Spouses Willie & Amelia Umaguing V. Atty. Wallen de Vera: 3D 2021-2022 - Problem Areas in Legal Ethics

#1
SPOUSES WILLIE & AMELIA UMAGUING v. ATTY. WALLEN DE VERA

A.C. No. 10451 | 4 February 2015 | Duty of Candor
DOCTRINE
Every lawyer is a servant of the law, and has to observe and maintain the rule of law as well as be
an exemplar worthy of emulation by others. It is by no means a coincidence, therefore, that the core
values of honesty, integrity, and trustworthiness are emphatically reiterated by the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
FACTS
As alleged in the Complaint, Umaguing ran for the position of SK Chairman in the SK Elections for
the year 2007 but lost to her rival Jose Gabriel Bungag by one (1) vote. Because of this,
complainants lodged an election protest and enlisted the services of Atty. De Vera. On November 7,
2007, complainants were asked by Atty. De Vera to pay his acceptance fee of P30,000.00, plus
various court appearance fees and miscellaneous expenses in the amount of P30,000.00.[4]
According to the complainants, Atty. De Vera had more than enough time to prepare and file the
case but the former moved at a glacial pace and only took action when the November 8, 2008
deadline was looming.
Atty. De Vera then rushed the preparation of the necessary documents and attachments for the
election protest. Two (2) of these attachments are the Affidavits[6] of material witnesses Mark
Anthony Lachica (Lachica) and Angela Almera (Almera), which was personally prepared by Atty. De
Vera. At the time that the aforesaid affidavits were needed to be signed by Lachica and Almera, they
were unfortunately unavailable. To remedy this, Atty. De Vera allegedly instructed AbethLalong- Isip
(Lalong- Isip) and Hendricson Fielding (Fielding) to look for the nearest kin or relatives of Lachica
and Almera and ask them to... sign over the names. The signing over of Lachica's and Almera's
names were done by Christina Papin (Papin) and Elsa Almera- Almacen, respectively. Atty. De Vera
then had all the documents notarized before one Atty. Donato Manguiat
Later, however, Lachica discovered the falsification and immediately disowned the signature affixed
in the affidavit and submitted his own Affidavit, declaring that he did not authorize Papin to sign the
document on his behalf. Lachica's affidavit was presented to the MeTC and drew the ire of Presiding
Judge Edgardo Belosillo (Judge Belosillo), who ruled that the affidavits filed by Atty. De Vera were
falsified. Judge Belosillo pointed out that while Atty. De Vera filed a pleading to rectify this error
seeking, among others, the withdrawal of Lachica's and Almera's affidavits, it was observed that
such was a mere flimsy excuse since Atty. De Vera had ample amount of time to have the affidavits
personally signed by the affiants but still hastily filed the election protest with full knowledge that the
affidavits at hand were falsified.
In further breach of his oath as a lawyer, the complainants pointed out that Atty. De Vera did not
appear before the MeTC, although promptly notified, for a certain December 11, 2007 hearing; and
did not offer any explanation as to why he was not able to attend.
The complainants then confronted Atty. De Vera and asked for an explanation regarding his non-
appearance in the court. Atty. De Vera explained that he was hesitant in handling the particular case
3D 2021-2022 | Problem Areas in Legal Ethics

because of the alleged favoritism of Judge Belosillo. According to Atty. De Vera, Judge Belosillo
received P60,000.00 from the defense counsel, Atty. Carmelo Culvera, in order to acquire a
favorable decision for his client. Atty. De Vera averred that he would only appear for the case if the
complainants would give him P80,000.00, which he would in turn, give to Judge Belosillo to secure a
favorable decision for Umaguing.
On December 12, 2007, for lack of trust and confidence in the integrity and competency of Atty. De
Vera, as well as his breach of fiduciary relations, the complainants asked the former to withdraw as
their counsel and to reimburse them the P60,000.00 in excessive fees he collected from them,
considering that he only appeared twice for the case.
ISSUE
Whether or not Atty. De Vera should be held administratively liable. – YES.
HELD
The Court adopts and approves the findings of the IBP, as the same were duly substantiated by the
records. However, the Court finds it apt to increase the period of suspension to six (6) months.
Fundamental is the rule that in his dealings with his client and with the courts, every lawyer is
expected to be honest, imbued with integrity, and trustworthy. These expectations, though high and
demanding, are the professional and ethical burdens of every member of the Philippine Bar, for they
have been given full expression in the Lawyer's Oath that every lawyer of this country has taken
upon admission as a bona fide member of the Law Profession, “I will do no falsehood, nor... consent
to the doing of any in court”
The Lawyer's Oath enjoins every lawyer not only to obey the laws of the land but also to refrain from
doing any falsehood in or out of court or from consenting to the doing of any in court, and to conduct
himself according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity to the courts as
well as to his clients. Every lawyer is a servant of the law, and has to observe and maintain the rule
of law as well as be an exemplar worthy of emulation by others. It is by no means a coincidence,
therefore, that the core values of honesty, integrity, and trustworthiness are emphatically reiterated
by the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In this light, Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that "[a]
lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to... the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead,
or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice."
All told, Atty. De Vera is found guilty of violating the Lawyer's Oath and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility by submitting a falsified document before a court.

#2
ATTY. FERDINAND AGUSTIN v. ATTY. DOMINGO LAENO, ATTY. ROMEO ROBISO, and ATTY.
REGINALDO BERGADO
A.C. No. 8124 | 19 March 2019 | Duty of Candor
DOCTRINE
Certainly, he had a duty as an officer of the court to abide by the judgment rendered even if it was
unfavorable to him.
As held in Lazareto v. Atty. Acorda, the ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoins every lawyer to
act with the highest standards of truthfulness, fair play, and nobility in the course of his practice of
law.
FACTS
This is a complaint for disbarment filed against respondents Attys. Domingo Laeno, Romeo Robiso
and Reginaldo Bergado.
Atty. Laeno and the mother of Atty. Ferdinand Agustin, Marcelina Agustin, agreed to the sale of a
house and lot registered under E.M. Laeno and Associates for P6.5 million. In the agreement to sell
and the completion of the sale thereof, Marcelina was represented by her daughter, Perpetua. After
the property was transferred in the name of Marcelina, Perpetua entered into a rental agreement
with Atty. Laeno at P20,000 per month over the same property.
Later, Atty. Laeno started to miss rental payments and when asked, refused to vacate the premises.
After Marcelina, through her son Atty. Agustin, instituted an ejectment case against Atty. Laeno, it
was discovered that the sale of the said property was covered by 2 Deeds of Absolute Sale
executed and signed by Atty. Laeno and both were notarized by Atty. Bergado. None of these
documents reflected the true consideration of the property.
The Investigating IBP Commissioner absolved Atty. Robiso from any administrative liability. The
Commissioner, however, found Atty. Laeno guilty of misconduct for executing 2 Deeds of Absolute
Sale covering 1 property and 1transaction, for instituting several suits as a ploy to avoid being
evicted from the property despite a final adjudication in the ejectment suit, and for knowingly
introducing a bogus deed of sale as evidence. Similarly, Atty. Bergado is guilty of affixing his seal as
a notary on the 2 Deeds of Sale covering one and the same property, and of assisting in causing
several annotations on Marcelina's property although the latter was never a party to the case.
The IBP-Board of Governors affirmed the findings of the Commissioner, finding that Canon 1, Canon
7, Canon 10, and Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility were violated. Atty. Laeno
was suspended from the practice of law for 2 years while Atty. Bergado, for violation of the notarial
law and Canon 1 of the CPR, is disqualified from reappointment as Notary Public for 2 years and his
notarial commission is hereby revoked. As to Atty. Robiso, the case against him is dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence.
ISSUE
Whether or not Atty. Laeno is guilty of violating the CPR. – YES.

HELD
Atty. Laeno's acts of (i) executing two deeds of sale that covered one single property, (ii) indicating
an undervalued consideration contrary to what was agreed on by the contracting parties, and (iii)
offering one of these bogus deeds as evidence before the Court is exactly what is proscribed under
the following Canons of the CPR:
CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect
for law and legal processes.
CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.
CANON 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
Atty. Laeno's resort to several suits against Marcelina and Perpetua to avoid eviction or cause the
delay in the execution of an unfavorable judgment in an ejectment suit is likewise contrary to Canon
12.1
Certainly, he had a duty as an officer of the court to abide by the judgment rendered even if it
was unfavorable to him. As held in Lazareto v. Atty. Acorda, the ethics of the legal profession
rightly enjoins every lawyer to act with the highest standards of truthfulness, fair play, and
nobility in the course of his practice of law.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Domingo Laeno is hereby suspended from the practice of law for 5 years
while the case against Atty. Romeo Robiso is hereby dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
NOTES
Atty. Bergado is already dead which is why there is no judgment against him.
1
Canon 12 - A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of
justice.

#3
PEDRO LUKANG v. ATTY. FRANCISCO LLAMAS
A.C. No. 4178 | 8 July 2019 | Duty of Candor
DOCTRINE
A lawyer is first and foremost an officer of the court. As such, although he is required to serve his
clients with utmost dedication, competence and diligence, his acts must always be within the bounds
of law. Graver responsibility is imposed upon him than any other to uphold the integrity of the courts
and show respect to their processes. Hence, any act on his part that obstructs, impedes and
degrades the administration of justice constitutes professional misconduct necessitating the
imposition of disciplinary sanctions against him.
FACTS
Complainant Pedro Lukang seeks the disbarment of respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas for
violation of the Lawyer’s Oath, Sec. 20, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, and the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
In his original petition for disbarment and in the series of supplemental petitions, the complainant
stated that he was a party in civil cases seeking the annulment of title, annulment of deed of
donation, reconveyance of properties, accounting and receivership of lands; and in criminal cases
for falsification of public documents, perjury and false testimony filed in the MTC and RTC in Lucena
City, while the respondent was the opposing counsel.
During the pendency of such cases, the respondent allegedly filed a petition for reconstitution of
transfer certificates of title involving the subject matter of the pending civil cases in the Office of the
Register of Deeds in Lucena City. In this petition, the respondent alleged that his clients, Simeon and
Rosalina Lukang, the half-siblings of the complainant, and Mercedes Dee, the mother of Simeon and
Rosalina were the true and registered owners of the properties. This statement was alleged to be
misleading as the respondent knew fully well that the ownership of the properties was the core issue
in the cases then pending before the MTC and RTC. The respondent further falsely alleged that his
clients were in possession of the subject properties, when in fact, it was the mother of the
complainant who was in the actual possession of the same. The respondent likewise falsely claimed
that the subject properties were free from all liens and encumbrances, and deliberately did not
indicate in the petition for reconstitution the pending cases assailing the titles over the subject
properties.
Moreover, the respondent also allegedly tampered the records of a civil case pending before the
RTC in Lucena by making it appear that he had received a the order of non-suit on February 14,
1993 (Sunday – post office was closed), despite the order having been actually received by his
clerk-secretary on December 14, 1992.
Lukang further alleged that Atty. Llamas committed forum-shopping by filing an intestacy case with
petition for letters of administration and adjudication vis-a-vis the estate of the deceased Arsenio
Lukang in the RTC in Manila, and subsequently, after the case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction,
by filing another intestacy case concerning the estates of deceased Arsenio Lukang and Mercedes
Dee in the RTC in Parañaque City that included the same properties.

In his answer, the respondent countered that he filed the questioned petition for reconstitution to
protect the rights and interests of his clients who were the absolute, true and registered owners of
the properties. He also averred that with respect to the alleged tampering of records, he had
committed an honest mistake in writing February 14 instead of February 15. As to the
forum-shopping charge, respondent maintains that he filed the intestacy cases in venues that he
considered appropriate.
After investigation, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP recommended the disbarment of the
respondent. On appeal, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the decision, but
modified the penalty to a 1-year suspension from the practice of law. However, for humanitarian
reasons, considering that the respondent was already 82 years old at the time of resolution, the IBP
Board of Governors lowered the penalty to suspension from the practice of law for 6 months.
ISSUE
Whether or not Atty. Llamas violated the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
– YES.
HELD
A lawyer is first and foremost an officer of the court. As such, although he is required to serve his
clients with utmost dedication, competence and diligence, his acts must always be within the bounds
of law. Graver responsibility is imposed upon him than any other to uphold the integrity of the courts
and show respect to their processes. Hence, any act on his part that obstructs, impedes and
degrades the administration of justice constitutes professional misconduct necessitating the
imposition of disciplinary sanctions against him.
In this case, the respondent did not live up to his duties and responsibilities as an officer of the court.
Firstly, the respondent exhibited dishonesty and deceit in alleging in the petition for reconstitution
that his clients had been the true and absolute owners of the property involved therein, and that such
property had been free from all liens and encumbrances despite his knowledge that the ownership of
the same was controversial and still the subject of several cases pending in the MTC and RTC in
Lucena City.
Secondly, the respondent's act of instituting intestate proceedings involving the estate of the late
Arsenio Lukang simultaneously in two courts of co-equal jurisdiction in the hope of obtaining a
favorable ruling constituted a deliberate disregard of court processes that smacked of outright forum
shopping and tended to unduly clog the courts' dockets. Further, he instituted the petition for letters
of administration for the same estate despite the existence of a valid and binding extrajudicial
settlement executed by the heirs of the decedent. Thereby, the respondent manifestly neglected his
solemn vow under his Lawyer's Oath to act with all good fidelity to the courts and to maintain only
such actions as appeared to him to be consistent with truth and honor.
Lastly, the respondent ignored his solemn duty under the Lawyer's Oath not to do any falsehood nor
consent to its doing in court by noting in the records in Civil Case No. 89-87 of the RTC in Lucena
City that he had received the order of non-suit only on February 14, 1993, which was contradicted by

the certification of the postmaster of the Parañaque Post Office to the effect that he had received it
on December 14, 1992.
By the aforementioned acts, the respondent also violated Canon 10, Rule 10.01 and Rule 10.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, viz.:
Canon 10 – A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
Rule 10.01 – A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court;
nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
Rule 10.03 – A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to
defeat the ends of justice.
WHEREFORE, the Court SUSPENDS respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas from the practice of law
for six months effective upon receipt of this decision, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of
the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

