
"t~ason'" inthis case becomes very problematic. Was he lctyal to Austria?
Again, answering this question depends on. whether Austrians viewed
the Anschlzlss with Nazi Germany in 1938 as a positive or a negative step
and whether the Alzsclzluss can be perceived, ideologicaily, as a positive
pro"^^. The main reason Seyss-lnquart was kied (nnd convi,cted) as a
traitor was that h i s morality and politics were such that he gave up Aus-
tria" independence as a cultural, political, and social entity. However, it is
not too difficult to argue fiat Seyss-Inquart was loyal to the idea of an ex-
panded, htegrated Nazi Reichf m d so his behavior may have presented a
consistent patriotic motivation,

Czechoslovakia
The f i n i c h Pact (Sptember 29-31),1938), in MIhich Ex~glandand France
agreed that: Nazi Germany could acquire the Sudetenland, actually
meant the end. of Czechoslovakia as m independent state. It dld not take
long. Within a few months Nazi Germany took over the S u d e t e n l d ,
Poland seized a small border district, Slovakia became a vassal. German
state, and the leftovers of Bohemia and Moravia were occupied by the
Nazi military in March 1939, If citizens of Czechoslovakia, a d the Czech
p~""den,t,Eduard BeneA, viewed Western countries with scorn and sus-
picion and felt betrayed by both Enghnd and French, who can blame
them? In a hopdess policy of appeasement, French and Engfish politi-
crjans sacrificed the integrity of Czechodovakia, exposed its citizens to
Nazi rule, and.certainly did not ach-ieve the. goal they wanted-the pse-
vention of another world war. The Nazi occupation of Czechoslovakia
was relatively be11ig11; the Nazis felt that they could maximize economic
explojtatim and. squeeze more out of Czechoslovakia by using benign
means rather than by using harsh repression. Correspondingly, resis-
tance to Nazi occupat-ion was not very strong, at least not until the 1940%
The most notable act of resistance was the assassination of Reinhard
Heydrich (May 27, 1942) by Free Czech agents (trained in Ex~glmdand
pamachut.ed into Czechoslovakia for the task). His dealh, a week later, re-
sulted in the Nazi massacres and destruction of the villages of Lidire
(June 9,1942) and Lezaky.
Folfowlng the November 1938 Munich Pact, Eduard BeneB resigned his
post as president.24 His successor was Ernil Hacha. Put under bmtat, pres-
sure in Berlin, sixty-seven years old, and in poor health, Ilaeha s i p e d a
surrender document in Mar& 1939. i2Ithough he continued to serve as
the nomisral head of state of what was left of Czechoslovakia, the state
was actually managed by its Nazi rulers." Mastny points out: that
Czechoslovakia was Nazi Germany's first conquest m d remained u ~ ~ d e r
Nazi rule the longest time, Ui~derpleas from Emil Hacha" government,
Czechs were asked to refrain from acts of resistance. However, the assas-
sination of Heydrich (ordered by the C,ondon-based BeneA) unleashed a
campaign of terror by the Nazis, Mashy claims that by 1942 the Nazis
had sirtlply crushed the Czechs popuiar will to resist, a situation that re-
mained in effect u11ti.l the end of the war, and that ""at no time did the
Czechs challenge the Nazis with a significant resistance movement."'""
142 Vintalitzg Trrtsl and hyalty Durr'12g WurIcZ War 11: Part l

It is difficult not to ask whether Hacha was a traitor and thus examhe
what some view as his tragic rde. He was sympathetic to Nazi G e r m y
before Ihe N'azi occupation of Czechoslovakia, urged his people to sup-
port the n i r d Reich, and expressed satisfaction and joy at Germay's vic-
tory over Frmce.27 Al-thtrugh he was arrested after the war and died in
p"son kvaithg for his trial on charges of col1ahnrati.on and treaso~~ (Jwne
27,19451, it is clear that he tried. his best to keep as much of what was left
of his country intact and independent. However, that task was bopeless
under Nazi rule. mough not as powerful and strong as Vichy's P&tain,
Ilacha was cast into a somewhat similar position." It is noteworthy thctt
the collaboration of the Czechs was very useful for the Nazis. In 1941, for
example, Czech industry provided about 30 percent of German armor, 40
percent of its automatic weapons, and close to one-third of its trucks, Ob-
wiousiy, there were s w e good reasons for the relatiwely benign treatment
of Czechoslovakia by the Nazis. Nevertheless, close to 70,000 Czech Jews
were sent to their dcaths,29 and close to 35C),OO Czechs perished as a re-
s d t of Nazi occupation+^^
MacDonald and K a p m provide an illustrative descriptim of life u d e r
Nazi occupation in Czechoslovakia. For example, in January 1941 the
BBC called people under Nazi occupation to mark the letter "V" m walls
as a sign for "vicbory-" Compliance of people in Prague was enthusiastic
because this behavios offered a fnrm of resjstance and a marking of moral
boundaries in a way that did not pmvoke bloody reprisals. Moreover, the
campaign was very sz-lccessful throughout Europe until the Germans
themseIves adopted this s i p . In the summer of 1941 Prague was flooded
with huge 'V signs-n walls, Locomotives, and bulletin boards. Ger-
mans used the sign to proclaim faith in G e r m victory.31
Two possible cases of betrayal may be exmjned. in the Czech context.
One was durkg the Sudetenland crisis. a r k g that crisis, which began to
heat up durhg April 1938, Konsad He~~leh-headof the German Sude-
ten party in reality a Nazi party-caffed. for autonomy for his people.
tlenlein's politicd agitation was very useful for Nazi Germany and
played directly into Hitler's expansionist inte~~tions. Although by %p-
ternher 15, 1938, the Czech government had the agitation under control,
and Henlein Red to Germmy, the Munich Pact voided that control. Fol-
lowing the Munich Pact, Henlein was appointed the Gauleiter of the
Sudetenlmd in Octuber 1938. The fact is that he exercised little power,
and many of his supporters were kilkd by the Nazis. In I945 Henlein
committed suicide whj.le in an Allied internmelnt camp.
The other case occurrcd follwing the Nazi mcupatioan of Czechoslava-
kia when a Local Czech political organizaticm was allowed to exist-fie
National Cooperation-headed by the Czech fascist General Rudolf
Gajda. Cwld Gajda and Henlein be considered traitors? Indeed, they as-
sisted in the disintegration of their corntry and participated in a process
that meant the end of Czech independence and srtbjugation to Nazi Ger-
many. Fmrn this pojnt of view, they indeed vi,olated the basic trust and
loyal.ty beween citizens and their corntsy. However, both were also cam-
rnitted fascist Nazis and &ought that their ccnantrfs genuine good future
was with. Nazi Germany, and their actions were based on that belief. mey
trusted, and were loyal to, Nazi Germany and they displayed their pref-
erc.nce in public. 1t is interesting to note that at the ertd of World War 11,
Czechnslovakia regained the Sudetenland, and under the terms of the
Potsdam Allied Agreements (July-August 1945), the Sudetenland Ger-
man popdation was expelled.

Hitler invaded Poland on September 1, 1939. Nazi rule of Poland was

ruthless, Overall, no major ideological collaboration by Poles is docu-
mented (altlnoul;h the invading Nazi Wehn~luchtwas assisted by diffewnt
individuals). Indeed, no political or ideological supportkg Polish group
existed for the Nazis. Howeves, as the Nazis-brutal occupation devet-
oped, some forced forms of limited collaboration took place, especially in
con cent ratio^^ camps and Jewish ghettos..In return for more controt, even
if sometimes for a limited period of t h e , there were those willhg to serve
as Kapos (""trustees") or Saaci'rrkmr~1~nd~t (participants in the extermina-
tion process inNazi conee~~tration camps). The fride~zrafkvas the comcil of
Jews set up as the sellf-governing body of the various gfnettos constructed
by tbr Nazis in occupkd Eastern Europe." Jewish mernbers in Judenrats
had complex motives to collaborate with Cheir torturers and executioners.
Some thought they could save themelves and their families; others
thought that they could s-ve the communit,v and he%pit survive, Retro-
spectively, it is obvious that the Nazis used the Jzrdenraks to achieve better
control and exploitation of the local Jewish population; hence, servirrg in
a Jude~zrafwas a blocked exit that, in most cases, led nowhere.
It is worth noting that many Potes we= mobilized by t-he Sovkts to ei-
ther fight the Nazis under Soviet command or join cadres of communists
in prepation for a Polish communist regime. Many other Poles, defh7ing
themselves as patriotic, viewed these steps as collaborative and treason-
able because they were putting what they viewed as genuine Polish na-
timai interests in secmd or third place. One needs to be reminded at this
point that Stalin managed to lurc most mmbers of the Polish Communist
Party into the Soviet tinion in 1938, where they we= all murdered. More-
over, carried out by direct orders of Stalh and the Soviet Politbura, Soviet
NKVO personnel m a s s a e ~ dmore than 4,000 Palish officers in t-he Katyn
forest near Smalensk. These vile mass murders took place probably in
144 Vintalitzg Trrtsl and hyalty Durr'12g WurIcZ War 11: Part l

.April and early May of 1940.3"ose Polish dficers were among 180,000
other Polish prisoners of war who fell into the hands of the Red A r y
during the Nazi-Soviet partition of P d m d in 1939.3"ese murders, ob-
viously, raise some interesting questions of trust and loyalty between
Poland and the Soviet Ul~ionunder Stalin,

Pllazi G e r m y ' s Weftmrachtdewloped a successful d i t a r y attack west-

ward in the spring of 1940, conquering first Denmark and Norway
(April), and then continuing going through the Arcjennes invading and
conquering B d g i m , the Netherlands, and Luxel-Rbourg ( M a y ) , and
France (June).The defeat of France in the summer was followed by a Nazi
inwasion and occupation of the Ch el Islands. This swifl military move
put several Western E u r o p m conntries under fttll Nazi control. Sud-
denly, issues of collaboration and resistance became an everyday realit).
for millions of Western Europeans. The experiences of the Poles m d the
Czechs provide some clues to what was about to transpire.

Denmark
Two Nazi German djvisions invaded Denmark on April 9, 19it0, Capen-
hagm was taken within twelve hours, and Denmark accepted the Nazi
cxcupation. Denmark was not the target of the German military move,
but controlling Clensnark was crucial for the German military campaign
against Norway.
The Dmish gover ent was alilowed to mainta,in parts of its powers,
and such osganizations as the police, courts, and even the laws were re-
tained. Even a downsized Uanish army was allowed to exist. Clearly, the
Danes wanted to keep as much of: the country's administratim as possi-
bfe in Danish hands, and a national coalition was formed fcrr that pur-
pose. b r such a policy to succeed, the Gemans had to be persuaded that
a genuine coclperatio~~existed. It did, for a long time (1940-1943). 011the
other hand, it was expected by the Danes that the German interference in
Denmark's internal affairs would be m h h a l . It was not. The Germans
kept dentmding military equipme~~t, removal of ministers, and so on. To
prevent a compulsory conscription to the army, about 100,000 Danish
workers were required to go to Gemany. bliowing the Nazi invasion of
the Soviet Union, the Danish Communist Party was banned, and the
Danes had to agree to the recruit.m.ent of the so-called Danish Free C o v s
to patkipate in the war effort. &tit 1943, most of the Danish population
seemed to have supported a po:[icy clf collaboration in =turn for litnited
independence.
 AIthough a small Dani.sh Nazi party existed in Denmark even beforc
the German iwasion and occupation of the country, it must be noted that
many Danish diplomats outside Denmark supported the Allies, Such
Danish territories as Greenlmd, Iceland, and the Faeroe Islasrds became
available to Allied forces, and lrhe Danish merchant fleet sailed to Allied
ports and heiped the Allied war effort. The I>anish colla,hmation with Ihe
Nazis was strained.
As the German demancis on the Danish eccmamy grew and military
losses for the Nazis increased, Danes became mare defiant. h 1943strikes
occurred, m under;gmund Freedom C o r n 3 was created, and when anti-
Semitic laws were introduced (October 19$3), most of the country's 8,1100
Jews had already been moved to n e ~ ~ t rSweden.
al In response, the Nazis
tightened their totalitarian grip on Denmark. By 1944 the Nazi occupation
of Denmark resembled the occupation in other areas, and much of the
Danish independence was withdrawn. Danish resistance grew day by
day, thrking on the lack of inner factions, m d was ready fnr a full-scale
rebellion. That became umecessary when the German military surren-
dered an May 5,1945,35
The nature of the Dcanish collaboration with the Nazis is interesting,
The thecrrtrltical trade-off was ""cllaboration" for "limikd independence."
For a \zrhile, this poiicy worked as cxpected and apparently mjoycd pop-
ular support. Thus, the use of the term "ttreason" in this particular context
may be inappropriate because violation of the trust and loyalv of most of
the Danish pop~~1atio11 cannot be established.
After the war, 14,(MO prison sentences were given to Danes accused of
collaborating with the Nazis (that is, &out 374 Danes out of every 100,000
WC"= jailed for this offease). Demark also carried out twenty-three out of
forty-six death sentmccs it passed against collaborators.36

Norway and Quisling

Imediately following the Nazi incursion into Denmark, Germany at-
tacked Norway (on the same date, April 9,194Q),which was the principal
goal, of their mititar). move (operation "lnJeser Exescise"). The major =a-
sans were the need for Swedish iron ore, raw materials from Scandinavia,
and strategically located bases for both Nazi submarines and aircraft,
which were used against Allied convoys and naval shipping, Moreover,
Nazi idedogy viewed Norwegians as a ~ l a t e but d wayward Nordic tribe
that needed Nazi-guided persunsicm to return to its proper place-the
Nazi Third Reich.
Following a military effort that tcrok the Germans two months to c m -
plete, they occupied thc whole corntry. The Norwegians, Gded by British
and other forces, fought valiantly, causing the VVehr~ac/ft very serious ca-
146 Vintalitzg Trrtsl and hyalty Durr'12g WurIcZ War 11: Part l

sualties and losses (especially to the German Kriegsmari~ze).King Haakm

VII and the Norwegian royal family, the cabinet, and many members of
parliament were able to escape to the United Kingdom Uune 7). There
they established a govcmmnt in exile, but not before rejecting the Nazi
demand for the establishment of a Norwegim Nazi gave
by Norway's Nazi-Vidkul-r Quisling.
Norwegians did, not follow the Danish case, and Nazi rule was never
accepted. Resistance to the Nazis began to be organized after the inva-
sion. However, the realization that freedom from the Nazi yoke could
only be achieved once the Germans lost the war and surrendered dictated.
a restrained stnrggle. That struggle was difficult because, among other
thirrgs, Nazi agents had penetrated underground groups.
Che of the more spectacular series of sabotage acts of the Norwegiian
resistance was the contirruous action against a beavy water plant.37 First
actim was s~~pposed to be carried out by pmachuted British enginews
and aided by Noswegian Special Operations Executive (S.O.E.) agents in
October-Novembele 1942 (the failed "Vemork raidU).38Second was the
February 28, 1,943, sabotage of the plant by Mrwegian S.Q.E. agents,
which was successful only in slowing production, not stopping it com-
pletely An unsuccessful air raid on the plant took place m November 16,
1,943, by 140 bontbers of the Bonnber Command (UStAir Force 8th Divi-
sion in Britain). This raid prompted the Germans to transfer the large
stoclipile of about folarteen tons of heavy water manufactured by the
Norsk Hydro Hydrogen Electrolysis plant at Vemork to Germany. On
Sundaqr.Fehruar). 11?0,1944,the Noswegian ferry Hyduu, carrying the entire
heavy water stockpile, was sabotaged (with explosive charges) by S.0.E.
agelrts and sunk to the bottom of L& Tnnsjoc, one ol Europe's deepest
lakes.3"
N o w a y was liberated on May 8,1945. Its p ~ w gowe a
on May 31, and King Haakon returned on June 7.40
The Nazi occupation of Norway was the context fnr one of the most no-
torious of traitors: Vidkun Quisling. Quisfirtg was born in B87 in Fyres-
dal (located in the west-central part of the province of TeXernark), Nor-
way. His father, Jon Laurits, served as both a pastor and a state
bureaucrat. His mothrr, Anna Carolhe, was fifteen years younger than
his father. The couple had four chjldre~zand placed a strong emphasis on
educaticm. Consevently, all four children received the equivalent of a
university education.
atisling showed m early hterest i,n history, abstract ideas, and some
mystjcism, as well as a national zeal. He entered. the War College in Sep-
tember 1905 and graduatd from that c d e g e in 1908 as a lieutenant in
field artiuery, first in his class, Following a short break i,n his mililary ca-
reer to earn some money as a teacher, he returned to it in 1909 and en-
rolled in the Miiitar). Academy He gracluated from that academy in 1911,
again first in his class fin fact, he eanwd the highest grade ever granted by
the academy). X'olfokving this spletndjd carczer, @is)i,ng became a junior
member withh the Norwegian General Staff. He not only served in head-
quartcrs but experienced some field co ands as well. &ring a tour of
du,ty as an artitkry off-icer, he was p r m ~ t e dto captain, and in 1918 he
was p m o t e d to adjutant, @isling% path up to this point indicated &at
he was settling into the b q and monotonous cart_.= of a military officer.
Indications are that- his style of comrnand was kind, and he was highly
respected.
The Norwegian m i l i t v assigned Quisling to study Emperid Russia
m d to determir.~its military capabaities. Me was able to fulfll this task,
with a deep irnmrsim into Russian culltare, and so vast was his knowl-
edge t-hat when t-he post of military attach4 became availa:ble in Russia in
1918, he was appointed to it, However, the political instability in Russia
was such that he served there from mly April to December 1918; when he
=turned to Norway he wap; appointed to a two-year tour of duty in Fin-
land. Having completed this mission, he returned to Norway and then
went agah to Russia, this time as part of Fridt-jof Nanseds mission of re-
lief @ringingfood) to Russia. Zn Russia he met and married his first wife
(Alexmdra, irn August 1922). Because he overstayed in Russia, his mili-
tary career was interrupted, and he was dismissed from the Gcneral Staff
in August 1923. Then he met and secretly married his secmd wife (Maria,
September 10, 1923) before-. divorcing his fist wife (no record of the di-
vorce exists). After a period of travel, Quishg =turned to hssia, where
he apparently learned to despise communism. In 1929 he returned to
Norway. Havir-tgbeen m a y for so many years, hc had to carve hjmself a
new niche in Norway.
Quislirtg chose to begin a politicai career within the sphere of radical
conservatism of the early 1930s-That- ailiance kvolllid gradztalXy take hi+n
into political networks that would p ~ s e n and t prmotc the Norwegian
version of fascism and, later, Nazism. He started by assuming some cen-
tral positims in the N'orwegim Nordic Folk-Rising Party.
:In 1931, a political crisis engdfed Paorway, the g a v e m e a t resigned,
and a new mir~oritygove ent was created, headed by Pedar Kolstad.
h l s t a d , who was leading the Agrarian Party into assuming power,
lacked good candidates for varinus positions FR the new government, It
was suggested that Vidkun Quisling was a dependable and wlrrthy can-
didate for the position of minister of defense. Kolstad accepted the recnm-
mendation. Thus, on May 12, 1931, Quislixrg became Norway" mminister
of defense. Wth this appointment, he left his previous party and joined
the conservative Agrarim Party Although Quislhg" te~nureas the mhis-
ter of defense showed his competency as a capabfe day-to-day adminis-
148 Vintalitzg Trrtsl and hyalty Durr'12g WurIcZ War 11: Part l

trator, it was also dotted with various political controversies and codicts.
Quisling did not hide his moral, political, or ideological views, and he
tried to expand the power of his position. Evezztually, an March 3, 1933,
@isling was forced to resign. His main achievements were the crctation
of a state militia ( k i d e ~ g r zand
) his rise from rczlativr anonymiy to one of
Norway" recognized (md controversial) figures,
After resigning as minister of defense, Quisling formed in 1933 the
Nasjonai Sading (N.5.-National Unilrn Party), over which he had com-
plete control. The N.S. emphasis on nationalism was attractive to some
young people, and its antilabor stands attracted some support from busi-
ness people. Morwer, Quislhg and the N.S. never hid their affhity and
adnniration for Nazi Germany (and fascist Italy). Mast N.S. supporters
were young and joined for ideological reasons; others simply believed
and admired Quisling perscrnatly. Hwever, the party did not attract
many supporters and did, wry poorly in the 1933election. Nationally, Ihe
Nasjonal Smling

gained 27,850 -\rotesout of a total of 1,248,686 cast, amounting to 2.23 percent:

of the electorate. Of the N.S. votes, 14,942 came from the rural districts and
12,908 from the towns, which respectiriely was 1.76 pel-cent and 3.21 percent
of the total in the rural and urban divisions of the electorate.4'

Following the 1933 election, the N.S. made some changes to its plat-
.form, the most siwiffcant of which was a gradual transition between 1934
and 1936 to fascism, both in ideology and in adoptLng @pica1&zi-i-like
external s i p s (wjl7gthe Nazi salutre from 1934, and ~ f e r r i n gto Quislinl;
as the parfiJ@ret.r,or simply as the Fgrer, meaning the leader)>"
The 1936 election put the N.S. to a real test of power, the test of a basi-
c d y nondemocratic party ccrmpethg for power within a democratic
framework. Quisling gradlaally fmused his antagonism on the demcxratic
system itself, and by doing that d o m e d the N.S. and himself to a mar-
ginal role in a poputatim that embraced demwraey. ong other things,
s o m N-S. meetings were the scelles of violent: clashes.43
The general election took place on October 1936, and the N.S. won
only X,S77 votes ( t h t is, less than in fie 1933Action in absolute terms).
The N.S. vote declined .from 2.23 p e ~ e nof t the total vote in the 1933elec-
tion to 1.83 percent in 1936. The derlis\e in rural areas was from 1.76 per-
cent in 1933 to 1.4 percent in 1936 (a dmp from 14,942 to 14,Ef votes) and
in urban arws kom 3.21 percent to 2.74 perce~ztfa, drop from 12,908 to
12,426 votes). The N.S. was clearly losjng supgost.4 The drop FR support
and populaity had its impact m the N.S., and in 1936-1937 it exgeri-
enced cfisintegration and gradually turned into kvhat Hoidal refers to as a
margirral sect." Consequently, during 1937-1W3, &is&% begm to turn
more of his attenticm to Nazi Germany.
 Quisling's first contacts with the German Nazi Party had been made in
the early 1930s. In 1934 the head of the Scmdinavim desk of the Nazi
Partvs office for foreign affairs (headed by Mrcrd Roscnbergl-Thilo vctn
Trotha-visited Norwa)i and attended the annual meeting of the N.S. in
Stiklested." h e Nazis, however, wew fuliy knowledgeable about the dis-
integratim and insigrlificance of the MS., and they were not too enthusi-
astic about either Quisling or the N.S. tn 1933 Quisljtng sent congratula-
tory cables to both Franco in Spain (February 28, 1939) and Hitler (April
20,1939). Hitler was referred to as a ""hro." A lower clerk for Frmco ac-
knowledged receipt of the message, but Hitler never responded." The
Nazi attitude toward Quisling and the N.S. was clearly illformed and am-
bivalent. Mowever, this amt?ivalence did not prevent the Nazis from sup-
porting @isling, or Hitler from meeting hixn.4"
The main reasan for these contradictions and zigzags was that although
the Nazi foreip office had a realistic evaluatim of Q~zisli~~g's m r g k a l po-
sition, Hitler either lii.Ked him or thought that something could be gained
from Quishg. In fact, during their first meetings, one of the topics they
discussed was Germmy-Norway cooperation. It is clear that h that meet-
ing Quisling presented to FXitkr his plans fclr a pro-Nazi coup in Norway
Quisling was interested in politjcal cotzperatiltn and in Ncrrway becoming
an indegerrdel~tpro-Nazi state within a Nazi German federation. AI-
fiough E-fjAlcr delayed his response to W s l h g " hitiatke, the Nazis we=
v i c k to trandate Quishg" ?;&tic& aspirations into practical mititary
terns. 'They were h the process of pl k g their offensive to hvade and
conquer Norway#and they recognized that Quisling cou%d,be useful.
Wen the legitimate Norwegian gwernment left Norway followhg the
Pllazi invasi.on of April 9,1940, Quisling announced 811 t%le radjo that he
had become both the prime minister and foreip minister and was head-
ing a national government. That government was headed by a man who
had failed in two elections and was certainly pro-Nazi However, the
Nazis remined ambivalent, On April 15,1940, wit-hin a week of the inva-
sion, they dismissed him because-among other things-he could not
maiintain a stable governmelrt and he attracted too much hostility. Instead
of QQuisling's national government, an Administrative Council was crc-
ated, and Nazi Germany appointed a Reichkrtmrszissnu to rule the con-
quered country-Josef Terboven.
nrboven, a bank clerk by profession and a party official in the Rhine
prowince, was summoned to Hitler's office cm April 19 and told &at he
was to becom t-he chief Nazi admiaistrator in Nmway, effective April 24,
1940, Terboven was to administer Norway brutally, cruell~u;and ruth-
lessly, as ordered by Hitler, until the end of WorId War ZX, On May 8,1945,
Terboven committed suicide in Norway.49
Of course, @isling was su& a true believer that he never gave up. His
politicai aspirations created a cl-zrcmictension between him and 'lefboven.
150 Viotalitzg Trrtsl and hyalty Durr'lfg WurIcZ War 11: Part l

Quisfirzg ir-z unqorm nC Fsis desk, Movetnbet 1940.

50U136E: Reprinfedfrom Oddvor K. S-loidaI,Quisling: A Study in Treasrrm
Press, 1989). Phofogmplz by tlze Marzuegl;nn News Agency.
(Oslo:Norwegian U~ziz?ersi'fy

Moreover, Quisling wanted. to expand the membership of the N.S., nego-

tiate more &dependence fnr Norway, and shape Norcvegian society to fil:
his fascist, radst, and anti-Semitic ideas. Followjng the Nazi conquest of
Norway and.the banning of all other political parties, the N.S. enjoyed
eccmomic prosperity (due largely to the confiscation of the property of
other parties). The nckv h d s it acqrxired were used to rebuild the party.
Numhers were important for @isling because the Nazis responded to
his eteman& for more power by poifiting out that suppod for him was
meager. Mowever, rnernbershir in the N.S. grekv steadily and the party
membership reached its peak in the fall. of 1943 with morc than 43,000
members. Hoidal estimates that membershig in the N.S., including its
youth movemetnt, approximated bF),Ol)(f.= However, in 1941 it was obvi-
ous that despite all efforts, the gap between the N.S. and the majorit). of
Norwegians was too great tc:,bridge. Hoidal, puzzled by the poor support
Quislhg won, suggests that

Quisling's failure to attract a mass membership was largely due, in the final
analysis, to the ~ ~ b v i fact s he was perceived as a collaborator. He was
~ u that
directly associated with the power that had deprived N o w a y of its saver-
 eipty. His insistence that he was carrying out a carnpaip to win back inde-
pendence tzrithin a greater Germanic federation was disregarded as inronse-
quential prcypaganda by the ovem-helming majsriq.
The public" svew of him as a traitorous canspiratc>rbecame even stmnger
as the arcupation progressed because af his ads. To prove to the Germans
that he deserved to be trusted as the head of government, he assisted their
war efhrt by taking part in the formatian of NoweGan military units, re-
cruited to fight on Germany" bbehalf.51
. . . The o>vem-helmingmajority of the pclopte regarded their opposition to
N.S. as a fight against evil, . . . N.S. was further weakened by its inability to
a"tract influential people into its ranks.'"

:In February 1942, Quisllng was appointed minister president of Nor-

way*This move gave the false impreskn that Noway had gained some
independence, with Quisling heading a new government- However,
@isling and his government were totally under the command of Ter-
boven. Quisling's attempts to expand his sphere of influence over Nor-
way werc unsuccessM.,Co~zsquentiy,durhg late 1,942 and throtlghont:
1343, he tried to achieve g ~ a t e control,
r through tighter collaboration
with Nazi Gemany, helping its war effort." Hwever, his mobilization
efforts fajled. C o q l e t e failure and collapse developed h 1,945.
Quisling surrendered himself to the police on May 9, 1945, He was
charged with treason because of his activities, which included the
usurpation of governme~ztalpower, attempts to mobilize Norwegians,
orders to cease rclsistance to the Mazis, and attempts to bring Nomay
under fowign rule. Negotiations tcrok place, and a trial followed. Quis-
ling responded to the charges by staf.ing that he was not gujlty, and he
denied some of the obvious cbarges. Those denials were cmtrary to the
facts that w r e presented to the court (for example, conspirhg with
Hitler and Raeder to place Norway under Nazi rule; getting fu~zdsfrom
the Nazis; helping the Nazis during the occupation). The court decided
that Quisling was guilty on charges of betraying his country (September
10, 1,945), and hc was sentenced to death. Art appeal to l.hc Supreme
Colnrt was rejected, and. a mercy plea (by his wife, Maria) was rejected.
tle was executed m Octcrber 24,1945,2:40 AM., in Akershus Castle by a
firing squad of ten men. Quisling maintained, even minutes before his
execution, that he was innocent.54 In fact, in his defense testimony he
stated, "lf my activity has been trc-rason . . . then :l wish to God for Nor-
way" sake that a goad many of Norway's sons would became traitors
like me, only that they be not thrown into jail."55 Clearly, although the
large majority of Norvvegians wiewed him as a traittlr, he most certair11.y
viewed hirnsPf as a genuine patriot Mlith an inspired vision for the fu-
ture of Norway,
152 Vintalitzg Trrtsl and hyalty Durr'12g WurIcZ War 11: Part l

C:harges of collabomtion and treason did not end, with the execution of
Quislirrg. Almost 93r00C)individuals suspected of being comected to the
NS.were illvcstigatd. They jncludcd nnt just N-S. mclntbers but non-N.5,
collaborators as well, Abrsut half were either found not guilw or not brought
to bid. AIt;hou& 46,085 Norwegians were fomd H l t y most wert, passive
NS.members who received penalties ranging from Hnes to deprivation of:
civil rights for limited periods. &out 18,000 people were hprisoned., By
1948 onb 3,2W remahed in prison," Of every 100,WQNorwegims, 633
werc in pis011 for charges of coliaboratiol1,~7and of the thirty Norwegians
who werc sentenced to death,hiventyfive werc actually executed."
A1:hough Quisling is constructed as a genuine traitor, his treason has
problelxatic aspeds..He ide~~tified with Nazi Germany m d believed that
:Norway should. be an independent state within a German-dominated
federaticm. He did everything in his power to realize this end by collabo-
rating with, the Natzis- Uflfortmately fol. him, very few Norwegims were
wilahg to embrace his '"vision," which, so m n y of them, apparently, con-
sietered a frightfut nightmare. It was that; inconsistmt and deceptive for
Qlljsling to deny at hjs trial the obvious facts djsclosing his inti,mal.e rela-
tions, conspiracies, and collaboration with the Nazis.59

Nazi G e m m y began its offensive in Wstern Europe (code-named /'Fall

C;elbm")0011 May 10,1940. Dri-vhg an awesome military war machine con-
sisting of 119 divisions (plus another Went).-three later in the operation)
through the Ardennes, it managed to bring about the collapse of the
French military withh a month. hlong the way, Chc Nazi Wehmcrcht in-
vaded, three neutral countries: Luxembourg, Belgium, and the Nether-
lartds. Issues of cupa at ion, collaboration, and ~sistancebecame an irn-
mediate m d day-to-day reality in these coulztnies.

Luxembourg
The tiny country of Luxembourg, with a population of close to 300,000
people, was occupied by the:Nazis on h'lay 10. The ruling family a d g w -
ernment escaped to England where they formd a government in exile,
Although most Luxembourgians did. not welcome the Nazis, about 2,000
joi~~edthe German military. After the war, about 10,001) Luxembourgians
faced charges of colla,boration wjth the Nazis.61

In terms of collaboration, the picture in Belgium was different, Despite

initial military ~sistance,Belgium surrendered on M a y 28. King Lkopold
negotjated the surrender, after which he retired to his palace until 'June
1944. It is clear that the Belgian king negotiated with the Nazis (including
a N o v d e r 19 meethg with Hitler) inthe hope of gaining some sort of a
political settlement for his country. Mopold viewed the Belgian govern-
ment in exile (in Londcm) with scorn and regarded them as "traiton;."
Germany mnexed twn Belgian cantons, and the rest of Relgim was con-
trolled by the Nazi militar). machine, headed by General Alexander von
FalkeAausen, until June 15644. 11%fact, von Falkenhausen left the actual
dedsionmaking and rule of Belgium to Eggast:Reeder; who was the presi-
dent of the military admbistration,
During the German occupation of Belgium, there emerged pro-
German groups that identified with Pllazi goals m d ideolaa and sought
integration into Hitler's Third Reich. Two of these groups, and their
leaders, are well worth noting. One group developed in Ffanders, the
Vlaams Nationaal Verband, or National Flemish Front (V.N.V.), headed
by Staf de Clercq, and later by Hendrik Elias. By 1940 this group was al-
ready a close ally of the Nazis. Consequently quite a few members of the
V.N.V. were given intportmt positions in both local and central govern-
ment, Moreovet V-I"d.V. members served in the Nazi was machine in Bel-
gium and on the eastern front. A second group, the Nazi-sympathizing
Rexist movement headed by L6on Degrelle, developed in Francophone
Belgium. At first the Nazi Wehr~~lacht neglected Clegmlle; however, after
Oegmlle c ~ a t e dthe Lkgion Waiictnie, and that legion fougl~tcm the east-
ern kont with some distinction, l.he group quicky becam close to the
S.S. withjn Belgium.a
e born in 1906 in Bouillon, Belgiurn. At a very early stage in
D e g ~ l l was
his life, he was influenced by Charles Maurras, a French nationnlist. De-
grellc became convinced that lawf order, and monarchy werc the most
crucial factors for a nation. Hwever, he did not stop them; his beliefs
werc also atigned with Nazi ideas of racial "purity" and anti-Semitism. In
1930 he established the Rexist movement, which was a Belgian fascist
group modeled after MussolinYs Italian movement and which irnitated
is quoted as having said, "If
Pllazi tactics, Hitler, flattered by the imitatio~~,
I had a son, I woutd want hirn to be like ClegreIle."'" Much like the Nor-
wegian case of Quisling, Belgims were not very impressed with Degrelle
or Wjlh the Nazi f i r e r ' s compliments on his behalf. Degrelle lost Che cm-
cial election of February 1937. The Nazi occupation of Bclgiurn in 1940
b~atl-rednew life into Degwlle. He was revived politically and culturaily.
me11 he joi,ned the forces of the M o o n legion to fight on the eastern
front, Degrelle gained consjderable respect in the eyes of the Nazis. Out
of an original fnrce of about 850 men, only three srtrwived three years of
fighting. In 1943 Degrelle negotiated the transfer of Che legion to the Nazi
Waffen SS,,and he was awardted several military decorations, induding
the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves.@
154 Vintalitzg Trrtsl and hyalty Durr'12g WurIcZ War 11: Part l

In 1945 Degrelle escaped to Spain. A Belgian h i e court sentmced hlrn

to death (in absent* on charges of treason. Degrelle went to Argentha in
1946 but later returned to Madrid. A television interview he granted in
.April 1973 to a Dutch ch et rcvealed that he regretted nothing. Among
other things, he is reputed to have stated, '(1 am only s o r v I diein't suc-
ceed, but. if I had the chance, I kvolllid do it all again,but much more force-
kLxlIym@ Degrelle died in Spain in 1994.
Much like Quisling, Degrelle was attracted to a fascist, pro-Nazi ideol-
o g early in his life. He never co~~cealed his political m d ideological sym-
pathies, and when the Nazis conquered Belgium he felt that there was a
gdden opportunity to actudize some fascist and racist dreams he had
been harboring for a long time. Like Quisljng, he failed the free democratic
test of elections by the people of his country Whereas @isling served as
his country's minfster of dcfense prior to the Nazi conquest, Degrelle
nevcr rcf.a&ed such a fiigh positio~~. However, judging by the decorations
he received, Degrelle must h v e been a courageous indi:vibuaX,
R must be d d e d &at the fascist mwernent bad. contempt for conven-
tional dections. Elections were vkcved as a barricr to the authority of the
fascist movernmt itself. Thus, those who were not too enthusiastic about
fascist movements in ~ g u l aekctions
r were seen as needing correctim or
deansing Tram the influelnce of what wati referred to "bad and hosti,le ele-
ments." F m the fascht paint of view a lack of support in conventioml
elections, while mfortunate, was not taken as a major ideological obstacle.
After the war, Belgians arrcsted bctweem 50,000 and 60,000 of their ocvn
people on charges of treason; 596 of every I.U0,000 Belgians were inprison
on charges of cotlaboratim, and '"Belgium p n o u m e d the death penalty
on 4,170 peopfc, of tvvhonn 230 were executed."~~

The Nazi W e h m c h f invaded. the Nethedands on May 10,1940. Follow@

the heavy bombarclment of Amsterdam cm M a y 14, the &tch surrendertld
the same day. seen Wlhelmha fled to EngXmd, and a govemme1"l in ex-
ile was formed in London, The Nazis viewed the Dutch as descendmts of
an hryan rare, in need of reintegration with the Third Reich. :Elitler ap-
pointed Arthur Seyss-lncyuari:in charge of the Netherlands, aided by Ger-
m m SS. m d Police Chief Hams Albh Rauter. Beheen these two Austri-
ans, &ey managed to get out of the Netherlands all that it was possible to
take out in terms of food and nnerch,andjse and ship it to Germany These
Nazi masters rim a harsh and brutal conquest admixlistration.
Although there was a Dutch resistance movement,67 there were also
s o m cases of possible betrayal. Before the Nazi invasion, t k r c actuatly
was a h t c h Nazi Party In the 1937 general election, that party won about
4 percent of the electorate.&The size of the party grew from around 30,000
members before the Nazi invasion to about 50,000 after the invasion.
Although Anton Adriaan Mussert, the leadcr of the D ~ ~ t Nazi
c h Party,
kept funneliizlg suggestions to Hitler Labout Aryacrizhg the Dutch people,
he never received m y serious answer from BerliI7.69 H e was appointed by
the Nazis in 1942 as the leader of the Dutch people, but his leadership
was on paper only, Un May 7,1945, Mussert was arrested by the Dutch as
a tr;7titor and collaborator, and he was executed by hanging at 7'he Hague
on May 7,1946.70
Another interesting case is that of General Hendrik Alexander Seyf-
fardt, who was the chief of staff of the Dutch army between 1929 and
1934, when he retired as a lieutenant ge~zeral,Folfawlng the German oc-
cupation of the Netherlands, Seyffardt. came out of retirement, changed
sides, and became a major collaborator with Nazi Germany. He willingly
lent his past reputation to the Nazi cause and formed a volunteer unit
caIled the ""Viijkorps," wwhich fought with the Nazi Wehnl~~lacht in the So-
viet Union. He was assassinated in m e Hague on February 5, 1943.73
Foot estimates that out of a populahn close to 9 milIion, "over 5,000
Dutchmen johed the TnJaffen-S.S., and.mother 54,000 belonged of their
own free will to various other Nazi ~rganizations.~"72
Clearly there were m m y Dutch who were Nazi sympat"hi"ersand who
assisted the Nazis in hunting d.own Jews. About 80 percent of the esti-
mated 150,OW Dutch Jews were erctermi~~ated, and only about 4 pexent
of the 1,11),000 who were cleported to camps returned,"
After the war, the Netherlands had 130,000 of its own people arrcsted
on charges of treason, and 40,0(X1served prison smtences (about "419 out
of every 1(113,000Dutchmen'". OveraiS, "as many as tiO,O(lC1f)ulch collabo-
rators were deprived of their civil rights, and the Netherlands carried out
thirty-six out of 430 death sentenceseff74
'The cases of Quislihg, Uegrelle, and Mussert share similarities. In each
case, a preoccupatim :Nazi sympathizer failed politically within his own
country. None of them hid their sympathies, and they all seized the first
opportunity they had to try and push Chejir pm-Nazi ideas. k t none of
them were successful,

France
01June 22, 1940, wi&k &out six weeks of the successful Nazi invasion,
Frmce's mrnilltary nrracK11e was hcapacitated by the s~~perior
msibry war
juggernaut of Nazi Geman5 and France was forced to s i p m amistice
agreement with the Nazis. Drnk7-phes that when the French a m y R-
treated, French citizens, fearhg German reprisals, prevented the French
Army from sabotaging bridges or even f,hting sometimes, French losses
156 Vintalitzg Trrtsl and hyalty Durr'12g WurIcZ War 11: Part l

were astounditsg: about 90,QUO dead and 20Q,000 wounded, plus about 1.9
million prisoners or mil;sing. France was divided into several administra~ve
areas,From that point in time, the issue of French collaboratio~~ with the
:Nazis became a paistful and,complicated. reality for the French. Of the areas
into which Frmce was divided, the sou&em zone is of most interest ta us.

Marshal Philippe Pbtain, The man who replaced. PauI Reynaud as

French prime minister on June 16, 1940, was M m h a l Philigpe I"&tain.
Born in 1856, Pktairr was the victor of the World War 1 battle of Verdm
and had gained the position of a military hero. He was the one who had
negotiated the armistice agreement with the Nazis and the one who
signed it. h fact, on June 17,1940, at 't2:30,

the quavering broken voice of a Marshal of France, the eighty-fclrar-year-c)Id

Philiippe Pktain, announced over the radio that France had lost not just a bat-
tle but the war as well. . . .
"Frranqaiws! At the Request of the President of the Republic, 1 assume as of
today the direction of the gc>vernmentof France. . . .
I: give to France the gift of my perscrrn to alleviate her misfortunes. . . . It is
with a sad heart that I say to you today that the fighting must ~top."7~

:Pi.tain beaded the French colllabosationist regime, whose headquarters

were in the resort town of Vichy. Between July l940 and August 1944, :PG-
taints regime developed a genuine collaboration with the Nazjs: military,
political, ecmomir, culhral, and personal. Some authors even cllaim that
the very meaning of World War EI collaboration can, and shodd, be
trared to Vichy's France. HirschMd and Marsh's f 989 collection is rcflec-
tivc of the great n u b e r of books written on this subject, revealing the
depth and scope of French cclilaboration in ietecrlogy, fine arts, filmmak-
ing, theater, and in po:[itical and economic areas. Ildeed, an orchestrated
attesnpt was made to convert Frmce as much as possible to German Na-
tional Socialism.77 Moreover, the ccollaborationist direction taken by the
Vichy governme~~t was presented as a new positive, and bold political or-
der for France, Viewkg itsdf as the rightful govc ent of Frmce, this
collaborationist regirne had no difficulty deciding that others were trai-
tors. The events invotving Chasfes de GauUe, who later became president:
of France, are instructive,
Charles de C d e (l890-1979, a veteran of World War I, was promoted
to brigadier gemsal on June 1,1940, .fought the Nazi invasion, and was
appointed underserretav for national defense by French prime minister
Reynaud on June 6. De Gaulie's tenurr. in his new post lasted only ten
e Reynaud resigned m d Pktah, who replaced him, nego-
days, On J w ~ 16,
tiated the armistice with Hitlet This meant the end of de Gaulle's short
Pkftnin zuith his c~ttargedgover~zmetzt,2940. Picrre Lnrfnl is fto ttic of-Pkf~in,and
Gclneml Wqgalzd is on the riglzf.
SOURCE: Rq?rinted*fiomWmpler Ri~qgs,Life with "re Enemy: Gollaboratic~n and
Resistawe in Hitler" Europe, 1939-1945, frnnslrrled by I. iClnxz~~c/l Browfzjo/tn
{London:WeidenfiM n ~ Pdieolsoa,
d 3982). 1"Iaofogr.qla~om Verlag! Municif.
Sz~ddEZdlscl~er

career in Repaud's government. On June 17,1940, a Royal Air Force air-

plane transported de Gaulle to London. From there, on June 18,1940, he
made his famous speech on the BBC urging Frenchmen to continue fight-
ing the Nazis because France, in his words, had lost a battle but not the
war. The rest is history. De Gaulle eventually became the undisputed
leader slthe Free Frmce movement-
P4tain's regime had no difficulty deciding what to do with the recalci-
trant de Gaule. I"6tai11 ordered him to rebrn ta France, but de Caulle re-
fused. Consequently, on July 4,1940, he was sentenced, in absentia, by a
court-martial appointed by P4tain, to four years in prison. This obviously
was ineffective and was thus perceived as insufficient. The Vichy regime
then declared de Gaulle a traitor to France.

The? Vichy. minister of war, General Colson, on July 12 ordered him tried for
treasc)~and desertion in time of war. This time (August 12) the ver-dict was
. . . death in absentia and confiscation of all property.
158 Vintalitzg Trrtsl and hyalty Durr'12g WurIcZ War 11: Part l

Pktain later wrote: "This .\rerdictwas required by the need for discipline, to
set an example, in order to stop the exodus of French. officers out of the coun-
try, but it is dear that this verdict in absentia can only be in principle- It has
never been my t b u g h t that it tzrorald be impc>sed."78

It is important to note that the above me1Bo written by P&tainwas drafted

inAugust 1944 when it was clear that de Gaulle w m .
After the war, P4tain was put on trial, which began on July 23,1945. Al-
though techically he was chaqed with a few spceific crimes, the gist of
the trial was that he betsayed his country by coliahoraiing with the Nazis
and working with tbem agairtst the intert-sts of France. &ring P4tairtfs
trial, French p ~ m i e Edouard
r Daladier w s put: on the sland to testiEy.79
Beforc delving into Daladier's testimony some backgromd farts about
Daladier must be mmtioned. Daladier had to r e s i p his third premiership
(on Mach 20,1940) because of douhts &out his prewar Icadership (hc. was
replaced with his poliitical rival Paul Reynaud). He was arrested by the
Vichy clrliaborationist gave ent in September 1940 and tried at Kitrm
(1942)011 charges that he had direct responsibility for the French defeat- His
trial was only one m o n g many that the colXaborationjst Viichy governmnt
initiated. The purpose of the trials was to c~nstmctBe image that promi-
nent French politicians were directly responsihlc for the b e g M , g ol
Miorfd. War :I1as well, as for what was referred to as ""poXitical cormption,"
which was blamed for fiance's military defeat. Because the &faders were
allowed to speak freeiy, the trjals becme entbamassing for Petairr, and thus
they were suspended," Daladier was handed over to the G e m m s after the
trial (in which he defended himself admirably)but was freed in 1945.
'This is what Daladier had to say whezz he was asked by the prosecution
whether P4taisr betrayed his countq-: "In all,conscience, 1: will answer that
in my opinion Marsh1 f"4tain betrayed the duties of his office." m e n re-
quired to elaborate he added: "The word treason has many different
memings. n e r e are men who b e t r q their country for money; t h c e are
men who betray it sometitnes out of pure incompeknce. . . . As for Mar-
shal Piltain I will state frankly-eve11 though it pains me-that he be-
trayed. his duties as a f;renchmm.""n R its interesting to note that Daladier
seemed to have used the criterion af motivation in decidhg whether P6-
tain was a traitor, as well as the character of his treason.
P4tah denied the charges agai.nst him and stated that he tried to help as
much as he could m d was able to maintain Frmce" s i i y for four d3ficult
years. On August 15, 1945, P&tainwas found gujlty and sentenced to
death. The sentence was never carried out, and he djed inprism in 1951.
Was P4tain a traitor or a hero? Lotman (1985) fit~dsit difficult to m-
swer this question. P4tain hinnself mod certainly did not think he corn-
miited. treason, and he was not the m l y one." Tbe way in which, he con-
ducted himself while beading the Vichy government was Obviollsly
a h e d at mahtai~~ing, as best as he could, French nationalism under very
difficdt cmclitions. However, the price he paid for that- unity was m c h
too high in terms of the depth of his collaboration with the Nazis, and it is
very doubtful that what I"4tain wmted was achievable at all. Moreover,
his goals were not always clear.

Pierre Laval. Pierre Laval provides us with another case of a traitor-

collaborator"Me was P4tain" vice premier until December 1940, when P4-
tain dismissed him. Attempts to replace taval with others did not work
well, and under Nazi p ~ s s u r eLavaf
, was ~ i n s t i k t e d
in April 1942.
Born in 1883, he later becme a lakvyer, and his initial career kvas affili-
ated with French socialism, However, be drifted to the right. Un June 25,
1940, he joined P4tainfs collaboratianist gove ent anci was very effec-
tive in promoting Fre1zcl-r-German collaboration, in which he was a ge12-
uine believer. L a d was certa-inly favored by the Germans, After his re-
htm to power in April 1942, he broadcast an appeal to the French people
to work hand in hand with the Nazis (June 1942) and added that he sup-
ported a German victory in order to prevent cornanism from prevail-
ing. Laval tried to get ""m" concessions from the Germms in return for
collaboration, but that did not wnrk out very well. Me was effective in
providing French workers for Germany and gave the Germans foreign
Jews who lived in fiance. 'These steps were rationalized as sacrifiicing t.he
"t.w in ordcr to save the many However, Nazi clemands werc growing,
and LavaYs policy s h p l y collapsed. Afler the war, Laval tried to find asy-
lum outside France but did not succeed. He was extradited to France
where he was sentenced to death (in a rather controversial trial). Al-
though be tried to comrmit suicide by taking poison, his life was saved
only so that he could be e x ~ u t e don October 9,3945.83
Although "the collaborationist moveme~ztsreprese~~ted a very small if
vocal proportj.on of t:he French population during the German occqa-
tion,"" the Vichy government, beaded by Laval and Pktain, cctrtainly
marked a djrection of voluntary and willing coltaboration. 'Thus, Laval
and PBtain, are probably the most prominent names associated with
French collaboration durhg TvVorld War 11.85
'The collaboration of the Frezzch with the Nazis produced many hdivid-
ual cases of betrqal.% Aitcr the war, the issue of dealing with collabora-
tors came up. 'The widesprtrad collaboration was such that it was not pas-
sible to prosecute every coll;zborator, However, tens of thousands of
collaborators werc prosecuted. FaIlowing the liberation of Paris by the Al-
lies, hundreds of French women with shaved heads were forced into the
streets carrying big signs stating that they had had ktimate relations wi&
Germans." According to official figures, the resistance executed more
160 Vintalitzg Trrtsl and hyalty Durr'12g WurIcZ War 11: Part l

than 10,800persons suspected of colla:borating with the Nazis. This is Sel-

wyn"s description oE one such case:

Robert Brassillach, the young editor of the pro-Vichy Je Suis Partout, insbted
. . . that he acted in the best interests of his country. He had undoubtedly
been consistent. His views as a journalist had been fascist before the war.
Brassiltlach had simply not changed them. He died before a firing squad on 6
February 4945 at the fortress oaf Mcmtrr~ragewith a cry of ""Courage! Vive la
Fra~tcel'~88

Although after the war many of the collaborators wercl. pmsecuted and
pmi&ed, the scope of these prosecutions is djfficult to assess. ""lFrance,
more than 6,000 m m and womm were condemned to death for collabora-
tion with the Germms, let alone those who met a summary fate immedi-
atety after the liloeration."g% different set of numbers is provided by
Dank who notes that French courts had to deal with 125,000 cases of
women m d men who were charged with cdlahoration with the Nazis
and betraying France. Of those, 2,853 were sel~tencedto death, and of
those, '767 were actually executed. According to Dankf post-VVorld VVar 11
France sent to firing s ~ dmow s people than any other occupied country
in Europe.%Archer provides still a diffemt number: "ln f 946, the Frezzch,
purgi,g citizens who had turned collaborationist durlng the Nazi occu-
pation, arrested half a miilion men m d women on chargemof trea~on.~'gI
Novick's work also tried to assess this issue and is probdly the better
one, He maintains that f r m the k n w n cases in, the Cmrs de justice,
45,017 were not prosecuted m d 50,095 were heard; around 39,000 were
sent to prison. G v i c k notes that "presidential commutations spared all
but 3 of the 8 men sentenced to death by the High Court, and all but 767
of the 2,853 scmtenced to death by the cows lie justice.""- En the Chambrrs
civique, 67,965 cases were processed." Novick also tried to assess some
summary executions statistics, His research indicates that there are two
sets of data. &e set indicates that 5,234 cases occurred before liberation
and 4,439 after it (totaling "3,673cases). 'The second set considers cases
where the motive could, not be established satisfactorily (1,955 cases) and
adds prt?- and post-liberation cases (8,867) for a total of 30,822 cases.94
Havhg painstakingly examisred the issue of the magnitude of sunmary
executions of suspected collaborators, Novick comes to the conclusion
that the "official numbers" (ranging between 9,200 and 11,100 cases) must
be taken as a minimum. The methodological problem in\rolved i,n assess-
ing the numbers, and hence the magnitude of the French reaction to col-
laboration in this regard, am simply too complex to be solved. Ilowewer,
even these mhimal numbers are high, and Novick indeed adds that "94
out of every 100,000 Frenct-rmm were hprisoned for coll.aboration,"'""
Clemency however, began in 1947, and in March 1954 all punishments
given in absentia wert? canceled. &y 3 9 a , not even one collaborator re-
maiined in m y French prison.96

Visiting Vichy. Between June 24 and June 27, ,998, I visited Vichy, a
small, quiet, and very pleasant French town about three hours by train
from Paris. The amazing thing is that there is absolutdy nothing in Vichy
that presents any connection to the World War 11 period. I had to ask a
French colleague to show me the buildjng wherc. the Kchy govame"t:
was. nere were no markings, no signs, nothjng, The "Vichy Guide" F-
phlet distributed to tourists (as well as the interpretaticms given in local
orgmized tows) state the f0llokvin.g:

THE END OF THE THIRD REPUBLIC, THE WAR, AND THE OCCUPA~ON

After the 1940 French defeat, MarGchal Pktain was in charge of forming a
new go>vernment.G4n6ral de GauXle broadcasted his Earnous call from Lon-
don on J m e 2 8.
The French government, unable to stay in Paris, moved to Bordeaux.
After the 1940Armistice, the government had to leave Bordeaux, occupied
by the German Army, and moved to Vichy, The reasons far this choice were
the hotel facilities af the "queen of spa towns" and a modern telephone
switchboard.
On July 1, the gavernment took possession of the hotels. Six hundred
members af parliament voted in favor of the Fourth Republic. The republi-
can regime was abolished-.The French State replaced it, with Philiippe P4talr-i
as head of state (only eighty members of parliament out of six hundred op-
posed the bill).
From that date onward, Vichy became the capital of the French State for
four years.97

There was not a word about the nabre of the defeat, about a death sen-
tence for de Gaulle, or the nature of the collitborationist "French State"
ruled from. Vichy.98 Thus, the question of the necessi.t)i and legitimacy of
the Vichy regitne is still not settled in France..

Resistance, Ca)la:bmation r e q u i ~ discussing

s French resistance as well.
'T"here were foms of French cultural resistance and contempt for the Ger-
mans. However, the most famous French resistance was the Maquis.99
French resistance began with sporadlc individual acts, and m e d ac-
ticm was rare at that stage..As the war continued, and Nazi Germany in-
vaded the Soviet Union, resistance grew as different groups began to or-
ganize and act, After much effort and. sacrifice (including that of Jean
162 Vintalitzg Trrtsl and hyalty Durr'12g WurIcZ War 11: Part l

Modin who was captured on June 21, 1943, tortured, and klled), the
Maquis was created in 1943. Struggling with objective difficulticrs, the
Maqwis eventually mastered armed resistance, The cost was high. nbout
90,000 resisters were killed, tortured, or deported, and thousands of oth-
ers suffered Nazi reprisais.

Admiral Jean Eiranlais Raslan. We shall end the section on French col-
laboration with the case of Jean Frmqois Darlm. W ~ e nWorld War I1 be-
gan, Fleet Admird Darlan was the colnanander in chief of the Frer~ch
Navy. The navy was a modern and powerful force cmcentrated in the
Mediterrmean Sea. It had seven battleships (two of which were battle
crrwisers), seven heavy cruisers, twelve light cruisers, seven@-onedestroy-
ers, m d seventy-six submarines pius a large number of smaller and auxil-
iary craft. After the defeat of France (June 1940), Darlan assured British
prime rninister Winsto11 Churchill that the French fleet wouM never fall
into Geman hmds. FXoweves, fullowhg the surrender of France, Admiral
Darlan did not order the French fleet to sail to British or neutral ports. In-
stead he ordered his fleet to sail to French colonial bases in North Afirica,
The British were obviously suspicious of the intentions of the F m c h h e t ,
anli fearing it rnight act agaifist them, they sent strong BriSish naval forces
to ellgage and neutralize the Fre~~ch naval forcm in Mers el, Kkbir (a naval
base mar the Algerian port of &an) a d Alexandria (fu2y 3-6,1%0).1" A
few days after the defeat of France, Darlan gave his allegime to Marshal
Philippc Petain and accepted a position as mhister of the m y and later
as vire premier (February 1941) in the Vichy regime.101
As vice premier in the Vichy gowe ent, Admirat Dartan pursued a
policy of: limited cooperation with the Axis powers. H@ most certahly
presented a slick and evasive frmt. Darlan confided to the U.S. amba*
sador, William D. Leahy, that he woulLi dissxiate himself from cotlabora-
tim and wot~1,dwelcome strong Allied intemel~tionif supported with ad-
equate strength (B0vel.i states that Darlan mentioned a force of 500,000
men),l" Dmlanfs zigzagging created a situation where neither the Ger-
mans nor the ALlies really h e w cvhere his loyalties lay or whether Darlan
could be tmsted.
Early in 1942 Darlan lost his ministerial posts when Lava1 returned to
power, but he was gjverl command of all French armed foxes and n a m d
high commissicmer of French North Akica.
The Anglo-American invasion of French Narth Africa was launched on
November 8,1942.10Wespite ai-i;e~xpts to secure Fre~~chnonresistmce, the
invading Allies did. encounter resistance by French forces, especially at
the naval base of Oran. 'I'hat port was assaulted on November 8,1942. Ue-
spite its formjdable deknses, opposition was overcome within two days
of the Iandings.l@It so happens that at that particular time, Darlan was
visiting his sick son in Algiers (his visit began Noverrzher 6). The French
resistance to the Allies and f>arlanfspresmce in Algkrs provoked negoti-
ations between Eisenhower"~deputy, MMark Clark, and Darfan (Novem-
ber 9). The Nazis began applying psessurc on Pktaisl to accept Gcrman
"support" hTirnisia. P4tain was trying to gain tkne m d prevent Germm
weupation of southern France and thus kept smding hdnniml Darlan con-
tradictory and. vague messages, Darlan was able to delay a cease-fire
agreement to November 11, when Geman forces entered Vichy-controUed
Frmce.
Darlan" success in securing the active support of French officers in
'Titnisia was only partially successful, and the situation remained con-
fused. The remains of the French fieet in Todon delayed sailillg to M r t h
Afrka and scuttled more than seventy fleet units on November 27, Since
Darian%authority was accepted by at least part of the French forces in
North Mrica, Qncral Eisenhower desig~zatedhim colnrnander and polit-
ical head of French North Afrka. Eisehower" move was severely criti-
cized in Britail1 m d the United States, causing much embarrassment.1~~
h d yet Staiin had a favorable view: "I consider it a rclmarkable feat on
your part that you have succeeded in drawing DarXan and the others to
the side of the Allies.""fb How does one describe someone who collabo-
rated with the Nazis who then helps the Allies? The solutio~~ was the des-
ignation of Darlan as a "temporary expedimt,"loT
Vctrrier" 11990 work fmplies that Acfmiral Uarlan was a key player in a
pivotal episode of World tRlar II. Behind Darlan" presellce ixt Algiers h
1942, says Verrier, lay a conflict between Roosevelt and Churchill, on
which hung the fate of France. He clailns that the "choice"' both Chwhill
m d Roosevelt faced was betweell Darlm m d de Gaulle. Verrier is quick
to point out that Darbn was P&tainfsforrner deputy and Roosevelt" col-
laborator in maintaining the Vichy administration of :North Africa as a
full and repressive force."Wooscvelt was awarently not a great admim
of de Gaulle m d preferred Darlan. According to t7errier"s intevretation,
the reason for this preference was I(ot>seveltFsinterest in ~ d u c i n gthe
size, influence, and power of the French empire. To accomplish that, a
complaisant Frenchman had to be found. Darlan seemed like t:he ideal
choice for that purpose.
Ch Christinas Eve, 1942, Fernand de Xa Chapelle Boiznier (1922-1942), a
twenty-year-old member of the French resistance entered the office of Ad-
miral Darlan and fired at him two deadly shots from a 7.65-caliber pistol.
Bonnier was a men7ber of a group of five young anti-Nai Frenchmn
who pEotted the assassination because they thought Darlan was a traitor.
Although he viewed hknself as a national hero, others did not. A court-
martial ordered by General Henri Giraud (see below) condemned him to
death. He was executed on the morning of December 26,1942.1" Clearly,
164 Vintalitzg Trrtsl and hyalty Durr'12g WurIcZ War 11: Part l

Darlan"s assassination removed a possible ubstacle to de Gaullek amch

to become the leatler of fiance. Moreover, it allowed a morally nonprcrb-
lematic person to take the helm. It is probable that Darlan" swartime
zigzags wou%dhave encurnbed a postwar French political career.
:In view of Verrier" 1990 work, it is possible that the assassination of
Darlan was a nnajor crossroad in the modern fiistory of France. It eased
de GauXlle" rise to leadershiyp, However, one must remember that even if
Verrier's work is valid, elevating Darlan could not have been an easy
task in view of his public: image and collaboration with the Naziis*Indeed
Wheal, Pape, and Taylor note that the assassination of Darlan spared
""the Allies further embarrassment" and eased "the relations with French
Colonial, forces-'"m 'Thus, any such plan to ul-rderntine Che infl~lenceof
France, as suggested by Vesrier, had to consider the shaky public posi-
tion sf Darlan.
AAer the assasshation, Gelzeral Henri Giraud (1879-1949) assumed the
position of high commissioner for F m c h North and West Africa. Giraud,
dearly m d pubkly anti-Nazi, had been taken prisoner during the Nazi
attack m France in the s u m e r of 1940 but escaped i,n April 1942. In N'R-
vember he! was taken to Algiers in a British submarine to help in opesa-
ticm Torch. The Allies (especially the U ~ ~ i t eStates)
d considered Giraud a
more sujtable person for their purposes than de Gaulle. However, de
Gaulle-notorious for his stubborn in.bependenc managed to politi-
cally neutralize him, and de Gaulle" mmeuvers cost Giraud his Ameri-
c m suppod as well. In April 1943 he quit his position as high commis-
sioner for French Africa, Csnthued confrontations with de Gaulle led to
his resignation f m his second position as commander in chief of thc.
Free French Army hApril 1944.'11
:In retrospect, it seems obvious that Darim had become a problematic
figure. krrier (1990) states that Darlan was Churchill's "odious QuishgPf'
George Patton's "little red-faced pig,;,"and Robert Aron's "grc3at enigma of
the war." 'deed, Boveri"s WO&m treason in the twentkth, century de-
votes a wbole chapter to Darlan.~1Wttackedin the press, distnrsted by
both countrynte~zand fomigners, how could he have justifkd his actions?
According to Boveri (19561, Darlan justified the decision to leave the
French fleet in French parts by stating that "if he had odered it to set sail
and put in at a British or Cmadim harbor the German reprisals in Metro-
politan France wodd have been terrible" @. 126), adding that ""h had
obtained a promise from the Germans that the fleet would not be
touched, and had h turn promised Churchill at their last meet;irxg that the
fleet would never fall into German hands. This engagement was re-
spected by Darlan and his subordinates to t-he last minute detail'" (p. 127).
Bovcri (p. 128) states that Darlan's son was ill with polio and that Roo-
sevelt's kind treatment of Darlm should be mderstood in that humme
context (Roosevelt himself was crippled by that same disease).
Roveci, as well as others, points out that the cooperation of s o m Ailied
figures with Darlan was made with much measjness, But the realization
that Nor& Africm French troops were committed and loyal to Vichy ne-
crcssit&ed that cooper&ion. Indeed, that is why Robert Murphy, President
Roosevelt" special envoy, began negotiating with Darlan. h an apols-
getic letter to Rossevelt, Churchill shows full awareness sf the moral hn-
plications of using Darian:

The more I reflect upcm it, the mow cmvinced I become that it can only be a
t e m p o r a ~expedient justified no>tablyby the stress of battle. We must meet
the serious political injury which may be done to our cause, not only in
France but throughout Europe, by the feeling that we are ready to make
terms with the local Quislings. Darlan has an odious record-.It is he who has
inculcated in the French Navy its malignant disposition by promuting his
creatures tcr cc>mmand'"3

Roosevelt" withdrawal of support from Darlan decreased French readi-

ness to cooperato in :North Africa.
S:hortly befure his assassination, Darlan w o t e letters to Chusehill,
Eisenhower, and X.Rahy.llVerhaps his best deknse can be found in his
letter to Churchill dated December 4,1942, in which he stated:

From January, 1941, until April, 1942, by order of my chief, Marshal Petain, I
carried out policies tzrithout the implementation of which France and her
colonies would have been crushed. These polides were unforttlnatel y dia-
metrically v p o s e d to yours. What else could I have done? You were in no
position to offer the slightest help, and any gesture in your direetic~nwould
have brought disaster to my country.

His letter to Eisehower also indicates his realization of declirring

- Ameri-
can. support m d his bitterness about it,
AIthough Churckill. bitterly opposed DarXan"s handling of the fleet, he
nevertheless paid cart~fuitrihute to Darlan and noted that, as he had
promised, the Frelneh fleet newr fell into German hancts,'""
How are we to view Darlm" actions? Was he a collaborator m d trai-
tor? The Nazi defclat of France placed him in a very compla situation. He
was Che commander in chief of a powerful navy What was he tt? do? Col-
laborate with It""6tahpsVichy government? Order the fleet to sail to British
ports? That very s m e navy one must remember, had been an ally of
Britain and, in fact, assisted in the evacuation from Dankirk. m a t were
his hterests? Arnung other things, be wanted to preserve the French em-
166 Vintalitzg Trrtsl and hyalty Durr'12g WurIcZ War 11: Part l

pire and colonies, m a h t a h the integrity of the French fleet, and minimize
the effects of the occupation of Franceall in the face of determined and
ruthless Nazi rule. It was an overhelmjng task.
Moreover, it was probably not a realistic goal. For example, to what ex-
tent was it realistic to expc~ctto maintail1 a peripheral colmid indepen-
dence while the empire's center was occupied by enemy farcesflhe real
test for Darlan, and individualis like him, was whether to grind one's
teeth, cotlaborate with the Nazis, and try to mfnimize damage to France,
or to face Nazism for wfiat it realty was and defy it in the strongest possi-
ble way-that is, join the British. a c e we accept that Darlan saw the real-
ity of the occugatior~,decided to play along, and tried to minhize darn-
age, rhen his zigzagging actions become understandable. Not morally
justified but understandable.
Darlan, perhaps well-fntentioned, failed to see the evil of the Nazi
regime and preferred to colabarate with it. One needs to be reminded
that Darlm could have taken the risk and joined the Allies, However, this
is only part of the story. The other part is that Churtlhjll a d Roosevelt
we= concerned with the postwm world order, and so was cle Cau,lfe. The
potential and actual insrer political conflicts among members of the Allied
forces &o played a part. At the very least, Darlan did collaborate with
the Nazis, caushg at some points more trouble to the Allies. To mswer
the question, was Darlan a French Quisling (in the jargon used in
Chwhill" letter), we need to ask, from whose point of view?

The Ghan~elIslands
The Channel Xslmds comprise nine islands, the largest of which are the is-
lands of 'Jersey and Guernsey, posil-ioned about forty miles west of Cher-
b o w and about eighty miles south of England. Fotlowing the German
victory over France, Germans began bombardm,etnt of the islands on Jwne
28,1940. tnvasim and occupation began on June 30. This military move
cost the lives of forty-four idalders and the evacuatilrn of about 30,1100
crivilians. About 60,0610 rclmained in the islands. The occmpa.t.ionendcd on
May 9,1945, when the German garrison there surrendered. The conquest
and occupation of this BrifiSh t e r r i t ~ ywas the closest the Germans ever
got to the minland of Britain.
The issue of cotlaboration with the Nazis in these islands was a compfi-
cated one. It appears that previous claims that the occupation was moder-
ate reflected the experience of the islands' colildborative admhistmtors,
who were tseated well by the Nazis. Life for the ordinary islander was
harsh, as starvation, imprisonment, and harsh fh~eswere cornonplace.
In September 1,942, 2,000 British-born citizetns wcx deported to intern-
ment camps in Germany, and in January 1943, another 201) were deported.
as rcvenge fur a British c m m n d o raid, Collaboration was also common,
not only by local administrators (who helped the Nazis control the is-
lmds and cooperated in the deportation of Jews to concentration camps),
but also by black marketeers, informers, and a host of British women, re-
ferred to as "'Jerrybags," who dated soldiers from the German garrison."b

Concluding Discussion
Chapters 5 and 6 providc us with a broad view of s o m of the ~ S S Z Xof~ S
treason during World War 11, fn these chapters, we exasnine the empirical
meaning of treason in a situation of extreme conflict h e r e moral bomd-
aries are continuously challenged and h e m loyalty and trust becorn de-
batable issues, In a series of cases, we have seen how simple appearances
contrast with complex realities m d how, in each case, treason is defined
withh a specific context.
Fifth coliumism is a conspiracy aimed at dishtegrathg a government
from witJlin a country. Clcrse examindim of the reafity behind tbis con-
cept reveals a compex hchaal level, where fifth colmnism may be less
prevalent than commonly believed, The term ""fif2.h coliumn" has also
come to refer to political inBuence and subversion.
Callaboration also provides us MIith a complex reality The popular im-
age of World War XZ collabosatoss is a negative one; it implies that collabo-
rators were willing tcr close their eyes to the evil of Nazism and hclp it to
achieve its goal of European dominatio~~. h many cases, this eval~~atiolz is
valid.. However, mce we accept that the moral: judgment of ""cllabora"
ticm" is not clear-cut, then we c m examilne the cmplex ~ a l i t y
'There are different types and levels of colfaboratian, and one needs to
ask, what real choices did people have under Nazi occupation? Could
they choose the least damagFr~gone, or even one of the many forms of E-
sistmce (active or passive)? The reality behind ""cllaboration" was much
more connplex than the simple black-and-white dichotomy. There were
many forms of collaboration and resistance, each with a somewhat differ-
ent moral charge.
Moreover, some of those referred to as ""clZaborators" "believed in the
Nazi ideology and were co itted to it prior to the Nazi wcupatittn (for
example, Degrelle, Quisling, and Seyss-Inquart). Although evaluating
their activities as treacherous may seem to be a complex issue, the viola-
ition of trust and loyalty c m be established in each of their cases. Obvi-
ously, it requ,jres that we define wt.tose loyalty and what trust they
bseachect, Doing that may necessitate taking a stand., which brings us
back to Chapter I, where it was pointed out that this study requires mak-
ing judgments. 7he ksues of l o p trust in collaboration are sharp
and painful, OveraXl, one can exa ;in detail-the realities h which
168 Vintalitzg Trrtsl and hyalty Durr'12g WurIcZ War 11: Part l

potential traitors were immersed, t k i r possible options in terms of ac-

tion, as W& as their actual cbttices. And in each of the cases presented in
this chapter, choices are assessed jn terms of realities and options. From
this perspective, the important poiM is that regardless of the specific di-
~ c t i o nof the violations of trust a d loyalty, in each of these cases, it is
pom"jbl,eto establish that such vidatims in fact took place.
The issue of co1la:horation in World War 11 surfaced again during the
1990ti. It is now dear that Swiss banks and Eurvean insurance c m p a -
nies collaborated wif-;hthe Nazis in their cmfiscatio~~ of economic assets
from Holocaust victims, Holocaust survivors demanded, compensation
for the prcrflts made by these institutions from their ccmfiscated assets.
During 1998 the clajm was expanded to jncludc the collaboration of"vari-
ous industries with the Nazi war machine and the Naziskse of slave Za-
bor during the \oiar."T The same issues we faced in examining treason and
cotlaboratim during World War 11 in this chapter also surfaced in these
recent discussions about collaboration,
We shall continue our examination of cases of betryal during W r l d
War II: in Charter 6.
 ating Trust and Loya
During Wor d War 11: Part 2

In the previous chapter we examjned a few cases of betrayd in Western

Europe, as weil as cases of collaboration a d fifth colrtmnism. In this
chapter we shall conthue this examination by looking at same cases in
Eastern Europe, Germany, the Far East, and the Middle East,

Yugoslavia: The Chetniks and

General Draia Mihajlovii.
Here is another ifiustratim for tfie complicated meaning of tmst, loyalty,
and treason. This case ccmcerns the backgromd of the Nazi invasion into
the Balkms. The Germm aMack on the Balkms on April 6, 1941, exacer-
bated the inner tensions in the Royal hgoslavian Army which reflected
the deep cleavages characteristic of Yugodav swiety. During the attack,
Croat units muthied, m d many wclcamed the Nazi invasion. By April, IQ,
the Uugoslav army sixnply disjrttegrated. Once King Peter ZX (1923-1970)
anli his govenlment fled. tc:,Ex~gianliin 1941, ~sistancebased on Srbian
nationalism began. In late 1941 royalist Serbian Yugoslav commander
Generill Dra2a MihajIwii., born 1893, osmized and led the resistance to
the Axis army His guerrilIa forces called tl-temselves Chehiks and oper-
ated o11ly in Serbia.
At the t h e of its formation in 1941, the Chehik resistance was hailed in
the West as tbr first guerrilla movement in Europe to fight the Nazis. Gen-
eral DraZa Mihnjlovii." reputation as a nationalist Ieader was both local
and international. In fact he was appohted minister of defense by the h-
ent in exile in London. However, it liid not take long for
Gt.neml M~ajlovitto find himself in c d i c t with a diffment new farce.
That force was the Communist-led guerrilla movement, commanded by
170 Vintalitzg Trrtsl and hyalty Durr'12g WurIcZ War 11: Part 2

Cmatian Josip Broz, also known as Marshal Eto (who was the general sec-
retary of the Yugoslav Communist Party prim to W r l d War D). Tito" or-
ganized f m e s were called ""Pastisans," after the irregular f m e s who
fought agai.nst Napoleon in%sin in 1808 and in Russia in 1842.
General Mif-rajlovii:made ~ p e a t e dtmces with the Germans in an at-
tempt to ntinimize casualties. Marshal Tito was much nnore aggressive
and ruthless in his tactics and consequently more effective, This differ-
ence did not escape Churchill's stkntion. At a conference in Teheran (No-
vember 28-Dece~~ber 1, 19431, the first meetbg of W.nstasz S, Churchill,
Jaseph Stalin, and Franklin D. Roosevelt (the Big Three), the Allies de-
cided to support 'Tito's foxes. It is worlh noting Lees's (1990) s o m e h a t
d j f f e ~ nversion,
t Mc suggests that British Commmists fed Churchill mis-
leading information regarding General Mih.ajloviC%activities and that
this information led hhn to prefer Tito. Lees implies that Mif-rajlovit was
actually betrayed.
As clashs contirrued with the Partisans, the Chetniks, lacking real sup-
port from the Allies, were drawn into the sphere of Nazi Germany
thmugb conthued negotiations, and theis coll,aboration with Axis forces
increased. They first collaborated with the Italians, and later with the
Nazis, to cornbat the Partisans, whom they viewed as the primary enemy
g @me, the Chetniks cdaborated quite openly wlCh Ihe Nazis
D ~ ~ r i nthis
in hgoslavia, At the very least, it is clear that Lalthough Gcneral M&aj-
lovit opposed the Nazi occupation, he most definitely collaborated with
them on. more than one occasion.
The Chetniks were destroyed in May 1945, after their attempts to gain
support from the Allies and the local population failed. General Miha~louit
went into hiding but was caught on March 12,1946, and take13 to Belgrade
the next day, On June 10,194& his trial on charges of cdlahoratlim with
the Nazis and for high treason and war c r h e s began. The well-publicized
trid lasted until JuXy 15. He w s h u n d guilty and sentmccd to death. C h
July 17,1946, a firing squad executed h, Twent).-three other collabora-
tars were also tried with him. In 1992 Serbia erected a monument memori-
alizing MihajloviC at Rams Gora, rehabiliitating him (and several other
World War 11collaborators),
Chetniks used mass terror agahst their enemies. Some of the most out-
rageous acts task place between @fober 1942 and February 1943. Amo~zg
other acts, the Chehiks were jnvolved in ""cleming" actions against Mus-
lims and Croatians in countertermr actiwities, It is importmt to m t e that:
the Chehiks were not the only collaborators with AXISforces. 'There were
other Serbian and Slovenian forces who collaborated,with Nazi Germaniv,'
As in other European countries, the Nazi occupation made the issue of
the content of betmyal a complex one i,n Yugosfavia. The personal deci-
sions of Mihajlovii- and individual Chetniks werc directly ~ l a t e dto the
exjsting political and military realit).; that is, decisionmaking was related
to pm"'; amwell as the complex (and sometimes conflicting) interests
m d moralities in which loyalty and trust were contextualized.
:It is, perhaps, unfair not to mention in this context the secret fascist or-
ganization that was fomded around 1929by extreme Croatim nationalist
Ante Pavdit-the Wstachi. Followillg the fall of Yugoslavia in 1941,
Pavelii: and.the Ustachi declared (on April 10) the esta.blis:bmnt of an "in-
dependmtfTmtia, and under a Nazi umbrella tbry ruled it ruthlessly,
violently, and mercilessly until 1945, This r e g h e committed nulnerous
barbarous and brutal purges and massacres against those they viewed as
their ""opponentsf"-Jews, Muslims, Orthodox Serbs, and others. After the
end of World War 12 Pavelit escaped to Argentha.
The issue of whether Pavelie and the Ustachi were traitors is an inter-
esting one. They cotlabmated with the Nazis and were invollied in some
extremely brutal activities, but from the late 1 E 2 s on, these individuals
had never f-iiddcn their desire for an independent filscist Croatia, minus
ethnic groups they did not want in their nightmarish "state," Atthough
it is possible, and even i~nperative,to accuse the ZTstachi and Pavelif
with war crimes and atrocities, betrayd may be a more djfficult charge
to support because one needs to establish exac.tly who they betrayed.
Although it is possible to acgtle that Chcse terrorists violated the trust:
and loyaky of other Uugoslav citizens, it may be equally argued that
many cJf their victims never trusted or were loyal to the Ustachi, and
thus the term "betrayal" "re is on a higher level. of citizens (with
pawer) against citizens (without power), like Stalin's purges, Hitler's
genocide-or state-spcmscrred terrorism. Mowover, like the many Ger-
mans who welcomed Hitler, many Croatians welcomed the Wstachi. For
those, no betrayal was involved."

