G.R. No.

204926               December 3, 2014

ANACLETO C. MANGASER, represented by his Attorney-in-fact EUSTAQUIO

DUGENIA, Petitioner,
vs.
DIONISIO UGAY, Respondent.

CA Ruling

The CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC. Citing Quizon v. Juan,  it emphasized that
14

petitioner must allege and prove that he was in prior physical possession of the property in
dispute. The word "possession," as used in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, meant
nothing more than physical possession, not legal possession in the sense contemplated in civil law
[rebutted by SC]. The CA wrote that petitioner was not in physical possession despite the
presentation of the OCT No. RP-174(13789) and his tax declarations.  It reiterated that when the
15

law would speak of possession in forcible entry cases, it is prior physical possession or
possession de facto, as distinguished from possession de Jure. What petitioner proved was
legal possession, not his prior physical possession. Furthermore, the CA stated that the RTC
misquoted Nunez v. SLTEAS Pheonix Solutions  by giving the wrong notion of what kind of
16

possession was contemplated in forcible entry cases. In other words, physical possession was the
crux in forcible entry, not possession that stemmed upon ownership.  The dispositive portion of the
17

assailed decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review is GRANTED, accordingly, the
Decision dated August 23, 2011 and Order dated October 25, 2011, of the RTC Branch 33, Bauang,
La Union in Civil Case No. 2029-BG are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the MTC
dated April 26, 2011 is hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO CONSIDER THE EVIDENCE OF

OWNERSHIP OF PETITIONER WHICH MAY ESTABLISH PRIOR POSSESSION OVER THE
PROPERTY BY HEREIN PETITIONER.

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE RESOLUTION DATED DECEMBER 5, 2012 OF THE COURT OF

APPEALS, FORMER SPECIAL FOURTH DIVISION, DENYING THE MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION IS VALID. 22

Petitioner argues that in ejectment cases, possession of the land does not only mean actual or
physical possession or occupation but also by the fact that a land is subject to the action of
one's will or by proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right; that the
CA should have considered OCT No. RP-174(13789) his tax declaration as proofs of prior physical
possession over the property; and that the issuance of the same are considered to by law as proper
acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right. Petitioner cited Tolentino, as one of
the authors and experts in Civil law, stating that the "proper acts and formalities" refer to juridical
acts, or the acquisition of possession by sufficient title, inter vivas or mortis causa, onerous or
lucrative. These are the acts which the law gives the force of acts of possession.

Petitioner also avers that the December 5, 2012 CA Resolution was not valid as it did not state the
legal basis required by the Constitution.

On May 28, 2013, respondent filed his Comment  before this Court. He stated that the issues raised
23

and the arguments presented by petitioner have been thoroughly resolved and ruled upon by the
CA. The appellate court did not err in reversing the RTC decision because petitioner was never in
prior physical possession of the property in dispute. Respondent asserts that he has been in prior,
actual, continuous, public, notorious, exclusive and peaceful possession in the concept of an owner
of the property in dispute.
24

On March 28, 2014, petitioner filed his Reply,  reiterating the case of Nunez v. SLTEAS Phoenix
25

Solutions, Inc.,  where a party was able to demonstrate that it had exercised acts of ownership over
26

the property by having it titled in its name and by paying real property taxes on it. Petitioner also
laments the wrongful insistence of respondent that his possession over the property was one in the
concept of an owner. To petitioner's mind, respondent failed to adequately adduce evidence to show
proof of his right to possess the property when his possession came under attack with the filing of
the subject case. 27

The Court's Ruling

The Court finds the petition meritorious.

For a forcible entry suit to prosper, the plaintiffs must allege and prove: (a) that they have prior
physical possession of the property; (b) that they were deprived of possession either by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; and, (c) that the action was filed within one (1) year from the
time the owners or legal possessors learned of their deprivation of the physical possession of
the property. 28

There is only one issue in ejectment proceedings: who is entitled to physical or material possession
of the premises, that is, to possession de facto, not possession de Jure? Issues as to the right of
possession or ownership are not involved in the action; evidence thereon is not admissible,
except only for the purpose of determining the issue of possession. 29

As a rule, the word "possession" in forcible entry suits indeed refers to nothing more than prior
physical possession or possession de facto, not possession de Jure or legal possession in
the sense contemplated in civil law. Title is not the issue, and the absence of it "is not a ground for
the courts to withhold relief from the parties in an ejectment case." 30