#4
JUDGE NIMFA SITACA v. ATTY. DIEGO PALOMARES, JR.
A.C. No. 5285 | 14 August 2019 | Duty of Candor
DOCTRINE
Administrative complaints for disbarment are referred to the IBP for formal investigation by the Court
after an evaluation by it of the pleadings submitted. An ex-parte investigation may only be conducted
when the respondent fails to appear despite reasonable notice. In this case, it would appear that no
investigation, not even just an ex-parte investigation, was conducted by the Commission on Bar
Discipline.
FACTS
Judge Nimfa Penaco-Sitaca seeks the disbarment of Atty. Diego M. Palomares, Jr., for having filed a
falsified bail bond. Judge Nimfa Penaco-Sitaca was the Acting Presiding Judge of Branch 35 of RTC
of Ozamis City. Among the cases in her sala was criminal case for murder against Dunhill
Palomares, son of Atty. Diego M. Palomares, Jr., herein respondent. In September 1997, Atty.
Palomares, in representation of Dunhill, filed a bail bond of P200,000.00 to secure the latter's
release. The bail bond was purportedly signed and approved by the late Judge Nazar U. Chavez,
then Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 18 of Cagayan de Oro City, and with it was a corresponding
order of release signed by RTC Branch 18 Clerk of Court Atty. Glenn Peter C. Baldado.
When informed of the filing by Atty. Palomares of the bail bond, ostensibly signed by Judge Chavez,
Judge Sitaca approved the release of the accused. When RTC Branch 35 Clerk of Court Atty. Roy P.
Murallon later requested Atty. Baldado to forward to the Ozamis City RTC the original records and
supporting documents on the bail bond, Atty. Baldado, by then already a practicing lawyer,
disavowed the existence of the bail bond. Atty. Baldado wrote to say that per the official records of
Cagayan de Oro RTC, Branch 18, the bail bond did not exist, that no approval was made by Judge
Chavez, and that no order for the release of Dunhill was issued. Atty. Baldado concluded that the
bail bond was a forged document.
Atty. Palomares in his letter to Judge Sitaca stated that he was the corporate legal counsel of
Bentley House International Corporation. When the bail application was approved for P200,000.00,
he requested the amount from Jonathon Stevenz and Cristina Q. Romarate, Chief Operations Officer
and Treasurer, respectively, of Bentley House International Corporation. Instead of giving the money,
Stevenz and Romarate proposed to utilize the services of William Guialani which he acceded.
Guialani then delivered the release order, which Atty. Palomares immediately presented to the
Branch 35 clerk of court of RTC Ozamis City. Unsatisfied with the explanation, the present
disbarment case was filed.
ISSUE
Whether or not Atty. Palomares violated the CPR. – YES.
HELD
Commissioner San Juan held that there was no doubt that the bail bond and order of release were
"fictitious." She stated that while there was no conclusive proof that Atty. Palomares had been the
author of the fictitious bail and release order, it could not be denied, however, that it was he who

presented the papers to the court. Atty. Palomares failed to satisfactorily explain, she stated, why he
had to take a circuitous route and secure the services of Guialani despite his claim that he could
have easily availed himself of the facilities of other insurance companies. She recommended that
Atty. Palomares be suspended from the practice of law for a period of 18 months. The
recommendation was adopted by the IBP Board of Governors.
NOTES
In this case, no investigation or even an ex-parte investigation was conducted by the Commission on
Bar Discipline. Thus, the Court remands the case to the IBP for further proceedings.

#5
NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC. v. HON. AUGUSTO SANCHEZ, MINISTER OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT, and THE UNION OF FILIPRO EMPLOYEES
G.R. No. 75209 | 30 September 1987 | Duty of Respect
DOCTRINE
Grievances, if any, must be ventilated through the proper channels, i.e., through appropriate
petitions, motions or other pleadings in keeping with the respect due to the Courts as impartial
administrators of justice entitled to "proceed to the disposition of its business in an orderly manner,
free from outside interference obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass the
administration of justice.
FACTS
While their cases are pending during the period July 8-10, 1987, respondent in G.R. No. 75029,
Union of Filipro Employees, and petitioner in G.R. No. 78791, Kimberly Independent Labor Union for
Solidarity, Activism and Nationalism-Olalia, intensified the intermittent pickets they had been
conducting since June 17, 1981 in front of the gate of the Supreme Court building. They set up
pickets' quarters on the pavement, at times obstructing access to and egress from the Court's
premises and offices of justices, officials and employees. They littered the place with food containers
and trash and waved their red streamers and placards with slogans, and took turns haranguing the
court all day long with the use of loudspeakers.
Atty. Jose C. Espinas, counsel of the Union of Filipro Employees, had been called in order that the
pickets might be informed that the demonstration must cease immediately for the same constitutes
direct contempt of court and that the Court would not entertain their petitions for as long as the
pickets were maintained. He also was required to SHOW CAUSE why he should not be
administratively dealt with.
In resolution, Atty. Espinas, for himself and on behalf of the union leaders concerned, apologized to
the Court for the above described acts, together with an assurance that they will not be repeated. He
likewise manifested to the Court that he had explained to the picketers why their actions were wrong;
that any delay in the resolution of their cases is usually for causes beyond the control of the Court;
and that the Supreme Court has always remained steadfast in its role as the guardian of the
Constitution.
ISSUE
Whether or not Atty. Espinas must be cited for direct contempt. – NO.
HELD
Following the resolution, the Court accepted the apologies offered by the respondents and forego
the imposition of the sanction warranted by the contemptuous acts.
The right of petition is conceded to be an inherent right of the citizen under all free governments.
However, such right, natural and inherent though it may be, has never been invoked to shatter the
standards of propriety entertained for the conduct of courts.

Even as the rights of free speech and of assembly are protected by the Constitution, any attempt to
pressure or influence courts of justice through the exercise of either right amounts to an abuse
thereof, is no longer within the ambit of constitutional protection, nor did they realize that any such
efforts to influence the course of justice constitutes contempt of court. The duty and responsibility of
advising them, therefore, rest primarily and heavily upon the shoulders of their counsel of record.
Atty. Jose C. Espinas, when his attention was called by this Court, did his best to demonstrate to the
pickets the untenability of their acts and posture. Let this incident therefore serve as a reminder to all
members of the legal profession that it is their duty as officers of the court to properly apprise their
clients on matters of decorum and proper attitude toward courts of justice, and to labor leaders of the
importance of a continuing educational program for their members.

#6
GAVINA MAGLUCOT-AW, ET. AL. v. LEOPOLDO MAGLUCOT, ET. AL. 2
G.R. No. 132518 | 28 March 2000 | Duty of Respect
DOCTRINE
A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive, or menacing language or behavior before the
courts.
FACTS
The core issue in this case is whether a partition of Lot No. 1639 had been effected in 1952.
Petitioners contend that there was already a partition of said lot; hence, they are entitled to exclusive
possession and ownership of Lot No. 1639-D which originally formed part of Lot No. 1639 until its
partition. Private respondents, on the other hand, claim that there was no partition; hence, they are
co-owners of Lot No. 1639-D. After trial, the lower court rendered judgment in favor of petitioners.
On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC.
However, the Court took notice of the language utilized by counsel for petitioners in their petition for
review on certiorari. Thrice in the petition, counsel for petitioners made reference to the researcher
of the CA. First, he alluded to the lack of scrutiny of the records and lack of study of the law "by the
researcher." Second, he cited the researcher of the CA as having "sweepingly stated without
reference to the record" that "[w]e have scanned the records on hand and found no evidence of any
partition." Finally, counsel for petitioners assailed the CA decision, stating that "this will only show
that there was no proper study of the case by the researcher."
ISSUE
Whether or not it was highly improper and unethical for counsel for petitioners to berate the
researcher of the CA in his appeal. – YES.
HELD
Any court when it renders a decision does so as an arm of the justice system and as an institution
apart from the persons that comprise it. Decisions are rendered by the courts and not the persons or
personnel that may participate therein by virtue of their office. It is highly improper and unethical for
counsel for petitioners to berate the researcher in his appeal. Counsel for petitioner should be
reminded of the elementary rules of the legal profession regarding respect for the courts by the use
of proper language in its pleadings and admonished for his improper references to the researcher of
the CA in his petition. A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive, or menacing language or
behavior before the courts.
NOTES
Petitioners filed with the RTC a complaint for recovery of possession and damages alleging, inter
alia, that they are the owners of Lot No. 1639-D.
2
GAVINA MAGLUCOT-AW, CATALINA ORCULLO, RICHARD ESTANO, NIDA MAGLUCOT, MELANIA MAGLUCOT-CATUBIG, EMILIANO
CATUBIG, LADISLAO SALMA, v. LEOPOLDO MAGLUCOT, SEVERO MAGLUCOT, WILFREDA MAGLUCOT-ALEJO, and CONSTANCIO
ALEJO

Sometime in 1963, Guillermo Maglucot rented a portion of Lot No. 1639-D (subject lot).
Subsequently, Leopoldo and Severo, both surnamed Maglucot, rented portions of the subject lot in
1964 and 1969, respectively, and each paying rentals therefor. Said respondents built houses on
their corresponding leased lots. They paid the rental amount of P100.00 per annum to Mrs. Ruperta
Salma, who represented the heirs of Roberto Maglucot, petitioner's predecessors-in-interest. In
December 1992, however, respondents stopped paying rentals claiming ownership over the subject
lot. Petitioners thus filed the complaint a quo.
After trial, the lower court rendered judgment in favor of petitioners. On appeal, the CA reversed the
decision of the RTC. The appellate court ruled that the sketch plan and tax declarations relied upon
by petitioners are not conclusive evidence of partition. The CA likewise found that the prescribed
procedure under Rule 69 of the Rules of Court was not followed. It thus declared that there was no
partition of Lot No. 1639.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court is
hereby REINSTATED.

#7
DENIS HABAWEL and ALEXIS MEDINA v. THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 174759 | 7 September 2011 | Duty of Respect
DOCTRINE
The power to integrate is an inherent part of the Court's constitutional authority over the Bar.
The integration of the Philippine Bar is constitutional because courts have the inherent power to
supervise and regulate the practice of law among other reasons.
FACTS
Petitioners were counsel of Surfield Dev’t Corp, which sought from the Mandaluyong Office of the
City Treasurer a refund of the excess of the realty taxes it paid but was denied. Because of this,
Surfield initiated a special civil action for mandamus. The RTC dismissed the petition on the ground
that the period to file the claim had already prescribed and that Surfield had failed to exhaust
administrative remedies. It further ruled that he grant of a tax refund was not a ministerial duty
compellable by writ of mandamus. Surfield, represented by the petitioners, elevated the dismissal to
the CTA via petition for review. However, this petition was likewise denied for failure to exhaust the
remedies provided under Section 253 and 256 of the LGC.
Thereafter, petitioners sought reconsideration in behalf of Surfield, arguing that the CTA First
Division manifested its "lack of understanding or respect" for the doctrine of stare decisis in not
applying a decided case , to the effect that there was no need to file an appeal before the Local
Board of Assessment Appeals. The CTA took notice of the language the petitioners employed in the
motion for reconsideration,\ and required them to explain. Eventually, the CTA found petitioners
guilty of direct contempt of court for failing to uphold their duty of preserving the integrity and respect
due to the courts.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Court of Tax Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion when it held that
petitioners are liable for direct contempt. – NO.
HELD
The CTA did not act with grave abuse of discretion in finding that the petitioners committed direct
contempt of court.
Canon 11 of the CPR mandates all attorneys to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts
and to judicial officers and to insist on similar conduct by others. In lieu with this, Rule 11.03 of such
Canon provides that a lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or
behavior before the Courts.
Although an attorney or any other person may be critical of the courts and their judges, the criticism
is made in respectful terms and through legitimate channels. It is well established that every citizen
has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public officers. This is because courts
and judges are not sacrosanct. They should and expect critical evaluation of their performance. With
this, the lawyer has a right to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate
channels the acts of courts and judges.