Romania: The Iron Guard and Anfionescu

In March 1939 &mania and Gemany signed an agwement that estab-
lished the priority of Germany in the Roma12im ecollomy. BasicmZly; Ger-
many heIped, to develop the Romnian economy, and the majoriv of Bo-
manian products were purchased by Germany. Illis 1939 agreement
continued a trend of increased mutual dependence and cooperation be-
tween the two countries that had begun after the 1938 Munich agreement,
This trend was reinforced May 1940 when the Ramanim gave
dedded to atign with Gemany. Following a series of agreements, almost
one-third of Romania was gken to other countries, and in return, other
parts of it remained under Romanian control. Follcrwing these foxed con-
crcssions, King Carol II was forced to step down, and his son Michael took
over (September 6, 1940). Prior to his abdication, Carol bad appointed
172 Vintalitzg Trrtsl and hyalty Durr'12g WurIcZ War 11: Part 2

General fon Antonescu as the powerful preHlier (September 4). In Octo-

ber 1940, the Germans were already in tbe process of creating a Romanian
army, and more of the Romanjan economy was shifted to fit the needs of
the Germm war machine.
At first, the fnfamous Iron Guarcl-a military organization of the Ro-
manian fascist movement-was a partner to Antonescu. A ruthless and
violent group that practiced. violence against both its opponents and
Jews, the Iron Guard and its terrorist tactics eventuaUy i~~terfered with
htonescu's regime. Me thus began to disarm them (and strengthened the
army). This caused the Iron Guard. to rebel against Antonescu and Ger-
many (January 21,1.941). That rebelim was crushed, and by January 27,
1941, Antoncscu had formed a new government (composed mostly of
military officers).
50 far it was clear that Romania, as a cowtry, was shinking m d that it
was being drawn more and morc3 into the clutches of Nazi Germany Did
King Carol betray his country's interests, integrity, tmst, and loyalty by
givifig up so much territory a d compromising Romania's sovereignty?
Did he have any other options? Was Che Iron Gmrd betrayjng Romania?
It certainly violated, brutally, the trust and loyalty of other Romanian citi-
zens by using violence against them (Like the Ustachi).
'There is little doubt that Antonescu collaborated with the Nazis. His
suppression of the Iron Guard. was made on purely pragmatic grounds
(they were interferi~~g with the preparations for the Nazi inwasion of the
Sovkt Won).E-fokvever,Hitler's rclspect for Antonescu helped the Latter
keep a semblance of an independent Romania. The price for that was Ro-
manian support (economic and military) for the Nazi war effnrt. W e n
Germcrany invaded the Soviet U~zionon June 22, 1941 (Operation Bar-
barosa), Antonescu ordered Romanian army dkisions to join the inva-
sion. He atso managed to secure the support of the Romanian people for
that war effnrt. The short-term gains of that military coopadion were
such that Romania recaptured some of the territories it had. previously
lost.Wowever, as the war with the Soviet U ~ ~ i oconthued,
n Rommian
troops sutfered increasing casudties.. ConsequentQ, Antonescds popu-
larity decreased.
Was Ion htonescu a traitm? Born in 3B6, htcmescu developed a mil-
itary carc3cr and by 1932 had been appointed minister of war. Following
his appointment as preHlier in September of 1940, Antonescu established
a pro-German mflitary fascist cltictatorship known as the National Le-
gionary State. Within a mo~zthof his a p p o h t ~ ~ e nAntonescu
t, had sig~zed
a pact with the Axis powers and won Hitler % trust.
ing Antonescu enjoyed papdarit;v, and with the success
of the early war effort in the Soviet Union, he promoted himsel,f to the
rank of marshall. However, the military losses involved In the continued
Romanian involvement in Nazi Germany" war in the Soviet Union
prompted Antonescu to search for ways to p d l Romania out of the Ger-
man alliance, and he began to explore the possibil2ies for negotiation of a
peace settlement. These elfforts ixre~asedafter the Nazi dckat at Stalln-
grad (Jmuary 1943), but they failed when Antonescu refused the Allies"
delnand fsr an unconditional surrender, Eventually, With the Russian in-
vasion of Romania imminent, King Illichael signed an armistice agree-
ment m d had Antonescu arrcllsted on August 23,1944. In 1946Antonescu
was charged wi& treason and war crimes. A Romanim cornmm~ist"Pea-
plc% Ceourtr90und him guilty and sentenced him to death. He was exe-
cuted on June 1,1946.4
Romania is an interesting case that gives us a d i f f e ~ nperspective
t on
betrayal. Basically, Rornania acted as an ally of Nazi Germany. And yet
when the fascist Iron Guard seemed to pose a threat it was crushed. As
the tide of the war turned agaiinst the Nazis, pressttre grew withh Roma-
nia to change course. Thus, before 1943, in Nazi-friendly Romania, the
Iron Guard was regarded as extreme and traitorous. After 1943, An-
tt?nescu's search for ways to break away from the Nazi alliance was seen
by the suspicious Nazis as an indication that Romania was potentially a
traitorous state.

The Soviet Union and

Lieutenant General Andrey A. Vlasov
Andrey And~yevichVlasov" ((born1900) first significmt military assip-
mmt in the Soviet Red Army was his appointment as advisor to Chiang
Kai-shek from 19% to 1939. In January 1941 he was appointed cornman-
der of fie 4th A r m m d Corps fn L v o In ~ Febmary he was awarded the
C)1:derof IJenj,n.The Pllazjs invaded the Soviet tlnjnn inJune of 1941 (@-
eration Barhamsa). Vlasov pmved his courage ~andability in the defense
of Kiev in August-September 1941.Althou$ the Red Army lost Kiev, the
holdup oE the Germm forces &ere dclayed the Battle ol Moscow to Ihe
winter. Tn October 1941 the Nazis were about sixty miles west of Moscow
During the Battle of Moscow (mostly, October-December) Stalin ap-
pointed Vlasov as commander of l.he newly f o r l ~ e d20th A m y . That
army pIayed a significant role in resisting and repelling the German at-
tack. His promotion to lieutenant general came in January of 1942. On
that occasion he was awarded the @der of the Red Bamec He was &iven
a new command, the Second Shock Amy, and assigned to the V0lTcho-c.
front.
Shce CJ)ct&es 1941, Germm m d Rommim forces, headed by Wellr~~rachtzf
Field Marshal1von Manstein, had been engaged in what has becorn known
I 74 Vintalitzg Trrtsl and hyalty Durr'12g WurIcZ War 11: Part 2

as the Battle of Sevastopol. Although Manstein" 11th Army was not very
successfut h its first assault, Manstein etevised a diffaent strategy. He fo-
cused on first iso:tati.ng and then purghg Soviet military presence from
the Kerch Penirtsula (at the easternmost tip of the Crirnea). By mid-May
1942 his strategy had yielded some spectacular successes, His fnrces had
wiped out two Red Army divisions and captured altnost 1711,UW prison-
ers. Followhg this success, the fate of Sevastopol was sealed. During June
17-31), Sevastopol fell to the Nazis, who captured an additional 915,OC)O
priso~zer S.
During these fierce and fateful battles, Vlasov" command was sur-
mmded by German forces in May 1942. Refusing to surrender, he was
captured by the Germans.' Whereas official Soviet versions state that
Vlasov had been irt contact with the Germans since the Battle of Kiev and
thus gave hirnseff up immediately after fie Soviet defeat in Svastopol,
Andseyev asserts that foiilowing the colfapse m d dispeaioon of his 2nd
Shock Army troops, Vlasov wandered in the forest for more than two
weeks before being captured (June2.1: to luly 121, probably reflecting on
what had happened.Mncfreyev kets Chat these two weeks are crucial fm
understanding Vlasov" later behavia Durtng that time, Vlasov's smjnd
changed from "that of a pmmhent Sowiet commander to that of a collab-
orator with the enemy, and prepared the ground for his subsequent dcd-
sion to try and form an mti-Stalin Russian Weration ArnyMe7 That trans-
formation was neither simple nor eav.
Overall, it is important to understand the context of these evezzts. Thou-
sands of prisoners were taken by the Wehrnzaelrf on its eastern front.
Stalids totalitarian rule was very unpopular, and the Red Army itself ex-
perie~zcedhtensive Stalhist purges.. Few Soviet POWs, at least initially
had the starmjna to fight for the Soviet Union. That changed as the war
continued and the brutal nature of the Nazi cmyucst became clear. Foot
points out that the Germans captured nearly 5 million members of the
:Red Army, noting that

the Germans treated captured St~vietpersonnel abominably: about five-

sixths of the soldiers of the Red Army who were taken prisoner did not sur-
vive the war. . . . These men were hardly given food or shelter at all; their of-
ficers were, with few exceptions, shot after interro>gation,and the rest were
left prey to lice and typhus. Those who got the chance volunteered to join
General Wlasctv" renegade army-any thing to escape from the pit they were
in. German policy in this respect was dictated by Nazi racial myth, which
held that . . . Slavs were only a superim form of cattle."

Persuaded to side with the Germans, Vlasov first made propaganda

broadcasts irt which he voiced the distmst of Stalin felt by the Red Army.
 Viasozl inspects the troops of his Rnussialz Liberatiotz Army.
WUIXCE: Reprint& ~ Y U I I Inkcrrzer
E Rings, Life with the
Enemy: Collaboration and Resistance in Hitler" Europe,
4939-1945, frnnslnt~dby 1.Maxzu~llBrow~tjulzrz(Lorzdt>n:
Weidenfeld ~ n Nz'colson,
d from UIEsteia
11982). Plfotngra.npi"z
Bilderdic~tst.,B~rJin,

hitially; Vlasov (as well as other Soviet Paws) was distrusted by Hi"cller,
who viewed them as inierior people. Thus, Wlasov" activities were con-
fh~edto making propaganda, and he was not: giwen the means or author-
ity to form, an asmy, which is what he really w n t e d . But as the war
tumed against Nazi Germany, Nazi taboos were sosnewhat relaxed. In
November 1944, I-CeichsfGhrer Heinrich Himmler, head s E the
Schutzstaffel (the S.S.), allowed Vlasov to form the Anti-Stalinist Commit-
tee for the Liberation of the Ptzoples of Russia. VIasov recruited soldiers
176 Vintalitzg Trrtsl and hyalty Durr'12g WurIcZ War 11: Part 2

from POW camps and those who bad been brought back from Russian
territories as forced labor. Vtasov then set up three divisions of Russian
soldiers"This military force became h o w n as the Russkaya Osvoboditel-
naya Amiya or Russim Liberation Army (R.O.A.). The idea was to create
a free Russian army that was not under the authority of a communist
regime. Oa November 14, Vlasov and the R.0.A. published a manifesto
in Prague. In it, Stalisl's annexation of foreign territory m d his policy of
rc.prtrssior.1oE indigenous Russian nationalities were attacked (Andreyev
1987:124-133).
At U?e end of the war, one R.O.A. division was involved in fietine; the
Red hrmy at Franuurt-m-fie-mer.9 h o t h e r division was involved in the
1945 Partisans' uprising in Prague (a2ay 1-2.). Requests Eor mpport from
Pattods 3rd a m y before the arrjvaf. of the Suviet Ukrairrian Front were ig-
nored. hcking the support cJf other forces and karing that the Nazi forces
commanded by Qneral Tonssaint wodd destroy Prague, the rebels ap-
pealed to Vlasov. At that point, Vlasw bad about 20,000 troops statinned to
the west of Prague. "X'heR.0.A. arrived in P r a p e on May K, 1945 and al-
though they were poorly equipped, they managed to clekat German rein-
forcements before withdrawing. However, when Konev" Red b y ar-
rived the next d a y in Prague, the city was cleared of Gemms.10
R.O.A. troops surrendered to the U.S. 7th army However, in accor-
dance with one of the agreements reached during the Yalta Confercnre,ll
Vhsov, his troops, and six other generals were handed over to the Soviet
army. Many of the troops committed suicide. General Vasw was ar-
rested by Soviet authorities on Czech soil in May 1945, m d m August I,
1946, he and the other generals were hanged in Moscow on charges of
Ereas011 and espionage.12
Vlasw" defection to the :Nazis needs to be vkwed in context, Sb begin
with, Stalirr's rule was very unpopular. Vlasov"s anti-soviet and anti-Stalin
feeljngs had deep roots. The hormrs of Stalin's rcgime, his brutd collec-
tivization of farming, and his bloody and ruthless purges of the 1330s
were not easily forgotten. Moreover, several historims have noted the en-
thusiasm with which the Nazi Wt.hrrnacht and S.S, mits were welcomed
by local. Sovicts when Operation Barbarosa commenced. M m y believed.
that the Germms were comirrg to Iiberate them. Indeed, Andreyv argues
that: "dekatism, the doctrjne that wges soldiers to waken their own side
so that the regime m i e t be morc easily overthrown, was exhibited on a
much larger scale in 1941 than could even be considered normal."13
Burton (1963) refers to Vlasov and his followers as the "Vlasov defeatist
movement." He points out that the nurnber of Soviet citizens who partici-
pated in the war effort cm the side of the Nazis ""was not of primary im-
portmce" and that these individmls were effective o d y in fsel.ing "Ger-
man military strength for combat, takhg over . . . such service functions
as mti-pastisan warfare, anti-aircraft duties, and services of suypIy." In
terns oE frontline figheing, they rendered service against the "Allied inva-
sion of Italy and of France . . . where [they] gave good accounts of thetn-
selves in action."M Clearly, Burtm domplays the role of these turncoats,
unaware of the contradiction in his w n description. The Soviet forced la-
bor that was sent to Germany helped in the war effc~rtas well, and many
of these forced liaborers later jolsled the iR.0.A.
Burton interprets the Vlasov movement as a ~flectionof Soviet citi-
zens' aat-titudestoward their own regime. Me notes the many defections in
the Red Army, especially in the first six months of the Nazi invasion.'"
The events of the sumrner of 1941 clearly indicated the widespread dis-
content of the Sovi,et ejtizenry Durjng the first phase of the Nazi iwasion
into the Soviet mien, Soviet citizens welcomed the Webi?rmaehtas a liber-
ating army*" If Hitler had taken advantage the Soviets' hatred for Stalin,
his in\rasion of the Soviet U'nion might have ended differently. Mowever,
his racist ideology which led him to view and tmat the Slavs with scorn
and contempt, effecthely prltvented such an occurrence.
h d r e y e v point oats that many Soviet citizens in Germm hmds, par-
ticularly primers of war and forced Iaborers, made clear their opposition
to Stalin between 1941and 1945. This r&ses the question of whether these
individuals should be viewed as traitors and collaborators. For some, the
answer seems clear because they jojned the Nazis in actively figfiiting the
Red Army The nature of this violation of trust and loyalty appearwobvi-
ous. For ofiers, it is not so clear.
Should. resistance to Stalin"s regime, while professing toyally to Russia,
be cmsidered treasod Whose tmst and what loyalty were viobted? And
what exactly was its nature? Andrcyev prefers to call Chose Soviet citizens
who expressed their oppmitim to Slaljn through military, civil, and polit-
ical means the "Russian Liberation Movement," v The most crystallized
form of this oppctsition, in the shape of a military organization, W= the
military unit headed by Lieu tenant General Andrey Andreyevich VIasov,
This discussion shows how difficult it is ta adhere to technical defh~i-
tims of treason-and how lutile it is. The political, social, and military re-
ality in which the h s s i a n Liberatiun Movemnt operated q u i r e s us to
make moral judgments about who betrayed whom.
Other Soviet military residance units had been crcated b e f m Vlasov's
R.O.A., but VIasov gave these groups the power, respectabiliv, and impe-
tus they had lacked. However, during most of the war, even Vlasov's
strongest war effort was in the propaganda, front. M t until January 1945,
was he actually allowed. to crc3ate a rnjlitary unit. Thus, in reality, Vlasov's
"arn?yMwwas little more than words.
In the context of World War 11, resistmce to Stalin. took the form of de-
featism. Andrrzyev (1987) examines the debate regarding Sovict defeatlism
178 Vintalitzg Trrtsl and hyalty Durr'12g WurIcZ War 11: Part 2

very critically and argues that in mality the situatim was quite complex.
For example, the Soviets did not sign the Geneva Ctmventicm, and so it is
not clear to what extelzt their Paws were protected. West (2985) argues
that treason involves betraying the state" pprotection, but what kind. of
protectim did Stalin's ~ g i r n offer?
e TOthe extent that it did offer any pro-
tedian, what was the nature of this protectionVIrlasov, asserts Andreyev,
was basically a propaganda tool until Labout November 194.18 It is also
clear fiat by lieciding to o p d y join fie Nazis, Vlaslzv was entering an
immemsely complicated politic& a m a for hvlnich he lacked any trainhg
or experictnce.l%s Keegan points out, "Vlasov was . . . an idcalistic m n
who hated the tyranny of Stalin and made the mistake of seeing the Ger-
mans as potential liberators.""2"
Unfortunately, many documents relating to the R.0.A. were deliber-
ately destroyed out of fear that they would fall into Soviet hands and be
used as evidence. However, as time has passed, the threat has dimin-
ished, and more individuals have been willing to provide informatiosl.
However, as the context of Vlasov" actions becomes clearer, fie nabre of
fiis betrayal hecoms mnre probkmati.~.
The Nazi Wetrr~~lacht and the Red Army were locked in a titanic clash.
?"he ddection cJf a resourceful, high-ranking, and decorated officer is-
simply put-a vio:latim of both the trust and loyalty jnvested in that: offi-
cer by his country Thus, many Soviets viewed Vlasov as a traitor and an
opportunist. However, unfolding the context of that famous defection
creales uncertainties about the natusc of that loyalty and trust
The issue of Vtasov's betrayal must be juxtaposed against the ~ a l i t y in
which he functioned. His actions were certainly FnRumced by the cata-
clysmic events in which he took part. Thus, determhing whether Vlasov
was a traitor or a hero depends-almost completely n how one views
Stalin's rufe cJf the Sowiet URion, TechnicailL; Vlasow betrayed the trust
and loyalty hvested in him. However, one must consider what: it was that
he betrayed and his aspirat-ions to help create a dif-ferent Russia. Viewed
in this way, that is, ccmlparing the reality with the image, the issue of por-
traying Vlasov as a traitor becomes problematic.

Treason Within the Third Reieh

Although th headlng of this particular section may seem a bit strange,
Nazi Germany was a state, and it enacted laws and had a judicial
sy"t"m.21 What happened to people who were perceived to violate their
trust and loyalty to Nazi Germany and the ffihrer? Generallqi speaking,
like fiose defiled as traitors elsewhere, they were severely punished. The
brutality and rzlt.hless nature of the N'azi rclgilrrc only m d e that more pro-
nounced. As Zentner and Redurftig (f997) point out,
 Volksz7errat was a generic term for . . . high treamn, state treasrrm, and tesritur-
ial treason, among other such crimes. Any attack on the authority crf the state
or on the "idea of the Vofk Community" that underlay National Socialism
constituted treasrrm against the Volk. . . . High treason and state treason were
by nature the same crime, . . . Natimal Socialist criminal Law . . . accorded
the highest prioriq to the persecution of Vofk treason." (p. 2006)

Of course, in the totditarian nature of Nazi Germany, oppositicln to

Hitler; to Nazi ideology, or to the Nazi state was perceived as t ~ a s o nIt. is
thus well worth our while to look into some of the cases.

Hitler Charged with and Convicted of T m s m

It is, perhap". appropriate to begin this section by noting the fact that
Adolf Mirler h i m & was cha,rged with and emvicted o.f the crjrne of high
treason. In brief, here is the tale,
By 1923 Hitler was convinced that the end of the Germm Wimar Re-
public w s in sight. He thought this was an opportunity to enlist the sup-
port of the a m y and create a new nationalistic order for Germany. He re-
cruited W r l d War I generai Erish Ludendiorff to support this plot, and on
November 8,1,923, they launched the now f m o u s Beer-MaXI Pu6ch i,n Mu-
nich. When the Nazis marched on November 9 in the Munich streets in
the direction of the war ministry, police opened fire on them, caushg the
group of marchers to disperse, Thai: was the end of that failed m d arna-
teurish P~ifcIt.
Hitler w s caught and on February 26,3924, only about three mm&s af-
ter the fajled Pufc!~,was brottgnt. to trial (before a very sympathetic judge)
an a charge of high trcasm. Hitler would not have given up suck m op-
portunity and used the legal proceedings to launch a personalized propa-
ganda crnmpaig~~. His speeches the court were auno1Ig his very best, and
they obvjously left a strong impression. This, however, did not help much,
He was found guilty as charged and sentenced to five years in prison.
Hitler served d y nine months of the sentence. Eiis impriso
Landsberg am Lech was far from difficuilt, and his life in prison was mre
like life in a sanatorium.2qt was there that Hitler began to draft (by dic-
tating to Rudolf Mesti) his book Mein I(crmph kvhich surnnarized his polit-
icd and ideological philosophy and his prescribed direction of action.
It must be remembered that Ilitler was found guity of treason by the
Iegal o ~ a n ofs a democratically elected German government. However,
when Hitler came to power, he w d d not allow his political rivals to cm-
joy a similar toleramt and forgiving crirni11a1 justice system.2" conviction
on charges of treason in Hitler's brutal and cruel, Third Reich typically
memt the death penalty
1811 Vintalitzg Trrtsl and hyalty Durr'12g WurIcZ War 11: Part 2

The case of Adolf Hitlcr as a traitor illustrates the main problem in-
volved in treason. It was fie Weimar f\lepuhlic that viewed him as a trai-
tor. Most. certainly, Hitler and his suppctrters did not view it in that way
From their point of view#the very establishment of the Weinrar Republic
was the result of a betrayal. The trial of Hitler illustrates the clash of two
very differer~tsymbolie moral universes, one succeeding the other in a
rather quick fashion. Indeed, a mme generalized observation can be
made here: Leaders of an incoming regime can be vittwed as ""traitors'~o
the old, and vice versa.
Some of the statements Hitler made in public during his trial are worth
quothg. Having taken full rr-?sponsibilivfor planning the Putch, he said
that he was such a natior~alisticGerman that he ""wodd rather be hanged
in a Bolshevik Germany than perish under the mle of F-~ench swords," He
then added, ""Ewen if you judge us guilty a thousand times, the goddess of
the eternal court o.f kistory will laugh and tear up the verdict of this court,
but she pronomces us not guilty,"x hrthermore, as stated in Mein
I(lam~JHitler did not even accept the democratic rules of the game. His
politicai agenda was that for Germany to become powerful m d thrive, a
a
n
people-supported dictatorship was reytlired. He despised t:he constitu-
ticm of the Weirnar Republic (August 14,1919).
In 11924 the Weimar Repubhe had the authority and power to prosecute
and pu"j.sh Nlitler. VVithin thirteen years or so, the situation would be
completely reversed. Hitler had the opportunity to actualize Mthat he en-
visinned and preacl-ced as his political dream. It was, in fact-, a genuine
nightmare to free people in the rest of the world and-in the final analy-
sis-to Gemms as well.
Aside from Hitler 'S past record as a democratic state-cmvicted traitor,
it is worth our while to exmisre at least some of the more famous cases
that his ~ g i m persecuted
e as treason.

Resistance to Hitler
No act of m y mti-Hitler persol1 or group within Germmy marked the end
of Nazi Germany One can safely state that Hitl@r%r e g h e was never seri-
ously challenged or threatened from withir.1. It was the combined mditary
e h t of the Allies that ended the existence of that vilc regime. Howcver,
there was opposition to Hithr. That opposition was disorganized., antago-
nistic, hesitmt, and unable to unite for a meaningful coordinated action
aimed to elilninate Nazism. In fact, &though there were quite a few at-
tempts to assasshate Hitler ( k n z and Ptzhlc 1997:12&122), there was only
one time when Hitier c m e close to be actuatty killed, and that was the July
1944 faikd attempt to assassjnate fiim with a b o d eAny opposition wiffl.l,in
Nazi G e m m y faced a ruthkss and relatively efficient security police,
 Looking at the different resistant groups within Nazi Germany, Zim-
mermam points out:

There is no doubt that the contrasts among the different resisting groups,
and the tzreaknesses af their political and wcial perceptims, are of secondary
importance, The crucial factor was their willingness to defend the hvnor of
the human race apinst a total disintegratbn of Christian and human values
resulting from the unlimited rule of a political regime which was based an
an exaggerated use of force, ruthless brutality personality cult, idwlogicat
zealotry, cynicism, loathe for human values, corruption, and arrogance.=

It is important to note the moral and political.aspects of discussing the

opposition to Hitler. As Zirmermann points out, exmjning the "resjs-
tance" to Hitler can be used to ease guilty conscimces, incjicating that not
everyone was part of one of the darkest regimes in human history." The
more resistance one can find, the better. Overall, about 10,000 people we=
executed cm charges of disloyalty to Hitler 'S regime.
Another relevant question is, wfiat is the nature of resistance? C)n the
one hand, we have either individuals or groups who speak agaislst the
rc"gj,e or organize actions against it. On the other hand, we may have
such pam"ie forms of residance as expressing djsgust, ohectims, evad-
ing different tasks, and the like. Discussion of resistance in the Third
Reich typically bcuses on the first type and not on passive forms.
'There is a fair m o u n t of search m resistance i,n Nazi Germany" As it
is virtuatlq. impossible to review even most of it, 1 will fwus, briefly, on
several famous cases: the W ~ i t eRose, the July 20,194, assassination at-
tempt on Hitler's life, Dietrich Ronhoeffer, Casl Friedrich Gwrdela, hd-
miral Wikelm Cmaris, and Marlene Dietrich.

The White Rose, =ring the late 1"360s, the West was rocked by a series
of student revolts that threatened to destabilize regimes and alter social
oders. Those revdts were reseaded quite intensively However, during
al)that time, not many (if any one) cared to remeznber that- a small g r o q
of students at the University of Munich, supported by one faculty mem-
ber, chose to express their sense of horror at the Nazi regime. These rebels
orgmized a group of resistance wjthin the u~ziversityat the height of the
Nazi regirne in 1,942.The scope and magnitude of this "revolt" ((actually,a
very moderate expression of dissent) were minuscute compared to the re-
volts of the late f 960s. However, to do this as early as 1,942, against such a
ruthless regime, defistitelly took much integrity m d courage. They all took
a tremmdous risk and paid with their lives for their defiance. Their "ac-
tims""wcre mostly verbal, criticisms and dispersion of pamphlets, far less
than what so many students did FR 1968. Their story can be found in quite
182 Vintalitzg Trrtsl and hyalty Durr'12g WurIcZ War 11: Part 2

a few studies,28 as well as in the fact-based 1983 German movie The White
Rose. The essmce of that group's story is as follows.
"The n m e "the Wbite Rose"' refers to a group of studernts at Munich
University that lformed in 1942 and lasted into 1943, The students whose
names are most: frequently mentioned am Sophie (born 1921) and her
brother Hans (born 1,918) Schd, Wilie Graf, Chrjstoph Probst, Mexmder
Schmordi, m d one faculty member-Professor Kurt Huher.
Hans was a medical student, and SopPlie specialized in biology. Pro-
fessor Huber taught philosophy and encouraged the students to take
the rebellious stand, Students in the White Rose were in touch with stu-
dents from other universities. Although in mid-February t-ians and So-
phie participated in a demonstration in Munich, quite an occasion in
Nazi Germmy, their most overt action was dispersiSlg (anonymously)
pmphZets against the Nazi regime in which they called citizens to top-
ple the Nazi regjme of fear and terror: Tfie student-s began dispersing
the leaflets in mid-June 1942, and altogether, they produced six of them.
Following the surrender of Field Marshall Paulusfs 6th Army in Stalin-
grad (E;ebrun,ry2, 1913-31, the White Rose puhl,ished its sixth m d firnal
pamphlet. In it, it was stated: "Three hundred and thirty thousand Ger-
man men were senselessly and ir~sponsiblydriven to their deaths by
the brilliant strategy of th& world W,r I corporal,. Fiihrer, we t h d
you. . . . We grew up in a state where all free expressjon of opinion has
been suppressed.''
The b u j l d i ~ ~superintende~nt,
g MIho wifnes~edthe Schotls dispersing
their latest batch of leaflets irm an upper floor, reported. them to the
Gestapo on February 48,4943. Munich tlni:versity headed at that time by
an S.S. officer, dmounced their acli\rity. -Together with four &hers, they
were armsted and brought before the Nazi People" Court ruled by the in-
famous and dreaded ""hanging judge" "8land dreisler on February 22,
1943," "Frcisler found the SCholls and Probst gu&y of treason m d sen-
tenced them to death, Supposedly, Rrrichsfijhrer Himmler was not inter-
ested in creating martyrs and demanded that the execuf;ictnbe delayed.
However, his telegram arrived too late and the condemned were be-
headed. Prokssor Huber, Alexander S~hmorell~ and Willie Graf were ar-
rested later. Their trial took place in Munich in Freisler's colartroom m
April 19,1943. They w r e found guilty of treason and sentenced to death.
OShers were sentenced to prison and fines,
Born in 1893 in SLvitzerlartd, Professor Huber taught philosophy and
pvychnlogy at Munich Wniversity from 1925, whex he was appointed
professor in 1926. Huber opposed. Nazism and was the m e who helped
the kholls draft their leaflets. He was beheaded on July 13,1943, Alexm-
der Sehnnorc311 was also beheaded on that day. W i e Cral: was beheaded
on October 12,1943.
 :It is interesting to note that on February 3,1945, Freislier was lPcilled dur-
ing an Allied air attack from a bomb dropped by m Americm plane. This
happened in the mid,st of another treason case. The trial was of Frau Solf
and her daughter Grafin Ballestrm, who were associated marginaXly
with the July 20, 1944, plot to kill Hitler, Mlhich brings me to our next
topic.

The July 20, 194.4, Assassination. Attempt Against Hitler, Aside from
an atrt-emptto plant a defective bomb inhis airpllane (March 13,7,943), and
von Gcrsdorffk ffailed attcsnpt to personallqi bomb him (March 19431, the
only time Hitler really came close to being killed was the assassination at-
tempt on July 20, 1944..'The person behind this failed assassination at-
tempt was Colonel Count Claus von Stauffenherg (born 1907). That Stauf-
fenberg was a rnilitary m m was m coincidence; the relationship between
Hitler and the Germm military w s complicated." T h e had dways
been a group of military officers who were unhappy with Hitier % regime.
tlcrwever, for the most part, off-icers were. unable and umilling to coordi-
nate m effective opposition to Hitler. Van StauEenberg fhally managed
not o d y to organize such a g r o q but also took upon himseLf the risk of
smggling a suitcase with a time bomb into Hitler" headquarters at Ras-
te~~burg, East Pmssia (hewn as the "Wolf" Lair"). 'The bomb exploded,
as plmned, m July 20,1944, at 12:42 IW., causing much damage to prop-
erty and woundhg and killing several officers, but somehow Mitler sus-
tained only minor injuries, although he was only twelve feet away from
the explosion.
Hitler's rage cuhinated in the identification and capture of all the can-
spi,rators, even those who wcre o d y remotely associated with it (for ex-
am*, Field Marshal Ewin Rommel), and the execution of mast of them,
sometimes in a vicious mmnele, Overall, almost 5,000 individuals were
executed, as Hitler utilized the opportunity to eliminate many of his op-
ponents. Clarifying the Nazi mnral and political boundaries in this lethal
er bmught the Nazi Party tc:,new peaks of power; the failed assassi-
nation plot was used to rcldefine the ReiCXlls moral bomdarics and to reaf-
firm trust in and toyalty to Ad.ol.f Flitler," This was accomplished by suc-
cessfuily constructing the conspirators as traitors. Momower, loyalty to
the Nazi fGhrer was constraded as Che equivdent of honor. "&r Monor
is Loyalty" was the motto of the S.S. and an oath by which they swore.
Emm the Nazi Party point of view this failed caup was an effective tool
.for generating more social inlegration and cohesion around Hitla at- a
very difficult time.32

Dietrich Bonhoeffer. Barn in 1907, Dietrich BoAoeffer was a remark-

able German Protestant theologian who opposed Nazi GermmyYHe was
184 Vintalitzg Trrtsl and hyalty Durr'12g WurIcZ War 11: Part 2

arrttsted on April 5/ 19113, and sent to Bucbenwald. During this time, he

wrote some of the most movilizg documents agah~stNazi G e r m y and
detailed his ideas for a new form of rc1igios:ity. Me was later tried by a
summar). court-martial and executed, at Flossenburg concentration camp
on Agril S,3945. 'There were other Germans who shared Bonhwffer's
point of view m e of them was the popular World War I U-boat cornmm-
der Martin Nimoller, winner of the Iron Cross, who left the navy to be-
come a pastor. Although at first he supported Hitler's ~ g i m ehe , was
later cowinced that Hitier posed a genuine danger to Germany and sided
with Bonhoeffer in opposhg the regime. His activities led to charges of
treason, and he was sent tc:,a concentration camp, where he spent eight
~ears.3~

Car2 Friedrich Goerdefer, Car1 Friedrich Goerdeler (born 1884) was a

jurist, lord mayor of Leipzig, and a rnajor c-ivilian figure in anti-Hitler
conspiracy. Althaugh in the early phases of Hitler" regime he was part of
the administration, in 1936-3937 he became disillusioned with Nazism
and began to distance hhsclf from the Nazis and to opedy oppose t k m ,
A personally powerful persuaske, and impressive m n , he became one
of the main figures in the July 20 assassillation plot, lending it civilian
support and moral integrity. Following the failure of the plot, he was
idmtit'ied as one of the main conspirators, arrested, and sentenced to
death. He was hanged on February 2,1945.M

Admiral Wilhelim Canaris. Admiral Wlhelm Canaris was one of the

more devious, enigmatic, yet interesting figures of German opposition.
Born in 1,887,he began a naval career in 1905 and served in naval intelIi-
gence during Wosld War I and participated in several daring opem"tons,
Afkr the war, he remained in the Geman navy. In 3935 Captain Cmaris
became h a d of the Ahwehr and was later prmoted to the rank of
admiralass
"Though small at first, the Abrueltr J ~ R Wto become a large a d important
organization by the begjnning o( Wctrld War 11. It seems quite clear that
Cmaris was never too thrilled about Hitler, m d both he and the Abwehr
were a locus of resistmce to Hitler. Unwilling to openly express opposi-
tion to Mitler, Canaris conspired against Mitler under the cover of his j&.
He thus exhibited behaviors that involved plots, subplots, ambivalence,
uncertainty, m d the like. The "mystery" around him is due-at least in
part-to this ambivalence. Thus, Canaris pretended trust in and loyalty to
Hialer, but in fact had pr&a:bIy none.
The Nazi security service was not ignorant of Gmaris" ambivalence.
Evenhaally, the suspicions against:him accumulated to such a degree that
in February 1944 Hitler ordered Canaris to stay out of Berlk, and the Ab-
.ioehu was put under the directorship of 5.5. ReichsfGhrer Heinrich Hirnm-
ler, hlthough Canaris wap; not involved in the July 20 attempt to assassi-
nate Mit-ler, he kvas arrested following the conkssion of one of the con-
spirators. There was plenty of information leading to the conclusion that
he was definite not loyal to the Third Reirh. :He was hanged in April
1945 at Flossenburg.
Assor" conclusim+Iearly reflecting a moralizing point of view-is
that Canaris was a ""gnuine German patriot" who opposed Hitler and
tried to both be effective as an intelfigence officer and rcduce the clamage
caused by Nazism. Unfortunate@ for Cstnal-is, the journey down this dou-
ble road could m t last for very Long." hmvell and Fraenkel's analyt;is
(1969) asserts trhat the nobility and religious idealism of conspirators like
Canaris made them less effective as conspirators because they were inhib-
ited morally as well as physically, &sisting Hitler revired some serious
soul-searching, &termination, stubborn resolution, and a strong sense of
both purpose and righteousness. However, Canaris-despite his proven
as ambivalent. :Ele hated violence; as m intelligence perscm,
~ t confront hirn, and fie
fie p ~ f e r r e dto o~ttmanezlverhis o p p o n e ~ than
seemed to enjoy intl-igue for its own sake. He must have loved his coun-
try from a traditimai, right-wing point of view, in which Hitler was per-
ceived as a destrayez

Marlene Dietrich. Marlene Dietrich, one of the world" most famous

entertahers, was also involved in some interestkg maral issues"Born on
December 27,11901, in Berth, she developed an extraordirrary career as an
actress. Her career took off following her unforgettable role as the seduc-
tive cabaret sjnger Lola, in the 1930 Cesman movie T!ze Blur Angel (di-
rected by Josef von Sternberg), An anti-fascist, Dietrich left Germany in
1933 and refused to rr.h;lm until 1945 because cJf the Nazi regime. W e n
Hitler =quested that she r e k m to Germny (and mke films there for
Nazi Germany), she flatly refused. From 1937 an she lived mostly in the
United States and acted in a number of movies. Dietrich became an
American citizen (in 1,937), and during World. War XX she entertained
American soldiers, wearing a U,S, Army uniform. Many Gcrmans never
forgave Dietrich fur choosing not to align hersell' with Nazi Germany
during World War 11.
:In 1960 she appeared in Germany, but her serits of performances were
disturbed and t"hreatened by demonritraticms and bomb threats..Some ed-
itorials characterized her as a traitor*Dietrieh reacted by rehsing to re-
turn to Germany. After her death on May 6, 1992 (in Paris), she was
buried, according to her wishes, in Berlin, next to her mothelr, 111 1993, her
marble tombstone was ~rmdalized.However, no desecration of her grave
has occurred since then.
186 Vintalitzg Trrtsl and hyalty Durr'12g WurIcZ War 11: Part 2

:In November 1996 the municipaliv of Berlin cmsidcred naming a city

street after her. Reports in the intcmational press test;@ that followhg the
annolmcement, representatives of the neighborhood imoived (Shonen-
berg) received tetters and phone calls from indiviciuals who characterized
Dietrich as "non-Cerman'hnd as a ""t;raitor." Dietrich" choice to not
trust, to not be loyal. to, and to not align herself with Nazi Germany has
been interpreted as treason by those who chose to embrace Nazism. This
case illustrates how problematic the characterization of treason can he for
those involved in a moral struggle, even in what athewise seems to be a
clear-cut case*

The Far East

msserstefn (1998) exami~~es some specific forms of callaboration by dif-
ferent individuals, some of them in key political ,and economic positions,
especially in Shanghai during the Japanese occupation. Foot points out
that the cmtext of collaboration fn the Far East was very differat than in
Western Europe.37 To begin with, many Far Eastern cowltries were u~lder
colonial occupation prior to the Japanese irtvasjon. Enitially many of these
countries welcomed the Japanese because they felt that the Japanese werl,
liberators who were about to grant these countries independence. As time
passed, that tragic misperception was exposed, forcefully and brutally.
Even wben the Japanese did grmt some form of indepcmdence (for exam-
ple, Burma and the Philippines), it was a charade; in Rumta, some of the
leaders collaborated with the pre-Japanese colonial power. It became ub-
vious that t.he last tbing the Japanese conquerors were i n t e ~ s t e din was
the political, economic, or social well-behg of the nebvly co~~quered na-
t h s . The main goal of the occupation was to enrich the cmquemrs. The
conquerors demonstrated their contempt for non-Japanese people
through the humiliatim and degradation of- the vanquished.
This is the backgrounlt for such p h e n m n a as the "comfort women"';""
the Rape of Nanking, where a ~ a r t ofa a mftlion people were slaugh-
tercd wjr-hin six weeks;"g the Japanese fmperial Forces' special unit, which
was involved in a human experimentation program;" aand the Bataan
Death March," b r i n g wbich Japanese troops forced about '?tf,(lO starv-
ing Allied prisoners of war to march 1115 kitometers from Mariveles to
prison camps in San Fernando and a h g that way the POWs were
""beaten, clubbed, and baylmeted.'""zft is estimated that up to 14,0W died
along the way.43
Thusl while local people may have hoped that the Japanese conquest
rnight free them, the reality was that it =placed one colmid occupation
with mothet; whirh was, illmost respedS, much worse and more ruth-
less. This situation was similar to the situation in Eastern Europe during
the Nazi occupation that drove w a y Stalin" ddictatoriai regime.
Coll,aboratio~~ with the Japanese under these conditions was not very
appealing. However, local people seemed to collaborate in one specific
area, a d that was in the &liberate campaign by the Japanese to erase all
dtural, po:[itical, and econonnic-of the occupatim of the Ameri-
can, Dutch, French, and British colonial, powers in Southeast Asia. Tn the
long run, that particular aspect of the otherwise brutal and rulhless
Japanese occupation may have been useful in cultivathg local people's
striving for independence, by providing them with an opportunity to for-
mulate their own aspirations in the political, cultural, and econmic ar-
eas. Clhim provides a good illwtration for both the brutal Japanese occu-
pation and later independence,
It is well wlrrth ncrting that some of the Japanese d i t a r y cclmmanders
did try to set up colfaborationist puppet Chbese governments, for exam-
ple, in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia by the Kwantung Army, the North
China Area Armypand the Central China Expeditimary A r q Mthough
none of these Japmese a t t e ~ ~ pwast s very successful (they were discred-
ited from the beginning), some of them did control various resources and
had coexive powers. Perhaps one of the m m famous of these was the
Kwantung Army's conquest of Manchuria m d the creation of the puppet
state of Manchukuo headed by the empemr Pu-K, fn fact, the Japanese
commander of the Kwantung Army-General Minami Jiro-was "ap-
poi,nled" Japanese antbassador to Manchukuo. Generd Jiro, si.mply put,
governed Manchukuo (with very littte-if my-guidance or control from
Tokyo). I'u-Ui, t.he p u ~ p e Chinese
t ruler of Manchkuo from 1932 (and
"the last emperor of China")),was imprisoned in Siberia bp the Sovi,ets af-
ter their invasion of China in 1945. He was returned to Chha in 1950,
where he was imprisoned again. Havil^lg converted to communism, he
was released from prison in 3,959, and until his death in 3,967 be work&
as a gardener in Pekhg" bbotanical gadens m d in the Chinese depart-
ment of historical archives.
'The Japanese were also able to create puppet Chinese armies, the sizes
of which are still under debate. However, these were not effective fighting
forces and were not trusted by the Japanese themselves. As in other
places (for example, Norway and France), they became associated with
betrayaX.44
By most Wstem criteria used after World War 11, I'u-Ui was a traitor.
He collaborated with the occupykg Japanese forces. Dear and Foot poht
out that he accqted the Japanese offer to become the new state" chief ad-
ministrator with "eagerness."'@Tme, he had been entJRr0nc.d at the age of
three as Emperor Hsum Yung, but he was deposed in the IN1 ClChjxlese
188 Vintalitzg Trrtsl and hyalty Durr'12g WurIcZ War 11: Part 2

revolution. Thus, his personal motivation to rule the Chinese may have
overc.ome his pofiticat and culktral sensibilities, and he agreed to become
a puppet emperor ""ruling" part of China. He may have atso hoped, like
@isling, Pktain, Vlasov, and a host of other European politicians, to gain
some independmce for his cowtry. Regadless of h w c ~ n elooks at it, Pu-
Yi did colla'Llorate wit-h the Japanese occupation, certainIy to their benefit,
It is interestislg to note that despite this fact, he was allowed to live his
nabral life (he died in 1967 at the age of sixty-one) and was not etiecuted
like European collaborators. Although one should, not make sweeping
generaliizations from this single special case, the way Pu-Yi was trezlted
might prompt some tl-toughts &out possible diffewnces between Euro-
pean and Chinese forms of justice.46

It is not too easy to find Japmese forms of betrayal, However, hnio rather
famous ones, from very different perspectives, involve Ozaki Hotsurni
and wfiat has become h w n as Tokyo Rose. X &scu,ss Tokyo Rose in de-
tail in Chapter 7; here E discuss, briefly#the case of Ozaki Hotsumi, To un-
derstmd the context, one needs first to review the case of molther famous
Wctrld War I1 spy-Rehard Sorge.

Richasd Sol.ge is often descrjbed as one of the most successfuli known

spies. He was born in 1895 in Baku, Russia to a Russian mother and a Ger-
man father (a mini.ng engineer who worked for the h p e r i d Russim Oil
Company). At the age of three he was brought to Germany, where he
grew up. Zn Octcrber 1944 he volunteered to serve in the German Army in
World War I on the western front, where he was wounded three times.
Uurhg the last two years of the war, he studied. at the universities of
Berlin, Kie1, and Hamburg. After the war he obtained a Ph.D. in political
science from Hamburg University.
Disillusioned by the devastation crcated by Wosld Miar I, Sorge gravi-
tated slowly toward communism. His commitment to communism be-
came much firmer after the October IN17 Russim Revolution (he later be-
came an admirer of Stalin), Serge" full conversion to communism
o c c u r ~ dprobahly in the early 19205, l-fe joined the C o m u n i s t Party and
begm to recruit peaple to communis~~., Sorge worked as a history teacher
in Hamburg, Germany, but his at-tempts to ~ecruitmembers to commu-
nism durkg school hours caused the schoolmaster to dismiss hhn. His
commitme~~t to cmmunism then led him to Moseow.
 In 1924 Sorge moved to Moscow and even acquired Soviet citizenship.
'T"here he began to work fnr the International Liajsm Department of the
C l o m w ~ i sInterndional.
t Following the end of the war, he also operated
as an agent for the Comintern." He kveloped the cosmopolitm exis-
tcnce of a Comfntr~rnagent on different assipments ir., Europe and Asia.
mere he was recruited to become a spy by Dimitry Mmuilsky, head of
the foreign intelligence division of the Godntern. His tsainjn.g in
Moscow (1924-1923 resulted in missions to Scandinavia (192q, the
United States (192cLos Angeles, to cojfect information on the film in-
dustry), and Britah (1929-an unclear mission in London). Sometime
during 1929-1931) Gmeral Yan Karlovich Berzin, head of the iz~tdigence
unit of the Red Army' managed to wcruit Sorge to work for his depart-
ment. From that time on, Sorge was actually working for the Soviet mili-
tary intdigmce orgmization-the G.R.U.48
Berzin sent Sorge to Shanghai (1930). His mission was to solidify Soviet
espionage actkitics there and provide the Suviets with information Labout
the sihlation in China and about Chiang Kai-shek. As Japan was emerg-
ing as a cent-rd force inthe Far East, Sorge w s recalled to Mosco\vI \zrhere
he was involved in lengthy discussions about the hture direction of So-
viet inteligence efforts in the ~ g j o nn. e s e discussims ended with his as-
signment to Jmpm.
However, before going to Japan, Sorge went to Germany. There be be-
came a ccnrespclndent for several newspapers and a member of the Nazi
Party; eventually he developed a close relationship with the Nazi leader-
ship. These activities were part of a plan of purposefuI deception. Sorge
was playing the role of a dedicated, trusted, and &voted Nazi but was, in
fact, using this guise as a cover for spyistg inJapan for Stab*
The plan workcd almost perfectly Sorge, a Soviet spy, was perceived
by the Nazis as one of them. As a trusted cclrrespondent for the Frank-
Brier Zeitla~g,he traveled to Tokyo, where hc aXso becme the p ~ s at- s
tach6 in the German Embassy (October 1933).Hjs position in the German
Embassy gave him access to the information available there (including
iles, messages, and covert discussions). 'ThusI Stalin had h Tcrkyo a spy
who bad access not only to Japanese sources but to German secrets as
well. Soqe gassed d l the informatim at his disposal to his c~peratorsin
the Red Army intelligence from 7,933 to 1941. Sorge, however, did not
work alone. From Tokyo he operated a spy network.
?"he Japanese secret ser\iice-Kempai Tai-very d w l y closed fn on
Sorge and his ring of spies. Japanese electronic engineers wcre monitor-.
ing the radio transmissions sent by one of Sorge's m n , Max Clausen, but
experienced ciiWculties pjnpointing its origin." Both 5eth and Rower note
that Sorge" Japanese lover-Kiyomi-ws working for the Kempai Tai,
1911 Vintalitzg Trrtsl and hyalty Durr'12g WurIcZ War 11: Part 2

and so he was very closely watched.%On OctObes 15, 1941, to the corn-
plete shock of the Germans, he was arrcllsted in his home in Meguro. Eol-
lokving- Sorge's arrest, his ring of spies (about thirty-five members alto-
gether) was exposed m d its members arrested. The Japanese were very
successfut in efiminating Serge's spy network completely.
.hga,in, Seth and Rower note that S o r g spent the evening and night be-
fore his arrest with the w m a n who made his arrest possible-l(iyomi-
and that she was in the hhase at the time he was arrested.51 From Sorge's
paint of view, Kiyomi violated his trust and loyalty and he11ce betrayed
him. However, much like Blblical Dclilah, K y m i never had a genuine
loyalty to Sorge, and his trust in her was thus mfsplaced and founded on
deceit. Sorge's trial took place on. September 29, 1943. He was sentenced
to dea&, but his execution was delayed until November 7,1944, when he
was hawed in Sugamcr Prism in Tokyo. In 1947Kiyomi was shot tcr death
outside a club where she used to perform, "probabiy by agents of Srnersh
attempting to avenge the death of their brilliant spy"" The Soviets
warded-gcrsthu.mou.sly-Sorge the "Hero of the Soviet Union'hnd
honored his melnory by creating a s t m p carrying his pictw.3
Because of the nature of StaliPl" rreghe, it is not entkely clear to what ex-
tent Stalh tmsted the infornation passed cm to him by Serge." Hwever,
there is little doubt rcgasding the value of the intellige~~ce passed on by
Sorge. Two very irnportmt pieces of infornation were passed. on to Stalin.
fist, S t a h was given a three-week a$vance noticr about Hitler's plms to
invade the %vkt Union. Sorge &armed Stdin in May 1941of the planned
German attack on the Soviet Union and specified June 20 as the date of at-
tack. 'I'he actuat attack took @ace on June 21. Staiin, however, discounted
the hformatio~~. Second, %rge hformed Stalh that Japan had no intell-
tions of initiating hostilities against the Soviet Union. Sorge estimated,
based on his G e m a n and Japanese sources, that fapan" strategic. interests
were in southern Asia and the Pacific and not in Siberia. This enabled
Stalin, perhaps not too enthusiastically or tmsthgly, to p d i army units out
of eastern Siberia in the fall of 1941and repcwition them tcr defend Mwcoclr.
This, most certady was very csudal, in the Kanle of Mosco\v. If Stalixl had
more fully tmsted his man in Tokyo, the combination of these two items of
i n f o m a ~ o nwould have mabled him to move milibry units from the bor-
ders with Jilpan to face the Nazi Maim much earlier and more forcefully.
a h e r important pieces of hformation prwided by Serge" espionage ring
were the forecaswg of "the Japmese military mutiny of February 1936and
the Japmese invasion of China in July 1937."55

Ozaki Hotsunzi
.Although Riehard Sorge is a very promhent fjgure in the literature of
W r l d \Nar 11 espionage, Sorge"s primary Japanese collaborator, Ozaki
Hotsumi, is often omitted. However, without Ozaki, much of Sorge's
valuable intellit;ence work could not have been accompl-ished.Sorge even
adxnjtted that when he wrote in 1941 that Ozaki "'was my first and m s t
important real confederate. . . . Our relationship, both business and per-
sonal, was perfect. The information he coltected was the most accurate
and the best that I ever obtained from any Japanese source, and I formed
a close personal friendship with him at once."sh For many Japanese,
Ozaki is considered the traitor. The letters that Ozaki wrote his wife, Eiko,
from prison were published as a book irn 1,946, and it b e m e a best-selkr,
sellhg more than 10U,1)(10 copies inf apm between 1946 and 1962.'7
Johnson's 1990 book, An Insfatzce of^ Treasorz: Oznki Hotsuilrzi nrzd fhe Sorgc
f(ilqI providcs a very detailed xcount of C)zalti%treachery fnr the
English-speaking audience. I shall., therefore, describe the case in brief.
Ozaki Hotsumi was born in 1901 in 'l'okyo but raised in Taiwan (t-hcn For-
mosa), where hjs fatkr worlted as m editor. He attended Tokyo fxnperial
Wniversity (1919-1925), from which he graduated in 1925.Fdowing his
father" footsteps, he joined the Japanese newspaper Asaki Shinzbla~in
May 1926 as a reporter, Me was not very successful at a city desk job, and
in Octdber 1922 (at his own request), he was transkrred to the Chinese sec-
tion of the Osaluz Amhi. m I I e he was sbdying, specializing in the "Chi-
nese problelx," kalso used his time to study Marxism and communism,
A month after his move to Osaka, Ozaki married his siste~in-lawAl-
thou$ such a marriage wollld have received little notice in any Western
culture, it was extraordhary in Japm.58 However, cmtrary to a naive as-
sumption, Ozaki did not "steal" his brothefs (Hostami) wife (Eikct). Eiko
and Honami's marriage was goirtg nowhere, and they had separated in
1927. 'The Ozaki-Eiko romance developed during the sprjng m d stlmmer
of 1927. During tbe summer, Hnnami married another woman, and Eiko
was free to remarry*Ozaki's move to Osaka in October 1927 was followed
by Eiko moving there in November, m d the two were married.39 HOW-
ever, it seems that Ozaki was not very faithful to his wife. He apparently
violated both her trust in him and his loyalty to her, as he had several
mistresses.@
:In 1928he was assigned a comspondent post in Shanghai, where h re-
mained until 1932. Ozaki and Eiko"s only daughter, k k o , was born there
on Novennber V , f 929, <)zalci%fateful meeting with Sorge took place in
1930, probably in Orrtober or Movembet:
It is interesting to note that the woman who inf;roducedOzaki to Sorge
was Ms. Ag~zesSmedley, a traitor in her own right. Agnes was born in
Missouri m d committed herself to anticolonialism in 1917.hl She was an
active member of the Socialist Party In 1918 Agnes w a s indicted on
charges of espionage, She was part of an Indim nationalist spy ring, who
contacted the Gemaxls in order to smuggle weapons and propagmda,
and she was inwolved in schemes aimed at underminfng British colonial
192 Vintalitzg Trrtsl and hyalty Durr'12g WurIcZ War 11: Part 2

rule, After her arrest, she moved. to Berlin, continuing to support the tn-
dim nationalist cause. Zn Nwernber 1928, Agnes travcled to C h a as a
correspondent fos a German newspaper and involved herself in the Chi-
nese revolutionary movemestt, Later that year, she moved to Sfnanghai
and became Sargefsassistant in ~ c m i t i n gmembers for his spy ring and
pmhbly became his rnistrcss as well (for a while at least).bz
As bhnson points out, Sorge and Ozaki li.ked, each other from the first
moment they met. They discovered that tbey both despised the foreign
imperiaiist intemel~tionin China At that time, Qzalci thought that Sorge
(he actualfy met blrn when Sorge called himself '"Johnson"") somehow
~ p r e s m t e dthe Communjst Intematilmal, and he thus believed that he
was assisting the Chinese revolution by providing the Comintern with
aid. Only after his arrest in 1941, did he learn that Sorge was working for
Soviet military fntelligence.
Qzaki never joined the C o m u n i s t Party, but he was what Johnson
refers to as a ""poto-communist,"' believing that Japan" better future lay
with some form of co unist social order. By today's standards, Ozaki
was probcrlbly a liberd who abhorred fascisln and had a strong Marxist
tendency. The link betwcm Ozaki and Sorgs was not mly personal but
expressed a deep ideological commitment to a Marxist, c o m u n i s t
worldview as w d . However, it is fair to quote kom one of Qzaki's lettms
to his wife, Eiko: " h a m not first and foremost a Cammunist,"~"hnson
adds: "The most sipificmt tribute to his fndependence was paid him by
his judge, Takada Tadashi, nfter the trial, Takada privately said that
Ozaki was a man of virtue, devoted to his ideals, and the very model: of a
patriot. "a
W e n OzaE left Shanghai in 1932 m d returned to Qsaka, he broke all
contacts with Sorge until 3934. h r i n g this interval s o m critical events
to& place: the hlfay 15, 3932, assassination of the Japanese premier by
naval aca&rny cadek; the Fcbrwary 20,1933, arrest and mzlrder of the fa-
mous Japanese novelist Kcibayashi Takiji at the Tsukiji police station in
Tokyo; and the February 27, 1933, burning of the Gclrman Reichstag.
When Sorge met Ozaki in M y and asked him to help the ComiMern,
Ozaki agreed." %cge had deceived Ozaki about the true nature of his
mastctrs; they were a prcrfessiclnal espionage organization, not a bona fide
ideological group.
Ozaki established hin\self as one of the m a h fapanese commentators
m China. Ilc. was intelligent and shrewd and had. a sharp eye and a clear
miad, His analyses were read by many people and infl,uenced deejsion-
makers. Although he left China in 1932, his ana2yses were accurate and to
the poht. tle kept warning the Japanese government: about the rise of
Chhese naticmaiism as a result of the provocations committed by the
Japanese Army, and he noted that this nationalism served well the hter-
ests of the Chinese Communist Party. Between 1937 and 1940, he pub-
lished six hooks. Ozaki's expertise on China affairs was not a ""cover." He
was indeed a genuhe expert on China. During the Sko-Japanese War,
Ozaki provided, continuous evaluations of the situation. Mareover, he
was appointed as a cmsultant to Japanese premier Kmyoe's first cabinet
m d was hvolved h official research. Thus, Ozaki had direct access to the
highest echelons of the Japanese ruling network, Since Sorge was at-
tached to the German Embassy in Tokyo, he had access to the highest-
level Germm reports. It is no w o ~ ~ dthen e r that between the two of them,
such high-level intelfigence was securcd fur Stalin,
After Sorge was arrested, C)zaki's turn came. He was arrested on the
same day that Sorge was, that is, October 15,1941. 'This was the last time
Eiko saw him until 1943. However, while in prison, Ozaki wrote Eiko
more than 200 letters (between November 1941 and November 1944).
mese letters were published in 1946, and they provide hsight into a c m -
plex man. As fohnson points out, much of what we know about Ozaki is
from these letters.
CJ)zaE% trial opened on May 31,1943, and on Septe~~ber 29,1943, Judge
Takada sentmced h h to death. An appeal. was presented in February 29,
1944, and reached the supreme court on Maxh 5. April 5, the supmme
court rcljected the appeal (because, amnng other things, Ozakj was still
considered a Marxist). Other appeals were ux.lsuccessful, m d on the
moming of Nowember 7,1944, Ozaki was hanged (with Rchard Sorge) at
Sugarno prison. Thus ended the lives of two extremely rcmarka:ble m m
com~nitted,to a similar ideology.
Alfiough Johnsm asserts that Ozaki is considered the greatest traitm
in Japanese history, one needs to mderstand the context of his acts of
treason. To begin with, Ozaki was Japanesef that is, part of the Japanese
collecthe. He most certainly vicrlakd both the trust invested in him by
the Japmese m d their loyalty at a mast difficult period hJapan" history
He pretended to be trustful and loyal but in fact passed his country's
most secret intentions to a hostile nation. By all criteria, Ozaki fits very
W& the charackrization of a traitor*His agreexnent-to help Sorge resulted
from his belief in some i n t e ~ ~ t a t i form
v e of Marxism. Thusl both Sorge
and Ozaki were motivated by ideotogical Easms. Both were very keen
~"liticaicommntators and journalists, m s o n points out that while
Sorge was feeding his Soviet operatives with classified intefiigmce, he
provided the Nazis with regular political anrxlyses, Mlhich they valued
quite highly-"" Ozaki established hixnsel, as quite an authority on China,
and Sorge esthlished. himself as quite m expert mJapan,
:111 some mspects, Ozaki was a true believer in a Marxist ideology. His
vision for Japan was a socialist-commw~istfuture, and he f c t that such a
future was a much better alternative to the type of fanatical Japanese na-
194 Vintalitzg Trrtsl and hyalty Durr'12g WurIcZ War 11: Part 2

tionalism he was wjtnessing, In his own mind, he was certainly con-

winced that he was helping to grwent the ascendancy of fascism. How-
ever, rather than c o m out in the open and fight for his views, he pre-
tended to be foyaX to the p~vailingnationalistic view, while he secret+
tried to help Japan" enemy. The type of '"patriotism" C)zaki displayed re-
mains a subject for debate. Indeed, Johnson documents the attempts of
some Japanese groups to rehabilitate and construct Ozaki as a hero.67
tlcrwever, "undoing"' Ozaki's t r w o n may be difficult or even impossible.
Thus, working in stealth and di,sguising one's true ideological ident.ity
may have a lasting negative social price.

JapaneseAmericans
EolloMling the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor (December 7 ,
1941), Americm authorities felt sa threate~~ed that they decided to intern
around 120,OUO American rclsidents with Japanese origi""(most of whom
were American citizens). Despite t-he fact that President Roosevelt had no
reliable iutformation suggestiq that these Arnerican citizens were in-
volved in subversive activities, and that such measurGs were not sag-
gested or taken agai11s.t Italian or German Americans, the p r e d e n t
sig11c.d executive order 9066 on Feitlruary 19, 1942, which gave the mili-
tary the authority to intern Japanese Americms. Un March 2,1942, Lieu-
tenant General DeWitt, head of Western Defense Command, declared
ClaEfomja, Oregon, and I"lashixlgto11 to be areas Trom which t?ll residents
of Japanese descent should be excluded. Consequently, around 110,000
Japanese Americans (of whom about 64 percent were American citizens)
were forced to leave their homes and bushesses m d sent to one of ten re-
location centers.
These Japanese Americans were f o ~ e dto abandcm their homes, prop-
erty, status, friends, and interests i,n their communities m d pressed into
hard labor. The unsubstantiated suspicion was that they canstituted a
,potmtial (or actual) traitors, and that their supposed loyalty
to their cotmtry of origin-Japm-was such that they would necessarily
violate their loydty to the United States and its trust hthem. That is, they
would betray their hmerican citizenship. The US. Supreme Court ini-
t i d y uphd the relocation polirsy but i,n 2944 declared that the detention
of persons whose loyalty was not cornpromised was uncon
ent camps were thus closed in 1944, but Japanese
contir~uedto experience discrimination. However, one development
helped to counter this discrimination: the heroic battle performance of the
Nisei.
'The Nisei, or Japanese American troops, fought valiantly and proved
their toyaXty numerous times. Units involving fdisei, as wetl as indkidual
soldiers, were repeatedly awaded military citations. Certahlp, the coura-
geouverformance of Japanese American units duriz~gthe war hetped
neu.t.ralize the feerings jnvolved in the incarceration of other Japanclse
Rmericms.@The memorable 1951 rnotim picture G o f i r Broke iocuses on
the M2n$ Regimental Combat Team, which was composed of Nisei, sus-
tained heavy casualties in 1944-19.3-5, and won m y colnntendations for
vaior, including a Congressional.Medal of Hmor.b9

EETYP*
During World War 11, Egypt was ruled by King Farouk (1920-1965).
British rule of Egypt was resented by Egyptian nationalists, and m n y
Egyptians were striving for nativnal independencc,m Farouk displayed a
~ l u c t a npro-British
t stand (to which he was bound by a treaty he siwed
with Great Britain) but retained a pro-Axis gover~zmexrt.Thus, he ap-
pointed a pro-Nazi prime mixlister, and he and some nationalist officers
such as Gamal Abdel Nasser and h w a r Sadat (both later became Egyp~an
presidelzts) culfivated hopes for a G e r m victory because they believcd
that such a victory would get them closer to national independerne. As
Weinberg" smcmumental work points out, given the pditical and social
nature of Nazi Germany, such a belief could, only be characterized as ""eoo
ridiculous to be worthy of serious discussion,"n That belief trmslated it-
self into actions as they maintained contacts with the Germans. Mihat
these Egyptians did not comprehend was that Germm rule would be sig-
nificantly more oppressive than the BritisE9.7"
Mihen the Axis victoric.~,led by Rommel's Afrika Korps, in the North
African desert threatened Cairo in 1942, Farouk was forced by the British
to dismiss his pm-Nazi prime minister, and his pro-Nazi officers were ar-
rested. " M e n the h i s powers wew cm the brink of defeat, Egypt de-
clared war on Germmy and Italy in February 1945 so that she could join
the United Nations."Ts
The British Imperial War Museum keeps in its artlhive a document con-
crcrning "'Farouk 1, f i g of Egypt."7Uccording to this documnt, on July
28, 1942, ""to Egyptian militar). planes . . . [fIew] . . . to Field Marshal
Rommel" headquarters . . . [with] . . . inrportant maps and plans in-
tended for the German military authorities." The docment accuses f i g
Farouk of maintajning a two-year negotiation process with the Nazis, in-
cluding an exchmge of letters with Hitler. Among other tbings, Farouk
yearned for a Nazi victory, supported the pro-Nazi rebc3llion in Iraq
(April 1941), and called for the bombardment of Jerusalem and Tel k i v .
Emm a Britib pojnt of view, Farouk's actions certainly placed him very
close to behg a bana fide trajtor. Hocvever, that could not h e been the
j u d p m t from an Egyptian nationalistic point of view.
 Vintalitzg Trrtsl and hyalty Durr'12g WurIcZ War 11: Part 2

Concluding Discussion
This chapter extelzds the discussio~~ of cases of treason in World War 11.
We have examined the context in which the different traitors operated,
the options they had, and the choices they made. MilnailoviC-,Antonescu,
Vtasov, von StaufIe&erg, F"u-X, &aki Hotsunti, King Farottk, the Chet-
niks, the Iron Guard, and the Whjte Rose were defhed by contemporaries
as traitors because they we^ perceived to have crossed the boundaries of
trust and loydty. 'Thus, structurally, the characterization of traitor fits be-
cause in these cases a violation of trust and loyalty existed.
"T'hethreat presmted by these individuals to their ~spectivestates was
grave. Mowver, \zrhen these cases are closely examhed in terms of his-
torical context, the issues of violating both trust and foyalty in terms of
content a d mrality (that is, their constmcticm) become complex. With
the exception of the cme of Japanese Axnericans, it is not sutficient to state
that the different indjviduals violated trust m d loyalty. From a moralistlic
point of view, one must: consider the question of trust and Loyalty to
whom? In thc case of Japanese Americans, the westion can be reversed;
that is, many of them felt that their countsy (the United States) betrayed
their trust and loyalty.
Weintar Germany prosecutkg Hitler for treason (md he rnnst cerhimly
presented. the gravest threat for that unstable democracy) and the Third
Reich prosecuting those who we= perceiwed as untmstwor&y, disloyal,
and threate~~ing to Hitler provide us with a sinnilar illustra'rinn. As the
mord buundaries of Germany shified, the very meming of trust and icy-
alty changed radically In both cases, those who were pweived to have vi-
dated trust and )oyaLty were ialheled traitors and treated accordhgly. The
threat potential in each case was indeed large. However, morally, it is
prololematic to equate Weirnar Germany and the Third Keich. In m r a l
terns, they racliically differa~t.'Thus, &though the structural mem-
ing of treason in both societies was sim.i:iar and based m analogous viola-
tions,the content of these different cuftural contexts, and consegumtly the
moral. meaning and significance of hese vi,olations, was very different.,
:InChapteps 5 and 6, we focused on individual cases of treason in a very
brbulent period. In each case, a better understanding emerged when the
image was contrasted with the reality. Moreover, we could see how in
each case, the same unkersal structure of violations materialized. But we
did not stop there; we took one m m step by viewing not only the stntc-
ture of the violations, but their co~ttentas well, which necessitated the use
of morality as a criterion for evaluating the cases.
The next three chapters delve in detail into three cases of betrayai in
World War 11. Chapter 7 exambes the ""rdio traitors," those who used
the relatively new radio technology to disperse to their enemies messages
of despair, propaganda, and misinform;ttim in order to weaken their will
to fight. There were quite a few such inciividuals, but we &all focus m
two: Lord Haw-Haw and liskyo Rose. Chapter 8 focuses on individual
cases oi intellectual betrayal. There, we look at a curious phenomenon-
inkllectuds who arc. gifted with humanity, sensitivity and empathy lend-
ing support ta the cruel, the crude, and the oppressive. Firrally, we shall
examhe, in grcat depth, the case of a traitor king-Edward VX1X.
This page intentionally left blank
 Radio Traitors:
Lord Haw-Haw and Tokyo Rose

The term "radio traitors'' was used by both Weyl and Edwards to de-
scribe a special situation during World W;ar 11.1 During the war, both
Japan and Nazi Germany recruited individuals to transmit, via radio,
propaganda to their opponents (and supporters). It is importmt to em-
phasize that t:he Allies used such transmissions as well, The new radio
technology thus gave rise tcr a new form of betrayal, using radio wawes to
comrnit treason."n&ed, the= were quite a few such traitors-me meth-
ods of recruit.hg radio trait.ors varied.. Some did, it wilXingly because they
were committed ideologically. Others were offewd money or other in-
duccmenl.s. Still others were recruited frnm prisoncr-of-war camps under
threats or for promises for better living conditions, As both Weyl and
Archer note,%su& traitors included the following: Robert H, Best, who
trmsmitted for the Nazis;" British comic aut.lnar P. G. Wodehouse (creator
of Bertie Wooster and Jeeves), who made a se;t-iesof radio transmissions
from Berlin to E~~gland and the United States in 1943, for which he was
paid by the Nazis;Wblitdrc?d Gillas-also known as "Axis Sa,l,lyff-who
broadcast lfor the Nazis and was sentenced in 1949 to ten to thir_tyyears in
prison irr the U ~ ~ i t eStates;T
d and Jane Xnderson-&so known as ' l a d y
Haw-Maovffand "'the Georgia, Peachf'-who transmitted for Che Nazis to
the United States 'four times a week.8 However, hnio radio traitors won
particular f m e : Lord Haw-Hw m d Tokyo b s e . :ill tbis chapter, we shall
explore these two cases in detail.

