Translated from Spanish to English - www.onlinedoctranslator.

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STATE MANAGEMENT OF THE SOCIO-ENVIRONMENTAL

CONFLICT OF “TÍA MARÍA” IN PERU

Manuel Alejandro Ugarte Cornejo, Master in Political Science, San Pablo Catholic University, Arequipa (Peru). Email:
mugartec@ucsp.edu.pe ; Orcid: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7621-5233

* This research article is the result of the thesis carried out by the author to opt for the academic degree of Master in Political Science
and Government with a mention in Public Policy and Public Management from the Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú. [http://
tesis.pucp.edu.pe/repositorio/handle/123456789/12136]

ABSTRACT

This article seeks to understand the state management of one of the most emblematic socio-environmental
conflicts in Peru: the “Tía María” conflict. To do this, we ask ourselves how was the performance of the State
in managing the conflict, and how it influenced the evolution of the conflict in a country that registers more
than 8,600 mining environmental liabilities. Among the main findings are: deficiencies in state management
capacity; disarticulation and centralism of the government; loss of impartiality; Absent state; lack of legal
and administrative capacities; loss of capacity to channel demands of the population; Loss of technical
capacity to evaluate mining projects; deficient management of the police force under a criminalization
approach to protest.

Keywords: Peru; socio-environmental conflict; mining; environment; state capabilities.

[24]
STATE MANAGEMENT OF THE SOCIO-ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT OF “TÍA MARÍA” IN PERU

ABSTRACT

This article seeks to understand the state management of one of the most emblematic socio-environmental
conflicts in Peru: the “Tía María” conflict. To do this, we asked ourselves how the State's performance in managing
the conflict was, and how it influenced the evolution of the conflict in a country that has more than 8,600 mining
environmental liabilities. Among the main findings are: deficiencies in state management capacity; disarticulation
and centralism of the government; loss of impartiality; State absent; lack of legal and administrative capacities;
loss of capacity to channel demands of the population; loss of technical capacity to evaluate mining projects; poor
management of the police force under a criminalization approach to protest.

Keywords: Peru; socio-environmental conflict; mining; environment; state capacities.

Reception date: 05/02/2020

Approval date: 07/31/2020

political analysis nº 99, Bogotá, May - August 2020, pp. 24-40

State management of the socio-environmental conflict of "Tía María" in Peru Manuel Alejandro Ugarte Cornejo

INTRODUCTION

Since 2000, Peru faces a new cycle of social conflicts and particularly socio-environmental
conflicts related to mining activity (Arce, 2010, 2011; Grompone and Tanaka,
2009). This is verified when analyzing the reports of the Ombudsman's Office on social conflicts. As of December 2019, the

Ombudsman's Office (2019) reported the existence of 184 active and latent social conflicts in Peru. Of them, the majority (69.0%), that is,

127, are of a socio-environmental nature, and among the latter, 65.4% (83 cases) are conflicts related to mining. The Peruvian State,

through the central government, manages this type of conflict mainly with the intervention of the presidency of the Council of Ministers

(PCM), and the ministries of Energy and Mines (MINEM), Environment (MINAM), Agriculture (MINAGRI), and Interior (MININTER).

DOSSIER: CLIMATE CHANGE AND POLICY

However, when we see cases of large investment projects in which there is strong local opposition (cases such as Conga, La Oroya, Río

Blanco, Cañarico, Toromocho, to name a few), we found that in general, the State has not been able to manage the demands, and the

different dynamics of the conflicts, but, on the contrary, they have escalated to situations of violence, even claiming human lives. And

this has happened, even though state institutions and laws have been created for the prevention and management of social conflicts.

We refer to institutions such as the Ministry of the Environment (2008), the Office for the Management of Social Conflicts of the

Presidency of the Council of Ministers (2010) even though state institutions and laws have been created for the prevention and
management of social conflicts. We refer to institutions such as the Ministry of the Environment (2008), the Office for the Management

of Social Conflicts of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers (2010) even though state institutions and laws have been created for the

prevention and management of social conflicts. We refer to institutions such as the Ministry of the Environment (2008), the Office for the

Management of Social Conflicts of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers (2010)1, National Service of Environmental Certification for

Sustainable Investments - Senace (2012). And among the regulations we refer to laws such as the National System for Environmental

Impact Assessment (2001, Law No. 27446), General Environmental Law (2005), Prior Consultation Law (2011).

[25]
Within this panorama we find one of the conflicts that has remained active since 2010 in
southern Peru, it is the one that has arisen around the Tía María mining project, in the province
of Islay (Arequipa). This is one of the most important socio-environmental conflicts in recent years
in Peru —and a case worth studying— due to various factors. The first is the long period of
duration without being resolved, which begins in 2008 and extends to the present (2020), going
through four different governments: Alan García, Ollanta Humala, Pedro Pablo Kuczynski and
Martín Vizcarra. As a second factor, we are faced with a conflict that has repeatedly escalated to
episodes of violence and has claimed the lives of seven people and more than two hundred
injured. The third factor is that the economic investment in this project is very important for the
country's economy because it amounts to an investment of 1.4 billion dollars. The fourth factor is
the fact that, despite having an Environmental Impact Study (EIA) approved by the State, the work
has not yet started due to the fear of the government in the face of strong opposition from a
decisive sector of the local community.

For the reasons stated, this conflict is emblematic for studying state management and
capacity dynamics. That is why we have taken it as an object of study.