But, it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over
the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and
abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is
a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to
disciplinary action
The test for criticizing a judge’s decision is, therefore, whether or not the criticism is bona fide or
done in good faith, and does not spill over the walls of decency and propriety
In the case, petitioner’s MR contained statements such as: “It is is gross ignorance of the law for the
Honorable Court to have held that it has no jurisdiction over the instant petition” and “The Honorable
Court’s lack of understanding or respect for the doctrine of stare decisis”
The Court found that by such statements, the petitioners overstepped the bounds of propriety as
attorneys, and disregarded their sworn duty to respect the courts. An imputation in a pleading of
gross ignorance against a court or its judge, especially in the absence of any evidence, is a serious
allegation and constitutes direct contempt of court. It is settled that derogatory, offensive or malicious
statements contained in pleadings or written submissions presented to the same court or judge in
which the proceedings are pending are treated as direct contempt because they are equivalent to a
misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the
administration of justice.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED

#8
RE: VERIFIED COMPLAINT OF THOMAS MERDEGIA AGAINST HO. VICENTE S.E. VELOSO,
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, RELATIVE TO CA G.R. SP NO. 119461
IPI No. 12-205-CA-J | 10 December 2013 | Duty of Respect
DOCTRINE
While a lawyer has a duty to represent his client with zeal, he must do so within the bounds provided
by law. He is also duty-bound to impress upon his client the propriety of the legal action the latter
wants to undertake, and to encourage compliance with the law and legal processes.
FACTS
According to Atty. Adaza, he should not be punished for indirect contempt as he was merely
performing his duty as Merdegia's counsel when he assisted him in preparing the administrative
complaint against Justice Veloso. Atty. Adaza asserted that both he and his client observed Justice
Veloso's partiality during the oral arguments, but instead of immediately filing an administrative
complaint against him, he counseled Merdegia to first file a Motion to Inhibit Justice Veloso from the
case. However, upon finding that Justice Veloso refused to inhibit himself, Merdegia repeated his
request to file an administrative complaint against Justice Veloso, to which Atty. Adaza acceded.
Thus, Atty. Adaza pleaded that he should not be faulted for assisting his client, especially when he
also believes in the merits of his client's case.
ISSUE
Whether or not Atty. Adanza is guilty of indirect contempt. – YES.
HELD
Atty. Adaza's explanation, read together with the totality of the facts of the case, fails to convince us
of his innocence from the contempt charge.
As Atty. Adaza himself admitted, he prepared the administrative complaint after Justice Veloso
refused to inhibit himself from a case he was handling. The complaint and the motion for inhibition
were both based on the same main cause: the alleged partiality of Justice Veloso during the oral
arguments of Merdegia's case. The resolution dismissing the motion for inhibition should have
disposed of the issue of Justice Veloso's bias. While we do not discount the fact that it was Justice
Veloso who penned the resolution denying the motion for inhibition, we note that he was allowed to
do this under the 2009 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals. Had Merdegia and Atty. Adaza
doubted the legality of this resolution, the proper remedy would have been to file a petition for
certiorari assailing the order denying the motion for inhibition. The settled rule is that administrative
complaints against justices cannot and should not substitute for appeal and other judicial remedies
against an assailed decision or ruling.
While a lawyer has a duty to represent his client with zeal, he must do so within the bounds provided
by law. He is also duty-bound to impress upon his client the propriety of the legal action the latter
wants to undertake, and to encourage compliance with the law and legal processes.
A reading of Merdegia's administrative complaint shows an apparent failure to understand that cases
are not always decided in one's favor, and that an allegation of bias must stem from an extrajudicial

source other than those attendant to the merits and the developments in the case. In this light, we
cannot but attribute to Atty. Adaza the failure to impress upon his client the features of our
adversarial system, the substance of the law on ethics and respect for the judicial system, and his
own failure to heed what his duties as a professional and as an officer of the Court demand of him in
acting for his client before our courts.
To be sure, deciding administrative cases against erring judges is not an easy task. We have to
strike a balance between the need for accountability and integrity in the Judiciary, on the one hand,
with the need to protect the independence and efficiency of the Judiciary from vindictive and
enterprising litigants, on the other. Courts should not be made to bow down to the wiles of litigants
who bully judges into inhibiting from cases or deciding cases in their favor, but neither should we
shut our doors from litigants brave enough to call out the corrupt practices of people who decide the
outcome of their cases. Indeed, litigants who feel unjustly injured by malicious and corrupt acts of
erring judges and officials should not be punished for filing administrative cases against them;
neither should these litigants be unjustly deterred from doing so by a wrong signal from this Court
that they would be made to explain why they should not be cited for contempt when the complaints
they filed prove to be without sufficient cause.
What tipped the balance against Atty. Adaza, in this case, is the totality of the facts of the case that,
when read together with the administrative complaint he prepared, shows that his complaint is
merely an attempt to malign the administration of justice. We note Atty. Adaza's penchant for filing
motions for inhibition throughout the case: first, against Judge Ma. Theresa Dolores C. Gomez
Estoesta of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, who issued an order unfavorable to his client; and
second, against all the justices of the Court of Appeals division hearing his appeal, for alleged bias
during the oral arguments on his case. These indicators, taken together with the baseless
administrative complaint against Justice Veloso after he penned an order adverse to Atty. Adaza's
client, disclose that there was more to the administrative complaint than the report of legitimate
grievances against members of the Judiciary.

#9
RE: INTERVIEW WITH ATTY. LORNA KAPUNAN ON CORRUPTION IN THE JUDICIARY
A.M. No. 13-11-09-SC | 12 August 2014 | Duty of Respect
DOCTRINE
True, well-recognized is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to
criticize the courts or any of its officers. This right, however, is not without limitations. Atty. Kapunan
should be reminded that comments made against the courts must not go beyond the bounds of
courtesy and fairness in order not to destroy the people's trust in the judicial system.
FACTS
"A.M. No. 13-11-09-SC (Re: Interview with Atty. Lorna Kapunan on Corruption in the Judiciary.)
— Submitted to the Court for disposition is the Compliance, dated December 12, 2013, of Atty. Lorna
Patajo-Kapunan (Atty. Kapunan), pursuant to the directive of the Court in its November 26, 2013
Resolution.
In the said Resolution, the Court directed Atty. Kapunan to explain her answers in an
interview by Anthony Taberna (Taberna) in his show "Umagang Kay Ganda" on November 21,
2013 regarding corruption in the judiciary, within ten (10) days from notice.
The Court required Atty. Kapunan to submit an explanation because, in an interview before a
nationwide television audience, she made unwarranted remarks which tended to erode public trust
and confidence in the judiciary. She made unfounded insinuations that some members of the
judiciary can easily be bribed at the expense of justice.
In the said Compliance, Atty. Kapunan avers that, generally, the topic in the one hour face-to-face
interview was her life as a lawyer, which started with her family background and flowed into a
discussion of her law practice and her experiences with the courts and the justice system. In the
course of the discussion, she made certain statements pertaining to corruption in the judiciary.
Atty. Kapunan, however, claims that, mindful of a lawyer's duty to observe and maintain the respect
due to the courts and judicial officers, she refrained from using grossly disrespectful, contemptuous
and derogatory language against the courts and individual judges.
Atty. Kapunan explains that she made no personal accusation against any court or judge. She adds
that when imparting information on corruption and bribe money based on hearsay and/or general
knowledge within the legal circles, she, in the interest of candor and transparency, would use the
appropriate caveats — "known to receive," "I am told" and "hindi ko po alam." (See full text for copy
of excerpt of transcript)
Atty. Kapunan, thus, claims that the remarks made in the subject interview were not intended to
insult, malign, embarrass, or bring the Court into disrepute. She is not unmindful, she said, of the
admonition of this Court that "a lawyer is entitled to voice his criticism within the context of the
constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech which must be exercised responsibly. After all, every
right carries with it the corresponding obligation. Freedom is not freedom from responsibility, but
freedom with responsibility."

ISSUE
Whether or not Atty. Kapunan failed to maintain a respectful attitude toward the courts. – YES.
HELD
In sum, Atty. Kapunan admits to have made remarks with reference to corruption in the judiciary, but
denies to have uttered the same to degrade the court and bring it to disrepute.
True, well-recognized is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to
criticize the courts or any of its officers. This right, however, is not without limitations. Atty. Kapunan
should be reminded that comments made against the courts must not go beyond the bounds of
courtesy and fairness in order not to destroy the people's trust in the judicial system.
Moreover, it is well to remind Atty. Kapunan that, as a member of the Bar, she is under the
obligation to maintain at all times a respectful attitude toward the courts. This responsibility of
a lawyer in relation to the court is imposed under the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Specifically, Canon 10 and 11 provide:
CANON 10 — A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE

COURT.
CANON 11 — A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO

THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR
CONDUCT BY OTHERS.
Rule 11.03 — A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or
behavior before the Courts.
This responsibility under the said Code is closely entwined with her vow in the attorney's oath, to
conduct herself as a lawyer with all good fidelity to the courts, as well as her duties under Section 20
(b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the first canon of the Canons of Professional Ethics, thus:
For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties which are not
mere flux and ferment. His investiture into the legal profession places upon his shoulders no
burden more basic, more exacting and more imperative than that of respectful behavior
toward the courts. He vows solemnly to conduct himself "with all good fidelity . . . to the
courts; and the Rules of Court constantly remind him "to observe and maintain the respect
due to courts of justice and judicial officers." The first canon of legal ethics enjoins him "to
maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent
of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance."
WHEREFORE, the Compliance submitted by Atty. Lorna Patajo- Kapunan, dated December 12,
2013, is NOTED.
SEPARATE OPINIONS

Brion, J. Concurring
the Court should proactively react to the smoke that Atty. Kapunan has raised; a fire must exist
somewhere behind her statements. Even smoking embers, if left unattended to, may turn into a
raging conflagration.
In light of the law, both the bar and the public have no recourse but to look up to the Supreme Court
and its leadership for responsibility; for accountability for how things are turning out; and for
initiative for solutions. And they would judge the Court not only through its actions and proactive
reactions, but through the live and actual examples the Court would set. To carry this statement of
burden a step further, for a credible approach to whatever solutions there may be, it is important that
examples be set and that we in the Court ourselves lead in this task.
Inaction on this type of report cannot but place in question the integrity of the Court and its
leadership, and attribute to it, at the very least, deplorable complacency.
Leonen, J. Concurring
First, the maintenance of ethical standards is not the responsibility of the judiciary alone. It is
likewise a burden that all lawyers must share.
I do not fault Atty. Lorna Kapunan for the statements she made on national television. I do find her
liable because she acknowledges that she has heard (and probably experienced) acts of corruption
and admits that she has done nothing to bring the perpetrators to the proper forum. Our younger
lawyers seek leadership among the more prominent members of the bar. By making statements
without backing it up with the corresponding action, she undermined the nobility of this profession.
Exciting the audience with tales of corruption heard or experienced is a selfish act if it is not backed
up with leadership and action. Making insinuations is easy. Doing the right thing often requires more
courage.
Second, we need to restructure our bureaucracy to be able to proactively address alleged corruption
in the judiciary. Specifically, I propose that we should have our own active investigation unit (Internal
Affairs Unit) that answers to a committee of this court.

#10
TEODULO ENRIQUEZ v. ATTY. EDILBERTO LAVADIA, JR.
A.C. No. 5686 | 16 June 2015 | Duty of Respect
DOCTRINE
The Court’s Resolution is not a mere request. A lawyer’s blatant disregard or refusal to comply with
the Court’s orders underscores her disrespect of the Court’s lawful orders.
FACTS
Teodulo Enriquez availed the legal services of Atty. Lavadia for the case of forcible entry filed against
him. In open court, Atty. Lavadia agreed to submit their position papers and affidavits within 30 days
from the receipt of the pre-trial order after which the case would be submitted for decision. However,
Atty. Lavadia failed to file the position paper resulting in the defendants being declared in default.
Atty. Lavadia filed a notice of appeal with sufficient bond however the same was dismissed on the
ground that Atty. Lavadia failed to file the appeal memorandum after more than 71 days.
Due to this, Teodulo Enriquez filed a disbarment case against the respondent alleging that in failing
to file the necessary pleadings before the court, Atty. Lavadia caused him great damage and
prejudice. The Court then required respondent to submit his comment, however respondent
repeatedly failed to obey the request and command by the court even if he was repeatedly granted
extension of time to submit such comment. In total, respondent requested four-times to extend the
period to file his comment – that amounts to an extension period for more than 100 days.
Atty. Lavadia argues that his repeated inaction to file his comment on the matter is due to the
following unfortunate events that happened in his life:
1. Heavy caseload and family problems;
2. His wife being ill caused by dark-beings;
3. Their house was razed by a fire;
4. His hard drive to which the complaint is stored is crashing
ISSUE
Whether or not Atty. Lavadia should be disbarred on the ground of his repeated inaction to file his
comment as required by the court. – YES.
HELD
Atty. Lavadia violated his duty to the court particularly Rule 12.3 which provides that a lawyer shall
not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse
without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so.
More so, under Canon 11 of the CPR, a lawyer is required to observe and maintain due respect to
the court and its judicial officers. Reading such provision in relation to Rules 10.3 and 12.03 of the
CPR does not merely affect the client but the judicial process.
Citing Sebastian v. Bajar, respondent’s cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the
Supreme Court constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial institution. Respondent’s conduct indicates
a high degree of irresponsibility. A Court’s Resolution is "not to be construed as a mere request, nor

should it be complied with partially, inadequately, or selectively". Respondent’s obstinate refusal to
comply with the Court’s orders "not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in his character; it also
underscores his disrespect of the Court’s lawful orders which is only too deserving of reproof."
Lawyers are called upon to obey court orders and processes and respondent’s deference is
underscored by the fact that willful disregard thereof will subject the lawyer not only to punishment
for contempt but to disciplinary sanctions as well. In fact, graver responsibility is imposed upon a
lawyer than any other to uphold the integrity of the courts and to show respect to their processes.
The complaint was filed in January 2002. The Court granted Atty. Lavadia every opportunity to file
his comment to the complaint. The Court issued eight resolutions ordering Atty. Lavadia to comment:
two of which ordered him to pay fines of ₱1,000.00 and ₱2,000.00 and requiring him to show cause
for his failure to file and to comply with the Court’s resolutions. In fine, the Court granted him a total
of 155 days extension to file his comment, in response to his repeated pleas contained in his
numerous ex parte motions. After a lapse of 8 years, this Court referred the case to the IBP where
Atty. Lavadia once again filed a motion for extension to file his position paper but nevertheless failed
to file the same.
While the Court is not unsympathetic to the plight of Atty. Lavadia, the Court cannot countenance his
act of repeatedly pleading for extensions of time and yet not submitting anything to the Court. This
reflects his willful disregard for Court orders putting in question his suitability to discharge his duties
and functions as a lawyer. The Court’s Resolution is not a mere request. A lawyer’s blatant disregard
or refusal to comply with the Court’s orders underscores her disrespect of the Court’s lawful orders
which is only too deserving of reproof. Despite the extended time granted him, he continued to fail to
do so. Such obstinate disobedience to the Court’s orders merits disciplinary action.
This Court finds that it should impose the severe sanction lest some other unknowing client’s engage
his services only to lose their case due to Atty. Lavadia's nonchalant attitude. Considering the gravity
of Atty. Lavadia's cavalier actions both to his client and his impertinent attitude towards the Court, we
find the penalty of DISBARMENT as recommended by the IBP appropriate.