The Case of William Joyce-Lord Haw-Haw

Lord Haw-Haw is a case that is framed in Europe during World War fI.
Willim Joyce, after having lived in England for thirty years, left London
in the summer of 1939 for Berlin just as World War 11 was beginning. Me
joined the Nazi cause out of his own free will and informed choice, enthu-
201) h d i o Traitors: Lord kinur-kinuralzd Tokyo Ruse

siasticralry and without any coercion. Joyco gained worldwide fame for
being the person who broadcast Nazi propaganda to Britain and other
countries, He was arrested after the war, charged with treason, found
guilty, and hmged in January 194ba9

Background
Williarn Joyce, also h o w n as 'Lord Haw-Hakv, was born on April 24,1906.
His place of birth is not insignificant: Rrooklyn, New York, His father,
Michael, was born in County Mayo, Ireland, in 1868, and emigrated from
Ireland to the United States in 1888, when he was twenty years old. In
1894 Michael became a U,S, citizen, follwing his decliaratjon of intent to
do so in 1892. In 1904, with a U.S. passport, Michael went to ERgland for a
visit. That visit was momentous for Michaeli, It was then that he met his
estmde Emily Brooke ("Queenie"") of Shaw#in Lancashire,
Gertnrde was a phy"i"i"n's daughter and about ten years younger than
Michael. The two married in New York on May 2,1905. William was their
first child (they had two more sons).
Having made some m n e y in the United States, Michael apgartrntly felt
that it was time to return to his home corntry The Joyces left the Unikd
States in 1909 to settle in County Mayo. William was then three years old,
They =turned as U.S. citizens with U.S. passports. Michael's heart was
with Ixland, and he apparently regretted becoming a US. cjtizern, to the
point of ""denying on occasion that he had ever become a naturalized
Arnerican.""lWe insisted that he and his family were all British. In fact,
Selwyn points out that Michael was see11 by his younger son Quelltin
burning his American cilizenship documents in 1935. Young William was
thus educated in freland, with strong English ir^lclinations, and he was
raised in an atmosphere of extreme conservatism with s t r o ~ ~imperialis-
g
tic ideas.11

William had his nose was broken in a schoolyard fist fight, but he did not
r e p & his ir\jury Consquently, it was not trcated property, m d his voice
acquired a nasal tone.1"
In those years of William"s childhod, frc-rlandwas in the clutches of go-
litical turmail. Michael sided with the British Crown. In 1928, at age four-
teen, William also joined the struggle against the frish nationalists by col-
lecting intelligence for the infamous '"Blacic and Tans," the irregular
Crown forces.'"us, Wltlam associated himself with brute force at an
early age, He most certainly saw what effects clandestine operations
 h d i t ~Traitors: Lord kinur-kinuralzd Tokyo Rose 201

codd achieve, Rstimony irom the period, indicates that Wiltiam was fa-
naticaily devoted to England and opposed to what he saw as the Irish in-
surgency. Willian's service came to an end whetn a truce was amounced
on July 11,1921, and the paramilitary units of the Bfack and Tans began to
~trcllatin October. Extremists on both sides felt that they had been be-
trayed.'"
The establishment of an Irish Free State left the Joyces little choice.
Fearing the revenge oE Irish nationalists, they moved to E~~gland (Decem-
ber 8, 1921). Wlliam lied about his age and enlisted in the British Army
When his true age was disclosed, he was mleased from the a m y after
only four months of service.1"
It: is clear that from his very early years, Joyce preferred physical action,
combat, intrigue, manipulation, military disciptine, and seg-iqrovement.1"
Joining the Black m d Tans, and his attempt to join the army so very early
in his life, m s t eertady wveals an opinionated, determined person with
a clear afEin.ity far conservatism and a fascination with force. These actions
also invol\ied lies, disguke, a d pretense at a very early age..
In August 1922, Willjam Joyce wrote a letter to London Umi\lersity,
which is frrsquently voted. In it, he states that he was born in the United
States to British parmts and that "hno wayfWwashe connected with the
United States. It expresses extreme, perhaps even juvenile, loyalty to the
Crown. This letter was rehfarced by a letter from his fatha, Michael, who
added that "we are all British m d not Americm subjects." It is clear that
although the Joyces' presentation of themselves as exclusively British was
filctually misllcading, they most certainty viewed themselves as British
sub~ects.That view was patriotic; genuine, and a result of a choice.17
William began his formal studies in 1922 at Battersea Pdytechnic. After
graduation he continued his stucties at tiirbeck College, London Unjver-
sity, focusing on ERglish language and literature, H e receivd a First Class
Hsnors Degree in June 1927, Along the way, in May of 1927, he mrried
Hazel Kathleen Barr; they eventually had two daughters, but their mar-
riage ended in 1936. 'f'his line of William's cartrer indicated a bright and
intelligetnt mind, quite capable of impressive academic aclhievements,
Mrilliam, however, was also developing a political. career. Un December
6, 1923, hr-. joined the British Fascisti. This rather strange group was
fa~lndedby Miss R. L. tJifiton-.Omtan,and its primary goal was to prevent:
a socialist revolution in Britain,lWn the evening of October 22, 1924,
Joyce was in charge of the ""fsquad" of the British Fascisti. A public polit-
ical activity was to take place in s ~ ~ p p oofr ta pOlitical candidate h Lam-
beth North.lWuring the meeting, countergroups intervened, and bycc
was attacked by an anonymous person who made a long cut on his face,
causi,ng a very vi,sible scac In 1924 it was clear that thc British Faseisti was
disirttegrating. Although byte was givcn an opportuni-ty to restructure
202 h d i o Traitors: Lord kinur-kinuralzd Tokyo Ruse

the group, he was too busy studykg for final exams and makirzg an in-
come as a tutor, Although joyce chose at thjs time to pursue an academic
career, he was not filzished with political adion.
:InMarch of 19B he applied for a job in the Foreign Office but failed the
rwiew process and was rejected. At the same timc., he also tried to join the
Conservative Party. By that t i m , Joyce must have already possessed
some strong opinions, The Conseclrvatjve Party was not very open to ex-
treme anti-%mitic fascists like himself. After two years of trylng to exert
inSluence the=, he quit?qfn July 11933 he joi;ned the Britisfn tlnian of Fas-
cists (B.U.E), headed by Oswa1.d Mosley.21 In the autumn of that same
year, Joyce was already deputizing at meetings for Mosley. Joyce quick3y
established hintsdf as an =set and a capable, aspiring politician. He was
certainly considered a very good orator.
htieipating the possibility of a trip to Berlin with ikfosley tc:,meet in
person the new Germm fiihrer, Adotf Hitler (never to be actualized),
Joyce applid for a BritisEt passport. In his applicalion, Joyce stated that
he was British by birth, a clear and obvious lie.22 In July 1933 he was
grmted the requested passport." h 19% he was promoted to Diredor of
Propaganda for the B.U.E His paid appolntrnent in the B,GJ,f",,and later
promotion, enabled him to leave the Victoria 'I'utcrrial College, and he
abandoned his doctoral progrant at King's College.2""Th,roughout 1,934,
Joyce remained, next to Mosky the most powerkrl figurc of the B.U.F. in
the p ~ d a imagination."'Wmever,
r the two devebged personal reser-
vations toward each other.%Among other things, Joyce exhibited e x t ~ m e
patriotism (he insisted, for example, that "friends stand to attention and
sing 'Gocl save the Kingbt informal evening parties at his home'") and
overt hatred for Jews and capifalism,27
Jayce was not succes~fuIin the March 1937 etectims for London
County Council. A mcmth later, Mosley "purged" foyce and a close asso-
criate of his (Joh Beckett) fmm the B.U.I-i2"0yee then fnunded hjs own
parhyI the National Socialist Lague, with its paper T11.1c.Helmman." The
party had only a small number of recruits. In February 1937, Jlryce mar-
ried Margaret Cairns WMe, a B.U.F. mcmtber." =ring 1938-1 939, Joyce
called puhlicty for a pact with Hitkr (and Italy) and for active discrimina-
tion against Jews.31
'The events precedhg World War I1 began ta reduce the choices Joyce
had. In March 1938, Austria was amexed to Germmy (the Anschi'uss), In
March 1939, Hitler took over CzechoslovaZtia, and a British pact with
Poland followed. It was clear that a major war was in the making. foyce's
British political fantasy had very little cbance of materializing, and be had
to make a choice. He could not join tbr British in their fight againp;t Nazi
Germany; m d he could not apt out by declarirrg himself a cmscientious
objector, Momover, Joyce truly believed in FXjtler, Although the Joyces
 h d i t ~Traitors: Lord kinur-kinuralzd Tokyo Rose 203

considered going to Dublin, they decided eventudly to go instead to

Berlin." On A u p s t 24, 1939, fcryce applied for a mnewal of his old pass-
port, again stating falsely that he was British bp birth." "'fhc passport was
renewed on that day. Un August 26,1939, the foyces left England and ar-
rived in Berlin the next day. Five days later, Hitler invaded Poland, and
on Sptember 3, England and Frmce declared war against Nazi Germany
Selwyn points out that when the Jqces arrived, in Berh, "&ey wem m-
invited, unrxpcrlcted, wi&out a single close friend or any means of subsis-
tc~lce,"xHowever, it is equaily true that prior to their coming to Berlu~,they
asked a friend, J o h MacNah, to check the potentittl response lo a request
from the Joyces to become nahraEzed Germm cikms.5 MacNab brought
ba,Ck a favorable response. m a t mant, simply put, that the Joyces wcre web
corned in Nazi Gemmy. Joyce met his Ge istim Bauer-
in the Ministry of I"ropitt;md.a."hAl&ough
very reliable person?y Joyce nevertheless foulnd employment in that- min-
istry, making radio broadcasts to the United Kingdom. ""Within three
months, the ~ f u g e from
e &gland had became the h o w n and acknowl-
edged assistmt of two of the greatest powers hn the land."38
Mthough at first there were doubts about Joyce" abilit.y as a broad-
caster (his voice test was not very good), he did eventually end up broad-
casting in English for Nazi Germmy- He became, both in person. m d on
the rad.io, an avid and enthusiastic supporter of Hitler" National Social-
ism.
It must be stated that Jopce was not the only English brsadcaster.3Tre-
ceding him was another Englishman, Noman Baitlie-Stewart.

As early as 14 September 1939, Jonas Barrington in the Daily Expwss de-

scribed this voice that called from Germany, though in the first instance it
probably belonged to Norman Bailie-Stewart: ""He speaks English of the
Haw-Haw dammit-get-out-of-my-way .\rariety and his strong suit is gentle-
manly indignation." On 2 8 Syternber "Lord Haw-Haw of Zeesen'kas far-
mally christened in the same newspaper, the name soc~nbecoming exclu-
sively attached to the tones of Wifliam Joyce. Tn radio music-hail, the
Western Brothers introduced a new comic song on the topic of "Lord Haw-
Haw of Hamburg"""

By October 3, 1939, the voice on Radio F I a m b u ~had been publicIy

identified as that of Joyce, and British intelligence positively identified
Joyce in his broadcast of Auf$ust2,1940.41 EventuaXly, foyce was the orle
identified as ""Lord Haw-Haw#'kd he even identified himself as such in
the transmissions. Furthermore, "Jooyce was denounced as Lord Haw-
Haw in the House of Commorns as early as 23 May l940 by the Member
for Wlverhampton, G*Le M. Mander."az
204 h d i o Traitors: Lord kinur-kinuralzd Tokyo Ruse

During this t h e , Joyce applied for German citizenship and changed

his name to Wilhelm Froelich. Xle became a German citizen on Septerrtber
26, 1949. X n early 7,940, he also kvrote a political manifesto, in English, in
the form of a 50,0110-wrd, book, titled Ruilight over E~zgtnndThe book was
publishrd (lC)OfO110copies) in September 1941)in Berlir7.43 Sales of the book
werc slow, and many copies WE sent to X)OW t a n p a An inslruetive fact
is that on the first page of the author" ppreface, Joyce expresses no doubt
as to how the British people (for wham the book was meant) would view
him. There, in the very first paragraph, he characterizes hinnself as "a
daily pespetrator of High Treason."'""
The book is not an impressive tribute to Joycefsacademic ability. It is
full of stereotypical, historically unfnrrnded stat-ements supporting Nazi
views. A whole chapter in the book concerns the Jews, who are found by
him to be guilty of almost rwery possibk crime.
It: is evident that Joyce's career as the English loudspeaker for Nazi pro-
pagmda was meteoric. Joyce was not only rewarded by honor and pres-
tige but also was paid very wefl. "He was to be fie best-paid of the broad-
casters, and, far more important, he was achowfedged as the English
voice of Berlln."" did a good job-so much so that the Nazis
awarded him the Kriegsverdienstkreuz 1st Class ( W r Merit Cross) in
1944. Charman, who wrote the introductjon for the Imperial War Mu-
seurm"s edition of Joyce" bbok, could not help but notice that the s m e
awarcj was bestowed in January 1945 to Joseph Kramer, known as "the
beast of BeIsen'"46

Some mtes alz His Pansnzissions

Joycds transmissions iocused on two issues. The first was the encourage-
ment of different groups in Englmd to revolt against the legitimate
British government of "Mr. Bloody Churchill," in inhis terminology. He
""blieved wholeheartedly in rousing the British people to revolution."47
In this respect, foyce helped to create the illusion of a fifth column by sug-
gesting that a ghost army was waiting in the shadows, ready to strike,
The second was the presentation of a fanatic who loathed England, with a
""savage conternpt . . . for Churchill.""" Joyce did not just play the role oE a
bmadcastes, Me plamed the transntissions, was deeply involved in their
content, and spent time trying to persuade British POWs to join him.
Some, in fact, did.
To get a sellse of the criharacterisi-icquality of Jsyce's trmsmissions, let
us examjne two illustrations, As usual, my approach to these illustrations
is that of a contextual cmstructionist-l: present both the cmstructions
m d the fads..
 h d i t ~Traitors: Lord kinur-kinuralzd Tokyo Rose 2(15

The Admiral Graf Spee. The first transmission concerns what has be-
come h o w n as the Rattle of the River Plate. That bat.tle took place on De-
cember 13,1939.
i r a l Spee was commanded by Cap-
The Nazi pocket battleship A d ~ ~ ~ Craf
tain I-lans Langsdorff and had a crew of 1,101),4qis pocket battleship
was sent to the South Atlantic seas, mrhing in September 1939. Her or-
ders stipulated that she was to hunt and sink Alied commrce. In two
months of raiding, that pocket battlehip was efkctive in sinking at least
nine ships (totalkg 50,089 tons). 'The British Admiralty could not allow
such hostile high seas activities to contirrue unchallenged. A battle hrce
naval squadron consisting of the heavy cruiser Exeter and the light cruis-
ers Achilles and Ajax, commanded b y C m n o d o r e Sir Henry Marwood,
hunted down the :Nazi ship.50 The three British warships found the Admi-
ral Graf Sp;. on acember 13,1939, and engaged hcr in the battle that has
become k~own. as the Battle of the River Plate.
They surrounded. the Nazi ship and hunched at her c7ne salvo after the
other. Clearly tbr Nazi ship had superior guns (11-inch), but it was infe-
rior in speed to both light crrwisers. Captain I,angsdorif focused hjs main
armament against the most powerful of tbe tbsc Exefer-md hit her
quite badly. At the end of the battle the Exefer T-IQ0to starboard
and was thrrse feet down in the bows. She was steered by a boat colnpass,
and all her guns were uut oi action. Her bridge was destroyed, and six@-
m e offiicers and men wew kilied and twenty-three were wounded. 'The
battle co~~tinued to rage for fottrteen hours, and the Admiml Craf Specr w s
not doing badly. However, Captain Langshrff made a fatal mistake by
underestimatit~ghis chances in a continued battle against the three cruis-
ers. He disengaged and fottnd asylrtm in the neutral port of Montevideo.
Dcspit.e his request to stay hMontevideo for f f een days to allow for
necessary repairs, only a three-day stay was approved. Captain Langs-
dorff was led to believe, fdsely, that a large and formida,ble British naval,
force was waitirrg for him outside th harbor. FXe decided., with the full
howledge and approval of the highest eehelons of the Nazi gove
to scuttle the ship. On Sunctay, December 17, 1939, at 18:0(3, the Adllrirul
Craf Spee moved, out and stoppedf and her crew abandoned,her; then a se-
ries of explositms U n e d the ship into a flaming wreck," x r e e days later,
Captain Langsdorff, wrapped in the flag of the old Imperial German
Navy, shot hirn.~elf.~z The symbolic value of the Nazi defeat was gl-eat, It
was considered to be a moral boost for fie British, and it shattered the
myth that the Nazi pocket battleships were invincible. What did Lord
Haw-Haw have to say about this bitter Nazi defeat?
On December 17,1939, Radio Hamburg made its triple "Germany Catl-
ing" mnouncemem.t.follocved by the 'You are about to hear the ncws in
206 h d i o Traitors: Lord kinur-kinuralzd Tokyo Ruse

English," read by Wltiam Joyce. Here is what he had to say about the Bat-
tle of the Ever Plate:

The New Yo& Ernes reports the British cruises Exeter has been run aground
near part StanZey near the east coast of the Falkland Islands, This American
newspaper states that the Exeter has been so severety damaged by the ar-
tillery of the Admiml Gmf Spee that it is impossible to make this ship seawor-
thy again. As =me of the guns of the Excter are stilt in working ordel; the
British admiralty obviously intends to make use of the hulk a s an additional
coast battery at Port Stanley.53

Not a word about the real defeat..

Let us examhe the actual fate of the Exeter, This heavy cruiser survived
the Battle of the Kiwer Plate. In fact, &ere is a photograph of H.M.S. Exefer
sailing into her home port of Plysnouth on February 15, 1940.3 Among
those cheering crowds waiting to greet the Exeter was Mlinstm Churchill,
who was there, he said, "to pay my tribute to her brave officers and
men."s"l"fier being ~ p a i z dthe, Exeter joined Allied operations in con-
voys and other actions in the h t c h East Indies, She was hit badly during
the Battle of the Java Sea but was able to limp back to Sourabaya.56 Alter
being rept?ircd, the Exeter tried to escape to Colombo. As she was sailing,
she was intercepted by a fapanese naval force that consisted of powerhl
cruisers. In the battle fiat developed, the Exeter was hit in such a way that
all power failed, the main armaxnent was put out of action, and fires
raged. Realking that his ship could no longer fight, Caytah Godon de-
cided to sink her. The order to abandon ship was given after all measures
we= taken to assuse that. the ship w ~ t ~ 1indeed
d dive to the bottom. The
Exeter" career ended when she plunged into the South fava Sea on March
1,1942.57

The Invasion of Norway, A second example cmcerns t:he Nazi inva-

sion of Norvvay (April 9, 194(>f.In a transmission from April 4940, Lord
Haw-MW talks about the occupation of Norway. He slates that the attack
against Norwa~."and Denmark is advancing according to plan, that the
W i n g and occugation of Denmark wem uneventful, and that the cam-
paign against Norway met no sig~~ificant resistance on the beaeh. C)nly
near Oslo were there a few inciderrts, but Oslo was now occupied. He
then goes on to quote the appeal of the German minister for Norway to
the Norwegian government to avoid resisting Germany because it was
"'senseless." "Germany does not intend to infringe on the territorial in-
tegrity or political independence of the kingdom of Norway either now
or in the future,""""
 h d i t ~Traitors: Lord kinur-kinuralzd Tokyo Rose 207

Joyce ipored the brutal Nazi occupation of Nosway and the hypocrisy
of "political independence." Furthermore, the German Nawy sustain&
serious darnages in the operation, and its operational ability was signifi-
cantly reduced. The Norwegians put up a courageous defense, and the
Nazi conquest of Noway was certainly not a picnic.
Wliam Joyce's personal life was not smooth. His f rst marriage dis-
solved into nothingness. Now, hBerlh, his second wife was I-ravisrga hot
love affair with a younger man. The traitor Joyce was thus betrayed m
the personal le~el.~gIn August 1941, Willim foyce sued his wife Margaret
for a divorce on the grounds of infidelity*Mxgarct responded by stati%
that her husband abused her by losing all ~ s p e cfor
t her."" It was clear
that the marriage came to a dead-end. Divorce was granted. Followhg
the divorce in court, the two newly dkorcees displayed an emotional out-
burst and feu into each other arms outside the court. 'They went to have a
meal at the Kaiserhof. Later that day they each went his m d her separate
ways,hl The two remarried again in February of 1942.a

Last Radio Recordingsfronz Lord Haw-Haw

War hostilities ended May 7,1945, and Joyce" last ~ c o r dfor
i ~a radio
broadcast was made on April 30,1945." h that broadcast "foyce insisted
that the sole cause of war h 1939 was the Germm wish that the city of
Danzig-racialty and politically German and part of Germany until
1919-should be turned by Poland."" Had Danzjg, accordi,ng to l-his id-
iotic and maliciotls, not to mention historicauy wrong, version, been
given to Germany, World War I1 would have been prevented.@In that
trmsmission, Joyce also talked about Germmy:

I'm talkin" to you about Germany That is a concept that many of you have
failed to understand. . . . Here we have a united people-.. . . They are not im-
perialists, they do not want to take what doesn't belong to them. All they
want is to live their own simple lives, undisturbed by outside influences.
That is the Germany that we know.

Of c o m e , Joyce conveniently forgot to mention that a simple, undis-

tubed life was alil that- millions of Jews, Gypsies, 1301t.sfRussians, Czechs,
Danes, Norwegians, French, British, and others also wanted, The record-
ing ends with, "Germany will live . . . :Eleil Hitler! . . .Farewell." "ere is a
qualitative difference to this recording. Joyce sounds tired and hjs speech
is c1earj-y slurred.6"
?i>nyGemghty reported in 197'4 that this last ""transmissim'kas never
actually trmsmitted. Gesaghty notes that Joyce drank too much during
208 h d i o Traitors: Lord kinur-kinuralzd Tokyo Ruse

the receding, m d his Nazi superiors decided not to trmsmit the record-
ing because it was too obvious from thr voice that somethirrg was very
wrong. The recarding itself was found in the archives of Radio Luxern-
bourg.67

The Capture of Joyce

""Ry the end of R/farch the Joyces were lodged in the little t o m of Apen . . .
in the former Grmd Duchy of Oldenburg."@Plms were made to trms-
port the Joyces by U-boat to the Irish Republic, where it was felt they
coufd live safely. However, by May 1945, thjs plan was sirtlply not kasi-
ble-MAnather plan was to escape though German-occupied Dellmark ta
neutral Sweden. The Joyces were put in Hamburg, and Joyce was given a
false passport under the namc. of Wiikeh )lansen,TO However, the rapid
collapse of the hattered Third Reich left the Joyces wi& very few choices.
Joyce decided to go back to Flensburg, near the DmisFt.boder.71

On the evening of 28 May 1945, Jc>ycewas walking through a wood which

overlooked the harbar. He was alone, Ahead of him he saw two English offi-
cers tzrt-ro were apparently gathering firewoc~d.They belonged to the Recon-
naissance Regiment of the Royal Armoured Corps. . . . One of the officers
was Captain Lickorish, and the other was Lieutenant Perry Joyce could have
passed on his tzray without attracting their attention. Instead, he waved a
hand, speaking to them first in French. Then he called out helpfully in Eng-
lish, "There are a few more pieces over here.'" He was walking away again
tzrt-ren the two officers overtc~skhim. Lieutenant Perry said, ""Vou wouldn't
happen to be Wiltiarn Jcyce, would you'?"
The question was almost sugerfiuom, for as Captain Lickorish said later,
he had already recognized the voice as ""tat c ~ the
f announcer or speaker on
the German radio."
Joyce stopped, put his hand into his pocket, looking far that faked pass-
port which identified him as "WiLkLm Hansen." (Selwyn 1987:162)

The two British officers were alert, They suspected that the man infront
of them may try to puil a gun on them. Thus, as Joyce was rczachi~~g into
his pocket, Ijeutenant I+rcy-in a husry-got hold of his revolver and
fired bw. At this dose range, the bullet hit Joyce in his right thigh and
passed to his left. He fell crying in his confusion "my name is Fritz
Hanserr." Captah Z,ickorish went ta the wounded man searching for a
weapon, He found none, but did find two passports: one for '"VViXJnelm
Hmsenffand the other, a military pawp"tf"r "William Joyce.'"foyce was
taken to the nearest Danish fror~tierpost. hterestirg that JOYCC? was nat
thirtking of a gun. He thought that the British officers suspected that he
 h d i t ~Traitors: Lord kinur-kinuralzd Tokyo Rose 209

William )t~yce,accompanied by two gziards, or2 gmunds of ftw Lur2eberg Iroyit~tto

witere l~zewas kaken after I.lc was woztnded dztrz'ttgillis arrest.
SQUIPCE: AZnlz Wfzamnt,Treason: Farnous English Treason Trials (Phoenix Mill,
Englntzd: Alniz Szkfforz,19951, p. 269, Photo from Times Newspapers Ltd.

was about to use a poison vial. The story of the capturc, and woundjng, of
Lord Haw-Haw made its way quickly to the news.n
.h historical irony can be foulld in the Wiener Library, Lolldon. In the
archives held there, Mr. Simmon, horn the Jewish Chronicle, notes that
Lieutenant Geoffrey Perry was Jewish.7Wis original n a m was Pin-
sche\vcr, and he had lived in Berlin prior to his immigration to England in
1935. Al the tirne of the report, he was described as working for the
British Association af Publisherrs"i"4

The Trial
The next chapter inJoyce's life was his trmsfer to England, interrogation,
and trial. Along the way he was treated for his wounds. foyce was coop-
eratrive, and despite wamhgs, he "was a ccrmpdsive talker,"n I'he British
press easily defined Joyce's acti,vity in h d i o Hamburg as treason and
Lord Haw-Haw as a traitor.
210 h d i o Traitors: Lord kinur-kinuralzd Tokyo Ruse

S e l w p points out that before Joycer was brought back to England, the
'Tieason Act (1945) was amended. 'The law of 3695 required two wit-
nesses to an act of treason ""or else two acts of treason each vouched for
by a separate witness. This safeguard. was now abolished, and in Joyce's
case the prosecution offered only one clear act of treason vouched for by
one witne~s,~'76
Joyce was charged with high treason for his transmissions and for be-
coming a German citizen in 1940.7'he issue of his original ci-t.izctnsl~ip was
a serirtus one. It was difficdt, if not impossible, for a Britisfn court to con-
vict an American citizen turned German citizen on a charge of treason to
Britain. Thus, the case is an empiricd illustratricm of the need to establish
that a traitor is a member of the group bejing betrayed. The prosecution
claixned that obtahing a British passport (under fahe claims) put Joyce
under British jurisdiction and made hirn a British citizen, requiring from
fiim t-he dut-y of h i t h f u h e s s , ~
Joyce ptcaded ""not guile*"As far as be was concerned, be did not be-
tray T o n e . He never hid his fascist views, a d when war broke out, he
did as his belief required. However, his defense was based on the claim
that the British court had no jurisdiction because he was a non-British cit-
izen, That did not work. Joyce was also bothered by the possibility that a
"pedominantly Jebvish juryf' would judge him.7"
The trial began in Septttmher 17,1945, and lasted three days. ' m e trial
of Cord Haw-Haw had caught the ima&ination of the world" pressef'79
Joyce codd answer afirxnatively to the charge that he had never been a
British citizen. However, he did feel himself to be British m d had lived in
Britah for tl-tirty years. Thus, it was possible that treason codd he in-
voked between 9ptember f 8,1939, and Septentber 26, 1940 when he be-
came a German citizen). As Slwyn pojnts out, "it was iar from clear that
erican suhject in Germany could be guilty of trmsm against E%-
land, a countr>iwhich he had left and to h i c h he had no intention of re-
tuming,"8(1However, it is equaIly true that "Wi1Iiam Joyce bad broadcast
~ p e a t e d l yand mregentantly m behaif of the Nazi regime, undermhhg
British morale by evwy means at his disposal."" Joyce's blatant and re-
peated radio messages threatening Britain with destruction and &feat,
accusing the second-front of being "Jewish inspired,qz and inciting citi-
zells with cdLs of "Lay down your arms! Resistance is uselessl"8"illus-
tsate this charge dramatically.
The jury found Joyce guilty on the charge of high treasm in twenty-
three nrrk3utes of deliberations. His case came before the Court of Crirni-
nal Appeals on October 30, 1945. The hearing lasted for three days, and
the problem of Joyce" nationality was a crucial me. On November 7 ,
1945, the appeal was rejected. The case was then appealed before the
House of Lords on December 10,1945. The discussions ended on Decem-
 h d i t ~Traitors: Lord kinur-kinuralzd Tokyo Rose 211

ber 13, and on Decermber 1%it was announced that the appeal was re-
jected fiere as well.84
'There were letters and appeals to the British authorities not to execute
William Joyce, Documents released in 1995 by the Public Record Office
""disclose a file of letters, telegrams, a d petitions 3 inches thick urging
George IV, Clement Attke, the prime minister, and Chute R. Ede, the
Home Secretary, to be lenient with a man who earned historical notoriety
as the broadcaster Lord Haw-Haw" The Duke of Bedford wrote to Attlee:

I gather he has nwer been charged with betraying military secrets. . . . I must
say that I feel his execution would be an act of quite unjustifiable vindictive
severity involving a not inconsiderable degree of hypocrisy as well. . . . Al-
though in his frequent use of the term "Jewish," he displayed the exagger-
ated bigotry characteristic of anti-Semites, Joyce, when telling the British
people in his broadcasts that their real enemies were the international fi-
nanciers, spoke no more than the truth.85

Wiltiam Joyee, known as "Lord Haw-HawI was h q e d in the early

hours of the morning of Jmuary 3, 11946, at Wmdsworth Prism. As Se%-
wyn indicates, even on this day, he still had some devotees praying for
him. Joyce's last letter to his wife stated: "l salute you, Freja, as your lover
forever! Sieg H&l! Sieg Hcil! Sieg t-Xeil," Me added I-he German call of the
battaliun to which he was recmitctd to defend Berlin's Wlhelmplatz dis-
the advance of the Red ArmygWccorcting to Sfwyn:
trict agai~~st

At 1 P.iVZ.the BBC Home Service reported the executian at Wandsworth and

the last public message of the man who had been hanged.
""E death, a s in this lifef T defy the Jews who caused this last war, and 1
defy the power of darkness which they represent.
""Iarn the British people against the crusFting imperialism of the Sclviet
Union,
"May Britain be great once again and in the hour of the greatest danger in
the West may the standard of the Imkenkrezaz [Swastika] be raised from the
dust, crc>wnedwith the historic words "hr lab! doelz gmiegf.' [YOUhave con-
quered neverf heless].
"h amproud to die for my ideals; and I am sorry ECX the sons of Britain
who have died without knowing why." Wlwp 39827-8)

As Selwyn points out, although Joyce was conwicted of t ~ a s o non a

grand scale, "he died wit-;hout relBorse, writing his last 'SSieg Heil!hnot
twenty minutes before the hangman entered the condemn cell" ((p, 8).
222 h d i o Traitors: Lord kinur-kinuralzd Tokyo Ruse

Thus, very clearly, until his very last moments foyce regretted nothing
and haci learned nothing. He remained loyal to his fallen idol, Adolf
Hitler, m d the abomhable National Socialism to the end.

Some Hz'sdorz'cnlIronies
History can play some sard.nni.c tricks. Rccall that Joyce was captured and
shot in the leg by a Jewish refugee from Germany. Another irony occurred
years after his execution. One of Joyce's daughters from his first mar-
riage-Heather Iandol+becanre a regular visitor to the Shiabbat morn-
ing service in tbr Ghatham Synagogue. According to the @wish C:hro~z%cle,
the last time si,x%-sjx-year-oldHeather saw her fatker was when her par-
ents were divorced (1936)." She was then seven years old, Mrs. farrdola
was repclrted as having a ""chc.rishrd and warm regard for Jews," unlike
her father: She visited Israel twice, and her daughter spent two years in
an Israeli kibbutz,

The Impact of Lord Haw-Haw's Transmissions

Were Joyce's transmissitms effecthe?
Selwyn quotes a conficfmtial rczport clf the BBC issued on March K, 7,940:

[The report] was based on interviews with a random sample of 3,000 people.
Of every six interview-ees,one was a regular listener to WilEiam Joyce and four
listened to him from time to time, The fipres were mexpededly high and not
made more palatable by the discovery that it was the politicaliy better-
informed and the yc3ung who Xistmed to Hamburg Radio regularly These were
also identified as people who did not easily believe in the myth of the Britik
Empire d t e d agaimt a CO cm enemy but, said the report, who h e w quite
welt that a g o d many of its people had no enthusiasm fox such a war.88

A quarter of the sample surveyed in December 1939 stated. that they had
listened to W i a m Joyce the day before; S8 percent stated that they found
foyce to be fantastically funny; 50 percent just listened so that they would
have something to talk about; 38 percent found Joyce amusing; 29 percmt
wmted to hear the German version of events; 26 percent kvanted Efie ncws
fiat the BBC did not give t h m ; 15 percent tfiought he was a good broad-
caster; 9 perilent found RBC boring; m d R percmt admired Joyce"s broad-
casthgs,. Most in the sample did not thkk it was mpatriotic to listen to
foyce. However, Selwyn also states that '"inthe BBC surveyF22 percent of
those questioned said that they never Listened to Raciic:,Hamburg or any of
the other German stations, because their wircless sets were sjmply not
powerful enough to pick t h m up,"m These numbers stand in cmtsast to
 h d i t ~Traitors: Lord kinur-kinuralzd Tokyo Rose 213

other relevant figures: 23 million rclgular listeners to the BBC, and 10 d-

lion occasional listeners (to the news)." C l e a r l at least in the early years
of Ihe war, m y people in Britain chose to expose themclves to the pro-
paganda trmsmissims from Germmy.

Other Bmadcasters
The impressive works by Edwards (1991) and Bergmeier and Lotz Rainer
(1997) document the extent to which the Nazis utilized radio transmis-
sions to non-Germans as a way to spread their version of rcality. Edwasds
discusses at length Arnerican broadcasters w orn he refers to as "raeiio
traitorsM")inthe service of the 'Third Reich, such as Jane Anderson, Max
Otto Koischwitz, Robert I-I. Best, Douglas Chandler, and DonaId Day
(and a few others)." Bergmeier and Lcrtz Rainer's 1997 work surveys the
more general radio propaganda trmsmissions of Nazi Germany. Ed-
wards concludes that, much like Joyce, most of the American broadcast-
ers lost their loyalty to the Llnited States yearsbefore World War I1 began.
The number of such people, t-hough not: large, was significant.

Some mtes alz This Case

Leaving aside the fine legal distinctions cmcernbg citizenship, who and
what exactly did foyce betray? He was a significant force in the Nazi pro-
paganda campaign, but hc did it out of his own free will alld out: of a
deep conviction in the Nazi cause, which he never hid, Was his execution
an act of vengeance? I have no doubt that it was, although in the present
polit.ically c o r ~ cterminolow
t the more accurate term would be "justice
was served." T'hsi raises a more gmeral question rcgading the issue of
what should be done with the leaders of defeated enemies after a conflict.
Ki1roy's 1,994play about Lord Haw-E(aw deals With this issue.
Although I am not entirely convinced that conceptually (not techni-
cally or legally) the charge of treason in foyce's case is simply con-
structed, deception was involved on several levels. Joyce's s b effort
was to persuah Allied soldiers and citizens to change sides, In other
words, foyce was committed to persuading the opponents of Nazi Ger-
m n y to alter their moral boundaries, to violate their loyalty and corn-
mitment, to betray trust, Although the charge of treason as applied, to
foyee hirnseif is not simple, he was most certaillly callillg on others to
betray their country. 'That call puts Joyce in a very questionable moral
position. Moreover, Joycek transmissions were based on half-truths,
and falsclhoods. Thus, Joyce's fight was based on decepticm while pre-
tending to be an "honest" ideological oppone~~t. In short, he was a liar
at the very least,
 h d i o Traitors: Lord kinur-kinuralzd Tokyo Ruse

The Case of Iva Toguri-Tokyo Rose

During the war in the Pacific, thousands of American soldiers were ex-
posed to a bright, clear, and rather sexy voice transmitting to them daily
from Japan. They came to call the female broadcaster "Ti,kyoRose. In at
least two World W r 12 submarine movies, Tokyo Rase is featured as sub-
mariners listen to her transmissions (in the 19443 Uestinatiorz Tokyo the
submarhers ridicule the trmsmissions, and in the 1958 Rzdrz Sileitzf, Rura
Deep these transmissions arc used to help make an important operational
derision),
In these transmissions, contemporary music: was glayc.d, news was m -
nouncedI and Alnerican soldiers were urged not to fight. The main pur-
pose of these transmissions, Obviously, wwas to erode the morale of Ameri-
can sotdiers. For those Americans fighting the Japanese in the Pacific,
Tokyo Rose was a very familiar voice, and according to many sources,
they seemed to enjoy the pmgrm. Thus, ixrstead of demralizing the sol-
diers, her transmissions may have achieved tbr oppot;ite effect. "T'heques-
tion rclgarding the idenlity of Tokyo Rose is a thorny one. Several Japanese-
American women were employed as broadcasters, However, one of
them-Iva Ikuku 'lbguri D"Ayuino (born in 1916)-wati put on trial for
treaso~~ in 19448. She became ide~~tiiiedwith the voice of Tokyo Rose.
Iva was an American citizen of Japanese parents. Her father, Jun
?i,guri, came to the United States in 1899 when be was scrventeen, intend-
ing ta find employment as a farmworker. C k t J w ~ 8,1907,
e when 'Jun was
twenty-five years old, he returned to Japan to find himself a bride. Al-
thou$ he was travelil7g with a Japmese passport, he was ablc to secure
himelf a Canadian passport as well. This passport guaranteed that he
codd return to Nor& America whenever he so wished, fn Japan he mar-
ried nineteen-year-otd Fumi Iirnuro. After the marriage, he returned t~
the Uni,ted States done. It took six years before he could afford to bring
his wife to America. fn the meantinne, he visikd fapan, m d F m i gave
birth to a son (Fred-born in 1910). h a was born in Los Angeles, cm 'July
4,15316, and mo.trher sister was born later. JWI was determined to Ameri-
canize his children. They we= discouraged from learnirtg or usixzg Japan-
ese and were strongly encouraged to adopt American ways of life.
Iva was successfz,zlin her schooling, and in 1933began her study of zo-
ology at U C M , Having compIeted her degree in 1936, she plmned to cm-
ter medical school. H w v e r , Iva's aunt, Shizu, was sericrusly ill, and Ivafs
parel~tsdecided to send her to Japan to help her aunt- When Iva left
America on July 1,1941, for Yokoharna, Japan, she had only a certification
of identity and was instmcted by the U.S. Immigration and Namaliza-
tion Service in Los Angeles to get her pa~sportfrom the US. consulate in
Vokohama. Iva arrived in Uokohama on July 24, where her relathes met
 h d i t ~Traitors: Lord kinur-kinuralzd Tokyo Rose 215

her and took her to k k y o , h a , barcly able to speak Japanese and fully
Americanized, fomd it difficult to adapt to Japanese life.
Moreover, material shortages were an integral part of life in Japan. Iva
clearly missed the United States and expressed, h r longixrg in letters and
talks with her family On Sptember 8,1941, she applled for an American
visa, So unhappy was Iva that in N8vembc.r 1941 she catled her fatha
and told him that she wanted to return to the United. States right away.
Her father cabled her a few days later, instructing her to board a Japan-
ese-owned passellger ship that was scheduled to leave Yokohama on De-
c e d e r 2. Tbe cable arrived one day before the departure oi the ship, but
Iva was unable to get: ail the documents necessary before departure.
However, it did not make much difference. The Japanese attacked Pearl
Harbor on December 7,m d the ship that she wouM have taken to the
U ~ ~ i t eStates
d was imtructed to r e t m to Japan. The declaraticm of war
meant that Iva was prevented b n ?goi.ng back to the Uni,ted States.
Like other Japanese Amdcan families, her family in the Urtited States
was interned in a camp @er sick mother died in the process). Iva's mmey
was running out, but her family in the United States codd nt:,longer help,
Despite all this, she did try to find ways to return, thhkixlg that an intern-
ment carnp was better than remaining in Japan. Unforbnately, she sirtlply
codd not afford a detoured sailing rnute to the Wnikcd States (she had to
first go to a third country, for example, Tndja, and f r m tkere to the United
States). For d l practicd purposes, Iva, without a U.S. passport and with
close family ties in Japan, was stuck in Japan. She had to deal with Chc au-
thorities to get ratianing cards, work, and other essentiafs for survival.
Obviously, the attention of the Japanese security service was focused on
her (as well as others in similar situations)"
:In desperate need of income, she joined in June 1942 the Japanese na-
~ o n anews
l agmry Her jot, was to m a ~ t oand
r tr;mscribe hglish-language
radio transmissions from such phces as Hawaii, Austraia, India, and
China. There she met Felipe dxquino, an English speaking-man, five
years younger than Iva, and the son of a Japanese mother and a For-
tuguese father. A pacifist, he offered her emotional. support and idel~tifica-
tion, Eventually the two were married. Despite her attempts to sumive,
her inclrme was barely sufficient, and she was deprived of a food ra-
tioning card. It did not take l o ~ ~forg her, on a starvation diet, to become
very sick, and she was consequently hospitalized for six weeks. fmnicalfy,
on October 22, 1942, Americm officials notified the Swiss consulate &at
Iva was entitled to a passport and that she could return to the United
States. No indication exists that the Swiss mission ever contacted Iva with
this news.
Lookis~gfor a jab, she responded to an advertiselnellt in the Nippon
Ti~~fes for employment as a part-tirne typist in English for Tokyo Radio,
21 6 h d i o Traitors: Lord kinur-kinuralzd Tokyo Ruse

and she was accepted for the job, Sometlme during November 1943, she
was told that she was being cmsidered for a position as an amouncer for
a radio program put together by P m . Although she was reluctanl at:
firstt she was pressured, threatened, and eventually coerced into taking
the job. She later rnet Australian major Charies Hugh Cousms, Britih-
born and a graduate of Smdhurst, who was a radio personality hSydney
radio before the war and very well known.
Cousens had jofned the Australian a m y and had fou&t as a c
of an infantry battalion in Malaya, He became a POW alter the fall of
Singapore, Like Iva, he was sick with dysentery, Once the Japanese dis-
covered who he was, they begm a long process of p ~ s s u r i n ghim into
broadcastjng for them. He ~ s i s t e dat first but eventualjy a g ~ e d
to trans-
mit POW messages. That was only the beginning. Soon he was asked to
do more. In June 49-42, Cousens was flown to -li,kyu. b e ' s 1990 work
points out: that: Cwsens a p e d to transmit because he was planning to
sabotage the transmissions from the inside, He began trmsmitting, at first
irnitathg Japanese pronunciation. Eventually in August 3443, he chose
Iva to join him as an amamlcer*Howe, agaiin, pohts out that this choice
of an inexperienced announcer indicates the subversive intentions
Cousens may have had and that h a was party- to. hccoriling to Howe,
Cousens's choice of Xva meant that the trmsmissions were much less pro-
fessional, effective, inffuential, or useful, Under Cousens" gguidmce, Iva
begm transmitting on 'lbkyo Radio, and in March 1943, Tokyo Radio be-
g m its "Zero Hot~r,"in which Iva's voice became even more pronounced
as Tokyo Rose, It is important to emphasize that there were other POWs
who particjpafed in the transmissions. Howe's 1990 w r k makes it abun-
dantly clear trhat Xva Toguri and Major Cousens (and others) were coerced
into their roles.
Once the war was over and 'Japansurrendered, U.S. journalists went to
Japan searching br interesthg stories. Two of &em found Iva Tagufi and,
after talking with her, constructed her as the Tokyo Rose. This exposure
eventudly led to her arrest, trial, and impriso
Iva was found g d t y of trcason, sents~cedto ten years i,n priso~z,and
fhed $10,000. She was released after six years in prison, and onJanuaq 19,
1977, President Gerald Ford girnted her a pardon (on his last day in oflice).
Mether Iva Taguri was the one m d only Tokyo Rose is a secmdary is-
sue. Even if she was not the sole female transmitter, she did transmit pro-
pagmda fur the Japanese against the United States. However, Iva
Toguri" sadions are not equivalent to those of Willim Joyce. Whezl the
war began, she was trapped in Japan against her will.. She did nut identify
at afl with Japan, was coerced into broadcasting, and-if one is to trust
her (and Couf.;ensfs)account-the &erlion was to sabotage such trans-
missions by makhg them funny and discreditable.
 h d i t ~Traitors: Lord kinur-kinuralzd Tokyo Rose 217

The fact was that Iva, born American and feeling American, transmit-
ted propaganda with the purpose of demoratizitlg American soldiers.
Were her transmissions successful? 'This is a difficdt question. From Ihe
available anecdstes, it is possible to conclude that the transmissions did
not seem to affect soldiers in the battlefields. Did she have a choice? She
may have, to some extent, but one needs to remelnber the context in
which she operated; one of those choices was starvation. Howe (1.990) as-
serts that her behavior can be thwght of as ~semblingthe mentality in
nt.Bridge on the Rimr Kruai. The answer is not simple. One cannot state
that, like Williitm foyce, she willjngiy conspired against the United States.
Her actions were motivated Zly coercion, starvation, and fear. Does this
make her less of a traitor? That she was coerced into broadcasting cer-
tainly makes her offense liglnter. Did she violate trust and loyalty? As an
American citizen, a d furthermore, one who loved her life in the United
States, the answer is that she indeed violated the trust and loyalty ex-
pected of a citizen-tmst and loyalty that, by her own accounts, she felt
very strmgly about.
'The case involvi-ng Iva Toguri raises i s s ~ ~col~cemhg
es individuals who
are forced to collaborate with an opponent of their country. n r o u g h such
collaboration, thry may be able to minhnize damage or slrbvert the en-
emfxfforts. However, as we saw in the cases of cdaboration in Ewrope,
choosing this line of behavior is opting to walk a very narrow and slip-
pery tightrope. Some tangible gains may be made in the short run, but
such behavior rmains moralfy questionable afterward and is open to
contradictory interpretations. The basic reason is that such behavior al-
ways involves manipulation, deceit, concealment, and secrecy. Those
choosing collaboration must take into cansideration that such courses of
action have a very high probabjlily of being interpreted in a very unfa-
vorable light. Cases such as Sacha Anderson (see Chapter 3) and Harold
C& (see Chapter 5) illustrate how mmipulation, double meal7ings'
steallh, and dishonesty pervade the d.ouble g a m of collaboration and un-
derscore the difficulty of maintaining moral boundaries when such a
course is chosen.

Concluding Discussion
The two "radio traitors" we focused on in this chapter illustrate some
important points. 'lb begin with, they were both ~ g a r d e das traitors. It
is not too difficult to show that, structurally, in both cases violations of
both trust and loyalty led to that judgment. However, closer examina-
tion sf the moral content of the cases reveals that the reality was much
more complex. Iva Tuguri and William Joyce are twn very different
cases,
228 h d i o Traitors: Lord kinur-kinuralzd Tokyo Ruse

Jayce developed an early affinitJi for fascist ideologies. He was not

forced to join Nazi Gemany; his co i t m a t to Nazism was given freely
and he elnbraced it enthusiastically becausc it provided him a compatible
political, social, and personal identity. Indeed, he wanted Britain to be-
come anothrr Nazi state. Much like Qlrisling and Degrelle, he did not "col-
laborate" with the Nazis. He saw himseli as part of Nal.jonal Socialism and
dedicated hhself to the Nazi cause. As pointed out earlier, Joyce never
hid his sympathies; he wanted to realize his dream of a Nazi Britain. 1111
this respect, the questio~~of Joyce's citizenship is irrelevant"Joyce's idetllify
was that of a Nazi, and. his actions conformed to his identity From a
British-hmerican point of view; he wa~;irtdeed a traitor. Joyce even con-
crcded this in his book. In strwtural terms fm all points of view, k vio-
lated the tmst m d loyalty rclquised of him to the Angto-American sym-
bolic moral universe. In terms of content, the Nazis did not see him as a
traitor because they thought that his move was morally jtrstified, A nan-
Nazi examination of the way in which bis trcasm was committed (pub-
licly) and its content leads one to cclnclude that Joyce elected to identify
hhself with the morally wrong. Thus, we have here an ilfustration for the
fieorctical argument prctsented in the first chapters of the book-a struc-
tural betrayal, but one that is interpted differently in varied contextti.
Iva Toguri presents a difierent case altogethec Clearlyr she was forced
into the role of Tokyo Rose and never developed a Japanese identity or
identified with Japan" World War 11 moral and political views. But she
did violale the trust and loyaify to her country-the United States. Mow-
ever, given the situation that she was trapped in, what real choices did
she have? In other W&, Togufi faced m m or less the same choices that
many European colla,horators faced.
Thus, the structural mirrors reflecting the image of traitor for both
'Tbglari and foyce hide a complex reality and conterct in whjch they both
can be llndcrstood as vhlating s o m f o r m of trust and loHty. In that re-
spect, the universal structuse of betrayal exists in both cases, However,
when we examine the circumstances of those breaches, their content, and
hocv they were constructed, the label ol treason becoms jnterprctively
problematic,
 Ezra Pound and Knut Hamsun

Intellectual support fur the Nazi cause is an inte~stingissue. Two of the

most pmmi~~ent literary men of thr cenbry lent open and public support
to the Nazi cause-Ezra Pound and Knut Hamsun. In this chapter, we
shall explore the case of Pound and, more briefly, that of Hamsun. It is
quite significant that after World War 11 ended, both men wercl. diaposed
by professionals as %Mering from some b r m of "mental ilhess-"

Ezra Paund
Ezra Pound, m e of the most distinguished Wentieth-century American
poets, played a morally questionable role before and during World War E.
His anti-Semitism and disenchantment:were an o(d story, long before the
war, Indeed Selwyn pojnts out that ""some of his most famous lines from
NZLgh Selzuyn Matihcrly had denounced the futility of figbting Germanyf"'
Pound was born inMaiZey, Idaho, on C)ctober 30,188,4, and raised inI"lyn-
cote (clme to Philadelphia). He graduated from Hamilton CoUege in 1905
md. f ~ s h e his
d M.A. degree at the University of sylvania in 19116. WUI-
nilng a fellowship inthe samcl yerar, he kfP the United Statc-.sto go to Europe
to study Romance lanf~uage. Howwer, his feilowrjhip was termhated after
only seven months, m d he had to return. l?e next took a teaching positinn at
Wabast-r P~sbyterianCo:[lcge in fndima (3903, but it did n d take stornny
Pound more than a few months to deride to leave again for a caeer as a
poet in Europe. h3 1908 he arrived. again in Europe, this tirng in Gibraltar,
and began to tmvd (coverimg large d.istmces by w a h g ) , sczttlh~geventw-
ally inVenice. It did not take Pound long to enter and become part of literary
circles in diBerclnt cities across Europe and in London, &rhg 1924, he m d
his wife f?(Dsra&y; whom he married in 1914) segled in RapaUo, Italy where
he was to stay for quite same t h e .
 During these years, Pound" main activit-y was focused on promoting
several young titerary figures, but he was also producing bis mwork.2
h Rapallo, Pound focused on.

his labyrinthian life-work, the cantos, a kind of a joul-ney thrc~ughthe story

of mankind.. . . In cantos XIV-XV, Pc>und directly attacked war prc>fiteers,
high finance, politicians and imperialists alike, as well as all liars, orators
and preachers. Because many banks were owned and managed by Jews,
Pound developed a blind hatred of them."

:111 April 3939, Pound visited the United States, hoping to meet Presi-
dent Roosevelt, He wanted to persuade him not to get the United States
involved in mother European war, but the president wouXd not see him.
The trip was a part of a significant personal effort by Pound tcr lobby h
m y way he could to prevent the United States from entering the war in
Europe. X n letters he wrote that the Jews were responsible fnr the war,
Pound" version was fiat the war benefited the Jews because it enabled
them to take cmtrol of the metals market.
Pound decided. to stay in IZapallo when the W t e d States joined the
war effort agaiz~stNazi G e r m y .

From the start of the war, when Italy still held "non-belligerent" "status,
Pound canvassed Italian radio officials to let him go on the air to address
the American people. Eventuallyl beginning on 23 January 1941, he was
given a ten-minute slot every three days in the ""American Hour." This
marked the beginning of an unprecedented one-man peace movement. To
r(r?cc>rdhis talks, Pound had to travel from RapalIo to the Italian capital. For
each broadcast he was paid the equivalent of fifteen dollars. In his broad-
casts, Pound blasted the "money hungry" Americans for sending aid to
Britain, warned against the cost of intervention in terms of lives and blood:
"For God's sake, don? send your boys over here to die h r the Shell oil com-
pany and the Jewish war profiteers," He blamed the Jews for most of the
wars in history; and held fc~rthon just about anything that popped into his
mind."

Pound did fiis hest to support fascist Italy's war effort, as he felt corn-
fortable with that fascism.' mough he did not give up his Americsln citi-
zmship, he nevertheless preachrd agair7st his country's policy siding with
i t s enemies, in the midst of a war. As Ihe wm progressed, he focused more
and more on wbat be saw as the ""communjst m.c.nace,"'h Although
Pound's actiwity was problematic before the Japanese attack on Pearl Har-
bor and the declarat.ion of war by the United States, i t s treasonable naturc
became obvious after that declaration of war. Had Pound g k m up his U,$,
cit.izenshlp, or kept quiet after Pearl Harbor, his activities might have been
overlooked. After all, the U.S. declaration of war (followed by Hitler's
declaration of war on the United States) drew very sharp m d clear moral
bmndaries between the tvvo sides, Pound made his choice, FXe preferred
to bust fascism and to be disloyai to the Idnited Stata and the Allies. Three
days after Pearl Harbor, Pound resumed the transmission of anti-U.S. and
anti-Semitic propaganda. In his transmissions, he continued to attack his
home country in a most vicious way.' For example, here is what he said on
Febnaary 14,1942: "That any Jew in the White Housc shodd sezzd Ameri-
can kids to die for the private h ~ t e ~ soft sthe scum of the English earth . . .
and the still bwer dregs of the Levanthe . . . '""
Moreover, Pound sought out. and corresponded with another f m o u s
""radio traitoru-Lord Maw-Haw. Although Wliarn Joyce" responses to
Poland were s o m e h a t reserved, Pound wrote Joyee long and detailed
letters. And although Pound continuously solicited Joyce's responses and
wrote to him frequently, Joyce-for all. practical purpose+politely ig-
nored this flood. However, neither forgot to sign their letters with the
"Heil Hitler" eerrdhg.9
On July 26, 1943, "'a federal grand jury in Washington FRdieted Ezra
Pound . . . on charges of wartime treason.'Tounnd's respmse to these
charges is instructive. Mc "received the news with disbelief, and sent a
letter to Washington arguing that the simple fact that someone expresses
his perstrnal views coutd not possibly be taken as evidence of treason.'""'"
Fobwing the Allied invasion of Italy and the surrmder of the Nazi
a m y in Italy on May 2, 1945, a few partisans located Pound, captured
him, and gave him to the U.S. counterintelligence unit in Genoa-1' Pound
was arrested azd held in a military prison near Pisa, He was the11 sixty
years old, His health, and perhaps his psychological well-being, was fail-
ing. The physical conditions of his imprisonment werc;, difficult. Flrr ex-
ample, he was kept in isolation; his belt and laces were taken away; there
were guards present around the clock; and the lights were never shut off.
After being exposed to these cmditims .for three weeks, Pomd began to
complai,n &out nightmares and hallucin&ion,seHe lost both hjs appetite
and some weight. A local psychiatrist who examined him did not h d
any cause to diagnose him as mtlntalv ill but ~commendedtransferring
the pro-Nazi poet to the sick bay. There, Pound continued his work m the
Canlos.12
h November 1945, Pound was put on an a*lane and sent to the United
States. Although he was charged with treason and the chances for a co~~vic-
tion wem hi.gh, a well-publidzed trial was considssed a problematic situa-
tion, A wetl-hown poet kvho bad idmtikd publicly with fascism a long
time befosc3 the war and who had broadcast propaganda from Itdy seerned
like a possibly exploshe mix. The day was saved by same mental heal&
proiessionals who suggested that Pound"s experience in prison may have
made him mentally mbalmced and &erefore unlit to stmd trial,
Julien Cornell, who was Found's lawyer, wrote a book (1966) &out Ihe
"trial." He admits that the charge of t ~ a s o nagainst Pound was made be-
cause of Bound's Italian radio tra~~smissisns, which aided m d comforted
the enemy at some very critical nrrome~~ts of the war for the Allies" Haw-
ever, he claims that Pound"s own response to the charge of treason was
that "the trt?ason was in the White House, not in Rapallo."JVRefore any
trial into the nature of the accusations could actually begin, Pound's
lawyer chose a drtfense that would rest in showing that Pound was men-
tally ill and, hence, unfit to stmd trial.
If Cornelf could get his client certified as "insane," the embarrassmnt
of trying the famous poet w u l d be avoided, as well as the danger of his
being declared a traitcrr m d possibly shot as such. Mtbougb the stigma of
nrrad~zessis perhaps not m y better thm that of badness, it would absolve
Pound of responsibility for his dubious wartime actions; but most irnpor-
tant of all, it would get Pound out of the cltanger zme of a potential death
sente~~ce. To accomplish this goal, Cornell demnnded that the issue of
Poundfs smiw be settled. The court agreed, Thus, four psychiatrists were
assiped to examine Pound. "Ilhree were appoifited by the government:
Dr. M a i m King (age fifty-six), Dr. Jaseph I,. Gilbert (age fifty-five), and
Dr. Winfred Overholster (age fifty-one); one was appointed by the de-
fense: Dr. Wendell Muncie (age forty-eight), Having examined Bound,
these four psychiatrists concluded that hc. was "insane and unfit to stand
trial." They submitted their report to the court on Clecenber 14,1945. In it
they wrote the following:

In our opinion, with advancing years his personality, for many years abnor-
mal, has undergone further distortion to the extent that he is now suffering
from a paranoid state which renders him mentally unfit, . . . He is. . . insane
and mentally udit for trial, and i s in need of care in a mental hurjpital.14

'This unanimorls report left very little choice for the jury and the judge,
The ""tia1" eended on February 13, 1946, when the federal jury accepted
the psychiatrists' judgment and concluded that Pound was "mentdy m-
sound" and "was mfit to stand trial-''IS
One must note that the onXy issue in this pmcedure, which Cornell
refers to as a "trial," was whether Ezra Pound was fit to stand trial, that is,
m issue of sanity This, amazingly does not prevel~tCome1I from giving
the impression that the= actually was a trial and from stating that Pound
was not found guilty because his crime was never proven, One needs to
read this outrageous statement a k w times to understmd this techical
hocus pocus, In any event, judge Law, who presided over the sanity pro-
cedure, sent Pound to St. Elizabeth's Hospital for the mentally ill. As
Cole's seviebv (1983)notes, Pownd

had frequently participated in Italy" shortwave broadcasts to North Amer-

ica, making speeches that were not only full of praise ECIX" MussoJiinX and
Hitler but outspokmly opposed to Axnrtrica" wartime purposes and its po-
litical leadership, The Constitution defines treason as ""levying war" on the
United States or "ggiing aid and comfort" to its enemies, and Pound cer-
tainly did the latter in his broadcasts.

It thus seems fairly reasonable to assulne that had bumd been tried, he
would have been convicted of treason.
Structurally, there can be little doubt that Pound was a traitor. P o n d ,
a citizern of the Unitccf St.ates, chose to stay i.n Italy during the war be-
cause he sided with Italy against the United States, and he willingly
made radio transmissions for Italy sairrst his home country. He violated
the trust of his country and was most certabnly dissloyasl. However, from a
moral point of view, one must note that Pound" pro-fascist and. anti-
Semitic views had been established much earlier. He did not side with
.fascist Itdy out of convenience or some form of tangjt?le inducement or
pressure. Pound seems to have genuinely believed in the fascist and
Nazi ideology In this sense, he resembles the ""patriotictraitors" &-
scribed by Littlejoh (1972).
Those interested in how the psychiatric evaluation was made and
what Pound did at St. Elizabeth" s i l l find the answers in Torrey's in-
structive (1984) work. A. psychiatrist at St. Elizabeth's Hospital, Torrey
was in. a strategic position to evaluate the situation, He states, very
clearly, that Pound was never mentally ill m d that he continued to work
durilng all of his stay at the hnsgitaL Torrey documents, in detail, the
collaboration between Pound and the psychiatrists and how they cre-
ated the deception that P o d war; crazy. Having examined Pound's
wartime activities, Torrey believes that these activities should be seen as
treason.lWhat Cornell refers to as the "trial," Torrey refers to as the
"non-trial.""" Torrey states that the psychiatrists who examined Pound
felt that thcy saved thc great poet frm sncial degradation and possihly
a very harsh sentence. Furthermore, according to Torrey, Pound cooper-
ated fully in this charade and did his best ta give a ""show" that would
persuade the psychiatrists that he was insane.18 Torrey confirms that
Cornell" skategy was very successful. Pound was not branded as a trai-
tor, he was able to continue his work, and those who knew him did not
think for a minute he was crazy. Torrey found Pound to be ecwntric,
 Pound gives ti~efnscisfs a l ~ t eOM a v i v ~ in
l NtzpEes on ftrly 9, 3958, after being
relmsedfrom flze mental Fsospital.
SOUEKE: E. Fufkr.Torrey, The Roots of Treaso)n: Ezra Pound and the
Sc?cret of St. Elizabeth (Mew York:McGraw-Hill, 49841. Photogmyh
nttribtrted to Wide World Photos.

racially bigoted, and rather oblivious to social norms, but he felt that
Pound was defhnitely not crazy During Pound" stay at St. Elizabeth",
he expressed consistent fascist tendencies, praised Mussolini,lp and con-
tinued with his extreme mti-Semitism.ao
Found was visited daily by his wife, Dorothy- Many literary fsjcnds
visited. him as well, and he managed to conduct an extensive corre-
spondence. 7"he lobby for Pound's release was meanwhfte g a h h g mo-
mentum. Ernest Herningwmy's ccrommexrt after receiving the 1954 Nobel
Prize for literature that indeed it was Ezra Pound who deserved the
prize helped, too. The pressure achicved its desired result, and at the
age of seventy-two, in April 1958, Pound was released, having never
been put on trial for trcason, X n June of the same year, he and his wife
left tl-re W t e d States for Brunnertburg in South Tyrol. Pound died on
Pllovemher lit 11972, at the age of eighty-severn in Venice, fourteen years
after his release f mm. St. Elizabeth" Hospital.21
It is noteworthyf and sjgnificant, that the winner of the Nobel Prize for fit-
erature in 1920, the Norwegian author Knut Hamsun (described by many
as a literary giant), was also a Nazi sympathizer.
Mamsun was born on August 4,1859. He had had a harsh childhood
and was employed as an occasional worker. He traveled throughout the
Wllited States, t a h g on several diBerent jobs. In 1890 his novel Hu~zgtrap-
peared (translded into German in 1891) and was followed by more stories,
H e won the 1920 Nobel Prize fur liLerature for his masterpiece, The Cmztillz
q f tlzr Soil (published in 1917and trmslated into German ir7 1918).Between
1927 m d 1933, H m s u n produced the Vagabo~~d Trilogy Hamsm's work
displays some unmistakable characteristics: an appreciation of the simple
l&, a closeness to nabre, and a strong tone of anti-hericm and mtitech-
nological civilization. Hmsun's expressed positims were consistently
hostile to both Britain and the United States. He didiked parliamntav
mefiods of government and what he defhed as "a lack of cult-ure" irr the
United States. Also, the process of jndustrializ&ion was not to Hantsw~'s
likhg, and he was all hfavor of a rural way of life.
These themes made Hamsun's work quite popular among Hitler's
youth movement. Hamsun was not indifferent to Ger~nanNational So-
cialism and did not hide his view that he saw in Nazism an antidote to
Angldmerican materialism. 'l-his, naturally and inevitably, led hirn to
Qui,sling and his fascist party.22 Me jOined Quisling's politicd cause,
gave him a solid endorsement (October 17,1936), and was thus the most
distinguished individual to suyport that Ntrrwegian Nazi. In endorsing
Quisling, Hamsun exclaimed, "If I had ten votes, he [Quisting] would
receive them."'"?.Although Hamsun joined Quisljng rather early, he re-
mained committed to Quisling even during some difficult times artd re-
lused to break away from him, despite requests to do so." bllowing
the German invasion and occupation of Norway (l940), Hamsun had. no
ksitation in calfhg upon Norwegians to teminate resistance because,
like Q~zisling,he believed that Norway had an advantaged position in a
Nazi-ruled Europe,
Hamsun was accepted for an i~~terview by Hitler (in Vienna in 1943)
and expressed open s~tpporf.for him, He urged Hitler to rclmove the Nazi
commissioner of Norway-Terboven-but Hitler was not moved by his
appeal. Terboven serwed his purposes, ir-t spirit and in practice, much bet-
ter than either Halns~tnor atisling ever could.2Wespit.e his d,isappoi.nt-
ment in the meeting with the fGhrer, his public suppwt for Hitler did not
waver.26
Mareover, Hamsun was hosted by B. Goebbels-the mird Reich mas-
ter pmpagandist-in his Berlin home on Map 13, 1943. Hamsun and
Goebbels seemed to adrnire each other and apparently enjoyed each
other's company. After Hitler% suicide, Harnsun c ~ a t r t dan emotional
eulogy irt his me1~0ry.27
Halmsun, clearly, went hrther in suppwthg Nazism than Pound. Both
men, however, felt committed to an ideology that, to them, made sense,
descrjbed the kind of world they wanled to live in, and set acceptable
moral and political boundaries
:It is interesting to note that Hamsun, like E m P a d , was subected to
p9Y"biatric examin,at.ions after the war. Professor Gabriel Langfeldt, a
leading Norwegian psychiatrist, diagnosed him as not responsibje
enough to stand trial on charges of tmascm, Based on this diagnosis, t-he
Pllorwegian authorities "concluded that H m s u n was not mentally com-
petent to be prosecuted. Tbe outcome of this case, however, was that the
novetist at the age of ninety mustert-d his 'pemanently impaked mental
faez~lties'to write his final mast.erpiece, part fiction and part autobiogra-
phy, in whirh he attacked 131: Langfeldt."= Hamsun, it must be noted, re-
b e d to be declared mentally ill and was fully p p a r e d to pay for his
wartime activities,2i"
Nevertheless, Hamsun was denomced and fined after the war for his
fi.iendliness toward Germany. He had publiciy suppclrted t-he Nazis, had
written articles for them,and had helped recruit Norwegians for their
cause. His version of his trial, On O~er~~ucrzrtnPaths, was published in 1949
(and translated h t o Germm in 1950)." This was his last book. It is inter-
estkg to note that durhg his trial, Hamsun tried as best he cot~1dto mhi-
mize bls connections with Nazi Germany and his support for Quisling
and denied that he caused any real damage." lamsrtn died m Febntary
19, 1952"
:It is worth noting that although Hamsun was the most pmmjnent Nor-
wegian to publicly support t-he Nazi cause and Quisling, he was not the
d y one. %c7 individmls as Kirsten Flagstad, hvodd-famous Wag~~erian
soprano, and Christim Sindig, an eminent composer, were involved in
similar activities-32

Concluding Discussion
mere are several issues that require our attention at this point: The first is
a puzzle; the second is the naturcl of the betrayal here, and the third is the
processing of deviance in the cases of Pound arzd Hamsun.
'There is a puzzle behind the ""inte:Llectualbetrayal""of Ezra Pound and
h u t Hamsun, B& Pound and Hamsun were famous and gifted literary
men, a d so one wonders how these hcredibly fertile a d creative minds,
so smsitive to h u m nuances and with such a powmfral control of lan-
guage, c d d lend such s k m g support to totalitarian ideologies founded
on the opprclssion of the human spirit and the hatred of large collectives
of humans. (r>f course, poets and authors are not i m u n e to overinflated
egos or idiosyncratic or eccelztnic behavior. However, one asset they must
possess is a sensitivity to the '"urnan condition," a mature perspective of
the complexity of hulnan culture. It is difficult to understand how the
works of Pomd and Hams~tncould have been created without this semi-
tkity, sympathy, and compassion. ?i, illustrate just a l h i t e d sense of that
power, I v o t e one oE Poland's short poems:

1 make a pact with you, Wait Whitman-

I have detested you long enough.
I come tcr you as a grown child
Who has been a gig-headed father;
1 am old enough now to make friends.
It was you that broke the new womd,
Now is a time for carving.
We have one sap and one r o ~ t -
Let there be commerce between use3"

:In this poem m e can see animosities oi the past, ambivalence, reconcil-
iation, remorse, and hope for a "otter future.. Pound's alignment with fas-
crisln and Nazisxn does not fit with, the sensitivity rcveded here. Coles's
4983 review csxpressts a similar amazement at this migma.
Pound's and Hamsun's affinity f o r fascism and Nazism is part of a
larger puzzle. Many intellectraals have aligned themselves with question-
able characters and oppressive ideologies. At issue is whether an intellec-
tual% ppoliticd ideology shodd play a part in our attihtk t o w 4 his or
her work, and il so, how. The deba.t-e =quires a morall judgment, but it
need not detract from the admiration, or criticism, of the works of the per-
son in question.
7'he failure to cletect the evil nat-ure of fascism and Nazisxn by two such
gifted individuals is an enigma, but it also reqrrires a moral judlgment of
these two intcflech;lals who are viewed by many as I;iants of the human
spirit-bound, perhaps, more so than Hamsun.3-e must co~zcedethat
these two great men made a choice. No one fnrced their hand. They frtzely
elected to side with fascism and Nazism a long time before. the war be-
gan. Regardless of the quality of their work, this was-first and fore-
most-a moral choice.
?'he debate of L\rhe&er Pound's work should be separated from his po-
liticai and moral views was rcignited in t 999. A repctrt by Dinitia SmiCh in
the New York Times (October 23) informed readers that the dean of the
Cathedral of St. John the D i v i n e t h e Very Reverend Harry S. Pritchett
fr.--overruled a decision by a group of promii~entAmerican writers to
honor Ezra Pound wiCh a place h the Poets' Corner of the eathedtd. Me
justified. his decision by stating that Pound" destructke anti-Semitic
writings and broadcasts from fascist Italy duriw World War II caused too
much pain, Reverend Pritchett's decision was clearly a moral judgment.
Structmrally, the nature of treason in Pound.'s and Hamsuds acts is
clear. They violated the trust invested in them by free democratically
elected governments and violated thcir loyalty to these regin?es. In, other
wmds, Pound and Hamsun stood up against the sovereigty and inter-
ests of their countries, as d e h e d by drrmocratically elected gove
However, one must co11cede that their own views were not brery sympa-
thetic to democracyf and they were drawn to the totalitarian and repres-
sive ideolngies represented by Hitler and Mussofini. 11% this sense, they re-
m i n e d faithful to their views, much Eke other European collaborators
mentioned eadier, such as Quisling, Mussert, and Joyce. Once again we
see how the stmcture of betrayal materializes, and how its moraf cmtent
and context can be interpreted differe~~tly.
Finaily! the way in, which social control agencies processed the de-
viance presented by Pound and Hamsun is similar. Both were discredited
as mentally ill- Thus, one codd infer that they w r e not respmsible for
their wartime activities, which, through this r a t i d e , become invali-
dated-a rather ad hominem escape route. ObviousT~the cmstmdion of
Pound and Mamsun as irrespmsibly '"il'bmakes one qztestior?the validity
of this judgnent. fudging by Fuller Torrey's 1984 work, the validity of
Pound's "illness"' is rather questionable.
An added note here must be focused on the advantages m d disadvm-
tages of viewjng both Pound and FXamsun through a medlcaj prism
rather than through a moral one. I must confess that, for rt;asons stated in
Chapter 1,I believe that the moral prism is mare valid in these cases. The
political choices of Pound and Hamsun must be judged for what they
were-as moral decisions. 'That choice, during MiiJrld War E, irnplied an
aff311ity with fascism andim Nazism. That mord preference needs to be
assessed from a moral point of view, C)ne can and should expect such
gifted individuals to he more cornpassimate than to identify with world-
views that are extreme, racist, full of hatrd, shplistic, and militaristic.
The impjication oi this stand to their works is a different, but related, is-
sue. Would it be easier to evaluate P o n d " s d Hamsun" works if we
werc to assume that they were mcntally ill rat,her than morally wrong, or
vice versa?
 Edward VIII:
A Traitor Monarch?

The Riddle
The popular image of King Edtvard VIfl is primarily a romantic one.1 :It is
of a popular king who p ~ f e r r e dlove to pctkver, MIho leit his role as the
king of England in December 11936 in favor of livhg with the woman he
fell in love with-Mrs. Walfis Warfield Shpson.
Edward VlfX's story is m hstructive historical tale because of the cru-
cial question of whetl-ter he was a traitor. :It has been virtually impossible
to find direct and 'bfficial'\evidence of betrayal by Edward VIXf in the
writtetn literature, Hourever, some of the most import& aspects of the
case have been concealed. Une needs to read the literature very careiully
to h d those telltale bits and pieces of information about a possibte trea-
son. Hakvever, a London Channel 4 television program transmitted in
1995 and litled Secret. Lge: Edrvarit Wl-The Traitor Kirfg made it very clear
that, in fact, Edward V111 was a traitor.2
'The Channel 4 program indicated that new information supported
their view that Edward V111 was a traitor and that his affair with Mrs.
Simpson was used by politicians as a face-saving justification for yartking
him out of his throne. The progran? impljed that this new i n f m t i o n
was concealed by botk the British governmnt and the royal family in or-
der to prevent a ccllossal embarrassment. Winston Churchiff,M;hc, appar-
ently h e w about Edward VflZ's treacherous actions, preferred not to dis-
close the facts to the public for the same reason, and because he was
deepfy cmvinced of the vitality and necessity of the mmarchy. Brown
notes that: Churchill was determi,ned to ""clip the tongue and hobble Ihe
feet of . . . the Duke of Windsor."""
Thus, we are dealing with two stories here. The first has to do with the
factual basis for the claim that Edward V111 was a traitor. The secmd has
to do with the possibfe cover-up of m y traces of treason on part of Ed-
ward Wlff. In the following narrative, I have tried to integrate several
sources to examine the pcwsible betmyal by Kirng Edward W.
It is importanl to note that Ch-44 was not the first to question the
behavior of Edward VIII (later Duke of Windsor). Quite a lfew authors
and researchers have examined, in more or less direct w a p , the same is-
sue.%at the Channel 4 program did was to clarify and focus many of
the questions in such a m er that the viewer was left gasping at the old
and new rt?velatic,ns. And yet confirming the informatim provided by
Charnel. 4 in other sources is difficult and makes the claim that Edward
VXIl was a traitor problematic. fndeed, sources confjrrn that Edward VIE
behaved erratically and childishly, was irresponsible, c d d not be tnrsted
with classified military information, and leaned rather strongly toward
filscism and Hitlcr. These are troublesome qualities, but did that make
hhn a traitor?

The Beginning
Edward VZTI (Duke of Wir-rdsor, among other titles) was born Jzxlne 23,
1894, the eldest son (out of four) of George, Duke of York (who later be-
came King George V) and Princess Mary of Teck (later Queen Mary). He
b e c m e heir to the t h o n e in May 1930. He was tri\ined for the Royal
Navy (3907-3911) and was commissioned in the army" G~renadier
Guards after the beginning of World War I (August 6,3914). Edtvard had
much df-ection and naturd sympa.t.hy fos Germany His molf.ler's family
had deep roots h Germany, m d he spent much time there. Germm was
also a language he liked and felt comfortable with.
'The outbreak of World War I h 1914 meant that Edward had to make
some tau@ decisions. Although he was prevented from being placed in
an actual combat role, it seems that whatever duties he was assifled to
he performed in an acceptable manner. After the war ended, he to;red ex-
tensively the areas controlled by the British Empire, He was a hmdsome
and popular king in the making. FatioLving the iline?js of his fatber fn
1928, his interest h national i s s ~ ~ grew.
es In the early 1930s' his interest
and hvoZvement htrying to find solutions for the memployed increased
significantly :His influence was beneficial, and his popularity in the e d y
1930s soared. h 1930 Edcvard was given Fort Belvedere by f i g George
V, There he dcveloped, the art of gardenkg m d harbored a social circle of
friends. Althoug the American ambassador told Roosevelt that Edward
was "surrounded by a pro-German caba1,'"iegler claims that there is
scant evidence for this,"
&ring this time, Edward developed a distaste fnr royal rituais and had
several affairs with married women."hese indiscretions were never
publicized, but his assistant private secretary-Sir Man Lascdes, ap-
pointed at the end of 1920-was distuhed by what he considered to be
his hnmoral behavior (and wrote about it to his wife). Edward" conth-
ued irresponsible behavior caused their relationship to deteriorate, and in
19127 Lascelles asked for an interview with Stanley BaIdwin, then the
prime mhister, ~ g a r d h the
~ g issue. )?e told Baldwin about the deteriorat-
ing morality of Edward and added that "the Heir Apparent, in his unbri-
dled pursrait of wine and women, and whatever setfish whim occupied
hhn at tbe mommt, was rapidly going to the devil, and untess he meneied
his ways, would s o m become no fit wearer of the British Crown." Bald-
win agreed with hirn.7
In 1930 the futum king met the ambitious and outspoken Mrs. 5imp-
son, an acquaintance that would prove fateful. Wallis TNasfield Simpsm
was divorced from a U.S. Navy lieutenant in 1927 and married Ernest
Simpson in 1928. The couple were part of the prince's social circle of
hierzds. It so happened that by 7,934 the prince was maclify in Love with
Mrs. Simpson. However, King Georfye V died. (January 20,1936) beiore
the prince could discuss the matter with him.
By I933 Wil.ler had risen to power inQrmany Edward felt that Hitler's
performance with the German economy was outstanding; it appeared
that he had Led Germany out of economic d e p ~ s s i o nand pmvided em-
ployment to the German masses. Edward became convinced that Eng-
land should support Hitler byf among otlner things, g i v h ~ ghim a friendly
and congratulatory hand. Also, the memories of the horrors of World War
I werc stit very fresh, and the desire to avoid a replay of such a calamity
must have played a, strung role h Edward"s conciliatory mood toward
Hitler. He chose to ignortr the potential meaning of t-iitler's massive pro-
g r m of rearming Germany and its obvious implications..In fact, hJune
1935, in a speech to the RoyaX British Legion, the prince advocated an al-
liance betwen Germany and Britain. The speech was very well received
in Germany.8 Edward's father, King George V: was furious. He accused
his son of behaving in an unconstitutional way because he was involving
hhnself in foreign affairs and making pro-German statements. More than
one source states that shortly before his death, the ailing king nokd that
once he was dead, his successor son would ruin himself with;isl. a year.'
Actually, it took Edward much less than a year to fulfil1 his fatherfs
prophecy
It should. be noted that British appeasement toward Germany in the
1930s had deep roots.10 Moreover, facism did win some genuine con-
verts.. For example, a rdhcr famotls wrnber of the Kritisb aistcxsacy-
Unity Mitford-was an admirer of Hitler and Nazism.ll Britaisl also had a
fascist movement, Mxhicf"lried to win conver-ts.72
Edward's reaction to his father 'S iihess and death Xed to the fhal break
with Lascelles. The news of King George W's grave condition reached his
son while he was on a safasi trip in Soutfi. Africa. His reaction was disbe-
lief, and he viewed thc. news as an ""electiondodge of old R a l d ~ i n " ~
(Rradfnrd 1989:167).Accordjng to LascelSes:

Then for the first and only time in our association, I last my temper with
him. "SSir," "aid, "the king of England is dying; and i f that means no>thing
to you, it means a great deal to us." He looked at me;?,went out without a
tzrord, and spent the remainder of the evening in the successful seduction af
a Mrs. Barnes, wife of the lojcal Commissioner=He told me so himself next
morning.