1 This office later (2012) was converted into the National Office for Dialogue and Sustainability (ONDS), which initially
It depended directly on the PCM, but later (2017) it became part of the Vice Ministry of Territorial Governance of the
PCM itself.

political analysis nº 99, Bogotá, May - August 2020, pp. 24-40

 State management of the socio-environmental conflict of "Tía María" in Peru Manuel Alejandro Ugarte Cornejo

METHODOLOGY USED

This is a qualitative investigation. The information gathering techniques were the in-
depth interview, the analysis of secondary sources and the participant observation. Three
fieldwork stays were carried out in the Tambo Valley (scene of the conflict) between April and
December 2016.

The conceptual axes that guide our study are two: one on the nature of social conflict and
the other on state capacities. For the first axis, we assume the Theory of New Social
Movements (Tilly, 1977; Mcadam, 1982; Tarrow, 1983) because it allows us to understand the
different complexities of social movements and conflicts, and their interrelation with social
and state institutional structures. Regarding the second axis, we adopt the definition of state
capacity developed by Fabián Repetto, who understands it as “the aptitude of government
agencies to capture the highest possible levels of social value through public
policies” (Repetto, 2004, p. 8 ). From this author we also take the definitions of
"administrative capacity" and "political capacity" of the State.

STATE OF THE QUESTION

The main question posed by recent social-scientific research on social conflicts in Peru is
what are the factors that explain the appearance of a new cycle of social protests? (De Echave
et al., 2009; Grompone and Tanaka, 2009; Arce, 2010, 2011). Some authors explain that the
answer to this question lies in the liberalization of the economy and the measures to expand
[26]
the market economy and economic growth (Grompone and Tanaka, 2009; Arce, 2011). The
thesis of social inequalities and poverty as a cause of social protests, or if political factors
have been more influential, has also been tested (Arce, 2011). In addition, it has been sought
to determine what types of conflicts exist in Peru and what are their characteristics, and what
dynamics lead to a social conflict towards violent protest (De Echave et al., 2009). It has also
been investigated how the new leading social actors are and what their new repertoires of
collective action and social protest are (Toche, 2003; Pajuelo, 2004; Arce, 2011; Meléndez and
León, 2009).

The first answer to these questions is that the political transformations that occurred in
our country after the end of the Alberto Fujimori government in 2001 are the factor that best
explains the new cycle of social conflicts (De Echave et al., 2009; Grompone and Tanaka,
2009; Arce, 2010, 2011). This approach coincides with the theory of the New Social
Movements through the analytical framework of “Political Opportunities”. This model affirms
that “social movements are launched as a result of social changes that transform the existing
political order, making it more accessible to the demands of a social movement” (Arce,
2010, p. 275). This occurred in Peru from the year 2001 with the progressive transformation of
the structure of political opportunities that made the institutionalized political system more open
to social protests (Arce, 2011). Another important factor in the analysis of the causes of conflict
has been the destructuring of the political system of representation, something that has been
studied especially by Meléndez (Meléndez, 2004, 2012).

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State management of the socio-environmental conflict of "Tía María" in Peru Manuel Alejandro Ugarte Cornejo

Within social conflicts, socio-environmental conflicts are the ones that have most concerned
some social researchers in recent years, among whom we highlight De Echave (De Echave, 2011),
Bebbington (Bebbington, 2007, 2013) and Arellano (Arellano-Yanguas , 2011a, 2011b,
2013). All of them coincide in adding to the causes of the conflicts, factors such as the growth of
mining activity, the configuration of an institutional framework favorable to private mining
investment, and the consolidation of social organizations that channel environmental discontent.

Thus we can verify that the bibliographic and scientific-social production on the new cycle
of social conflicts in Peru is broad in trying to explain the dynamics of conflicts, their

DOSSIER: CLIMATE CHANGE AND POLICY

typology, nature and actors. Despite this, we can affirm that “little has been investigated and
written about the State's response to them,” as stated by Martín Tanaka (Tanaka,
2012, p. 36) and Eduardo Dargent confirms it by stating that “the state response to
challenges and actors that challenge the state has been little studied by
academia” (Dargent, 2015, p 12). Among the few studies that address these aspects of
state performance, we can find (Huamaní et al., 2012; Tanaka et al., 2011; Bravo, 2009),
who have identified common denominators of shortcomings in the institutional response
of the State to social conflicts. Along the same lines, (Tanaka, 2012) finds three factors of
state deficiency: first, the lack of institutional capacities that is verified in the lack of
resources, procedures and intervention protocols. Second, insufficient regulations to
address the new context of expansion of private mining activity. Third,

[27]
On the other hand, despite the importance of the TíaMaría conflict, it is evident that it has
been little studied. Quintanilla and Scott (2013) study this case to test the analytical value of
four different theoretical models of collective action analysis. In conclusion, the authors
found that the threat and opportunity model has better analytical advantages for
understanding peasant protests in Peru. We also find Pinto Herrera who analyzes the
reasons for the protest in this conflict (Pinto, 2016b) and then makes a recapitulation of the
events of 2015 (Pinto, 2016a). There are also publications on this conflict made
collaboratively with opposition groups, such as Castillo (2015) and Castillo et al. (2011) that
make a broad technical description of the territory of the Tambo Valley, its agricultural
importance in regional development, its water scarcity, the risks to which the Valley would be
exposed with an open pit mining project, and human, environmental and social rights that
would be violated. However, none of these publications has exhaustively focused on the role
of the State, and it is there where we find an academic gap in which this research makes a
contribution.