#11
RET. JUDGE VIRGILIO ALPAJORA v. ATTY. RONALDO ANTONIO CALAYAN
A.C. No. 8208 | 10 January 2018 | Duty of Respect
DOCTRINE
It must be remembered that all lawyers are bound to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts,
and to promote confidence in the fair administration of justice. It is the respect for the courts that
guarantees the stability of the judicial institution; elsewise, the institution would be resting on a very
shaky foundation.
FACTS
An intra-corporate case entitled "Calayan Educational Foundation Inc. (CEFI), Dr. Arminda Calayan,
Dr. Bernardita Calayan-Brion and Dr. Manuel Calayan vs. Atty. Ronalda A.V. Calayan, Susan S.
Calayan and Deanna Rachelle S. Calayan," was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Lucena City designated as a commercial court and presided over by Judge Adolfo Encomienda.
Respondent was President and Chairman of the Board of Trustees of CEFI. He signed and filed
pleadings as "Special Counsel pro se" for himself. Court proceedings ensued despite several
inhibitions by judges to whom the case was re-raffled until it was finally re-raffled to the complainant.
Thereafter, the complainant issued an Omnibus Order for the creation of a management committee
and the appointment of its members. That Order prompted the filing of the administrative case
against Judge Alpajora.
The administrative case against the complainant was dismissed. The Court, however, referred the
comment/opposition with counter-complaint filed by complainant in the administrative case against
him to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for appropriate action.
The OBC deemed it proper to re-docket the counter-complaint as a regular administrative case
against the respondent. Thus, in a Resolution, upon recommendation of the OBC, the Court
resolved to require respondent to submit his comment on the counter-complaint.
In its Resolution, the Court noted respondent's comment and referred the administrative case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
After a mandatory conference before the IBP, both parties were directed to submit their respective
verified position papers.
COMPLAINANT'S CONTENTION:
Complainant asserted that respondent committed the following: (1) serious and gross misconduct in
his duties as counsel for himself; (2) violated his oath as lawyer for [a] his failure to observe and
maintain respect to the courts (Section 20(b), Rule 138, Rules of Court); [b] by his abuse of judicial
process thru maintaining actions or proceedings inconsistent with truth and honor and his acts to
mislead the judge by false statements (Section 20(d), Rule 138); (3) repeatedly violated the rules of
procedures governing intra-corporate cases and maliciously misused the same to defeat the ends of
justice; and (4) knowingly violated the rule against the filing of multiple actions arising from the same
cause of action.

RESPONDENT'S CONTENTION:
Respondent maintained that complainant committed the following: 1) grossly unethical and immoral
conduct by his impleading a non-party; (2) betrayal of his lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR); (3) malicious and intentional delay in not terminating the pre-trial, in violation
of the Interim Rules because he ignored the special summary nature of the case; and (4) misquoted
provisions of law and misrepresented the facts.
ISSUE
Whether or not the respondent is guilty of violating the lawyer's oath and the CPR. – YES.
HELD
Harassing tactics against opposing counsel
As noted by the IBP Investigating Commissioner, respondent did not deny filing several cases, both
civil and criminal, against opposing parties and their counsels. In his motion for reconsideration of
the IBP Board of Governors' Resolution, he again admitted such acts but expressed that it was not
ill-willed.
The Court is mindful of the lawyer's duty to defend his client's cause with utmost zeal. However,
professional rules impose limits on a lawyer's zeal and hedge it with necessary restrictions and
qualifications. The filing of cases by respondent against the adverse parties and their
counsels, as correctly observed by the Investigating Commissioner, manifests his malice in
paralyzing the lawyers from exerting their utmost effort in protecting their client's interest.
Even assuming arguendo that such acts were done without malice, it showed respondent's gross
indiscretion as a colleague in the legal profession.
Unsupported ill-motives attributed to a judge
As officers of the court, lawyers are duty-bound to observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts and judicial officers. They are to abstain from offensive or menacing language or behavior
before the court and must refrain from attributing to a judge motives that are not supported by the
record or have no materiality to the case.
Here, respondent has consistently attributed unsupported imputations against the complainant in his
pleadings. He also accused the complainant judge of being in cahoots and of having deplorable
close ties with the adverse counsels; and that complainant irrefutably coached said adverse
counsels. However, these bare allegations are absolutely unsupported by any piece of evidence.
Respondent did not present any proof to establish complainant's alleged partiality or the antedating.
The date of mailing indicated on the envelope is not the date of issue of the said order.
Canon 11 and Rule 11.04 of the CPR state that:
Canon 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the Courts and to judicial
officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.

Rule 11.04 - A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or
have no materiality to the case.
In light of the foregoing, the Court finds respondent guilty of attributing unsupported ill-motives to
complainant. It must be remembered that all lawyers are bound to uphold the dignity and
authority of the courts, and to promote confidence in the fair administration of justice. It is
the respect for the courts that guarantees the stability of the judicial institution; elsewise, the
institution would be resting on a very shaky foundation.
Hence, no matter how passionate a lawyer is towards defending his client's cause, he must not
forget to display the appropriate decorum expected of him, being a member of the legal profession,
and to continue to afford proper and utmost respect due to the courts.
Failure to observe candor, fairness and good faith before the court; failure to assist in the speedy
and efficient administration of justice
It cannot be gainsaid that candidness, especially towards the courts, is essential for the expeditious
administration of justice. Courts are entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty from the
lawyers appearing and pleading before them. A lawyer, on the other hand, has the fundamental duty
to satisfy that expectation. Otherwise, the administration of justice would gravely suffer if indeed it
could proceed at all.
Atty. Calayan's indiscriminate filing of pleadings, motions, civil and criminal cases, and even
administrative cases against different trial court judges relating to controversies involving CEFI, in
fact, runs counter to the speedy disposition of cases. It frustrates the administration of justice. It
degrades the dignity and integrity of the courts.
A lawyer does not have an unbridled right to file pleadings, motions and cases as he pleases.
Limitations can be inferred from the following rules:
1. Rules of Court
Rule 71, Section 3. Indirect Contempt to be Punished After Charge and Hearing. - After
charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment
thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or
counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:
x x x (c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a
court not constituting direct contempt under Section 1 of this Rule;
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice; x x x
2. Code of Professional Responsibility

Canon 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and for legal processes.
Canon 10, Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse
them to defeat the ends of justice.
Canon 12 - A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy
and efficient administration of justice.
Canon 12, Rule 12.04 - A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a
Judgment or misuse Court processes.
Respondent justifies his filing of administrative cases against certain judges, including complainant,
by relying on In Re: Almacen (Almacen). He claims that the mandate of the ruling laid down in
Almacen was to encourage lawyers' criticism of erring magistrates.
In Almacen, however, it did not mandate but merely recognized the right of a lawyer, both as an
officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate
channels the acts of courts and judges. In addition, the Court therein emphasized that these
criticisms are subject to a condition, to wit:
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over
the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and
abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is
a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to
disciplinary action.
Indubitably, the acts of respondent were in violation of his duty to observe and maintain the respect
due to the courts of justice and judicial officers and his duty to never seek to mislead the judge or
any judicial officer.
For having violated the CPR and the Lawyer's Oath, respondent's conduct should be meted with a
commensurate penalty.
WHEREFORE, the Court ADOPTS and APPROVES the Resolution of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines - Board of Governors dated September 28, 2013. Accordingly, Atty. Ronaldo Antonio
V. Calayan is found GUILTY of violating The Lawyer's Oath and The Code of Professional
Responsibility and he is hereby ordered SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2)
years, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or a similar offense will warrant the
imposition of a more severe penalty.

#12
PRESIDING JUDGE AIDA ESTRELLA MACAPAGAL 3 v. ATTY. WALTER YOUNG
A.C. No. 9298 | 29 July 2019 | Duty of Respect
DOCTRINE
As held in Pantanosas, Jr. v. Pamatong, while lawyers have the right, both as officers of the court
and as citizens, to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of
courts and judges, such criticisms, no matter how truthful, shall not spill over the walls of decency
and propriety.
FACTS
Judge Aida Estrella Macapagal alleged that she received a letter from Atty. Walter Young,
threatening her that an administrative and a criminal complaint for "knowingly rendering an
unjust judgment" would be filed against her if the writ of possession/writ of demolition would
be implemented.4 This was in connection with a pending complaint for expropriation filed by
Parañaque City against Magdiwang Realty Corporation and Fil-Homes Realty Development
Corporation. Judge Macapagal alleged that Atty. Young committed an act unbecoming of a lawyer in
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) in sending the subject threatening letter.
Portions of the subject letter sent by Atty. Young are hereby reproduced:
“…Modesty aside, I am also the counsel for the K-Ville residents who recently figured in the
so-called Torres land grab scam which affected a 24-hectare parcel of land in the heart of Quezon
City and that I have[,] in coordination with my colleagues, caused the filing of an administrative
complaint both against the Sheriff and the Presiding Judge for the uncanny attempts to execute a
judgment against non-parties to the case.
Indeed, this expropriation case as well as the Torres land grab case, though at first blush are
distinct from each other, have drawn certain parallels. The most significant parallelism is that in
both cases, both magistrates, particularly Your Honor, in regard to this expropriation case, are
attempting to execute a judgment against non-parties to the cases. The foregoing indeed is a very
basic violation of a fundamental precept of law which strikes at the very heart of the concept of
"due process". Having declared such, and with all due respect, but much to our regret, we
wish to make manifest that we will be compelled to file an administrative complaint against
you before the Office of the Court Administrator as well as a criminal complaint for
"knowingly rendering an unjust judgment" if you should persist in your stubborn actuation
of implementing the writ of possession/writ of demolition against non-parties to the
expropriation case…”
The Investigating Commissioner found that Atty. Young's act of writing the subject letter to Judge
Macapagal is tantamount to simple misconduct and thus, he recommended the imposition of the
penalty of warning with a reminder that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with
more severely. The Investigating Commissioner noted that writing a personal letter to Judge
Macapagal regarding a case pending before her is not one of the remedies available to Atty. Young,
3
Presiding Judge of RTC Br. 195, Parañaque City
4
Even before the said case was unloaded to Judge Macapagal in 2008, the writ of possession had already been issued in 2006 by
the previous presiding judge. On February 3, 2011, Judge Macapagal granted the plaintiff’s motion for demolition and issued the
corresponding writ, which the sheriff served on the occupants of the subject properties on October 28, 2011.

his intention is immaterial and "what he did is uncalled for" and "cannot be countenanced under any
situation."
The IBP Board of Governors reversed the said report, ruling that Atty. Young committed a
disrespectful and uncalled for act against the judiciary and thus, recommended that he be
suspended from the practice of law for 6 months. It held that Atty. Young is guilty of violating Canon
11 and Rule 11.04 of the CPR for his "menacing language that imputes ill and corrupt motive to a
member of the judiciary." His imputations and statements against Judge Macapagal in his letter and
in his Comment are disrespectful and show his conduct unbecoming of a member of the Bar.
ISSUE
Whether or not Atty. Young’s act of sending the subject letter to Judge Macapagal is highly improper
and in violation of Canon 11 of the CPR. – YES.
HELD
Atty. Young's act of sending the subject letter to Judge Macapagal highly improper. Moreover, there
is no question that Atty. Young did threaten to file administrative and criminal complaints against
Judge Macapagal if the writ of demolition was implemented:
x x x with all due respect, but much to our regret, we wish to make manifest that we will be
compelled to file an administrative complaint against you before the Office of the Court
Administrator as well as a criminal complaint for "knowingly rendering an unjust judgment" if
you should persist in your stubborn actuation of implementing the writ of possession/writ of
demolition against non-parties to the expropriation case. x x x
Furthermore, while Atty. Young alleged in his Comment that he had no intention to threaten Judge
Macapagal in sending the subject letter, he also stated that she may be "stubbornly pursuing" the
demolition operations "because of her desire to please and gratify" the Mayor of Parañaque City’s
Mayor. He also stated in his Comment that he sent the subject letter in order to "courteously warn"
and prevent Judge Macapagal from "committing a judicial act which would be a transgression" of his
clients' right to due process, and which would make her "truly vulnerable to criminal as well as
administrative" complaints. These statements, in the mind of the Court, indubitably
demonstrate how Atty. Young had failed to observe the respect due to the Courts and to
judicial officers. While he denied in his MR that he criticized Judge Macapagal, the Court finds
otherwise. As held in Pantanosas, Jr. v. Pamatong, while lawyers have the right, both as
officers of the court and as citizens, to criticize in properly respectful terms and through
legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges, such criticisms, no matter how truthful,
shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety.
The Court deems it appropriate to lower the penalty to reprimand considering that this is
respondent’s first offense and in view of his advanced age. WHEREFORE, Atty. Young is guilty of
violating Canon 11 of the CPR and is hereby reprimanded with a stern warning that a repetition
of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

NOTES
In determining the penalty to be imposed, the Court considers the facts and factors which may serve
as mitigating circumstances, such as the respondent's acknowledgment of his or her infractions and
feeling of remorse, family circumstances, respondent's advanced age, humanitarian and equitable
considerations, among others.