Despite a good start in late 1920, Z,ascelfes became so disillusioned with

E d w d that he resigned about eight years later, En 1935 he was asked to
rejoin Edward's entourage-which he reluctantly did. Both he and Bald-
win felt that the prince was childljke and som&ow did not matlare.l"

Edward VIII as King

Followirtg the death of King Gcorge V, Edward. Vn3 became king on Janu-
ary 20,3936. Edward Vlll's hehavior was not that etipectc-rd from a king.15
Moreover, as he began to exercise his new role, he began to try to per-
suade the royd family to accept Mrs. Simpson. At that time, she was in-
volved in securing a divorce horn her husband and had in fact ~ c e i v e da
p ~ h i n a r ydecrcle of djvorce on October 27, 1936. Hokvever, Edward"s
attempts in this regard. were met with fierce resistance. The idea of having
a foreiper as the king's wife was very problematic.
At King George V's funeral, Charles Edward (uncle of Edward VlfI),
Duke of Saxe-Coburg and Gotfia, an overt pro-Nazi and a member in the
Nazi Party (as well as a smior officer in the S.A.), showed up in a Nazi
unifnrm.1Woreover, Coburg wrote a detailed rcport to Hitler and
bachim von :Rjbbentrop (German ambassador at large) relating that he
had had Imglthy and frank discussicrns with Eciward Wll, in which the
kix~gtold him that "an alliance Germmy-Britain is . . . an urgelzt necessity
and a guiding prirzciQle fnr British foreign policy"l7 Alt%roughsome cast
douht on the accuracy of Coburg's report, he did point out that Edward
Vlfl saw a German-British alliance as someirhing important and desirable.
The issue of Edward VIIX meeting Hitler also canne up, and the new king
certainly expressed his wish to meet the fiihrer, using Ccrburg as a media-
tor. Edward Vlfl was thus giving clear signals of his ktentio~zto play an
active role in British foreign policy. Cohurg, who was an enthusiastic Nazi
sympathiza, did not hesitate to pass the new king's preferences on to
Berlin.18
 The Nazis took these reports very seriously, and Ribbentsop noted that
he "was convinced Edward V111 was 'a kind of English National Socialist,
with strong concern for the social. problems of his country and w r m
sympathy for an tmderstanding with Germany."'lg Although the new
king was advised against making pobtical statements, this warning was
apparently ignored, Costello states that Edward VllI most certainly
wanted to develop directly or infiuence indirectly, foreign policy toward.
Nazi Germany20
mamas states that Hitler was cmcerned about a new war wi& Britah
and tried repeatedly, through various dipiomatic channels, to initiate con-
tacts with the British royal family in order to forge some sort sf m under-
standing or alfia~cewith Britah." l e memories of the terrible hulnan
lass during World VV;ar I underlay the ieelings of many British citizens
that a new war had to be averted, perhaps at any cost. This sentiment ex-
plains, at least in part, what has become known as the "appeaselse~~t"
policy of the 1930s. mamas poislts out that direct diplomatic channels be-
tween Ed\Nard W11 and the Nazis wem kept open through several chan-
nels (hcludhg Shpson),
It is instructive to look at mother relevmt report:

Sir Orme Sargent of the Foreign Office at the end of 1936 recorded a conver-
satiron in which he was told of Ribbentrap's belief that the real reason far the
abdicatic~nwas neither maral nor ccjnstitutional but political: "Mr. Baldwin's
real motive was . . . to defeat those Germanophile Ecx-ces which had been
working through Mrs, Simpsrrm and the late King with the object of reversing
the present British palicy and bringing about an Angla-German dktente.""
Hitler also was said to be very distressed by the abdication, ""since he had
looked upon the late King as a man after his own heart and one who under-
stood the FGhrer-prinzip and was ready I-0 introduce it into his coun-
try."".. . In December 1936 the German Ambassador was personally in-
structed by Hitler to do all he could to prevent the abdication.2'

Ziegler is quick to pojnt out that the G e r m n Foreign Office was corn-
pletely misguided about hterpreting Edward VlX3" views and intentions.
t?r>wever,even f r m this report it is clear that at the very least Mrs. Simp-
son was a Nazi sympathizer, as her frequent visits to the German ern-
bassy indicate. It may be that the Nazis we= misguided about the magni-
htete and cltepth of EdLvard Vfll's sympathies, but not about their naturo
or direction. Xn fact, Ziegler notes that German mbassadors to Britain in
the early 1930s we= instructed to "cultivate him" and that the future lcing
(then the Prince of Wales) clearly expressed p r o - G e r m views.23 More-
over, German reactions to the October 1937 visit of King Edward Vllf to
Germany were very positive, and &ss, Goering, and Ribbentrop very
much hoped ""t see Edward VXIX remain cm the throne.""24
In March 1936, Hitler took quite a risk when he decided to occupy the
dedlitarized mineland.2i This occupation was a blatant violation of
pacts Germany signed. What was Edward VI1l"s reaction to Hit:ter%entry
into the m h e l m d ? He gwe clear and urnpivocal support for a ""120 re-
action" response and to appeasement.
AIbert Speer recatls that m March 7, 1936-the day German troops
marched into the demilitarized mineland-Hitler rode a special evening
train to Munich, anxiously awaiting reports of other countries9eactions
to his iwasion, "At one station a message was handed into the car. Hitler
sighed with relief: 'At last! The King of England will not intervet~e,He is
keeping his promise. That means that it can all go well."Qb One is feft
wmderitlg, What promise was Hitler referring to? When was it made?
Regardfess of the king's actual ability to hffucnce the governmetnt, there
is little doubt that his voice carried. at least sople weight. Speer is quick to
poirrt out that any "military intervention would have probably required
the King's approval," and howing that the kjng of England was, at the
minimal level, an appeaser wantirrg a "peaceful s o l u t i d b o s t certahly
lifted Hitler 's mood.27
Brown is much blunter. He quotes Ambassador 1,eapold von Hoesch's
telegram to Ribbentrap of March 11,15336, in which the ambassador wrote
that he found much understmtjing for the Nazi point of view from the
court m d that the cot~rtinstructed the gover ent that "no matter how
the details of the affair are dealt with, cmplicatiom of a serious nature
are. in no circ.umstances to be allo~vedto develop."% This message obvi-
ously hclped to calm the highest Nazi officials. 'Their peace of mind fol-
lowing Hitler" aggression ""was attributable to the influence of the King
of E~~gland."'zWradford corroborates this prJint: "There is evidence . . .
from captured G e r m docments that the King put presswe m the gov-
ernment against gohg to war over Germanfs take-over of the Rfiinelmd
in March 1936."30
nounas asserts that Edward VfXI told German ambassador Leopold
von Haesch directly that there would be no war as a result of the German
agg~ssion.31'The act of passing ""highly sensitive military information,
obtaked by virtue of [the King's] privileged position, to a foreign pokver
was nothixlg less than high treason.'"Z However, it must be remembered
that the Britisboovernrnent at that time was not eager to go to war.
Churchill, who advocated armed opposi,tion to the German move, m d
his supporters were iabeled '"warmongers" by Chamberlain and Bald-
win." However, even the pro-Edward VIZ1 bisrapher Ziegler pail"tts out
of the %ineland, Edward VllE
that folf0kvin.g the illegal ren^ritit.arizationtriton
called von Hoesch m d told him: "bent for the P r h e Minister and Gave
him a piece of my mind. 1 told the old so-and-so that :I would, abdicate if
he made war. There was a frightful scene. E;ut you needn't worry. There
wonftbe a waref"4
:It becanne obviws that Edward. VIll wanted to express himself politi-
cally and was determined to do so. The king's political activity-in both
content and structure-caused much cmcern. He was clearly out of line
constitutionallyflintervening in matttlrs he should not bave; and he was
sympathetic to Nazi Germany. As Braciford points out, the main issue
was not whether the king was pro-German-many people in Britain were
pro-German-but that he was acting in m uncmstituSional manner.
On August 11,1936, Joachirn von Ribbclmtrop became the Geman am-
bassador to Great Britah.35 Evidently, Ribbentrap and Mrs. Shpson were
close fricnds and spent a great deal of time togcrther." :It seems obvious
now that Mrs. 5impmn was tellhg Ebbentmp what she must have heard
from Edward Vlll (before and &er hc. became the Iking) about: his brief-
ings from British prirne minister B a l h i n . Thus, Rtlbbentrog must have
h o r n the content of the discussions in the British cabhet. As it became
e-vide~~t that both Mrs. Simpson m d Edward VllX were leaning strongly
toward N a z i Germany, Edward VIE was perceked more and more as a
security risk, and the British f ~ r e i office
p was withhdding certah dwu-
ments from hh-37
As i w a s reveakd much later, during the spring and mmmer of 1936 a
group of powerful and influential British dficials were unithg against Ed-
ward VliJ, because they felt that he was unfit to rule, The D&ion na-
tions were consulted on whether they would accept Mrs. Sirmpson as
queen, and the answer ~ c e i v e dwas a clear "no.'%liaecorclhg to Ch
if was becoming obvious that the antipat-hy toward Mrs. Simpson eould be
used to get rid of a very problematic king. By September 1936 Neville
a m b e r l a i n agreed to the plan. Bradforcl points out that the anti-Bdtvard
V111 conspiracy had also gahed some support the United States,3%nd
the Whdsors themselves may have begun to lean toward, it, too.
The oppmhnity was fast approaching. In October 193%Mrs. Sixnpson
began formd divorce proceedings. So desperate were the eonspiraiors
against E h & VfEIthat a m m r about a secret file ("the China dossier")
was fabricated and circulated." The rumor implied that Mrs. Simpson
had enjoyed an exotic sex life in the 19nls in connection with ltlxwious
brothels in the East.4"
Baldwin told EdLvard W11 that Mrs. Simpsm was unacceptable as
queen to him, his governme~~t, the Dornhion nations, m d the British Em-
pire. Edward VfIlseal-ched in vain for ways to bypass this problem.41
Since no solutim could be found to this romantic quagmfre, Edward
made a choice: He gave up his position as king in order to remain wi&
:Wlrs. Simpson, :Me submitted.his abdication on December 10,1936, Parlia-
mmt endorsed the ;instmment of abdication on December 11, and in a ra-
dio broadcast that evening, Edtvard explained that he fomd it fmporisible
to act as king wiChout the szlpport of the woman he loved. He thercirfore
chose love over power. His brother George V1 was appointed king. Ed-
ward VIZ1 reiped as king between January 20 and December 10,1936, a
short period of eleven months. Edward left England that night for Aus-
tria, where he waited for Mrs. Simpson" divorce to become final. C)n June
3, 1937, Eclward and Mrs. Simpson were married at Cand4, France. No
reprtlsentatives of the royal h i l y were present. George ZiI made Edward
VIII the Duke of Whdsor and his wife the Duchess of Wiyrdsor, but he re-
fused to allow her to use the title Her Royal Highness. Edward became
very mgry and upset about this.
:It is interesting to note Thornas% 1995 hypothetical scenario. What
might have happened if Edward VIII had been king when Nazi G e m a n y
in\Paded Poland in Spten-7ber 1939? It is possibl,e that such an opinion-
ated king would have intervened in Britain" foreign pdicy and rehsed
to go akng with the ultimatum given to Nazi Germany following that in-
vasio~~, or refused ta later declare war on Nazi Germany That could have
created a major constihntional crisis in Britairz: a cab-3net that was deter-
mined to go to war, and a king who refused to sanctim that move. Such a
crisis, however, was averted when Edward abdicated the throne,
A major tenet in Thornas" wmk is that Athough Edward, left England,
he most certainly expected to re- to the throne.lWoreover, the Nazis
not only were interested in getting a pro-Nai.,i king hack cm the throne but
were probably involved in plots to facilitate that event,
Although Edward was happy with WaLiis, abdication created three cen-
tral problems that were to haunt him for years ta c m e . First, his fi~zancial
resources after abdkation were-in his own mhd-unsatisfactory. Sec-
ond, he very desperately wmted Wallis Simgsm to be recognized as Her
Royal Highnest;, in other wctsds, to receive the honor that he felt she de-
served, but that honor had been rehsed. n i r d , he wmted to be involved
in matters of state and may have expected to play an active part irr British
diplomacy He was placed, however, in a very minor positim, and he fell
that his wishes to be involved were, fur afl practical purposest ignored.43

Post-Abdication
The whereabouts of the Duke of Whdsor during the period of World War
12 is an interesthg, importme and thorny issue. Between 1936 and 1938
the couple lived mostly in France and visited several European countries.
One of the individuals with whom the Duke of Wh~dsorassociated was
Charles Bedaux, a French millionaire with worldwide industrial interests,
including some strmg connectiosls in Nazi Genxany, Bczdaux was an ad-
visor to Hitler in the Vichy government and was probably involved in
Nazi Germanvs war effort. He was later imprisoned by the Allies in
Pllorth Africa m d e r eharges of treason and of trading with Nazi Ger-
many4 Bloch points m t that Bc_.dauxcommitted suicide in an American
prison in 1944, but that in 1961 the French government 'Vormally ab-
solved [ h i d ol any treasonable wartime conduct."4"?Kcaux played a
crucial role in arrangiq the Duke of Windsor % trip to Nazi Gcrmany and
his pcrlrsonal meeting with Adolf Hitler. He was also involved in arrang-
ing the duke's visit to Che United States. Although perhaps at the begin-
ning the duke was not awam of Redaux's comections in Nazi Germmyt4b
he could not have possibly missed it later. It is clear that Bedaux tried to
move the duke further toward the direction of Nazi Germany
Bedaux recruited another millionaire into the duke" social circlethe
Swedish Axel Wemer-Gren. 'This man was an arms dealer close to Reichs-
marschall Hermann Gwring and a Nazi sym,pathizec" Although the offi-
cial version downplays, and pehaps even yuestions, the fact that the
Duke met Wenner-Grm before 1940," the Charnel 4 documentary stated
that evidence indicates that Ihe two had already met in 1937 in Paris, Ac-
coding to this version, it was Wenner-Gren who gave, in person, to the
Duke of Winstsor a personal invitation from Adolf Hitler to visit him in
Germany And Ziegler concedes that the Paris meeting was docume~~ted
in Wenner-Gren" diary49 However, in an interestingly dlscrclditing fash-
icrn, Ziegler characterizes the meeting as "brief" and states that in that
"brief" meeting the two "'presmabJy '"iscm,ssed the idea of supporting
an international organizatim that would c o d j n a t e "all the various
peace movements." It must be said that discussing ""peace"' with Hitler at
this point in time could onIy mem s ~ ~ p p ofor r t Hitler's expansionist in-
tentions, Furthermore, when Wenner-Gren later met the duke in Nassau,
he noted in his diary that the duke ""rmembers very well our conversa-
tion in Paris,"m which tends to co~~tradict the notion that it was a "brief"
and supposedly insignificant metirtg,
?"he Duke of Windsor began to plan his trip to Germany. The news
about this plmned visit was most unpleasant to the British government.
:It crclatcd, questions about the Duke of Windsor" possible ambitions to
return to the political arc.na and most certainly constikted an interven-
tion in British foreign policy at a very djfficult moment. Indeed, Bloch
notes that both Churchill and Beaverbrook tried hpersuade the duke not
to visit Germany, but their efforts faited. 0 1 1 Octtder 3,1937, the duke re-
leased a press statement, which om~cedthat the Whdsors were going
to visit both Germany and the United States ""for the purpose of stu.dyi3ng
housing and working conditions."~~
'The Nazis did not fait to gsasp the meaning of such a trip and pre-
sented it as m unoffjcial state visit aimed at promoting an agreement be-
 The Windsors mcet Hiftel; 1937.
SQUItCE: Ma'ariv, December 5,Ei; 1996. Pf1?.utnfrom
Associatlld Press arc/zives.

tween Germany m d Great Britah. It is certah that the duke hated World
Miar I, and it is possible that the ex-king felt that he could persuade FIitller
to prevmt another war. Also, it was obvious that the Nazis wercJ. goir~gto
give him the red carpet treatment, and he m y have misscd that kind of
pubfic respect. The Nazis, evibently, had other ideas. They had llmg be-
lieved that thr ex-king and Mrs. Simpson were sympathizers m d thougbt
that Chey could usc? the d d e in promoting a peace accord to t h i s advm-
tage, m d not just in Europe.

Visiting Nazi Gemany

The Duke and a c h e s s aE Windsor arrived at the Friedrichstrasse Station
in Berlh an October 11, 1937, as Hitler" guests, meir visit to Nazi Ger-
many lasted until October 23. Their oificial host was Dr. IZsbert Ley (in
charge of labor). Brown quotes the Ne'iu York T i f ~ ~ report
es that on two sep-
arate occasions the duke gave what a p p e a ~ dto be thr Nazi salute (on
one occasion, to Mitler himself). Aithaugh the tour plan was exhausthg,
the Duke apparently enjoyed his visit tremendously." Nazi officials paid.
hhn cmsiderabte respect, and tbr Windscrrs also met GoebZlels, Goering,
Hess, and Ribbentrop.
According to the Channel 4 documentar)i the idea of mounting sup-
port fnr Hitler was discussed when the duke visited tke home of b d o l f
Hess on October 22, 1937%It turns out that Hess and the duke shared
some points of views: They were against communism, and they both
wanted peace. The idea was to promote a world peace, dominated by a
Nazi army and kvith Britain's ennpire htact, The U'ni.ted Stales was sup-
posed to remain uutside Europe. Edward was supposedly told that when
such a peace prevailed, he woutd =turn to the thrcme.
The dztke's visil: to Gemmy included listellkg to musk and visitkg the
5.5. t r a ~ n gcenter md, a concentration camp (al%ough it is quite certain
that he was maware of the atroci~esc the=). The bight of the
visit, no doubt; was a o~~e-hour persona (md tea) with Adolf Hitler
at Berchtesgaden m Octciber 22,The dscummtasy showed a
phcrtogmph of a smiling Hitler with the Al&ough Hitler refused
to the duke and used m interyrett3.t; he most certainly as-
duke shared the Nazi worldview.~That an officiat,visit bp
uchess at that time could be, m d wm, i n t e q ~ t e das giving
szxpport to Nazi Germany is dear. Ziegler, who wmte thc official biography
of Edward VIIX, notes that "the worst that can be said about the Germm
visit is that the Duke closed his eyes to most of what he did not wish to see,
and allowed himself to be paraded as an admi-rer of the economic miracle
and,as tacitly condoning the brutal side of the social experiment."ss
Bradford m d the Ch et 4 documentav provide a less
prehtion and s m e very real concerns rclgarding the potent.ial, poljtical
impIicatims of that Urne cannot simply excuse a visit to a dictator
like Hitler, not even in 1937, as expressing innocent intewsts in examining
what may have looked like some economic "xniracle" (whieh, in rcdity; it
was not), Moforeover, h a world. where Hitler" fascism was ideologirally
competing with other potitjcat ideologies (communism, liemwracy, even
monarchy), lendi,ng Hitler szxpport m d Icgitimacy by visiting him and his
nation had some very clear md. loud m o d and poiiticd impliclatims, es-
pecially when the visitor was the f o r m r h g of Englmd.

Trusting the Duke

Q,jte a few Bdtisfi officia,ls were suspicious of the political aspirations of
the duke, both before and after the 1936 abdication. As tension was
mounting in Europe, both the British and the Americans became con-
cerned about the Duke's indiscretion with classified military and politi-
cal information. One incident took place in 1,937,two years hefore World
Mrar II began. An Arnerican low-level diplomt, George Messersmiih,
met the duke in Viema in 1937'. Messersmit_htold the duke about a train
accident that: had occurred. X
n the course of the story it was revealed that-
the Americans had broken a secret military code of the Axis powers. The
Duke of Windsor did not keep his mouth shut but told the story at a din-
ner par% given by an Italhn diplomat, Messersmilh reported the inci-
dent. This seemed to confirm. the suspicion that the duke could not be
tr~sted.~7As we shall see, there were several other i~~cidents, too.

The Verdun Radio Transmission

Another problelnatic event involving the Duke of Wndsor occurred in
the spl-ing of '1939, just a few months before the war began, A few days af-
ter :King Ceorgc V1 and his wife emharked on a trip to Canada and the
United States (May 5, 1939), the Duke of Whdsor broadcast "an appeal
for world peace directed at America from the famous First World War bat-
tlefield at Verdun,"m Bloch notes that this was the last time the duke
made a speech th& mi11.ions of people listened to and that- mmy rcceivcd
with enthusiasm.sY The speech was made on May 8, which is the mniver-
s a q of the Battle of %dun. I h e rwaning of that broadcast, at that partic-
ular point in time, cannot be underestimated. Great Britair.r was on the
brink of war with Nazi Germany, and the king was m his way to the
United States m a very important mission.
l e duke stated in his broadcast that as ""a soldier of the last war" and
in "&re presence of the great company of the dead," he was making an ap-
peal for wlrrld peace. It must be acknowledged that regardless of the
dukefs political con~rictions,his experience in Mlorld War 1 was such that
he felt that preventirrg a replay of that war was worth almost anything.
However, the thought that such a mthless tyrant as Hitler could "a sso eas-
ily appeased was, at best, terribly naive,
Bradford notes the duke" rationale for the transmission: "Became
convh-rcedthat E w p e was l-readed dawn the slippery slope to war. &ly
the Axnericans had the inRuetnce to arrest Che slide. That was why X de-
cided to aim my appeal at them.""@Ironically there is nut a shred of evi-
dence that the duke was trying to persuade Hitler to stop his aggmssive
actio~ns,which were the source of the co~nfiict* h the duke's conversation
with his wife after his persond meeting with Hitler, reported. by the
duchess in her autobiography there was no mention of any such effort to
avert kvar." l u s , alt-houghthc duke was calling for peace, he was in real-
ity asking for appeasement (in that particular historical contextf '*peacefr
really meant ""pace under Hitler's terms"').
It is kstrudive to examine how Ziegler, Edward VIII's official biogra-
pher, ixrterprets this broadcast." Accordjng to Ziegler, the American ra-
dio network NBG ""invited him to broadcast to the United States from
&dun after a visit to the bdtlefield. His speech was short, eloquent, un-
controversial and written entirely by himself,"'h"Ziegler ad.ds that "no-
body else had offered him t-he chance or was likely to do so-least of all
the British. It was hardly the D~tkeof Windsor's fault if the BBC rehsed
to let the British people hear his words. He believed, that he had some-
thing of real significance to say and that, coming from h, it might be
listened to.''M
Close reading of this passage reveals the speciousness of the aqument,
The facts are that the duke gave up power and influence once he chose
Mrs. Sirm,pson, yet he was trying to steer British p o k y h m the backseat
when he directly appealed to the American people. The duke was thus
undermi~~ing British policy and intervenir-tgin the royal visit to the North
h e r i c a n cont.inent. TMhy should anyone be sllrpriscd that the BBC
w d d not let the duke cast his defeatist, pro-Nazi Germany position? Rt-
sides, the duke most certainly had direct charnels of communication to
the British government, and he could have tried to persuade them di-
rectly n e Verdun broadcast was a blatant attempt to intervene in British
policy by a m m wh to a large extent-had given up that right. Clearly
Ziegler assttlnes m knocelnt peace-seeking motivation behind the duke's
broadcast to the United States, whereas Chmnel 4 and Bradford f h d that
it was a treacherous and defeatist speech.
Ziegler notes that on Aug~~si: 25,1939, the duke telegraphed Hitler: "Re-
membering your courtesy and our meeting two years ago, I address to
you my entirely personal, simple thougf~very eamest appeal for your ut-
most infl~tencetocvards a peareflal sdutim of the presetnt problems,"b""
Une must note the humble and apologetic position the duke assumes in
begging Hitler, Hitler replied: "You may be sure that my attitude towards
England is the same as ever.. . . It depends upon England, howwes,
whether my wishes for t:he future developmat of Angle-German rela-
ticms materialize.""" This message is chilling in its hypocrisy. Hitler at this
point was about a we& away from brutally violating Poiish sovereig~nty;
on September I he unleashed a devastating and ferocious blitzkrieg c m -
paign against Poland, taking a gamble that tbr Unikd :Kingdom would
not honor its lasbminute guarantee of Polish hdepetndence (not to metn-
tjon tke violation of the tm-year nonaggression pact FXjtler s i p d with
P o l a ~ din 1934). Britail1 could tolerate no more and declared war on Cer-
many on. September 1,1939.
 The Mirrdsors in France
When the war began, the Duke m d Duchess of W d s o r came home to
England, but they =turned to France on September 29. The duke was
given a military appointment." However, it was made clear to the duke
that he could not pssibly "be a fsee-lance in, the ~ ~area,"@
a r 'The Channd
4 documentav statcd that the duke devokd, littie time to his military as-
sigment, prefmhg to s p e d most of his t h e in Paris with the duchess
and his friend Bedaux, who paid the hotel bill oE the royal couple. One
gets a totaIly different kpression from reading Ziegier % vversim." "c-
coding to Ziegler, the duke was active in touring fie units and preparhg
repads. However, his insistence on acting independe~~tly became prob-
lematic.
Count 'Juliusvon Zech-Burkesroda, the German minister to fie Nether-
lmds, recognized very quickly that the duke was ""disgruntled over the
insignificance of his role."7(1 Endeed, on October 16,1939, the duke wrote
that there was "no enthusiasm over this waref'T1
When Hitler was preparhg his invasion into the Low Countries and
France, he had several options: (1)attacking south through the Maghot
Line; (2) attacking through Belgium and norl..hern France; and (3) attack-
ing through the Arde~~nes. 'The Charnel 4 docume~~tary stated that origi-
nally Hitler plamed to use the second, option, through Belgium and
nort_hcm France. However, on m u a r y 10,1940, a Lziffzuafe airplane was
forced to lmd in Belgium, and on it were documents with alf the details
ed German attack.7Ul.thougt-ian attempt was made by a Ger-
m m officer to bum the documents, there was not enough time to do so,
and the papers were captured by a local law e ~ ~ f o r c e ~ofticer."
~ e n t Baudat
et d.state that although the German invasion plans were communi.cated
to the British and French governments, it did not make much difference.7"
It was assumed that these papers prese~~tect "a clumsy German attempt at
deception." 'Unfortunatelyf these plans were genuine and arathen tic.
Weinberg is mow skeptical and is guick to point out fiat the Cermm in-
tention to attack leaked out continuously through various chamels.7"
Channel I f s slersion, however, intctgratcs this incident with the duke's
disloyal and untrustworthy behawior. Followhg the crash landhg, ac-
cordi,ng to the Charnel 4 documntary, Hitlcr needed to find out wfiether
his war plans had. been connpromised. Then, Count Zech, the German
rninister to the Netherlartds, =parted to Berlin that the duke had dis-
cussed in &tail what would happen if Hitler invaded the Netherlancls.
According to Count Zech, the duke stated that his information was based
on documents found in a German airphne that made a crash landing in
Belgium;, Obviously the duke had been briefed by non-German intell-i-
gence sources, Channel 4 stated that this was exactly what Hitler was
waithg for. He altered his war plms and instructed his forces to use the
third option instead. That pfm was cmsidered irnpracti"a1 by the Allies
because it was felt that if:was not possible to move armor trhrotlgh the Ar-
dcnnes. FXowever, Hitler believed. that it was possible. Enstead of launch-
ing an attack t h r o w the Low Countries, the Nazjs penetrated the Ar-
denncs on May 10, 1940, wi& a force of seven panzer divisions, driving
across Belgian and Luxembourgim boders afong the narrow Ardennes
roadways. Like a hot knife cutting butter, the Nazi advance was ex-
tremely swit, and Mlithin two days they reached the Meuse Rivcc C)n
May 12, the Nazi military machine was threatening Park. As Gostello
paints out, "it is now possible to develop a convincing case that an intelli-
gence leak leadhg back to the h k e of Wirrdsor may have played a sig-
nificant part in prompting Hitler to order his generals to change &eir bat-
tle pl;tn,"76 Accorcling to Brown, who wrote the biotgraphy of 'KC"' (British
chief of intelligence jn World War II), "that leakage from Ihe 'Duke to Zech
through irttermdiaries was again plain treachery.

The Windsors in Spain and Portugal

e14 documentay stated that not only was the duke a hopeless
ta1ke.t; but as the Nazi invasion progressed, he left: his post and travcled
with the duchess to southern Frmce to rest, and later to Spain and Portu-
gal. Channel 4 pr,inted out that the duke's only real cboices were to re-
main in his military unit or to return to England. Leaving his post to
travel throughout southern Europe was rezlsm enough for a court-martial
on a charge of etesertion, a charge that any other officer would have had
tt? face. B r o w is more blunt: "The duke abandoned his post without per-
mission, a court-martial offense, and fled to the south of Frmce to ~ j a i s l
the duchess at their villa on the Riviera."'Uiegler quotes Metcalfe vvho
stated that the duke had to remain with his unit and e x p ~ s s e dhis fear
that the duke might ""d o~rzything-anything a c ~ the t right thing. . . . He
talks of having done enoug2rl"~Qomas offers a different interpretation
far the duke's rather &rangebehavior:

Believing that the fall of France was imminent, he h e w if he remained at his

post$he would be odered back to Engfand where he ran a very real risk that
his involvement with Bdaux had been repode8 and he would be branded a
traitor. By making his tvay to the scmth of France, he tvas not fleeing the Cer-
man advance as has of"l;enbeen suggested, but-putting himself out of reach of
the British.80

.hga,in, Zie@r offers a somewfiat difkrent version.81 Me asserts that al-

though the duke went to southern France with the duchess, he returned
to Paris by May 22, Since he was given virtually nothhg to do, he left
Paris to rejoin the duckss. In a draft of a message to the duke that
Churchill prepared to telegraph on 'July I, 1940, he wrote: "Already there
is a great deal of doubt as to the circumstances in which h u r Royal High-
ness left Paris." However, Churchill decided ta cut out this sentence.
Zicgler leaves the rclader with the clear impressjon that the duke had little
choice: "The Duke left Paris with the approval, indeed the relief of the
Military Mission. . . . 'l'o say that t-he Duke had iieserkd his country when
he had no&ing to do in Paris, and had been told to leme by his superior
officer, was obviousXy unfair, The Ch el 4 rlocumentasy drmatized
this issue by pointing out that while thousands of refugees were forced to
leave their horns, the Duke and the BucS-ress of Windsor were battning in
the sun, The Germans invaded France, and on June 21,1940, France sur-
rendemd. Most British citizens chose either to escape to Dunkirk or to
Britain.
The Duke of Windsor chose Spain. The Wndsors arrived in Barcelona
late on the night on fum 20, 1940, where they stayed for two days, and
then continued to Madrid, arriving there on June 23. They resided at the
Rtz FXotd, suite 501. Spain, one must =member, was under the dictator-
ship of Generalissimo Franco. Although Franco declared Spain to be neu-
tral in the war, the= is Ittle doubt eoncming S p a s s sympathies. Spain
was clearly allied with Hitlem: Moreover, Madrid was a city of cmspira-
cies, M l with spies m d htrigue. The choice of Spain as a rduge looks in-
deed strange..After all, the Windsors could get to Bunkklk and from there
back to England. h any event, the time was not an easy one for Britajn,
and the evacuation from a n k i r k , heroic and mapifictmt as it was, did
not change the overall bkak picture.
:It may be that the duke felt more secure in Madrid, and. he may have
hoped to be able to influence some sort of a peace scrttlernent by keeping
in touclh with the Germans..Regardless of the duke's feebngs, as England
and Germany were entering the war, the Whdsors found themselves wel-
comed by li"rmco irr neutrd (but sympathetic to Hitler) Spain.The duke
was still bitter &out havhg to abdicate the throne, angry that Mrs. S h p -
son was not given FXRH status, and upset for not being given a position of
power and influence. Moreover, it was quite obvious that he was far from
antagonistic toward Hitler. Further, he rnighl have genuinely fell that:
nothing was worth another world. war and that if appeasixrg Hitler was
the way to avoid it, he was willing to go ahtng. That the Windsors had
chosen Spain at this particular time mwt have carnsed alarm in the British
g o v e r n & and raised suspicions in the court of King Geoqe W.
h equafly phusible interprtttaticrn for the d&efs behavior was that he
was trying to g a h time, hoping perhaps to be able to press the British
g o v e r n & to give hin? m appropriate po"itonF to give official recogsli-
tion to Wallis, ad-possibly-to leave the door open for negotiations
with the Nazis. The duke's bbehavior most certainly was not characteristic
of a man who decided to give up his throne and s h k into a comfmable
life with the womm he loved.
h c r m the time of the duke" arrival in Madrid (June 23, an interesting
exchange developed betwcen Churchill and the duke regarding the
duke" choice of residence, The Charnel 4 documentary stated that the
real struggle during tbis time was the battle between Churchill and Hitler
far the duke%loydties. The Germans wanted to keep hixn inSpain so that-
they codd lliegotiate with firirm; C1-rurchitl wanted him. back in England.
Mowover, the British ambassador to Spain,Sir Samuel Hoare, believed
that the war was either lost or unwinnahle and that a negotiated peace
should not be ruled out. That view was close to the duke"," m d the duke
had no ~servations sharing his pro-German views with others, including
Americans,.'The American ambassador to Spain, A. W. Weddell, sent a re-
port to Washingtm, D.C., on July 2,1940, in which he noted:

[The duke] dedared that the most important thing now to be done was to
end the war before thumands more were killed or maimed to save the faces
of a few politicians, . . . These rtbservatiom have their value, if arty, as doubt-
less reBect-ing the views of an element in England, possibly a growing one,
who find in Windsor and his circle a group who are realists in world politics
and who hope to came into their own in event of peace,%

Even Ziegler, who is sympathetic to the Windsars, notes that to support

appewmmt in June 1940 could be forgiven, but ""t say it openly to a rep-
~sentativeof a foreign, even if friendly power, was to say the least indis-
creet." As Ziegler points out, so damaghg wese these talks between the
duke and Ambassacior Hoare, as well as 'I-he duke's public expressions
suppo&ing appeasement, that the ambassador telegraphed Z,ondon (on
June 30, 1940) and w e d the government "to contradict G e m a n propa-
p n d a saying that Woare anli the Duke were carrying on negotiations for
peace.'"qhe results of these activities were obvious. Waller notes that
""6ermal.l Ambassador Eberhard, von Stohrer . . . bad high hopes when he
=parted to Hitler: 'Windsm has e x p ~ s s e dhimself in strong terms against
Bradford adds that if indced the docu-
aurchill and against the \.varrf'*8h
ments regarding the duke" eexprcssions against Churchill and the war are
true, then the duke was "ca~~templating something very Like treason.""w
Ch June 19, 7,940, Churchill stated in the cabinet that "steps must be
taken to ensure the Duke" safe return."@Ziegler quotes Alexander Cado-
g m , permanent undersecretary at the Foreign Office, cwmenting on
June 29,1948, on the Windsors in Spain: ''The quicker we get theln out of
the country the better. But I'd sooner send them to a penal settlement.
He% be the @isling of England when Gcrmany conquers us and. I'm
deadaff8g
Indeed, British ambassador Haare contacted the Windsors and ""has-
tened to irtfom them that the Prime Minister athched grcat wen" to
their return to England and wanted them to go on immediatefy to Lisbon,
where., on their arri\id, two flying-boats of Coastal Command would be
sent to take them home, He told them too, that the Duke of Westmisrster
had offered them the use of his house, Eaton Hall, near Chester."W On
J m e 24,1940, the duke repfied to Churchill that he was not =turning, and
opened a process of negotiation in his lictter about the position be wanted
to be given once he ~ t r t m e dstating,
, in addition, that a position outside
England might be prefesabrc. Churchill replied on June 26 that such nego-
tiations would be better held after the duke had returned to Englan& The
duke refixsed, stating that he would ret-urn only after these negotiations
had been successfully accomplished (inclndjng giving the duchess an
HRH status and,exemption from some taxes). Ambassador Hoare found
hhnself in the midst of these negotiations and added in ofie oE his corn-
mw~icationsthe bizarre idea that giving the duke a "command at seaff
might be a solution,Yl
These negotiatbns were taking place just after France had coltapsed
m d the completion of the May 26June 4 Dunkirk evacuation. Churchill
was trying to cope with a very difiicuXt and complex situation. That these
negotiations with the duke were taxing his p ~ " f j o utime s is obvious.
Moxeover, the trivial demands the duke was maki.ng on t-he prjme minis-
ter in a time of national crisis reveaX the nature and magnitude of the
duke's abominate position. Even sympathetic Ziegter must admit that t-he
duke was "badgering the f'rirne Minister,""that- hjs position was "'incxcus-
able," and that his "sense of prap~&ion. . . bad failed him."^^
et 4 docuentary is more blunt. According to the program,
the Duke hebv fairly well that he was making dernands that Churchill
could not have possibly met, Moseover, the program stated that at that
t h e there was a small, but not insipificant, pro-peace (or appeasement)
movement in EngSand, which was lobhying for a negotiated settlement
with Hitler, Indeed, Bradford notes: "In November Horace Wilson, the
most inkential man in W~itehalt,told Moncktm that t-he only real worry
as far as the Government was cmcerned was that the Dklkefs return to
Englanb might be exptoited by extremist. p u p s , which be undoubtedly
meant to include Sir Oswald Moslefs fascist blaekshirts, who had sup-
pmted Edward WII over the .hhdication."~~hurchilLI m s t have been
concerned that the duke would speahead. that movement. And the
Windsors had alwady proven in Madrid &at they werc. willing to speak
out very loudly for appeasement and against Churchill.
 Ch 'June 25,1940, Churchill wrote back to the duke: ""Vour Royal High-
ness has taken active mftitary rmk, m d refusal to obey direct orders of
a
n
competent military authority would create a serious situation. 1 hope it
will not be necessary for such orders to be sent. l: most strongly urge com-
pliance with wishes of thcJ Cove ent.'"me threat of a possible court-
martid implied in Churchill's Hrm, message is quite clear. And thc threat
worked. A few days later the Windsors left for Portugal, They arrived in
the Lisbon area on July3,1940,
However, before leaving Spain, the duke made some dantaghg state-
ments, Mr. Weddell, the Arnerican ambassador to Spain, wrote to the
State Department that he had heard; the duke saying that the only t h i q to
do was to achieve ""a peace settlement with Germany."% The anti-British
nature of these s t a t e m t s is unquestionable.
W i l e negotiaticms were going m between Churchilf and the Duke of
WIndsor, the Germans were forming their own plots." hieglcr states that
the duke was unaware of these plots, but the Germans were not mistaken
in assuming that the duke represented a political force that. was symga-
thetic to their cause.
The Germans were tving to deternine how best to utilize the duke's
political sympathies. Several researchers point out that the Germans,
headed by Iqbbentrop on this issue, made several co~~thgency plms fo-
cusing on moving the duke to their side.97 In ;5iegler%tarns, the Ger-
mans wanted "to keep the Duke of Windsor in Europe, and make use of
him as a tool of their pctticy."gB At first, atrt-emptswere m d c to persuade
the Spania.rd.s to keep the duke in Spain for as long as possible..These ef-
forts failed, but before the duke left Madrid, he made some rather strong
statements against Churchill to German ambassador van Stohrere99
The move to Lisbon did not silence tfie Windsors. "An American diplo-
mat in Lisbon, H. CIaiborne Pell, repo&ed to Miashhgton Uuly 20,194C)I
Duchess are indiscreet and outspoken against the
Brown is mom specific about the nature of the
Portugal: "The Dukti was soon repmted to have
stated that England 'faced a catastrophic military defeat, kvhich couid
only be avoided through a peace settlement with Germ.anym"'""l
&coding to the Ch et 4 documentaq King George W was aware of
the political threat posed by the Duke af Whdsor, because regular intelli-
gence reports rclceived from Madrjd indicated the duke" disloyal position.
'The Channel 4 program stated that King George W's private secretary,
Alexmder Hardinge of Pashot a secret report to the Icing in which
he states that the Nazis were pl to overthrow King Gearge W ancl
~ s e a fEdward
: VIZ1 as king. That scmario rc_.flectc-.dthe Nazi evaluation of
the extent to which they cot~ldexped the duke to side With Chem if and
when they conquered Eng1asrd.U02The secret Nazi plan to d e t h the duke
in Europe and their cont%ency plan to =store him as king of England
show Chat they viewed the duke as a potential collaborator. As Ziegler
points out, the duke's behavior gave them good rcason to think so.103
In Portugal, the Windscrrs resided in the villa of a rich banker, Kicardo
Espirito Santo Silva, at: Cascais (a few mifes outside t,istson). Various
sources note that Santo was a Nazi informant, sympathize&and sup-
porter.'("%d, s a i n , the duke did m t hide his views. & m e occasion
the duke was heard ohis time by an informant to Marcus C k k , a British
embassy clerk) predicting that Churchill" ggvvernment would fall and
that Labour w U f d f o m a new government that would negotiate peace
with the Germans. In this scelzario, King George VI would abdicate the
crown and the duke would be restored to the throne: ""Britah would then
lead a cclalition of France, Spain, and Portugal, and Germany would be
left free to march on Russia.'"Q"
Another rather strange event took place while the Windsurs were in
Portugal. Aucording to the Channel 4 documentary, t-he a c h e s s of Wind-
sor left some personal ite17ns hher Paris apart~aentwhe~zthe royal couple
fled south, She instructed her maid to travel to Paris and retrieve these
personal belongings. Paris, however, was then occupied by the Nazis,
m d the duke had to obtain special permissio~zand doc~~ments for the trip
of the maid. Who did he apply tot The Gestapo. Ail this occurred after
Dunkirk, of course. Thus, the Windsors were Ln contact with the enemy,
making requests and asking fnr special fa~rors.Sarah Bradford comrnents
that this was "extraord.inary."lQGShe also reports that in response to a re-
quest from the duke while he was in Madrid, "the Germans agreed to
keep watch on the duke" Paris hoLtse,"""'7Donaldson conf r m this rather
bizarre incident, adding that a telegram was sent by von Stohrclr (Gernan
ambassador to Spain) to Berlin exptailning that the maid's trip to Paris
could be used to help postpone Chc Wbdsors' dept?rture,li"BIndeed, dter
the war ended, the Windsors returned to Paris and found that "their
house in the Boulevard Suchet had been mdisturbed during the war, all
their possessions were m h a r m d , m d their caretaker even jnformed
them that, when a pair of boots belonging to Major Gray Philljps had
been taken, he had complained to the Ksrrzmarrda~tz.irwho had them re-
turned with apol0gies"""2~
Although the Duke of Wjndsar has been portrayed by some as a de-
vout peacenik (even at the price of appeasing Hitler), another incident
shattms Chat iltusim. 7'he Nazi air force, the I,~1f'fwalCjCe,
took an active and
effeclive part inthe Nazi military campaign, which led to the British evac-
uation at Dmkirk, and Nazi bombers were constantly attacking British
(and other) ships engaged in the evacuation and other operiztionse1l0C h
'July 10,1940, Baron Oswald von Hoyningm-Huene, the German amhas-
sador to Portugal, '?old Rjbhentrop that the Duke spoke freely in farvor of
compromise and said that the bombing of England would soon make it
ready for peace."lll "'The Duke believes with certainty that continual
heavy b o d i n g will make hgland ready for peace." In other words, the
duke made the fantastically absurd sutjgestion that the aerial heavy born-
bardntemt of Brjtain was for Britain's own good. M a s s a d o r Hoynjngem-
:Fluem%report further states that the duke '"intends to postpme his jour-
ney . . . at least until the beg ing of August, in a hope of a change in his
favor. He is convinced that had he relnained on the throne, war could
have been avoided and describes himself as a firm. supporter of a peaceful
compromise with C';ermany.""l'
Bradford too does not fail to note that this German docwent implies
that the duke was tryhg to &lay his departure from Portugd, hoping
that events would turn in his fa\..or,"3 That could only mean, in the rele-
vmt cantext, a radical change in British policy m d the recall of the duke
to England to assume a powerful position (presumably h g ) . Thus, the
peace-lowinl; M e of Miindsor recommended heavy bombardment of his
owl1 country-all, for the sake of peace, of course. C)ne cannot avoid
Thornas% acid note: "There is no record that he ever suggested to
Churchill that bombing G e r m y would have a similar effect."H4 Such
statements make it plahly clear whose side the duke was on. And such
violations of tmst m d loyalty are indicatiw of genuine treason.
MeanMthile, the Nazis MreR busy m a h g their plans to keep the duke
in Eurctpe (and, if necessary, to kidnap hint),"'" Cme of these plans catled
for the return of the duke to Spain. The plan was that durirzg a hmting
campaip near the Spanish border, the Wndscrrs would cross the borcier
secretly and ask for asytum in Spain. There, accorcting to the Channcl.1:
documentary, the Windsors would live in, a castle owned by Comt of
Montarco. The count was instructed to prepare the castle fm the royal
couple. The plan called for the duke to use the castle as the place k m
which he would announce his &engagement from the British govern-
ment and call for peace. In that public announcement, preferably in a ra-
dio transmission, the duke was supposed to publicly reject the British war
policy and sever tics with his brother the king. Ribbentrop thought that
intimidating the duke and making him feel that Bortugd was unsafe
would he@ to realize this plan.
:Rjbbentrop%m m for the job was the S.S. offjeer Miallter Schellenberg.
Schellenberg hired individuals to break the windows of thrt duke's home
by thrnwing rock, wh,ieh achieved some eMect of int.in?id,ation.Moreover,
he had a message delivered to the duke" home in which it was stated
that the British secret service was planning to assassimte him."%Schekn-
berg states that he was workhg under Ribbentrop's instructions and that
his goal was to bring the Whdsors into the Nazi area of hfltlenre.
 Angel dc Wesco, a Spanish agent who was working at the tirne for the
Nazis, wap; sent to Portugat to help bring tbr duke back to Spain. Valesco
appearcd on the Chnnel4 documentary and stated that when he met the
duke at the villa, "the Duke was trembling, the pool. man, There were
times when he etiein't know what he vvas saying. H e knew what he
wanted to say . . . but could not say it properly So when anyone ash me
what 1 thhk about that interview . . . what 1 say is, The man was con-
fused, he was trembling. He did not know what would happen nextafff
'The duke was under the sttrveiUance of British agents in Lisbon, m d
Churchill knew the dmgemus and.precarious position the duke was in,
Indeed, even Ziegler, who tries his best to prtrsent the Duke of Windsor in
the best possible fight, has no choke but to a c k n o h d g e that- "a report
from a representative of the British Secret Service in Lisbon said. that the
Germans had recently appma&ed Bedaux and asked hirn to establish
whether the Duke of Whdsor would be prepared to become King in the
event of a German victory. Bedaux declined,"ll"7radf ord summarizes the
"@isling activities" of the duke in Spain and Portugal by statin; that
""lrom the momel-rt of his arrival on 23 June, the Germans in collaboration
with the Spanish Government contemplated ushg him as a weapon ei-
ther in the event of a successful invasion of England or, possibly in peace
negotiations, detahing him in Spain wi& or without his ~o-operation.~~~18
The problematic nature of the duke" activities did not escape British
intelligence. Indeed, Bradford points out that thr duke made statements
against. Churchill and the war and that the chief of British intelligel-rce
was discussing the "Cfuisl.ing acti:vities"' of t h duke (jn Madrid and Lis-
bon as well).lw At the very least, the Duke showed practically no support
for his cou~ztryat a time when it was most needed.
Meanwhile, in Lmdon, various options were cmsibered for the duke"s
futurt;, Both Churchill and :King Ceclrge VI felt that bringing the duke
back to Englmd was a bad idea. h fact, the king wrote, "My brother has
behaved disgracehlly,"120 "Bradford adds that on July 10, 1940, the king
was ""amused at Cl% [head. of British :It~telligence]report of thr Quisling
activities of my brother.'"= Apparently, the king wanted to project in
pu:blic t:he impression that his brother" activities were nont%ireatening.
Ewneually, Churchill decidrd to offer the duke &c? positim of governor
m d commander in chief of the Rafiarnas. Although some concerns were
raised that the duke rnight use this position to plot against Churchill, he
brushed these concerns aside. He did warn the duke, in a letter, to be very
careful about hvhat he said as a representalive of the British Crown.122
However, even this decision was fraugl-rt with difficulties. London was
concerned that the duke rnight change his mind and, instead of going to
the B a h m s , might decide to go back to Spain,\zrhere he codd launch a
peace initiative. British ambassador Samuel Hoarc, concerned about such
an event, wrote in July 26, 1940, that an effctrt must be made to prevent
the duke from comfng back to 5pah.123
As concern about the duke's h t e n t i o ~ was
~ s nrrom~thgh London, Wal-
ter Monckton-the duke" good frimd-was asked to go to Lisbon and
talk to him. Moncktm arrived in Lisbon on the evening of July 28. Lfke
Wesco, he found a demoralized duke who did not really believc that the
British secret sewice was planning to assassinate him, but was a little m-
sure about it.He atso suspected that the Germans f i g h t try to assassh~ate
h h once he arrived in the Bhamas, and he was not too keen to return to
Spairt. Accordhg to the Channel.4 program, Monckton carried with him a
letter warning the duke about m a h g contradictory statements about the
British governme~~t" policy It may be that Mo~~ckton had some harsher
thirtgs to say, too, Monckton" pprcsence in Lisbon had its effect, After his
arrival, concern ~ g a r d i n gthe duke's actions diminished. On August 1,
1940, the Windsors boarded Excakibur at 15:00 and sailed to the
Bahamas.124
It is interesting to note that on the same day, Hitler issued his Directive
17 on the planned Nazi invasion of Britail7. P~parationsfor the invasi.an
by the army were to be completed by September 15, and the operation
was to take place September 19-26.7'he order was to be given about four-
teen days &er the main Luftrunfle offawive had begun.DVz.~ffwaffe attacks
on British shipping in the English Channel increased, in irttensity betvveen
August 1 and 11, and on August 11 Weymouth and Portland were
bombed from the air; Ports~xout.Ezwas bombed the next day. 'The Battle of
Britain had begun. On August 15, the L21fizuafe f i w a h o s t 1,800 sorties,
and the British Royal Air Force (R.A.F.) almost 1,001). The advice given by
the Duke of Windsor to bomb England was bejing ruthlessly executed.
A revealing communication from the duke to his brotkr, King George
VI, dating July 23, 1940 (just prior to his departure from Portugal), testi-
fies to his state of mind then. Xn that telegram, the duke "urged Ihe King
to end the war, telling him to dismiss the Cabillet and replace it with one
headed by the elderly but still active Uoyd George, which meant dismiss-
ing Churchill, the feadcr of a democraticalfy ekcted Government-."l% In
the context of events between September 1939 and the summer of 1940
(and the insatiable German qgressim prior to September 1939), this sug-
gestion codd only be interpreted as a strong pm-Nazi stmd, m e t-hat was
completely contrary to the stance of ChurchilZ" government.
One final note here is that when the Nazis realhed that the duke might
leave European soil, they clearly tried to change his xnind even about
leaving Portugal, mostly by talks with Santo Silva, the owner of the villa
wfiere the Windsors stayed. According to the Charnel 4 documentary, the
duke told his landlord Phat he could not djsobey the hstruetions he re-
ceived from London because it 'kould disclose his intentions pre-
maturelqi." h other words, the duke may have had a plan that he thought
he codd opcrlrationaiize from the Bahamas. This intapretation ~ c e i v e s
support from reports by Santo and Hoynj,ngen-Hueme that the duke
wanted, explicitly, tto keep his German contacts open. The duke may have
wanted to keep all his vtions open in case Britain lost the war,'27 Almost
all sources seela to agree that while the Windsors were in Spaiin and Por-
tugal, the Nazis were working frantically on plans a h e d at keeping the
Whdsors in Europe.12Ut the fmwell party far the Duke of Windsor in
Psrtqal, the duke assured the Germans "oE his 'deepest sistcerity and ex-
pressed admiration and sympathy for the :FGhrer.Wmoreover, Windsor
said 'he could, if necessaryf intervene from the Bahamas."""2"

The Windsars in the Bahamas

n o s e thinking that the Duke of Windsor was harmless in the Bharrtas
were about to face an unpleasant surprise. The Windsors arrived in the Ba-
hamas in the rniddle of August 1940.ls"eir stay in the Bahamas had some
hteresfting problemal-ir asgctcts. Che of the first incidents was the duke's
wish to spend a total of about E7000 to renovate the Gove
M e n Churckll s w the duke's first demand for an initial E5,(30C) from gub-
lic f u ~ d hs Britaiin, his comme~~twas, 'Tornment is needless." Such a de-
mand in the midst of a costly war was, at the very h a t , insmitive. The
Ti-ibune pointed out that with fiat kind of mmey anofier hurricane
could be purchased to defend Buchgham 13alaceh-orn bnntbi37g.S'
Swedish industrialist Axel Wenner-Gren resided h the Bahamas when
the duke arrived there. ?"he duke had already met with Axel Wenner-
Gren in Paris. There seelns to be little doubt that the Americans and the
British viewed Wemer-Gren as a Nazi synrpathizer or wosse. Even
Ziegler concedes that British intelligence i n t e ~ e p t e da letter sent to
Wenner-Gren fram a kiend Jn Rio de Janeiro prior to the duke's arrival in
Nassau telling WennerGren that he should expect the arrival of "a new
and interesting farnity . . . who . . . hold sympathetic understanding for
totalitarian ideas."'" H~oever,Ziegler djsmisses the letter as a "cryptic
message and asserts that Axel Mienner-Gren was in.terested only in
""peace.'" The duke, however, had been warned by Lord Halifax, then
British ambassador to the United States, that We~zner-Gren"was not a
suitable companion" for him, The duke ~ s p o n d e dby questioning Lord
tlalifax" advice and demanded to know exactly on what grounds the
suspicions against Wenner-Gren were based.1" QC course, the suspicions
were based, on intelligence evaluations, whirh codd not possibly be re-
vealcd to the duke in full, given his past behavior. Ilowewer, thrrc. can be
no doubt about two facts. C)ne, the duke was explicitly warned against as-
s~liatingwith Wemer-Gren, and two, he rejected the advice and kept
close ties with Wemer-Gren. In 193.1t-he Americans put Wenner-Gren m
a list of persons who wcx to be treated as "'enemy aliens.""Up to that-
point, the duke could refuse the advice of his own gove
tain close ties with Wenner-Grm, but that position was insupportabte af-
ter Wemer-Gren was dcfined as an "enemy alien" by the Amerjcans."""
More light about British 'fears of the association between Wenner-Grm
and the &ke of Windsor is shed by Brown:

On several occasians in 1942 and 1943, Churchill expressed amicsty that a U-

boat, acting under the cctntrr~lof the Sou ther~zCross's [Wemer-Cren's yacht]
powerful wireless station, would land an armed party in the Bahamas and
spirit the duke and duchess away to Germany. Churchill therefore ordered
that a platoon of British tmops be statianed arc~randthe Windsors" home in
Nassa u.135

Although the duke wanted to visit the United States and meet with
President Rassevelt, Britain was-obviously-not too thrilled about this
prospect.'" However, the duke did meet with Roosevelt in Miami hoard.
the "lirsclzloosu cm December 1.3, 1940. Ziegler notes that Roosevelt was
""dismayedby the g l o m which [the duke] radiated and his obvious belief
that the United St.ates would, shelter in isolationism." Ziegler notes that a
second meeting with Roosevelt (October 4,1941) was marked Zly a more
positive spirit.'" 'The Windsors sailed back on We~~ner-Gren's yacht, the
Sozdfher~Cross,

to spend Christmas among what was, according to American intelligence,

his circle of men like Mooney, an anti-British Irish American traveling with
arath~rizationfrom Goering to make piece with. Hitler, and ALked P. Sloan,
chairman of General Motors, another Hitier sympathizer. During this periud
the Duke is alleged ta have had several conversations on the subject of peace
with Nazi Cermany.13"

Une must remember that durirrg this period, Nazi Gcrmany was involved
in a vicious battle against Britah~in both air and sea.
'Thus, while h the Bahamas, the duke was maintaining cmtacts with
people who were under very strung inteuigence suspicions of being Nazi
sympathizers. Among these associates t-he duke could freely ventifate his
political and moral views, and thmugh them fie codd selnd the Nazis sig-
nals that they should not forget bim.It was a way of keephg his options
open. 'I'he verbal context for such discussicrns was that the duke was in-
tercsted in pursuing a ""peaceful"solution to the conflict hEumpe. Mow-
ever, given the n a t u r ~of Hitler" regime, ""pace" could only be inter-
preted as concession tcr a racist, ruthless, and declzptive tyrant who could
not be appeased. Moreover, for a formr British king to have held such
vicws in late 1940 was ethically very questionable,
One reason that fie British were not too keen about the Duke of Wind-
sor making visits to the United States and meethg with high-rmking U.S.
officials m s t have been that they felt he could not be trusted to represent
their interests in a forceful, loyal, and meaningful way. Developmentri in
the imer political arella of the United States in 1940-1941 heightelzed that
mistrust. At issue was the pending legislation for the Lend-Lease Act,
whereby the United States would provide aid to nations fighting Ger-
many and Italy (and later lapan). Durhg Decemher 19120, P ~ s i d e nXZoo-
t
sevelt was lobbying for passage of the bill., against the prcssure of Ameri-
c m isolationists. A lorrt; and bitter debate raged about t k type and
degree of U.S. hvolvement in the war. Afier much debate, the hill was
submitted to Congress in January 1948, Roosevelt received solid support
from the Democrats, and it passed fie House on Xjebruary 8, 3941 (260
votes to 165) m d the Sellate on March 8,19441 (vote was sixty to thirteerz).
Thus, the months of February-March 1941 were crucial for decisions
made ~garciingthe nature of U.S. involvement in Miorld War E. The duke
was not ulzaware of this debate. An hcident much like the duke's Verdun
radio I-rmsmission in the spring of 1939 was about to unfold..
111 either December 1940 or Febmary of 1941,139 fie Duke of Windsor
gav" m interview to Fulton azrsler, a jonmalist for the American maga-
zine Liberty and a fricnd of President Roosevelt. The interview was pub-
lished first hLiberty cm March 32 and later in the Lcmdon Su~rltlyDispatch
March 16,1911-1).Rractford's vcrsion is that the duke gave his inksview to
Ourslcr on February 6, 1942, only two days before the bill passed the
House. The timing of the interview could not have been worse from a
British poinl of view. What did the Duke tell Oursler? Bradford states that
in the interview the duke appeared to "advocate a negotiated peace and
aei\iised America under no circumstances to enter the war.'"m Ziegler ex-
pands a bit on the imp~ssionIhat emerged from the interview:

The Duke . . . satzr na hope af a British victory. Ncrr was there hope of a
change of heart in Germany " k u cannot kill 8Qm Germans and since they
want Hitler, haw can you farce them into a revofutian they don't want?"TThe
only hope tzras for a Pax Americana: a peace imposed upon a discredited Eu-
rope by the New World, which would restore a measure of sanity to interna-
tional relations. "The Duke of Windsor has given an intesview to a magazine
in the U.S,A, in tzrhich he pretty frankly dixlaims all chance af an English
?~ictuq,"Goebbets is supposed to have commented, adding that they would
not use it in their propaganda for fear of discrediting the speaker.141
 Zkgler adds that the duke ""claimed to have had many words put into
his mouth." Churchill was not the type to watch this twacherous inter-
view and keep quiet. Indeecf, he was furious. Ziegler notes, "Whatever
was meant, . . . Churchill . . . said the Duke" words would certajnlly be in-
tcrpreted as 'defeatist and pro-Nazi, a d by impiicatim, approving of the
isolatinnist aim to keep America out of the war,'"l" Churchill "advised"
the duke to seek advice before making pubhc statements m d used the op-
portunity to demand that thr duke sever his cmtacts with Wenner-Gren
as well.143 The duke ;.was a bit belligerent m d exchanged some telegrams
about these issues with Churchill. The Nazi attack on Russia on June 22,
1941, but much more so, the December 7, 1941, Japanme surprise attack
on Pearl Harbor, shattered completely any hope the duke might have h-
dled of keephg the United States out of the war.
By the time the Ch e14 dcxlumentary program was taped, Oufsler
had died. The prodtlcers Chus interviewed his son. H@ told the British
television crew that the hterview with the duke had been conducted on
December 19, 1940. In that interview, the duke stated that the United
States should not enter the war, that it would be a tragic event if "Hitler
w d d be overthrown," that "Hitkr was the right and logiral leader of the
German people," a d that it was "unfortunate"' that he had never met
Hitler (an obvious lie; the duke met Hitler in e t o b e r 19371, who, in his
view, was "a great man." Accordjng to Ourslefs son, the duke told his fa-
ther that if fCoosevclt would make a move t o w 4 peace, the duke would
support that move immediately. Such a move, the duke is reputed to have
said, would start a revdution in England and would force peace.
Oursler's son states that his an-tazed father returned to the hotel, finding
it difficzrlt to bclieve Ml)nat he has just heard. He thought that the du,ke
wanted his t~acheroussentiments to be passed on to Roosevelt, Accord-
ing to Oursler" son, his father saw Roosevelt and told him about the in-
terview. Oursler9s son states that Roosevelt told his father that nothing
was surpris-ing in t h s e days and that some upper-dass people in Britajn
wanted to appease Hitler and stop thr war. The hterwiew was wentuaily
published i,n March 1941, havirtg been heavily censored. In this respect,
the duke's c l a h that the articIe had not quoted him correctly was correct.
Brown, author of the biography of the chief of Rritish intelljgence dur-
ing the war, rcil~forcesOurster's revdations. According to Brown, the
duke "made little secret of his sympathies" and told "a pro&ent Ameri-
can visitorfr that it was ""toolate for America to save Democracy in Eu-
r o p e ' b d that it was better for America to ""save it in America for itself""
Moreover, Brown adds:

The Duke was said to have written highly c=omprc>misingletters to Hitler

personally, ones that escaped the British censorship but were known to have
 been delivered. The Dutchess too, was being watched by the FBI, for a s As-
sistant Secreta ry Ado1f Berte recorded in his diary on September 20,1940, the
eve of the day scheduled for the invasion of England: "Tamm, of the FBI,
came down, They have uncovered same correspondence which loclks as
though the Dutchess of Windsor was in constant communication with
Ribbentrup. . . . It looks as thaugh these has been some intriguing. . . . Maybe
the Dutchess would Like at Icmg Last to be Queen.144

Folfawlng the end of the war, the Windsors lived mostly in Paris, wi&
the duke occasionally visiting BriLain, There are reports that he was in-
volved in some rather questit,na:ble dealings in currency durhg and after
the war.

The Covemp
Une last episode involves an attempt to cover up the treacherous nature
of the Duke of Windsor% activities during the war, Accordix~gto the
Channel 4 program, the British royal fmily asked art historian Anthony
Blunt (at that t i m , working for British intelligence) to help them hide the
duke's pro-Nazi wartime activities.
In. 'July 2945, Bli~~nt
traveled to Germmy; suppo~"dlyto retrieve some
innocent letters. But according to the Chiannel 4 documentary, this was a
cover-up. Blunt's mai mission was to mtrieve (and destmy) documents
pertainhg to the Duke of Windsor, for example, the transcripts of his con-
versation with Hitler in October 1937. Bradford refers to the so-called
Marburg File, which is the record of Hit:ter%conversations with f a ~ i p
statesmen, slating that no record exists of Hitler's conversation with the
Duke of Wi.ndsor.1" Moreover, the contents of the file that relates to the
duke" activities in Lisbon in July 1940, c l e m a damaging file, were
taken and classified as ""serret" by the Allies. Bradford adds that the
Americans werc persuaded to keep these documents secret.146
According to the Channel 4 program, Blunt was highly successful in his
xnission. The documnts that he bmught back with hixn are locked up in
Windsor Castle for 100 years, Mraller confirms that documents relatirrg to
the Windsors are sealed in British top secrt-lt files until the twenty-first
century.'" M~oreover,the Channel 4 documentmy, relying on John
Costello, claims that M16's (external British intelligence) archives have
m m information about the duke's treacherous behavior during ttiorld
War XI. Zkgler cmcedes that Blm~tand Owen Morshead (fie Windsor li-
brarian) went to Europe and visited both Germany and Holland in a non-
secret mission to retrieve some Letters and rt;lics.""siegler denies categor-
i c d y the existence of a cover.-up.
 It is perhaps no cojncidence that Anthony Bhnt himself was a traitor
and one of Britain's most famous spies of t-he twentie& century A book
about his treachery has becn written by John Coste1lo.l" Other sources
tend to support, some very strmgly, the coverup version. Brown, for ex-
am*, is cmvinced that the "lost" documents, which s h w e d "evilience
of treasonable commm~ication.between Windsor and Hitler . . . and the
ex-kaiser, . . . almost certainly existed."l~(~
The coverup story ubviously,
supports the idea that the royal family had somethi~~g very serious to
hi& regarding the behavior of the duke dwing World War XI.

Those familiar with the Wndsorsbtory were not surprised at the Chan-
nel 4 documentary* mat this program did was tcr assemble, irr a focused
short presentation, the facts supporlling the idea that the h k e of Wndsor
was a traitor, Clearly, W l e r is grossly understating the tmtt-r when he
says that, at the very least, "'the Duke of Wihdsor was frankly an en-tbar-
rassment to the Brit.ish g o ~ ~ e r n m e ~ ~ t . " ~ ~ l
It is obvious that much of the Duke of Windsor" behavior c m be ecasi3-y
interpreted as tmachery, There is no doubt fiat he sympathized with t-he
Pllazis, associated wilh Nazi sympathizers, m d was quite idisereet inair-
ing his views and in guafding secret intelligence information that rcached
him. Prominent resemhers of World War I1 confim this. Wehbeq has no
dollbt that the Duke of Whdsor "and even rnorc his wik, had displayed
strong pro-German sentiments."l~~ Costeitlo confims thisls and adds that
the duke "admired Hitler's Ieadership.'"~Weirrberg adds that "the evi-
dence is clear that he seriously considered working with the Germans
and, in fact, remained in cmtact with them for s o m t i m after going to
the B&amas."fi3

Concluding Discussion
This case is hteresting and instructive in terms of treason. To begh wi&,
it involves the well-known sympathy of the Duke of Windsor (and his
wife) for t-he Nazis, as well as his public statements (for example, his visit
with Hitler, the Verdu~~ radio trmsmission, the cable to his brofier, the in-
tewiew with Uursler), which clearly reBicct his consistent advocating of
an ""appeaxmntf' soiution to the conflict. AIthough unpleasant and
morally wrong, this se~~timent, h the co~~text of the early to mid-193Qs,
could not possibly be considered. t ~ a s o nh. this respect, the duke was no
different than many others in the early 1930s who were faced with the
choices of fascism, Nazisnt, dennncracy and c o m m i s m , not to mention
monarchy. However, as the outcomes of these choices became clearer,
particularly with the evident military expansionist policy of Nazi Ger-
many and its blatmt m d hateful racism, and as it became clear that a sec-
ond world war was FR the making the moral, meaning of these choices
could no longer be ipored.
Hitler's invasion of 13nland in Septefinber 1939, and the bllowing ulti-
matum and dedaration of war by Britain, settled the questions of trust
and loyalty fn a swift and liecisive way- Either one was with England or
against England. The Windsors' overt behavior prior to August 1, 1940,
was certainly not one of solid support for Britain. Even after August 1
(whm t-he Windsors departed for the Bahamas), the duke continued to
maintain his contacts with the Nazis and made statemelnts aimed at pre-
ventirrg the United States from enter& the war.
One can concede that the Duke of Whdsor was interltskd in prevent-
ing the war. However, to achieve this goal he was ready to appease Hitler
(although he must have known that HitZer"s appetite was insatia:ble).
Thus, under the rhetoric of ""pace," he provided support for m e of the
most brut.& m d wretchcd regim,es in the history of this planet. Moreover,
when one examines those aspects of his behavior that wese nut overt, but
apparently quite welt known to Allied ir^ltt.fligmce, the aikgations of dis-
trust and &sloyali,tybecome m c h moro serious.
The Duke of Wbdsor" continued unhappiness with the royal family
who rehsed to grant HE23 status to the woman he married, and his clear
sympathy for Hitler combined to create an explosive concoction. It is
clear that ChurchiI1, a firm believer in the mnarchy, spent a great deal of
t h e and energy keeping the Duke of Whdsor in check. Zn the midde of a
war, he sent letters and friends, conducted surveillmce, and exiled the
duke to the Bahamas to contain his questionable loyalty and untmstwor-
thiness.
It is, perhaps, appropriate to end this part by reviewing the summary
of the Channel 4 documentary. It argued that the W e of Windsor ac-
cepted the Nazis"roposal to head Britain under German t-utelage, a kind
of a Vichy government, Doing that simply meant klping the Nazis and
"workhg with the enemy." "The program implied that he &o helped Ges-
man eslpionage efforts and that on the diplomatic level he tried to cm-
vince President Roosevelf to press a "peace" aagreelnelnt between Nazi
Germany and England. fn reality, suggestilrg "peace" at that point in time
could o d y mean a British capihalatio~~ m d a collapse of Churtlhill"s pol-
icy It was also suggested that at one time Roosevelf:proposed assasshat-
ing the duke, but the British wodd not allow that. The royal family must
have felt that to divulge hfs actkity to the public would hurt the monar-
chy. Some friends of the Dulte of"Windsor ~ u e that d he was convinced
that Britain was close to losing the war and that a worldwide Nazi regime
w d d be established. If such a scenario was about to happen, the duke
was convinced that he was going to ""svef?he re ants-a ratianaliza-
rim of several collaborators durhg the war years (for example, X"6tain).
Although the Rrit.ish people and the Duke of Windsor denied the t ~ a c h -
erous nabre of his beplavior, there are some very serious doubts regard-
ing his loydty to and trust in Britain at its most difficult mrnents. The
Channel 4 documentary implies that, perhaps, be should have been
charged with treason.
Clearly; there are compelling reasons to s~~spect that the duke violated
loyalv to his government and the trust invested in him by his govern-
ment (not to m m t i ~ nhis people). His activities certainly bring him very
close to the deHniti011 of traitor. The fact that m n y of his activities were
conducted in s e c ~further
t supports the cbarge.
However, an important ingredient in betrayal, -coating, did not take
place here. C)f the three elernents necessary to define the duke as a traitor
(violatirrg trust, violatjlrg loyalty and turncoating), only two seem to have
been present in his behawior, tRus making fie charges made by the Cl~an-
nel4 documentary at least partially substmtive. The duke most certainly
violated both trust and loyalty on more than one occasion. FXe is situated.
rather well within the boundaries of being a traitor. However, his behav-
iar did not illustrate the full cxtent of t ~ a s o nm
. e major elernmt, Chat is,
siding unequivocalfy and openly with the Nazis is missing. The lack of
such a move makes labeling the Duke of Windsor a traitor more difficult.
This case alerts us to the fact that sometimes the potential traitor walks a
very thin line, just on the verge of treason.
This case certainly adds to our understanding of treason by illustrating
that treason is not a discrete variable but a conthuous one, The depth and
intensity of treason varies. Gathering adequate information is crucial, too,
especialiy in cases where cmcealment took place. For example, the un-
Itnow implications of the duke's meeting with Hitler and the secreting
of the records of that meeting leave too much important information out
of the picture. If and when this fnformation becomes available, more light
will pour on. this puzzlb~gcase.
The Duke of FNindsor died. in 1972, H e never faced djrectly, or provided
persuasive accounts for, the nature of his questionable behavior befow,
during, or after World War XL mere are many uncertahties in regard to
the facts of this case. Because no explicit and open records exist, one must
read the ~ l e v a ntexts
t very carefully to reach a cmclusion. The important
lessm from this is that one can be a ""taitor" and, at the same time, carn-
ouflage it quite effectively n e r e are several contributing factors to this
situation: politics, leadership, identity, and loyalty.
'The first is politics. There were powerful actors who bad an hterest in
concealing the Duke of Windsor" true support for Nazi Germany. The
German cause was better served by havhg the duke appear to be a loyal
and trustful British ciltizen. This mask aided them in gaining access to &:he
higher echelons of the British poliEical system, and kept a potential
P4tain-like collaborator in stock, without discrediting him. The British po-
litical system had no interest in ercposkg the duke's red preferences and
sppathies because that- would only have caused divisiveness in their ef-
forts to deal with the conflict, Fimallyras the war progressed and G e m m y
was losing, t-he duke himself had no reason to clear the fog surrounding
his unethical behavior, What some journalists, inklligence oMicers, and
politicians knew was squelched, quite effectively after the war, Blunt's
posmar mission to Germany to retrieve the potentially incriminating
trmscripts clf the Hitler-Duke conversat-ionsassured secrecy The i n t e ~ s t s
of various political actors thus coincided in this case and helped to obhs-
cate the reality of trmsm with a mask of loyalty and trust, seasoned with
the duke's resentment that he was not being given the respect he de-
served, Such a deceptive political game, particularly FR the context of
W r l d War D, was not unique to the case of Edward VIII. This type of
g m e is typical of politics, Mlhere interests create a game of masks for
public consumption, camnuflaging a reality of immorality and, in this
case, of treasonable behavior,
.h related topic is the nature of leadership. Clearly leadcrs from all
sides faced the dilemma posed by the duke" questionable behavior and
participated in this game of masks versus reality. For the reasons stated
above, none of the major political or mifitary leaders came out i,n the pub-
lic arena and. exposed the duke's behavior for what it was. The Nazis
ing to coerce the duke into liekction, but when this secret plan
collapsed, they did not expose it in public. Sirn,ilarly, Churchill;,who had
to allocate pltecious time from his busy schedule to deal with the duke,
kept quiet about t-he problem. However, this did not prevent hinl from h-
tervening forcefully and decisively by telling the duke what was appro-
priate and what was not. mere is no doubt that dcspitc the secl.ecy and
potential embarrassment posed by the duke's behavictr, Churchill pro-
jected reliablef credible, and solid leadership in this case. n e lesson here
is clear, Once Churchill and the Nazis clearly defined their interests,
based on a specified moral symboiic universe, appro@atc leadership
styles m d decisions followed.
The last two topics are those of identiCy and loyajty. The most impor-
tant issue is t-he way in which &e Duke of Wh~dsorsaw his identity-po-
liticalfy; socially m d culhrally As we saliv, from very early on, the duke
felt a kinsltip with Nazi Germany and was probably willing to cooperate
and collaborate with the regime. In this respect, he was probably closer to
iJavalfi"r P4tain, rather than Quisling, Degretle, or Antmesczl.
 Had the Nazis successfully hvaded Britah, the duke would have been
useful to the Gemans as the new king. This type of a split identity was
characteristic of not only the duke. In Europe, one leader after anotkr
whose countries were occupied by the Nazis faced a similar dUemma,
tlcrwever, the Duke of Windsor had shown clear signs of his political pref-
erences by the early 11930s. M a t was he to do? His British government
was pursuislg a policy that he did not like, and Nazi Germany" victory
was not guarmteed. 'f'hus, while expressing dissatisfaction and expound-
ing pro-German sympathies k~private, he mmaged to maiintah a public
facade of loyal@ to the Crown, with no small help from ChurchiH and
others in fie government. The loyaity issue was a by-product of the con-
flict that the duke helped into being. Was he contpleteiy loyal to
Churchill" Britajnl Not quite. Did he make a full switch of loyal@ to Ger-
many? Not quite. In other words, the duke never crossed, unambigu-
ously moral boumdasies. When such a crossing seems to have occz~rred,
its true llaturc was denied, or it was interpreted, in morally mutral terms,
or the crossing itself was dfuscated. In several instances, understanding
the nat-ure of the duke's violations of trust and loyalty repired that we
present the Lalternatives he faced. fn other &stances, the nature of the act
was evident in itself.
Overall, this case provides a portrait of a m m in a high political pasi-
tion who was apparently torn among his desire for peace at almost m y
cost, his loyalty to Britain, and his love and appreciation of Germany. Sit-
uations of conAict m typical m n a s for antagox-tisticlloyalties, indecisive-
ness, playing one game in public and another in private, and thus keep-
ing as many options open as posible (for ertample, see Admiral Uarlan's
behavhr). This type of behavior may actuafly be nnore pronounced in in-
dkiduals in hi@ positions because there is more at stake. Thus, walking
the tightrope of conflicting loyalties, not fulIy comrrtitting oneself to any
one side, constructing various masks of behavior in pllhlic a l ~ dconccating
others is often typical of such situations.
Finally, one must add that this morally dubious behavior involves an
intricate play of fabrication, concealment, and ambiguity. Conseque~~tly,
separathg fact from. fiction, the real from the Mse, creates prob.X.ems not
just for contemporaries, but for later generations a d searchers as well.
Because the Duke of Windsor appeared to have honorcd his byalty to the
Crown, deconstructing his betrayal requires delving into the details of his
actions. Not only was the Duke of Windsor prcrscmting a public ilnage of
loydty and tmst in Britain, while engaging jn activities that were cleasfy
damaging the British cause, but he was also enrneshed in indecisiveness
itself,
This page intentionally left blank
 The Case of Ma

This sixteenth-century case of betrayal is complicated alld fascinating,

and h o w n very well in Mexico, but much less so elsewhere. This case in-
volves the story of the Conquest of Mexico led by H e r n h Cort4s
(1485-1547) in the sixteenth century. Prevailing historical accounts state
that in that cmyrrest, Cort4s was helped by a local woman n m e d Ma-
linche. She has became a symbol of treasrm. In i?nexico today "to be cailed
a malinchista is to be called . . . a traitor*. . . La Malinche . . . has become a
symbol. . . . [She] is for tke most part portrayed as the perpetrator of Mex-
ico's original sin and as a cultural metaphor for all that is wrong with
Mexico.'" Even the house where she lived with C-ortksin Mexico City (57

?"he historkal narrative of the Spanisln Conquest of Mexico is not a sirn-

p1e account. The story itself is based nnnstly on Spanish sottrces, that is,
the victors tding their version of the events. Moreover, the various narra-
tors had their ovvn %endas and interests to p m t and &fend, and thus
one should approach the popular and accepted historical narrative with
that in mind. 7b complicate matters a bit lurther, there is no consensus
about all the details. In the narrative below, I have tried to present the
more or less accepted view. Recently, Massig's challemging 1996 work has
cast some serious doubts an this accepted history. I will present Hassig's
views later.