THE TÍA MARÍA MINING PROJECT AND THE TAMBO VALLEY

The Tía María mining project is geographically located in the Tambo Valley, in the districts of
Cocachacra, Mejía and Deán Valdivia (Islay province, Arequipa department, Peru). This project is
concessioned to the mining company Southern Copper Corporation and consists of the
exploitation of two open pit deposits: La Tapada and Tía María with total reserves of 650,760,000
tons of oxidized copper ore with an average grade of 0.381%. The construction of this project is
estimated in 27 months and the operations will last 18 years. The estimated investment

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 State management of the socio-environmental conflict of "Tía María" in Peru Manuel Alejandro Ugarte Cornejo

it amounts to $ 1.4 billion. The mineral will be produced using the method of leaching,
solvent extraction and electrolytic deposition to make copper cathodes.

The Tambo Valley is a coastal valley located in southern Peru, in the department of Arequipa,
in the natural waste zone of the Tambo River. This valley is made up of five districts: Cocachacra,
Deán Valdivia, Punta de Bombón, Mejía and Mollendo, which belong to the province of Islay,
department of Arequipa, and which are under the administration of the Regional Government of
Arequipa (GORE Arequipa).

In the Tambo Valley, and in the entire province of Islay, the main territorial formation is desert, and the
main source of water is the Tambo River. Different technical studies of the Ministry of Agriculture and the
National Institute of Natural Resources (INRENA), several of them evaluated and cited in the Ministry of
Agriculture (MINAGRI, 2005, p. 40), have concluded that the demand for water for agricultural purposes and
not For agricultural purposes, the “only available water” is the natural discharges of the Tambo River. For
their part, Castillo and Gallardo confirm this data, estimating that 85% of the population of the Tambo
Valley macro space and 100% of agricultural production, are supplied with the water they need through the
Tambo river (Castillo et al., 2011, p. 15).

The Ministry of Agriculture has also concluded that both the quantity and the quality of the
water supplied by the natural basin of the Tambo River in the dry season (October to December)
have decreased. This decrease is estimated at 12.6 MMC2 as a consequence of the start-up of the
Pasto Grande reservoir since 1989. This is because the Pasto Grande reservoir stores the waters
of the Vizcachas River, which is one of the most important tributaries of the Tambo River. The
[28]
severity of the lack of water is observed in the water balance, which shows an estimated deficit of
13.48 MMC (Ministry of Agriculture (MINAGRI), 2005, p 39).

These data illustrate the importance of the Tambo River for the life and development
of the Tambo Valley and the towns and cities of the province of Islay, and justify social
concern about any governmental or private decision that affects the destination of these
waters. This is precisely one of the great fears present in the local population and their
authorities to oppose the Tía María Mining Project, which we have verified in our field
research. These fears grew, among other reasons, because the mining company, in its
first Environmental Impact Study (EIA) in 2009, chose to use the water from the Tambo
river aquifer. Even though subsequent environmental impact studies ruled out this
possibility, the doubt remains,

THE ACTORS AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT

Among the actors in this conflict, we first find the peasant settlers of the Tambo Valley who
are opposed to the miner project, and represented by their local, social and political leaders,
grouped mainly in the Broad Front for the Defense of the Tambo Valley. Applying our theoretical
framework on social movements we verify that this Front became the main resource mobilization
structure with a capacity for successful organization to sustain the opposition to the mining
project for seven years, between 2008 and 2015. This Front was able to organize

2 MMC: Millions of Cubic Meters.

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State management of the socio-environmental conflict of "Tía María" in Peru Manuel Alejandro Ugarte Cornejo

and sustaining four indefinite stoppages and its main success has been the postponement of
the start of mining operations. However, it is paradoxical the fact that, in 2015, this Front
dismantled due to the appearance of evidence of corruption that involved its main leaders,
who are currently accused of attempted extortion against Southern, and of illicit association
to commit a crime. These leaders allegedly demanded that the company pay a million and a
half dollars, in exchange for the cessation of the protests. The other actors in the conflict are:
in a second place, the mining company Southern Copper Corporation, which is the owner of
the Tía María mining project. And, thirdly, the Peruvian State mainly through the
National government.

DOSSIER: CLIMATE CHANGE AND POLICY

Table N ° 1
Stages of conflict and important milestones

Dates Important milestones

First stage: Preliminary stage

1994 Teck Cominco begins exploration of the Tía María deposit.

2003 Southern begins a detailed exploration program for the Tía María deposit.

2006 Southern discovers the La Tapada deposit.

Second stage: Beginning of the conflict and consolidation of the opposition

2007 Nov 14 Southern initiates the socialization of the project: First Prior Consultation Workshop.

2008 May 8 The Broad Front for the Defense of the Environment and Natural Resources of the Tambo Valley is formed.
[29]
2009 Jul 7 Southern presents the First Environmental Impact Study to MINEM.

2009 Sep 27 Opponents carry out neighborhood consultation. 93.4% spoke out against the Tía María project.

Third stage: First acute crisis and rejection of the first EIA

2010 Apr 14 The first indefinite stoppage begins in Islay.

2010 Nov 20 Second indefinite unemployment begins.

2011 Mar 16 UNOPS provides MINEM with a report on the EIA of Tía María with 138 observations.

2011 23 Mar Third indefinite local strike against Tía María begins.

2011 Apr 4 The first mortal victim of the conflict dies: Andrés Taype Choquepuma.

2011 Apr 8 MINEM declares the Environmental Impact Study inadmissible and rejects it.

Fourth stage: Approval of the second EIA and second acute crisis

2013 Oct 24 Southern holds the first participatory workshop prior to the second EIA.

2013 Oct 30 Southern conducts second participatory workshop of the second

2013 Dec 19 EIA. Southern holds a Public Hearing on the second EIA. MINEM

2014 Aug 4 approves Southern's second EIA.

2015. 23 Mar Starts fourth indefinite stoppage.