#13
ANTONIO GENATO v. ATTY. ELIGIO MALLARI
A.C. No. 12486 | 15 October 2019 | Duty of Respect
DOCTRINE
By provoking a sitting Justice of the Court of Appeals to a debate, respondent violated his basic
obligation under the Rules of Court to obey the laws of the Philippines, and to observe and maintain
the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers. He also transgressed Rule 11.05, Canon
11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
FACTS
Respondent and his wife claimed to be the owner of a 133 hectare real property located in San
Fernando, Pampanga which he allegedly acquired by virtue of a judgment award in a previous case.
Respondent induced complainant to invest P18 Million in the property. In turn, the respondent would
give the complainant the exclusive power to sell a portion of the land, about 33 hectares, and all
proceeds of the sale would go to the complainant. The latter, however, discovered that the property
actually belonged to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and had been divided for distribution to land
reform beneficiaries. Complainant filed a criminal complaint for estafa against the respondent. The
criminal complaint was, however, dismissed.
Aside from his own personal experience with respondent, complainant drew attention to cases and
instances involving respondent which showcased the latter's propensity to deceive, his unethical
behavior, and his abusive use of power as a member of the bar and one of these is the respondent's
published challenge to an Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals to a "public and televised
debate." On October 29, 2012, respondent paid advertisements published in the Philippine Star and
the Philippine Daily Inquirer, challenging Court of Appeals' Associate Justice Apolinario D. Bruselas,
Jr. to a "public and televised debate" in relation to an issuance in the case entitled "PNB v. Eligio P.
Mallari, et al." The Court took note of respondent's practice built on harassing and intimidating
judges and court personnel, as well as opposing lawyers and their clients, with complaints and
frivolous submissions.
The Investigating Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors concluded that respondent
violated the following provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility: Canon 1; Rule 1.02;
Canon 10; Rule 10.03; Canon 11 — A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts and to Judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others; and Rule 11.05 — A
lawyer shall submit grievances against a judge to the proper authorities only.
ISSUE
Whether or not the respondent violated Canon 11. – YES.
HELD
It is a lawyer's sworn duty to maintain a respectful attitude towards the courts. There is, thus, no
rhyme or reason for respondent's reprehensible and arrogant behavior in challenging a Justice of the
Court of Appeals to a public debate. Even assuming that the decision rendered by a magistrate is,
according to the losing lawyer, erroneous and completely devoid of basis in law, evidence, and
jurisprudence, a person, let alone a lawyer, should not act contemptuously by challenging the judge

or justice concerned to a public debate that would unavoidably expose him or her and the entire
Judiciary which he or she represents, to public ridicule and mockery.
A lawyer must foster respect for the courts and its officers. A lawyer must not sow hate or disrespect
against the court and its members. He or she must be at the forefront in upholding its dignity. A
lawyer, more than anyone, must know that there are proper venues for grievances against a
magistrate or his or her decision or orders, which are sanctioned by law. Debate, a public one at
that, is not one of these remedies.
By provoking a sitting Justice of the Court of Appeals to a debate, respondent violated his basic
obligation under the Rules of Court to obey the laws of the Philippines, and to observe and maintain
the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers. He also transgressed Rule 11.05, Canon
11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:
Rule 11.05 — A lawyer shall submit grievances against a Judge to the proper authorities
only.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is a standard guideline to determine the weight and
repercussions of the acts committed by legal professionals. Not only did respondent commit gross
misconduct and willful disobedience to a superior court, his repeated and persistent transgressions
of court issuances, abuse of court processes, and disrespect to lawful authority demonstrate a clear
violation of the lawyer's oath whereby he imposed upon himself the following duties: to maintain
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; to support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as
the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; to do no falsehood nor consent to the
doing of any in court; to not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful
suit, or give aid or consent to the same; to not delay any man for money or malice, and to conduct
himself or herself as a lawyer according to the best of his or her knowledge and discretion, with all
good fidelity as well to the court as to his or her clients; and to impose upon himself or herself these
voluntary obligations without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion.
Considering respondent's actions vis-à-vis these sworn duties, it is clear as day that he committed a
violation of his basic oath as a lawyer. His unfitness to remain in the legal profession has now
become indubitable.
Respondent Atty. Eligio Mallari is found guilty of violation of Rule 10.03, Canon 10, Rule 11.05,
Canon 11, and Rule 12.04, Canon 12, of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Lawyer's
Oath. Respondent is ordered disbarred from the practice of law.
NOTES
Other cases involving respondent:
1. In "Eligio P. Mallari v. Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and the Provincial
Sheriff," respondent employed dilatory tactics to stop the execution of a final and executory
decision involving his debt with GSIS which he had evaded to pay for twenty-four (24) years.
In that case, given respondent's atrocious professional behavior, the Court had to order the
Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) to investigate his actuations. Despite the investigation,
respondent continued to act with impunity in disregarding and flouting the Court's directives.

2. Respondent employed delaying tactics to prevent the enforcement of a writ of possession
issued in the case docketed G.R. No. 157660 entitled "Eligio P. Mallari v. Banco Filipino
Savings and Mortgage Bank." Consequently, the Court warned the respondent about his
unethical conduct.
3. Respondent filed baseless harassment cases against the lawyers of PNB and the Register of
Deeds of Pampanga. These cases were dismissed. But respondent continued to file frivolous
petitions before the Court purportedly to protect his alleged land ownership when it was too
obvious that he merely fabricated a facade for his suspicious title.

#14
EUPROCINA CRISOSTOMO v. ATTY. PHILIP NAZARENO 5
A.C. No. 6677 | 10 June 2014 | Duty to Assist in the Admin. of Justice
DOCTRINE
● A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
● A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
● Owing to the evident similarity of the issues involved in each set of cases, Atty. Nazareno, as
mandated by the Rules of Court and more pertinently, the canons of the Code, should have
truthfully declared the existence of the pending related cases in the certifications against
forum shopping attached to the pertinent pleadings.
FACTS
Complainants6 individually purchased housing units Patricia South Villa Subdivision, Anabu-II, Imus,
Cavite, from Rudex International Development Corp. (Rudex). In view of several inadequacies and
construction defects in the housing units and the subdivision itself, complainants sought the
rescission of their respective contracts to sell before the HLURB, seeking the refund of the monthly
amortizations they had paid. The first batch of rescission cases was filed by Sioting on May 24,
2002, and Crisostomo and Marquizo on June 10, 2002, while the second batch of rescission cases
was filed by Balatucan on March 3, 2003, Solis and Ederlinda M. Villanueva (represented by
Minerales) on May 12, 2003, and Batang on July 29, 2003. In all the rescission cases, Rudex was
represented by Atty. Philip Z. A. Nazareno (Atty. Nazareno).
Judgments of default were eventually rendered against Rudex in the first batch of rescission cases.
Sometime in August 2003, Rudex filed three petitions for review before the HLURB assailing the
same. In the certifications against forum shopping attached to the said petitions, Rudex, through its
President Ruben P. Baes, and legal counsel Atty. Nazareno, stated that it has not commenced or
has knowledge of any similar action or proceeding involving the same issues pending before any
court, tribunal or agency – this, notwithstanding the fact that Rudex, under the representation of Atty.
Nazareno, previously filed an ejectment case on September 9, 2002 against Sioting and her
husband, Rodrigo Sioting (Sps. Sioting), before the MTC.
On January 29, 2004, Rudex, again represented by Atty. Nazareno, filed another complaint against
Sps. Sioting before the HLURB for the rescission of their contract to sell and the latter’s ejectment,
similar to its pending September 9, 2002 ejectment complaint. Yet, in the certification against forum
shopping attached thereto, Rudex declared that it has not commenced or is not aware of any action
or proceeding involving the same issues pending before any court, tribunal or agency. The said
certification was notarized by Atty. Nazareno himself.
On April 1, 2004, six similar complaints for rescission of contracts to sell and ejectment, plus
damages for non-payment of amortizations due, were filed by Atty. Nazareno, on behalf of Rudex,
5
EUPROCINA I. CRISOSTOMO, MARILYN L. SOLIS, EVELYN MARQUIZO, ROSEMARIE BALATUCAN, MILDRED BATANG, MARILEN MINERALES, AND
MELINDA D. SIOTING, Complainants, VS. ATTY. PHILIP Z. A. NAZARENO, Respondent.
6
Euprocina I. Crisostomo (Crisostomo), Marilyn L. Solis (Solis), Evelyn Marquizo (Marquizo), Rosemarie Balatucan (Balatucan),
Mildred Batang (Batang), Marilen Minerales (Minerales), and Melinda D. Sioting (Sioting)

against the other complainants before the HLURB. The certifications against forum shopping
attached thereto likewise stated that Rudex has not commenced or has any knowledge of any
similar pending action before any court, tribunal or agency.
On February 21, 2005, complainants jointly filed an administrative complaint for disbarment against
Atty. Nazareno, claiming that in the certifications against forum shopping attached to the complaints
for rescission and ejectment of Rudex filed while Atty. Nazareno was its counsel, the latter made
false declarations therein that no similar actions or proceedings have been commenced by Rudex or
remained pending before any other court, tribunal or agency when, in fact, similar actions or
proceedings for rescission had been filed by the complainants before the HLURB against Rudex and
Atty. Nazareno, and an ejectment complaint was filed by Rudex, represented by Atty. Nazareno,
against Sps. Sioting. In addition, complainants asserted that Atty. Nazareno committed malpractice
as a notary public since he only assigned one document number (i.e., Doc. No. 1968) in all the
certifications against forum shopping that were separately attached to the six April 1, 2004
complaints for rescission and ejectment.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not Atty. Nazareno is guilty of making false declarations in the certifications
against forum shopping subject of this case. – YES.
2. Whether or not Atty. Nazareno is guilty of malpractice as a notary public. – YES.
HELD
1. Under Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court7, the submission of false entries in a
certification against forum shopping constitutes indirect or direct contempt of court,
and subjects the erring counsel to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions.
Further, in the realm of legal ethics, said infraction may be considered as a violation of Rule
1.018, Canon 1 and Rule 10.019, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(Code).
7
Section 5. Certification against forum shopping. — The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or
other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed
therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court,
tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if
there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter
learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom
to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory
pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after
hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute
indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party
or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with
prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.
8
A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
9
A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be
misled by any artifice.

In this case, it has been established that Atty. Nazareno made false declarations in the
certifications against forum shopping attached to Rudex’s pleadings, for which he should be
held administratively liable.
Records show that Atty. Nazareno, acting as Rudex’s counsel, filed, in August 2003,
petitions for review assailing the judgments of default rendered in the first batch of rescission
cases without disclosing in the certifications against forum shopping the existence of the
ejectment case it filed against Sps. Sioting which involves an issue related to the
complainants’ rescission cases. Further, on January 29, 2004, Rudex, represented by Atty.
Nazareno, filed a complaint for rescission and ejectment against Sps. Sioting without
disclosing in the certifications against forum shopping the existence of Sioting’s May 24,
2002 rescission complaint against Rudex as well as Rudex’s own September 9, 2002
ejectment complaint also against Sps. Sioting. Finally, on April 1, 2004, Atty. Nazareno, once
more filed rescission and ejectment complaints against the other complainants in this case
without disclosing in the certifications against forum shopping the existence of complainants’
own complaints for rescission.
Owing to the evident similarity of the issues involved in each set of cases, Atty. Nazareno, as
mandated by the Rules of Court and more pertinently, the canons of the Code, should have
truthfully declared the existence of the pending related cases in the certifications against
forum shopping attached to the pertinent pleadings.
2. It is a standing rule that for every notarial act, the notary shall record in the notarial register at
the time of the notarization, among others, the entry and page number of the document
notarized, and that he shall give to each instrument or document executed, sworn to, or
acknowledged before him a number corresponding to the one in his register. Evidently, Atty.
Nazareno did not comply with the foregoing rule.
Worse, Atty. Nazareno notarized the certifications against forum shopping attached to all the
aforementioned complaints, fully aware that they identically asserted a material falsehood.
The administrative liability of an erring notary public in this respect was clearly delineated as
a violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code in the case of Heirs of the Late Spouses
Villanueva v. Atty. Beradio, to wit: “Where admittedly the notary public has personal
knowledge of a false statement or information contained in the instrument to be notarized,
yet proceeds to affix his or her notarial seal on it, the Court must not hesitate to discipline the
notary public accordingly as the circumstances of the case may dictate. Otherwise, the
integrity and sanctity of the notarization process may be undermined and public confidence
on notarial documents diminished. In this case, respondent’s conduct amounted to a breach
of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires lawyers to obey the
laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal processes. Respondent also
violated Rule 1.01 of the Code which proscribes lawyers from engaging in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.”

#15
VICTOR D. DE LOS SANTOS II. v. ATTY. NESTOR BARBOSA
A.C. No. 6681 | 17 June 2015 | Duty to Assist in the Admin of Justice
DOCTRINE
Lawyers are officers of the court and they have a responsibility to assist the courts in the
administration of justice. Acts committed in order to delay the prosecution of a case are considered
unethical, improper and inexcusable.
FACTS
Melba D. De Los Santos Rodis (Rodis) filed a complaint for Falsification of Public Document against
her father, Ricardo D. De Los Santos, Sr. (De Los Santos, Sr.) and Rosie P. Canaco (Canaco). She
alleges that Canaco made untruthful statements in the certificate of live birth of her son, Victor
Canaco De Los Santos. It was indicated in her son’s birth certificate that she was married to De Los
Santos, Sr. when no such marriage took place. An Information was filed against Canaco for violation
of Sections 1 & 2 in relation to Section 9 of PD No. 651 (Requiring the registration of births and
deaths in the Philippines which occurred from January 1, 1974 and thereafter).
During the preliminary conference, the Respondent, as counsel de parte of Canaco, objected to the
Prosecution’s offer in evidence of the photocopy of the birth record of Victor Canaco Delos Santos.
This then resulted in a resetting of the preliminary conference at some other time to give the
prosecution time to file a certified true copy of the birth certificate.
Thereafter, respondent sent a letter to St. Luke’s Hospital warning the Hospital that there are certain
laws that deal with secrecy and confidentiality of records, and that his client, Canaco (complainant)
never authorized anybody to secure a copy of his records. But eventually, the MeTC issued a
subpoena ordering the Civil Registrar of Quezon City to produce a certified true copy of the Birth
Certificate of Canaco. Meanwhile, the complainant (Victor D. De Los Santos II), filed a complaint with
the prosecutor for obstruction of justice against atty. Barbosa (the lawyer).
In defense, the respondent argued, among others, that the name of his client Canaco’s son is
VICTOR C. DE LOS SANTOS and not VICTOR P. DE LOS SANTOS as stated in the Information
charging Canaco with violation of Presidential Decree No. 651.Thus, the respondent vehemently
denied that he intentionally intended to delay and obstruct the proceedings in the MeTC.
Complainant then filed a Petition for Disbarment, charging the respondent with multiple gross
violations of his oath as a lawyer and Canons of Professional Ethics for unlawfully obstructing and
delaying the proceedings against Canaco. The complainant alleges that the sending of letters was
maliciously done to delay the prosecution against Canaco, who is the respondent’s client. That such
act was a violation of the lawyers oath, Canons of Professional Ethics, and his duties as an attorney.
ISSUE
Whether or not Respondent Atty. Nestor Barbosa should be held administratively liable. – YES.