The Background
In f 511 Hernjm, Cort4s and Diego Ve1Bzquez sailed from Spain to conqua
Cuba. Following that endeavor, Cort4s was chosen to lead an expedition
to the Vucatliin peninsula in early 1519; he was thirty-three years old. After
a delay to adequately supply his forces, he left Cuba on February 18, His
military strength at the time of departure included. the followirrg: eleven
264 The Case of Mall'fzat i T e ~ z c p ~ l - M l i ~ z c f ~

Montezunzn X 1 meets Hemrl'n Corkis. lLlalilzclze is standislizzg behiitzd Cortks. Recorded l'fi
C l l ~L i e n z ~
de Tlaxcala.
WURCE: Nigel Davks,The Aztecs: A History (New E?rk: G. l? PudtzamS Surzs, 1973).

ships (25 according to some sources), about 550 ddiers,z and 150 sailors."
He had ten heavy guns, .four lig-hter pieces called fdcmets, a fair an?ount:
of mmunition, m d sixten horses. Mt a very impressive force inWstem
military terms.
In March 1,519, the s~nallsquadso11 arrived at m island off the coast of
Yucath called CazumeZ. There, Cartks tried to find and rescue two sur-
vivors oE a Sp""ish shipwreck in 3513, who were being held by the local
peapk. .hlLL-\oughhis attempts failed, he nevertheless used his stay in
Cozu~lelto resupply his ships.
ing of March, the ships left Cozumel. They did not travel
far. A leak in one of the boats forced them to return to tbe same port.
Upon returnjng, they met one of the Spanish captives, Gertjnim de
Aguilar, During the time Aguilar had been stranded on Cozumel, he be-
c m e famiiiar with the M y a n dialects of Ytlcatbn, which m d c him an
ideal candidate for interpreter, Another major advantage, perhaps more
 The Case of Mall'fzat i Te~zcp~l-Mlitzcf~ 265

important, was that he had not really integrated into the local culture. Fle
wanted to rejoin his origi11a1 Spanish culture. CorMs prcrvided Xguilar
with exactly the opportwity he wanted. This is an important point, be-
cause another Spanish sailor who survived t:he shipwreck, Gonzalo de
Guerrero, had become completely naturaiized and a2ssorbed into the local
d t - u r e and showed no interest: i,n rejoining C o r t 4 s . a c e the repairs of
the ship were completed, Cort4s and his Beet sailed again on Maxh 4,
The next goirrt of landing was near a coastal area h w n as Tabasco (on
about March 22). The town that was to become the focus of battle was Po-
tonchan, From now on, a clash of It-miocultures was to unfold.
The Aztec empire, which domilnated Mexico, was then d e d by Mon-
tezuma (sometimes called Moctezuzna) 11. The Aztecs based their rule on
a taxatiun system that was highly coercive and on a blood-thirsty reli-
gious belief system. Their lust for human sacrifices is well documented.
Some reports (probably exaggerated) state that the Aztecs once made
80,000 human sacrifices in four days. The amount of coercion and pres-
sure rczquired to supply the Aztec priclsts with the hurnans needed for the
ritual sacrifices must have been e~~ormous.
Moreover, at the tjme of the conquest, the Aztec system was character-
ized by a high degree of connict. Mmtezurna II was both an admirer of
power and a firm religious heljever*He also expected the return of a leg-
m d a q gad-Quetzalcaatl, the Plumed Serpent-whose comeback was
based. on both prophecies and omens. There arc. irrdicatrions that when the
nekvs of Cort4s's landing =ached Mofiezuma H, he believed these white
Spaniards to be the gods he was waithg for.5 This belief was a fateful mis-
take. It was going to cost him his empire and his life.
In military terlns, Cort4s had about 550 soldiers, some horses, and
some technologically advanced weapons (armor and fireams). This rcla-
tively modest force was about to bring down a migMy empire. Militarily,
it is cmceivable that had Mmtezuzna II been mare determhed, assured,
and not so hesitant, his vast superiority in manpower, howledge of the
terrain, and better intelligence could have translated into a defeat of
Cortdis At lea&, he could have m d e the price of conquest so high that it
w d d have become impractical for CorMs to continue. But Montezuma
was not blessed with these attributes. His opponent, Cartes, was a deter-
mined, decisive, cunning, m d ruthless c m a n d e r . He hccv hukv to cre-
ate opportunities and took advantage of them when they were present. En
this clash, the fate of the Aztecs was sealed. Hassig discusses a number of
explanations for how and why it was possible for so few Spaniards to de-
feat so many Aztecs,We also adds that Cort4s did not land into a vac-
uum. He found himself in the midst of military and political conflicts
among the various groups that formed the Aztec empire. Some of these
groups m s t certainjy used Cortks and his fosces for a e i r own purposes.7
266 The Case of Mall'fzat i Te~zcp~l-Mlitzcf~

The first battle began in March 1519 around Potmchan.8 n e r e , defiant

Indims were mounting their forces against Cartes. They "consisted of
five squadrons of eight t%fousandm n eac:h."g Cortks had "a force of three
hundred Spaniards" with horsemen and cannms.lo In the fierce battle
that ensued, Cortbs's forcles won. Having conpered Potonchan, Cort4s
left on April 97 to continue the Conquest of Mexico.

Enter Marina
h o t h e r important event took place in Potonchan. Before the Spaniards
left, they acquired twenty (nineteen, acceding to some versions) women
slaves. One of these women-Malinche-is the focus of this narrative.11
Cortks next fanded near what we now h o w as Vera Cruz, on April 21,
1519, Cort4s realized that Aguilar could not provide interpretative assis-
tance because he was ignorant of the spoken language.12 Unlike the
Maym dialect used in Tabasco, the area where Cost4s lmded was under
Aztec inftuence, and the spoken language was Nahuatl. At that point,
Cortks was informed that one of the female slaves was a native Mexican
and understood the language. The name given to that female slave was
Marina. IR Vaillantfs 1962 book on the Conquest of Mexico, figure 28
shows the Spaniards landing at Vera Cruz, and at the right side of the
drawing one can see Marina "exercising her diplomacy m a native."l3
Mihen Marina was brought to Cortks she was between fourteen and
nineteerz years old." b a s e Marina never left mything h writhg about
her life, her persmal history prior to her life with the Spaniards is nut en-
tirely ctear, but what fotlows is based on existing evidence. It is beliczved
that her orighal name was Malinali Tenepal. Her first n m e is like the
twdfih day of the twenty-day Aztec month. 1Phe second. m m possibly
hints at a person who talks a lot, and with animats.
MalinaXi was said to have been born in I'ainda in the province of
Coatzacualco, on the southeastern borders of the Mexican eznpire.15Mali-
nali was a native speaker trE Nahuatl. Although details about the social
status of her family of origin are unclear, it is claimed that she was the
daughter of a local chief (cncir;i~lc.)who died while she was stifl young.1"
Her mother, Cimatl, soon remarried another mciqz-le.A son was born of
this new marriage. Cirnatl feared that Malinali might stmd in the way of
her half-brother inheriting the position of chief. Accoding to this version,
she sold Maiinali seeretly to some t r a d i n g traders of Xicatlanco, rTi, con-
ceal. this, she pretended that Malinali died. In fact, she used the dead
body of a child of one of her slaves to show that Malinali was dead.17 The
traders sold Malinali, again, to the cuciqrre of 'TBbasco, who gave her to the
Spaniards. Johson suggests that the name the Spmiards gave her-Ma-
rina-was a Spanish approximation of MalinaIi. The locals, however,
 The Case of Mall'fzat i Te~zcp~l-Mlitzcf~ 267

might have found the Malinali-Marina names too difficult, and they
cafled her Malinche (the suffix "&em hdicated rc.spect).l"mus, when Ma-
linali was givcn to Cortci?~, she was t? "slave in Polonckan in the Chontal
Maya-speaking area of Ymucatan."~~
Marina was fluent fn Nahuatl, her mother% tongue, and her stay in
Tabasco gabre her a goad h~owledgeof Mayan, too. The use of Marha
and Aguilar as intevreters worked this way: Marina talked bhraatl with
the Aztecs. She then trrmslated it to Mayan for Aguilar, and be translated
it into Spanish. Eventually Maria h e w ellough Spmish so that this cum-
bersorne translation was no longer necessary. Clearly, the Aguilar-Marina
colnbination was a phcrnomenal advantage for Cnrt4s.z"
Various sotlrces state that Marina looked differe~~tthm the o ~ efemale
r
slaves; she was more distinguished and. beautiful," as well as "intelli-
gent."zz She is described as ""clever a ~ seemed
d somethnes humme. Tradi-
tion says Chat she w s "beautiful as a goddessef""e';n the female slaves
we= given to CorMs, he first gave Marina to one of his good friends,
Alonso Hern6ndez de I"uertacarrera.zil However, as Markla settled into
her new role as interpreter, Cort4s waked that she was one of his major
assets, Marina ""culd not only tell Cort4s what the words meant, but
could also explain fndian attitudes, expressions, gesbres, acts, m d reac-
tions, She was sensitive to everything that went on, an acute obser~er.~~Zs
Puertacarrero was soon sent to Spain on Cmtesfsflagship, heading a mis-
sion to give the Spanish king his share of the accrtmulated treasures.26 Ma-
rina "rode behind Cort4s on his horse, stood beside him in the field,
shared his bed at night and later bore him a son.""" Marisra, thus, was not
just a technical linguist ad\risor to Ccrrtks. She was the cultural expert
whose advice to him was tlte tool that made a cnlcial differellee in Cort6sfs
ability to conquer Mexico. :lnthis respect, Marjna shifted her trust and loy-
alty from her local cuitural matrix to the Spanish conquistadors.
At Vera Cruz, Cort4s destroyed his ships, so that his men would not
consider retreating to Cuba on the masch inland to the Aztec capital.
Many sources note how indispensable Malinche's advice and assistmce
we= on the march. Along the way, Cort4s learned about the cruelty of the
Aztecs, their demands for taxes, and their capture of prisoners to be sacri-
ficed to the Aztec gods inTenochtitlh. Many Indian t r h s were unhappy
with Aztec rule and were waiting for an opportunity to h e themselves
from the Aztec yoke, Marina stepped way beyond the technical rofe of a
translator as she assumed the role of cultural intergreter and advisor. Her
cultural h~okvledgeenabled Cort4s to take advantage of opportwnities
about which he would not have known without Marina" guidarrce. This
ahantage was mapified by the er divisions and conflicts m o n g the
different Indian groups and by Nontezumn's apparent ambivalence
about how to deal with Cartes,
268 The Case of Mall'fzat i Te~zcp~l-Mlitzcf~

Two additional events arc worthy of mention, One was Cort&s%en-

counter with the naxcaltecs. The naxcaltecs were no great admirers of
the Aztecs. Yet they fou$ht Cort4s with determjnation and courage, caus-
ing him considerable darnage." hentually, they b e c m e his allies, In-
deed, figurc. 32 in Vai1.1ant" book s h w s Cortks meeting Tlaxcaltec high
dig~~it-aies with Marina doing the hterpretatiofl
The second event is that during Cort4sfs march to the Aztec capital,
Tenochtitlkn, he went to see the Cholollans, who were allies af Mon-
tezuma and the Aztecs. Cort4s and his soldiers entered Chololfan, while
his Tlaxcaltec escort waited outside the city The story goes that while in
the city, Malinche found out that the CholotZans were preparhg an am-
bush for Cort4s and that a big Aztec army was waiting just outsidc
Chololian. She told Cort4s about it, and he prepared his own ambush.
The next day, under the p ~ t e x of t some fabricated ertcuse, he cmvemd
the Cholollm nobiiit-y and soldiers into a centrd cottrt, and there, unpro-
voked and in a coordinated, act, his soldiers massacred them all. This sig-
ing of a larger massacre of fie Choldans in the streets,
in whicb the Tlaxcaltecs took an active part. Clearlyr in this tde Majinche
is credited with betrayjng a local plan to ambush Cartes m d finish hin?
off. Here is how J o h s o n describes the event:

[Marina] had been approached by a Chalultan woman who admired her and
tzranted her to remain in Chcjlula and marry cjne af her sons. She was urged to
accept in order to save her <>W-nlife, because the Spaniards were soon to be at-
tacked. The Cholulan woman knew because her hwbmd, a chief, had been
given a golden drum by the Aztecs as an inducement to take part in the as-
sault. Marina pretended to agree and begged for time, saying she would have
to find someone to carry her personal gmds, her clothes and the jewelry, and
she persuaded the cjlder woman to wait in her quarters while she did so.
When Cort4s heard Marina" story, he seized a priest and, thrc3ugh Ma-
rina's interpretation, forced a canfessiun out of him that confirmed the
story,""

Davies questions the validity of the Cholollan conspiracy against

Cortes, caliing it unrealistic." From this paint on, Cholollan served as a
modcl of obedience and loyaity to Cort&s,JVtmust be emphasized that
the question of whether there actually was a Cholollan conapirary agajnst
Cartes is not as important as Ma%inchefsrole in exposing such a cmspir-
acy whether real or innagined. 'The fact is that Malinche emerges as the
one who betrayed the Cholollans, The massacre at Gholollan was-as
I'rescott points out-to =main a "dark staill on the memory of fie Con-
quer~rs"~%nand"one of the most eontroversid events in Cnrt&sflifeeff34
 The Case of Mall'fzat i Te~zcp~l-Mlitzcf~ 269

.And Malinche has certainly been portrayed as havjng played a central

role in that event.
Davies reports on another possible betrayal by Malhche during the ex-
pedition to Honduras..

Cuauht4moc [Montezuma's successor] was compelled to accompany his

master [Cortks]an this ill-fated adventure. . . . During the long march, on the
pretext af an alleged plot, Cartes ordered Cuauht4mac and the cacique af
'Tacuba to be hanged. According to native sources, Cuauhtkmo>cwas the vie-
tint of mere calumy. One wonders why Uaiia Marina, still acting as inter-
preter, could not, had she wished, have ascertained the real truth. Before the
former ruler was hanged, he exclaimed: ''Q Malinche, for many days 1 have
understood that you would condemn me to this death, and have known
your false wards, far you kill me ~njustly.'~35

The rest of the historical narrative is well known, Cartes continued his
conquest of Mexico. He reached Tencrchtitlhn in November 1519. Later,
Montezuma was killed, TenochtitlBn destroyed, and the conquest ex-
panded. to Honduras and Guatemala. When Vaillant shows the conquest
of Tenochtitlhn, he prociuces a drawing in Mthi& ""Cuauht&moc, who con-
ducted the defense of Tenochtitltiin, is received wi& all the horrors a%war
by Cortks and his consort, Mar;ina. . . . With this event, the Mexicans were
finishedaU36
Militarily and politically, the Conquest af Mexico is most certainly one
of the most fantastic and extraordinary tales inhistosy In it, a rather small
rnilitary force, fighthg its way in an u n h o w n territory, c m q u e ~ dand,
in fact, elimhated the entire Aztec empire,
The role of Marina in t h i s conquest is porh-ayed, repeatedly, as crucial.
W ~ e nMontezuma met Cortkr;, Marina (and Aguilar) translated. Critical
conversatio~~s between the two were translated by Marina, too.37 Indeed,
plate 62 in billant's 1962 book shows the meeting of Mmtezuma and
Cortcis with Marina standing right behind Cortcis. Vaillant states that
"Marina's value to Corttits camat be underestimated.~
Cortks" official wi Catalina-ventually arrived in Mexico. Within
three rnonlths of her arrival, she was dead, officially from astl~ma.How-
ever, Catalina's mothcr accused Cort4s of participating in her daugMerfs
murdcr by stranglkg her." Although Cortks had several women (includ-
ing one daughter of Montezuma), Nfarina bore him a son-Martin. hl-
though historically and biologically inaccur&e, this s n n is credited as the
first mestizo. Thus the Sgmish Conquest of Mexico not only was a military-
political conquest, but it ""was fullowed by a biological conquest that
would create a mestizo society."@
270 The Case of Mall'fzat i Te~zcp~l-Mlitzcf~

During the course of the expedition to FIonduras, Cort4s eventctaly

"arranged and supervised a marriage between his faithful interpreter,
diplomatic advisor, and mistress, Marina,, and Juan de Jaramirlo.
jaramillo was drunk at the time, and many of the Spaniards were secrcltly
critical of Cort4s for his treament of the womm who had not only made
his conquest possible, but: had also borne him t?l. least one child. Despite
her mrriage, Marina conthued to serve Cort4s as m hterpreter."41
Both Collis alld Le6n-Portiila write about Marir~a" ccfllxrage and de-
scribe hokv indificult: moments of despair and danger; such as during the
Tlaxcaltec attack, Marina showed no fear.42 Their accounts support the
position that Malinchefsrole was predclminmtly one of cultulral mediator,
not just techical, trmslbatar.
Callis adds that ""near Tlaxcala there is a volcano which in Cort&sfstime
was called Matlalciuatl (the Dark Green Woman). The divine denizen of
this mountain was afterwards identified with Dofia Marina and the
momtain is now called Maljnche, her name."43 That Marina &splayed
authoritarianism in her dealings with the Aztecs is also clear from an-
o&er draoving in Vaillant's book. In, the illustration, Marina gives an or-
der to an Aztec to do something, and that Aztec, to use Vaill-ant" own ex-
plmation, ""cmplies with ilI grace."%
Marha joined Cortks on his last trip to Honduras*Aguilar had died by
then," but Marina could now speak Spanish. Johnson describes how dur-
ing that expedition she was remited with her mcrther:

During her bst service to Cortks-an interpreter during the March to Hon-
dura-Marina had a reunion with her mather, who had sald her to slave
traders years earlier: The mother, by nc>w Christened Marta, and her son
LBzaro were brought to the Spaniardskamp at Coatzacoalcos, The older
tzroman and the young man tzrere trembling with fear. But Marina fc3rgave
her mother, treated both of them with kindness, and lctaded them with
gift5.46

It appears that in her later years Marina enjoyed a high income from the
estates given to her by Cort4s. She had. townhouses in Mexico City, a
country house in Chapultepac, and a garden in Coyuacen." However, lit-
tle else is b o w n of her Zife.

Beyond the fact that she bore a daughter to Juan de jaramillcl, little more is
know-n of Marina, except that her death occurred around 1540. In 1605 Don
Fernando Cortks, son of the illegitimate Don Martin Cortbs, addressed a
memarial tcr the Spanish court detailing the services his grandmather had
performed during the Conquest. With that the record, official and othe~wise,
of Malinali, Marina or Malinche ends, The name Malinche, however, unhap-
 The Case of Mall'fzat i Te~zcp~l-Mlitzcf~ 274

pily lives on in Mexican slang as a pejorative term far persons who betray
their nation and heritage.@

n e r e is little doubt that although Malilrche was a herolne for the con-
quistadors, she was considered an archetypicai traitor by many Mexicans.
The popular narrative of the cmquest leaves very little doubt as to Ma-
linche's cmcial role in that conquest. Even FXassig admits that the Marina
is "widely regarded. . . to have played a vital role in the canvest of Mex-
ico land] I.,a Mafhche has become a major motif in Mexican literaturc."l"
It is easy to understand why Malinche is considered a traitor, Although
she most definitely seems to have had some very good Rasons for violat-
ing trust in, and loyalty to, her native c u l t w , that dues not: seem to
change the image, Thus, we have a woman who was considered a hero
CJwil7g the cotonial period, but following the War of Independence (1821),
"she was increasingly regardcd as a trai,mr, a whore?,m d a racial turncoat
who collaborated with the Spanish invaders,"'""

Hassig's Challenge
In a powerfully argued and persuasive 1996 paper, Hassig attacks the ac-
cepted popular narrative about Malhche. Hassig is no amateur. He has
published, two major books focusing on the Aztecs and the Conquest of
:Mcxico."l In his 1994 short history of the Spmish Clmvest, Hassig, can-
trary to otbcr researchers, plays down Malinche's role. For example, fiis
description of the events in ChoXollan does not even mention MasinaS5z
tlassig does not fail to notice that (a) the history of thr Spanish Conquest
is typically knokvn. from Spa"i& sot~rces,and fb) very little factual infor-
mation is known with any dcgree of certainty about Malinche. He points
out, for example, how even infarmaticm &out her background is rwager.
Hassig summarizes the ilnpllrtance of Matinche in Mexican history in
three areas: (1)she is considered to be the mother of the mestizo race; (2)
she acted as a cdtural intevreter for Cortgs and thus facilitated the Con-
quest of Mexico; and (3) she is " c ~ d i t e dwith saving the Spaniards by
learning of the ChoIoltec plans to massacre them, warning Cort4s" (p.2).
tlassig then takes these three popular beliefs, one by one, and shatters
their ~ralidity.
:In brief, the first claim, says Hassig, cannot be hctually true. '*The
Spmiards wem givm numerous Indian women before the prtrpancy of
blarina.. . . Thus Marha was not the molf.ter of the first recopbed mes-
tizo" "(PP.2-3). As to hes d e as culbal: interpreter, Hassig admits that h-
deed she must have acted as a banslator, but the hnpclrtance of her role-
he claims-is greatly exaggerated. Hassig claims that "the pivotal
translator in the early days of the Conquest was not she but Aguifar" (p. 4).
272 The Case of Mall'fzat i Te~zcp~l-Mlitzcf~

Also, he challenges the accepted version that she quickly learned Spanish
m d thus the need for another trmslator was sipificantty diminished (p. 4).
Moreover, Hassig pohts out that Malhche" social positio~~ was such that:
her abilit)l to act as a cultural interpreter was probably very lowI or none at
all (p. 5). In other wods, her knowledge about, and abiliv to comprehend,
the geopolitiral intricaciss ol' the culktrr;.was very minimal, to say the least.
The Chdollm massacre, according to Hassig, is the most significant in-
tervention by Malinche. Hassig easily discounts her role there. He points
out that there is no tangible evidence that the Cholollans were indeed
preparing any ambush for CorMs. Hassig points out that once Cort4sfs
forces began the conquest, he became entangled in local politics am-
various Indian groups*The massaese at Cholollan can, and should, be un-
derstood within this context. Basically, Hassig argues that the Tlaxcdtecs
ant( Corth conspircrd together to massacre those Chololtecs who were sid-
ing with the Aztecs against the I;taxcalt.ecsand Cortks. Corti.s, in this eon-
text, is viewed as having been manipulated by the Zaxcaltecs to help them
as their ally, against part of the Chdoltecs. "In a single stroke, Cartes killed
the b ~ gmu& , OS the political leadership, and the cream of the ct'f7ololtec
amy. After the massacre, Cortks appointed a new king m d forced m al-
liance between t-he Tlaxcaltecs and the Chcrlolte~s.""~3 Hassig also discards
Malinche's story about behg asked to rnarry a local as highly improbable.
Moreover, klassig argues that althoutgh the Chololtecs posed no threat
for Cortes, they did pose a political challmge to t-he Tlaxcaltecs. Thus t-he
massacre in Chololl,a,n must be hierprekd as an hner confict within its
palitieal cmtext in central America. "hshort, the Tlaxcaltecs had the
most to gain by defeakg Choloilan, since they we^ the mmt sipificant
military threat. the Chololtecs faced. . . . [AI massacre of thc Chololtec
leadership would serve Tlaxcallm's interests, removing those who be-
trayed them while strengthening those out of power who were sympa-
thetic to the Tla x ~ a l t e c s . ' ~ ~
Hassig is convinced that "the Tlaxcaltecs were almost certainly the
masterminds of this event,""" and "Cort6s's o m massacre was both pre-
medjtated and coordinn.t.ed with the Tlaxcaltecs."" He thus completely
discards Marina's role as the "discoverer" of the supposed CholoUan
""plot'" s a i n s t Cortcits.'7 However, it is clear that placing Marina in the
certtral role of betraying the Choldan plot to ambush Cort4s-thus leav-
ing CorMs little choice but to launch a preemptive strik+removes the re-
sponsibility for the massacre from Cnrt4s and casts Marks into the un-
comfortable heroine/ traitor role.
About Marina, Hassig concludes: "Her role as a translator was real, but
she was neither unique nor irreplaceable. But what of her role in warning
Cort4s of the plmned ambush in CholoXlan? Except for C0rti.s" sword,
these is no evidence of such a plot.""We also pohts out that whereas the
 The Case of Mall'fzat i Te~zcp~l-Mlitzcf~ 273

"eadiest chronicles pay [Marina] the Icast attention, over time her role be-
c m m r e certain, defined, and ixnportant. . . . From brief references to
her in the earliest accounts, she grows and is fler;hed, out (hvented?),both
as a persm and as a participant.'J~~
'The question of betrayal is also addressed by Hassig:

The ultimate betrayal in the Conquest does not belong to Marina and what
she may or may not have done but, rather; to those who accept the ""facts" "of
the Conquest, and Marina" role in it, front a Spanish perspective. . . . The
facts af Marina's life are not what is impadant here; it is how her life was
used in support of a gart..icularview of history . . . Thus, the post-colonial re-
assessment that dismissed Marina as a heroine and reconceived her as traitor
was not the daring revisionism ioseems. It did nat reassess the role of Ma-
rina, but merely shifted her position within the Spanish-authored history
that this reinterpretation accepts unquestioningly. Marina as traitor did not
break free af the conqueror "s vision; it mere1y shifted its emphasis and con-
tinued the coXIaboration.a

Very strmg words in$eed.

Furthermore, Hassig poi.nts out that the consensus ""view of the Con-
quest has grown largely from the h e major first-hand. accounts of the
Canquest, plus that of I4pez de 66mara.""" He directs our attention to
the fact that thase xlarrati.ves werc? witten by nonob~ectiveobservers.

Concluding Discussion
We currently have two very different accounts about Malinche, One, the
popular and accepted view, tells her story from the Spanish point of view.
h1 it, she is portrayed as a heroine by the Spmiard conquistadors. Follow-
ing the colonial period, she was rclgarded as a traitor. The essence of tfiis
contradictory perileption is a matter of who views her. The acts attributed
to her by the Spaniards constructed her as a herohe. The very same acts,
vicwed by the Mexicans, made her a racial,and cultural traitor, violator of
the trust and lyaity of her people. Malhche is an exceflent example of
how the very s m e actims, exarnined Trom different points of view, give
rise to the hemineltraitor dichotomy. This is a prime illustration of how
the intevretation of the moral content of treason is t o t a y dependent m
poliLical context and on the stntcfzkrr. of betrayal.
Then along comes Hassig, who chafleng@sall that. :Inhis interpretation,
the role of Malinche was ertlremely exaggerated. "rbe real treason, accord-
ing to hint, is to trust the historical narrative of the conquest, as given by
the victors,
274 The Case of Mall'fzat i Te~zcp~l-Mlitzcf~

The ixnportant point for our purposes is not whether Hassig is right or
wrow. The sociological and historical fact is that Malhche was irrdeed
socially constructed as both a heroine and a traitor. Whetha that con-
struction is historicatly accurate does not concern us here. Much like
other national myths, such as Israeli myths," the myth of the :!litz,h3 and
the Masada myth8&the narra.t.iveof Malkche gained a life of its own as a
national symbol. Malilrche is a classic case of the social constmctim of na-
tional consciousness.
'The case involvhg Malhche fits our theoretical approach very nicely
Cort4s and Malinali were from entirely different symbolic moral uni-
verses. VVhen t-hey met, Malinali must have been quick to apprtrciate t-he
power 01 Cort&s,as w e l as the opportunities presented bp this f&eful
meeting. Cost4s was quick to capitalize on Malinali"s evident lingual tal-
ents and prclbably her natural intelligence and quick grasp of the local
geopolitical situation. For Cort4s and his Spaniards, there could only be
app-rcciation for her. Ixrdetld, from their perspective, she was a heroine.
She made a complete move to tbrir si$e-psychologically, politically, and
physically. It was a genuine case of turncoalng. For postcolonial Mexico,
Malkali was viewed with scorn as a traitor, as the woman who enabled
Cort6s to cmyuer and alter Mexic olitically, socially, culturatly, and
physically. The power to dccide the n a t m of the symbolic rneanjng of
Malinali" actions is obvious here, too,
Was the moral constmction of Malhali as a traitor by postcolonial Mex-
ico justific.d? They certainly had the power to constmct her as a traitor,
but the moral basis of their judgment is rather shaky The peopte whose
trust and loyalty Malinche violated and suppose* betrayed had en-
slaved h r . The question of whether a slave can "betrw those who en-
slaved her remains a rather thorny issue when viewed horn a Western
spbotic moral unfverse.
Mareo~rer,Malinali was not the only one to collaborate with the cm-
quistadors. Hassig points out that the Totonacs, Tetzcocas, Chalcas, and,
of course, the 'Tiaxcaltecs all took the side of the Spaniards." If Ifmt6s and
his liznited rnilitary power could overcome Montezurna, it was in no
small measure because of the local help he received.. For exarrrple, the
Tlaticaitecs werl, mfghty allies. And it is not too difficult to reatize that t-he
motivation of a slave to help people who, to a large extent, freed her and
offered her a lifestyle sfne could not possibly have had as a slave, was
strong and probably even justsed. The social construction of Malhali as
first a hero m d later a traitor rclAect changes in the complex skucture and
mord content of Mexican society, as well as the change"^ power config-
urations in that society The acts Malinali supposedly committed were
not, in themselves, ~ e r e n t l treacherous.
y h decidhg whether she was a
 The Case of Mall'fzat i Te~zcp~l-Mlitzcf~ 27.5

traitor, one must first answer the questions, who trusted her? Who was
expected to trust her and why? Who was she supposed tcr be loyal to and
why"?ven if the popular ~Tersion.of the evezzts leadkg to the massacre at
Cholollan (contested by Hassig) is valid,to conclude that she '"betrayed""
any Indian in Ch~1oIl;mmust be viewed as a ccmtroversial statement.
Cleariy, Matinali cmssed clnlttrrat bolmdaries. She moved from being
loyal to her own cultural heritage to a hostile culture whose rclpresenta-
tives came to Mexico on a voyage of conpest and exploitation. Can a
slave be defined as a traitor if that slave goes against her captors? Al-
though Mafinali sided with the victors, when she joined them, it was not
clear that they would hdeed win. Moreover, it is possible that her joining
Cortks provided the Spaniards with an hdispensable assistmce, which
increased their chmces of W
Politically, Malinali, the onverted from the Aztec-dominated
cnnlture to a Merent cdture. Her identity must have been transformed as
well, as she adopted and @&raced the ways of life of the conqueriq
Spmiards. These transformatims obviously culmhated in a chmged di-
rection of trust and loyalty for her, As we have seen in previous chapters,
Malinali" account is not atypical. Vlasov is a comparable example,
The generalization from this case is as follows. W had one culture,
dominated by a powerful, abusive, and divisive regime rted
disunity rivalry, and conflict. Many individuals were quit md
wanted to get the oppressive yoke off their backs. Then a foreip power
invaded the territory, threatened the powerful hegemony of the 10ct.d
regime, and searched for local support. This situation is analogous to
many other similar invasions firoughout history.
Such evezzts may ellcourage individuals to redefine the boundaries of
their symbolic moral universes; trust and lctyalty may shift, and conver-
sion and turncoating from one culture to another may take place.. Very
much in C. Wighi: Mills's spirit, the poliitieal, social, and cultural up-
heaval may trmslate to the personal level with the forming of new idmti-
ties, and those new identities support the upheaval. This case ftlustrates
that hdividuals who experience such transfsmtatiorzs of Chejir idmtities
risk being socially constructed as "'traitors." Furthermore, as Ducharme
and Flne showed in their 3995 study of Renedict Amold, and Hassig in
this case, as I-he concepts of loyalty and trust change their meaning, and
different groups of people construct different meanings for national con-
scicrusness, the images of betrayal and heroism also change. We can cer-
tainly expect that when similar cmflict sitt~ationsarise, hdividuals like
MaIhali m d Vlasov, who straddle the line between hero m d traitor, will
emerge. The non-European case of Malinali supports the power of the
generalizations of the analytical cmceptualization created here.
This page intentionally left blank
 Treason in daism and Israe

So far we have examjned quite a few cases of betrayal in Europe and

North America. It is, perhaps, only fair that I ccmlplement these cases by
exmining a few famous cases of traitors k m Israel and the history of Ju-
daism, since I come from that cul'lural context. Although quite a few cases
can be f o n d in Black m d Morris" 1991 work, and W s t even devotes a
whole chapter to Israeli cases," would )ike to present a somewfiat differ-
ent selection of cases, based on the andytical iapproach presented in this
book.
Like other cultures, Judaism had its share of traitors. I describe below a
few of the more famous characters, the period in which they acted, and
the meanh~gof their actions. This, by no means, is an exhaustive list and
is meant for illustrative pwposes only As W shall see, periods of tur-
moil, of debate about the meaning and nature of moral bomdaries and
their enforcement, are periods when the issues of trust and logfatty
e ~ ~ e r gM
e .e n c~dfuresare experie~zcingprocesses of disintegration, rein-
tegration, and. chmge, the issue of moral boundaries is at the forefront.
'T"hese are periods when hdividual members are required to decide who
they arc, MIho or what they identify with, and wfiich side they stand with.
Typically, it is durhg periods of such unrest and. hrrmoil that we find uur
traitors.
Etsewl-iere in this book I have mem.t.ionsome biblical cases of betrayal,
The first case I discuss here takes place in the fast perioa of the second
Jewish temple.

JosephusFlavius and
Yachanan Ben-Zakkai
During A.D. 66-73 the Jews rwolted against the Roman conquest of Israel
(referrcld to at that time as the R m a n provirtce oE Judeaj.2 The hit-ialivc of
a small number of people, the Jewish revolt against the Roman Empirtli
was doomed to fail, What has become h o w n as the Great Revolt was in
fact a majestic military, sociai, and political hilure of the Jews. The last ef-
fort by Che Roman imperial army against the Jcwish rebels of the Great-
Revolt was the destruction of Masada in A.D. 73.Ulthough Jewish resis-
tance agafnst Rome etid not end in this revolt (the Bar Kokhba revolt
erupted again about sixty years later), the Roman victory against the
rebels was decisive, and the second Jewish tmple was destroyed and.re-
duced to ashes. However, out of this destmc.tion arose a new form of Ju-
daism, not nationalistic but rather spiritual. In many sig~~ificant aspects,
this was the birth of @tlrrodox Judaism.
That period gave rise to two very famous figures who defected to fie
Romans. Che is a person who became, perhaps, the best-hown traitor h
Jewish history-Josephus Flavius; the other was Rabbi Yochanan Ben-
Zakkai who is credited with establishing Orthodox Judaism, a form of Ju-
&ism that prtlvailed until 1948, when a new Jewish state, and hence a re-
newed Jewish national culture, was esthlished by secular Jews.
Joseph Ben-Matityahu, later known as Josephus Flavius, was born in
Jerusalem in A.D. 37 to a priestly family. He was not an e~~thusiastic sup-
porter of the Great Revolt. However, when the Great &volt began, at
around A.D. 66, he became the gwernor of fie Galilee and was charged
with the important responsibility of defendislg it. In AD. 67, the major
fortress in the Galileelbdfat (Jotapataj-feu. The last few survivors, in-
cluding Josephus, decided to commit suicide. Josephus managed to trick
the others, and he and anol.her person remained as the last ones dive. At
that point, Josephus persuaded the other man that they should both sur-
rt.nder to the Romans. Josephrts was apparently a skillful man, and he
struck a relationship with the c o r n a n d e r of the Romm f m e s , &S-
pasian, Among other thixrgs, Josephus s u p p o s e q t d d him that he would
become emperor, Vespasian indeed later became the Roman emperor.
Regardiess of how hislorically accwate this story is up to this pobt, it
is clear that Josephus then went to Rome where he became a Roman citi-
zen and an officiai historian. He married four times and proloably died
smetime around A.D. l(ltf.4 As a resulrt of Joseph Ben-Matityahu's be-
trayal hYodfat and his defection to the Romans, he has been viewed by
many as one of the most prcmounced traitors in Jewish history W ~ aist re-
garded as his act of betsayal is accentuated even further because of his in-
effectfie defense of the GaXilee. However, this man wrote the only book
available about the period- Xt is a strange situation indeed &at we have to
form an opinion about the behavim of Jews during those fateful years,
based on information provided by a Jew who i s viewed by many as a trai-
tor to his ovvn culturt?and people.
In 1998 there was m interesting twist related to Jssephus Flavius and
treason. The head of Israeli premier Binyarnin Netanyahu's chambers in
1998 was a m m named Uri Elitzur, Elitzur has been identified with the Is-
raeli ~ l i g i o u right,
s liv* in and supporting Israeli settlemnts in thr oc-
cnnpied West Bank He has k e n politically involved and even edjted the
settlers' extreme right weekly magazine Nekuda, In 1998 Netmyahu's
g o v e m e n t was involwed with the Palestinian Authority in negotiations
that were aimed at giving &em more territory for continuation of the
Middle East peace process,
For many settlers, t;i\ling any of the territories to the Palestinians is con-
sidered a "no-no.'TElzuur seelned to support Netmyahu's position that
some territoriat concessions were unavoidable. Consequently some set-
tlers distributed pamphlets in which Elitzur was renamed ""fsephus
1F"lavius"-h other words, stating that he was a traitoz Sure enough, Ne-
tanyafnu, as well as other settlers, denounced, these pamphlets. Since the
Rabin assassi~~ation, Israel has indeed become very sensitive to name-
callhg.3
Josephs FIavius was not the only one p i l t y of betrayal in that era. An-
other rather farnous man dekcted from the JeLvish camp to the Romans
and is generally not v i w e d as a traitor at all. That m m W= Rabbi
Yochman Bcn-Zakkai who, like fosephus Flavius, lived and died during
this cataclysmic period for the Jewish people. Ben-Zakkai escaped from
fcrusdem, prdably in A.D. 69, in the middle of"kspasiads spring offe17-
sive in the north, and found refuge with the Romms.h
Like many other contemporary Jews, bchanan Ben-Zakkai kept a
healthy and sober degree of skepticism in the face of" increasing levels of
military-political activism, zealot fervor, and Mse messianism. Cfeasiy, he
was not a fan of either the Zealots or the Sicarii7 and questioned t-he wis-
dom of ChaHtnging the might of the Roman Empire. The case of
Yochanan Ben-Zakkai not only raises the issue of possible alternatives to
the Great Revolt but also provides a comparison to Joseph Ben-Matityahu
Uosephus Fla~ius)~
Like Josephus FLavius, Ben-Zakkai disagreed with many of the stated
goals of the Jewish Great Revolt.WReing in his sixties when he dekcted,
he qpa~t""7ly found common ground with Vespasian (who was morc3 or
less his age), chief commander of the Roman militaq- mashhe that was
crushing the Jewish rebellion ( a d on his way to becoming emperor of the
Roman Empire). kspasian granted Ben-Zakkai his wish to establish a
smdl center, with a few Jewish scholars, to study and contjnue develup-
ing spiritual Judaism. The place Ben-Zakkai was sent to was Uavneh.
'There Ynchanan Bcn-Zakkai was slrccessftd in esthtishing a renewed
branch of spiritual Judaism. As so many have poixrted out, despite his dc-
fection, Ben-Zakkai is definitely ~zotconsidered a traitor. His way led to a
renekved type of Jewish life, and his challenge of the rebels' decision to
confront the Roman Empire is frequently presented as an alternative to
the rebellion. Apparently, both Ben-Zakkai and Josephus Flavius cibjected
to the rebellion against the Romans. M~ereasJosephus prohably left ]U-
daisrn altogether, went. to Rome, and adopted a Roman lifestfle, Ren-
Zakkai did not leave and remained Jewish to his last day
Many individuals take Ben-Zakkai as an illustratiox~of what could
have been the alternative to the rebellio~~ agaiinst the Romans, that is, in-
stead of decimation and destruction on a mass scale, a renewed and
meaningfd Jewish life that enabled Jews to fulfifl their religious and cul-
rural aspirations without e~~dangering what was mast cherished to themWg
The bsephus-Ben-Zakkai contrast is used continuously in potitical and
mord debates in modern Israel. For example, Israel Eichler, editor of the
Hart.di1" weekly The Naredi Canrp, kvrote in his magazine that one needs to
remember the hoodlums who, during the days of the second temple,
brought destmctim to tbe land (despite their good inf;entions). He cm-
trasted them with Yachmm Ben-ZaUai, whom he called a Jewish holy
scholar and righteow m n who surrendered to the Romans and went to
Galut in Yavneh. Eirhler was quick to paint out that Ben-Zakkai was the
one to be credited with the survival of the people of Israel since then (A.D.
69-70) '1'
?"here are many interesting paraflels between Ben-Zakkai and Jose-
phus. Both werc front the in-group; both i v e d in the s m e period and UII-
der similar circumstances; both left their people in a most difficult time.
tlcrwever, Ben-Zakkai is portrayed as continuing to be part oE his people
and helping in its revival. Josephus left his people connpletely to become
something else. The violation of trust and loyalty by Josephus, as well as
his turncoaitimg, thus holds an altogether different meaning than that of
Ben-Zakkai. It is thus Josephus who is remembered as a dcfector and trai-
tor. fndetld, Ladoucew notes that Josephus is "usudly r e g d t d as an op-
portmistie traitor."l2

The Jzldenr~f
C)uf ncxt case took place about 1,870 years after the Great &volt, Jlulen-
rats were the councils of Jews set up as the governing bodies of the vari-
ous ghettos cms.tructed by the Nazis throughout Germany and occupied
Europe during World W r 11. These cotrncils =presented the Jcws in the
:Nazi regime, and the Nazi orders concerning Jews were funneled through
these councils. 'f'he Nazis certainly used these councifs to help them con-
trol the Jewish population. Many Jews view these coulncils with scorn and
disgust because, to them, they =presented, a form. of collaboration with
the Nazis and in fact the councils helped the Nazis exterminate Jews. ]U-
dcnrats, for many Jews, have becorn synonpous with betrayal and col-
laboration with the enemy. Thus, the judenrat suggests the existence of an
~r~qanization that, by nature, is regarded as tseachmus, as opposed to the
individual traitor.
'Those Jews who were acfive in the J~rdenrafsfaced an impossible situa-
tion. It is inconceivable that t h y zmnted to help the Nazis exterminate the
Jews, and many of them prohably thought that by participating in these
councils they codd mitigate Che evil wrath of the Nazis and perhaps even
save lllfe (including, of course, their own and their famjfics). Uniortu-
nately, the nature of the Nazi occupation and exterminatirrn plan was
such that these Jewish councits could not really do much to allevi,ate the
situation in a significant way.1"

Pre-Israel Cases of Betrayal

Before the state of Israel was established in 1948, secular Zionism devel-
oped a determilled drive to establ.ish a nation-state. That effort began ia
the last decades of the nineteenth century. The major political struggle
was to secure the legitimacy of a new Jewish state by the major wlrrld
powers. Another political. and military struggle was with the emerging
Arab national movement.
Ho~vever,there wew several codicting ideological streams within sec-
ular Zionism, MIhich differed on a variety of issues: How shoufd the
British Mandate occupation of Palestine (which lasted from 1917 until
1948) be dealt with? What role should the Arabs play? What shodd be
the social and politicral shape ol the emerging state? Beginnjng in the
1920s, there emerged three main prestate underground. Jewish groups
who practiced direct action: (l) Hagana, (2) Etzel f"":lgun""),m d (3) L&i
(also known as the "Stern Gang'"" These groups were unequal in size,
with dlfferhg ideological stands on a variety of issues; sometimes they
cooperated, and at other times they competed with one another." At
times, the hostility of these groups to one another reached lethal propor-
tions; sometimes one group viewed members of the other grouy(s) as
""taitt>rsfkdpersecuted and even killed them. From the large number of
such cases, some quite bseinating, X shdl discuss only two.1"

Tlze Case of Israel De Hghn

Israel De H a h was born in the small Dutch town of Smilda to an Ortho-
dox Jewish family on December 31,1881. His father was active in the life
of the local Jewjsh community but w a not ~ doing v e y well cconomicatly
and tumed into a very bitter person. Israel's sister, Carey, was born less
than a year before him, on January 21,1881. Carey and Israel were appar-
ently gifted and very talented cfiild,ren. As they g ~ c up
v they turned their
backs on Orthodox Judaism.
 At the age of nineteen and having finished school, Israel De Hahn de-
cided to move to Amsterclarn a d tcr become completely secular. 'There he
studied law and, at the age of twentyone, receitled his doctorate degree.
In Amsterdam he also joined the socialist party. Cle H&n% ppditical and
academic career in Amstercfam was strtlng and stahle. There were also in-
dicatio~~s that he was developing (or actualizhg) a hornasexual ide~~tity.
Despite this, De H a h got into a problematic and stormy marital rclatim-
ship with a Christian physician named Johanna V m Marsphain. De Hahn
traveled to Russia several times, m d apparently his experielzces in Rus-
sia, and of Jewish life there, persuakd him to return to Orthodox Ju-
daism. Later he decided to i igrate to Palestine.
In February 1919, Ue Mahn left his fmily jn A m t e r d m and began hjs
long journey to Palestine. C)n his arrival, he settled in Jerusalem. M-
though De Hahn ohwiously moved to Pakstine out of a Zionist idedogy,
he wry quickly becamc djsillusioned with the local Zionjst political and
social leadership. He drifted slowly into the circles of the most extreme
anti-Zionist Jewish Orthoeiox groups in Jerusalem. He later began to
write for newspapers in Hollmd very critical essays about the Zionist e11-
tevrise in Palestine and got involved in lmal anti-Zionist activities. De
tlahds icjeology crystallized in 1920, and duri- 1921 he attacked not
d y the Zionist elite but the new immigrants as welf, f;or exanple, aft=
the 1920 riots in Jerusalem, De Hahn supported the British governor of
Jerusalem-Sir Ronald Storrs-when most of the Jewish commlanity de-
manded his resig~~a.t.ion. There were other anti-Zionist activities in which
De H a h was involved and which were regarded by contemporaq and
important Zionist figures as being pure treason, or close to it. These activ-
ities did not make De Hrshn a very populilr figzsre witbin the Yishuv
(prestate [194K]Jewish community in Palestine),le
This pm"~"""me to a peak when in 1922 some of these debates re-
ceived public attentio~~ outside Palesthe. ZJocalnewspapers (secular m d
religious) pubfished pieces calling for vengeance against Ue Hahn for his
activity I-le began to ~ c e i v threats,
e and in M a y of 1923 he receivd a di-
rect death threat de~xandingthat he should leave Palestine. All this did
not stop De Hahn, and he continued his activities and published ex-
tremety critical essays abroaci. De Hahn continued to receive written
threats and warnings urging him to stop his activities,
Ch the evening of Monday, June 30,192112, Cle Hahn went to pray in the
synagogu" that was located w i ~ the h old structure of the 5hakrei Zedek
hospital in Jaffo Street in Jerusalem, Dc M&n left the synagogue at ap-
proximately 19:45. As he left the synagogue and was walking down the
street;,he was shot three times and died a few mfnutes later in the operat-
ing worn of the hospital at the age of forty-three.
 Although there were mrnors that De H a h " assassination was related
to his alleged hamosexuality, it became evident that the real reason was
political. Athough &ere are several opinjons as to exactly who msassi-
natcrd De Hahn, &ere is little doubt that a member of the Flagasla did. it,
on explicit d e r s from the Hagana"~leadership. It was a case of an ultra-
Orthodox 'Jew who was perceived as threatening the secular Zionist effort
to reestablish a Jewish state and who was thus d e h e d by them as a ""trai-
tor," that is, as a person who vidated what was seen by the Hagana as the
vaitres of Jewish trust and loyalv. It is quite obvious that De M&n was
assassinated because he was perceived as posjng an immediate thrt.at to a
group of dedkated, active, and ~volutionaryZionists who occupied im-
portant positions in the leadership of the Jewish community in
Palestine.17

The Case of Yehuda Arie Levi

Yehuda Arie Levi, tbirty-three years old and single, was a Sfardi Jew w h
came to Palesthe from Italy. He was gifted with techllical tdelzts and when
he jojned Lehi he became tlne mmager of the techl-rical department. Levi
served as a p i d e and teacher in Lehi's courses on explo"ives ,412 iztdustri-
ous and invaztive kllokv, l ~ vdeveloped
i mad mines, bullets, and ignithg
grenades. He showed an inclination toward. the study of chemistry and
was going to be sent to tJle United States as a rep~sentativeof tRhi.
On November 29, 1947, the United Nations decided that the Jekvish
state would be established, This created a pltoblem for Lehi..They had to
decide whether to disband the organization and join the new emerging
Jekvisln state or to c o n h u c to exist and operate as an independent organi-
zatbn. Originally Lehi"s headyuarters gave the order to disband, but the
order was canceled within a month. That process left many members of
Lehi totally co~nfused.
Vehuda Arie Levi was one of those who decided to leave Lehi m d join
the Hagana. He contacted the Hagana" members and told them of his in-
telntions. He did not keep his decision a secret m d also told other mem-
bers of Lehi about it. Lehi's headyuarters sent a woman to t& to Levi to
find out exactly what his intentions were and why. Despite the cancella-
tion of the disbanding order, he insisted on joinhg the Wagana.
After the woman talked with Levi and reported to her superior, Lehils
members were instmcted to avoid contacts with Levi and to exco
crate him, Most of bis frie~ndsstayed w a y k m him. k v i did not give up;
he continued to voice his opinion and demanded an explanation horn
Lehi's command. A clarification was needed. The process of clarification
turned very q.ilickly into a "triat.'Wokvever, even the "judges'kcouid not:
find anything wrmg in Levi's actions or words. The whole affair was
htmed over to Lehi's headquarters. There it was decided that he should
be 3killed.IR
At 6:30 on Thursday, January 15, 1948, about fifteen armed yomg
males broke into Levifs apartment in Hayarkon Street in Tel Aviv and
took Uefiuda Arie by force with them, Alt.lnough the exact debils are not
entirely clear, it appears that a few weeks after Levi's kidnapping, his
family began to apply pressure m different politicai figur(_."o help h d
their son. Even the Tel Aviv Rabbhate demmded to h o w where Levi's
body was buried (aft-er a mmor that he was killed was spread). And, in-
deed, his body was found later, with four handgltn butlet holes in his
chest.
h inner memo of Lehi told members that Levi was accused of violat-
ing the groupf4iscipline, telling lies, demoralizing other members of
Lehi, and disclosing secrets. He was brought before a special ""court,"
found g d t y as chargcrd, and executed. Lehi rnembers were told that this
act could not be avoided.
C)n Friday, N o v d e r If, 1987, Yedicrt Aharm~otpub1is:hed a long cover
story on this case written by Amos Nevo. According to the report, on the
day Levi was kidnapped by Lehi, be was put before a Lehi '"court" and
shot on the s m e day, after kflin-Mor-one of Let7i's commanders-ap-
proved the verdict." The actual: assassin was interviewed, under the
pseudonym "Zefev,'" and stated that he shot Lewi because had he not, he
would have been shot himself. ""What could I do? Why did those who
were the judges not prevent it? I recelved m order, and 1shot, I could not
refuse-"m ""Zekv" told Nevo that the order to shoot c m e from ""Adam."
The use of pseudonyms t-hirty-fnur years after the assassination and the
reluctance to be exposed obviously indicate that those involved certainly
do not feel comfortable with their actions.
C)n F&ruary 15,1977, Levi's name was added to the list of Lehi's casu-
alties. His family wrote on his tombstone that he was murdered by bad
people (""Zedim"") which made some cmtempcrrary Lehi swvivors (for
example, Vazernitzki, Rnshe:ll S h p i h a n ) quite angry Shpill,man told
Nevo that in 1948 Lehi had no prisons, that Levi could not bave been iso-
lated, and that ""there was no choice . . . the undergromd could not afford
such anarchy- . . . 'That: was a loss, a tragedy. But he [Levi] brought the
death upon himself ."zl
Levi was not a ""traitorfbra "squealerf% the stereotypical smse of the
terms..He just wanted to transfer from Lehi to the Hagana on Che reason-
ing that Lelni was about to become one with the new Jewish state. His ex-
ecution cannot possibly be understood as anything other than a strong
signd from tJehifsleadership to the other mmbers, in a period of great-
confusion and contradictory messqemnd commands, that the coherent
syrmbolic m o d universe of Lehi was still intact and vibrant and that any-
body willixlg to violate Lehi's moral boundaries w o d d be puIlished se-
verely, Lsvi refused to hide his opinions. That made his chatlenge to the
moral boundaries even harder. His execution needed to be explairned to
Lehi's ambers-for exactly the s m e reason-to clarify and reify the
moral boundaries in the most explicit mmner.

Israeli Cases of Behayal After 1948

.Al%terthe establishmnt of the state of Israel in 1948, there were quite a
few cases illvOLVjl"tg treasm, 'The cases hvolving Wanunu and Mmbar
were discussed elsewhere in this book. Here I describe a few more.

Tlze Case of Captain Meiv Tubianski

Short amounccmmts in the Jewish daiIy press on JuXy 20,1948, informed
the public that on June 30 an unknown spy was executed. 'The man vvho
was killed was Captain Mcir Tirbianski-the only Israeli executed on
charges of treason,

The Accusations. The British Mandate over Palestine ended in May

1948, and the partition plan did not award Jerusalem to the Jews. A long
and fiexe battle over Jerusalem to& place i.111948, and the Jewish portion
of fewatcm W= under siege..7'he city was bombed and bonnbc-lrded by
the artillery of the Jordanian Legion, as well as exposed to the shooting of
Arab snipers. Life in Jewish Prusalem was under much p ~ s s u r emilitar-
ily, economicdly (food W= ratimed), socia,lt4; and politically. The Lehi,
EtzeI, and Hagma were active in defending the city During the siege, ru-
mors about spies, collabrators, informers, and traitors; abounded, and
the ugly ghosts of war pctisoned the a t ~ ~ o v h e rDurjng
e. 1948 Lehi alone
assassinated four individuals in Jerusalem on suspicions of 'kcspionage."'
&ring the Arab siege of Jemsalem in 1948, the three untfergrtlmd Jew-
ish organizations continually moved their headquarters and weapon
shops, TThe Hagana's FRtelIigcrnce service, the Shai, headed at that time by
Binyamin Gibly, became suspicious about the accuracy of the Arab ar-
tillev in hitting targets that mwed about the city (for example, wapons
shops and headquarters). Gradually' suspicions focused on the Jerusatem
Electric Company. 'The company had the addresses of all important places
in the city, and some of its worlcers wcre in constant contact wifh the Arab
side of the cityI using their wireless trmsmitters (for legitimte reasons),
5uspedhg that employees of the Jerusalem E)ectric Company were E-
spo~~sible for the "accurate artillerytfTtzelarrested five British clerks of
the company and.investigated thern. The Hagana arrested Meir Tubianski,
 Meir Tabianski held. the rank of major h the British a r y during the
Secmd World War. In June 1948, he was appointed the first commander
of the newly esta,bIishc.d Ismei D e h s e Forces f1.D.E) camp h Schneler
near Mea Shearim.22 Since Tubianski did not succeed in this job, he was
transferred to command the airstrips in Jerusalem.2Wwever, in 1948,
Tubimski was also an e~~gineer m d a senior official inIhe Jerusalem Elec-
tric Company Members of the Iiagma suspected that he gave important
military addresses to his British colleagues in the Jemsalem Electric Com-
pmy so that they could connect them to the eiectricd network. It was sus-
pected that this infornation was then transmitQd to the Arab artitlery,
which bombarded the new addresses. It must be noted that even if these
suspicions were valid, Tubianski was clearly not guilty of deli:berate espi-
onage. Xf these headquarters and. weapons shops, which were moving
about the city, wanted electricity, sorner,ne had to get the addrt-sses for the
company to cctnnect t-hern to the electrical,grid,.
Xbianski was an old member (about twenty-tvvo years) of the Hagma.
In the early month of 1948, Isser Bekry, the head of the Shai in Israel,"
receitled hformation Chat Tubianski was providing hostile British clerks
with information (which they sulpposedly passed m to the Arabs). Be"ery
consulted with the head of the legal service of the newly formed I.D.F.,
then rZbfaharn Gorally, and as a result, decided to arrest lilbianski. Re'ery
later clahed that he mderstood horn Gorally that he was allowed to es-
tablish a military court agairtst Tubfanski. On the very same day, Bekry
told the commander of the Palmaclls (originally; Hagana" military unit)
about his suspicions. A written reyuest was mad.e to the Pahach" re-
gional commander to assist Be'ery in any way pcwsible.

The "Tuialef' On :Monday June 30,1948, Bekery sent one of his oificers to
arrest Wianski, vvho was in Tel h i v , Tubianski came wilhgly and tvith-
out rcsistanee. They left Tel Aviv at around 15:C)O.At around 16:llt)Tubim-
ski ffaced the charge of treason in frmt of a "xnilitary court" h the de-
serted Arah willage of Beit Giz (on the road from Tel Aviv to Jemsalem).
Three judges were appointed to hear the triai.2Tubians:tci was not al-
lowed to prepare a defense or to consult with a lawyer. He was shown a
list of the arms m d ammuniticln shops/factaries in fc.rusa1t.m of which he
supposedly had given the addresses to his British superiors in the
Jemsalem Electric Cmpany.
?i> understand the specific charge we need some &tails. At that time
Jerusaiem had two different nctworks of eiectriciq, m e of which servked
the military and both of which were serviced by the Jerusalem Electric
Company. 7'he B r i t i s h a n a g e r of the Jerusalem Electric Company-
Michael Bryant-may have h o w n about the two electrical networks, It
was claimed that during a conversathn on June 16,1948, Tubianski gave
Bryant the information. This conversation was open and was prohably
overheard by other Jewish workws. Because it was suspected that
Tubianski was givhg vital and secret information to a hostile British citi-
zen, this informatim was passed on to the Hagana's intdigcncer unit. It
needs to be noted that despite the insinuaticzns, the information pmvieied
by Ebianski could, havc been obtained in other ways. Tubianski was also
accused on charges that the information given on June I6 to Bryant was
passed m to tbr ford;mian artiltery.
When Tubianski heard the charges, he supposedly admitted giving
Bryant the hformation, thereby in.directly admitting guilt. Although
there is a version that he supposedly may have wen said that he de-
served a cleath sentence, a more refiable version is that he probably ad-
mitted givjng the list of places that needed dectricity on both networks in
fewsalem, but maintained that the infornation was given tltzly so that
these places could be connected to the network and receive electricity and
not for reasons of sabotage. :Nevertheless, the judges found lirbianski
guilty of eripionage and trr-?asonand sentenced hirn to cieath. Ch-t the same
day he was arsested, at m u n d t,9:l)ll, a firing squad shot Tubjanski to
death. The whole "trial," "conviction, and execution took about three
hours.

The Aftermath. TubiansE's wife, Chaya (Lena), was not told what had
happened, but Mthrn she found out, she wrote to Uavid Ben-Gurion (No-
vember 1948), demanding an expanation. Ren-Gurion instructed the
army chief of staff to investigate. Consequently, Ben-Gurion wrote
Tubianski's wife in December 1948 that "I checked fie p m c e d u ~of his
trial and X fomd out that it was not in ordcr, perhaps because the under-
ground laws were still dornhant in the arrny.''Ze
On July 1,1949, kn-Gurion wrote agaill to Mrs. Tubianski that

It was found that Meir Tubianski was innocent (and his execution) was a
tragic mistake. . . . Attempting to reetiQ the tragedyf the chief of staff de-
dcied: l. to give Meir Tubianski a rank of a captain; 2. to give him a full mili-
tary burial; 3. to pay you and your son compensation. . . . Your husband
made a mistake and perhaps a serious one, giving his British superior a List
and did not think it would fall into the wrong hands. He admitted the mis-
take and regretted it, but he had no bad intentions and without i n t a t there is
na treason.27

Tubimski was buried in a full military service on July ;7: 1949.28

July 10,1949, Isser Be'ery then head of military intdigence and di-
rectly responsible for Tubianski's execut-ion, was amsted and charged
with the unlawful kiliing of Tubianski. Tke trial itself was open to the
public and began in the district c a t of Tel Aviv on Octsiber 16,1949, and
lasted until October 30, 1949. 0x1November 22, 1949, the verdict was
given, The court stated specifically that no charges of treason agahst
Tubimski were substantiated and that his execution was a fatal mistake,
The court stated that the use of the list Tubianski supposedly had given
to his British superior as evidence lacked any basjs. Furthermore, some
questions werc raised during the trial regarding the nature of the accusa-
ticms against Tubianski. For example, between June 11and July 7,a cease-
fire was h effect, so the informaim supposedly given by Tubianski could
not have served the fordmim artillery. Moreover, them were some que*
tions as to Mthether in fact the Jordanian artilrery ruas so accurate.2Vn
short, Tubimski was hnocent of the charges of espionage and tstlason.
Tubianski" execution was attributed, to Bekry for three reasons: (1)
Befery appointed three of his subordinates as judges in a /'field military
cou,rt""a.nd told them that if thcy found Tubianski guilty they had permis-
sion to sentence bin\ to death; (2) after the judges had found Tubianski
guilty and smtenced him to death, Be'ery approved the sentence and ver-
dict; (3)Be'ery ordered that a Aring squad be assembled to carry out the
court" decision. Bekry was found guilty as cbarged and was sentenced
to one day in prison." Clearty the court was convinced that Tubianski
was killed illcgalfy but was equn[ly convinced that Re'ery did not du
what he did with a malicious htent,
The five British cttrrks kidnapped by Etzef in 194X were given to the Ha-
gma. 'Three were releasccf for lack of evidence, two were charged wilh es-
pionage. Oste (Hawkins) was found ocent, and the other (William Sil-
wester) was found guilty. In an appeal to the Israeli Supreme Court, this
individual was fom~dnot guilty and was consequently released.31
The Tubianski case left a scar in the moral fiber of Israeli society. De-
bates about it still rage.32 Tubimski was the cmly person in the history of
Israel cvho was executed on eharges of treaso~~, and the first:person (out of
two; the other was Adolf Eichmann) who was sentenced to death iin Israel
and ackally executed.
'The Tubianski case is significant and instructive. The "trial" and
'"court" represent the type of "justice" that prevailed ammg the three
prestate urtdergrourtd fewish organizations until 1948. The justice that
emerged, crystallized, and prevailed after 1948 was based on open and
formal proceduses grounded on facts and due process and was radically
differcmt from thr pre-1948 '*'justice.'"e Tubianski cme was based on in-
sufl"iejent and inconclusive evid,en,ce, corjecturc, pressure, a lack of pmce-
dums, and improper attention to basic rights of defendants, and there
was no right of appeal. What was called a trial was not a trial in the sense
that we all b o w and understand. Tubianski really djd not havc much of
a reasonable chance to defend hhself once the ""trial" k e n .
 Tubianski, a victim of cisrcumstances beyond his control and of human
error, fear, and vicicrusness, was certainy considered (wrongly) by his
pm=cutors to be a melnber of the collective cvho betrayed the trust in-
vested in him and who was disloyal: to his collective, This combixration
led to his definition as a traitor; with a tragic result.

The Case of Dr. Israel Kasztller

In March 3,944 the Nazis invaded Hungary. Adolf Eichmann and his aides
came to Budapest m d began their preparations to activate the " h a I solu-
ticm'90r Hmgarian Jews.
'The Jews h Hungary were divided into several main groups. M m y of
them were, however, awarcl of what the Nazis we= doing to European
Jews. They tried to organize help and created a ""saving committee."
Clne of the key mennbers of the c o r n i t t e e was Dr. Rudolf (Israel)
Kasztner @ern 1906). Kaszher was a local Zionist politician who found
himself in the midst of something more dreadful than Dante" shell,He
tried to negotiate with E i c h a m and his group of killers and attempted
to save as many Jews as he possibly could. under the circumstances.
Kasztner was effective i17 s e c u r a the exit of what has becclme known
as the ""erain of the prestigious" hJune 1944. 'That was a train with 1,684
Jews aboarb, which the Nazis LalZowed to leave Hungary for Switzerlmd,
supposedly as a s i p of ""god will" and an indication of "intent.'" Kaszt-
ner was also involved in several other activities aimed at saving Jews33
Ch May 25,1953, the legal advisor to the Issaeli government accused., in
c r h h a l file no. 53/124., Malkiel Greenwald with defaming Dr. Kasztner."
At that time, &%&er was the spokesmm for the Israeli ministry o.f com-
merce and industry*G ~ e n w a I di,n mimeographed letters, accused Kaszt-
ner of collaborating with the Nazis, helying in the final extermination of
Hungarian Jews, helping a Nazi war criminal, and living on funds "confis-
cated" "from Hungarian Jews. Greenwald called for the death of Kasztner
because of his supposedly treacherous behavior. According to Green-
wald's accusations, Dr. Kasztrzer actuauy helped the Nazis. Tfne main
claims were that the June 1944 traix\ was a price the Nazis paid to buy
Kasztmer's silence in order to keep most Hungarian Jews unaware of what
was really awaithg &em and that Kasztner gained economically from the
money conliscated from the Jews. These were certainly monstrous accusa-
tions.
In January 1%4, the trial began in Jerusalem, and Greenwald hired
Shmuel Tamir as his lawyer." Tamir was very effective in converting the
trial from a sirnple crimind case into a potitical trial, and G~envvaidbe-
came the accuser rather thm the accused. This trial was one of the most
dramatic and painful trials in the history of Israel. Et lasted from January
1954 to June 22,1955. In the trial, the role of the Jewish leadership in Nazi-
occupied Hungary in 1 9 4 and in Palestine was examined with a m a p i -
Qing glass.
Tamir implied that there were many different issues in which Kasztner
was ir-tvolved, and in which he basically acted as a collaborator with the
Pllazis, and hence hc was a bona M e traitor. I shalS mentio~ztrhm briefly,
First, he maintained, contacts with and negotiated with I.he Gestapo and
the S.S. Second, he was involved in what later became h ~ o w nas the June
1944 "train of the prestigious."' The ifnplicdion was that the trajn was the
price that Eichmann and his Nazi group paid. for Kasztnerfs silence,
nird,the Nazis allowed Dr. :Kasztner to hide his Jewish identity in Bu-
dapest and his behavior thcrc., accor$ing to Tamir, was di~gracefui.~ He
did not wear a yelXow Nagen David, and he played cards with Nazis.
Fourth, Kasztner selected Jews from the Klrrj Ghetto over Jews from other
places; 388 Jews from that particajar ghetto were on. the June 1944 train,
and many of them were relatives of Kasztner. FiAh, Kasztner helped to
turn Uoel Brand" mission into a failure. Sixth, Kaszber failed to alert and
inform Mmgarian Jews that they werc not just being transported outside
of Hungary to a new resettlement but that they we= being transported to
an extermination c m p at Auschwitz. He atso failed to warn Jewish lead-
ers outside Httlngary of the horrendous events. Seventh, in 1944 the
British A m y sent several British Jewish officer paratroopers to Hungary
for ir-ttelligencepurposes. Three of them-Hanna Senesh, kel Nur;bacher
(Palgi), and Peretz Goldstein-clearly htended to help organize the Jews
into resistJng the Nazis.s"t was claimed that Kaszher was involved in
the arrest of all three by the Nazis- Eighth, after the war ended, Kasztner
testified in favor of S.S. officer Kurt Bachar*Ninth, Kasztner interfered
with operations to save Jews irt Europe. Tenth, Kasztner had personally
used the money confiscated from Jews to live luxuriously in Switzerland.
Ch June 22, 1955, Judge Halevi, in a lo~zgand debiled verdict, deter-
mined that in fact Kasztner had cooperated with the Nazis and. thus had
helped indirectly in prt-paring the ground for the extermination of Hun-
garian Jews, and that he had helped ex-S.S. off-icesKurt Rachar*The judge
stated that the above tenth accusation was totally groundless. Judge
tlalevi stated in the verdict that when Kasztner had accepted "the gi.ft-'%f
the train, "he sold his soul to the devilq"s7
The trial in Jerusdem attracted much attentjon. On the night of March
15, 1955, an anonymous pamphlet was cltistrihuted in which one of the
judges-M Peretz-was accused of being biased and of cooperating with
the old "leadershipf' so as to help "cover upf' Kasztner" supposed "atroc-
ities.'"" It is obvious that there were many people in Israel in the mid-
1951)s who were unhappy with &%&er's activities during the period of
the Holocaust and saw it as a major betrayal.
 Eldad Sheib, who was m e of the triumvirate that had previously corn-
mandied Lehi, had a newspaper called Sula11~(""Xadder"'in Hebrew), which
preaehed a right-wing nat-imal ideology, He also formed an organization
called Hazit Hanoar Haleumit fin HebrewI "the front of the national
youth"") where smail gmups met and discussed various national topics.
Eldad prcaeln,ed d o h 8 '%somethi,ng" about Kasztner"39
The trmsitian of Israel to a state: in the late 1940s and early 1950s was a
problematic and pair"1fu1process. Various politic& grourps felt that the
emrgjng state was not what they wanted and ehose terrorism ""tn get
their way" One of these groups was the r i g h t - w a Malchut Israel ("the
Kingdom of krael"), or, as it later became k n o w as, the "Zerih under-
grotmd." That group was particularly active during 1952-15353. For exam-
ple, on Febmary 9,1953, late at night, members from the group planted a
bomb at the Soviet embassy, which was then located at 46 Rothschifd
Street in Te1. Aviv. The bomb exploded and wounded some M I Q ~ ~ Eand ~TS
caused much damage. Consequently Moscow severed. its diplomatic tics
with Israel for about six months. The Israeli secret service began an irrtves-
tigation, exposed the group, and arrested about sixteen members. 'They
we= charged in a military court. Some were found guil.ty and sent to
prison, Two mernbers of that group were b k c o v Herouti alld Joseph
Menkes, who were previousiy men?bers of tehi.4TTh.e lawyer for the de-
fendmts was agah Shmtlel Tamir. For lack of evidence, Menkes was not
brought to court. Herouti received a ten-year prison sentence. In 1955
Herouti, and others, received state cfe~xencyand were released.
On Saturday night, March 2,19517, Dr. :Kas&er returned to his home in
E l Aviv from his work as the night editor of a local Hungarian language
newspaper.4Un anonymous male approached, identified him, m d shot
him three times with a gun. Dr. Kaszher was taken to a kospital: where he
fought death for about two weeks. He died on Maxh 18. The Israeli secret
service, headed then by Isser Harel, began an investigation. Very soon
four suspects we= arrested: Va%acov HeroutifJoseph Menkes (thirty-eight
years old), Zekv Ekstein (twenty-four years old), alld U r n Shemer
(fwenty-three years old)." 2 e police told. the press on March 12, 1957,
that they had. solved the case.43
Although there were other individuats in the background," only
Melzkes, Eksteh, m d Shemer were hdicted on May 28,1957, for the as-
sassixzatim of Dr. Kaszher and for beislg members in a terrorist organiza-
ticm. Herouti was charged with membership im a terrorist mganization.
C h January 28,1958, in a different trid, HerotlCi was found guilt-y of"pro-
ducing the pamphlet mentioned above and was sentenced to eighteen
months in prison. An appeal to the Israeli Supreme Court was not ac-
crcpted. Nenkes, Shemcr, and Ekstein were found guilty of Kaszher's as-
sassination. h responding to an appeal, the Israeli Supreme Court stated
that it was Menkes who persuaded Ekstejn to assassinate Kaszher and
even gaw him the gun to do it. The court stated that there was an under-
ground o~aninatio~z that was responsible for the assassination. 'The three
were cmicrted for their participation in a terrorist organization and re-
ceived long prison sentences.
Memwhile, the Israeli Supreme Court debated the orighal Greerzwald-
Kaszher trial. The five judges reconfirmed that Gsztner in fact helped
S.S. officer Kurt Bachar by givirrg false testimny cm his bcrhalf. Ilowever,
most j d g e s rejected all the ofies t?ccmsati.ons made by Greenwald as es-
sentially baseless,
On May 23, 4960, Israel's prime Minister-Dwid Ben-Gufion-an-
nounced in the Israeli Knesset that: Adolf Eichmam had been caught and
w d d be put on trial in Israel. After a long and dramatic trial, Eichmam
was executed. The :Kasztner affair did not become a m4or issue in Eich-
mam" triall,but from the few referelzces to it (and from interviews Eich-
mann gave to L,@ magazine), it appears that from Eichmam" perspec-
tive, Kasztner was ohwiously trying to save as many Jews as he possibly
codd. But it w s also c m c d e d that a by-product of that effort: was the
fact that Hungarian Jews were kept quiet. Gsztner 's enigma, therefore,
was not hlly resolved.
Clearly, Ekstein, Shemer, and Menkes acted as a group. Theis cofiesion
was partly integrated by their idealogical conviction in what they viewed
as Kaszhner's guilt incollaboration with the Nazis. They were. also united
by a right-whg and nationalistic worldview that welzt back to Lehi and to
Sheib" '%ulam" group In fact, SheWs club was located. at Menkes's
house.4WShc.ibfsrewlutionary right-wing propaganda no doubt hebed to
h a p c and crystallize the group into taking the lethal path leading to
Kaszher 'S assasshation.
The Creenwald-Kaszber trial and Kaszber's assassination served as
hot platform for mord debates. The Grcenwald-1Casztrner trial examined
the nature and scope of the Jewish Ileadershipfsinvolvmnt and collabo-
ration in help% to prevent (or helping to accomplish) the Naziskextermi-
nation canpaiws. The assassins' trial was used by Tamir and jottmalist
Uri Avneri to claim that the Israeli secret service was behhd Masztner" sas-
sashation because it was too dangerous for the major pol-itieal party-
then Mapai-to leave Kasztrner alive. Their version seemed to have been
supported by the fact that the Israel secret service bad penetrated the
Menkes-Ekstein gmup and that for a short while before the assassinatim,
Eksteh had worked for the service. These claims were examhed and dis-
missed.46
Frarthermore, other works imply that at least in the Brand affair (dis-
cussed in Chapter 3), Hi~nmlerprobably inkmded to negotiate a peace
agreement with the Allies, tn this context, Eichm % ""offer'2tospa= the
'Jews in the ""blood for trucks" deal was a by-product of that hitiative.
Bauer's wlrrk indicated that some essential parts in Brad's 1954 testi-
monies were not true and points to Tamir's qraestionable role in helping;
to aqlifgi lies.47
?%toKaszber affair continues to haunt Israeli society Dinur asserted in
a 1987 perspective on the case that bsit;&er 'S adions during World War
II in Hungary were a h e d at saving as many 'Jews as poss&le and were
distorted by Tamk's biased and one-dixnmsimal interprc.tation, In 19514,
fiistorian Yechiam Weita coll,aborated with Israeli W in the production of
a three-hour miniseries about the case, accompanied by three hours of
prime-the televised discussions. fn 1995he also published a book cm the
topic.48

Tlze Case of LIdi Adiv and Dan Veved

Wdi. (Ehud) Adiv was a member oi an Israeli Jewish-Arah rizlg of opera-
tors who p v i d e d Syrian intefligence with information. The ring was es-
tablished by Daoud 'Tuski, a nationalist and Communist Christim-Arab
from Haifa. The common denomhator between the Arab and the 'Jewish
members of this ring cJf spies was their belief in socialism, with strong
Maoist m d Trotskyist tendlencies. The Isracli secret servke exposed the
affair in December 1972 when details of the spy ring were leaked to the
press. Although during the investigation more than thirty Arabs and
about four Jews were arrested, clearly the most prombent left-whg Jew
in the espimage net was Udi Adiv, as Black m d Morris (1991:277-279)
point out. He was twenty-six years old when he was arrested, an ex-
melnber of the Gan Shmuel kibbutz, ex-paratrooper in the Israeli army
who fought in the Six Day War, and a star basketball player, With him
was Dan Vt.red, a twenty-eight-yc;ar-old mathematics teacher from Tel
Aviv. In 1972, the e x p o s u ~of Ikis case of espionage created noisy echoes.
Adiw m d V'red secretly visited Damascus and were trahed in the basic
skills of coding and the use of weapons and explosives. ?hey also gave
their hosts inlormatio~~.
Adiw later claimed that the information given was amateurish and not
essential. He was indicted incourt on charges of espionage and treason in
a trial that begm on February 25,1973.
Turki (singing the International) and Adiv wcre found g~liltyof espi-
onage and t ~ a s c mand sentenced in Martll-r 1973 to seventeen years h
p"son. Other members of the spy rjng cvho wcre on trial (four, including
Dan Vered) were sentenced to variolls punishments. Both Turki m d A d k
served about twelve years, until 1985 when they were deased. After his
release, Adiv expressed regret frtr his acts, but not for his ideological
views,
 As Cromer (1.998) points out, the case of Udi Adiv served as a point of
clashing betwen two major symbohc moral universes in Israel. The reli-
gious one stated that Adiv, the archetype of a sccttfar Jeliv-kibbutznik,
paratrooper, secular, Zionist-has also become an archetype of a traitor.
Tl~eimplication was that secularism inevitably leads to betrayal, and
hellee sticking to orthodox religion was the solution. Ho-cvever, secdarists
pointed out that Adiv was an mseprcsentative case (for example, Uri Tl-
lm, mentioned below, came from the same Ebbutz as Adiv, was also sec-
ular, and is considered a gel~uinehero) and the orthodox versjo~~ of Ju-
daisrn did not provide m inocu%atimagainst treason or deviance." It is,
of course, no cohcidence that treason provided the platform for the two
major ideologies to clash. It does, after alll, signify Ihe boundaries of trust
and loyalty. The debate between the secular and religious interpretations
of Judaism, as focused on the case of Udi Adiv, was thus about the diag-
nosis of the case, its reasoning, its meirhods of correcthg the deviance, its
meming and generalizability
On April 10, 1975, whjle in prison, Adiv married 5ylvia mi-ngberg, the
da23ghter of a fazsovls Soviet spy-Markus Klingberg (discussed in Chap-
ter 3). Klingberg was kprisoned for penetratjng Israeli high-security in-
stdlations working in the area of chernical and biologic& warfare and
providing his Soviet: operators with the information he g a t h a d there, In
1978 the two were divorced and married otLter partners.50
Both Adiv and Vered were members of the majority Jewish collective in
Israel. 'Their decision to aid Israel's elIelsy, Syria, by providhg it with in-
formation and undergoing training as spies reflect& a decision to violate
the trust invested in them by the state and their loyaity to that state. Adiv
becam the n m e associated hvilh this spy ring and a synonym for trea-
son.