Four policemen are massacred during acts of protest. One of them will die: AlbertoVásquez Durand: seventh
2015. May 6
mortal victim of the conflict.

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 State management of the socio-environmental conflict of "Tía María" in Peru Manuel Alejandro Ugarte Cornejo

2015. May 15 President Humala gives a Message to the Nation and says that the Tía María mining project cannot be suspended.

The main opposition leader Pepe Julio Gutiérrez is arrested for alleged crimes of extortion and illicit
2015. May 15
association to commit a crime.

2015. May 22 The government declares a state of emergency in Islay for 60 days.

Source: Own database. Own elaboration.

In the evolution of the conflict that we present in Table N ° 1, we find two episodes of
escalation to the crisis phase with high degrees of violence (years 2011 and 2015). In the
first of these episodes, acts of sabotage are seen in the face of the attempt to approve
the first Environmental Impact Study (EIA), and with successful results for opposition
groups. This occurred during the Aprista government of Alan García (2006-2011) whose
state management of social conflicts was characterized by a lack of prevention and
strategy in the face of social conflict, in addition to a repressive accent and the
criminalization of social protest. Furthermore, the previous years (2010 and part of 2011)
were electoral years and therefore political interests had an influence on the
development of the conflict. At that time, the local population already perceived from the
central government a biased management in favor of the mining project, and at the
same time a minimization and discrediting of the motives used by the opponents. The
second episode of crisis was in 2015 when opponents wanted to stop Southern from
starting operations in Tía María, after MINAM approved the second EIA in August 2014.
The strategy of the opposition sectors was popular mobilization that it was radicalized in
[30] March 2015 and that, for two long months, the State could not control. Given this, the
national government of Ollanta Humala (2011-2016) had to declare a state of emergency
in the province of Islay for 60 days.

Applying the Theory of Social Movements, in relation to the interpretative frameworks, that is, the meanings and concepts shared by the opposition

population, we find as an axis the fear that mining activities contaminate surface and underground waters, contaminate the lands that are used for crops, or

could be used to expand the agricultural frontier, and also pollute the air. And that this irreparably harms agricultural activities, the health of the population,

traditional forms of social coexistence and quality of life. These ideas have been maintained despite the fact that the mining company has assured that it will

comply with the environmental standards of the national regulations, and that it will not take water from the Tambo River for its operations. Nevertheless, We

have verified that mistrust is present in large part because the first EIA (2009), chose to use the water from the Tambo river aquifer, which for the inhabitants

represented a serious threat since they see this river as their main source of water. life. The Tambo River provides almost one hundred percent of the water

used for agriculture and human consumption in a valley that suffers from a proven water deficit. Even though subsequent environmental impact studies

ruled out the use of water from this river, the doubt is still present in most of the people, as we can see in the interviews made for this study. which for the

inhabitants meant a serious threat since they see this river as their main source of life. The Tambo River provides almost one hundred percent of the water

used for agriculture and human consumption in a valley that suffers from a proven water deficit. Even though subsequent environmental impact studies

ruled out the use of water from this river, the doubt is still present in most of the people, as we can see in the interviews made for this study. which for the

inhabitants meant a serious threat since they see this river as their main source of life. The Tambo River provides almost one hundred percent of the water

used for agriculture and human consumption in a valley that suffers from a proven water deficit. Even though subsequent environmental impact studies

ruled out the use of water from this river, the doubt is still present in most of the people, as we can see in the interviews made for this study.

During this investigation it was also possible to identify what the population understands about the
State. Although for the academic world the concept of State does not have a single interpretation, but
rather it is broad and subject to different approaches; something particular about the perception of

political analysis nº 99, Bogotá, May - August 2020, pp. 24-40

State management of the socio-environmental conflict of "Tía María" in Peru Manuel Alejandro Ugarte Cornejo

State occurs in the inhabitants of the Tambo Valley. For them, the conception of the State focuses
solely on the actions of the Executive Power. When we asked the population and local leadership
about the State's participation in the conflict, they identified the State with the Executive Power:
mainly the President of the Republic, the President of the Council of Ministers, the Minister of
Energy and Mines, the Minister of the Interior and the National Police. The ministries of
Environment and Agriculture are also included. This is the perception that residents and local
leaders have, and this way of understanding the State has guided us in our analysis, because it is
a central axis of how this population, in this conflict, relates to the State, and makes its interaction
decisions with state institutions and officials. Along the same lines, circumscribing state capacity

DOSSIER: CLIMATE CHANGE AND POLICY

to the action of the Executive Power and its interrelation with other formal and informal powers,
is something that has not been alien to the academy. In fact, in our theoretical framework Fabián
Repetto develops a conception of the exercise of state capacity with an approach very similar to
this, and that we apply to this case, to help us better understand the perception of the State that
the inhabitants of the Tambo Valley have. .