HELD
Affirming the findings of the IBP Commissioner, the Court held that respondent’s acts of objecting to
the offer in evidence of a photocopy of the birth certificate of Victor C. De Los Santos which
necessitated the postponement of the preliminary conference in order to afford the prosecution the
opportunity to secure a certified true copy thereof was a calculated ploy to delay the successful
prosecution of the case. To guarantee its further delay, on the same day of the preliminary
conference, he prepared the letter addressed to the Office of the Civil Registrar, National Census
and Statistics Office and St. Luke’s Hospital to prevent or delay the issuance of the certified true
copy of the birth certificate. Such conduct is unethical, improper and inexcusable.
The Court furthered that they find the respondent’s acts of writing and sending out letters,
deliberately misleading the MeTC, the Supreme Court and the IBP into believing that Victor C. De
Los Santos and Victor P. De Los Santos are two different persons as acts which constitute gross
violation of the Lawyer’s Oath and of the CPR. It is to be noted that lawyers are officers of the
court, that they have a responsibility to assist the courts in the administration of justice.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds respondent Atty. Nestor C. Barbosa GUILTY of
violating Rules 1.01 and 1.03 of Canon 1, Rule 10.01 of Canon 10, and Rule 12.04 of Canon 12
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED for one (1) year from the
practice of law, effective upon his receipt of this Decision, and is STERNLY WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

#16
NEMESIO FLORAN and CARIDAD FLORAN v. ATTY. ROY PRULE EDIZA
A.C. No. 5325 | 9 February 2016 | Duty to Assist in the Admin of Justice
DOCTRINE
The intentional delay and utter refusal to abide with the Court's orders is a great disrespect to the
Court which cannot be tolerated
In Tugot v. Judge Coliflores, the Court held that its resolutions should not be construed as mere
requests from the Court. They should be complied with promptly and completely.
FACTS
In a Decision dated 19 October 2011, the Court found Atty. Roy Prule Ediza administratively liable
for violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Canon 15, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. The Court upheld the findings of the IBP and suspended Atty. Ediza
from the practice of law for 6 months. Aside from being suspended, he was also ordered by the
court to (1) return to petitioners the two sets of documents that he misled them and Sartiga
Epal into signing and (2) pay the petitioners P125,463.38 with legal interest from 8 September
2000 until fully paid.
Atty. Ediza's liability stemmed from a Complaint/Affidavit filed by Spouses Nemesio and Caridad
Floran. The subject of the complaint was a 3.5525 hectare parcel of unregistered land located in
Misamis Oriental, which was covered by a tax declaration in the name of Sartiga Epal, a relative,
who gave the property to the petitioner.
From the records, the Court found that Atty. Ediza deceived complainants when he asked them to
unknowingly sign a deed of sale transferring a portion of their land to him. When the sale of
petitioners’ land pushed through, Atty. Ediza received half of the amount of the proceeds given by
the buyer and falsely misled petitioners into thinking that he would register, using the same
proceeds, the remaining portion of their land. These actions, which deprived petitioners of their
property, showed Atty. Ediza's behavior as unbecoming of a member of the legal profession.
Atty. Ediza then filed a Manifestation of Compliance, attaching a sworn statement attesting that he
desisted from the practice of law for 6 months from receipt of the decision. The Court deferred action
on the Manifestation of Compliance and required Atty. Ediza to (1) submit certifications from the IBP
Local Chapter where he is a member and the Office of the Executive Judge where he practices his
profession, both stating that he had desisted from the practice of law from 18 November 2011 to 29
May 2012; and (2) show proof of payment to complainants of P125,463.38 plus legal interest, and
the return of the two sets of documents that Atty. Ediza misled complainants and Sartiga Epal to
sign. The Court also required petitioners to manifest whether Atty. Ediza had already paid the said
amount and returned the said documents.
Thereafter, petitioners wrote the Court that Atty. Ediza had yet to comply with the Court's
Decision and asked the Court's assistance in implementing the same. Later, in a Verified
Compliance with Manifestation executed with the assistance of the PAO, petitioners informed the
Court that as of 17 October 2012, Atty. Ediza had not paid any single centavo and neither had

he returned the required documents. The Court noted the manifestations and further ordered
Atty. Ediza to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or be held in
contempt and to comply with the Decision.
More than 4 years since the Court promulgated its Decision dated 19 October 2011, Atty.
Ediza has yet to comply with the Court's directives to (1) submit certifications from the IBP Local
Chapter where he is a member and the Office of the Executive Judge where he practices his
profession both stating that he has desisted from the practice of law from 18 November 2011 to 29
May 2012; (2) pay complainants the amount of P125,463.38 plus legal interest; and (3) return the
two sets of documents that Atty. Ediza misled complainants and Sartiga Epal to sign.
ISSUE
Whether or not Atty. Ediza violated the CPR by repeatedly and blatantly disregarding and defying the
orders of the Court. – YES.
HELD
The Court issued numerous Resolutions10 requiring Atty. Ediza to comply with the October 19, 2011
Decision and show cause why he should not be disciplinary dealt with or be held in contempt for his
failure to abide by the Court's orders. However, Atty. Ediza repeatedly and blatantly disregarded
and obstinately defied these orders from the Court. Instead, he responded by (1) claiming
ignorance over the documents stated in the Decision, and worse, adjudged that the documents were
fictional; (2) alleging newly discovered evidence; (3) demanding to stay the execution of the
Decision; and (4) reporting that he has complied with the order of suspension without submitting any
required certifications from the IBP and the Office of the Executive Judge.
The intentional delay and utter refusal to abide with the Court's orders is a great disrespect to
the Court which cannot be tolerated. Atty. Ediza willfully left unheeded all the warnings imposed
upon him, despite the earlier six-month suspension that was meted out to him for his administrative
liability. In Tugot v. Judge Coliflores, the Court held that its resolutions should not be construed as
mere requests from the Court. They should be complied with promptly and completely. The failure of
Atty. Ediza to comply betrays not only a recalcitrant streak in his character, but also disrespect for
the Court's lawful orders and directives.
As a member of the legal profession, Atty. Ediza has the duty to obey the orders and processes of
this Court without delay and resistance. Rule 12.04 of Canon 12 of the CPR states:
CANON 12 - A LAWYER SHALL EXERT EVERY EFFORT AND CONSIDER IT HIS DUTY TO
ASSIST IN THE SPEEDY AND EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.
Rule 12.04 - A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or
misuse Court processes.
In the present case, Atty. Ediza had previously been found guilty of violating the CPR and was
suspended from the practice of law for 6 months. Despite the suspension, Atty. Ediza is once again
demonstrating to this Court that not only is he unfit to stay in the legal profession for failing to protect
10
Five resolutions dated 3 September 2012, 25 February 2013, 15 July 2013, 4 June 2014, and 12 November 2014

the interests of his clients but is also remiss in following the dictates of the Court, which has
administrative supervision over him. In Martinez v. Zoleta, we held that the Court should not and will
not tolerate future indifference to administrative complaints and to resolutions requiring comment on
such administrative complaints. It bears stressing that a disregard of Court directives constitutes
grave or serious misconduct and gross or willful insubordination which warrant disciplinary
sanction by this Court.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Roy Prule Ediza, having violated the CPR by committing grave misconduct
and willful insubordination, is disbarred and his name ordered stricken off the Roll of
Attorneys.

#17
IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDING FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. VICENTE
RAUL ALMACEN in L-27654
ANTONIO CALERO v. VIRGINIA YAPTINCHAY
G.R. No. L-27654 | 18 February 1970 | Duty to Refrain from Impropriety
DOCTRINE
● Post-litigation utterances or publications, made by lawyers, critical of the courts and their
judicial actuations, whether amounting to a crime or not, which transcend the permissible
bounds of fair comment and legitimate criticism and thereby tend to bring them into disrepute
or to subvert public confidence in their integrity and in the orderly administration of justice,
constitute grave professional misconduct which may be visited with disbarment or other
lesser appropriate disciplinary sanctions by the Supreme Court in the exercise of the
prerogatives inherent in it as the duly constituted guardian of the morals and ethics of the
legal fraternity.
● To view the doctrinal rule that the protective mantle of contempt may ordinarily be invoked
only against scurrilous remarks or malicious innuendoes while a court mulls over a pending
case and not after the conclusion thereof, is erroneous. The rule that bars contempt after a
judicial proceedings has terminated has lost much of its vitality. As expressed by Chief
Justice Moran, there may still be contempt by publication even after a case has been
terminated.
● Well-recognized is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to
criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and
judges. But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bonafide and shall
not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism
on the one hand, and abuse and slander of Courts and judges on the other. Intemperate and
unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty to respect to Courts. It is such a misconduct
that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.
FACTS
Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's filed a "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," in protest
against what he therein asserts is "a great injustice committed against his client by this Supreme
Court." He indicts the Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal "peopled by men who are calloused
to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and
commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity." His client's he continues, who
was deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," has become "one of the sacrificial victims
before the altar of hypocrisy."
In the same breath that he alludes to the classic symbol of justice, he ridicules the members of
this Court, saying "that justice as administered by the present members of the Supreme
Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb." He then vows to argue the cause of his client
"in the people's forum," so that "the people may know of the silent injustices committed by this
Court," and that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed must never be
repeated." He ends his petition with a prayer that a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to

receive the certificate of the undersigned attorney and counselor-at-law IN TRUST with reservation
that at any time in the future and in the event we regain our faith and confidence, we may retrieve
our title to assume the practice of the noblest profession.
The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled Virginia Y. Yaptinchay vs. Antonio H.
Calero, in which Atty. Almacen was counsel for the defendant. The trial court, after due hearing,
rendered judgment against his client. On June 15, 1966 Atty. Almacen received a copy of the
decision. Twenty days later, or on July 5, 1966, he moved for its reconsideration. He served on the
adverse counsel a copy of the motion, but did not notify the latter of the time and place of hearing on
said motion. Meanwhile, on July 18, 1966, the plaintiff moved for execution of the judgment. For
"lack of proof of service," the trial court denied both motions. To prove that he did serve on the
adverse party a copy of his first motion for reconsideration, Atty. Almacen filed on August 17, 1966 a
second motion for reconsideration to which he attached the required registry return card. This
second motion for reconsideration, however, was ordered withdrawn by the trial court on August 30,
1966, upon verbal motion of Atty. Almacen himself, who, earlier, that is, on August 22, 1966, had
already perfected the appeal. Because the plaintiff interposed no objection to the record on appeal
and appeal bond, the trial court elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.
CA however dismissed the appeal and denied the motion for reconsideration. Atty. Almaen then
appealed to Court by certiorari and was again denied through a minute resolution but shortly
thereafter, he again filed a motion for reconsideration as well as his petition for leave to file a 2nd
motion for reconsideration and for extension of time but was ordered expunged from the records.
It was at this juncture Atty. Almacen vented his disappointment by filing his “Petition to Surrender
Lawyer's Certificate of Title'' pleading filled from beginning to end with insolent, contemptuous,
grossly disrespectful and derogatory remarks against the Court as well as for its individual members
that is seen as unprofessional.
Nonetheless, the Court decided by resolution to withhold action for his petition until he has actually
surrendered his certificate. Court waited for him but no word came from him. He was reminded to
turn over his certificate so that the Court can act on his petition however he manifested “he has no
pending petition in connection with Calero v. Yaptinchay for case is now final and executory” and that
the Court's resolution did not require him to do either a positive or negative act, and that since his
offer was not accepted, he “chose to pursue the negative act”.
In exercise of the Court's inherent power to discipline a member of the Bar for gross misconduct, the
Court resolved to require Atty. Almacen to show cause why no disciplinary action should be taken
against him.
Atty. Almacen, denying the charges against him, asked for permission “to give reasons and cause
why no disciplinary action should be taken against him... in open and public hearing”. Court then
resolved to require Atty. Almacen to state his reasons for such a request. He then reasoned that
since the Court is the “complainant, prosecutor and Judge” he preferred to be heard and answer
questions in an open and public hearing so that the Court could observe his sincerity and candor. He
also asked to file a written explanation “in the event the Court has no time to hear him in person”.
Court allowed him and he was also heard in oral argument.

In Atty. Almacen's written answer, as undignified and cynical as it is unchastened, offers no apology.
Far from being contrite, Atty. Almacen unremittingly repeats his jeremiad of lamentations, this time
embellishing it with abundant sarcasm and innuendo.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not Atty Almacen could be held liable for contempt for such post-litigation
utterances and actuations. – YES.
2. Whether or not the utterances and actuations of Atty. Almacen here in question are properly
the object of disciplinary sanctions. – YES.
HELD
1. In line with the doctrinal rule that the protective mantle of contempt may ordinarily be invoked
only against scurrilous remarks or malicious innuendoes while a court mulls over a pending
case and not after the conclusion thereof, Atty. Almacen would now seek to sidestep the thrust
of a contempt charge by his studied emphasis that the remarks for which he is now called upon
to account were made only after this Court had written finis to his appeal. This is of no moment.
The rule that bars contempt after a judicial proceedings has terminated, has lost much of its
vitality. For sometime, this was the prevailing view in this jurisdiction. The first stir for a
modification thereof, however, came when, in People vs. Alarcon, the then Chief Justice Manuel
V. Moran dissented with the holding of the majority, speaking thru Justice Jose P. Laurel, which
upheld the rule above-adverted to. A complete disengagement from the settled rule was later to
be made in In re Brillantes, a contempt proceeding, where the editor of the Manila Guardian was
adjudged in contempt for publishing an editorial which asserted that the 1944 Bar Examinations
were conducted in a farcical manner after the question of the validity of the said examinations
had been resolved and the case closed. Virtually, this was an adoption of the view expressed by
Chief Justice Moran. in his dissent in Alarcon to the effect that there may still be contempt by
publication even after a case has been terminated. Said Chief Justice Moran in Alarcon:
"A publication which tends to impede, obstruct, embarrass or influence the courts in
administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding, constitutes criminal contempt
which is summarily punishable by courts. A publication which tends to degrade the
courts and to destroy public confidence in them or that which tends to bring them in
any way into disrepute, constitutes likewise criminal contempt, and is equally
punishable by courts. What is sought, in the first kind of contempt, to be shielded
against the influence of newspaper comments, is the all-important duty of the court to
administer justice in the decision of a pending case. In the second kind of contempt,
the punitive hand of justice is extended to vindicate the courts from any act or
conduct calculated to bring them into disfavor or to destroy public confidence in
them. In the first there is no contempt where there is no action pending, as there is
no decision which might in any way be influenced by the newspaper publication. In
the second, the contempt exists, with or without a pending case, as what is sought to
be protected is the court itself and its dignity. Courts would lose their utility if public
confidence in them is destroyed."