The Cases of Amos L~vinbevyand Uri Illan

On the day that the 1973 ki,m Kippur War began, October Q, the Israeli
stronghold in the Mermon mountains, the Golm Heights, held close to
sixty soldiers. At around 15:00, four Syrian he[i.copters carrying com-
mando soldiers landed near the strmghold, attacked it, m d overcame the
Israeli sol$iers. Eighteen Israeli soldiers died in that fierce battle; thirty-
one were taken prisoner. Among the prisoners was Lieutenant Amos Lev-
inherg. He was m intelligmt p u n g ofiiicer whose appetite for knowledge
was voracious. Volunteering h r a variety clf duties, he had learned a )ot
about Israeli military. Levinbe~,m obsessive collector of detailed infor-
mation, was also gifted with a phenomenal memory*fn fact, it was clear
that he h e w too much.
 Ui-i Illan. Photo by
Urifs sister H n ~ n a .

?"he Syrians have a rc-rputation for their brutat treatment of P W s .

However, it turned aut that no such ""eeatme~~t" was necessary for Levh-
berg, He provided the Syrians with all the informatiost they wanted, and
mow. The military darnage that Levinberg inflicted on Israel was sub-
stantial.
That Levinberg had a weak character is obvious. However, Israeli intel-
ligence, which allowed h h access to so much sensitive i~~formation (cer-
tainly hvay beyond his "need to how""),must share the Isrtame.
When Levinberg returned from Syrjan captkity, the extent of the disas-
ter he h e e d into being became clear. He was ostracized as a traitm Co-
hen quotes h h as sayhg, "baryears X wmted to die. I had a strong sense
of betrayal, of guilt, but the guilt lies with whoever stationed me in the
Hermm outpo&."% h oother words, given the bread& and depth of his
h o h d g e , he should have been assigned to an outpost where the risk of
him becoming a prisoner was not so high.
Was Levinberg a traitor? He was certair~lya member of the in-gro"p,
m d he vioiated the trust invested in hiln ancl connpmntised his loyalty to
the state by givjng so much information so frtzely to the Syrians, Bid he
have a choice? Had he been tortured, he could have died without disclss-
ing mything, or he might have broken under torture and give all the in-
formation he knew anyway. The issue of what is expected of POWs in
terns of disclosing information (and under what conditions) is a difficult
m d thorny questio~~.
 Uri Illan provides the opposite c a s e t h a t of heroism, He was born in
1935 in the kihbutz of Gan Shmuel,") "joined the Israeii Army in 1953, and
was trajned as a paratroopec C-h7 Decennber 8,1954, Illan, three other s&
diers, and an officer, were sent across the Syrian border in the Golan
Heights to attach listening &vices to Syrian telephone lines. They wew
all caught by the Syrims m d placed in a Syrian prison. All the soldiers
were subjected to psychological manipulation and torture. .After a mmth,
Illan committed suicide. His body was returned to Israel on January 14,
1955. M e n his body was examined, it was found that prior to kis suicide
he had placed little notes in his clothes m d between his toes in which he
m t e that he had not betrayed his friends. The notes aiso implied that he
was under great stress and wanted revenge. The other four soldiers were
returned to Israel on March 29, 1956, in return for forty Syrian soldiers,
Two of the Israeli soldiers were court-ma~tialed.~"
It is appr~priateto examhe these cases because they shed light on a
very particular type of behavior. Are POWs, under the credible thrreat of
sevexc. torturt-, or ackalty under such torture., still 'kequimd'3to disclose
basically nothing? If they do djsclose hformation, s h u l d it be considered
a '*betrayalu?From the perspective presented in this book, the answer ap-
pears to be yes. However, the themtical perspective we used have as-
sumed that- a decisim to violate trust: and become djsloyal is not forced
but a voluntary decision. When one is coerced to betray, smetimes bru-
tally and under a threat of death, should we still consider our moralistic
response to it, straight and simple, as noncoerced betrayal" My inclina-
tion is to respond in the negative. Perhaps the expectation that civilians,
or soldiers, under such conditions, should keep quiet is an unrealistic ex-
pectation. The implications of this issue go b e y o ~ ~X>OWs
d being coerced
to reveal military secrets, Xt has obvious implicatims for collaborators
during World War II (and in other conflicts). The question we must ask
ourselves is, what is the threat that the potential collabomtor faces? Al-
though the universal structure of violating trust and loyalty materializes
in t-he cases of both collaborators artd POW who disclose miliZary secrets,
the circumstances may be such that the social. and moral responses to
such behavisrs must- be different than those of iindividuals who commit
such violations under little or no threat or danger.

The Case of Derech Hanitzotz

I17 1982 a monchly lsraeli magazine, Derech ManI'tzotz (in Hebrcw, "the way
of the spark"" began to appear, The magazine reflected the views of a
rather s m l l group of Israeli leftists called Hanitzcltz. 11%1985the magazjrre
was upgraded to a biweeky and was pzlblished inboth Mebre?\v and Ara-
bic. It focused on reports and news about t h Israeli-occupied, territories
and about the Palestinians. Roni m d Ya'acov Ben-Efiat were paid em-
ployees, and Mirhal Schwartz (originally hrielli) wlrrked as a volunteer.
Du,ring 1988, about five individuals associated with Ilrrrecl? HaniCsobs were
arrested, Rabchi El-Aruri, Arab editor of the Arab language version of the
magazine, was arrested first (F&marqt 16,1988); two days later (February
18)Derech Hanz'tzotz was closed by m admhistsative order. When the man
in charge of issu% the order was asked to explain it, he responded that
the magazine and its people ha$ a comeetion to Nayif Hawam&, head of
the Det~ocraticFro~ntfsr the E,i.toerationof Palesthe (DFXI,P), a terrorist or-
ganization. Un April 15, 1988, Ua'acov Ben-Effrat was arrested, and. on
April 23, his wife, Rani, was arrested, too. Michal Schwartz was arreskd
on April 27. Other rnelMbers of the group were Assat Adiv (hmther o.E Udi
Adiv, discussed earlier) and Hadas Lahav, who werc arrested inMay 1988.
All inall, five Jewish members and one Arab were arrested.%
'The main charges against the hdividuals associated with Derech Hanit-
m t z were that they werc in contact with a foreip agent and members in
an illegal terrorist ortymization. The grosc-lcu.ticm claiMed that some time
at the etnd of 7,983 or early 7,984, Michal Schwartz met in iJondon with
Sal& Reht-a senior member in Nayif Hawatmeh" organization-and
she was persuaded to join the organization. She was follwed shortly by
Rmi Ben-Effrat- These individuals, together with h'acov Ben-Effrat,
agreed with Hawatnneh"~people that they would establish in Israel a
Jewish-hab political organization and wlruld publish a newspaper, all fi-
nanced by HaovatmeWs organization. Indeed, Schwartz and Ben-Effrat
established in Israel a not-for-profit organjzation called Hntzifzulz and
gublishrd &re& Wu~z%lzotz. Ilawatmeh" terrorist orfjanizaticm,according
to the prosecution, Hnanced it all and provided gujdelines for their activi,-
ties. The report in Hakaueh quoted anonymous sources in the state" pms-
ecutian, who noted that "it was decided not to accuse Sclhwartz and Ben-
Effrat with treason because there is no solid evidence for such an
accusation, which is difficult to prove in court."'"?The same report stated
that although Hadas Lahav, l"afacov Ben-Effrat m d Assaf Adiv were in
custody, the specific accusations against them had not yet been estab-
lished.
:111 short, the basic accusation against the Jewish members in I - f a ~ i f Z ~ t z
was that they cultivated contacts with Hawatmeh's group. Eventually; Is-
raeli journdists were told that the nature of the evidence was such that in-
dividuals associated with Uerech W a ~ i t z o fwere
z not going to be charged
with treason, but with '"embership in a foreign hostile organization"
and with "contacts with a foreip agent,"%Although techni.cally none of
these charges was dirc?cttreasm, the subtext was certainly one of treason.
'The implication was, clearly that Jewish indjviduals associated with
Derech Hu~itzcltzwere conspiring with an Arab terrorist organization
agairzst the state of Israel. Violating trust and loyalty were certainly the is-
sues here, tncieed, m May 23,19XX, Mchal Shwartz and Roni Ben-Effrat,
the two editors of D m h Hn~~itsttfz, were formdly accused in court of the
above crixnes. Eventually, each mmber of this group who was in custody
was charged in court, was found guilty, and received a prison sentence.57
By 1,991no Jewjsh member of h e grottp remained in prjson.
Two related events are wefl worth noting here. First, Michaef War-
shawski, who was involved in publishiq a pamphlet of HwatmeWs ter-
rorist organization. (but was not associated with Derech Hanitzofz), was
also sentenced to a prism sentence." " c d , m October 3, 1989, a very
famous Israeli ""pecenikU-Mi Natan-was sentenced to six months in
p"son h r meeti.ng Yasser Ardat, c h a i r m of the Palestine Liberation Or-
ganization, which was viewed then as a terrorist organization." Later
that m t h , Aibi Natan =fused to express 'kegretf9for meeting Arafat in
return for "cleme~~cy."~~
Clearly, Jewish members of Hanz'tzolz were considered to be members
cJf t-he in-gmup who violated their loyaity to t-he state and the state's trust
in them by cmspiring with a hostile organization.

Tlze Case of Hctou Ostrovsky

Victor Ostrovsky was born in. Edmonton, Canada, on November 28,1949,
to a Canadian father and an Israeli mother. Victor" parents separated
when he was a yomg child. He was raised inboth Canada and Israel as a
Zioni.st. M e n he was eighteen, he joined the Israeli army where he served.
for three years in t-he miljtary poiice as an officer. After his release from the
army in N s v e ~ ~ b1971,
e r he retur~~edto Canada, but after five years he re-
turned to fsrael, in Nay 1977, and joined the navy (he served in sub-
marines). In Xprit 1979, while still in the Israeli navy, the Israeli secret ser-
vice, the Msssad, hitiated an interview with him to determine whether he
was inter~stedh joining its ranks. Victor was indeed, interested. The
process was long, m d the April 1979 interview was just the beg
1981 he left the navy and tried to start a busin.ess as a graplnic artist, The
business was not very successkrl, fn October 1982, the Mossad, contacted
him again, and more interviewing folfowed. He passed t-he e n t y examfna-
tion, and in February 1984 he began his c m c r with the Mossad. For two
years he was trained for, and eventually participated in, an operation that
evcmtually failed. (March 1986).Consequently, he was fired." He left Israel
and eventually settled in Canada with his wife, Bella, and two daughters.
It is difficult to h o w what exactly drove Victor to his next act-his hurt
feelintgs fmm being fired from tbr Mossad, or as he likes to put it, his can-
cern for Israel- 1x1 any event, he deeded to w 2 e a book spelling out
everything he h e w about the Mossad. He did that with the aid of a pro-
fessional journalist, Clair Hoy, and in 1990 the Toronto-based puhlishing
house, Stoddart, p&lished their book, By Way of Deeeptian: A Dcmstafing
fnsider's Portmif ofthe Mossad, with Hoy as the first author. The book is, in-
deed, a pl.etity devastating critique of the Mossad from a knowledgeable
insi$er. Israel's attempts to prtrvent tbr publication of the book failed. Al-
though there are quite a few books on the Israeli R'lossad (including some
by one of its legendary commanders-Isser Harel), Ostrovskcy" book is
differcsnt. Unlike other books, it attempts to hide n o ~ i n gIt. exposes the
structure of the Mossad, the n m e s of units, commanders, operaflives,
modes of recruitment and training, as well as m d e s of operation. It ap-
pears to be a very accurate, reliable, and believable book. Indeed, at a
price of $26.95 Canadian, it must have been considered an almost free gift
by any of Israel" enemies. By publishing this book and spil:ling out his
knowledge, Ostrovsky violated his oath and a g r m e n t to the Mossad to
keep secret the knowedge he gained from Mossad. That meant that- a
member of the group violated the trust in him and his loyalty by provid-
ing classified infomtatim in a discreditk~gway to trYhoever could afford
the price of the book. Not surprisingly the book sold very w d , thus pro-
viding Ostrczvsky a comfortable existence, mere can be little doubt that
Ostrcrvsky is cclnsidered a bona fide traitor by many Israelis.

The Assassilzation of Yitzhak Rabin (Novembeu 4,19951

The reason for deivhg into this case is that Rabh was defhed by his as-
sassh (md not only by him) as a traitor.@Israelis and Palesthims have
been engaged in a bitter and bloody conajct for mmy years. Israeli Jews
who tend to accept at least some of the moral arguments made by the
Palestinians (typically found in the so-called Israeli left) run a serious risk
of being ~ f e r r e dto as "traitorsf"by other Israeli Jews (typically from the
so-called lsracli right, or Israeli rclligious right). The main reason is that in
a conflict situation, the issues of tmst and loyalty are seen as polar and
contradictory. Such vestions as, "Are you with US or against us?"bnd
" C m we trust you?'%ecome crucial. These questio~~s are interpreted to
mem whether a persm can be trusted to identify with the interests of a
specific e t h i c or religious group in a way that the mjority oE (or power-
ftd) m e d e r s in lhat group see as legitinnate. Such a conflict raises the
possibility for different people to define interests and loyalties in differrent
ways and claim loyalty to and trust irr altogether different sets of values,
for example, those promoting peace and/or liberal serularisln versus
continued conflict and/or cmservatke orhodox religious interpretation
of Judaism. This conflict spawned great debate regardhg thr nature of
treason, and Ihe assasshtion of Israeli p r i m minister Yilzhak Rabin oc-
curred in p~ciselythis context.
 As in other cases of assassination by 'Jews, the killlng of IZabh had a
strong politic&-ideological background." Rahin was killed because of his
moral pnljticd position, his power, and his acts. This assassination was
committed with a carefully pmmeditated intention and not out of any
momentary rage. Assassinating Rabin was thus the end product of a long
process that Yigael Amir, the murderer, was gohg through. 'This process
not only provided the context within which Amir was persuaded that Ra-
bin had to be killed, but it was also the cmtext that provided Amir with
the rhetoric of jusliiication Chat Amir was to use. As in other similar cases,
this assasshation was committed by an individual belonging to the same
ethnic, or cultural, group as that of the assassin, that is, a 'Jew killing an-
other Jew.
:Rabin%assassin was a member of a group. h this context, we must
make a distinction betwen two grouQs. "The first one is the small and irn-
mediate group withh which Amir interacted intensely. Mernbers of this
immediate and jntimate group were the ones with whom A d r shared his
"
ermost thoughts, ideas, and intentim. This was a group of yomg, ob-
servant Orthodox 'Jews, with extre~nemilitant right-whg ideoloa em-
bed.ded wi.thin a polit y conservathe religious worldview Et was this
groupfdee&ack that r heard, and it was these people M;hc, prwieied
h i r " s m a l l psychological, political, and practical support (for exam-
ple, his brother or Margalit Har Shefi).
This rather small group was immersed in the subcutture cJf a much
larger potitical, religious, and ideologicral rnilieu fmm which this smafl
group drew its inspiratiun, ideas, support, and the powerful rhetorical
and psychological dwices with Mthich it interpreted and shaped its
worldview in a specific wy.
This rather large group itself was also part of a broader spectrum of
groupm""eimovernents on the right side of the political map of Israd in
1995 that shared a common worldview of Israel. Their ~riebvswere similar
on important issues regadjng the interpretatjon of Israel" ppoticaf and
ideological past and fubre, and many of them shartrd the same set oE pri-
orities regarding policy and ideology 'The psychological trick that en-
abled so many members of these groups on the rdigious right-wiX2g side
of Israeli polilics to sociatty construct Rabfn, a democratically elected
prime xninister, as a "'traitor," a "collaborator," or ever1 a "terrorist" and a
""kilXer" "could be performed only withixl this context. -That is, the political
steps that Kabin and his gove ent took in a courageous and risky at-
tempt to reach a political. settleme~~t with the Palesthims were not at a111
liked by these members, who preferrttd to define this as '?treason." "e
cannot, and shouid not, avoid stating that a very similar social dynarnic
was operating in ano&er farnous case of assassination, that of Ur. Israel
(Rudolf) Kaszher, discussed earlier.
 As in other cases of Jews assassinatirrg other Jews, Yitzhak Rabin, along
with the ministers in his gove ent, was exposed-for a very tong pe-
riod of time-to unrestricted, inffexihle, and constant instigation kom
many elements in the Israeli right. This c m p a i p was focused on con-
structhg Rabin as a genuine traitor. 'f'hese elctments used a campaip of
vile propaganda that was m tabielize and delegilimize a freely
and democratically elected. g ,and much of their deceitftll pro-
paganda was personally d i ~ c t e dat Rabin. Rabin was p ~ s e n t e das a trai-
tor and a collaborator with the Palestkims, and threats were made that
in due t h e he wouldt be judged a criminal, much like other well-known
traitors, such as Vidkun Quisling, Lord Haw-Haw, and others Mxho were
put on trial m d executed. Rabinfs government was portrayed as the "Ju-
denrat, and he and his ministers were compared to the Vichy govem-
ment. "The rhetoric used was cynical, ernotional, poismous, and sophisti-
cated m d it. created a depressing aimsphere of hired, of verbal (and
nonverbal) violence and abuse, h such an atmosphere, and in the eyes of
many people, Rabin was seen as stigmatized, deviant, and estranged. In
other words, he beclme the "otht.r,'kxternal to the group. .hdanger to the
group, tn fact, surveys and polls made before the assassination s h w e d
that his popularily had declined very sipificantly Simple, superficial, and
deceitful slogans, whose explicit goal W= the delegitimization of Rabin
and his government, appeared on houses, on bumper stickers, in newspa-
pers, and at crossrrrads. W ~ e n
individuals from the left ( b r e m p l e , from
the Peace Now movement) tried to stage counter-demonstrations, they
we^ cursed at, spit on,and werc h q u m t l y severely beaten by hooligans
from the right."
Two illustrations epitomize the situatio~~. A. few weeks before Rabin's
assassination, s m e kaders h m the Israeli right staged a demonstration
in downtown Jerusakm (Zim square), and the head of the r a t - w i n g op-
po&tion, ME Benyamin Netanyahu, made a speech. During that event,
some members of the right put up a very big photo-montage (clearly visi-
ble in televised =ports of that event) whrre one could easily see &bin in a
Nazi d i t a r y uniform (ei&er $5,or GesCapo). The size of this abomina-
tion is indeed incredible. That any Jew cwld evm think about, much less
so do, something like this is instructive. 'f'he second illustration is a testi-
mony to the media by Leah Rahin after the assasshation. Leah told R-
porters that somethe before the assassination she returned home, As hap-
pened before, demonstraton; f m the right staged a &anstration in
front of her house, cursing her and her huSbmd. Mowwer, the "new'kele-
ment h this particular demonstration was that some demonstrators
threatened that after the elections, she and Uitz:hak would be put on trial
""like Mussolb~iand his mistress" "after the end of World War XI. To those of
us who need a reminder, let me poixrt out that sixty-two-year-old Benito
Mussolini, :Italy%fascist dictator since 1922, and his young mistress, Clara
I'etacci (twmty-five ycars old), were caught by partism forces near Lake
Coma on April 27,1945. They were court-martialed and shot the next day,
together with sixteen other fascist leaders, On April 29, their bodies-
hanging by the heds- we^ displayed fn Mih.h"ese two asswiations
(as well as those made to Quisling, Lord Maw-Haw and others) were
made in the most brutal way possiMe, as if there was anything these at all
which made these compariscms viable. Thus, these hate crkes, preceding
the actual assassination, turned Rabin-in the rninds of many Israelis-
into a traitor to his people, a collaborator, and a strmgcrr. This cmpaign of
instigation and vi2ification-as in other case reated the necessary social
m d psyhdogical background required for the assasshatim.
:It is well worth noting that the word "instigation" need not be inter-
preted in its narrow or technical sense. The phenomencm of instigation
against Rabin was much broader, It involved a very difierent political
and ideological worldview than the one held by R;abin. This wrldview
provicied the andytical frameworlr within which the trmslation and cre-
ation of the concrete expressions of instigation and hatred were made
meaningful.
Furthermore, Arnir was an observmt Orthodox few, who chose to
study at the only religious (Orthodox) u~~iversity in Israel (Bar Illan) m d
identified himself with the fsraeli right, His act of assassination brought
into focus a possible theocratic justification for tl-te assassination. 'That a
religious Jew, identified with the right, assassinated a secular Jew, from
the kft, could hardly have escaped attention. Mmover, Amir stated that
he recefved ~ l i g i o u sjustification for his act. The works of Shteinberg
(1996) and Ekndocvitz flc397) point out Ihe ~ l i g i n u context
s of the assas-
sination, with Efenbowitz noting that the major lesson from the assassina-
ticm was that its maor motive was religious.
'This is the place to note that eleme~~ts in the Jebvish Israeli right have no
monopoly, or exchive rights, over campaigns of instigation and hatred
like t b s e preceding the assassination of Rabin, In other historicai peri-
ods, the direction of hatred and h~stigationW= reversed.& E-Iowwe~,
since at least the early 1 9 8 0 ~the ~ ideological cannpaign of instigation,
delel;itirnization, and h a t ~ of d elements in the Jewish Israefi right (many
of whom arcl C)rRhodox Jews) against the left (many of whom m secula)
was a clear background for a number of acts of terror. Let me give just a
few illustrations.
Ch the evel~ingof Fdruary 10, 1983, during a de~~onstration of the
Peace Now movement, a hand grenade was thrown into the crowd and
exploded. Ten demonstrators; were wounded and Ernile Greenzweili;,
thirty-three years old, was killed. bnat.1 Avrrashmi was accused and
found guilty of murdering Greenzweig. Ch October 28#1984, a nineteen-
y e a ~ o l dAWOL soldier, David Ben-Shimol, fired a stolen ""Lau" antitank
guided missile into an Arab bus in Jerusalem, near the Cinematheque.
m e Arab was killed, and ten others were wounded. Cb April 22,1985, a
group of three Jews-Danny Eiseman (twenty-seven years old), Gil Fux
(twenty-one years dd), and Michal Ilailel (twenty-five ycars old)-mm-
dered aa Arab taxicab driver, H m i s Tutanji (thirty-two years old), in re-
venge for an Arab terrorist act of murdering a Jewish taxicab driver-
David Casgi-a few days earlier, fn Febmary 1994, Dr. Baruck Goldsteirr,
a physician, ent-ered the tomb of the fathers (""W'arat Hamachpda," in
Hebrew) in HfJbmn, a holy place for Jews and Arabs, with an M-l6 auto-
matic rifle, and opened fire on Moslem worshipers. Twenty-nine I'trabs
were killed, and 125 wounded. In May 18,1995, Haniel Koren, a twenty-
two-year-old soldier, entered a church in Jerusalem, poured turpentine
and tried to set the place on fire. Ch-I M a y 24, he entered a church in Jaffs
m d opened fire. Luckily, in both cases no one was injured, Athough Ko-
ren stated that the reasons for his acts were "retligous," it was Arvrushmi
who stated clearly that the reason for his act was the instigation he was
exposed to.
men. can hascity be a doubt that those co tthg the above-mentioned
acts of terror were affected by the ahnosphere of hatrred created by the pro-
paganda and instigation comhg from ell.me11t.s in the right, which t e ~ ~ d e d
to describe anythhrmg with which they disagreed as '%etmyay or "trcaso-
nous." "us, members of Peace Naw were defh~edas ""traitors." This at-
mosphcre of intolerance m d hatred served as the background for Yigacl
h i r 'S sassassi;nationof Rabin.
%e assassin's motivation was to stop the peace pace" wwhich Rabin
was in\iolved and to avenge Rabin's betrayal, as seen from the assassin's
right-wing religious Orthodox worXdview, From the assassin" ppoint of
view, his murderous act was politically and ideologicaly justified. This
justification was established within the social network in which he lived
and functioned, m d which supported h h , n e s e two groups, the general
and the specific concrete, form& the social structurt-s that pmwidcd the
assassin the psychological and rhetorical devices that not only helped
him orient himself to the act but also gave h h the motivation and the
will to cclmmit &is act of political murder.
In this respect, the similarity betwell the assassination ol "r'ibhak Ra-
bin in 1995 and the m u d e r of Haim Arlosoroff in 1933 is striking.fl In
both cases, the murder exposed the deep and hteful cleavages dividing
the right and the left i,n Jewish Israeli society. h both cases, the murder
became th focal poislt for the political and ideological breaking of differ-
ent popdatkn groups. Heilbruner (1995) points out the similarities be-
tween the assasshatiol~of Rabh and the atmosphere of extrelne instiga-
t h and accusations of betrayal by the extreme right in German& which
led to the assiassixzatim of Waltf-ier Rathenau, the German fnreign minis-
ter, on 'June 24,1922.
As in other cases of poljtical assassin&ion, m d certainiy from the point
of view of the assassin and those who support or identify with him, it can
be clairned that what is operatrive here is an alternative system of justice.
The assas* feels that he cannot get political just..ice for a p r i m minister
whom he views as a traitor. He thus resorts to assassination in order to
achieve justice. Eurthermore, the violence of the act calls attention to his
political, religious, m d ideological viebvs,.In just this mmner, Prime M ~ I -
iskr Rabjn, not protected as he should have been, was shot and killed by
Arnir on Saturday evening, November 4,3995, in Til Aviv.

Concluding Discussion
In some respets, the inspiration 'or writing this chapter cane from such
previous works as tl-tose by Archer (197f), O'TooXe (NB), and Weyl
(19511). The idea of looking at one culture, historicallyf and examining
cases of betrayal and treason these is interczsting and suggestive. It allows
an in-depth view of the different cases and, perhaps, opens an opportu-
nity for making some cultwal generajizatims.
The first observation that needs to be made is that, like other cultures,
both f u d a i m and. Israel have their share of traitors. In this respect, Ju-
daism does not prt-sent a differmt case than other culturlts. It is certa;nly
not free of traitors. This observation, coupled with the diseussian about
infideliq, rchforces the conclusion that betrayal is not a drmatirally rase
event. Ch tl-te cmtrary, it is nearly an everyday, almost routine event.
Second, h all the cases we examined, the issue of crossing the bom~d-
aries of synnbolic moral universes on issues of trust and loyalty was the
core stmchral issue fiat determined the constmction of the relevant indi-
viduals as traitors. That was clear, case by case,
mird, e x m i n i n g the casa revealed the diereace b e h e m the h a g e of
m individual as a traitor and the reality behind it. h each af these cases, the
politics of i d e ~ ~ tm
i qd the co~~text played a major mle- The cases of Jose-
phus FXavius and Vochanan Ben-Zakkai show how two conteznporanes
coped with a shF1ar context, and with similar choices; one kept his Jewish
identit)s wheseas the otber chose to transform. OIe has bee11 cmstnlcted
m d commemorated as a hero, the other as a traitor. h a shilar way, h o s
Levinberg and Uri IUm both faced a difficult tortuous capevity Mereas
IXlm chose not to reveal kvhat- be knew, Levinherg revealed eveqthing he
knew Again, fllan is construct& as heroicr,kvinberg as a traieor. The mur-
ders of De Hahn and Levi p v i d e us with an excellent illustration for the
cnnlt-ural antagonism of c d i c t i n ; identities. De Mahn represe~~tedevery-.
f i h g the Hagana was against. Levi represented indeyendence and the free-
dom to embrace a new idmtiv that was supposed to emerge with the c=-
ation of a new Jewish state. Lehi's leaders cauld not accept it. The Judenrat
is remembered. as a treackrous organization, However, examinjng fie con-
text fn which it functioned softens this image. 'l'here we= several cases of
asassination that resulted from the co~~struction of the vicths as traitors.
Israel De H h ,Yehuda Levi Israel Kasztneq m d Ktzhak b b h were all
kifled because individlaals and groupmere convinced that they violated
their loyalty and trust insuch a profound mmner &at the only remcdy was
to kill fieme&However, in each of these cases, a close examhation reveals
that the assassins we= insensitive to complex sit-uations and iporant of
the facts, not In mention lacking incompassio~nand m a y . h no case is this
as clear as inthe case of the tmnecessaq unjustifid, and hurried execution
of CaptL3in Meir 'Tubianski.
Fo~~rth, in this chapter we examined some orgmizations that were de-
fined as treacherous-the Jtkl;kTnmdand Dereeh HaniCzolz. One can add to
this the small gmups of activists that were behirtd the treachery of Udi
Adiv and Dan Vered, as well as the ones behind the assassinations of
Kasztner and Rabin. This is an interesting p h e n m n m because it hplies
that cultures may have mganizations whose goal is to violate the trust
m d loyalty of the mainstream morality of these cultures, by presenting
and reinforcing a different morality. There is one major difference be-
tween the Judenrat and the other organizations, and it has to do with con-
text and choices. U'aljke memtoersbip in the other organizations, the
membership of the Judenrat was under conditions of extreme stress and
thrlrat, and joining the organization was not made f m a stand of full free
will and choice. Moreover, the choice and conse~~t of many individuals
who served in the Judenrats were not fully informed regardhg th real
intentions of the Nazis. However, the co on denominator of these or-
gmizatio~~s is that their actions were defhed as treacherous. m e needs to
remember though that in all these cases, the construction of these orgmi-
zations as inseminators of betrayal is not miversally shared.
'The more general cmcllusjio~~ is that it may not be uncommon to f h d an
ideological group behind the traitors. T0 counterbalance the possible exis-
tence of a fifth colurnn, a cold war, or espionage, nations have created
state-sponsored orgmizations that recruit operate, and support traitors.
The case of th Israeli-operated spy (traitor to the United States) fonathan
Pollard is a good example.
Fifth, examhing the personal motivati.011 of trajtors has provided some
interestirtg clues. The historical cmkxt played a major part in the traitors'
choice of actions and their diwction (for ertample, Levinherg, I)e;trovsky).
Traitors d s o used hjstorical context: to jwtify their acts.
 Finally, Lalthough application of the universal structure of betrayal-
that is,the violation of trust and Ioyalty-enabled us to explain the differ-
ent cases presented in this chapter, it: was morality that was crucial in con-
structing the cases as betrayals. Without morality as a criterion, no
meaningm interpretation could have been accomplished.
Was Delilah a traitor? Can such figures as Quisling, Vlasov, Benedict
Amold, Judas, Malhche, ZJord Haw-HawFEzra Potmd, Stauffenberg, Ed-
ward VIXZ, Josephus, Pollard, and Kasztner be Lal lumped together in one
category as traitors? If so, in what sense?
'This book was never intended to be a comprehensive encyclopedia of
betrayal. Its major purpose was to develop a conceptudizing apparatus
that would help us better understmd the naturt. of betrayal. HopefullyI
this goal has been achieved. Elowe~rer,writing or reading a dry docu-
ment, hi&ly abstracted, about betrayal is a punishment undeserved, by
anyone. Thus, firoughout the book, we examined numerous cases, some
very detded, of betrayai. All these individual red-life stories helped us
to weave our more general sociological treatise on betrayal.
mrtlughout this book we examined a great number of cases invoking
various forms and ~nanifestationsof betrayal. We saw that it is possiblt to
classify many of the cases into analytical categories. Examining all these
cases, one needs to ask,When is the likelihood of invoking the label "trai-
tor" inineased?Althou$h this label is context and si:uatim depcnde116 it
also has a social structure, This structure emeqes when we exmine care-
fully the type of vicrlations that invoke this term. 'This exami~~ation reveals
that the prhdbility of jnvctking this term, is increased sii;lnificantly w k n -
ever specific boundaries of symbolic moral universes arc crossed.
7'he method we used cmsiskd of examining diverse behaviors, fn dif-
ferent time periods and cultures, trying to crystallize the contmon analyt-
ical core behind the different empirical manifestati~nsof betrayal without
losing the cdtural mosaic itself. This metl-rod inwlves two interesting
and contradictory processes. On the one hand, it decontextualizes the
cases by lumping so many cases and contexts togethes. Oxl the other
hand, it enhances the importance of context by exami~~ing the specific
content that elicits the societal response of "traitar'kr the more specific
form referred to as "treason.'f
 Our examhation of the behaviors of a considerable number of individ-
uals and groups, in different time pericrds m d c u l t u ~ sreveals
, that the
varieties of the behaviors that are viewed as betrayal provide a fasdnat--
ing, rich, and stimulating mosaic, This variety has a cornmm core that, at
the mfnimal l e d , can be characterized as foflows. Betrayal is a behavior
that, first of all, involves a social interaction, presurned or directly ob-
served, of individuals who are perceived to share the same cultural her-
itage m d similar cultural goals.
In addition, there are some main elelxents that must be prese~~t to in-
voke the term '"traitor." Ta begin with, attribution of betrayal occurs when
two major violations of expectations occur: violation of tmst and viofa-
tion of loyalty- These violations by an in-gmup melxber typically invoke
the accusation of the deviant violator as a traitor. The more serious and
thrtratening these violations are perceived to be, the higher the liketihood
of invoki.ng the label. When no such violations exist, the charge of be-
trayal is weakened considerably, For example, a spy who pretends to be
s o m e w he c ~ she
r is not can hardfy be accused of '%etrayingfhcollective
he never belmged to, mird, betrayal means that a person from the in.-
group defaults on his or her moral &Xigations and commit.rnents to the
group a d crosses the boundaries of the group or dyad. In other words,
some actual turncoating must take place in addition to the aforemen-
tioned violations, This added element inwitably increases the probability
of finding the person to be a traitor. Finally, when viotations of trust and
loyalty occur, accompanied by turnmathg and committed h stealth or
secrecy, the label of ""traitor" is practically unavoidable. X
n such cases, the
tern "traitorf"s used ~ g w d l eof s the power configuration. intert-stingly
enough, these cases are nnostly concentra.t.ed in the interpersonal level.
Such actions as those commigted by strike violators and police informers
also tend to fall in this category*
Chzr examhation of the different forms of betrayal makes one conclu-
sion very clear. Betrayal is not a rare occurrence. It takes pIace in numer-
ous awas of our life, alrnmt on a daily basis. Betrayal, in other words, is
quite prevalent; most of us have experienced at )east one .form of it, m s t
likely mort. than once,
Analyticatly speaking, dthough betray& is a mdtidimensiclnal phe-
nomenon, the two most crucial varihlcs that distinguish betrayal from
other foms of human behavim are vidations of trust and loyalty. How-
ever, these twlr variables are not discrete but continuous. Betrayal h-
valves behaviors that are spread on a qualitative spectrum, varying in
terns of perceived severity,
Che of the important distinctions is whether the betrayat is personal or
collective. Withh these two types, we have even fher distinctions. Far ex-
ample, people seem to differentiate between a "one-ni#t stand" and a
long-lasting affair. Moreover, a further distinction within a "one-night
stand" concerns the motivation and cmtext of the art, for exampl",
wkther money was used to obtain sex. If we are examhing betrayal on
the collective fevel, then questions of motkation, context (for example, in-
dustriaf espionage in peacetime versus military espionage in wartime),
m d inflicted damage become crucial.
For both types of betrayal-personal and collective-the issue of
stealth or open belxavior is another sipificant variable. C)ne reason why
this distinction is so important is that violating trust and loyalty in se-
crecy typically hvolves deceit. Thus, issues of dishonesty, pretenser lying,
and making other people believe in a Mse reality come into play*
h o t h e r dimension invdves threat potential.. When a large organiza-
tion such as a state is being threatened by a structural violation of trust
and loyatty (for example, treason), especially during periods of c d i c t ,
its reaction will be severc. Betrayal orz the interpersonal level (for exam-
ple, inf delity) also typically yjclds strong emotional reactions, as identi-
ties are being scrricausly chailenged and threatened.
To st~mmarize,""eraitor" i s a ggezzeral name referrbg to an. individual
who violates trust and loyalty in a variety of circumstances and contexts.
Traitors can be found in interpersonal, group, mganizational, or national
crntext.~.. The term "traitor" ~ f e r to
s a person who is perceived to be a
bona fide member of the s a m collective, or group, as those whose trust
and loyalty the traitor comprt,mfses. 'fhat is, a strung assrtmpticm about a
common and shared czlltural heritage (pasl., present, future, common
gods, language, values, norms, worldviews) exists between the traitor
and the betrayed. Added to this basic structure of violation are issues that
can solidify, or weaken, the appljcation of the term "'traitorf?in specific
cases, n e s e issues include the ioilowing: M r e the violations committed
in secret? W r e the victims of thr violationti specific indiviciuals, groups,
organizations, or countries? Did the violations involve deception? Was
the threat potent-ial of the violation large or small? Moreover, the nature
and circumstances of betrayals have been used to determine the pmper
societal, reactions to such actions.
Followkg the tradition of contextual constructionism, we first estab-
lished the facts and the characterization oE betrayal. Once we exposed the
universal structure underlying betrayal, we could move on to the con-
stmction. It became clear that although the universal stmcture of viola-
tions could be rather easify identified in each case we discussed, there
were several other important related issues. mese issues are relevmt to
the constructjon of the tern "traitor" and its application in different con-
texts. First and foremost is the issue of moraliw.
Basic questions of boundaries and power lie at the heart of betrayal.
When the term ""betrayal" is invoked, the issue of moral bomdaries is not
far behind. The main reason is that issues of loyalty and trust are funda-
mental moral issues. Facit~gthese issues =quires making decisions m-
garding loyalty and solving similar questions regarding trust. In each
case discussed in this book, issues of morality determine the ethical judg-
ment of the case in question.
Mora:ljty, however, like deviance, is highly infiuenced by power. Spe-
cific moral claims, and the conseqtlent social reactions to those claims, dc-
pmd on power and its usage. Invoking the possibiljty of betrayal thus al-
ways involves examining chalienges to both moraiity and power.
Moreover, when secrecy is involved in the betrayal, an element of deceit
is added to the mix, and thus an additional mclrai issue clrmpomds an al-
ready complex situation. Power relatio~~s are also mag~~ifiecfhere, as the
issue of who has the power to deceive who and why is at the fnrefront as
well. Obviously one result of his is that. invoking and validatiw the exis-
tence of betrayd h o s t gmrantees a harsh societaii response,
A distinction beheen the universal social stmcturc of betrayal and its
specific moral content was made throughout the book. Discusshg morai
issues requires paying some attention to those making the moraf, diag-
noses, including the author of this book. Mareover, these mord stands
gain importance because labeling any specific persun as a traitor is-like
it or not-passhg a moral,judgment, Of course, it is irresponsible to make
overgeneralizing statemnts, For example, although it is easy to deter-
rnine t v h e ~ e an
r act of betrayat was co itted on the personal level c ~ r
on the collective level, punishment- is typically much moro severe for be-
trayal on the collective, or national, level. I f we confine ourselves just to
the issue of treason, and we remind ourselves of such individuals as
Qx~isling,Lord Haw-Haw, Ezra Pound, and Malinche, it may become
quite difficult to decide who was a bona fide traitor and who or what they
betrayed. h gemon with a Nazi worldview would definitely not view
m i s l h g or Lord Haw-Haw as traitors. lis my mhd, the issue of morality
and power is indeed crucial.
Black" theory of srrcial control is appropriate here, at least fmm the
point of"view of t h s e la,helcd '"raitors.'" Black;bases his approach on the
concept of ""self-help criminal justice," He argues that the main reason
that offenders involve fiemselves in devimt a d crimh~albehavior is not
that they want to violate norms or iaws. Rathes, these offenders feel that
they achieve justlice by b ~ a k i n gsome rules, According to Black, these de-
viants are involved in a process oE exercising social control either by forc-
ing the culture in which they live to =cognize their claims or by getting
justice for what they defne as their own cause. From, this intriguing per-
spective, traitors can indeed be viewed as being involved in the pursuit of
"justjce"; however, it is "'justice" accordi.ng to their own criteria.
 There is another major issue hvolved here, and that is the issue of the
type of identities that emerge from betryal. C. Wright Mills alerts us to
the fact that personal biograghies, and consequently ide~~tities, are linlced
intirnatefy to social and historical processes. Nowhere is this process
clearer than in the cases of treason. Traiton; facing competing symbolic
moral universes have to make a choice. Such a choice can make them he-
roes for m e universe but despised and detested traibrs for another. Con-
sider intfividuais such as Mdinche, John An&&,Nathan Hale, and a large
number of others" Moreover, the very selection of specified cases as trai-
tors reacts a moral choice that accqts the construction of particuiar indi-
viduals as traitors as opposed to heroes. We live within cultures, and as
Might Mills points out, we cannot escape the cultural context..However,
we need to be aware of this, so that we can develop a better understand-
ing of betrayal. The iejentities that various traitors embraced, and those
given them after the fact, were all embedded in specific pofitical and,
even much more so, moral contexts.
This observation necessarily brings me to the next point, which in-
volves masks and reality In an interesthg fashion, this also comects us to
contextual constmctiosrism, Once we have ascertaisred the basic facts of
the case, we c m unfold the social ( m d moral) constmction of betrayal.
Then we can contrast the reality with the construction. In fact, we re-
peated this exercise numerous tirnes throughout our analysis. Although it
is m almost classical exercise in contextual constructionism, it is also an
exercise in debm:kjng and tends to color research with a subversive hue,
which it should.
The identities of traitors are thus a reflection of the political and social
contexts in which they live and fu~~ction. In this sense, m e can ask, To
what degree are these identities genuine? Are they part of the empirical
and factual substratlrm c ~ are
r they sociatly and moratly cmstruckd? In
the context of World War 11, these questions help us draw a line between
genuine colllaborators and true believers (for example, I(auiding, Seyss-.
Inquart, Degrelk, VIasov, and Joyce) and opp0rtu"i"ic collaborators,
fafcing loyalty and trust. 'The issue of fact versus construction, truth ver-
sus falsehood, and empirical versus mythical is thus cutting across not
only the macro social and culturat level but also fie l e d of indivibal
identities. This conclusion sterns not only fsom C. Wright Mills's formu-
lations but also from syrnbolic inkraction. That, perhaps, should not re-
ally surprise us. Contextual constmcticmism is grounded rather strongly
in symbolic interaction.
Deviance (and crime), as argued elsewhere, needs to be understood
within central cultural cmtertCs.2 Indeed, betrayal, as a form of deviance,
is intimately connected to both loyalty and trust m d to membership in
groups. This means that issues of betrayal always involve central
processes of change and stabilit-y in the moral and social boundaries of
collectives of people and hence irr their smse of belonging and identity, It
is no wmdcr then that issues involving betmyal are often emotionally ex-
plosive and typicallly give rise to moralistic discourses.
Treason, perhaps not surprishgly, is the most complex betrayd. When
all rhe major elments that define betrayal exist (violat-ions of trust and
loyal.t>iby a member of the in-grou~7,secrecy, and turncoating), the likeli-
hood for a consmsrtal etefh~itionof betrayal is rather high. When the ele-
xnmt of: stealt;h disappears, and individuals who are britnded as traitors
are simpty those with different political views, the p w e r configurations
play a major part, and the nature of "tr.easonffbecomes prciblematic and
debataible (for example, Quisling, Lord Haw-Hakv, Pktain, Vlasov, Pound,
and Malinche). If and when such ""lraitors" are b r o u e t to trial., one can
expect a harsh sentence, but one can also expect that the accused will not
accept the verdict as valid. Moreover, the issue of treason will. always
elicit a debate mgarding the proper dividing line between legitimate dis-
sent and violation of trust and loyalty or even giving aid and comfort to
the enemy. Mr'hat exacerbates this probleln these days is that the bomd-
aries between "friend'hnd "enemyff may be bfurring, as even "the other"
may be difficult to discern. I'crstmodernit;m, by nature, blurs the bound-
aries between diverse symbolic moral u~~iverses, m d heszce sharp disthc-
tions may become difficult to mahtah.
?he various definitional elements presented here can be used to delin-
eate the moral boundaries between different forms and manifestations of
betrayal. The term. "betrayal" rdcrs to a farge nrarnber of types and cate-
gories representing a wide spectrum. Although there. is a universal social
structure behind these diiferent: manifestations, the specific content of
different types of betrayal needs to be assessed in different ways. I hope
that we now powes the analytical tools for cmceptualizing this fasci-
nating form of h u m n behavior in a way that is true to its rich and com-
plex nature.
 Notes

Chapter 1
1. See short report in Newsweek, December 29, 1996, p, 22, and a mview of the case
by Ronen Bergman in I-I~krefs's supplement, December 11, 199& pp. 59-62. The
charge Cif faced in eau& was espionage related and dealt with individuals who
give infornation that is meant to harm and damage the state" scurity. On the ver-
dict, see Mn'cariv; March 25,1999, pp. 12-43; and Yediclt Rluzro~zot,same datef p. 19.
2. See Bbck and Morris 1991:4 09; Cufman 1995; Rachum 19%; and Raviv
and Melman 1930:27Zt--38Q.
3. See Ben-Yehuda 1985; and Zerubavel1992.
4. See Ben-Yehuda 3985,1989.
5. Landa 4994; Fukuyarna 4995; Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984; and Seligman
1997 examine these issues.
6. See Goc~deand Ben-Uehuda 4994 on moral panics. In a wa)?r,this interpreta-
tian can also help us understand the modern quest for reltigim and the revival of
interest in religionsf new and old, as well as in magical and fantasy scjlutions, The
major failure here is the liberals' failure to educate people to cope and Xive with
empirical and spiritual uncert.ajnties.
7, See Fletcher's intriguing 1993work,
8. See Poimar and AXlen 199"7357>5;74; Gilfing and McKnjght 2995; and 'Tc>scano
1990. See also Yediot Alrarurzot, March IS, p. 5, A group of British and ather peapfe
created a support group for him, demanding, among other things, that he be
treated as any atker prisoner; see Hg%retz, April 10,1998, p. 133; and Tel Avilt, Sep-
tember 27, 1996, pp, 53-58, In 1998, this group (the Israeli committee h r
Mordechai trapanmuand fcrr a Middle East free from atomic, bicjlogical, and
chemical weapons) published a book expressing its views, Vaklanttnu alrd trlte Bomb
(in FTc-;brew).
9. See Hra'nretz, April 17,1998, p. A8.
10. "I"edi(~t
Ahnrc;tnol,July 17; 1998, p. 2. See also Maron 1998a. For more details,
see &diot Rhnro~zol,November 24, 4999, pp. 4-44.
11. Mnklarl'v, July 17, 1998, p. 3. Manbar" aacounts received wide pulaliciq in
October 4998, when Illana DayanpsTV Channel 2 program "FACT" pprc~videda
forty-eight minute docurnrtntary on this affair. It i s worth noting that another Is-
raeli-Hertzel Kad-bvas found guilty and cmvicted in 1995 on charges of espi-
onage for Iran, too. He was sentenced to six years in prison, half of which were
conditional. He was released frc>mprison in Maxh 1997.
 12. See Amit 1992:372409.
13. Judges, chapters 13-46. See also Bower 1W0:2-3; and %th, 1972:150-153,
14. Judges, chapters 4-5; see also Heaps 2 969:39-42,
15. See report in Nculsrveclk, vol. 128, no. 12,(Sczptember 16,1996), pp. 36-37.
16. Far example, see Eoenirzg St n ~ d a r dSeptember
, 17,2996, front page.
17. For exampte, Cardinat Winning, leader of the Roman Catholic Church in
Scotland,
18. See Eaenizzg S t a n d ~ r dSeptember
, 20,1996, pp. 1,s..
19. The newspaper paid the ctluple E15,000 (equivalent, at that time, to about
US $23,000). The interview was quoted widely by the BBC, tm.
20, For short summaries we the Sptember 30,1996, issues of Erne, p. 24, and
Nczostucek, p. 6.
21. See Ezleni~zgStandard, Octojber 8,1996, and the BBC3 18:00 news on that day,
and The Tinzes, October 9, 2 996, p. 90,
22, Ezrenir-zg Shndard, July 2,19917, p. 4. See also Ku 1998.

Chapter 2
1. Granting an illegal pass to a ship-the CFznrming Natzcy.
2. Brandt 3994:188-189.
3. See Pofrnar and ALlen 1W732.
4, Lentz 1988:xvii; and Polmar and Allen 1997:24.
5. There are numerclus tzrrrrks about Benedict Amold. %e Arnold 1979; Bakeless
2 "398; Boy fan 1973; Decker 2 932; Flexner 2 "391; OToole 2 992 :55-59; Polnnar and
Alfen 19"3:32; Randafl 1990; Sellers 3930; Seth 1972:28-32; WaIXace 1954,1978; and
Weyl 1950:44-59, My favorite two items are Brandt" (1994) excellent and very
well-written account and Ducharme and Fine's (1995) critically penetrating analy-
sis of the images of Benedict Amold,
6.Lentz 1988:xvii; B'Tc>c>ol1993:22-24; PoEmar and AIlen 1997:258; and Seth
1972:285-282. Frrr a critical evaluaticrn of Hale's mission, see Bakeless 1998:440-422,

Chapter 3
1. See the Newsweek issue of Spternber 30,1996, which was devoted to the gen-
eral issue of infidelity. On adultery in China, see Ncrusaueek, August 24,1998, p. 24.
Malaysia's punishment consists of six fioggings, three years in prison, or a fine of
around $1,190. Malaysia utilizes ""Modesty Guards," whose job is to find pclopte
who are involved in illegal sex in hatets and public parks. See Yediot Alznm~of, "24
Hours," "supplement, August 23,1998, p. 6.
2. For example?see tawson 1988.
3. See Norton and Hastings 1997.
4. Newswcek, Sptember 30,1996, p. 40.
5. This case is described in Chapter 1.
6. See Ncwszoeek, spternber 30,1996, p. 38*
7. Ibid., p. 40,
 Motes

8. Ibid.
9. Chapter 10, pp. 287-307.
10. See also Ofir-Sl~acham1998.
11. i\a'c>rtc>n
and Hastings 1997.
12, Shenhar 1998. See also Muhlbauer and Zernach 1991:438-444; Nardi
1996:42-45; and Sherner 1992:26&267,
13. Hc~rowitzand Ben-Arie 1998:14; and Weitz 4998. See also contemporary
newspaper coverage, Ear example, Yedl'ot. Ah~mnot,January 15 and 17, 1993; in
both cases coverage begins on front page.
14. See Yedr'otAfiarclnot, "2% Hours," supplemenl; August 23,1998, p. 6.
15. For a short review of an internaticynal list of infidelities and adulteries by
celebrities, see Kobi 1998.
16, See The Ernes, October 9,1996, fmnt page.
17, See Nezusaueek, December 8,1997 p. 22.
18. Horow-itz and Ben-Arie 1998:14,
19. See h'arr'z~,October 11, 1996, magazine Weekct:.~zd, pp. 30-31; and Horc~witz
and Ben-Arie 1998.
20, See Nezusaueek, August 20,1998, pp. 12-21.25-39,
21.. July 3,2997, p. 8.
22. "0peratic)n Drumbeat-," which began in January 1942; see Blair 1996:50%526;
Gannon 19% and Hickam 1989,
23. See Blajr 1996:559.
24, See Villkman 1994:5&80,
25. Dc,bson and Payne 1986:288-289; and Polmar and Alfen 1997:158,3";7$, 508.
26. Atdrich tzrorked in CIA headquar2ers. In mare than a decade of twacheraus
activity, he betrayed at least eleven CIA agents to the Soviets, of which at least
fcxtr were executed (Richelson 4995:422),
27, 1301marand Alien 1997:22-22,443-4M.
28. Alias Walter G. Krivitsky, born 1898. See Deacon 3982202-203; Dc,bson and
Payne 1986:175-176; and Potrnar and Allm 1997:318.
B.Vol krnan 19"3:77.
30. Lentz 1988:79; and Polmar and Allen 4992319.
33. Polrnar and AIlen 199"7101;7.
32, Volkman 1994:77.
33. See also Bower 1990:60-67; Friedrich 1972:100-103; and Richelson 1995:
94-96,
34. For example, see Richetson 1995:95; Smith 1976; Weinstein 1978; and Wein-
stein and Vassiliev 1999,
35, See Polmar and Allen 1997:263; and Scott 1996,
36. Scott 1996:33.
37. Ibid.
38. I""olrnarand AlIen 3992263,575578; and Richetson 1995:224225. For more
on Venana, see Haynes and Klehr 4999,
39, 1301marand Allen 1997:263.
40, Scott 1996:31.
41, See also Friedrich 1972:10%104; and Weyl 1950:424441 for shorter rwiews.
 42. In its most intense fc>rm,this war lasted from the early 1950s to the late
1980s, a period of about forty years. See Whitcomb 1998, See also Weinstein and
Vassiliev 1999; and Friedman 2Q00.
43, See Beacon 1982301-302; and Polmar and Allcsn 1997:239.
44. Pen kojvsky 1965; Polmar and Atlen 199E-429431;Richetson 1995:2'74-282;
and Volkman 1994:2%30.
45. I""c>lmarand Allen 199'7:239.
46. The Report u f t h Royal Commission, 4946:ll.
47. See Sawatsky 1984 (who conveys how difficult it was to cope with Gouzenkai);
and S t h 19";"2:27&278.
48. See Deacon 1982316-317; 130fmarand Allen 1997:270-272; and Wise 1988,
49. See Bower 1990:141-151; King 1989; liichelson 19(35:91-94; and Sinclair
1986 for the political and academic (as well as sexual) cantextualization of cam-
puwcultures in which this ring developed. See also Winks's 198'7 mc)re general
approach,
50. Deacon 1987:334-336; Dobson and I""a~me 1986:205-208; and Polmar and
Allen lli3923-47-349.
51. Bobson and Payne 1986:41-44; and Polmar and Allcsn 1997:90-92.
52, Costello 19138; Penrose and Freeman 1986; Polmar and Alien 1997:77-78; and
Votkman 1994:17-22.
53. Also knc>wn as the ""tird man," see Page, Leitch, and Knlghtley 1969;
Philtby 1969; and Volkrnan 1994:8-16.
54. %metimes referred to as the ""fifth manm";~bson and Payne 1986:46-47;
Polrnar and ALlen 1997:97; and Richelson 1*5:95--94,436,485,
55. Dctbson and Payne 2 986:217-228; Polmar and Atlen 1997:358-359; and Seth
19;;'2:388-391.
56. Bobson and Payne 1986:19>194; and Polmar and Allcsn 1997:342.
57. He also had an affair tzrith Maclean's wMrifeMelinda-which began in 1964,
58. Polmar and Allen 1997:433436.
59. Newsweek, September 8,199'7, p. 42.
60. See also Bullocl-r 1%6:158-168; and 13incher 1987:19?-224,
61 . Dear and Ftx~t1995:297.
62. There are several bmks and studies written about this affair. Frrr concise ac-
counts, see Gutman 1995:265-278; Melman and Raviv 1"389:611-.;7Q; and %hiM and
H aber 1976:400-402,
63. For example, see Bearse and Read 1991; Pofmar and Allen 1997:309-310;
VoLkman 4994:77; and %LW yn 4987:115-449.
64, Palmar and Allen 1997:65-66, as well as Seth 1972:317--319,provide good
summaries. There are several spying epix~desin the Bible, One is about J o ~ p h ' s
brclthers, who say that they came to Egypt to search for food, but Joseph accuses
thern of being spies. A second epimde involves a command by the Almighty to
Moses to send spies into Canaan, Moses sends twelve spies and when they return
after spending forty days on their mission, their reports are mixed and even con-
tradictory Only two of the spies recommend an invasion; the rest warn of big
troubles ahead. The Israelites panic, but the Almighty, who feels that this panic re-
action indicates little faith in Him, punishes thern by keeping them from the
13romisedLand far farty years, A third episode involves Joshua sending two spies
to Jericho. There, the spies, who practice the world's second-oldest profession,
meet Rahab, a practitioner of the world's oldest profession. She manages to save
the spies from an infcjrmer working for the king of Jericho. During the Israelites"
successful attack and conquest of Jericho, Rahab's househclld is spared. Surely
these stories have some interesting lessons for today
65. For example, Bower 4990:282-298; P-ic~we4486; and two Bctional movies
about her called Mata Hari, one made in 1932 (starring Greta Carbo in the title
rc~le)and one in 1985 (with Sylvia Kristel in the title mle).
66, ""Cicero," was the code name for Elyeza Bazna, who spied for the Nazis in
the British embassy in Turkey in World War II; far short descriptions, see Deacon
1982170; 130fmarand Allen 1997:121; and Seth 1972:126-129,
67. For example, see Vijlkman 1994:260---280.
68. See Deacon 198"i79&97; Palmar and Allen 1W7464; and %th 1972:443-449.
69. See Johnston 1998.
70. See Pctlrnar and Allen 199"3":442443,for a short description of the case, and
Vinitzky-Serouss 1999 and ZeIizer 1999 for an analysis of the public debate that
folioweb and its implications. Hillel Cohen (1998) confronted Pollard's 1lawycl.l;
tary Dav, with parts of the events described here. Dav's r e s p o n ~was that Pollard
never contacted the South African embassy and never received large sums of
money. Dav's srersim is that Pollard received a Xow salary, which, at its peak,
reached no more than $1,500 a month and that his motivation was ideological.
Dav also stated that he had heard about a secret Swiss bank account Pollard sup-
powdly had, but neither he nor Pc~llardhad ever seen it. Qbviousty, Dav's interest
is in representing his client in the most pcjsitive light possible. For example, ideo-
logical motivatian appears better than hancial geed. h o t h e r spy for Israel, Ice-
brand6 Smith (renamed Avmr Shamir in Israel), who operated in Holland, tvas
also caught, but unlike Pollard, he was allawed to leave the country and chase to
move to Israel; see Melrnan 1998.
71. See Black and Morris 1992:22&229; Deacon 1977:79-91; Ei~nberg,Dan, and
tandau 19i78:65-133; MeXman and Raviv 1989:165160; Polmar and Allen 1992128;
Raviv and Melman 1990:443-146; S g e v 1986; and Steven 1980:199-206. Many
sources couple the description of Eli "Cc>hen% activities with those of another Israeli
implanted s p the ~ German-born Israeli Wc~lfgangtotz, who operated in E a p t m-
der an assumed identity, Again, Lotz cannot be referred to as a traitor.
72, Black and Morris 1994:164. For mare on Beer, see Beer 1956-1957, 4966
Qwrittm in prison and brought to press by Amikam Gurevitz); Black and Morris
1991:158-166; Hart31 1987:93-168; Melrnan and Raviv 1989:122-125; Polmar and
Allen 1"37:54-55; and Raviv and ;Velman 1990:98-108. On the inRuence of the
Beer case on an inner cultural dispute within Israel, see "Crc3rner 1985.
73. See Raviv and Melrnan 4990:102-403.
N.Prange 1984; and Whyrnant 1996.
75. For example, see Codevilla 1992; Deacon 1987 Dabson and Payne 4986;
Mnightley 1986; Laqueur 1985; Polmar and Alien 1997; Richefson 1995; Sarbin,
Camey, and Eoyang 1994; Seth 4972; Volkman 194; and W s t 1993,
76. For example, see Srohl 1989,
 1717. Abwellr was the German military intelligence organization headed by Ad-
miral Canaris from 1935; see Zmtner and Bedurftig 2997:2-3. On the double-cross
system, see Masterman 1972; and Polmar and Allen 199'7:17%1;7$.
78, X am deeply grateful to Jaama Michlic-Coren, who not only suggested this
type of betrayal but read this section very carefully and made some very useful
and construdive comments and suggestic~ns,
179..See Noakes and Pridharn 1988, vot. 3:6617-1705.. On the Pact of Steel, see
Toxano 1967.
80, See Laqueur 1976:135-139.
81. Heim-Dietrich Lowe in Dear and I-arrot 1995:250. It is estimated that there
were about 7,800,000 Soviet IX,OWs,about 2,800,000 of wham died while in Nazi
captivity; see Baudot et at. 1989:395-396.
82, Far example, see Bethef 1995; and T'olstoy 1979.
83. See Kersten 1991;and Steinlauf 199'7, ch. 3.
84, See report in Ha%refz, June 3,1998, p. B5, based on a repark in the Gzrardiatz
Ercm May 25.
85. Robinson 1996:288-284.
86. For more on whistle-blowing, see Akerstrorn 1991:43-51; Bok 1993; Be-
Maria 1992; Glazer and Glazer 1989; Greenbere and Baron 1997; Near and Miceli
1985, 2992, 1997; "Nice Guys Finish Last," a 1994,55 minute television documen.-
tary produced and directed by N-icholas Adter and Gasoline Sherwood, Aus-
tralian Film Corporation and Titus Films; Miethe 1998; Robimrrm 2 996~273-288.
817. Glazer and Glazer 1989:252-255.
88. Far example, see H~'nre.trtz,January 23,1996, p. At;,
89. Flklrat.elz, November 11,1995.
90. Some examples of the consequences af whistle-blowing in Israel include the
follavcring: (1) A tester in the ministry of transportation who warned that road
tests af matorcyclists tzrere faulty was fired (Hafare"idfZ,
June 30,198); (2)An adviser
to fire depa&ments was fired after warning that many hospitals were dangerous
firetraps (L)nvnrt %ptember 38,1995); (3)A securiq officer who complained about
fiscal mismanagement in the municipality of Loci was transferred to an inferior
job (hf;nfareti;,August 22, 1997); (4)A woman who expc~sedin public that vegeta-
bles were being falsely marketed as "organic" and that the marketing organiza-
tion was deceiving the pubtic was isolated and persecuted, along with members
af her family (varic~usreports in the press in the summer of 1997). The Qgen Assa-
ciatbn was established in Israel to help whistle-blowers. It was established by a
woman who had exposed mismanagement and was then committed, wrc~ngly~ tc)
a mental hospital, following a complaint by the organization that her behavior
was erratic. Her suffering was so great that it prcrpefted her into public effc~rtson
behalf of whistle-blowers, For more on whistle-blowing in Israel, see Bar-Ufpan
1997; and Verner 1992..
91, Robinsan 1996:274-275.
92. See Leach I W5:I.
93. Ibid.,2.
94. See Rofef 1988:130-131.
95,July 26,4997, p, 4.
5%. From the Canadian The Globe alzd ILlar'l, August 15,1997, p,A13.
 Motes 319

97. Nettler (1982:50) is one of the few who include a dixussion of cornersion
within the context of an interpretatim of treaso)n.
98, The (London) Tinzes, July S, 1396, pp. 1-2,
99. Abu-Tuema 1995:18.
100. Pincher 4987:427.
101. Gray 1994:147. Gray refers to Casement:as a jftrajtc>r."
102. For short descriptions of the case, see Elzqclopedlr;I Britnnnica, 1980, Mi-
cmpnedl'n, vol. 2, p. 608; Pincher 1987:xvi, 4, 108, 127; and 1301mar and Allen
1997:103. For a longer account, see Cwynn 1931. Ingliss 1973 and Wharam
2995:156-165 focus on the trial. Allegations of homosexual behavior were in-
volved in this case, too, and some accounts state that this may have created a grej-
udiced atmosphere against Casement.
103. Polmar and Alten 1997:103,
104. Ceva" military and pcllitical superic~rsincluded the chief of staEfl, Rafilel
"RaEuX" Etan, Minister of Defense Ariel Shamn, and Prime Minister Menachern
Begin.
105. khiff and Ua%ri 19%:264-266.
106. The dean of faculty was Professctr Gershon Ben-Shachar (from the depart-
ment of psychfogy). Departmental chief administrator was Mrs. Osnat (""Ossie"")
bn-Shachar:
107. The p ~ s i d e n at
t that time was Profesmr Hanoch Gutlreund (from the de-
partment: of physics).
108. Quoted in Archer lli3"i7:1;2,See also Rasenbloclm" 4998 work, which exam-
ines, among other issues, the effectiveness of strikebreakers. Rosenbloom%study
is bcused an the recruitment of strikebreaking labor from outside the striking
group. His conclusion is that recruitment and usage of strikebreakers significantly
impacted strike effc~rtsin such sectors as the cotton textile industry, mining; iron
and steel production, the cigar industry, and in the railroad industry.
109. This part- is based on my 2993 book, hlitical Assrlssinntions by Jemus: A
Rhetorical Device for Justice (Albany: State University of New York 13ress), pp.
2639. Used with permission from SUNY Press.
110. See Rapopclrt 1979:%4.
111. See Rapoport 1984; and Hum-oad 3 970:1>1 6.
112. For example, see Ben-Vehuda 4993:102-106; see Ben-Uehuda 4995 for sum-
maries on the Siicarii and Masada.
113. For example, see Hodgsan 1955; and Lewis 1967.
114. Lewis 196220.
115. For example, see t w i s 196212; Rapoport 1984; and Ford 1985:3Q8-1Q4.
116. Rapoport 3.984.
117. For more on the Assassins, see Ford 19&5:9&104; Franzius 1969; Hammer
1835; Hodgsctn 1955; Hu~wood1978:543; Lerner 4930; Lewis 1947; and Wilson
1975:15--301.
118. Rapclpart 1971,
119, Or like fifh column saboteurs (discussed in Chapter 5).
120. Lentz 1988:78--79.
121. Ben.-Uehuda1993,
122. Published originally in 1903and made into a movie in 1984.
 123. lE~ntz1988:48; and Polmar and Alfen 199Z110.
124, Callins was mudered because some r&ellious farces thought that he pre-
sented a political threat for the Irish Rebetlic~n(Lentcz 1988:4748), An impressive
1996 movie titled Ml'clzael Callins was made on the controversy.
125. See Seth 1972150-1 53 on Delilah. See Bower 1990; and Polmar and AlIen
1997:2%, an ""hney traps" or sex traps.
126. The ca.= is described in fiifuller detail in Chapter 1. For the specifk subplot
involving ""Cindy," from Va'anunu's point of viewt see %d-Eot Afznronot, January 24,
1997, Saturday Supplement, pp. 16-22. This story had an interestkg twist in April
1996, Uzi Mahaneimi-a journalist tzrorking for the Sunday Ti~ncs-managed to fo-
cate and expose the real 'Yindy." He found out that her real name was Sheryf
Ben-Tov, where she lived, and talked with her. Besauw of this exgo>sure,the head
of Israel's sailitary intelligence (AMAN), Shlamo Cazit, told journalists that the
state of Israel should consider charging Ma haneirnj with treason, or something
sirnilar; see 1Vlafariz~,
April 44, 4997, p. 6.
127. %e Colton and Vanstone 199'7,alas methodofogicalfy.weak.
128. For example, see Ben-Yehuda 1985,1986; Kohn 19%; and Pallane and Hen-
nessy 1995.
129. The dexriptian is based on my 1993busk, Potiticnf Assassine;ri'iotzs by IIP'ZUS:
A
Rlzetnrictll Devicefar Justice, pp. 201-202,208,283.
130. Sefer Toldok H @ H ~ p n nvol.
, 3, part 1:562-563.
131. See Braham 2981; Hilberg 3.9235, vol. 23796868; and Laqueur 1980.
132. See Bauer 1982348-191; and Wyman 19%:2.44,
133. Bowyer Bell 4987:95; Katz 1966:185; Bauer 1982:14%191; and Hadar 1974.
134. Brand 195'7:355. See also Brand 1960:49-79; N i v 1965-1980, vol. 4:8&81;
Ayalan 1980; Rosenfeld 1955; Bauer 1982: 448-494; and P-iadar 49711,
135. Far sample, see Hadar 1972; and Bauer 1982:134-191.
136. Brand 1957,1966,4974,
137. See Wyman 198cZ:24%245,
138. Ibid.
139. See Marx and Fijnaut 1995.
140. For examples, see Mam and Fijnaut 1995; and Staples 1997.
141, See Black and Morris 1994:15&167; Harel1982 MNman 1998; and Melman
and Raviv 1989:122-129,236243.
142. See Black and Morris 1991:14%149; and Melman and Raviv 4989:12&128.
143. Black and Morris 1991:149.
144, Ibid., 442-443; and MeIslman and Raviv 1989:243. See alw Yediot Rlmrotzut,
Spternher 4,2 W8, p. 4, and Illn'nriv, same date, p. 7,
145. Black and Morris 1991:443; see also Melman and Raviv 198"3:241-2431.
Kalmanovifch was later dg>orted to Russia.
146. N;rrkrefs,December 12,1997, g. 1.
147'. See HafaretzZ,June 4, 4993, pp. AI-3; Kol kinir, June 4,1993, pp. 46-51; Yediot
Altnmnot, June 4,1996, pp. 2-3; Yedz'at Ahmnot, Supplement, Octcyber 22,1993, pp.
14-45,17.
148. And a hefty fine of $250,000. See Blum 2 987; Earley 1988; and Polmar and
Allen 1992585-588.
149. Polmar and All- 199221-22; and Weiner, Johnstm, and Lewis 1995.
 Notes 321

150. See Beacon 198E263-265; Bobson and Payne 2986:4-5; 1301marand Allen
1997:H, 447; and Seth 19?2:9-15. On Gar)r Francis Powers and the U-2 incident,
see Beschloss 19%; Polmar and All- 1997:448,562-563; Richelson 1995:264-2ti8,
293-294; and Seth 1972:465489.