[…] This “state capacity” would be in some way in the hands of the instances of the state executive
branch. But it cannot be explained only in the sphere of what happens within these instances or in its
limited link with the legislative and judicial powers. As "state capacity" is directly associated with the
question of power, the asymmetry of resources between the actors who seek to express said capacity at
the systemic and sectoral level must also be recognized as a central element; as well as the power
correlates derived from the current formal and informal institutional framework - general and particular
rules of the game (Repetto, 2004, p 10).
[31]
CONCLUSIONS

The case study analyzed in this article allows us to contribute seven characteristics of
the lack of state capacity to manage social conflicts. We present them below:

The first characteristic is the disarticulation and centralism of the national government, which
directly and negatively affected the state's ability to manage this conflict. The disarticulation was
present in the form of coordination (or lack thereof) between the different levels of government,
national, regional and local. Each ministry with its own conflict management units, its own work logic
and its own strategy tried to intervene, but in a disjointed way, which affected the state's ability to
manage the conflict. Another fact that confirms this conclusion is that, despite the creation and
strengthening of a National Office for Dialogue and Sustainability at the national government level so
that it can lead the national government's strategy of social conflicts, it never fulfilled its function in
the face of the Tía María conflict. The management of the conflict was in the hands of the ministerial
units of social conflicts, especially Energy and Mines through its General Office for Social
Management, but also the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of the Environment and the Ministry of
the Interior.

To analyze this particular aspect, we interviewed —among other actors— the Chief of the Conflict
Prevention and Management Office of the Regional Government of Arequipa. He states that:

Unfortunately, the issue of conflict does not have a national system that allows it to address the problem
in a holistic, comprehensive manner. Each ministry has its own conflict units and they have

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 State management of the socio-environmental conflict of "Tía María" in Peru Manuel Alejandro Ugarte Cornejo

their own work logic, the Ministry of Energy and Mines, the Ministry of the Environment, the Ministry of
Agriculture, each work on their own, each one makes and has designed their own strategy on how to
address conflict (César Huamantuma, Conflict Office Social of the Regional Government of Arequipa, 19 /
Aug / 2016).

The following ideas were clear from the interview with this official of the Arequipa Regional
Government (GORE Arequipa), which we were later able to corroborate with other GORE Arequipa
officials interviewed for this investigation:

• In Lima, the capital city of the country, there is a divorce between State agencies. The National Office
for Dialogue and Sustainability of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers does not respond to
their requirements in a timely manner.

• The State does not have a system that allows them to communicate and make decisions in a timely
manner.

• The level of coordination that the government has with the provinces is almost nil.

• The central government is fragmented. There is no social conflict office in Lima that has
the capacity to enforce its decisions.

• Each ministry has its own conflict units, its own work logic, its own strategy.

[32]
These characteristics that we explain of the Tía María conflict management are
consistent with other studies that have corroborated “that weak institutions create
incentives to use protests as an instrument with which to influence the rulers (Arce, 2010;
Machado, Scartascini & Tommasi, 2009) ”(cited in (Arce, 2015, p. 62)). We have observed
this same state disarticulation in our field work as a serious problem for the state to
manage the conflict. In this same sense, when analyzing the structure of the State
designed to address social conflict, we will find a scattered panorama of thirteen
disaggregated government offices, which confirms our first conclusion.

Table N ° 2
Areas of the Executive Power with conflict management functions

Executive power Area involved in social conflict management Year of creation Legal device

Presidency of the Council of

National Office for Dialogue and Sustainability (ONDS) 2012 Supreme Decree No. 106-2012-PCM
Ministers

Presidency of the Council of

Vice Ministry of Territorial Governance 2017. Supreme Decree No. 022-2017-PCM
Ministers

Ministry of Energy and

General Office of Social Management (OGGS) 2005 DS N ° 066-2005-EM
Mines

Office of Advice on Socio-Environmental Affairs

Ministry of the Environment 2008 DS Nº 007-2008 - MINAM
(OAAS)

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State management of the socio-environmental conflict of "Tía María" in Peru Manuel Alejandro Ugarte Cornejo

Ministry of Agriculture and (DL 997) and its Regulations (DS

Regional Support and Liaison Office 2008
Irrigation 031-2008-AG)

Directorate of Community Relations for Order

Ministry of Interior 2013 Supreme Decree No. 010-2013-IN
Internal

Regulation of Organization and

Functions of the Ministry of Labor
Ministry of Labor and Conflict Prevention and Resolution Directorate
2010 and Employment Promotion,
Employment Promotion Social Labor and Corporate Social Responsibility
Supreme Decree No. 004-2010-TR,
rule that regulates Law No. 29381

DS N ° 001-2015 - MINEDU (ART.

Ministry of Education Dialogue Office 2015.
103)

DOSSIER: CLIMATE CHANGE AND POLICY

Reso luc i on Mini st er ial N °
Ministry of Production General Directorate of Fisheries Sustainability 2012
343-2012-PRODUCE

Ministry of Relations Directorate of Crisis Management and Prevention

2010 Supreme Decree No. 135-2010-RE
Exteriors Conflicts

Extrajudicial Conciliation Directorate and

Ministry of Justice 2008 Supreme Decree No. 014-2008-JUS
Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanisms

National Authority of Headquarters Resolution No. 243-2014-

Conflict Prevention and Management Unit (UPGC) 2014
Water ANA

Coordination of Conflict Management and Compliance

Environmental Assessment Resolution of the Presidency of the
with Socio-environmental Commitments and
and Enforcement Agency 2016 Board of Directors No. 098-2016-
Coordination of Systematization of Information and
- OEFA OEFA / PCD
Investigation of Socio-environmental Conflicts

Source: Websites of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers and of the ministries of Energy and Mines, Environment, Agriculture and Irrigation, Interior,
Labor, Education, Production, Foreign Relations, Justice, National Water Authority, OEFA. Own elaboration.