Accordingly, no comfort is afforded Atty. Almacen by the circumstance that his statements and
actuations now under consideration were made only after the judgment in his client's appeal had
attained finality. He could as much be liable for contempt therefor as if it had been perpetrated
during the pendency of the said appeal.
2. The Court acknowledged that it is natural for a lawyer to express his dissatisfaction each time
he loses what he sanguinely believes to be a meritorious case. That is why lawyers are given
wide latitude to differ with, and voice disapproval of, not only on Court's rulings but also in
manner which they are handed down.
Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen,
to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and
judges. But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide and shall not
spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism on the
one hand, and abuse and slander of Courts and judges on the other. Intemperate and unfair
criticism is a gross violation of the duty to respect to Courts. It is such a misconduct that
subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.
Membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties which are not mere flux
and ferment. He vows solemnly to conduct himself “with all good fidelity to the Court” and the
Rules of Court constantly remind him “to observe and maintain respect due to courts of justice
and judicial officers”. The first canon of legal ethics enjoins him to “maintain toward the Courts a
respectful attitude, not for the sake of temporary incumbent of judicial office but for the
maintenance of its supreme importance”.
The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to Courts is essential to orderly

administration of justice. Hence, in assertion of their client's rights, lawyers, even those gifted
with superior intellect, are enjoined to rein up their tempers.
In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at
one time and a mere citizen at another. Thus, statements made by an attorney in private
conversations or communications or in the course of a political campaign, if couched in insulting
language as to bring into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice, may subject the
attorney to disciplinary action.
In the case at bar, Atty Almancen’s proffered surrender of his lawyer's certificate is, of course,
purely potestative on his part. Unorthodox though it may seem, no statute, no law stands in its
way. Beyond making the mere offer, however, he went farther. In haughty and coarse language,
he actually availed of the said move as a vehicle for his vicious tirade against this Court. The
integrated entirety of his petition bristles with vile insults all calculated to drive home his
contempt for and disrespect to the Court and its members. Picturing his client as "a sacrificial
victim at the altar of hypocrisy," he categorically denounces the justice administered by this
Court to be not only blind "but also deaf and dumb." With unmitigated acerbity, he virtually rakes
this Court and its members with verbal talons, imputing to the Court the perpetration of "silent
injustices" and "short cut justice" while at the same time branding its members as "calloused to
pleas of justice." And, true to his announced threat to argue the cause of his client "in the

people's forum," he caused the publication in the papers of an account of his actuations, in a
calculated effort to startle the public, stir up public indignation and disrespect toward the Court.
Called upon to make an explanation, he expressed no regret, offered no apology. Instead, with
characteristic arrogance, he rehashed and reiterated his vituperative attacks and, alluding to the
Scriptures, virtually tarred and feathered the Court and its members as inveterate hypocrites
incapable of administering justice and unworthy to impose disciplinary sanctions upon him.
The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. Almacen's petition, answer and oral argumentation
speaks for itself. The vicious language used and the scurrilous innuendoes they carried far
transcend the permissible bounds of legitimate criticism. They could never serve any purpose
but to gratify the spite of an irate attorney, attract public attention to himself and, more important
of all, bring this Court and its members into disrepute and destroy public confidence in them to
the detriment of the orderly administration of justice. Odium of this character and texture
presents no redeeming feature, and completely negates any pretense of passionate
commitment to the truth. It is not a whit less than a classic example of gross misconduct, gross
violation of the lawyer's oath and gross transgression of the Canons of Legal Ethics. As such, it
cannot be allowed to go unrebuked. The way for the exertion of our disciplinary powers is thus
laid clear, and the need therefore is unavoidable.
We must once more stress our explicit disclaimer of immunity from criticism. Like any other
Government entity in a viable democracy, the Court is not, and should not be, above criticism.
But a critique of the Court must be intelligent and discriminating, fitting to its high function as the
court of last resort. And more than this, valid and healthy criticism is by no means synonymous
to obloquy, and requires detachment and disinterestedness, real qualities approached only
through constant striving to attain them. Any criticism of the Court must possess the quality of
judiciousness and must be informed by perspective and infused by philosophy.
The misconduct committed by Atty. Almacen is of considerable gravity and cannot be

overemphasized. However, heeding the stern injunction that disbarment should never be
decreed where a lesser sanction would accomplish the end desired, and believing that it may
not perhaps be futile to hope that in the sober light of some future day, Atty. Almacen will realize
that abrasive language never fails to do disservice to an advocate and that in every
effervescence of candor there is ample room for the added glow of respect, it is our view that
suspension will suffice under the circumstances.
His demonstrated persistence in his misconduct by neither manifesting repentance nor offering
apology therefore leave us no way of determining how long that suspension should last and,
accordingly, we are impelled to decree that the same should be indefinite. The merit of this
choice is best shown by the fact that it will then be left to Atty. Almacen to determine for himself
how long or how short that suspension shall] last. For, at any time after the suspension
becomes effective, he may prove to this Court that he is once again fit to resume the practice of
law.
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen be, as he is hereby,
suspended from the practice of law until further orders, the suspension to take effect immediately.

NOTES
Rule 13.02 – A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case
tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party.

#18
RE: SUSPENSION OF ATTY. ROGELIO Z. BAGABUYO, FORMER SENIOR STATE
PROSECUTOR
A.C. No. 7006 | 9 October 2007 | Duty to Refrain from Impropriety
DOCTRINE
The Court is not against lawyers raising grievances against erring judges but the rules clearly
provide for the proper venue and procedure for doing so, precisely because respect for the institution
must always be maintained.
FACTS
The case stemmed from the events of the proceedings in People v. Luis Bucalon Plaza, heard
before the sala of Presiding Judge Jose Manuel P. Tan, who favorably resolved the Motion to Fix the
Amount of Bail Bond. Instead of availing of judicial remedies, Bagabuyo caused the publication of an
article regarding the Order granting the bail in the Mindanao Gold Star Daily entitled “Senior
prosecutor lambasts Surigao judge for allowing murder suspect to bail out.”
RTC then directed Bagabuyo and Mark Francisco, writer of the article, to explain why they should
not be cited for indirect contempt of court for the publication of the article which degraded the court
with its presiding judge with its lies and misrepresentations. Bagabuyo refused to explain and the
RTC held him in contempt of court.
Despite the citation of indirect contempt, Bagabuyo presented himself to the media for interviews in
Radio Station DXKS and again, attacked the integrity of Judge Tan. In the radio interview, Bagabuyo
called Judge Tan a liar, ignorant of the law and that as a mahjong aficionado, he was studying
mahjong instead of studying the law.
RTC required Bagabuyo to explain and show cause why he should not be held in contempt and be
suspended from the practice of law for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility. Bagabuyo
denied the charge that he sought to be interviewed. He said that he was approached by someone
who asked him to comment on the Order. He justified his response to the interview as a simple
exercise of his constitutional right of freedom of speech and that it was made without malice.
However, the RTC found his denials lame, held him in contempt, and suspended him from the
practice of law for 1 year.
ISSUE
Whether or not Bagabuyo violated the Code of Professional Responsibility. – YES.
HELD
Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts who are empowered to appear, prosecute and defend;
and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a
consequence. Membership in the bar imposes upon them certain obligations. Canon 11 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility mandates a lawyer to observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts and to judicial officers and [he] should insist on similar conduct by others. Rule 11.05 of
Canon 11 states that a lawyer shall submit grievances against a judge to the proper authorities only.

Bagabuyo violated Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for not
resorting to the proper authorities only for redress of his grievances against Judge Tan. He also
violated Canon 11 for his disrespect of the court and its officer when he stated that Judge Tan was
ignorant of the law, that as a mahjong aficionado, he was studying mahjong instead of studying the
law, and that he was a liar.
It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude. As an officer of the
court, it is his duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the court to which he owes fidelity, according
to the oath he has taken. Respect for the courts guarantees the stability of our democratic
institutions which, without such respect, would be resting on a very shaky foundation. The Court is
not against lawyers raising grievances against erring judges but the rules clearly provide for the
proper venue and procedure for doing so, precisely because respect for the institution must always
be maintained.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo is found guilty of violating Rule
11.05, Canon 11 and Rule 13.02, Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and of
violating the Lawyers Oath, for which he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year
effective upon finality of this Decision, with a STERN WARNING that the repetition of a similar
offense shall be dealt with more severely.

#19
ERLINDA FOSTER v. ATTY. JAIME AGTANG
A.C. No. 10579 | 10 December 2014 | Duty to Refrain from Impropriety
DOCTRINE
Rule 1.0, Canon 1 of the CPR, provides that “[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.” It is well-established that a lawyer’s conduct is “not confined to the
performance of his professional duties. A lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed either
in his professional or private capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in
moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or whether it renders him unworthy to
continue as an officer of the court.”
FACTS
A complaint was filed by Erlinda Foster against respondent for "unlawful, dishonest, immoral and
deceitful" acts as a lawyer. Foster agreed to engage the legal services of Agtang for the filing of the
appropriate case in court, for which they signed a contract and she then paid respondent P20,000.00
as acceptance fee and P5,000.00 for incidental expenses. On various occasions, Agtang borrowed
money from Foster for his personal use. Agtang also demanded 50,000 to bribe the judge and get a
favorable decision. Later, Foster learned that Agtang lost the case his case due to negligence and
incompetence in drafting the complaint. It also turned out that Agtang was once the lawyer of the
opposing party. Foster then terminated the services of Agtand and requested that Agtang pay the
amounts he received from her less the contract fee and actual cost of filing, but Agtang did not reply.
An administrative complaint was then filed against respondent Agtang.
ISSUE
Whether or not the respondent violated the code of professional responsibility. – YES.
HELD
In this case, the respondent is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct, both in his
professional and private capacity. As a lawyer, he clearly misled the complainant into believing that
the filing fees for her case were worth more than the prescribed amount in the rules, due to feigned
reasons such as the high value of the land involved and the extra expenses to be incurred by court
employees. In other words, he resorted to overpricing, an act customarily related to depravity and
dishonesty. He demanded the amount of P150,000.00 as filing fee, when in truth, the same
amounted only to P22,410.00. As a lawyer, he is not only expected to be knowledgeable in the
matter of filing fees, but he is likewise duty-bound to disclose to his client the actual amount due,
consistent with the values of honesty and good faith expected of all members of the legal profession.
The act of demanding a sum of money from his client, purportedly to be used as a bribe to ensure a
positive outcome of a case, is not only an abuse of his client’s trust but an overt act of undermining
the trust and faith of the public in the legal profession and the entire Judiciary. This is the height of
indecency. As officers of the court, lawyers owe their utmost fidelity to public service and the
administration of justice. In no way should a lawyer indulge in any act that would damage the image
of judges, lest the public’s perception of the dispensation of justice be overshadowed by iniquitous
doubts. The denial of respondent and his claim that the amount was given gratuitously would not
excuse him from any liability. The absence of proof that the said amount was indeed used as a bribe

is of no moment. To tolerate respondent’s actuations would seriously erode the public’s trust in the
courts.
NOTES
Records reveal that he likewise violated Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the CPR, which states that “[a]
lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are fully protected by the
nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except,
when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is
handling for the client.”
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the CPR, provides that “[a] lawyer shall not represent conflicting interest
except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.” The relationship
between a lawyer and his/her client should ideally be imbued with the highest level of trust and
confidence. This is the standard of confidentiality that must prevail to promote a full disclosure of the
client’s most confidential information to his/her lawyer for an unhampered exchange of information
between them. Needless to state, a client can only entrust confidential information to his/her lawyer
based on an expectation from the lawyer of utmost secrecy and discretion; the lawyer, for his part, is
duty-bound to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all dealings and transactions with the client.
Part of the lawyer’s duty in this regard is to avoid representing conflicting interests. Thus, even if
lucrative fees offered by prospective clients are at stake, a lawyer must decline professional
employment if the same would trigger the violation of the prohibition against conflict of interest. The
only exception provided in the rules is a written consent from all the parties after full disclosure. The
representation of conflicting interests is prohibited “not only because the relation of attorney and
client is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree, but also because of the principles of
public policy and good taste. An attorney has the duty to deserve the fullest confidence of his client
and represent him with undivided loyalty. Once this confidence is abused or violated the entire
profession suffers.”