Chapter 4
1. Oxford E~.zgtz"sh Dictionary, 2nd ed., vol. 8 (OxEord: Ctarendc~nPress), pp. 458--.459.
2. Etzcyel'op~rdr'aHebraica, vol. 7 Uerusaiern: Encyclopedia Publishing), pp.
603407 (Hebrew).
3. Encyclopaedr'n Britnnnica, vol. 22 (London: Encyclvaedia Britannica, 1956),
pp. 435-438.
4, Mkrok~aedia,vol. 10 (London: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1974), p. 2 03.
5. Plsscoe 193493. It is interesting that the 1968 edition does not have treason
listed in it.
6. And possibly a few ~3thers;see Stc~ne1988.
7. Jiordano Brmo died for chatlmging the Ptolernaic tzrorldview and the moral-
ity that s u g p o ~ e dit; Galilm also suffered because of this woridview. Freud's psy-
choanalytic theories, tzrhich revolutionized psyehobgy and psychiatry and en-
riched other disciplines, were originally criticized heavily on moral grounds, For
mare on these issues, see Ben-Uehuda 1985,
8. Encyelo;~aediaBI-r'ta~lzica,vol. 22, p. 435.
9. Ploscoe 1934:93.
10. Nettler 1982:35; and Hurst 1983:1559.
11. Enqclopaedk Brifasilnl;ca,1701.22, p. 436.
12. For example, Andreyev 1987 Cc3ntzray 1993; Hoidal 1989; Johnson 1990;
1,ottxnan 1985; Randalf 1990; and Selwyn 1987.
13. For example, Pincher 198'7; Weyl1950; and West 1995,
14, For example, Boveri 2956; Bullock 1966; Klement 1984; Littlejohn 1972;
DToole 4991; Weale 1994; and West 1964,
15, For example, Archer 1971:3; Hagan 2989,1997; Pincher 2 %7; and West 1995,
16. Archer 1971.
17, The case is that of William John Vassall-a British Admiralv clerk whose
espionage caused much da rnage. For details, see Bulloch 1966:152-153; see also
West 1995:65-69,
18. See Bergmeier and tcjtz Rainer 199R and Weale 1994.
19. See PoZmar and Allen 1997:451452; Klnightley and Kennedy 1987.
20, West 1985:361-370,
21. See Kooistra" 44989 work on criminals as heroes. On a related case, see
Campbell 1977.
22, See A kerstrorn 1991:52; and Hagan 1989,1997.
23, 13incher1 9 8 7 : ~ ~
24. Ibid., 1-14,22.
25. Ibid., 22-23.
26. Friedrich 1"32:83,93.
27. Ibid., 91-92.
 28. ibid., 223.
29, Ibid., 89,
30. Ibid., 188.
31, Nettler 1982:35,
32. ibid., 42,
33. As do Hurst" 11983and Ploscc>e%almost legal-technical 4934 presentations,
34. Archer 1971:10-11; and Weyt 1956:22.
35. Archer 197'4:16.
36. Ibid., 22-23.
37. Weyl4950:464. See alw Archer 1974:34-37; and Weyl 1950: 140-162.
38. Archer 1971~38-47;and Weyl1950:164&231.
39. Archer 1971:48-51; and Weyl 1950:212-237.
40, Archer 1971~51-54;and Weyl1950:23&261.
41. Archer 1971:48-62; and WeyX 1950:262-302.
42. Detailed in Klement 1984, eh, "i"187-247.
43. ibid., 217.
44, Archer 197l:Q-63.
45. Ibid., 6348.
46. Quoted in ibid., 70.
47. Ibid., 72.
48. Weyt 1950:304. See also Archer 1971:69-75; Weyt 1950:303--336; White 1957;
and ffvitcover 1989.
49. Archer 1972:116. On Kuhn and the Bund, see Higham 1985; Parrish and
Marshall 4978:221,%9; and Weinstein and 'Wassiliev 1999,
50. Archer 1971:'E-118; Higham 1985; and WeyX 1950:317--341. See also the rele-
vant parts in Weinstein and Vassiliev%fascinating 1999 botjk.
52. Archer 1971~12 C;,
52, I bid ., 7&77.
53. See also Wey l 1950~317-341,
54. Archer 1971:115--116; Blair 19"3:6Q3405; Hickarn 1989:238-252; and WeyX
1950:347-356,
55. Archer 19"7:10&118.
56. Ibid., 117,
57. ibid ., 143-154. See also Weinstein and Vassiliev 1999.
58. Archer 197"1:155166.
59, On the historical inaccuracies of the 1966 movie' see Marjus 1995370-73. See
also Ackroyd" 19915 superb and vivid biography,
60. On the movie's historical inaccuracies, see Fraser 2 995,
61. See Ash 1990; and Mackay 1995.
62, Far a short review, see Weyl 1950313-20.
63.For more on traitors and their executions in EngXand in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, see Gatref l 4996:298-321.
64.See, for examplef Hagan 1989,1997.
65. For example, the cases of the German White Rose and of Captain Meir
Tubianski .
66. Far example, see Besgesen 197'7.
 Motes 323

67, See Ben-Yehuda 1985:23-173; Briggs 1996; Klaits 1985; Levack 1987; and
Quaife 19817.
68, See Ploscoe 1934; and H-furst 1983,
69. Hurst 1983:156.
70. Ernes Literary Szrpplemenk, February 16,1996, p. 36.
71. This connects this work more explicitly to works by such scholars as Erving
Coffman, Anselm Strauss, and Gustav Iclrkzeiser (19m).

Chapter 5
1. For reviews, see Bear and Foot 19995;Parrish and Marshall 1978; Weinberg
1994; Wheal, Pope, and Taylor 4995; and Yormg 1981. Baudot et al." 1989 TIze kirk-
tor.ical Erzcyelapedia of World War I1 even devotes some decent space to treason
within the context of World War TT (p. 457). Tt points out that the sharp clash be-
Ween such extreme ideol%ies as fascism and communism created clear bound-
aries and made usage of the term "treason" meaningi-ul.
2. For Cole" story see Murphy 1987. Fc~rSuzanne Warren's side, see Young
1959.
3. Pctlrnar and ALlen 4992209. Frrr an interesting discussion of saboteurs in the
U ~ t e States
d during World War X, see Witcaver 1989.
4, See Baudot et al. 1989:432-434; and Fcmt 1984.
5. Kessler 1991:144,
6. See Pryce-Jones 1976; Shermer 1971; and Weyl1950:317-341.
7. The Office of Strate@c Srvices-a U.S. intelligence and sabotage organiza-
tion-was created by President Rm)sevelt on June 13,1942,and abolished by Pres-
ident Truman an January 12,1946, In July 194Xrurnan established the Central In-
telligence Agency (CIA), which in many respects continued the work of the QSS.
For a short review, see Polmar and ALlen 199?:40&41Q.
8. Polmar and Allten 1992209-210.
9, White" svork (1957) ccjntinues this argument into the 1950s. His work is fo-
cused on sabotage by the communists during the cold war, but the cases exam-
ined in the book are instructive because they shcm how difficult it is to discern
whether certain incidences were actually the result of saboteurs+vvork. Among
them he notes the burning of the ReicX-rstagon the night of Februa~y27, 1933, for
which the Dutch Van der tubbe was blamed and cmdemned to death. It is adu-
ally quite reasonable to assume that the Nazis themsetves were behind that fire,
which was used to cmsctlidate Hitler" grip on Germany (for a short descripticrn,
see Snyder 1976:28&289), In addition, M i t e mentions the "mysterious" mid-air
explosions af the British-designed and manufactured Comet jet, We now know
that these accidents were due to a fatal design flaw and metal fatigue and did not
result from sabcytage. See also M. R. D. Fcx.t In Baudot et al. 19&9:423-424.
10, See also Archer 1971:81-93; Breuer 1989; and Weyl1950:317-341.
11. See PoXmar and AIlen 3992395-396, and the discussion in Chapter 6.
12. Far example, see Hc>ettl1953.
13. See De Jong 1950,1956. For a general review, see Baudot et al. 1989:16&164.
 14. See Snyder 19'76:141-142; and Zentner and Bedurftig 199'7:396. See also
Smelser'S 1975study of the Sudeten problem,
15. See H a ' a ~ l z ,July 7, 1997, g. A2, and a penetrating documentary by Gil
Sedan from Israeli TV's Channel 1 on this topic on July 6,1997, titled "The Stmy
of Three Ex-coXIaborators," produced by h r i n Kirnox:
16, See Citbert 1963; and Zentner and Bedurftig 1497:34-35.
1'7. Warmbruun 1963:272-2"7.
18. Typically called lude~zmts.See Trunk 1972 [49"3"];and Zentner and Bedurftig
199243.
19, From touise De Jnng's intmduction to Warmbrurm%1193bonc~k,p. v.
20, See Baudot et al. 1985):102-109; and Zentnes and Bedurftig 1997:1453-151.
21. See %th 1956, which provides details about resistance in Nctway, Greece,
Denmark, Luxembourg, Holland, Yugoslavia, Belgium, France, and Italy. See also
M. Baudot" m m general view in Baudot et al. 1989:42&414.
22. See Rings 1979 for cliffewat patterns of cr~llaboration.
23, Parrish and Marshall 19;722:563;Snyder 19'7&32Q;Hans Urnbert in Dear and
Foot 1995:90-93, see also p.,998; Young 1981:589-90; Zentner and Bedurftig
1992872-873.
24. BeneB later fled first to the United States and then to England, where he be-
came the voice of Free Czechoslovakia. See Zmtner and Bedurftig 1997:77,
25. Dear and Foot 1995:521; Snyder 19174:234; Wheal, Pope, and. TayXor
1995:204-205; and Zentner and Bedurftig 4 997:175-1 76,
26. Mastny 19"7:2;?3.
27. Weinberg 1994:518.
28. Dear and Foot 1995:521; Parrish and Marshall 19[78:255; Wheat Pope, and
Taylor 4995:204-205; and Zentner and Bedurftig 1997:375,
253, Assor 199263-64.
30. See H. Bernard in Bauclot et al. 1989:129-130; and Paul Latawski in Dear
and Foot 1995:279-280.
33. MacDonald and Kaplan 1995:60.
32. See Runk 1972, [1977]; and Zentnes and Bedur.Etig1997:43,
33. The discclvery of the bctdies was made on April 12, 1943. For more on this,
see Paul 1994; Wittlin 1965; and Zaslavsky 4999.
34. Sword, in Dear and Fcmt 1995:644,646.
35. Claus Bjrcrrn in Dear and Frrot 1995:293-295; tittlejohn 1972:53-82; Wheal,
Pope, and Taylor IW5:125-126; and Zentner and Bedurftig 1992192.
36. See Novick 1948:184, on sentcmcing and ratios; and Baudot et al, 1989:401,
on the executionti.
37. Heavy water is an important component in the production of atomic en-
ergy.
38. SpeciaX Operations Executive was a British secret ser~iceaimed at subver-
sive warfare in enemy-occupied territory; see M, R, D. Foot in Dear and Foot
1995:101&-.1022,and his o>wn1984 book.
39. See Dear and Foot 1995:4244-1245; Callagher 1975; and Kurzman 497. Far a
more general context, see also Bermtein 1995, particularly pp. 25-27; Bmoks 1992;
Cruickshank 4986; Walker 198%and Weinberg 1994:56&570. The 4965 British mo-
t b n picture The Heroes of TeEemark, filmed on location, depicts these actions.
 Notes 325

40. Olav Riste in Bear and Foot 1995:838-823; Wheal, 130pe, and "fylor
1995:339-340; and Zentner and Bedurftig 1997:652454.
41, Hoidal 'i%9:159,
42, Ibid., ch. 5.
43. Far example, the May 21, 1936, ""battle of Gjavik,"hhich invctlved street
fighting fo11lo)wing an indting speech by N.S. members. These members were at-
tacked and beaten, and after mare than seven hours of fighting they were able tcr
free thernslves only because state police troops were sent to Gjrrrr~ik;ibid., 229,
44. Ibid., 236237.
45. Ibid., ch. 8.
46. Ibid., 334.
47. Ibid., 319-320.
48. Their first meeting was on December 14, 1939, and their last in January
1945.
49. Wistrich 19@:313; and Zentner and Bedurftig 3992946947.
50. Hoidat 1989:4%"3.
51, Ibid., 473-474,
52. Ibid., 499-500.
53. Ibid., ch. 15.
54. Tbid., ch. 18,
55, Quoted by Hoidal 1"389: 717.
56, Hctid at 1989~773-774.
57, Nctvick 196&187.
58. Baudot et al. 1989:401.
59, For more on the Quisling affair, see Dahl 4999; Hewins 1965 (albeit cmtro-
versial); f-loidal 1989; Parrish and Marshalit 19783512-513; Zentner and Bedurftig
1992744,946-947. On Nomegian cl-rllaboration,see Littlejc3hn 19"il-52.
60, Baudot et al. 1989:153-160; and Dear and Foot 1995:346,
61. Dear and Foot 1995:701; and Zentner and Bedurftig 199"7:563.
62. Martin Conway in Dear and Foot 1995:121; see also Conway" s u c h fuller
1993work; j.Gerard-Liboisin Baudot et al. 1989:5%56,134; Littlejchn 1972131-1M;
m d Ent?ler and Bedurftig 199275-76.
63. Quoted in Snyder 1976:62; see also Zentner and Bedurftig 1997:187,
801-802.
64, Snyder 1976:62; Canway, in Dear and Foot 1995:289,
65. Quoted by Snyder 1976:62.
66, See Archer 1971:128 and Novick 1968:187 on the numbers of arrestees, and
Novick 1968on the population ratio. The number of executions is given in Baudot
et al. 1989:401.
67. From the Allied point of view, the Dutch undergrc~undwas one of the most
effective in Eumpe, See Warmbruun 1963:275282,
68,HirschfeXd" 3 988 work states that they won only 0.2 percent of the votes.
69. Foot in Dear and Foot 1995:782-786; Hirschfeld 4988; Rings 49"79:4-99;
Weal, Pope, and Taylor 1995:324-326; and Zentner and Bedurftig 1997:633.
70. Snyder 1976:239; and Zentner and Bedurftig 1992643,
71. 13arrish and Marshal1 197835643; Rings 1979:197-198; and Warmbruun
1963:206..
 172. In Dear and Foot 1995:783; see also M. R. D. Foot in Baudctt et al.
1989:349-350; Littlejohn 2972:8%129; Hirschfeld 2988; and Wrmbruun 1963.
173. Yediol: Alzamnol, September 26, 1996; Foot in Dear and Fcmt 1995:782; and
Warmbruun 1963:165--184.
N.See Archer 1971:l28 on the number of arrestees and Nctvick 1968:187 on the
sentences given and the pc~pulationratio. Number of executions is given by Bau-
dot et al. 1989:401.
75. Dank 1974:12-43,
76. Quoted from Dank 1974:13.
77. See Roderick Kedward in Dear and I-asrot 1995:407408. See alsc~Littlejohn
1972:185-290.
178. Qtlo~tedin Dank 191;74:2;see also P. M. FT. Bell in Dear and Foot 1995:42@31
(on de Gaufle and Free France); E, Pognon in Baudot et al. 1989:181-183 (on Be
Gaulte) and 167-l@ (on Free France). On aspects of the I""4tain-deGauIle cmtrast,
see T ~ ~ u r m4964.
w
79. Daladier served as premier three times (the latest term being 1938 through
March 4940) and as minister of war from 4836 to 4940,
80, 13arrishand Marshal1 2978:148-149,527-528,
81. Quoted in Dank 19;7$:294.For more on P4tain" trial, see Roy 1968.
82, See also Dear and Foot 1995:396--398, 876-877; E, P o p o n in Baudot et al.
1989:38&388; Roy 1967; and Zentner and Bedurftig 19921782-1703.
83, Assvr 1997:84-95; Dear and Foot 1995:673; and Zentner and Bedurftig
19973528-529.
84, Cordon 1980:326,
85. See Dear and Fc>ot1995:396-398; Gordon 1980; Hirschfeld and Marsh 1989;
and Kedward and Austin 1985.
86. For example, see an agonizing account of some such cases in Bank
197'4:139-1 58.
87, See f-lirschfeld in Dear and Foot 2 995:24&249,
88. Selwyn 198Z220; see also Baudot et al. 1989:61.
89. Selwyn 2 %7:214.
90. See Dank 1974:322.1[am not sure that the numbers were tower in the %>viet
Union,-M.B.Y
91. Archer 1971:128.
92. Novick 1968~487.
93,Ibid., 228-22 9.
94, Ibid., 204,
95, Ibid., 187,
96. See also M. Baudot's lucid surnrnazy in Baudot et al. 1989:4G2403.
97, Quoted from the section ""A Ti>uchof History," p. 17, from Vicfiy Guzi;Je,pub-
Xished and distributed by the TcJurist Office. I used the pamphlet 1 received in the
hotel I was staying in-tes Celestirrs-in June 1998.
98. For more on the Vichy go>vernment,see Paxtc~n1972 and the illustrative
brtc~kby Az&maand Wievicnrka 1997.
99, See Baudot et al. 1989:173-175; Roderick Kedward in Bear and Foot
1995:405407; Kedward 1993; and Schoenbrm 1990.
 Motes 32 7

100. On July 3,1940, the French fleet was destrayed by the British in veration
Cntnpzcll".at Mers el Kkbir. The "battXesM"began June 24-26 and lasted into Jufy 4.
For more, see Bear and Foot 1995:739-740; Parrish and Marshalt 1978:400; Tute
1989; Weinberg 1994:145-146; and Wheal, Pope, and Taylor 1%5:308-301.
101, According to Boveri (lf)56:129),Darlan was mueh closer to Pktain person-
ally than L a d .
102. Boveri 195k423.
103. Operation Torch, commanded by Eisenhower. See Dear and Foot
1995:81&818; Parrish and Marshall 49"i7:468-469; and Wheat, Pope, and Taylor
1995:633.
104. Wheat Pope, and Taytor 1995:11,345.
105. See Parrish and Marshall 1978:150-251,211-212; and Wheal, Pope, and
Taylor 1995:122,172-173.
106. From a 1942 letter to Rc>osveltquoted by Boveri 1956:132.
107. Wheat, Popef and Taytor 1995:469.
108. Verrier 1990:49.
109, Parrish and Marshalt 1978:74.
110. Wheal, Pope, and Taylor 4995:122.
111. ]Ibid., 188.
112. Bcj\reri 1956:12&134.
113, Quoted in Boveri 1956:131.
114. Bcj\reri 1956:132--133.
145. Parrish and Marshalt 1978:150-151; see also Assor 19(37:96-10T On
Churchill and de Gaulle, see Kersaudy" 1982,work.
116, See Bunting 4995; Cruickshank 1975; Dear and Fcmt 4995:202; Parrish and
Marshall 1978:112; Sinel19S9; Tarns 1967; and Wheaf, Pope, and Taylor 1995:90.
117. See, for example, Newswcek, Intei-national Edition, December 14, 1998, pp.
22-28,

Chapter 6
1. Tc>masevich1975:460--363. See also Dedijer 1992; M a ~ i n1978; Milazzc~1975;
and Roberts 1973. For a more general background, see 13arrishand Marshall 1978;
Zentner and Bedurftig 1997:1Q72-10173; and Cohen 19536. On atrocities, see Tbma-
sevich 1975:25&261; and Cohen 1996.
2. See Baudot et al. 1989:372, 484; Gojben 19"3:88-91, 100-1 06; Dear and Foot
1995:86(3; Wheal, Pope, and Taylor 1995:116, 490; and Zentner and Bedurftig
1992694,985.
3. See Dennis Deletant in Dear and Foot 19%5:954-959; and Zentner and
kdurftig 1997:809-810.
4. Dear and Fcmt 1995:45; Parrish and Marshall 197&22;and Yc~ung1981:523-524.
For a more pnerat discussion about Romania in this context, see H, Bemard in Bau-
dot et al. 198%417420;and a n t n e r and. Bdurftit-ig1997:33.
5. Mayer 19773246; Parrish and Marshall 1978:446, 561, 660; Wheal, Pope, and
Taylor 1995:496; Ycfung 1981:606407; and Zent-ner and Bedurftig 1997:997.
6. Andreyev 1987:37.
 7. Ibid., 37.
8. Dear and Foot 1995:914.
9. Mayer 1972246.
10. Wheal, 130pe,and Taylor 1995:376-377.
11. The h l t a Conference took glace in February 1945 and was the second meet-
ing of Churchill, Rc~ssevelt,and Stalin.
12. Keegan 1978:214; ParrisEt and Marshal1 1978:G60; Wheal, Pope, and Taylor
1995:496; Young 1984:606-60'7; and Zentner and Bedurftig 4997:99T On the more
general issue of collaboratiron in the Soviet Union, see Littfejohn 1972:292-334.
13, Andreyev 1987:3.
14. Burton 1963:125,
15. ibid., 126;.
16. Andreyev 2 "387,
1'7. ibid., 2.
18. Ibid., 7.
19. Andreyev in Dear and Foot 1995:224'7-1248.
20, Keegan 49"3":214; see also Young 1981:607.
21. See Mach 2 989; McKafe 1974; Muller 1991; and Zmtner and Bedurftig
199ii7:gW-1WO,
22, Snyder 2976:153; and Zmtner and Bedurftig 1997:42M26,43M32.
23, See Koch 1989.
24, Snyder 2 "3&153.
25. Zimrnerrnann 1986:27.
26. Ibid., 9-11,
27. For example, see Baudot et al. 1989:18&186; Benz and Pcsble 199'7; Dear and
Foot 1995:477-478; Fest 1996; Graml, Mr~mmsen,Reirhhardt, and Wolf 1970;
Hamerow 1997; f-ledley 2 %6; Hofhann 1977,1988; Mlemperer 1994; teber 1957;
Masan 4978; and Zirnmermann 1986 for general reviews. On the JULY 20, 1944,
conspiracyf see Baigent and Leigh 19994; Farman 1973; Galante 1981; Kramarz
1967; Manvell 1971; Whalen 1993; and Wiltiarns 19%.
28, Bayfes 1945; Dulles 1947; Ctumbach and Newborn 1986; f-lanser 2979; Neu-
mann 1945; and Zent-ner and Bedurftig 1997:1045--1046..
29. Quote is from Dumbach and Newborn 19%:179-180, On Freislel; see Kcxh
1989:136--138; and Zentner and Bedurftig 199E295-296.
30. See Wheeler-Bennett 1967.
31, Bear and Foot 1995:478; see also Kershaw 1987, chapter 8.
32, For mare and fuller details, see Baigent and Leiglr 1994; Dear and Foot
1995:478; Fest 1996; Forman 1973; Friedrich 1972:104-108; Galante 1981; Kramarz
1967; Manvell 1973; Mason 19'78; Parrish and Marshal1 1978:6Q1-682; Snyder
1976:332; Whalen 1993; Wheal, Pope, and Taylor 19953252-253; and Zentner and
Bedurftig 1997:971-973. On equating ""lr,yaXtyf' with ""knor" in the S.S., see
Williamsan 4995; and Zentner and Bedurftig 1%7:682, This was an instrlxctirie ex-
ercise in rhetoric because it evaded the direct moral issue, which is ""loyalty to
what" "to whom""),
33-On Bohoeffex, see Bear and Foot 1995:152; 13arrishand Marshall 1978374;
Snyder lli376:34-35. See also New York Elnes, August 16, 4996, p. A2. On Niemoller,
see Hadley 1995:70-71; and Zentner and Bedurftig 1997:647-6448.
 Motes 329

34, Baudot et al. 1989:202; 13arrish and Marshall 1978:239-240; Snyder

1976:121-I 2;and. Zentner and Bedurftig 1997:351-352.
35. "fhe A b m h r conducted German military intelligence and counterintelli-
gence; it was created after Wc3rld War i.For short descriptions, see Winfried
Heinemann's discussion in Dear and Foot 4945:1-3; and Zentner and Bedurftig
1997:2.
36. Assor 499";7144-487; Colwin 195"i";Dear and Frrot 1W5:489-490; P-iclhe 197'9;
13arrish and Marshal1 1978:202; Snyder 1976:49-50; Zentner and Bedurftig
1997:125-126.
37, Bear and Foot 1995:251-252.
38. See Dear and Fcxt 1995:257; and Hicks 1995.
39, See Brackman 1987; and Chang 1997.
40. See Gold 1996; and WilXiarns and Wallace 1989.
41. The march follc3wed the fall af Bataan, a small area an the western side af
the main Philippine island of Luzon, on April. 9,1942.
42. See Dear and Foot 1W5:445; Knctx 4981; and Stewad 1956 (for one soldier's
illustrative account).
43. Wheal, Pope, and Taylc~r4995:49-50,228,
44. Lyman 13. Van SXyke in Dear and Foot 1995:215-216, 222-223; see also pp.
660461 on the Kwantung Army and p. 916 on Pu-M.
45. Dear and Fmt 1995:916.
46. See also Pu-Yi 198%and Bernardo Be~olucci" 198'7movie The Lasf Emperw7;
tzrhich won nine Academy Awards.
47. Baudot et al. 1"3853:112--115.
48. See Polmar and Allen 1997:24%247,
49, Johnson 1990:IM-168.
50. See Seth 4972:591-594; and Bower 1Wa127.
51, Seth 1972:591-594; and Bower 1990:127.
52. See Seth 1972:595-596; quote fr~wr~Bcjwer 1990:129.
53. A picture of the stamp can be found in Polmar and AlXen 1997:421, 447,
along with similar stamps featuring other spies (for example, Abel, Philbyf and
Nathan Hale).
54. See Knightley 1986:192-3; and taqueur 19&5:236.
55. Richelsan 1995:90. For more on Sorge, see Bower 19"3:121-129; Deacon
1987:241-243; Dobson and 13ayne116)86:297-299; Knightley 1986:18%2"33; Parrish
and Marshall 1978:580; Polmar and Allen 4997:523; Prange 1984; Richelson
1995:89-91, 113 - 4 3 5, 124-125; Seth 1"62:583-596; Snyder 1976:325; VoXkman
1994:112-120; Whyrnant 1996.
56. Johnson 1990:2,
57. ibid.
58. Ibid., 35.
59. ibid., 35-36.
60.Ibid./ 36.
61. West 1995:277-278; West argues that this ideological Xine was adopted by
Agnes as a result af her meeting Laipat Rai, an Indian nationalist, at Columbia
University.
62,West 1995:27'7-278; and Polmar and Alfen 19W52'7-528.
 63.Jc>bnson1990:198.
64, bid.
6. ibid., 11.
66, Ibid., 12.
6'7".ibid., 200-21 5.
68. See Clayborne Carson in Dear and Foot 1995:63243. This is also the place
to calX attention to Shibutani's 1973 fascinating work.
69. See Tanaka lli397,
70, Meegan 1978:77; Parrish and Marshall 2 "37:186; and Weinberg 1994:504,
71. See Weinberg 4994:8913.
72. Ibid., 504,
73, Keegan 1978:77.
74, The Record of Collnbomtimz of Kz'lzg Farozrk of Egypt witFz trlte Nnzis and Thtir A Ily,
The Mufti. The official Nazi Record of the King's Alliance and of the Mufti" Plans
for Bombing Jerusalem and Te1 Aviv. Memarandurn submitted tcr the United Na-
t.ic>ns,June 1948, by the Nation Assodates, New Ycfrk.

Chapter "7
1. See Weyl1%&364-373; and Edwards 4991.
2, Weyl 1950:388.
3. Eclwards 1991; and West 1987.
4, Wf;lyl1950:361-373; and Archer 1971:119-128,
5. Edwards 1%1:99-114.
6. On Wodehouse, see the Globe and Mail, Sept. 17, 1999, p. ,416; Edwards
1991:32; and Bergmeier and Imtz Rainer 19"3:112-114.
7. On ""Axis Sally," see Bergmeier and Lotz Rainer 499E126-130; Edwards
1991:8&93,97-98; and Weyl1950:3"17382.
8. Edw ards 1991:41-56; and Weyl1950:37&376.
9. See Cole 1964; Selwyn 1987; and Wharam 2995:166-172.
10, Selwyn 1487:43.
11. Stwyn 1987.
12. Cole 19@:21.
13. Ibid., 23,
14. ibid., 24.
15, Ibid., 26.
16. Bo>tihCole (1964) and Selwyn f198'7:16,22)derive this conctusisn.
17, See Cole 4964:2&29; quote is from p. 23.
18. Ibid., 29,
lli3. Ibid., 30.
20, Ibid., 35,
21. See Sherrner 1371.
22. CoXe 29&:41.
23, This passpc~rt-based on falsified infc2rmation-would eventually be used
by the British prosecution as an indication of Joyee's ppmfessed Icjyalty and his
breach of it. It would mean Joycefsdeath.
 Motes

24, Selwyn l"387341.

25. ibid., 43.
26, Charman 1992:vii.
27. ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. Cole 19&:72-81..
30. Ibid., 66.
31, Charman 1992:vii.
32, Cole 1964:84-85.
3%Ibid., 85.
34. Selwyn 198E76-7";".
35, MacNab visited Berlin in the summer of 1939; see Cote 1964:82-83.
36. Bauer was the one W ~ gave U MacNab positive reassurances about their ac-
ceptance.
37. Cole 19&:93-95.
3"3 Selwyn 1987:93; Selwyn refers tcr Coxbbels and Caering.
39, See Bergmeier and Lotz Rainer 1997; Edwards 1991; and West 11987.
40, Selwyn 198"7:91-92,
41, Ibid., 124.
42, ibid.; see also Cole 1964:110-119.
43, Selwyn 1987:105, "Te book, by the way, was reproduced in English by the
British imperial War Museum in 1992.
44, PZ, "i"n the 4992 reprint of his brtc~kpublished by the Imperial War Museum.
45. Selwyn 15382130.
46. Charman 1992rxii.
47. Selwyn 1%7:111,
48. Ibid., 112,
49, The Germam built three such pocket battleships. They were desiped to be
more powerful than cruisers and faster than battleships. The Admiml CrafSpec's
technical specifications matched the above goal. It was bunched in 1934, with six
11-inch guns as main armament, eight 6-inch guns, eight 19.7-inch torpedo tubes,
and an impressive cruising speed of 26 knots.
50. The Exeter. was buiXt in 1931 with six 8-inch guns as main armament, eight 4-
inch guns, and a top speed of 32 knots. The Achilles was a New Zealand cruiser. Its
main armament consisted af eight 6-inch guns, and it had a top speed of 31.25
knots, The Ajnx was a Royal Navy cruiser completed in 1934, It had eight 6-inch
and four gater eight) 4-inch guns and eight 21-inch torpedo tubes.
51. See Wheal, Pope, and Taylor 1995; and Pope 1956.
52, Snyder 1"36:126,
53. Tape #l3438 in the Imperiat, V\lar Museum, London. The r's in ""Admiral.
Graf" were pronounced as German rc~llingr%.
54. Tke Dmmn of flze CrafSpee, 1964:xxvi; see af SC)Tbnks 1971:20.
55. Tanks 1971:17'.
56. January-February 1942; see Parrish and Marshall 1978:320-321.
57. Tanks 1971; Wheal, Pcjpe, and Taylc-rr1995:541.
58. Tape no. 4859, in the Imperial War Museum, London.
59. Coie 19H:186-38";".
 60.ibid., 195.
61. Ibid., 196,
62,ibid., 205.
63. Selwyn 19873152,
64.Ibid., 156.
65. Elitler's territorial expansionist intentions (including world domination)
were laid trut In his Mein Krc~ntpJ and his taking of Austria and Czecho>slovakiais
proof enough that tzrt-rateverhe could not achieve by pc~litics,he tcmk by military
force. It is important to make this point clear became a somewhat similar claim
tzras made by Kilzer (1994).
66, Tape no. 522411, Imperial War Museum, London.
67. See also Weale 1994:185,
68, Seiwyn 1%7:150,
69. Cole 19C;$:229.
70. Selwyn 198E454.
171. ibid., 160; see also Charman 1992:xii; and CoXe 1964:244-247.
7'2,Selwyn 198";7:162-463.
73. May 28, 1976, Biblio~aghicalA~hriveG15, reel 27,
74. See also Sefwyn 198E163; Charman 1992:xiii; and Cole 1964:247,
75. Selwyn 1"3873168,
176, Ibid., 1'70.
77, Charman 1992:xiii-xiv.
1725. Selwyn 198Z1179.
79. Ibid., 180.
80. ibid., 190-191.
81. Ibid., 189,
82. Radio trantimissian from April 11,1943.
83. Selwyn 19817:107.
84. Charman 9992:xiv.
85. Tke Times, Frc3bruary 8,1995.
86, Selwyn 1987:4,
87. fewish Cfzronicle, February 17, 1995, g. 10.
88. Selwyn 1987:108-409.
89. ibid., 118-119.
90. See Charman 4992:ix.
91, Bergmeier and Lotz Rainer (1997:45-83) add several more names to the list.
92. Full details are provided in accounts by Duus 4983 and Howe 4990. For
shorter accounts, see Archer 1971:122-123; Baudot et al. 1989:456; Dear and Foot
1995:1119; Parrisk and Marshall 1978:432; Weyl 1950:382-388; Wt-teal, Pope, and
Taylor 1995:467; and Young 1981:602403.

Chapter S
1. %twyn 198'7:219,
2. Bergmeier and Lotz Rainer 1W773-74,
 Motes

3. Ibid., 74.
4, Ibid.,'75.
5. Redman 1991.
6. See Pound 19178.
7. Torrey 1984:161. The anti-Semitic tone in his transmissions in 4941 was very
salient. Casillo (1%88) points out that Pound" anti-Semitism emerged from his
work and his mind, ALtht->ughit diminished later, it remained a major theme in his
transmissians; see Carpenter 1988:594-597. Caryenter points out that Italian offi-
cials were puzzled by Parmd" motives and were cmcei-ned that his transmissions
might be using a code to pass informatian to the Allies, that is, that Pound may
have been a spy (p. 597).
8. Torrey 1984:161.
9. See Carpenter 1988:592-596: and Bergmeier and t o & Rainer 1991i":75-79.
10, Bergmeier and Lotz Rainer 1997:77.
11. Bid-.
12. Ibid., 77-78.
13. Cornell 1966:vii.
14, In Torrey 4984:196.
15, Cornell I"36:M.
16. Torrey 1984:155-Z 7%.
17, Ibid., 177-228.
18. Ibid., 195.
19, Ibid., 225-226.
20. I""c>undtended to deny his anti-Semitism when confronted with it. See Ibid.,
22622R See also the excelfenk review in Coles 1983.
22, Bergmeier and Lotz Rainer 1997:78-79; and Sc?lwyn 1987:219-220. Fur short
accounts of the case, see Boveri 1964:482-188; and Weyf 1950:400411. See Hey-
m a m 1975 on 130und's personal history; see Morn 1985 on Pound" usage of his-
tory
22, Zentner and Bedur.Etiig1997:379,
23, Quc)ted in Hoidat 1989:236,803, n57 and n58.
24, For example, in June 24/ 1937. See ibid., 272 and 8flt3,n179,
25. Zentner and Bedurftig 1997:379.
26. Bclveri 1961:197,
27, Assor 1997:26-28.
28. Hoidal1989:743.
29, Boveri 1961:199.
30. Zentner and Bedurftig 1992379.
31, Boveri 1961:198-199.
32. titt.lej;icthn197231.
33. Pwsorzne: The Catlected Slzorter Poe-lns of Ezrn Pound (New York: New Direc-
tions, 1926), p. 89. 1 am very gratehl to Declan Spring, editor; New P>.irectic>ns,
New York, who grmted me permission to quote the poem.
34. 130und's affinity far fascism did not fail to attract attentiron. For examplm,
see Carpenter 4(388:566-597 Casillu 4988; Chace 1973; and Redman 1991.
 Chapter 9
1. This includes a 1980 biographical movie titled Edzuard Mrs. Simpsun, star-
ring Edwad Fux and Cynthia Harris,
2. The British television drlcurnentary prclgram on King Edward VIiI was trans-
mitted on November 16, 1995. The executive producers were Sally ttlovdward
and Davit3 Hart. The prc"ram was directed by David Hart and Nick Read-.1shall
refer to this program here as Channel 4.
3. Brown 1987:272.
4. For example, see Bloch 4988; Bradford 1989; Costello 1988; Higham 4988;
Parker 1988; and 'Thornas 1995.
5. Ziegler 1990:26&269.
6. See Bradford 1989:125127.
7. Bradford 498"3166.
8. Thomas 1995:41*
9. Channel 4,1995.
10. See Gilbert 1%3; and Morris 1991.
11. Pryce-Jones 1976.
12. See Shermer 49Tl for a shart review; see also Chapter 7 on radio traitors and
Lewd Haw-Haw.
13. Quoted in Bradford 1989:167.
14. Zieglctr 1990:163.
15, Bradford 1989.
16. Ibid., 164; and Costello 1988:49,
1'7. Brown 1987:181-182,678.
18. Zieglm 1990:267; Bradford 1989:165; and Costello 1988:451.
19. Ziegler 1990:268.
20, Costello lli388:449,
21. Thomas 1995:28-30.
22. Ziegler 4990:268.
23, Ibid., 207-208.
24, Ibid., 391.
25. The agreement was achieved within the framework of the 1925 Locasno
Facts.
26, Speer 1971:113,
27. Ibid.
28. Brown 1987:483.
29. ibid., 184.
30. Bradford 1989:465.
31, Thamas 1%5:69-'70,
32, Ibid., 7'0.
33-Ziegler 1990:270,
34. ibid. This telephone conversation was overheard and reported by Fritz
Hesse, a press attach4 in the German embassy.
35. Ribbentrop was Xater appcjinted foreip minister of the Third Reich (on Feb-
ruary 4,1938).
 Notes 335

36. See Higham 1988, Brown (1987:179) notes that "C,,"' chief of the British Se-
cret Intelligence Service (SIS),was quite cmcerned about the relationship between
Mrs. Sirngson and Ribbentrop.
37. Bradford 1989.
3"3 Ibid., 283-284.
39. See Ziegler 1990:224,
40, For a statement that there was no fabrication and that in fact, Mrs. Simpson
Ifad such a past, see Thornas 2 995:3T, and Higham 1988,
41. For example, he suggested that Mrs. Simpson give up scjme significant
rights as queen; see Bradford 1989:182-186.
42. Thomas 1995388.
43, See Bloch 1988.
44. Blsch 1988:jQR;Bradford 1989:441; and Channel 4,1995.
45. Block 4988:108.
46. Ziegler 1990:362.
47. See Higham 1985:45, 45, 160, 164170; for a rather strange and dissenting
view, see Zic?gler 1990:456.
48. Ziegler 1990:454-459,
49, Ibid., 455.
50. Quoted in ibid., 456457.
51. Bloc11 1988:112.
52. Brown 198E186. For mc~re,see Bloch 1988:113; and ZiegXer 1990:391.
53. More pictures can be seen in Bryan and Murphy 19713 (Morrow edition),
eighth picture gage bllowing page 320 (Hitler shaking the hand of the Duchess);
Donaldson 1974, Brst picture page following page 324 (Hitler shaking the
Duchess" hhad and Mazi officials escorting the Windsors); Thornas 1995, third
picture page following page 128 (the Windsors Leaving Berchtesgaden, with Nazis
saluting in the back). With the exception of one insipificant picture of the Wind-
sors meeting with Josef Tehuven, the Nazi GauXeiter of Essen (on April 24, 1940,
he was appointed Reich Commissioner of Noway, a position he held until the
end of the war and that he executed with ruthless brutality), Ziegler (1990) prc~-
uides no pictures of the October 15337 visit to either Germany or Bel-chtesgaden
(picture gage before gage 319).
54, See Ziegler 11390:392.
55, Ibid., 392-393.
56. Bradford 1989:254-257.
57, Channel 4,1995,
58. Bradfc>rd1989:285-.
59, Bloch 1988:136-139; see there the transcript of the speech on pp. 315314.
60. Bradfc~rd1989:286.
61. See her boc~k,The Heart kiss Ifs Rmso~ts(London: Landr;borough, 49562, pp.
268-269. The duchess states that visiting Hitler was a last-minute, unplanned
event and that her husband refused to discuss with her the emtents of his meet-
ings with Hitler. Her version is that the duke told her that during the one-hour
meeting with ElitZer, it was Hitler who did most cjf the talking, focusing on "W hat
he's tying to do for Germany and to combat Bolshevism" ((p, 269).
 62,Ziegler 1990:398-400.
63. Ibid., 398.
4%. Ibid., 399.
65, Ibid., 400. This cable was sent about a week before Hitter" invasion of
Poland, which marked the beginning of T/Vc)rld War TX, more than three months af-
ter the Verdun broadcast..
66. ibid., 401.
67. The duke was assigned to the command of Major General Sir Richard
Howard-Vyse, headqua&ered at Vincennes; ibid., 406407.
68, Ibid., 406.
69, Ibid., 406413.
70. ibid., 414.
71, Ibid., 415.
72. Different sources vary slightly about the exact date.
73. The incident is referred to as the ""Mechlin Incident." Young (1984:46), Bau-
dot et at. (1989:313),and Weinberg (Z994:11) all confirm the story about this forced
Landing of a German plane, Breuer (199T14-18) provides more details. He identi-
fies one of the two German officers on the airplane as army officer Major Fqefmuth
Reinberge~No name cjf the pilot is given, Keinberger tried to burn the documents
in front of the Belgian investigating officer, Captain Emilio Rodrigue. Major Rein-
berger threw a batch of papers, which he had been carrying under his gray coat,
into the burning stove in the room where he was waiting to be interrogated, Cap-
tain Rodrigue rushed to the stove and got the papers out ('. 15). Breuer d a t a the
incident to January 10,1940.
N.Baudot: et al. 1989:313.
75. Weinberg 1994:14.
76. Costeilo 1988:452.
77. Brown 1987:Ciiff).
78, Ibid., 273; see also Kessler 1992:143.
79. Ziegler 1990:416.
80. Tihomas 2995:181.
81. Ziegler 1990:4lf;.
82. Ibid., 417,
83. Ibid., 421. Hoare was a strong supporter of Chamberlain" appeasement
polcy; see Baudot 1989:224.
84, Quoted in Donaidson 1974:3M,
85, Ziegler 1990:421.
86, VVailer 2996:168.
87. Bradfc)rd 1989:578.
88, Quoted in Ziegler 1990:421.
89. ibid., 420.
90. Donaldson 1974:359.
91. Ziegler '11 990:422-423.
92. Ibid., 423.
93,Bradford 2 989:341,
94, Quoted in Bradfc~cd1989:5;76.
95, Brown 1%7:273.
 Notes 337

5%. Far example, see Blach 19&4,1988:165-169.

97. For example, see Btoch 1984; Bryan and Murphy 19?9:422-436 (Morrow edi-
tion); Urnaidson 1974:359-377; KessXer 1991:146; Kilzer 1994:240-247; Schetlen-
berg 1965:66-80 (including the publisher% skrong disclaimer on pp. 66-67);
Thomas 1995; and Ziegler 1990:423-436,
98. Ziegler 1990:423.
99,Ibid., 424, Ziegler attempts to dixredik this report.
100. Watler 1996:168.
101, Brown 1987:273,
102. See Ziegfm 1B0:434,
103. Ibid., 424.
104, Fur =ample, Channel 4,1995; Brown 1987:273; and Ziegler 1990.
105. Ziegler 1990:425.
106. Interview in Charnel 4 pmgram, 1995.
107. Brad fc>rd1989:5;"1(.
108. Donaldson 19"i74:368,376.
109, kid., 391.
11Q.Miller 1995:8(5.
111. ZiegXer 1990:425.Again, Ziegler tries to discredit the report.
112. Qucrted in Thomas 1995:204, and in Channel 4,1995.
113, Bradford 1989:579,
114. Thomas 1995:204.
115. Brown 4982273-276; and Costello 1988:45=54.
116. Zliegler 1990:331; Brown 1982275; KessEer 1991:Z52-159; and kheflenberg
1965:6&tS4,
117, Ziegler 1990:459.
118. Bradfs~rd1989:578.
119, b i d .
120. Bid., 577.
121. kid., 578.
122. See ibid., 576; see atso Ziegler 1990:42&327. The warning letter is repro-
duced in Brawn 1987:2%.
123. Ziegler 1990:432.
124. Ibid., 432-433, Brown (1987:2"i"2"i"I;) notes that in fact %hellenberg% smis-
sion failed and that following the fiasco in Lisbon, %hellenberg fell ill as a result
af ""a severe case af liver or gall bladder ps)isoning, an episode from which he
nwer recovered and fram which he died young. He always insisted that he had
been poisoned by the British secret ser~ice,""hehenberg died at the age of fif"t-y-
two.
125. See Ycjung 1981:69.
126. Tficlmas 1995:205.
127. See Ziegier 1990:433-434.
128. Brown 198i":Z"i"-276; Thomas 1995; and Waller 1996:167-173,
129. Costello 1"388~454.
130. Ziegler 1990:442.
131. kid., 443,
132. Ibici., 455.
 133. Ibid., 457.
134. Ibid., 458.
135. Brcjwn 198E681.
136. Bradford 1989:583-584; and Ziegler 1990:464483.
137. Ziegler 1990:461.
138. Bradford 49893584.
139. Bluch (1988:186) states that it was in December. BradiEord (1983:584) states
February as the date of the intei-view.
140. Bradford 1989:584.
141, Ziegler 1990:4a.
142. Ibid.; see also Bloch 1988:181;-190.
143. Bradbrd 2989:585.
144, Brown 1987:276.
145. Brad fc-rcl 2 989:425.
146. Ibid., 1%.
147. WalIer 1996:171.
148. Ziegler 1990:550.
149,See John Castella, Mask ofPeaclze?y (New York: William Morrow, 1988); see
also Penrc~seand Freeman 1986. Costello (1988:463) even implies that Blunt" iinti-
mate knowledge of the nature of the contacts beween the Duke of Windsor and
the Nazis during World War 111, gained through his mission to retrieve the relmant
documents in Europe, gave him a powerful insurance policy against being pun-
ished by the British for his treachery. The fact is that when the British became
awaW of Blunt" treachery, he was not punished accordingly.
150. Brc3wn 1987:6153. See a i m Bradford 1%8:563-564; Costelf o 1988:443-471;
and Kusbridger 1989:483.
151. Wafler 1996:168.
152, Weinberg 1994:143.
153, Costello 2988:448.
154. Ibid., 449.
155-Weinbesg 1994:144.
156. The Duke of Wndsor prc3babty met Laval in December 1935. The purpose
of that aleged meeting tzras, supposedly, to discuss and solidify support for
British nonintervention in the Italian invasion of Abyssinia in 1935. Again, the
duke was sympathetic to a fascist regime" expansionist policy. See Ziegler
1990:210-211.

Chapter 10
1. Kraus 1992A4.
2. Hassig (1994:47) states that there were 450; other sources place the entire
number of Spaniards at 508.
3- Plus "two hundred Tndiam . . . and a few Indian women for menial offices"';
I""rc3scott1925:124.
4. Jc~hnson197'7.
5. Hassig 1994:54.
 Motes

6. Hassig 19%:13,
7. Ibid.
8. Thornas 1993:169-171.
9. See Prescott 1925:136. Please note that he cautions against attributing too
much credibility to numbers.
10. Hassig 1994:50.
11,Ibid., 51,163-164; and Thornas 4993:171,
12. 13rescutt1925:140.
13. Waillant F19443 4962:242.
14. Bavies 2 "373:243.
15. Johnsc>n197243. Others give different localities far her glace of birth; see
Hassig 1996:1.
16. See Gruzinski 19%:79.
17, Johnson (1977:43) states that, in fact, a slave's daughter tvas actually Erilled
for this purpox.
18. See Garnara 1964, chapter 26. There are difkrent versions regarding her en-
slavement; see Hassig 1996:1.
19. Hassig 1996:l.
20, See Davies 1973.
21. For example, see Hunter 1990:9; and Davies 1973:238,
22. Borner 19r;72:72,
23, Thornas 1993:172.
24, Thomas 1993472,
25. Jc>bnson1977:44.
26. Ibid., 44,64.
27, Ibid., 44.
28. See Hunter 1990:44.
29, Vaitlant [l 9441 1962:246.
30. Jcrhnson 19;7i7:93.
31. Bavies 2973:252. See also Hunter 1990:15; Prescatt 1"65:238-244; and
mornas 1993:260-262.
32, Joknson 497:94.
33. Prescott 1925:244.
3.Thomas 191)3262,
35. Davies 1973:288, See also Thomas (1993:594), who does not mention Ma-
linehe in this cmtext.
36. Vaillant 1962, fig. 50, p. 260.
317. Daviet; 1973:263; Hunter 1990; Jc>bnson197E116; Le6n-Pc>rt..iXla1990:65; and
Thornas 1993.
38. Valllant 1962:247.
39. Hunter 1990:23.
40. Je>hnson1972179.
41. Ibid., 192; see also Presott 1925:597.
42, Collis [l9541 2994:97; and Le6n-Portilla 1990:69,
43. Collis 1994:233. The volcano La Malinche is Ic~cated120 kilc~meterseast of
Mexico City, 225 kilometess northeast of 13uebla;,Its elevation is 4,461 meters.
44. Vajllant1962, fig. 34, p. 247.
 45. Golf is 1994:235.
46, Johnson 197221-222. See also 13rescott1925:596--597.
417. Coltis 1994.
48, jahnson 197:222.
49. Hassig 1996:3.
50. Ibid., 1,17,
51. See Hassig" 1988,1992, and 2 994 works.
52, P-iassig 1%4:78-80.
53. Ibid., 80,
54, Hassig 1W6:44.
55, Ibid., 12.
56, Xbld., 16.
57, Hassig (1996:16) indeed offers a few possible explanations as to why Marina
was ""credited" k i t h the "discovery" of the CX-toXotitans"plot.
58, P-iassig 1W6:25.
59. Tbid., 16-2 7.
60.Ibid., 18.
61. Bid., 6-7; quote is from p. 6.
62. See &rubave11995,
63. Calder 1992,
64.Ben-Yehuda 1995.
65. Hassig 1996:17.

1. West 2995:352-366; Ostrovsky and Va%nunu star in that chapter. The topic of
treason has traditionally attracted much attention in Israel. Crorner has Bone
some academic work on both the case of Xsrael Beer (1985) and on Adiv (19%). Tn
the daily popular press, Maron (1998b) drafted one the more analytically con-
fused and contradictory but colorful pieces. He surveyed some of the traitors (Udi
Adiv, Yoseph Amit, Israel Beer, Markus Klingberg, Shimon Levinsctn, Nachum
Manbar, Victor Ostrovsky, and Mordechai Vakanunu), making the factually un-
substantiated claim that they all did what they did because of what he referred to
as a problem of "lost honor." That is, all these traitors felt that people did not give
them the honur for respect) they deserved.
2. Part of the description of this case is based on Ben-Yehucla 1W5:4M9.
3. See Ben-Yehuda 1995.
4. For short biographical sketches of Jc~sephttsFlavius-the man, his deedq and
his writings-see Encyclopedia jzddaica, 1971, vol. 10, pp. 251-2M; and fewr'sh E ~ c y -
~ I o p e d i~01.7.
~, For mow m J c ~ ~ p h u swritings,
's see Aberbach 1985; Feldman 1984;
FXusser 15385;Hadas-L&et 1994; Rajak 1983; Rapopvrt 1982; Stern 1987; Stone 1984;
and Thackeray 1968. There are literally thousands of works about Josephus Flav-
ius, and it is impossible, and counterproductive, far this short review to delve into
all of them. Nevertheless, the curious reader is referred to Feldman" summarizing
works from 4984 (about 100Ot- pages) and 1984 (about 700 paga),
5. %e HarareCs,June 15,1998, p. A3; and Vcdiot Altnronot, June 22,1998, p. 5.
 Notes 341

6. There are several versians concerning his escape. See Ber 1976-1971:2 75-2 90;
Karninka 1933-1934; Lewris 1975:28-21; Zerubavel 1980:107-116; and Kedar
2 982:59-60, For more readings on Ben.-Zakkaiand Yavneh, see Alon 2 96R219-252;
bn-Dov 1998; Hadas-hbel 1994:112-115; En~-yckopediaHebmicn 1967-1 968, vol. 19,
pp. 346-349; Encyclopedia judait-a 1471, vol. 10, pp. 448-154; Goren 4987; and
Neusner 19178.
7. The Galats and the Sicarii were Jewish ideolt~giealand pc~liticalgroups that
existed during the time of the Great Revolt,
8. See Stern 19%:320-345,
9, Far an interesting discussian about the Masada-(""el;athI destruction"")
Yavneh ("life"")mtrast, and its possible implications for Judaism generally and
contemporary Jrrdaism particularly, see Weiss-Rosmarin 1966. See also Ben-
Yehuda 1995:413,531,n, 39.
10, Haredi is the ultra-Orthodox version of Judaism.
11. Segiiil 1996.
12. Ladoueeur 1487:95,
13. See Snyder 19%:184; and Trunk 1972,29777.
14, Fotr a short description of the historical development of these groups and
the historical context, see BeeYehuda 2 993:79-97,
15. For a fuller discussion, see Ben-Y&uda 1993, upon which the description of
these cases is based,
16. He alienated mojstly the non-ultra-Orthodm community; but some mern-
bers of the ultra-Orthodox cl-rmmunity too. Soxially, this put De Hahn in a ques-
tio~nabtegc~sitionwithin local contemporary Jewish,networks.
17, Far a fuller summary of the case, see Ben-Uehuda 19%:137-140.
18. 13robablyby the two leaders of Lehi at that time-Yellin-Mor and Shaib.
lli3. See Nevc~4987,
20, Ibid., 21..
21. For a fuller surnrnaT of the case, see Ben-Yehuda 19"3:252-254.
22. Schiff and Haber 197&:E2-223.
23, Shealtielfstestimony, Flln'nl.etz, October 19,1949, p. 2.
24. The S h i was the intelligence service of the Hagana. In June 4948 it was re-
placed by three different units: military intelligence (headed by Tsser Be'eery and
Chaim Herzcrg); imer intelligence sei-vice (headed by Isser Halperin and Uoseph Is-
raeli); and external political intellipnce service (headed by Reuven Shiloach).This
strudure was Later changed agah. As is clear, the case of Tabianski occurred during
a period of structural uncedainq when Israel as a state was emerging and when its
intelligence community was in the prc3ccr.s~of being fc>rmed.See Ben-Yehuda
1993:438, n. 2 15,
25. Be'eery- appointed himself as a prc>secutor:He appc~intedas judges Binyamin
Giblyf Avraham Kidron, and David Caron. No Legal (or other) defense was ap-
pointed for Tubianski.
26. M'nl-iv, July 5,4949, p. 2.
27, Tubianski"~file in the Hca'nretz archives.
28. Hn'arefz, July 5, p. I; july 7, p. 4; July 8, p. 1,1li349.
29, Ha'czret-z, Octclber 26, 1949, p. 2.
 30. See also Bar-Zohar 19?0:39-45; Harel 19&9:113-1317; and Ha'nrefs, Nctvember
23,1949.
31. Katz 196:4217.
32. Far example, Gutman 1995:16&-269;and Teveth 1992.
33, For example, Kasztner was involved in Yoel Brand" misskn to the West,
mentioned elsewhere in this bc~ok.This was the famous diabolical "blood far
trucks" ""'offer" "c>m the Nazis; Jews were to be traded for trucks from the Ajlies.
34, See Haw1 1985:113-425,
35, Tamir was earlier a member of Etzel, and in the late 1970s he became Israel's
minister of law,
36. Sefer Toldat HaHagann (The History of the Hagana), vol. 3, pt. 1, pp. 635-640,
317. See Rosen feld 1955:415.
38. Haref 1985:106.
39. See Ibid., 4748,145-1 47.
40, See ibid., 55-"i"3,for a short accc~rant.
41. At 8 Shderc~tShrnuel Street
42. See bitz%nl.@t.z,
March 7 and 11,1957.
43, See Ha'nretz, p. 4.
44, Such as Tamir, Rumak, and Sheib.
45. Hare1 1985:138,
46. See Black and Mcjrris 3 991:153-156; Harel 1985; and Margalit 1982.
47. See Hadar 1971; and Bauer 1982:134-191.
48. See Gutman 1995:1817-196. For a fuller summaT of the case, see Ben-Yehuda
1993:27&2%.
49. For a short description, see khiff and Haber 19?6:495. See Cromer (1986,
1998) cjn the sclcietal reactions to this case.
50. Syfvia married in Paris, Adiv in Israel. See Mnrnriz?,August 4, 1993, p, 2;
Y,dit~fAAlraro~tol.,Supplement, August 6,1993, pp. 1-3,23.
51, Cohen 1993:55.
52. This is the same kibbutz that Udi Adiv and Assaf Adiv (discussed next)
came from.
53. See Schiff and Haber 19176:38; FJnknretz, January 16, 1955, p. 1; Granot
1984:39-43; and Melman 1999,
54. Flklrat.elz,May 6,1988, g. 82..
55. Hn"areEz, May 24,1988, p. 4.
56. Hahretz, May 3,1988, p,AI, and May 19,1988, p. ,412.
57. Miehal Schwartz was sentenced to eighteen months in prison; Ben-Effrat tcr
thirty months; and Assaf Adiv to Wenty months.
58. Flnkrefz, Nctvember 120,1989, p. 13.
59. In addition, he was handed a twelve-month prison sentence conditional
upon abstaining fmm similar activities for the next three years.
October 4,4989, p. 3, and October 253,1983, p. 3.
60.See bitz%nl.@t.z,
61. For an interview with the man who fired Ostrovsky-David ArbeX-see
Ma 'carizj, May 5, 1998, weekend supplement, pp. 12-80. Arbet cla i m that Ostlmv-
sky prwided inaccurate accounts and concocted blatant lies. Consequently, "it
was necessary to fire him" (p. 12).
62, nhis passage is partially based on Ben-Uehuda 1997 and 1998.
 63. Ben-Yehuda 1993.
64.See for example Karpin 1999; and Sprinzak 1999.
65. See Ford 1985:286-287; and Lentz 1988:101-102.
66. An example is the so-called %ason-during the early 1940s. For a short de-
scription, see Ben-Uehuda 1993:240,
6'7".Haim ArtosowofE was a major Jew-ish political figure in Palestine at the time.
See Ben-Uehuda 4993:440-443.
68. As pointed out in my 19413 book, these are several other cases, far example,
Michael SchetZ and Chaya Gidenberg, among others.
This page intentionally left blank
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This page intentionally left blank
 Index

Abdication, 371,233,235,236,239,244, Aho, James A., 17

246,248 Aibi, Natan, 298
Abel, Col, Rudcllf Ivanavitch, 400 Air Force 2,21
Abu Ba kr, 90 Airplane, crushing with invasion
A bwehl; 72,100, 121,184,185,329n35 planes, 242
Accc~rants,44,67,96, 414, 131 Akerstrclm, Malin, 28,55J, 144
Adarn, Hanna, 35 Alabama, 117
Adiv: Assaf, 297; Udi, 29S294, Abmut, 9O,91
297,305 Al-Assad, Hafez, 3
Admz'mf Craf Spce, 205-206,332 n50 Alcibiades, 18-19
Adultery, 38,43-53; dual standard, 44; "AXt)fi," 60
generalizability, 51; identifying, Alexandria, 162
51; as illegal, 49-50; and Alexei, Anna, 98
mamiage, 52; new meaning of, 47, Algiers, 163,164
52; in Newsroeek, 52; parallel, 46; Al-Hassan, Hussein Karnal, 64
prevalence and meaning of, 4&50; Alice's Wonderland, 4-5
rec~atianaf,46; and religion, 44; Allan, Ronatd, 47
as theft, 45; traditional, 46 Allen, Clolc~rteLEthan, 28,147'
Afghanistan, 68 Allen, Robert L., 56
African National Congress (ANC), 84 Allen, Thamas B,, 60
Afrika Kc~rps,495 Allies, 129,145,164,166,170,205,221,
Agent($): double, '72; foreign, 297; 256,292; western, 174,75,
German, 119,120,121; Al-Sabbah, ibn Hasan, 90
rmdel-cctver, 97' Al-Sadiq, Jafar, 9Q
Agitator(s), 121,134 Alsworth, Adrianna, 22
Agnes, Ms. Smedley, 192,192,329n61; AMAN, 320n126
Sorge's lover, 192 A h n f o r all Sensorzs, 122
Agujlar; Gerubimc:, def 2H-267, "American Hour," 220
269-271 American isolatianists, 254
370
American Revolution, 56,7!5,11 7,118
Amery, John, 411,123,124
Ames, AIdrich H., 36,58,68, 100, 1013,
115
Amir, Uigael, 300,302-304
Amit, Yoseph, 99
Amsterdam, 282
Anderson, Benedict, 27
Anderson, Jane, 199,1213
Aderson, Sacha, 54,217
Andr&#Major J c ~ h34,32,33,34,344
, Assassination(s), 25,38,89-92, 455;
Andrew, Christopher, 71
Adreyev, Catherine, 176,177,178
Angola, 85
Ann of tltp Tlzousnnd Days, 123
A nselzlzlss, 69,134,140,202
Anti-aircraft, 477
Anti-fascist, 185
Anti-%mitism, 17,123,202; in
Belgium, 153; in Denmark, 445;
and Lord Haw-Haw; 204; and
Pound, 221,224; and Quisling,
450; in U.S.A., 120
Anti-Stalinjst Committee, 175
Antonrncu, General Ion, 172,196,260;
arrested, 173; collaboration with
Nazis, 1'72; execution of, 173;
minister of war, 172; pupubrity
of, 172; as premier, 472; as a
traitor, 172; trial of, 173
Anusim, 41
A Pact, 227
Apomfypse Moru, 20,65
Apulo@es(y), 73
Appeasement, 141,231,233,234,23f3,
240,241,244,245,246,248,255,
258
Arafat, Uasser, 298
Ax;bel, David, B2n6l
Archer, Jules, 117,199,304
Ardennes, 130,144,152,242,243
Argentina, 77,171
ArgyXe, Bishop of, 21
Index
ArXosoroff, Hainn, 303,343n67
Armistice, 157
Amold, Bendict, 24,28-34,69,101,
105,108,117,275,307;
demcmization of, 34, duel, 32;
feeling betrayed, 30; honeymo<)n
of, 31; promotion of, 30
Arc~n,Robert, 164
Asahi Shimbun, 191
A s i ~(kitish war ship), 35
attempts of Hitler, 180,183; of
charactex; 80; of BarXan, 16S164;
of De P-iahn, 282,283; of Japanese
premier, 192; of Kasztner, 291,
292,300,305 ;of Lehi, 285; plots
against Windsor, 249,254,258; cjf
Rabin, 279,299-304,305; of
Xxathenau, 304
Aswts, 58,59, 468
Asylum, 69
Athenian law and society 105
Athens, 48,19
Atrocities, 171
Awchwitz-Birkenau, 96,290
Austria, 69, 434,135, 437, 440-444,236
Australia, 14,58,@
Authority, 115
Avneri, Uri, 2(a2
Avnj, Ze'evj 98
Avrushmi, tlonah, 302,303
AWOL, 65,303
Axis, '1"3,162,170,195,24Q
Axis Sally, 199
k a r , Shmuel, 67
Aztec, 267,270,272; capital of, 267; and
coercion, 265; and conflict, 265;
cruelty of, 267; empire, 265; gods,
267; and human sacrifices, 265,
267; month, 266; priests, 265; rule,
267; system, 265; taxation system,
265,267; yoke, 267; See also,
Carte"; Marina; Tenochtitla'n
 Index
Bachau; Kurt, 290,292
Back, General, 113
Bacon, Nathanjef, 117
Bahamas, 250,251,252-256,258
Baillie-Stewad, 123,203
Bakeless, John Edwin, 56, 1I 6
Baker, Robin, 49
Baku, 188
Baldwin, StanXey 231,232,233,234,
235
Balhm, 130,134,1652
Ballestrern, Countess Grafin, 183
Bankers, 95
Bar Illan University, 302
Bar Kokhba: revolt, 278
Bar, Ruth, 49
Barcelt~na,244
Barr, Hazel Kathleen, 201
Bataan, 329n41; death march, 286
Battle of: the Atlantic, 137,205; Britain,
252; the Buf ge, 130; Gjjctvik,
32Ein43; the Java Sea, 206; Kiev,
474; Moscc~w~ 173,190;
performance of Nisei, 194-1 95;
plan, 243; the IGver Plate'
205-206; Sevastopc~l,174;
Stalingrad, 138 173,182; Verdun,
240,241
Bnl'fle of- the Bulge, 20-21
BattXeshlp(s): French, 162; potcket, 205,
331n49
Barak, 20
Bauer, Chrisian, 203
Baysian principles, 2 0
Bazna, ELy em, 3171tS
BBC, 21,142,157,212,241
kaveu;brook, Lord, 237
Becker, Howard S., 8
Becket, Thornas A., 21,114,122
k d a u x , Charles, 236,237,242,243,250
&er-Hall Pulch, 17Pf 180
Beer, Israel, 69
W e r Sheva, 99
374
Be'ery, Isser, 286,287,288; charged and
cmvicted in killing Tubiansky,
288
Begin, Menachem, 319112 04
Beirut, 87
Beit Giz, 286
Belgium, 2 33,244,252-254,242,242;
government in exile, 153; King
teopold, 153; invaded, 233;
surrender of, 137; see also, Rexist
movement; DegretIe; Legion
Walfonie
Belgrade, 270
Belonging, sense of, 10
Belzec, 96
Ben-Ari, Ey al, 2 C;
Beneg, Eduard, 141
Ben-Effrat: Roni, 297,298; l"a%cc~v, 297,
298
Ben-Gurion: David, 51,67,70,2(a2;
Pota, 51; and Tubianski, 287
Ben-Curion university, 14
Ben-Matityahu, Joseph, 278
Ben-Shachar: Gerson ("Zerc~"),
319n2OS; Osnat (""Ossie"") 319nZOS
Ben-Shimol, David, 303
Ben-TCIV,Sheryt, 320n126
Ben-Yehuda, Nachman, C;
Ben-Zakai, Yachanan, 2V-280,304;
defection of, 279; and false
messianism, 279; questioning the
revolt, 279; and Uatineh, 279
Berchtesgaden, 239
Bergmeier, Horst J, I,., 223
Berle, AQolf, 59
Berlin, '1"3,86, 135,185, 192,203,225;
East, 54; Wall, 54; West, 59; visit of
the Duke of Windsor, 238
Berzin, General Yan Kartovich, 189
Best, Joel, 7
Best, Robert, 199,213
Betrayat 8; boundaries of, 121,308; in
Church, 21-23; conditians of, 308;
372 Index
and collabora tion, 136; collcsctive
level, 42,308,309; in the emquest
of Mexico, 273; content of, 307,
310; context of, 24,307;
continuctus VS. discrete variable,
25,37, 308; core of, 25,27, 196,
307; and crisis, 2 2; and danger, 9;
definition of, 115, 305,309; as
deviance, 25,213,127; 330,311;
emotional, 52,312; encyclopedia
of, 127,307; frequency of, 308;
forms of, 25,312; group, 309; and
identity, 311,312; intellectual, 226;
international, 38, 72-75;
interpersonal, 309; meaning of,
28,307; and morality, 28,411
motivation fctq 115,305; na"tonal,
309; ol-ganjzational, 309; personal
level, 18,27,37,42, 125, 126,308,
309; in pc~litics,303; and powel;
28,41,125; professional, 38;
reactions to, 37; of the State, 76;
and secrecy, 37,39,116, 260,309,
31Q, 312; and secuf arism, 294; in
society, 52; socially constructed,
23; socic~logyoft 127; state level,
217,3";7;structure of, 23,27,3i7,196,
2128,273,306,307,309, 310; vs.
treason, 17, 3 2 ; typolo~gyoft 38;
universal structure vs. mcsral
contenl; 310; as violating loyalty,
23,308; as viola"ting trust, 42,23,
308; and Weirnax; 180,196;
widespread existmce of, 2 01. See
also, Loyalty; Stealth Traitor;
Treason; Trust; Turncoati ng
Betrayers of Trutlz, 95
Bible, 19,36,68; and spies, 34Cin64
Big Three, 170
Billings, ttliznen, 119
Binet, Major Meir, 67
Bicjgraphy 34,41,311; personal and
social, 312
Bishop: of Argyll, 21; runaway, 22;
traitor, 22
Black, Donald, 310
""t3ack fuhreu;" 121
Black, Ian, 70,277,293
Black marketeers, 167
Blackshirts (British), 246
Black Watch Mutiny?56
Blaiir, T h y ; 83
Blitzkrieg, 241
Bloch, Michael, 237; 240
""Blocjd for Trucks," "-96,292-293
Blue Angel, The, 185
Blunt, Anthony, 42,6J, 113,256,257,
2CZO, 338n14.9
Bohemia and Moravia, 141
Boleyn, Anne, 123
Bomber Command, 146
Bombing: Britain, 237; Jerusalem and
Tel Aviv, 195,330n74
Bomb(s), 67; 7;7,291; death camps, 96;
in Hitler" airplane, 183
Bonhmffer, Dietrich, 181,18>184
Bonnier, Fernand de Xa Chapell% 163
Boston: siege of, 35
Boveri, Margaret, 442-114, 416,162,
164,165
Bowels, Camilla Parkeu; 50
Bowel; Donald E,, 189,190
Bcjwyer Bell, J., 95
BoyB, Belle, 118
Bradford, Sarah, 234,235,23% 240,241,
245,246,248,249,1250, 254,256
Brand, tloel: mission, 95-96,97,290,
2 E , 293
Brando, Marlon, 65
Brandt, Clare, 30,31
Brandt, Wilfy, 444,138
Brassiiilach, Rcjbe~,160
Brnz~ellelteart,21, 123
Brazil, 77; 85
Brewer M., 10
Bridge cat Remagen, Tke, 20
Bridge on trlte Riuer Kwal;, Tfze, 20,217 "C," 223,250,335n314
Britain, 66,75,82,83, 435, 463, 489, 495 Cacr'que?2261;,269
British: admiralty 205; anti-, 119; Cadogan, Alexander, 245
Army, 31,32,286; blackshirts, 246; Caesar, Jufius, 92
citizens, 20(1"3";commandc1,167; Cahos, 17
empiref 230,239; fascisti, 201; Cair-zeMufiny, The, 56
fascist movement, 231,246; Free Cairncross, J o h , 63
Corps, 124; intelligence, 250; Claircl, &5,95,145
Legion of St. George, 124; CaXanter, Racharnim, 81
Mandate, 281,285; morale, 210; Calanterism, 81
Royal family, 233,236; secret California, 194
service, 250; submarines, 164; CaXigula, 92
traitors in WW XI, 123; Union of Caliphate, 90
Fascists (B.U.F.), 202; tzromen, 167 Cambodia, 76
Brc>ad,W J., 95 Cambridge: spy ring, 63,111,114;
Brokers, 95 university, 63
Broc~ke,Gertrude Emily ("Queenie"), Camp: concentration 24,143,167,184,
200 239; death, 24;internment, 166,
Brookf y n,36 'I94
Brothels, 235 Campbell, Rcybney, 55
Brc>wn,Anthony Cave, 229,234,239, Canaan, 316n64
243,247,253,255,257 Canada, 58,62,1 00,'I'I9,298; fifth
Brom, John, 118 column in, 432; invasion aft 32;
Brcx, josip (Marshal Tito), 1'70 Royal commjssisn, 132; and
Bruno?JJiordano, 321117 Vermont, 'I17; visit of George V I,
Bryant, Michael, 286,287 King, 240
Buchenwald, 184 Canaris, Admiral Wilhefm, 181,
Budapest, 290 'I84-1 85
B.U.E, see Jayee, British Union of Canterbury: archbishop aft 122;
Fascists. Cathedral of, 122
Bujold, Genvieve, 123 Cargo, 78
Bulgaria: surrender of, 437 Carol 13 (King), 471,472
Bulloch, John, 109-1 11 Carre, John ZR, 72
Bulow, Claus von, 51 Casement Roger, 24,8586,105
Burgess, Guy, 558,bJ Caspi, Dan, 303
Burma, 186; National Army, 65 Celibacy, 22
Burr, Aaron, 117 Central China Expeditionary Army,
Burton, Kehard, 422,423 187
Bustun, Xiobert Bentley, 1177 Chalfengex;78
Bus no. 300,4 Chamberlain, Joseph, 82
Buthelezi, Mangosuthu, 84 Chamberlain, Neville, 73,137,234,235
By Way of Decepl.io:on:A Devaslnthg Chambers, Whittaker, 59,f;R
Insider% Portmit of the Illossnd, 299 Chandler, Bouglas, 213
374 Index
Channel Islands, 144,166-1 67
Charles 11,46
CharXston (South Carolina), 31
Charman, Terry, 204
Chekej Narcus, 248
Cherbourg, 166
Chesapeake Bay, 32
Cheshire cat, 5
Chetniks, 169,1170,196; coXIaboration
with Nazis, 170
Chiang hi-shek, 473,489
Chicago, 35,63,119,121; Universiv of,
45
Childers, Erskine, 92
China, 49,138,187,188,192;
communist party, 193; and justice,
488; problems, 1191; nationalism,
192; puppet armies, 187; puppet
governmrtnt, 187; revolutionary
movement, 492
Chizis, Elisheva, 50
Choice, 40,80,202,208,227,228,221,
227,2236,264
ChoXoElans, 268; and challenge to
Tlaxcaltecs, 272; and conspiracy,
268; and P-iassig" cchalfmge, 2"i";
massacre of, 268,272,275; nobiliw
of, 268; plans, 271; preparing an
ambush, 268,2782; saldiers, 268;
threat to Corte's, 2.72. See atso
Malinche
Christ' 49,113
ChristianCity), 14; majority 221
Churchill, Winston S., 68/74 82,130,
431,4(-;2,463,465,466,476),204,
229,234, 237,244,245,246,247,
249,250,251,253,255
C.I,A., 64,63,64, 400,323n"i"
Ciano, Count Galeazzo di Corteflazc>,
73,74
""Cicez-o," 68,34 7n66
""Cindy '"14,93,94,320n126
Cinema, 67
Cinematheque, 303
Cipher clerk, 62,68,98
Claim-making, 7
Clark, Mark, 163
Clausen, Max, 489
Cleansing, 170
Clemency, 161,298
Clercq, Staf de, 153
Clergy, 22,68,123
Clink exhibition, 122
Clinton, Sir Henry, 31,32
Clinton: Bill, 4';1,51,53; Hilfary 51
Cuhm, Eiti, 69,70,317n71
Cohen, Erik, 16
Co>hen,Miriam, 51
Cuhen, S t a d q , 77
Cold War, 61,108,112,113,121,124,
305
Cule, Harold (Pole), 130,217
Coleman, James S,, 40
Coles, Ro>bert,223,227
Collaboration, 38,39,57,132,136-178,
159,11;O, 162; administrative, 1%;
and Antonescu, 172; and betrayal,
136; definition of, 136; in the Far
East, 186-195; in Israeli-
Palestinian cmflict, 136; with
Nazi Germany, 138,280; popular
image in WMrlf, 467; reality of,
167; and resistance, 138,139;
success of, 138; types of, 138
Collaborators, 53,136,285,296;
Malinche, 271; operational life of,
136; opportunistic, 311
Colledive conxience, 11
Collective: insurrection, 75; memories,
27; national, 125; patterns of, 139;
social defhiltic~ns,6
ColXectivization of farming, 1%
Cullins, Michae1,92
Collis, Maurice, 270
Colonies: American, 117
Curnet jet, 323n9
 Index
Cornfad women, 186
Comintei-n, 189,192
Communism, 129,136,159,1;78,188,
192,220,239,239,257
Commrmists, 75
Conceal, 37; 40,41,54
Conceal(ment), 80,217,261
Con: artistry, 338,42,93-94; game, 93
Confederate army, 1l8
Confederate: prisoners, 119
Confession(s),41,77
Confidence, 10,11
ConBict, 105,261,265
Congo Free State, 885
Congress, 29,30,34,51
Congressional Medal of Honor,
495
Connecticutf 28,32,35,36,47
Conquistadors, 267
C1omciencl.e~~ 4484
Conscientious o>bjection,65,87,2Q2
Consent, 40,M
Comeivative orthodox, 239
Conspiraey(tors), 183; Canaris, 184; as
traitors, 1283
Comtrudionism, R contextual 7,8,
204,309,311; strict 7; variants 7
Continental Army, 28,35
Conversion, 38,66,84-85,85,188; and
Va'aanunu 14;
Cook, J,, 9
Crstppc~la,Franeis Ford, 65
Cornell, Julien, 222
Corruptian, 34,79,11 C;
Corte's Hernan, 263,265,267', 269,272,
2174; accumulated treasures of,
267; burning his ships, 267; and
Catalina" death, 269; cmquest af
Mexico, 269,271; encounter with
Cholollam, 268; and Tlaxealte~s~
268,272; entangled in lacal
politics, 272; military qualities,
265; military strength, 26S264,
274; power of, 274; wife of, 269;
See also Chalollans; Malinche;
Marina; Tenepal; Montezuma;
"fiaxcaltecs
Cosel; 108
Cosmetics, 13
Costella, J o h , 233,243,256,257
Coughlin, Father Charles, 120
Counterfeit Traz'iol; T k , 21
Courageous man, 34
Court-martial, 30,157, 184,247,296,
302
Cowens, Major Charles Hu&, 216;
subversive intentiom of, 214
Co>ventry35
Cover-up, and bus 300,4;
Cozumel, 264
Crimea, 174
CroatQia): independenl; 171;
na"tonalism, 171; and Nazi
influence, 171; and massacres,
171; and Pavelic, 171; and purges,
171; as faxist, 471; and terror, 170;
units, 369
Cromer, Gerald, 294
CruiserCs): Achilles, 205,331n50; Ajax,
205,333 1150; Exeter, 205,206,
331n50
Crusaders, 91
Cuauhte'mmoc, 269
Cuba, 91,263,267; missile crisis, 61
Cultrtre(s), 4,8,17; belonging to, 37;
boundaries of, 275; definition of,
9; fiction, 47; and heroes, 114;
hostile, 275; Israeli, 4% and
mistrust, 102; moral point of view,
12; pluralistic, 24; political, 54;
worldviews, 423
Cultural: cmtext, 311; interpreter, 267,
270,272,272; mosaic, 307
Curtis, Ms. Catherine, 420
Cynical, 12
Czechs, 207
376 Index