[33]
To conclude this analysis on state disarticulation in the management of this social conflict, we will say that the deficient coordination

evidenced is an element that directly affects state capacity, as Fabián Repetto warns in our theoretical framework. This author points out

that "coordination" is one of the attributes in which state capacity is expressed, that is, through it we can measure whether we have

more or less state capacity. And in the Tía María case, the conclusion is that the lower state capacity is evidenced in the state's

disarticulation for the management of social conflict. Repetto defines coordination as “the way in which the various state actors and

agencies, both at the sectoral and jurisdictional levels, interact coherently, generating synergies based on their assigned tasks and / or

their comparative advantages to meet the planned public objectives ”(Repetto, 2004, p. 20). We have precisely verified that the state
management of the TíaMaría case is characterized by poor coordination between state actors and agencies. The second characteristic

that affected state capacities to manage the conflict was the loss of state impartiality, to the point that an emblematic phrase between

The interviewees for this investigation was: "We do not fight against the company, but we fight against the State." What happened was

that the State identified itself, mainly with its role as promoter of private investment, and that made it "the other party in dispute" within

the conflict. It was not the mining company that appeared directly with a radical speech in the debate. This radical role in favor of mining

was assumed by the State, and it was something that contributed to the distrust of the State. The State was in favor of mining

throughout the approval process of the Environmental Impact Study (EIA), in the official government discourse when responding to

opposition groups, and in the criminalization of social protest. One fact that explains the radical position assumed by the Executive

Power is that, although the Ministry of Agriculture was charged with command the negotiation with the local population, in practice it

was always The State was favorable to mining throughout the approval process of the Environmental Impact Study (EIA), in the official

speech of the government when responding to opposition groups, and in the criminalization of social protest. A fact that explains the

radical position assumed by the Executive Power is that, although the Ministry of Agriculture was charged with command the

negotiation with the local population, in practice it was always The State was in favor of mining throughout the approval process of the

Environmental Impact Study (EIA), in the official government discourse when responding to opposition groups, and in the criminalization

of social protest. One fact that explains the radical position assumed by the Executive Power is that, although the Ministry of Agriculture

was charged with command the negotiation with the local population, in practice it was always

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 State management of the socio-environmental conflict of "Tía María" in Peru Manuel Alejandro Ugarte Cornejo

the Ministry of Energy and Mines, who throughout the process made its favorable position to the
mining project predominate. We verify this in testimonies of regional officials and local leaders
interviewed for this investigation. At this point, it is evident that the characteristics of how the
State has intervened in the Tía María conflict have seriously affected the perception that the
population has of the State, which diminished its capacities to manage it properly. If we
summarize the ideas that the local population has about the State and that they have expressed
in the field research, we will find the following:

• the State has lost autonomy in the face of economic power,

• the State has been penetrated by corruption,

• the State does not have the control capacity to protect the population against mining
environmental liabilities,

• The State prioritizes the promotion of private investment when it conflicts with human
rights, peoples' rights or environmental rights.

On this subject, the statements offered for this research by a social leader from the
Tambo Valley turn out to be very representative:

Those of Southern have always been denounced in everything, in the Public Ministry, in the Judicial Power, but
when sanctions and fines are applied to them for having contaminated, for example, the Bay of Ite, the town
[3. 4] of Candarave, they do not receive the weight of the law, they laugh at justice, they go to Lima and there they
fix everything [...]. East Gonzales Rocha3 arrives in Lima and fixes everything. We know perfectly well that here
everything is fixed with money (Mary Luzmila Marroquín León, President of the Board of Users of the
Ensenada Mejía Mollendo Irrigation, May 21/2016).

Another GORE Arequipa official who has a similar analysis on this position of the government
Well, it is the Regional Councilor of Islay, who when interviewed for this investigation commented:

“The central government bet and gave the green light to the Tía María project. Obviously, that position of the
government puts it very close to defending the position of the company. Objectively it looked like this. And
that, worse, the State also put it in a complicated situation ”(Mauricio Chang, Regional Councilor for Islay in the
GORE of Arequipa, 18 / Aug / 2016).

As a third conclusion, we find a state absent and disinterested in local needs. We have
seen this —for example— in the lack of state capacity to meet the water needs of the
Tambo Valley. Since the early 1990s, the flow of the Tambo River began to decrease as a
result of the construction of the Pasto de Grande dam. The water balance in the area
shows an estimated deficit of 13.48 MMC and the State has not fulfilled its promise of a
dam for the Tambo Valley since 1994. This is very present in the consciousness of the
inhabitants and affects the state political capacity that according to

3 The interviewee refers to Oscar Gonzales Rocha, President of Southern Peru Copper, the mining company that owns
taria of the Tía María project.

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State management of the socio-environmental conflict of "Tía María" in Peru Manuel Alejandro Ugarte Cornejo

One author of our theoretical framework is the capacity of the State to manage the demands of the
population (Repetto, 2004, p. 16).

Our fourth conclusion is the loss of state legal and administrative capacities to control
extractive mining operations. This is perceived by the population of the Tambo Valley, first,
through the inefficient state management of cases of mining environmental liabilities, and
second, before a particular group of legal modifications favorable to extractive activities.

Regarding the first point, we find a lack of state capacity to supervise and demand the

DOSSIER: CLIMATE CHANGE AND POLICY

remediation of mining environmental liabilities. We know that the Ministry of Energy and Mines
has registered 8,616 mining environmental liabilities, but it has only been able to determine
responsibilities for 1,001 liabilities (Defensoría del Pueblo, 2015a, p. 112). This inefficiency
seriously affects the State's ability to manage any socio-environmental conflict. Among the
population of the Tambo Valley, the names of the following mining projects are associated with
social and environmental impacts that the State has not been able to control: Toquepala,
Cuajone, Bahía de Ite, Candarave, Morococha, Choropampa, Las Bambas.