#20
VANTAGE LIGHTING PHILIPPINES, INC., JOHN PAUL FAIRCLOUGH and MA. CECILIA ROQUE
v. ATTY. JOSE DIÑO, JR.
A.C. No. 7389 | 2 July 2019 | Duty to Refrain from Impropriety
DOCTRINE
● Canon 13 - A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any impropriety
which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the court.
● Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon
demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as
may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly
thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and
executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.
FACTS
On January 2, 2007, complainants filed a verified disbarment complaint against Atty. Diño, which we
referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
Complainants alleged that, on August 15, 2006, Atty. Diño and Vantage executed a Retainer's
Agreement for purposes of instituting a complaint against PHPC Co. (PHPC) and Hitachi Plant
Engineering Co. Ltd. (Hitachi). As per their agreement, Vantage paid Atty. Diño P75,000.00 upon
signing of the retainer.
The civil complaint against PHPC and Hitachi was filed on September 5, 2006 before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque City. On September 11, 2006, Atty. Diño called Roque informing her
that Vantage had to pay P150,000.00 to the judge to whom the civil complaint of Vantage would be
raffled for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO). Atty. Diño also texted Roque, saying
that if Vantage is unable to give him the cash before 2:00 o'clock that same afternoon, Atty. Diño will
just advance the P20,000.00 to the judge to whom the case would be raffled. Later that same day,
Atty. Diño informed Roque through a text message that the case was raffled to Judge Rolando How
(Judge How). Thinking that the payment for the TRO is just a regular legal expense, Vantage agreed
to reimburse the P20,000.00 to Atty. Diño. As it was then already past banking hours, Roque texted
Atty. Diño that he will be reimbursed the P20,000.00 on the date of the hearing scheduled the
following day. In reply, Atty. Diño told Roque that Vantage will have to prepare another P65,000.00
because the TRO might be issued after the hearing.
The September 12, 2006 hearing was ultimately reset to the following day. Vantage, thru a Mr.
Mannix Franco, nevertheless gave Atty. Diño the amount of P20,000.00. Atty. Diño was silent as
regards the P65,000.00.
On September 14, 2006, Roque texted Atty. Diño to ask about the status of the case and whether
the TRO was going to be issued. She also told Atty. Diño that Vantage had already prepared the
additional P65,000.00 that he asked for. In response, Atty. Diño texted Roque, "Yes awaiting it now I
already paid 130k but that's my own lookout." Thereafter, at 2:16 in the afternoon of the same day,
Atty. Diño texted Roque "pls ask ur messenger to stand by and be ready to personally pick up the tro
at the RTC [sic]." After a few minutes, he again texted Roque "tro will be issued tom anyway that's
my commitment. No expense on ur part without tro on hand.”

On September 15, 2006, Atty. Diño texted Roque that if the TRO will not be issued on Monday, the
deal with the judge is no longer valid and the P20,000.00 will be returned to Vantage. Three days
later, he texted Roque again to say that "Fixer said judge will release order on Wednesday
(September 20) I said no. Your 20k will be returned tomorrow. For your information.”
In the morning of September 19, 2006 and not having received any news from Atty. Diño, Vantage
re-deposited the P65,000.00 with the bank and sent its messenger to pick up the P20,000.00 which
Atty. Diño promised to return. Atty. Diño, however, refused to return the same and declared that he
would just apply the amount to his legal fees.
It appears that Atty. Diño continued to send more text messages to Roque, which the latter only got
to read the following day, or on September 20, 2006. Roque replied to Atty. Diño, apologizing for not
being able to promptly respond to his text messages the previous day. She also informed Atty. Diño
that she will ask Vantage's personnel about the P65,000.00. At Roque's instructions, Vantage's
accounting officer called Atty. Diño to inform him that the P65,000.00 he asked for was re-deposited
after he intimated that no TRO would be issued. Atty. Diño thereafter called Roque in anger,
threatening that they (Vantage) will be sorry if they fail to pay his fees and reimburse him the amount
of P130,000.00 which he allegedly gave to the fixers as payment to Judge How for the issuance of
the TRO. When Roque told Atty. Diño that she will have to clear the matter first with Vantage
management, Atty. Diño reportedly went berserk. Because of their misunderstanding, Atty. Diño
withdrew as counsel for Vantage on September 21, 2006. The next day, he sent Vantage a Billing
Statement which ballooned to 235k. It also appears that Atty. Diño filed a number of cases against
complainants in a span of two months from the date he sent the Billing Statement to Vantage.
Complainants here assert that: (1) the suits and actions filed by Atty. Diño against them are clearly
groundless and these acts of harassment are sufficient cause to disbar him from the legal profession
for gross misconduct; (2) Atty. Diño violated Rule 20.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
when he filed several cases against complainants instead of settling his financial concerns with
them; and (3) Atty. Diño committed serious fraud, gross dishonesty, and gross misrepresentation
when he accused the Reals of claiming that he (Diño) sent a letter to the BI claiming that Fairclough
is the subject of an estafa case and a child molester. Complainants also claim damages on account
of Atty. Diño's harassment suits.
Atty. Diño, in his verified comment, dismissed the complainants' allegations as false and incredible.
He denied bribing Judge How to secure the TRO. Atty. Diño also argued that complainants'
allegations are affirmative defenses which should be brought in the fora where the cases against
them are pending. He added that the cases he filed were not baseless as in fact the respective
adjudicating bodies found reasonable grounds to continue with the proceedings therein.
On September 4, 2007, Investigating Commissioner Maria Editha Go-Biñas (Investigating

Commissioner Go-Biñas) issued a Notice of Mandatory Conference directing the parties to appear
on October 18, 2007 to take up the parties' admissions, stipulations of facts, and definition of issues.
The mandatory conference, however, was reset to December 6, 2007 upon Atty. Diño's motion.41
The parties were also directed to submit their respective mandatory conference briefs three days
before the scheduled hearing.

On December 6, 2007, Atty. Diño, Fairclough, Roque and the Reals appeared at the scheduled
hearing although the latter failed to file their mandatory conference brief. With the acquiescence of
Atty. Diño, they were allowed to file their mandatory conference brief within three days. Investigating
Commissioner Go-Biñas stated in her Order dated December 6, 2007 that after the submission of
the brief, the parties will be notified when to file their respective position papers and thereafter, the
case will be submitted for decision unless there is a need to answer clarificatory questions. Both
parties submitted their respective mandatory conference briefs as directed.
ISSUE
Whether or not Atty. Diño should be disbarred. – YES.
HELD
We find Atty. Diño guilty of gross misconduct and violation of the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Gross misconduct is defined as any inexcusable, shameful or flagrant
unlawful conduct on the part of a person concerned with the administration of justice; i.e., conduct
prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right determination of the cause. Generally, such
conduct is motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose.
We agree with and find as persuasive the finding of the IBP Investigating Commissioner that Atty.
Diño tainted the image of the Judiciary by claiming that the P150,000.00 to be collected from
Vantage will be used to facilitate the issuance of the TRO. Although Atty. Diño now denies bribing
the judge to secure the issuance of the TRO, explaining that the amount of P150,000.00 was for the
payment of the additional fees, expenses and costs of litigation which he euphemistically called
"mobilization expenses" and, for alleged professional fees for collaborating lawyers who devoted
laborious man-hours in personally monitoring the progress of the complaint, we find his explanation
not worthy of credence.
First, Atty. Diño himself admitted in his complaint-affidavit for estafa that the P150,000.00 which he
described as mobilization and representation expenses was for the purpose of securing the TRO.
This statement negates his assertion in the verified complaint that the P150,000.00 was for other
expenses. Atty. Diño did not even explain in the Billing Statement what he needed to mobilize.
Second, the Retainer's Agreement and the Billing Statement did not authorize the hiring of
collaborating lawyers. Third, the reimbursement of incidental expenses such as sheriff's and process
server's fees were billed under Item No. 5, i.e., "Reimbursement of incidental expenses" in the Billing
Statement. This is different from Item No. 2, i.e., "Reimbursement of Mobilization and
Representation Expenses" of the same Billing Statement. Plainly, and contrary to Atty. Diño's claim,
the P130,000.00 could not have included the sheriffs and process server's fees.
By representing to his clients that he can secure the issuance of a TRO by bribing the judge
P150,000.00, Atty. Diño violated Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
As an officer of the Court, Atty. Diño has a paramount duty to protect the court's integrity and assist it
in the administration of justice according to law. He should not espouse a belief that the judicial
system can be bought, much less contribute to the perpetuation of such belief. Unfortunately, instead
of relying on the merits of his clients' cause, Atty. Diño represented to his clients that the judicial
system can be bribed. This inexcusable, shameful and unlawful act of Atty. Diño, by itself, constitutes

gross misconduct. In fact, we find that it is conduct so condemnable that it merits the harshest of
penalties.
Worse, after failing to get the reimbursement/payment for his fees and other amounts he advanced
for such illegal purposes, Atty. Diño threatened complainants that they would not like the succeeding
events if they-fail to pay him. Indeed, he made true to his threats to institute retaliatory acts against
complainants and the Reals as he in fact filed five actions against Vantage and its officers within a
span of two months.
Atty. Diño claims that he was merely trying to collect his professional fees and other advances that
he made on complainants' behalf. Under Rule 16.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
however, a claim for attorney's fees may be asserted either in the very action in which a lawyer
rendered his services or in a separate action.
The existence of this appropriate recourse notwithstanding, Atty. Diño still opted to file criminal and
civil complaints against his former clients. This supports the view that his acts were ill-intentioned,
and in violation of: (1) the Lawyer's Oath, which provides that he shall not wittingly or willingly
promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit; and (2) Rule 20.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which imposes upon him the duty to avoid unnecessary lawsuits against
his client to collect his fees and to resort to judicial action only to prevent imposition, injustice or
fraud.
We also find that Atty. Diño violated Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he
filed a disbarment case to harass the Reals, his former clients' new counsel. By resorting to such
harassment tactics against the opposing counsel, he failed to conduct himself with courtesy, fairness
and candor towards his professional colleagues.
In view of Atty. Diño's above-enumerated acts of professional malpractice and gross misconduct,
and considering further the gravity of his acts, we find that Atty. Diño's conduct warrants
disbarment from the practice of law. A three-year suspension from the practice of law is too light a
penalty for a lawyer who, instead of protecting the integrity and independence of the Court,
besmirched its reputation by claiming that a member of the Judiciary is for sale. Atty. Diño is clearly
unfit to discharge the duties of an officer of the Court; hence, he deserves the ultimate penalty of
disbarment.

Spouses Willie & Amelia Umaguing V. Atty. Wallen de Vera: 3D 2021-2022 - Problem Areas in Legal Ethics

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Spouses Willie & Amelia Umaguing V. Atty. Wallen de Vera: 3D 2021-2022 - Problem Areas in Legal Ethics

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SPOUSES WILLIE & AMELIA UMAGUING v. ATTY. WALLEN DE VERA

3D 2021-2022 | Problem Areas in Legal Ethics

3D 2021-2022 | Problem Areas in Legal Ethics

3D 2021-2022 | Problem Areas in Legal Ethics

3D 2021-2022 | Problem Areas in Legal Ethics

3D 2021-2022 | Problem Areas in Legal Ethics

3D 2021-2022 | Problem Areas in Legal Ethics

3D 2021-2022 | Problem Areas in Legal Ethics

3D 2021-2022 | Problem Areas in Legal Ethics

3D 2021-2022 | Problem Areas in Legal Ethics

3D 2021-2022 | Problem Areas in Legal Ethics

3D 2021-2022 | Problem Areas in Legal Ethics

3D 2021-2022 | Problem Areas in Legal Ethics

3D 2021-2022 | Problem Areas in Legal Ethics

3D 2021-2022 | Problem Areas in Legal Ethics

ACCORDINGLY, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED

3D 2021-2022 | Problem Areas in Legal Ethics

3D 2021-2022 | Problem Areas in Legal Ethics

3D 2021-2022 | Problem Areas in Legal Ethics

3D 2021-2022 | Problem Areas in Legal Ethics

CANON 10 — A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE

CANON 11 — A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO

3D 2021-2022 | Problem Areas in Legal Ethics

3D 2021-2022 | Problem Areas in Legal Ethics

3D 2021-2022 | Problem Areas in Legal Ethics

3D 2021-2022 | Problem Areas in Legal Ethics

3D 2021-2022 | Problem Areas in Legal Ethics

Unsupported ill-motives attributed to a judge

Canon 11 and Rule 11.04 of the CPR state that:

3D 2021-2022 | Problem Areas in Legal Ethics

2. Code of Professional Responsibility

3D 2021-2022 | Problem Areas in Legal Ethics

3D 2021-2022 | Problem Areas in Legal Ethics

3D 2021-2022 | Problem Areas in Legal Ethics

3D 2021-2022 | Problem Areas in Legal Ethics

3D 2021-2022 | Problem Areas in Legal Ethics

3D 2021-2022 | Problem Areas in Legal Ethics

3D 2021-2022 | Problem Areas in Legal Ethics

3D 2021-2022 | Problem Areas in Legal Ethics

3D 2021-2022 | Problem Areas in Legal Ethics

3D 2021-2022 | Problem Areas in Legal Ethics

3D 2021-2022 | Problem Areas in Legal Ethics

3D 2021-2022 | Problem Areas in Legal Ethics

3D 2021-2022 | Problem Areas in Legal Ethics

3D 2021-2022 | Problem Areas in Legal Ethics

3D 2021-2022 | Problem Areas in Legal Ethics

3D 2021-2022 | Problem Areas in Legal Ethics

3D 2021-2022 | Problem Areas in Legal Ethics

3D 2021-2022 | Problem Areas in Legal Ethics

3D 2021-2022 | Problem Areas in Legal Ethics

The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to Courts is essential to orderly

3D 2021-2022 | Problem Areas in Legal Ethics

The misconduct committed by Atty. Almacen is of considerable gravity and cannot be

3D 2021-2022 | Problem Areas in Legal Ethics

3D 2021-2022 | Problem Areas in Legal Ethics

3D 2021-2022 | Problem Areas in Legal Ethics

3D 2021-2022 | Problem Areas in Legal Ethics

3D 2021-2022 | Problem Areas in Legal Ethics

3D 2021-2022 | Problem Areas in Legal Ethics

3D 2021-2022 | Problem Areas in Legal Ethics

On September 4, 2007, Investigating Commissioner Maria Editha Go-Biñas (Investigating