The Court, however, has consistently ruled in a number of cases  that while prior physical
31

possession is an indispensable requirement in forcible entry cases, the dearth of merit in

respondent's position is evident from the principle that possession can be acquired not only by
material occupation, but also by the fact that a thing is subject to the action of one's will or by
the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right. The case of Quizon v.
Juan,  which surprisingly was relied on by the CA, also stressed this doctrine.
32

Possession can be acquired by juridical acts. These are acts to which the law gives the force
of acts of possession. Examples of these are donations, succession, execution and
registration of public instruments, inscription of possessory information titles and the
like.  The reason for this exceptional rule is that possession in the eyes of the law does not mean
33

that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in
possession.  It is sufficient that petitioner was able to subject the property to the action of his
34

will.  Here, respondent failed to show that he falls under any of these circumstances. He could not
35

even say that the subject property was leased to him except that he promised that he would vacate it
if petitioner would be able to show the boundaries of the titled lot.

In the case of Nunez v. SLTEAS Phoenix Solutions, inc.,   the subject parcel was acquired by the
36

respondent by virtue of the June 4, 1999 Deed of Assignment executed in its favor by Spouses Ong
Tiko and Emerenciana Sylianteng. The petitioner in the said case argued that, aside from the
admission in the complaint that the subject parcel was left idle and unguarded, the respondent's
claim of prior possession was clearly negated by the fact that he had been in occupancy thereof
since 1999. The Court disagreed with the petitioner and said: Although it did not immediately put the
same to active use, respondent appears to have additionally caused the property to be registered in
its name as of February 27, 2002 and to have paid the real property taxes due thereon alongside the
sundry expenses incidental thereto. Viewed in the light of the foregoing juridical acts, it consequently
did not matter that, by the time respondent conducted its ocular inspection in October 2003,
petitioner hml already been occupying the land since 1999.

Hence, in that case, the Court ruled that such juridical acts were sufficient to establish the
respondent's prior possession of the subject property.

The case of Habagat Grill v. DMC-Urban Property Developer, Inc.,  also involves an action for
37

forcible entry. On June 11, 1981, David M. Consunji, Inc. acquired a residential lot situated in Matin
a, Davao City, which was covered by TCT No. T-82338. On June 13, 1981, it transferred the said lot
to respondent DMC. Alleging that the petitioner forcibly entered the property in December 1993, the
respondent filed on March 28, 1994 a complaint for forcible entry. One of the issues raised therein
was whether respondent DMC had prior possession of the subject property, to which the Court
answered in the affirmative. It ruled that:

Prior possession of the lot by respondent's predecessor was sufficiently proven by evidence of
the execution and registration of public instruments and by the fact that the lot was subject
to its will from then until December 1, 1993, when petitioner unlawfully entered the premises and
deprived the former of possession thereof.
[Emphasis and underscoring supplied]

In the case at bench, the Court finds that pet1t1oner acquired possession of the subject
property by juridical act, specifically, through the issuance of a free patent under Commonwealth
Act No. 141 and its subsequent registration with the Register of Deeds on March 18, 1987

This Court is of the strong view that the issue of ownership should be provisionally
determined in this case. [Possession de jure or ownership can be used to aid in the determination
of “prior possession”] First, the juridical act from which the right of ownership of petitioner arise
would be the registration of the free patent and the issuance of OCT No. RP-174(13789).
Apparently, the Torrens title suggests ownership over the land. Second, respondent also
asserts ownership over the land based on his prior, actual, continuous, public, notorious, exclusive
and peaceful possession in the concept of an owner of the property in dispute.  Because there are
40

conflicting claims of ownership, then it is proper to provisionally determine the issue of ownership to
settle the issue of possession de facto.

Returning to the case, this Court cannot agree with the CA that petitioner's OCT No. RP-
174(13789) and his tax declarations should absolutely be disregarded. The issuance of an
original certificate of title to the petitioner evidences ownership and from it, a right to the
possession of the property flows. Well-entrenched is the rule that a person who has a
Torrens title over the property is entitled to the possession thereof

Moreover, his claim of possession is coupled with tax declarations. While tax declarations are not
conclusive proof of possession of a parcel of land, they are good indicia of possession in the concept
of an owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual
or constructive possession.  Together with the Torrens title, the tax declarations dated 1995
42

onwards presented by petitioner strengthens his claim of possession over the land before his
dispossession on October 31, 2006 by respondent.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The June 13, 2012 Decision and the December 5, 2012
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 122153 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The August 23, 2011 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, Bauang, La Union, is
hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.