Regarding the second point, the state's loss of legal capacities to control and supervise the
extractive activity is verified. Between 2009 and 2017, the national government made a normative
modification that, on the one hand, tried to simplify and modernize the administrative processes
related to extractive activities, to facilitate investment and the development of projects in this
area. But, on the other hand, it curtailed the legal, administrative and technical capacities with
which the State can regulate, control and supervise the extractive activity, mainly with regard to
[35]
territorial development, technical evaluation or environmental supervision. We mainly refer to a
series of rules4 that affect environmental impact studies, legal deadlines for technical evaluations,
land use planning and the attributions of the Environmental Assessment and Enforcement
Agency (OEFA) and the Ministry of the Environment. These measures generated among the
population of the Tambo Valley the impression of a State that renounced its capacities for
regulation, control and supervision, in order to favor private investment in extractive industries.
This also fed the perception of a state institutionality with an unequal distribution of power.

Fifth, the loss of state capacity to channel the demands of the local population is noted. This was
evident in the process of development and evaluation of the Environmental Impact Study (EIA). Let us
remember that the body in charge of approving the EIA of Tía María was the General Directorate of
Mining Environmental Affairs of the Ministry of Energy and Mines, which meant something like being a
judge and a party at the same time, with the consequent loss of credibility. On this subject, we came to
the conclusion that in the case of Tía María, the EIA evaluation process did not become an effective
and transparent mechanism for citizen participation. On the contrary, the workshops and the hearings
of the Tía María case became spaces of power struggle. When environmental impact studies do not
meet their objectives5 -as it happened in

4 We refer mainly to the supreme decrees: 054-2013-PCM, 060-2013- PCM, 001-2015-EM, and the laws
30230 and 30327.
5 The objective of an environmental impact study is to be “a coordinated system […], of a preventive nature, whose function
The main one is the identification, evaluation, mitigation and anticipated correction of negative environmental impacts […] [and

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 State management of the socio-environmental conflict of "Tía María" in Peru Manuel Alejandro Ugarte Cornejo

Tía María—, then the population interprets that the State has not met their demands, and this is
channeled by more radical opposition sectors capable of challenging the State with a more
confrontational and belligerent repertoire of protest.

We found in this investigation that the process (structured in the respective regulations6)
of preparing environmental impact studies, reduced state capacities in such a way that it was the
company that assumed the greatest responsibility in this regard. This situation minimized the
intervention of state agencies almost to the function of a “table of parties”, and turned the EIA into
minimally an administrative obstacle to be overcome in the fastest way, although not the most
appropriate for the right of the people to the participation and information.

We were able to verify these data in the testimony of a specialist who was present on
December 19, 2013, in Cocachacra, at the last Public Hearing of the EIA (which was approved by
the State months later). This is Edwin Guzmán Espezúa, director of the Civil Labor Association,
who, interviewed by us, testified that: the workshops and the hearings were distorted in such a
way that they became a space of conflict of forces between the mining company and the
opponents, to show "who was capable of bringing more people" and to "move [forward] or cancel
a hearing." "The workshops have become that, and not a stage to validate the information [about
the project]." When environmental impact studies do not meet their objectives, then the
population thinks that they have not been heard, and that the only way for the State to pay
attention to them is through measures of force. This is what happened in Tía María.

[36]
Sixth, we find the loss of the State's technical capacity to evaluate mining projects.
This is clearly identified in the way in which the State managed the evaluation of the EIA
of Tía María byUnited Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) that ended up being
devastating for the state's management of this conflict. This UNOPS technical report was
a severe setback for the State, which hoped to use this institution to provide technical
support to the questioned first EIA of Tía María. However, this United Nations body made
138 technical observations contrary to the mining project. Our field research concluded
that this fact was a watershed in the population's perception of technical capacity and
state autonomy. Our investigation concludes that from this incident the local population
questioned the credibility of the technical evaluations of the project. Our interviewees
confirm that throughout the conflict "the debate was never technical",

At that time, Islay was experiencing the convulsion of a third indefinite strike and three
people died in clashes with the National Police. With the UNOPS report, “[the government]

that] operates through participatory processes and surveillance, control, supervision, inspection and sanctions and incentives
”(MINAM, 2009).
6 See Law No. 27446, Law of the National System for Environmental Impact Assessment. DL No. 1078, Amendment of the
Law of the National System of Environmental Impact Assessment. Supreme Decree No. 019-2009-MINAM, Regulation
of the Law of the National System of Environmental Impact Assessment. RM N ° 239-2010-MINAM, Procedure called
“Provisions for the random review of Environmental Impact Studies approved by the Competent Authorities”. RM Nº
157 - 2011 - MINAM Approve the first update of the list of inclusion of investment projects subject to the National
System of Environmental Impact Assessment.

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State management of the socio-environmental conflict of "Tía María" in Peru Manuel Alejandro Ugarte Cornejo

the shot backfired ”, says for our investigation, the lawyer from the Tambo Valley Defense Front7.
"This is something that the population [of the Tambo Valley has never forgotten and they take it
as] another example of state bias." These statements reflect the opinion of the local stakeholders
interviewed, and with them we conclude that the UNOPS report marked a before and after in the
perception of the population about the autonomy of the State, as a factor of State capacity.