Czechoslovakia, 61,72-73,1 33,1 34, Defection(ors),38,57--59,260,279;to

435,444-443,202 Israel, 98; in place, 58; Vlasov, l7hf
177
h i l y Exyrms, 203 Defendirtg the Realtrzs: W5 a ~ fked
h i l y Tribzinc, 252 ShnyEer Afail; 71
Daladier, Edouard, 73,137 158 Defoe, Daniel, 643
Damascus, 69,70,293 de Gautle, Charles, 156, 157,161,163,
Danbury, 30 164,166; and BBC speech, 15%"
Danes, 207 Degrelle, teen, 116,153,155,167,218,
Bank, Mitton, 155 2f;Q,311; in Argentina, 153;
Danzig, 207 caurage of, 154; and Iron Cross
WAquino: Felipe, 215; Iva, see Toguri, with Oak Leaves, 153; lost
Iva elections, 153,154; in Spain,
Darlan, Admiral Jean Francois, 108, 153
162-166; justifications, 164-165; as De Hahn, Israel, 281-283,304,305; and
an (odiow) Quisling, 164,165, anti-Zionism, 282; assassination
466; son of, 164; as a ternparay aft 282,283; and homosexuality,
expedience, 163,165; zigzagt;, 162, 282,283; marriage, 282; sister 05,
164,261 281; threats on, 282
Darth Vader, 20 de Louis, Jclng, 4434
Dasch, Georg, 121 Defegitlmization, 136,302
Basgupta, Partha, 10 Detilah, 19-20,93,190,307
Davis, J. H., 10 Demacracy, 129,148,228,239,25%";
Davies, Nigel, 2653 parliamentary 113,225; unstable,
Bay, Bonald, 213 196
Dayan: IIlana, 313nll; Demanization pmcess, 34
Moshe, 50,70,882. Denmark, 144--145,206,208;
Bay an, Ruth, 50 communist party of, 144; Free
DC-40,78 Corps, 444; German economic
Death: maxlch, 186; penalty 17; 19,62, demands from, 145; and
108,170,173,193; squads, 77 evacuation of Jews! 145; Freedom
Debre, Michel, 73 Cormeil aft 445; government of,
Debs, Eugene V., 119 144; independence, 144-1 45;
BeceptionQs), 3,11,17,33,37,3941,54, internal affairs of, 144; merchant
69, 1133,1,243,247,242,260; and fleet, 145; Nazi party in, 145;
the Dedaration of Indc;pendence, resistance in, 145
117; definition of, 40; as a Dennis, Lawrence, 120
continuous variable 13; military Dennistone, Robin, 130
use of, 130; in Pound" case, 223; Dercctz H~lziteois,296-298,305
and treason, 1l 6 Desertion, 38,654-145
Declaration of Independence: as Destirznlio:orzTokyo, 214
ultimate treason, 11'7 Detente, 73
Defeatism, 176
 Index 377

Deviance, 7,9,25,28,52,114,124,310, Duke of Windsor, 229,131,338n149;

311; and betrayal, 311; and abandonhg his military past, 243,
cultural cmtext, 311; in science 25 247; and appeal to Hitler, 241; and
DeWit"c,Lieutenant General John L., appeasemenl; 239,244246,248,
494 255,258; anti-British, 247;
DFLP (Democratic Frc.nt for the badgering ChurclhiX1, 246,258; in
Liberation of Palestine), 297 the Bahamas, 250-256,258; and
Dictators, 115 battle af Britain, 248-249; and
Dietrich, Marlene, 17; 41,138,181, Bedaux, 236,242,243,250;
185-186; as traitor, 186 betraying military secrets, 240;
Dilling, Mrs. ELizabeth, 120 and Channel 4,229,241,247,
Dirnbleby, Jonathan, 23 256258; choices, 243,244; and
Dimonia, 14 Churchill, 237,244-246,247,
Dinur, Dov, 293 249-253,255,2r;CI; and the
Diplomats, 12. coverup, 256257,259-261 ;
Disenchantment of the world, 2 2 3,114 disloyalty, 247; defeatism, 241,
Disloyalty: c h r g e s of, 124; us. dissent, 255; financial problems, 236; and
12,181 George VI, King, 240,247,248,
Disobedience, 27 250; gives a Nazi salute, 239; Her
Dissent, 121,122,136,342; vs. Royal Highness ( M M ) status,
disloyalty 121,122,181 236,246,258; and Hitler, 240; as
DissidentQce), 54, 124 Hitler" guest, 238; and Hoare,
"Divine" Brc~wn,50 245,246,250; indiscretim(s), 240,
Divorce, 49,5Q 245,2417,125'7; and intef tigence
DNA: on Monica" dress, 51; testing, 48 leak, 243; interview to Oursler,
Dc~lfus,Engelbert 140 254255,257; invitation to meet
Dc)no>van,Major General Wiitliam, Hitler, 237; lending Hitler
131 suppork 239; and Lloyd, George;?,
Dc~ublethink,40 251; marriage, 236; and meaning
Dortbte meaning, 217 of peace, 241,254; meet HitXer,
Douglas, Camp, 119 238,239,255,25Qr257,2a;
Draft: evasion, 65 meeting Nazi elite) 239; meeting
Drew, Christopher, 108 RooJsevelt, 253; meet Valexclo, 250,
Dubcd, Alexander, 73 251; and military appointment,
Dublin, 85,203 242; minor position aft 236; and
Duce, 174 Monckton, 251; in Nassau, 237;
Ducharme, Lori J., 34,275 and Nazi plots, 247-248,249,252;
Ducruet, Daniel, 50 in Paris, 237; 242,244; and Paris
Duel, 32 apartment, 248; political
Duke of Bdford, 212 aspirations of, 239; in Portugal,
Duke of Saxe-Coburg and Gatha, 232 247-252; as Quisling 246,250; pro-
Duke of Westminster, 131,246 Nazi, 241; recommending
378
bombing England, 249,253;
renovating house, 252; return to
the throne, 23% Simpsc~n,236,
241; in Spain, 243-247,248,249,
254; and Stohrer, 245,247",48;
and threat of a court martial, 247;
and treachery 243,245,257,259;
and trivial demands, 246;
undermining British pc)l,ilicy,241;
untrustworthy, 240; Verdun radio
transmission, 240,241,254,257;
visit to Nazi Germany, 23'7,
238-239; visit S.S. training center,
23% and Wenner-Cren, 237;-
252-253,255; wish to meet Hitler,
232; and world peace, 239,240,
244; writing Hitler, 255,257
Duke of York, 230
Dune, 20
Dunkirk, 244,246,248
Durkheim, Emile, 10,11
Dutch East Indies, 70,206
Economic: crisis, 136; demands, 145;
prosperity, 150
Edward VII, King, 446,131
Edward VIII, King, 25,197,229-263,
307; abdicatian of, 233,235,236,
239,244,246; and appeasement,
232,233,234; and Baldwin, 231,
232,233,235; becoming king, 232;
burn, 230; and Chamberlain, 235;
and Channel 4,229,238,235; and
the ""China dossier,'" 235; choice,
236; and Churchill, 229,234; and
conquest of the Rhineland, 234;
conspiracy against, 235; cover-up,
229; distaste for Royal rituals, 2230;
and the Duke of Saxe-Coburg and
Gotha, 232; and f o r e i p policy,
233,235; Ceorge (Duke cjf Uurk,
later King George V, hther), 238,
231,232; and George VT, King,
Index
236,247; and German
ambassadors, 2233; and Germany,
230,231,234; Grenadier Guards,
2N; and I-jj~esch,234; image of,
229; immoral behavictr, 234,232;
and I,ascelles, Sir Man, 230,231,
232; Mary of Teck, 13rincess(later
Queen Mary), mother, 230;
poputariQ of, 230; in the Royal
Navy, 2N; and Mrs. Simpsrrm,
229,230,232,233,235; as a
security risk, 235; speech to Royal
British Legion, 231; and treason,
234; uncmstitutional behavior,
235; untrust-\lzPorthy,230; and
WWI, 230; see alw, Duke of
Windsor; Simpstjn
Edwards, John Carver, 199,213
Egypt, 64,66,69,9O, 91,130,195,
316n64,317n7'1; nationalism, 195;
prc~Axisgo~vernment,195
Eichlitsr, Israel, 280
Eichman, Adolf, !25,96,288,289, 29QQ, 292
Eiko, 191,192,293
Eisenhower, General b i g h t B., 163,
165
Eisenman, D a n n ~ 303
EisenstekFSergei, 56
Eitan, Rafael ("Rafut"), 51,53,319n404
Ekman, Paul, 11,40,41
Ekstein, Zekv, 292,292
El-Aruri, Kabchi, 297
El-ias,Hendrik, 153
Elint, 71
Elitzur, Uri, 279
ElIsberg, Daniel, 16
Embezzle, 95: 120
Emrnanuel 111, King Victor, 7'4
Emotional: betrayal, 52; exclusivity, 52;
intimacy, 48; involt\rernent, 48;
reaction, 13, 309
Emperor Hsuan Thug, 187
E n e m ~17,57,294,299,312
 Index 379

England, 32,92,122,118,131,141,154, FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigatians),

466,203 53,58,59,69,101,121,256
EngXish Channel, 33 Federal Aviation A u t h o r i ~77
,
EphiaXtes, 2 8 Feelings, 13
Emser, 21 Felgale, Waiter; 83
""Esek Bish (fiasco)," 66-67 Ferry (rf;Tydut;t),146
Espionage, 38,66,98-101,111,12 6,119, Fidais, 90
491,293,305; Fielding, Nick, 71
in cyberspace, 72; Fifth c=oXurnn(isn),132-336,305; in
Hagan's definition of, 72 Britain, 204; meaning of, 2 31,235,
Essentialist perspective, 8 167; empirical existence of, 135;
Essex rebellion, 123 implications of, 132; meaning oft
Estee Lauder, 50 232; in the U.S.A., 132,194
Etihics: contextual, 24; Fifth man, 3 1 b 5 4
prc>blemsin, 94 Final solut.ic>n,139,289
EthnornethoBolog(ical), 12 Fine Gary Man, 34,275
Etzef, 284,285 Finland, 59
Evenir-zg Standard, 51 Flagstad, Kirsten, 226
ExcaEl'b~r,251 Flanders, 2 53
Evolutionary intei-pretation, 49 Fleming, lan, 72
Exchange theory; 11 Flensburg, 208
Exploitation, 85,115,275 Fletcher, George I,., 16
Explosive(s), 119, 424, 433, 446,283 Florida, 121
Extramarital affairs, 44,118,451,309 Flossenburg, 184
Foot, MichaelI3. B., 274
Fabrication, 34,95,261,268 Forblddezz Planet, 20
Faeroe Islands, 145 Forced Iabor, 140,176
Ftzltrenlzeit 452, 20 Force X, 56
Faithfulness, 13 Fctrd, Cerald, 246
Falkenhausen, Ford, Henrlr, '77,120
General Alexander von, 153 Fort Ticonderoga, 2% 334
Falkland Islands, 206 442nd Regimental Combat Team, 195
False presentation, 40 France, 50,75,133,141,144,155-156,
Falsification, 40,95 2 56,l 87,203,236,243,248; defeat
Far East, 72,137,18&194 of, 162,166,236; Free, 45"i";
Farouk, 1, King of Egypt, 195,196 invasion of Nazi Germany into,
Farren, Harry Desmond, 132 242; leader of, 164; surrender of,
F a ~ i s m429,436,204,218,224,224,
, 137,142,152,155,244,246
231,246,257; contempt to Franciscus, James, 47
electirons, 154; in Craatia, 171; Franco y Bahamonde, General
Hitler "s,239; in Ncjrway; 147; Francisco, 1317,244
popular support of, 131; and Frankfurt-on-the-OderI 176
secret organizationti, 171 Frankfirter Zeitung, 189
3811 Index

Free Czech, 141 attacks Poland, 137,141,144,236,

Freislel; Roland, 482, 483 258; East, 54; embassy in Tokyo,
French, 34, 361; citizens, 207, 193; and saboteurs, 319,121;
cullabaratian, 156; collapsrz, 131; hegemony, 134; navy, 207; Nazi
colt~nial,162,166; defeat, 158; rule off 14S144; rearming of, 231;
empire, 163,165; fleet, 33,162, victory over Franc% 166; West,
163,164,166; Tndochha, 70; navy, 70
462; North Africa, 162,164,165; Gersdorfi, Baron Rudolf-Christoph
pstrts, 364; Quisling, 366; vtm, 183
resistance, 161,163; revolution, Gestapo, 182,248,301
33,75, 413,114; Gethsemane, Garden of, 19
submarines, 362; wsjmen, 159; Geva, Elij, 8687
workers, 159 Gihly, Bhyarnin, 285
Friedrich, Carl J,, 145-116 Gibraltar, 219
Friedrichs, David Q., 10,112 Gibsctn, Met, 323
Froetich, Wilhelm, 204 Giddens, Anthony, 11
Fry, Mrs. kslie, 121 Gil, Jang Sung, 64
Fuchs, Ernil Ktaus, 113 Gil, Yehuda, 3-44
Faet tank, 78 Gilbest, Bc Joseph, 222
Fux, Cil, 303 Gillars, Mildred, 499
Ginsberg, khmeka, 58
Gagarin, Vuri, 94-95 Giraud, General Hemi, 163,164
Cajda, General Rudolff 142 Glass, Shirly, 48
Galileo, 322x17 Glazer M. P. and P. M., 179
Galut, 280 Glee, Anthony, 127
Cambetta, D, C., 9 Glenton, Bill, 56
Game, 55 GoebbeXs, Dr. Jctseph, 225,226,239,254
Gandi, Mohandas K,, 92 Goerdeler, Carl Friedrich, 181,184
Can Shmuel (kibbutz), 293,296 Goering, Keichsmarschall Hermam,
Genoa, 221 140,234,237,239,253
Garbo, Greta, 337n65 Goffman, Erving, 3231171
Cazit, Shlomcl, 320n126 Go For Broke, 195
Gehlen, Reinhard, 'I"Q Golan Hights, 3,69,294,296
Gendfer, Anat01y, 99 Coldcr~Eye, 20
Geneva Convention, 178 Goldfus, Emil K,, 101
George V, King, 230,231; dying, 232; Goldstein, Dr. Baruch, 303
prophecy of, 231 Goldstein, Peretz, 290
Cesrge Wf, King, 2236,240,244,247, Golienewski, Michal, 59
250; psttential abdication, 248 Golitsin, Anatoli, 59,6Q
Georgia 13each,the, 199 Gdnrrara, L6pez Be, 273
Ceraghty, Tom, 207' Good, D., 10
German(y), 68,773, '74,248; agents of, Goode, Erich, '7,124
119,220,121; aristocracy of, 113; Gorally; Abraham, 286
Gordievsky, Oleg, 61-61
Cordon, Captain 0.L., 206
Gouzenko, Igor Sergeievitch, 58,61, 62,
132
Graf, Willie, 482
Grant, Hugh, 50,53
Great Revolt, 90,278,279
Greece: ancient 48; attacked by Nazi
Germany, 137
Greed, 34,110
Greenherg, Lawrence M,, 76
Greene, Graharn, 68
Greenhow, Rose, 118
Greenland, 145
Greenwald, Malkiet, 289,292
GreemwBg, Emile, 302
Grey, Sir Charles, 333
Grosz, "Bandi" Andor, 95
G.R.U. (Soviet Military Intelligence),
58,61,489,492
Guadaloupe, 33
Guatemala, 269
Guernsey 166
Guerrero, GonzaXo de, 265
Guns ofNtzvamne, Tke, 21
Gutfreund, Hanach, 34 9n107
Guttridge, tec>nard F., 56
Gwynn, Nell ("the king's shore'"),
46
Gypsies, 207
Haakon Wfil, King, 146
Flln'nrefs, 297
Hacha, Emil, 241,242
Hadfield, Robert L., 56
Hagan, Frank, 39,'1"2,114
Hagana, 69,281,283,228,285,286,227,
305; order to Erill De Wahn, 283
Haifa, 293
Hale, Nathan, 28,34-36,39,69, 2 01,
405,311
Halevi, judge, 290
Halifax, b r d , 252
Hallel, Michal, 303
Hamburg' 188; university, 188
Harnsun, Knut, 25,219,225-226;
agc2inst his country, 228; born,
225; call to stop resistance, 225;
choice, 227 and compassion, 22';:
228; eulogy in Hitler % memory,
226; failing to detect evil, 227 and
hatred, 227,228; hosted by
Goebbels, 225-226; hostility to
Britain and the U.S.A., 225;
insanity 228; intewiew with
Hitler, 225; nature of work, 225; as
Nazi sympathizer, 225; navels,
225; poputariQ with Hitler's
youth movement, 225; and
psychiatric examination, 226; and
sensitivity 227; trial, 226; and
Quisling, 225,226; and Te;T;boven,
225
Hanna, B., 10
Hansen, Wihetm, 208
Hardinge, Alexander of Penshot, 247
Harel, Isser, 70,291,299
Hari, Mata, 68;
mavies about, 31h65
Har Shefi, Margalit, 308
Hashish, 90,92
Hassig, Ross, 263,265, 272-2723, 275
Hate: atmosphere of, 303; and sociaX
cleavages, 303; crime, 302
Haunted m o d : Soviet Espiorznge irz
America-77~eStalin Era, 7"ke, 71
Haugt, Herbert, 121
Havana, 94
Hawat-meh,Nayif, 297,298
Haw-Haw Lady, 2 99
Haw -Haw, Lord (William Jnyce), 24,
25,36,105,111,324,397', 399-213,
221,301,302,307,310,312
Heavy water, 146,324n37
Hebrew UniversiqI 87; department of
Sociology and Anthropology, 87
382 Index
Hebron, 303
Hegel, 5
Heilbruner; Bded, 303
Helsinky, 59
Herningwa~Emest, 68,131,224
HenXein, Konrad, 133,134,142
Henry 11, King/ M, 122
Henry VIIl, Kingt 422,423
Herbert, Frank, 20
Hero: cultural, 42; dissidenl; 54;
genuine, 294; Hale, 36; vs.
informer(s), 53; national, 163; vs.
rebels, 54; vs. traitor, 19,28,33,34,
425,426,458,494,271,273,2f35; of
the Sc>vietUnion, 91,190
Heroes of Terfema&, The, 324n39
Herouti, Ya%accty 291
Hess, Rudolf, 130,234,239
Hesse, Fritz, 3%n34
Hestcm, Charltan, 122
Hewitt, Jarnes, 50
Heydrich, Reinhard, 141
Higham, Charles, 432
HirnmIer; Reichsfuhrer Heinrich, 96,
175,182,185,292
Hirschfeld, Cerhard, 156
Hiss, AAlgex; 59,62
Hitler, Adolf, 74,75,92,202; appeased,
240; aggression of, 234; and
Antonescu, 272; attempts to
assassinate, 180,183; chancellou;
437,439; cohesic~nand integration
around, 183; convicted as traitor,
1713,180; declaring war on the
U.S.A., 221; directive, 17#2551;
expansionism, 237,258; interview
with Hamsun, 225; and King
Edward VIII, 2%; and Degrelle,
153; and geno>cide,171;invasion
plans, 242; and Marlene Didrich,
485; and non-aggression pack 241;
and Quisling, 149; and reply to
the Duke of Windsor; resistance
to, 180; rise to power, 231; trial,
179;as a tyrant, 240; see also,
Duke of Windx~r;Edward VXIT;
Hamsun
Hoare, Sir Samuel, 245,246,250
Hc>bbes,5
Hocus gocus, 223
Hoesch, Leapold van, 234
Holland, 133,135,256,281,282,317n';"Q
Hollingsworth, Mark, 71
Holt~caust,168,290
Honami, 191
Honduras, 269,270
Honey trap, 14,71,93,94
Hong Kong, 23
Honor, 15,283,328n32; construction of,
183; lost, 340n4; and the S.S., 183
Hunor~bleTreaclzely, 117
Hoofigan(s),301
Hotsumi, Ozaki, 24,414,188, 1W194,
196; commentator on China, 192;
executed, 2 93;
faithlessness, 494; as hem, 194;
letters, 191; marriage, 191;
meeting Sorge, 191; mistresses of,
191; and patriotism, 1%; and
Sorge, 192;
as traitor, 191, 193; trial of, 193;
value of, 191; tzraminga492
Houghton, Harry, 59
House of Lords, 32
House of Representativesf51
Hc>ward,Edward Lee, 62-ti3
Howe, Russell VVarren, 226,217
Howe, Sir Williarn, 36
Hc>yGlair, 299
Hoyningen-Huenc3, Baron Oswald van,
248,249,252
Huber, professor Murt, 182
Human: conditian, 227; nuances, 226;
rights, 338, %V; spirit, 227
Hurnint, 71
Hungarian: Army, 65; Jews, 290
 Index
Hungary, 95,290; Nazi invasian into
289
Huntington, 36
Hurl% Elizabeth, 50
P-iurst, Jarnes Willard, 108
Hussein, Robert, 84-85
Hussein, Saddam, 64
Iceland, 145
Ichheiser, Gustav, 3231171
Idaho, 249
Identity(ies): and betrayal, 331,312;
conflicting, 304; deceptive, 66;
faked, 66,77,3011; false, 69; group,
37; homosexual, 282; Jewish, 41,
290; Malinali's, 275; natbnal, 27;
newt 305; personal, 27,275;
politics of, 304; true, 93;
Windsor %, 2f;Q
Ideology, 110,443; isala"tionist, 420,253,
254; and justification for
assassination, 303; Maoist, 293;
pc~litical,23% repressive, 228;
sodalism,293; totalitarian, 228;
Trotskyist, 293
I.D.F. (Israel Defenw Fctrce), 286
Ijmuro, Furni, 214
Illan, Uri, vi, 294,304; as a hero, 2914
Illusion, 43
Imagined communities, 27
Imperial War Museum, 195,204
Imprisanment, 166
Indian nationalism, 191-192
Indiana, 219
I-ttdinnnJorzesalzd The Temple ofD(>om,20
Individuals, new perception of, 10
Infidelity, 17,38,42,43-53,309; in
China, 4% deceptive, 145;and
DNA testing, 48; essence of, 47;
international, 48; in Israel, 48-49;
natuw of, 44; prevalence and
meaning of, 48-50; of Williarn
Joyce" wife, 207
383
Informatian: damaging, 78
Infc~rming(ers),38,53-55,102,167,285;
police, 42
Ingalls, Ms. Laura, 3 20
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFB), 83
Instigation, 302,303
Insurrection, 17,75
Integrity personal, 40
Intefligence: British, 250; c o m m u n i ~ ,
58; counter, 221; Israeli, 69; Soviet,
70,98,189
Intention, 13,40
Iran, 15,654
Iraq, 59,144
Ireland, 85,92,200; civil war in, 92;
republican army of, 92
1l.ish: culture, 54; free state#92,201;
independence, 54; RepubXic, 208
Iron Cross, 153,184
Iron Guard, 172,173,1196
Islam, 90; fundamentalist, 45
Ismaili, 89,90
Israel, 59,130; immigrmts from Russia
to, 136; income tax, 53; and
Joyce's daughter, 212; KGB
station in, 98; military
intelligence, 66; and Negev, 14;
new defectors, 84; and nuclear
weapc~ns,114; and nuclear reador
14; October 19'73war, 130,294;
and spies, B, 285; and Syria, 294;
and tzrhistle-blowers, 80,328n90
Israeli: citlzenship, 85; embassy in
VVashingtcm, 69; and fifth column,
136; invasion to Lebanon, 65,86;
intelligence, 69; Jews, 29% left, 14,
336,295; navy 298; peacenik, 298;
prestate underground groups,
281; right, 299,301,302; secret
service, 59,70,291,292,293;
submarines, 298; supreme court,
291; Technion, '70; universities on
strike, 87
384
Italy 74,138,170,219,220,283; Allied
invasion into, 221; fascist, 73, 137,
220,302; northern, '74
Italian Army, 74
Ivan IV, Czar (the Terrible), 57
Jackson, Frank, 9.1
Jacksc~nville~ 121
Jael (Heber Hakelni" wife), 220
Jaffo, 303
James Bond, 20,"i"2
Jamestc>wn,117
Japan, 7Q,138,188-194,214; material
shortages in, 215
Japanese: American, 132,194-1 95;
attack on Pearl f-larbor, 194,215,
220; collaboration with, 487;
conquerclrs, 186; fifth column,
132; human experimentation, 186;
imperial forcesf 186; as Liberators,
186; militar)~mutiny 190;
occupation, 186; secret service,
489
Jararnilfo, Juan def 2178
Jeeves, 199
Jericho, 317n64
""ferry bags," 367
Jersey, 166
Jerusalem, 84,85,2"i"8,282,286,3301;
airstrip, 286; cease-fire in, 288;
electric company, 285,2286; and
Kasztner 'S trial, 289,290; under
siege, 285; Mufti, 85; Zion square,
301
Jew($, 207; in Crclatia, 171; as
conspirators, 120; councilis of, 12250;
deported from f-lmgary;96;
ation of, 96,4430,140,443,
280, B9,290; failure of, 278;
Gwnrrm, 159; and Haw-Haw 204;
Hungafian, 95;hunted in the
Netherlands, 155; killing another
Jew, m,301; secular, 84,282,294;
Index
o d h d o x , 131?,281,285302; and
Pomd, 221; in Ramania, 172;
Sfardi, 283; ultra-orthc~do~:,84,136
Jewish: Agency, 96; councils, 139;
ghettos, 143; history, 278; leaders,
96, 290; national culture, 278;
paratroopers, 2290,293,296;
rebellon, 279; refugees, 996;
scholars, 279; state, 283,284,305;
Temple, 278; traitors, 278
jeutis!l Gfzm~ticlc; 209,212
Jirc), General Minami, 187
Johnmn, Chambers, 191,192
Johwn-George, C., 9
Johnscln, Lady Bird, 46
Johnmn, Lyndc~nB, $6
J o h w n , Wifliam Weber, 266,268
Jordan (Kingdom), 64; a r t i l l e ~of, 285,
287,288; Legion of, 285
Jordan, Robert, 421
Joseph (BibEicaI), 316n64
Josephus, Ffavim, 124,277-280,304,
307; death of, 278; governor of the
Galilee, 278; marriagez 278; an
official historian, 278; as an
opportunistic traitor, 280; in
Rome, 278; Roman dtizen, 278
Joyce, Wifliam ("Lord Haw-Hawf'),
108,144, 413,114,123,124,
199-213,228,311; academic life,
201-202; affinity for faxism, 218;
American citizen, 200,204,203;
appeal, 212; birth, 200; in Berlin,
203,207; betrayed by Margaret,
207; Black and Tans, 200-201; and
Britain" future, 21 8; and British
morale, 210; braadcasthg, 203;
Bmc~ke~ Certrude Ernily ( m t h e r
of), 200; capture of, 208; cause of
war, 207; choices, 202,208; and
Churchill, 204; childhoc~d,200;
citizenship, 210; and
correspondence with 130und,223;
 daughtex; 212; defines himself as
traitor, 204; divorce, 207; and
Duke of Bedfc>rd,211; enlisting to
the army, 201; escape plan, 208;
execution of, 214; failure in
foreign office, 202; false passport,
208; fifth column, 204; fomd
guilty 240; German citizen, 204,
207; jdmtification of, 203; identity
of, 21 8; impact of transmissions,
212-213; invasion tcr Norwa)?r,
206-207; and ""jewish jury," "12;
and Jews, 204,211; last letter, 221;
last recording, 201;; leaving
England, 203; lc>yaltyto, 21Q;
Michael (father of), 200; Ministry
of Propaganda, 203; marriage,
201,202,207; and Nazi
propaganda, 204; and pact with
Hitler, 202; patriok, 201,202;
personal Ii fe, 207; political career,
201-2@; preaching revolt, 204;
purged from B.U.F., 202; radic)
transmissions, 204; scar, 201; trial
of, 209-211; War Merit Cross, 204;
judaism: cmservative, 299;
liberal, 299; new form of, 278;
orthodox, $5,278,281,282,294,
299; religic~ras,294; secular, 294,
299; spiritual, 279
Judas Xscariot, 19'24,353,
401,411,114,30"i"
Judas-Jude (Nazi term), 19
Judea, province of, 277
lude~zmf,139,143,280-281,
305,324nZ 8
Judgmental, 24
July 1944 assassination attempt, 180,
182,183
Just war, 1;?f)
Justice, 288, 310
Maczynski, Bavid and Ted, 53
Kali, 20,9O
blmanovitch, Shabtai, 99
Karnal, General Saddam, 64
Kansas, 1128
b p l a n , Jan, 142
Kapns, 143
Karmona, tloseph, 67
b r s k i , jan: mission, 9&97
Kasztner, Dr. Rudolf (Israel), 289-293,
307,305,342n33; accused of, 289,
2%; activities in Hungary, 289;
assassinated, 291; assassins of,
291,25)2,292; and Bachar, 290,
2 E ; and Brand, 29Q and cover
up," "1290; frc~ma criminal case to a
political trial, 289; and Eichman,
2W, 2 E ; and role of leadership in
Hungav, 290;
and Mlsj Ghetto, 290; and moral
debatesy292;
and pamphXets, 290;
saving Jews, 289; "sold his soul
tcr the devil,"T990;suing
Greenwald, 289,292; and Tamir,
289,290,292,293; and Ntrainof
the prestigious," 28% 2290; and
trial, 289; .\rerdict,290. See also
Greenwald
b t y n (forest massacre), 443-444
Kayotis, Andrew, 1CfO
Kee, H. W., 9
Keegan, John, 178
Kempai Tai, 189
Kennedy:John E, 61; Robert E, 92
Kent, Tyier, G., 67-68,653,108
Keppef, Mrs., 46
Kerch 13eninsub, 174
Kerling, Edward, 121
KGB, 59,60,61,63, '70, 71,98,99,1Q8
m m e r Rouge, 76
murshah, Rukh-al-Din, 91
Kiev, 173
Klroy, 1994 play, 22 3
386 Index

Milzer, Louis C,, 332n65 Lama, Joe "%cbIf' 55

King, Dr, Marian, 222 Laseelles, Sir Alan 'Tommy" 230t 234,
King, Dr. Martin Luther; 92 232
Miyomi, 189-190; S r g e ' s lover, 2 89 Last S, 18
Klement, Frank L,, 418,119,124 Last Supper, 19
Klingberg: Markus, 98,294; Sylvia, 294 "Lau" 303
h e s s e t , 82 Laval, Pierre, 157,159-161,162,260
Knightley, Phillip, 67 Lavon, Pinhas, 67
Knowlton, Colonel, 36 l,awson, Annette, 44,45,46,48,52
h o x , Oliver, 53 Leach, Robert, 81,82,83
Knox, R, E,, 9 Leahy, William D., 162,165
Kc3bal)rasbi, Takiji, 192 Lees, Mishael, 1'70
Moischwitz, Max, 213 Legion WaXlonie, 2 53
Kolstad, Pedar, 447 Lehi, 281,283,284,285,291;
Komarcvv; Vladirnir, 94-95 assassinations of, 285; Xeaders,
Monev, Marshal I-van, 176 305; order to disband, 283; order
Konyo, Prince Fumimam, 193 tcr kill Levi, 284
Kooistra, Paul, 321~21 Zxipzig, 184
Moor corporation, 98 Lemke, William, 2 20
Koren, P-ianiel, 303 Lend-Lease Act, 120,254
Kramer; Joseph (''beast of Belsen"") 204 lxonidas, King, 18
Mramer, R., 10 Leo%-Portilla, Miguelt, 270
Kreisau Circle, 443 Lectpc~ld,(King), 152-153
Kristel, Syfvia, 317n65 lxvi, Levi, 98
Kriegsn~~n'ne, 146 Levi, Yehuda Arie, 28%285,304,305;
Krivitsky, Walter G., 315n28 accused of, 284; excr~mmunication
Kuhn, Fritz, 120 of, 283; judges of, 284; move from
Murbsky, prince Andrey Mikhaylovich, t e h i to Hagana, 283; talk with a
57 Lehi woman, 283; as a traitor, 284;
Kuwait, 84,85 trial of, 283; killed, 284
Mwantung Army, 2287 Levkberg, Amos, 296295,304,305
Levison, Shimeun, 98
tabor: disputes, 119; stri ke, 88 lxwinsk~r,Monlca, 51
tadouceuu; Bavid, 280 Ley, Robert, 238
Lady Hamifton, 46 Lezaky, 444
La fa yette, 31,55 1,iberal secularism, 299
tahav, Hadas, 297 Liberty, 254
Lake: Champlain, 29; Tinmjoe, 446 Libya, 64
Lambeth Ncjrth, 201 lEJickorish,Captain, 208
tandsberg prison, 2 79 Lidice, 2 41
Langfeldt, Gabriel, 226 Lie(s), 11,12, 43,284; as a cmtinuc)us
tangsdorf, Hans, 205 variable, 13; necessity of, 13
tansky, Meir, 55 "Lilti MarXene,'" 238
Lincoln, Abraham, 92,11 8
Linton-Orman, Miss R, L,, 2024
Lisbon, 246,247; 248,258,252,256
Lithuania, 57
Littlejohn, David, 41,438,223
Livingston, Bob, 52
Lloyd, George, 251
Lacarno Pad, 137,334n25
Lc~ndin,Gregox~~, 98
tandon, 32,83,93,123,189, 199,209,
250,297'; dungeons, 422
Lc~ndon,Jack, 89
tandon University, 201
Lang, Huey, 120
Long Island, 36,121
tang, Leo, 63
Las Angeles, 1189, 2244
Lotz Rainer, E., 21 3
tatz, Wlfgang, 317n71
Lauisiana, 117
Love: illicit, 22
tayalty, 14-15,24,27; to Americans,
33; and bank account 14; to
British, 33; and deception, 37;
definition of, 129; and Germans
44; and hanor, 328~32;meaning
of, 16; to one's count% 16;
violation of, 28,36,37,2%, 308;
and whistle-blowers, 78
Lubbe, Van der, 3 3 n 9
Luciano Project, 55
Ludendorf, General Erich, 179
L~~jfwafle~242 (see Mechlin Inddence);
bombing Britain, 248,251
Luhmann, Niklar;,r;", 10, 43
Lurnc>vrAlexander, 98
Luxembourg, 133, 1M, 152,208,243
Luzon, 329n4I
Macmillan, 112
MacNab, John, 203
MacPhee, Kathleen, 22,46
Madrid: conference, 85; and Begreltle,
153; fifth column in, 131;
Windsor's visit in, 244,245,247
MAFDAL, 81,82
Mafia, 55
Magino>tLine, 242
Mahaneimi, Uzi, 32Qn126
Main, 29
Maitland, Jarnes (Earl of Lauderdale),
32
Makeup, 13
Malaysia, 50
Malchut Israel, 291
Malinche, 25, 405, 444, 1116,263,266,
267,269,270,307, 310,311,312;
betraying Cholollan;sj,268; and
Corte's, 26T 2269; as a collaborator,
272 ;infc~rmationabout, 271 ;
importance of, 271; in Mexican
literature, 274; and national
cmsciousness, 274; popular
narrative of, 271; as a racial
turncoat, 271; role of, 273; scxial
position of, 272; symboX of
heroism for the Conquistadors,
271,273,274; symbol of treast~nin
Mexico, 263,271,1273,274; two
accounts about, 273; volcano's
name, 276 33h43; as a wh~?re,
272. See also ChoXollans; Carte";
cultural interpreter; Marina,
Mestizo); Tenepal, Malinali
Malshinon, 53
Malta, 47
Mamluk, 91
Manbar, Nachurn, 15,285
Manchukuo, puppet state, 187
Mancfiuda, 68,187
Manhattan, 36
Manila, 21
388 Index

Mansfield, Margaret, 31 MeDonne11 Douglas, 78

Manstein, Field Marshal Erich uon, McGann, Eileen, 47
173,174 Mechlin incident, 336n73
Manailsky, Birnitry 189 Mediterranean, 73
Maquis, 464,41;2 Meitz Knmpb 1%,17"3,18t3,332n65
Marburg File, 256 Meix; GoXda, 51
Marco Polo, 90 Membership, 28; in dyad, 36; in
Marina, 266,269,2271; and CorZe'r;, 267 calledive, 36; faked, 66; in g r ~ ~ u p ,
and courage, 2178; daughter of, 23,317,308; meaning of, 38; in
270; death, 270; discovering pluralistic cultures, 24
Chctlollan's plot, 272; estates of, Me~tkes~ J~oseph,294,292
2178; hero vs. traitor, 273; income Mercadex; Ramojn, 91
of, 270; intelligence of, 262,274; as Merchanl; 13iers,50
interpreter, 267 looks of, 267; Mers el Kebir, 162,327nlOO
marriage of, 270; and. plot against Messersmith, George, 240
Carte's, 272; reunited with her Mestizo, 26% 271
mother, 27'0; role in the conquest Metcalfe, Edward Truity" 223
of Mexico, 269, 27Zf 21711; roXe of, Meuw River, 243
273,273; shifting trust and loyaltyf Mexico, 25,263,265,275; city, 91,263,
267,274; son of, 269,2"i"; soral-ce 270; cmquesl of, 263,265,266,
of name, 266; speaking Spanish, 2@,273,275; liberation of, 33; war
270,272; value to Carte", 269; with, 118. See also Carte"; Marina
and uolcana, 27'0; See also Mi5,63,613,71,72
Cholollans; Malinche, Tenepa l MI6,59,61,63,64,256
Marranos, 41 MICE, 114
Marsh, Patrick, 156 MichaeL (King), 173
Marsphain, Johanna van, 282 Middle East, 64,9Q, 96,100; peace
Martyr(s), 35,182 process, 279,303
Marzuk, Dr, Moshe, 67 Mig-24,552
Masada: destruction of, 2178 Mihajlovic, General Draza, 169-171,
Mate swapping, 44 1%; executed, 170; hiding, 170;
mlrisr, 'The,20 betrayed, 170; minister of defense,
Maugfiam, %>merset,68 169; misleading infcj'cmation
Maurras, Charles, 153 about, 171); trial of, 170; truces
Maxwell, Robert, 93 with Germans, 478
May AXan Nunn, 63 Milan, 73,302
May, Uoris, 51 Milligan, Lambdin R, 118
Maya: dialect, 264,266,267 Mills, Cl. Wright, 4,41,140, 275, 344
Mayer, R. C.# 10 Mindanau, 21
Mazarine, 50 Mirror, 50
Mazowiecki, 73 Mississippi, 147
McCarthy persecution, 59,121,124 Mistress, 50, 191
McDonaghin850 Misuari, Nur, 21.
Misztal, Barbara A., 11
Mitfcjrd, Unity, 131,231
Mr'troktiizzArc.chz've:The KGB ir-z Ezrl.ope Morshead, Owen, 256
and trlte Wst, Tht, 71
Mitrokhin, Vasili, 71
Mitterrand, Francois, 5Q,53
Mock trial, 77
Mc>hammed,90
Mola, General Emjlio, 131
Mole(s), 27,58,99
Mc~lotov,Vyacheslav, 775
Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, 75
Monarchy, 123,129,239,258
Mc~nckton,Walker, 246,251
Mongolia, 187
Mongols, 91
Mc~ntezuma,265; ambivalence toward
Corte's, 267; beliefs, 265; death of,
269; expectations, 265; military
qualities, 265; s-txccssarof, 269
Montevideo, 205
Montgomery, Bernard, 75
Mc~ntini,Ciovanni, 68
Montreal, 29, 34
Mooney, Tom, 119,253
Moral: boundariest 22,27, 36,39,76,
1Q2,133,139,167,183,196,213,
217,221,285,308,309,312; claim,
310; commitments, 308; complex
stands, 124; content, 228,273;
contexts, 311; debates, 292;
decisions, 228; entrepreneurs, 424;
evaluat.ic>n,24;features of
ideafogy, 113; judgment 227,228;
and loyaltr; 31Q;meaning; 258;
non-prc)biematic, 364; o>btigations, Nansen, Fridqctf, 147
308; panics, 313n6; and power,
310; subversion and morality, 217; Napoleon, 470; Bonaparte, 333
and trust, 310; whistle-blow-ing,
8&81
Mc~rdechai,Uitzhak, 4
More, Thomas, 21,1Q5,122
Mormon RAellion, 118
Morris, Benny, 70,277,293
Morris, Dick, 47, 50'53
Moscow, 60,101,188,189,291;
American embassy in, 63
Moses, 316n64
MosXey, Oswald, 82,131,2@, 246
Mossad, 4, 44,59,69,94,298,299
Motivation, 34,3i7,4l; and Hagan's
tyyofogy, 72; personal, 33
MouIin, jean, 464-462
Movies, 40
Moyne, Lord, 96
Mozambique, 85
Mufti, 85
Muncic?,Dr. Wmdell, 222
Munich, 435; agreement, 73,134,137;
141,142; Pu tch, 179, 180;
university of, 181,182
Muslim: minority, 21, 171
Mussert, Anton Adriaan, 155,228
Mussolini, Benito ("Duce'"), 73,74137,
153,301,302; and Clam Petacci,
302
Mutiny, 17,38,55-56,7L%76; of Croat
units, 463; in India, 76; in Iran, 76;
Japanese militar)lf 190; of Lord
Sempiltf's Highland R e ~ m e n t56;
,
of the Pennsylvania line, 56
Mutz'r-zyon the Boz-lnly, Vtie,56
Myth, 25,274; of the Blitz, 274; Israeli,
274; of Masada, 274; national,
274
NahuatI, 266,26T
Nanking, rape of, 181;
Nasjonal Sampling (N.$.), 148,150
Nassau, 237
Nasser, Carnal Abdel, 495
Natanson, Philip, 67
National Flemish Front (V.N.V), 153
390
National Scialist League, 202
National: cmsciousness, 224; unit?i; 424
Naval: base in Bran, 162; insurrection,
56; intet ligence, 55; scuttling, 163,
205
Nave, Eric, 130
Nazi: activity in U.S.A., 120; aircraft
basesf 445; Austrians, 140;
brutality 174; control o f , 144;
conquest, 174; defeat, 205; evil of,
466; expansionism, 139,258;
extermination plan, 281; fuhrer,
120; Germany, 73,75,76,%, 1E,
429,136, 470,199; goals, 133;
ideology 19,120,145,167;
insipia, 135; invasion to
Yugoslavia, 469; and Jews, 24,41;
Jud a ti-jude, 119; moral bound a ries,
183,196; party, 18% 189; party in
Denmark, 145; propaganda, 12Q
174,175; racial myth, 174,177;
rule, 166; submarines, 55,145;
sympathizer(s), 68,134,155,236,
237; taboos, 175; winning
elections, 137; war with the USSR,
473,477,490; worldview, 310
Nazi Germany: appreciation of the
Duke of Windsor visit, 237;
judicial system of, 478; as a state,
178; treason in, 179
Nazism, 129,137,257
NBC, 241
""Need to know-f"295
Nekzkdn, 279
Nelson, 46
Nes Ziona, 98
Net-, TZ14,21
Netanyahu, Benyamin ("Bibif'), 45,43,
5Q,53,228,229,301
Netherlands, 140,144,152,
454-455,242;
a ~ a n i z i n gof, 155; coXIaboration,
155; and Jews, 155; invaded, 242;
Index
Nazi party, 15&155; Nazi
sympathizers, 155. See also
Mussert.; Seyffardt; Vrijkorps
Nettleu; Gwynn, 108,116
Nevo, Amas, 284
New London, 32,35
New Mexico, 62
News of the Worl~Z,22
Newsweek, 47,49,52
New York, 35,101,200; attack of, 31/32
New Vczrkcq The, 111
New "Ical-k Times, 1dif2Q6,22i"
New Zealand, 23
Niemoller, Martin, 184
Nippon Ernes, 215
Nisei, 132,194195; Congressional
Medal af Honor, 495
Nixon, Richard M., 60
N.K,V,B.,58,63,100,143
Ncjbel Prize: see Hamsrm, h u t and
Pound, Ezra
NORC, 45
Ncjrmandy, 137
Nctrsk Hydro Hydn>genElectrolysis,
146
North: Africa, 90,137; 162, 195;
America, 277; China Area Army;
187; Korea, 64
Ncjmay 133,134,144,145-152,187;
Agrarian party. o f , 147; attacked
by Germany, 145; government in
exile, 146; Nazi invasion to,
206-207; Royal family of, 146;
SOE IN, 146; and version of
fascism, 147; viewed by Nazis,
145; See also Flagstad, Hamsun,
Quisling, Sindig
NcjmegiamI 207
Nctsenko, Yuri, 61
Natium, naval battle at, 18
NSA (National Scurity Agency), 60
Nueces, 118
Nuremberg, 140
 Index 393,

Palestine Liberation Organizatian

(PLO), 298; negntiatiom with, 300
Obfuscate, 26Q,261 Palestinian Authority, 279
Objective, 7 Palmach, 286
Occupation, 466,486,284 Panzer: divisictns, 243
@day, Rosemary 78 Paradise, 91
Office of Strategic Semices (OS$),131, Paris, 130,161, 185,242,243,244,248
323n"i" Parkinson, Lord, 83
Ogen, assodation, 318n90 Partisan(s), 1'1"0,176,302,
WLeary, Jeremiah, 119 Party: contiernative, 82,83,202;
Oliver, Arnalya L., 10 independent, 82; labor, 82; liberal,
Ombudsman, 79 82; sc:,ciat demo>cratic,83
" h e night stand," "gQ8,309 Pastor, 2 84
Operation: Barbarc~sa,172, 173?176; Patblogy of politics, 4115-146
Catapult, 327n100; Drumbeat, Patient (S), 94
315d2; Fall Gelb, 152; Nazi, 121; Patriotic traitors, 41,238,223
Torch, 164; Weser Exercise, 145 Patriot(ism), 420, 424, 454, 485, 494,204
Oran, 162 Patten, Chris, 23
Oregon, 194 Pattun, General George, 264,Z 76
Organiz;ation(s):formal, 3% hostile, 39, Paulust Field Marshal Friedrich, 482
See also treacherr~us Pavelic, Ante, 171;as a traitor, 171
organizations Peace Now, 301,302
0rganiz;ed muder, 91 Pearl Harbor, 130,133,194,215,220,
Ormerod, Captain Gerald j., 15 221,255
OwelX, George, $0 Peking, 187
Osaka, 494,492 Pell, Claiborne H., 247
Qsakn A s ~ h i 191
, Pettey, Williarn Dudley 120
Oscar awards, 122,123 Penkovsky, Oleg, 61-62
OSS, see Office of Strategic Services Perfidy 47
Qslnrbeitel; 74 Perry, GeoRrey, Z,ieutenant, 208,209
Ostrovsky Victor, 29&--299,305;and Persians, 18
book, 239; born, 298; in Mossad, Peru, 85
298; as trajtc3z; 299; wifet 298 Petacci, CXara, 302
WToofe, J, A., 117,123,304 Petain, Marshal Philtlip, 2 2 3,116,138,
UToole, Peter, 422 142! 156-159, 161, 162! 165, 188,
Ottawa, 58,Q 259,2CZO,312; trial of, 158; betrayal
Oursler, F-trfton, 254255 of, 158; traitor or hero, 258
Overholster, Dr. Winfred, 222 Peter 11 (King), 169
Petrov, Vladlimir; 58,61
13aci&c:wuth, 56 Philadelphia, 30,31
""Pct of Steel,"73?74 Philby, Kim, 36,58,62,6344,68,143
Palestine, 69,282,283,290; and Philistines, 19-20
Transjordan, 95 Philippines, 21,76,2 86,329n41
392 Index

13incher,Chapman, 16,114-115 Potanchan, 265,266,267

Pingectt, Anne, 50 Potsclam Allied Agreements, 143
Fing-pong, 98 Pound, Ezra, 25,36,112,114,219-224,
13into, 78 226,227,307,310,312; A Pact, 227;
Pitt (British Prime Minister), 33 anti-%mi tism, 220,221,223, 224,
Fittman, Dr. Frank, 47 228,333n7n20;
131agiarize,95 agc2inst his country, 228; amested,
Ploscowe, Morris, 108 221; barn, 219; cantos, 220,224;
FIumed Serpent, 265 career as a poet, 219; choicq 221,
131urafistic mcic?;ty,9 227; and Cdes, 223; and
Plymouth, 2% communism, 220; and
Foetfs), 68 compassion, 227; 228;
130etsTorner,228 correspondence with Lord Haw-
Pogrom, 120 Haw, 224; and Cornell, 222; death
Poker, 41 of, 223; and deception, 223; and
130fand,57,7!5,134,202,203; attacked Borathy, 224; eccentric, 223;
by Germany, 137,207; and fifth failing to detect evil, 227 and
column, 133; and non-aggression federal,jury 221,222; giving the
pact, 241 fascist salute, 224; and hatred,
Poles, 207 227,228; and EIemingway, 224;
Fotice, 53; military 298 insanity 222,223,228; and Judge
130fish:communist party, 143; taw, 223; marriage, 219;
government-in-exile, 75;integrity, patriotic traitor, 223; and Poets'
75; officers, 143-144; secret Corner, 228; pro-faxist-, 223;
service, 59,98; soldiers, 773; promoting young authors, 220;
Sctlidarity mctvement, 73; radio transmission%220; in
undergrc~und,96 Rappalo, 21 9,220,222; sanity 222,
130fitical:consciousness, 76; influence, 224; in St. Elizabeth" hospital,
432,467 223,224; and semitivity, 227;
Fot k, President, 118 as traitor, 223; and treason, 221,
130flard,Jonathan, 36,39,42,6M9,%, 2 2 ; "trial" of, 221,222; visit to
99,115,305,307; Ann, 69 U.S.A., 220; walking, 219; and
Fotmax; Norman, 60 Washington" indictment, 221;
130f 130t, 76 13QW:Allies, 186, 199, 216; British,
Polyakov, Dimitri, 58 124,204; camp, 449,204; Irish, 81";;
Fond, Charles, 36 Soviet, 174,175,176,17;7,178
130ntr?Vedra Beach, 121 Power, 171,310; configurations, 274;
Podland spy ring, 59, 1111 cmtest of, 89, 425;
Fort StanXey, 206 of money 113; ritual of, 97;
130rtugal,243,247,248,248,249,250 struggle, 89;
Poduguese East Africa, 85 in time of crisis, 424
Fostmc>dernism,312 PcIwers, Garlr, 101
Potemkin, 56 Powel, Enoch, 83
 Index
13rague,142; destruction of, 176; 13.O.A.
manifesto, 176; spring of?73;
uprising in, 1%
13redictability, 11
Prescott, William H., 268
Prince Charles, 58
13rinceof Wales, 233
Princess Diana, 50
Prisoner(s) of war (POW), 42,295;
coercion of, 296; expectations
from, 295,296. See also Illan;
Levinberg; Cousens
13ritchettthe Very Rwerend Harry S.,
228
Private: investigation, 38,42,94; life, 51
13robst,Christoph, 182
Professional Betrayal, 38,94-95
Profurno, John, 112
13ropagc2nda,11(4,120,174,175,177,
491,203,213,304,303
Prostitute, 47,5Q
13rotestantism,85
Public life, 51
Public vs. private, 112
13uertacarrero,Alonso Hern6ndez de,
267
Pu-M (emperc~r),187, 196
Quebec, 34
Queen Alexandra, 46
Queen Mary, 230
Quetzalcaatl, 265
Quisling, Vidkun, 24,36,42,108,113,
114,226,14&152,155,164, 166,
467, 488,218,228,260,304,302,
307,310,313,312; adapting Nazi-
like insignia, 148; admiratian of
Germany and Italy, 148; and anti-
Semiitism, 150; Germany's
attitude towards, 149; conspiring
with Hitler and Raeder, 151;
contacts with Germany Nazi
party, 149; and democracy, 148;
393
elections, 148; executed, 151; and
Hamsun, 225,226; ideological
views of, 148,149; marginal
position of, 149; marriage, 147;
military career, 147; as minister of
defense, 147; as minister
president, 151; and Na$onal
Sampling, 448; as the pnrtqorel;
148; and patrio>tism,151; political
career of, 147; political failure,
149-151; and "praf. A," 88; and
Terboven, 149; as a traitor; 151.
See also Duke of Windsor.
Qumm, 90
Rabin: Leah, 301; Yitzhak, 279,
29-305; and ideological
differences, 303; in Nazi unifc~rm,
301; similarities to other
assassinations, 303; threats on,
303; as traitor, 299-301
Rachel (Israeli poet), 51
Kad, Hertzel, 313~11
Radfa, Munir, 59
Radio: Hi-rmbuq, 203; Luxembourg,
208; traitors, 25,196,213;
transmissions, 69,103,120,174,
204,213,220,240; from Verdun,
240,241,254
Rahab, 317n64
Ramos, Fidel, 21
Kappalo, 249,220,222
Rastenburg, 183
Rathenau, Walteu; 304
Kauter, Hanm Albin, 154
Ravna Gora, 170
Reality; 7,304; construction of, 13, 311;
false, 309; vs. image, 304; mirrors
and masks of, 127,311
Red Army, 100,144,174,176,177,178,
189; intelligence unit, 189
Reichstag: burning of, 137,192,
323n9
394 Index
Rebel(s), 54,11 8; traitorurn, 76
Rebellion: in Iraq, 195; Iran Guard, 472,
196; in Pragulrl, 1%; Scottish, 123.
See also Essex;
Jewish; Mormon,
Red1is, Alexandex; 98
I3eedel; Eggart, 153
Repatriation, 74,75
Researcherfs),94
Resistance, 138,139,141,145,154,159,
464,4(-;2,477,480
Revolt, 17; against Britain, 204; of
students, 181
Rexist movement, 153
Reynaud, Paul, 156,158
Ixhineland, 137,234
Wade Island, 448
Ribbentrop, Joachim von, 73,175,2312,
233,234,239,249,3Xn35;
ambassador to Britain, 235; and
Mrs. Simpson, 235,256,335n36;
plotting against the Windsors, 247
Riddle of ftw Sands, The, 92
Rio Grandet 118
IGyka, Hubert, 133
Ksk(s), 11/75
R.O.A., see Russian Liberation Army
Robinsrrm, 13eterW., 80
Roman: Catholic, 22,885;
Emperc~r,278; Empire, 27'7,279;
province of Judea, 277
Romania, 137; 171-173; army 172;
economy, 172; Jews in, 172;
Nazi friendly 173; Russian
invasion to, 473; I-raitorc~usstate,
173;
see also Iron Guard
Romans, 425
Romantic: friendship, 38;
mamiage, 45
Romanticism, 444
Rome, 54,94; irnperiaX 18
RornmeX, Field Marshal Ewin, 183,195
Roosevdt, Franklin B., 46, 59,60, 68,
74,96,131, 132,163,164,165,166,
1170,220,253,254,255,258,33n7
Rosenberg, Alfred, 149
Rosenberg' EEthel and Julius, 111
Rc>wlands,Sherr~p,47
Royal Air Force QR,A.E), 251
Royal UugnsIavian Army, 169
Run Silent, Rtlrl Deep, 214
Rusbridger, Jarnes, 130
Russia, 147,248; Czarist, 57, 470
Russian(s): dtizens, 207; revolution, 75,
188; soldiers, 176; white, 75
Russian Liberation Army (R.O.A,), 174
175,176; fighting duties, 176,177;
performance, 177; Pragzle
manifesto, 176; suicide, 176;
surrender, 176
Sabri, Sheik Akrame, 885
Sabotage,55,96,116, 319,131,132,146,
155,216,323n3
Sadat, Artwar, 495
Saxerno, 75
Salo Republic, 74
Samson, 49-20
Saratoga, Battle of, 30,34
Sargent, Sir Orme, 233
Slay knn, 436
Ijcandinavia, 183
khelleberg, WaXter: mission, 249,
337n124; paisaned, 33"7124;
threatening Windsox; 249
kheppele, Mim Lane, 39
ghmidt, Maria, 60
Ijchmorelf, Alexandex; 182
%hull: Ham, 182; Suphie, 182
ghosrman, D. F., 40
Ijchuschnigg, Kurt von, 135,140
Selzutzbund, 70
ghutzstaffel (the $,S.), 175,176,239,
303
Selzuyler, 36
Schuyter, General Philip, 31 Shayter, 71
khtvartz, Michal, 237,2298 Shazar, Zalman, 51
khwart.zenegger, Amold, 21 Sheib, EIdad, 291,292
Science fiction, 25 Sherner, Dan, 291
kofield, Paul, 422 Shepherd, Elizabeth, 47
Season, 343n66 Shertok, Mcjshe, 96
Second Oldest Projess-io:~,The, 67 Shevchenko, Arkady, 58
Secrecy, 33,37, 115, 446,247,340; Shia, 85,90
definition of, 39; existence of, 48; Shiitcz,83
sociology of, 39 Shippen, Margaret (Peggy), 30,31,33
Secret(s): betrayal, 146; disclosing af, Ships: Corte" burning af, 267; cjf fire,
284,299; intimacy, 47; and 33
whistle-blowers, 78 Shiva, 20
Sedition, 17,27; 116, 420 Shorokhov, Afamy M,, 58
Selection: of cases, 127 Shpillman, Anshetl, 284
""Self help crinninal justice," 320 Shrimpton, Michael, 83
Seligman, Adam, 10,14,413 Slztinkeq 136
Selwyn, Francis, 203,221 0,221 1 Siberia, 187,190
Senesh, Hama, 290 Sicarii, 90
Sensation seeking, 140 Sicily, 47
Serbia: fc~rcel;,370; memorializing Sijva, Ricardo Espirito Santo, 248,251,
General Mihajtovic, 170; 252
natimalism, 469; Orthcjdox, 4 71 SimmeL, Georg, 40,13, 408
Seth, Ronatd, 124,189,190 Simpson, Mrs. Wallis Warfielid, 229,
Settlers, 279 23,232,241,244; and the "China
Sex, 22,4ii",440; espionage, 72; exotic, dossier" 23235;divorcet 234,232;
235; group, 44,126; and money, Duchess of Windsor, 236; Her
309; trap, 93 130yal f-lighess (HlW) status,
Sexual: abuse, 94; attraction, 48; 236,244,246; as Hitler "sguest,
chemistry; 48; exchanges, 63; 238; a Nazi sympathizer, 233; and
exclusivity, 353,44,47,126; Paris ayartmrtnl; 248; and
faithlessness, 52, 494; favors, 94; Kbbentmp, 335n36; shaking
relations, 46 Hitler" bhand, 238,335~53;visit to
Seyffardt, General f-lendrik Alaander, Nazi Germany, 23&-239; watched
155 by the FBI, 256
Seyss-Inquad, A ~ h u r1, 40,154,167, Sinai Campaign, 67
312 Sindig, Christian, 226
Shabac, 4 Sin<>-Japanese war, 193
Shai, 285,286,341n24 SE, 63,335n36
Shamir, Avner, 317n7Q Sisera, 20
Shanghai, 486,489,494,492 Sisigmund If, King Augustus, 57
Shamn, Ariet, 339n104 Sita, Kurt, 78
Shaved heads, 2 59 Six Bays War; 67
396
Skorzeny, Major Otto, 74
Slave, 118,177; and betrayal, 275; as
inferior people, 175
Sloan, Alfred I?., 253
Slc~vakia,141,170
Smersh, 190
Smiley, 72
Smith, Icebrandt, 317~750
SmoXensk, 143
Snipers, 285
Social: boundaries, 312; cohesictn, 183;
control, 310; integration, 183;
problems, 7; justice, 120;
stmctul-e, 52
Sc~detalreaction, 108
SucietyQies): atomized and
bureaucratized 413;
monochromatic 12; multimorality
12
Sociolagical imagination, 4, 110
Sc~crates,107-1 08
Sukolow, Victor, 70
Sold his soul to the devil, 45
Sc~ff,Frau Johanna, 183
Suf ilary canfinemnl; 14
Sorzderkommandl~,143
Sc~ntag,Sherry 100
Surge, Richard, 68,7Q, 114,188,
488-490; and P-iotsumiOzaki, 192;
conversion to c=ommunism,188;
lover, 189; trust of Stalin in, 190
South Africa, 23,68,77; 83,135,
232
Suutheast Asia, 138
Soviet: army, 665;
citizens welcoming invasion, 177;
defeatism, 176,177; dixontent,
477; embassy in Israel, 70,291;
espionage in America, 71;
intelligence, 70; military
Intelligence, see C.R.U .;
operators, 294; I""s>Xitburo,143;
troops, 137; Ukranian Front, 176;
Index
Unian, 36,57,58,6l, 62,64,73, 75,
99,130,137; 144,172,173
Space Shuttle, 78
Spain, 41,134,137,170,243,244,247,
248,251,263
Spaniards, 274,275
Spanish, 267; Civil War; 63,69,131;
Conquest, 263,269,2"i7;
c=s>nqujstadors, 267,2653; culture,
265; invaders, 2271; Mexico, 117;
shipwr-eck,264; sources, 2711
Sparta, 18
Spartans, 18
Special Operations Executive (SOE),
131,3;?4n38; Nowegian, 146
Speer, Albert, 234
Spencel; Earl Charles, 550
Spy(ies), 28, 70, 102; famous pclopte as,
68; industrial, 93; netwrork, 66,
189,190; planted, 28; as traitors,
66,98--101
Spying, 66
Squealing(ers),53,8fl
S.S., see khutzstaffel
Sl'nIrlg 37,21
Stalin, Jnseph, 58,71,74,77,470,488,
189; brutality 1%; distrust of, 174;
purges, 124,171,174,176;
resistance to, 177; totalitarian rule,
174,176; tyranny of, 178
Stalingrad, see Battle, oof Stalingrad
Stamp(s), 101,190, 329n53
Staples, William J., 97
Starnation, 166,217
Stasi, 54
State Department, 59,643,120,247
State-sponmred terror, 38'76-T, 171;
see also Croatia and Utjtachi
Status quo, 5
Stauffenberg, Colonel Count Claw
ucm, 112,114,138,183,196,307
Stealth, 24,221 7,309,312
St. Elizabeth's hospital, 223,224
 Index 397

St. John the Divine Cathedral, 228 296; telephane lines in, 296; and
Stephanie of Monaco, 50 Y m Kippur war, 294
Sternberg, Josef von, 185
Stern Gang, 2281, See Lehi Tabasco, 265,266,267
Stigmatization, 34 Taiwan, 191
SlingI 93 Takada, Tadashi, 192
Stohreu; k%erhard van, 245,247, Tarnir, Shmuelt, 2854,290,291,292,293
248 Target, 37
Stc~rrs,Rc>naldSir; 282 Teheran, 170
Strauss, Anselm, 323n71 Te1 Aviv, 70,99,284,286,288,291,293,
Strikebreaking, 38,87-89,404 304; university of, 70
Students: in Nazi Germany; 181; Telemark, 146
revolts (1%8), 76 Tenepal, Malinali, 24,266,267,270,
Subversion, 47,132,167,194,216,217; 274; acts of, 274; brc~therof, 270;
as morally questionable, 217 CirnatX (mother of), 266,270;
Sudeten, 134,135,141,142,143; crossing cultural boundaries, 275;
German, 38,432 family of origin, 266; lingual
Suez Canal, 66 talents of, 2%; place of birth, 266;
Sugarno prison, 2 93 social construction of, 274; and
Suicide, 459, 476,278,296 slavery, 2&5,2"i"; and trust and
Sztfnnz,291,292 lo>yalty275; and VEasc)v, 275. See
Sunday Dispn tck, 254 also Cltolollam; Co&e%s,
S u n d q Tifzes, 14,15,9St320n126 Malincfie; Marina
Surgery: unnecessary 94 Tenochtltla'n, 26F269
Surveillance, 38,97-98; military, 97 Terboven, Josef, 149,225,335n53; see
Survey 212-21 3 also Norway.
Suspicion, 1I Terror: countex; 170; mass, 1170; reign
Swap, W., 9 of, 57,77
SWAPO (South West Africa Pe.oplePs Theater, 40
Organization), '77 Theft: by individuals, 71; of
Sweden, 2 45,208; iron ore from, 145 information, 71,72
Swinging, 44 Theological circle, 113
Switzerland, 134,135,182,290; banks, Therapistfs), 94
168 Thermopylae, 2 S
Sydney, 216 Third man, 316n53
Symbolic interaction, 311 Thomas, Gwynne, 233,234,236,243,
Symbolic moral universe, 9,12,22,24, 249
55,180,260,274,275, 285,294, Threat potential, 27,33,45,52,108,115,
304; and betrayal, 217,3017,312; 196,309
competition beween, 312 Thugs, 90
Syria, 3,64,69,91,95,130,294; "Ticking BombfPT7
captivity in, 245; intelligence of, Emcs Lz'temq Sznppletnenl, 127
293; and POWs, 295; and prison, Tito (Marshal), 170
398 Index
"naxcaltecs, 268,270,274
Taguri, Iva, 214,218; American citizn,
214; choices, 217,218; and
Cousens, 216; hospitalization of,
215; Iimuro, Ftrmi, ( m t h e r (;)Q,
214; coerced into broadcasting,
216; compared to Joyce, 216,217;
Jun (father of), 214; marriage, 245;
and Medical school, 214; pardon
to,216; sabotagng trantimissions,
216; Shizu (aunt of), 214; and
Swiss mission, 215; as Tokyo
Rose, 216; and UCLA, 214;
Uokc~kama,214
Tokyo, 187,189,191,192,193,215,216;
radia, 215,216
Takyo no%, 25,188,197,199,214-217;
see also Tc>guri,Iva
Tolerance, 122,124
Tarontcr, 299
Torrey, E. Fuller, 223
T o r t u ~77,162,296
, and power, 125;
Taulon, 163
Toussaint, (General), 176
Tower of London, 21,122,123
Tawrmsend, Francis E,, 120
"Train of the prestigious," "9, 290
RaitorCs): conditians for, 308; and
conspiracy, 183; Debs, 11%
definition of, 309; as deviants, 114;
Farouk, 195; vs. heroes, 105,271;
and identitis, 341; individual,
281,309; in Jerusalem, 285;
motivation of, 114; opportunistic,
288,311; and radio, 196,189; role
of, 112; as sad men, 109; vs. spies,
9&--101,295;as true believers, 1122;
unrealistic view of the world, 123;
viewing of, 36. See also, Hero, .\rs.
traitor
Traitor" Gate, 21,122
Tralee Bay; 86
Rantilator, 267,269,270
Treacherous organization, 281,305,
309; See also, Dereeb Hanitzaz
Treason, 17,25,27,38,39,293; act, 210;
vs, betrayal 18,312; boundaries
aft 121,196; as a cmtinuous
variable, 259; and criminolc>gy,
116; damages of, 115; and
deception, 116; definition aft
106-1 07,115,116, 125; depth and
intensity of, 259; as deviance, 114;
and the Duke crf Windsor, 245;
empirical manifestations of, 127';
encyclopedia of, 127; in Engjand,
122-124; and Ezra Pound, 221;
high and petit, 106. 170;
insinuatians, 119; in Mexico, 271;
and morality, 125; motivation for,
110,112,114,115, 124; nature of,
299,312;
in Nazi Germany, 17'&1%; vs.
opposition, 121;political Ievel 18;
punishment for, 108,310; via
radio, 199; and Rabin, 300;
reason(s) for, 108,111, 112; and
social change, 112,416,124; and
societies, 127; structure and
content of, 126-127; threat of, 115;
trials, 423; types aft 112, 446;
universal crime 125; in the
U.S.A., 116-1 22; and violence, 11C;;
within the Third Reich, 17'&1%,
196. See also, Derech Hanltzc>z;
Dissent
Trickery, 47'
Trots, Thilo von, 149
Trotsky, Lean, 91
Truck drivers strike, 89
Trunk, 63
Trust, 9-14,24,27; boundaries of, 294;
crisis in, 40; and deception, 37;'
definition of, 9-10, 129;
diminishing of, 113; faked, 93;
 Index
importance of, 11--l4; invoking
other concepts, 41; meaning of 12;
nationat 17,130; and secrecy; 39;
and treason, 113; violatiron of
42-13,36,37, 296,308; and
whistle-blc>wers,'78
Ruman, Harry, 323n7
Trusted Criminals, 42
Truth, 7; manipulation of, 12;
unadulterated, 13
Tubianski, Captain Meir, 285-289,305,
322~65;arrest of, 285,2%; and
Ben-Curion, 287; buried, 287;
career of, 286;
cleansed, 287-288; convicted, 287;
executed, 287,288; found
innocent, 288; judges of, 287; and
justice, 288; member of Hagana,
286; suspected of, 286; and
treason, 286,287; trial ofy286-287;
wife of, 287
Tmisia, 163
Turin, 74
Turkey 95,130
Turki, Boud, 293
Tumcc>at(ing),32,37; 81-84,259, 308,
312; and persc>naliv,83; political,
38,39; R,C),A., 177
Tutanji, Wamis, 303
Truili'ghl otter Engl~nd,204
2002 - A S p c e Odyssey, 20
Typology 38,72
Tyranny, 122,178
Tyrannicide, 92
U-2,101
U-boatls), 5 5 233,208,253;
commander, 1%; pens 47; U-19,
86; U-202,121; U-584,121
Ukraine, 2 32
Unabamber, 53
Unconditional surrender, 173
U ~ t e Kingdom,
d 46,63,2 22,246
399
United Nations, 283
United Statesf 558,64,66,96, 404, 463,
189,2t33,33n3; civil war, 118,124;
collaboration with Nazis in, 132;
embassy in London, 68; and fifth
column, 132,194; German agents
in, 119'2 20'2 21; natianal security,
61,9f); navy 68; Nazi activity in,
120; submarines, 99; Supreme
Court, 294; and treasrrm, 2 2 6-122;
visit of Gesrge Vl, King, 224; war
with Nazi Germany, 221; and
whistle-blowers, 79. See aalso,
Pound, Togttri
Universiv of: Califc~rnia,Los Angeles
QUCLA), 214; Chicago, 45;
Pennsylvania, 219
Uprising, 17
Ustachl 171,172; as traitors, 171
Uxbridge, 83
"V," '142
Va'anunu, Mordechai, 14-45,93,94,
101,115,285,320n 126
Vaillant, George C., 266,267,269,270
Valcaur Island, Battle of, 29,%
Valesco, Angel de, 250,251
Vallandigan, Clement L., 118
Value, 28,299; in~l-rmmensurability~ 16;
system, 1I
Vassal, John Williami, 112,321n27
Vassiliev, Alexander, 71
Vela'zzquez, Diego, 263
Venice, 219,224
Venona, 60,315~138
Vera Cruz, 266,267
Verdun, 240. see atso, Battle, of Verdun;
radio transmission from Verdun
Vered, Dan, 293-294,305
Vermont: as a Canadian prwince, 117
"hrmork Raid," 146
Verrier, Antchony, 163,164
Vespasian, 278
400 Index

Vichy, 142,156,157,1 58,159,161,162, 171; civil, 118; French Indian, 28;

445,258,30It326n97&98; and 0ctcr;ber 1973,130
Bedaux, 237; guide, 161; owerrun Warfare: ant-Partisan, 177;chemical
by German forces, 163 and biological, 99,294;
Victim, 37 subversive, 38
Vienna, 63,69,225,1240 Warmbruun, Wemer; 138
Viereck, George Sylvester, 120 Warren, Suzanne, 130
Vietnam: war in; 16,65,444,121 Warshawski, Michael,298
Vitification, 302 Washbum, Mrs. tois de, 120
Vinitzky-Seroussi, Yered, 317n70 Washington, 494
Violence, 116,304; vehal, 304 Washington, D.G., 51,58,69,120,221,
Virginia: Harper's Ferry, 118; 245,247
Richmond, l27 Washiington, General George, 29,30,
Vlasov, Lieutenant General Andrey A., 31,32,35,36
173-1 ;78,188,196,275,307, 31l, Wasserstein, Bernard, 96
312; amnsted, 176; capture, 174; Weale, Arian, 123,124
defeatist mavement, 176; Weapons: atomic, 62,132;
defection, 17%; pr~mC)tic>n of, 173;
undem-atex; 112
propaganda broadcasts, 174,175,
Weber, Max, 113
477,4713; Order of the Red Barner,
Weddel, A. W., 244,247
173; as trajtc3z; 178; wandering in
Wchrrnncf.&t, 61,65,71,95,
the forest, 174
124,137,140,143,144,145,152,
V.N .V. - Vlaam Naticjnaal Verbcjnd, 453
153,154,155,173,174,1176,178
Vc3cabularl"esof mo>tivet;,1717
Weimar Republic, 114,179,180,196;
Volcano, 339n43
Volkhcjv front, 17'3 and betrayal, 180
Vc3Xkogonov; General Dmitri, 60 Weinberg, Gerhard L., 195,242,257
Volkov, Kc~mtantin,61 Weinstein, Alfm, 71
Voltaire, 122 Weisfeld, Roman, 98
Vrij korps, 155 Weitz, Yechiarn, 293
Vyshinsky, Andrei, 60 Weitzman, Ezex; 53,8Q
Wemer-Gsen, Axel, 237,252,253,255
Wade, N., 95 Weygand, GmeraX, 157
VVaffen, S.S., 138 West: Bank, 279;
Walker: Arthur J,, 100; family of spies, Indies, 33; Point, 34,32
1CfO,115; John A., 100; Michael, 100 West, Rebecca, 111-31 2,113
VVall, T*, 9 West, Nigel, 111,277
Wallace, Wilfiarn, 423 Western civilizatian, 113
Waller, John H., 256,257 Westminster Abbey 32
VVandsworth prison, 211 Weyl, Nathaniel, 117, 493,304
War(s): of 1812, 448; American Wharam, Alan, 122,123
Revt,lutionar)l, 30,34,117; crimes, fitrhibley: Joanna, 22; Kevin, 22
 Index 401

WistXe-blowerO,4,38,53,78-81,201, Wright, Rev. Roderick, 21,46; as traitou;

411,318n86; legal protection for, 22
79-80; and powex; 80; Wyman, Davici S., 96
risks of, 79
White-collar crime, 38 Yale University 36
m i t e House, 51; and treaso)n, 222 Yalta Conference (""Argonaut"")55, 60,
m i t e , Margaret Cairns, 202,207 74,176,328n11
White Rose, 414,125,181,181-183,196, Vavneh, 279,280
322~65 Yazernitzky (Shamir), Uitzhak,
W?ziIeRose, The, (movie), 182 284
m i t e slavery, 120 Yedl'ot Aftamnot,284
Whitworth, jerry A,, 99 Yellin-Mc~r,Natan, 284
Wiener Library; 209 Yishuy 282
Wilhelmina (Queen): Fleehg to Vodfat, 278
England, 454 Yokcj, 1%
Wilson, Horaee, 246 Yc)kc)harna, 21 4
Wilson, Woodrclw, 119 Vucatan, 264,267; p e ~ n s u l a263
,
Winning, (Cardinal), 344n344 Yugoslavia, 432, 437 46%474;
Witch: craft, 25; hunt, 124 communist part_)j;170
VVodehouse, I? G., 2 99 Vurchenka, Vitaly, 2 00
Wolfi Markus, 68
V\lalf% Lair, 183 Zech-Burkesroda, Count Julius von,
VVoXsley, Cardinal, 2 23 242,243
Women: British, 167 ccctmEc>&,1%; Zelizer, Barbie, 334 7n70
French, 159; slaves, 266 Zerifin rmdergrctrmd, 231
muster, Bertie, 199 ''Zero hour," 21 6
VVocrsteu; General Uavid, 30 Ziegler, 13hilip,233,237,239,241,243,
Wordswclrth, William, 68 245,247,248,250,254256
W r l d War 1 (WWI), 63,86,119, 120, Zigzags, 162,164
156,184,188,230,231 Zilbemman, Vitzhak, 98
World War 11 (WWII), 63,72, 88, 95, Zimmermann, Mcwhe, 484
108,311,120, 137,156, 196, Zionist: elite, 282; ideology 21282;
323n3 leadership, 282; movemenl; 76;
Worsthorne, Sir Peregrine, 54 secular, 85,281,283,294
W u k , Herman, 56 Zulu, 83