As a consequence of the circumstances that we have mentioned and that delegitimize the approval
of the EIA, even though a study of this type that has been approved by the State has subsequently

DOSSIER: CLIMATE CHANGE AND POLICY

been prepared, this instrument does not serve either the State or the company , much less the
population. Regarding this, a former official of the Regional Government opined that the second EIA
did not meet its objectives either:

In itself, socially, it did not meet the corresponding requirements, which was to give, precisely, the greatest
participation to the population and, on the other hand, if the fundamental observations to the first EIA were
from UNOPS, I think the correct thing would have been to invite [again] UNOPS , so that they themselves with
their presence can somehow support that their observations have been taken into account both by the
government at the time of evaluating, and by the company at the time of presenting the new study. But there
have been no such details. It seems to me that they must have been fundamental to be able to generate at
least a little more credibility in people who already no longer believed, when the observations of UNOPS came
out (Berly González, former GORE Arequipa official, Jul 25, 2016) .

In sum, we conclude that when the Peruvian State loses its impartial role, and on the [37]
contrary, its role as promoter of private investment predominates in it and in its
decisions, as we have previously documented, this affects "legitimacy" and "relevant
equity" , which are important attributes of state capacity according to the concepts that
we have assumed in our theoretical framework. Legitimacy is “referred to the basic
consensus established by the main actors involved, the citizens, in general, and the
beneficiaries themselves, in particular, regarding the way in which the problem in
question is faced” (Repetto, 2004, p. twenty-one). And the “relevant equity: It implies the
achievement of equal opportunities in its various aspects.
2004, p. twenty-one). Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the deficient state management of the
environmental impact study negatively affected “legitimacy” and “relevant equity”, which in turn had
an impact on the deterioration of state capacities to manage the Tía María conflict.

In seventh place, we find a deficient state management of the use of police force
under a criminalization approach to protest. On this point, Tía María is one of the social
conflicts that has produced the greatest violence against internal order and human
rights in Peru. It has caused seven deaths and 236 wounded. Our investigation has
collected testimonies of disproportionate use of force by PNP troops, as well as the use
of lethal weapons, arbitrary arrests of people, indiscriminate use of tear gas and pellets,
blocking of free movement, sabotage of the media. local. Considering

7 IvánHurtado Frisancho, since 2008 was a lawyer for the Tambo Valley Defense Front. Later it was
attorney for the Tambo Valley Users Board. And then also a lawyer in some processes of the social leaders Jaime de la
Cruz and Pepe Julio Gutiérrez.

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 State management of the socio-environmental conflict of "Tía María" in Peru Manuel Alejandro Ugarte Cornejo

From this information, our investigation reached the following finding: that the actions of the
National Police instead of being a pacifying factor, became a new cause of conflict. In this
sense, our interviewees explained that, in the crisis phases, the protest was no longer only
against the mining project but also against the way in which the protesters were repelled by
the police force.

In our field research we have also collected several testimonies from people who claim to
have been victims of police abuse. One of them told us these events of the month of April
2015:

An attack happened to me. The same police. I was here in my armchair with my daughter, and the police came, and
they began to smash my glasses. Me watching. You strip, everything made strips of me. They made my other door
strip for me. They insulted me, they took my mother out. I spoke to the governor, he came and helped me. My
daughter was devastated [emotionally], she was bad, very bad. I made the complaint, but it was shelved. The police
do not even come to listen to us, the police come face to face to violate (anonymous resident of Cocachacra, Jul 22,
2016).

Let us remember that this history of violence begins in 2010 and continues until the year
2015. In this period there have been four indefinite stoppages. The last of them lasted 62
days and with a fairly high intensity of violence and the loss of security control in the Tambo
Valley. According to our theoretical framework, this type of social protest is called
contentious collective action which —as in the case we are studying— can become
“sustained”, “disruptive” and “dramatic”. Tarrow explains that the class action:
[38]

it becomes contentious when used by people who lack regular access to institutions, who act
on behalf of new or unaccepted demands, and who conduct themselves in a way that
constitutes a fundamental threat to others (Tarrow, 1997, p. 19 ).

It is clear to conclude that these theoretical aspects are congruent with the characteristics of the
Tía María conflict that we are analyzing at this point.

This situation is explained because the Police are not trained to act in the face of a situation of
social protest, and its immediate consequence is an accentuated situation of rejection and
distrust of the local population towards the State, which ended up damaging the state capacities
for management successful conflict. To analyze this particular situation, we interviewed the
commissioner for social conflicts of the Ombudsman's Office, Rolando Luque Mogrovejo. In his
analysis, he affirmed that the fact that, in Peru, in the last 5 years 73 people have died and more
than 3,500 have been injured, between civilians and police, is data that shows that “no progress
has been made in a specialization of the National Police to intervene in a scene of social protest ”.
Luque maintains that the Police are not trained to act in a situation of social protest. The Police
have been trained to face:

organized crime, common crime, drug trafficking, illegal logging, terrorism, [but] the scene of
public protest, social protest has different characteristics because it is, in principle, people who
are citizens like anyone, who are not there to commit crimes,

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State management of the socio-environmental conflict of "Tía María" in Peru Manuel Alejandro Ugarte Cornejo

they are there to express dissatisfaction, annoyance, a feeling of harm (Rolando Luque
Mogrovejo, Ombudsman, 12 / Aug / 2016).

These seven factors reduced state capacities to adequately manage the Tía María conflict
and are part of the cause of the current entrapment that keeps the conflict in a state of
dormancy.

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